May He, who links the minds of all people, through the apertures of time, with new threads of knowledge like a garland of flowers, be pleased to accept this my thread of Eastern thought, offered, though it be small, with the greatest devotion.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

C. F. CLAY, Manager

LONDON : FETTER LANE, E.C. 4

NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO.

BOMBAY \

CALCUTTA L MACMILLAN AND CO., Ltd.

MADRAS J

TORONTO : THE MACMILLAN CO. OF

CANADA, Ltd. TOKYO: MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

TO HIS EXCELLENCY

LAWRENCE JOHN LUMLEY DUNDAS, G.C.I.E.,

EARL OF RONALDSHAY, CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA AND THE GOVERNOR OF BENGAL.

May it please your Excellency,

The idea of writing this work was first suggested to me by the Rectorial address which your Excellency delivered some years ago at a Convocation of the University of Calcutta, in which you emphasised the special need of the study of Indian philosophy by Indian students. I shall ever remember with gratitude the encouragement that I received from the kind interest that you showed in my work by going through the manuscript, in the conversations that I had the honour of holding with you on various occasions, and in your subsequent letters to me. Your Excellency's honoured name has thus already become peculiarly connected with the composition of this work. With your Excellency's kind permission, I therefore wish to take advantage of this opportunity in associating your Excellency's name with this volume as a mark of deepest respect and esteem. The present work is an attempt to present the thought of Ancient India at its best. This thought still holds the spirit of India, and the more it is studied the more do we see that the problems are often identical with those of European thinkers. That both East and West should realise each other's tasks and find that they are often identical is an auspicious omen for the future. The great work of uniting India with Europe can only be gradually accomplished through mutual appreciation of what is best in each country. I shall be very happy if this humble volume may even in a very small measure aid this process which is already begun in various ways and may represent to your Excellency after your return to this country something of the ancient ideals of India.

I remain, your Excellency,

Loyally and sincerely yours,

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA.

NOTE ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF

TRANSLITERATED SANSKRIT

AND PALI WORDS

The vowels are pronounced almost in the same way as in Italian, except that the sound of a approaches that of o in bond or u in but, and a that of a as in army. The consonants are as in English, except c, ch in church; /, d, 11 are cerebrals, to which English /, d, n almost correspond; /, d, n are pure dentals; kh y gh, ch, j'h, th, d/i, th, d/i, ph, bh are the simple sounds plus an aspiration; n is the French gn\ r is usually pronounced as ri, and s. s as s/t.

PREFACE

THE old civilisation of India was a concrete unity of many-sided developments in art, architecture, literature, religion, morals, and science so far as it was understood in those days. But the most important achievement of Indian thought was philosophy. It was regarded as the goal of all the highest practical and theoretical activities, and it indicated the point of unity amidst all the apparent diversities which the complex growth of culture over a vast area inhabited by different peoples produced. It is not in the history of foreign invasions, in the rise of independent kingdoms at different times, in the empires of this or that great monarch that the unity of India is to be sought. It is essentially one of spiritual aspirations and obedience to the law of the spirit, which were regarded as superior to everything else, and it has outlived all the political changes through which India passed.

The Greeks, the Huns, the Scythians, the Pathans and the Moguls who occupied the land and controlled the political machinery never ruled the minds of the people, for these political events were like hurricanes or the changes of season, mere phenomena of a natural or physical order which never affected the spiritual integrity of Hindu culture. If after a passivity of some centuries India is again going to become creative it is mainly on account of this fundamental unity of her progress and civilisation and not for anything that she may borrow from other countries. It is therefore indispensably necessary for all those who wish to appreciate the significance and potentialities of Indian culture that they should properly understand the history of Indian philosophical thought which is the nucleus round which all that is best and highest in India has grown. Much harm has already been done by the circulation of opinions that the culture and philosophy of India was dreamy and abstract. It is therefore very necessary that Indians as well as other peoples should become more and more acquainted with the true characteristics of the past history of Indian thought and form a correct estimate of its special features.

But it is not only for the sake of the right understanding of

India that Indian philosophy should be read, or only as a record of the past thoughts of India. For most of the problems that are still debated in modern philosophical thought occurred in more or less divergent forms to the philosophers of India. Their discussions, difficulties and solutions when properly grasped in connection with the problems of our own times may throw light on the course of the process of the future reconstruction of modern thought. The discovery of the important features of Indian philosophical thought, and a due appreciation of their full significance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as the discovery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern philological researches. It is unfortunate that the task of re-interpretation and re-valuation of Indian thought has not yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale. Sanskritists also with very few exceptions have neglected this important field of study, for most of these scholars have been interested more in mythology, philology, and history than in philosophy. Much work however has already been done in the way of the publication of a large number of important texts, and translations of some of them have also been attempted. But owing to the presence of many technical terms in advanced Sanskrit philosophical literature, the translations in most cases are hardly intelligible to those who are not familiar with the texts themselves. A work containing some general account of the mutual relations of the chief systems is necessary for those who intend to pursue the study of a particular school. This is also necessary for lay readers interested in philosophy and students of Western philosophy who have no inclination or time to specialise in any Indian system, but who are at the same time interested to know what they can about Indian philosophy. In my two books The Study of Patanjali and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought I have attempted to interpret the Samkhya and Yoga systems both from their inner point of view and from the point of view of their relation to other Indian systems. The present attempt deals with the important features of these as also of all the other systems and seeks to show some of their inner philosophical relations especially in regard to the history of their development. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts as I could and have always given the Sanskrit or Pali technical terms for the help of those who want to make this book a guide

lor further study. To understand something of these terms is indeed essential for anyone who wishes to be sure that he is following the actual course of the thoughts.

In Sanskrit treatises the style of argument and methods of treating the different topics are altogether different from what we find in any modern work of philosophy. Materials had therefore to be collected from a large number of works on each system and these have been knit together and given a shape which is likely to be more intelligible to people unacquainted with Sanskritic ways of thought. But at the same time I considered it quite undesirable to put any pressure on Indian thoughts in order to make them appear as European. This will explain much of what might appear quaint to a European reader. But while keeping all the thoughts and expressions of the Indian thinkers I have tried to arrange them in a systematic whole in a manner which appeared to me strictly faithful to their clear indications and suggestions. It is only in very few places that I have translated some of the Indian terms by terms of English philosophy, and this I did because it appeared to me that those were approximately the nearest approach to the Indian sense of the term. In all other places I have tried to choose words which have not been made dangerous by the acquirement of technical senses. This however is difficult, for the words which are used in philosophy always acquire some sort of technical sense. I would therefore request my readers to take those words in an unsophisticated sense and associate them with such meanings as are justified by the passages and contexts in which they are used. Some of what will appear as obscure in any system may I hope be removed if it is re-read with care and attention, for unfamiliarity sometimes stands in the way of right comprehension. But I may have also missed giving the proper suggestive links in many places where condensation was inevitable and the systems themselves have also sometimes insoluble difficulties, for no system of philosophy is without its dark and uncomfortable corners.

Though I have begun my work from the Vedic and Brah-manic stage, my treatment of this period has been very slight. The beginnings of the evolution of philosophical thought, though they can be traced in the later Vedic hymns, are neither connected nor systematic.

More is found in the Brahmanas, but I do not think it worth while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this epoch. I could have dealt with the Upanisad period more fully, but many works on the subject have already been published in Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to the dominant current flowing through the earlier Upanisads. Notices of other currents of thought will be given in connection with the treatment of other systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected. It will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is largely due to the inconclusive character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and where the precision and directness required in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars and it is not always easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic; and the scope of my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had no space for entering into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different in some cases from those offered by some European scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be in the right. I have not dealt elaborately with the new school of Logic (Navya-Nyaya) of Bengal, for the simple reason that most of the contributions of this school consist in the invention of technical expressions and the emphasis put on the necessity of strict exactitude and absolute preciseness of logical definitions and discussions and these are almost untranslatable in intelligible English. I have however incorporated what important differences of philosophical points of view I could find in it. Discussions of a purely technical character could not be very fruitful in a work like this. The bibliography given of the different Indian systems in the last six chapters is not exhaustive but consists mostly of books which have been actually studied or consulted in the writing of those chapters. Exact references to the pages of the

texts have generally been given in footnotes in those cases where a difference of interpretation was anticipated or where it was felt that a reference to the text would make the matter clearer, or where the opinions of modern writers have been incorporated.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to acknowledge my deepest gratefulness to the Hon'ble Maharaja Sir Manindrachandra Nundy, K.C.I.E. Kashimbazar, Bengal, who has kindly promised to bear the entire expense of the publication of both volumes of the present work.

The name of this noble man is almost a household word in Bengal for the magnanimous gifts that he has made to educational and other causes. Up till now he has made a total gift of about £300,000, of which those devoted to education come to about £200,000. But the man himself is far above the gifts he has made. His sterling character, universal sympathy and friendship, his kindness and amiability make him a veritable Bodhisattva— one of the noblest of men that I have ever seen. Like many other scholars of Bengal, I am deeply indebted to him for the encouragement that he has given me in the pursuit of my studies and researches, and my feelings of attachment and gratefulness for him are too deep for utterance.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friends Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library and Mr Douglas Ainslie for their kindly revising the proofs of this work, in the course of which they improved my English in many places. To the former I am also indebted for his attention to the transliteration of a large number of Sanskrit words, and also for the whole-hearted sympathy and great friendliness with which he assisted me with his advice on many points of detail, in particular the exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of the cause of rebirth owes something of its treatment to repeated discussions with him.

I also wish to express my gratefulness to my friend Mr N. K. Siddhanta, M.A., late of the Scottish Churches College, and Mademoiselle Paule Povie for the kind assistance they have rendered in preparing the index. My obligations are also due to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the honour they have done me in publishing this work.

To the Hon'ble Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc, Ph.D., the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta,

I owe a debt which is far greater than I can express here, especially for the generous enthusiasm with which he had kindly agreed to accept this work for publication by the Calcutta University, which would have materialised if other circumstances had not changed this arrangement.

To scholars of Indian philosophy who may do me the honour of reading my book and who may be impressed with its inevitable shortcomings and defects, I can only pray in the words of Hemacandra:

PramanasiddhantaviruddJiam atra

Yatkinciduktam matimandyadosdt

Matsaryyam utsdryya taddryyacittah

Prasadam ddJidya visodhayantu*.

1 May the noble-minded scholars instead of cherishing ill feeling kindly correct whatever errors have been here committed through the dullness of my intellect in the way of wrong interpretations and misstatements.

S. D.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

February, 1922.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY I

CHAPTER II THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

i The Vedas and their antiquity 10

2 The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind 10

3 Classification of the Vedic literature 11

4 The Samhitas 12

5 The Brahmanas 13

6 The Aranyakas 14

7 The Rg-Veda, its civilization 14

8 The Vedic gods 16

9 Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism 17

10 Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajapati, Visvakarma . . 19

11 Brahma 20

12 Sacrifice ; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma . . .21

13 Cosmogony—Mythological and Philosophical 23

14 Eschatology; the Doctrine of Atman 25

15 Conclusion . 26

CHAPTER III THE EARLIER UPANISADS (700 B.C.—600 B.C.)

1 The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature .... 28

2 The names of the Upanisads; Non-Brahmanic influence . . 30

3 Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads 31

4 The meaning of the word Upanisad 38

5 The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads .... 38

6 Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times 39

7 The Upanisads and their interpretations 41

8 The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures ... 42

9 Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method ... 44

10 The Atman doctrine 45

11 Place of Brahman in the Upanisads 48

12 The World 51

13 The World-Soul 52

14 The Theory of Causation . 52

15 Doctrine of Transmigration 53

16 Emancipation 58

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1 In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible? . . 62

2 Growth of the Philosophic Literature 65

3 The Indian systems of Philosophy 67

4 Some fundamental points of agreement 71

1 The Karma theory 71

2 The Doctritie of Mukti 74

3 The Doctrine of Soul 75

5 The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end 75

6 Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours) JJ

CHAPTER V BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

PAGE

i The State of Philosophy in India before Buddha .... 78

2 Buddha : his Life 81

3 Early Buddhist Literature 82

4 The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism ... 84

5 The Khandhas 93

6 Avijja and Asava .......... 99

7 Sila and Samadhi 100

8 Kamma 106

9 Upanisads and Buddhism 109

10 The Schools of Theravada Buddhism 112

11 Mahayanism 125

12 The Tathata Philosophy of Asvaghosa (80 A.D.) . . . .129

13 The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school—Nihilism . . .138

14 Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnanavada Buddhism 145

15 Sautrantika theory of Perception . . . . . . . 151

16 Sautrantika theory of Inference 155

17 The Doctrine of Momentariness 158

18 The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva) 163

19 Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems diverged 164

20 Brief Survey of the Evolution of Buddhist Thought . . . 166

CHAPTER VI THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

1 The Origin of Jainism 169

2 Two Sects of Jainism 170

3 The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains .... 171

4 Some General Characteristics of the Jains 172

5 Life of Mahavlra 173

6 The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology 173

7 The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (Anekantavada) . . 175

8 The Doctrine of Nayas . .176

9 The Doctrine of Syadvada 179

10 Knowledge, its value for us 181

11 Theory of Perception 183

12 Non-Perceptual knowledge 185

13 Knowledge as Revelation 186

14 The Jlvas 188

15 Karma Theory igo

16 Karma, Asrava and Nirjara 192

17 Pudgala . I95

18 Dharma, Adharma, Akasa 197

19 Kala and Samaya 198

20 Jaina Cosmography 199

21 Jaina Yoga I99

22 Jaina Atheism 203

23 Moksa (emancipation) 207

CHAPTER VII THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAMKHYA (YOGA)

PAGE

i A Review 208

2 The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanisads 211

3 Samkhya and Yoga Literature 212

4 An Early School of Samkhya 213

5 Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Misra and Vijnana Bhiksu ..." 222

6 Yoga and Patanjali 226

7 The Samkhya and the Yoga doctrine of Soul or Purusa . . . 238

8 Thought and Matter 241

9 Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 242

10 The Gunas 243

11 Prakrti and its evolution 245

12 Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium . . . 247

13 Mahat and Ahamkara 248

14 The Tanmatras and the Paramanus 251

15 Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy . . . 254

16 Change as the formation of new collocations 255

17 Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause) . . 257

18 Samkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism 258

19 Buddhi and Purusa 259

20 The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta . . 261

21 Sorrow and its Dissolution 264

22 Citta 268

23 Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma) 270

24 The Yoga Meditation 271

CHAPTER VIII THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

1 Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the Nyaya standpoint . 274

2 Nyaya and Vaisesika sutras 276

3 Does Vais'esika represent an old school of Mlmamsa ? . . . 280

4 Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras 285

5 Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 294

6 Philosophy of Nyaya sutras and Vais'esika sutras .... 301

7 The Vaisesika and Nyaya Literature 305

8 The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy . . . 310

9 The six Padarthas: Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Visesa, Sama 313 v aya • . . . . .' .313

10 The Theory of Causation 319

11 Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srsti) 323

12 Proof of the Existence of I£vara 325

13 The Nyaya-Vaisesika Physics 326

14 The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana) 330

15 The four Pramanas of Nyaya 332

16 Perception (Pratyaksa) 333

17 Inference 343

18 Upamana and Sabda 354

19 Negation in Nyaya-Vaisesika 355

20 The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker

of Salvation 360

21 The Doctrine of Soul 362

22 Isvara and Salvation 363

Contents

CHAPTER IX

MLMAMSA philosophy

PAGE

i A Comparative Review 3^7

2 The Mlmamsa Literature . . .. . . •_•_• 3 6 9

3 The Paratah-pramanya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svatah-pramanya doctrine of Mlmamsa 372

4 The place of Sense-organs in Perception 375

5 Indeterminate and Determinate Perception 378

6 Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception 379

7 The Nature of Knowledge 3 8z

8 The Psychology of Illusion 3 8 4

9 Inference 3 8 7

10 Upamana, Arthapatti 39 1

11 Sabda-pramana 394

12 The Pramana of Non-perception (anupalabdhi) .... 397

13 Self, Salvation, and God . . . ... . . • 399

14 Mlmamsa as Philosophy and Mlmamsa as Ritualism . . • 4°3

CHAPTER X THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA

1 Comprehension of the Philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of Controversy .

2 The philosophical situation : a Review

3 Vedanta Literature ....

4 Vedanta in Gaudapada

5 Vedanta and Saiikara (788—820 A.D.)

6 The main idea of the Vedanta philosophy

7 In what sense is the world-appearance false?

8 The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena

9 The Definition of Ajnana (nescience)

10 Ajnana established by Perception and Inference

11 Locus and Object of Ajnana, Ahamkara and Antahkarana

12 Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta dialectic

13 The Theory of Causation . .....

14 Vedanta theory of Perception and Inference .

15 Atman, Jlva, Isvara, Ekajlvavada and Drstisrstivada

16 Vedanta theory of Illusion

17 Vedanta Ethics and Vedanta Emancipation

18 Vedanta and other Indian systems ....

406 408 418 420 429 439 443 445 452 454 457 461 465 470

474 485

489 492

INDEX 495

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are but very imperfectly known to the world at large, and it is unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics living a retired life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and are not used to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the subject does not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both in Europe and in India large numbers of philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pali have been published, as well as translations of a few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of them has been translated. Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical terms are so different from those of European thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult for a person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing from translations. Pali is a much easier language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pali is helpful in understanding only the earliest school of Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But no one from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily understand the Vedas, the Upanisads, the Puranas, the Law Books and the literary works, and is also well acquainted with European philosophical thought, may find it literally impossible to understand even small portions of a work of advanced Indian logic, or the dialectical Vedanta. This is due to two reasons, the use of technical terms and of great condensation in expression, and the hidden allusions to doctrines of other systems. The

tendency to conceiving philosophical problems in a clear and unambiguous manner is an important feature of Sanskrit thought,but from the ninth century onwards, the habit of using clear, definite, and precise expressions,began to develop inaverystriking manner, and as a result of that a large number of technical terms began tobe invented. These terms are seldom properly explained, and it is presupposed that the reader who wants to read the works should have a knowledge of them. Any one in olden times who took to the study of any system of philosophy, had to do so with a teacher, who explained those terms to him. The teacher himself had got it from his teacher, and he from his. There was no tendency to popularize philosophy, for the idea then prevalent was that only the chosen few who had otherwise shown their fitness, deserved to become fit students (adhikdri) of philosophy, under the direction of a teacher. Only those who had the grit and high moral strength to devote their whole life to the true understanding of philosophy and the rebuilding of life in accordance with the high truths of philosophy were allowed to study it.

Another difficulty which a beginner will meet is this, that sometimes the same technical terms are used in extremely different senses in different systems. The student must know the meaning of each technical term with reference to the system in which it occurs, and no dictionary will enlighten him much about the matter 1 . He will have to pick them up as he advances and finds them used. Allusions to the doctrines of other systems and their refutations during the discussions of similar doctrines in any particular system of thought are often very puzzling even to a well-equipped reader; for he cannot be expected to know all the doctrines of other systems without going through them, and so it often becomes difficult to follow the series of answers and refutations which are poured forth in the course of these discussions. There are two important compendiums in Sanskrit giving a summary of some of the principal systems of Indian thought, viz. the Sarvadarsanasajiigraha, and the Saddarsanasamuccaya of Haribhadra with the commentary of Gunaratna; but the former is very sketchy and can throw very little light on the understanding of the ontological or epistemological doctrines of any of the systems. It has been translated by Cowell and Gough, but I

1 Recently a very able Sanskrit dictionary of technical philosophical terms called Nyayakosa has been prepared by M. M. Bhhnacarya Jhalkikar, Bombay, Govt. Press.

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. Gunaratna's commentary isexcellent so faras Jainism is concerned, and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems, and also supplies us with some short bibliographical notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines or discussions which are so necessary for the right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the absence of a book which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological positions of the Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, even though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the difficulties of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical terms and the general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient toil. The technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in helping us to understand the precise and definite meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or misunderstanding them are reduced to a minimum. It is I think well-known that avoidance of technical terms has often rendered philosophical works unduly verbose, and liable to misinterpretation. The art of clear writing is indeed a rare virtue and every philosopher cannot expect to have it. But when technical expressions are properly formed, even a bad writer can make himself understood. In the early days of Buddhist philosophy in the Pali literature, this difficulty is greatly felt. There are some technical terms here which are still very elastic and their repetition in different places in more or less different senses heighten the difficulty of understanding the real meaning intended to be conveyed.

But is it necessary that a history of Indian philosophy should be written? There are some people who think that the Indians never rose beyond the stage of simple faith and that therefore they cannot have any philosophy at all in the proper sense of the term. Thus Professor Frank Thilly of the Cornell University says in his HistoryofPhilosophy*," A universal history of philosophy would include the philosophies of all peoples. Not all peoples, however

1 New York, 1914, p. 3.

have produced real systems of thought, and the speculations of only a few can be said to have had a history. Many do not rise beyond the mythological stage. Even the theories of Oriental peoples, the Hindus, Egyptians, Chinese, consist, in the main, of mythological and ethical doctrines, and are not thoroughgoing systems of thought: they are shot through with poetry and faith. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to the study of the Western countries, and begin with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, on whose culture our own civilization in part, rests." There are doubtless many other people who hold such uninformed and untrue beliefs, which only show their ignorance of Indian matters. It is not necessary to say anything in order to refute these views, for what follows will I hope show the falsity of their beliefs. If they are not satisfied, and want to know more definitely and elaborately about the contents of the different systems, I am afraid they will have to go to the originals referred to in the bibliographical notices of the chapters.

There is another opinion, that the time has not yet come for an attempt to write a history of Indian philosophy. Two different reasons are given from two different points of view. It is said that the field of Indian philosophy is so vast, and such a vast literature exists on each of the systems, that it is not possible for anyone to collect his materials directly from the original sources, before separate accounts are prepared by specialists working in each of the particular systems. There is some truth in this objection, but although in some of the important systems the literature that exists is exceedingly vast, yet many of them are more or less repetitions of the same subjects, and a judicious selection of twenty or thirty important works on each of the systems could certainly be made, which would give a fairly correct exposition. In my own undertaking in this direction I have always drawn directly from the original texts, and have always tried to collect my materials from those sources in which they appear at their best. My space has been very limited and I have chosen the features which appeared to me to be the most important. I had to leave out many discussions of difficult problems and diverse important bearings of each of the systems to many interesting aspects of philosophy. This I hope may be excused in a history of philosophy which does not aim at completeness. There are indeed many defects and shortcomings, and

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that the imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more competent efforts will supersede it. No attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imperfections.

In the second place it is said that the Indians had no proper and accurate historical records and biographies and it is therefore impossible to write a history of Indian philosophy. This objection is also partially valid. But this defect does not affect us so much as one would at first sight suppose; for, though the dates of the earlier beginnings are very obscure, yet, in later times, we are in a position to affirm some dates and to point out priority and posteriority in the case of other thinkers. As most of the systems developed side by side through many centuries their mutual relations also developed, and these could be well observed. The special nature of this development has been touched on in the fourth chapter. Most of the systems had very early beginnings and a continuous course of development through the succeeding centuries, and it is not possible to take the state of the philosophy of a particular system at a particular time and contrast it with the state of that system at a later time; for the later state did not supersede the previous state, but only showed a more coherent form of it, which was generally true to the original system but was more determinate. Evolution through history has in Western countries often brought forth the development of more coherent types of philosophic thought, but in India, though the types remained the same, their development through history made them more and more coherent and determinate. Most of the parts were probably existent in the earlier stages, but they were in an undifferentiated state; through the criticism and conflict of the different schools existing side by side the parts of each of the systems of thought became more and more differentiated, determinate, and coherent. In some cases this development has been almost imperceptible, and in many cases the earlier forms have been lost, or so inadequately expressed that nothing definite could be made out of them. Wherever such a differentiation could be made in the interests of philosophy, I have tried to do it. But I have never considered it desirable that the philosophical interest should be subordinated to the chronological. It is no

doubt true that more definite chronological information would be a very desirable thing, yet I am of opinion that the little chronological data we have give us a fair amount of help in forming a general notion about the growth and development of the different systems by mutual association and conflict. If the condition of the development of philosophy in India had been the same as in Europe, definite chronological knowledge would be considered much more indispensable. For, when one system supersedes another, it is indispensably necessary that we should know which preceded and which succeeded. But when the systems are developing side by side, and when we are getting them in their richer and better forms, the interest with regard to the conditions, nature and environment of their early origin has rather a historical than a philosophical interest. I have tried as best I could to form certain general notions as regards the earlier stages of some of the systems, but though the various features of these systems at these stages in detail may not be ascertainable, yet this, I think, could never be considered as invalidating the whole programme. Moreover, even if we knew definitely the correct dates of the thinkers of the same system we could not treat them separately, as is done in European philosophy, without unnecessarily repeating the same thing twenty times over; for they all dealt with the same system, and tried to bring out the same type of thought in more and more determinate forms.

The earliest literature of India is the Vedas. These consist mostly of hymns in praise of nature gods, such as fire, wind, etc. Excepting in some of the hymns of the later parts of the work (probably about iooo B.C.), there is not much philosophy in them in our sense of the term. It is here that we first find intensely interesting philosophical questions of a more or less cosmological character expressed in terms of poetry and imagination. In the later Vedic works called the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas written mostly in prose, which followed the Vedic hymns, there are two tendencies, viz. one that sought to establish the magical forms of ritualistic worship, and the other which indulged in speculative thinking through crude generalizations. This latter tendency was indeed much feebler than the former, and it might appear that the ritualistic tendency had actually swallowed up what little of philosophy the later parts of the Vedic hymns were trying to express, but there are unmistakable marks that this tendency

existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose and verse called the Upanisads, which contain various sorts of philosophical thoughts mostly monistic or singularistic but also some pluralistic and dualistic ones. These are not reasoned statements, but utterances of truths intuitively perceived or felt as unquestionably real and indubitable, and carrying great force, vigour, and persuasiveness with them. It is very probable that many of the earliest parts of this literature are as old as 500 B.C. to 700 B.C. Buddhist philosophy began with the Buddha from some time about 500 B.C. There is reason to believe that Buddhist philosophy continued to develop in India in one or other of its vigorous forms till some time about the tenth or eleventh century A.D. The earliest beginnings of the other Indian systems of thought are also to be sought chiefly between the age of the Buddha to about 200 B.C. Jaina philosophy was probably prior to the Buddha. But except in its earlier days, when it came in conflict with the doctrines of the Buddha, it does not seem to me that the Jaina thought came much in contact with other systems of Hindu thought. Excepting in some forms of Vaisnava thought in later times, Jaina thought is seldom alluded to by the Hindu writers or later Buddhists, though some Jains like Haribhadra and Gunaratna tried to refute the Hindu and Buddhist systems. The non-aggressive nature of their religion and ideal may to a certain extent explain it, but there may be other reasons too which it is difficult for us to guess. It is interesting to note that, though there have been some dissensions amongst the Jains about dogmas and creeds, Jaina philosophy has not split into many schools of thought more or less differing from one another as Buddhist thought did.

The first volume of this work will contain Buddhist and Jaina philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought. These six systems of orthodox Hindu thought are the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Nyaya, the Vaisesika, the Mlmamsa (generally known as Purva Mlmamsa), and the Vedanta (known also as Uttara Mlmamsa). Of these what is differently known as Samkhya and Yoga are but different schools of one system. The Vaisesika and the Nyaya in later times became so mixed up that, though in early times the similarity of the former with Mlmamsa was greater than that with Nyaya, they came to be regarded as fundamentally almost the same systems. Nyaya and Vaisesika have therefore been treated

together. In addition to these systems some theistic systems began to grow prominent from the ninth century A.D. They also probably had their early beginnings at the time of the Upanisads. But at that time their interest was probably concentrated on problems of morality and religion. It is not improbable that these were associated with certain metaphysical theories also, but no works treating them in a systematic way are now available. One of their most important early works is the Bhagavadgita. This book is rightly regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of Hindu thought. It is written in verse, and deals with moral, religious, and metaphysical problems, in a loose form. It is its lack of system and method which gives it its peculiar charm more akin to the poetry of the Upanisads than to the dialectical and systematic Hindu thought. From the ninth century onwards attempts were made to supplement these loose theistic ideas which were floating about and forming integral parts of religious creeds, by metaphysical theories. Theism is often dualistic and pluralistic, and so are all these systems, which are known as different schools of Vaisnava philosophy. Most of the Vaisnava thinkers wished to show that their systems were taught in the Upanisads, and thus wrote commentaries thereon to prove their interpretations, and also wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra, the classical exposition of the philosophy of the Upanisads. In addition to the works of these Vaisnava thinkers there sprang up another class of theistic works which were of a more eclectic nature. These also had their beginnings in periods as old as the Upanisads. They are known as the Saiva and Tantra thought, and are dealt with in the second volume of this work.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600 B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the systems with any degree of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest manifestation of a system some crude outlines only are traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an unbroken chain of teachers and pupils. Even now each system of Hindu thought has its own adherents, though few people now

care to write any new works upon them. In the history of the growth of any system of Hindu thought we find that as time went on, and as new problems were suggested, each system tried to answer them consistently with its own doctrines. The order in which we have taken the philosophical systems could not be strictly a chronological one. Thus though it is possible that the earliest speculations of some form of Samkhya, Yoga, and Mlmamsa were prior to Buddhism yet they have been treated after Buddhism and Jainism, because the elaborate works of these systems which we now possess are later than Buddhism. In my opinion the Vaisesika system is also probably pre-Buddhistic, but it has been treated later, partly on account of its association with Nyaya, and partly on account of the fact that all its commentaries are of a much later date. It seems to me almost certain that enormous quantities of old philosophical literature have been lost, which if found could have been of use to us in showing the stages of the early growth of the systems and their mutual relations. But as they are not available we have to be satisfied with what remains. The original sources from which I have drawn my materials have all been indicated in the brief accounts of the literature of each system which I have put in before beginning the study of any particular system of thought.

In my interpretations I have always tried to follow the original sources as accurately as I could. This has sometimes led to old and unfamiliar modes of expression, but this course seemed to me to be preferable to the adoption of European modes of thought for the expression of Indian ideas. But even in spite of this striking similarities to many of the modern philosophical doctrines and ideas will doubtless be noticed. This only proves that the human mind follows more or less the same modes of rational thought. I have never tried to compare any phase of Indian thought with European, for this is beyond the scope of my present attempt, but if I may be allowed to express my own conviction, I might say that many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are essentially the same as those found in Indian philosophy. The main difference is often the difference of the point of view from which the same problems appeared in such a variety of forms in the two countries. My own view with regard to the net value of Indian philosophical development will be expressed in the concluding chapter of the second volume of the present work.

CHAPTER II THE VEDAS, BRAHMANAS AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY

The Vedas and their antiquity.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race. It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Miiller supposed the date to be 1200 B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bal Garigadhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the "seers" (mantradrasta) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some time had elapsed after the composition of the Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had, theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some unknown remote period at the beginning of each creation.

The place of the Vedas in the Hindu mind.

When the Vedas were composed, there was probably no system of writing prevalent in India. But such was the scrupulous zeal of the Brahmins, who got the whole Vedic literature by heart by hearing it from their preceptors, that it has been transmitted most faithfully to us through the course of the last 3000 years or more with little or no interpolations at all. The religious history of India had suffered considerable changes in the latter periods, since the time of the Vedic civilization, but such was the reverence paid to the Vedas that they had ever remained as the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus at all times. Even at this day all the obligatory duties of the Hindus at birth, marriage, death, etc., are performed according to the old

Vedic ritual. The prayers that a Brahmin now says three times a day are the same selections of Vedic verses as were used as prayer verses two or three thousand years ago. A little insight into the life of an ordinary Hindu of the present day will show that the system of image-worship is one that has been grafted upon his life, the regular obligatory duties of which are ordered according to the old Vedic rites. Thus an orthodox Brahmin can dispense with image-worship if he likes, but not so with his daily Vedic prayers or other obligatory ceremonies. Even at this day there are persons who bestow immense sums of money for the performance and teaching of Vedic sacrifices and rituals. Most of the Sanskrit literatures that flourished after the Vedas base upon them their own validity, and appeal to them as authority. Systems of Hindu philosophy not only own their allegiance to the Vedas, but the adherents of each one of them would often quarrel with others and maintain its superiority by trying to prove that it and it alone was the faithful follower of the Vedas and represented correctly their views. The laws which regulate the social, legal, domestic and religious customs and rites of the Hindus even to the present day are said to be but mere systematized memories of old Vedic teachings, and are held to be obligatory on their authority. Even under British administration, in the inheritance of property, adoption, and in such other legal transactions, Hindu Law is followed, and this claims to draw its authority from the Vedas. To enter into details is unnecessary. But suffice it to say that the Vedas, far from being regarded as a dead literature of the past, are still looked upon as the origin and source of almost all literatures except purely secular poetry and drama. Thus in short we may say that in spite of the many changes that time has wrought, the orthodox Hindu life may still be regarded in the main as an adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.

Classification of the Vedic literature.

A beginner who is introduced for the first time to the study of later Sanskrit literature is likely to appear somewhat confused when he meets with authoritative texts of diverse purport and subjects having the same generic name " Veda " or " Sruti" (from sru to hear) ; for Veda in its wider sense is not the name of any

12 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

particular book, but of the literature of a particular epoch extending over a long period, say two thousand years or so. As this literature represents the total achievements of the Indian people in different directions for such a long period, it must of necessity be of a diversified character. If we roughly classify this huge literature from the points of view of age, language, and subject matter, we can point out four different types, namely the Sarnhita or collection of verses {sam together, hita put), Brahmanas, Aranyakas (" forest treatises") and the Upanisads. All these literatures, both prose and verse, were looked upon as so holy that in early times it was thought almost a sacrilege to write them; they were therefore learnt by heart by the Brahmins from the mouth of their preceptors and were hence called sruti (literally anything heard) 1 .

The Samhitas.

There are four collections or Samhitas, namely Rg-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of these the Rg-Veda is probably the earliest. The Sama-Veda has practically no independent value, for it consists of stanzas taken (excepting only 75) entirely from the Rg-Veda, which were meant to be sung to certain fixed melodies, and may thus be called the book of chants. The Yajur-Veda however contains in addition to the verses taken from the Rg-Veda many original prose formulas. The arrangement of the verses of the Sama-Veda is solely with reference to their place and use in the Soma sacrifice; the contents of the Yajur-Veda are arranged in the order in which the verses were actually employed in the various religious sacrifices. It is therefore called the Veda of Yajus—sacrificial prayers. These may be contrasted with the arrangement in the Rg-Veda in this, that there the verses are generally arranged in accordance with the gods who are adored in them. Thus, for example, first we get all the poems addressed to Agni or the Fire-god, then all those to the god Indra and so on. The fourth collection, the Atharva-Veda, probably attained its present form considerably later than the Rg-Veda. In spirit, however, as Professor Macdonell says, " it is not only entirely different from the Rigveda but represents a much more primitive stage of thought. While the Rigveda deals almost exclusively with the higher gods as conceived by a com-

paratively advanced and refined sacerdotal class, the A tharva- Veda is, in the main a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon world, and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity. These two, thus complementary to each other in contents are obviously the most important of the four Vedas 1 ."

The Brahmanas 2 .

After the Samhitas there grew up the theological treatises called the Brahmanas, which were of a distinctly different literary type. They are written in prose, and explain the sacred significance of the different rituals to those who are not already familiar with them. "They reflect," says Professor Macdonell, " the spirit of an age in which all intellectual activity is concentrated on the sacrifice, describing its ceremonies, discussing its value, speculating on its origin and significance." These works are full of dogmatic assertions, fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the field of sacrificial details. The sacrificial ceremonials were probably never so elaborate at the time when the early hymns were composed. But when the collections of hymns were being handed down from generation to generation the ceremonials became more and more complicated. Thus there came about the necessity of the distribution of the different sacrificial functions amongseveral distinct classes of priests. We may assume that this was a period when the caste system was becoming established, and when the only thing which could engage wise and religious minds was sacrifice and its elaborate rituals. Free speculative thinking was thus subordinated to the service of the sacrifice, and the result was the production of the most fanciful sacramental and symbolic

1 A. A. Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 31.

2 Weber (Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 11, note) says that the word Brahmanasignifies "that which relates to prayer brahtnan." Max Miiller (S.B. E. I. p. lxvi) says that Brahmana meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans, whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B E.xu. Introd. p. xxii) says that the Brahmanas were so called "probably either because they were intended for the instruction and guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests." But in view of the fact that the Brahmanas were also supposed to be as much revealed as the Vedas, the present writer thinks that Weber's view is the correct one.

14 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

system, unparalleled anywhere but among the Gnostics. It is now generally believed that the close of the Brahmana period was not later than 500 B.C.

The Aranyakas.

As a further development of the Brahmanas however we get the Aranyakas or forest treatises. These works were probably composed for old men who had retired into the forest and were thus unable to perform elaborate sacrifices requiring a multitude of accessories and articles which could not be procured in forests. In these, meditations on certain symbols were supposed to be of great merit, and they gradually began to supplant the sacrifices as being of a superior order. It is here that we find that amongst a certain section of intelligent people the ritualistic ideas began to give way, and philosophic speculations about the nature of truth became gradually substituted in their place. To take an illustration from the beginning of the Brhadaranyaka we find that instead of the actual performance of the horse sacrifice (asvamedhd) there are directions for meditating upon the dawn ( Usas) as the head of the horse, the sun as the eye of the horse, the air as its life, and so on. This is indeed a distinct advancement of the claims of speculation or meditation over the actual performance of the complicated ceremonials of sacrifice. The growth of the subjective speculation, as being capable of bringing the highest good, gradually resulted in the supersession of Vedic ritualism and the establishment of the claims of philosophic meditation and self-knowledge as the highest goal of life. Thus we find that the Aranyaka age was a period during which free thinking tried gradually to shake off the shackles of ritualism which had fettered it for a long time. It was thus that the Aranyakas could pave the way for the Upanisads, revive the germs of philosophic speculation in the Vedas, and develop them in a manner which made the Upanisads the source of all philosophy that arose in the world of Hindu thought.

The Rg-Veda, its civilization.

The hymns of the Rg-Veda are neither the productions of a single hand nor do they probably belong to any single age. They were composed probably at different periods by different sages, and it is not improbable that some of them were composed

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually swelled through the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the collection had increased to a very considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present form, or in some other previous forms to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization of the Aryan people at different periods of antiquity before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of the primitive society which produced it—the oldest book of the Aryan race. The principal means of sustenance were cattle-keeping and the cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, and watering the ground when necessary with artificial canals. "The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread, of various preparations of milk, cakes of flour and butter, many sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, is little used, and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more important part than eating 1 ." The wood-worker built war-chariots and wagons, as also more delicate carved works and artistic cups. Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The women understood the plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing; they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men and covering for animals. The group of individuals forming a tribe was the highest political unit; each of the different families forming a tribe was under the sway of the father or the head of the family. Kingship was probably hereditary and in some cases electoral. Kingship was nowhere absolute, but limited by the will of the people. Most developed ideas of justice, right and law, were present in the country. Thus Kaegi says, "the hymns strongly prove how deeply the prominent minds in the people were persuaded that the eternal ordinances of the rulers of the world were as inviolable in mental and moral matters as in the realm of nature, and that every wrong act, even the unconscious, was punished and the sin expiated 2 ." Thus it is only right and proper to think that the Aryans had attained a pretty high degree

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, 1886 edition, p. 13. 2 Ibid. p. 18.

16 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

of civilization, but nowhere was the sincere spirit of the Aryans more manifested than in religion, which was the most essential and dominant feature of almost all the hymns, except a few secular ones. Thus Kaegi says, " The whole significance of the Rigveda in reference to the general history of religion, as has repeatedly been pointed out in modern times, rests upon this, that it presents to us the development of religious conceptions from the earliest beginnings to the deepest apprehension of the godhead and its relation to man 1 ."

The Vedic Gods.

The hymns of the Rg-Veda were almost all composed in praise of the gods. The social and other materials are of secondary importance, as these references had only to be mentioned incidentally in giving vent to their feelings of devotion to the god. The gods here are however personalities presiding over the diverse powers of nature or forming their very essence. They have therefore no definite, systematic and separate characters like the Greek gods or the gods of the later Indian mythical works, the Puranas. The powers of nature such as the storm, the rain, the thunder, are closely associated with one another, and the gods associated with them are also similar in character. The same epithets are attributed to different gods and it is only in a few specific qualities that they differ from one another. In the later mythological compositions of the Puranas the gods lost their character as hypostatic powers of nature, and thus became actual personalities and characters having their tales of joy and sorrow like the mortal here below. The Vedic gods may be contrasted with them in this, that they are of an impersonal nature, as the characters they display are mostly but expressions of the powers of nature. To take an example, the fire or Agni is described, as Kaegi has it, as one that " lies concealed in the softer wood, as in a chamber, until, called forth by the rubbing in the early morning hour, he suddenly springs forth in gleaming brightness. The sacrificer takes and lays him on the wood. When the priests pour melted butter upon him, he leaps up crackling and neighing like a horse—he whom men love to see increasing like their own prosperity. They wonder at him, when, decking himself with

changing colors like a suitor, equally beautiful on all sides, he

presents to all sides his front.

All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light, His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance, The changing shimmer like that floats upon the stream, So Agni's rays gleam over bright and never cease 1 ."

R. V. I. 143. 3.

They would describe the wind (Vata) and adore him and say

"In what place was he born, and from whence comes he? The vital breath of gods, the world's great offspring, The God where'er he will moves at his pleasure: His rushing sound we hear—what his appearance, no one 2 ."

R. V. X. 168. 3, 4.

It was the forces of nature and her manifestations, on earth here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the Heaven beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and imagination of the Vedic poets. Thus with the exception of a few abstract gods of whom we shall presently speak and some dual divinities, the gods may be roughly classified as the terrestrial, atmospheric, and celestial.

Polytheism, Henotheism and Monotheism.

The plurality of the Vedic gods may lead a superficial enquirer to think the faith of the Vedic people polytheistic. But an intelligent reader will find here neither polytheism nor monotheism but a simple primitive stage of belief to which both of these may be said to owe their origin. The gods here do not preserve their proper places as in a polytheistic faith, but each one of them shrinks into insignificance or shines as supreme according as it is the object of adoration or not. The Vedic poets were the children of nature. Every natural phenomenon excited their wonder, admiration or veneration. The poet is struck with wonder that " the rough red cow gives soft white milk." The appearance or the setting of the sun sends a thrill into the minds of the Vedic sage and with wonder-gazing eyes he exclaims:

" Undropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it That downward turned he falls not downward ? The guide of his ascending path,—who saw it 1 ?" R. V. iv. 13. 5.

The sages wonder how " the sparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever filling it." The minds of the Vedic

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 35. 2 Ibid. p. 38.

18 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for them to accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude of gods nor to universalize them in a monotheistic creed. They hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed them or filled them with gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion or admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has called Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "abelief in single gods, each in turn standing out as the highest. And since the gods are thought of as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special concerns and desires, call most of all on that god to whom they ascribe the most power in the matter,—to whose department if I may say so, their wish belongs. This god alone is present to the mind of the suppliant; with him for the time being is associated everything that can be said of a divine being;—he is the highest, the only god, before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, no offence or depreciation of any other god 1 ." "Against this theory it has been urged," as Macdonell rightly says in his Vedic Myth-o/ogy 2 , "that Vedic deities are not represented ' as independent of all the rest,' since no religion brings its gods into more frequent and varied juxtaposition and combination, and that even the mightiest gods of the Veda are made dependent on others. Thus Varuna and Surya are subordinate to Indra (i. 101), Varuna and

the AsVins submit to the power of Visnu (i. 156) Even when a

god is spoken of as unique or chief (eka), as is natural enough in laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context or even by the same verse 3 ." " Henotheism is therefore an appearance," says Macdonell, "rather than a reality, an appearance produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the

1 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, p. 27.

2 See Ibid. p. 33. See also Arrowsmith's note on it for other references to Henotheism.

growing belief in the unity of the gods (cf. the refrain of 3, 35) each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine 1 ." But whether we call it Henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration of the powers of the deity in question, it is evident that this stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic, but one which had a tendency towards them both, although it was not sufficiently developed to be identified with either of them. The tendency towards extreme exaggeration could be called a monotheistic bias in germ, whereas the correlation of different deities as independent of one another and yet existing side by side was a tendency towards polytheism.

Growth of a Monotheistic tendency; Prajapati, Visvakarma. This tendency towards extolling a god as the greatest and highest gradually brought forth the conception of a supreme Lord of all beings (Prajapati), not by a process of conscious generalization but as a necessary stage of development of the mind, able to imagine a deity as the repository of the highest moral and physical power, though its direct manifestation cannot be perceived. Thus the epithet Prajapati or the Lord of beings, which was originally an epithet for other deities, came to be recognized as a separate deity, the highest and the greatest. Thus it is said in R. V. x. 121 2 :

In the beginning rose Hiranyagarbha,

Born as the only lord of all existence.

This earth he settled firm and heaven established:

What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

Who gives us breath, who gives us strength, whose bidding

All creatures must obey, the bright gods even;

Whose shade is death, whose shadow life immortal:

What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

Who by his might alone became the monarch

Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,

Of all, both man and beast, the lord eternal:

What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,

The ocean and the distant stream exhibit;

Whose arms extended are these spreading regions:

What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,

Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens;

Who measured out the air's extended spaces:

What god shall we adore with our oblations ?

1 MacdonelPs Vedic Mythology, p. 17. 2 The Rigveda, by Kaegi, pp. 88, 89.

20 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

Similar attributes are also ascribed to the deity Visvakarma (All-creator) 1 . He is said to be father and procreator of all beings, though himself uncreated. He generated the primitive waters. It is to him that the sage says,

Who is our father, our creator, maker,

Who every place doth know and every creature,

By whom alone to gods their names were given,

To him all other creatures go to ask him 2 . R. V. x. 82. 3.

Brahma.

The conception of Brahman which has been the highest glory for the Vedanta philosophy of later days had hardly emerged in the Rg-Veda from the associations of the sacrificial mind. The meanings that Sayana the celebrated commentator of the Vedas gives of the word as collected by Haug are: (a) food, food offering, (6) the chant of the sama-singer, (c) magical formula or text, (d) duly completed ceremonies, (e) the chant and sacrificial gift together, (/) the recitation of the hotr priest, (g) great. Roth says that it also means " the devotion which manifests itself as longing and satisfaction of the soul and reaches forth to the gods." But it is only in the Satapatha Brahmana that the conception of Brahman has acquired a great significance as the supreme principle which is the moving force behind the gods. Thus the Satapatha says," Verily in the beginning this (universe) was the Brahman (neut.). It created the gods; and, having created the gods, it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this

(terrestrial) world, Vayu the air, and Surya the sky Then the

Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up to the sphere beyond, it considered, 'How can I descend again into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these two, Form and Name. Whatever has a name, that is name; and that again which has no name and which one knows by its form, 1 this is (of a certain) form,' that is form : as far as there are Form and Name so far, indeed, extends this (universe). These indeed are the two great forces of Brahman; and, verily, he who knows these two great forces of Brahman becomes himself a great force 8 . In another place Brahman is said to be the ultimate thing in the Universe and is identified with Prajapati, Purusa and Prana

1 See TheRigveda, by Kaegi, p. 89, and also Muir's Sanskrit Texts,\o\. iv. pp. 5-11.

2 Kaegi's translation.

(the vital air 1 ). In another place Brahman is described as being the Svayambhu (self-born) performing austerities, who offered his own self in the creatures and the creatures in his own self, and thus compassed supremacy, sovereignty and lordship over all creatures 2 . The conception of the supreme man (Purusa) in the Rg-Veda also supposes that the supreme man pervades the world with only a fourth part of Himself, whereas the remaining three parts transcend to a region beyond. He is at once the present, past and future 8 .

Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.

It will however be wrong to suppose that these monotheistic tendencies were gradually supplanting the polytheistic sacrifices. On the other hand, the complications of ritualism were gradually growing in their elaborate details. The direct result of this growth contributed however to relegate the gods to a relatively unimportant position, and to raise the dignity of the magical characteristics of the sacrifice as an institution which could give the desired fruits of themselves. The offerings at a sacrifice were not dictated by a devotion with which we are familiar under Christian or Vaisnava influence. The sacrifice taken as a whole is conceived as Haug notes " to be a kind of machinery in which every piece must tally with the other," the slightest discrepancy in the performance of even a minute ritualistic detail, say in the pouring of the melted butter on the fire, or the proper placing of utensils employed in the sacrifice, or even the misplacing of a mere straw contrary to the injunctions was sufficient to spoil the whole sacrifice with whatsoever earnestness it might be performed. Even if a word was mispronounced the most dreadful results might follow. Thus when Tvastr performed a sacrifice for the production of a demon who would be able to kill his enemy Indra, owing to the mistaken accent of a single word the object was reversed and the demon produced was killed by Indra. But if the sacrifice could be duly performed down to the minutest detail, there was no power which could arrest or delay the fruition of the object. Thus the objects of a sacrifice were fulfilled not by the grace of the gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice. The performance of the rituals invariably produced certain mystic or magical results by virtue of which the object desired

1 See S. B.E. xliii. pp. 59, 60, 400 and XLiv. p. 409.

2 See Ibid. XLiv. p. 418. 3 R. V. X. 90, Purusa Sukta.

22 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

by the sacrificer was fulfilled in due course like the fulfilment of a natural law in the physical world. The sacrifice was believed to have existed from eternity like the Vedas. The creation of the world itself was even regarded as the fruit of a sacrifice performed by the supreme Being. It exists as Haug says " as an invisible thing at all times and is like the latent power of electricity in an electrifying machine, requiring only the operation of a suitable apparatus in order to be elicited." The sacrifice is not offered to a god with a view to propitiate him or to obtain from him welfare on earth or bliss in Heaven; these rewards are directly produced by the sacrifice itself through the correct performance of complicated and interconnected ceremonies which constitute the sacrifice. Though in each sacrifice certain gods were invoked and received the offerings, the gods themselves were but instruments in bringing about the sacrifice or in completing the course of mystical ceremonies composing it. Sacrifice is thus regarded as possessing a mystical potency superior even to the gods, who it is sometimes stated attained to their divine rank by means of sacrifice. Sacrifice was regarded as almost the only kind of duty, and it was also called karma or kriya (action) and the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good or for bad, moral or immoral (for there were many kinds of sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or gaining worldly prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that the first recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the use of the word Rta (literally the course of things). This word was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the "' order' in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious world as sacrifice or ' rite 1 '" and its unalterable law of producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here that we find the first germs of the law of karma, which exercises such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present day. Thus we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe.

Cosmogony—Mythological and philosophical.

The cosmogony of the Rg-Veda may be looked at from two aspects, the mythological and the philosophical. The mythological aspect has in general two currents, as Professor Macdonell says, " The one regards the universe as the result of mechanical production, the work of carpenter's and joiner's skill; the other represents it as the result of natural generation 1 ." Thus in the Rg-Veda we find that the poet in one place says, " what was the wood and what was the tree out of which they built heaven and earth 2 ?" The answer given to this question in Taittirlya-Brahmana is "Brahman the wood and Brahman the tree from which the heaven and earth were made 3 ." Heaven and Earth are sometimes described as having been supported with posts 4 . They are also sometimes spoken of as universal parents, and parentage is sometimes attributed to Aditi and Daksa.

Under this philosophical aspect the semi-pantheistic Man-hymn 5 attracts our notice. The supreme man as we have already noticed above is there said to be the whole universe, whatever has been and shall be; he is the lord of immortality who has become diffused everywhere among things animate and inanimate, and all beings came out of him; from his navel came the atmosphere; from his head arose the sky; from his feet came the earth; from his ear the four quarters. Again there are other hymns in which the Sun is called the soul (atmati) of all that is movable and all that is immovable 6 . There are also statements to the effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the sages 7 . The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hiranyagarbha 8 ). In some passages it is said " Brahmanaspati blew forth these births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent: thereafter the regions sprang, thereafter, from Uttanapada 9 ." The most remarkable and sublime hymn in which the first germs of philosophic speculation

1 Macdonell's Vatic Mythology, p. 11.

2 R. V. x. 81. 4. 3 Taitt. Br. II. 8. 9. 6.

4 Macdonell's Vcdic Mythology, p. 11; also R. V. II. 15 and IV. 56.

B R.V. x. 90. 6 R.V. 1. 115.

7 R. V. 1. 164. 46. 8 R. V. x. 121.

9 Muir's translation of R. V. x. 71; Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. V. p. 48.

24 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

with regard to the wonderful mystery of the origin of the world are found is the 129th hymn of R. V. X.

1. Then there was neither being nor not-being. The atmosphere was not, nor sky above it. What covered all ? and where ? by what protected ? Was there the fathomless abyss of waters ?

2. Then neither death nor deathless existed;

Of day and night there was yet no distinction. Alone that one breathed calmly, self-supported, Other than It was none, nor aught above It.

3. Darkness there was at first in darkness hidden; The universe was undistinguished water. That which in void and emptiness lay hidden Alone by power of fervor was developed.

4. Then for the first time there arose desire, Which was the primal germ of mind, within it. And sages, searching in their heart, discovered In Nothing the connecting bond of Being.

6. Who is it knows ? Who here can tell us surely From what and how this universe has risen? And whether not till after it the gods lived ? Who then can know from what it has arisen?

7. The source from which this universe has risen, And whether it was made, or uncreated,

He only knows, who from the highest heaven Rules, the all-seeing lord—or does not He know 1 ?

The earliest commentary on this is probably a passage in the Satapatha Brahmana (X. 5. 3. 1) which says that " in the beginning this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda X. 129,1), 'There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to become manifest,—more defined, more substantial: it sought after a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency 2 ." In the Atharva-Veda also we find it stated that all forms of the universe were comprehended within the god Skambha 3 .

Thus we find that even in the period of the Vedas there sprang forth such a philosophic yearning, at least among some who could

1 The Kigveda, by Kaegi, p. 90. R. V. x. 129.

2 See Eggeling's translation of S. B., S. B. E. vol. xliii. pp. 374, 375.

question whether this universe was at all a creation or not, which could think of the origin of the world as being enveloped in the mystery of a primal non-differentiation of being and non-being ; and which could think that it was the primal One which by its inherent fervour gave rise to the desire of a creation as the first manifestation of the germ of mind, from which the universe sprang forth through a series of mysterious gradual processes. In the Brahmanas, however, we find that the cosmogonic view generally requires the agency of a creator, who is not however always the starting point, and we find that the theory of evolution is combined with the theory of creation, so that Prajapati is sometimes spoken of as the creator while at other times the creator is said to have floated in the primeval water as a cosmic golden egg.

Eschatology ; the Doctrine of Atman. There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could exist after death, though we do not find there any trace of the doctrine of transmigration in a developed form. In the Satapatha Brahmana it is said that those who do not perform rites with correct knowledge are born again after death and suffer death again. In a hymn of theRg-Veda(x.58)the soul (manas) of a man apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun, etc. In many of the hymns there is also the belief in the existence of another world, where the highest material joys are attained as a result of the performance of the sacrifices and also in a hell of darkness underneath where the evil-doers are punished. In the Satapatha Brahmana we find that the dead pass between two fires which burn the evildoers, but let the good go by 1 ; it is also said there that everyone is born again after death, is weighed in a balance, and receives reward or punishment according as his works are good or bad. It is easy to see that scattered ideas like these with regard to the destiny of the soul of man according to the sacrifice that he performs or other good or bad deeds form the first rudiments of the later doctrine of metempsychosis. The idea that man enjoys or suffers, either in another world or by being born in this world according to his good or bad deeds, is the first beginning of the moral idea, though in the Brahmanic days the good deeds were

1 See S. B. i. 9. 3, and also Macdonell's Vedic Mythology, pp. 166, 167.

26 The Vedas, Brahmanas and their Philosophy [ch.

more often of the nature of sacrificial duties than ordinary good works. These ideas of the possibilities of a necessary connection of the enjoyments and sorrows of a man with his good and bad works when combined with the notion of an inviolable law or order, which we have already seen was gradually growing with the conception of rta, and the unalterable law which produces the effects of sacrificial works, led to the Law of Karma and the doctrine of transmigration. The words which denote soul in the Rg-Veda are manas, atman and asu. The word dtman however which became famous in later Indian thought is generally used to mean vital breath. Manas is regarded as the seat of thought and emotion, and it seems to be regarded, as Macdonell says, as dwelling in the heart 1 . It is however difficult to understand how atman as vital breath, or as a separable part of man going out of the dead man came to be regarded as the ultimate essence or reality in man and the universe. There is however at least one passage in the Rg-Veda where the poet penetrating deeper and deeper passes from the vital breath (asu) to the blood, and thence to atman as the inmost self of the world ; " Who has seen how the first-born, being the Bone-possessing (the shaped world), was born from the Boneless (the shapeless)? where was the vital breath, the blood, the Self (atman) of the world ? Who went to ask him that knows it 2 ?" In Taittirlya Aranyaka I. 23, however, it is said that Prajapati after having created his self (as the world) with his own self entered into it. In Taittirlya Brahmana the atman is called omnipresent, and it is said that he who knows him is no more stained by evil deeds. Thus we find that in the pre-Upanisad Vedic literature atman probably was first used to denote " vital breath " in man, then the self of the world, and then the self in man. It is from this last stage that we find the traces of a growing tendency to looking at the self of man as the omnipresent supreme principle of the universe, the knowledge of which makes a man sinless and pure.

Conclusion.

Looking at the advancement of thought in the Rg-Veda we find first that a fabric of thought was gradually growing which not only looked upon the universe as a correlation of parts or a

1 MacdonelPs Vedic Mythology, p. 166 and R. V. vm. 89.

a R. V. I. 164. 4 and Deussen's article on Atman in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

construction made of them, but sought to explain it as having emanated from one great being who is sometimes described as one with the universe and surpassing it, and at other times as being separate from it; the agnostic spirit which is the mother of philosophic thought is seen at times to be so bold as to express doubts even on the most fundamental questions of creation—"Who knows whether this world was ever created or not?" Secondly, the growth of sacrifices has helped to establish the unalterable nature of the law by which the (sacrificial) actions produced their effects of themselves. It also lessened the importance of deities as being the supreme masters of the world and our fate, and the tendency of henotheism gradually diminished their multiple character and advanced the monotheistic tendency in some quarters. Thirdly, the soul of man is described as being separable from his body and subject to suffering and enjoyment in another world according to his good or bad deeds; the doctrine that the soul of man could go to plants, etc., or that it could again be reborn on earth, is also hinted at in certain passages, and this may be regarded as sowing the first seeds of the later doctrine of transmigration. The self (dtman) is spoken of in one place as the essence of the world, and when we trace the idea in the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas we see that atman has begun to mean the supreme essence in man as well as in the universe, and has thus approached the great Atman doctrine of the Upanisads.'

CHAPTER III

THE EARLIER UPANISADS 1 . (700 B.C.—600 b.c.)

The place of the Upanisads in Vedic literature.

THOUGH it is generally held that the Upanisads are usually attached as appendices to the Aranyakas which are again attached to the Brahmanas, yet it cannot be said that their distinction as separate treatises is always observed. Thus we find in some cases that subjects which we should expect to be discussed inaBrahmana are introduced into the Aranyakas and the Aranyaka materials are sometimes fused into the great bulk of Upanisad teaching. This shows that these three literatures gradually grew up in one

1 There are about 112 Upanisads which have been published by the "Nirnaya-Sagara" Press, Bombay, 1917. These are 1 Ka, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 PraSna, 5 Mun-daka, 6 Mandukya, 7 Taittirlya, 8 Aitareya, 9 Chandogya, 10 Brhadaranyaka, n Svetasvatara, 12 Kausitaki, 13 Maitreyi, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jabala, 16 Brahma-bindu, 17 Harnsa, 18 Arunika, J9 Garbha, 20 Narayana, 21 Narayana, 22 Para-mahamsa, 23 Brahma, 24 Amrtanada, 25 AtharvaSiras, 26 AtharvaSikha, 27 Mai-trayanl, 28 Brhajjabala, 29 NrsimhapurvatapinI, 30 Nrsimhottaratapini, 31 Kalag-nirudra, 32 Subala, 33 Ksurika, 34 Yantrika, 35 Sarvasara, 36 Niralamba, 37 Su-karahasya, 38 Vajrasucika, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Nadabindu, 41 Dhyanabindu, 42 Brah-mavidya, 43 Yogatattva, 44 Atmabodha, 45 Naradaparivrajaka, 46 Tri&khibrahmana, 47 Sita, 48 Yogacudamani, 49 Nirvana, 50 Mandalabrahmana, 51 Daksinamurtti, 52 Sarabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripadvibhutimahanarayana, 55 Advayataraka, 56 Rama-rahasya, 57 Ramapurvatapini, 58 Ramottaratapini, 59 Vasudeva, 60 Mudgala, 61 Sandilya, 62 Paiiigala, 63 Bhiksuka, 64 Maha, 65 Sarlraka, 66 Yogaiikha, 67 Turiyatita, 68 Samnyasa, 69 Paramahamsaparivrajaka, 70 Aksamala, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekaksara, 73 Annapurna, 74 Surya, 75 Aksi, 76 Adhyatma, 77 Kundika, 78 Sa-vitri, 79Atman, 80 PaSupatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhuta, 83 Tripuratapini, 84 Devi, 85 Tripura, 86 Katharudra, 87 Bhavana, 88 Rudrahrdaya, 89 Yogakundali, 90 Bhasmajabala, 91 Rudraksajabala, 92 Ganapati, 93 Jabaladar^ana, 94 Tarasara, 95 Mahavakya, 96 Pancabrahma, 97 Pranagnihotra, 98 GopalapurvatapinT, 99 Gopa-Iottaratapini, 100 Krsna, 101 Yajnavalkya, 102 Varaha, 103 ^athyayaniya, 104 Ha-yagrlva, 105 Dattatreya, 106 Garuda, 107 Kalisantarana, 108 Jabali, 109 Sau-bhagyalaksmi, no Sarasvatlrahasya, in Bahvrca, 112 Muktika.

The collection of Upanisads translated by Dara shiko, Aurangzeb's brother, contained 50 Upanisads. The Muktika Upanisad gives a list of 108 Upanisads. With theexception of the first 13 Upanisads most of them are of more or less later date. The Upanisads dealt with in this chapter are the earlier ones. Amongst the later ones there are some which repeat the purport of these, there are others which deal with the 6aiva, Sakta, the Yoga and the Vaisnava doctrines. These will be referred to in connection with the consideration of those systems in Volume II. The later Upanisads which only repeat the purport of those dealt with in this chapter do not require further mention. Some of the later Upanisads were composed even as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century-

process of development and they were probably regarded as parts of one literature, in spite of the differences in their subject-matter. Deussen supposes that the principle of this division was to be found in this, that the Brahmanas were intended for the householders, the Aranyakas for those who in their old age withdrew into the solitude of the forests and the Upanisads for those who renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation. Whatever might be said about these literary classifications the ancient philosophers of India looked upon the Upanisads as being of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as dictating the path of knowledge {jfiana-mdrga) as opposed to the path of works {karma-mdrga) which forms the content of the latter. It is not out of place here to mention that the orthodox Hindu view holds that whatever may be written in the Veda is to be interpreted as commandments to perform certain actions {vidhi) or prohibitions against committing certain others (nisedha). Even the stories or episodes are to be so interpreted that the real objects of their insertion might appear as only to praise the performance of the commandments and to blame the commission of the prohibitions. No person has any right to argue why any particular Vedic commandment is to be followed, for no reason can ever discover that, and it is only because reason fails to find out why a certain Vedic act leads to a certain effect that the Vedas have been revealed as commandments and prohibitions to show the true path of happiness. The Vedic teaching belongs therefore to that of the Karma-marga or the performance of Vedic duties of sacrifice, etc. The Upanisads however do not require the performance of any action, but only reveal the ultimate truth and reality, a knowledge of which at once emancipates a man. Readers of Hindu philosophy are aware that there is a very strong controversy on this point between the adherents of the Vedanta ( Upanisads) and those of the Veda. For the latter seek in analogy to the other parts of the Vedic literature to establish the principle that the Upanisads should not be regarded as an exception, but that they should also be so interpreted that they might also be held out as commending the performance of duties; but the former dissociate the Upanisads from the rest of the Vedic literature and assert that they do not make the slightest reference to any Vedic duties, but only delineate the ultimate reality which reveals the highest knowledge in the minds of the deserving.

Sarikara the most eminent exponent of the Upanisads holds that they are meant for such superior men who are already above worldly or heavenly prosperities, and for whom the Vedic duties have ceased to have any attraction. Wheresoever there may be such a deserving person, be he a student, a householder or an ascetic, for him the Upanisads have been revealed for his ultimate emancipation and the tn^e ."knowledge. Those who perform the Vedic duties belong to* a stage inferior to those who no longer care for the fruits of the Vedic duties but are eager for final emancipation, and it is the latter who alone are fit to hear the Upanisads 1 .

The names of the Upanisads ; Non-Brahmanic influence.

The Upanisads are also known by another name Vedanta, as they are believed to be the last portions of the Vedas {veda-anta, end); it is by this name that the philosophy of the Upanisads, the Vedanta philosophy, is so familiar to us. A modern student knows that in language the Upanisads approach the classical Sanskrit; the ideas preached also show that they are the culmination of the intellectual achievement of a great epoch. As they thus formed the concluding parts of the Vedas they retained their Vedic names which they took from the name of the different schools or branches (sakJia) among which the Vedas were studied 2 . Thus the Upanisads attached to the Brahmanas of the Aitareya and Kausltaki schools are called respectively Aitareya and Kausltaki Upanisads. Those of the Tandins and Talavakaras of the Sama-veda are called the Chandogya and Talavakara (or Kena) Upanisads. Those of the Taittirlya school of the Yajurveda

1 This is what is called the difference of fitness (adhikdribheda). Those who perform the sacrifices are not fit to hear the Upanisads and those who are fit to hear the Upanisads have no longer any necessity to perform the sacrificial duties.

2 When the Samhita texts had become substantially fixed, they were committed to memory in different parts of the country and transmitted from teacher to pupil along with directions for the practical performance of sacrificial duties. The latter formed the matter of prose compositions, the Brahmanas. These however were gradually liable to diverse kinds of modifications according to the special tendencies and needs of the people among which they were recited. Thus after a time there occurred a great divergence in the readings of the texts of the Brahmanas even of the same Veda among different people. These different schools were known by the name of particular Sakhas (e.g. Aitareya, Kausltaki) with which the Brahmanas were associated or named. According to the divergence of the Brahmanas of the different Sakhas there occurred the divergences of content and the length of the Upanisads associated with them.

form the Taittirlya and Mahanarayana, of the Katha school the Kathaka, of the Maitrayanl school the Maitrayanl. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad forms part of the Satapatha Brahmana of the Vajasaneyi schools. The Isa Upanisad also belongs to the latter school. But the school to which the Svetasvatara belongs cannot be traced, and has probably been lost. The presumption with regard to these Upanisads is that they represent the enlightened views of the particular schools among which they flourished, and under whose names they passed. A large number of Upanisads of a comparatively later age were attached to the Atharva-Veda, most of which were named not according to the Vedic schools but according to the subject-matter with which they dealt 1 .

It may not be out of place here to mention that from the frequent episodes in the Upanisads in which the Brahmins are described as having gone to the Ksattriyas for the highest knowledge of philosophy, as well as from the disparateness of the Upanisad teachings from that of the general doctrines of the Brahmanas and from the allusions to the existence of philosophical speculations amongst the people in Pali works, it may be inferred that among the Ksattriyas in general there existed earnest philosophic enquiries which must be regarded as having exerted an important influence in the formation of the Upanisad doctrines. There is thus some probability in the supposition that though the Upanisads are found directly incorporated with the Brahmanas it was not the production of the growth of Brahmanic dogmas alone, but that non-Brahmanic thought as well must have either set the Upanisad doctrines afoot, or have rendered fruitful assistance to their formulation and cultivation, though they achieved their culmination in the hands of the Brahmins.

Brahmanas and the Early Upanisads.

The passage of the Indian mind from the Brahmanic to the Upanisad thought is probably the most remarkable event in the history of philosophic thought. We know that in the later Vedic hymns some monotheistic conceptions of great excellence were developed, but these differ in their nature from the absolutism of the Upanisads as much as the Ptolemaic and the Copernican

1 Garbha Upanisad, Atman Upanisad, Praina Upanisad, etc. There were however some exceptions such as the Mandukya, Jabala, Paingala, Saunaka, etc.

systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Visvakarman or Hiranyagarbha into the atman and the Brahman of the Upanisads seems to me to be very improbable,though I am quite willing to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the atman doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout the earlier Upanisads no mention is to be found of Visvakarman, Hiranyagarbha or Brahmanaspati and no reference of such a nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upanisad ideas with those conceptions 1 . The word purusa no doubt occurs frequently in the Upanisads, but the sense and the association that come along with it are widely different from that of the purusa of the Purusasukta of the Rg-Veda.

When the Rg-Veda describes Visvakarman it describes him as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom they pray for worldly benefits. " What was the position, which and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Visvakarman produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might ? The one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, shapes them with his arms and with his wings Do thou, Visvakarman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, and the lowest, and the middle...may a generous son remain here to us 2 "; again in R.V.X.82 we find "Visvakarman is wise,energetic,

the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition He

who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the other creatures resort for instruction 3 ." Again about Hiranyagarbha we find in R.V. I. 121, " Hiranyagarbha arose in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our oblation ?... May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced the great and brilliant waters !—to what god, etc.? Prajapati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we become masters of riches 4 ." Speaking of the purusa the Rg-Veda

1 The name ViSvakarma appears in Svet. IV. 17. Hiranyagarbha appears in Svet. HI. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvahammani Hiranyagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later Nrsimh. 9. The word Brahmanaspati does not occur at all in the Upanisads.

2 Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7. 3 Ibid. p. 7. * Ibid. pp. 16, 17.

says " Purusha has a thousand heads.. .a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it]

by a space often fingers He formed those aerial creatures, and

the animals, both wild and tame 1 ," etc. Even that famous hymn (R.V. X. 129) which begins with " There was then neither being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above " ends with saying " From whence this creation came into being, whether it was created or not—he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably knows or does not know."

In the Upanisads however, the position is entirely changed, and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth,and the true self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does not carry with it in the Upanisads any elaborate philosophical discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the apparently meaningless speculations of the Brahmanas this doctrine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable to be believed.

On the strength of the stories of Balaki Gargya and Ajata£atru (Brh. II. 1), Svetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali (Cha. V. 3 and Brh. VI. 2) and Aruni and Asvapati Kaikeya (Cha. v. 11) Garbe thinks "that it can be proven that the Brahman's profoundest wisdom, the doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin in the circle of Brahmans at all 2 " and that "it took its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste 3 ." This if true would of course lead the development of the Upanisads away from the influence of the Veda, Brahmanas and the Aranyakas. But do the facts prove this ? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe him-

1 Muir's Sanskrit Texts, vol. V. pp. 368, 371.

2 Garbe's article, "Hindu Monism," p. 68. 3 Ibid. p. 78.

self has produced. In the story of Balaki Gargya and Ajatasatru (Brh. II. i) referred to by him, Balaki Gargya is a boastful man who wants to teach the Ksattriya Ajatasatru the true Brahman, but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this Ajatasatru replies (following Garbe's own translation) " it is contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction* from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to him 1 ." Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the Ksattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a Ksattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning of the conversation, Ajatasatru had promised to pay Balaki one thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman 2 . The second story of Svetaketu and Pravahana Jaibali seems to be fairly conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, the way of the gods {devaydna) and the way of the fathers (pitrydna) had originated among the Ksattriyas, but it is without any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge of Brahman as the true self.

The third story of Aruni and Asvapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. u) is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddalaka Aruni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied them to the Ksattriya king Asvapati Kaikeya who was studying the subject. But Asvapati ends the conversation by giving them certain instructions about the fire doctrine {vaisvdnara agni) and the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are only the few exceptional cases where Ksattriya kings were instructing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were discussing and instructing the atman knowledge. I am thus led to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references given by him to the Upanisad passages are also the same as we

1 Garbe's article, " Hindu Monism" p. 74.

2 Brh. 11., compare also Brh. iv. 3, how Yajnavalkya speaks to Janaka about the brahmavidva.

just examined 1 . The truth seems to me to be this, that the Ksattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upanisads. The enquirers were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and birth 2 ; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking that the Upanisad philosophy originated among the Ksattriyas or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the Brahmanas and the Aranyakas which were the productions of the Brahmins.

The change of the Brahmana into the Aranyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the Brhadaranyaka (1. 1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth 3 .

1 Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, I. pp. 197 ff.

2 The story of Maitreyl and Yajfiavalkya (Brh. 11. 4) and that of Satyakama son of Jabala and his teacher (Cha. iv. 4). 3 Cha. V. 11.

The Uktha (verse) of Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya Aranyaka under several allegorical forms with the Prana 1 , the Udgltha of the Samaveda was identified with Om, Prana, sun and eye; in Chandogya II. the Saman was identified with Om, rain, water, seasons, Prana, etc., in Chandogya III. 16-17 man was identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation ; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras; and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with sacrificial fees (daksina). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the Aranyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure identity. Thus in Ait. Aran. II. 1. 3 we find "Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajapati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman 2 ."

The word Brahman according to Sayana meant mantras (magical verses), the ceremonies, the hotr priest, the great. Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, "as not having hitherto existed," and as "coming into being from the fathers." It originates from the seat of the Rta, springs forth at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its guardian (R.V. VHI. 37. 1, vni. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, I. 47. 2, VII. 22. 9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts 8 . I am disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as we find it in many passages in the Aranyakas and the Upanisads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between

1 Ait. Aran. n. 1-3. 2 Keith's Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka.

8 Hillcbrandt's article on Brahman, E. K. E.

"magical force" and "great," transition between which is rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages of the Upanisads people are thinking of meditating upon this great force " Brahman " as being identified with diverse symbols, natural objects, parts and functions of the body.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its actual performance in the external world to certain forms of meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations of the Pancagnividya are so much referred to in the Upanisads as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for the gods that men should know this great truth 1 .

In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vayu (wind) to blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The whole process of Upanisad thought shows that the magic power of sacrifices as associated with Rta (unalterable law) was being abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. There are many stories in the Upanisads of the search after the nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman originated.

1 Brh. I. 4. 10.

The meaning of the word Upanisad. The word Upanisad is derived from the root sad with the prefix ni (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to him. In his introduction to the Upanisads he says, "The history and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that Upanisad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher 1 ." Deussen points out that the word means "secret "or "secret instruction," and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upanisads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used in this sense in the Upanisads 2 . There we find that great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires proves himself deserving to hear them. Sarikara however, the great Indian exponent of the Upanisads, derives the word from the root sad to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the word Upanisad occurs in the Upanisads themselves it seems that Deussen's meaning is fully justified 3 .

The composition and growth of diverse Upanisads. The oldest Upanisads are written in prose. Next to these we have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upanisad the more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upanisads have an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. We can read and read them over again without getting tired. The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word Upanisad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of "secret doctrine or instruction" ; the Upanisad teachings were also intended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving

1 Max Miiller's Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E. vol. I. p. Ixxxi.

2 5". /?. E. vol. 1. p. lxxxiii.

3 Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 10-15.

emancipation. It was thus that the Upanisad style of expression, when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upanisad form of composition had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upanisads were compiled by 500 B.C., they continued to be written even so late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The earliest and most important are probably those that have been commented upon by Sarikara namely Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Aitareya, Taittirlya, Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka and M andukya 1 . It is important to note in this connection that the separate Upanisads differ much from one another with regard to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of Siva, of Visnu and the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be respectively called the Yoga, Saiva, Visnu and Sarlra Upanisads. These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.

Revival of Upanisad studies in modern times.

How the Upanisads came to be introduced into Europe is an interesting story. Dara Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor Shah Jahan heard of the Upanisads during his stay in Kashmir in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend-Avesta, received a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shuja-uddaulah. Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he

1 Deussen supposes that Kausltaki is also one of the earliest. Max Miiller and Schroeder think that MaitrayanI also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upanisads into four periods. In the first period he includes Brhadaranyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Kausltaki and Kena. In the second he includes Kathaka, Isa, SvetasVatara, Mundaka, Mahanarayana, and in the third period he includes Prasna, MaitrayanI and Mandukya. The rest of the Upanisads he includes in the fourth period.

writes in the preface to his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 1 , "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads is by no means the case." Again, " How does every line display its firm,definite,and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death! 2 " Through Schopenhauer the study of the Upanisads attracted much attention in Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as well.

The study of the Upanisads has however gained a great impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were derived directly from the Upanisads.

1 Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.

* Max Miiller says in his introduction to the Upanishads (S. B. E. I. p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) "that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom'...that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, M.ilebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour."

The Upanisads and their interpretations.

Before entering into the philosophy of the Upanisads it may be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the Upanisads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past times. The Upanisads, as we have seen, formed the concluding portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the Vedanta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having been once for all declared in the Upanisads. Reason had only to unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be should have any right to say anything regarding the highest truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary for him to show from the texts of the Upanisads that they supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their principal duties to interpret the Upanisads in order to show that they alone represented the true Vedanta doctrines. Any one who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any particular school might say that in following that school he was following the Vedanta.

The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upanisads

which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the various systems of Upanisad interpretation we find that the interpretation offered by Sankara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upanisad doctrines, though there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedanta is generally associated with the interpretation of Sankara and Sankara's system of thought is called the Vedanta system, though there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing the true Vedanta doctrines.

Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter of the Upanisads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upanisads not as a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of thought—the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of Sankara, or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients that all the Upanisads represent a connected system, but take the texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upanisads, and thus find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.

The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.

The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upanisads is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which underlies the essence in man 1 . If we look at Greek philosophy in Par-men ides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upanisads are

1 Brh. IV. 4. 5, 22.

no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?

We have noticed that during the closing period of the Samhita there were people who had risen to the conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajapati, Visvakarman, Purusa, Brahmanaspati and Brahman. But this divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the nature of this deity began in the Upanisads. Many visible objects of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages in the Upanisads had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity at all? The Upanisads present to us the history of this quest and the results that were achieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not yet gone out of the Aranyaka ideas and of symbolic {pratlka) forms of worship. Prana (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This recognition of the superiority of prana brings us to the meditations on prana as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting characters of omnipresence and eternality akdsa (space) is meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Aditya (sun) are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vayu, or the sun and the immaterial representation as akasa, manas or prana, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought

which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of Brahman.

Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.

Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.

It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be satisfied with anything short of the highest.

They found that by whatever means they tried to give a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not like aught that we find in experience. Yajnavalkya said "He the atman is not this, nor this {neti neti). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke

of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury 1 ." He is asat, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (ma/iat), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death 2 ." Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical universe. When Bahva was questioned by Vaskali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence—"Teach me," said Vaskali, "most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman." Bahva however remained silent. But when the question was put forth a second or third time he answered," I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Atman is silence 3 ." The way to indicate it is thus by neti neti, it is not this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.

The Atman doctrine.

The sum and substance of the Upanisad teaching is involved in the equation Atman = Brahman. We have already seen that the word Atman was used in the Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital breath in man. Later on in the Upanisads we see that the word Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word Atman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the

1 Brh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all misinterpreted this passage; asito has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced; it is evidently the ablative of asi, a sword.

3 Katha ill. 15.

3 Sankara on Brahmasutra, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, Philosophy of the Upani-shads, p. 156.

Upanisads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical parts of man) he is called annamaya. But behind the sheath of this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath which is called the self as vital breath (prdnamaya dtman). Behind this again there is the other self "consisting of will" called the manomaya dtman. This again contains within it the self "consisting of consciousness" called the vijhdnamaya dtman. But behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the dnandamaya dtman). The texts say: "Truly he is the rapture; for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could live, who could breathe if this space (dkdsa) was not bliss? For it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, between himself and this Atman there is fear for him 1 ."

Again in another place we find that Prajapati said: "The self (dtman) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired; he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self 2 ." The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from Prajapati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could find. They answered: " We see, this our whole self, even to the hair, and to the nails." And he said, "Well, that is the self, that is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman." They went away pleased, but Prajapati thought, "There they go away, without having discovered, without having realized the self." Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and pestered with doubts and came back to Prajapati and said, "just as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes

1 Taitt. 11. 7. 2 Cha. vm. 7. 1.

when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory." Prajapati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and said, "He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came back and said "that though the dream self does not become blind when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered and as if it wept—in this I see no good." Prajapati gave a still higher instruction: "When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman." Indra departed but was again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said "the self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. I see no good in this." And now Prajapati after having given a course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the full truth about the self, and said "this body is the support of the deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless self 1 ."

As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Atman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than

1 Cha. via. 7-12.

son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par excellence, our inmost Atman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void {dkdsa)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.

Place of Brahman in the Upanisads.

There is the atman not in man alone but in all objects of the universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this atman. There is nothing outside the atman, and therefore there is no plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of black iron is known, so when this atman the Brahman is known everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But we must also remember that the Upanisads do not represent so much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered into it as its inner controller (antaryamiri). Here is thus a glaring dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as £arikara the great professor of Vedanta does by explaining away the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The

world is his body, yet he is the soul within. "He creates all, wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and unaffected 1 ". He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south and in the north, he is all this 2 . "These rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being do not know that they have come from the Being....That which is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self thou art O Svetaketu 3 ." "Brahman," as Deussen points out, "was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman." Thus it is said in Mund. 1. 1. 7:

As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads),

As the plants shoot forth on the earth,

As the hairs on the head and body of the living man,

So from the imperishable all that is here.

As the sparks from the well-kindled fire,

In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands,

So, my dear sir, from the imperishable

Living beings of many kinds go forth,

And again return into him 4 .

Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest teaching of the Upanisads is "That art thou."

Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the "inner

controller" in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as

the atman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the

result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a

theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing

aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it

is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and

earth stand held together 5 . God and soul are distinguished again

in the famous verse of Svetasvatara 6 :

Two bright-feathered bosom friends

Flit around one and the same tree;

One of them tastes the sweet berries,

The other without eating merely gazes down.

1 Cha. III. 14. 4. 2 Ibid. vn. 25. 1; also Mundaka II. 2. 11. 8 Cha. VI. 10. 4 Deussen's translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 164. 5 Brh. in. 8. 1. 6 Svetasvatara IV. 6, and Mundaka III. 1. i, also Deussen's translation in Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 177.

But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional use of the word Isa or Isdna, there seems to be no doubt that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted position of the atman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in Kausltaki Upanisad 3. 9, " He is not great by good deeds nor low by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul {atman)!' Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it and no one can transcend it. This is that,".. .from its fear the fire burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vayu and Death the fifth (with the other two) run on 1 ."

If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman in the Upanisads and look to the main-currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the Atman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that identifies the universe with the Atman or Brahman. The third current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked out, that the later exponents of Vedanta, Safikara, Ramanuja, and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of thern. Thus it is that the doctrine of Maya which is slightly hinted at once in Brhadaranyaka and thrice in Svetasvatara, becomes the foundation of Sankara's philosophy of the Vedanta in which Brahman alone is real and all else beside him is unreal 2 .

1 Katha n. 6. i and 3. 2 Brh. II. 5. 19, iavet. 1. 10, iv. 9, 10.

The World.

We have already seen that the universe has come out of Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as represented to experience could not be denied. Safikara held that the Upanisads referred to the external world and accorded a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it is maintained in him and it will return back to him.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, animals or men, have souls 1 . Brahman desiring to be many created fire (tejas\ water (ap) and earth (ksiti). Then the self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination that all other bodies are formed 2 . So all other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially in the Samkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (tanmatrd) and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Prasna IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler natures, e.g. earth (prthivt), and the subtler state of earth {prtkivimdtra). In the Taittirlya, II. 1, however, ether (akasa) is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it.

1 Cha. vi. ii. 2 ibid. vi. 2, 3, 4.

The World-Soul.

The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V. X. 121. 1, where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred to in the Svetasvatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upanisads. In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance from the point of view of the development of the theory of Brahman or Atman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the Purusa, nor the Visvakarma, nor the Hiranyagarbha played an important part in the earlier development of the Upanisads leads me to thinkthat the Upanisad doctrines were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Rg-Veda speculations. The passages in S vetasvatara clearly show how from the supreme eminence that he had in R.V. X. 121, Hiranyagarbha had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hiranyagarbha doctrine of the Upanisads says that the "entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also {hiraiiyagarbha) by whom it is sustained. Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality 1 ." This however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hiranyagarbha doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the Upanisads.

The Theory of Causation. There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the Upanisads. Sankara, the later exponent of Vedanta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upanisads looked upon the cause

1 Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 201.

as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did on the strength of a series of examples in the Chandogya Upanisad (vi. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, plate, or jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, the real par excellence.

It seems however that though such a view may be regarded as having been expounded in the Upanisads in an imperfect manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the cause itself through the action and combination of the elements of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we shall see hereafter) the Parinama theory of causation advocated by the Samkhya school 1 .

Doctrine of Transmigration.

When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration had but little developed at the time.

In the Upanisads however we find a clear development in the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with

1 Cha. vi. 2-4.

the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers {pitryana\ in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world 1 .

The other way is the way of gods (devayand), meant for those who cultivate faith and asceticism (tapas). These souls at death enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into Brahman never to return. Deussen says that "the meaning of the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the 'light of lights'" (jyotisavi jyotihy.

The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of his deeds {karma) by passing through the other worlds and without reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, the Yanas. Thus Yajnavalkya says, "when the soul becomes weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become one(with him); (people about him)say he does not see; (the senses) become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The

1 Cha. v. 10. 2 Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 335.

tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any other part of the body, the vital function (/fraud) follows and all the senses follow the vital function (praua) in coming out. He is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (prajna) accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a newer and fairer form as of the Pitrs, the Gandharvas, the gods, of Prajapati or Brahma or of any other being....As he acts and behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this world for doing karma 1 . So it is the case with those who have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahma here" (Brh. IV. iv. 1-7).

A close consideration of the above passage shows that the self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories. Thus it is said that "he is of the essence of understanding,

1 It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds.

of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of the essence of the five elements (which would make up the physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this (manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)" (Brh. IV. iv. 5). The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes follows from this nature of his ; for whatever he desires, he wills and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of the physical world on the other.

The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But there is no emphasis in the Upanisads on this point. The Pitryana theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between desires and rebirth—for it is said that whatever a man desires he wills, and whatever he wills he acts.

Thus it is said in another place " he who knowingly desires is born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his desires vanish here" (Mund in. 2. 2). This destruction of desires is effected by the right knowledge of the self. " He who knows

his self as ' I am the person' for what wish and for what desire will he trouble the body,...even being here if we know it, well if we do not, what a great destruction" (Brh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). "In former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe" (Brh. IV. iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought can be found in the Upanisads. The whole scheme is worked out on the principle of desire {kamd) and karma only serves as the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by the person.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently with the idea that desires (kamd) led to rebirth, we find that in some Upanisads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes part of the woman's self like any part of her body ; it therefore does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going away he is born again that is his third birth " (Aitareya, II. 1-4) 1 . No special emphasis is given in the Upanisads to the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kama, whatever was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (Brh. IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any other desire.

1 See also Kausitaki, n. 15.

Emancipation.

The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (niukti). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (tapas) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (pitrydna) where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful and perform sraddha had a distinctly different type of goal from those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means in the Upanisads the state of infiniteness that a man attains when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.

He who beholds that loftiest and deepest,

For him the fetters of the heart break asunder,

For him all doubts are solved,

And his works become nothingness 1 .

The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is false. We " do not know " but are " pure knowledge " ourselves. We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that

1 Deussen's Philosophy ofthe Upanishads, p. 352.

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Katha Upanisad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with him, said, " O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against me." This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, " There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said," It was inquired of old, even by the gods ; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not compel me to this." Naciketas said, " Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said," Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure; those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death." Naciketas replied, " All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said." Yama said, " One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is

what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals its own nature 1 ." So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle of the universe, the immortal and the infinite,he ceases to have desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents of the gross body (annamaya kosa), the vital functions (prana-maya kosa) of life, the will and desire {manomaya) and the thoughts and ideas (vijhanamaya), and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not

1 Katha n. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.

whatever one knows as this and this {neti neti). In this infinite and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no meum and tuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyl, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge" (Brh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible ?

It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came one after another and offered their independent speculations on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon the influence of one school upon another or upon the general change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these were formulated just after the earliest Upanisads had been composed or arranged.

The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences {sutras) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the sutras the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them. The sutras of the Vedanta system, known as the Sarlraka-sutras or Brahma-sutras of Badarayana for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high esteem and respect in which these writers of the sutras were held by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of the system fn the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the. school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyaya system of philosophy consisting of a number of half-sentences or sutras is attributed to Gautama, also called Aksapada. The earliest commentary on these sutras, called the Vatsyayana bhdsya, was written by Vatsyayana. This work was sharply criticized by the Buddhist Dinnaga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary called the BJidsyavattika 1 . As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vacaspati Misra wrote a commentary called Varttika-tatparyatika on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyaya system made by other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called Nyaya-tatparyatika, had another commentary called Nyaya-tatparyatlka-parisuddhi written by the great Udayana. This commentary had another commentary called Nyaya-nibandha-prakdsa written by Varddhamana the son of the illustrious Gafigesa. This again had another commentary called Varddha-manendu upon it by Padmanabha Misra, and this again had another named Nyaya-tdtparyamandana by Sankara Misra. The names of Vatsyayana, Vacaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any

1 I have preferred to spell Dinnaga after Vacaspati's Tatparyatlka (p. i) and not Dignaga as it is generally spelt.

64 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

original system. Even Sankara, probably the greatest man of India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the Brahma-sutras, the Upanisads, and the Bhagavadgitd.

As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was originally formulated in the sutras had probably but few problems to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems in which the original views were more or less involved but to which no attention had been given before.

The contributions of the successive commentators served to make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole 1 . In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems which had their importance only so long as they lived and were then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.

1 In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.

Growth of the Philosophic Literature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upanisads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final essence or truth was the atman, that a search after it was our highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we want {neti neti). Philosophical enquires were however continuing in circles other than those of the Upanisads. Thus the Buddha who closely followed the early Upanisad period, spoke of and enumerated sixty-two kinds of heresies 1 , and these can hardly be traced in the Upanisads. The Jaina activities were also probably going on contemporaneously but in the Upanisads no reference to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than those of the Upanisad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upanisad circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded it in sutras. These sutras were intended probably for people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained in the aphorisms. The sutras thus contain sometimes allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own

1 Brahmajala-sutla, Dlgha, I. p. 12 ff.

66 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced

work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop—a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.

Besides the sutras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called kdrikds, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the Sdmkhya kdrikd may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the varttikas; the Slokavdrttika, of Kumarila or the Vdrttika of Suresvara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sutras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the Nydyamanjari of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the Prasastapdda blidsya, the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana Sarasvati or the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmara-jadhvarlndra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.

The Indian Systems of Philosophy.

The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the ndstika and the dstika. The nastika {na asti "it is not") views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible

68 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimarpsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika, generally known as the six systems (saddarsana 1 ).

The Samkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patafijali and the original sutras are called the Patanjala Yoga sutras. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god {Is'vara) as distinct from Atman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Samkhya denies the existence of Isvara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Samkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system associated with Patafijali are but two divergent modifications of an original Samkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Samkhya system—one may be called the Kapila Samkhya and the other Patanjala Samkhya.

The Purva Mlmamsa (from the root man to think—rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.

1 The word "darfana" in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the Vaihsika sutras of Kanada (ix. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pitakas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions "ditthi" (Sanskrit—drsti from the same root drs" from which dar£ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century a.D.) uses the word Dar£ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (sarvadarfanavdcyo' rthah — Sadiiarianasamuccaya 1.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense (" Yadi nama dars"ane dariane nanaprakaram sattvalak-sanam uktamasti." Ksanabhangasidd/n' in Six Eudd/iist Nyaya tracts, p. 20). Madhava (1331 A. D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, Sarvadarsanasamgraha. The word "mata" (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote 'philosophers' in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views " tairlhika" The words " siddha," "JHilnin" etc. do not denote philosophers in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of " seers" or "perfects."

The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it maybe applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mimamsa formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mimamsa that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sutras of Mimamsa are attributed to Jaimini, and Sabara wrote a bhasya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mimamsa literature after Jaimini and Sabara are Kumarila Bhatta and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as guru-mata, whereas the views of Kumarila Bhatta pass as bhatta-mata}. It may not be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (smrti) accepts without any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated by the Mimamsa.

1 There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence "Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaruktam" (hence spoken twice). Tunoktam phonetically admits of two combinations, tu noktam (but not said) and tuna uktam (said by the particle tu) and tatrapi noktam as tatra apt na uktam (not said also there) and tatra apina uktam (said there by the particle apt). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean," Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here it is indicated by tu and there by apt, and so it is indicated twice." Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil "Guru" (master) at this.

jo Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

The Vedanta sutras, also called Uttara Mlmamsa, written by Badarayana, otherwise known as the Brahma-sutras, form the original authoritative work of Vedanta. The word Vedanta means "end of the Veda," i.e. the Upanisads, and the Vedanta sutras are so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general views of the Upanisads. This work is divided into four books or adhyayas and each adhyaya is divided into four padas or chapters. The first four sutras of the work commonly known as Catuhsutri are (i) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upanisads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to justifying the position of the Vedanta against the attacks of the rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual Upanisad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus limited to the first four sutras and the first and second chapters of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries to the Upanisads, which however contain many theological views of the system. The first commentary of the Brakma-sutra was probably written by Baudhayana, which however is not available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that of the great Sankara. His interpretations of the Brahma-sfitras together with all the commentaries and other works that follow his views are popularly known as Vedanta philosophy, though this philosophy ought more properly to be called Visuddhadvaita-vada school of Vedanta philosophy (i.e. the Vedanta philosophy of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic philosophy as represented by the Vaisnavas, Saivas, Ramayatas, etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma sutras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva, Srlkantha, Baladeva, etc., have written independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra to show that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of the Upanisads and as summarized in the Brahma-sutras. These differed largely and often vehemently attacked Sarikara's interpretations of the same sutras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by the name of Vedanta as these are also claimed to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedanta (Upanisads)

and the Vedanta siitras. Of these the system of Ramanuja has great philosophical importance.

The Ny ay a sutras attributed to Gautama, called also Aksapada, and the Vaisesika siitras attributed to Kanada, called also Uluka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor importance. So far as the sutras are concerned the Nyaya siitras lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while the Vaisesika sutras deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon largely as modifications of the Samkhya and Vedanta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy.

Some fundamental Points of Agreement. 1. The Karma Theory.

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general postulates for the realization of the transcendent sta.te,ihesuinmum bonum of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them at this stage.

First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to suffer them.

The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic

72 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called the adrsta (the unseen) or the apurva (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the modus operandi of the apurva is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Samhitas, as we have already noticed, that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest ■ material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of rta, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upanisads, where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad births.

To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma doctrine as established in the astika systems we find that it was believed that the unseen (adrsta) potency of the action generally required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world process, so there is no time at which any person first began his actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,

the special instincts of that life (technically called vdsand) come forth. In accordance with these vasanas the person passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such an emancipated (mukta) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (Jukla), black or wicked {krsna), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (Jukla-krsna) as most of our actions are, neither black nor white (asuklakrsna), i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the asuklakrsna type no fresh karma for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.

The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called kar-masarira,vjh\ch. encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by his activities, and thus keep him in a continuous process of suffering and enjoyment. The karma matter thus accumulated in the soul produces a kind of coloration called lesyd, such as white, black, etc., which marks the character of the soul. The

74 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

idea of the sukla and krsna karmas of the Yoga system was probably suggested by the Jaina view. But when a man is free from passions, and acts in strict compliance with the rules of conduct, his actions produce karma which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated. Every karma that the sage has previously earned has its predestined limits within which it must take effect and be purged away. But when by contemplation and the strict adherence to the five great vows, no new karma is generated, and when all the karmas are exhausted the worldly existence of the person rapidly draws towards its end. Thus in the last stage of contemplation, all karma being annihilated, and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever.

Buddhism also contributes some new traits to the karma theory which however being intimately connected with their metaphysics will be treated later on.

2. The Doctrine of Mukti.

Not only do the Indian systems agree as to the cause of the inequalities in the share of sufferings and enjoyments in the case of different persons, and the manner in which the cycle of births and rebirths has been kept going from beginningless time, on the basis of the mysterious connection of one's actions with the happenings of the world, but they also agree in believing that this beginningless chain of karma and its fruits, of births and rebirths, this running on from beginningless time has somewhere its end. This end was not to be attained at some distant time or in some distant kingdom, but was to be sought within us. Karma leads us to this endless cycle, and if we could divest ourselves of all such emotions, ideas or desires as lead us to action we should find within us the actionless self which neither suffers nor enjoys, neither works nor undergoes rebirth. When the Indians, wearied by the endless bustle and turmoil of worldly events, sought for and believed that somewhere a peaceful goal could be found, they generally hit upon the self of man. The belief that the soul could be realized in some stage as being permanently divested of all action, feelings or ideas, led logically to the conclusion that the connection of the soul with these worldly elements was extraneous, artificial or even illusory. In its true nature the soul is untouched by the impurities of our ordinary life, and it is through ignorance

and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginning-less time that we connect it with these. The realization of this transcendent state is the goal and final achievement of this endless cycle of births and rebirths through karma. The Buddhists did not admit the existence of soul, but recognized that the final realization of the process of karma is to be found in the ultimate dissolution called Nirvana, the nature of which we shall discuss later on.

3. T/ie Doctrine of Soul.

All the Indian systems except Buddhism admit the existence of a permanent entity variously called atman, purusa or jlva. As to the exact nature of this soul there are indeed divergences of view. Thus while the Nyaya calls it absolutely qualityless and characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity, Samkhya describes it as being of the nature of pure consciousness, the Vedanta says that it is that fundamental point of unity implied in pure consciousness {cit\ pure bliss (ananda), and pure being (sat). But all agree in holding that it is pure and unsullied in its nature and that all impurities of action or passion do not form a real part of it. The summum bonum of life is attained when all impurities are removed and the pure nature of the self is thoroughly and permanently apprehended and all other extraneous connections with it are absolutely dissociated.

The Pessimistic Attitude towards the World and the Optimistic Faith in the end.

Though the belief that the world is full of sorrow has not been equally prominently emphasized in all systems, yet it may be considered as being shared by all of them. It finds its strongest utterance in Samkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism. This interminable chain of pleasurable and painful experiences was looked upon as nearing no peaceful end but embroiling and entangling us in the meshes of karma, rebirth, and sorrow. What appear as pleasures are but a mere appearance for the attempt to keep them steady is painful, there is pain when we lose the pleasures or when we are anxious to have them. When the pleasures are so much associated with pains they are but pains themselves. We are but duped when we seek pleasures, for they are sure to lead us to pain. All our experiences are essentially sorrowful and ultimately sorrow-begetting. Sorrow is the ultimate truth of this process of the

j6 Observations on Systems of Indian Philosophy [ch.

world. That which to an ordinary person seems pleasurable appears to a wise person or to a yogin who has a clearer vision as painful. The greater the knowledge the higher is the sensitiveness to sorrow and dissatisfaction with world experiences. The yogin is like the pupil of the eye to which even the smallest grain of disturbance is unbearable. This sorrow of worldly experiences cannot be removed by bringing in remedies for each sorrow as it comes, for the moment it is remedied another sorrow comes in. It cannot also be avoided by mere inaction or suicide, for we are continually being forced to action by our nature, and suicide will but lead to another life of sorrow and rebirth. The only way to get rid of it is by the culmination of moral greatness and true knowledge which uproot sorrow once for all. It is our ignorance that the self is intimately connected with the experiences of life or its pleasures, that leads us to action and arouses passion in us for the enjoyment of pleasures and other emotions and activities. Through the highest moral elevation a man may attain absolute dispassion towards world-experiences and retire in body, mind, and speech from all worldly concerns. When the mind is so purified, the self shines in its true light, and its true nature is rightly conceived. When this is once done the self can never again be associated with passion or ignorance. It becomes at this stage ultimately dissociated from citta which contains within it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever conquers all sorrow. It is important, however, to note in this connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion to intercourse with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti as the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic creed of each system have developed from the logical necessity peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise above them through right performance and right understanding. It is only when a man rises to the highest pinnacle of moral glory that he is fit for aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which all worldly things or even the joys of Heaven would not only shrink into insignificance, but appear in their true character as sorrowful and loathsome. It is when his mind has thus turned from all ordinary joys that he can strive towards his ideal of salvation. In fact it seems to me that a sincere religious craving after some

ideal blessedness and quiet of self-realization is indeed the fundamental fact from which not only her philosophy but many of the complex phenomena of the civilization of India can be logically deduced. The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.

Unity in Indian Sadhana (philosophical, religious and ethical endeavours).

As might be expected the Indian systems are all agreed upon the general principles of ethical conduct which must be followed for the attainment of salvation. That all passions are to be controlled, no injury to life in any form should be done, and that all desire for pleasures should be checked, are principles which are almost universally acknowledged. When a man attains a very high degree of moral greatness he has to strengthen and prepare his mind for further purifying and steadying it for the attainment of his ideal; and most of the Indian systems are unanimous with regard to the means to be employed for the purpose. There are indeed divergences in certain details or technical names, but the means to be adopted for purification are almost everywhere essentially the same as those advocated by the Yoga system. It is only in later times that devotion (bhakti) is seen to occupy a more prominent place specially in Vaisnava schools of thought. Thus it was that though there were many differences among the various systems, yet their goal of life, their attitude towards the world and the means for the attainment of the goal {sadhana) being fundamentally the same, there was a unique unityin the practical sadhana of almost all the Indian systems. The religious craving has been universal in India and this uniformity of sadhana has therefore secured for India a unity in all her aspirations and strivings.

CHAPTER V

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Many scholars are of opinion that the Samkhya and the Yoga represent the earliest systematic speculations of India. It is also suggested that Buddhism drew much of its inspiration from them. It may be that there is some truth in such a view, but the systematic Samkhya and Yoga treatises as we have them had decidedly been written after Buddhism. Moreover it is well-known to every student of Hindu philosophy that a conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophic enquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought. A knowledge of Buddhism is therefore indispensable for a right understanding of the different systems in their mutual relation and opposition to Buddhism. It seems desirable therefore that I should begin with Buddhism first.

The State of Philosophy in India before the Buddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upanisads are well known, and these have already been briefly described. But these were not the only ones. Even in the Upanisads we find references to diverse atheistical creeds 1 . We find there that the origin of the world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought that " time " was the ultimate cause of all, others that all these had sprung forth by their own nature (svabkdva), others that everything had come forth in accordance with an inexorable destiny or a fortuitous concourse of accidental happenings, or through matter combinations in general. References to diverse kinds of heresies are found in Buddhist literature also, but no detailed accounts of these views are known. Of the Upanisad type of materialists the two schools of Carvakas (Dhurtta and Susiksita) are referred to in later literature, though the time in which these flourished cannot rightly be discovered 2 . But it seems

1 Sveta£vatara, I. 2, kalahsvabhabo niyatiryadrcckabhutaniyonihpurusaiticintyam.

2 Lokayata (literally, that which is found among people in general) seems to have been the name by which all carvaka doctrines were generally known. See Gunaratna on the Lokayatas.

probable however that the allusion to the materialists contained in the Upanisads refers to these or to similar schools. The Carvakas did not believe in the authority of the Vedas or any-other holy scripture. According to them there was no soul. Life and consciousness were the products of the combination of matter, just as red colour was the result of mixing up white with yellow or as the power of intoxication was generated in molasses (madasakti). There is no after-life, and no reward of actions, as there is neither virtue nor vice. Life is only for enjoyment. So long as it lasts it is needless to think of anything else, as everything will end with death, for when at death the body is burnt to ashes there cannot be any rebirth. They do not believe in the validity of inference. Nothing is trustworthy but what can be directly perceived, for it is impossible to determine that the distribution of the middle term (Jietu) has not depended upon some extraneous condition, the absence of which might destroy the validity of any particular piece of inference. If in any case any inference comes to be true, it is only an accidental fact and there is no certitude about it. They were called Carvaka because they would only eat but would not accept any other religious or moral responsibility. The word comes from carv to eat. The Dhurtta Carvakas held that there was nothing but the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, and that the body was but the result of atomic combination. There was no self or soul, no virtue or vice. The Su£iksita Carvakas held that there was a soul apart from the body but that it also was destroyed with the destruction of the body. The original work of the Carvakas was written in sutras probably by Brhaspati. Jayanta and Gunar-atna quote two sutras from it. Short accounts of this school may be found in Jayanta's Nyayamanjari, Madhava's Sarvadarsanasain-graha and Gunaratna's Tarkarahasyadipika. Mahabharata gives an account of a man called Carvaka meeting Yudhisthira.

Side by side with the doctrine of the Carvaka materialists we are reminded of the Ajlvakas of which Makkhali Gosala, probably a renegade disciple of the Jain saint Mahavira and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahavira, was the leader. This was a thoroughgoing determinism denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of Makkhali's system is this, that "there is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity. They

become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends on any human effort, for there is no such thing as power or energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature 1 ."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds ; there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this life. Nothing that we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to an end at death 2 .

There were thus at least three currents of thought: firstly the sacrificial Karma by the force of the magical rites of which any person could attain anything he desired; secondly the Upanisad teaching that the Brahman, the self, is the ultimate reality and being, and all else but name and form which pass away but do not abide. That which permanently abides without change is the real and true, and this is self. Thirdly the nihilistic conceptions that there is no law, no abiding reality, that everything comes into being by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances or by some unknown fate. In each of these schools, philosophy had probably come to a deadlock. There were the Yoga practices prevalent in the country and these were accepted partly on the strength of traditional custom among certain sections, and partly by virtue of the great spiritual, intellectual and physical power which they gave to those who performed them. But these had no rational basis behind them on which they could lean for support. These were probably then just tending towards being affiliated to the nebulous Sarnkhya doctrines which had grown up among certain sections. It was at this juncture that we find Buddha erecting a new superstructure of thought on altogether original lines which thenceforth opened up a new avenue of philosophy for all posterity to come. If the Being of the Upanisads, the superlatively motionless, was the only real, how could it offer scope for further new speculations, as it had already discarded all other matters of interest ? If everything was due to a reasonless fortuitous concourse of circumstances, reason could not proceed further in the direction to create any philosophy of the unreason. The magical

1 Samaiinaphala-sntta, Dlgha, n. 20. Hoernle's article on the Ajlvakas, E. R. E.

2 Samannaphala-sutta, II. 23.

force of the hocus-pocus of sorcery or sacrifice had but little that was inviting for philosophy to proceed on. If we thus take into account the state of Indian philosophic culture before Buddha, we shall be better able to understand the value of the Buddhistic contribution to philosophy.

Buddha: his Life.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu in the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, a prince of the Sakya clan, and his mother Queen Mahamaya. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would enter upon the ascetic life when he should see " A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried his best to keep him away from these by marrying him and surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was confronted by those four things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and realizing the impermanence of all earthly things determined to forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to immortality to remove the sufferings of men. He made his " Great Renunciation " when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled on foot to Rajagrha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvela, where in company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell down senseless and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great struggle he was convinced that the truth was not to be won bv the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course of life at last attained absolute and supreme enlightenment. Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in travelling from place to place and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha realized that the time drew near for him to die. He then entered into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained nirvana 1 . The vast developments which the system of this great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries in India and in other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will probably take yet many years more before even the materials for

1 Mahaparinibbanasuttanta, Dlgha, XVI. 6, 8, 9.

such a study can be collected. But from what we now possess it is proved incontestably that it is one of the most wonderful and subtle productions of human wisdom. It is impossible to overestimate the debt that the philosophy, culture and civilization of India owe to it in all her developments for many succeeding centuries.

Early Buddhist Literature.

The Buddhist Pali Scriptures contain three different collections: the Sutta (relating to the doctrines), the Vinaya (relating to the discipline of the monks) and the Abhidhamma (relating generally to the same subjects as the suttas but dealing with them in a scholastic and technical manner). Scholars of Buddhistic religious history of modern times have failed as yet to fix any definite dates for the collection or composition of the different parts of the aforesaid canonical literature of the Buddhists. The suttas were however composed before the Abhidhamma and it is very probable that almost the whole of the canonical works were completed before 241 B.C., the date of the third council during the reign of King Asoka. The suttas mainly deal with the doctrine (Dhamma) of the Buddhistic faith whereas the Vinaya deals only with the regulations concerning the discipline of the monks. The subject of the Abhidhamma is mostly the same as that of the suttas, namely, the interpretation of the Dhamma. Buddhaghosa in his introduction to A tthasalini, the commentary on the Dhammasahgani, says that the Abhidhamma is so called (tf£/zz'and dhamma) because it describes the same Dhammas as are related in the suttas in a more intensified (dhammatireka) and specialized (dhammavisesattliena) manner. The Abhidhammas do not give any new doctrines that are not in the suttas, but they deal somewhat elaborately with those that are already found in the suttas. Buddhaghosa in distinguishing the special features of the suttas from the Abhidhammas says that the acquirement of the former leads one to attain meditation (samadhi) whereas the latter leads one to attain wisdom (paiindsampadam). The force of this statement probably lies in this, that the dialogues of the suttas leave a chastening effect on the mind, the like of which is not to be found in the Abhidhammas, which busy themselves in enumerating the Buddhistic doctrines and defining them in a technical manner, which is more fitted to produce a reasoned

insight into the doctrines than directly to generate a craving for following the path of meditation for the extinction of sorrow. The Abhidhamma known as the KatJiavatthu differs from the other Abhidhammas in this, that it attempts to reduce the views of the heterodox schools to absurdity. The discussions proceed in the form of questions and answers, and the answers of the opponents are often shown to be based on contradictory assumptions.

The suttas contain five groupsof collections called the Nikayas. These are (1) Dlgha Nikaya, called so on account of the length of the suttas contained in it; (2) Majjhima Nikaya (middling Nikaya), called so on account of the middling extent of the suttas contained in it; (3) Samyutta Nikaya (Nikayas relating to special meetings), called samyutta on account of their being delivered owing to the meetings {samyogd) of special persons which were the occasions for them; (4) Angitttara Nikaya, so called because in each succeeding book of this work the topics of discussion increase by one 1 ; (5) Khuddaka Nikaya containing Khuddaka patJia, DJiammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Sittta Nipdta, Viwd/ia-vatthu, Petavatthu, Theragathd, Therigdthd, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhiddmagga, Apaddna, Buddhavainsa, Carydpitaka.

The Abhidhammas are Patthdna, Dhammasahgaiii, Dhatn-kathd, Puggalapafihatti, Vibhahga, Yamaka and Kathdvatthu. There exists also a large commentary literature on diverse parts of the above works known as atthakatha. The work known as Milinda PahJia (questions of King Milinda), of uncertain date, is of considerable philosophical value.

The doctrines and views incorporated in the above literature is generally now known as Sthaviravada or Theravada. On the origin of the name Theravada (the doctrine of the elders) Dipa-vanisa says that since the Theras (elders) met (at the first council) and collected the doctrines it was known as the Thera Vada 2 . It does not appear that Buddhism as it appears in this Pali literature developed much since the time of Buddhaghosa (400 A.D.), the writer of Visuddhimagga (a compendium of theravada doctrines) and the commentator of Dlghanikdya, Dhammasahgani, etc.

Hindu philosophy in later times seems to have been influenced by the later offshoots of the different schools of Buddhism, but it does not appear that Pali Buddhism had any share in it. I

1 See Buddhaghosa's Atthasalini, p. 25. 2 Olaenberg's DTpavamsa, p. 31.

have not been able to discover any old Hindu writer who could be considered as being acquainted with Pali.

The Doctrine of Causal Connection of early Buddhism 1 .

The word Dhamma in the Buddhist scriptures is used generally in four senses: (1) Scriptural texts, (2) quality (guna), (3) cause {hetii) and (4) unsubstantial and soulless (nissatta nijjiva*). Of these it is the last meaning which is particularly important from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy. The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas. The question arises that if there is no substance or reality how are we to account for the phenomena? But the phenomena are happening and passing away and the main point of interest with the Buddha was to find out " What being what else is," " What happening what else happens " and " What not being what else is not." The phenomena are happening in a series and we see that there being certain phenomena there become some others; by the happening of some events others also are produced. This is called (paticca-sanmppddd) dependent origination. But it is difficult to understand what is the exact nature of this dependence. The question as Samyutta Nikdya (II. 5) has it with which the Buddha started before attaining Buddhahood was this: in what miserable condition are the people! they are born, they decay, they die, pass away and are born again; and they do not know the path of escape from this decay, death and misery.

How to know the way to escape from this misery of decay and death. Then it occurred to him what being there, are decay and death, depending on what do they come ? As he thought deeply into the root of the matter, it occurred to him that decay and death can only occur when there is birth (jati), so they depend

1 There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of causes as we find it in the Samyutta Nikaya as the earliest Buddhist view, as Samyutta does not represent the oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to the earliest form. Dr E. J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.

2 AtthasalinT, p. 38. There are also other senses in which the word is used, as dhamma desana where it means religious teaching. The Lahkavatara described Dharmma as gunadravyapurvakd dharmma, i.e. Dharmmas are those which are associated as attributes and substances.

on birth. What being there, is there birth, on what does birth depend ? Then it occurred to him that birth could only be if there were previous existence (bkava) 1 . But on what does this existence depend, or what being there is there bhava. Then it occurred to him that there could not be existence unless there were holding fast (updddnay. But on what did upadana depend? It occurred to him that it was desire (tan/id) on which upadana depended. There can be upadana if there is desire (tan/id) 3 . But what being there, can there be desire ? To this question it occurred to him that there must be feeling {vedana) in order that there may be desire. But on what does vedana depend, or rather what must be there, that there may be feeling (vedana)? To this it occurred to him that there must be a sense-contact (p/iassa) in order that there may be feeling 4 . If there should be no sense-contact there would be no feeling. But on what does sense-contact depend? It occurred to him that as there are six sense-contacts, there are the six fields of contact {dyatanay. But on what do the six ayatanas depend ? It occurred to him that there must be the mind and body (namarupa) in order that there may be the six fields of contact 5 ; but on what does namarupa depend ? It occurred to him that without consciousness (yinhdna) there could be no namarupa 6 . But what being there would there

1 This word bhava is interpreted by Candraklrtti in his Madhyaniika vrtti, p. 565 (La Vallee Poussin's edition) as the deed which brought about rebirth (punarbhava-

janakdfn karma samutthapayati kayena vaca tnanasd ca).

2 Atthasdlinl, p. 385, upadanantidalhagahanam. Candraklrtti in explaining upadana says that whatever thing a man desires he holds fast to the materials necessary for attaining it (yatra vastuni satrsnastasya vastuno 'rjanaya vidhapandya upadanamupa-datte tatra tatra prdrthayate). Madhyaniika vrtti, p. 565.

3 Candraklrtti describes trsna as asvadanabhitiandaiiadhyavasanasthanadatmapri-yarupairviyogo ma bhut, nityaviaparityago bhavediti, yeyam prarthana —the desire that there may not ever be any separation from those pleasures, etc., which are dear to us. Ibid. 565.

4 We read also of phassayatana and phassakaya. M. N. II. 261, Hi. 280, etc. Candraklrtti says that sadbhirayatanadvaraih krtyaprakriydh pravarttante prajndyante. tannamarupapratyayam sadayatanamucyate. sadbhyascdyatanebhyah satsparSakaydh pravarttante. M. V. 565.

5 Ayatana means the six senses together with their objects. Ayatana literally is " Field of operation." Salayatana means six senses as six fields of operation. Candraklrtti has dyatanadvaraih.

6 I have followed the translation of Aung in rendering namarupa as mind and body, Compendium, p. 27 r. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nama in each birth. These together with riipa (matter) give us namarupa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates possiblesothattheremaybeknowledge. (Zt.M. K.564. Govindananda, the commentator

be vinnana. Here it occurred to him that in order that there might be vinnana there must be the conformations (sahkkdra) 1 . But what being there are there the sankharas? Here it occurred to him that the sankharas can only be if there is ignorance {avijja). If avijja could be stopped then the sankharas will be stopped, and if the sankharas could be stopped vinnana could be stopped and so on 3 .

It is indeed difficult to be definite as to what the Buddha actually wished to mean by this cycle of dependence of existence sometimes called Bhavacakra (wheel of existence). Decay and death (jardmara/ia) could not have happened if there was no birth 3 . This seems to be clear. But at this point the difficulty begins. We must remember that the theory of rebirth was

on Sankara's bhasya on the Brahma-sutras (n. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarupa which may probably refer to the Vijfiana vada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says—To think the momentary as the permanent is Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijfiana or thought of the foetus is produced; from that alayavijfiana, and the four elements (which are objects of name and are hence called nama) are produced, and from those are produced the white and black, semen and blood called rtpa. Both Vacaspati and Amalananda agree with Govindananda in holding that nama signifies the semen and the ovum while riipa means the visible physical body built out of them. Vijfiana entered the womb and on account of it namarupa were produced through the association of previous karma. See Vedantakalfiataru, pp. 274, 275. On the doctrine of the entrance of vijfiana into the womb compare D. N. II. 63.

1 It is difficult to say what is the exact sense of the word here. The Buddha was one of the first few earliest thinkers to introduce proper philosophical terms and phraseology with a distinct philosophical method and he had often to use the same word in more or less different senses. Some of the philosophical terms at least are therefore rather elastic when compared with the terms of precise and definite meaning which we find in later Sanskrit thought. Thus in S. N. in. p. 87, "SanMatam abhisahkharonli" saiikhara means that which synthesises the complexes. In the Co7npendium it is translated as will, action. Mr Aung thinks that it means the same as karma; it is here used in a different sense from what we find in the word saftkhara khandha (viz. mental states). We get a list of 51 mental states forming safikhara khandha in Dhanima Sahgani, p. 18, and another different set of 40 mental states in Dharmasamgraha, p. 6. In addition to these forty cittasamprayuktasamskara, it also counts thirteen cittavi-prayuktasamskara. Candrakirtti interprets it as meaning attachment, antipathy and infatuation, p. 563. Govindananda, the commentator on Sankara's Brahma-sutra (11. ii. 19), also interprets the word in connection with the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada as attachment, antipathy and infatuation.

2 Samyutta Nikaya, II. 7-8.

3 Jara and marana bring in soka (grief), paridevana (lamentation), duhkha (suffering), daurmanasya (feeling of wretchedness and miserableness) and upayasa (feeling of extreme destitution) at the prospect of one's death or the death of other dear ones. All these make up suffering and are the results of jati (birth). M. V. (B. T. S. p. 208). Saiikara in his bhasya counted all the terms from jara, separately. The whole series is to be taken as representing the entirety of duhkhaskandha.

enunciated in the Upanisads. The Brhadaranyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth 1 . All schools of philosophy except the Carvakas believed in it and so little is known to us of the Car-vaka sutras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the case of a few emancipated ones would have an infinite number of them in the future. It was strongly believed by all people, and the Buddha also, when he came to think to what our present birth might be due, had to fall back upon another existence {bhava). If bhava means karma which brings rebirth as Candraklrtti takes it to mean, then it would mean that the present birth could only take place on account of the works of a previous existence which determined it. Here also we are reminded of the Upanisad note " as a man does so will he be born " ( Yat karma kurute tadabhi-sampadyate, Brh. IV. iv. 5). Candraklrtti's interpretation of "bhava" as Karma (punarbhavajanakam karma) seems to me to suit better than " existence." The word was probably used rather loosely for kammabhava. The word bhava is not found in the earlier Upanisads and was used in the Pali scriptures for the first time as a philosophical term. But on what does this bhava depend ? There could not have been a previous existence if people had not betaken themselves to things or works they desired. This betaking oneself to actions or things in accordance with desire is called upadana. In the Upanisads we read, " whatever one betakes himself to, so does he work" ( Yatkratur-bhavati tatkarmma kurute, Brh. IV. iv. 5). As this betaking to the thing depends upon desire (trsnd), it is said that in order that there may be upadana there must be tanha. In the Upanisads also we read "Whatever one desires so does he betake himself to" (sa yathakamo bhavati tatkraturbhavati). Neither the word upadana nor trsna (the Sanskrit word corresponding

1 The attempts to prove the doctrine of rebirth in the Hindu philosophical works such as the Nyaya, etc., are slight and inadequate.

to tanha) is found in the earlier Upanisads, but the ideas contained in them are similar to the words "kratu" and "kdma." Desire {tanha) is then said to depend on feeling or sense-contact. Sense-contact presupposes the six senses as fields of operation 1 . These six senses or operating fields would again presuppose the whole psychosis of the man (the body and the mind together) called namarupa. We are familiar with this word in the Upanisads but there it is used in the sense of determinate forms and names as distinguished from the indeterminate indefinable reality 2 . Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga says that by " Name " are meant the three groups beginning with sensation (i.e. sensation, perception and the predisposition); by "Form" the four elements and form derivative from the four elements 3 . He further says that name by itself can produce physical changes, such as eating, drinking, making movements or the like. So form also cannot produce any of those changes by itself. But like the cripple and the blind they mutually help one another and effectuate the changes*. But there exists no heap or collection of material for the production of Name and Form ; " but just as when a lute is played upon, there is no previous store of sound; and when the sound comes into existence it does not come from any such store; and when it ceases, it does not go to any of the cardinal or intermediate points of the compass ;...in exactly the same way all the elements of being both those with form and those without, come into existence after having previously been non-existent and having come into existence pass away 5 ." Namarupa taken in this sense will not mean the whole of mind and body, but only the sense functions and the body which are found to operate in the six doors of sense (salayatand). If we take namarupa in this sense, we can see that it may be said to depend upon the vinnana (consciousness). Consciousness has been compared in the Milinda Pafiha with a watchman at the middle of

1 The word ayatana is found in many places in the earlier Upanisads in the sense of "field or place," Cha. I. 5, Brh. in. 9. 10, but sadayatana does not occur.

2 Candraklrtti interprets nama as Vedanadaydriipitias'catvarah skandhdstatra tatra bhave ndmayantiti nama. saha rupaskandhena ca nama rupam ceti namarupamucyate. The four skandhas in each specific birth act as name. These together with rupa make namarupa. M. V. 564.

3 Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 184.

4 Ibid. p. 185, Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvn.

15 Ibid. pp. 185-186, Visuddhimagga, Ch. XVII.

the cross-roads beholding all that come from any direction 1 . Bud-dhaghosa in the Atthasdlinl also says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijdnana), goes in advance (pubbah-gamd), connects (sandhdna), and stands on namarupa {ndmarupa-padatthdnani). When the consciousness gets a door, at a place the objects of sense are discerned (drammana-vibhdvanatthdne) and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye it is known only by the consciousness, and when the dhammas are made the objects of (mind) mano, it is known only by the consciousness 2 . Buddhaghosa also refers here to the passage in the Milinda Paiiha we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another, they leave no gap between the previous state and the later and consciousness therefore appears as connected. When there are the aggregates of the five khandhas it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as namarupa, it stands on nama and therefore it is said that it stands on namarupa. He further asks, Is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours, etc., but he is not different from those in truth; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact, etc., and cognizes them. So though it is the same as they are yet in a sense it is different from them 3 .

To go back to the chain of twelve causes, we find that jati (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jardmarana, etc. Jati is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas 4 . Coming to bhava which determines jati, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already

1 Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 182. Milinda Paiiha (62 s ).

2 Atthasdlinl, p. 112.

3 Ibid. p. 113, Yatha hi rupadini upddaya paiihattd suriyadayo na atthato rupd-dihi aniie honti ten' eva yastnin samaye suriyo udeti tasmin samaye tassa tejd-sah-khatam rupam piti evam vuccamane pi na rupddihi anno suriyo nama atthi. Tatha cittam phassadayo dhamme upddaya pannapiyati. Atthato pari ettha tehi atiiiam eva. Tena yasmin samaye cittam uppannam hoti ekamsen eva tasmin samaye phassadihi atthato annad eva hoti ti.

* "Jdtirdehajanma pancaskandhasamuddyah," Govindananda's Ratnaprabhd on Sankara's bhasya, 11. ii. 19.

suggested, namely, the works {karma) which produce the birth 1 . Upadana is an advanced trsna leading to positive clinging 2 . It is produced by trsna (desire) which again is the result of vedana (pleasure and pain). But this vedana is of course vedana with ignorance (avidya), for an Arhat may have also vedana but as he has no avidya, the vedana cannot produce trsna in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upadana. Vedana means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to trsna (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (sparsa). Prof. De la Vallee Poussin says that £rllabha distinguishes three processes in the production of vedana. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the vedana. Depending on Majjhima Nikaya, iii. 242, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedana takes place simultaneously with sparsa for they are " produits par un meme complexe de causes (samagriY."

Sparsa is produced by sadayatana, sadayatana by namarupa, and namarupa by vijilana, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as namarupa, out of which the six senses are specialized.

Vijnana in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (sahkhdrd) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too.

We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next

1 Govindananda in his/to/«a/raMfl on Safikara's bhasya, n.ii. 19, explains "bhava" as that from which anything becomes, as merit and demerit (dharrnadi). See also Vibhanga, p. 137 and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 201. Mr Aung says in Abhidhammatthasangaha, p. 189, that bhavo includes kammabhavo (the active side of an existence) and upapattibhavo (the passive side). And the commentators say that bhava is a contraction of " kammabhava , ' or Karma—becoming i.e. karmic activity.

2 Prof. De la Vallee Poussin in his Thiorie des Donze Causes, p. 26, says that Salistambhasutra explains the word "upadana" as "trsnavaipulya" or hyper-trsna and Candraklitti also gives the same meaning, M. V. (B. T. S. p. 210). Govindananda explains "upadana" as pravrtti (movement) generated by trsna (desire), i.e. the active tendency in pursuance of desire. But if upadana means "support" it would denote all the five skandhas. Thus Maiihyamaka vrtti says upaddnam pancaskandkalaksanam... paficopadanaskandhakhyam upadanam. M. V. XXVII. 6.

3 Poussin's Thdorie des Douze Causes, p. 23.

birth 1 . The manner in which the vijfiana produced in the womb is determined by the past vijnana of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijfiana resulting from his previous karrnas and vijfianas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijfiana thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijfiana that name (ndma) and form (rupd) become associated.

The vijnana is indeed a direct product of the samskaras and the sort of birth in which vijnana should bring down {namayati) the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the samskaras 2 , for in reality the happening of death {maranabhavd) and the instillation of the vijfiana as the beginning of the new life (itpapatti-bhavd) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijnana had not entered the womb then no namarupa could have appeared 3 .

This chain of twelve causes extends over three lives. Thus avidya and samskara of the past life produce the vijnana, nama-

1 The deities of the gardens, the woods, the trees and the plants, finding the master of the house, Citta, ill said " make your resolution, ' May I be a cakravartti king in a next existence,'" Samyutta, iv. 303.

2 "sa cedanandavijnanam matuhkuksim navakrameta, na tat kalalam kalalatvaya sannivartteta," M. V. 552. Compare Caraka, SarTra, in. 5-8, where he speaks of a "upapaduka sattva" which connects the soul with body and by the absence of which the character is changed, the senses become affected and life ceases, when it is in a pure condition one can remember even the previous births; character, purity, antipathy, memory, fear, energy, all mental qualities are produced out of it. Just as a chariot is made by the combination of many elements, so is the foetus.

3 Madhyamaka vrtti (B.T. S. 202-203). Poussin quotes from Dlgha, II. 63, "si le vijnana ne descendait pas dans le sein maternel la namarupa s'y constituerait-il ? " Govindananda on Saiikara's commentary on the Brahma-sutras (11. ii. 19) says that the first consciousness (vijnana) of the foetus is produced by the samskaras of the previous birth, and from that the four elements (which he calls nama) and from that the white and red, semen and ovum, and the first stage of the foetus (kalala-budbuddvastka) is produced.

rupa, sadayatana, sparsa, vedana, trsna, upadana and the bhava (leading to another life) of the present actual life. This bhava produces the jati and jaramarana of the next life 1 .

It is interesting to note that these twelve links in the chain extending in three sections over three lives are all but the manifestations of sorrow to the bringing in of which they naturally determine one another. Thus Abhidhammatthasangaha says " each of these twelve terms is a factor. For the composite term 'sorrow,' etc. is only meant to show incidental consequences of birth. Again when ' ignorance' and ' the actions of the mind' have been taken into account, craving {trsna), grasping (upadana) and {karma) becoming {bhava) are implicitly accounted for also. In the same manner when craving, grasping and {karma) becoming have been taken into account, ignorance and the actions of the mind are (implicitly) accounted for, also; and when birth, decay, and death are taken into account, even the fivefold fruit, to wit (rebirth), consciousness, and the rest are accounted for. And thus :

Five causes in the Past and Now a fivefold ' fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold ' fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (i. sankhara and vififiana, 2. vedana and tanha, 3. bhava and jati) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of five modes) 2 ."

These twelve interdependent links {dvadasahgd) represent the paticcasamuppada {pratityasamntpada) doctrines (dependent origination) 3 which are themselves but sorrow and lead to cycles of sorrow. The term paticcasamuppada or pratltyasamutpada has been differently interpreted in later Buddhist literature*.

1 This explanation probably cannot be found in the early Pali texts; but Buddha-ghosa mentions it in Sumangalavilasini on Mahanidana suttanta. We find it also in Abhidhammatthasangaha, vm. 3. Ignorance and the actions of the mind belong to the past; "birth," "decay and death" to the future; the intermediate eight to the present. It is styled as trikandaka (having three branches) in Abhidharmakoia, m. 20-24. Two in the past branch, two in the future and eight in the middle "sa pratityasa?nutpado dvddaJdngastrikdndakah purvaparantayordve dve madhyestau."

2 Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids' translation of Abhidhammatthasangaha, pp. 189-190. s The twelve links are not always constant. Thus in the list given in the Dialogues

of the Buddha, 11. 23 f., avijja and sankhara have been omitted and the start has been made with consciousness, and it has been said that "Cognition turns back from name and form; it goes not beyond." 4 M. V. p. 5 f.

Samutpada means appearance or arising (prddurbkdva) and pra-tltya means after getting (prati-\-i-\-ya)\ combining the two we find, arising after getting (something). The elements, depending on which there is some kind of arising, are called hetu (cause) and paccaya (ground). These two words however are often used in the same sense and are interchangeable. But paccaya is also used in a specific sense. Thus when it is said that avijja is the paccaya of saiikhara it is meant that avijja is the ground [thitt) of the origin of the saiikharas, is the ground of their movement, of the instrument through which they stand (nimittattkiti), of their ayuhana (conglomeration), of their interconnection, of their intelligibility, of their conjoint arising, of their function as cause and of their function as the ground with reference to those which are determined by them. Avijja in all these nine ways is the ground of saiikhara both in the past and also in the future, though avijja itself is determined in its turn by other grounds 1 . When we take the hetu aspect of the causal chain, we cannot think of anything else but succession, but when we take the paccaya aspect we can have a better vision into the nature of the cause as ground. Thus when avijja is said to be the ground of the saiikharas in the nine ways mentioned above, it seems reasonable to think that the saiikharas were in some sense regarded as special manifestations of avijja 2 . But as this point was not further developed in the early Buddhist texts it would be unwise to proceed further with it.

The Khandhas.

The word khandha (Skr. skandha) means the trunk of a tree and is generally used to mean group or aggregate 3 . We have seen that Buddha said that there was no atman (soul). He said that when people held that they found the much spoken of soul, they really only found the five khandhas together or any one of them. The khandhas are aggregates of bodily and psychical states which are immediate with us and are divided into five

1 See Patisambhidamagga, vol. I. p. 50; see also Majjhima Nikdya, I. 67, saiikhara...avijjanidana avijjasamudaya avijjajatika avijjapabhava.

2 In the Yoga derivation of asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (antipathy) and abhinive^a (self love) from avidya we find also that all the five are regarded as the five special stages of the growth of avidya (paucaparvd avidya).

3 The word skandha is used in Chandogya, II. 23 (trayo dharmaskandhah yajiiah adhyayanam danam) in the sense of branches and in almost the same sense in Maitri, VII. 11.

classes: (i) rupa (four elements, the body, the senses), sense data, etc., (2) vedana (feeling—pleasurable, painful and indifferent), (3) sanfia (conceptual knowledge), (4) sankhara (synthetic mental states and the synthetic functioning of compound sense-affections, compound feelings and compound concepts), (5) vinnana (consciousness) 1 .

All these states rise depending one upon the other (patzcca-samuppanna) and when a man says that he perceives the self he only deludes himself, for he only perceives one or more of these. The word rupa in rupakhandha stands for matter and material qualities, the senses, and the sense data 2 . But " rupa" is also used in the sense of pure organic affections or states of mind as we find in the Khandha Yamaha, I. p. 16, and also in Sam-yntta Nikaya, III. S6. Rupaskandha according to Dharma-samgraha means the aggregate of five senses, the five sensations, and the implicatory communications associated in sense perceptions (vijfiapti).

The elaborate discussion of Dhammasangani begins by defining rupa as " cattdro ca maJiabhuta catunnahca mahabhutdnam updddya riipam" (the four mahabhutas or elements and that proceeding from the grasping of that is called rupa) 3 . Buddha-ghosa explains it by saying that rupa means the four mahabhutas and those which arise depending (m'ssdya) on them as a modification of them. In the rupa the six senses including their affections are also included. In explaining why the four elements are called mahabhutas, Buddhaghosa says : "Just as a magician {mdydkdra) makes the water which is not hard appear as hard, makes the stone which is not gold appear as gold ; just as he himself though not a ghost nor a bird makes himself appear as a ghost or a bird, so these elements though not themselves blue make themselves appear as blue {nilam upddd riipani), not yellow, red, or white make themselves appear as yellow, red or white {oddtam updddriipani), so on account of their similarity to the appearances created by the magician they are called mahabhuta 4 ."

In the Samyutta Nikaya we find that the Buddha says, "O Bhikkhus it is called rupam because it manifests (rupyati); how

1 Samyutta A'ikaya, III. 86, etc.

2 Abhidhammatthasangaha, J. P. T. S. 1884, p. 27 ff.

3 Dhammasangani, pp. 124-179. 4 Atthasalinl, p. 299.

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats, mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rupa 1 ."

If we take the somewhat conflicting passages referred to above for our consideration and try to combine them so as to understand what is meant by rupa, I think we find that that which manifested itself to the senses and organs was called rupa. No distinction seems to have been made between the sense-data as colours, smells, etc., as existing in the physical world and their appearance as sensations. They were only numerically different and the appearance of the sensations was dependent upon the sense-data and the senses but the sense-data and the sensations were " rupa." Under certain conditions the sense-data were followed by the sensations. Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upanisads nor in the Samkhya system which is regarded by some as pre-Buddhistic. The four elements manifested themselves in certain forms and were therefore called rupa; the forms of affection that appeared were also called rupa; many other mental states or features which appeared with them were also called rupa 2 . The ayatanas or the senses were also called rupa 3 . The mahabhutas or four elements were themselves but changing manifestations, and they together with all that appeared in association with them were called rupa and formed the rupa khandha (the classes of sense-materials, sense-data, senses and sensations).

In Samyutta Nikaya (ill. 101) it is said that "the four mahabhutas were the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the rupakkhandha {rupakkhandhassa pahhdpandyd). Contact (sense-contact, phassa) is the cause of the communication of feelings (vedand); sense-contact was also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of the sannakkhandha; sense-contact is also the hetu and paccaya for the communication of thesarikhara-kkhandha. But namarupa is the hetu and the paccaya for the communication of the vifmanakkhandha." Thus not only feelings arise on account of the sense-contact but saniia and saiikhara also arise therefrom. Safina is that where specific knowing or

1 Satnyutta Nikaya, III. 86. 2 Khandliayamaka.

3 Dhammasangani, p. 124 ft.

conceiving takes place. This is the stage where the specific distinctive knowledge as the yellow or the red takes place.

Mrs Rhys Davids writing on sanna says: "In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma pitaka I found a classification distinguishing between sanna as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and sanna as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition (patigJia-sanna). This, writes Buddhaghosa, is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions ; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word or name (adhivachana-sanna) and is exercised by the sensus communis (mano), when e.g. 'one is seated...and asks another who is thoughtful: "What are you thinking of?" one perceives through his speech.' Thus there are two stages of sanna-consciousness, 1. contemplating sense-impressions, 2. ability to know what they are by naming 1 ."

About sarikhara we read in Samyutta Nikdya (ill. 87) that it is called sarikhara because it synthesises (abhisahkharonti), it is that which conglomerated rupa as rupa, conglomerated sanna as sanna, sarikhara as sarikhara and consciousness (vinnana) as consciousness. It is called sarikhara because it synthesises the conglomerated (sahkhatam abhisankharonti). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rupa, sanna, sarikhara and vinnana elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sarikhara states and also that the sarikhara exercises its synthetic activity on the conglomerated elements in it, goes to show that probably the word sarikhara is used in two senses, as mental states and as synthetic activity.

Vinnana or consciousness meant according to Buddhaghosa, as we have already seen in the previous section, both the stage at which the intellectual process started and also the final resulting consciousness.

Buddhaghosa in explainingthe process of Buddhist psychology says that "consciousness (citta) first comes into touch (phassa) with its object (arammand) and thereafter feeling, conception (sanna) and volition (cetand) come in. This contact is like the pillars of a palace, and the rest are but the superstructure built upon it (dabbasambhdrasadisd). But it should not be thought that contact

1 Buddhist Psychology, pp. 49, 50.

is the beginning of the psychological processes, for in one whole consciousness {ekacittasmini) it cannot be said that this comes first and that comes after, so we can take contact in association with feeling {vedand), conceiving (sanna) or volition {cetana); it is itself an immaterial state but yet since it comprehends objects it is called contact." "There is no impinging on one side of the object (as in physical contact), nevertheless contact causes consciousness and object to be in collision, as visible object and visual organs, sound and hearing; thus impact is \ts function; or it has impact as its essential property in the sense of attainment, owing to the impact of the physical basis with the mental object. For it is said in the Commentary:—"contact in the four planes of existence is never without the characteristic of touch with the object; but the function of impact takes place in the five doors. For to sense, or five-door contact, is given the name 'having the characteristic of touch' as well as 'having the function of impact.' But to contact in the mind-door there is only the characteristic of touch, but not the function of impact. And then this Sutta is quoted 'As if, sire, two rams were to fight, one ram to represent the eye, the second the visible object, and their collision contact. And as if, sire, two cymbals were to strike against each other, or two hands were to clap against each other; one hand would represent the eye, the second the visible object and their collision contact. Thus contact has the characteristic of touch and the function of impact 1 '. Contact is the manifestation of the union of the three (the object, the consciousness and the sense) and its effect is feeling (vedand); though it is generated by the objects it is felt in the consciousness and its chief feature is experiencing (anubhavd) the taste of the object. As regards enjoying the taste of an object, the remaining associated states enjoy it only partially. Of contact there is (the function of) the mere touching, of perception the mere noting or perceiving, of volition the mere coordinating, of consciousness the mere cognizing. But feeling alone, through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feeling is like the king, the remaining states are like the cook. As the cook, when he has prepared food of diverse tastes, puts it in a basket, seals it, takes it to the king, breaks the seal, opens the basket, takes the best of all the soup and curries, puts them in a dish, swallows (a portion) to find out 1 Atthasalinl, p. 108; translation, pp. 143-144.

qS Buddhist Philosophy [ch.

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal according to his pleasure so feeling being lord expert, and master, enjoys the taste of the object and therefore it is said that enjoyment or experience is its function 1 ."

The special feature of sanna is said to be the recognizing {paccabkihiia) by means of a sign {abhifihanenci). According to another explanation, a recognition takes place by the inclusion of the totality (of aspects)— sabbasahgahikavaseiia. The work of volition {cetana) is said to be coordination or binding together (abkisandahand). "Volition is exceedingly energetic and makes a double effort, a double exertion. Hence the Ancients said 'Volition is like the nature of a landowner, a cultivator who taking fifty-five strong men, went down to the fields to reap. He was exceedingly energetic and exceedingly strenuous; he doubled his strength and said "Take your sickles" and so forth, pointed out the portion to be reaped, offered them drink, food, scent, flowers, etc., and took an equal share of the work.' The simile should be thus applied: volition is like the cultivator, the fifty-five moral states which arise as factors of consciousness are like the fifty-five strong men; like the time of doubling strength, doubling effort by the cultivator is the doubled strength, doubled effort of volition as regards activity in moral and immoral acts 2 ." It seems that probably the active side operating in sarikhara was separately designated as cetana (volition).

" When one says ' 1/ what he does is that he refers either to all the khandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I.' Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen, so one could not say that the rupa was 'I' or that the vedana was ' I' or any of the other khandhas was ' I.' There is nowhere to be found in the khandhas 'I am 3 '."

1 Atthasalini, pp. 109-110; translation, pp. 145-146.

2 Ibid. p. in ; translation, pp. 147-148.

Avijja and Asava.

As to the question how the avijja (ignorance) first started there can be no answer, for we could never say that either ignorance or desire for existence ever has any beginning 1 . Its fruition is seen in the cycle of existence and the sorrow that comes in its train, and it comes and goes with them all. Thus as we can never say that it has any beginning, it determines the elements which bring about cycles of existence and is itself determined by certain others. This mutual determination can only take place in and through the changing series of dependent phenomena, for there is nothing which can be said to have any absolute priority in time or stability. It is said that it is through the coming into being of the asavas or depravities that the avijja came into being, and that through the destruction of the depravities {asava) the avijja was destroyed 2 . These asavas are classified in the Dhammasahgani as kamasava, bhavasava, ditthasava and avij-jasava. Kamasava means desire, attachment, pleasure, and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; bhavasava means desire, attachment and will for existence or birth; ditthasava means the holding of heretical views, such as, the world is eternal or non-eternal, or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body and the soul are one or are different; avijjasava means the ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction. Dhammasahgani adds four more supplementary ones, viz. ignorance about the nature of anterior mental khandhas, posterior mental khandhas, anterior and posterior together, and their mutual dependence 3 . Kamasava and bhavasava can as Buddhaghosa says be counted as one, for they are both but depravities due to attachment 4 .

1 Warren's Budilhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap. XVII.), p. 175.

2 M. N. 1. p. 54. Childers translates "asava" as "depravities" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "intoxicants." The word "asava" in Skr. means "old wine." It is derived from "su" to produce by Buddhaghosa and the meaning that he gives to it is "cira parivasikatthena 1 '' (on account of its being stored up for a long time like wine). They work through the eye and the mind and continue to produce all beings up to Indra. As those wines which are kept long are called "asavas" so these are also called asavas for remaining a long time. The other alternative that Buddhaghosa gives is that they are called asava on account of their producing samsaradukkha (sorrows of the world), Atthasdlini, p. 48. Contrast it with Jaina asrava (flowing in of karma matter). Finding it difficult to translate it in one word after Buddhaghosa, I have translated it as "depravities," after Childers.

3 See Dhamniasangani, p. 195. 4 Buddhaghosa's AtthasCilinl, p. 371.

The ditthasavas by clouding the mind with false metaphysical views stand in the way of one's adopting the true Buddhistic doctrines. The kamasavas stand in the way of one's entering into the way of Nirvana (andgamimagga) and the bhavasavas and avijjasavas stand in the way of one's attaining arhattva or final emancipation. When the Majjhima Nikaya says that from the rise of the asavas avijja rises, it evidently counts avijja there as in some sense separate from the other asavas, such as those of attachment and desire of existence which veil the true knowledge about sorrow.

The afflictions {kilesas) do not differ much from the asavas for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (lobka), anger or hatred {dosa), infatuation {moha), arrogance, pride or vanity {mdna), heresy {ditthi), doubt or uncertainty {vicikiccha), idleness {thlna), boast-fulness {udJiacca), shamelessness (ahirikd) and hardness of heart (anottapa); these kilesas proceed directly as a result of the asavas. In spite of these varieties they are often counted as three (lobha, dosa, moha) and these together are called kilesa. They are associated with the vedanakkhandha, sannakkhandha, sarikharak-khandha and vinfianakkhandha. From these arise the three kinds of actions, of speech, of body, and of mind 1 .

Sila and Samadhi.

We are intertwined all through outside and inside by the tangles of desire {tanha jatd), and the only way by which these may be loosened is by the practice of right discipline {sila), concentration {samadhi) and wisdom {pahha). Sila briefly means the desisting from committing all sinful deeds {sabbapdpassa akaranam). With sila therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all actions prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances. This serves to remove the kilesas, and therefore the proper performance of the sila would lead one to the first two successive stages of sainthood, viz. the sotapannabhava (the stage in which one is put in the right current) and the sakadagamibhava (the stage when one has only one more birth to undergo). Samadhi is a more advanced effort, for by it all the old roots of the old kilesas are destroyed and the tanha or desire is removed and

1 Dhamtnasangani, p. 180.

by it one is led to the more advanced states of a saint. It directly brings in panna (true wisdom) and by panna the saint achieves final emancipation and becomes what is called an arhat 1 . Wisdom (pannd) is right knowledge about the four ariya saccas, viz. sorrow, its cause, its destruction and its cause of destruction.

Sila means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Sila thus means I. right volition {cetand), 2. the associated mental states (cetasika), 3. mental control {samvara) and 4. the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by the preceding three silas called avitikkama. Samvara is spoken of as being of five kinds. I. Patimokkhasamvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), 2. Satisamvara (the control of mindfulness), 3. Nanasamvara (the control of knowledge), 4. Khantisamvara (the control of patience), 5. Viriya-samvara (the control of active self-restraint). Patimokkhasamvara means all self-control in general. Satisamvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object he will by virtue of his mindfulness (sati) control himself from being tempted by avoiding to think of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khantisamvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized, stabilized (samddhd-nam, itpadlidranam, patitthaf.

The sage who adopts the full course should also follow a number of healthy monastic rules with reference to dress, sitting, dining, etc., which are called the dhutaiigas or pure disciplinary parts 3 . The practice of sila and the dhutaiigas help the sage to adopt the course of samadhi. Samadhi as we have seen means the concentration of the mind bent on right endeavours (kusala-cittekaggatd samddki/i) together with its states upon one particular object {ekdrammana) so that they may completely cease to shift and change {sammd ca avikkhipamdndy.

1 Visuddhimagga Nidanadikatha. - Visttddhimagga-silaniddeso, pp. 7 and 8.

3 Visuddhimagga, II. 4 Visuddhimagga, pp. 84-85.

The man who has practised slla must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire the chief concentration of meditation called jhana (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the mind for the acquirement of jhanasamadhi eventually lead to it and are called upacara samadhi (preliminary samadhi) as distinguished from the jhanasamadhi called the appanasamadhi (achieved samadhi) 1 . Thus as a preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking {ahare patikkfdasanna) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come 2 . Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, ksiti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the butcher's shop. This is technically called catu-dhatuvavatthanabhavana (the meditation of the body as being made up of the four elements) 3 . Thirdly he has to habituate his mind to think again and again (auussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the sarigha (the monks following the Buddha), the gods and the law {dhamma) of the Buddha, about the good effects of slla, and the making of gifts (caga?iussati), about the nature of death (inarananussati) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (itpasamanussati) 4 .

1 As it is not possible for me to enter into details, I follow what appears to me to be the main line of division showing the interconnection of jhana (Skr. dkydna) with its accessory stages called parikammas (Visuddhimagga, pp. 85 f.).

2 Visuddhimagga, pp. 341-347; mark the intense pessimistic attitude, "/man ca pana akare patikulasanfiam annyuttassa bhikkhuno rasatanhaya cittani patiliyati, patiknttati, pativattati; so, kantaranitthai-anatthiko viya puttamanisam vigatamado akfiram aharetiyavadeva dukkhassa nittharanatthaya" p. 347. The mind of him who inspires himself with this supreme disgust to all food, becomes free from all desires for palatable tastes, and turns its back to them and flies off from them. As a means of getting rid of all sorrow he takes his food without any attachment as one would eat the flesh of his own son to sustain himself in crossing a forest.

a Visuddhimagga, pp. 347-370. 4 Visuddhimagga, pp. 197-294.

Advancing further from the preliminary meditations or preparations called the upacara samadhi we come to those other sources of concentration and meditation called the appanasamadhi which directly lead to the achievement of the highest samadhi. The processes of purification and strengthening of the mind continue in this stage also, but these represent the last attempts which lead the mind to its final goal Nibbana. In the first part of this stage the sage has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of the human carcases and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are, and from this he will turn his mind to the living human bodies and convince himself that they being in essence the same as the dead carcases are as loathsome as they 1 . This is called asubhakam-matthana or the endeavour to perceive the impurity of our bodies. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhana by leading his mind away from his body. This is called the kayagatasati or the continual mindfulness about the nature of the body 2 . As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passasa) and the exhaling (assasa) of his breath, so that instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark it definitely by counting numbers, so that by fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may fix his mind on the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. This is called the anapanasati or the mindfulness of inhalation and exhalation 3 .

Next to this we come to Brahmavihara, the fourfold meditation of metta (universal friendship), karuna (universal pity), mudita (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkha (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship,one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is not

1 Visuddhimagga, VI. - Ibid. pp. 239-266. 3 Ibid. pp. 266-292.

connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he would not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and of others. He should never become angry with any person. Should he at any time feel himself offended on account of the injuries inflicted on him by his enemies, he should think of the futility of doubling his sadness by becoming sorry or vexed on that account. He should think that if he should allow himself to be affected by anger, he would spoil all his slla which he was so carefully practising. If anyone has done a vile action by inflicting injury, should he himself also do the same by being angry at it ? If he were finding fault with others for being angry, could he himself indulge in anger? Moreover he should think that all the dhammas are momentary (khanikatta) ; that there no longer existed the khandhas which had inflicted the injury, and moreover the infliction of any injury being only a joint product, the man who was injured was himself an indispensable element in the production of the infliction as much as the man who inflicted the injury, and there could not thus be any special reason for making him responsible and of being angry with him. If even after thinking in this way the anger does not subside, he should think that by indulging in anger he could only bring mischief on himself through his bad deeds, and he should further think that the other man by being angry was only producing mischief to himself but not to him. By thinking in these ways the sage would be able to free his mind from anger against his enemies and establish himself in an attitude of universal friendship 1 . This is called the metta-bhavana. In the meditation of universal pity (karuna) also one should sympathize with the sorrows of his friends and foes alike. The sage being more keen-sighted will feel pity for those who are apparently leading a happy life, but are neither acquiring merits nor endeavouring to proceed on the way to Nibbana, for they are to suffer innumerable lives of sorrow 2 .

We next come to the jhanas with the help of material things as objects of concentration called the Kasinam. These objects of concentration may either be earth, water, fire, wind, blue colour, yellow colour, red colour, white colour, light or limited space {paricchinuakasa). Thus the sage may take a brown ball of earth and concentrate his mind upon it as an earth ball, sometimes

1 Visuddkimagga, pp. 295-314. 2 Ibid. pp. 3i4 3'5-

with eyes open and sometimes with eyes shut. When he finds that even in shutting his eyes he can visualize the object in his mind, he may leave off the object and retire to another place to concentrate upon the image of the earth ball in his mind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (pathamam jhdnam) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and penetrates into it without any quivering. This state is called vicara (steadily moving). The first stage vitakka has been compared in Buddhaghosa's Visud-dhimagga to the flying of a kite with its wings flapping, whereas the second stage is compared to its flying in a sweep without the least quiver of its wings. These two stages are associated with a buoyant exaltation {piti) and a steady inward bliss called sukha 1 instilling the mind. The formation of this first jhana roots out five ties of avijja, kamacchando (dallying with desires), vyapado (hatred), thlnamiddham (sloth and torpor), uddhaccakukkuccam (pride and restlessness), and vicikiccha (doubt). The five elements of which this jhana is constituted are vitakka, vicara, piti, sukham and ekaggata (one pointedness).

When the sage masters the first jhana he finds it defective and wants to enter into the second meditation {dutiyam jhdnani), where there is neither any vitakka nor vicara of the first jhana, but the mind is in one unruffled state (ekodibhavani). It is a much steadier state and does not possess the movement which characterized the vitakka and the vicara stages of the first jhana and is therefore a very placid state {vitakka-vicarakkhobha-virahena ativiya acalata suppasamiata ca). It is however associated with piti, sukha and ekaggata as the first jhana was.

When the second jhana is mastered the sage becomes disinclined towards the enjoyment of the piti of that stage and becomes indifferent to them (upekkhakd). A sage in this stage sees the objects but is neither pleased nor displeased. At this stage all the asavas of the sage become loosened {khinasavd). The enjoyment of sukha however still remains in the stage and the

1 Where there is piti there is sukha, but where there is sukha there may not necessarily be piti. Visuddhimagga, p. 145.

mind if not properly and carefully watched would like sometimes to turn back to the enjoyment of piti again. The two characteristics of this jhana are sukha and ekaggata. It should however be noted that though there is the feeling of highest sukha here, the mind is not only not attached to it but is indifferent to it (atimadhurasukhe sukliaparamippatte pi tatiyajjhane upekkliako, na tattlia sukhabhisangena akaddhiyati'y. The earth ball {pathavl) is however still the object of the jhana.

In the fourth or the last jhana both the sukha (happiness) and the dukkha (misery) vanish away and all the roots of attachment and antipathies are destroyed. This state is characterized by supreme and absolute indifference (itpckkha) which was slowly growing in all the various stages of the jhanas. The characteristics of this jhana are therefore upekkha and ekaggata. With the mastery of this jhana comes final perfection and total extinction of the citta called cetovimutti, and the sage becomes thereby an arhat 2 . There is no further production of the khandhas, no rebirth, and there is the absolute cessation of all sorrows and sufferings— Nibbana.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life; he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha Nikaya also we read how Payasi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done 3 ." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it, they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best precautions we do not find at the time of the death of any person that his soul goes out, or that his body weighs less on account of the departure of his soul, and so on. Kassapa refutes his arguments with apt illustrations. But in spite of a few agnostics of

1 Visuddhimagga, p. 163.

2 Majjhima Nikaya, I. p. 296, and Visuddhimagga, pp. 167-168.

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 349 ; D. N. II. pp. 317 ff.

Payasi's type, we have every reason to believe that the doctrine of rebirth in other worlds and in this was often spoken of in the Upanisads and taken as an accepted fact by the Buddha. In the Milinda Panha, we find Nagasena saying " it is through a difference in their karma that men are not all alike, but some long lived, some short lived, some healthy and some sickly, some handsome and some ugly, some powerful and some weak, some rich and some poor, some of high degree and some of low degree, some wise and some foolish 1 ." We have seen in the third chapter that the same sort of views was enunciated by the Upanisad sages.

But karma could produce its effect in this life or any other life only when there were covetousness, antipathy and infatuation. But " when a man's deeds are performed without covetousness, arise without covetousness and are occasioned without covetousness, then inasmuch as covetousness is gone these deeds are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra tree and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future 2 ." Karma by itself without craving (tanha) is incapable of bearing good or bad fruits. Thus we read in the Mahasatipatthana sutta, "even this craving, potent for rebirth, that is accompanied by lust and self-indulgence, seeking satisfaction now here, now there, to wit, the craving for the life of sense, the craving for becoming (renewed life) and the craving for not becoming (for no new rebirth) 3 ." "Craving for things visible, craving for things audible, craving for things that may be smelt, tasted, touched, for things in memory recalled. These are the things in this world that are dear, that are pleasant. There does craving take its rise, there does it dwell 4 ." Pre-occu-pation and deliberation of sensual gratification giving rise to craving is the reason why sorrow comes. And this is the first arya satya (noble truth).

The cessation of sorrow can only happen with " the utter cessation of and disenchantment about that very craving, giving it up, renouncing it and emancipation from it 5 ."

When the desire or craving (taiiha) has once ceased the sage becomes an arhat, and the deeds that he may do after that will bear no fruit. An arhat cannot have any good or bad

1 Warren's Buddhism in Translations, p. 215. 2 Ibid. pp. 216-217.

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, II. p. 340. 4 Ibid. p. 341. 6 Ibid. p. 341.

fruits of whatever he does. For it is through desire that karma finds its scope of giving fruit. With the cessation of desire all ignorance, antipathy and grasping cease and consequently there is nothing which can determine rebirth. An arhat may suffer the effects of the deeds done by him in some previous birth just as Moggallana did, but in spite of the remnants of his past karma an arhat was an emancipated man on account of the cessation of his desire 1 .

Kammas are said to be of three kinds, of body, speech and mind (kdyika, vacika and mdnasika). The root of this kamma is however volition (cetand) and the states associated with it 2 . If a man wishing to kill animals goes out into the forest in search of them, but cannot get any of them there even after a long search, his misconduct is not a bodily one, for he could not actually commit the deed with his body. So if he gives an order for committing a similar misdeed, and if it is not actually carried out with the body, it would be a misdeed by speech (vacika) and not by the body. But the merest bad thought or ill will alone whether carried into effect or not would be a kamma of the mind (mdnasika) 3 . But the mental kamma must be present as the root of all bodily and vocal kammas, for if this is absent, as in the case of an arhat, there cannot be any kammas at all for him.

Kammas are divided from the point of view of effects into four classes, viz. (i) those which are bad and produce impurity, (2) those which are good and productive of purity, (3) those which are partly good and partly bad and thus productive of both purity and impurity, (4) those which are neither good nor bad and productive neither of purity nor of impurity, but which contribute to the destruction of kammas 4 .

Final extinction of sorrow (nibbdna) takes place as the natural result of the destruction of desires. Scholars of Buddhism have tried to discover the meaning of this ultimate happening, and various interpretations have been offered. Professor De la Vallee Poussin has pointed out that in the Pali texts Nibbana has sometimes been represented as a happy state, as pure annihilation, as an inconceivable existence or as a changeless state 5 .

1 See Kathavatthu and Warren's Buddhism in Translations, pp. 221 ff.

2 Atthasalini, p. 88. 3 See Atthasalini, p. 90. 4 See Atthasalini, p. 89. 8 Prof. De la Vallee Foussin's article in the E. R. E. on Nirvana. See also

Cullavagga, IX. i. 4; Mrs Rhys Davids's Psalms of the early Buddhists, I. and II., Introduction, p. xxxvii; Digha, II. 15; Udana, VIII.; Samyutta, III. 109.

Mr Schrader, in discussing Nibbana in Pali Text Society Journal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (akasd) or consciousness (vinnana) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbana seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbana in terms of worldly experience, and there is no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a cessation of all sorrow; the stage at which all worldly experiences have ceased can hardly be described either as positive or negative. Whether we exist in some form eternally or do not exist is not a proper Buddhistic question, for it is a heresy to think of a Tathagata as existing eternally (sdsvata) or not-existing (asasvata) or whether he is existing as well as not existing or whether he is neither existing nor non-existing. Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbana is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.

Later Buddhistic writers like Nagarjuna and Candraklrtti took advantage of this attitude of early Buddhism and interpreted it as meaning the non-essential character of all existence. Nothing existed, and therefore any question regarding the existence or non-existence of anything would be meaningless. There is no difference between the wordly stage (samsdra) and Nibbana, for as all appearances are non-essential, they never existed during the samsara so that they could not be annihilated in Nibbana.

Upanisads and Buddhism.

The Upanisads had discovered that the true self was ananda (bliss) 1 . We could suppose that early Buddhism tacitly presupposes some such idea. It was probably thought that if there was the self {atta) it must be bliss. The Upanisads had asserted that the self (dtman) was indestructible and eternal 2 . If we are allowed

1 Tait. 11. 5. - Brh. iv. 5. 14. Katha. v. 13.

to make explicit what was implicit in early Buddhism we could conceive it as holding that if there was the self it must be bliss, because it was eternal. This causal connection has not indeed been anywhere definitely pronounced in the Upanisads, but he who carefully reads the Upanisads cannot but think that the reason why the Upanisads speak of the self as bliss is that it is eternal. But the converse statement that what was not eternal was sorrow does not appear to be emphasized clearly in the Upanisads. The important postulate of the Buddha is that that which is changing is sorrow, and whatever is sorrow is not self 1 . The point at which Buddhism parted from the Upanisads lies in the experiences of the self. The Upanisads doubtless considered that there were many experiences which we often identify with self, but which are impermanent. But the belief is found in the Upanisads that there was associated with these a permanent part as well, and that it was this permanent essence which was the true and unchangeable self, the blissful. They considered that this permanent self as pure bliss could not be defined as this, but could only be indicated as not this, not this {neti neti)-. But the early Pali scriptures hold that we could nowhere find out such a permanent essence, any constant self, in our changing experiences. All were but changing phenomena and therefore sorrow and therefore non-self, and what was non-self was not mine, neither I belonged to it, nor did it belong to me as my self 3 .

The true self was with the Upanisads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as " there," behind all the changing mental categories. The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience ? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was not trained in the way of wise men, and considered himself to be endowed with form (ritpa) or found the forms in his self or the self in the forms. He

1 Samyntta Nikaya, III. pp. 44-45 ff.

- See JJrh. iv. iv. Chandogya, vin. 7-12. 3 Samyutta Nikaya, in. 45.

experienced the thought (of the moment) as it were the self or experienced himself as being endowed with thought, or the thought in the self or the self in the thought. It is these kinds of experiences that he considered as the perception of the self 1 .

The Upanisads did not try to establish any school of discipline or systematic thought. They revealed throughout the dawn of an experience of an immutable Reality as the self of man, as the only abiding truth behind all changes. But Buddhism holds that this immutable self of man is a delusion and a false knowledge. The first postulate of the system is that impermanence is sorrow. Ignorance about sorrow, ignorance about the way it originates, ignorance about the nature of the extinction of sorrow, and ignorance about the means of bringing about this extinction represent the fourfold ignorance (avz/j'd) 2 . The avidya, which is equivalent to the Pali word avijja, occurs in the Upanisads also, but there it means ignorance about the atman doctrine, and it is sometimes contrasted with vidya or true knowledge about the self (atman)*. With the Upanisads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow 4 . This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (ariya saccd) —sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.

There is no Brahman or supreme permanent reality and no self, and this ignorance does not belong to any ego or self as we may ordinarily be led to suppose.

Thus it is said in the Visuddhimagga "inasmuch however as ignorance is empty of stability from being subject to a coming into existence and a disappearing from existence...and is empty of a self-determining Ego from being subject to dependence,— ...or in other words inasmuch as ignorance is not an Ego, and similarly with reference to Karma and the rest—therefore is it to be understood of the wheel of existence that it is empty with a twelvefold emptiness 5 ."

1 Samyutta Nikaya, ill. 46. 2 Majjhima Nikaya, I. p. 54.

3 Cha. 1. 1. 10. Brh. iv. 3. 20. There are some passages where vidya and avidya have been used in a different and rather obscure sense, Ka 9-11.

4 Aiig. Nikaya, III. 85.

5 Warren's Buddhism in Translations (Visuddhimagga, chap, xvil.), p. 175.

The Schools of Theravada Buddhism.

There is reason to believe that the oral instructions of the Buddha were not collected until a few centuries after his death. Serious quarrels arose amongst his disciples or rather amongst the successive generations of the disciples of his disciples about his doctrines and other monastic rules which he had enjoined upon his followers. Thus we find that when the council of Vesali decided against the Vrjin monks, called also the Vajjiputtakas, they in their turn held another great meeting (Mahasangha) and came to their own decisions about certain monastic rules and thus came to be called as the Mahasanghikas 1 . According to Vasu-mitra as translated by Vassilief, the Mahasanghikas seceded in 400 B.C. and during the next one hundred years they gave rise first to the three schools Ekavyavaharikas, Lokottaravadins, and Kukkulikas and after that the Bahusrutlyas. In the course of the next one hundred years, other schools rose out of it namely the Prajnaptivadins, Caittikas, Aparasailas and Uttarasailas. The Theravada or the Sthaviravada school which had convened the council of Vesali developed during the second and first century B.C. into a number of schools, viz. the Haimavatas, Dharmaguptikas, Mahlsasakas, Kasyaplyas, Sankrantikas (more well known as Sautrantikas)andtheVatsiputtrIyas which latter was again split up into the Dharmottarlyas, Bhadrayanlyas, Sammitiyas and Chan-nagarikas. The main branch of the Theravada school was from the second century downwards known as the Hetuvadins or Sarvastivadins 2 . The Mahabodhivamsa identifies the Theravada school with the Vibhajjavadins. The commentator of the Katha-vatthu who probably lived according to Mrs Rhys Davids sometime in the fifth century A.D. mentions a few other schools of Buddhists. But of all these Buddhist schools we know very little. Vasumitra (100 A.D.) gives us some very meagre accounts of

1 The Mahavamsa differs from Dipavamsa in holding that the Vajjiputtakas did not develop into the Mahasanghikas, but it was the Mahasanghikas who first seceded while the Vajjiputtakas seceded independently of them. The Mahabodhivmnsa, which according to Professor Geiger was composed 975 A.D.—1000A.D., follows the Mahavamsa in holding the Mahasanghikas to be the first seceders and Vajjiputtakas to have seceded independently.

Vasumitra confuses the council of Vesali with the third council of Pataliputra. See introduction to translation of Kathavatthu by Mrs Rhys Davids.

* For other accounts of the schism see Mr Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids's translation of Kathavaiihu, pp. xxxvi-xlv.

certain schools, of the Mahasanghikas, Lokottaravadins, Ekavya-vaharikas, Kukkulikas, Prajnaptivadins and Sarvastivadins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the points of interest are (1) that the Mahasanghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (citta) which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajnaptivadins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvastivadins believed that everything existed. From the discussions found in the Kathavatthu also we may know the views of some of the schools on some points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered as being of sufficient interest to them, but which to us now appear to be quite trifling. But as we do not know any of their literatures, it is better not to make any unwarrantable surmises. These schools are however not very important for a history of later Indian Philosophy, for none of them are even referred to in any of the systems of Hindu thought. The only schools of Buddhism with which other schools of philosophical thought came in direct contact, are the Sarvastivadins including the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, the Yogacara or the Vijnanavadins and the Madhyamikas or the Sunyavadins. We do not know which of the diverse smaller schools were taken up into these four great schools, the Sautrantika, Vaibhasika, Yogacara and the Madhyamika schools. But as these schools were most important in relation to the development of the different systems in Hindu thought, it is best that we should set ourselves to gather what we can about these systems of Buddhistic thought.

When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as "the Buddhists say" without calling them the Vijnanavadins or the Yogacaras and the Sunyavadins, they often refer to the Sarvastivadins by which they mean both the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravada doctrines

as expressed in the Pali works. The Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas have been more or less associated with each other. Thus the A b/ndharmakosasdstra of Vasubandhu who was a Vaibhasika was commented upon by Yasomitra who was a Sautrantika. The difference between the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas that attracted the notice of the Hindu writers was this, that the former believed that external objects were directly perceived, whereas the latter believed that the existence of the external objects could only be inferred from our diversified knowledge 1 . Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.) in his commentary Tarkarahasyadipika on Saddarsanasamnccaya says that the Vaibhasika was but another name of the Aryasammitlya school. According to Gunaratna the Vaibhasikas held that things existed" for Tour moments, the moment of production, the momenT of eTrisxerree, the moTnent of decay and the moment of annihilation. It has been pointed crtnT in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa that the Vaibhasikas believed these to be four kinds of forces which by coming in combination with the permanent essence of an entity produced its impermanent manifestations in life (see Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of Yasomitra on Abhidharmakosa karika, V. 25). The self called pudgala also possessed those characteristics. Knowledge was formless and was produced along with its object by the very same conditions (arthasahabhasi ekasamagryadhinali). The Sautrantikas according to Gunaratna held that there was no soul but only the five skandhas. These skandhas transmigrated. The past, the future, annihilation, dependence on cause, akasa and pudgala are but names {samjnamatrairi), mere assertions ( pratijnamatram), mere limitations {samvrtamatrani) and mere phenomena (vya-vaharamatrani). By pudgala they meant that which other people called eternal and all-pervasive soul. External objects are never directly perceived but are only inferred as existing for explaining the diversity of knowledge. Definite cognitions are valid; all compounded things are momentary {ksanikdh sarvasamskaraJi).

1 Madhavacarya's Sarvadarianasamgraha, chapter II. Sastradipika, the discussions on Pratyaksa, Amalananda's commentary (on Bhamali) Vedantakalpaia.ru, p. 286, " vaibhasikasya bahyo'rthah pralyaksah, santrantikasya jfianagatakaravaicitryen anumeyah." The nature of the inference of the Sautrantikas is shown thus by Amala-nanda (1247-1260 A.D.) " ye yasmin satyapi kadacitkah te tadatiriktapeksah" (those (i.e. cognitions) which in spite of certain unvaried conditions are of unaccounted diversity must depend on other things in addition to these, i.e. the external objects) Vedantakalpatarn, p. 289.

The atoms of colour, taste, smell and touch, and cognition are being destroyed every moment. The meanings of words always imply the negations of all other things, excepting that which is intended to be signified by that word {anyapohah sabdarthaJi). Salvation (nioksd) comes as the result of the destruction of the process of knowledge through continual meditation that there is no soul 1 .

One of the main differences between the Vibhajjavadins, Sau-trantikas and the Vaibhasikas or the Sarvastivadins appears to refer to the notion of time which is a subject of great interest with Buddhist philosophy. Thus AbhidJiarmakosa (v. 24...) describes the Sarvastivadins as those who maintain the universal existence of everything past, present and future. The Vibhajjavadins are those " who maintain that the present elements and those among the past that have not yet produced their fruition, are existent, but they deny the existence of the future ones and of those among the past that have already produced fruition." There were four branches of this school represented by Dhar-matrata, Ghosa, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Dharmatrata maintained that when an element enters different times, its existence changes but not its essence, just as when milk is changed into curd or a golden vessel is broken, the form of the existence changes though the essence remains the same. Ghosa held that " when an element appears at different times, the past one retains its past aspects without being severed from its future and present aspects, the present likewise retains its present aspect without completely losing its past and future aspects," just as a man in passionate love with a woman does not lose his capacity to love other women though he is not actually in love with them. Vasumitra held that an entity is called present, past and future according as it produces its efficiency, ceases to produce after having once produced it or has not yet begun to produce it. Buddhadeva maintained the view that just as the same woman may be called mother, daughter, wife, so the same entity may be called present, past or future in accordance with its relation to the preceding or the succeeding moment.

All these schools are in some sense Sarvastivadins, for they maintain universal existence. But the Vaibhasika finds them all defective excepting the view of Vasumitra. For Dharmatrata's

1 Gunaratna's Tarkarahasyadlpika, pp. 46-47.

view is only a veiled Samkhya doctrine; that of Ghosa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation, since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibhasika finds himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity ; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it, it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time. The Sautrantika however thought that the Vaibhasika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the Vaibhasika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that there is no difference between efficiency and the entity, you at once find that there is no time at all and the efficiency, the entity and the moment are all one and the same. When we remember a thing of the past we do not know it as existing in the past, but in the same way in which we knew it when it was present. We are

never attracted to past passions as the Vaibhasika suggests, but past passions leave residues which become the causes of new passions of the present moment 1 .

Again we can have a glimpse of the respective positions of the Vatsiputtriyas and the Sarvastivadins as represented by Vasubandhu if we attend to the discussion on the subject of the existence of soul in Abhidharmakosa. The argument of Vasubandhu against the existence of soul is this, that though it is true that the sense organs may be regarded as a determining cause of perception, no such cause can be found which may render the inference of the existence of soul necessary. If soul actually exists, it must have an essence of its own and must be something different from the elements or entities of a personal life. Moreover, such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging being would be without any practical efficiency (artha-kriydkdritva) which alone determines or proves existence. The soul can thus be said to have a mere nominal existence as a mere object of current usage. There is no soul, but there are only the elements of a personal life. But the Vatslputtrlya school held that just as fire could not be said to be either the same as the burning wood or as different from it, and yet it is separate from it, so the soul is an individual {pudgala) which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was altogether different from the elements of a personal life or the same as these. It exists as being conditioned by the elements of personal life, but it cannot further be defined. But its existence cannot be denied, for wherever there is an activity, there must be an agent (e.g. Devadatta walks). To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who is conscious must also exist. To this Vasubandhu replies that Devadatta (the name of a person) does not represent an unity. " It is only an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity and to which they give the name Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned, and is based on an analogy with their own experience, but their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to another. This movement, though regarded as

1 I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of Abhidharmakoia by my esteemed friend Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilize it.

belonging to a permanent entity, is but a series of new productions in different places, just as the expressions ' fire moves,' ' sound spreads' have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words 'Devadatta cognises' in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments coming in close succession being called Devadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say " this same fire which had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet we overlook the difference and say that it is the same fire. Again, what we call an individual can only be known by descriptions such as " this venerable man, having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, of such an age, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure in such things, of such an age, the man who after a life of such length, will pass away having reached an age." Only so much description can be understood, but we have never a direct acquaintance with the individual; all that is perceived are the momentary elements of sensations, images, feelings, etc., and these happening at the former moments exert a pressure on the later ones. The individual is thus only a fiction, a mere nominal existence, a mere thing of description and not of acquaintance; it cannot be grasped either by the senses or by the action of pure intellect. This becomes evident when we judge it by analogies from other fields. Thus whenever we use any common noun, e.g. milk, we sometimes falsely think that there is such an entity as milk, but what really exists is only certain momentary colours, tastes, etc., fictitiously unified as milk; and "just as milk and water are

conventional names (for a set of independent elements) for some colour, smell (taste and touch) taken together, so is the designation ' individual' but a common name for the different elements of which it is composed."

The reason why the Buddha declined to decide the question whether the " living being is identical with the body or not" is just because there did not exist any living being as " individual," as is generally supposed. He did not declare that the living being did not exist, because in that case the questioner would have thought that the continuity of the elements of a life was also denied. In truth the " living being " is only a conventional name for a set of constantly changing elements 1 .

The only book of the Sammitiyas known to us and that by name only is the Sammitlyasdstra translated into Chinese between 350 A.D. to 431 A.D.; the original Sanskrit works are however probably lost 2 .

The Vaibhasikas are identified with the Sarvastivadins who according to Dipavamsa v. 47, as pointed out by Takakusu, branched off from the Mahlsasakas, who in their turn had separated from the Theravada school.

From the Kathdvatthu we know (1) that the Sabbatthivadins believed that everything existed, (2) that the dawn of right attainment was not a momentary flash of insight but by a gradual process, (3) that consciousness or even samadhi was nothing but

1 This account is based on the translation of AstamakoSasthananibaddhah pudgala-viniicayak, a special appendix to the eighth chapter of Abhidharmakoia, by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky, Bulletin de fAcadimie des Sciences de Russie, 1919.

2 Professor De la Vallee Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the Sammitiyas in the E. R. E. He there says that in the Abhidhar-tnakosavydkhya the Sammitiyas have been identified with the Vatsiputtriyas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibhasikas of a later age. Some of their views are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvana can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and rebirth called antardbhava ; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (tyagdnvaya) but also by the fact of the actual use and advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (paribhogdnvaya purtya) ; (4) not only abstention from evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul) as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. " The pudgala cannot be said to be transitory (anitya) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (skandhas) shouldering a new burden; it cannot be said to be permanent, since it is made of transitory constituents." This pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Professor De la Vallee Poussin is not in full agreement with the pudgala doctrine of the Sammitiyas as sketched by Gunaratna which we have noticed above.

a flux and (4) that an arhat (saint) may fall away 1 . The Sab-batthivadins or Sarvastivadins have a vast Abhidharma literature still existing in Chinese translations which is different from the Abhidharma of the Theravada school which we have already mentioned 2 . These are 1. Jndnaprasthdna Sastra of Katyayanl-puttra which passed by the name of Maha Vibhdsd from which the Sabbatthivadins who followed it are called Vaibhasikas 3 . This work is said to have been given a literary form by Asvaghosa. 2. Dharmaskandha by Sariputtra. 3. DJidtukdya by Purna. 4. Prajiiaptisastra by Maudgalyayana. 5. Vijndnakdya by De-vaksema. 6. Saiigltiparyydya by Sariputtra and Prakaranapdda by Vasumitra. Vasubandhu (420 A.D.—500 A.D.) wrote a work on the Vaibhasika 4 system in verses (kdrika) known as the Abhidhar-makosa, to which he appended a commentary of his own which passes by the name Abhidharma Kosabhdsya in which he pointed out some of the defects of the Vaibhasika school from the Sautrantika point of view 5 . This work was commented upon by Vasumitra and Gunamati and later on by Yasomitra who was himself a Sautrantika and called his work Abhidharmakosa vydkhyd ; Sanghabhadra a contemporary of Vasubandhu wrote Samayapradlpa and Nydydnusdra (Chinese translations of which are available) on strict Vaibhasika lines. We hear also of other Vaibhasika writers such as Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, Vasumitra and Bhadanta, the writer of Samyuktdbhidharmasdstra and Ma-hdviblidsd. Dirinaga(48oA.D.),the celebrated logician, a Vaibhasika or a Sautrantika and reputed to be a pupil of Vasubandhu, wrote his famous work Pramdnasamuccaya in which he established Buddhist logic and refuted many of the views of Vatsyayana the celebrated commentator of the Nydya sutras\ but we regret

1 See Mrs Rhys Davids's translation Kathdvatthu, p. xix, and Sections I. 6, 7; 11. 9 and XI. 6.

2 Mahavyutpatti gives two names for Sarvastivada, viz. Mulasarvastivada and Ary-yasarvastivada. Itsing (671-695 A.D.) speaks of Aryyamulasarvastivada and Mulasarvastivada. In his time he found it prevailing in Magadha, Guzrat, Sind, S. India, E. India. Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Paramartha, in his life of Vasubandhu, says that it was propagated from Kashmere to Middle India by Vasubhadra, who studied it there.

3 Takakusu says (P. T.S. 1904-1905) that Katyayaniputtra's work was probably a compilation from other Vibhasas which existed before the Chinese translations and Vibhasa texts dated 383 A.D.

4 See Takakusu's article^/. R. A. S. 1905.

5 The Sautrantikas did not regard the Abhidharmas of the Vaibhasikas as authentic and laid stress on the suttanta doctrines as given in the Suttapitaka.

to say that none of the above works are available in Sanskrit, nor have they been retranslated from Chinese or Tibetan into any of the modern European or Indian languages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the Sabbatthivadins from the Chinese versions of the Abhidharmakosa, Mahdvibhd-sdsdstra, etc., rather elaborately 1 . The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts given by Mr Sogen.

The Sabbatthivadins admitted the five skandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, the three asamskrta dharmas of pratisamkhyanirodha apratisamkhyanirodha and akasa, and the samskrta dharmas (things composite and interdependent) of rupa (matter), citta (mind), caitta (mental) and cittaviprayukta (non-mental) 2 . All effects are produced by the coming together (samskrta) of a number of causes. The five skandhas, and the rupa, citta, etc., are thus called samskrta dharmas (composite things or collocations— sambhuyakdri). The rupa dharmas are eleven in number, one citta dharma, 46 caitta dharmas and 14 cittaviprayukta samskara dharmas (non-mental composite things); adding to these the three asamskrta dharmas we have the seventy-five dharmas. Rupa is that which has the capacity to obstruct the sense organs. Matter is regarded as the collective organism or collocation, consisting of the fourfold substratum of colour, smell, taste and contact. The unit possessing this fourfold substratum is known as paramanu, which is the minutest form of rupa. It cannot be pierced through or picked up or thrown away. It is indivisible, unanalysable, invisible, inaudible, untastable and intangible. But yet it is not permanent, but is like a momentary flash into being. The simple atoms are called dravyaparamdnu and the compound ones saingkdtaparamdnu. In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky " the universal elements of matter are manifested in their actions or functions. They are consequently more energies than substances." The organs of sense are also regarded as modifications of atomic matter. Seven such paramanus combine together to form an anu, and it is in this combined form only that they become perceptible. The combination takes place in the form of a cluster having one atom at the centre and

1 Systems of Buddhistic Thought, published by the Calcutta University.

2 Sankara in his meagre sketch of the doctrine of the Sarvastivadins in his bhasya on the Brahma-sutras II. 2 notices some of the categories mentioned by Sogen.

others around it. The point which must be remembered in connection with the conception of matter is this, that the qualities of all the mahabhutas are inherent in the paramanus. The special characteristics of roughness (which naturally belongs to earth), viscousness (which naturally belongs to water), heat (belonging to fire), movableness (belonging to wind), combine together to form each of the elements; the difference between the different elements consists only in this, that in each of them its own special characteristics were predominant and active, and other characteristics though present remained only in a potential form. The mutual resistance of material things is due to the quality of earth or the solidness inherent in them; the mutual attraction of things is due to moisture or the quality of water, and so forth. The four elements are to be observed from three aspects, namely, (i) as things, (2) from the point of view of their natures (such as activity, moisture, etc.), and (3) function (such as dhrti or attraction, samgraha or cohesion, pakti or chemical heat, and vyuhana or clustering and collecting). These combine together naturally by other conditions or causes. The main point of distinction between the Vaibhasika Sarvastivadins and other forms of Buddhism is this, that here the five skandhas and matter are regarded as permanent and eternal; they are said to be momentary only in the sense that they are changing their phases constantly, owing to their constant change of combination. Avidya is not regarded here as a link in the chain of the causal series of pratltyasamutpada; nor is it ignorance of any particular individual, but is rather identical with " moha" or delusion and represents the ultimate state of immaterial dharmas. Avidya, which through samskara, etc., produces namarupa in the case of a particular individual, is not his avidya in the present existence but the avidya of his past existence bearing fruit in the present life.

" The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name jar arises 1 . The Sarvastivadins allowed simultaneousness between cause and effect only in the case of composite things (sainpraynkta hetu) and in the case of

1 Sogen's quotation from Kumarajiva's Chinese version of Aryyadeva's commentary on the Madhyamika Jristra (chapter xx. Karika 9).

the interaction of mental and material things. The substratum of "vijfiana" or "consciousness" is regarded as permanent and the aggregate of the five senses {indriyas) is called the perceiver. It must be remembered that the indriyas being material had a permanent substratum, and their aggregate had therefore also a substratum formed of them.

The sense of sight grasps the four main colours of blue, yellow, red, white, and their combinations, as also the visual forms of appearance {sainsthana) of long, short, round, square, high, low, straight, and crooked. The sense of touch (kayendriya) has for its object the four elements and the qualities of smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, cold, hunger and thirst. These qualities represent the feelings generated in sentient beings by the objects of touch, hunger, thirst, etc., and are also counted under it, as they are the organic effects produced by a touch which excites the physical frame at a time when the energy of wind becomes active in our body and predominates over other energies ; so also the feeling of thirst is caused by a touch which excites the physical frame when the energy of the element of fire becomes active and predominates over the other energies. The indriyas (senses) can after grasping the external objects arouse thought {vijfiana) ; each of the five senses is an agent without which none of the five vijilanas would become capable of perceiving an external object. The essence of the senses is entirely material. Each sense has two subdivisions, namely, the principal sense and the auxiliary sense. The substratum of the principal senses consists of a combination of paramanus, which are extremely pure and minute, while the substratum of the latter is the flesh, made of grosser materials. The five senses differ from one another with respect to the manner and form of their respective atomic combinations. In all sense-acts, whenever an act is performed and an idea is impressed, a latent energy is impressed on our person which is designated as avijnapti rupa. It is called rupa because it is a result or effect of rupa-contact; it is called avijnapti because it is latent and unconscious; this latent energy is bound sooner or later to express itself in karma effects and is the only bridge which connects the cause and the effect of karma done by body or speech. Karma in this school is considered as twofold, namely, that as thought (cetana karma) and that as activity (caitasika karma). This last, again, is of two kinds, viz.

that due to body-motion (kayika karma) and speech {yacika karma). Both these may again be latent {avijnapti) and patent (yijriapti), giving us the kayika-vijftapti karma, kayikavijfiapti karma, vacika-vijfiapti karma and vacikavijnapti karma. Avijnapti rupa and avijnapti karma are what we should call in modern phraseology sub-conscious ideas, feelings and activity. Corresponding to each conscious sensation, feeling, thought or activity there is another similar sub-conscious state which expresses itself in future thoughts and actions; as these are not directly known but are similar to those which are known, they are called avijnapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (cetati), manas because it thinks (manvate) and vijfiana because it discriminates (nirdisati). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhava nirdesa (natural perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdesa (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusmrti nirdesa (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the svabhava m'rdesa,the other two belong exclusively to manovijnana. Each of the vijnanas as associated with its specific sense discriminates its particular object and perceives its general characteristics; the six vijnanas combine to form what is known as the Vijfianaskandha, which is presided over by mind (inano). There are forty-six caitta samskrta dharmas. Of the three asamskrta dharmas akasa (ether) is in essence the freedom from obstruction, establishing it as a permanent omnipresent immaterial substance {nirupdkhya, non-rupa). The second asamskrta dharma, aprati-samkhya nirodha, means the non-perception of dharmas caused by the absence of pratyayas or conditions. Thus when I fix my attention on one thing, other things are not seen then, not because they are non-existent but because the conditions which would have made them visible were absent. The third asamskrta dharma, pratisamkhya nirodha, is the final deliverance from bondage. Its essential characteristic is everlastingness. These are called asamskrta because being of the nature of negation they are non-collocative and hence have no production or dissolution. The eightfold noble path which leads to this state consists of right views, right aspirations, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right rapture 1 .

1 Mr Sogen mentions the name of another Buddhist Hlnayana thinker (about 250 A. v.), I Iarivarman, who founded a school known as Satyasiddhi school, which

Mahayanism.

It is difficult to say precisely at what time Mahayanism took its rise. But there is reason to think that as the Mahasaiighikas separated themselves from the Theravadins probably some time in 400 B.C. and split themselves up into eight different schools, those elements of thoughts and ideas which in later days came to be labelled as Mahayana were gradually on the way to taking their first inception. We hear in about 100 A.D. of a number of works which are regarded as various Mahayana sutras, some of which are probably as old as at least 100 B.C. (if not earlier) and others as late as 300 or 400 A.D. 1 . These Mahayanasutras, also called the Vaipulyasutras, are generally all in the form of instructions given by the Buddha. Nothing is known about their authors or compilers, but they are all written in some form of Sanskrit and were probably written by those who seceded from the Theravada school.

The word Hlnayana refers to the schools of Theravada, and as such it is contrasted with Mahayana. The words are generally translated as small vehicle (hina= small, yana = vehicle) and great vehicle (inaJid = great, ydna — vehicle). But this translation by no means expresses what is meant by Mahayana and Hlnayana 2 . Asariga (480 A.D.) in his Mahayanasiitralamkdra gives

propounded the same sort of doctrines as those preached by Nagarjuna. None of his works are available in Sanskrit and I have never come across any allusion to his name by Sanskrit writers.

1 Quotations and references to many of these sutras are found in Candrakirtti's commentary on the Mddhyamika karikas of Nagarjuna; some of these are the following: Astasdhasrikdprajndpdramitd (translated into Chinese 164 A.D.-167 A.D.), Satasdhas-rikdprajndpdramitd, Gaganaganja, Samddhisutra, Tathdgataguhyasutra, Drdhadhya-iayasancodanasiitra, Dkydyitamustisutra, Pitdputrasamdgamasutra, Mahdydnasutra, Maradamanasutra, Ratnakutasutra, Ratnacuddpariprcckdsutra, Ratnameghasutra, Ratnaraiisutra, Ratndkarasutra, Rastrapalapariprcchasutra, Lankdvatdrasutra, Lalitavistarasutra, Vajracchedikdsutra, VimalakirttinirdeJasutra, Sdlistambhasutra, Samadhirajasutra, Sukkdvativyuka, Suvarnaprabhdsasutra, Saddharmapundarika (translated into Chinese A.D. 255), Amitdyurdhydnasutra, Hastikdkhyasiitra, etc.

2 The word Yana is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle (Lalitavistara, pp. 25, 38; Prajndpdramitd, pp. 24, 319; Satnddkirajasutra, p. 1; Karundptindarikaj p. 67; Lankdvatdrasutra, pp. 68,108,132). The word Yana is as old as the Upanisads where we read of Devayana and Pitryana. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense. We hear in Lankdvatdra of Sravakayana (career of the Sravakas or the Theravadin Buddhists), Pratyekabuddhayana (the career of saints before the coming of the Buddha), Buddha yana (career of the Buddhas), Ekayana (one career), Devayana (career of the gods),

us the reason why one school was called Hlnayana whereas the other, which he professed, was called Mahayana. He says that, considered from the point of view of the ultimate goal of religion, the instructions, attempts, realization, and time, the Hlnayana occupies a lower and smaller place than the other called Maha (great) Yana, and hence it is branded as Hina (small, or low). This brings us to one of the fundamental points of distinction between Hlnayana and Mahayana. The ultimate good of an adherent of the Hlnayana is to attain his own nirvana or salvation, whereas the ultimate goal of those who professed the Mahayana creed was not to seek their own salvation but to seek the salvation of all beings. So the Hlnayana goal was lower, and in consequence of that the instructions that its followers received, the attempts they undertook, and the results they achieved were narrower than that of the Mahayana adherents. A Hlnayana man had only a short business in attaining his own salvation, and this could be done in three lives, whereas a Mahayana adherent was prepared to work for infinite time in helping all beings to attain salvation. So the Hlnayana adherents required only a short period of work and may from that point of view also be called hina, or lower.

This point, though important from the point of view of the difference in the creed of the two schools, is not so from the point of view of philosophy. But there is another trait of the Maha-yanists which distinguishes them from the Hinayanists from the philosophical point of view. The Mahayanists believed that all things were of a non-essential and indefinable character and void at bottom, whereas the Hinayanists only believed in the impermanence of all things, but did not proceed further than that.

It is sometimes erroneously thought that Nagarjuna first preached the doctrine of Sunyavada (essencelessness or voidness of all appearance), but in reality almost all the Mahayana sutras either definitely preach this doctrine or allude to it. Thus if we take some of those sutras which were in all probability earlier than Nagarjuna, we find that the doctrine which Nagarjuna expounded

Brahmayana (career of becoming a Brahma), Tathagatayana (career of a Tathagata). In one place Lankavatara says that ordinarily distinction is made between the three careers and one career and no career, but these distinctions are only for the ignorant (Larikdvatdra, p. 68).

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhuti saying to the Buddha that vedana (feeling), samjna (concepts) and the samskaras (conformations) are all maya (illusion) 1 . All the skandhas, dhatus (elements) and ayatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas, and this absolute cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge {prajhdpdramitdy. Everything being void there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (sdsvata) nor non-eternal {asdsvata) but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the " thatness" {tathatd) and consider all things as void. The saint {bodhisattva) has to establish himself in all the virtues {paramita), benevolence {ddna-pdramita), the virtue of character (silapdramita), the virtue of forbearance {ksdntipdramitd), the virtue of tenacity and strength {viryyapdramita) and the virtue of meditation {dhydnapdra-mitd). The saint {bodhisattva) is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirvana. In reality, however, there are no beings, there is no bondage, no salvation ; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory bondage. The saint is actuated with that feeling and proceeds in his work on the strength of his paramitas, though in reality there is no one who is to attain salvation in reality and no one who is to help him to attain it 3 . The true prajnaparamita is the absolute cessation of all appearance {yah anupalambhah sarva-dharmandm sa prajnaparamita ityucyate)*.

The Mahayana doctrine has developed on two lines, viz. that of Sunyavada or the Madhyamika doctrine and Vijnanavada. The difference between Sunyavada and Vijnanavada (the theory that there is only the appearance of phenomena of consciousness) is not fundamental, but is rather one of method. Both of them agree in holding that there is no truth in anything, everything is only passing appearance akin to dream or magic. But while the Sunyavadins were more busy in showing this indefin-ableness of all phenomena, the Vijfianavadins, tacitly accepting

1 Astasahasrikaprajnaparamita, p. 16. 2 Ibid. p. 177.

3 Ibid. p. 2i. * Ibid. p. 177.

the truth preached by the Sunyavadins, interested themselves in explaining the phenomena of consciousness by their theory of beginningless illusory root-ideas or instincts of the mind {vdsana).

Asvaghosa (ioo A.D.) seems to have been the greatest teacher of a new type of idealism {vijhdnavddd) known as the Tathata philosophy. Trusting in Suzuki's identification of a quotation in Asvaghosa's Sraddhotpddasdstra as being made from Lankdva-tdrasfitra, we should think of the Lahkdvatdrasutra as being one of the early works of the Vijnanavadins 1 . The greatest later writer of the Vijfianavada school was Asariga (400 A.D.), to whom are attributed the Saptadasabhumi sutra, Maliayana sfitra, Upadesa, Mahaydnasamparigraha sdstra, Yogdcdrabhumi sdstra and Mahaydnasutrdlamkdra. None of these works excepting the last one is available to readers who have no access to the Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts, as the Sanskrit originals are in all probability lost. The Vijfianavada school is known to Hindu writers by another name also, viz. Yogacara, and it does not seem an improbable supposition that Asanga's Yogdcdrabhumi sdstra was responsible for the new name. Vasubandhu, a younger brother of Asanga, was, as Paramartha (499-569) tells us, at first a liberal Sarvastivadin, but was converted to Vijfianavada, late in his life, by Asanga. Thus Vasubandhu, who wrote in his early life the great standard work of the Sarvasti-vadins, Abhidharmakosa, devoted himself in his later life to Vijfianavada 2 . He is said to have commented upon a number of Mahayana sutras, such z&Avatamsaka, Nirvana, Saddharmapun-darika, Prajiidpdramitd, Vimalakirtti and Srtmdldsim/iandda, and compiled some Mahayana sutras, such as Vijiidnamatrasiddhi, Ratnatraya, etc. The school of Vijfianavada continued for at least a century or two after Vasubandhu, but we are not in possession of any work of great fame of this school after him.

We have already noticed that the Sunyavada formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahayana. The most powerful exponent of this doctrine was Nagarjuna (100 A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its proper place. Nagarjuna's karikas (verses) were commented upon by Aryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumarajlva (383 A.D.), Buddhapalita and Candraklrtti (550 A.D.). Aryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at

1 I)r S. C. Vidyabhiishana thinks that Laiikavatara belongs to about 300 A.D.

2 Takakusu's "A study of the Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu, n J. R.A.S. 1905.

least three other books, viz. Catuhsataka, Hastabalaprakaranavrtti and Cittavisuddhiprakarana 1 . In the small work called Hastabalaprakaranavrtti Aryyadeva says that whatever depends for its existence on anything else may be proved to be illusory; all our notions of external objects depend on space perceptions and notions of part and whole and should therefore be regarded as mere appearance. Knowing therefore that all that is dependent on others for establishing itself is illusory, no wise man should feel attachment or antipathy towards these mere phenomenal appearances. In his Cittavisuddhiprakarana he says that just as a crystal appears to be coloured, catching the reflection of a coloured object, even so the mind though in itself colourless appears to show diverse colours by coloration of imagination (vikalpa). In reality the mind (citta) without a touch of imagination (kalpana) in it is the pure reality.

It does not seem however that the Sunyavadins could produce any great writers after Candraklrtti. References to Sunyavada show that it was a living philosophy amongst the Hindu writers until the time of the great Mlmamsa authority Kumarila who flourished in the eighth century; but in later times the Sunyavadins were no longer occupying the position of strong and active disputants.

The Tathata Philosophy of Asvaghosa (80A.D.) 2 .

Asvaghosa was the son of a Brahmin named Saimhaguhya who spent his early days in travelling over the different parts of India and defeating the Buddhists in open debates. He was probably converted to Buddhism by Parsva who was an important person in the third Buddhist Council promoted, according to some authorities, by the King of Kashmere and according to other authorities by Punyayasas 3 .

1 Aryyadeva's Hastabalaprakaranavrtti has been reclaimed by Dr F. W. Thomas. Fragmentary portions of his Cittavisuddhiprakarana were published by Mahamahopad-hyaya Haraprasada sastri in the Bengal Asiatic Society's journal, 1898.

2 The above section is based on| the Awakening of Faith, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of Sraddhotpadas'dstra by Asvaghosa, the Sanskrit original of which appears to have been lost. Suzuki has brought forward a mass of evidence to show that Asvaghosa was a contemporary of Kaniska.

3 Taranatha says that he was converted by Aryadeva, a disciple of Nagarjuna, Geschichte des Buddhismus, German translation by Schiefner, pp. 84-85. See Suzuki's Awakening of Faith, pp. 24-32. Asvaghosa wrote the Buddhacaritakavya, of great poetical excellence, and the MahalamkdraJastra. He was also a musician and had

He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished —the aspect as thatness (bhutatathata) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (samsara). The soul as bhutatathata means the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhdtii). Its essential nature is uncreate and external. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smrti) appear under the forms of individuation 1 . If we could overcome this smrti "the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects." "All things in their fundamental nature are not nameable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (samatd). They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruction. They are nothing but one soul" —thatness (bhutatathata). This "thatness" has no attribute and it can only be somehow pointed out in speech as "thatness." As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, "this is the stage of thatness." This bhutatathata is neither that which is existence, nor that which is non-existence, nor that which is at once existence and nonexistence, nor that which is not at once existence and non-existence; it is neither that which is plurality, nor that which is at once unity and plurality, nor that which is not at once unity and plurality. It is a negative concept in the sense that it is beyond all that is conditional and yet it is a positive concept in the sense that it holds all within it. It cannot be comprehended by any kind of particularization or distinction. It is only by transcending the range of our intellectual categories of the comprehension of the limited range of finite phenomena that we can get a glimpse of it. It cannot be comprehended by the particularizing consciousness of all beings, and we thus may call it negation, "sunyata," in this sense. The truth is that which

invented a musical instrument called Rastavara that he might by that means convert the people of the city. " Its melody was classical, mournful, and melodious, inducing the audience to ponder on the misery, emptiness, and non-atmanness of life." Suzuki, p. 35. 1 I have ventured to translate "smr/i" in the sense of vasana in preference to Suzuki's "confused subjectivity" because smrti in the sense of vasana is not unfamiliar to the readers of such Buddhist works as Lahkavatara. The word "subjectivity" seems to be too European a term to be used as a word to represent the Buddhist sense.

subjectively does not exist by itself, that the negation (sunyata) is also void (siinyd) in its nature, that neither that which is negated nor that which negates is an independent entity. It is the pure soul that manifests itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and completely holds all things within it. On that account it may be called affirmation. But yet there is no trace of affirmation in it, because it is not the product of the creative instinctive memory (smrti) of conceptual thought and the only way of grasping the truth—the thatness, is by transcending all conceptual creations.

"The soul as birth and death (samsdra) comes forth from the Tathagata womb (tatJidgalagarbhd), the ultimate reality. But the immortal and the mortal coincide with each other. Though they are not identical they are not duality either. Thus when the absolute soul assumes a relative aspect by its self-affirmation it is called the all-conserving mind (dlayavijhdnd). It embraces two principles, (1) enlightenment, (2) non-enlightenment. Enlightenment is the perfection of the mind when it is free from the corruptions of the creative instinctive incipient memory {smrti). It penetrates all and is the unity of all (dliarma-dhdtu). That is to say, it is the universal dharmakaya of all Tathagatas constituting the ultimate foundation of existence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence—a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the influence of the delusive smrti. The multitude of people {bahujand) are said to be lacking in enlightenment, because ignorance (avidyd) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of smrti (past confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of this smrti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal nor in a spatial relation with the one soul, for they are not self-existent.

"This high enlightenment shows itself imperfectly in our corrupted phenomenal experience as prajna (wisdom) and karma (incomprehensible activity of life). By pure wisdom we understand that when one, by virtue of the perfuming power of dharma, disciplines himself truthfully (i.e. according to the dharma) and accomplishes meritorious deeds, the mind (i.e. the dlayavijndnd)

which implicates itself with birth and death will be broken down and the modes of the evolving consciousness will be annulled, and the pure and the genuine wisdom of the Dharmakaya will manifest itself. Though all modes of consciousness and mentation are mere products of ignorance, ignorance in its ultimate nature is identical and non-identical with enlightenment; and therefore ignorance is in one sense destructible, though in another sense it is indestructible. This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidya), the waves of mentality (vijnana) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed." It is for ever cut off from the hindrances both affectional (klesavarand) and intellectual (jfieyavarand), as well as from the mind (i.e. alayavijnand) which implicates itself with birth and death, since it is in its true nature clean, pure, eternal, calm, and immutable. The truth again is such that it transforms and unfolds itself wherever conditions are favourable in the form of a tathagata or in some other forms, in order that all beings may be induced thereby to bring their virtue to maturity.

" Non-elightenment has no existence of its own aside from its relation with enlightenment a priori." But enlightenment a priori is spoken of only in contrast to non-enlightenment, and as non-enlightenment is a non-entity, true enlightenment in turn loses its significance too. They are distinguished only in mutual relation as enlightenment or non-enlightenment. The manifestations of non-enlightenment are made in three ways: (1) as a disturbance of the mind (alayavijhami), by the avidyakarma (ignorant

action), producing misery (duhkha); (2) by the appearance of an ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an external world which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned by the unreal external world six kinds of phenomena arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation); being affected by the external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second phenomenon is succession. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention and succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging. The fourth phenomenon is an attachment to names or ideas {samjna\ etc. By clinging the mind hypostatizes all names whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds {karma). On account of attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon is the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and curtailed of its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through avidya.

The relation between this truth and avidya is in one sense a mere identity and may be illustrated by the simile of all kinds of pottery which though different are all made of the same clay 1 . Likewise the undefined {anasrava) and ignorance {avidya) and their various transient forms all come from one and the same entity. Therefore Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity abiding in Nirvana.

It is by the touch of ignorance {avidya) that this truth assumes all the phenomenal forms of existence.

In the all-conserving mind {alayavijhana) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego {manas). Five different names are given to the ego (according to its different modes of operation). The first name is activity-consciousness {karmavijnand) in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to be disturbed (or

1 Compare Chandogya, vi. 1.4.

awakened). The second name is evolving-consciousness (pravrtti-vijhdnd) in the sense that when the mind is disturbed, there evolves that which sees an external world. The third name is representation-consciousness in the sense that the ego (manas) represents (or reflects) an external world. As a clean mirror reflects the images of all description, it is even so with the representation-consciousness. When it is confronted, for instance, with the objects of the five senses, it represents them instantaneously and without effort. The fourth is particularization-consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things defiled as well as pure. The fifth name is succession-consciousness, in the sense that continuously directed by the awakening consciousness of attention (inanaskara) it (inanas) retains all experiences and never loses or suffers the destruction of any karma, good as well as evil, which had been sown in the past, and whose retribution, painful or agreeable, it never fails to mature, be it in the present or in the future, and also in the sense that it unconsciously recollects things gone by and in imagination anticipates things to come. Therefore the three domains (kamaloka, domain of feeling— rupaloka, domain of bodily existence— arupaloka, domain of incorporeality) are nothing but the self manifestation of the mind (i.e. alaycruijiidna which is practically identical with bhuta-tathata). Since all things, owing the principle of their existence to the mind (alayavijnana\ are produced by smrti, all the modes of particularization are the self-particularizations of the mind. The mind in itself (or the soul) being however free from all attributes is not differentiated. Therefore we come to the conclusion that all things and conditions in the phenomenal world, hypostatized and established only through ignorance {avidya) and memory {smrti), have no more reality than the images in a mirror. They arise simply from the ideality of a particularizing mind. When the mind is disturbed, the multiplicity of things is produced; but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears. By ego-consciousness (jnanoviji'iana) we mean the ignorant mind which by its succession-consciousness clings to the conception of I and Not-1 and misapprehends the nature of the six objects of sense. The ego-consciousness is also called separation-consciousness, because it is nourished by the perfuming influence of the prejudices {dsrava), intellectual as well as affectional. Thus believing in the external world produced by memory, the mind becomes

oblivious of the principle of sameness (samata) that underlies all things which are one and perfectly calm and tranquil and show no sign of becoming.

Non-enlightenment is the raison d'etre of samsara. When this is annihilated the conditions—the external world—are also annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also annihilated. But this annihilation does not mean the annihilation of the mind but of its modes only. It becomes calm like an unruffled sea when all winds which were disturbing it and producing the waves have been annihilated.

In describing the relation of the interaction of avidya (ignorance), karmavijfiana (activity-consciousness—thesubjective mind), visaya (external world—represented by the senses) and the tathata (suchness), Asvaghosa says that there is an interperfuming of these elements. Thus Asvaghosa says, "By perfuming we mean that while our worldly clothes (viz. those which we wear) have no odour of their own, neither offensive nor agreeable, they can yet acquire one or the other odour according to the nature of the substance with which they are perfumed. Suchness {tathata) is likewise a pure dharma free from all defilements caused by the perfuming power of ignorance. On the other hand ignorance has nothing to do with purity. Nevertheless we speak of its being able to do the work of purity because it in its turn is perfumed by suchness. Determined by suchness ignorance becomes the raison d'etre of all forms of defilement. And this ignorance perfumes suchness and produces smrti. This smrti in its turn perfumes ignorance. On account of this (reciprocal) perfuming, the truth is misunderstood. On account of its being misunderstood an external world of subjectivity appears. Further, on account of the perfuming power of memory, various modes of individuation are produced. And by clinging to them various deeds are done, and we suffer as the result miseries mentally as well as bodily." Again "suchness perfumes ignorance, and in consequence of this perfuming the individual in subjectivity is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death and to seek after the blessing of Nirvana. This longing and loathing on the part of the subjective mind in turn perfumes suchness. On account of this perfuming influence we are enabled to believe that we are in possession within ourselves of suchness whose essential nature is pure and immaculate; and we also recognize that all phenomena in the world are nothing

but the illusory manifestations of the mind {alayavijnand) and have no reality of their own. Since we thus rightly understand the truth, we can practise the means of liberation, can perform those actions which are in accordance with the dharma. We should neither particularize, nor cling to objects of desire. By virtue of this discipline and habituation during the lapse of innumerable asarikhyeyakalpas 1 we get ignorance annihilated. As ignorance is thus annihilated, the mind {alayavijnand) is no longer disturbed, so as to be subject to individuation. As the mind is no longer disturbed, the particularization of the surrounding world is annihilated. When in this wise the principle and the condition of defilement, their products, and the mental disturbances are all annihilated, it is said that we attain Nirvana and that various spontaneous displays of activity are accomplished." The Nirvana of the tathata philosophy is not nothingness, but tathata (suchness or thatness) in its purity unassociated with any kind of disturbance which produces all the diversity of experience.

To the question that if all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness and are therefore equally perfumed by it, how is it that there are some who do not believe in it, while others do, Asvaghosa's reply is that though all beings are uniformly in possession of suchness, the intensity of ignorance and the principle of individuation, that work from all eternity, vary in such manifold grades as to outnumber the sands of the Ganges, and hence the difference. There is an inherent perfuming principle in one's own being which, embiaced and protected by the love {maitri) and compassion {karuna) of all Buddhas and Bodhisatt-vas, is caused to loathe the misery of birth and death, to believe in nirvana, to cultivate the root of merit (kusalamula), to habituate oneself to it and to bring it to maturity. In consequence of this, one is enabled to see all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and, receiving instructions from them, is benefited, gladdened and induced to practise good deeds, etc., till one can attain to Buddhahood and enter into Nirvana. This implies that all beings have such perfuming power in them that they may be affected by the good wishes of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas for leading them to the path of virtue, and thus it is that sometimes hearing the Bodhisattvas and sometimes seeing them, "all beings thereby acquire (spiritual) benefits (Jiitata)" and "entering into the samadhi of purity, they

1 Technical name for a very vast period of time.

destroy hindrances wherever they are met with and obtain all-penetrating insight that enables them to become conscious of the absolute oneness (samata) of the universe {sarvalokd) and to see innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

There is a difference between the perfuming which is not in unison with suchness, as in the case of sravakas (theravadin monks), pratyekabuddhas and the novice bodhisattvas, who only continue their religious discipline but do not attain to the state of non-particularization in unison with the essence of suchness. But those bodhisattvas whose perfuming is already in unison with suchness attain to the state of non-particularization and allow themselves to be influenced only by the power of the dharma. The incessant perfuming of the defiled dharma (ignorance from all eternity) works on, but when one attains to Buddhahood one at once puts an end to it. The perfuming of the pure dharma (i.e. suchness) however works on to eternity without any interruption. For this suchness or thatness is the effulgence of great wisdom, the universal illumination of the dharmadhatu (universe), the true and adequate knowledge, the mind pure and clean in its own nature, the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulating and the pure, the tranquil, the inimitable and the free, and this is called the tathagatagarbha or the dharmakaya. It may be objected that since thatness or suchness has been described as being without characteristics, it is now a contradiction to speak of it as embracing all merits, but it is held, that in spite of its embracing all merits, it is free in its nature from all forms of distinction, because all objects in the world are of one and the same taste; and being of one reality they have nothing to do with the modes of par-ticularization or of dualistic character. "Though all things in their (metaphysical) origin come from the soul alone and in truth are free from particularization, yet on account of non-enlightenment there originates a subjective mind {alayavijhanci) that becomes conscious of an external world." This is called ignorance or avidya. Nevertheless the pure essence of the mind is perfectly pure and there is no awakening of ignorance in it. Hence we assign to suchness this quality, the effulgence of great wisdom. It is called universal illumination, because there is nothing for it to illumine. This perfuming of suchness therefore continues for ever, though the stage of the perfuming of avidya comes to an end with the Buddhas when they attain to nirvana. All Buddhas while at

8 Buddhist Philosophy [ch.

the stage of discipline feel a deep compassion (inaJidkaruna) for all beings, practise all virtues (pdramt'tds) and many other meritorious deeds, treat others as their own selves, and wish to work out a universal salvation of mankind in ages to come, through limitless numbers of kalpas, recognize truthfully and adequately the principle of equality (samata) among people; and do not cling to the individual existence of a sentient being. This is what is meant by the activity of tathata. The main idea of this tathata philosophy seems to be this, that this transcendent "thatness" is at once the quintessence of all thought and activity; as avidya veils it or perfumes it, the world-appearance springs forth, but as the pure thatness also perfumes the avidya there is a striving for the good as well. As the stage of avidya is passed its luminous character shines forth, for it is the ultimate truth which only illusorily appeared as the many of the world.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth than that of the nihilistic idealism of Lankavatara. Considering the fact that Asvaghosa was a learned Brahmin scholar in his early life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upanisad influence in this interpretation of Buddhism, which compares so favourably with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sankara. The Lankavatara admitted a reality only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self (atmaii). But Asvaghosa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Nagarjuna's Madhyamika doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of Asvaghosa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist creed and to the Vijnanavada creed of Buddhism as explained in the Lankavatara 1 .

The Madhyamika or the Sunyavada school.—Nihilism.

Candraklrtti, the commentator of Nagarjuna's verses known as "Madhyamika kdrikd" in explaining the doctrine of dependent origination {pratltyasamntpada) as described by Nagarjuna starts with two interpretations of the word. According to one the word pratityasamutpada means the origination {ittpadd) of the nonexistent (abhava) depending on {pratityd) reasons and causes

1 As I have no access to the Chinese translation of Asvaghosa's Sraddhotpada Siislra, I had to depend entirely on Suzuki's expressions as they appear in his translation.

(hetupratyaya). According to the other interpretation pratitya means each and every destructible individual and pratityasamutpada means the origination of each and every destructible individual. But he disapproves of both these meanings. The second meaning does not suit the context in which the Pali Scriptures generally speak of pratityasamutpada (e.g. caksnh pratitya riipdni ca ntpadyante caksiirvijhdnaui) for it does not mean the origination of each and every destructible individual, but the originating of specific individual phenomena (e.g. perception of form by the operation in connection with the eye) depending upon certain specific conditions.

The first meaning also is equally unsuitable. Thus for example if we take the case of any origination, e.g. that of the visual percept, we see that there cannot be any contact between visual knowledge and physical sense, the eye, and so it would not be intelligible that the former should depend upon the latter. If we interpret the maxim of pratityasamutpada as this happening that happens, that would not explain any specific origination. All origination is false, for a thing can neither originate by itself nor by others, nor by a co-operation of both nor without any reason. For if a thing exists already it cannot originate again by itself. To suppose that it is originated by others would also mean that the origination was of a thing already existing. If again without any further qualification it is said that depending on one the other comes into being, then depending on anything any other thing could come into being—from light we could have darkness! Since a thing could not originate from itself or by others, it could not also be originated by a combination of both of them together. A thing also could not originate without any cause, for then all things could come into being at all times. It is therefore to be acknowledged that wherever the Buddha spoke of this so-called dependent origination {pratityasamutpada) it was referred to as illusory manifestations appearing to intellects and senses stricken with ignorance. This dependent origination is not thus a real law, but only an appearance due to ignorance (avidya). The only thing which is not lost (amosadharmd) is nirvana; but all other forms of knowledge and phenomena {saviskdras) are false and are lost with their appearances (sarva-samskdrdsca mrsaviosadhamnanaJi).

It is sometimes objected to this doctrine that if all appear-

ances are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor cycles of births {samsard) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnakutasutra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover consciousness (citta)\ what cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist, and what does not exist Is neither past, nor Tutu re, nor present, and as such it cannot be said to have any nature at all; and that which has no nature is subject neither to origination nor to extinction. He who through his false knowledge {viparyydsa) does not comprehend the falsehood of all appearances, but thinks them to be real, works and suffers the cycles of rebirth {samsdrd). Like all illusions, though false these appearances can produce all the harm of rebirth and sorrow.

It may again be objected that if there is nothing true according to the nihilists {sunyavadins), then their statement that there is no origination or extinction is also not true. Candraklrtti in replying to this says that with sunyavadins the truth is absolute silence. When theSunyavadin sages argue, they only accept for the moment what other people regard as reasons, and deal with them in their own manner to help them to come to a right comprehension of all appearances. It is of no use to say, in spite of all arguments tending to show the falsehood of all appearances, that they are testified by our experience, for the whole thing that we call "our experience" is but false illusion inasmuch as these phenomena have no true essence.

When the doctrine of pratltyasamutpada is described as "this being that is," what is really meant is that things can only be indicated as mere appearances one after another, for they have no essence or true nature. Nihilism (Junyavddd) also means just this. The true meaning of pratltyasamutpada or sunyavada is this, that there is no truth, no essence in all phenomena that

appear 1 . As the phenomena have no essence they are neither produced nor destroyed; they really neither come nor go. They are merely the appearance of maya or illusion. The void (sfmyd) does not mean pure negation, for that is relative to some kind of position. It simply means that none of the appearances have any intrinsic nature of their own (nihsvabhdvatvani).

The Madhyamaka or Sunya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhava) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhava). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhava), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either 2 .

It is again objected that we nevertheless perceive a process going on. To this the Madhyamaka reply is that a process of change could not be~am"rmed oFthings that are permanent. But we can hardly speak of a process with reference to momentary things; for those which are momentary are destroyed the next moment after they appear, and so there is nothing which can continue to justify a process. That which appears as being neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere, and that which appears as destroyed also does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere, and so a process (samsarci) cannot be affirmed of them. It cannot be that when the second moment arose, the first moment had suffered a change in the process, for it was not the same as the second, as there is no so-called cause-effect connection. In fact there being no relation between the two, the temporal determination as prior and later is wrong. The supposition that there is a self which suffers changes is also not valid, for howsoever we

1 See Madkyamikavrtti (B.T.S.). P- 50. 2 Ibid. pp. 93-100.

may search we find the five skandhas but no self. Moreover if the soul is a unity it cannot undergo any process or progression, for that would presuppose that the soul abandons one character and takes up another at the same identical moment which is inconceivable 1 .

But then again the question arises that if there is no process, and no cycle of worldly existence of thousands of afflictions, what is then the nirvana which is described as the final extinction of all afflictions (klesa)} To this the Madhyamaka reply is that it does not agree to such a definition of nirvana. Nirvana on the Madhyamaka theory is the absence of the essence of all phenomena, that which cannot be conceived either as anything which has ceased or as anything which is produced (aniruddham anutpannairi). In nirvana all phenomena are lost; we say that the phenomena cease to exist in nirvana, but like the illusory snake in the rope they never existed 2 . Nirvana cannot be any positive thing or any sort of state of being (b/idva), for all positive states or things are joint products of combined causes (samskrtd) and are liable to decay and destruction. Neither can it be a negative existence, for since we cannot speak of any positive existence, we cannot speak of a negative existence either. The appearances or the phenomena are communicated as being in a state of change and process coming one after another, but beyond that no essence, existence, or truth can be affirmed of them. Phenomena sometimes appear to be produced and sometimes to be destroyed, but they cannot be determined as existent or non-existent. Nirvana is merely the cessation of the seeming phenomenal flow (prapancapravrtti). It cannot therefore be designated either as positive or as negative for these conceptions belong to phenomena {na capravrttimatram bhavabhaveti parikalpitum paryyate evam na bhavabhavanir-vanam, M.V. 197). In this state there is nothing which is known, and even the knowledge that the phenomena have ceased to appear is not found. Even the Buddha himself is a phenomenon, a mirage or a dream, and so are all his teachings 3 .

It is easy to see that in this system there cannot exist any bondage or emancipation; all phenomena are like shadows, like the mirage, the dream, the maya, and the magic without any real nature {tiihsvabhava). It is mere false knowledge to suppose that

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-102. 2 Ibid. p. 194.

3 Ibid. pp. 162 and 201.

one is trying to win a real nirvana 1 . It is this false egoism that is to be considered as avidya. When considered deeply it is found that there is not even the slightest trace of any positive existence. Thus it is seen that if there were no ignorance (avidya), there would have been no conformations (samskaras), and if there were no conformations there would have been no consciousness, and so on; but it cannot be said of the ignorance "I am generating the samskaras," and it can be said of the samskaras "we are being produced by the avidya." But there being avidya, there come the samskaras and so on with other categories too. This character of the pratityasamutpada is known as the coming of the consequent depending on an antecedent reason (hetupanibandha).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination {pratyayopanibandha). It is by the combination (samavdya) of the four elements, space (dkdsa) and consciousness (vijnana) that a man is made. It is due to earth (prthivi) that the body becomes solid, it is due to water that there is fat in the body, it is due to fire that there is digestion, it is due to wind that there is respiration; it is due to akasa that there is porosity, and it is due to vijnana that there is mind-consciousness. It is by their mutual combination that we find a man as he is. But none of these elements think that they have done any of the functions that are considered to be allotted to them. None of these are real substances or beings or souls. It is by ignorance that these are thought of as existents and attachment is generated for them. Through ignorance thus come the samskaras, consisting of attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness (rdga, dvesa, mo/ia) ; from these proceed the vijnana and the four skandhas. These with the four elements bring about name and form (ndmarupa), from these proceed the senses (sadayatana), from the coming together of those three comes contact (sparsa); from that feelings, from that comes desire (trsna) and so on. These flow on like the stream of a river, but there is no essence or truth behind them all or as the ground of them all 2 . The phenomena therefore cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent, and no truth can be affirmed of either eternalism (sasvatavada) or nihilism (ucchedavada), and it is for this reason

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), pp. 101-108.

"- Ibid. pp. 209-211, quoted from Salistambhasutra. Vacaspatimisra also quotes this passage in his Bhamati on Sarikara's Brahma-ititra.

that this doctrine is called the middle doctrine (mad/iyamaka) 1 . Existence and non-existence have only a relative truth (sam-vrtisatyd) in them, as in all phenomena, but there is no true reality (paramarthasatyd) in them or anything else. Morality plays as high a part in this nihilistic system as it does in any other Indian system. I quote below some stanzas from Nagar-juna's Suhrllekha as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886) from the Tibetan translation.

6. Knowing that riches are unstable and void (asara) give according to the moral precepts, to Bhikshus, Brahmins, the poor and friends for there is no better friend than giving.

7. Exhibit morality (Si/a) faultless and sublime, unmixed and spotless, for morality is the supporting ground of all eminence, as the earth is of the moving and immovable.

8. Exercise the imponderable, transcendental virtues of charity, morality, patience, energy, meditation, and likewise wisdom, in order that, having reached the farther shore of the sea of existence, you may become a Jina prince.

9. View as enemies, avarice (mdtsaryyd), deceit (sathya\ duplicity (mayo), lust, indolence (kaitsidya), pride (mana\ greed (raga), hatred (dvesa) and pride (mada) concerning family, figure, glory, youth, or power.

15. Since nothing is so difficult of attainment as patience, open no door for anger; the Buddha has pronounced that he who renounces anger shall attain the degree of an anagamin (a saint who never suffers rebirth).

21. Do not look after another's wife; but if you see her, regard her, according to age, like your mother, daughter or sister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.

29. Thou who knowest the world, be equanimous against the eight worldly conditions, gain and loss, happiness and suffering, fame and dishonour, blame and praise, for they are not objects for your thoughts.

37. But one (a woman) that is gentle as a sister, winning as a friend, careful of your well being as a mother, obedient as a servant her (you must) honour as the guardian god(dess) of the family.

40. Always perfectly meditate on (turn your thoughts to) kindness, pity, joy and indifference; then if you do not obtain a higher degree you (certainly) will obtain the happiness of Brahman's world (brahmavihdra).

41. By the four dhyanas completely abandoning desire (kama\ reflection (vicara), joy (firi/i), and happiness and pain (sukha, duhkha) you will obtain as fruit the lot of a Brahman.

49. If you say "I am not the form, you thereby will understand I am not endowed with form, I do not dwell in form, the form does not dwell in me ; and in like manner you will understand the voidness of the other four aggregates."

50. The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from

1 See Madhyamikavrtti (B.T.S.), p. 160.

nature (Jirakrti), not from themselves (svabhdvdt), nor from the Lord (jsvara), nor yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (avidyd) and desire (trsna).

51. Know that attachment to religious ceremonies (Jilabratapardmarsd), wrong views (mithyddrsti) and doubt (vicikitsd) are the three fetters.

53. Steadily instruct yourself (more and more) in the highest morality, the highest wisdom and the highest thought, for the hundred and fifty one rules (of the prdtimoksd) are combined perfectly in these three.

58. Because thus (as demonstrated) all this is unstable (anitya) without substance {andtma) without help {asarand) without protector (andtha) and without abode {astha.no) thou O Lord of men must become discontented with this worthless (asdra) kadali-tree of the orb.

104. If a fire were to seize your head or your dress you would extinguish and subdue it, even then endeavour to annihilate desire, for there is no other higher necessity than this.

105. By morality, knowledge and contemplation, attain the spotless dignity of the quieting and the subduing nirvana not subject to age, death or decay, devoid of earth, water, fire, wind, sun and moon.

107. Where there is no wisdom {prajnd) there is also no contemplation {dhydna), where there is no contemplation there is also no wisdom; but know that for him who possesses these two the sea of existence is like a grove.

Uncompromising Idealism or the School of Vijnanavada Buddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijnanavada or Yogacara has often been referred to by such prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumarila and Sarikara. It agrees to a great extent with the Sunyavadins whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary constructions of ignorant minds. There is no movement in the so-called external world as we suppose, for it does not exist. We construct it ourselves and then are ourselves deluded that it exists by itself \nirminitapratimohiy. There are two functions involved in our consciousness, viz. that which holds the perceptions (khyati vijiiand), and that which orders them by imaginary constructions {vasluprativikalpavijhana). The two functions however mutually determine each other and cannot be separately distinguished (abhinnalaksane anyonyahetuke). These functions are set to work on account of the beginningless instinctive tendencies inherent in them, in relation to the world of appearance {anadikala-pra-panca-vasanahetukancd) 2 .

All sense knowledge can be stopped only when the diverse

1 Laiikdvatdrasutra, pp. 21-22. 2 Ibid. p. 44.

D. IO

unmanifested instincts of imagination are stopped {abhuta-parikalpa-Tjasand-vaicitra-nirodhay. All our phenomenal knowledge is without any essence or truth (iiihsvabhava) and is but a creation of maya, a mirage or a dream. There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind (svacitta), which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time. This mind by whose movement these creations take place as subject and object has no appearance in itself and is thus without any origination, existence m\dextmction(utpddast/iitib/iangavar/jaw)and is called the alayavijnana. The reason why this alayavijnana itself is said to be without origination, existence, and extinction is probably this, that it is always a hypothetical state which merely explains all the phenomenal states that appear, and therefore it has no existence in the sense in which the term is used and we could not affirm any special essence of it.

We do not realize that all visible phenomena are of nothing external but of our own mind (svna'tta), and there is also the beginningless tendency for believing and creating a phenomenal world of appearance. There is also the nature of knowledge (which takes things as the perceiver and the perceived) and there is also the instinct in the mind to experience diverse forms. On account of these four reasons there are produced in the alayavijnana (mind) the ripples of our sense experiences (pravrttivijiidnd) as in a lake, and these are manifested as sense experiences. All the five skan-dhas called paficavijndnakdya thus appear in a proper synthetic form. None of the phenomenal knowledge that appears is either identical or different from the alayavijnana just as the waves cannot be said to be either identical or different from the ocean. As the ocean dances on in waves so the citta or the alayavijnana is also dancing as it were in its diverse operations (vrtti). As citta it collects all movements {karma) within it, as manas it synthesizes {vidhlyate) and as vijnana it constructs the fivefold perceptions {yijndnen vijanati drsyani kalpatepahcabhiJC)^.

It is only due to maya (illusion) that the phenomena appear in their twofold aspect as subject and object. This must always be regarded as an appearance (samvrtisatyatd) whereas in the real aspect we could never say whether they existed (b/idva) or did not exist 3 .

1 Lankavatdrasulra, p. 44. 2 Ibid. pp. 50-55.

3 Asanga's A/akayanasiilrdlatnkara, pp. 58-59.

All phenomena both being and non-being are illusory {sada-santah mdyopamdh). When we look deeply into them we find that there is an absolute negation of all appearances, including even all negations, for they are also appearances. This would make the ultimate truth positive. But this is not so, for it is that in which the positive and negative are one and the same {bhdvdbhdvasa-mdnatd) 1 . Such a state which is complete in itself and has no name and no substance had been described in the Larikavatara-sutra as thatness {tathata)'. This state is also described in another place in the Lankdvatdra as voidness (sunyata) which is one and has no origination and no essence 3 . In another place it is also designated as tathagatagarbha 4 .

It may be supposed that this doctrine of an unqualified ultimate truth comes near to the Vedantic atman or Brahman like the tathata doctrine of Asvaghosa; and we find in Larika-vatara that Ravana asks the Buddha " How can you say that your doctrine of tathagatagarbha was not the same as the atman doctrine of the other schools of philosophers, for those heretics also consider the atman as eternal, agent, unqualified, all-pervading and unchanged?" To this the Buddha is found to reply thus—"Our doctrine is not the same as the doctrine of those heretics; it is in consideration of the fact that the instruction of a philosophy which considered that there was no soul or substance in anything (nairdtmya) would frighten the disciples, that I say that all things are in reality the tathagatagarbha. This should not be regarded as atman. Just as a lump of clay is made into various shapes, so it is the non-essential nature of all phenomena and their freedom from all characteristics {sarvavikal-palaksauavinivrttam) that is variously described as the garbha or the nairatmya (essencelessness). This explanation of tathagatagarbha as the ultimate truth and reality is given in order to attract to our creed those heretics who are superstitiously inclined to believe in the atman doctrine 5 ."

So far as the appearance of the phenomena was concerned the idealistic Buddhists {vijudnavddins) agreed to the doctrine of pratltyasamutpada with certain modifications. There was with them an external pratltyasamutpada just as it appeared in the

1 Asanga's Mahay anas ill rdlamkdra, p. 65.

2 Lankavatarasutra, p. 70. 3 Ibid. p. 78.

* Ibid. p. 80. 5 Ibid. pp. 80-81.

objective aspect and an internal pratltyasamutpada. The external pratltyasamutpada (dependent origination) is represented in the way in which material things (e.g. a jug) came into being by the co-operation of diverse elements—the lump of clay, the potter, the wheel, etc. The internal (ddhydtmikci) pratltyasamutpada was represented by avidya, trsna, karma, the skandhas, and the ayatanas produced out of them 1 .

Our understanding is composed of two categories called the pravicayabiiddlii and the vikalpalaksanagrahdbhinivesapratisthd-pikdbuddhi. The pravicayabuddhi is that which always seeks to take things in either of the following four ways, that they are either this or the other {ekatvdnyatva); either both or not both (ubhaydniibhayd), either are or are not (astinasti), either eternal or non-eternal {idtydnityd). But in reality none of these can be affirmed of the phenomena. The second category consists of that habit of the mind by virtue of which it constructs diversities and arranges them (created in their turn by its own constructive activity — parikalpd) in a logical order of diverse relations of subject and predicate, causal and other relations. He who knows the nature of these two categories of the mind knows that there is no external world of matter and that they are all experienced only in the mind. There is no water, but it is the sense construction of smoothness (sneka) that constructs the water as an external substance; it is the sense construction of activity or energy that constructs the external substance of fire; it is the sense construction of movement that constructs the external substance of air. In this way through the false habit of taking the unreal as the real {mithyasatyabhinivesd) five skandhas appear. If these were to appear all together, we could not speak of any kind of causal relations, and if they appeared in succession there could be no connection between them, as there is nothing to bind them together. In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived with all their relations, and ourselves as per-ceivers. It is simply a convention {yyavaharci) to speak of things as known*. Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech-construction {vdgvikalpa) and unreal. In speech one could not speak of anything without relating things in some kind of causal

1 Lankavatarasiilra, p. 85.

a Laiikavalarasulra, p. 87, compare the term " vyavaharika" as used of the phenomenal and the conventional world in almost the same sense by 6ankara.

relation, but none of these characters may be said to be true; the real truth {paramdrtha) can never be referred to by such speech-construction.

The nothingness (sunyata) of things may be viewed from seven aspects—(1) that they are always interdependent, and hence have no special characteristics by themselves, and as they cannot be determined in themselves they cannot be determined in terms of others, for, their own nature being undetermined, a reference to an " other " is also undetermined, and hence they are all indefinable (laksanasunyatd) ; (2) that they have no positive essence (bhdvasvabhdvasunyatd), since they spring up from a natural nonexistence (svabhdvdbhdvotpatti); (3) that they are of an unknown type of non-existence {apracaritasunyata), since all the skandhas vanish in the nirvana; (4) that they appear phenomenally as connected though non-existent {pracaritasunyata), for their skandhas have no reality in themselves nor are they related to others, but yet they appear to be somehow causally connected; (5) that none of the things can be described as having any definite nature, they are all undemonstrable by language {nirabhilapyasunyata) ; (6) that there cannot be any knowledge about them except that which is brought about by the long-standing defects of desires which pollute all our vision; (7) that things are also non-existent in the sense that we affirm them to be in a particular place and time in which they are not {itaretarasunyatd).

There is thus only non-existence, which again is neither eternal nor destructible, and the world is but a dream and a maya; the two kinds of negation (nirodhd) are akasa (space) and nirvana; things which are neither existent nor non-existent are only imagined to be existent by fools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of this school, that the reality is called the tathagatagarbha (the womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal appearances of the clusters {skandhas), elements (dfidtus), and fields of sense operation {dyatanas) only serve to veil it with impurities, and this would bring it nearer to the assumption of a universal soul as the reality. But the Lankdvatdra attempts to explain away this conflict by suggesting that the reference to the tathagatagarbha as the reality is only a sort of false bait to attract those who are afraid of listening to the nairatmya (non-soul) doctrine 1 .

1 Lankdvatarasiilra, p. 80.

The Bodhisattvas may attain their highest by the fourfold knowledge of (1) svacittadrsyablidvand, (2) utpddasthitibkahga-vivarjjanata, (3) bahyabhavabhdvopalaksanatd and (4) svapra-tydryyajfidnddhigamabhinnalaksanatd. The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (vdsand) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.

The four dhyanas spoken of in the Lankdvatdra seem to be different from those which have been described in connection with the Theravada Buddhism. These dhyanas are called (1) balo-pacdrika, (2) arthapravicaya, (3) tathatdlambana and (4) tathd-gata. The first one is said to be that practised by the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It consists in concentrating upon the doctrine that there is no soul (pudgalanairdtmya), and that everything is transitory, miserable and impure. When considering all things in this way from beginning to end the sage advances on till all conceptual knowing ceases (dsamjndnirodhdt); we have what is called the valopacarika dhyana (the meditation for beginners).

The second is the advanced state where not only there is full consciousness that there is no self, but there is also the comprehension that neither these nor the doctrines of other heretics may be said to exist, and that there is none of the dharmas that appears. This is called the arthapravicayadhydna, for the sage concentrates here on the subject of thoroughly seeking out (pra-vicayci) the nature of all things (artha).

The third dhyana, that in which the mind realizes that the thought that there is no self nor that there are the appearances, is itself the result of imagination and thus lapses into the thatness (tathata). This dhyana is called tathatdlambana, because it has for its object tathata or thatness.

The last or the fourth dhyana is that in which the lapse of the mind into the state of thatness is such that the nothingness and incomprehensibility of all phenomena is perfectly realized;

and nirvana is that in which all root desires {vasana) manifesting themselves in knowledge are destroyed and the mind with knowledge and perceptions, making false creations, ceases to work. This cannot be called death, for it will not have any rebirth and it cannot be called destruction, for only compounded things (samskrta) suffer destruction, so that it is different from either death or destruction. This nirvana is different from that of the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas for they are satisfied to call that state nirvana, in which by the knowledge of the general characteristics of all things (transitoriness and misery) they are not attached to things and cease to make erroneous judgments 1 .

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When it is said that the world is maya or illusion, what is meant to be emphasized is this, that there is no cause, no ground. The phenomena that seem to originate, stay, and be destroyed are mere constructions of tainted imagination, and the tathata or thatness is nothing but the turning away of this constructive activity or nature of the imagination (vikalpa) tainted with the associations of beginningless root desires {vasana) 2 . The tathata has no separate reality from illusion, but it is illusion itself when the course of the construction of illusion has ceased. It is therefore also spoken of as that which is cut off or detached from the mind (cittavimukta), for here there is no construction of imagination (sarvakalpandvirahitamy.

Sautrantika Theory of Perception.

Dharmottara (847 A.D.), a commentator of Dharmaklrtti's 4 (about 635 A.D.) Nyayabindii, a Sautrantika logical and episte-mological work, describes right knowledge (samyagjnana) as an invariable antecedent to the accomplishment of all that a man

1 Lankdvatdrasutra, p. ioo. 2 Ibid. p. 109.

3 This account of the Vijnanavada school is collected mainly from Lankdvatdrasutra, as no other authentic work of the Vijnanavada school is available. Hindu accounts and criticisms of this school may be had in such books as Rumania's Sloka vdrttika or Sahkara's bhasya, 11. ii, etc. Asanga's Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra deals more with the duties concerning the career of a saint (Bodhisattva) than with the metaphysics of the system.

* Dharmaklrtti calls himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his Santdndntara-siddhi, a treatise on solipsism, but his Nydyabindu seems rightly to have been considered by the author of Nydyabindutikdtippanl (p. 19) as being written from the Sautrantika point of view.

desires to have (samyagjiidnapurvikd sarvapurusdrthasiddhi) 1 . When on proceeding, in accordance with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (arthddhi-gati). The process of knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (arthddhigamdt samaptah pramdnavydpdraJi). Thus there are three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while in inference this is brought about indirectly through the liriga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series {nllddau ya eva santdnah paricchinno nilajiidnena sa eva tena prdpitah tena nilajndnam pramdnamy.

When it is said that right knowledge is an invariable antecedent of the realization of any desirable thing or the retarding of any undesirable thing, it must be noted that it is not meant

1 Brief extracts from the opinions of two other commentators of Nyayabindu, Vinitadeva and Santabhadra (seventh century), are found in Nyayabitidutlkatippani, a commentary of Nydyabindntika of Dharmmottara, but their texts are not available to us.

" NyayabindiUikatippani, p. u.

that right knowledge is directly the cause of it; for, with the rise of any right perception, there is a memory of past experiences, desire is aroused, through desire an endeavour in accordance with it is launched, and as a result of that there is realization of the object of desire. Thus, looked at from this point of view, right knowledge is not directly the cause of the realization of the object. Right knowledge of course directly indicates the presentation, the object of desire, but so far as the object is a mere presentation it is not a subject of enquiry. It becomes a subject of enquiry only in connection with our achieving the object presented by perception. Perception (pratyaksa) has been defined by Dharmakirtti as a presentation, which is generated by the objects alone, unasso-ciated by any names or relations (kalpand) and which is not erroneous (kalpandpodhamabhrantamy. This definition does not indeed represent the actual nature (svarfipa) of perception, but only shows the condition which must be fulfilled in order that anything may be valid perception. What is meant by saying that a perception is not erroneous is simply this, that it will be such that if one engages himself in an endeavour in accordance with it, he will not be baffled in the object which was presented to him by his perception (tasmadgrahye artJie vasturupe yadaviparyastam tadabhrdntamiha veditavyam). It is said that a right perception could not be associated with names (kalpand or abhildpd). This qualification is added only with a view of leaving out all that is not directly generated by the object. A name is given to a thing only when it is associated in the mind, through memory, as being the same as perceived before. This cannot, therefore, be regarded as being produced by the object of perception. The senses present the objects by coming in contact with them, and the objects also must of necessity allow themselves to be presented as they are when they are in contact with the proper senses. But the work of recognition or giving names is not what is directly produced by the objects themselves, for this involves the unification of previous experiences, and this is certainly not what is presented

1 The definition first given in the Pramanasamuccaya (not available in Sanskrit) of Dinnaga (500 A.D.) was " Kalpanapodham" According to Dharmakirtti it is the indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa j'/ldna) consisting only of the copy of the object presented to the senses that constitutes the valid element presented to perception. The determinate knowledge (savikalpa jnand), as formed by the conceptual activity of the mind identifying the object with what has been experienced before, cannot be regarded as truly representing what is really presented to the senses.

to the sense {purvadrstdparadrstancdrthamekikurvadvijndnam-asannihitavisayam piirvadrstasydsannihitatvdt). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly. Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its and its alone (svalaksanam). The validity of knowledge consists in the sameness that it has with the objects presented by it (arthena saha yatsdrupyam sddrsya?nasya jndnasya tatpra-mdnamihd). But the objection here is that if our percept is only similar to the external object then this similarity is a thing which is different from the presentation, and thus perception becomes invalid. But the similarity is not different from the percept which appears as being similar to the object. It is by virtue of their sameness that we refer to the object by the percept (taditi sdrupyam tasya vasdf) and our perception of the object becomes possible. It is because we have an awareness of blueness that we speak of having perceived a blue object. The relation, however, between the notion of similarity of the perception with the blue object and the indefinite awareness of blue in perception is not one of causation but of a determinant and a determinate (yyavasthdpya-vyavasthdpakabhdvend). Thus it is the same cognition which in one form stands as signifying the similarity with the object of perception and is in another indefinite form the awareness as the percept (lata ekasya vastunah kincidrupam pramdnam kincitpra-mdnapkalam na virudhyate). It is on account of this similarity with the object that a cognition can be a determinant of the definite awareness {yyavasthdpanaheturhi sdrupyant), so that by the determinate we know the determinant and thus by the similarity of the sense-datum with the object (pramdna) we come to think that our awareness has this particular form as "blue" (pramdnaphala). If this sameness between the knowledge and its object was not felt we could not have spoken of the object from the awareness (sdrnpyamanubhiitam vyavasthdpanahetiiti). The object generates an awareness similar to itself, and it is this correspondence that can lead us to the realization of the object so presented by right knowledge 1 .

1 See also pp. 340 and 409. It is unfortunate that, excepting the Nyayabindu, Nyayabindutlka, Nyayabindutlkatippani (St Petersburg, 1909), no other works dealing with this interesting doctrine of perception are available to us. Nyayabindu is probably

Sautrantika theory of Inference 1 .

According to the Sautrantika doctrine of Buddhism as described by Dharmakirtti and Dharmmottara which is probably the only account of systematic Buddhist logic that is now available to us in Sanskrit, inference (amimdna) is divided into two classes, called svarthanumana (inferential knowledge attained by a person arguing in his own mind or judgments), and pararthanumana (inference through the help of articulated propositions for convincing others in a debate). The validity of inference depended, like the validity of perception, on copying the actually existing facts of the external world. Inference copied external realities as much as perception did; just as the validity of the immediate perception of blue depends upon its similarity to the external blue thing perceived, so the validity of the inference of a blue thing also, so far as it is knowledge, depends upon its resemblance to the external fact thus inferred (sarupyavasaddhi tannilapratitiriipam sidhyati).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these joint conditions that an unfailing connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the above case. This law (niyama) is essential for establishing the unfailing condition necessary for inference 2 . This unfailing natural connection (svabJiavapratibandhci) is found in two types

one of the earliest works in which we hear of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva (practical fulfilment of our desire as a criterion of right knowledge). Later on it was regarded as a criterion of existence, as Ratnakirtti's works and the profuse references by Hindu writers to the Buddhistic doctrines prove. The word arthakriya is found in Candra-kirtti's commentary on Nagarjunaand also in such early works as Lalitavistara (pointed out to.me by Dr E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University Library) but the word has no philosophical significance there.

1 As the Pramanasamuccaya of Dinnaga is not available in Sanskrit, we can hardly know anything of developed Buddhist logic except what can be got from the Nyaya-bitidutika of Dharmmottara.

2 tasmat niyamavatorevanvayavyatirekayok prayogah karttavyah yena pratibandho gamyeta sadha?iyasa sadhyena. Nyayabindutika, p. 24.

of cases. The first is that where the nature of the reason is contained in the thing to be inferred as a part of its nature, i.e. where the reason stands for a species of which the thing to be inferred is a genus; thus a stupid person living in a place full of tall pines may come to think that pines are called trees because they are tall and it may be useful to point out to him that even a small pine plant is a tree because it is pine; the quality of pineness forms a part of the essence of treeness, for the former being a species is contained in the latter as a genus; the nature of the species being identical with the nature of the genus, one could infer the latter from the former but not vice versa; this is called the unfailing natural connection of identity of nature (tdddtmya). The second is that where the cause is inferred from the effect which stands as the reason of the former. Thus from the smoke the fire which has produced it may be inferred. The ground of these inferences is that reason is naturally indissolubly connected with the thing to be inferred, and unless this is the case, no inference is warrantable.

This natural indissoluble connection {svabhdvapratibandhd), be it of the nature of identity of essence of the species in the genus or inseparable connection of the effect with the cause, is the ground of all inference 1 . The svabhavapratibandha determines the inseparability of connection (avinabhavaniyamd) and the inference is made not through a series of premisses but directly by the liriga (reason) which has the inseparable connection 2 .

The second type of inference known as pararthanumana agrees with svarthanumana in all essential characteristics; the main difference between the two is this, that in the case of pararthanumana, the inferential process has to be put verbally in premisses.

Pandit Ratnakarasanti, probably of the ninth or the tenth century A.D., wrote a paper named Antarvydptisamarthana in which

1 na hi yo yatra svabhavena na pratibaddhah sa tarn apratibaddhavisayamavaJya-meva na vyabhicaratlti nasti tayoravyabhicaraniyamah. Nyayabindutlka, p. 29.

2 The inseparable connection determining inference is only possible when the lifiga satisfies the three following conditions, viz. (1) paksasattva (existence of the lifiga in the paksa—the thing about which something is inferred); (2) sapaksasattva (existence of the lifiga in those cases where the sadhya or probandum existed), and (3) vipaksasattva (its non-existence in all those places where the sadhya did not exist). The Buddhists admitted three propositions in a syllogism, e.g. The hill has fire, because it has smoke, like a kitchen but unlike a lake.

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the liriga or reason with the cases which possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the liriga with that which has the characteristics of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the liriga, viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (antarvydpti), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing liriga and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer concomitance (bakirvyapti) and generally accepted by the Nyaya school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the Kathavattlm (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the Yamaka points out that Buddhist logic at the time of Asoka "was conversant with the distribution of terms" and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the udaharana ( Yo yo aggima so so dhiimava —whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (ayam pabbato dhumavd —this hill is smoky) and the niggama (tasmddayam aggima —therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the Kathdvatthu as follows:

"Adherent. Is A B? (thdpand). Opponent. Yes. Adherent. Is C D1 (pdpand). Opponent. No. Adherent. But if A be Z? then (you should have said) C is D.

That B can be affirmed of A but D of C is false.

Hence your first answer is refuted.")

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed thapana, because the opponent's position, A is B, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the con-

elusion is termed ropana because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:

"If D be derived of C.

Then B should have been derived of A.

But you affirmed B of A.

(therefore) That B can be affirmed of A but not of D or C is wrong."

This is the patiloma, inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

\{ A is B Cis D. But A is B. Therefore C is D.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished 1 ."

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence {sattva), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence {anvayavydpti\ and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (arthakriydkdritvd). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: "Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary." It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

1 See introduction to the translation of Kathavatthu {Points of Controversy) by Mrs Rhys Davids.

produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce at one moment and does not produce at another, this contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two moments {saktasaktasvabhavataya pratiksanam bhedaJi). The capacity of producing effects (arthakriyasakti), which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness (ksanikatvavyaptd).

The Nyaya school of philosophy objects to this view and says that the capacity of anything cannot be known until the effect produced is known, and if capacity to produce effects be regarded as existence or being, then the being or existence of the effect cannot be known, until that has produced another effect and that another ad infinitum. Since there can be no being that has not capacity of producing effects, and as this capacity can demonstrate itself only in an infinite chain, it will be impossible to know any being or to affirm the capacity of producing effects as the definition of existence. Moreover if all things were momentary there would be no permanent perceiver to observe the change, and there being nothing fixed there could hardly be any means even of taking to any kind of inference. To this Ratnaklrtti replies that capacity (sdmarthya) cannot be denied, for it is demonstrated even in making the denial. The observation of any concomitance in agreement in presence, or agreement in absence, does not require any permanent observer, for under certain conditions of agreement there is the knowledge of the concomitance of agreement in presence, and in other conditions there is the knowledge of the concomitance in absence. This knowledge of concomitance atthe succeeding momentholds within

itself the experience of the conditions of the preceding moment, and this alone is what we find and not any permanent observer.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (sattva) is indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed that in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of being;—seed was but the capacity of producing shoots, and even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce effects, the fact which has been perceived still remains, viz. that the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing the shoots and thus there is no vicious infinite 1 . Though things are momentary, yet we could have concomitance between things only so long as their apparent forms are not different (atadrupa-paravrttayoreva sadhyasadhanayoh pratyaksata vydptigrahaitai). The vyapti or concomitance of any two things (e.g. the fire and the smoke) is based on extreme similarity and not on identity.

Another objection raised against the doctrine of momentariness is this, that a cause (e.g. seed) must wait for a number of other collocations of earth, water, etc., before it can produce the effect (e.g. the shoots) and hence the doctrine must fail. To this Ratna-klrtti replies that the seed does not exist before and produce the effect when joined by other collocations, but such is the special effectiveness of a particular seed-moment, that it produces both the collocations or conditions as well as the effect, the shoot. How a special seed-moment became endowed with such special effectiveness is to be sought in other causal moments which preceded it, and on which it was dependent. Ratnaklrtti wishes to draw attention to the fact that as one perceptual moment reveals a number of objects, so one causal moment may produce a number of effects. Thus he says that the inference that whatever has being is momentary is valid and free from any fallacy.

It is not important to enlarge upon the second part of Ratnaklrtti's arguments in which he tries to show that the production of effects could not be explained if we did not suppose

1 The distinction between vicious and harmless infinites was known to the Indians at least as early as the sixth or the seventh century. Jayanta quotes a passage which differentiates the two clearly {Nyayamanjarl, p. 22) :

" midaksatikarhnahuranavasthtim hi diisafiam. midasiddhatt tvarncyapi naiiavaslka nivaryate." The infinite regress that has to be gone through in order to arrive at the root matter awaiting to be solved destroys the root and is hence vicious, whereas if the root is saved there is no harm in a regress though one may not be willing to have it.

all things to be momentary, for this is more an attempt to refute the doctrines of Nyaya than an elaboration of the Buddhist principles.

The doctrine of momentariness ought to be a direct corollary of the Buddhist metaphysics. But it is curious that though all dharmas were regarded as changing, the fact that they were all strictly momentary {ksanika —i.e. existing only for one moment) was not emphasized in early Pali literature. Asvaghosa in his Sraddhotpadasastra speaks of all skandhas as ksanika (Suzuki's translation, p. 105). Buddhaghosa also speaks of the meditation of the khandhas as khanika in his Visuddhimagga. But from the seventh century A.D. till the tenth century this doctrine together with the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva received great attention at the hands of the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas. All the Nyaya and Vedanta literature of this period is full of refutations and criticisms of these doctrines. The only Buddhist account available of the doctrine of momentariness is from the pen of Ratnakirtti. Some of the general features of his argument in favour of the view have been given above. Elaborate accounts of it may be found in any of the important Nyaya works of this period such as Nyayamanjari, Tatparyyatlka of Vacaspati Misra, etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent. With the development of this doctrine they gave great emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and the next moment they were destroyed. Whatever is existent is momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived from the notion of permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied the existence of any such permanent selves. What appears as self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions, and active tendencies manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these dissolve, and new bundles determined by the preceding ones appear and so on. The present thought is thus the only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas, and active tendencies, we cannot discover any separate self or soul. It is the combined product of these ideas, emotions, etc., that yield the illusory appearance of self at any moment. The consciousness of self is the resultant product as it were of the combination of ideas, emotions, etc., at any particular moment. As these ideas, emotions, etc., change every moment there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The fact that I remember that I have been existing for

a long time past does not prove that a permanent self has been existing for such a long period. When I say this is that book, I perceive the book with my eye at the present moment, but that "this book" is the same as "that book" (i.e. the book arising in memory), cannot be perceived by the senses. It is evident that the "that book" of memory refers to a book seen in the past, whereas "this book" refers to the book which is before my eyes. The feeling of identity which is adduced to prove permanence is thus due to a confusion between an object of memory referring to a past and different object with the object as perceived at the present moment by the senses 1 . This is true not only of all recognition of identity and permanence of external objects but also of the perception of the identity of self, for the perception of self-identity results from the confusion of certain ideas or emotions arising in memory with similar ideas of the present moment. But since memory points to an object of past perception, and the perception to another object of the present moment, identity cannot be proved by a confusion of the two. Every moment all objects of the world are suffering dissolution and destruction, but yet things appear to persist, and destruction cannot often be noticed. Our hair and nails grow and are cut, but yet we think that we have the same hair and nail that we had before, in place of old hairs new ones similar to them have sprung forth, and they leave the impression as if the old ones were persisting. So it is that though things are destroyed every moment, others similar to these often rise into being and are destroyed the next moment and so on, and these similar things succeeding in a series produce the impression that it is one and the same thing which has been persisting through all the passing moments 2 . Just as the flame of a candle is changing every moment and yet it seems to us as if we have been perceiving the same flame all the while, so all our bodies, our ideas, emotions, etc., all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.

1 See pralyabhijfianiiasa of the Buddhists, Nyayamanjari, V.S. Series, pp. 449, etc.

2 See Tarkarahasyadipika of Gunaratna, p. 30, and also Nyayamatijari, V.S. edition, p. 450.

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be denned from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics 1 . What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one 2 . Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called arthakriyakaritva which literally translated means—the power of performing actions and purposes of some kind 3 . The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency). That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or sat. Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

1 Compare Milindapanha, n. i. i—The Chariot Simile.

2 Compare Tarkarahasyadipika of Guriaratna, A. S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and NyByamanjarT, V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on Ksanabhahga-siddhi by Ratnaklrtti in Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts.

3 This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnaklrtti as well as in Nyaya writers who referred to this doctrine. With Vinitadeva (seventh century A. D.) the word "arthakriyd-siddhV meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (artha-sabdena prayojanamucyate purusasya prayojanarn dampakadi lasya siddhih nispatlih — the word artha means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; siddki of that, means accomplishment). With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later arthasiddhi means action (amtsthiti) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects (heyopadeyarthavisaya). But with Ratnaklrtti (950 A.D.) the word arthakriyakaritva has an entirely different sense. It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence (sattva). Thus he says in his Ksanabhangasiddhi, pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as arthakriyakaritva (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnaklrtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of arthakriyakaritva they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakirtti's sense.

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are associated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness shown by Ratnaklrtti.

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (avayavi) and the part (avayava), (3) the relation of generality {samanyd) to the specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

relation of power (sakti) to the power-possessor {saktimari). Thus on the relation of cause and effect, Sankara held that cause alone was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent illusions due to ignorance, Samkhya held that there was no difference between cause and effect, except that the former was only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects. Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by another and this determination is nothing more than " that happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and thus there is no such thing as " whole 1 ." The Buddhists hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there is no such thing as fingerness (ahgulitvd) as the abstract universal of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we know that the Sautrantika Buddhists did not believe in the existence of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation. In the external world there are as many individual simple units (atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the assemblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation as that of inherence (sainavdya) in which relation the attributes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

1 See Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1910.

believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power.

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four noble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it ? The doctrine of paticcasa-muppada was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sila, samadhi and panfia and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahayana scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non-essentialness and voidness of all dhammas began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, Aryyadeva, Kumarajiva and Candraklrtti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality. The Tathata doctrine which was preached by Asvaghosa oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent entity could exist. The Vijfianavada doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the £unyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but Sunyavada, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

non-essential hovvdid it originate? Vijfianavada proposes togivean answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind generated by the beginningless vasana (desire) of the mind. The difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathata doctrine that there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijfianavada doctrine. The Vijfianavadins could not admit the existence of such a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality assumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijfianavada literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we are not in a position to judge what answers Vijfianavada could give on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the same time and the difficulty of conceiving sunya (void), tathata, (thatness) and the alayavijnana of Vijfianavada is more or less the same.

The Tathata doctrine of Asvaghosa practically ceased with him. But the Sunyavada and the Vijfianavada doctrines which originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with Sunyavada doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu philosophy, after Rumania and Saiikara. From the third or the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu logicians. Diiinaga the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines of the great Hindu logician Vatsyayana, in his Pramana-samuccaya. In association with this logical activity we find the activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvastivadins (known also as Vaibhasikas) and the Sautrantikas. Both the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas accepted the existence of the external world, and they were generally in conflict with the Hindu schools of thought Nyaya-Vaisesika and Sarnkhya which also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu (420-500 A.D.) was one of the most illustrious names of this school. We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist thinkers such as Yasomitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

Dharmmaklrtti (writer of Nyayabindu 635 A.D.), Vinltadeva and Santabhadra (commentators of Nyayabindu), Dharmmottara (commentator of Nyayabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.), Pandita Asoka, and Ratnakara Santi, some of whose contributious have been published in the Six Buddhist Nydya Tracts, published in Calcutta in the Bibliotheca Indica series. These Buddhist writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and the doctrine of causal efficiency (arthakriyakdritva) as demonstrating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyaya and Samkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrantika and non-Vaibhasika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between Hindu thought up to Sarikara (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought till the time of Sarikara consisted mainly in the denial by the Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world. For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the Vedanta of Sarikara admitted the existence of the permanent external world in some sense. With Sarikara the forms of the external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrantikas admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel with Nyaya and Samkhya was with regard to their doctrine of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the different ontological problems were in accordance with their doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyaya, the Vedanta of the school of Sarikara and the Theistic Vedanta of Ramanuja, Madhva, etc.

CHAPTER VI THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Origin of Jainism.

NOTWITHSTANDING the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nataputta Varddhamana Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tirthaiikara) of Jainism 1 . His predecessor Parsva, the last Tirthaiikara but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahavira, while Parsva's predecessor Aristanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahavira's Nirvana. The story in Uttaradhyayanasutra that a disciple of Parsva met a disciple of Mahavira and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahavira seems to suggest that this Parsva was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tlrtharikaras. In the present period the first Tirthaiikara was Rsabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamana Mahavira. All

Tirtharikaras have reached moksa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped 1

Two Sects of Jainism 2 .

There are two main sects of Jains, Svetambaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the Tirtharikaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahavira was not removed from the womb of Devananda to that of Trisala as the Svetambaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Moksa, fourthly that no woman can reach Moksa 3 . The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the Svetambaras and assert that these had been lost immediately after Mahavira. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to Sivabhuti (A.D. 83) by the Svetambaras as due to a schism in the old Svetambara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabahu, the eighth sage after Mahavira, the last Tlrtharikara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphalakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of Svetambaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the Svetambaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the Svetambaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called gacchas, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

1 See " Digumbara Jain Iconography (i. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and Biihler's " Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura," in Epigraphica Indica, n. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E.

2 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E.

8 See Gunaratna's commentary on Jainism in Saddarianasamuccaya.

preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahavlra (stkavirdvali, pattdvali, gurvdvali) and also many legends about them such as those in the Kalpasutra, the Parisista-parvan of Hemacandra, etc.

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Purvas and the eleven Arigas. The Purvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven Aiigas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are Acdm, Sutrakrta, Sthdna, Samavaya Bhagavatl, Jhdtadhar-makatkds, Updsakadasds, A ntakrtadasds A nuttaraupapdtikadasds, Prasnavydkamna, Vipdka. In addition to these there arethetwelve Updngas 1 , the ten Prakirnas 2 , six C/iedasiitras 3 , Ndndl and Anu-yogadvdra and four Mtdasutras (Uttarddhyayana, Avasya&a, Dasavaikdlika, and Pindaniryukti). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhama-gadhl, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prakrit and that of the later works Jaina Maharastrl. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain systematic expositions of their faith in Prakrit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umasvati's TattvdrtJiddhigamasutra (1-85 A.D.). Some of the most i m portant later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are Visesdva-syakabhdsya, Jaina Tarkavdrltika, with the commentary of Santyacaryya, Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), Syddvddamaiijari of Mallisena (1292 A.D.), Nydydvatdra of Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.), Pariksdmiikhasutralaghuvrtti of Anantavlryya (1039 A.D.), Prameyakamalamdrtanda of Prabha-

1 Aupapatika, Rajaprcdnlya, Jivabhigatna, Prajnapana, Jambudvipaprajnapti, Candraprajiiapli, Suryaprajiiapti, Nirayavali, Kcdpavatamsika, Puspika, Puspaeiilika, Vrsnidaids.

2 CatuMarana, Sainstara, Aturapratyakhyana, Bhaktaparijiia, Tandulafvaiydll, Candavija, Devendrastava, Ganivija, Mahapratyakhyana, Virastava.

3 Niiitha, Mahdniiitha, Vyavahdra, DaJainttaskandha, Brhatkalpa, Paficakalpa.

candra(825A.D.), Yogasdstraoi Hemacandra(io88-ii72A.D.),and Pramanaiiayatattvdlokdlamkara of Deva Suri (1086-1169 A.D.). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyabhusana's Indian Logic.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prakrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. Samaraicca-kahd, Upamitabhavaprapanca-kathd in Prakrit, and the Yasastilaka of Somadevaand Dhanapala's Tilakamanjari); Jaina Sanskrit poems both in the Purana and Kavya style and hymns in Prakrit and Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches: grammar,biography,metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic deserve special notice 1 .

Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Rajputana and the Punjab. The head-quarters of the Svetambaras are in Gujarat and Western Rajputana, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to bare necessaries,and these hemust beg—clothes,a blanket,analms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it 2 . The outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow {cdmard) z . The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E. 2 See Jacobi, loc. cit.

" See Saddarianasamuccaya, chapter iv.

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in the upasrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist viharas). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc., and has thrust them into commerce 1 .

Life of Mahavira.

Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Ksattriya of the Jnata clan and a native of Vaisali (modern Besarh, 27 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhartha and Trisala. The Svetambaras maintain that the embryo of the Tirtharikara which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devananda was then transferred to the womb of Trisala. This story the Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents were the worshippers of Parsva and gave him the name Varddha-mana (Vlra or Mahavira). He married Yasoda and had a daughter by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained omniscience (kevala, cf. bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to preach for forty-two years more, and attained moksa (emancipation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. 2 .

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chandogya Upanisad held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E.

2 See Hoernle's translation of Uvasagadasdo, Jacobi, loc. cit., and Hoernle's article on the Ajivakas, E. R. E. The Svetambaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C., and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later.

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (ndma-rupa) x . What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upan-isads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and possibly of some of the Upanisads too, and they had also a solution to offer. They held that it was not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that there was no permanent substance but merely the change of passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements: (i) that some collocations of qualities appear to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated ; (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

1 See Chandogya, vi. i.

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (sat) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent (dhmvd) accession of some new qualities (utpdda) and loss of some old qualities (vyaya) 1 . The solution of Jainism is thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on grounds of common-sense experience.

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekantavada).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekantavada or what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme abso- -lutism of the Upanisads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as anekanta (na-ekdnta), or in other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence as a substance (dravya) is of the nature of a collocation ofatoms and not as any other substance such as space (dkdsa), i.e. a gold jug is a dravya only in one sense of the term and not in every sense; so_it is a dravya in the sense that it is a collocation of atoms and not a dravya in the sense of space or time (kdla). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

1 See Tatlvarlhadhigamasutra, and Gunaratna's treatment of Jainism in Saddar-tanasamuccaya.

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajnadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite number of qualities (anantadJiarmatmakam vastu), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely 1 . Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya 2 .

The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

1 See Gunaratna on Jainamata in Saddarianasatmiccaya, pp. 211, etc., and also Tattvarth adh igamasutra.

2 See Tattvurlhadhiga7>iasfttra, and Viiesavafyaka bhasya, pp. 895-923.

the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two points of view are respectively called dravyanayaandparydyanaya*. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryaya-naya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, samgraha-naya and vyavahara-naya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other ones. This is the point of view from which according to the Jains the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools interpret experience.

Samgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." This according to the Jains is the Vedanta way of looking at things.

1 Syadvadamanjarl, pp. 171-173.

The vyavahara-naya standpoint holds that the real essence of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the Samkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryaya-naya called rjusutra is the Buddhist view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as the true essence of our notion of things 1 .

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The Jains hold that the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the Vedanta, the Samkhya, and the Buddhist,, have each tried to interpret and systematize experience from one of the above four points of view,/and each regards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error {nayabhasa), for each standpoint represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirma-, tions from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore . be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

1 The other standpoints of paryaya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are Sabda-naya, samabhirudha-naya, and evambhuta-naya. See VtitsavaSyaka bhasya, pp. 895-923.

things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase sydt (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, i made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syadvada 1 .

The Doctrine of Syadvada. The doctrine of Syadvada holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (nayd) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some syddasti ox "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (syddavaktavya); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (syddasti sydnndsti) ; all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (syddasti cdvaktavyascd); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (syddasti sydnndsti syddavaktavyascd). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (sydt) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence "the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

1 See Vihsdvaiyaka bhasya, pp. 895, etc., and Syadvadamanjari, pp. 170, etc.

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment" the jug is" one may say, may be it is an affirmation of being (syddasti), may be it is a negation of being (sydnndsti); or I may proceed in quite another way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable— avaktavya, for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, (i) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called saptabhangi) holds good 1 . The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

1 See Syadvadamanjari, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166, etc.

point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (upadhi). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation , which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syadvada doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by syadvada. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely according to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the syadvada doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas (naydbhdsay.

Knowledge, its value for us. The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on Nydyabindu says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (samyagjiiana or pramand). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists 2 . They also

1 The earliest mention of the doctrine of syadvada and saptabhang! probably occurs in Bhadrabahu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary Sutrakrtahganiryukti.

2 See Pramana-naya-tattvalokalanikara (Benares), p. 26; also Pariksa-mukha-siitra-vrtti (Asiatic Society), ch. 1.

say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (prdmdnya) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad 1 . The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions assume such a special fitness (yogyata) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it 2 . The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination (utpreksd), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (nirvikalpa jnand). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

1 Pramdna-naya-tattvalokiilamkara, p. 26.

2 See Pariksa-mukha-sutra, II. 9, and its vrtti, and also the concluding vrtti of ch. 11.

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that 1 . The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptional (pratyaksa); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptional (parok^a 2 ).

Theory of Perception. The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception (pralyak§(i) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

1 Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relationing with the " this " as " this is a snake " does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called satkhyati or misrelationing of existents (sat).

2 See Jaina-tarka-varttika of Siddhasena, ch. I., and vrtti by Santyacarya, Pramananayatattvalokalamkara, ch. I., Pariksa-mukha-sutra-vrtti, ch. I.

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vi-jfianavadin Buddhist thinks)but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose 1 . Perception of an object means

1 Tanna indriyam bhautikam kirn lu atmaca indriyam...anupahatacaksuradiddesu eva almanah karmaksayopaiamaslenasthagitagavaksatulydni caksuradlni upakarandni. Jaina-Vdttika- Villi, ir. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See Pramanamimamsa. See also Tattvartha-dhiqcimasutra, ch. 11. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savi-kalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of in-> determinate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part 1 .

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (paroksa) differs from pratyaksa in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Paroksa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively pralijiia, hetu, drstanla, tipanaya and nigamana, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process {Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 108, 109). When we make an

of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed. 1 Prameyakamalamdrtanda, pp. 8—n.

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhava) or as invariable antecedence {kramabkdva) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference 1 .

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance 2 .

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

1 As regards concomitance (vyapti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer antarvyapti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svartha-numana for one's own self and pararthdmimana for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Dasavaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (i) Pratijnd (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijnavibhakti (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) Vipaksa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipaksa pratisedha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptuies should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drstanta (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) As-anku (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) Asankapratisedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhusana's Indian Logic). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his JVydya-sutrabhdsya, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.

2 Seejainatarkavaritika, and Pariksdmukhasutravrtti, and Saddarianasamuccaya with Gunaratna on Jainism.

which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect, they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence irr olves a notion of permanence associated with change— paryaya (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint {naya) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold* that in formulating the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as Samkhya does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrantikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mimamsa view that the validity (prdmaiiya) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself (svatahprdmdnyd) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (samvdda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts {prdmdnyamutpattmi parata eva jiiaptau svakdrye ca svatah paratasca abhydsdnabhydsdpeksaya) x . The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The JTvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (j'wa) and the non-living (ajivd). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body 2 . It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

1 Prameyakamalamarianda, pp. 38-43.

2 See Jaina Varttika, p. 60.

a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mlmamsa authority Prabhakara 1 . The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (ananta-darsand), infinite knowledge (ananta-jfidna), infinite bliss (ananta-suk/ia) and infinite power (anatita-vlryay. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (m?tkta-jiva), all the other jlvas (samsdrin) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them frombeginningless time. These souls are infinite innumber. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (lokdkdsa), have a limited size (niadhyama-parimdna) and are neither all-pervasive (yibhii) nor atomic (ariu); it is on account of this that jiva is called Jivdstikdya. The word astikdya means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jlvas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely manas by virtue of which they are

1 See Prameyakamalamartaiida, p. 33.

2 The Jains distinguish between dariana and jnana. Darsana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jnana means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first darsana and then jnana. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.

called rational (samjniti) while the lower animals have no reason and are called asavijhin.

Proceeding towards the lowest animal we find that the Jains regard all the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) as being animated by souls. Thus particles of earth, etc., are the bodies of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again in another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organ lives are plants. Of some plants each is the body of one soul only; but of other plants, each is an aggregation of embodied souls, which have all the functions of life such as respiration and nutrition in common. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant lives may also be subtle and invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters, having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains. The whole space of the world is closely packed with them like a box filled with powder. The nigodas furnish the supply of souls in place of those that have reached Moksa. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single nigoda has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the Nirvana of all the souls that have been liberated from beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident the samsara will never be empty of living beings. Those of the nigodas who long for development come out and contiune their course of progress through successive stages 1 .

Karma Theory.

It is on account of their merits or demerits that the jivas are born as gods, men, animals, or denizens of hell. We have already noticed in Chapter III that the cause of the embodiment of soul is the presence in it of karma matter. The natural perfections of the pure soul are sullied by the different kinds of karma matter. Those which obscure right knowledge of details (jiidna) are called jnanavaraniya, those which obscure right perception (darsand) as in sleep are called darsandvaraniya, those which

1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. £., and Lokaprakafa, vi. pp. 31 ff.

obscure the bliss-nature of the soul and thus produce pleasure and pain are vedaniya, and those which obscure the right attitude of the soul towards faith and right conduct mokaniya 1 . In addition to these four kinds of karma there are other four kinds of karma which determine (1) the length of life in any birth, (2) the peculiar body with its general and special qualities and faculties, (3) the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., (4) the inborn energy of the soul by the obstruction of which it prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it. These are respectively called (1) ayitska karma, (2) ndma karma, (3) gotra karma, (4) antaraya karma. By our actions of mind, speech and body, we are continually producing certain subtle karma matter which in the first instance is called bhava karma, which transforms itself into dravya karma and pours itself into the soul and sticks there by coming into contact with the passions (kasdya) of the soul. These act like viscous substances in retaining the inpouring karma matter. This matter acts in eight different ways and it is accordingly divided into eight classes, as we have already noticed. This karma is the cause of bondage and sorrow. According as good or bad karma matter sticks to the soul it gets itself coloured respectively as golden, lotus-pink, white and black, blue and grey and they are called the lesyas. The feelings generated by the accumulation of the karma-matter are called bhava-lesya and the actual coloration of the soul by it is called dravya-lesya. According as any karma matter has been generated by good, bad, or indifferent actions, it gives us pleasure, pain, or feeling of indifference. Even the knowledge that we are constantly getting by perception, inference, etc., is but the result of the effect of karmas in accordance with which the particular kind of veil which was obscuring any particular kind of knowledge is removed at any time and we have a knowledge of a corresponding nature. By our own karmas the veils over our knowledge, feeling, etc., are so removed that we have just that kind of knowledge and feeling that we deserved to have. All knowledge, feeling, etc., are thus in one sense generated from within, the external objects which are ordinarily said to be generating them all being but mere coexistent external conditions.

1 The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge : (i) motif nana (ordinary cognition), (2) fruit (testimony), (3) avadhi (supernatural cognition), (4) manahparyaya (thought-reading), (5) kevala-Jnana (omniscience).

After the effect of a particular karma matter (karma-vargand) is once produced, it is discharged and purged from off the soul. This process of purging off the karmas is called nirjard. If no new karma matter should accumulate then, the gradual purging off of the karmas might make the soul free of karma matter, but as it is, while some karma matter is being purged off, other karma matter is continually pouring in, and thus the purging and binding processes continuing simultaneously force the soul to continue its mundane cycle of existence, transmigration, and rebirth. After the death of each individual his soul, together with its karmic body {kdrma?iasarira\ goes in a few moments to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

In the ordinary course karma takes effect and produces its proper results, and at such a stage the soul is said to be in the audayika state. By proper efforts karma may however be prevented from taking effect, though it still continues to exist, and this is said to be the aupasamika state of the soul. When karma is not only prevented from operating but is annihilated, the soul is said to be in the ksdyika state, and it is from this state that Moksa is attained. There is, however, a fourth state of ordinary good men with whom some karma is annihilated, some neutralized, and some active {ksdyopasamikdf.

Karma, Asrava and Nirjara.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all the experiences of this world process, including births and rebirths in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic particles of matter (karma-vaigand). The influx of these karma particles into the soul is called asrava in Jainism. These karmas are produced by body, mind, and speech. The asravas represent the channels or modes through which the karmas enter the soul, just like the channels through which water enters into a pond. But the Jains distinguish between the channels and the karmas which actually

1 The stages through which a developing soul passes are technically called guna-sthanas which are fourteen in number. The first three stages represent the growth of faith in Jainism, the next five stages are those in which all the passions are controlled, in the next four stages the ascetic practises yoga and destroys all his karmas, at the thirteenth stage he is divested of all karmas but he still practises yoga and at the fourteenth stage he attains liberation (see Dravyasamgiahavrtti, 13th verse).

enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds of asravas, bhavasrava and karmasrava. Bhavasrava means the thought activities of the soul through which or on account of which the karma particles enter the soul 1 . Thus Nemicandra says that bhavasrava is that kind of change in the soul (which is the contrary to what can destroy the karmasrava), by which the karmas enter the soul 2 . Karmasrava, however, means the actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These bhavasravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion (mitkydtva), want of control {avirati), inadvertence (pramddci), the activities of body, mind and speech (yoga) and the passions (kasdyas). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely ekdnta (a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), viparita (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), vinaya (retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), samsaya (doubt as to right or wrong) and ajnana (want of any belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (hiinsd), falsehood (anrta), stealing (cauryya), incontinence (abrahma), and desire to have things which one does not already possess (parigrahdkahksa). Pramada or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation (vikathd), passions (kasdya), bad use of the five senses (indriyd), sleep (nidrd), attachment (rdga) z .

Coming to dravyasrava we find that it means that actual influx of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight different kinds, namely jnanavaranlya, darsanavaranlya, veda-nlya, mohanlya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya. These actual influxes take place only as a result of the bhavasrava or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (parindmd) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas is called bhavabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called dravyabandha. It is on account of bhavabandha that the actual connection between the karmas and the soul can take place 4 . The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking

1 Dravyasamgraha, SI. 29.

2 Nemicandra's commentary on Dravyasamgraha, SI. 29, edited by S. C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.

3 See Nemicandra's commentary on SI. 30.

4 Nemicandra on 31, and Vardhatnanapiirana XVI. 44, quoted by Ghoshal.

of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with oil. Thus Gunaratna says: " The influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul, just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its samsara stage 1 ." From one point of view the bondage of karma is only of puny a and papa (good and bad karmas) 2 . From another this bondage is of four kinds, according to the nature of karma (prakrti), duration of bondage {st/riti), intensity (anubhaga) and extension (pradesa). The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already mentioned, namely the jnanavaranlya karma which obscures the infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, darsana-varanlya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge of the soul, vedanlya karma which produces the feelings of pleasure and pain in the soul, mohanlya karma, which so infatuates souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, ayu karma, which determines the tenure of any particular life, nama karma which gives them personalities, gotra karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle of division, anubhaga. Pradesa refers to the different parts of the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the different classification of karmas as jnanavaranlya, etc., are due to the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter 3 .

Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhava-srava and dravyasrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are respectively called bhavasamvara and dravyasamvara 4 .

1 See Gunaratna, p. 181. ~ Ibid. 3 Nemicandra, 33.

4 Varddhamdnapurana, XVI. 67-68, and Dravyasamgrahavrtti, SI. 35.

The bhavasamvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order to avoid injury to insects (iryd), gentle and holy talk {bhdsd), receiving proper alms (esand), etc., (3) guptis or restraints of body, speech and mind, (4) dharmas consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment, indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and supreme sex-control 1 , (5) a?iupreksd consisting of meditation about the transient character of the world, about our helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the unclean-liness of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining true knowledge, faith, and conduct, and about the essential principles of the world 2 , (6) the parisahajaya consisting of the conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc., and of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) cdritra or right conduct.

Next to this we come to nirjara or the purging off of the karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjara also is of two kinds, bhavanirjara and dravyanirjara. Bhavanirjara means that change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are destroyed. Dravyanirjara means the actual destruction of these karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by penances before their time of fruition, called savipaka and avipaka nirjaras respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed moksa or liberation is effected.

Pudgala.

The ajiva (non-living) is divided into pudgaldstikdya, dharma stikdya, adharmdstikdya, dkdsdstikdya, kdla, punya, papa. The word pudgala means matter 3 , and it is called astikdya in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms

1 Tattvarthadhigamasutra. 2 Ibid.

3 This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists pudgala means an individual or a person.

which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (anu). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic space (ghanapratarabhedena). Some combinations take place by simple mutual contact at two points (yugmapradesa) whereas in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive force (pjahpradesd) (Prajfidpanopangasutra, pp. 10-12). Two atoms form a compound (skandha), when the one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce the gross things of the world. They are, however, liable to constant change {parindmd) by which they lose some of their old qualities (gunas) and acquire new ones. There are four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these are alike in character. The perception of grossness however is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise (as the Samkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the darsanavaraniya and jnanavaranlya veil, there arises in the soul the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness (samdna-riipatd) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) is technically called tiryaksdmdnya. This samanya or generality is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity

(as maintained by the Naiyayikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This sameness of qualities in time is technically called urdhvasamdnya}. If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of substance (dravyci) they are eternal.

Dharma, Adharma, Akasa.

The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe (lokakasa) and pervades every part of it. The term astikaya is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent or passive (udasina) and not an active or solicitous (prerakd) cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move ; but if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (/oka) in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma 2 . Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which

1 See Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 136-143; Jainatarkavarttika, p. 106.

2 Dravyasamgrahavrtti, 17-20.

helps jivas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on account of their notion that the inner activity of the jlva or the atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jivas were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent in the region of the liberated souls.

The category of akasa is that subtle entity which pervades the mundane universe (/oka) and the transcendent region of liberated souls (a/oka) which allows the subsistence of all other substances such as dharma, adharma, jlva, pudgala. It is not a mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness, but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate it. On account of its pervasive character it is called akdsastikaya \

Kala and Samaya.

Time (kala) in reality consists of those innumerable particles which never mix with one another, but which help the happening of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change of qualities of the atoms. Kala does not bring about the changes of qualities, in things, but just as akasa helps interpenetration and dharma motion, so also kala helps the action of the transformation of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, hours, days, etc., is called samaya. This is the appearance of the unchangeable kala in so many forms. Kala thus not only aids the modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments, hours, etc., are its paryayas. The unit of samaya is the time required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.

1 Dravyasamgrahavrtti, 19.

Jaina Cosmography.

According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, urdhva (where the gods reside), madhya (this world of ours), and adho (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe {lokakasa) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement possible. Beyond the lokakasa there is no dharma and therefore no movement, but only space (dkdsa). Surrounding this lokakasa are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over the urdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakasa and (there being no dharma) remains motionless there.

Jaina Yoga. Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation). This yoga consists of jnana (knowledge of reality as it is), sraddha (faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of ahiinsd (not taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), sfinrta (speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), asteya (not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya (abandoning lust for all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and body), and aparigraha (abandoning attachment for all things) 1 . These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and

1 Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are: Iryya (to go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun's rays, so that proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), bhasa (to speak well and pleasantly to all beings), isana (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), danasamiti (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything), ntsargasamiti (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), manogupti (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), vaggnpti (absolute silence), and kayagupti (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of caritra are counted in Dravyasamgrahavrtti 35.

honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon the virtues of ahimsa, sunrta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the root of all these is ahimsa. The virtues of sunrta, asteya and brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrol-laries of ahimsa. Ahimsa may thus be generalized as the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be passed in accordance with the standard of ahimsa ; sunrta, asteya and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression leads to himsa (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called mahabrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahabrata it would be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts. Ahimsa according to a householder, according to anubrata, would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to any living being in any way.

Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahimsa. These are (i) digvirati (to carry out activities within a restricted area and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), (2) bhogopabhogamana (to desist from drinking liquors, taking flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding time and place of taking meals), (3) anarthadanda consisting of (a) apadhyana (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, killing of one's enemies, etc.), (b) papopadesa (desisting from advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing of so many insects), (c) himsopakaridana (desisting from giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury of insects), (d) pramadacarana (to desist from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature,gambling,etc), (4) siksd-padabrata consisting of (a) sdmayikabrata (to try to treat all beings equally), (b) desdvakasikabrata (gradually to practise the digviratibrata more and more extensively), (c) posadhabrata

(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) atithisamvibhdgabrata (to make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called aticdra, should be carefully avoided.

All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are burnt {dhydndgnidagdhakarma) the self becomes purified. The soul is itself the samsara (the cycle of rebirths) when it is overpowered by the four kasayas (passions) and the senses. The four kasayas are krodha (anger), mdna (vanity and pride), mdyd (insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and lobha (greed). These kasayas cannot be removed except by a control of the senses ; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind (mana/zsudd/ii). Without the control of the mind no one can proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism (tapas) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment and antipathy (rdgadvesa) can be removed only by the purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin (sage) that he should be free from them and become independent in the real sense of the term. When a man learns to look upon all beings with equality {samalvd) he can effect such a conquest over raga and dvesa as one could never do even by the strictest asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of meditation (bhdvana) :

We should think of the transitoriness {anityata) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles in a whirlwind.

All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in

whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we find that it fails us. This is called asaranabhavana (the meditation of helplessness).

Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate on these aspects is called ekatvabhavana and anyatvabhavana.

To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called asucibhavana (meditation of the impurity of the body).

To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal friendship and compassion and the passions are removed, then only will good (Jubha) accrue to me, but if on the contrary I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil will befall me, is called asravabhavana (meditation of the befalling of evil). By the control of the asrava (inrush of karma) comes the samvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nirjara (decay and destruction of karma matter).

Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas (virtues) of self control (samyama), truthfulness (sunrta), purity (sauca), chastity (bra/ima), absolute want of greed (aki?icanata) y asceticism (tapas), forbearance, patience (ksdnti), mildness (mdrdava), sincerity (rjuta), and freedom or emancipation from all sins (mukti) can alone help us in the achievement of the highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called dharmasvakhyatatabhavana.

Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the diverse conditions of men. These two are called lokabhavana and bodhibhavana.

When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should take to the performance of dhyana or meditation by deep concentration. The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyana are interdependent, so that without dhyana there is no samatva

and without samatva there is no dhyana. In order to make the mind steady by dhyana one should think of maitri (universal friendship), pramoda (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of men), kamna (universal compassion) and mddhyastlia (indifference to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any note of sinners). The Jaina dhyana consists in concentrating the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The dhyana however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete course of moral discipline which leads to the purification of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu yoga of Patanjali or even of the Buddhists 1 .

Jaina Atheism 2 .

The Naiyayikas assert that as the world is of the nature of an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and this agent is Isvara (God). To this the Jain replies, " What does the Naiyayika mean when he says that the world is of the nature of an effect"? Does he mean by "effect," (1) that which is made up of parts (sdvayava), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (vikdrit-vani). Again, what is meant by being "made up of parts "? If it means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (sdmdnya) existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence destructible, but these the Naiyayikas regard as being partless and eternal. If it means "that which has parts," then even "space" (dkdsa) has to be regarded as "effect," but the Naiyayika regards it as eternal.

Again "effect" cannot mean "coinherence of the causes of a thing which were previously non-existent," for in that case one could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.

Again if "effect" means "that which is regarded by anyone as

1 Yogcdastra, by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellscha/t, Leipsig, 1874, and Dravyasamgraka, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.

2 See Gunaratna's Tarkarahasyadipika.

having been made," then it would apply even to space, for when a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in the hollow which he dug.

If it means "that which is liable to change," then one could suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require another creator to create him and he another, and so on ad infinitum. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to change with reference to his creative activity.

Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some time and do not happen at other times are regarded as "effects." But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are "effects," then that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue of that. And even atoms would be "effects," for they also undergo changes of colour by heat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (anyonyasrayd).

Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body, for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body. If you take the instances of other kinds of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle {cakraka), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such a blind destiny (adrsta) might take the place of God. If He took to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of

admitting him at all ? You may rather say that the world came into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense with the supposition altogether 1 .

1 See Saddarfanasamuccaya, Gunaratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124.

Moksa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release {moksa) is the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (aiiantajfidnd) and infinite perception {anantadarsand). In the samsara state on account of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and that time as ordinary knowledge {mati), testimony {sruta), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (avad/ii), and direct knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (mana/i-parydyd). In the state of release however there is omniscience {kevala-jnana) and all things are simultaneously known to the perfect (kevaliri) as they are. In the samsara stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action {anantavirya), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavirya in him he might have been eternally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured his bondage (Jbandhd). But since man is the repository of this indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his highest good.

CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SAMKHYA (YOGA) 1 .

A Review.

The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upanisad sages. That certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some of the Upanisads but were accepted by the two nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nastika schools appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brahmanas. Both these systems originated with the Ksattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical power of producing the desired effect—a shower of rain, the birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

1 This chapter is based on my Study of Patanjali, published by the Calcutta University, and my Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.

objects. Truth cannot be determined a priori but depends upon the test of experience 1 .

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness 2 . Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere a priori abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner a priori demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

1 The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mimamsa of Kumarila and Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined a priori while error is determined by experience.

2 Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of arthakriyakdritva. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriyakdritva.

would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formu-. late a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it; a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas. Karma and the fruit of karma {karmaphald) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits—temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upa-

nisads which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upanisads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upanisads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upanisads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Samkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upanisads.

The Germs of Samkhya in the Upanisads. It is indeed true that in the Upanisads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result 1 . In many passages of the Upanisads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedanta as explained by Sarikara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in Sveta-svatara and particularly in MaitrayanI from which it appears that the Samkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use 2 . But the date of MaitrayanI has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

1 See Hillebrandt's article, " Brahman" (E. K. £.).

- Katha in. 10, V. 7. Sveta. v. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, 1. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought, in the first chapter.

found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Samkhya thought as it developed in the Upanisads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Samkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanisads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.

Samkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Samkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Samkhya karika, the Samkhya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patafijali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Samkhya karika (about 200 A.D.) was written by Isvarakrsna. The account of Samkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vacaspati Misra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as Tattvakaumudi. But before him Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the Samkhya karika 1 . Narayanatlrtha wrote his Candrika on Gauda-pada's commentary. The Samkhya sutras which have been commented on by Vijnana Bhiksu (called Pravacanabhasyd) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the Samkhya sutras. Vijnana Bhiksu wrote also another elementary work on Samkhya known as Sdmkhyasdra. Another short work of late origin is Tattvasamdsa (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Samkhya, viz. Slmananda's Sdmkhyatattvavivecana and Bhavaganesa's SamkhyatattvayCithdrthyadipana (both later than Vijnanabhiksu) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patanjali's Yoga sutra (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vyasa (400 A.D.) and Vyasa's bhasya commented on by Vacaspati Misra is called Tattvavaisdradl, by Vijfiana Bhiksu Yogavdrttika, by Bhoja in the tenth century Bhojavrtti, and by Nagesa (seventeenth century) Chaydvyakhyd.

1 I suppose that Raja's commentary on the Karika was the same as Rajavarttika quoted by Vacaspati. Raja's commentary on the Karika has been referred to by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.

Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the A ncient Hindus and the PositiveSciencesofttieAncientHindus by Dr B. N. Seal and my two works on Yoga Study ofPatanjali published by the Calcutta University, and Yoga Philosophy in relation to otJier Indian Systems of TJwught which is shortly to be published, and my Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.

Gunaratna mentions two other authoritative Samkhya works, viz. Mdtharabh&sya and Atreyatantra. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Samkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it was called Atreyasamhitd or Atreyatantra. Nothing is known of the Mdtharabhdsya 1 .

An Early School of Samkhya.

It is important for the history of Samkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Samkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (dhdtus), viz. the five elements such as akasa, vayu etc. and cetana, called also purusa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prakrti (prakrti, mahat, ahamkara and the five elements) 2 . The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing {uhd) and conceiving (vicdra) before definite understanding (buddhi) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

1 Readers unacquainted with Samkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.

2 Purusa is here excluded from the list. Cakrapani, the commentator, says that the prakrti and purusa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. Prakrtivyatiriktancodasinam purusamavyaktatvasadharmyat avyaktayam prakrtaveva praksipya avyaktafabdenaiva grhndti. Harinatha Vi^arada's edition of

Caraka, Sdrtra, p. 4.

of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmatras at all 1 . The conglomeration of the sense-objects {indriyarthd) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhutas and prakrti, mahat and ahamkara taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the purusa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the atman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This purusa, called also paramatman, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will.antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of purusa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prakrti with purusa as forming one category. The vikara or evolutionary products of prakrti are called ksetra, whereas the avyakta part of prakrti is regarded as the ksetrajiia {avyaktamasya ksetrasya ksetrajhamrsayo viduh). This avyakta and cetana are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested prakrti or cetana is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego {ahamkara) and from the ahamkara the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prakrti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the purusa the unmanifest {avyakta), all the manifested forms—the evolutes of buddhi, ahamkara, etc.—

1 But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of prakrti which is regarded as having eight elements in it {prakrtiica-stadhdtuki), viz. avyakta, mahat, ahamkara, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prakrti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prakrti.

appear 1 . This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (rdsi), and not by the atman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (trsna) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Moksa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived 2 . It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Samkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,

1 This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakra-pani as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prakrti—the purusa—and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapani on sarlra, I. 46.

2 Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (a/aksariam), resembling Nagarjuna's Nirvana. Thus Caraka writes:— tasmimscarama-sannyase samuldksarvavedandh asanijnajndnavijndnd nivrttim yantyasesatah. atah-param brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate nihsrtah sarvabhdvebhyah cihnain yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidam brahma taccaksaramalaksanam. Caraka, Sdrira I. q8-ioo.

the state of moksa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again 1 and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (mokse nivrttirnihsesa).

The main features of the Samkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: I. Purusa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera-of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, ahamkara etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (bliautikd).

This account of Samkhya agrees with the system of Samkhya propounded by Pancasikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of Asuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahabharata XII. 219. Pancasikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Samkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka 2 . Pancasikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Samkhya literature to prakrti) in the state of purusa (purusd-vasthamavyaktani). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pancasikha also, and the proofs

1 Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (i) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.

2 Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pafi-caSikha's doctrine as a genuine Samkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Samkhya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice.

for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pancasikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,—and the element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Moksa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The gunas described by Pancasikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the ksetra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called alifiga (without any characteristic)—a term reserved for prakrti in later Samkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (samyagbadha).

Gunaratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of Sad-darsanasamuccaya, mentions two schools of Samkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) 1 . Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Samkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman {inaidikyasdinkhyd hydtmanamatmanam prati prthak pradhdnam vadanti). This seems to be a reference to the Samkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Samkhya.

In Mahdbhdrata XII. 318 three schools of Samkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Samkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to purusa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Samkhya advocated in the Mahabharata. The schools of Samkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Samkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

1 Gunaratna's Tarkarahasyadipika, p. 99.

other chapters of the Mahdbharata (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Rahu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (saririnaJi) are spoken of as manifesting from prakrti.

We do not know anything about Asuri the direct disciple of Kapila 1 . But it seems probable that the system of Samkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the Mahdbharata and has been attributed there to Pafi-casikha is probably the earliest form of Samkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Gunaratna's reference to the school of Maulikya Samkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.D.) does not refer to the Samkhya as described by Isvarakrsna and referred to in other parts of Mahdbharata is a definite proof that Isvarakrsna's Samkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Samkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavasin altered the Samkhya according to his own views 2 . Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavasin was a title of Isvarakrsna 3 and Garbe holds that the date of Isvarakrsna was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Isvarakrsna was indebted for his karikas to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his Karikd seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

1 A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gunaratna [Tarkarahasyadipika, p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (purusa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.

2 Vassilief's Buddhismus, p. 240.

3 Takakusu's "A study of Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," J. R.A.S., 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gunaratna mentions Isvarakrsna and Vindhyavasin as two different authorities ( Tarka-rahasyadipika, pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in anustubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Isvarakrsna. It appears that Isvarakrsna wrote two books; one is the Samkhya karikd and another an independent work on Samkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gunaratna, stands as follows:

" Pratiniyatadhyavasayah irotradisamuttha adhyaksam" (p. 108).

If Vacaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumana in his Tattvakautnudi be considered to be a correct explanation of Samkhya karika then isvarakrsna must be a different person from Vindhyavasin whose views on anumana as referred to in Slokavarttika, p. 393, are altogether different. But Vacaspati's own statement in the Tatparyyatika (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.

Mahabhasya of Patanjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) 1 . The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Samkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patanjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Arya metre by Isvarakrsna was not a Samkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Samkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Samkhya doctrine of prakrti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Samkhya book which was paraphrased by Isvarakrsna.

The earliest descriptions of a Samkhya which agrees with Isvarakrsna's Samkhya (but with an addition of Isvara) are to be found in Patanjali's Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Samkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Samkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Samkhya of Caraka and Pancasikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upanisad ideas and the orthodox Samkhya doctrine as represented by Isvarakrsna. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that the purusa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyaya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer than the orthodox Samkhya.

We hear of a Sastitantrasastra as being one of the oldest Samkhya works. This is described in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita as containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters 2 . A quotation from Rajavarttika (a work about which there is no definite information) in Vacaspati Misra's commentary on the Samkhya karika(j2) says that it was called the Sastitantra because it dealt with the existence of prakrti, its oneness, its difference from purusas, its purposefulness for purusas, the multiplicity of purusas, connection and separation from purusas, the evolution of

1 Patanjali's Mahabhasya, iv. i. 3. Atisatmikarsadativiprakarsat tnurttyantara-vyavadhanat tamasavrtatvat indriyadaurvalyadatipramadat, etc. (Benares edition.)

2 Ahirbudhnya Samhita, pp. 108, no.

220 The Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya [ch.

the categories, the inactivity of the purusas and the fiveviparyyayas, nine tustis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the eight siddhis 1 .

But the content of the Sastitantra as given in Ahirbudhnya Samhitavs, different from it,and itappearsfrom it that the Samkhya of the Sastitantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita was of a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pancaratra Vaisnavas and the Ahirbudhnya Samhita says that Kapila's theory of Samkhya was a Vaisnava one. Vijnana Bhiksu, the greatest expounder of Samkhya, says in many places of his work VijhandmrtaBhasya that Samkhya was originally theistic, and that the atheistic Samkhya is only a praudhivada (an exaggerated attempt to show that no supposition of Isvara is necessary to explain the world process) though the Mahabharata points out that the difference between Samkhya and Yoga is this, that the former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy between the two accounts of Sastitantra suggests that the original Sastitantra as referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita was subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that Gunaratna does not mention among the important Samkhya works Sastitantra but Sastitantroddhdra

1 The doctrine of the viparyyaya, tusti, defects of organs, and the siddhi are mentioned in the Karika of IsVarakrsna, but I have omitted them in my account of Samkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (antipathy), abhinive^a (self-love), which are also called tamo, moha, mahamoha, tamisra, and andhatamisra. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prakrti will herself bring our salvation (ambhas), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's life (salila), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (megha), that salvation will be worked out by fate (b/idgya), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (para), the troubles of protecting the earned money (supara), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (para-para), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (anuttamambhas), all gain leads to the injury of others (uttamdmbhas). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider prakrti and its evolutes as the self. The siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (i) reading of scriptures (tdra), (2) enquiry into their meaning (sutara), (3) proper reasoning (tdratara), (4) corroborating one's own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (ramyaka), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (sadamudita). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamana lead directly to the separation of the prakrti from the purusa. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tustis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Samkhya goal.

(revised edition of Sastitantra) 1 . Probably the earlier Sastitantra was lost even before Vacaspati's time.

If we believe the Sastitantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita to be in all essential parts the same work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila's Samkhya was theistic 2 . It seems probable that his disciple Asuri tried to popularise it. But it seems that a great change occurred when Pancasikha the disciple of Asuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in Samkhya kdrikd (70) that the literature was divided by him into many parts {tena bahudhakrtam tantrani). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that the original Sastitantra was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vaisnavas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential parts as the Samkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Patanjala Samkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may be ventured is that Pancasikha probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of Samkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Patanjala school of Samkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pancasikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Samkhya system. An important change in the Samkhya doctrine seems to have been introduced by Vijnana Bhiksu (sixteenth century A.D.) by his treatment of gunas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this interpretation of Samkhya as the most rational and philosophical one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system of the accepted Kapila and the Patanjala school of Samkhya. But it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gunas was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the

1 Tarkarahasyadtpika, p. 109.

2 evam sadvimfakam prdknk fariratnih manavah samkhyatn samkhydtmakatvdcca kapiladibhirucyate. Matsyapurana, I v. 28.

totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explana-nation of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijnana Bhiksu and the Vaisnava writer Venkata 1 . As the Yoga philosophy compiled by Patanjali and commented on by Vyasa, Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhiksu, agree with the Samkhya doctrine as explained by Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhiksu in most points I have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Patanjala schools of Samkhya and have treated them together—a principle which was followed by Haribhadra in his Saddarsanasamuccaya.

The other important Samkhya teachers mentioned by Gauda-pada are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanatana and Vodhu. Nothing is Known about their historicity or doctrines.

Samkhya karika, Samkhya sutra, Vacaspati Misra and Vijnana Bhiksu.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Samkhya-Yoga system. The Samkhya karika is the oldest Samkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. The Samkhya siitra was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth century A.D.). Even Gunaratna of the fourteenth century a.d. who made allusions to a number of Samkhya works, did not make any reference to the Sainkhya siitra, and no other writer who is known to have flourished before Gunaratna seems to have made any reference to the Sdmk/iya siitra. The natural conclusion therefore is that these sutras were probably written some time after the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is said at the end of the Samkhya karika of Isvarakrsna that the karikas give an exposition of the Samkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Samkhya works—the Sastitan-trasastra. The Samkhya sutras contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Samkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the Sastitantrasdstra {Sastitatitroddhara as mentioned by

1 Verikata's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.

Gunaratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the Samkhya doctrine found in the sutras differs in any important way from the Samkhya doctrine as found in the Samkhya karika. The only point of importance is this, that the Samkhya sutras hold that when the Upanisads spoke of one absolute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved in the class of intelligent purusas as distinct from the class of the gunas. As all purusas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upanisads as one, for they all form the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in the Samkhya karika. This is, however, a case of omission and not of difference. Vijfiana Bhiksu, the commentator of the Samkhya sutra, was more inclined to theistic Samkhya or Yoga than to atheistic Samkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his Sdmkhyapravacanabhasya, Yogavarttika, and Vijiianamrta-bhasya (an independent commentary on the Brahmasutras of Badarayana on theistic Samkhya lines). Vijfiana Bhiksu's own view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he agreed more with the views of the Samkhya doctrine of the Puranas, where both the diverse purusas and the prakrti are said to be merged in the end in Isvara, by whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the Samkhya sutras, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Samkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Isvara it could explain all facts. Vijfiana Bhiksu in his interpretation of Samkhya differed on many points from those of Vacaspati, and it is difficult to say who is right. Vijfiana Bhiksu has this advantage that he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points on which Vacaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the nature of the conception of the gunas, which I believe is the most important thing in Samkhya. Vijfiana Bhiksu described the gunas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vacaspati and Gaudapada (the other commentator of the Samkhya karika) remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of Vijfiana Bhiksu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the gunas, Bhiksu definitely

came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the gunas is found in any other work before Bhiksu, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the Mahabharata explains the nature of the gunas. But Bhiksu's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the gunas in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhiksu in giving my account of the nature of the gunas. The Karika speaks of the gunas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness {sattva, rajas and tamas). It also describes sattva as being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati merely paraphrases this statement of XheKdrika but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhiksu's interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the gunas, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Samkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness as to the conception of the gunas.

There are some other points in which Bhiksu's interpretation differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the purusa. Vacaspati holds that there is no contact (samyogd) of any buddhi state with the purusa but that a reflection of the purusa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the purusa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (bhogd) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the purusa with the buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati Misra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (sannidhi) means only a specific kind of fitness {yogyata) by virtue of which the purusa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijfiana Bhiksu differs from Vacaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

reason why purusa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the purusa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijfiana Bhiksu thus holds that there is a real contact of the purusa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the purusa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the purusa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the purusa, and when the purusa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vacaspati and Bhiksu as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhiksu thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called samkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhiksu who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vacaspati's commentary on the Samkhya kdrikd which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (aham-kard) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of Vydsabhasya and Vijfiana Bhiksu etc. Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was ahamkara and

from ahamkara the tanmatras 1 . Vijnana Bhiksu however holds that both the separation of ahamkara and the evolution of the tanmatras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vacaspati and Bhiksu which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patanjali.

The word yoga occurs in the Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the Satapatha Brahmana and the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2 . The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature 8 .

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power 4 .

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses 6 .

In Panini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root " yuj samadhau" (yiif in the sense of concentration) from " yujir yoge" (root yujir in the sense of connecting). Yiij'xw the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga 6 .

1 See my Study of Patanjali, p. 60 ft.

2 Compare R.V. I. 34. 9/vn. 67. 8/ni. 27. 11/x. 30. 11/x. 114. 9/lV. 24. 4/1. 5. 3/1. 30. 7; Satapatha Brahmana 14. 7. 1. 11.

3 It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. geoc, Latin jugum.

4 See Chandogya III. 17. 4; Brh. 1.2. 6; Brh. III. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. i/m. 2. i/lll. 3. i ; Taitt. Brah. 11. 2. 3. 3; R.V. x. 129; Satap. Brah. xi. 5. 8. 1.

6 Kalha HI. 4, indriyani hayanahuh visayatesugocaran. The senses are the horses and whatever tliey grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. Karme?idriyanyasya hayah the conative senses are its horses.

6 Yugyah is used from the root of yujir yoge and not from yuja samadhau. A consideration of Panini's rale <l 7'adasya bra/imacaryam," V. i. 94 shows that not only

In the Bhagavadgitd, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root " ' yuj-samadhau " but also with " yujir yoge" This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the Bhagavadgltd. "Yogin" in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the Bhagavadgltd tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from yujir yoge) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kautilya in his A rthasdstra when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata. The oldest Buddhist sutras (e.g. the Satipatthdna suttd) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Samkhya, as we find it in the Yoga sutras of Patanjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upanisads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of pranayama (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to MaitrayanI that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upanisads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the Svetasvatara and the Katha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upanisads of Krsna Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Samkhya tenets, though the Samkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the MaitrayanI in the conversation between Sakyayana and Brhad ratha where we find that the Samkhya metaphysics was offered

different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Panini as Goldstiicker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.

in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Samkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patanjali. Thus Sakyayana says: "Here some say it is the guna which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief—this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state 1 .'"

An examination of such Yoga Upanisads as Sandilya, Yoga-tattva, Dhyanabindu, Hamsa, Amrtanada, Varaha, Mandala Brahmana, Nadabindu, and Yogakundall, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Samkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

1 Vatsyayana, however, in his bhasya on Nyaya siitra, i. i. 29, distinguishes Samkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Samkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (niratisayak cetatuik). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the purusa. Dosas (passions) and the pravrtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non-being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of Vyasabhasya. It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Samkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sanikhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the indriyas being " abkantika." Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a passage from Vyasabhasya, ill. 13, in his bhasya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (viruddha).

Saivas and Saktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantra-yoga; they grew in another direction as the Hathayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upanisad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Hathayogaand Rajayoga 1 . Insomecases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedantism with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as they are not connected with our present endeavour.

Of the Patanjala school of Samkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patanjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Samkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us. Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhiksu, the two great commentators on the Vyasabhasya, agree with us in holding that Patanjali was not the founder of the Yoga, but an editor. Analytic study of the sutras also brings the conviction that the sutras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and classification shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali only systematized them. There was no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of other systems, except as far as they might come in, by way of explaining the system. Patanjali is not even anxious to establish the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts as he had them. Most of the criticisms against the Buddhists occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhists are

1 The Yoga writer Jaigisavya wrote " Dharanasaslra" which dealt with Yogamore in the fashion of Tantra than that given by Patanjali. He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati's Tatparyatika or Vatsyayana's bhasya on Nyaya sutra, III. ii. 43.

criticized; the putting of an "zYz" (the word to denote the conclusion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course another "iti" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali who was anxious to supply some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a marked change (due either to its supplementary character or to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last chapter as compared with the style of the other three.

The sutras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what has already been said in the second chapter and some of the topics introduced are such that they could well have been dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sutras, whereas the average number of sutras in other chapters is between 51 to 55.

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Patamchala of Satapatha Brahmana 1 ; in Katyayana's Vdrttika we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as patantah afijalayah yasmai (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names. There is however another theory which identifies the writer of the great commentary on Panini called the Maha-bhdsya with the Patanjali of the Yoga sutra. This theory has been accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of some Indian commentators who identified the two Patanjalis. Of these one is the writer of the Patanjalicarita (Ramabhadra Diksita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth century. The other is that cited in Sivarama's commentary on Vasavadatta which Aufrccht assigns to the eighteenth century. The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and Cakrapanidatta,

1 Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 22311.

the commentator of Caraka, who belonged to the eleventh century A.D. Thus Cakrapani says that he adores the Ahipati (mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech and body by his Patafijala mahabhasya and the revision of Caraka. Bhoja says : " Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign Ranararigamalla who by composing his grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patafijala and by producing a treatise on medicine called Rajamrgahka has like the lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyasa (which is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion between the three Patanjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as Pdlaiijalatantra, and who has been quoted by Sivadasa in his commentary on Cakradatta in connection with the heating of metals.

Professor J. H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great commentators of the grammar school such as Bhartrhari, Kaiy-yata, Vamana, Jayaditya, Nagesa, etc. are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the two Patanjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age. And if other proofs are available which go against such an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patanjali's grammatical work contains anything which may lead us to think that he was not the same person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the philosophic concept of substance {dravya) of the two Patanjalis differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that dravya is described in Vydsabhdsya in one place as being the unity of species and qualities {sdmdnyavisesdtmakd), whereas the Mahabhasya holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

Vyadi and Vajapyayana (Vyadi holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vajapyayana holding that words denoted species 1 ). Even Panini had these two different ideas in "jdtydkhyd-ydmekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasydm" and " sarupanameka-sesamekavibhaktau" and Patanjali the writer of the Mahdbhdsya only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of Vydsabhdsya, though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the sutras. Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the Mahdbhdsya as that object which is the specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.— "yat sdsndldhgiilakakudakhura-visdnyartharupam" we are reminded of its similarity with " ayutasiddhdvayavabhedduugatah samuhah dravyam" (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the Vydsabhdsya. So far as I have examined the Mahdbhdsya I have not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the Mahdbhdsya knew most of the important points of the Samkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the guna theory (I. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Samkhya dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of change vikdra as production of new qualities gut/dutarddhdna (5.1.2,5.1.3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the Mahdbhdsya agrees with the Yoga view as regards the Sphotavada, which is not held in common by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin their works in a similar manner (athayogamisasanam and atha sdbddmtsdsauam) —" now begins the compilation of the instructions on Yoga " ( Yoga sutrd) —and " now begins the compilation of the instructions of words" {Mahdbhdsya).

It mayfurther be noticed in this connection that the arguments

1 Patafijali's Mahabhasya, I. 2. 64.

which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the Yoga sutra between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patanjalis cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed Buddhist 1 reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijnana-vadi type, we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras had been developing long before the time of Nagarjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two Patanjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative critical study of the Yoga sutras and the text of the Maha-bhasya, which can lead us to say that the writer of the Yoga sutras flourished at a later date than the other Patanjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patanjali the Yoga editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other work Kitab Patanjal, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book called Sanka (Samkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the present Yoga sutra of Patanjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by Alberuni Kitab Patanjal, which is to be translated as the book of Patanjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when translated stands as "the author of the book of Patanjal." It had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in the Yoga sutra, but the manner in which these are described (so

1 It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference nacaika-cittatanlram vastu tadupramanakam tada kim syat (iv. 16) was probably a line of the Vyasabhasya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as a sutra.

far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change from what we find in the Yoga sutra. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption with him and beatitude is obtained 1 .

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the Yoga sutra. The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the Yoga sutra. He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the abhydsa (habit) of Patanjali, and the object of this abhyasa is unity with God 2 . The second stands for vairagya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. Yoga sutra, I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasa-yana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in the Yoga sutra, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an Firddhvamula avaksakha asvattha (a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upanisad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the

1 Cf. Yoga sfitra 1. 23-29 and 11. 1, 45. The Yoga sutras speak of I<5vara (God) as an eternally emancipated purusa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyasa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the Yoga siitras of the existence of God.

2 Cf. Yoga 11. 1.

object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.

The difference of this system from that of the Yoga sutra is : (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama 1 and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in the Yoga sutra has been lost sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God ; (5) the introduction of Brahman ; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (cittavrttinirodJia) is lost sight of, and (7) rasayana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patanjali's Yoga sutra in the direction of Vedanta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sutras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedanta, Tantra and Saiva doctrines 2 . As the author mentions rasayana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nagarjuna and was probably the same person who wrote Patanjala tantra, who has been quoted by Sivadasa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nagesa as "Carake Patanjalih." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapani and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the Mahabhasya. It is also very probable that Cakrapani by his line " patanjala^}nahabhasyacarakapratisa7nskrtaih'' , refers to this work which was called " Patanjala." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvlpas and the sagaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the Vyasabhasya, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when the Vydsabhasya was not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni

1 Alberuni, in his account of the book of Samkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.

2 Cf. the account of Paiitpatadariana in Sarvadarsanasamgraha.

also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapani also probably confused him with Patanjali the grammarian ; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patanjali was probably written by some other Patanjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that when Vyasabhasya quotes in III. 44 as " iti Patanjalih," he refers to this Patanjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitrayana Upanisad consisted of six angas or accessories, namely prana-yama, pratyahara, dhyana, dharana, tarka and samadhi 1 . Comparing this list with that of the list in the Yoga sfitras we find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by asana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the Brahmajala sutta we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samadhi or Dhyana school as belonging to one class of thinkers called sasvatavada, and from the inclusion of tarka as an anga in samadhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the angas given in MaitrayanI Upanisad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Samkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Samkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of asana for tarka in the list of Patanjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Samkhya. The introduction of ahimsa (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and sauca (purity), santosa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sutras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitrl, karuna, mudita, upeksa is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the Acarahgasutra, Uttaradhyayanasutra,

1 frdndydmah pratydhdrah d/iydnam dhdrand tarkah samddhih sadahga ityucyate yogah (Maitr. 6. 8).

the Sutrakrtdngasutra, etc., and passing through Umasvati's Tat-tvdrthddhigamasutra to Hemacandra's Yogasdstra we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's Pdtanjal that these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering 1 . Again, the metaphysics of the samsara (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidya is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidya should not be confused with the Vedanta avidya of Saiikara, as it is an avidya of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidya is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sutra " anitydsuciduh-kkdndtmasu nityasuciduhkhdtmakhyatiravidya" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live {abhinivesa). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least 2 ." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinivesa, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that the Yoga sutras proper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such

1 Yoga sutra, n. 15, 16, 17. Yathacikitsasdstram caturvyuham rogo rogahetuh arogyam bhaisajyamiti eva/nidamapi sastram caturvyiiha?neva; tadyatha samsarah, samsarahetuh moksah moksopayah ; duhkhabahulah samsaro heyah,pradhanapiirusayoh samyogo heyahetuh, sarnyogasydtyantiki nivrttirhanam hatwpayah samyagdarsanam,

Vydsabkdsya, 11. 15

2 Oldenberg's Buddhism 1 .

a stage that they would not like to borrow from one another. As this can only be held true of earlier Buddhism I am disposed to think that the date of the first three chapters of the Yoga sntras must be placed about the second century B.C. Since there is no evidence which can stand in the way of identifying the grammarian Patanjali with the Yoga writer, I believe we may take them as being identical 1 .

The Samkhya and the Yoga Doctrine of Soul or Purusa.

The Samkhya philosophy as we have it now admits two principles, souls and prakrti, the root principle of matter. Souls are many, like the Jaina souls, but they are without parts and qualities. They do not contract or expand according as they occupy a smaller or a larger body, but are always all-pervasive, and are not contained in the bodies in which they are manifested. But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul. The souls are many, and had it not been so (the Samkhya argues) with the birth of one all would have been born and with the death of one all would have died 2 .

The exact nature of soul is however very difficult of comprehension, and yet it is exactly this which one must thoroughly grasp in order to understand the Samkhya philosophy. Unlike the Jaina soul possessing anantajnana, anantadarsana, ananta-sukha, and anantavlryya, the Samkhya soul is described as being devoid of any and every characteristic; but its nature is absolute pure consciousness (cit). The Samkhya view differs from the Vedanta, firstly in this that it does not consider the soul to be of the nature of pure intelligence and bliss (ananda) 3 . Bliss with Samkhya is but another name for pleasure and as such it belongs to prakrti and does not constitute the nature of soul; secondly, according to Vedanta the individual souls (j'wa) are

1 See S. N. Das Gupta, Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought, ch. 11. The most important point in favour of this identification seems to be that both the Patafijalis as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of sphota which was denied trven by Samkhya. On the doctrine of Sphota see my Study of Patanjali, Appendix 1.

2 Karika, 18.

3 Sec Citsukha's Tattvapradlpikd, IV.

but illusory manifestations of one soul or pure consciousness the Brahman, but according to Samkhya they are all real and many. The most interesting feature of Samkhya as of Vedanta is the analysis of knowledge. Samkhya holds that our knowledge of things are mere ideational pictures or images. External things are indeed material, but the sense data and images of the mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge, are also in some sense matter-stuff, since they are limited in their nature like the external things. The sense-data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes, or photographs of external things, and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest. These images of the mind could not have appeared as conscious, if there were no separate principles of consciousness in connection with which the whole conscious plane could be interpreted as the experience of a person 1 . We know that the Upanisads consider the soul or atman as pure and infinite consciousness, distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas, and the images. In our ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle which has no change, no form, but which is like a light which illumines the mute, pictorial forms which the mind assumes. The self is nothing but this light. We all speak of our "self" but we have no mental picture of the self as we have of other things, yet in all our knowledge we seem to know our self. The Jains had said that the soul was veiled by karma matter, and every act of knowledge meant only the partial removal of the veil. Samkhya says that the self cannot be found as an image of knowledge, but that is because it is a distinct, transcendent principle, whose real nature as such is behind or beyond the subtle matter of knowledge. Our cognitions, so far as they are mere forms or images, are merely compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance, and thus are like a sheet of painted canvas immersed in darkness; as the canvas gets prints from outside and moves, the pictures appear one by one before the light and are illuminated. So it is with our knowledge. The special characteristic of self is that it is like a light, without which all knowledge would be blind. Form and motion are the characteristics of matter, and

1 Tattakaumudi,^; Yogavarttika,\\.ii; Vijrianamrtabhasya,\>. 74; Yogcwarttika and Tallvavaisaradi, I. 4, 11. 6, 18, 20; Vyasabhasya, 1. 6, 7.

so far as knowledge is mere limited form and movement it is the same as matter; but there is some other principle which enlivens these knowledge-forms, by virtue of which they become conscious. This principle of consciousness {cit) cannot indeed be separately perceived per se, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity 1 . The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes of knowledge and experiences of pleasure and pain. Each item of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is but a subtle knowledge-stuff which has been illumined by the principle of consciousness, but so far as each item of knowledge carries with it the awakening or the enlivening of consciousness, it is the manifestation of the principle of consciousness. Knowledge-revelation is not the unveiling or revelation of a particular part of the self, as the Jains supposed, but it is a revelation of the self only so far as knowledge is pure awakening, pure enlivening, pure consciousness. So far as the content of knowledge or the image is concerned, it is not the revelation of self but is the blind knowledge-stuff.

The Buddhists had analysed knowledge into its diverse constituent parts, and had held that the coming together of these brought about the conscious states. This coming together was to them the point of the illusory notion of self, since this unity or coming together was not a permanent thing but a momentary collocation. With Samkhya however the self, the pure cit, is neither illusory nor an abstraction; it is concrete but transcendent. Coming into touch with it gives unity to all the movements of the knowledge-composites of subtle stuff, which would otherwise have remained aimless and unintelligent. It is by coming into connection with this principle of intelligence that they are interpreted as the systematic and coherent experience of a person, and may thus be said to be intelligized. Intelligizing means the expression and interpretation of the events or the happenings of

1 It is important to note that Samkhya has two terms to denote the two aspects involved in knowledge, viz. the relating element of awareness as such (cit), and the content [budxihi) which is the form of the mind-stuff representing the sense-data and the image. Cognition takes place by the reflection of the former in the latter.

knowledge in connection with a person, so as to make them a system of experience. This principle of intelligence is called purusa. There is a separate purusa in Samkhya for each individual, and it is of the nature of pure intelligence. The Vedanta atman however is different from the Samkhya purusa in this that it is one and is of the nature of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure bliss. It alone is the reality and by illusory maya it appears as many.

Thought and Matter.

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of matter are, why then should the purusa illuminate it and not external material objects. The answer that Samkhya gives is that the knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects in this, that they are far subtler and have a preponderance of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (sattva), which resembles the light of purusa, and is thus fit for reflecting and absorbing the light of the purusa. The two principal characteristics of external gross matter are mass and energy. But it has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able to catch the reflection of the cit —the super-translucent transcendent principle of intelligence. The fundamental characteristic of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff. But mass is at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity of translucence, or what may be otherwise designated as the intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the gross matter had none of the characteristics of translucence that thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of thought; for thought transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its object. Thought could not have copied the matter, if the matter did not possess some of the essential substances of which the copy was made up. But this plastic entity (sattva) which is so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination in matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible in

thought; thus the images of thought are limited, separate, have movement, and have more or less clear cut forms. The images do not extend in space, but they can represent space. The translucent and plastic element of thought {sattva) in association with movement {rajas) would have resulted in a simultaneous revelation of all objects; it is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction {tamos) that knowledge proceeds from image to image and discloses things in a successive manner. The buddhi (thought-stuff) holds within it all knowledge immersed as it were in utter darkness, and actual knowledge comes before our view as though by the removal of the darkness or veil, by the reflection of the light of the purusa. This characteristic of knowledge, that all its stores are hidden as if lost at any moment, and only one picture or idea comes at a time to the arena of revelation, demonstrates that in knowledge there is a factor of obstruction which manifests itself in its full actuality in gross matter as mass. Thus both thought and gross matter are made up of three elements, a plasticity of intelligence-stuff {sattva), energy-stuff {rajas), and mass-stuff {tamos), or the factor of obstruction. Of these the last two are predominant in gross matter and the first two in thought.

Feelings, the Ultimate Substances 1 .

Another question that arises in this connection is the position of feeling in such an analysis of thought and matter. Samkhya holds that the three characteristic constituents that we have analyzed just now are feeling substances. Feeling is the most interesting side of our consciousness. It is in our feelings that we think of our thoughts as being parts of ourselves. If we should analyze any percept into the crude and undeveloped sensations of which it is composed at the first moment of its appearance, it comes more as a shock than as an image, and we find that it is felt more as a feeling mass than as an image. Even in our ordinary life the elements which precede an act of knowledge are probably mere feelings. As we go lower down the scale of evolution the automatic actions and relations of matter are concomitant with crude manifestations of feeling which never rise to the level of knowledge. The lower the scale of evolution the less is the keenness of feeling, till at last there comes a stage where matter-complexes do not give rise to feeling

1 Karikd, 12, with Gaudpada and Narayanatlrtha.

reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life. What we call matter complexes become at a certain stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at a certain stage of descent sink into mere matter-complexes with matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-them-selves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in taking feelings to be the ultimate substances of which gross matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed to take feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember the Samkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances which are in essence but three types of feeling entities. The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we have noticed in the preceding section are but the manifestations of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings that we call the sorrowful, there is another class of feelings that we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither sorrowful nor pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression (visdda) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as shining {prakdsa), energy (pravrtti), obstruction {niyama), there are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as the ultimate things which make up all the diverse kinds of gross matter and thought by their varying modifications.

The Gunas 1 .

These three types of ultimate subtle entities are technically called guna in Samkhya philosophy. Guna in Sanskrit has three meanings, namely (1) quality, (2) rope, (3) not primary. These entities, however, are substances and not mere qualities. But it may be mentioned in this connection that in Samkhya philosophy there is no separate existence of qualities; it holds that each and every unit of quality is but a unit of substance. What we call quality is but a particular manifestation or appearance of a subtle entity. Things do not possess quality, but quality

1 Yogavarttika, II. 18; Bhavaganesa's Tattvayatharthyadipana, pp. 1-3; Vijnd-ndmrtabhasya, p. 100; Tatlvakautnudl, 13; also Gaudapada and Narayanatlrtha, 13.

signifies merely the manner in which a substance reacts ; any object we see seems to possess many qualities, but the Samkhya holds that corresponding to each and every new unit of quality, however fine and subtle it may be, there is a corresponding subtle entity, the reaction of which is interpreted by us as a quality. This is true not only of qualities of external objects but also of mental qualities as well. These ultimate entities were thus called gunas probably to suggest that they are the entities which by their various modifications manifest themselves as gunas or qualities. These subtle entities may also be called gunas in the sense of ropes because they are like ropes by which the soul is chained down as if it were to thought and matter. These may also be called gunas as things of secondary importance, because though permanent and indestructible, they continually suffer modifications and changes by their mutual groupings and re-groupings, and thus not primarily and unalterably constant like the souls (purusa). Moreover the object of the world process being the enjoyment and salvation of the purusas, the matter-principle could not naturally be regarded as being of primary importance. But in whatever senses we may be inclined to justify the name guna as applied to these subtle entities, it should be borne in mind that they are substantive entities or subtle substances and not abstract qualities. These gunas are infinite in number, but in accordance with their three main characteristics as described above they have been arranged in three classes or types called sattva (intelligence-stuff), rajas (energy-stuff) and tamas (mass-stuff). An infinite number of subtle substances which agree in certain characteristics of self-shining or plasticity are called the sattva-gunas and those which behave as units of activity are called the rajo-gunas and those which behave as factors of obstruction, mass or materiality are called tamo-gimas. These subtle guna substances are united in different proportions (e.g. a larger number of sattva substances with a lesser number of rajas or tamas, or a larger number of tamas substances with a smaller number of rajas and sattva substances and so on in varying proportions), and as a result of this, different substances with different qualities come into being. Though attached to one another when united in different proportions, they mutually act and react upon one another, and thus by their combined resultant produce new characters, qualities and substances. There is how-

ever one and only one stage in which the gunas are not compounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the guna substances is opposed by each of the other guna substances, and thus by their equal mutual opposition create an equilibrium, in which none of the characters of the gunas manifest themselves. This is a state which is so absolutely devoid of all characteristics that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It is a qualitiless simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium of the gunas is called prakrti 1 . This is a state which cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it serves no purpose, but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the earliest stage, by the breaking of which, later on, all modifications take place.

Prakrti and its Evolution.

Samkhya believes that before this world came into being there was such a state of dissolution—a state in which the guna compounds had disintegrated into a state of disunion and had by their mutual opposition produced an equilibrium the prakrti. Then later on disturbance arose in the prakrti, and as a result of that a process of unequal aggregation of the gunas in varying proportions took place, which brought forth the creation of the manifold. Prakrti, the state of perfect homogeneity and incoherence of the gunas, thus gradually evolved and became more and more determinate, differentiated, heterogeneous, and coherent. The gunas are always uniting, separating, and uniting again 2 . Varying qualities of essence, energy, and mass in varied groupings act on one another and through their mutual interaction and interdependence evolve from the indefinite or qualitatively indeterminate the definite or qualitatively determinate. And though co-operating to produce the world of effects, these diverse moments with diverse tendencies never coalesce. Thus in the phenomenal product whatever energy there is is due to the element of rajas and rajas alone; all matter, resistance, stability, is due to tamas,and all conscious manifestation to sattva. The particular guna which happens to be predominant in any phenomenon becomes manifest in that phenomenon and others become latent, though their presence is inferred by their

1 Yogavarltika, II. 19, and Pravacanabhasya, I. 61.

- Kaumudi, 13-16; TattvavaUaradl, 11. 20, IV. 13,14; also Yogavarttika, IV. 13,14.

effect. Thus, for example, in a body at rest mass is patent, energy latent and potentiality of conscious manifestation sublatent. In a moving body, the rajas is predominant (kinetic) and the mass is partially overcome. All these transformations of the groupings of the gunas in different proportions presuppose the state of prakrti as the starting point. It is at this stage that the tendencies to conscious manifestation, as well as the powers of doing work, are exactly counterbalanced by the resistance of inertia or mass, and the process of cosmic evolution is at rest. When this equilibrium is once destroyed, it is supposed that out of a natural affinity of all the sattva reals for themselves, of rajas reals for other reals of their type, of tamas reals for others of their type, there arises an unequal aggregation of sattva, rajas, or tamas at different moments. When one guna is preponderant in any particular collocation, the others are co-operant. This evolutionary series beginning from the first disturbance of the prakrti to the final transformation as the world-order, is subject to "a definite law which it cannot overstep." In the words of Dr B. N.Seal 1 , "the process of evolution consists in the development of the differentiated {yaisamyd) within the undifferentiated (samyavastha) of the determinate (vzsesa) within the indeterminate (avisesa) of the coherent (yutasiddha) within the incoherent (ayutasiddha). The order of succession is neither from parts to whole nor from whole to the parts, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole." The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of guna reals take place within the body of the prakrti. Prakrti consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the gunas in the prakrti has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of gunas constituting the worlds of thought and matter has been upset. These gunas once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the later aggregates appear in supersession of the former ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist.

1 Dr B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 1915, p. 7.

For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the prakrti. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals of the second stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the prakrti. Thus by a succession of refillings the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved. Evolution {tattvantaraparinama) in Samkhya means the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being, and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation of new stages as integrated in previous stages {samsrsta-viveka).

Pralaya and the disturbance of the Prakrti Equilibrium.

But how or rather why prakrti should be disturbed is the most knotty point in Samkhya. It is postulated that the prakrti or the sum-total of the gunas is so connected with the purusas, and there is such an inherent teleology or blind purpose in the lifeless prakrti, that all its evolution and transformations take place for the sake of the diverse purusas, to serve the enjoyment of pleasures and sufferance of pain through experiences, and finally leading them to absolute freedom or mukti. A return of this manifold world into the quiescent state {pralaya) of prakrti takes place when the karmas of all purusas collectively require that there should be such a temporary cessation of all experience. At such a moment the guna compounds are gradually broken,and there is a backward movement (pratisancara) till everything is reduced to the gunas in their elementary disintegrated state when their mutual opposition brings about their equilibrium. This equilibrium however is not a mere passive state, but one of utmost tension; there is intense activity, but the activity here does not lead to the generation of new things and qualities {yisadrsa-parinama) ; this course of new

production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same state isadrsa-parindmd) of equilibrium, so that there is no change or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension of the teleology or purpose of the gunas, or an absolute break of the course of guna evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it has been generated to fulfil the demands of the accumulated karmas of purusas, and since there is still the activity of the gunas in keeping themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the samsara cycle. The state of mukti (liberation) is of course quite different, for in that stage the movement of the gunas ceases for ever with reference to the liberated soul. But still the question remains, what breaksthe state of equilibrium? The Samkhya answer is that it is due to the transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the purusa 1 . This influence of the purusa again, if it means anything, means that there is inherent in the gunas a teleology that all their movements or modifications should take place in such a way that these may serve the purposes of the purusas. Thus when the karmas of the purusas had demanded that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period there was a pralaya. At the end of it, it is the same inherent purpose of the prakrti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable world for the experiences of the purusas by which its quiescent state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the inherent teleology of the prakrti, which demands that a state of pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity should begin. Since there is a purpose in the gunas which brought them to a state of equilibrium, the state of equilibrium also presupposes that it also may be broken up again when the purpose so demands. Thus the inherent purpose of the prakrti brought about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for the creative work again, and it is this natural change in the prakrti that may be regarded from another point of view as the transcendental influence of the purusas.

Mahat and Ahamkara.

The first evolute of the prakrti is generated by a preponderance of the sattva (intelligence-stuff). This is indeed the earliest state from which all the rest of the world has sprung forth; and it is a state in which the stuff of sattva predominates. It thus holds

1 The Yoga answer is of course different. It believes that the disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakrti for new creation takes place by the will of I^vara (God).

within it the minds {buddhi) of all purusas which were lost in the prakrti during the pralaya. The very first work of the evolution of prakrti to serve the purusas is thus manifested by the separating out of the old buddhis or minds (of the purusas) which hold within themselves the old specific ignorance (avidya) inherent in them with reference to each purusa with which any particular buddhi is associated from beginningless time before the pralaya. This state of evolution consisting of all the collected minds (buddhi) of all the purusas is therefore called buddhitattva. It is a state which holds or comprehends within it the buddhis of all individuals. The individual buddhis of individual purusas are on one hand integrated with the buddhitattva and on the other associated with their specific purusas. When some buddhis once begin to be separated from the prakrti, other buddhi evolutions take place. In other words, we are to understand that once the transformation of buddhis is effected for the service of the purusas, all the other direct transformations that take place from the prakrti take the same line, i.e. a preponderance of sattva being once created by the bringing out of some buddhis, other transformations of prakrti that follow them have also the sattva preponderance, which thus have exactly the same composition as the first buddhis. Thus the first transformation from prakrti becomes buddhi-transformation. This stage of buddhis may thus be regarded as the most universal stage, which comprehends within it all the buddhis of individuals and potentially all the matter of which the gross world is formed. Looked at from this point of view it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation, and is thus called maJiat (the great one). It is called lihga (sign), as the other later existences or evolutes give us the ground of inferring its existence, and as such must be distinguished from the prakrti which is called alihga, i.e. of which no liriga or characteristic may be affirmed.

This mahat-tattva being once produced, further modifications begin to take place in three lines by three different kinds of undulations representing the sattva preponderance, rajas preponderance and tamas preponderance. This state when the mahat is disturbed by the three parallel tendencies of a preponderance of tamas, rajas and sattva is called ahamkara, and the above three tendencies are respectively called tdmasika ahamkara or bhutadi, rajasika or taijasa ahamkara, and vaikarika ahamkara. The raja-sika ahamkara cannot mark a new preponderance by itself; it only

helps (sahakari) the transformations of the sattva preponderance and the tamas preponderance. The development of the former preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more and more determinate character of the buddhi, for we remember that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva preponderance. Further development with the help of rajas on the line of sattva development could only take place when the buddhi as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first development of the buddhi on this line is called sdttvika or vai-karika ahamkara. This ahamkara represents the development in buddhi to produce a consciousness-stuff as I or rather "mine," and must thus be distinguished from the first stage as buddhi, the function of which is a mere understanding and general datum as thisness.

The ego or ahamkara (abhimana-dravyd) is the specific expression of the general consciousness which takes experience as mine. The function of the ego is therefore called abhimana (self-assertion). From this again come the five cognitive senses of vision, touch, smell, taste, and hearing, the five conative senses of speech, handling, foot-movement, the ejective sense and the generative sense; the pranas (bio-motor force) which help both conation and cognition are but aspects of buddhi-movement as life. The individual ahamkaras and senses are related to the individual buddhis by the developing sattva determinations from which they had come into being. Each buddhi with its own group of ahamkara (ego) and sense-evolutes thus forms a microcosm separate from similar other buddhis with their associated groups. So far therefore as knowledge is subject to sense-influence and the ego, it is different for each individual, but so far as a general mind (karana buddhi) apart from sense knowledge is concerned, there is a community of all buddhis in the buddhitattva. Even there however each buddhi is separated from other buddhis by its own peculiarly associated ignorance (avidya). The buddhi and its sattva evolutes of ahamkara and the senses are so related that though they are different from buddhi in their functions, they are all comprehended in the buddhi, and mark only its gradual differentiations and modes. We must again remember in this connection the doctrine of refilling, for as buddhi exhausts its part in giving rise to ahamkara, the deficiency of buddhi is made good by prakrti; again as ahamkara partially exhausts itself in generating sense-faculties, the defi-

ciency is made good by a refilling from the buddhi. Thus the change and wastage of each of the stadia are always made good and kept constant by a constant refilling from each higher state and finally from prakrti.

The Tanmatras and the Paramanus 1 .

The other tendency, namely that of tamas, has to be helped by the liberated rajas of ahamkara, in order to make itself preponderant, and this state in which the tamas succeeds in overcoming the sattva side which was so preponderant in the buddhi, is called bhutadi. From this bhutadi with the help of rajas are generated the tanmatras, the immediately preceding causes of the gross elements. The bhutadi thus represents only the intermediate stage through which the differentiations and regroupings of tamas reals in the mahat proceed for the generation of the tanmatras. There has been some controversy between Samkhya and Yoga as to whether the tanmatras are generated from the mahat or from ahamkara. The situation becomes intelligible if we remember that evolution here does not mean coming out or emanation, but increasing differentiation in integration within the evolving whole. Thus the regroupings of tamas reals marks the differentiation which takes place within the mahat but through its stage as bhutadi. Bhutadi is absolutely homogeneous and inert, devoid of all physical and chemical characters except quantum or mass. The second stadium tanmatra represents subtle matter, vibratory, impingent, radiant, instinct with potential energy. These "potentials" arise from the unequal aggregation of the original mass-units in different proportions and collocations with an unequal distribution of the original energy (rajas). The tanmatras possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction 2 .

In intimate relation with those physical characters they also possess the potentials of the energies represented by sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell; but, being subtle matter, they are devoid

1 I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given in Ray's Hindu Chemistry. The credit of explaining Samkhya physics in the light of the text belongs entirely to him.

2 Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.

of the peculiar forms which these "potentials" assume in particles of gross matter like the atoms and their aggregates. In other words,the potentials lodged in subtle matter must undergo peculiar transformations by new groupings or collocations before they can act as sensory stimuli as gross matter, though in the minutest particles thereof the sensory stimuli may be infra-sensible (atin-driya but not anudbhutd) y .

Of the tanmatras the sabda or dkdsa tanmatra (the sound-potential) is first generated directly from the bhutadi. Next comes the sparsa or the vayu tanmatra (touch-potential) which is generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhutadi with the akasa tanmatra. The rupa tanmatra (colour-potential) is generated similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from bhutadi; the rasa tanmatra (taste-potential) or the ap tanmatra is also similarly formed. This ap tanmatra again by its union with a unit of tamas from bhutadi produces the gandtia tanmatra (smell-potential) or the ksiti tanmatra-. The difference of tanmatras or infra-atomic units and atoms (paramdnu) is this, that the tanmatras have only the potential power of affecting our senses, which must be grouped and regrouped in a particular form to constitute a new existence as atoms before they can have the power of affecting our senses. It is important in this connection to point out that the classification of all gross objects as ksiti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoman is not based upon a chemical analysis, but from the points of view of the five senses through which knowledge of them could be brought home to us. Each of our senses can only apprehend a particular quality and thus five different ultimate substances are said to exist corresponding to the five qualities which may be grasped by the five senses. In accordance with the existence of these five elements, the existence of the five potential states or tanmatras was also conceived to exist as the ground of the five gross forms.

The five classes of atoms are generated from the tanmatras as follows: the sound-potential, with accretion of rudiment matter from bhutadi generates the akasa-atom. The touch-potentials combine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the

1 Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindtts.

2 There were various ways in which the genesis of tanmatras and atoms were explained in literatures other than Samkhya; for some account of it see Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.

vayu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate the earth-atom. The akasa-atom possesses penetrability, the vayu-atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat and light, the ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom cohesive attraction. The akasa we have seen forms the transition link from the bhutadi to the tanmatra and from the tanmatra to the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special notice at this stage. Samkhya distinguishes between a karana-akasa and karyakasa. The karana-akasa (non-atomic and all-pervasive) is the formless tamas—the mass in prakrti or bhutadi; it is indeed all-pervasive, and is not a mere negation, a mere un-occupiedness (dvarandbhdva) or vacuum 1 . When energy is first associated with this tamas element it gives rise to the sound-potential ; the atomic akasa is the result of the integration of the original mass-units from bhutadi with this sound-potential (sabda tanmatra). Such an akasa-atom is called the karyakasa; it is formed everywhere and held up in the original karana akasa as the medium for the development of vayu atoms. Being atomic it occupies limited space.

The ahamkara and the five tanmatras are technically called avisesa or indeterminate, for further determinations or differentiations of them for the formation of newer categories of existence are possible. The eleven senses and the five atoms are called visesa, i.e. determinate, for they cannot further be so determined as to form a new category of existence. It is thus that the course of evolution which started in the prakrti reaches its furthest limit in the production of the senses on the one side and the atoms on the other. Changes no doubt take place in bodies having atomic constitution, but these changes are changes of quality due to spatial changes in the position of the atoms or to the introduction of new atoms and their re-arrangement. But these are not such that a newer category of existence could be formed by them which was substantially different from the combined atoms.

1 Dr B. N. Seal in describing this aka£a says *'Aka^a corresponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists and in others to what may be called proto-atom (protyle)." Ray's History of Hindu Chemistry, p. 88.

The changes that take place in the atomic constitution of things certainly deserve to be noticed. But before we go on to this, it will be better to enquire about the principle of causation according to which the Samkhya-Yoga evolution should be comprehended or interpreted.

Principle of Causation and Conservation of Energy 1 .

The question is raised, how can the prakrti supply the de-ficiences made in its evolutes by the formation of other evolutes from them? When from mahat some tanmatras have evolved, or when from the tanmatras some atoms have evolved, how can the deficiency in mahat and the tanmatras be made good by the prakrti ?

Or again, what is the principle that guides the transformations that take place in the atomic stage when one gross body, say milk, changes into curd, and so on? Samkhya says that "as the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms of the same ultimate Energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in a potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the gunas, but without creation of anything new. What is called the (material) cause is only the power which is efficient in the production or rather the vehicle of the power. This power is the unmanifested (or potential) form of the Energy set free (iidbhuta-vrtti) in the effect. But the concomitant conditions are necessary to call forth the so-called material cause into activity 2 ." The appearance of an effect (such as the manifestation of the figure of the statue in the marble block by the causal efficiency of the sculptor's art) is only its passage from potentiality to actuality and the concomitant conditions {sahakdri-sakti) or efficient cause (nimitta-kdranciy such as the sculptor's art) is a sort of mechanical help or instrumental help to this passage or the transition 3 . The refilling from prakrti thus means nothing more than this, that by the inherent teleology of the prakrti, the reals there are so collocated as to be transformed into mahat as those of the mahat have been collocated to form the bhutadi or the tanmatras.

1 Vyasabhasya and Yogavarttika, iv. 3; Tattvavaifdradi, IV. 3.

2 Ray, History of Hindu Chemistry, p. 72. s Ibid. p. 73.

Yoga however explains this more vividly on the basis of transformation of the liberated potential energy. The sum of material causes potentially contains the energy manifested in the sum of effects. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of energy together with a fresh collocation {gunasannivesavis'esa). As the owner of an adjacent field in transferring water from one field to another of the same or lower level has only to remove the obstructing mud barriers, whereupon the water flows of itself to the other field, so when the efficient or instrumental causes (such as the sculptor's art) remove the barrier inherent in any collocation against its transformation into any other collocation, the energy from that collocation flows out in a corresponding manner and determines the collocation. Thus for example the energy which collocated the milk-atoms to form milk was in a state of arrest in the milk state. If by heat or other causes this barrier is removed, the energy naturally changes direction in a corresponding manner and collocates the atoms accordingly for the formation of curd. So also as soon as the barriers are removed from the prakrti, guided by the constant will of Isvara, the reals in equilibrium in the state of prakrti leave their state of arrest and evolve themselves into mahat, etc.

Change as the formation of new collocations.

It is easy to see from what we have already said that any collocation of atoms forming a thing could not change its form, unless the barrier inherent or caused by the formation of the present collocation could be removed by some other extraneous instrumental cause. All gross things are formed by the collocation of the five atoms of ksiti, ap, tejas, marut, and vyoman. The difference between one thing and another is simply this, that its collocation of atoms or the arrangement or grouping of atoms is different from that in another. The formation of a collocation has an inherent barrier against any change, which keeps that collocation in a state of equilibrium, and it is easy to see that these barriers exist in infinite directions in which all the other infinite objects of the world exist. From whichever side the barrier is removed, the energy flows in that direction and helps the

formation of a corresponding object. Provided the suitable barriers could be removed, anything could be changed into any other thing. And it is believed that the Yogins can acquire the powers by which they can remove any barriers,and thus make anything out of any other thing. But generally in the normal course of events the line of evolution follows "a definite law which cannot be overstepped" (parindmakramaniyama) or in other words there are some natural barriers which cannot be removed, and thus the evolutionary course has to take a path to the exclusion of those lines where the barriers could not be removed. Thus saffron grows in countries like Kashmere and not in Bengal, this is limitation of countries {desdpabandhci) ; certain kinds of paddy grow in the rainy season only, this is limitation of season or time (kaltipabandhd); deer cannot beget men, this is limitation by form (dkdrdpabandha) ; curd can come out of milk, this is the limitation of causes (nimit-tdpabandhd). The evolutionary course can thus follow only that path which is not barricaded by any of these limitations or natural obstructions 1 .

Change is taking place everywhere, from the smallest and least to the highest. Atoms and reals are continually vibrating and changing places in any and every object. At each moment the whole universe is undergoing change, and the collocation of atoms at any moment is different from what it was at the previous moment. When these changes are perceivable, they are perceived as dharmaparindma or changes of dharma or quality; but perceived or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This change of appearance may be viewed from another aspect by virtue of which we may call it present or past, and old or new, and these are respectively called the laksanaparindma and avasthd-parindma. At every moment every object of the world is undergoing evolution or change, change as past, present and future, as new, old or unborn. When any change is in a potential state we call it future, when manifested present, when it becomes sub-latent again it is said to be past. Thus it is that the potential, manifest, and sub-latent changes of a thing are called future, present and past 2 .

1 Vydsabhasya, Tattvavaifaradi and Yogavarttika, III. 14.

2 It is well to note in this connection that Sanikhya-yoga does not admit the existence of lime as an independent entity like the Nyaya-VaUesika. Time represents the order of moments in which the mind grasps the phenomenal changes. It is hence a construction of the mind {biiddhi-nirmana). The time required by an atom to move

Causation as Satkaryavada (the theory that the effect potentially exists before it is generated by the movement of the cause).

The above consideration brings us to an important aspect of the Samkhya view of causation as satkaryavada. Samkhya holds that there can be no production of a thing previously non-existent; causation means the appearance or manifestation of a quality due to certain changes of collocations in the causes which were already held in them in a potential form. Production of effect only means an internal change of the arrangement of atoms in the cause, and this exists in it in a potential form, and just a little loosening of the barrier which was standing in the way of the happening of such a change of arrangement will produce the desired new collocation—the effect. This doctrine is called satkaryavada, i.e. that the karya or effect is sat or existent even before the causal operation to produce the effect was launched. The oil exists in the sesamum, the statue in the stone, the curd in the milk. The causal operation (karakavydpdrd) only renders that manifest (dvirbhuta) which was formerly in an unmanifested condition (tirohitriy.

The Buddhists also believed in change, as much as Samkhya did, but with them there was no background to the change; every change was thus absolutely a new one, and when it was past, the next moment the change was lost absolutely. There were only the passing dharmas or manifestations of forms and qualities, but there was no permanent underlying dharma or substance. Samkhya also holds in the continual change of dharmas, but it also holds that these dharmas represent only the conditions of the permanent reals. The conditions and collocations of the reals change constantly, but the reals themselves are unchangeable. The effect according to the Buddhists was non-existent, it came into being for a moment and was lost. On account of this theory of causation and also on account of their doctrine of sunya, they were called vainasikas (nihilists) by the Vedantins. This doctrine is therefore contrasted to Samkhya doctrine as asatkaryavada.

its own measure of space is called a moment (ksana) or one unit of time. Vijnana Bhiksu regards one unit movement of the gunas or reals as a moment. When by true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish. Vydsabhdsya, TattvavaUaradi, and Yogavarttika, in. 52 and m. 13. 1 TattvakaumttdT, 9.

The Jain view holds that both these views are relatively true and that from one point of view satkaryavada is true and from another asatkaryavada. The Samkhya view that the cause is continually transforming itself into its effects is technically called parinama-vada as against the Vedanta view called the vivarttavada: that cause remains ever the same, and what we call effects are but illusory impositions of mere unreal appearance of name and form —mere Maya 1 .

SSmkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism.

Granted that the interchange of the positions of the infinite number of reals produce all the world and its transformations; whence comes this fixed order of the universe, the fixed order of cause and effect, the fixed order of the so-called barriers which prevent the transformation of any cause into any effect or the first disturbance of the equilibrium of the prakrti? Samkhya denies the existence of Isvara(God) or any other exterior influence, and holds that there is an inherent tendency in these reals which guides all their movements. This tendency or teleology demands that the movements of the reals should be in such a manner that they may render some service to the souls either in the direction of enjoyment or salvation. It is by the natural course of such a tendency that prakrti is disturbed, and the gunas develop on two lines—on the mental plane, citta or mind comprising the sense faculties, and on the objective plane as material objects; and it is in fulfilment of the demands of this tendency that on the one hand take place subjective experiences as the changes of the buddhi and on the other the infinite modes of the changes of objective things. It is this tendency to be of service to the purusas (purusdrthatd) that guides all the movements of the reals, restrains all disorder, renders the world a fit object of experience, and finally rouses them to turn back from the world and seek to attain liberation from the association of prakrti and its gratuitous service, which causes us all this trouble of samsara.

Yoga here asks, how the blind tendency of the non-intelligent

1 Both the Vedanta and the Samkhya theories of causation are sometimes loosely called satkaryyavada. But correctly speaking as some discerning commentators have pointed out, the Vedanta theory of causation should be called satkaranavada for according to it the karana (cause) alone exists (sat) and all karyyas (effects) are illusory appearances of the karana; but according to Samkhya the karyya exists in a potential state in the karana and is hence always existing and real.

prakrti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be of the best service to the purusas, how can it remove its own barriers and lend itself to the evolutionary process from the state of prakrti equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the evolutionary order that all men must suffer pains according to their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? There must be some intelligent Being who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be attained. This Being is Isvara. Isvara is a purusa who had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His body is of pure sattva quality which can never be touched by ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of the reals by which the evolution of the gunas may best serve the double interest of the purusa's experience (bhoga) and liberation {apavarga) should be removed. It is according to this permanent will of Isvara that the proper barriers are removed and the gunas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best interests of the purusas. Isvara has not created the prakrti; he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prakrti in its quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is brought about. This acknowledgement of Isvara in Yoga and its denial by Samkhya marks the main theoretic difference between the two according to which the Yoga and Samkhya are distinguished as Sesvara Samkhya (Samkhya with Isvara) and Nirlsvara Samkhya (Atheistic Samkhya) 1 .

Buddhi and Purusa.

The question again arises that though purusa is pure intelligence, the gunas are non-intelligent subtle substances, how can the latter come into touch with the former? Moreover, the purusa is pure inactive intelligence without any touch of impurity and what service or need can such a purusa have of the gunas? This difficulty is anticipated by Samkhya, which has already made room for its answer by assuming that one class of the gunas called sattva is such that it resembles the purity and the intelligence of the purusa to a very high degree, so much so

1 Tattvavaisaradl, IV. 3; Yogavdrttika, I. 24; and Pravacanabkasya, V. 1-12.

that it can reflect the intelligence of the purusa, and thus render its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent. Thus all our thoughts and other emotional or volitional operations are really the non-intelligent transformations of the buddhi or citta having a large sattva preponderance; but by virtue of the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi, these appear as if they are intelligent. The self (purusa) according to Samkhya-Yoga is not directly demonstrated by self-consciousness. Its existence is a matter of inference on teleological grounds and grounds of moral responsibility. The self cannot be directly noticed as being separate from the buddhi modifications. Through beginningless ignorance there is a confusion and the changing states of buddhi are regarded as conscious. These buddhi changes are further so associated with the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi that they are interpreted as the experiences of the purusa. This association of the buddhi with the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi has such a special fitness (yogyata) that it is interpreted as the experience of the purusa. This explanation of Vacaspati of the situation is objected to by Vijnana Bhiksu. Vijnana Bhiksu says that the association of the buddhi with the image of the purusa cannot give us the notion of a real person who undergoes the experiences. It is to be supposed therefore that when the buddhi is intelligized by the reflection of the purusa, it is then superimposed upon the purusa, and we have the notion of an abiding person who experiences 1 . Whatever may be the explanation, it seems that the union of the buddhi with the purusa is somewhat mystical. As a result of this reflection of cit on buddhi and the superimposition of the buddhi the purusa cannot realize that the transformations of the buddhi are not its own. Buddhi resembles purusa in transparency, and the purusa fails to differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as a result of this non-distinction the purusa becomes bound down to the buddhi, always failing to recognize the truth that the buddhi and its transformations are wholly alien to it. This non-distinction of purusa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by avidyd (non-knowledge) in Samkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery 3 .

1 TattvavaiSaradi zx\& Yogavarttika, I. 4.

2 This indicates the nature of the analysis of illusion with Samkhya. It is the non-apprehension of the distinction of two things (e.g. the snake and the rope) that

Yoga holds a slightly different view and supposes that the purusa not only fails to distinguish the difference between itself and the buddhi but positively takes the transformations of buddhi as its own. It is no non-perception of the difference but positively false knowledge, that we take the purusa to be that which it is not {anyathakliyati). It takes the changing, impure, sorrowful, and objective prakrti or buddhi to be the changeless, pure, happiness-begetting subject. It wrongly thinks buddhi to be the self and regards it as pure, permanent and capable of giving us happiness. This is the avidya of Yoga. A buddhi associated with a purusa is dominated by such an avidya, and when birth after birth the same buddhi is associated with the same purusa, it cannot easily get rid of this avidya. If in the meantime pralaya takes place, the buddhi is submerged in the prakrti, and the avidya also sleeps with it. When at the beginning of the next creation the individual buddhis associated with the purusas emerge, the old avidyas also become manifest by virtue of it and the buddhis associate themselves with the purusas to which they were attached before the pralaya. Thus proceeds the course of samsara. When the avidya of a person is rooted out by the rise of true knowledge, the buddhi fails to attach itself to the purusa and is forever dissociated from it, and this is the state of mukti.

The Cognitive Process and some characteristics of Citta.

It has been said that buddhi and the internal objects have evolved in order to giving scope to the experience of the purusa. What is the process of this experience? Samkhya (as explained by Vacaspati) holds that through the senses the buddhi comes into touch with external objects. At the first moment of this touch there is an indeterminate consciousness in which the particulars of the thing cannot be noticed. This is called nirvikalpa pratyaksa (indeterminate perception). At the next moment by the function of the samkalpa (synthesis) and vikalpa (abstraction or imagination) of manas (mind-organ) the thing is perceived in all its determinate character; the manas differentiates, integrates, and associates the sense-data received through the senses, and

is the cause of illusion; it is therefore called the akhyati (non-apprehension) theory of illusion which must be distinguished from the anyathakhyati (misapprehension) theory of illusion of Yoga which consists in positively misapprehending one (e.g. the rope) for the other (e.g. snake). Yogavdrttika, I. 8.

thus generates the determinate perception, which when intelligized by the purusa and associated with it becomes interpreted as the experience of the person. The action of the senses, ahamkara, and buddhi, may take place sometimes successively and at other times as in cases of sudden fear simultaneously. Vijnana Bhiksu differs from this view of Vacaspati, and denies the synthetic activity of the mind-organ (manas), and says that the buddhi directly comes into touch with the objects through the senses. At the first moment of touch the perception is indeterminate, but at the second moment it becomes clear and determinate 1 . It is evident that on this view the importance of manas is reduced to a minimum and it is regarded as being only the faculty of desire, doubt and imagination.

Buddhi, including ahamkara and the senses, often called citta in Yoga, is always incessantly suffering changes like the flame of a lamp; it is made up of a large preponderance of the pure sattva substances, and is constantly moulding itself from one content to another. These images by the dual reflection of buddhi and purusa are constantly becoming conscious, and are being interpreted as the experiences of a person. The existence of the purusa is to be postulated for explaining the illumination of consciousness and for explaining experience and moral endeavour. The buddhi is spread all over the body, as it were, for it is by its functions that the life of the body is kept up; for the Samkhya does not admit any separate prana vayu (vital breath) to keep the body living. What are called vayus (bio-motor force) in Vedanta are but the different modes of operation of this category of buddhi, which acts all through the body and by its diverse movements performs the life-functions and sense-funetions of the body.

1 As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the senses, the sense-data of colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally speaking Yoga holds that the external objects are faithfully copied by the buddhi in which they are reflected, like trees in a lake :

'' tasmi/nsca darpane sphdre samasta vastudrstayah imastah pratibimbanti sarasiva tatadruniah" Yogavarttika, I. 4.

The buddhi assumes the form of the object which is reflected on it by the senses, or rather the mind flows out through the senses to the external objects and assumes their forms : " indriydiiyeva prandlikd cittasancaraiiaindrgah taih samyujya tadgola-kadi'drd bahyavast'usuparaktasya cittasyendriyasdhitycnaivdrthdkdrah parinatno bhavati." Yogavdrttika, 1. vi. 7. Contrast Tattvakaumudi, 27 and 30.

Apart from the perceptions and the life-functions, buddhi, or rather citta as Yoga describes it, contains within it the root impressions (samskaras) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies of all past lives {vdsandy. These samskaras are revived under suitable associations. Every man had had infinite numbers of births in their past lives as man and as some animal. In all these lives the same citta was always following him. The citta has thus collected within itself the instincts and tendencies of all those different animal lives. It is knotted with these vasanas like a net. If a man passes into a dog life by rebirth, the vasanas of a dog life, which the man must have had in some of his previous infinite number of births, are revived, and the man's tendencies become like those of a dog. He forgets the experiences of his previous life and becomes attached to enjoyment in the manner of a dog. It is by the revival of the vasana suitable to each particular birth that there cannot be any collision such as might have occurred if the instincts and tendencies of a previous dog-life were active when any one was born as man.

The samskaras represent the root impressions by which any habit of life that man has lived through, or any pleasure in which he took delight for some time, or any passions which were

1 The word samskara is used by Panini who probably preceded Buddha in three different senses: (i) improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality (Sata utkarsadhanam samskarah, Kasika on Panini, VI. ii. i6j, (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and (3) adornment (Panini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pitakas the word sankhara is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation, matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact sankhara stands for almost anything of which impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the meaning of aggregation (samavdya of Panini) is prominent. The word samskaroii is used in Kausitaki, 11. 6, Chandogya, iv. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and Brhadaranyaka, vi. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet come across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of samskara in Hindu philosophy is altogether different. It means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (smrti). The word vasana ( Yoga sutra, iv. 24) seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanisads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Palj pitakas. Abhidhdnappadipikd of Moggallana mentions .it, and it occurs in the Muktika Upanisad. It comes from the root "vas" to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of samskara, and in Vyasabhdsya they are identified in iv. 9. But vasana generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But samskaras are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vasanas are innate samskaras not acquired in this life. See Vyasabhasya, Tatlvavaisaradl and Yogavarttika, II. 13.

engrossing to him, tend to be revived, for though these might not now be experienced, yet the fact that they were experienced before has so moulded and given shape to the citta that the citta will try to reproduce them by its own nature even without any such effort on our part. To safeguard against the revival of any undesirable idea or tendency it is therefore necessary that its roots as already left in the citta in the form of samskaras should be eradicated completely by the formation of the habit of a contrary tendency, which if made sufficiently strong will by its own samskara naturally stop the revival of the previous undesirable samskaras.

Apart from these the citta possesses volitional activity (cestd) by which the conative senses are brought into relation to their objects. There is also the reserved potent power (sakti) of citta, by which it can restrain itself and change its courses or continue to persist in any one direction. These characteristics are involved in the very essence of citta, and form the groundwork of the Yoga method of practice, which consists in steadying a particular state of mind to the exclusion of others.

Merit or demerit (punya, papa) also is imbedded in the citta as its tendencies, regulating the mode of its movements, and giving pleasures and pains in accordance with it.

Sorrow and its Dissolution 1 .

Samkhya and the Yoga, like the Buddhists, hold that all experience is sorrowful. Tamas, we know, represents the pain substance. As tamas must be present in some degree in all combinations, all intellectual operations are fraught with some degree of painful feeling. Moreover even in states of temporary pleasure, we had sorrow at the previous moment when we had solicited it, and we have sorrow even when we enjoy it, for we have the fear that we may lose it. The sum total of sorrows is thus much greater than the pleasures, and the pleasures only strengthen the keenness of the sorrow. The wiser the man the greater is his capacity of realizing that the world and our experiences are all full of sorrow. For unless a man is convinced of this great truth that all is sorrow, and that temporary pleasures, whether generated by ordinary worldly experience or by enjoying heavenly experiences through the performance of Vedic sacrifices, are quite unable to

1 Tattvavaifaradi and Yogavarttika, II. 15, and TattvakaumudI, 1.

eradicate the roots of sorrow, he will not be anxious for mukti or the final uprooting of pains. A man must feel that all pleasures lead to sorrow, and that the ordinary ways of removing sorrows by seeking enjoyment cannot remove them ultimately; he must turn his back on the pleasures of the world and on the pleasures of paradise. The performances of sacrifices according to the Vedic rites may indeed give happiness, but as these involve the sacrifice of animals they must involve some sins and hence also some pains. Thus the performance of these cannot be regarded as desirable. It is when a man ceases from seeking pleasures that he thinks how best he can eradicate the roots of sorrow. Philosophy shows how extensive is sorrow, why sorrow comes, what is the way to uproot it, and what is the state when it is uprooted. The man who has resolved to uproot sorrow turns to philosophy to find out the means of doing it.

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical •enquiry of the Samkhya philosophy 1 . All experiences are sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences may be shut out for ever. Death cannot bring it, for after death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and purusa are associated with each other, the sufferings will continue. Citta must be dissociated from purusa. Citta or buddhi, Samkhya says, is associated with purusa because of the non-distinction of itself from buddhi 2 . It is necessary therefore that in buddhi we should be able to generate the true conception of the nature of purusa ; when this true conception of purusa arises in the buddhi it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from and quite unrelated to purusa, and thus ignorance is destroyed. As a result of that, buddhi turns its back on purusa and can no longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevocably connected with sorrow, and thus the purusa remains in its true form. This according to Samkhya philosophy is alone adequate to bring about the liberation of the purusa. Prakrti which was leading us through cycles of experiences from birth to birth, fulfils its final purpose when this true knowledge arises differentiating

1 Yoga puts it in a slightly modified form. Its object is the cessation of the rebirth-process which is so much associated with sorrow (duhkhabahulah samsarah keyak).

2 The word citta is a Yoga term. It is so called because it is the repository of all sub-conscious states. Samkhya generally uses the word buddhi. Both the words mean the same substance, the mind, but they emphasize its two different functions. Buddhi means intellection.

purusa from prakrti. This final purpose being attained the prakrti can never again bind the purusa with reference to whom this right knowledge was generated ; for other purusas however the bondage remains as before, and they continue their experiences from one birth to another in an endless cycle.

Yoga, however, thinks that mere philosophy is not sufficient. In order to bring about liberation it is not enough that a true knowledge differentiating purusa and buddhi should arise, but it is necessary that all the old habits of experience of buddhi, all its samskaras should be once for all destroyed never to be revived again. At this stage the buddhi is transformed into its purest state, reflecting steadily the true nature of the purusa. This is the kevala (oneness) state of existence after which (all samskaras, all avidya being altogether uprooted) the citta is impotent any longer to hold on to the purusa, and like a stone hurled from a mountain top, gravitates back into the prakrti 1 . To destroy the old samskaras, knowledge alone not being sufficient, a graduated course of practice is necessary. This graduated practice should be so arranged that by generating the practice of living higher and better modes of life, and steadying the mind on its subtler states, the habits of ordinary life may be removed. As the yogin advances he has to give up what he had adopted as good and try for that which is still better. Continuing thus he reaches the state when the buddhi is in its ultimate perfection and purity. At this stage the buddhi assumes the form of the purusa, and final liberation takes place.

Karmas in Yoga are divided into four classes: (i) sukla or white {pu?iya, those that produce happiness), (2) krsna or black {papa, those that produce sorrow), (3) sukla-krsna (punya-papa, most of our ordinary actions are partly virtuous and partly vicious as they involve, if not anything else, at least the death of many insects), (4) asuklakrsna (those inner acts of self-abnegation, and meditation which are devoid of any fruits as pleasures or pains). All external actions involve some sins, for it is difficult to work in the world and avoid taking: the lives of insects' 2 . All karmas

1 Both Samkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state as Kaiz<alya (alone-ness), the former because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at this state purusa remains for ever alone without any association with buddhi, see Samkhya kcirika, 68 and Yoga sutras, IV. 34.

2 Vyasabhasya and TaltvavaisaradT, IV. 7.

proceed from the five-fold afflictions (k/esas), namely avidya, asmitd, raga, dvesa and abhinivesa.

We have already noticed what was meant by avidya. It consists generally in ascribing intelligence to buddhi, in thinking it as permanent and leading to happiness. This false knowledge while remaining in this form further manifests itself in the other four forms of asmita, etc. Asmita means the thinking of worldly objects and our experiences as really belonging to us—the sense of " mine " or " I " to things that really are the qualities or transformations of the gunas. Riga means the consequent attachment to pleasures and things. Dvesa means aversion or antipathy to unpleasant things. Abhinivesa is the desire for life or love of life—the will to be. We proceed to work because we think our experiences to be our own, our body to be our own, our family to be our own, our possessions to be our own; because we are attached to these; because we feel great antipathy against any mischief that might befall them, and also because we love our life and always try to preserve it against any mischief. These all proceed, as is easy to see, from their root avidya, which consists in the false identification of buddhi with purusa. These five, avidya, asmita, raga, dvesa and abhinivesa, permeate our buddhi, and lead us to perform karma and to suffer. These together with the performed karmas which lie inherent in the buddhi as a particular mode of it transmigrate with the buddhi from birth to birth, and it is hard to get rid of them 1 . The karma in the aspect in which it lies in the buddhi as a mode or modification of it is called karmdsaya (the bed of karma for the purusa to lie in). We perform a karma actuated by the vicious tendencies (klcsci) of the buddhi. The karma when thus performed leaves its stain or modification on the buddhi, and it is so ordained according to the teleology of the prakrti and the removal of obstacles in the course of its evolution in accordance with it by the permanent will of Isvara that each vicious action brings sufferance and a virtuous one pleasure.

The karmas performed in the present life will generally accumulate, and when the time for giving their fruits comes, such a life is ordained for the person, such a body is made ready for him according to the evolution of prakrti as shall make it possible for him to suffer or enjoy the fruits thereof. The karma of the

1 Vyasabhasya and Tattvavaiiaradi, II. 3-9.

present life thus determines the particular kind of future birth (as this or that animal or man), the period of life (ayus) and the painful or pleasurable experiences (bhogd) destined for that life. Exceedingly good actions and extremely bad actions often produce their effects in this life. It may also happen that a man has done certain bad actions, for the realization of the fruits of which he requires a dog-life and good actions for the fruits of which he requires a man-life. In such cases the good action may remain in abeyance and the man may suffer the pains of a dog-life first and then be born again as a man to enjoy the fruits of his good actions. But if we can remove ignorance and the other afflictions, all his previous unfulfilled karmas are for ever lost and cannot again be revived. He has of course to suffer the fruits of those karmas which have already ripened. This is the jlvanmukti stage, when the sage has attained true knowledge and is yet suffering mundane life in order to experience the karmas that have already ripened {tisthati samskaravasat cakrabhramivaddhrtasariraJi).

Citta.

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by Patanjali in his Yoga sutra in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta. Some sort of concentration may be brought about by violent passions, as when fighting against a mortal enemy, or even by an ignorant attachment or instinct. The citta which has the concentration of the former type is called ksipta (wild) and of the latter type pramudha (ignorant). There is another kind of citta, as with all ordinary people, in which concentration is only possible for a time, the mind remaining steady on one thing for a short time leaves that off and clings to another thing and so on. This is called the viksipta (unsteady) stage of mind (cittabkumi). As distinguished from these there is an advanced stage of citta in which it can concentrate steadily on an object for a long time. This is the ekagra (one-pointed) stage. There is a still further advanced stage in which the citta processes are absolutely stopped. This happens immediately before mukti, and is called the nirodha (cessation) state of citta. The purpose of Yoga is to achieve the conditions of the last two stages of citta.

The cittas have five processes {vrtti), (i) pramdna 1 (valid

1 Samkhya holds that both validity and invalidity of any cognition depend upon the cognitive state itself and not on correspondence with external facts or objects (sva/a/i pramanyam svatah apramanyam). The contribution of Samkhya to the doc-

cognitive states such as are generated by perception, inference and scriptural testimony), (2) viparyaya (false knowledge, illusion, etc.), (3) vikalpa (abstraction, construction and different kinds of imagination), (4) nidrd (sleep, is a vacant state of mind, in which tamas tends to predominate), (5) smrti (memory).

These states of mind (vrtti) comprise our inner experience. When they lead us towards samsara into the course of passions and their satisfactions, they are said to be klista (afflicted or leading to affliction); when they lead us towards liberation, they are called aklista (unafflicted). To whichever side we go, towards samsara or towards mukti, we have to make use of our states of mind; the states which are bad often alternate with good states, and whichever state should tend towards our final good (liberation) must be regarded as good.

This draws attention to that important characteristic of citta, that it sometimes tends towards good (i.e. liberation) and sometimes towards bad (samsara). It is like a river, as the Vyasa-bhasya says, which flows both ways, towards sin and towards the good. The teleology of prakrti requires that it should produce in man the samsara as well as the liberation tendency.

Thus in accordance with it in the midst of many bad thoughts and bad habits there come good moral will and good thoughts, and in the midst of good thoughts and habits come also bad thoughts and vicious tendencies. The will to be good is therefore never lost in man, as it is an innate tendency in him which is as strong as his desire to enjoy pleasures. This point is rather remarkable, for it gives us the key of Yoga ethics and shows that our desire of liberation is not actuated by any hedonistic attraction for happiness or even removal of pain, but by an innate tendency of the mind to follow the path of liberation 1 . Removal of pains

trine of inference is not definitely known. What little Vacaspati says on the subject has been borrowed from Vatsyayana such as the putvavat, iesavat and samanyatodrsta types of inference, and these may better be consulted in our chapter on Nyaya or in the Tatpar-yatlka of Vacaspati. Samkhya inference was probably from particular to particular on the ground of seven kinds of relations according to which they had seven kinds of inference "matranimittasamyogivirodhisahacaribhih. Svasvamibadhyaghatadyaih sdm-khydnam saptadhdnumd" (Tatparyatikd, p. 109). Samkhya definition of inference as given by Udyotakara (I. 1. v) is " sambandhddekasmdt pratyaksdcchesasiddhiranumd-nam. n

1 Samkhya however makes the absolute and complete destruction of three kinds of sorrows, ddhydtmika (generated internally by the illness of the body or the unsatisfied passions of the mind), adhibhautika (generated externally by the injuries inflicted by other men, beasts, etc.) and ddhidaivika (generated by the injuries inflicted by demons and ghosts) the object of all our endeavours (purusarthd).

is of course the concomitant effect of following such a course, but still the motive to follow this path is a natural and irresistible tendency of the mind. Man has power {sakti) stored up in his citta, and he has to use it in such a way that this tendency may gradually grow stronger and stronger and ultimately uproot the other. He must succeed in this, since prakrti wants liberation for her final realization 1 .

Yoga Purificatory Practices (Parikarma).

The purpose of Yoga meditation is to steady the mind on the gradually advancing stages of thoughts towards liberation, so that vicious tendencies may gradually be more and more weakened and at last disappear altogether. But before the mind can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of ordinary impurities. Thus the intending yogin should practise absolute non-injury to all living beings (ahimsa), absolute and strict truthfulness (satyd), non-stealing (asteya), absolute sexual restraint (brakmacaryd) and the acceptance of nothing but that which is absolutely necessary (aparigraha). These are collectively called yama. Again side by side with these abstinences one must also practise external cleanliness by ablutions and inner cleanliness of the mind, contentment of mind, the habit of bearing all privations of heat and cold, or keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in speech (tapas), the study of philosophy (svddhydya) and meditation on Isvara (Isvara-pranidhand). These are collectively called niyamas. To these are also to be added certain other moral disciplines such as pratipaksa-bhdvand, maitri, karund, muditd and upeksd. Pratipaksa-bhavana means that whenever a bad thought (e.g. selfish motive) may come one should practise the opposite good thought (self-sacrifice); so that the bad thoughts may not find any scope. Most of our vices are originated by our unfriendly relations with our fellow-beings. To remove these the practice of mere abstinence may not be sufficient, and therefore one should habituate the mind to keep itself in positive good relations with our fellow-beings. The practice of maitrl means to think of all beings as friends. If we continually habituate ourselves to think this, we can never be displeased with them. So too one should practise karuna or kindly feeling for sufferers, mudita 1 See my "Yoga Psychology" Quest, October, 1921.

or a feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, and upeksa or a feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The last one indicates that the yogin should not take any note of the vices of vicious men.

When the mind becomes disinclined to all worldly pleasures (vairdgya) and to all such as are promised in heaven by the performances of Vedic sacrifices, and the mind purged of its dross and made fit for the practice of Yoga meditation, the yogin may attain liberation by a constant practice {abhydsd) attended with faith, confidence {sraddhd), strength of purpose and execution (virya) and wisdom (prajnd) attained at each advance.

The Yoga Meditation.

When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced. At such a stage the yogin takes a firm posture (dsana) and fixes his mind on any object he chooses. It is, however, preferable that he should fix it on Isvara, for in that case Isvara being pleased removes many of the obstacles in his path, and it becomes easier for him to attain success. But of course he makes his own choice, and can choose anything he likes for the unifying concentration {samadhi) of his mind. There are four states of this unifying concentration namely vitarka, vicdra, dnanda and asmitd. Of these vitarka and vicara have each two varieties, savitarka, nirvi-tarka,savicdra,nirvicdra x . When the mind concentrates on objects, remembering their names and qualities, it is called the savitarka stage; when on the five tanmatras with a remembrance of their qualities it is called savicara, and when it is one with the tanmatras without any notion of their qualities it is called nirvicara. Higher than these are the ananda and the asmita states. In the ananda state the mind concentrates on the buddhi with its functions of the senses causing pleasure. In the asmita stage buddhi concentrates on pure substance as divested of all modifications. In all these stages there are objects on which the mind consciously concentrates, these are therefore called the samprajhdta (with knowledge of objects) types of samadhi. Next to this comes the last stage of samadhi called the asamprajhdta or nirodha samadhi, in which the mind is without any object. By remaining

1 Vacaspati, however, thinks that ananda and asmita have also two other varieties, which is denied by Bhiksu.

long in this stage the old potencies (samskaras) or impressions due to the continued experience of worldly events tending towards the objective world or towards any process of experiencing inner thinking are destroyed by the production of a strong habit of the nirodha state. At this stage dawns the true knowledge, when the buddhi becomes as pure as the purusa, and after that the citta not being able to bind the purusa any longer returns back to prakrti.

In order to practise this concentration one has to see that there may be no disturbance, and the yogin should select a quiet place on a hill or in a forest. One of the main obstacles is, however, to be found in our constant respiratory action. This has to be stopped by the practice of pranayama. Pranayama consists in taking in breath, keeping it for a while and then giving it up. With practice one may retain breath steadily for hours, days, months and even years. When there is no need of taking in breath or giving it out, and it can be retained steady for a long time, one of the main obstacles is removed.

The process of practising concentration is begun by sitting in a steady posture, holding the breath by pranayama, excluding all other thoughts, and fixing the mind on any object (dharand). At first it is difficult to fix steadily on any object, and the same thought has to be repeated constantly in the mind, this is called dhyana. After sufficient practice in dhyana the mind attains the power of making itself steady; at this stage it becomes one with its object and there is no change or repetition. There is no consciousness of subject, object or thinking, but the mind becomes steady and one with the object of thought. This is called samadhi 1 . We have already described the six stages of samadhi. As the yogin acquires strength in one stage of samadhi, he passes on to a still higher stage and so on. As he progresses onwards he attains miraculous powers {yibhuti) and his faith and hope in the practice increase. Miraculous powers bring with them many temptations, but the yogin is firm of purpose and even though the position of Indra is offered to him he does not relax. His wisdom (prajnd) also increases at each step. Prajfia knowledge is as clear as perception, but while perception is limited to

1 It should be noted that the word samadhi cannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or by " meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states.

vi i] Wisdom and Emancipation

-/ o

certain gross things and certain gross qualities 1 prajna has no such limitations, penetrating into the subtlest things, the tan-matras, the gunas, and perceiving clearly and vividly all their subtle conditions and qualities 2 . As the potencies {samskara) of the prajiia wisdom grow in strength the potencies of ordinary knowledge are rooted out, and the yogin continues to remain always in his prajna wisdom. It is a peculiarity of this prajiia that it leads a man towards liberation and cannot bind him to samsara. The final prajnas which lead to liberation are of seven kinds, namely, (i) I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it. (2) The grounds and roots of samsara have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted. (3) Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by inhibitive trance. (4) The means of knowledge in the shape of a discrimination of purusa from prakrti has been understood. The other three are not psychological but are rather metaphysical processes associated with the situation. They are as follows : (5) The double purpose of buddhi experience and emancipation (bhoga and apavarga) has been realized. (6) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gunas drives them into prakrti like heavy stones dropped from high hill tops. (7) The buddhi disintegrated into its constituents the gunas become merged in the prakrti and remain there for ever. The purusa having passed beyond the bondage of the gunas shines forth in its pure intelligence. There is no bliss or happiness in this Samkhya-Yoga mukti, for all feeling belongs to prakrti. It is thus a state of pure intelligence. What the Samkhya tries to achieve through knowledge, Yoga achieves through the perfected discipline of the will and psychological control of the mental states.

1 The limitations which baffle perception are counted in the Karika as follows : Extreme remoteness (e.g. a lark high up in the sky), extreme proximity (e.g. collyrium inside the eye), loss of sense-organ (e.g. a blind man), want of attention, extreme smallness of the object (e.g. atoms), obstruction by other intervening objects (e.g. by walls), presence of superior lights (the star cannot be seen in daylight), being mixed up with other things of its own kind (e.g. water thrown into a lake).

2 Though all things are but the modifications of gunas yet the real nature of the gunas is never revealed by the sense-knowledge. What appears to the senses are but illusory characteristics like those of magic (maya):

" iJiinanam paramam rupam na drstipathamrcchati Ynttit drstipatham praptam tanmayeva sutucchakam."

Vyasabhasya, iv. 13. The real nature of the gunas is thus revea'ed only by prajna.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NYAYA-VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

Criticism of Buddhism and Samkhya from the Nyaya standpoint.

The Buddhists had upset all common sense convictions of substance and attribute, cause and effect, and permanence of things, on the ground that all collocations are momentary; each group of collocations exhausts itself in giving rise to another group and that to another and so on. But if a collocation representing milk generates the collocation of curd it is said to be due to a joint action of the elements forming the cause-collocation and the modus operandi is unintelligible; the elements composing the cause-collocation cannot separately generate the elements composing the effect-collocation, for on such a supposition it becomes hard to maintain the doctrine of momentariness as the individual and separate exercise of influence on the part of the cause-elements and their coordination and manifestation as effect cannot but take more than one moment. The supposition that the whole of the effect-collocation is the result of the joint action of the elements of cause-collocation is against our universal uncontradicted experience that specific elements constituting the cause (e.g. the whiteness of milk) are the cause of other corresponding elements of the effect (e.g. the whiteness of the curd); and we could not say that the hardness, blackness, and other properties of the atoms of iron in a lump state should not be regarded as the cause of similar qualities in the iron ball, for this is against the testimony of experience. Moreover there would be no difference between material (updddna, e.g. clay of the jug), instrumental and concomitant causes (nimitta and sahakdri, such as the potter, and the wheel, the stick etc. in forming the jug), for the causes jointly produce the effect, and there was no room for distinguishing the material and the instrumental causes, as such.

Again at the very moment in which a cause-collocation is brought into being, it cannot exert its influence to produce its

effect-collocation. Thus after coming into being it would take the cause-collocation at least another moment to exercise its influence to produce the effect. How can the thing which is destroyed the moment after it is born produce any effect ? The truth is that causal elements remain and when they are properly collocated the effect is produced. Ordinary experience also shows that we perceive things as existing from a past time. * The past time is perceived by us as past, the present as present and the future as future and things are perceived as existing from a past time onwards.

The Samkhya assumption that effects are but the actualized states of the potential cause, and that the causal entity holds within it all the future series of effects, and that thus the effect is already existent even before the causal movement for the production of the effect, is also baseless. Samkhya says that the oil was already existent in the sesamum and not in the stone, and that it is thus that oil can be got from sesamum and not from the stone. The action of the instrumental cause with them consists only in actualizing or manifesting what was already existent in a potential form in the cause. This is all nonsense. A lump of clay is called the cause and the jug the effect; of what good is it to say that the jug exists in the clay since with clay we can never carry water? A jug is made out of clay, but clay is not a jug. What is meant by saying that the jug was unmanifested or was in a potential state before, and that it has now become manifest or actual ? What does potential state mean ? The potential state of the jug is not the same as its actual state; thus the actual state of the jug must be admitted as non-existent before. If it is meant that the jug is made up of the same parts (the atoms) of which the clay is made up, of course we admit it, but this does not mean that the jug was existent in the atoms of the lump of clay. The potency inherent in the clay by virtue of which it can expose itself to the influence of other agents, such as the potter, for being transformed into a jug is not the same as the effect, the jug. Had it been so, then we should rather have said that the jug came out of the jug. The assumption of Samkhya that the substance and attribute have the same reality is also against all experience, for we all perceive that movement and attribute belong to substance and not to attribute. Again Samkhya holds a preposterous doctrine that buddhi is different

from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this fictitious fuss that the qualities of buddhi are reflected on purusa and then again on buddhi. Evidently in all our experience we find that the soul (atmaii) knows, feels and wills, and it is difficult to understand why Samkhya does not accept this patent fact and declare that knowledge, feeling, and willing, all belonged to buddhi. Then again in order to explain experience it brought forth a theory of double reflection. Again Samkhya prakrti is non-intelligent, and where is the guarantee that she (prakrti) will not bind the wise again and will emancipate him once for all ? Why did the purusa become bound down ? Prakrti is being utilized for enjoyment by the infinite number of purusas, and she is no delicate girl (as Samkhya supposes) who will leave the presence of the purusa ashamed as soon as her real nature is discovered. Again pleasure (sukha), sorrow (diihkha) and a blinding feeling through ignorance (inohci) are but the feeling-experiences of the soul, and with what impudence could Samkhya think of these as material substances? Again their cosmology of a mahat, ahamkara, the tanmatras, is all a series of assumptions never testified by experience nor by reason. They are all a series of hopeless and foolish blunders. The phenomena of experience thus call for a new careful reconstruction in the light of reason and experience such as cannot be found in other systems. (See Nyayamafijarl, pp. 452-466 and 490-496.)

Nyaya and Vaisesika sutras.

It is very probable that the earliest beginnings of Nyaya are to be found in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meanings of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought trying to defeat one another. I suppose that such disputations occurred in the days of the Upanisads, and the art of disputation was regarded even then as a subject of study, and it probably passed then by the name of vakovakya. Mr Bodas has pointed out that Apastamba who according to Biihler lived before the third century B.C. used the word Nyaya in the sense of Mlmamsa'. The word Nyaya derived

1 Apastamba, trans, by Biihler, Introduction, p. xxvn., and Bodas's article on the Historical Survey of Indian Logic in the Bombay Branch of J.R.A.S., vol. XIX.

from the root ni is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyaya 1 . Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kautilya's enumeration of the vidya (sciences) as AnviksikI (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny), trayl (the three Vedas), vartta (the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and dandanlti (polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Samkhya, Yoga, Lokayata and AnviksikI, supposes that the Nyaya sutra was not in existence in Kautilya's time 300 B.C.) 2 . Kautilya's reference to Nyaya as AnviksikI only suggests that the word Nyaya was not a familiar name for AnviksikI in Kautilya's time. He seems to misunderstand Vatsyayana in thinking that Vatsyayana distinguishes Nyaya from the AnviksikI in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vatsyayana's statement in Nyaya sutra I. i. I is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyaya was the same as was referred to as AnviksikI by Kautilya. He distinctly identifies Nyayavidya with AnviksikI, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as samsaya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms pramana (means of cognition) and prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (prtkakpj'asthana) were treated, Nyayavidya would simply become metaphysics (adhyatmavidya) like the Upanisads. The old meaning of Nyaya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vatsyayana and is sanctioned by Vacaspati in his Nyayavdrt-tikatatparyatika I. i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyaya {pramanairarthaparlksanam —to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word anv!ksikI(to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vatsyayana of course points out that so far as this logical side of Nyaya is concerned it has the widest scope for

1 Kalidasa's Kumarasambhava " Udghatopranavoyasam nyayaistribhirndiranam?* also Mallinatha's gloss on it.

2 Prof. Jacobi's '' The early history of Indian Philosophy" Indian Antiquary, i o 18.

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences 1 . He quotes Kautilya to show that in this capacity Nyaya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vatsyayana himself designates the logical portion as a prthakprasthana (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vatsyayana or Kautilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kautilya. Vatsyayana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or adhyatmavidya was acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the dharmasastras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vatsyayana had to seek the support of Kautilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kautilya was not satisfied by counting Anvlksikl as one of the four vidyas but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Samkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kautilya's time Nyaya was composed of two branches, one as adhyatmavidya and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada Sastrl in an article in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society 1905 says that as Vacaspati made two attempts to collect the Nyaya sut7'as, one as Nyayasuci and the other asNyayasutroddhdra, it seems that even in Vacaspati's time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of the Nyaya sfttras. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sutras were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyaya and Yoga. He also

1 Yena prayuktah pravarttate tat prayojanam (that by which one is led to act is called prayojanam); yamart/iam abhipsan jihasan va karma drabhate tenanena sarve praninah sarvani karma ni sarvaica vidyah vydptdh tai/d/rayd/ca nyayah pravarttate (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all these depend on Nyaya). Vatsyayana bhdsya, 1. i. 1.

thinks that the sutras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the sutras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the Nyaya sutras still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the Nyaya sutras on the basis of references to Sunyavada naturally loses its value, except on the supposition that all references to Sunyavada must be later than Nagarjuna, which is not correct, since the Mahayana sutras written before Nagarjuna also held the Sunyavada doctrine.

The late Dr S. C. Vidyabhusana in J.R.A.S. 1918 thinks that the earlier part of Nyaya was written by Gautama about 550 B.C. whereas the Nyaya sutras of Aksapada were written about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyaya in the sense of logic in Mahabharata I. I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment of the subject that the fixing of the date of Aksapada was made to fit in somehow with his idea that Aksapada wrote his Nyaya sutras under the influence of Aristotle—a supposition which does not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyabhusana has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part of the Nyaya. Goldstiicker says that both Patanjali (140 B.C.) and Katyayana (fourth century B.C.) knew the Nyaya sutras 1 . We know that Kautilya knew the Nyaya in some form as Anvlksikl in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the Nyaya existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think that at least some of the present sutras were written some time in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Badarayana's sutras make allusions to the Vaisesika doctrines and not to Nyaya. On this ground he thinks that Vaisesika sutras were written before Badarayana's Brahma-sutras, whereas the Nyaya sutras were written later. Candrakanta Tarkalamkara also contends in his 1 Goldstiicker's Panini, p. 157.

edition of Vaisesika that the Vaisesika sutras were earlier than the Nyaya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vaisesika sutras were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of the Vaisesika sutras, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaisesika physics 1 . The Lahkdvatara sutra (which as it was quoted . by Asvaghosa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that the Vaisesika sutras are probably pre-Buddhistic 2 .

It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyaya sutras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. i. 32 in which the sutra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses {avayava) Vatsyayana says that this sutra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses 3 . The Vaisesika sutras also give us some of the earliest types of in ference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyaya doctrine of inference 4 .

Does Vaisesika represent an Old School of MImamsa ?

The Vaisesika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mlmamsa, older than that represented in the Mimdmsd sutras. But a closer inspection of the Vaisesika sutras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaisesika sutra. An examination of Caraka's Sutrasthdna (1. 35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vaisesika such as that of the Bhdsdpariccheda before him. Caraka sutra or karikd (i. i. 36) says that the gunas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the guna "para" (universality) and end with ll prayatna" (effort) together with the sense-qualities (sdrt/id). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the Vaisesika sutra (I. i. 6) which leaves out the six gunas,

1 Cara&a, Siirira, 39.

2 See the next section.

3 Vatsyayana's Hhasya on the JVyaya sutras, 1. i. 32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in DaSavaikalikaniryukti as noted before.

* Nyaya sutra I. i. 5, and Vaiiesika sutras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.

heaviness (gurutva), \\<\\\\d\ty{dravatva\o\\mess{sneha), elasticity (saniskara), merit (dharma) and demerit {adharma); in one part of the sutra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sutra was written at a time when the six gunas left out in the Vaisesika enumeration had come to be counted as gunas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bhasapariccheda (a later Vaisesika compendium), is a compilation from some very old karikas which are referred to by Visvanatha as being collected from "atisamksiptacirantanoktibhih" —(from very ancient aphorisms 1 ); Caraka's definition of samanya and visesa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vaisesika sutra that samanya (generality) and visesa are relative to each other 2 . Caraka's sutras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vaisesika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The Vaisesika sutras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mimamsa doctrines and occasionally to Samkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mimamsa doctrines referred to allude to the Mimdvisa sutras of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyaya phraseology of "piirvavat" and "sesavat" was not known. Vaisesika sutras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause 3 . We know that the Svetasvatara Upanisad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

1 Frofessor Vanamall Vedantatirtha's article in J. A.S.B., 1908.

2 Caraka (1. 1. 33) says that samanya is that which produces unity and visesa is that which separates. V. S. 11. ii. 7. Samanya and visesa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).

3 Vaitesika sutra (11. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).

systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view 1 . These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sutras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The Vaisesika sutra begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma." This is we know the manifest duty of Mlmamsa and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his Mlmamsa sutras by defining "dharma." This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaisesika, viz., the description of the nature of padartha 2 . He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (nihsreyasd) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts 3 . The fact that the Vaisesika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the adrsta (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adrsta, shows that Kanada's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of adrsta (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The

1 Svetaivatara 1. i. 1.

2 I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalapa Vyakarana, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kanada in his Vaihsika sutras^ after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Ilimavat (Himalaya). " Dharmam vyakhyattikdmasya satpadarthopavarnanam Himavadgantukamasya saga-ragamanopamani. "

:t The sutra " 7advacatidd dmitayasya prdmanyam (1. i. 3 and X. ii. 9) has been explained by Upaskara as meaning " The Veda being the word of Isvara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of " Isvara " anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaisesika. Sutra X. ii. 8 is only a repetition of vi. ii. 1.

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of adrsta proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V. i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, v. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to adrsta. In v. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskara) are said to be due to adrsta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of adrsta leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non-production of rebirths. Vaisesika marks the distinction between the drsta (experienced) and the adrsta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to adrsta. These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (vi. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Kanada's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to adrsta. But what leads to adrsta? In answer to this, Kanada does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snana), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukzilavdsa), retired forest life (vanaprastha), sacrifice {yajhd), gifts (ddnd), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure; and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through adrsta. He also described how

feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adrsta. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kanada is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mimamsa will show that the later Mimamsa writers agreed with the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mimamsa differs from Nyaya-Vaisesika are (1) self-validity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (sabda), (5) (according to Kumarila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vaisesika. But as no Isvara is mentioned, and as all adrsta depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vaisesika had no dispute with Mimamsa. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vaisesika sutras. It is probable that Kanada believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mimamsa suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vaisesika sutras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vaisesika sutras. As there is no reference to Isvara and as adrsta proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaisesika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mimamsa philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kanada gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. ^ till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mimamsa view as we know from the later Mimamsa writers 1 . Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyaya view is

1 The last two concluding sutras n. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by Sankara MiSra in his Upaskara (11. ii. 36 by adding an " api" to the sutra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination " samkhyabhava " as samkhya and bhava instead of samkhya and abhava, which in my opinion is the rifdit combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyfiya-Vaisesika view.

that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vaisesika view as well. But in Vaisesika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (agamci). To this the final Vaisesika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" {aham), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I" {aham) (ill. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the Vaisesika represented a school of Mlmamsa thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

Philosophy in the Vaisesika sutras.

The Vaisesika sutras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue {dharma) (I. i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity {abhyudaya) and salvation {nihsreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sutra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravyd), quality {guna), class concept {sdmdnya), particularity {visesa), and inherence {samavdya) 1 . The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The gunas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species 2 . Action {karma) means upward move-

1 Upaskara notes that visesa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference.

2 Here the well known qualities of heaviness (gunitvd), liquidity {dravatvd), oili-ness (sne/ia), elasticity (samskard), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vaisesika commentaries and coin-

ment,downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya.guna and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the gunas other gunas. But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect, but the gunas are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and guna and is regarded as the material {samavayi) cause. Gunas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gunas, and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of guna, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) of (derivative) dravyas, guna, and karma; guna is also the non-material cause (asamdvdyi) of dravya, guna and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma 1 . Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guna in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc., separateness, contact and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma not being connected with more than one thing is not produced by more than one thing 2 . A dravya is the result of many contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the cause of dravya and karma 3 .

In the second chapter of the first book Kanada first says that if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause even though there may not be the effect. He next says that genus (samanyd) and species ivisesa) are relative to the under-

pendiums. It must be noted that "guna" in Vaisesika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Samkhya-Yoga. Guna in Vaisesika would be akin to what Yoga would call dharma.

1 It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See Upaskara I. i. 22.

2 If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving.

3 It must be noted that "karma" in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious 01 vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.

standing; being (blidva) indicates continuity only and is hence only a genus. The universals of substance, quality and action may be both genus and species, but visesa as constituting the ultimate differences (of atoms) exists (independent of any percipient). In connection with this he says that the ultimate genus is being {sattd) in virtue of which things appear as existent; all other genera may only relatively be regarded as relative genera or species. Being must be regarded as a separate category, since it is different from dravya, guna and karma, and yet exists in them, and has no genus or species. It gives us the notion that something is and must be regarded as a category existing as one identical entity in all dravya, guna, and karma, for in its universal nature as being it has no special characteristics in the different objects in which it inheres. The specific universals of thingness (dravyatva), qualitiness {gunatva) or actionness (kar-matvci) are also categories which are separate from universal being (bhdva or sattd) for they also have no separate genus or species and yet may be distinguished from one another, but bhava or being was the same in all.

In the first chapter of the second book Kanada deals with substances. Earth possesses colour, taste, smell, and touch; water, colour, taste, touch, liquidity, and smoothness (snigdhd); fire, colour and touch; air, touch; but none of these qualities can be found in ether (dkdsa). Liquidity is a special quality of water because butter, lac, wax, lead, iron, silver, gold, become liquids only when they are heated, while water is naturally liquid itself 1 . Though air cannot be seen, yet its existence can be inferred by touch, just as the existence of the genus of cows may be inferred from the characteristics of horns, tails, etc. Since this thing inferred from touch possesses motion and quality, and does not itself inhere in any other substance, it is a substance (dravya) and is eternal 2 . The inference of air is of the type of inference of imperceptible things from certain known characteristics called samdnyato drsta. The name of air "vdyu" is derived from the scriptures. The existence of others different from us has (asmadvisistdndm) to be admitted for accounting for the

1 It should be noted that mercury is not mentioned. This is important for mercury was known at a time later than Caraka.

2 Substance is that which possesses quality and action. It should be noted that the word " adravyatvena " in II. i. 13 has been interpreted by me as " adravyavattvena."

giving of names to things (samjiiakarmci). Because we find that the giving of names is already in usage (and not invented by us) 1 . On account of the fact that movements rest only in one thing, the phenomenon that a thing can enter into any unoccupied space, would not lead us to infer the existence of akasa (ether). Akasa has to be admitted as the hypothetical substance in which the quality of sound inheres, because, since sound (a quality) is not the characteristic of things which can be touched, there must be some substance of which it is a quality. And this substance is akasa. It is a substance and eternal like air. As being is one so akasa is one 2 .

In the second chapter of the second book Kanada tries to prove that smell is a special characteristic of earth, heat of fire, and coldness of water. Time is defined as that which gives the notion of youth in the young, simultaneity, and quickness. It is one like being. Time is the cause of all non-eternal things, because the notion of time is absent in eternal things. Space supplies the notion that this is so far away from this or so much nearer to this. Like being it is one. One space appears to have diverse inter-space relations in connection with the motion of the sun. As a preliminary to discussing the problem whether sound is eternal or not, he discusses the notion of doubt, which arises when a thing is seen in a general way, but the particular features coming under it are not seen, either when these are only remembered, or when some such attribute is seen which resembles some other attribute seen before, or when a thing is seen in one way but appears in another, or when what is seen is not definitely grasped, whether rightly seen or not. He then discusses the question whether sound is eternal or non-eternal and gives his reasons to show that it is non-eternal, but concludes the discussion with a number of other reasons proving that it is eternal.

The first chapter of the third book is entirely devoted to the inference of the existence of soul from the fact that there must be some substance in which knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and their object inheres.

The knowledge of sense-objects (indriyarthd) is the reason by

1 I have differed from Upaskara in interpreting "samjfiakarma" in II. i. 18, 19 as a genitive compound while Upaskara makes it a dvandva compound. Upaskara's interpretation seems to be far-fetched. He wants to twist it into an argument for the existence of (iod.

2 This interpretation is according to Sankara Misra's Upaskara.

which we can infer the existence of something different from the senses and the objects which appear in connection with them. The types of inferences referred to are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from the existence of some things, (2) of the existence of some things from the non-existence of some things, (3) of the existence of some things from the existence of others. In all these cases inference is possible only when the two are known to be connected with each other (prasiddhipurvakatvat apadesasydy. When such a connection does not exist or is doubtful, we have anapadesa (fallacious middle) and sandigdha (doubtful middle);, thus, it is a horse because it has a horn, or it is a cow because it has a horn are examples of fallacious reason. The inference of soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses and objects is not fallacious in the above way. The inference of the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way in which the existence of one's own soul is inferred 2 , i.e. by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement. In the second chapter it is said that the fact that there is cognition only when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).

The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance and eternal can be proved after the manner of vayu. An objector is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of samanyatodrsta inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But the Vaisesika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But

1 In connection with this there is a short reference to the methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear. There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference are only pointed out as the basis.

2 The forms of inference used show that Kanada was probably not aware of Gautama's terminology.

then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences as "I am Yajnadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction. When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajnadatta goes, there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajnadatta the body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else. As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure, pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on the strength of the scriptures 1 .

In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that which is existent, but yet has no cause, should be considered eternal {nitya). It can be inferred by its effect, for the effect can only take place because of the cause. When we speak of anything as non-eternal, it is only a negation of the eternal, so that also proves that there is something eternal. The non-eternal is ignorance (avidytiy. Colour is visible in a thing which is great (ma/iat) and compounded. Air (z>dyu) is not perceived to have colour, though it is great and made up of parts, because it has not the actuality of colour (rupasamskara —i.e. in air there is only colour in its unmanifested form) in it Colour is thus visible only when there is colour with special qualifications and conditions 3 . In this way the cognition of taste, smell, and touch is also explained. Number,measure, separateness,contact, and disjoining, the quality of belonging to a higher or lower class, action, all these as they abide in things possessing colour are visible to the eye. The number etc. of those which have no colour are not perceived by the eye. But the notion of being and also of genus of quality (gunatva)

1 I have differed here from the meaning given in Upaskdra. I think the three sutras "Sukhaduhkfiajndnanispattyavisesddekdtmyam" " vyavasthdto ndtid" and "sas-trasdmarthydt ca " originally meant that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.

2 I have differed here also in my meaning from the Upaskdra, which regards this sutra "amdyd" to mean that we do not know of any reasons which lead to the non-eternality of the atoms.

3 This is what is meant in the later distinctions of udbhutarupavattva and anud-bhutariipavattva. The word samskdra in Vaisesika has many senses. It means inertia, elasticity, collection (samavdya), production (udbhava) and not being overcome (anab-hibhavd). For the last three senses see Upaskdra IV. i. 7.

are perceived by all the senses (just as colour, taste, smell, touch, and sound are perceived by one sense, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. by the manas and number etc. by the visual and the tactile sense) 1 .

In the second chapter of the fourth book it is said that the earth, etc. exist in three forms, body, sense, and objects. There cannot be any compounding of the five elements or even of the three, but the atoms of different elements may combine when one of them acts as the central radicle (iipastambhaka). Bodies are of two kinds, those produced from ovaries and those which are otherwise produced by the combination of the atoms in accordance with special kinds of dharma. All combinations of atoms are due to special kinds of dharmas. Such super-mundane bodies are to be admitted for explaining the fact that things must have been given names by beings having such super-mundane bodies, and also on account of the authority of the Vedas.

In the first chapter of the fifth book action {karma) is discussed. Taking the example of threshing the corn, it is said that the movement of the hand is due to its contact with the soul in a state of effort, and the movement of the flail is due to its contact with the hand. But in the case of the uprising of the flail in the threshing pot due to impact the movement is not due to contact with the hands, and so the uplifting of the hand in touch with the flail is not due to its contact with the soul; for it is due to the impact of the flail. On account of heaviness {gzirutvd) the flail will fall when not held by the hand. Things may have an upward or side motion by specially directed motions (nodanavisesd) which are generated by special kinds of efforts. Even without effort the body may move during sleep. The movement of needles towards magnets is due to an unknown cause (adrstakaranakd). The arrow first acquires motion by specially directed movement, and then on account of its inertia {vegasamskard) keeps on moving and when that ceases it falls down through heaviness.

The second chapter abounds with extremely crude explana-

1 This portion has been taken from the Upaskara of Sarikara Mi£ra on the Vaiie-sika sutras of Kanada. It must be noted here that the notion of number according to Vaisesika is due to mental relativity or oscillation (apeksdbuddkijanya). But this mental relativity can only start when the thing having number is either seen or touched ; and it is in this sense that notion of number is said to depend on the visual or the tactual

tions of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are explained as being due to unknown cause (adrstakaritani) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this unknown {adrsta). It is however said that with the absence of adrsta there is no contact of body with soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore moksa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self, manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, akasa are regarded as inactive.

The whole of the sixth book is devoted to showing that gifts are made to proper persons not through sympathy but on account of the injunction of the scriptures, the enumeration of certain Vedic performances, which brings in adrsta, purification and impurities of things, how passions are often generated by adrsta, how dharma and adharma lead to birth and death and how moksa takes place as a result of the work of the soul.

In the seventh book it is said that the qualities in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal. The change of qualities produced by heat in earth has its beginning in the cause (the atoms). Atomic size is invisible while great size is visible. Visibility is due to a thing's being made up of many causes 1 , but the atom is therefore different from those that have great size. The same thing may be called great and small relatively at the same time. In accordance with anutva (atomic) and mahattva (great) there are also the notions of small and big. The eternal size of parimandala (round) belongs to the atoms. Akasa and atman are called mahan or paramamahan (the supremely great or all-pervasive); since manas is not of the great measure it is of atomic size. Space and time are also considered as being of the measure "supremely great" (paramamahat). Atomic size (parimandala) belonging to the atoms and the mind (manas) and the supremely great size belonging to space, time, soul and ether (akasa) are regarded as eternal.

In the second chapter of the seventh book it is said that unity

and separateness are to be admitted as entities distinct from

other qualities. There is no number in movement and quality;

the appearance of number in them is false. Cause and effect are

1 I have differed from the Upaskara in the interpretation of this sutra.

neither one, nor have they distinctive separateness (ekaprthaktvd). The notion of unity is the cause of the notion of duality, etc. Contact may be due to the action of one or two things, or the effect of another contact and so is disjoining. There is neither contact nor disjoining in cause and effect since they do not exist independently (yulasidd/iyab/idvdt). In the eighth book it is said that soul and manas are not perceptible, and that in the apprehension of qualities, action, generality, and particularity perception is due to their contact with the thing. Earth is the cause of perception of smell, and water, fire, and air are the cause of taste, colour and touch 1 . In the ninth book negation is described; non-existence {asat) is defined as that to which neither action nor quality can be attributed. Even existent things may become non-existent and that which is existent in one way may be non-existent in another; but there is another kind of non-existence which is different from the above kinds of existence and non-existence 2 . All negation can be directly perceived through the help of the memory which keeps before the mind the thing to which the negation applies. Allusion is also made in this connection to the special perceptual powers of the yogins (sages attaining mystical powers through Yoga practices). In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as liiiga (reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (avidyd) is due to the defect of the senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true knowledge (vidyd). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to doubt and certainty.

1 Upaskara here explains that it is intended that the senses are produced by those specific elements, but this cannot be found in the sutras.

3 In the previous three kinds of non-existence, pragabhava (negation before production), dhvamsdbhava (negation after destruction), and anyonyabhava (mutual negation of each other in each other), have been described. The fourth one is samdn-yabhava (general negation).

A dravya may be caused by the inhering of the effect in it, for because of its contact with another thing the effect is produced. Karma (motion) is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. Contact is also a cause since it inheres in the cause. A contact which inheres in the cause of the cause and thereby helps the production of the effect is also a cause. The special quality of the heat of fire is also a cause.

Works according to the injunctions of the scriptures since they have no visible effect are the cause of prosperity, and because the Vedas direct them, they have validity.

Philosophy in the Nyaya sutras 1 .

The Nyaya sutras begin with an enumeration of the sixteen subjects, viz. means of right knowledge (pramdnd), object of right knowledge (prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instances {drstanta\ accepted conclusions (siddhdntd), premisses (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (iiir-naya), debates (vdda), disputations (Jalpa), destructive criticisms (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhdsa), quibble (chald), refutations (j'dti), points of opponent's defeat (nigrahasthdnd), and hold that by a thorough knowledge of these the highest good (fiihsreyasa), is attained. In the second sutra it is said that salvation (apavarga) is attained by the successive disappearance of false knowledge (mithydjfidna), defects (dosa), endeavours (pravrtti), birth (Jan-ma), and ultimately of sorrow. Then the means of proof are said to be of four kinds, perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), analogy (upamdna), and testimony (sabda). Perception is defined as uncontradicted determinate knowledge unassociated with names proceeding out of sense contact with objects. Inference is of three kinds, from cause to effect (pfirvavat), effect to cause (sesavat), and inference from common characteristics (sdmdnyato drstd). Upamana is the knowing of anything by similarity with any well-known thing.

Sabda is defined as the testimony of reliable authority (apta) 2 .

1 This is a brief summary of the doctrines found in Nyaya sutras, supplemented here and there with the views of Vatsyayana, the commentator. This follows the order of the sutras, and tries to present their ideas with as little additions from those of later day Nyaya as possible. The general treatment of Nyaya-Vaisesika expounds the two systems in the light of later writers and commentators.

2 It is curious to notice that Vatsyayana says that an arya, a rsi or a nileccha (foreigner), may be an apta (reliable authority).

Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of knowledge are said to be self (dtman), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (budd/ri), mind (manas), endeavour (pravrtti\ rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. Desire, antipathy, effort (prayatna), pleasure, pain, and knowledge indicate the existence of the self. Body is that which upholds movement, the senses and the rise of pleasure and pain as arising out of the contact of sense with sense-objects 1 ; the five senses are derived from the five elements, such as prthivl, ap, tejas, vayu andakasa; smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound are the qualities of the above five elements, and these are also the objects of the senses. The fact that many cognitions cannot occur at any one moment indicates the existence of mind (manas). Endeavour means what is done by speech, understanding, and body. Dosas (attachment, antipathy, etc.) are those which lead men to virtue and vice. Pain is that which causes suffering 2 . Ultimate cessation from pain is called apavarga*. Doubt arises when through confusion of similar qualities or conflicting opinions etc., one wants to settle one of the two alternatives. That for attaining which, or for giving up which one sets himself to work is called prayojana.

Illustrative example (drstdnta) is that on which both the common man and the expert (pariksaka) hold the same opinion. Established texts or conclusions (siddhdnta) are of four kinds, viz. (1) those which are accepted by all schools of thought called the sarvatantrasiddhdnta; (2) those which are held by one school or similar schools but opposed by others called the pratitantra-siddkdnta; (3) those which being accepted other conclusions will also naturally follow called adhikaranasiddhdnta; (4) those of the opponent's views which are uncritically granted by a debater, who proceeds then to refute the consequences that follow and thereby show his own special skill and bring the opponent's intellect to disrepute (abhynpagamasiddhdntay. The premisses are five:

1 Here I have followed Vatsyayana's meaning.

2 Vatsyayana comments here that when one finds all things full of misery, he wishes to avoid misery, and finding birth to be associated with pain becomes unattached and thus is emancipated.

3 Vatsyayana wants to emphasize that there is no bliss in salvation, but only cessation from pain.

4 I have followed Vatsyayana's interpretation here.

(1) pratijna (the first enunciation of the thing to be proved);

(2) hetu (the reason which establishes the conclusion on the strength of the similarity of the case in hand with known examples or negative instances); (3) udaharana (positive or negative illustrative instances); (4) upanaya (corroboration by the instance); (5) nigamana (to reach the conclusion which has been proved). Then come the definitions of tarka, nirnaya, vada, jalpa, vitanda, the fallacies (hetvabhasa), chala, jati, and nigrahasthana, which have been enumerated in the first sutra.

The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramana). In refutation of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pramana in general and particularly of perceptions on the ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyaya reply is that if there were no means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous existence of those different kinds of musical instruments, so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence of those objects of knowledge 1 .

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition of other things may themselves be the objects of right

1 YathapaScatsiddhena Sabdena purvasiddham atodyamanumiyate sddhyam ca ato-dyam sadhanam ca fabdah an tar kite hyatodye svanatah anumanam b/iavatiti, vino. 7/adyaie venuh piiryyate iti svanavifesena atodyavis'esam pratipadyate tatha purvasiddham upalabdhivisayam pafcatsiddhcna upalabdhihetuna pratipadyate. Vatsyayana bhasya, II. i. 15.

knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge. The means of right knowledge (pramana) do not require other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves as well.

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact of the soul with the mind 1 . Then it is said that though we perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms 2 . Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this the Nyaya answer is that there is always such a difference in the specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular cause 3 . In refuting those who object to the existence of time on the ground of relativity, it is said that if the present time did not exist, then no perception of it would have been possible. The past and future also exist, for otherwise we should not have perceived things as being done in the past or as going to be done in the future. The validity of analogy {iipamdnd) as a means of knowledge and the validity of the Vedas is then proved. The four pramanas of perception, inference, analogy, and scripture

1 Here the sutras, n. i. 20-28, are probably later interpolations to answer criticisms, not against the Nyaya doctrine of perception, but against the wording of the definition of perception as given in the Nyaya sutra, 11. i. 4.

2 This is a refutation of the doctrines of the Buddhists, who rejected the existence of wholes (avayavi). On this subject a later Buddhist monograph by Pandita Asoka (9th century A.D.), Avayavinirakarana in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, may be referred to.

3 Pitrvodakavifistam khalu varsodakan Sighrataram srotasa bahutaraphenaphala-parnakasthadivahanancopalabhamanah piirnatvena, nadya upari vrsto deva ityanu-minoti nodakabrddhimatreiia. Vatsyayana bhdsya, 11. 1. 38. The inference that there has been rain up the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics, associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of rain up the river.

are quite sufficient and it is needless to accept arthapatti (implication), aitihya (tradition), sambhava (when a thing is understood in terms of higher measure the lower measure contained in it is also understood—if we know that there is a bushel of corn anywhere we understand that the same contains eight gallons of corn as well) and abhava (non-existence) as separate pramanas for the tradition is included in verbal testimony and arthapatti, sambhava and abhava are included within inference.

The validity of these as pramanas is recognized, but they are said to be included in the four pramanas mentioned before. The theory of the eternity of sound is then refuted and the non-eternity proved in great detail. The meaning of words is said to refer to class-notions {jdti), individuals {vyakti), and the specific position of the limbs (dkrti), by which the class notion is manifested. Class {jdti) is defined as that which produces the notion of sameness (samanaprasavatmikd jdtili).

The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of the self or atman. It is said that each of the senses is associated with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men; again if there were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize things as having seen them before; the two images produced by the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united together as one visual perception of the things 1 ; moreover if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour fruit one couM not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition, for the experience of one could not be recognized by another. If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this entity the knovver would require some instrument by which it would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the

1 According to Vatsyayana, in the two eyes we have two different senses. Udyo-takara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which works in both eyes.

senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained. Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires, and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in previous existences.

The body is made up of the ksiti element. The visual sense is material and so also are all other senses 1 . Incidentally the view held by some that the skin is the only organ of sensation is also refuted. The earth possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one, but the sense of smell, taste, eye, and touch which are made respectively by the four elements of earth, etc., can only grasp the distinctive features of the elements of which they are made. Thus though the organ of smell is made by earth which contains four qualities, it can only grasp the distinctive quality of earth, viz. smell.

Against the Samkhya distinction of buddhi (cognition) and cit (pure intelligence) it is said that there is no difference between the buddhi and cit. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The Samkhya epistemology that the antahkarana assumes diverse forms in cognitive acts is also denied, and these are explained on the supposition of contacts of manas with the senses, atman and external objects. The Buddhist objection against the Samkhya explanation that the antahkaranas catch reflection from the external world just as a crystal does from the coloured objects that may lie near it, that there were really momentary productions of crystals and no permanent crystal catching different reflections at different times is refuted by Nyaya; for it says that it cannot be said that all creations are momentary, but it can only be agreed to in those cases where momentariness was actually experienced. In the case of the transformation of milk into curd there is no coming in of new qualities and disappearance of old ones, but

1 It is well to remember that Samkhya did not believe that the senses were constituted of the gross elements. But the Samkhya-Yoga view represented in Atreya-samhita (Caraka) regarded the senses as bhautika or constituted of the gross elements.

the old milk is destroyed and the curd originates anew. The contact of manas with soul {atman) takes place within the body and not in that part of atman which is outside the body; knowledge belongs to the self and not to the senses or the object for even when they are destroyed knowledge remains. New cognitions destroy the old ones. No two recollections can be simultaneous. Desire and antipathy also belong to the soul. None of these can belong either to the body or to the mind (manas). Manas cannot be conscious for it is dependent upon self. Again if it was conscious then the actions done by it would have to be borne by the self and one cannot reap the fruits of the actions of another. The causes of recollection on the part of self are given as follows: (i) attention, (2) context, (3) repetition, (4) sign, (5) association, (6) likeness, (7) association of the possessor and the possessed or master and servant, or things which are generally seen to follow each other, (8) separation (as of husband and wife), (9) simpler employment, (10) opposition, (11) excess, (12) that from which anything can be got, (13) cover and covered, (14) pleasure and pain causing memory of that which caused them, (15) fear, (16) entreaty, (17) action such as that of the chariot reminding the charioteer, (18) affection, (19) merit and demerit 1 . It is said that knowledge does not belong to body, and then the question of the production of the body as due to adrsta is described. Salvation (apavargd) is effected by the manas being permanenly separated from the soul (atman) through the destruction of karma.

In the fourth book in course of the examination of dosa (defects), it is said that moha (ignorance), is at the root of all other defects such as raga (attachment) and dvesa (antipathy). As against the Buddhist view that a thing could be produced by destruction, it is said that destruction is only a stage in the process of origination. Isvara is regarded as the cause of the production of effects of deeds performed by men's efforts, for man is not always found to attain success according to his efforts. A reference is made to the doctrine of those who say that all things have come into being by no-cause (cmimittd), for then no-cause would be the cause, which is impossible.

The doctrine of some that all things are eternal is next refuted on the ground that we always see things produced and destroyed. 1 Nyaya siitra in. ii. 44.

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (sunyavadin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like the fruits of trees which take some time before they can ripen. Even though there may be pleasures here and there, birth means sorrow for men, for even the man who enjoys pleasure is tormented by many sorrows, and sometimes one mistakes pains for pleasures. As there is no sorrow in the man who is in deep dreamless sleep, so there is no affliction (klesd) in the man who attains apavarga (salvation) 1 . When once this state is attained all efforts (pravrtti) cease for ever, for though efforts were beginningless with us they were all due to attachment, antipathy, etc. Then there are short discussions regarding the way in which egoism (ahamkdra) ceases with the knowledge of the true causes of defects (dosa); about the nature of whole and parts and about the nature of atoms (anus) which cannot further be divided. A discussion is then introduced against the doctrine of the Vijnana-vadins that nothing can be regarded as having any reality when separated from thoughts. Incidentally Yoga is mentioned as leading to right knowledge.

The whole of the fifth book which seems to be a later addition is devoted to the enumeration of different kinds of refutations (nigrahasthana) and futilities (jati).

Caraka, Nyaya sutras and Vaisesika sutras. When we compare the Nyaya sutras with the Vaisesika sutras we find that in the former two or three different streams of purposes have met, whereas the latter is much more homogeneous. The large amount of materials relating to debates treated as a practical art for defeating an opponent would lead one to suppose that it was probably originally compiled from some other existing treatises which were used by Hindus and Buddhists alike for rendering themselves fit to hold their own in debates with their opponents 2 . This assumption is justified when

1 Vatsyayana notes that this is the salvation of him who has known Brahman, iv. i. 63.

2 A reference to the Suvarnaprabhasa sittra shows that the Buddhist missionaries used to get certain preparations for improving their voice in order to be able to argue with force, and they took to the worship of Sarasvati (goddess of learning), who they supposed would help them in bringing readily before their mind all the information and ideas of which they stood so much in need at the time of debates.

we compare the futilities (jati) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the Nyaya sutra with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the Nyaya sutra and Caraka-samhita. which have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g. drstanta, prayojana, pratijna and vitanda) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the Nyaya sutras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthana, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. pra-tisthdpand, jzjndsd, vyavasdya, vakyadosa, vdkyaprasamsd, upa-lambha, parihdra, abhyanujiid, etc.) which are not found in the Nyaya sutra 1 . Again, the various types of futilities (jati) and points of opponent's refutation {nigrahasthana) mentioned in the Nyaya sutra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in Caraka, upamdna in Nyaya sutra, arthdpatti in Nyaya sutra and arthaprdpti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyaya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyaya sutras. If we leave out the varieties of jati and nigrahasthana of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyaya sutras. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyaya sutras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyaya sutras represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the Nyaya sutras is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrantika Buddhists, the Vijnanavada Buddhists, the nihilists, the Samkhya, the Carvaka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

1 Like Vaisesika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anti-tmlnii) as pftrvavat, fesaTCit and sanninyalodrsta.

further allusion elsewhere. The Vaisesika sutras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mimamsa, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mimamsa in the Nyaya sutras is the same as in the Vaisesika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge {svatahprdmdnyavdda) and the akhyati doctrine of illusion of the Mimamsists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mimamsa and later Nyaya, are never alluded to in the Nyaya sutras. The advocacy of Yoga methods {Nyaya sutras, IV. ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vaisesika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya sutras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamaho-padhyaya Haraprasada Sastri has pointed out 1 is not improbable. The Vaisesika sutras, III. i. 18 and III. ii. 1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of samskdra (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity {ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vaisesika as with Nyaya. The Nyaya sutras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of samskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vaisesika does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three classifications as purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta, but no definition. The Vaisesika sutras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V. S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti (concomitance ofketu (reason) and sddkya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyaya sutras or in the Vaisesika. Vaisesika sutra, ill. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipurvakatvat apadesasya),

1 J.A.S.B. 1905.

but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipurvakatva of Vaisesika seems to be more loose than the term vyapti as we know it in the later Nyaya. The Vaisesika sutras do not count scriptures (sabdd) as a separate pramana, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nyaya sutras sabda as a pramana applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds rsi, drya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamana which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even referred to in the Vaisesika sutras. The Nyaya sutras know of other pramanas, such as arthdpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramanas admitted by them, but the Vaisesika sutras do not seem to know them at all 1 . The Vaisesika sutras believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyaya sutras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them ; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived 2 . Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika sutras about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyaya sutras say nothing about the categories of dravya, guna, karma, visesa and samavaya which form the main subjects of Vaiseska discussions 3 . The Nyaya sutras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vaisesika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vaisesika sutras do not mention the name of" Isvara," whereas the Nyaya sutras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyaya sutras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

1 The only old authority which knows these pramanas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls arthdpatti arthaprapti (Caraka ill. viii.).

2 The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayaua's commentary.

3 The Nyaya sutra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as "samanapra-sav&tmika jatih " (H. ii. 71).

Vaisesika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika sutras admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyaya-Vaisesika are absent there. The Vaisesika calls salvation nihsreyasa or moksa and the Nyaya apavarga. Moksa with Vaisesika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyaya is cessation of pain 1 . In later times the main points of difference between the Vaisesika and Nyaya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness—apeksabuddhi—notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things) ; again, the doctrine of pilupaka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyaya held) was held by Vaisesika, which the Naiyayikas did not admit 2 . But as the Nyaya sutras are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyaya and early Vaisesika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vaisesika and the later interpreters of Nyaya. The Vaisesika as we find it in the commentary of Prasastapada (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyaya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vaisesika and Nyaya Literature. It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaisesika sutras by Kanada, also called Aulukya the son of Uluka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

1 Professor Vanamali Vedantatirtha quotes a passage from Samksepas'ahkarajaya, xvi. 68-69 in J.A.S.B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyaya writer Bhasarvajna, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S.B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyayikas considered that there was an element of happiness (suMa) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vaise-sikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the VaUesika sutras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the presence of some sort of bliss or happiness.

2 See Madhava's Sarvadarianasamgraha-Atdukyadariana.

306 . The Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy [ch.

appears from the Vdyu Parana that he was born in Prabhasa near Dvaraka, and was the disciple of Somasarma. The time of Prasastapada who wrote a bhasya (commentary) of the Vaisesika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Prasastapada's bhasya is this that unlike other bhasyas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sutras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sutras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents 1 . There were two other bhasyas on the Vaisesika sutras, namely Rdvana-bhdsya and Bharddvdja-vrtti, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in Kirandvalibhaskai-a of Padmanabha Misra and also in Ratnaprabhd 2. 2. n. Four commentaries were written on this bhasya, namely Vyomavati by Vyomasekharacarya, Nydyakandall by Srldhara, Kirandvall by Udayana (984 A.D.) and Lildvati by Srlvatsacarya. In addition to these Jagadlsa Bhattacarya of Navadvipa andSarikara Misra wrote two other commentaries on the Prasastapdda-bMsya, namely Bhdsyasukti and Kanada-raliasya. Sarikara Misra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the Vaisesika sutras called the Upaskdra. Of these Nydya-kandali of Srldhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vaisesika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhurisrsti in Bengal (Radha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchoka and he wrote his work in 913 Saka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes at the end of his work.

The Nydya sutra was written by Aksapada or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vatsyayana is known as the Vdtsydyana-bhdsya. The date of Vatsyayana has not

1 The bhasya of Prasastapada can hardly be called a bhasya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (Padiirthadharmasamgraha). He takes the categories of dravya, guna, karma, samdnya, vi§esa and samavaya in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyaya-Vaisesika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupaka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the Vaiiesika sutras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vaisesika available to us after Kanada and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a Vdrttika on Vatsy ay ana's bhasya to establish the Nyaya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Dirinaga (about 500 A.D.) in his Pramdnasamuccaya. Vacaspatimisra (840 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Nydyavdrttika of Udyotakara called Nydyavdrttikatdtparyatlkd in order to make clear the right meanings of Udyotakara's Vdrttika which was sinking in the mud as it were through numerous other bad writings (dustarakunibandhapahkamagndndiri). Udayana (984 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on the Tdtparyatlkd called Tdtparyatlkd-parisuddld. Varddhamana (1225 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nydyanibandhaprakdsa. Padmanabha wrote a sub-commentary on that called Varddhamdnendu and Sarikara Misra (1425 A.D.) wrote a sub-commentary on that called the Nydyatdtparyamandana. In the seventeenth century Visvanatha wrote an independent short commentary known as VUvandtha-vrtti, on the Nyaya sutra, and Radhamohana wrote a separate commentary on the Nyaya sutras known as Nydyasutravivarana. In addition to these works on the Nyaya sutras many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on the Nyaya system. The most important of these in medieval times is the Nydyamahjari of Jayanta (880 A.D.), who flourished shortly after Vacaspatimisra. Jayanta chooses some of the Nyaya sutras for interpretation, but he discusses the Nyaya views quite independently, and criticizes the views of other systems of Indian thought of his time. It is far more comprehensive than Vacaspati's Tdtparyatlkd, and its style is most delightfully lucid. Another important work is Udayana's Kusumdnjali in which he tries to prove the existence of Isvara (God). This work ought to be read with its commentary Prakdsa by Varddhamana (1225 A.D.) and its sub-commentary Makaranda by Rucidatta (1275 A.D.). Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka is a polemical work against the Buddhists, in which he tries to establish the Nyaya doctrine of soul. In addition to these we have a number of useful works on Nyaya in later times. Of these the following deserve special mention in connection with the present work. Bhdsdpariccheda by Visvanatha with its commentaries Muktavali, Dinakarl and Rdmarudrl, Tarka-samgraha with Nydya/iir/taya, Tarkab/idsd of Kesava Misra with

the commentary Nyayapradlpa, Saptapaddrthi of Sivaditya, Tdrkikaraksd of Varadaraja with the commentary Niskantaka of Mallinatha, Nydyasdra of Madhava Deva of the city of Dhara and Nydyasiddhantamaiijari of Janaklnatha Bhattacarya with the Nyayamanjarisara by Yadavacarya, and Nydyasiddhantadlpa of Sasadhara with Prabha by Sesanantacarya.

The new school of Nyaya philosophy known as Navya-Nyaya began with Gangesa Upadhyaya of Mithila, about 1200 A.D. Gangesa wrote only on the four pramanas admitted by the Nyaya, viz.pratyaksa,anumana,upamana,and sabda,and not on any of the topics of Nyaya metaphysics. But it so happened that his dis-cussionsonanumana(inference)attracted unusually great attention in Navadvlpa (Bengal), and large numbers of commentaries and commentaries of commentaries were written on the anumana portion of his work Tattvacintamarii, and many independent treatises on sabda and anumana were also written by the scholars of Bengal, which became thenceforth for some centuries the home of Nyaya studies. The commentaries of Raghunatha Siromani (1500 A.D.), Mathura Bhattacarya (1580 A.D.), Gadadhara Bhattacarya (1650A.D.) and Jagadlsa Bhattacarya (1590 A.D.), commentaries on Siromani's commentary on Tattvacintdmani, had been very widely read in Bengal. The new school of Nyaya became the most important study in Navadvlpa and there appeared a series of thinkers who produced an extensive literature on the subject 1 . The contribution was not in the direction of metaphysics, theology, ethics, or religion, but consisted mainly in developing a system of linguistic notations to specify accurately and precisely any concept or its relation with other concepts 2 .

Thus for example when they wished to define precisely the nature of the concomitance of one concept with another (e.g. smoke and fire), they would so specify the relation that the exact nature of the concomitance should be clearly expressed, and that there should be no confusion or ambiguity. Close subtle analytic thinking and the development of a system of highly technical

1 From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new school of Nyaya was started in Mithila (Behar); but from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century Bengal became pre-eminently the home of Nyaya studies. See Mr Cakravartti's paper, J. A. S. B. 1915. I am indebted to it for some of the dates mentioned in this section.

a ISvaranurnana of Raghunatha as well as his Padarthatattvanirupana are, however, notable exceptions.

expressions mark the development of this literature. The technical expressions invented by this school were thus generally accepted even by other systems of thought, wherever the need of accurate and subtle thinking was felt. But from the time that Sanskrit ceased to be the vehicle of philosophical thinking in India the importance of this literature has gradually lost ground, and it can hardly be hoped that it will ever regain its old position by attracting enthusiastic students in large numbers.

I cannot close this chapter without mentioning the fact that so far as the logical portion of the Nyaya system is concerned, though Aksapada was the first to write a comprehensive account of it, the Jains and Buddhists in medieval times had independently worked at this subject and had criticized the Nyaya account of logic and made valuable contributions. In Jaina logic Dasavaikdlikanirynkti of Bhadrabahu (357 B.C.), Umasvati's Tattvdrthddhigama sutra, Nydydvatdra of Siddhasena Divakara (533 A.D.) Manikya Nandl's (800 A.D.) Parlksdmukha sutra, and Pramdiianayatattvdlokalamkdra of Deva Suri (1159 A.D.) and Prameyakanialamdrtanda of Prabhacandra deserve special notice. Pramdnasamuccaya and Nydyapravesa of Dirinaga (500A.D.), Pramdnavarttika kdrikd and Nydyabindu of Dharmaklrtti (650 A.D.) with the commentary of Dharmottara are the most interesting of the Buddhist works on systematic logic 1 . The diverse points of difference between the Hindu, Jain and Buddhist logic require to be dealt with in a separate work on Indian logic and can hardly be treated within the compass of the present volume.

It is interesting to notice that between the Vdtsydyana bhasya and the Udyotakara's Varttika no Hindu work on logic of importance seems to have been written : it appears that the science of logic in this period was in the hands of the Jains and the Buddhists ; and it was Dirinaga's criticism of Hindu Nyaya that roused Udyotakara to write the Varttika. The Buddhist and the Jain method of treating logic separately from metaphysics as an independent study was not accepted by the Hindus till we come to Garigesa, and there is probably only one Hindu work of importance on Nyaya in the Buddhist style namely Nydyasdra of Bhasarvajna. Other older Hindu works generally treated of

1 See Indian Logic Medieval School, by Dr S. C. Vidyabhiisana, for a bibliography of Jain and Buddhist Logic.

inference only along with metaphysical and other points of Nyaya interest 1 .

The main doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy 2 .

The Nyaya-Vaisesika having dismissed the doctrine of mo-mentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same. Whether they produce any effect on us or on their surrounding environments is immaterial. Existence is the most general characteristic of things, and it is on account of this that things are testified by experience to be existing.

As the Nyaya-Vaisesikas depended solely on experience and on valid reasons, they dismissed the Samkhya cosmology, but accepted the atomic doctrine of the four elements (bhutas), earth (ksiti), water («/>), fire {tejas), and air (marut). These atoms are eternal; the fifth substance {akasd) is all pervasive and eternal. It is regarded as the cause of propagating sound; though all-pervading and thus in touch with the ears of all persons, it manifests sound only in the ear-drum, as it is only there that it shows itself as a sense-organ and manifests such sounds as the man deserves to hear by reason of his merit and demerit. Thus a deaf man though he has the akasa as his sense of hearing, cannot hear on account of his demerit which impedes the faculty of that sense organ 3 . In addition to these they admitted the existence of time (kala) as extending from the past through the present to the

1 Almost all the books on Nyaya and Vaisesika referred to have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. Those who want to be acquainted with a fuller bibliography of the new school of logic should refer to the paper called "The History of Navya Nyaya in Bengal," by Mr Cakravartti mj- A. S. B. 1915.

2 I have treated Nyaya and Vaisesika as the same system. Whatever may have been their original differences, they are regarded since about 600 A.D. as being in complete agreement except in some minor points. The views of one system are often supplemented by those of the other. The original character of the two systems has already been treated.

s See Nyayakandall, pp. 59-64.

endless futurity before us. Had there been no time we could have no knowledge of it and there would be nothing to account for our time-notions associated with all changes. The Samkhya did not admit the existence of any real time; to them the unit of kala is regarded as the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space. It has no existence separate from the atoms and their movements. The appearance of kala as a separate entity is a creation of our buddhi {buddhinirmand) as it represents the order or mode in which the buddhi records its perceptions. But kala in Nyaya-Vaisesika is regarded as a substance existing by itself. In accordance with the changes of things it reveals itself as past, present, and future. Samkhya regarded it as past, present, and future, as being the modes of the constitution of the things in its different manifesting stages of evolution (adhvari). The astronomers regarded it as being due to the motion of the planets. These must all be contrasted with the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of kala which is regarded as an all-pervading, partless substance which appears as many in association with the changes related to it 1 .

The seventh substance is relative space (dzk). It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kala like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it in the eight directions and in the upper and lower 2 . The eighth substance is the soul (dtmari) which is all-pervading. There are separate atmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain, desire, etc. belong to atman. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition

1 See Nyayakandall, pp. 64-66, and Nyayamaiijari, pp. 136-139. The Vaifesika sutras regarded time as the cause of things which suffer change but denied it of things which are eternal.

2 See Nyayakandall, pp. 66-69, an< ^ Nyayamaiijari, p. 140.

of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality {guna), action {karma), sameness or generality (sdmduya), speciality or specific individuality {visesa) and the relation of inherence {samavdya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance {dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (dsraya) on which all the others depend {dsrta). Dravya, guna, karma, samanya, visesa, and samavaya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made up 1 . When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated 2 . The Nyaya-Vaisesika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the demands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories {paddrtha), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number—dravya, guna, etc. If we take a percept "I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness " and "oneness," and we thus call the book a substance {dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatvd). So also guna and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Samkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say

1 Abhava (negation) as dependent on bhava (position) is mentioned in the Vaifesika sutras. Later Nyaya writers such as Udayana include abhava as a separate category, but Sridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted by Prasastapada as it was dependent on bhava— "ab/idvasya prthaganupadefah bhavaparatantryat na tvab/iavdt. u Nydyakandall, p. 6, and Laksanavali, p. t.

2 " Tattvato jnatesu bahyadhyatmikesu visayesn dosadar§anat viraktasya samiha -nivrttau atmajiiasya tadarthani karmanyakurvatah tat parityagasadhattani Srutismr-tyuditani asatikalpilaphalani upadadanasya atmajiiatiamabhyasyatah prakrstanivart-takadharmopacayt salt paripakvatmajnanasyatyantikaSarlraviyogasya bkavat." Ibid. p. 7.

whiteness) the latter would admit a corresponding real, but Nyaya-Vaisesika would collect "all whiteness" under the name of "the quality of white colour" which the atom possessed 1 . They only regarded as a separate entity what represented an ultimate mode of thought. They did not enquire whether such notions could be regarded as the modification of some other notion or not; but whenever they found that there were some experiences which were similar and universal, they classed them as separate entities or categories.

The six Padarthas: Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Visesa, Samavaya.

Of the six classes of entities or categories (jxiddrthd) we have already given some account of dravya 2 . Let us now turn to the others. Of the qualities (guna) the first one called rupa (colour) is that which can be apprehended by the eye alone and not by any other sense. The colours are white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown and variegated (citrd). Colours are found only in ksiti, ap and tejas. The colours of ap and tejas are permanent (fiitya), but the colour of ksiti changes when heat is applied, and this, Sridhara holds, is due to the fact that heat changes the atomic structure of ksiti (earth) and thus the old constitution of the substance being destroyed, its old colour is also destroyed, and a new one is generated. Rupa is the general name for the specific individual colours. There is the genus ru-patva (colourness), and the rupa guna (quality) is that on which rests this genus; rupa is not itself a genus and can be apprehended by the eye.

The second is rasa (taste), that quality of things which can be apprehended only by the tongue; these are sweet, sour, pungent {katu), astringent {kasayd) and bitter (tikta). Only ksiti and ap have taste. The natural taste of ap is sweetness. Rasa like rupa also denotes the genus rasatva, and rasa as quality must be distinguished from rasa as genus, though both of them are apprehended by the tongue.

The third is gandha (odour), that quality which can be apprehended by the nose alone. It belongs to ksiti alone. Water

1 The reference is to Sautrantika Buddhism, " yo yo viruddhadhyasavan nasave-kah" See Panditasoka's Avayavinirakarana, Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts.

2 The word " padartha" literally means denotations of words.

or air is apprehended as having odour on account of the presence of earth materials.

The fourth is sparsa (touch), that quality which can be apprehended only by the skin. There are three kinds of touch, cold, hot, neither hot nor cold. Sparsa belongs to ksiti; ap, tejas, and vayu. The fifth sabda (sound) is an attribute of akasa. Had there been no akasa there would have been no sound.

The sixth is samkhya (number), that entity of quality belonging to things by virtue of which we can count them as one, two, three, etc. The conception of numbers two, three, etc. is due to a relative oscillatory state of the mind {apeksabuddhi) ; thus when there are two jugs before my eyes, I have the notion—This is one jug and that is another jug. This is called apeksabuddhi; then in the two jugs there arises the quality of twoness {dvitva) and then an indeterminate perception {nirvikalpa-dvitva-gund) of dvitva in us and then the determinate perceptions that there are the two jugs. The conceptions of other numbers as well as of many arise in a similar manner 1 .

The seventh is parimiti (measure), that entity of quality in things by virtue of which we perceive them as great or small and speak of them as such. The measure of the partless atoms is called parimandala parimana ; it is eternal, and it cannot generate the measure of any other thing. Its measure is its own absolutely; when two atoms generate a dyad {dvyanuka) it is not the measure of the atom that generates the anu (atomic) and the hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule {dvyanukd), for then the size {parimana) of it would have been still smaller than the measure of the atom {parimandala), whereas the measure of the dyanuka is of a different kind, namely the small {hrasva)*. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number (samkhya) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small {hrasva) measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dyanuka) compose a tryanuka the number and not the measure " small"

1 This is distinctively a Vaisesika view introduced by Frasastapada. Nyaya seems to be silent on this matter. See Sankara Misra's Upaskara, vn. ii. 8.

2 It should be noted that the atomic measure appears in two forms as eternal as in "paramanus" and non-eternal as in the dvyanuka. The parimandala parimana is thus a variety of anuparimana. The anuparimana and the hrasvaparimana represent the two dimensions of the measure of dvyanukas as mahat and dirgha are with reference to tryanukas. See Nyayakandali, p. 133.

{hrasva) of the dyad is the cause of the measure " great" {mahat) of the tryanuka. But when we come to the region of these gross tryanukas we find that the " great" measure of the tryanukas is the cause of the measure of other grosser bodies composed by them. For as many tryanukas constitute a gross body, so much bigger does the thing become. Thus the cumulation of the tryanukas of mahat parimana makes things of still more mahat parimana. The measure of tryanukas is not only regarded as mahat but also as dlrgha (long) and this dlrgha parimana has to be admitted as coexisting with mahat parimana but not identical, for things not only appear as great but also as long {dlrgha). Here we find that the accumulation of tryanukas means the accumulation of "great" {mahat) and "long" (dlrgha) parimana, and hence the thing generated happens to possess a measure which is greater and longer than the individual atoms which composed them. Now the hrasva parimana of the dyads is not regarded as having a lower degree of greatness or length but as a separate and distinct type of measure which is called small {hrasva). As accumulation of grossness, greatness or length, generates still more greatness, grossness and length in its effect, so an accumulation of the hrasva (small) parimana ought to generate still more hrasva parimana, and we should expect that if the hrasva measure of the dyads was the cause of the measure of the tryanukas, the tryanukas should be even smaller than the dyanukas. So also if the atomic and circular {parimandala) size of the atoms is regarded as generating by their measure the measure of the dyanukas, then the measure of the dyanukas ought to be more atomic than the atoms. The atomic, small, and great measures should not be regarded as representing successively bigger measures produced by the mere cumulation of measures, but each should be regarded as a measure absolutely distinct, different from or foreign to the other measure. It is therefore held that if grossness in the cause generates still more greatness in the effect, the smallness and the parimandala measure of the dyads and atoms ought to generate still more smallness and subtleness in their effect. But since the dyads and the tryanuka molecules are seen to be constituted of atoms and dyads respectively, and yet are not found to share the measure of their causes, it is to be argued that the measures of the atoms and dyads do not generate the measure of their effects, but it is their number which is the cause

of the measure of the latter. This explains anuparimana, hrasva parimana, mahat parimana, and dlrgha parimana. The parimana of akasa, kala, dik and atman which are regarded as all-pervasive, is said to be paramamahat (absolutely large). The parimanas of the atoms, akasa, kala, dik, manas, and atman are regarded as eternal (nityd). All other kinds of parimanas as belonging to non-eternal things are regarded as non-eternal.

The eighth is prthaktva (mutual difference or separateness of things), that entity or quality in things by virtue of which things appear as different (e.g. this is different from that). Difference is perceived by us as a positive notion and not as a mere negation such as this jug is not this pot.

The ninth is samyoga (connection), that entity of guna by virtue of which things appear to us as connected.

The tenth is vibJiaga (separation), that entity of guna which destroys the connection or contact of things.

The eleventh and twelfth gunas, paratva and aparatva, give rise in us to the perceptions of long time and short time, remote and near.

The other gunas such as buddhi (knowledge), sukha (happiness), duhklia (sorrow), iccha (will), d">esa (antipathy or hatred) and yatna (effort) can occur only with reference to soul.

The characteristic of gurutva (heaviness) is that by virtue of which things fall to the ground. The guna of sneha (oiliness) belongs to water. The guna of samskara is of three kinds, (i) vega (velocity) which keeps a thing moving in different directions, (2) sthiti-sthapaka (elasticity) on account of which a gross thing tries to get back its old state even though disturbed, (3) bha-vana is that quality of atman by which things are constantly practised or by which things experienced are remembered and recognized 1 . Dharma is the quality the presence of which enables the soul to enjoy happiness or to attain salvation 3 . Adharma is

1 PraSastapada says that bhavana is a special characteristic of the soul, contrary to intoxication, sorrow and knowledge, by which things seen, heard and felt are remembered and recognized. Through unexpectedness (as the sight of a camel for a man of South India), repetition (as in studies, art etc.) and intensity of interest, the samskara becomes particularly strong. See Nydyakandali, p. 267. Kanada however is silent on these points. He only says that by a special kind of contact of the mind with soul and also by the samskara, memory (smrti) is produced (ix. 1. 6).

2 Pra&istapada speaks of dharma (merit) as being a quality of the soul. Thereupon Sridhara points out that this view does not admit that dharma is a power of karma (na karmasamarthyam). Sacrifice etc. cannot be dharma for these actions being momentary

the opposite quality, the presence of which in the soul leads a man to suffer. Adrsta or destiny is that unknown quality of things and of the soul which brings about the cosmic order, and arranges it for the experience of the souls in accordance with their merits or demerits.

Karma means movement; it is the third thing which must be held to be as irreducible a reality as dravya or guna. There are five kinds of movement, (1) upward, (2) downward, (3) contraction, (4) expansion, (5) movement in general. All kinds of karmas rest on substances just as the gunas do, and cause the things to which they belong to move.

Sdmanya is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as sat or existing. This sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, dravya, guna, and karma. This sameness is called sdmanya or jati, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on dravya, guna, or karma. This highest genus sattd (being) is called parajdti (highest universal), the other intermediate jatis are called aparajdti (lower universals), such as the genus of dravya, of karma, or of guna, or still more intermediate jatis such as gotvajati (the genus cow), nilatvajdti (the genus blue). The intermediate jatis or genera sometimes appear to have a special aspect as a species, such as pasutva (animal jati) and gotva (the cow jati); here however gotva appears as a species, yet it is in reality nothing but a jati. The aspect as species has no separate existence. It is jati which from one aspect appears as genus and from another as species.

they cannot generate the effects which are only to be reaped at a future time. If the action is destroyed its power (samarthya) cannot last. So dharma is to be admitted as a quality generated in the self by certain courses of conduct which produce happiness for him when helped by certain other conditions of time, place, etc. Faith (iraddha), non-injury, doing good to all beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, sex-control, sincerity, control of anger, ablutions, taking of pure food, devotion to particular gods, fasting, strict adherence to scriptural duties, and the performance of duties assigned to each caste and stage of life, are enumerated by Pra^astapada as producing dharma. The person who strictly adheres to these duties and the yamas and niyamas (cf. Patafijali's Yoga) and attains Yoga by a meditation on the six padarthas attains a dharma which brings liberation (rnoksa). Srldhara refers to the Samkhya-Yoga account of the method of attaining salvation {Nyayakandali, pp. 272-280). See also Vallabha's Nyayalilavati, pp. 74-75. (Bombay, 1915.)

This jati or samanya thus must be regarded as having a separate independent reality though it is existent in dravya, guna and karma. The Buddhists denied the existence of any independent reality of samanya, but said that the sameness as cow was really but the negation of all non-cows {apoha). The perception of cow realizes the negation of all non-cows and this is represented in consciousness as the sameness as cow. He who should regard this sameness to be a separate and independent reality perceived in experience might also discover two horns on his own head 1 . The Nyaya-Vaisesika said that negation of non-cows is a negative perception, whereas the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception, which cannot be explained by the aforesaid negatio n theoryjpf the JBuddhists. Samanya has thus to be admitted to have a separate reality. All perception as sameness of a thing is due to the presence of this thing in that object 1 . This jati is eternal or non-destructible; for even with the destruction of individuals comprehended within the jati, the latter is not destroyed 2 .

Through visesa things are perceived as diverse. No single sensation that we receive from the external world probably agrees with any other sensation, and this difference must be due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves. The specific difference existing in the atoms, emancipated souls and minds must be regarded as eternally existing, and it

1 The Buddhist Pandita^oka says that there is no single thing running through different individuals (e.g. cooks) by virtue of which the samanya could be established. For if it did exist then we could have known it simply by seeing any cook without any reference to his action of cooking by virtue of which the notion of generality is formed. If there is a similarity between the action of cooks that cannot establish jati in the cooks, for the similarity applies to other things, viz. the action of the cooks. If the specific individualities of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and that another, and we have a regressus ad infinitum. Whatever being perceptible is not perceived is non-existent (yadyadupalabdhilaksaiiapraptam sannopalabhyate tattadasat). Samanya is such, therefore samanya is non-existent. No samanya can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impressions of past experiences of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred erroneously to external objects. Apart from this no samanya can be pointed out as being externally perceptible— Samanyadusanadikprasarita —in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts. The Vedanta also does not think that either by perception or by inference we can know jati as a separate substance. So it discards jati. See Vedantaparibhasa, Sikhamani and Mani-prabkd, pp. 69-71. See also Sriharsa's Khandanakhandakhddya, pp. 1079-1086.

2 Similarity (sddr/ya) is not regarded as a separate category, for it is defined as identity in difference (tadbhiu?iatve salt tadgatabhuyodharmavattvam).

is on account of its presence that atoms appear as different to the yogins who can perceive them.

Samavaya, the inseparable relation of inherence, is a relation by virtue of which two different things such as substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and samanya, karana (cause) and karya (effect), atoms and visesa, appear so unified that they represent one whole, or one identical inseparable reality. This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action, and attribute, cause and effect, and jati in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing. Samyoga or contact may take place between two things of the same nature which exist as disconnected and may later on be connected (ytitasiddha), such as when I put my pen on the table. The pen and the table are both substances and were disconnected; the samyoga relation is the guna by virtue of which they appear to be connected for a while. Samavaya however makes absolutely different things such as dravya and guna and karma or karana and karya (clay and jug) appear as one inseparable whole (ayutasiddhd). This relation is thus a separate and independent category. This is not regarded as many like samyogas (contact) but as one and eternal because it has no cause. This or that object (e.g. jug) may be destroyed but the samavaya relation which was never brought into being by anybody always remains 1 .

These six things are called the six padarthas or independent realities experienced in perception and expressed in language.

The Theory of Causation.

The Nyaya-Vai£esika in most of its speculations took that view of things which finds expression in our language, and which we tacitly assume as true in all our ordinary experience. Thus

1 The Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation of samavaya as subsisting between two different entities (e.g. substance and qualities). Thus Sankara says (Brahma-sutrabhasya II. ii. 13) that if a samavaya relation is to be admitted to connect two different things, then another samavaya would be necessary to connect it with either of the two entities that it intended to connect, and that another, and so there will be a vicious infinite (anavastha). Nyaya, however, would not regard it as vicious at all. It is well to remember that the Indian systems acknowledge two kinds of anavastha— pranianiki (valid infinite, as in case of the question of the seed and the tree, or of the avidya and the passions), and another apramaniki anavastha (vicious infinite) as when the admission of anything involves an infinite chain before it can be completed.

they admitted dravya, guna, karma and samanya. Visesa they had to admit as the ultimate peculiarities of atoms, for they did not admit that things were continually changing their qualities, and that everything could be produced out of everything by a change of the collocation or arrangement of the constituting atoms. In the production of the effect too they did not admit that the effect was potentially pre-existent in the cause. They held that the material cause (e.g. clay) had some power within it, and the accessory and other instrumental causes (such as the stick, the wheel etc.) had other powers; the collocation of these two destroyed the cause, and produced the effect which was not existent before but was newly produced. This is what is called the doctrine of asatkaryavdda. This is just the opposite of the Samkhya axiom, that what is existent cannot be destroyed (nd-bhavo vidyate satali) and that the non-existent could never be produced {ndsato vidyate bkavah). The objection to this view is that if what is non-existent is produced, then even such impossible things as the hare's horn could also be produced. The Nyaya-Vaisesika answer is that the view is not that anything that is non-existent can be produced, but that which is produced was non-existent 1 .

It is held by Mlmamsa that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyaya objects that this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis, for there is no reason to suppose that there is any transcendental operation in causal movement as this can be satisfactorily explained by molecular movement (parispanda). There is nothing except the invariable time relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect, but the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice *o make it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (anya-thasiddhisunyasya niyatapurvavarttita). Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for kdryakdrana-bhdva or cause and effect relation. For example, the non-essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, only collateral or indirect. In other words their antecedence is conditional upon something else {na svatantryend). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour

1 Nyayamanjari, p. 494.

of a stick or its texture or size, or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done, is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly the co-effects of the invariable antecedents or what enters into the production of their co-effects may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar but it is a co-effect; and akasa (ether) as the substrate and vayu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect, but these are no unconditional antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. The conditions of the conditions should also be rejected; the invariable antecedent of the potter (who is an invariable antecedent of the jar), the potter's father, does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate. Finally all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are not unconditional and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. Thus Dr Seal in describing it rightly remarks, "In the end, the discrimination of what is necessary to complete the sum of causes from what is dependent, collateral, secondary, superfluous, or inert (i.e. of the relevant from the irrelevant factors), must depend on the test of expenditure of energy. This test the Nyaya would accept only in the sense of an operation analysable into molar or molecular motion (paris-panda eva bhaiitiko vyaparah karotyarthah atindriyastu vya-paro nasti. Jayanta's Manjarl Ahnika I), but would emphatically reject, if it is advanced in support of the notion of a mysterious causal power or efficiency (sakti) 1 ." With Nyaya all energy is necessarily kinetic. This is a peculiarity of Nyaya—its insisting that the effect is only the sum or resultant of the operations of the different causal conditions—that these operations are of the nature of motion or kinetic, in other words it firmly holds to the view that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, i.e. a redistribution of motion, but at the same time absolutely repudiates the Samkhya conception of power or productive

1 Dr P. C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (atindriya) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional invariable complements of operative conditions (karana-samagrt), and nothing in the effect other than the consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions 1 . Certain general conditions such as relative space (dik), time (kdla), the will of Isvara, destiny iadrsta) are regarded as the common cause of all effects {karyatva-prayojakd). Those are called sddhdrana-kdrana (common cause) as distinguished from the specific causes which determine the specific effects which are called asadliarana kdrana. It may not be out of place here to notice that Nyaya while repudiating transcendental power {sakti) in the mechanism of nature and natural causation, does not deny the existence of metaphysical conditions like merit (d/iarma), which constitutes a system of moral ends that fulfil themselves through the mechanical systems and order of nature.

The causal relation then like the relation of genus to species, is a natural relation of concomitance, which can be ascertained only by the uniform and uninterrupted experience of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, and not by a deduction from a certain a priori principle like that of causality or identity of essence 2 .

The material cause such as the clay is technically called the <samavdyi-kdrana of the jug. Samavaya means as we have seen an intimate, inseparable relation of inherence. A karana is called samavSyi when its materials are found inseparably connected with the materials of the effect. Asamavayi-karana is that which produces its characteristics in the effect through the medium of the samavayi or material cause, e.g. the clay is not the cause of the colour of the jug but the colour of the clay is the cause of the colour of the jug. The colour of the clay which exists in the clay in inseparable relation is the cause of the colour of the jug. This colour of the clay is thus called the asamavayi cause of the jug. Any quality (guna) or movement which existing in the samavaya cause in the samavaya relation determines the characteristics of the effect is called the asamavayi-karana. The instrumental

1 Dr P. C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, 1909, pp. 249-250.

2 See for this portion Dr B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 263-266. Sarvadarianasamgrahaow Buddhism. Nyayamaiijari, Bhasa-pariccheda, with Muktd7iali and Dinakari, and Tarkasanigraha. The doctrine of Anyathasiddhi was systematically developed from the time of Ganges^.

nimitta and accessory {sahakari) causes are those which help the material cause to produce the effect. Thus the potter, the wheel and the stick may be regarded as the nimitta and the sahakari causes of the effect.

We know that the Nyaya-Vaisesika regards the effect as nonexistent, before the operation of the cause in producing it, but it holds that the gunas in the cause are the causes of the gunas in the effect, e.g. the black colour of the clay is the cause of the black colour of the effect, except in cases where heat comes as an extraneous cause to generate other qualities; thus when a clay jug is burnt, on account of the heat we get red colour, though the colour of the original clay and the jug was black. Another important exception is to be found in the case of the production of the parimanas of dvyanukas and trasarenus which are not produced by the parimanas of an anu or a dyanuka, but by their number as we have already seen.

Dissolution (Pralaya) and Creation (Srsti).

The docrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mlmamsa 1 . According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika view Isvara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about dissolution {samhareccho bhavati). Simultaneously with it the adrsta force residing in all the souls and forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (sakti-pratibandha). As a result of this no further bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about of the dissolution of all produced things (by the desire of Isvara) the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations as bodies or senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to the disintegrated atomic state, then all ap, then all tejas and then all vayu. These disintegrated atoms and the souls associated with dharma, adharma and past impressions (samskdra) remain suspended in their own inanimate condition. For we know that souls in their natural condition are lifeless and knowledgeless, non-intelligent entities. It is only when these are connected with bodies that they possess knowledge through the activity of manas. In the state of pralaya owing to the adrsta of souls the

1 The doctrine of pralaya and srsti is found only in later Nyaya-Vaisesika works, but the sutras of both the systems seem to be silent on the matter.

atoms do not conglomerate. It is not an act of cruelty on the part of Isvara that he brings about dissolution, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings.

At the time of creation, Isvara wishes to create and this desire of Isvara works in all the souls as adrsta. This one eternal desire of Isvara under certain conditions of time (e.g. of pralaya) as accessory causes (sahakari) helps the disintegration of atoms and at other times (e.g. that of creation) the constructive process of integration and unification of atoms for the world-creation. When it acts in a specific capacity in the diverse souls it is called adrsta. At the time of dissolution the creative function of this adrsta is suspended and at the time of creation it finds full play. At the time of creation action first begins in the vayu atoms by the kinetic function of this adrsta, by the contact of the souls with the atoms. By such action the air atoms come in contact with one another and the dvyanukas are formed and then in a similar way the tryanukas are formed, and thus vayu originates. After vayu, the ap is formed by the conglomeration of water atoms, and then the tejas atoms conglomerate and then the earth atoms. When the four elements are thus conglomerated in the gross form, the god Brahma and all the worlds are created by IsVara and Brahma is directed by Isvara to do the rest of the work. Brahma thus arranges for the enjoyment and suffering of the fruits of diverse kinds of karma, good or bad. Isvara brings about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good of all beings. Even here sorrows have their place that they may lead men to turn from worldly attachment and try for the attainment of the highest good, mukti. Moreover Isvara arranges for the enjoyment of pleasures and the suffering of pains according to the merits and demerits of men, just as in our ordinary experience we find that a master awards prizes or punishments according to good or bad deeds 1 . Many Nyaya books do not speak of the appointment of a Brahma as deputy for supervision of the due disposal of the fruits of karma according to merit or demerit. It is also held that pralaya and creation were brought about in accordance with the karma of men, or that it may be due to a mere play (Jila) of Isvara. Isvara is one, for if there were many Isvaras they might quarrel. The will of Isvara not only brings about dissolution and creation, 1 See Nyayakandali, pp. 48-54.

but also acts always among us in a general way, for without it our karmas could not ripen, and the consequent disposal of pleasures and sorrows to us and a corresponding change in the exterior world in the form of order or harmony could not happen. The exterior world is in perfect harmony with men's actions. Their merits and demerits and all its changes and modifications take place in accordance with merits and demerits. This desire (icckd) of Isvara may thus be compared with the icchd of Isvara as we find it in the Yoga system.

Proof of the Existence of Isvara.

Samkhya asserts that the teleology of the prakrti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mlmamsakas, the Carvakas, the Buddhists and the Jains all deny the existence of Isvara (God). Nyaya believes that Isvara has fashioned this universe by his will out of the ever-existing atoms. For every effect (e.g. a jug) must have its cause. If this be so, then this world with all its order and arrangement must also be due to the agency of some cause, and this cause is Isvara. This world is not momentary as the Buddhists suppose, but is permanent as atoms, is also an effect so far as it is a collocation of atoms and is made up of parts like all other individual objects (e.g. jug, etc.), which we call effects. The world being an effect like any other effect must have a cause like any other effect. The objection made against this view is that such effects as we ordinarily perceive may be said to have agents as their causes but this manifest world with mountains, rivers, oceans etc. is so utterly different in form from ordinary effects that we notice every day, that the law that every effect must have a cause cannot be said to hold good in the present case. The answer that Nyaya gives is that the concomitance between two things must be taken in its general aspect neglecting the specific peculiarities of each case of observed concomitance. Thus I had seen many cases of the concomitance of smoke with fire, and had thence formed the notion that "wherever there is smoke there is fire"; but if I had only observed small puffs of smoke and small fires, could I say that only small quantities of smoke could lead us to the inference of fire, and could I hold that therefore large volumes of smoke from the burning of a forest should not be sufficient reason for us to infer the existence of fire in the forest?

Thus our conclusion should not be that only smaller effects are preceded by their causes, but that all effects are invariably and unconditionally preceded by causes. This world therefore being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is Isvara. This cause we cannot see, because Isvara has no visible body, not because he does not exist. It is sometimes said that we see every day that shoots come out of seeds and they are not produced by any agent. To such an objection the Nyaya answer is that even they are created by God, for they are also effects. That we do not see any one to fashion them is not because there is no maker of them, but because the creator cannot be seen. If the objector could distinctly prove that there was no invisible maker shaping these shoots, then only could he point to it as a case of contradiction. But so long as this is not done it is still only a doubtful case of enquiry and it is therefore legitimate for us to infer that since all effects have a cause, the shoots as well as the manifest world being effects must have a cause. This cause is Isvara. He has infinite knowledge and is all merciful. At the beginning of creation He created the Vedas. He is like our father who is always engaged in doing us good 1 .

The Nyaya-Vaisesika Physics. The four kinds of atoms are earth, water, fire, and air atoms. These have mass, number, weight, fluidity (or hardness), viscosity (or its opposite), velocity, characteristic potential colour, taste, smell, or touch, not produced by the chemical operation of heat. Akasa (space) is absolutely inert and structure-less being only as the substratum of sound, which is supposed to travel wave-like in the manifesting medium of air. Atomic combination is only possible with the four elements. Atoms cannot exist in an uncombined condition in the creation stage; atmospheric air however consists of atoms in an uncombined state.

Two atoms combine to form a binary molecule {dvyanuka). Two, three, four, or five dvyanukas form themselves into grosser molecules of tryanuka, caturanuka, etc. 2 Though this was the generally current view, there was also another view as has been pointed out by Dr B. N. Seal in his Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus,that the "atoms have also an inherent tendency to unite," and that

1 See Jayanta's Nyayamavjarl, pp. 190-204, and Udayana's KusMiiaiijali with rrakaia and livaranumana of Raghunatha.

2 Kaiiacit Iribhirarabhyale iti tryanukamityucyate, kaddcit caturbhirarabhyate kadacitpaiicabhiritiyathestatn kalpana. Nyayakaiidali, p. 32.

they do so in twos, threes, or fours, "either by the atoms falling into groups of threes, fours, etc. directly, or by the successive addition of one atom to each preceding aggregate 1 ." Of course the atoms are regarded as possessed of an incessant vibratory motion. It must however be noted in this connection that behind this physical explanation of the union of atoms there is the adrsta, the will of Isvara, which gives the direction of all such unions in harmony with the principle of a "moral government of the universe," so that only such things are produced as can be arranged for the due disposal of the effects of karma. "An elementary substance thus produced by primary atomic combination may however suffer qualitative changes under the influence of heat {ptikajotpatti)" The impact of heat corpuscles decomposes a dvyanuka into the atoms and transforms the characters of the atoms determining them all in the same way. The heat particles continuing to impinge reunite the atoms so transformed to form binary or other molecules in different orders or arrangements, which account for the specific characters or qualities finally produced. The Vaisesika holds that there is first a disintegration into simple atoms, then change of atomic qualities, and then the final re-combination, under the influence of heat. This doctrine is called the doctrine of piluptika (heating of atoms). Nyaya on the other hand thinks that no disintegration into atoms is necessary for change of qualities, but it is the molecules which assume new characters under the influence of heat. Heat thus according to Nyaya directly affects the characters of the molecules and changes their qualities without effecting a change in the atoms. Nyaya holds that the heat-corpuscles penetrate into the porous body of the object and thereby produce the change of colour. The object as a whole is not disintegrated into atoms and then reconstituted again, for such a procedure is never experienced by observation. This is called the doctrine of pitharapaka (heating of molecules). This is one of the few points of difference between the later Nyaya and Vaisesika systems 2 .

Chemical compounds of atoms may take place between the

1 Utpala's commentary on Brhatsamhita I. 7.

2 See Dr B. N. Seal in P. C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, pp. 190-191, JVydyamanjari, p. 438, and Udyotakara's Varllika. There is very little indication in the Nyaya and Vatiesika sutras that they had any of those differences indicated here. Though there

are slight indications of these matters in the Vatiesika sutras (vn. 1), the Nyaya sutras are almost silent upon the matter. A systematic development of the theory of creation and atomic combinations appear to have taken place after Vatsyayana.

atoms of the same bhuta or of many bhutas. According to the Nyaya view there are no differences in the atoms of the same bhuta, and all differences of quality and characteristics of the compound of the same bhuta are due only to diverse collocations of those atoms. Thus Udyotakara says (III. i. 4) that there is no difference between the atom of a barley seed and paddy seed, since these are all but atoms of earth. Under the continued impact of heat particles the atoms take new characters. It is heat and heat alone that can cause the transformations of colours, tastes etc. in the original bhuta atoms. The change of these physical characters depends on the colours etc. of the constituent substances in contact, on the intensity or degree of heat and also on the species of tejas corpuscles that impinge on the atoms. Heat breaks bodies in contact into atoms, transforms their qualities, and forms separate bodies with them.

Prasastapada (the commentator of Vaisesika) holds that in the higher compounds of the same bhuta the transformation takes place (under internal heat) in the constituent atoms of the compound molecules, atoms specially determined as the compound and not in the original atoms of the bhuta entering into the composition of the compound. Thus when milk is turned into curd, the transformation as curd takes place in the atoms determined as milk in the milk molecule, and it is not necessary that the milk molecule should be disintegrated into the atoms of the original bhuta of which the milk is a modification. The change as curd thus takes place in the milk atom, and the milk molecule has not to be disintegrated into ksiti or ap atoms. So again in the fertilized ovum, the germ and the ovum substances, which in the Vaisesika view are both isomeric modes of earth (with accompaniments of other bhutas) are broken up into homogeneous earth atoms, and it is these that chemically combine under the animal heat and biomotor force vayu to form the germ (kalald). But when the germ plasm develops, deriving its nutrition from the blood of the mother, the animal heat breaks up the molecules of the germ plasm into its constituent atoms, i.e. atoms specifically determined which by their grouping formed the germ plasm. These germ-plasm atoms chemically combine with the atoms of the food constituents and thus produce cells and tissues 1 . This atomic contact is called arambhaka-samyoga.

1 See I)r IJ. N. Seal's Positive Sciences, pp. 104-108, and Nyayakandali, pp. 33-34, " Saririirambhe para?ndnava eva karanam ?ia hikra-s'onUasannipatah kriyavibhaga-

In the case of poly-bhautik or bi-bhautik compounds there is another kind of contact called upastambha. Thus in the case of such compounds as oils, fats, and fruit juices, the earth atoms cannot combine with one another unless they are surrounded by the water atoms which congregate round the former, and by the infra-atomic forces thus set up the earth atoms take peculiar qualities under the impact of heat corpuscles. Other compounds are also possible where the ap, tejas, or the vayu atoms form the inner radicle and earth atoms dynamically surround them (e.g. gold, which is the tejas atom with the earth atoms as the surrounding upastambhaka). Solutions (of earth substances in ap) are regarded as physical mixtures.

Udayana points out that the solar heat is the source of all the stores of heat required for chemical change. But there are differences in the modes of the action of heat; and the kind of contact with heat-corpuscles, or the kind of heat with chemical action which transforms colours, is supposed to differ from what transforms flavour or taste.

Heat and light rays are supposed to consist of indefinitely small particles which dart forth or radiate in all directions recti-lineally with inconceivable velocity. Heat may penetrate through the interatomic space as in the case of the conduction of heat, as when water boils in a pot put on the fire; in cases of transparency light rays penetrate through the inter-atomic spaces with pan-spanda of the nature of deflection or refraction (tiryag-gamana). In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound back—which explains reflection. Lastly heat may strike the atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform the physico-chemical characters of the atoms, and again recom-bine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable velocity, an operation which explains all cases of chemical combination 1 . Govardhana a later Nyaya writer says that paka means the combination of different kinds of heat. The heat that

dinyayena tayorvindse satiutpannapakajaihparatnaniibhirarambhat, na ca sukrasonita-paravidnunam kascidvisesah parlhivalvdvisesat....Pituh sukram matuh sonitam tayos sannipdtanantararn jathardnalasambandhdt sukra-sonitdrambhakesu paramdnusu purvarupddivina.se samanagunantarotpattern dvyanukddikramena kalalasarirotpattih tatrantahkaranapraveso...talra mdturd/idraraso matraya savikramate, adrstavasdttatra punarjathardnalasambandhat kalalarambhakaparamdnusu kriyavibhdgddinyayena kalalasarire naste samutpannapdkajaih kalaldrambhakafaramdnubhiradrstavasad upajatakriyairdhdraparamanubhih sa/ia sambhiiya sarirdntaramarabhyate." 1 See Dr Seal's Positive Sciences of the Hindus.

changes the colour of a fruit is different from that which generates or changes the taste. Even when the colour and taste remain the same a particular kind of heat may change the smell. When grass eaten by cows is broken up into atoms special kinds of heat-light rays change its old taste, colour, touch and smell into such forms as those that belong to milk 1 .

In the Nyaya-Vaisesika system all action of matter on matter is thus resolved into motion. Conscious activity (prayatna) is distinguished from all forms of motion as against the Samkhya doctrine which considered everything other than purusa (intelligence) to arise in the course of cosmic evolution and therefore to be subject to vibratory motion.

The Origin of Knowledge (Pramana).

The manner in which knowledge originates is one of the most favourite topics of discussion in Indian philosophy. We have already seen that Samkhya-Yoga explained it by supposing that the buddhi (place of consciousness) assumed the form of the object of perception, and that the buddhi so transformed was then intelligized by the reflection of the pure intelligence or purusa. The Jains regarded the origin of any knowledge as being due to a withdrawal of a veil of karma which was covering the all-intelligence of the self.

Nyaya-Vaisesika regarded all effects as being due to the assemblage of certain collocations which unconditionally, invariably, and immediately preceded these effects. That collocation (sftmagri) which produced knowlege involved certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements and through their conjoint action uncontradicted and determinate knowledge was produced, and this collocation is thus called pramana or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge 2 . None of the separate elements composing

1 Govardhana's Nydyabodhini on Tarkasamgraka, pp. 9, 10.

2 " Avyabhicdrinimasandigdhdrthopalabdhim vidadhati bodhdbodhasvabhdvd saina-gripramanam" Nydyamaiijari, p. 12. Udyotakara however defined "pramana" as upalabdhihetu (cause of knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: " siddhamindriyddi, asiddhafica tatsannikarsadi vyaparayannutpddayan karana eva caritarthah karnam tvindriyddi tatsannikarsadi vd nanyatra caritarthamiti sdksadnpalabdhdveva phale vydpriyate." Tdtparyatikd, p. 15. Thus it is the action of the senses as pramana which is the direct cause of the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken place without the

the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly. These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate cognition as qualification (visesana) in determinate perceptions, the knowledge of lihga in inference, the seeing of similar things in upamana, the hearing of sound in sabda) but also the assemblage of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception, capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations that is called pramana.

Nyaya argues that in the Samkhya view knowledge originates by the transcendent influence of purusa on a particular state of buddhi; this is quite unintelligible, for knowledge does not belong to buddhi as it is non-intelligent, though it contains within it the content and the form of the concept or the percept (knowledge). The purusa to whom the knowledge belongs, however, neither knows, nor feels, neither conceives nor perceives, as it always remains in its own transcendental purity. If the transcendental contact of the purusa with buddhi is but a mere semblance or appearance or illusion, then the Samkhya has to admit that there is no real knowledge according to them. All knowledge is false. And since all knowledge is false, the Samkhyists have precious little wherewith to explain the origin of right knowledge.

There are again some Buddhists who advocate the doctrine that simultaneously with the generation of an object there is the knowledge corresponding to it, and that corresponding to the rise of any knowledge there is the rise of the object of it. Neither is the knowledge generated by the object nor the object by the knowledge; but there is a sort of simultaneous parallelism. It is evident that this view does not explain why knowledge should

subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as causes in some sense. " Pramatr-prameyayoh pramane caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya lasmat tadeva pha-lahetuh. Pramatrprameye tuphaloddesena pravrlle iti taddhelu kalhancit." Ibid.p. id.

express or manifest its object. If knowledge and the object are both but corresponding points in a parallel series, whence comes this correspondence? Why should knowledge illuminate the object. The doctrine of the Vijnana vadins, that it is knowledge alone that shows itself both as knowledge and as its object, is also irrational, for how can knowledge divide itself as subject and object in such a manner that knowledge as object should require the knowledge as subject to illuminate it ? If this be the case we might again expect that knowledge as knowledge should also require another knowledge to manifest it and this another, and so on ad infinitum. Again if pramana be defined asfirdfiana (capacity of being realized) then also it would not hold, for all things being momentary according to the Buddhists, the thing known cannot be realized, so there would be nothing which could be called pramana. These views moreover do not explain the origin of knowledge. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as an effect like any other effect, and its origin or production occurs in the same way as any other effect, namely by the joint collocation of causes intellectual and physical 1 . There is no transcendent element involved in the production of knowledge, but it is a production on the same plane as that in which many physical phenomena are produced 2 .

The four Pramanas of Nyaya.

We know that the Carvakas admitted perception {pratyaksa) alone as the valid source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vaisesika admitted two sources, pratyaksa and inference (anu-manriy. Samkhya added sabda (testimony) as the third source;

1 See Nyayamafijari, pp. 12-26.

2 Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Gaftgesa, a later naiyayika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. Taltvacinlamani, K. Tarkavagisa's edition, Pramanyavada.

3 The Vattesika stitras tacitly admit the Vedas as a pramana. The view that Vaisesika only admitted two pramanas, perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, " 'pratyaksamekamcarvakah kanadasngalau punak anumdnanca taccapi, etc." Prasastapada divides all cognition (buddhi) as vidya (right knowledge) and avidya (ignorance). Under avidya he counts sandaya (doubt or uncertainty), viparyaya (illusion or error), anadkyavasaya (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and svapna (dream). Right knowledge (vidya) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (drsa). Interpreting the Vaiiesika siitras I. i. 3,

Nyaya adds a fourth, upamana (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of pramanas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or sabda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and sabda are different pramanas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of sabda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different pramanas 1 .

Perception (Pratyaksa).

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasa, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The conative senses (yak,pdni,pdda,payu, and upasthd) recognized in Samkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

vi. i. 1, and vi. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. Artkapatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamana (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.

1 Samagribhedat phalabhedacca pramanabhedah

Anye eva hi samagrlphale pratyaksalingayoh Anye eva ca satnagrlphale sabdopamanayoh. Nyayamaiijarl, p. 33.

as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and determinate 1 . If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge {sabda-pramdna). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate {nirvikalpa) and (savikalpa) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyaksa. If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (i) contact with the dravya (thing) called samyoga, (2) contact with the gunas (qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samavdyd) in which they inhere in samavaya (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the gunas (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities,e.g.colourness (rupatva), which inhere in the gunas in the samavaya relation.

1 Gange&i, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness {pratyaksasya saksatkaritvam lakmnam).

This species of contact is called samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is akasa and the sound exists in akasa in the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (sabdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (abhdvd) is perceived, namely samyukta visesana (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty space which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation. Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented). The most important thing about the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory oi" perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed arthaprakdsa, revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well. The senses according to Nyaya-Vaisesika are material and wehave seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental {atlndriyd) power {sakti) than that of actual vibratory

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition 1 . The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals associated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called alocana-jhdna (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character (sukhasddhanatvasmrti) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character 2 . It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in association with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process. Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals associated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess (atasmimstaditi) and right knowledge (pramd) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has

1 Na khalvatlndriya Saktirasmabhirupagamyate yayd saha na karyyasya savibandhajnanasambhavah.

Nyayamanjarl, p. 69.

2 Sukhadi manasa buddhva kapitthadi ca caksusa tasya karanata tatra manasaivavagamyate...

.. .Sambandhagrahanakale yattatkapitthadivisayamaksajam jfianam tadupddeyadijndnaphalamiti bhasyakrtahetasi sthitam sukhasadhanatvaJHanamupadeyajiianam.

Nyayamanjarl, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.

viii] Nature of Illusion t>2>7

(tadvati tatprakdrakanubhavriy. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is associated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream 2 . Jayanta observes that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by illusion 3 . In the case of mental delusions however there is no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions 4 . This doctrine of illusion is known as viparitakhydti or anyathdkhydti. What existed in the mind appeared as the object before us (hrdaye parisphuratdrthasya bahiravabhdsanam) 5 . Later Vaisesika as interpreted by Prasastapada and Srldhara is in full agreement with Nyaya in this doctrine of illusion (bhrama or as Vaisesika calls it viparyayd) that the object of illusion is always the right thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics 6 .

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two classes as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this avikalpikaox ?iir-vikalpika stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness associated with it, but it does not reveal

1 See Udyotakara's Nydyavarttika, p. 37, and Ganger's Tattvacintamani, p. 401, Bibliotheca Indica.

2 " Indriye?idlocya marlcln uccavacamuccalato nirvikalpena grhitva pafcattatro-paghatadosat viparyyeti, savikalpake'sya pratyayo bhranto jayate tasrnddvijfidnasya vvabhicaro narthasya, Vacaspati's Tatparyatika" p. 87.

3 Nyayamanjarl, p. 88. 4 Ibid. pp. 89 and 184. 5 Ibid. p. 184.

6 Nyayakandali, pp. 177-181, " Suktisamyuktenendriyena dosasahakarina i-ajata-samskarasacivena sadrsyamanurimdhata suktikavisayo rajatadhyavasayah krtah."

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (jdtyddisvarupdvagdki na tn jdtyddindm mitho visesana-visesyabhdvavagdhitiyavaty. He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage 2 . Sridhara, in explaining the Vaisesika view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vacaspati. Thus Sridhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this," which can only take place at the savikalpa stage 3 . Vacaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in association with names. The later Nyaya writers however, following Garigesa, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any association with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers. But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

1 Tdtparyatika, p. 82, also ibid. p. 91, " prathamamalocitd'rthah samanyaviSesa-van."

2 Ibid. p. 84, " tasmddvyutpannasydpi ndmadheyasmaranaya purvamesitavyo vi-tiaiva ndmadkeyatnart/iapratyayak."

3 Nydyakandall, p. 189 ff., "atah savikalpakamicchatd nirvikalpakamapyesitavyam, tacca na sdmdnyamatram grhnati bhedasyapi pratibhasanat ndpi svalaksanamatram samanyakarasyapi samvedandt vyaktyantaradarfane pratisandhdndcca, kintu sdmdn-ya/n viSesaflcobhayamapi grhnati yadi paramidatn sdmdnyamayam viSesah ityevam vivicya na pratyeti vastvantardnusandhanavirahdl, pinddntardnuvi-ttigrahandddhi sdmdnyavi vivicyate, vydvrttigrahanadvtiesoyamiti vivekah."

not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate {visistavaisistyajhdnam prati hi visesa?iatdvacchedakaprakdram jndnam kdranam) 1 . So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations (jdtyadiyo-jandrahitavi vaisistydnavagdhi nisprakarakam iiirvikalpakam) 2 . But this stage is never psychologically experienced (atlndriyd) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Visvanatha says in his Siddhanta-muktavall, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality {visesanatdvacchedakd) of the predicate 'jug' which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content 3 ." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is associated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyaya and Vai-sesika admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with class-characters or universal and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jati (universal),guna (quality),

1 Tattvacintamani, p. 812. 2 Ibid. p. 809.

3 Siddhanta?nnktavali on Bhasdpariccheda karika, 58.

kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things 1 . The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical entity. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyaya and Vaisesika believe jati, guna and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not associated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the association. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only associated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the association of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reascn why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this identity is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions (samskard) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

1 Nydyamanjari, pp. 93-100, "Pama caite kalpaua bhavanti jatikalpana, gunakal-pana, kriyakalpana, namakalpaiid dravyakalpana ceti, taka kvacidabhedepi bhedakal-panat kvacicca bhecWpyabhedakalpanat kalpand ucyante." See Dharmaklrtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4. See also pp. 409-410 of this book.

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vacaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists 1 . It is easy to see that early Nyaya-Vaisesika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called sdmdnyalaksana, jnanalaksana and yogaja (miraculous). The contact samanyalak-sana is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally {alaukika) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal associated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. Jnanalaksana contact is that by virtue of which we can associate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact {alaukika sannikarsd) by virtue of which this is rendered

1 TatparyatTka, pp. 88-95.

possible is called jnanalaksana. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception 1 .

Pleasures and pains {sukha and duhkha) are held by Nyaya to be different from knowledge (jiiana). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was associated with sukha and in another case with duhkha. This shows that sukha and duhkha are not themselves knowledge. Such is the course of things that sukha and duhkha are generated by the collocation of certain conditions,and are manifested through or in association with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the pratyaksa of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"

1 Siddhantamuktavali on Karika 63 and 64. We must remember that Gangesa discarded the definition of perception as given in the Nyaya sutra which we have discussed above, and held that perception should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle {Tattvacintamani, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by Udyotakara as mentioned above.

and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhana-jnana, which is also to be regarded as a pratyaksa directly by the mind. This is of course different from the other form of perception called manasa-pratyaksa, by which memories of past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept visualized at the present moment; thus we see a rose and perceive that it is fragrant; the fragrance is not perceived by the eye, but the manas perceives it directly and associates the visual percept with it. According to Vedanta this acquired perception is only a case of inference. The pratibha-pratyaksa however is that which is with reference to the happening of a future event. When a cognition is produced, it is produced only as an objective cognition, e.g. This is a pot, but after this it is again related to the self by the mind as " I know this pot." This is effected by the mind again coming in contact for reperception of the cognition which had already been generated in the soul. This second reperception is called anuvyavasaya, and all practical work can proceed as a result of this anuvyavasaya 1 .

Inference.

Inference (annmand) is the second means of proof (pramana) and the most valuable contribution that Nyaya has made has been on this subject. It consists in making an assertion about a thing on the strength of the mark or liriga which is associated with it, as when finding smoke rising from a hill we remember that since smoke cannot be without fire, there must also be fire in yonder hill. In an example like this smoke is technically called liriga, or hetu. That about which the assertion has been made (the hill in this example) is called paksa, and the term "fire" is called sadhya. To make a correct inference it is necessary that the hetu or liriga must be present in the paksa,

1 This later Nyaya doctrine that the cognition of self in association with cognition is produced at a later moment must be contrasted with the tnputlpratyaksa doctrine of Prabhakara, which holds that the object, knower and knowledge are all given simultaneously in knowledge. Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), according to Garigesa, gives us only the cognition of the object, but the cognition that I am aware of this object or cognition is a different functioning succeeding the former one and is called anu (after) vyavasaya (cognition), "idamaham janamiti vyavasaye na bhasate tad-bodhakendriyasannikarsabhavat kintvidamvisayakajndnatvaviHstasya jnanasya vai-Hstyamatmani bhasate; na ca svaprakaie vyavasaye tddriam svasya vaiHstyam bha-siliiinarhati,purvamvis'esanasyatasyajMnatJasmadidatnaha>njananiitinavyavasayah

kintu anuvyavasayah." Tattvacintamant , p. 795.

and in all other known objects similar to the paksa in having the sadhya in it (sapaksa-satta), i.e., which are known to possess the sadhya (possessing fire in the present example). The linga must not be present in any such object as does not possess the sadhya (vipaksa-vyavrtti absent from vipaksa or that which does not possess the sadhya). The inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception {pratyaksa) or the testimony of the sastra {abadhita-visayatva). The linga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be possible {asat-pratipaksa). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvabhasa or seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the paksa) does not possess 1 . This hetvabhasa is technically called asiddha-hetu. Again, hetvabhasa of the second type, technically called viruddha-hetn, may be exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu " being created " is present in the opposite of sadhya {vipaksa), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called anaikantika-hetu, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since it is an object of knowledge. Now " being an object of knowledge " {prameyatva) is here the hetu, but it is present in things eternal (i.e. things possessing sadhya), as well as in things that are not eternal (i.e. which do not possess the sadhya), and therefore the concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya is not absolute (anaikantikd). A fallacy of the fourth type, technically called kaldtyaydpadista, may be found in the example—fire is not hot, since it is created like a jug, etc. Here pratyaksa shows that fire is hot, and hence the hetu is fallacious. The fifth fallacy, called prakaranasama, is to be found in cases where opposite hetus are available at the same time for opposite conclusions, e.g. sound like a jug is non-

1 It should be borne in mind that Nyaya did not believe in the doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Miniamsa did. Eternality of sound meant with Mlmamsa the theory that sounds existed as eternal indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of movement of the vocal muscles.

eternal, since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like akasa is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity of nature in two relations, viz. tadatmya (essential identity) and tadntpatti (succession in a relation of cause and effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not of causation ; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity {tadatmya). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the liriga or hetu (the concomitance of which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential identity, but to the invariable association of the liriga (mark) with the lirigin (the possessor of linga), otherwise called niyama. The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect) is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the linga with the lingin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted above, is what leads us to make a valid inference 1 .

We perceived in many cases that a liriga (e.g. smoke) was associated with a lingin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

1 See Nyayamanjarl on anumana.

that wherever theie was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered the concomitance {yyapti) of smoke and fire which we had observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill, which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the liriga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its concomitance with fire (trtiya-lihga-paramarsd) is thus the cause (anumitikarana or anumana) of the inference (anumiti). The concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called vyapti. When this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with those having fire, it is called bahirvyapti; and when it refers to the conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was observed, it is called antarvyapti. The Buddhists since they did not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference 1 .

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetii) with the signate (sadhya), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (vydp-tigrahd) had been correct, and the observation of concomitance had been valid. The Mlmamsa school held, as we shall see in the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke, i.e. not only every case of the existence of smoke should be a case of the existence of fire, but every case of absence of fire should be a case of absence of smoke. The former is technically called anvayavyapti and the latter vyatirekavyapti. But even this is not enough. Thus there may have been an ass sitting, in a hundred cases where I had seen smoke, and there might have been a hundred cases where there was neither ass nor smoke, but it cannot be asserted from it that there is any relation of concomi-

1 See Antarvyaptisamarthana, by Ratnakara&inti in the Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, Bibliotheca Indica, 1910.

tance, or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of smoke {yasmm sati bhavanam yato vind na bhavanam iti bhuyodarsanani, Nyayainafijari, p. 122), then only could we say that there was any relation of concomitance {yydpti) between the ass and the smoke 1 . But of course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a real hetu, and there might be some other condition (upadhi) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus we know that fire in green wood {ardrendhana) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with (vyaghata). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of vyapti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration 2 . The Buddhists and the naiyayikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vyapti {vydptigraha), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyaya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A natural fixed order that certain things happening other things would happen could certainly exist, even without the supposition of an identity of essence.

But sometimes it happens that different kinds of causes often have the same kind of effect, and in such cases it is difficult to

1 See Tatparyatlka on anumana and vyaptigraha.

2 Tatparyatlka on vyaptigraha, anil Tattvacintamani of Gange^a on vyaptigraha.

infer the particular cause from the effect. Nyaya holds however that though different causes are often found to produce the same effect, yet there must be some difference between one effect and another. If each effect is taken by itself with its other attendant circumstances and peculiarities, it will be found that it may then be possible to distinguish it from similar other effects. Thus a flood in the street may be due either to a heavy downpour of rain immediately before, or to the rise in the water of the river close by, but if observed carefully the flooding of the street due to rain will be found to have such special traits that it could be distinguished from a similar flooding due to the rise of water in the river. Thus from the flooding of the street of a special type, as demonstrated by its other attendant circumstances, the special manner in which the water flows by small rivulets or in sheets, will enable us to infer that the flood was due to rains and not to the rise of water in the river. Thus we see that Nyaya relied on empirical induction based on uniform and uninterrupted agreement in nature, whereas the Buddhists assumed a priori principles of causality or identity of essence. It may not be out of place here to mention that in later Nyaya works great emphasis is laid on the necessity of getting ourselves assured that there was no such upadhi (condition) associated with the hetu on account of which the concomitance happened, but that the hetu was unconditionally associated with the sadhya in a relation of inseparable concomitance. Thus all fire does not produce smoke; fire must be associated with green wood in order to produce smoke. Green wood is thus the necessary condition {upadhi) without which no smoke could be produced. It is on account of this condition that fire is associated with smoke; and so we cannot say that there is smoke because there is fire. But in the concomitance of smoke with fire there is no condition, and so in every case of smoke there is fire. In order to be assured of the validity of vyapti, it is necessary that we must be assured that there should be nothing associated with the hetu which conditioned the concomitance, and this must be settled by wide experience (bhuyodarsand).

Prasastapada in defining inference as the "knowledge of that (e.g. fire) associated with the reason (e.g. smoke) by the sight of the reason" described a valid reason (lingo) as that which is connected with the object of inference (anumeya) and which exists wherever the object of inference exists and is absent in all cases

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyaya qualifications of paksasattva, sapaksasattva and vipaksasattva of a valid reason (hetu). Prasastapada further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what Kasyapa (believed to be the family name of Kanada) said. Kanada says that we can infer a cause from the effect, the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or in a relation of inherence (ix. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated (prasiddhipur-vakatva) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Kanada can also be understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it {aprasiddhd) or it has a doubtful existence (sandigdhd). Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has horns it is fallacious, for neither the horse nor the ass has horns. Again if I say it is a cow because it has horns, it is fallacious, for there is no concomitance between horns and a cow, and though a cow may have a horn, all that have horns are not cows. The first fallacy is a combination of paksasattva and sapaksasattva, for not only the present paksa (the ass) had no horns, but no horses had any horns, and the second is a case of vipaksasattva, for those which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus, it seems that when Prasastapada says that he is giving us the view of Kanada he is faithful to it. Prasastapada says that wherever there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke. When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that there is fire. But with regard to Kanada's enumeration of types of inference such as " a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect from the cause," etc., Prasastapada holds that these are not the only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides inference into two classes, drsta (from the experienced characteristics of one member of a class to another member of the same class), and samanyato drsta. Drsta (perceived resemblance) is that where the previously known case and the inferred case is exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of flesh on its neck (sasna), I can whenever I see the same hanging

mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato drsta. Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests, namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of heaven). When the conclusion to which one has arrived {svani-scitarthd) is expressed in five premisses for convincing others who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinction of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana (inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists. Prasastapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an entirely new innovation of Prasastapada, for in IX. 2, Kanada himself definitely alludes to this distinction (asyedam karyyakdra-nasambandhascdvayavddbhavati). The five premisses which are called in Nyaya pratijna, hetn drstanta, iipanaya, and nigamana are called in Vaisesika. pratifnd, apadesa, nidarsana, anusandndna, and pratyamnaya. Kanada however does not mention the name of any of these premisses excepting the second " apadesa." Pratijna is of course the same as we have in Nyaya, and the term nidarsana is very similar to Nyaya drstanta, but the last two are entirely different. Nidarsana may be of two kinds, (1) agreement in presence (e.g. that which has motion is a substance as is seen in the case of an arrow), (2) agreement in absence (e.g. what is not a substance has no motion as is seen in the case of the universal being 1 ). He also points out cases of the fallacy of the example

1 Dr Vidyabhiisana says that "An example before the time of Dignaga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g. The hill is fiery; because it has smoke; like a kitchen (example). Asahga made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignaga converted it into a universal proposition, that is a proposition expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, e.g. The hill is fiery ; because it has smoke ; all that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen" (Indian Logic, pp. 95, 96). It is of course true that Vatsyayana had an imperfect example as " like a kitchen " (fabdah titpattidharmakatvadanityah sthalyadivat, I. i. 36), but Prasastapada has it in the proper form. Whether Prasastapada borrowed it from Dirinaga or Diiinaga from Prasastapada cannot be easily settled.

(iiidarsandbhasd). Prasastapada's contribution thus seems to consist of the enumeration of the five premisses and the fallacy of the nidarsana, but the names of the last two premisses are so different from what are current in other systems that it is reasonable to suppose that he collected them from some other traditional Vaisesika work which is now lost to us. It however definitely indicates that the study of the problem of inference was being pursued in Vaisesika circles independently of Nyaya. There is no reason however to suppose that Prasastapada borrowed anything from Dirinaga as Professor Stcherbatsky or Keith supposes, for, as I have shown above, most of Prasastapada's apparent innovations are all definitely alluded to by Kanada himself, and Professor Keith has not discussed this alternative. On the question of the fallacies of nidarsana, unless it is definitely proved that Dirinaga preceded Prasastapada, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the latter borrowed it from the former 1 .

The nature and ascertainment of concomitance is the most important part of inference. Vatsyayana says that an inference can be made by the sight of the linga (reason or middle) through the memory of the connection between the middle and the major previously perceived. Udyotakara raises the question whether it is the present perception of the middle or the memory of the connection of the middle with the major that should be regarded as leading to inference. His answer is that both these lead to inference, but that which immediately leads to inference is liiiga-paramarsa, i.e. the present perception of the middle in the minor associated with the memory of its connection with the major, for inference does not immediately follow the memory of the connection, but the present perception of the middle associated with the memory of the connection (smrtyanugrhito lihgapardmarsd). But he is silent with regard to the nature of concomitance. Udyotakara's criticisms of Dirinaga as shown by Vacaspati have no reference to this point. The doctrine of tdddtmya and tadut-patti was therefore in all probability a new contribution to Buddhist logic by Dharmaklrtti. Dharmaklrtti's contention was that the root principle of the connection between the middle and the major was that the former was either identical in essence with the latter or its effect and that unless this was grasped a mere collection of positive or negative instances will not give us

1 Prasastapada's bhasya with Nyayakandall, pp. 200-255.

the desired connection 1 . Vacaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot be determined as a separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless it can be ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a preceding time and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of yesterday morning). In the case of identity of essence {tdddtmya as in the case of the pine and the tree) also there cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke) are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there may always be certain unknown conditions which may vitiate the validity of inference. To this Vacaspati's answer is that if even after observing a large number of cases and careful search such conditions (upddhi) cannot be discovered, we have to take it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural connection between the middle and the major. The later Buddhists introduced the method of Pahcakdranl in order to determine effectively the causal relation. These five conditions determining the causal relation are (i) neither the cause nor the effect is perceived, (2) the cause is perceived, (3) in immediate succession the effect is perceived, (4) the cause disappears, (5) in

1 Karyyakaranabhavadva svabhtivadva niyiimakat avinabhavaiiiyanu? darsananna na darfanat. Tatparyatika> p. 105.

immediate succession the effect disappears. But this method cannot guarantee the infallibility of the determination of cause and effect relation ; and if by the assumption of a cause-effect relation no higher degree of certainty is available, it is better to accept a natural relation without limiting it to a cause-effect relation 1 .

In early Nyaya books three kinds of inference are described, namely purvavat, sesavat, and samanyato-drsta. Purvavat is the inference of effects from causes, e.g. that of impending rain from heavy dark clouds; sesavat is the inference of causes from effects, e.g. that of rain from the rise of water in the river; samanyato-drsta refers to the inference in all cases other than those of cause and effect, e.g. the inference of the sour taste of the tamarind from its form and colour. Nydyamaiijari mentions another form of anumana, namely parisesamana (reductio ad absurdum), which consists in asserting anything (e.g. consciousness) of any other thing (e.g. atman), because it was already definitely found out that consciousness was not produced in any other part of man. Since consciousness could not belong to anything else, it must belong to soul of necessity. In spite of these variant forms they are all however of one kind, namely that of the inference of the probandum (sdd/iya) by virtue of the unconditional and invariable concomitance of the hetu, called the vyapti-niyama. In the new school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya) a formal distinction of three kinds of inference occupies an important place, namely anvayavyatireki, kevalanvayi, and kevalavyatireki. Anvayavyatireki is that inference where the vyapti has been observed by a combination of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and agreement in absence, as in the case of the concomitance of smoke and fire (wherever there is smoke there is fire (anvaya), and where there is no fire, there is no smoke {vyatireka)). An inference could be for one's own self (svarthaniimand) or for the sake of convincing others {pardrthdnumd?ia). In the latter case, when it was necessary that an inference should be put explicitly in an unambiguous manner, five propositions (avayavas) were regarded as necessary, namely pratijfia (e.g. the hill is fiery), hetu (since it has smoke), uda-harana (where there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen), upanaya (this hill has smoke), nigamana (therefore it has got

1 Vatsyayana's bhasya, Udyotakara's Varttika and Tatparyyatika, I. i. 5.

fire). Kevalanvayi is that type of inference, the vyapti of which could not be based on any negative instance, as in the case " this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge (idcMy, vdcyam prameyatvdt)." Now no such case is known which is not an object of knowledge ; we cannot therefore know of any case where there was no object of knowledge (prameyatva) and no name (vacyatva) ; the vyapti here has therefore to be based necessarily on cases of agreement—wherever there is prame-yatva or an object of knowledge, there is vacyatva or name. The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our inference—earth differs from other elements, since it has the special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.

Upamana and Sabda.

The third pramana, which is admitted by Nyaya and not by Vaisesika, is upamana, and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never seen a wild ox {gavaya) goes to the forest, asks a forester— " what is gavaya ? " and the forester replies—" oh, you do not know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya. This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its similarity to a known thing is called upamana. If some forester had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would have been due to testimony (sabda-pramana). The knowledge is said to be generated by the upamana process when the association of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown animal to a known one. The naiyayikas are thorough realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is called upamana*.

Sabda-pramana or testimony is the right knowledge which we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the Vedas were uttered by Tsvara himself. The Vedas give us right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the utterances of the infallible Tsvara. The Vaisesikas did not admit sabda as a separate pramana, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony {sabda) on the strength of inference (anu-viiti) on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly corroborated by the Vaisesika sutras, which tacitly admit the validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this was how Vaisesika was interpreted in later times.

Negation in Nyaya-Vaisesika. The problem of negation or non-existence {abhavd) is of great interest in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumarila 2

1 See NyayamahjarI on upamana. The oldest Nyaya view was that the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association of the name " wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself "upamana." When Prasastapada held that upamana should be treated as a case of testimony (dftavacana), he had probably this interpretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vacaspati hold that it was not by the instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name " wild ox " was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead us to this association called upamana. What Vatsyayana meant is not very clear, but Dirinaga supposes that according to him the result of upamana was the knowledge of similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vacaspati of course holds that he has correctly interpreted Vatsyayana's intention. It is however definite that upamana means the associating of a name to a new object (samakhyasambandhapratipattirupama-ndrthah, Vatsyayana). Jayanta points out that it is the preception of similarity which directly leads to the association of the name and hence the instruction of the forester cannot be regarded as the direct cause and consequently it cannot be classed under testimony (Jabda). See Prasastapada and Nyayakandali, pp. 220-22, Vatsyayana, Udyotakara, Vacaspati and Jayanta on Upamana.

- See Kumarila's treatment of abhava in the Slokavdrttika, pp. 473-492.

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the next chapter, hold that negation {abJiavd) appears as an intuition (indnani) with reference to the object negated where there are no means of ordinary cognition (pramand) leading to prove the existence {satpai'icchedakcwi) of that thing. They held that the notion "it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the nonexistence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even without perceiving the place and without any operation of the memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could be regarded as a reason {linga), for the non-perception of the jug is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty about the notion of non-existence (cibhava) which was sought to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process of knowledge. Nyaya however says that the perception of non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of nonexistence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (abhavci) can thus, according to Nyaya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," as position (bJiava) is what generates the cognition "it is."

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think that negation could thus be associated with them in any relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its pratiyogi (thing negated—e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the relation of opposition {virodhd), for we could have admitted it, if

the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) svabhavanupalabdhi (natural non-perception— there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) karananupalabdhi (non-perception of cause—there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyapakanupalabdhi (non-perception of the species— there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) karyanupalabdhi (non-perception of effects—there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi (perception of contradictory natures—there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakaryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects—there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virud-dhavyaptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance—past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) karyyavi-ruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects—there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopa-labdhi (opposite concomitants—there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) karanaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes— there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) karanaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes— this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke 1 ).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (heturnabhavasamvidali). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (yogyata) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyata is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

1 See Nyayabitidn, p. n, and Nyayamafijarl, pp. 53-7.

leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (anupalambhah abhavam vyavahdrayati) 1 .

The Nyaya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (visesya visesand). The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not. The Vaisesika sutra (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhava in a similar way as Kumarila the Mlmamsist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away 2 . In Vaisesika the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) pragabhdva (the negation preceding the production of an object—e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2) dhvamsdbhdva (the negation following the destruction of an object—as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) anyonyabhava (mutual negation—e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

1 See Nyayabindutlka, pp. 34 ff., and also Nyayamaiijarl, pp. 48-63.

2 Prasastapada says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence. Sridhara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign {lingo) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (bhavavad abhavo'pindriyagra-hanayogyah) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence {abtevendriyasannikarso'pi abha-vagrahanasamagrl), Nyayakandali, pp. 225-30.

in the horse that of the cow); (4) atyantdbhava (a negation which always exists—e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed) 1 .

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, niruaya, vdda, jalpa, vitandd, hetvabhasa, chala, jdti and n igrahasthdna.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions ; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (samsaya) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nirnaya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an atman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a vdda. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called a vitanda when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvabhasas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. Nyaya sutras enumerate five fallacies (Jictvdbhdsas) of the middle (hetu): savyabJiicara (erratic), viruddha (contradictory), prakaranasama (tautology), sddhyasama (unproved reason) and kdlatlta (inopportune). Savyabhicara is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakaranasama is that

1 The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.

where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form {e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of eternality); sadhyasama is that where the reason itself requires to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not) ; kalatlta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. The later Nyaya works divide savyabhicara into three classes, (1) sadharana or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) asadharana or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound ; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasamharin or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn). The fallacy satpratipaksa is that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy asiddha (unreal) is of three kinds (1) dsrayasiddha (the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2) svarupasiddha (sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) ztydpyatvdsiddha is that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated with smoke. The fallacy bddhita is that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by Vaisesika. Contrary to Nyaya practice

62 The Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy [ch.

Prasastapada counts the fallacies of the example. Dirinaga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms ; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmaklrtti counted also the fallacies of the paksa (minor) ; but Nyaya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jati consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthana means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the attainment of moksa should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyaya sutra as being necessary for the attainment of salvation 1 .

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Carvakas called Susiksita Carvakas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. The naiyayikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

1 See Nyityamaiijari, pp. 586-659, and Tarkikaraksa of Varadaraja and Nis-kantaka of Mallinatha, pp. 185 ff.

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyaya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of Mlmamsa, for Nyaya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of atman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (vibhii), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though atman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations 1 .

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.

Isvara and Salvation.

Nyaya seeks to establish the existence of Isvara on the

basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Samkhya and

the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Isvara and

offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyaya wanted to refute

these and prove the existence of Isvara by an inference of the

samanyato-drsta type.

1 Jnanasamavayanibandhanamevatmanaketayitrtvam, &c. See Nyayamaiijarl, pp. 432 ff.

The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyaya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a difference between the order and arrangement of human productions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; and therefore from the order and arrangement(sanmvesa-visz'statd) of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyaya answers that the concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement" in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with specific cases of " order and arrangement," for each specific case may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and arrangement" in general with " the existence of a creator," and thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be different from the order and arrangement of things produced by man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

so Isvara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in the external world, so Isvara also can by his will create the universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any association of body with Isvara is indispensable for our conception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements are produced in the atoms 1 .

The naiyayikas in common with most other systems of Indian philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (sarvam duhkham vivekinali) ; the wise therefore is never attached to the so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge {inithyd-jiiand) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padarthas and as Nyaya says, of the proofs (pramd/ia), the objects of knowledge {prameya), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite {pratipaksa-bhdvana), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called dosa, cf. the klesa of Patanjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions {pravrtli) for the

1 See Nyayamafijari, pp. 190-204, I&vara7iumana of Raghunatha Siromani and Udayana's Kustimanjall.

fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyaya-Vaisesika is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness (anandd), though really speaking the state of mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. 1 .

1 Nyayamatijari, pp. 499-533.

CHAPTER IX

MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY 1

A Comparative Review.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy looked at experience from a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our common sense experience should be considered as coming out of an original universal (e.g. prakrti of the Samkhya). Space, time, the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many entities which have distinct and separate existence but which manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in substances. Knowledge (Jhdnd) which illuminates all things is regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and the objects of sense, knowledge (Jhdnd) is produced. Soul with Nyaya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc. inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action, class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as without it the different entities being without any principle of relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction. Samkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances, qualities, actions, etc. No difference was acknowledged to exist between substances, qualities and actions, and it was conceived

that these were but so many aspects of a combination of the three types of reals in different proportions. The reals contained within them the rudiments of all developments of matter, knowledge, willing, feelings, etc. As combinations of reals changed incessantly and new phenomena of matter and mind were manifested, collocations did not bring about any new thing but brought about a phenomenon which was already there in its causes in another form. What we call knowledge or thought ordinarily, is with them merely a form of subtle illuminating matter-stuff. Samkhya holds however that there is a transcendent entity as pure consciousness and that by some kind of transcendent reflection or contact this pure consciousness transforms the bare translucent thought-matter into conscious thought or experience of a person.

But this hypothesis of a pure self, as essentially distinct and separate from knowledge as ordinarily understood, can hardly be demonstrated in our common sense experience; and this has been pointed out by the Nyaya school in a very strong and emphatic manner. Even Samkhya did not try to prove that the existence of its transcendent purusa could be demonstrated in experience, and it had to attempt to support its hypothesis of the existence of a transcendent self on the ground of the need of a permanent entity as a fixed object, to which the passing states of knowledge could cling, and on grounds of moral struggle towards virtue and emancipation. Samkhya had first supposed knowledge to be merely a combination of changing reals, and then had as a matter of necessity to admit a fixed principle as purusa (pure transcendent consciousness). The self is thus here in some sense an object of inference to fill up the gap left by the inadequate analysis of consciousness {buddhi) as being non-intelligent and incessantly changing.

Nyaya fared no better, for it also had to demonstrate self on the ground that since knowledge existed it was a quality, and therefore must inhere in some substance. This hypothesis is again based upon another uncritical assumption that substances and attributes were entirely separate, and that it was the nature of the latter to inhere in the former, and also that knowledge was a quality requiring (similarly with other attributes) a substance in which to inhere. None of them could take their stand upon the self-conscious nature of our ordinary thought and draw their conclusions on the strength of the direct evidence of this self-

conscious thought. Of course it is true that Samkhya had approached nearer to this view than Nyaya, but it had separated the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift—a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties occurred because Samkhya soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense experience. The Nyaya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the Mimamsa system. The Mimatnsd sutras were written by Jaimini and the commentary (bhdsyd) on it was written by Sahara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made by Kumarila, who preceded the great Sarikaracarya, and a disciple of Kumarila, Prabhakara.

The Mimamsa Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the Brahmanas. This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations passed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

had it, and this it seems gave rise to the smrti literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of Mimamsa (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's Mimamsa siitras (which are with us the foundations of Mlmamsa)are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's Mimamsa sutras were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work of the Mimamsa system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as Bhartrmitra (alluded to in Nyayaratndkara verse 10 of Slokavarttika), Bhavadasa (Pratijnasutra 63), Hari and Upavarsa (mentioned in Sastradipikd). It is probable that at least some of these preceded Sabara, the writer of the famous commentary known as the Sabara-bhasya. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr Gariganatha Jha would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of King Vikramaditya as being the son of Sabarasvamin by a Ksattriya wife. This bhasya of Sabara is the basis of the later Mimamsa works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Varttikakara by Prabhakara and merely referred to as " yathahuh " (as they say) by Kumarila. Dr Gahganatha Jha says that Prabhakara's commentary Brhati on the Sabara-bhasya was based upon the work of this Varttikakara. This Brhati of Prabhakara had another commentary on it— Rjuvimala by Salikanatha Misra, who also wrote a compendium on the Prabhakara interpretation of Mimamsa called Prakaranapancika. Tradition says that Prabhakara (often referred to as Nibandhakara), whose views are often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of Kumarila. Kumarila Bhatta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of Sarikara (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

exposition of Sahara's bhasya in three parts known as Sloka-vdrttika (dealing only with the philosophical portion of Sahara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapada), Tantravarttika (dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and Tuptika (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books) 1 . Kumarila is referred to by his later followers as Bhatta, Bhatta-pada, and Varttikakara. The next great Mimamsa scholar and follower of Kumarila was Mandana Misra, the author of Vidhi-viveka, Mimamsanukramani and the commentator of Tantra-vdrttika,-wh.o became later on converted by Sarikara to Vedantism. Parthasarathi Misra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his Sdstradi-pikd, Tantraratna, and Nydyaratnamdld following the footprints of Kumarila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumarila, the names of Sucarita Misra the author of Kasikd and Somesvara the author of Nydyasudhd deserve special notice. Ramakrsna Bhatta wrote an excellent commentary on the Tarkapada of Sds-tradlpikd called the Yiiktisnehapurani-siddhdnta-candrikd and Somanatha wrote his Mayukhamalikd on the remaining chapters of Sastradlpikd. Other important current Mimamsa works which deserve notice are such as Nyayamdlavistara of Madhava, Subo-dhinl, Mimdmsabdlaprakdsa of Sarikara Bhatta, Nydyakanikd of Vacaspati Misra, Mimdmsdparibhdsa by Krsnayajvan, Mimamsa-nydyaprakdsa by Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta's Bhattacintdmani y etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the Mimamsa literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the smrti literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained by them. The legal side of the smrtis consisting of inheritance, proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even under the British administration is explained according to the Mimamsa maxims. Its relations to the Vedanta philosophy will be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with Nyaya-Vaisesika have also been pointed out in various places of this chapter. The views of the two schools of Mimamsa as propounded by Prabhakara and Kumarila on all the important topics have

1 Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada Sastri says, in his introduction to Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, that "Kumarila preceded Sankara by two generations."

also been pointed out. Prabhakara's views however could not win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that he was regarded by Kumarila as a very strong rival 1 . Hardly any new contribution has been made to the Mimamsa philosophy after Kumarila and Prabhakara. The Mimamsa sutras deal mostly with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of them. Sabara's contributions are also slight and vague. Varttikakara's views also can only be gathered from the references to them by Kumarila and Prabhakara. What we know of Mimamsa philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone. It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do not know of any work on Mimamsa written in English except the excellent one by Dr Ganganatha J ha on the Prabhakara Mimamsa to which I have frequently referred.

The Paratah-pramanya doctrine of Nyaya and the Svatah-pramanya doctrine of Mimamsa.

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-prdmanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering {smrti) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyaya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation. It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth ? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

1 There is a story that Kumarila, not being able to convert Prabhakara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to Kumarila's views or Prabhakara's. Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up Kumarila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumarila's views were the right ones. Kumarila then rose up and said that Prabhakara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.

it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation ? In other words, how can my perception " a blue thing " guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well ? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else. It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it {arthakriyd-jhdna or pJialajhdnd) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge (svatah-prdmdnyd), but validity is ascertained by samvdda or agreement with the objective facts of experience 1 .

It is easy to see that this Nyaya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

1 See Nydyamanjari, pp. 160-173.

only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity {svatah-prdmanya) of knowledge in its production (tttpatti). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well (svakaryakarane svatah pramanyam jnanasya). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work (pravrtti) according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid,and not in a passive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mlmamsa means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data {jnanasya pramanyam svatah apramanyavi paratali). Knowledge attained is proved invalid when later on a contradictory experience (badhakajnand) comes in or when our organs etc. are known to be faulty and defective (karanadosajndna). It is from these that knowledge appearing as valid is invalidated; when we take all necessary care to look for these and yet find them not, we must think that they do not exist. Thus the validity of knowledge certified at the moment of its production need not be doubted unnecessarily when even after enquiry we do not find any defect in sense or any contradiction in later experience. All knowledge except memory is thus regarded as valid independently by itself as a general rule, unless it is invalidated later on. Memory is excluded because the phenomenon of memory depends upon a previous experience, and its existing latent impressions, and cannot thus be regarded as arising independently by itself.

The place of sense organs in perception.

We have just said that knowledge arises by itself and that it could not have been generated by sense-contact. If this be so, the diversity of perceptions is however left unexplained. But in

face of the Nyaya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mlmamsa probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore accepted the Nyaya view of sense-contact as a condition of knowledge with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of svatah-pramanya. It does not appear to have been conscious of a conflict between these two different principles of the production of knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked at it was that the fact that there were the senses and contacts of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by virtue of which the things could be perceived, was with us a matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge are never experienced at the time of the rise of knowledge, but when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses must have acted. The only case where knowledge is found to be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one knowledge is found to depend on a previous experience or knowledge as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence of the rise of knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be operating before the rise of knowledge, and these are only inferred later on in accordance with the nature and characteristic of knowledge. We always have our first start in knowledge which is directly experienced from which we may proceed later on to the operation and nature of objective facts in relation to it. Thus it is that though contact of the senses with the objects may later on be imagined to be the conditioning factor, yet the rise of knowledge as well as our notion of its validity strikes us as original, underived, immediate, and first-hand.

Prabhakara gives us a sketch as to how the existence of the senses may be inferred. Thus our cognitions of objects are phenomena which are not all the same, and do not happen always in the same manner.for these vary differently at different moments; the cognitions of course take place in the soul which may thus be regarded as the material cause {samavayikdrand) ; but there must be some such movements or other specific associations (asamavayikarana) which render the production of this or that specific cognition possible. The immaterial causes subsist either in the cause of the material cause (e.g. in the case of the colouring of a white piece of cloth, the colour of the yarns which

is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself (e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again accepting the Nyaya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. This atom may be called manas (mind). This manas alone by itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light, and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye—for the cognition of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the akasic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas

with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The objects of perception are of three kinds,(i) substances, (2) qualities, (3) jati or class. The material substances are tangible objects of earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort 1 .

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that Kumarila Bhatta was rather undecided as to the nature of the senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might be entities which actually come in contact with their objects 2 , and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.

Indeterminate and determinate perception.

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa (determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception at the first moment of the association of the senses and their objects. Thus Kumarila says that the cognition that appears first is a mere alocana or simple perception, called non-determinate pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality (svalaksana) and regards it as being the only valid element in perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary

1 See Prakaranapancika, pp. 52 etc., and Dr Gariganatha Jha's Prabhakarami-mdmsa, pp. 35 etc.

2 Slokavaittika, see Pratyaksasiitra, 40 etc., and Nyayaratnakara on it. It may be noted in this connection that Samkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyaya that the senses actually went out to meet the objects (praf>yakaritva) but held that there was a special kind of functioning (vrtti) by virtue of which the senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature of this vrtti is not further clearly explained and Parthasarathi objects to it as being almost a different category (tattvantara).

impositions. But both Kumarila and Prabhakara think that both the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features in common with some other things; so we see that as other things are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived at the indeterminate stage 1 . So long as other things are not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as a valid cognition. Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception valid 2 .

Some Ontological Problems connected with the Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class {jati) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jati and avayavavayavl (part and whole notion) were

1 Compare this with the Vaisesika view as interpreted by Sridhara. 8 See PrakaranapaHcika and Sdstradlpika.

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavl (whole). He argues as an exponent of svatah-pramanyavada that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established. Following this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material cause and their connection {samyoga) is the immaterial cause (asamavayikaraiid), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed ; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived. Kumarila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see Slokavdrttika, Vanavdday.

Jati, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual constituting that jati {vydsajya-

1 According to Samkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (samanyavisesasamudayo dravyam, Vyasabhasya, in. 44); for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyaya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together {niraniara hi tadavayavdk), and it is this latter combination (ayutasiddkavayava) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts ; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Panditasoka has shown did not believe in any whole {avayavl) ; it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (paramanava eva hi pararupades"apari-harenotpannah parasparasahita avabhasamana desavitanavanto bhavanti). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see Avayavinirakarana, Six BuddhistNyaya Tracts). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless (niravayava) and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it :

" adustakaranodbhutamanavirbhutabadhakam asandigdancavijiianam katham mithyeti kathyate."

Nyayamatijari, pp. 550 ff.

vrtti), but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jati should be denied, because it involves the conception of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The class character or jati exists because it is distinctly perceived by us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual of that class (e.g. cow class) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the class-character existing in other individuals; for inherence {samavaya) according to Prabhakara is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyaya holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the class-character or jati has no separate existence apart from the individuals as Nyaya supposes. Apprehension of jati is essentially the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to other similar things of that class by the perception of the common characteristics. But Prabhakara would not admit the existence of a highest genus satta (being) as acknowledged by Nyaya. He argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because we find that the individuals of a class possess some common characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate jati as satta, as demanded by the naiyayikas. That all things are said to be sat (existing) is more or less a word or a name without the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When we speak of a thing as sat, we do not mean that it is possessed of any such class-characters as satta (being); what we mean is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svaru-

pasatta. Thus the Nyaya view of perception as taking only the thing in its pure being apart from qualities, etc. (sanmatra-visayam pratyaksam) is made untenable by Prabhakara, as according to him the thing is perceived direct with all its qualities. According to Kumarila however jati is not something different from the individuals comprehended by it and it is directly perceived. Rumania's view of jati is thus similar to that held by Samkhya, namely that when we look at an individual from one point of view (jati as identical with the individual), it is the individual that lays its stress upon our consciousness and the notion of jati becomes latent, but when we look at it from another point of view (the individual as identical with jati) it is the jati which presents itself to consciousness, and the aspect as individual becomes latent. The apprehension as jati or as individual is thus only a matter of different points of view or angles of vision from which we look at a thing. Quite in harmony with the conception of jati, Kumarila holds that the relation of inherence is not anything which is distinct from the things themselves in which it is supposed to exist, but only a particular aspect or phase of the things themselves (Slokavarttika, Pratyaksasutra, 149, 150, abhedat samavdyo'stu svarupam dharmadharminoli), Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara that jati is perceived by the senses (tatraikabuddhinirgrahyd jatirindriyagocara).

It is not out of place to mention that on the evidence of Prabhakara we find that the category of visesa admitted by the Kanada school is not accepted as a separate category by the Mimamsa on the ground that the differentiation of eternal things from one another, for which the category of visesa is admitted, may very well be effected on the basis of the ordinary qualities of these things. The quality of prthaktva or specific differences in atoms, as inferred by the difference of things they constitute, can very well serve the purposes of visesa.

The nature of knowledge.

All knowledge involves the knovver, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly. Thus as in all knowledge the self is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. The division

of the pramanas as pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference), etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (samvid) that reveals by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects. It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mimarnsa answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the cognized were not different from one another, they could not have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The cognition {samvedana) of a person simply means that such a special kind of quality {dharmd) has been manifested in the self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition is that with reference to which the active operation of the self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless, for they have the cognitional character by which things are illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency {adrstd). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the operation of adrsta, as the person deserves to have in accordance with his previous merit or demerit.

The Prabhakara Mimarnsa, in refuting the arguments of those who hold that our cognitions of objects are themselves cognized by some other cognition, says that this is not possible, since we do not experience any such double cognition and also because it would lead us to a regressus ad infinitum, for if a second cognition

is necessary to interpret the first, then that would require a third and so on. If a cognition could be the object of another cognition, then it could not be self-valid. The cognition is not of course unknown to us, but that is of course because it is self-cognized, and reveals itself to us the moment it reveals its objects. From the illumination of objects also we can infer the presence of this self-cognizing knowledge. But it is only its presence that is inferred and not the cognition itself, for inference can only indicate the presence of an object and not in the form in which it can be apprehended by perception (pratyaksa). Prabhakara draws a subtle distinction between perceptuality (samvedyatva) and being object of knowledge (prameyatva). A thing can only be apprehended (samvedyate) by perception, whereas inference can only indicate the presence of an object without apprehending the object itself. Our cognition cannot be apprehended by any other cognition. Inference can only indicate the presence or existence of knowledge but cannot apprehend the cognition itself 1 .

Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding that perception is never the object of another perception and that it ends in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he says that every perception involves a relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as the agent whose activity in grasping the object is known as cognition. This is indeed different from the Prabhakara view, that in one manifestation of knowledge the knower, the known, and the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of triputipratyaksd) 2 .

The Psychology of Illusion.

The question however arises that if all apprehensions are valid, how are we to account for illusory perceptions which cannot be regarded as valid ? The problem of illusory perception and its psychology is a very favourite topic of discussion in Indian philosophy. Omitting the theory of illusion of the Jains called satkhyati which we have described before, and of the Vedantists, which we shall describe in the next chapter, there are three different theories of illusion, viz. (1) atmakhydti, (2) viparltakhyati or anyathakhyati, and (3) akhyati of the Mimamsa school. The

1 See Prabhakaramimatnsa, by Dr Ganganatha Jha.

2 loc. cit. pp. 26-28.

viparitakhyati or anyathakhyati theory of illusion is accepted by the Nyaya, Vaisesika and the Yoga, the akhyati theory by Mimamsa and Samkhya and the atmakhyati by the Buddhists.

The commonest example of illusion in Indian philosophy is the illusory appearance of a piece of broken conch-shell as a piece of silver. That such an illusion occurs is a fact which is experienced by all and agreed to by all. The differences of view are with regard to its cause or its psychology. The idealistic Buddhists who deny the existence of the external world and think that there are only the forms of knowledge, generated by the accumulated karma of past lives, hold that just as in the case of a correct perception, so also in the case of illusory perception it is the flow of knowledge which must be held responsible. The flow of knowledge on account of the peculiarities of its own collocating conditions generates sometimes what we call right perception and sometimes wrong perception or illusion. On this view nothing depends upon the so-called external data. For they do not exist, and even if they did exist, why should the same data sometimes bring about the right perception and sometimes the illusion? The flow of knowledge creates both the percept and the perceiver and unites them. This is true both in the case of correct perception and illusory perception. Nyaya objects to the above view, and says that if knowledge irrespective of any external condition imposes upon itself the knower and the illusory percept, then the perception ought to be of the form "I am silver" and not "this is silver." Moreover this theory stands refuted, as it is based upon a false hypothesis that it is the inner knowledge which appears as coming from outside and that the external as such does not exist.

The viparitakhyati or the anyathakhyati theory supposes that the illusion takes place because on account of malobservation we do not note the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished from the silver, and at the same time by the glow etc. of the conch-shell unconsciously the silver which I had seen elsewhere is remembered and the object before me is taken as silver. In illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as silver. This school agrees with the akhyati school that the fact

that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.

The akhyati theory of Mimamsa holds that since the special peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the per-ceiver fails to apprehend the difference between these two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended, and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case of a real perception. Kumarila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhakara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as valid to the cognizor at the time that he has the cognition as any real judgment could be. If subsequent experience rejects it, that does not matter, for it is admitted in Mimamsa that when later experience finds out the defects of any perception it can invalidate the original perception which was self-valid at the time of its production 1 . It is easy to see that the Mimamsa had to adopt this view of illusion to maintain the doctrine that all cognition at the moment of its production is valid. The akhyati theory

1 See Prakaratiapancika, Sastradipika, and Slokavdrttika, sutra 2.

tries to establish the view that the illusion is not due to any-positive wrong knowledge, but to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension due to certain weakness of mind. So it is that though illusion is the result, yet the cognition so far as it is cognition, is made up of two elements, the present perception and memory, both of which are true so far as they are individually present to us, and the cognition itself has all the characteristics of any other valid knowledge, for the mark of the validity of a cognition is its power to prompt us to action. In doubtful cognitions also, as in the case " Is this a post or a man?" what is actually perceived is some tall object and thus far it is valid too. But when this perception gives rise to two different kinds of remembrance (of the pillar and the man), doubt comes in. So the element of apprehension involved in doubtful cognitions should be regarded as self-valid as any other cognition.

Inference.

Sabara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumarila on the basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g. smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary that the two things (smoke and fire) coexisting in a third thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of one thing should also be cases involving the existence of the other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire), though including all the cases of the existence of the other (smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter (smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the contiguity of the constellation of Krttika with RohinI, where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter may be inferred), or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or a case of cause and effect or otherwise between two things and a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is perceived, they fuse together in the mind as forming

one whole, and as a result of that when the existence of the one (e.g. smoke) in a thing (hill) is noticed, we can infer the existence of the thing (hill) with its counterpart (fire). In all such cases the thing (e.g. fire) which has a sphere extending beyond that in which the other (e.g. smoke) can exist is called gamya or vyapaka and the other (e.g. smoke) vyapya or gamaka and it is only by the presence of gamaka in a thing (e.g. hill, the paksa) that the other counterpart the gamya (fire) may be inferred. The general proposition, universal coexistence of the gamaka with the gamya (e.g. wherever there is smoke there is fire) cannot be the cause of inference, for it is itself a case of inference. Inference involves the memory of a permanent relation subsisting between two things (e.g. smoke and fire) in a third thing (e.g. kitchen); but the third thing is remembered only in a general way that the coexisting things must have a place where they are found associated. It is by virtue of such a memory that the direct perception of a basis (e.g. hill) with the gamaka thing (e.g. smoke) in it would naturally bring to my mind that the same basis (hill) must contain the gamya (i.e. fire) also. Every case of inference thus proceeds directly from a perception and not from any universal general proposition. Kumarila holds that the inference gives us the minor as associated with the major and not of the major alone, i.e. of the fiery mountain and not of fire. Thus inference gives us a new knowledge, for though it was known in a general way that the possessor of smoke is the possessor of fire, yet the case of the mountain was not anticipated and the inference of the fiery mountain is thus a distinctly new knowledge (desakdlddhikyddyuktamagrhitagrdhitvam anumdna-sya, Nyayaratnakara, p. 363) \ It should also be noted that in forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things, a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough that in the large number of cases whe/e the concomitance was noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an

1 It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila was indebted to Dinnaga for this ; for Dinnaga's main contention is that " it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us no new knowledge (see Vidyabhiisana's Indian Logic, p. 87 and Tdtparyatikd, p. 120.

absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for the forming of the notion of the permanent relation 1 . The experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two things were found to coexist together in another thing in some relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist in exactly the same relation 2 . In those cases where the circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other. It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of coexistence as well.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid. To this Kumarila's answer is that memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramana, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing others (parartlidnamand) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three premisses pratijna, hetu and drstanta may quite serve the purpose of an anumana.

There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila viz. pratyaksatodrstasambandha and samanyatodrstasambandha. The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

1 Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance (vyapti) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the positive ones.

2 " tasmadanavagatipisarvatranvaye sarvatasca z'yatireke bahnsah sahityavagama-matradeva vyabhicaradarsanasanathadaniinianotpattiraiigikartavyah." Nyayaratna-kara, p. 288.

relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals 1 . Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke) is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations of time and place the things in which these two subsist together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things (e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute 2 . When such a conviction is firmly rooted in the mind that the concept of the presence of smoke involves the concept of the presence of fire, the inference of fire is made as soon as any smoke is seen. Prabhakara counts separately the fallacies of the minor (paksdbhdsa), of the enunciation (pratijfiabh&sd) and of the example (drstantabhasd) along with the fallacies of the middle and this seems to indicate that the Mimamsa logic was not altogether free from Buddhist influence. The cognition of smoke includes within itself the cognition of fire also, and thus there would be nothing left unknown to be cognized by the inferential cognition. But this objection has little force with Prabhakara, for he does not admit that a pramana should necessarily bring us any new knowledge, for pramana is simply defined as "apprehension." So though the inferential cognition always pertains to things already known it is yet regarded by him as a pramana, since it is in any case no doubt an apprehension.

1 See Slokavarttika, Nyayaratnakara, Sastradipika, Yuktisnekapurani, Siddhan-tacandrikd on anumana.

2 On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (upfidhi) which may vitiate the inference, Prabhakara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say that it does not exist {prayatnenanvisyamane aupadhikatva-navagamdt, see rrakaranapancika, p. 71).

Upamana, Arthapatti.

Analogy (upamana) is accepted by Mlmamsa in a sense which is different from that in which Nyaya took it. The man who has seen a cow (go) goes to the forest and sees a wild ox (gavaya), and apprehends the similarity of the gavaya with the go, and then cognizes the similarity of the go (which is not within the limits of his perception then) with the gavaya. The cognition of this similarity of the gavaya in the go, as it follows directly from the perception of the similarity of the go in the gavaya, is called upamana (analogy). It is regarded as a separate pramana, because by it we can apprehend the similarity existing in a thing which is not perceived at the moment. It is not mere remembrance, for at the time the go was seen the gavaya was not seen, and hence the similarity also was not seen, and what was not seen could not be remembered. The difference of Prabhakara and Kumarila on this point is that while the latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the former regards it as a distinct category.

Arthapatti (implication) is a new pramana which is admitted by the Mlmamsa. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta outside the house is called arthapatti (presumption or implication).

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthapatti cognition is a matter on which Prabhakara and Kumarila disagree. Prabhakara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta, and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication, without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed. The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for

making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the house leads to the presumption of an external existence only when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt and uncertainty 1 .

Kumarila however objects to this explanation of Prabhakara, and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made doubtful by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt may as well be removed by the supposition that Devadatta is dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life of Devadatta should necessarily be resolved by the supposition of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed when the cause or the root of doubt is removed, and it does not follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is living. If it was already known that Devadatta was living and his absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very fact which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real procedure of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about the life of Devadatta being removed by previous knowledge or by some other means, we may presume that he must be outside the house when he is found absent from the house. So there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. It is the certainty of his life associated with the perception of his absence from the house that leads us to the presumption of his external existence. There is an opposition between the life of Devadatta and his absence from the house, and the mind cannot come to rest without the presumption of his external existence. The mind oscillates between two contradictory poles both of which it accepts but

1 See Prakaranapancika, pp. 113-115.

cannot reconcile, and as a result of that finds an outlet and a reconciliation in the presumption that the existence of Devadatta must be found outside the house.

Well then, if that be so, inference may as well be interpreted as presumption. For if we say that we know that wherever there is smoke there is fire, and then perceive that there is smoke in the hill, but no fire, then the existence of the smoke becomes irreconcilable, or the universal proposition of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes false, and hence the presumption that there is fire in the hill. This would have been all right if the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known otherwise than by inference. But this is not so, for the concomitance was seen only in individual cases, and from that came the inference that wherever there is smoke there is fire. It cannot be said that the concomitance perceived in individual cases suffered any contradiction without the presumption of the universal proposition (wherever there is smoke there is fire); thus arthapatti is of no avail here and inference has to be accepted. Now when it is proved that there are cases where the purpose of inference cannot be served by arthapatti, the validity of inference as a means of proof becomes established. That being done we admit that the knowledge of the fire in the hill may come to us either by inference or by arthapatti.

So inference also cannot serve the purpose of arthapatti, for in inference also it is the hetu (reason) which is known first, and later on from that the sadhya (what is to be proved); both of them however cannot be apprehended at the same moment, and it is exactly this that distinguishes arthapatti from anumana. For arthapatti takes place where, without the presumption of Devadatta's external existence, the absence from the house of Devadatta who is living cannot be comprehended. If Devadatta is living he must exist inside or outside the house. The mind cannot swallow a contradiction,and hence without presuming the external existence of Devadatta even the perceived non-existence cannot be comprehended. It is thus that the contradiction is resolved by presuming his existence outside the house. Arthapatti is thus the result of arthanupapatti or the contradiction of the present perception with a previously acquired certain knowledge.

It is by this arthapattipramana that we have to admit that there is a special potency in seeds by which they produce the

shoots, and that a special potency is believed to exist in sacrifices by which these can lead the sacrificer to Heaven or some such beneficent state of existence.

Sabda pramana.

Sabda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Carvaka and Vaisesika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyaya, and the Samkhya-Yoga systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu writers and they had wordy battles over it with the Buddhists who denied it. Some sought to establish this authority on the supposition that they were the word of God, while others, particularly the Mlmamsists strove to prove that they were not written by anyone, and had no beginning in time nor end and were eternal. Their authority was not derived from the authority of any trustworthy person or God. Their words are valid in themselves. Evidently a discussion on these matters has but little value with us, though it was a very favourite theme of debate in the old days of India. It was in fact the most important subject for Mlmamsa, for the Mlmamsa sutras were written for the purpose of laying down canons for a right interpretation of the Vedas. The slight extent to which it has dealt with its own epistemo-logical doctrines has been due solely to their laying the foundation of its structure of interpretative maxims, and not to writing philosophy for its own sake. It does not dwell so much upon salvation as other systems do, but seeks to serve as a rational compendium of maxims with the help of which the Vedas may be rightly understood and the sacrifices rightly performed. But a brief examination of the doctrine of word {sabda) as a means of proof cannot be dispensed with in connection with Mlmamsa as it is its very soul.

Sabda (word) as a pramana means the knowledge that we get about things (not within the purview of our perception) from relevant sentences by understanding the meaning of the words of which they are made up. These sentences may be of two kinds, viz. those uttered by men and those which belong to the Vedas. The first becomes a valid means of knowledge when it is not

uttered by untrustworthy persons and the second is valid in itself. The meanings of words are of course known to us before, and cannot therefore be counted as a means of proof; but the meanings of sentences involving a knowledge of the relations of words cannot be known by any other acknowledged means of proof, and it is for this that we have to accept sabda as a separate means of proof. Even if it is admitted that the validity of any sentence may be inferred on the ground of its being uttered by a trustworthy person, yet that would not explain how we understand the meanings of sentences, for when even the name or person of a writer or speaker is not known, we have no difficulty in understanding the meaning of any sentence.

Prabhakara thinks that all sounds are in the form of letters, or are understandable as combinations of letters. The constituent letters of a word however cannot yield any meaning, and are thus to be regarded as elements of auditory perception which serve as a means for understanding the meaning of a word. The reason of our apprehension of the meaning of any word is to be found in a separate potency existing in the letters by which the denotation of the word may be comprehended. The perception of each letter-sound vanishes the moment it is uttered, but leaves behind an impression which combines with the impressions of the successively dying perceptions of letters, and this brings about the whole word which contains the potency of bringing about the comprehension of a certain meaning. If even on hearing a word the meaning cannot be comprehended, it has to be admitted that the hearer lacks certain auxiliaries necessary for the purpose. As the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, it has to be admitted that the latter is the direct cause of verbal cognition. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila agree on this point.

Another peculiar doctrine expounded here is that all words have natural denotative powers by which they themselves out of their own nature refer to certain objects irrespective of their comprehension or non-comprehension by the hearer. The hearer will not understand the meaning unless it is known to him that the word in question is expressive of such and such a meaning, but the word was all along competent to denote that meaning and it is the hearer's knowledge of that fact that helps him to

understand the meaning of a word. Mlmamsa does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words 1 . Words are thus acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is admitted to be the cause of denotation. It is easy to see the bearing of this doctrine on the self-validity of the Vedic commandments, by the performance of which such results would arise as could not have been predicted by any other person. Again all words are believed to be eternally existent; but though they are ever present some manifestive agency is required by which they are manifested to us. This manifestive agency consists of the effort put forth by the man who pronounces the word. Nyaya thinks that this effort of pronouncing is the cause that produces the word while Mlmamsa thinks that it only manifests to the hearer the ever-existing word.

The process by which according to Prabhakara the meanings of words are acquired may be exemplified thus: a senior commands a junior to bring a cow and to bind a horse, and the child on noticing the action of the junior in obedience to the senior's commands comes to understand the meaning of " cow " and " horse." Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occuring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (anvitdbhid-hdna vdda), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word gam accusative case of go (cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentence gam anaya —bring the cow. Kumarila however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea {abliihitdnvayavdda). Thus in gam anaya, according to Kumarila, gam means the bovine class in the accusative character and anaya independently means

1 According to Nyaya God created all words and associated them with their meanings.

bring; these two are then combined into the meaning " bring the cow." But on the former theory the word gam means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as associated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of Kumarila which is also the Nyaya theory is called abhihitanvayavada 1 .

Lastly according to Prabhakara it is only the Veda that can be called sabda-pramana, and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But Kumarila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as sabda-pramana.

The Pramana of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).

In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. amipalabdhi for the perception of the nonexistence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped? It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramana namely anupalabdhi.

All things exist in places either in a positive {sadrupd) or in a negative relation {asadrupd), and it is only in the former case

1 See Prabhdkaramlmdmsd by Dr Ganganatha Jha and S. N. Dasgupta's Study of Paianjali, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that Mimamsa did not favour the Sphota doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested (sphota) but not created by the passing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word-manifestation. See Vacaspati's Tattva-bindu, Slokavarttika and Prakaranapancikd. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see Salikanatha's Vdkydrthamdtrkdvrtti.

that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate pramana as anupalabdhi. Prabhakara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate pramana as anupalabdhi. For what is meant by empty space ? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is denned as that which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate entity. If the perception of empty space is denned as the perception of space at the moment which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the external absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or abhava as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted. It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug But this also means that the moment of the perception of the ground is associated with the want of knowledge of the jug or its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can there be in the perception of " only the ground " if it is not meant that it (the perception of the ground) is associated with or qualified by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived. The qualifying phrase that " only the ground is perceived " be-

comes meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the ground. And this would require that we had already the notion of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the notion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a separate pramana by which the absence or want of a sensible object—the negation of a thing—can be comprehended.

Self, Salvation, God.

Mimamsa has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate entity from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions—even in those where there is no perception of the body? Kumarila however differs from Prabhakara about this analysis of the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that the self is different from the body is this, that movement or willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some other entity owing to the association with which the body ap-

pears to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the constituent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate entity as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But Mimamsa does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul. It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.

The question now arises, how is self cognized ? Prabhakara holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in what we have already described as triputl-pratyaksa (perception as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element " I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.

Kumarila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception {mmiasa-pratyaksd) as the substratum of the notion of " I," or in other words the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its

own nature shines forth in consciousness as the " I." The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhakara's theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of linguistic usage that though the walking affects the walker yet he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge, for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt known as the substratum of " I," but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the " I." The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the mind. This is indeed different from Prabhakara's analysis, who regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition, both being the result of the illumination of knowledge. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara however in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (svayamprakdsa), for then even in deep sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that " I slept in bliss " signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found when a man on rising from sleep says " I slept so long without knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of the body which contracts and expands according to the body it occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot be explained 1 .

1 See Slokavarttika, atmavada Sastra-dipika, atmavada and moksavada.

Kumarila considered the self to be merely the potency of knowledge (jndnasaktiy. Cognitions of things were generated by the activity of the manas and the other senses. This self itself can only be cognized by mental perception. Or at the time of salvation there being none of the senses nor the manas the self remains in pure existence as the potency of knowledge without any actual expression or manifestation. So the state of salvation is the state in which the self remains devoid of any of its characteristic qualities such as pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc., for the self itself is not knowledge nor is it bliss or ananda as Vedanta supposes; but these are generated in it by its energy and the operation of the senses. The self being divested of all its senses at that time, remains as a mere potency of the energy of knowledge, a mere existence. This view of salvation is accepted in the main by Prabhakara also.

Salvation is brought about when a man enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad actions and thereby exhausts them and stops the further generation of new effects by refraining from the performance of kamya-karmas (sacrifices etc. performed for the attainment of certain beneficent results) and guarantees himself against the evil effects of sin by assiduously performing the nitya-karmas (such as the sandhya prayers etc., by the performance of which there is no benefit but the non-performance of which produces sins). This state is characterized by the dissolution of the body and the non-production of any further body or rebirth.

Mimamsa does not admit the existence of any God as the creator and destroyer of the universe. Though the universe is made up of parts, yet there is no reason to suppose that the universe had ever any beginning in time, or that any God created it. Every day animals and men are coming into being by the action of the parents without the operation of any God. Neither is it necessary as Nyaya supposes that dharma and adharma should have a supervisor, for these belong to the performer and

1 It may be mentioned in this connection that unlike Nyaya Mimamsa did not consider all activity as being only of the nature of molecular vibration {parispanda). It admitted the existence of energy (fakti) as a separate category which manifested itself in actual movements. The self being considered as a £akti can move the body and yet remain unmoved itself. Manifestation of action only means the relationing of the energy with a thing. Nyaya strongly opposes this doctrine of a non-sensible (atlndriya) energy and seeks to explain all action by actual molecular motion.

no one can have any knowledge of them. Moreover there cannot be any contact {samyoga) or inherence (samavdya) of dharma and adharma with God that he might supervise them; he cannot have any tools or body wherewith to fashion the world like the carpenter. Moreover he could have no motive to create the world either as a merciful or as a cruel act. For when in the beginning there were no beings towards whom should he be actuated with a feeling of mercy? Moreover he would himself require a creator to create him. So there is no God, no creator, no creation, no dissolution or pralaya. The world has ever been running the same, without any new creation or dissolution, srsti or pralaya.

Mimamsa as philosophy and Mimamsa as ritualism.

From what we have said before it will be easy to see that Mimamsa agrees in the main with Vaisesika about the existence of the categories of things such as the five elements, the qualities, rupa, rasa, etc. Rumania's differences on the points of jati, samavaya, etc. and Prabhakara's peculiarities have also been mentioned before. On some of these points it appears that Kumarila was influenced by Samkhya thought rather than by Nyaya. Samkhya and Vaisesika are the only Hindu systems which have tried to construct a physics as a part of their metaphysics; other systems have generally followed them or have differed from them only on minor matters. The physics of Prabhakara and Kumarila have thus but little importance, as they agree in general with the Vaisesika view. In fact they were justified in not laying any special stress on this part, because for the performance of sacrifices the common-sense view of Nyaya-Vaisesika about the world was most suitable.

The main difference of Mimamsa with Nyaya consists of the theory of knowledge. The former was required to prove that the Veda was self-valid and that it did not derive its validity from God, and also that it was not necessary to test its validity by any other means. To do this it began by trying to establish the self-validity of all knowledge. This would secure for the Veda the advantage that as soon as its orders or injunctions were communicated to us they would appear to us as valid knowledge, and there being nothing to contradict them later on there would be nothing in the world which could render the Vedic injunctions

invalid. The other pramanas such as perception, inference, etc. were described, firstly to indicate that they could not show to us how dharma could be acquired, for dharma was not an existing thing which could be perceived by the other pramanas, but a thing which could only be produced by acting according to the injunctions of the Vedas. For the knowledge of dharma and adharma therefore the sabdapramana of the Veda was our only source. Secondly it was necessary that we should have a knowledge of the different means of cognition, as without them it would be difficult to discuss and verify the meanings of debatable Vedic sentences. The doctrine of creation and dissolution which is recognized by all other Hindu systems could not be acknowledged by the Mimamsa as it would have endangered the eternality of the Vedas. Even God had to be dispensed with on that account.

The Veda is defined as the collection of Mantras and Brah-manas (also called the vidhis or injunctive sentences). There are three classes of injunctions (1) apurva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and (3) parisarikhya-vidhi. Apurva-vidhi is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains should be washed (we could not know that this part of the duty was necessary for the sacrifice except by the above injunction). Niyama-vidhi is that where when a thing could have been done in a number of ways, an order is made by the Veda which restricts us to following some definite alternative (e.g. though the chaff from the corn could be separated even by the nails, the order that "corn should be threshed" restricts us to the alternative of threshing as the only course acceptable for the sacrifice). In the niyama-vidhi that which is ordered is already known as possible but only as an alternative, and the vidhi insists upon one of these methods as the only one. In apurva-vidhi the thing to be done would have remained undone and unknown had it not been for the vidhi. In parisarikhya-vidhi all that is enjoined is already known but not necessarily as possible alternatives. A certain mantra " I take up the rein " {imam agrbhnani rasanani) which could be used in a number of cases should not however be used at the time of holding the reins of an ass.

There are three main principles of interpreting the Vedic sentences. (1) When some sentences are such that connectively they yield a meaning but not individually, then they should be

taken together connectively as a whole. (2) If the separate sentences can however yield meanings separately by themselves they should not be connected together. (3) In the case of certain sentences which are incomplete suitable words from the context of immediately preceding sentences are to be supplied.

.The vidhis properly interpreted are the main source of dharma. The mantras which are generally hymns in praise of some deities or powers are to be taken as being for the specification of the deity to whom the libation is to be offered. It should be remembered that as dharma can only be acquired by following the injunctions of the Vedas they should all be interpreted as giving us injunctions. Anything therefore found in the Vedas which cannot be connected with the injunctive orders as forming part of them is to be regarded as untrustworthy or at best inexpressive. Thus it is that those sentences in the Vedas which describe existing things merely or praise some deed of injunction (called the arthavadas) should be interpreted as forming part of a vidhi-vakya (injunction) or be rejected altogether. Even those expressions which give reasons for the performance of certain actions are to be treated as mere arthavadas and interpreted as praising injunctions. For Vedas have value only as mandates by the performance of which dharma may be acquired.

When a sacrifice is performed according to the injunctions of the Vedas, a capacity which did not exist before and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures is generated either in the action or in the agent. This capacity or positive force called apurva produces in time the beneficient results of the sacrifice (e.g. leads the performer to Heaven). This apurva is like a potency or faculty in the agent which abides in him until the desired results follow 1 .

It is needless to dilate upon these, for the voluminous works of Sahara and Kumarila make an elaborate research into the nature of sacrifices, rituals, and other relevant matters in great detail, which anyhow can have but little interest for a student of philosophy.

1 See Dr Gaiiganatha Jha's Prabhakaramlmamsa and Madhava's Nyayamald-vislara.

CHAPTER X

THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy.

Pramana in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired, pramata means the subject or the knower who cognizes, prama the result of pramana—right knowledge, prameya the object of knowedge, and pramanya the validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject—the knower (that his perceptions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the pramanya of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of knowledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and interpretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was frequently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyaya or Mlmamsa thinker in a great public debate attended by many learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputation were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were therefore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical

mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms (to thwart opponents) sometimes called vitanda, before he can come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical divergence. All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the deficiency of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the speculations on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their net contribution to philosophy. With Vedanta we come to an end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the position of the Vedanta of the Sankara school in the field of Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall therefore now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory of knowledge (pramdnavdda) reached by some of the main schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by the Sankara Vedanta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.

The philosophical situation. A Review.

Before dealing with the Vedanta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine the position of the Vedanta as taught by Sankara and his school.

The Sautrantika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (purusdrtha). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (samyag-jiiand) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (arthaprdpakatva). The perception is right (abhranta non-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by it {samvddakatvd). That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination. When I say " this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence to objects perceived is called kalpana or abhilapa. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilapa association (kalpandpodha), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name—the nirvikalpa—is thus what is perceived. As a result of the pratyaksa the manovijnana or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an

object of knowledge (grdhya), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being what they are in themselves {svalaksana) are what is actually perceived (pra-tyaksavisayd) 1 . The pramanaphala (result of perception) is the

1 There is a difference of opinion about the meaning of the word " svalaksana" of Dharmakirtti between my esteemed friend Professor Stcherbatsky of Petrograd and myself. He maintains that Dharmakirtti held that the content of the presentative element at the moment of perception was almost totally empty. Thus he writes to me, "According to your interpretation svalaksana means—the object (or idea with Vijna-navadin) from which everything past and everything future has been eliminated, this I do not deny at all. But I maintain that if everything past and future has been taken away, what remains? The present and the present is a ksana i.e. nothing—The reverse of ksana is a ksanasamtana or simply samtana and in every samtana there is a synthesis ekibhava of moments past and future, produced by the intellect (buddhi =

niscaya = kalpana = adhyavasaya) There is in the perception of a jug something

(a ksana of sense knowledge) which we must distinguish from the idea of a jug (which is always a samtana, always vikalpita), and if you take the idea away in a strict unconditional sense, no knowledge remains : ksanasya jfianena prapayituma^akyatvat. This is absolutely the Kantian teaching about Synthesis of Apprehension. Accordingly pratyaksa is a transcendental source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. This pramana is asatkalpa. Kant says that without the elements of intuition (=sense-knowledge = pratyaksa = kalpanapodha) our cognitions would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpana = buddhi = synthesis = ekibhava) they would be blind. Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakirtti. He is a Vijiianavadl as I understand, because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijfiana) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our knowledge; he admits, it is bahya, it is artha, it is arthakriyaksana = svalaksana; that is the reason for which he sometimes is called Sautrantika and this school is sometimes called Sautranta-vijnanavada, as opposed to the Vijnanavada of Asvaghosa and Aryasanga, which had no elaborate theory of cognition. If the jug as it exists in our representation were the svalaksana and paramarthasat, what would remain of Vijnanavada? But there is the perception of the jug as opposed to the pure idea of a jug (suddha kalpana), an element of reality, the sensational ksana, which is communicated to us by sense knowledge. Kant's ' thing in itself is also a ksana and also an element of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakirtti has also hiddha kalpana and htddham pratyaksam. ...And very interesting is the opposition between pratyaksa and anumana, the first moves from ksana to samtana and the second from samtana to ksana, that is the reason that although bhranta the anumana is nevertheless pramana because through it we indirectly also reach ksana, the arthakriyaksana. It is bhranta directly and pramana indirectly; pratyaksa is pramana directly and bhranta

(asatkalpa) indirectly " So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers

are concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative element of sense-knowledge (svalaksana) and the affirmation (niscaya). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a ksana (moment) and is nothing. I also hold that it is a ksana, but it is nothing only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative element of the

ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be got [yena krtena arthah prdpito bkavati). Pramana then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramanaphala and not pramana which consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards the perceived object. The pramana therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge (anadhigatadhigantr) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective world. This account of perception leaves out the real epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.

first moment (pratyaksabalotpanna N. T., p. ao) but this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its own specific nature (svalaksana). But what is this specific nature? Dharmaklrtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance {yasyarthasya sannidhanasannidha-nabkyam jna?iapratibhasabhedastat svalaksana?n N., p. i and N. T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the object itself; it is the appearance of the "blue" in its specific character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea '' this is blue " {nilasarupam pratyaksamanubhuyamdnam nllabodhariipainavasthapyate ... nilasarupyamasya pramanam nilavikalpanarupam tvasya pramanaphalam, N. T. p. aa). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue {nilanirbhasam hi vijnanam, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance (yatkincit arthasya saksatkarijfianam tatpra/yaksamucyate, N. T. 7) and this is real (para??iarthasat) and valid. This blue sensation is different from the idea " this is blue" (nilabodha, N.T. aa) which is the result of the former (pramanaphala) through the association of the affirmative process (adkyavasaya) and is regarded as invalid for it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense, and is a vikalpa-pratyaya. In my opinion svalaksana therefore means pure sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object and with Dharmakirtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception and vikalpapratyaya or pramanaphala is the idea or concept which follows it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage of the first moment of sensation-presentation (ksanasya prapayitumas'akyatvat, N. T. 16). N. T. = Nyayabindutlka, N = Nydyabifidu (Peterson's edition).

The Yogacaras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from the above-mentioned Sautrantika Buddhists, and say that since we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone, what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the data of sensation determining our knowledge ? You say that sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come into touch with objects in themselves ; these can only be grasped by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore be the same as knowledge (saJiopalambhaniyamat abhedo nilataddhiyoJi) ; for it is in and through knowledge that external objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects. We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question why then if there are no external objects, there should be so much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption, the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire (vdsana) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person, say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects

believed to have been perceived before, for things or knowledge-moments, whatever they may be, are destroyed the next moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as per-ceiver or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of experience, interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought, Nyaya, Samkhya, and the Mlmamsa, accept the duality of soul and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also enquired after and considered important.

Pramana is defined by Nyaya as the collocation of instruments by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge consists partly of consciousness (bod/ia) and partly of material factors {bodhabodhasvabhavd). Thus in perception the proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate consciousness {nirvikalpd) as the jugness (ghatatva) and this later on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-contact etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the qualifying factor (visesanajhdna as jugness) he could not have comprehended the qualified object (visistabuddhi) the jug (i.e. the object which possesses jugness). In inference (anumdna) knowledge of the liriga takes part, and in upamana the sight of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramana; even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world, right knowledge was called pramana, because it was of the same form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the

external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the external world but simply enforces our convictions about the external world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions of the external world it is pramana, and so far as it determines our attitude towards the external world it is pramanaphala. The question how knowledge is generated had little importance with them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge was called pramana, because it was the means by which we could form convictions {adhyavasaya) about the external world. Nyaya sought to answer the question how knowledge was generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but thought that though as a guna (quality) it was external like other gunas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of collocations like any other happening in the material world. Pramana does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (anadhigatadhi-gantf) as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were collocations of pramana, knowledge was produced, no matter whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is produced whenever the cause of it namely the pramana collocation is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class {sdmdnya), inherence (samavayd), etc., were considered as having as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements. The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate consciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain collocation of things ended in a certain result (p/ia/a). Jnana (knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations (sdmagri) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul, of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philosophical distinction between knowledge and an external event of the objective world. Nyaya thus fails to explain the cause

of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jnana, sukha (pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence as much as substances, but when any new substances were produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It is very probable that in Nyaya the cultivation of the art of inference was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced later by an application of the inferential method which gave the introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psychological experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it 1 . Samkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same substances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another element, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations. This element of intelligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, "the self," which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the "I," the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge

1 See Nyayamaiijarl on pramana.

relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Samkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence {purusa) when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the pramana (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects {svatah-pramdnya and svatah-apranianyd). The pramana however can lead to a prama or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the purusa. The purusa comes in touch with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact. It is the transcendental influence of purusa that sets in motion the original prakrti in Samkhya metaphysics, and it is the same transcendent touch (call it yogyata according to Vacaspati or samyoga according to Bhiksu) of the transcendent entity of purusa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into consciousness. The Vijnanavadin Buddhist did not make any distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms {akara) and did not therefore agree that the akara of knowledge was due to its copying the objects. Samkhya was however a realist who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent substance (sattvd) which could assume the shape of the objects. But Samkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not think like Nyaya that the akara of knowledge was all that knowledge had to show ; it held that there was a transcendent element which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With Nyaya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like a physical event. With Samkhya however so far as the content and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.

The Mlmamsist Prabhakara agreed with Nyaya in general as regards the way in which the objective world and sense con-

tact induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things—the direct apprehension that should be called the pramana. Pramana in this sense is the same as pramiti or prama, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramana may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the prama. For prama or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (samvadiri). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyaya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory 1 .

Prabhakara rejected theSamkhya conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (cit) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating {pradarsakatva) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (annbhuti) has of prompting us to action in the external world ; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhakara did not enquire.

Kumarila declared that jiiana (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness {jndtata) of objective things. Jftana itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jnatata or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumarila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

1 Samkhya considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.

was sometimes the result. Jnana was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyaya supposed. Nyaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. Kumarila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called samvadi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more 1 . The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jnana 2 . Here Kumarila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijnanavada Buddhism, Samkhya, andMimamsawas manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijnanavada denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Samkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference,, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known ; Kumarila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

1 See Nyayarattiamala, svatah-pramanya-nirnaya.

2 See Nyayamaiijari on Pramana, Slokavarttika on Pratyaksa, and Gaga Bhatta's Bkattacintamani on Pratyaksa.

uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedanta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sutras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the Sunyavada Buddhism (of course according to Safikara's interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gaudapada revived the monistic teaching of the Upanisads by his commentary on the Mandukya Upanisad in verse called Mandukyakarika. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of Sankara (788—820A.D.). Safikara's commentary on the Brahma-sutras is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedantism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Anandagiri, a disciple of Safikara, wrote a commentary called Nyayanirnaya, and Govindananda wrote another commentary named Ratna-prabha. Vacaspati Misra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the Bhamati. Amalananda (1247—1260A.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadiksita (15 50 A.D.) son of Rafigarajadhvarindra of KancI wrote his Kalpa-taruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of Sankara, Padmapada, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as Pancapadika. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of Safikara's bhasya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sutra. Madhava (1350), in his Sankaravijaya, recites an interesting story about it. He says that Suresvara received Safikara's permission to write a varttika on the bhasya. But other pupils objected to Sankara that since Suresvara was formerly a great Mimamsist(Mantlana Misra was called Suresvara after his conversion to Vedantism) he was not competent to write

a good vdrttika on the bhasya. Suresvara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called Naiskarmyasiddhi. Padmapada wrote a tika but this was burnt in his uncle's house. Sankara, who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapada wrote it down. Prakasatman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapada's Paii-capddikd known as Paiicapadikavivarana. Akhandananda wrote his Tattvadipana, and the famous Nrsimhasrama Muni (1500) wrote his Vivaranabhavaprakdsikd on it. Amalananda and Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on Pahcapddikd, named Paiicapddikddarpana and Paiicapddikatika respectively, but the Paiicapadikavivarana had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyaranya who is generally identified by some with Mad-hava (1350) wrote his famous work Vivaranaprameyasamgraha^, elaborating the ideas of Paiicapadikavivarana ; Vidyaranya wrote also another excellent work named Jivanmnktiviveka on the Vedanta doctrine of emancipation. Suresvara's (800 A.D.) excellent work Naiskarmyasiddhi is probably the earliest independent treatise on Sankara's philosophy as expressed in his bhasya. It has been commented upon by Jnanottama Misra. Vidyaranya also wrote another work of great merit known as Paiicadasi, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedanta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of Sankara's bhasya is Samksepasdriraka, written by Sarvajnatma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Ramatirtha. Sriharsa (1190 A.D.) wrote his Khandanakhaiidakhddya, the most celebrated work on the Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after Sriharsa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedanta dialectic known as Tattvadlpikd which has also a commentary called JVayanaprasddini written by Pratyagrupa. Sankara Misra and Raghunatha also wrote commentaries on Khandauakhandakhddya. A work on Vedanta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedanta of great originality and merit known as Vcdantaparibhdsd was written by Dharmarajadhvarindra (about 1550 A.D.). His son Ramakrsnadhvarin wrote his Sikhamani on it and Amaradasa his ManiprabJid. The Vcdantaparibhdsd with these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance

1 See Narasimhacarya's article in the Indian Antiquary, 1916.

(though probably the last great work on Vedanta) is the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana SarasvatI who followed Dharma-rajadhvarindra. This has three commentaries known as Gauda-brahmdnandi, Vitthalesopadhydyl and Siddhivydkhya. Sadananda Vyasa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhisid-dhdntasdra. Sadananda wrote also an excellent elementary work named Veddntasdra which has also two commentaries Subodhini and Vidvanmanoranjini. They? dvaitabrahmasiddhi of Sadananda Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddhi is important, as it touches on many points of Vedanta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedanta works. The Nydyamakaranda of Ananda-bodha Bhattarakacaryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedanta interest. Veddntasiddhdntamuktdvali of Prakasananda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajiiana and its relations to cit, the doctrine of drstisrstivdda, etc., with great clearness. Siddhdntalesa by Apyayadiksita is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest. Vcddntatattvadipikd and Siddhdntatattva are also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedanta system. Bhedadhikkdra of Nrsimhasrama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedanta dialectic.

The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedanta works on which the present chapter has been based.

Vedanta in Gaudapada.

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the Brahma-sTttras without making any reference to the commentary of Sankara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahma-sutras were first commented upon by some Vaisnava writers who held some form of modified dualism 1 . There have been more than a half dozen Vaisnava commentators of the Brahma-sutras who not only differed from Sankara's interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sutras and to

1 This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the Vaisnava commentators of the Brahma-sutras.

the Upanisads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the Brahma-sutias were probably more faithful to the sutras than the interpretations of Sarikara.

The Srlmadbhagavadgitd, which itself was a work of the Ekanti (singularistic) Vaisnavas, mentions the Brahma-sutras as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons 1 . Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sutras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in the Brahma-sutras are not with regard to the Vijnana-vada of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the Sunyavada, but he regards the composition o( the Brahma-sutras to be later than Nagar-juna. I agree with the late Dr S. C. Vidyabhushana in holding that both the Yogacara system and the system of Nagarjuna evolved from the Prajndpdramitd*. Nagarjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of Sunyavada ; but so far as the essentials of Sunyavada are concerned I believe that the Tathata philosophy of Asvaghosa and the philosophy of the Pra-jhdparamitd contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nagarjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the Mahaydna sutras. Even in such later times as that of Vacaspati MiSra, we find him quoting a passage of the Sdlistambha sutra to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of pratltya-samutpada 3 . We could interpret any reference to Sunyavada as pointing to Nagarjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in the Bhagavadglta to the Brahma-sutras clearly points out a date prior to that of Nagarjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the Bhagavadglta by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. The Brahma-sutras could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of the B/uzgavadgltd.

1 " Brahmasutrapadaiscaiva hetumadbhirviniscitah " Bhagavadglta. The proofs in support of the view that the Bhagavadglta is a Vaisnava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section on Bhagavadglta and its philosophy.

3 Indian Antiquary, 1915.

3 See Vacaspati Mi^ra's Bhamatl on Sankara's bhasya on Brahma-sutra, 11. ii.

I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gaudapada or Sankara, and who interpreted the Brahma-sutras in accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries on the Brahma-sutras, goes to show that the Brahma-sutras were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This also explains the fact that the Bhagavadgita, the canonical work of the Ekanti Vaisnavas, should refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gaudapada who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upanisads), either by writing a commentary as did Sankara, or by writing an independent work as did Gaudapada. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upanisads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upanisads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such Upanisads as the Svetasvatara, and the like. The epic Samkhya was also the result of this dualistic development.

It seems that Badarayana, the writer of the Brahma-sutras, was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his commentator Sankara. Gaudapada seems to be the most important man, after the Upanisad sages, who revived the monistic .tendencies of the Upanisads in a bold and clear form and tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems very significant that no other karikas on the Upanisads were interpreted, except the Mandukyakarika by Gaudapada, who did not himself make any reference to any other writer of the monistic school, not even Badarayana. Sankara himself makes the confession that the absolutist {advaita) creed was recovered from the Vedas by Gaudapada. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on Gaudapada's karika, he says that " he adores by falling at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly attainable even by the immortal

gods 1 ." It seems particularly significant that Sankara should credit Gaudapada and not Badarayana with recovering the Upanisad creed. Gaudapada was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Sankara ; but he was probably living when Sankara was a student, for Sankara says that he was directly influenced by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gaudapada 2 . There is some dispute about the date of Sankara, but accepting the date proposed by Bhandarkar, Pathak and Deussen, we may consider it to be 788 A.D. 3 , and suppose that in order to be able to teach Sankara, Gaudapada must have been living till at least 800 A.D. Gaudapada thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers Asvaghosa, Nagarjuna, Asariga and Vasubandhu ; and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his karikas for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upanisads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his karikas he says that he adores that great ma.r\(dvipaddm varani)\Aio by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (sambuddJid) that all appearances {dharma) were like the vacuous sky {gaga?iopamam i ). He then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (desitd) that the touch of untouch {asparsayoga —probably referring to Nirvana) was the good that produced happiness to all beings, and that he was neither in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction in it {avivadah aviruddhasca). Some disputants hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas others quarrelling with them hold that being {jdta) is of non-existents {abhutasya); there are others who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents nor non-existents are liable to being and there is one non-coming-into-being (advayamajatini). He agrees with those who hold that there is no coming into being 5 . In IV. 19 of his karika he again says that the Buddhas have shown that there was no coming into being in any way {sarvathd Biiddhairajatih paridipitaJi).

1 Sankara's bhasya on Gaudapada's karika, Anandasrama edition, p. 214.

2 Anandasrama edition of Sankara's bhasya on Gaudapada's karika, p. 21.

3 Telang wishes to put Sankara's date somewhere in the 8th century, and Venka-tesvara would have him in 805 A.D.-897 a.d., as he did not believe that Sankara could have lived only for 32 years. J. R. A.S. 1916.

4 Compare Lahkavatara, p. 29, Katham ca gaganopamam.

5 Gaudapada's karika, IV. 2, 4.

Again, in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (vastu-vddi), who since they found things and could deal with them and were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken of origination {jdti). In IV. 90 he refers to agraydna which we know to be a name of MaJidydna. Again, in IV. 98 and 99 he says that all appearances are pure and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated one {mzikta) and the leaders know first. It was not said by the Buddha that all appearances (dharma) were knowledge. He then closes the karikas with an adoration which in all probability also refers to the Buddha 1 .

Gaudapada's work is divided into four chapters: (1) Agama (scripture), (2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4) Ala-tasanti (the extinction of the burning coal). The first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Mandukya Upanisad by virtue of which the entire work is known as Mdndukyakdrikd. The second, third, and fourth chapters are the constructive parts of Gaudapada's work, not particularly connected with the Mandukya Upanisad.

In the first chapter Gaudapada begins with the three apparent manifestations of the self: (1) as the experiencer of the external world while we are awake {visva or vaisvdnara dtmd), (2) as the experiencer in the dream state (taijasa dtmd), (3) as the experiencer in deep sleep (susupti), called the prdjha when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness and pure bliss (dnanda). He who knows these three as one is never attached to his experiences. Gaudapada then enumerates some theories of creation : some think that the world has proceeded as a creation from the prana (vital activity), others consider creation as an expansion {vibhuti) of that cause from which it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like dream (svapnd) and magic (mdyd); others, that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord; others that it proceeds from time; others that it is for the enjoyment of the Lord (bhogdrthani) or for his play only {kriddrtham), for such is the nature (svabhdvd) of the Lord, that he creates, but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are in a state of fulfilment.

1 Gaudapada's karika, iv. ioo. In my translation I have not followed Sarikara, for he has I think tried his level best to explain away even the most obvious references to Buddha and Buddhism in Gaudapada's karika. I have, therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gaudapada's karikas seemed to indicate. I have followed the same principle in giving the short exposition of Gaudapada's philosophy below.

Gaudapada does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (adrstd), unrelationable (avyavaJiaryani), ungraspable (agrdhyam), indefinable (alaksand), unthinkable (acintyam), unspeakable (avya-padesya), the essence as oneness with the self (ekdtmapratya-yasdra), as the extinction of the appearance (prapancopasamd), the quiescent (sdntam), the good (swam), the one {advaitdf. The world-appearance (prapancd) would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere maya (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (paramarthatali). In the second chapter Gaudapada says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only; external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside are all imaginary productions in association with the sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a perceiver or soul (j'iva) and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither any production nor any destruction (na nirodho, na cotpattUi), there is no one who is enchained, no one who is striving, no one who wants to be released' 2 . Imagination finds itself realized in the non-existent existents and also in the sense

1 Compare in Nagarjuna's first karika the idea of prapancopasamam sivam. Anirodhamanutpouiamamicchedamasasvatam anekartkamanandrthamanagamamanir-gamam yah pratityasa.7nutpadam prapancopasamam sivam desaydmdsa sambuddhastam vande vadatamvaram. Compare also Nagarjuna's Chapter on Nii-vanapariksd, Pfirvo-palambhopasamah prapancopasaviah sivah na kvacit kasyacit kascit dharmmo bud-dhmadesitah. So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use the words prapaii-ccpaiaman sivam.

2 Compare Nagarjuna's karika, " aniiodhamanutpadam" in Madhyamikavrtti, B. T. S., p. 3.

of unity; all imagination either as the many or the one (advaya) is false ; it is only the oneness (advayata) that is good. There is no many, nor are things different or non-different (na nanedam .. .na prthag naprthaky. The sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance (nirvikalpah prapaiicopasamaJi), the one 2 .

In the third chapter Gaudapada says that truth is like the void (dkdsa) which is falsely conceived as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies ; but howsoever it be conceived, it is all the while not different from akasa. All things that appear as compounded are but dreams (svapnd) and maya (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon the one (advaita) by maya. The truth is immortal, it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change. It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold is but the result of an imposition of maya upon it 3 . One mind appears as many in the dream, so also in the waking state one appears as many, but when the mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final cessation. Thinking everything to be misery (duhkham sarvam anusmrtya) one should stop all desires and enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth he should not see any production at all. He should awaken the mind {citta) into its final dissolution (Jayd) and pacify it when distracted; he should not move it towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not taste any pleasure (sukhani) and by wisdom remain unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into distraction ; when there is no sign, no appearance that is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge to come into being, the unproduced is then called the omniscent (sarvajiid).

In the fourth chapter, called the Alatasanti, Gaudapada further

1 Compare Madhyamikakarika, B. T. S., p. 3, anekartham aiulndrtham, etc.

2 Compare Lankavatarasiitra, p. 78, Advayasamsdraparinirvanavatsarvadhar-mhh tasmdt tarhi mahamate Sunyatdmtipddddvayanihsvabhdvalaksane yogah kara-riiyah ; also 8, 46, Yaduta svacittavisayavikalpadrstydnavabodhandt vijiianandm svacitladrfyamatranavatarena mahamate valaprthagjanah bhavabhtivasvabhavapara-marthadrstidvayavadino bhavanti.

3 Compare Nagarjuna's karika, B. T. S., p. 196, AkaSam safasp'iganca ba»-dhyayah putra eva ca asantascabhivyajyante tathabhavtna kalpana, with Gaudapada's karika, III. 28, Asato miiyaya janma iatvato naiva jayate bandhyaputro na tattvena mayaya vapi jayate.

describes this final state 1 . All the dharmas (appearances) are vyithout death or decay 2 . Gaudapada then follows a dialectical form of argument which reminds us of Nagarjuna. Gaudapada continues thus: Those who regard karana (cause) as the karyya (effect in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly unproduced (aja), for it suffers production ; how can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said that things come into being from that which has no production, there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated. Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which has itself suffered production. How again can one come to a right conclusion about the regressus ad infinitum of cause and effect (Iietu and phald)} Without reference to the effect there is no cause, and without reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born either by itself or through others; call it either being, non-being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth, neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its own nature {svabha-vataJi), and thus that which has no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production. All experience {prajnapti) is dependent on reasons, for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none of the afflictions (samklesd) that we suffer. When we look at all things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons. The mind (cittd) does not come in touch with objects and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge. It is not in any particular case that the mind produces the manifestations of objects while they do not exist so that it could be said to be an error, for in present, past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (khe), for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity. Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence then is the absence of

1 The very name Alatasanti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare Nagarjuna's karika, B. T. S., p. 206, where he quotes a verse from the Sataka.

2 The use of the word dharina in the sense of appearance or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense is that given by Jaimini, " Codanalaksanah arthah, dharmah." Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.

production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant {mdydhasti) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (vijiiana) is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness {avastutva), the cessation {sdntam). As the movement of burning charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is the movement (spanditd) of consciousness that appears as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes (e.g. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal fire, though in reality it does not possess them ; so also all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate any kind of causal relation between the consciousness and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated as unthinkable (acintyd). A thing {dravya) is the cause of a thing (dravyd), and that which is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor those which are not things, so neither are appearances produced from the mind (citta), nor is the mind produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (samsdra), but when that notion ceases there is no samsara. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (savivrti), there is therefore nothing permanent (sdsvata). Again, no existent things are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction {ucchedd). Appearances {dharma) are produced only apparently, not in reality; their coming into being is like maya, and that maya again does not exist. All appearances are like shoots of magic coming out of seeds of magic and are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary relative point of view (kalpita sainvrti) is not so in reality (para-mdrthd), for the existence depending on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist, do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist; that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are but thoughts with which fools are deluded.

It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Madhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nagarjuna's karikas and the Vijnanavada doctrines, as found in Lankavatara, that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gaudapada assimilated all the Buddhist Sunyavada and Vijnanavada teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upanisads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings which he believed to be his. Gaudapada took the smallest Upanisads to comment upon, probably because he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable vijnana or vacuity would hold good of the highest atman of the Upanisads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upanisad studies on Buddhist lines. How far the Upanisads guaranteed in detail the truth of Gaudapada's views it was left for his disciple, the great Sankara, to examine and explain.

Vedanta and Sankara (788-820 A.D.). Vedanta philosophy is the philosophy which claims to be the exposition of the philosophy taught in the Upanisads and summarized in the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The Upanisads form the last part of the Veda literature, and its philosophy is therefore also called sometimes the Uttara-Mlmamsa or the Mlmamsa (decision) of the later part of the Vedas as distinguished from the Mlmamsa of the previous part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas as incorporated in the Purvamimamsa sutras of Jaimini. Though these Brahma-sutras were differently interpreted by different exponents, the views expressed in the earliest commentary on them now available, written by Saiikaracarya, have attained wonderful celebrity, both on account of the subtle and deep ideas it contains, and also on account of the association of the illustrious personality of Sankara. So great is the influence of the philosophy propounded by Sankara and elaborated by his illustrious followers, that whenever we speak of the Vedanta philosophy we mean the philosophy that was propounded by Sankara. If other expositions are intended the names of the exponents have to be mentioned (e.g. Ramanuja-mata,Vallabha-mata, etc.). In this

chapter we shall limit ourselves to the exposition of the Vedanta philosophy as elaborated by Sankara and his followers. In San-kara's work (the commentaries on the Brahma-sutra and the ten Upanisads) many ideas have been briefly incorporated which as found in Safikara do not appear to be sufficiently clear, but are more intelligible as elaborated by his followers. It is therefore better to take up the Vedanta system, not as we find it in Sankara, but as elaborated by his followers, all of whom openly declare that they are true to their master's philosophy.

For the other Hindu systems of thought, the sutras (Jaimini sutra, Nyaya sutra, etc.) are the only original treatises, and no foundation other than these is available. In the case of the Vedanta however the original source is the Upanisads, and the sutras are but an extremely condensed summary in a systematic form. Sankara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original system, but interpreted the sutras and the Upanisads in order to show that there existed a connected and systematic philosophy in the Upanisads which was also enunciated in the sutras of Badarayana. The Upanisads were a part of the Vedas and were thus regarded as infallible by the Hindus. If Sankara could only show that his exposition of them was the right one, then his philosophy being founded upon the highest authority would be accepted by all Hindus. The most formidable opponents in the way of accomplishing his task were the Mlmamsists, who held that the Vedas did not preach any philosophy, for whatever there was in the Vedas was to be interpreted as issuing commands to us for performing this or that action. They held that if the Upanisads spoke of Brahman and demonstrated the nature of its pure essence, these were mere exaggerations intended to put the commandment of performing some kind of worship of Brahman into a more attractive form. Sankara could not deny that the purport of the Vedas as found in the Brahmanas was explicitly of a mandatory nature as declared by the Mlmamsa, but he sought to prove that such could not be the purport of the Upanisads, which spoke of the truest and the highest knowledge of the Absolute by which the wise could attain salvation. He said that in the karmakanda—the (sacrificial injunctions) Brahmanas of the Vedas—the purport of the Vedas was certainly of a mandatory nature, as it was intended for ordinary people who were anxious for this or that pleasure,

and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upanisads, which were intended for the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute, Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of persons. Sarikara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis, induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upanisads, and by reference to the content of passages in the Upanisads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upanisads was in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prakrti, etc. of the Samkhya. He had also to interpret the few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upanisads consistently with the Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upanisads as he expounded it was a consistent system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation of the Upanisads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhasya on the Brahma-sutras but also in his commentaries on the Upanisads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upanisad texts, and to persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upanisads as the absolute truth. His disciples followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyaya and other systems had put forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vedanta epistem-ology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the maya, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and other relevant topics. Many problems of great philosophical interest which

had been left out or slightly touched by Sarikara were discussed fully by his followers. But it should always be remembered that philosophical reasonings and criticisms are always to be taken as but aids for convincing our intellect and strengthening our faith in the truth revealed in the Upanisads. The true work of logic is to adapt the mind to accept them. Logic used for upsetting the instructions of the Upanisads is logic gone astray. Many lives of Sarikaracarya were written in Sanskrit such as the Sankara-digvijaya, Sahkara-vijaya-vilasa, Sahkara-jaya, etc. It is regarded as almost certain that he was born between 700 and 800 A.D. in the Malabar country in the Deccan. His father Sivaguru was a Yajurvedi Brahmin of the Taittirlya branch. Many miracles are related of Sarikara, and he is believed to have been the incarnation of Siva. He turned ascetic in his eighth year and became the disciple of Govinda, a renowned sage then residing in a mountain cell on the banks of the Narbuda. He then came over to Benares and thence went to Badarikasrama. It is said that he wrote his illustrious bhasya on the Brahma-sutra in his twelfth year. Later on he also wrote his commentaries on ten Upanisads. He returned to Benares, and from this time forth he decided to travel all over India in order to defeat the adherents of other schools of thought in open debate. It is said that he first went to meet Kumarila, but Kumarila was then at the point of death, and he advised him to meet Rumania's disciple. He defeated Mandana and converted him into an ascetic follower of his own. He then travelled in various places, and defeating his opponents everywhere he established his Vedanta philosophy, which from that time forth acquired a dominant influence in moulding the religious life of India.

Sarikara carried on the work of his teacher Gaudapada and by writing commentaries on the ten Upanisads and the Brahma-sutras tried to prove, that the absolutist creed was the one which was intended to be preached in the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutras 1 . Throughout his commentary on the Brakma-sutras, there is ample evidence that he was contending against some other rival interpretations of a dualistic tendency which held that the Upanisads partly favoured the Samkhya cosmology

1 The main works of Sahkara are his commentaries (bhasya) on the ten Upanisads (I£a, Kena, Katha, Pra^na, Mundaka, Mandiikya, Aitareya, Taittirlya, Brhadaran-yaka, and Chandogya), and on the Brahma-sit ti-a.

of the existence of prakrti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the Brahma-sutras is proved by the fact that Sankara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty 1 . In one place he says that others (referring according to Vacaspati to the Mlmamsa) and some of us (referring probably to those who interpreted the sutras and the Upanisads from the Vedanta point of view) think that the soul is permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the self (atmaikatvd) that this Sariraka commentary of mine is being attempted 2 . Ramanuja, in the introductory portion of his bhasya on the Brahma-sutra, says that the views of Bodhayana who wrote an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sutra were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhayana bhasya in writing his commentary. In the Vedarthasamgraha of Ramanuja mention is made of Bodhayana, Tarika,Guhadeva,Kapardin,Bharuci as Vedantic authorities, and Dravidacaryya is referred to as the "bhasyakara" commentator. In Chandogya III. x. 4, where the Upanisad cosmology appeared to be different from the Visnupurana cosmology, Sari-kara refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls "acaryya" (atroktah pariharah acdryyaili) and Anandagiri says that "acaryya" there refers to Dravidacaryya. This Dravidacaryya is known to us from Ramanuja's statement as being a commentator of the dualistic school, and we have evidence here that he had written a commentary on the Chandogya Upanisad. A study of the extant commentaries on the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana by the adherents of different schools of thought leaves us convinced that these sutras were regarded by all as condensations of the teachings of the Upanisads. The differences of opinion were with regard to the meaning of these sutras and the Upanisad texts to which references were made by them in each particular case. The Brahma-sutra is divided into four adhyayas or books, and each of these is divided into four chapters or padas. Each of these contains a number of topics of discussion (adhikarand) which are composed of a number of sutras, which raise the point at issue, the points that lead to doubt and uncertainty, and the considerations that should lead one to favour

1 See note on p. 432.

2 Sankara's bhasya on the Brahma-sutras, 1. iii. 19.

a particular conclusion. As explained by Sankara, most of these sutras except the first four and the first two chapters of the second book are devoted to the textual interpretations of the Upanisad passages. Sarikara's method of explaining the absolutist Vedanta creed does not consist in proving the Vedanta to be a consistent system of metaphysics, complete in all parts, but in so interpreting the Upanisad texts as to show that they all agree in holding the Brahman to be the self and that alone to be the only truth. In Chapter I of Book II Sankara tries to answer some of the objections that may be made from the Samkhya point of view against his absolutist creed and to show that some apparent difficulties of the absolutist doctrine did not present any real difficulty. In Chapter II of Book II he tries to refute the Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisesika, the Buddhist, Jaina, Bha-gavata and Saiva systems of thought. These two chapters and his commentaries on the first four sutras contain the main points of his system. The rest of the work is mainly occupied in showing that the conclusion of the sutras was always in strict agreement with the Upanisad doctrines. Reason with Sankara never occupied the premier position; its value was considered only secondary, only so far as it helped one to the right understanding of the revealed scriptures, the Upanisads. The ultimate truth cannot be known by reason alone. What one debater shows to be reasonable a more expert debater shows to be false, and what he shows to be right is again proved to be false by another debater. So there is no final certainty to which we can arrive by logic and argument alone. The ultimate truth can thus only be found in the Upanisads; reason, discrimination and judgment are all to be used only with a view to the discovery of the real purport of the Upanisads. From his own position Sankara was not thus bound to vindicate the position of the Vedanta as a thoroughly rational system of metaphysics. For its truth did not depend on its rationality but on the authority of the Upanisads. But what was true could not contradict experience. If therefore Sarikara's interpretation of the Upanisads was true, then it would not contradict experience. Sankara was therefore bound to show that his interpretation was rational and did not contradict experience. If he could show that his interpretation was the only interpretation that was faithful to the Upanisads, and that its apparent contradictions with experience could in some way be explained,

he considered that he had nothing more to do. He was not writing a philosophy in the modern sense of the term, but giving us the whole truth as taught and revealed in the Upanisads and not simply a system spun by a clever thinker, which may erroneously appear to be quite reasonable. Ultimate validity does not belong to reason but to the scriptures.

He started with the premise that whatever may be the reason It is a fact that all experience starts and moves in an error which identifies the self with the body, the senses, or the objects of the senses. All cognitive acts presuppose this illusory identification, for without it the pure self can never behave as a phenomenal knower or perceiver, and without such a perceiver there would be no cognitive act. Sarikara does not try to prove philosophically the existence of the pure self as distinct from all other things, for he is satisfied in showing that the Upanisads describe the pure self unattached to any kind of impurity as the ultimate truth. This with him is a matter to which no exception can be taken, for it is so revealed in the Upanisads. This point being granted, the next point is that our experience is always based upon an identification of the self with the body, the senses, etc. and the imposition of all phenomenal qualities of pleasure, pain, etc. upon the self; and this with Sarikara is a beginningless illusion. All this had been said by Gaudapada. Sarikara accepted Gauda-pada's conclusions, but did not develop his dialectic for a positive proof of his thesis. He made use of the dialectic only for the refutation of other systems of thought. This being done he thought that he had nothing more to do than to show that his idea was in agreement with the teachings of the Upanisads. He showed that the Upanisads held that the pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss was the ultimate truth. This being accepted the world as it appears could not be real. It must be a mere magic show of illusion or maya. Sarikara never tries to prove that the world is maya, but accepts it as indisputable. For, if the self is what is ultimately real, the necessary conclusion is that all else is mere illusion or maya. He had thus to quarrel on one side with the Mlmamsa realists and on the other with the Samkhya realists, both of whom accepted the validity of the scriptures, but interpreted them in their own way. The Mlmamsists held that everything that is said in the Vedas is to be interpreted as requiring us to perform particular kinds of action,

or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upanisads being a part of the Veda should also be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in the Upanisads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. Sankara could not agree to such a view. For his main point was that the Upanisads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmakanda (those dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upanisads, the jnanakanda (those which declare the nature of ultimate truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Throughout his commentary on the Bhagavadglta Sankara tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions of the Veda and perform Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices, etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in that order they had no right to follow the higher teachings of the Upanisads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural duties). When they succeeded in purging their minds of all desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions, the field of karmamarga (the path of duties), and wanted to know the truth alone, they entered the jnanamarga (the way of wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vedanta was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no longer inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man intending to study the Vedanta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is eternal and what is transitory {nitydnityavastuviveka), (2) disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or of

the after world (ihdmutraphalabhogavirdgd), (3) attainment of peace, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration and faith (samadamddisddhanasampaf) and desire for salvation (mumuksutva). The person who had these qualifications should study the Upanisads, and as soon as he became convinced of the truth about the identity of the self and the Brahman he attained emancipation. When once a man realized that the self alone was the reality and all else was maya, all injunctions ceased to have any force with him. Thus, the path of duties {karma) and the path of wisdom (Jridna) were intended for different classes of persons or adhikarins. There could be no joint performance of Vedic duties and the seeking of the highest truth as taught in the Upanisads {jndna-karma-samiiccaydbhdvali). As against the dualists he tried to show that the Upanisads never favoured any kind of dualistic interpretations. The main difference between the Vedanta as expounded by Gaudapada and as explained by Sarikara consists in this, that Sarikara tried as best he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition of the former and to formulate the philosophy as a direct interpretation of the older Upanisad texts. In this he achieved remarkable success. He was no doubt regarded by some as a hidden Buddhist {pracchanna Banddhd), but his influence on Hindu thought and religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine person or an incarnation. His immediate disciples, the disciples of his disciples, and those who adhered to his doctrine in the succeeding generations, tried to build a rational basis for his system in a much stronger way than Sarikara did. Our treatment of Sarikara's philosophy has been based on the interpretations of Vedanta thought, as offered by these followers of Sarikara. These interpretations are nowhere in conflict with Sarikara's doctrines, but the questions and problems which Sarikara did not raise have been raised and discussed by his followers, and without these one could not treat Vedanta as a complete and coherent system of metaphysics. As these will be discussed in the later sections, we may close this with a short description of some of the main features of the Vedanta thought as explained by Sarikara.

Brahman according to Sarikara is "the cause from which (proceeds) the origin or subsistence and dissolution of this world which is extended in names and forms, which includes many

agents and enjoyers, which contains the fruit of works specially determined according to space, time, and cause, a world which is formed after an arrangement inconceivable even by the (imagination of the) mind 1 ." The reasons that Sankara adduces for the existence of Brahman may be considered to be threefold: (1) The world must have been produced as the modification of something, but in the Upanisads all other things have been spoken of as having been originated from something other than Brahman, so Brahman is the cause from which the world has sprung into being, but we could not think that Brahman itself originated from something else, for then we should have a regresstis ad infinitum (anavastka). (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have come forth from a non-intelligent source. The intelligent source then from which this world has come into being is Brahman. (3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (saksi) which shines as the self, as well as through the objects of cognition which the self knows. It is thus the essence of us all, the self, and hence it remains undenied even when one tries to deny it, for even in the denial it shows itself forth. It is the self of us all and is hence ever present to us in all our cognitions.

Brahman according to Sankara is the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is the self of us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are identifying the self with thousands of illusory things, with all that we call " I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely without any touch of these phenomenal notions the nature of our true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual self as it appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure blessedness, and pure being.

All creation is illusory maya. But accepting it as maya, it may be conceived that God (Isvara) created the world as a, mere sport; from the true point of view there is no Isvara who creates the world, but in the sense in which the world exists, and we all exist as separate individuals, we can affirm the existence of Isvara, as engaged in creating and maintaining the world. In reality all creation is illusory and so the creator also is illusory. Brahman, the self, is at once the material cause (u/>dddna-kdrana) as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-karana) of the world.

1 &arikara's commentary, 1. i. 2. See also Deussen's System of the Vedanta.

There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause—a mere illusion of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and form (ndmarupa). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (vyavahdrika) as mere objects of name and form {ndmarupa), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality {pdramdrthikay.

The main idea of the Vedanta philosophy. The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the Sarikara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. While other systems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude in practical life towards them, Vedanta sought to reach beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm, the subject and the object. The famous instruction of Svetaketu, the most important Vedanta text {mahdvdkya) says, "That art thou, O Svetaketu." This comprehension of my self as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor instructs him, "That art thou." At once he becomes the truth itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence; all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the

1 All that is important in Sarikara's commentary of the Brahtna-sutras has been excellently systematised by Deussen in his System of the Vedanta ; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from the writings of his followers.

many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thine; the vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests, and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire and attachment with the world and had known the nature of his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly. The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mukti (salvation) meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded as an unconscious one by Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mlmamsa, and as a state of pure intelligence by Samkhya and Yoga. But with Vedanta the case is different, for it held that the world as such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired. As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance of the world process does not represent the ultimate and highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves really are, but do not also know what the world about us is. We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing

it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no doubt true that these experiences show us an established order having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth. They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as the absolute—the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance as experienced by us is thus often likened to the illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment the perception appears to be true and #ie man runs to pick it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again. The Upanisads tell us that he who sees the many here is doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sam-khya purusa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff is dissociated from it and merged in the prakrti, the Mlmamsa and the Nyaya soul is also incapable of knowing the world after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But the Vedanta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this

world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upanisads held that reality or truth was one, and there was "no many" anywhere, and Sarikara explained it by adding that the "many" was merely an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance is maya (illusion). This is what Sarikara emphasizes in expounding his constructive system of the Upanisad doctrine. The question is sometimes asked, how the maya becomes associated with Brahman. But Vedanta thinks this question illegitimate, for this association did not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons. In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion does not affect the unchangeable truth. Maya or illusion is no real entity, it is only false knowledge {avidya) that makes the appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found. Maya or avidya has an apparent existence only so long as it lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has existence so long as we are deluded by it (pratitika-satta). Maya therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded middle. For the maya can neither be said to be "is" nor "is not" (tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacafiiya). It cannot be said that such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent existence than the fact of their perception. If it has any creative function, that function is as illusive as its own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts. Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association with maya, for there can be no association of the real with the empty, the maya, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.

In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false—a mere product of maya. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither sat "is" nor asat "is not." Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not" is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "is not," since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in the air" or a hare's horn is "is not," for these are called tuccha, the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be "is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is sat (is), but since it does not exist for all times it is asat (is not). This is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (jagat-prapahcd) that it is neither sat nor asat in an absolute sense. Or rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the being, sat, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist, and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell, we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of illusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (this is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of silver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (sat), the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when the "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this" before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being {sat) though it is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance is an appearance which is different from what we know as real (sadvilaksaiid); for the real is known to us as that which is proved by the pramanas, and which will never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted; but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded as real 1 . Thus Brahman alone is true, and the world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth. The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself is also contradicted.

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous (svaprakasd) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things, ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called drsya (objects of consciousness), while it is the drasta (the pure consciousness comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as an expression of a mental state (vrtti), it is said to have a form and it becomes drsya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.

1 See Advaitastddhi, Mithydtvanirukti.

Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the Upanisad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakasa and drasta. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any form or mode. The notion of drsyatva (objectivity) carries with it also the notion of jadatva (materiality) or its nature as non-consciousness (ajjidnatva) and non-selfness (andtmatvd) which consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness. The relation of consciousness (jndna) to its objects cannot be regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence. In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss {dna/ida) shines forth, the ananda is not an object or form of the illuminating consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all finite determinations {paricchinna), whereas consciousness, the abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever. The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the individual appearances, there is no other class {jdti) such as cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different individual forms are illusorily imposed (ghatddikam sadarthe-kalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pratlyamdnatvdf). So this world-appearance which is essentially different from the Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it is imposed, is false {updddnanisthdtyantdbhdvapratiyogitvalak-sanamithydtvasiddhih —as Citsukha has it).

The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called prdtibkdsika, as they are contradicted by other

later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called vyavahdrika (from vyavahara, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true. It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedanta it is sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (sattva) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedanta answers that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and independence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth. Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is the being {sat) and not its forms. This being that is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events and appearances (ekenaiva sarvanugatena sarvatra satpratltik). Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (sat) as Nyaya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis (adhistJiana) on which the illusions appear. This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances. Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and sruti (scriptures) did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and sruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by iiiference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend {upajivya) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (pariksa), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedanta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedanta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upanisads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (drk) and the objects of consciousness {drsya). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (samyoga) nor inherence (samavdya) ; and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jnatata of Mimamsa vs produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admis^rble or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhakara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (Jndna-kdrand) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement ? Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedanta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states {vrtti) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without ? The answer that the Vedanta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (sat) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by association with the vrtti (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajnana (nescience). This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or vrtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the vrtti the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajnana which is removed by the action of the corresponding vrtti; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the vrtti of the mind, and the vrtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding ajnana veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the vrtti the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell) take place not because the dosa consisting of the defect of the eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong vrtti. It is because of the generation of the wrong vrtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion "this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the cit, consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by "this" or "idam" that is the basis (adhisthdnd) of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (ajfidna) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state {vrtti), so that the illusion is not of the form that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the cit being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the vrtti there is no illuminating knowledge. Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification {vrtti). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedanta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations {upddhi). It manifests ajfiana (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the ajfiana, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of vrtti. There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well as their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or vrttis.

The phenomena or objects called the drsya can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of any relation such as samyoga (contact) or samavaya (inherence)

between them and the pure consciousness called the drk ; for the truth is this, that the drk (perceiver) and the drsya (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere "this" can be. The answer of Vedanta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground (adhisthana) of the world-appearance its characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is," the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion. In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedanta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations. According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies (samskara) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (svena adhyastasya samskarasya viyaddd-yadhyasajanakatvopapatteh tatpratityabhavepi tadadhydsasya piir-vam sattvat krtsnasyapi vyavaharikapadartliasya ajiiatasattva-fthyupagamdf). It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (adhisthana) and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance. To this Vedanta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or pitta). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by adrsta —the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds. In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other dosa (defect) than the avidya (nescience) which constitutes the appearance. Here avidya is the only dosa and Brahman is the only adhisthana or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the adhisthana, the illusory creations could not have been manifested at all. The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhisthana. Hence where the adhisthana is hidden by the veil of avidya, the association with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhisthana. As soon as the adhisthana, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear. The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajnana (nescience).

Ajnana the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (anddi-bhavarupatve sati jiiananivartyatvani). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (bhdvarupd) it can very well constitute the essence of negation {abhava) too, for the positivity {blidvatvd) does not mean here the opposite of abhava (negation) but notes merely its difference from abhava (abhava-vilaksauatvamdtram vivaksitani). Ajnana is not a positive entity (bhdva) like any other positive entity, but it is called positive simply because it is not a mere negation {abhava). It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes objected that ajnana is a mere illusory imagination of the moment caused by defect (dosa) and hence it cannot be beginningless {anddi) ; but Vedanta holds that the fact that it is an imagination or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajnana therefore being ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajnana is the indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedantists however define ajnana as the substance constituting illusion, and say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what is necessary for the notion of a material cause (updddnd) is this, that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in and through the effects which are produced in the time process. Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajfiana which also is unreal should be the cause of it.

Ajnana established by Perception and Inference.

Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as " I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else," or " I do not know what you say," or more particularly " I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything." Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. It may be objected that the perception " I do not know" is not the perception of the indefinite, the ajnana, but merely the negation of knowledge. To this Vedanta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied. A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception "I do not know or I had no knowledge" does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajnana is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative.but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there. Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things ; similarly a general negation without any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception " I do not know " can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do not know " is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajnana. It is our common experience

that after experiencing the indefinite {ajnd?id) of a specific type we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving consciousness (sdksi) is such that both the root ajnana as well as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented in mental states {vrtti-jhdnd), are comprehended by it. Of course when the vrttijnana about a thing as in ordinary perceptions of objects comes in, the ajnana with regard to it is temporarily removed, for the vrttijnana is opposed to the ajnana. But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (sdksi-caitanya) is conceived it can comprehend both the ajnana and the jiiana (knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all positives either as indefinite ajnana or as states of knowledge or as specific kinds of ajnana or ignorance, but it is unable to comprehend a negation, for negation (abhdva) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (anupalabdhi). Thus when I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from the Nyaya point of view that since without the knowledge of a qualification {visesand) the qualified thing (visistd) cannot be known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness without the object being known first. To this Vedanta replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive. Even the naiyayikas would agree that in the expression " there is no negation of a jug here," no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to object that such perceptions as " I do not know" refer to the perception of an indefinite ajnana in consciousness. So also the perception " I do not know what you say " is not the perception of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is impossible to say " I do not know what you say."

So also the cognition " I was sleeping long and did not know anything " has to be admitted as referring to the perception of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the awakened man as " I did not know anything so long " is only an inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is by the impression (sainskdra) of the aforesaid mental state of ajnana that one remembers that state and says that " I did not perceive anything so long." The indefinite (ajnana) perceived in consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere negation of knowledge (jndndbhava) and the two are so connected that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajnana may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we say " I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the darkness 1 . Apart from such an inference its exist -

1 See Pancapadikavivaratia, Tattvadipana, and Advaitasiddhi.

ence is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajnana to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajnana there would have been no illusion. It is the ajnana that constitutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajnana is manifested by the perceiving consciousness (sdksi) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidya (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajnana, Ahamkara, and Antahkarana.

This ajnana rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states {vrtti). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego "aham" or the individual soul. Vacaspati Misra however holds that the ajnana does not rest on the pure cit but on the jlva (individual soul). Madhava reconciles this view of Vacaspati with the above view, and says that the ajnana may be regarded as resting on the jlva or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jlva (Cinmdtrdsritam ajndnam jivapaksapdtitvdt jivdsritam ncyate Vivaranaprameya, p. 48). The feeling " I do not know" seems however to indicate that the ajnana is with reference to the perceiving self in association with its feeling as ego or " I "; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close association of ajnana with antahkarana (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see Vivaranaprameyasarngraha,

P- 48).

The ajnana however does not only rest on the cit, but it has the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajnana is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the visaya,

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not shine (jidsti na prakasate iti zyava/uirak) or rather there is no appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajnana means nothing more than this, that it is such (tadyogyata) that the ajnana can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajnana-consciousness in experience. Ajnana is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajnana is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajnana is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajnana has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajnana are technically called tulajnana or avasthajnana. Any state of consciousness (vrttijnana) removes a manifestation of the ajnana as tulajnana and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajnana as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or ahamkara. This notion of ahamkara is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations held up in the mind (antahkarana) with the real, the false with

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the antahkarana taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so here also when I say " I perceive " there are two distinct elements of the self as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the antahkarana, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self. Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and the other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhakara sought to repudiate. Prabhakara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (triputi), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the antahkarana are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (anubhava) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilling of its purpose. But the Vedanta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara's supposition it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumarila thinks this thought (amibhava) to be a movement, Nyaya and Prabhakara as a quality of the self 1 . But if it were a movement like other move-ments,it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all-pervasive then it wbuld illuminate everything, if of medium size it would depend on its parts for its own

1 According to Nyaya the atman is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness (cit). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus Nyayamanjari in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity (svaprakala) says (p. 432)

sacelanascita yogattadyogeiia vina jadah narthavabhasadanyaddhi caitanyatii na?na manmahe.

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced ? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the atman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijfiana, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous 1 .

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet ahamkara is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels " I slept happily and did not know anything " : yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the antahkarana and the ahamkara are altogether submerged in the ajfiana, and there are only the ajfiana and the self; on waking, this ahamkara as a state of antahkarna is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajfiana in the sleep and originates the perception " I did not know anything." This ahamkara which is a mode {vrtti) of the antahkarana is thus constituted by avidya, and is manifested as jfianasakti (power of knowledge) and kriyasakti (power of work). This kriyasakti of the ahamkara is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The ahamkara itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or vrtti of the antahkarana, and as such the ahamkara of a past period can now be associated; but even then the vrtti of antahkarana, ahamkara, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of. the antahkarana. The same antahkarana is called manas in its capacity as doubt, buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering 2 . When the pure cit shines forth in association with this antahkarana, it is called a jiva. It is clear from the above account that the ajfiana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (asraya) ; its own nature as the ajfiana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as under-

1 See Nyayamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citsukha and Vivaranaframeyasamgraha, PP- 53-58-

2 See Vedanta-paribhasd, p. 88, Bombay edition.

lying these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the antahkarana, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The antahkarana of which ahamkara is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajnana-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jlva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it ? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have onlya temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

examined, and one cannot make any such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by Srlharsa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality. I shall give here only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (bheda) from Khatid(i7iakhandakhadya. Four explanations are possible of the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (svarupa-bheda) as Prabhakara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (anyonyabhava), as some Naiyayikas and Bhattas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics {vaidharmya) as the Vaisesikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the prthaktva quality of Nyaya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves by their very form and existence their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we perceive only its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug? i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of difference between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived ? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug ? If the difference from the cloth be the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

the jug only indicates that it is a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.-The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same difficulty arises ; for when I say that the absence or negation of jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be explained. If this mutual negation (anyonyabhavd) is explained as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded; and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics (vaidJiarmyci), then the question arises whether the vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless vaidharmyas progressing ad infinitum. If the answer is in the negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the other, then apart from the differences—the natural forms—the things are reduced to formlessness (nihsvariipata). If natural forms (svaricpa) mean special natural forms (svarupa-visesd) then as the special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there is no such quality as prthaktva (separateness) which can explain differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it exists or not, and so forth.

The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters of Kathdvatthu. In the great Mahabhasya on Panini by Patanjali also we find some traces of it. But Nagarjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the void (sunyd). Sankara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyaya and the Buddhist systems; but Srlharsa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyaya system, sought to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible definitions that the Nyaya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedantic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajnana produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of maya or ajnana, are indefinable or anirvacanlya. This great work of Sriharsa was followed by Tattvadipika of Citsukha, in which he generally followed Srlharsa and sometimes supplemented him with the addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of Vedanta thus followed on one side the method of Sunyavada in annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other Vijnanavada Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous ultimate reality.

The Theory of Causation.

The Vedanta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedanta had before it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. In fact the concept of causation and production had in it something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The Nyaya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyaya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually dependent upon each other (anyo7iyasraya) neither of these can be conceived independently. Another important condition is invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman's house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke 1 . If it means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contri-

1 Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.

buting to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special kind of effect (cf. Vatsyayana and Nydyamanjart), for out of the same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does it mean the factors themselves or something else above them ? On the former supposition the scattered factors being always present in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means something else above the specific factors, then that something always existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation (sdmagri) be defined as the last movement of the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible. Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajnana of maya, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajfiana or avidya. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable, and so illusory. The one truth is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what is called the satkdryavdda or more properly the satkdra?iavdda of the Vedanta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the vivarttavdda as distinguished from the sdmkhyayogaparind-mavdda, in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called vivartta but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called parinama {karanasvalaksaiianyathabhavah parindmah tadvilak-sano vivarttah or vastitnastatsamattdkdnyathdblidvah parindmak tadvisamasattakah vivarttah). Vedanta has as much to object against the Nyaya as against the parinama theory of causation of the Samkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality—all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (Tada-bhedam vinaiva tadvyatirekena durvacam kdryyam vivarttah).

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the world, the different followers of Sarikara Vedanta in explaining the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the maya, ajfiana or avidya, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes on them both. Thus Sarvajnatmamuni, the writer of Sanksepa-sariraka and his followers think that the pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance (upaddna) of the world-appearance, whereas Prakasatman Akhandananda, and

Madhava hold that Brahman in association with maya, i.e. the maya-reflected form of Brahman as Isvara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or parinama of the maya as located in Isvara, whereas IsVara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a distinction between maya as the cosmical factor of illusion and avidya as the manifestation of the same entity in the individual or jiva. They hold that though the world-appearance may be said to be produced by the maya yet the mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the avidya with the jiva or the individual as the causal matter {upadana). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom both Isvara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jiva in association with his avidya or ajnana. Others however hold that since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and maya are to be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal matter, upadana and maya as the entity evolving in parinama. Vacaspati Misra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through maya as associated with jiva. Maya is thus only a sahakari or instrument as it were, by which the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jiva as the manifold world of appearance. Prakasananda holds however in his Sid-dhanta Muktdvali that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the product of maya, which is both the instrumental and the upadana (causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect the principal Vedanta text that the only unchangeable cause is the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word maya was used in the Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the Brhadaranyaka, Prasna, and Svetasvatara Upanisads the word means magic. It is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upanisads

the word maya. occurs only once in the Brhadaranyaka and once only in the Prasna. In early Pali Buddhist writings it occurs only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhaghosa uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nagarjuna and the Lah-kavatara it has acquired the sense of illusion. In Sankara the word maya is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle of creation as a sakti (power) or accessory cause, and as the phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gaudapada the teacher of Sankara's teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help of the maya doctrine. The Upanisads are permeated with the spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gaudapada asserts clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that the world does not exist in reality, that it is maya, and not reality. When the highest truth is realized maya is not removed, for it is not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gaudapada who compared the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and unreal. The atman says Gaudapada is at once the cognizer and the cognized, the world subsists in the atman through maya. As atman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily follows that all experience is also illusory. Sankara expounded this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra, but he seems to me to have done little more than making explicit the doctrine of maya. Some of his followers however examined and thought over the concept of maya and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable thereby substantially contributing to the development of the Vedanta philosophy.

Vedanta theory of Perception and Inference 1 .

Pramana is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

1 Dharmarajadhvarindra and his son Ramakrsna worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedantic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedanta metaphysics. The early Vedantists were more interested in

pramana is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge {pramd) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (abadhitarthavisayajnanatva). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (anadhigatd) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedanta considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as having remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of a previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state representing the book is not changed every second, and hence there can be no such supposition that I am having separate mental states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmarajadhvarlndra he was largely indebted to the Mimamsa school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamana sabda and anupalabdhi also Dharmarajadhvarlndra accepted the Mimamsa view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarajadhvarlndra, had also tacitly followed the Mimamsa in these matters.

addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the absolute is realized.

When the antahkarana (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the antahkarana has been transformed into a state (vrtti) 1 . As soon as the antahkarana has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance {ajnana) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness (cit) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a vrtti of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-sup-poses that by the action of ajnana, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (ajnana), the former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of ajnana which is neither real nor unreal. It is the nature of ajnana that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the ajnana by its creating (viksepd) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (dvarand) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with antahkarana through the senses the antahkarana becomes transformed into the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil on that particular ajnana form—the object, and as the self-shining cit is shining through the particular ajnana state, we have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the ajnana has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

1 Vedanta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same antahkarana, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, ahamkara, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness ahamkara, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (vrtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of ajnana as antahkarana).

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajnana forms so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentia-tion (abhedd) of the subjective consciousness with the objective consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the specific mental states {tattadindriyayogyavisaydvacchinnacaitanyd-bJminatvam tattaddkdravisaydvacchinnajndnasya tattadamse pra-tyaksatvam). This union in perception means that the objective has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the antahkarana is called jivasaksi.

Inference (anuvidna), according to Vedanta, is made by our notion of concomitance {vydptijiidna) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (samskdra). Thus when I see smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is generated by the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known ivyabhicdrdjiidnd) regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases {bku-yodarsanam sakrddarsanam veti viseso nddaraniyafi). Vedanta is not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedanta whether this concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance (anvayavydpti) that the Vedanta allows. So the Vedanta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyaya supported, viz. anvayavyatircki (by joining agreement in presence with agreement in absence), kevaldnvayi (by universal agreement where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

kevalavyatireki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedanta advocates three premisses, viz. (i) pratijna (the hill is fiery); (2) Ji£tu (because it has smoke) and (3) drstanta (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyaya maintained 1 . Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedanta as being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (Brah-mabhinnam sarvam mithya Brahmabhinnatvat yedevam tadevam yatha suktirupyam). First premiss (pratijna) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (Jietii) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss (drstanta) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch 2 .

Atman, Jiva, Isvara, EkajTvavada and Drstisrstivada.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (svayamprakasa). But what does this mean? Vedanta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati aparoksavya-vaharayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. I f consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum (anavastha). If consciousness did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness (aniibhuti) manifests itself and thereby maintains the ap-

1 Vedanta would have either pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or udaharana, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyaya, viz. pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamana.

2 Vedantic notions of the pramana of upamana, arthapatti, £abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mimarnsa view, do not require to be treated here separately.

pearance of all our world experience. This goes directly against the jnatata theory of Kumarila that consciousness was not immediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality {jnatata) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedanta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association comprehended under the term ahamkara (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the atman is not the same as the jiva or individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences of worldly life. Isvara also must be distinguished from this highest atman or Brahman. We have already seen that many Vedantists draw a distinction between maya and avidya. Maya is that aspect of ajnana by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidya is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (viksepd) type, whereas in the latter veiling (avarand) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with maya and avidya (also called ajnana) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal Isvara and the phenomenal jiva or individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upadhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when we speak of akasa (space) in the jug or of aka£a in the room. The akasa in reality does not suffer

any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (avac/iinna) within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the akasa limited within it will remain as separate from the akasa limited within the room.

Of the Vedantists who accept the reflection analogy the followers of Nrsimhasrama think that when the pure cit is reflected in the maya, Isvara is phenomenally produced, and when in the avidya the individual or jlva. Sarvajnatma however does not distinguish between the maya and the avidya, and thinks that when the cit is reflected in the avidya in its total aspect as cause, we get Isvara, and when reflected in the antahkarana—a product of the avidya—we have jlva or individual soul.

Jlva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jlva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antahkarana is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajfiana and the jlva in this state is called prajna or anandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called visva. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with maya it is called Isvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virat purusa.

The jlva in itself as limited by its avidya is often spoken of as paramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavaharika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, pratibhasika (illusory).

Prakasatma and his followers think that since ajfiana is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jlva and Isvara; but it is better to admit that jlva is the image of Isvara in the ajfiana. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with maya is Isvara, and this when again reflected through the ajfiana gives us the jlva. The manifestation of the jlva is in the antahkarana as states of knowledge. The jlva thus in reality is Isvara and apart from jlva and Isvara there is no other separate existence of

Brahma-caitanya. Jlva being the image of Isvara is thus dependent on him, but when the limitations of jlva are removed by right knowledge, the jlva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jlva is cit limited (avac-chinna) by the antahkarana (mind). Isvara is that which is beyond it; the diversity of antahkaranas accounts for the diversity of the jlvas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending the relation of Isvara and jlva. In the Vedanta system IsVara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jlva and Isvara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedantists hold that there is but one jlva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jlvas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jlvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jlva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jivas. The cosmic jlva is alone the awakened jlva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajiva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedantists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedanta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore called the theory of drstisrstivada, i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedanta view however the objects of the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajnana, but still these phenomena of the ajnana are there as the common ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective epistemology whereas the drstisrstivada has no proper epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined by his own subjective avidya and previous impressions as modifications of the avidya. The drstisrstivada theory approaches nearest to the Vijnanavada Buddhism, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being Vedanta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that both are modifications of ajnana. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the nature of ajnana, though its presence in consciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedanta explains the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually mis-attributing the characteristics of the unreal forms—the modes of ajnana and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajnana. Moreover such is the nature of ajfianas that they are knowable only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous Brahman or atman. Being as such is the highest truth, the Brahman. The ajnana states are not non-being in the sense of nothing of pure negation {abhdva), but in the sense that they are not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being, the ajnana, and this illumination means nothing more than a false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajnana if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajnana states in themselves as apart from the atman we fall in a dilemma, for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other kind of its existence is known to us. If ajnana had been a nonentity altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive entity then it would never cease to be; the ajnana thus is a mysterious category midway between being and non-being and indefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is called tattvdnyatvdbhydm anirvdcya or undefinable and undeterminable either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible as to their real nature or mutual relation, and comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness, but apart from these no rational conception of them can be formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajnana (for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in consciousness and depending on this the Drstisrstivadins asserted that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence of avidya and that beyond that no objective common ground could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of Vedanta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining our common sense view (pratikarmavyavasatha) we may think that we have an objective world before us as the common field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be interpreted in the light of the Vedanta metaphysics.

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the atman, the one highest reality, secondly as jiva or the atman as limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated from the atman, but atman is regarded as identical with the psychosis thus appearing as a living and knowing being, asjivasaksi or perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jiva comprehends, knows, or experiences ; thirdly the antahkarana psychosis or mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidya manifestations, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of avidya phenomena or objective entities. The antahkarana is not only the avidya capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The antahkarana is always turning the various avidya modes of it into the jivasaksi (jiva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed into experience. These avidya states of the antahkarana are called its vrttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the vrtti-ajfianas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

forms of ajfiana remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only so long as they do not come into relation to these vrttis of antahkarana, for the ajfiana can be destroyed by the cit only in the form of a vrtti, while in all other forms the ajfiana veils the cit from manifestation. The removal of ajfiana-vrttis of the antahkarana or the manifestation of vrtti-jnana is nothing but this, that the antahkarana states of avidya are the only states of ajfiana which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous atman (adhydsa, false attribution). The objective world consists of the avidya phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity consists in this that avidya in this form cannot be superimposed on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These avidya phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidya phenomena as antahkarana states that they coalesce with the avidya states and render themselves objects of consciousness or have their veil of avarana removed. It is thus assumed that in ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the antahkarana goes out of the man's body (sariramadhydf) and coming in touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form, and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug. The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested (though these were taking place on the background of the same self-luminous Brahman or atman as forms of the highest truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajfiana phenomena in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous. It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena that the antahkarana could be transformed into corresponding states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed the antahkarana states and the objects with which these states or vrttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the vrttis alone has the power of removing the ajfiana veiling the cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer, or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of appearance and due to avidya. And it is only from the point of view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together through the antahkaranavrtti, which makes the external objects

translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajfiana which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The pratyaksa-prama or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the pure consciousness, reflected through the vrtti and identical with the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jlva or pramata, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the vrtti of the antahkarana; when these three unite perception is effected.

Prama or right knowledge means in Vedanta the acquirement of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by experience (abadhitii). There is thus no absolute definition of truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the. knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of antahkarana transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, " I am happy," or " I am sorry." In continuous perception of anything for a certain time as an object or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or vrtti is said to last in the same way all the while so long as any other new form is not taken up by the antahkarana for the acquirement of any new knowledge. In such cases when I infer that there is fire on the hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the antahkarana vrtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter of inference, for the antahkarana vrtti cannot be in touch with the fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it to be odoriferous. Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation called samavaya (inherence) or jdti (class notion) ; and so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the other class called inference, and holds that both perception and inference are but different modes of the transformations of the antahkarana reflecting the cit in the corresponding vrttis. The perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the antahkarana vrtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in the subjective aspect is regarded as the identity of the subjective cit with the objective cit. This identity of course means that through the vrtti the same reality subsisting in the object and the subject is realized, whereas in inference the thing to be inferred, being away from contact with antahkarana, has apparently a different reality from that manifested in the states of consciousness. Thus perception is regarded as the mental state representing the same identical reality in the object and the subject by antahkarana contact, and it is held that the knowledge produced by words (e.g. this is the same Devadatta) referring identically to the same thing which is seen (e.g. when I see Devadatta before me another man says this is Devadatta, and the knowledge produced by " this is Devadatta " though a verbal (sabda) knowledge is to be regarded as perception, for the antahkarana vrtti is the same) is to be regarded as perception or pratyaksa. The content of these words (this is Devadatta) being the same as the perception, and there being no new relationing knowledge as represented in the proposition " this is Devadatta " involving the unity of two terms " this " and " Devadatta " with a copula, but only the indication of one whole as Devadatta under visual perception already experienced, the knowledge proceeding from " this is Devadatta" is regarded as an example of nirvikalpa knowledge. So on the occasion of the rise of Brahma-consciousness when the preceptor instructs " thou art Brahman" the knowledge proceeding from the sentence is not savikalpa, for

though grammatically there are two ideas and a copula, yet from the point of view of intrinsic significance (tatparya) one identical reality only is indicated. Vedanta does not distinguish nirvikalpa and savikalpa in visual perception, but only in sabda perception as in cases referred to above. In all such cases the condition for nirvikalpa is that the notion conveyed by the sentence should be one whole or one identical reality, whereas in savikalpa perception we have a combination of different ideas as in the sentence, "the king's man is coming" {rdjapurusa agacchati). Here no identical reality is signified, but what is signified is the combination of two or three different concepts 1 .

It is not out of place to mention in this connection that Vedanta admits all the six pramanas of Kumarila and considers like Mimamsa that all knowledge is self-valid (svatah-pramana). But prama has not the same meaning in Vedanta as in Mimamsa. There as we remember prama meant the knowledge which goaded one to practical action and as such all knowledge was prama, until practical experience showed the course of action in accordance with which it was found to be contradicted. In Vedanta however there is no reference to action, but prama means only uncontradicted cognition. To the definition of self-validity as given by Mimamsa Vedanta adds another objective qualification, that such knowledge can have svatah-pramanya as is not vitiated by the presence of any dosa (cause of error, such as defect of senses or the like). Vedanta of course does not think like Nyaya that positive conditions (e.g. correspondence, etc.) are necessary for the validity of knowledge, nor does it divest knowledge of all qualifications like the Mlmamsists, for whom all knowledge is self-valid as such. It adopts a middle course and holds that absence of dosa is a necessary condition for the self-validity of knowledge. It is clear that this is a compromise, for whenever an external condition has to be admitted, the knowledge cannot be regarded as self-valid, but Vedanta says that as it requires only a negative condition for the absence of dosa, the objection does not apply to it, and it holds that if it depended on the presence of any positive condition for proving the validity of knowledge like the Nyaya, then only its theory of self-validity would have been damaged. But since it wants only a negative condition, no blame can be

1 See Vedantaparibhasa and Sikhamani.

attributed to its theory of self-validity. Vedanta was bound to follow this slippery middle course, for it could not say that the pure cit reflected in consciousness could require anything else for establishing its validity, nor could it say that all phenomenal forms of knowledge were also all valid, for then the world-appearance would come to be valid ; so it held that knowledge could be regarded as valid only when there was no dosa present; thus from the absolute point of view all world-knowledge was false and had no validity, because there was the avidya-dosa, and in the ordinary sphere also that knowledge was valid in which there was no dosa. Validity (pramanya) with Mlmamsa meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to practical action in accordance with it, but with Vedanta it meant correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of dosa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the correctness of knowledge 1 .

Vedanta Theory of Illusion.

We have already seen that the Mlmamsists had asserted that all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (yath-drtJiah sarve vivadaspadibhutdh pratyayah pratyayatvai). Even illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedanta objects to this, and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e. non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver), then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation, and negation with Mlmamsa is nothing but the bare presence of the locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

1 See Vedantaparibhasa, Sikhtlmani, Maniprabha and Citsukha on svatahpra-manya.

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mlmamsa position may be defined it fails 1 . Vedanta thinks that the illusion is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a phenomenon of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects; the difference in the two cases consists in this, that the illusion is generated by the dosa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific dosas. The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described thus. First by the contact of the senses vitiated by dosas a mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me is generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the avidya (nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence of the dosa, and this disturbance along with the impression of silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the appearance of silver. There is thus an objective illusory silver appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state generated by its contact with the illusory silver. These two transformations, the silver state of the mind and external phenomenal illusory silver state,are manifested by the perceiving consciousness (saksicaitanyd). There are thus here two phenomenal transformations, one in the avidya states forming the illusory objective silver phenomenon, and another in the antahkarana-vrtti or mind state. But in spite of there being two distinct and separate phenomena, their object being the same as the "this" in perception, we have one knowledge of illusion. The special feature of this theory of illusion is that an indefinable (anirvacaniya-khyati) illusory silver is created in every case where an illusory perception of silver occurs. There are three orders of reality in Vedanta, namely the

1 See Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and Nyayamakaranda on akhyati refutation.

paramarthika or absolute, vyavaharika or practical ordinary experience, and pratibhasika, illusory. The first one represents the absolute truth; the other two are false impressions due to dosa. The difference between vyavaharika and pratibhasika is that the dosa of the vyavaharika perception is neither discovered nor removed until salvation, whereas the dosa of the pratibhasika reality which occurs in many extraneous forms (such as defect of the senses, sleep, etc.) is perceived in the world of our ordinary experience, and thus the pratibhasika experience lasts for a much shorter period than the vyavaharika. But just as the vyavaharika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications of the ajfiana, as apart from our subjective experience and even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is also regarded as a modification of avidya, an undefinable creation of the object of illusion, by the agency of the dosa. Thus in the case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver is created by the dosa in association with the senses, which is called the creation of an indefinable {anirvacaniya) silver of illusion. Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same but the avidya of antahkarana suffers modifications {parinama) on account of dosa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation. The illusory silver is thus vivartta (appearance) from the point of view of the cit and parinama from the point of view of avidya, for the difference between vivartta and parinama is, that in the former the transformations have a different reality from the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it), while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same stuff as the avidya whose transformations it is). But now a difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to a coalescing of the cit underlying the antahkarana-vrtti as modified by dosa and the object—cit as underlying the "this" before me (in the illusion of "this is silver"), then I ought to have the experience that "I am silver" like "I am happy" and not that "this is silver"; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place in connection with my previous notion as "this," the form of the knowledge also is "this is silver," whereas in the notion " I am happy," the notion of happiness takes place in connection with a previous vrtti of "I." Thus though the coalescing of the two "cits" is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is" according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In dreams also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell. There the illusory creations are generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are imposed upon the cit. The dream experiences cannot be regarded merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the form that " I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space, time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for in the waking stages the antahkarana is being constantly transformed into different states on the expiry of the defects of sleep, etc., which were causing the dream cognitions. This is called nivrtti (negation) as distinguished from badha (cessation). The illusory creation of dream experiences may still be there on the pure cit, but these cannot be experienced any longer, for there being no dosa of sleep the antahkarana is active and suffering modifications in accordance with the objects presented before us. This is what is called nivrtti, for though the illusion is there I cannot experience it, whereas badha or cessation occurs when the illusory creation ceases, as when on finding out the real nature of the conch-shell the illusion of silver ceases, and we feel that this is not silver, this was not and will not be silver. When the conch-shell is perceived as silver, the silver is felt as a reality, but this feeling of reality was not an illusory creation, though the silver was an objective illusory creation; for the reality in the sukti (conch-shell) is transferred and felt as belonging to the illusion of silver imposed upon it. Here we see that the illusion of silver has two different kinds of illusion comprehended in it. One is the creation of an indefinable silver (anirvacaniya-rajatotpatti) and the other is the attribution of the reality belonging to the conch-shell to the illusory silver imposed upon it, by which we feel at the time of the illusion that it is a reality. This is no doubt the anyathakhyati form of illusion as advocated by Nyaya. Vedanta admits that when two things (e.g. red flower and crystal) are both present

before my senses, and I attribute the quality of one to the other by illusion (e.g. the illusion that the crystal is red), then the illusion is of the form of anyathakhyati; but if one of the things is not present before my senses and the other is, then the illusion is not of the anyathakhyati type, but of the anirvacanlyakhyati type. Vedanta could not avoid the former type of illusion, for it believed that all appearance of reality in the world-appearance was really derived from the reality of Brahman, which was self-luminous in all our experiences. The world appearance is an illusory creation, but the sense of reality that it carries with it is a misattribution {anyathakhyati) of the characteristic of the Brahman to it, for Brahman alone is the true and the real, which manifests itself as the reality of all our illusory world-experience, just as it is the reality of sukti that gives to the appearance of silver its reality.

Vedanta Ethics and Vedanta Emancipation.

Vedanta says that when a duly qualified man takes to the study of Vedanta and is instructed by the preceptor—" Thou art that (Brahman)," he attains the emancipating knowledge, and the world-appearance becomes for him false and illusory. The qualifications necessary for the study of Vedanta are (1) that the person having studied all the Vedas with the proper accessories, such as grammar, lexicon etc. is in full possession of the knowledge of the Vedas,(2)that either in this life or in another, he must have performed only the obligatory Vedic duties (such as daily prayer, etc. called nitya-karmd) and occasionally obligatory duty (such as the birth ceremony at the birth of a son, called naimittika-karmd) and must have avoided all actions for the fulfilment of selfish desires (kdmya-fcarmas, such as the performance of sacrifices for going to Heaven) and all prohibited actions (e.g. murder, etc. nisiddha-karma) in such a way that his mind is purged of all good and bad actions (no karma is generated by the nitya and naimittika-karma, and as he has not performed the ka?nya and prohibited karmas, he has acquired no new karma). When he has thus properly purified his mind and is in possession of the four virtues or means of fitting the mind for Vedanta instruction (called sadhana) he can regard himself as properly qualified for the Vedanta instruction. These virtues are (1) knowledge of what is eternal

and what is transient, (2) disinclination to enjoyments of this life and of the heavenly life after death, (3) extreme distaste for all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge, (4) control over the senses by which these are restrained from everything but that which aids the attainment of right knowledge (dama), (a) having restrained them, the attainment of such power that these senses may not again be tempted towards worldly enjoyments (uparati), {b) power of bearing extremes of heat, cold, etc., (c) employment of mind towards the attainment of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and Upanisads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing the above qualities should try to understand correctly the true purport of the Upanisads (called sravana), and by arguments in favour of the purport of the Upanisads to strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upanisads (called manand) and then by nididhyasana (meditation) which includes all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realize the truth as one. Vedanta therefore in ethics covers the ground of Yoga; but while for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding the difference between purusa and prakrti, with Vedanta salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman alone is the true reality, his own self 1 . Mlmamsa asserts that the Vedas do not declare the knowledge of one Brahman to be the supreme goal, but holds that all persons should act in accordance with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of good and the removal of evil. But Vedanta holds that though the purport of the earlier Vedas is as Mlmamsa has it, yet this is meant only for ordinary people, whereas for the elect the goal is clearly as the Upanisads indicate it, namely the attainment of the highest knowledge. The performance of Vedic duties is intended only for ordinary men, but yet it was believed by many (e.g. Vacaspati Misra and his followers) that due performance of Vedic duties helped a man to acquire a great keenness for the attainment of right knowledge; others believed (e.g. Prakasatma and his followers) that it served to bring about suitable opportunities by securing good preceptors, etc. and to remove many obstacles from the way so that it became easier for a person to attain the desired right knowledge. In the acquirement of ordinary knowledge the ajnanas re-

1 See Vedantasara and Advaitabrahmasiddhi.

moved are only smaller states of ajnana, whereas when the Brahma-knowledge dawns the ajnana as a whole is removed. Brahma-knowledge at the stage of its first rise is itself also a state of knowledge, but such is its special strength that when this knowledge once dawns, even the state of knowledge which at first reflects it (and which being a state is itself ajnana modification) is destroyed by it. The state itself being destroyed, only the pure infinite and unlimited Brahman shines forth in its own true light. Thus it is said that just as fire riding on a piece of wood would burn the whole city and after that would burn the very same wood, so in the last state of mind the Brahma-knowledge would destroy all the illusory world-appearance and at last destroy even that final state 1 .

The mukti stage is one in which the pure light of Brahman as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as illusory nothing. As all being of the world-appearance is but limited manifestations of that one being, so all pleasures also are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a taste of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep. The being of Brahman however is not an abstraction from all existent beings as the satta (being as class notion) of the naiyayika, but the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness and pure bliss is always identical with itself. Being (sat) is pure bliss and pure consciousness. What becomes of the avidya during mukti (emancipation) is as difficult for one to answer as the question, how the avidya came forth and stayed during the world-appearance. It is best to remember that the category of the indefinite avidya is indefinite as regards its origin, manifestation and destruction. Vedanta however believes that even when the true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a while, if the individual's previously ripened karmas demand it. Thus the emancipated person may walk about and behave like an ordinary sage, but yet he is emancipated and can no longer acquire any new karma. As soon as the fruits due to his ripe karmas are enjoyed and exhausted, the sage loses his body and there will never be any other birth for him, for the dawn of perfect knowledge has burnt up for him all budding karmas of beginningless previous lives, and he is no longer subject to any

1 Siddhantalesa.

of the illusions subjective or objective which could make any knowledge, action, or feeling possible for him. Such a man is called jivanmukta, i.e. emancipated while living. For him all world-appearance has ceased. He is the one light burning alone in himself where everything else has vanished for ever from the stage 1 .

Vedanta and other Indian Systems.

Vedanta is distinctly antagonistic to Nyaya, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. Sankara himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the Nyaya conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of sama-vaya, the conception of jati, etc. 2 His followers carried it to still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of Srlharsa, Citsukha, Madhusudana, etc. It was opposed to Mlmarnsa so far as this admitted the Nyaya-Vaisesika categories, but agreed with it generally as regards the pramanas of anumana, upamiti, arthapatti, sabda, and anupalabdhi. It also found a great supporter in Mlmarnsa with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting power of knowledge. But it differed from Mlmarnsa in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties only so long as he was not fit for Vedanta instruction and studies.

With Samkhya and Yoga the relation of Vedanta seems to be very close. We have already seen that Vedanta had accepted all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between Vedanta and Samkhya was this that Samkhya believed that the stuff of which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the purusas. In later times Vedanta had compromised so far with Samkhya that it also sometimes described may a as being made up of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Vedanta also held that according to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications

1 See raflcadaii.

2 See Saiikara's refutation of Nyaya, Saiikara-bhasya, n. ii.

of the maya. Thus Tsvara is believed to possess a mind of pure sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in Vedanta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as Sarnkhya held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that maya was believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long as it appeared. Prakrti also was indefinable or rather undemon-strable as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination of positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged to it with which it could be defined. Maya however was unde-monstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a separate category of the indefinite. Sarnkhya believed in the personal individuality of souls, while for Vedanta there was only one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the maya transformations. There was an adhyasa or illusion in Sarnkhya as well as in Vedanta; but in the former the illusion was due to a mere non-distinction between prakrti and purusa or mere misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vedanta there was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable creation. Causation with Sarnkhya meant real transformation, but with Vedanta all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems during the Upanisad period each was built up from very similar ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested themselves into the present divergences of the two systems. Though Sarikara laboured hard to prove that the Sarnkhya view could not be found in the Upanisads, we can hardly be convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the Sarnkhya thought had its origin in the Upanisads. Sarikara and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the sunya of Nagarjuna. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of Sarikara to the self-luminosity of the Vijiianavada Buddhism

can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusations against Sahkara by Vijnana Bhiksu and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to think that Sarikara's philosophy is largely a compound of Vijnanavada and Sunyavada Buddhism with the Upanisad notion of the permanence of self superadded.

abadhita, 482

abddhitavisayatva, 344

abadhitarthavisayajnanatva, 471

abhautika, 228 n.

abhava, 138, 141, 284/2., 298, 304, 312 n.,

335. 355. 356, 359- 453. 455 abhava-vilaksanatvamatram, 453 abhdvendriyasannikarso, 359 n. abhavd 1 pindriyagrahanayoqyah, 359 n. Abhidhanmia, 82, 83, 166 Abhidhamma Pttaka, 96 Abhidhammatthasangaha, gon., 92, 94 «. Abhidharmakosa, 115, 117, 119«-, 120,

121, 128; on paticcasamuppdda, 92/2. Abhidharmakosabhasya, 120 Abhidharma literature, 120 Abhidharmakoiaiastra, 114 Abhidharmakosavyakhya, 119/2., 120 Abhidhanappadlpika, 263 «. abhihitanvayavada, 396, 397 abhilapa, 153, 408 abkimdna, 250 abhimdna-dravya, 250 abhinivesa, 93/2-, 220/2., 237, 267 abhinnalaksane anyonyahetuke, 145 abhiiinanena, 98 abhisandahana, 98 abhisaiikharonti, 96 abhrdnta, 408 abhuta - parikalpa - vdsand - vaicitra - niro-

dha, 146 abhutasya, 423 abhyannjna, 302 abhydsa, 234, 271 abhyndaya, 285 abhynpagamasiddhanta, 295 abrahma, 193 Absolutism, 175 Acchoka, 306 acintya, 428 acintyam, 425 Actual, 275 adharma, 56, 197, 198, 281, 285 «., 292,

3 l6 > 3 2 3> 403. 404 adharmdstikaya, 195 adkikaranasiddkdnta, 295 adhikaribheda, 30 «. adhikart, 2

adhisthana, 446, 449, 451, 452 adhivacdnu sannd, 96 a</A0, 199

adhvan, 311

adhyavasdya, 409/2., 410/2., 413

adhydsa, 481, 493

adhydtma, 28 ».

adhydtmavidyd, ijj, 278

Adkydyas, 70, 433

Aditi, 23

adrsta, 72, 205, 282, 283, 284, 292, 317,

322, 323, 324, 327, 383, 425, 452 adrstakaranaka, 291 adrstakdritarn, 292 advaita, 422, 424, 425, 426, 439 Advaitabrahmasiddhi, 420, 490/2. Advaitasiddhi, 67, 420, 444/;., 456/2. Advaitasiddhisiddhdntasdra, 420 advaya, 426 advayamajdtim, 423 advayata, 426 Advayatdraka, 28 «. Affliction, 301 Afflictions, 259 Aggregate, 93, 94- "3. 3 2 7 Aggregates, 89, 144, 252 Aggregation, 245, 247, 251, 263/2. Agni, 12, 16, 17, 37 Agnostics, 106 agraydna, 424 agrahyam, 425 agrhltagrdhitvam, 388 aham, 285, 457 akamkdra, 213, 214, 216, 225, 226, 248,

249, 250, 253, 262, 276, 301, 457, 458,

460, 461 ahimsa, 200, 236, 270 Ahipati, 231

Ahirbudhnya Samhitd, 219, 220, 221 ahirika, 100

Aitareya, 28/2., 30, 39, 57, 432/2. Aitareya-Aranyaka, 36 Aitareya school, 30 aitihya, 298, 304, 333 «. «/a, 427

Ajatasatru, 33, 34 ajatih, 423 Ajitakesakambali, 80 ajiva, 188, 195 ajiiana, 193, 449, 450, 452, 453, 454,

455. 45«» 457. 458, 460, 461, 465, 467,

468, 469, 472, 481, 487, 491 ajiidna-consciousness, 458 ajiiana-phenomena, 461

1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones. But throughout the body of the book the names of Vedic works are in Roman with a capital, as a mark of respect for their supposed revealed character.

Index

ajnanas, 490

ajnanalva, 445

ajnana-vrtti, 481

ajnatasattvabhyupagamaty 452

Akhandananda, 419

akhydti, 261 «., 303, 384, 385, 386, 486 n.

akincanatd, 202

aklista, 269

Aksamala, 28 «.

Aksapada, 63, 71, 279, 306, 309

Aksi, 28 «.

alaksana, 425

alaksanam, 215 «.

alaukika, 341

alaukika sannikarsa, 341

alataianti, 424, 426

Alberuni, 233, 234, 235, 237

Alchemy, 235

alihga, 217, 249

aloka, 198

Amalananda, 86 w., 114H., 418, 419

Amaradasa, 419

ambhas, 2 20 «.

Amitayurdkydnasutra, 125 «.

amosadhartna, 139

Amrtanada, 28 «., 228

anabhibhava, 290 w.

anadhigata, 471

anadhigatadhigantr, 410, 413

anadhyavasaya, 332 «.

anaikantika-hetu, 344

anantadariana, 189, 207, 238

Anantadeva, 371

anantadharmatmakam vastu, 176

anantajnana, 189, 207, 238

anantasukha, 189, 238

anantavirya, 171, 189, 207, 238

anapadeia, 289

anarthadanda, 200

Anatomical, 103

anavastha, 160 «., 438

anavastha (aprdmdniki), 319 «.

anavastha (prdmdniki), 319 «.

anddi, 453

anddibhdvarupatve sati jndnanivartya-

tvam, 452 anddikdla-prapanca-vdsandhetukanca, 145 andgdmi magga, 100 andsrava, 133 andtha, 145 andtma, 145 andtmatva, 445 andhatdmisra, 220 n. aneidnta, 175 anekdntavdda, 175 anekarlhamandndrtham, 426 «. animitta, 300

anirodhamanutpddam, 425 «. Aniruddha, 212, 222 aniruddham anutpannam, 142 anirvacanlya, 487 anirvacaniyakhydti, 486, 489 anirvacan tyaramtopatti, 488

anirvdcyavdda, 461

anitya, ii9«., 145

anityatd, 201

annamaya, 46

annamaya kosa, 60

Annapurnd, 28 «.

Annihilation, 108, 109, 114, 135, 283

anottapa, 100

Anquetil Duperron, 39

anrta, 193

antakkarana, 299, 457, 458, 460, 461,

472, 481, 482, 483, 487, 488 antahkarana vrtti, 481, 482, 483, 486,

487 AntakrtadaJds, 171 antardbhava, 119W. antardya, 193 antardya-karma, 191 antarvydpti, 157, 186, 346 Antarvydptisamarthana, 156, 346 «. antarydmin, 48 Antecedent, 465, 466 <z««, 196

anubhava, 97, 459 anubhaga, 194 anubhuti, 416 anubrata, 200 anudbhuta, 252 anudbhutarupavattva, 290 «. anumdna, 155, 302 «., 308, 343, 346, 353,

3 8 3. 3 8 9> 39° "•» 393. 397. 4°9"-> 4™,

492 anumeya, 348 anumiti, 346, 355 anumitikarana, 346 anupalabdhi, 333 «., 397, 398, 399, 455,

471,492 anupalambhah, 359 anupasamhdrin, 361 ««£«> 236 angas, 171 angulitva, 165

Ahguttara Nikdya, 83, 111 «. a««, 189, 301, 314, 323 anuparimdna, 314 «., 316 anupreksd, 195 anusandhdna, 350 anusmrti nirdeia, 124 anussati, 102 anusthiti, 163 «. anustubh, 218 «. aniittamdmbhas, 220 «. AnuttaraupapdtikadaJds, 171 anuvyavasdya, 343 Anuyogadvdra, 171 anvaya, 353 anvaya-vyatireka, 347 anvayavyatireki, 353 anvayavydpti, 158, 346 anvitdbhidhdnavada, 396 anyathdkhydti, 261, 384, 385, 488, 489 anyathdsiddhi, 322 w. anyathdsiddhiiunyasya, 320

497

anyatvabhdvana, 202

anydpohah, 115

anyonydbhava, 293 n., 359, 462, 464

anyonyairaya, 204, 466

«A 51. 252, 255, 295, 310,313, 314, 323,

324, 328, 329 apadana, 83 apadeia, 289, 303, 350 apadkydna, 200 aparajdti, 317 aparatoilas, 112 aparatva, 316 aparigraha, 199, 236, 270 a/-atom, 253 apavarga, 259, 273, 294, 295, 300, 301,

305

apeksabuddhi, 305, 314

apeksabiiddhijanya, 291 «.

Aphorisms, 65

a/z, 284 7*,

apoha, 318

appandsamddhi, 102, 103

apracarita§unyatd, 149

aprasiddha, 349

apratisamkhyanirodha, 121

aprdmdnyam paratah, 375

a/ tanmdtra, 252

apurva, 72, 405

apitrva-mdhi, 404

Apyayadlksita, 418, 420

Ardhamagadhi, 171

Ardhaphalakas, 170

arhat, 90, 101, 106, 107, 120

arhattva, 100

Aristotle, 279

Aristanemi, 169

Arrah, 193 ».

Arrangement, 364

Arrowsmith, 18 ».

artha, 150, 163 »., 4097;.

arthah prdpitah, 410

arthakriya, 155 ».

arthakriyajiiana, 373

arthakriydkdritva, 117, 158,161, 168, 187,

209 «.; changes of meaning of, 155 ».;

Nyaya-objections to, 159; development

of the meaning of, 163 ». arthakriydksafta, 409 ». arthakriyasiddhi, 163 ». arthakriydiakti, 159 arthaprakasa, 335 arthapravicaya, 150 arthaprapakatva, 408 arthaprdpti, 302 arthasahabhasi, 114 artkasiddhi, 163 ». Arthaiastra, 227 arthavada, 405 arthddhigati, 152 arthdniipapatti, 393 arthdpatti, 298, 302, 304, 333 rc., 391,

393»47'. 49 2 arupaloka, 134 Aryan people, 15

asadrupa, 397

asamavdyi, 322

asamavdyi-kdrana, 322, 376, 380

asamprajiidta, 271

asamjmn, 190

asamskrta, 124

asamskrta dhartnas, 121, 124

Asanga, 125, 128, 146;/., i47«., 151 »., 350 «., 423

asankhyeyakalpas, 136

<w«'. 45, 293, 443

asatkalpa, 409 ».

asatkdryavdda, 257, 258, 320

asatpratipaksa, 344

asadhdrana, 361

asddhdrana-kdrana, 322

asdra, 144, 145

asdsvata, 109

Asceticism, 36, 58, 81, 201, 226

Ascetics, 1, 199

as 1 *', 45 ».

asidiiha, 361

asiddha-hetu, 344

om/o, 45 «.

as/nadvisistandm, 287

asmitd, 93 »., 220 «., 267, 271

asparfayoga, 423

Assimilation, 225

Association, 225

asteya, 199, 200, 236, 270

astkdna, 145

astikdya, 189, 195, 197

asti-nasti, 148

aj«, 26

asubhakammatthana, 103

aiaratta, 145

afaranabhavand, 202

Asoka, 82, 157

aJdsvata, 127

aiukldkrsna, 73, 266

A^vaghosa, 120, 128, 129, 135, 136, 138, 147, 161, 166, 167, 280, 409«., 421, 423; ethics of, 136, 137; ignorance and truth, 132; ignorance—manifestations of, 133, 134; perfuming theory, 135; soul as samsdra, 131 ; soul as that-ness, 130

Asvamedka, 14

Asvapati-kaikeya, 33, 34

asvattha, 234

Asvins, 18

Astamakoiasthdnanibaddhah pudgalavi-niScayah, ngn.

Astasdhasrika prajnapdramitd, 125 »., 127 «.

atadrupapardzirttayoreva, 160

atasmimstaditi, 336

AtharvaHkhd, 28 ».

Atharvasiras, 28 n.

Atharva- Veda, 12, 13, 24, 31, 469; complementary to /?£•- £Wa, 13

Atheism, 258

Atheistic, 220, 221, 223

Atheistic Samkhya, 259

Index

aticdra, 201

atisamksiptacirantanoktibh ih, 281

atithisamvibhagabrata, 201

atlndriya, 252, 322, 335, 339

Atom, 492

Atomic, 213, 253, 254, 323, 401, 416;

combination, 326, 327; doctrine, 280;

measure, 306 «., 314 «.; size, 292;

structure, 305, 313 Atoms, 115, 121, 165, 175, 196, 204,

252, 253, 255, 256, 291, 292, 297,

305, 3o6»-, 311, 314, 315, 316, 318,

3!9» 3 2 °> 3 2 3> 3 2 4> 3 2 5. 3 26 . 3 2 7.

3? 8 » 3 2 9> 3 62 » 377. 3 8 °. 400 Atri, 213 atta, 109 attha katha, 83 Atthasdlini, 82, 84 «., 85 «., 89, 94,

97 »., 98 »., 108 n. Attributes, 165 atyantdbhava, 360 audayika, 192 Aufrecht, 230 Aulukya darJana, 305 Aung, 85 »., 86»., 90«., 92M., ii2».,

157 aupamya, 302 Aupapdtika, ijm. aupaiamika, 192 Aurangzeb, 28 «. avadhi, 191 »., 207 Avadhuta, 28 «. avaktavya, 180 avasthdjiidna, 458 avasthdparindma, 256 avastutva, 428 Avatamsaka, 128 avayava, 164, 280, 294, 353, 380 avayavavayavi, 379 Avayavinirdkarana, 165 »., 297 «., 313 ».,

380 ». avayavi, 164, 297 »., 380 avdkidkha, 234 avidyd, 86 »., 90,91, 93«., m, 122,

131, 132. i33» J 34> I 37. i3 8 . *39. H3. 145, 148, 220«., 237, 249, 250, 260,

26l, 266, 267, 29O, 293, 319 «., 332 »., 442, 452, 457, 460, 468, 469, 481, 486, 487, 491

avidyddosa, 485

avidydkarma, 132

nvijjd, 86, 92 »., 93, 105, in; and the

dsavas, 99 ; as beginningless, 99 avijjdsava, 99, 100 avijnapti, 124 avijiiaptikarma, 124 avijnaptirupa, 123, 124 avikaJpika, 337, 338 avindbhdvaniyama, 156, 352 «. avipdka, 195 avirati, 193 avtiesa, 246, 253 avivddah aviruddhaica, 423 avitikkama, 101

avyakta, 214, 216

avyapadeiya, 425

avyavahdryatn, 425

Awakening of Faitk, 12972.

ayaugapadya, 303

ayutasiddha, 246, 319

ayutasiddhdvayava, 380 «.

ayutasiddhdvayavabheddnugatah ,232

Acdra, 171

Acdrdngasutra, 236

dcdrya, 433

adhibhautika, 269 «.

ddhidaivika, 269 ».

ddhydtmika, 148, 26972.

Aditya, 43

dgama, 285, 424

dhdre patikulasaniid, 102

Ajivaka, 79, 8o»., 173 ».

akdra, 415

dkdrapabandha, 256

flMfa, 43, 46, 48, 51, 109, 114, 124, 143, »49» x 75> 197. r 9 8 > ^9. 203, 213, 253, 287, 288, 292, 295, 310, 314, 316, 321, 3 2 6, 333, 335, 426; atom, 252, 253

akdia tawndtra, 252

dkdiastikdya, 195, 198

akrti, 298

dlayavijndna, 86»., 131, 132, 136, 137, 146, 167

alocana, 378

dlocana-jnana, 336

ananda, 75, 109, 238, 271, 366, 424, 445

Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, 420

Anandagiri, 418, 433

dnandamaya at man, 46

AnandaSrama, 423 «.

dnaya, 396

dnapanasati, 103

dnviksiki, 277, 278, 279

Apastamba, 276

^/<z, 294

dptavacana, 355 «.

drambhaka-samyoga, 328

drammana, 96

arammana-vibhdvanatthane, 89

Aranyakas, 6, 12, 14, 27, 28, 29, 33, 35, 43; character of, 14; composition of, 14; fanciful unifications in, 36; relation of, to Upanisads, 14

ardretidhana, 347

driya sacca, 101, in

Aruni, 33, 34

Arunika, 28 «.

arya, 294 »., 304

Aryadeva, 122 »., 128, 166; his doctrine, 129

Aryamulasarvastivada, 120 «.

Aryasammitlya, 114

Aryasarvastivada, 120 «.

rtrya satya, 107

Arya, 219

Aryasanga, 409/2.

flrjfl, 332 «.

asainjndnirodh&t, 150

499

dsana, 236, 271

dsava, 99, 100, 105; meaning of, 99 n.

dsrava, ggn., 134, 192, 193

asravabhavana, 202

dssasa, 103

astika, 67

astika-mata, six classes of, 68

Astika systems, karma doctrine of, 72

Asuri, 216, 218, 221

diankd, 186 n.

diankd-pratisedha, 186 n.

dJraya, 312, 460

ds"raydsiddha, 361

dirta, 312

Atmabodka, 28 «.

dttnaikatva, 433

dtmakhydti 384, 385

«"'«««. 23, 26, 27, 32, 45, 52, 65, 68, 75, 93, in, 138, 147, 214, 215, 217, 276, 292, 295, 298, 300, 303, 311, 316, 353, 360, 429, 459//., 460, 470, 481; as vital breath, 26

Atman, 28//., 31 n.

Attnatattvavhieka, 307

atmavdda, 401 n.

dtodya, 296 n.

Atreya-samhitd, 213

Atreya-samhitd (Caraka), 299 «.

Atreyatantra, 213

Aturapratydkhyana, I'jm.

dvarana, 472, 481

avarandbhdva, 253

Avaiyaka, 171

avirbhuta, 257

dyatana, 85, 88»., 95, 121, 127, 149

dyatanadvdraih, 85 ».

dyuhana, 93

ayu-karma, 194

aywj, 268

dyu ska-karma, 191

Badarikairama, 432

bahiravabhdsanam, 337

bahirvydpti, 157, 186 »., 346

bahndhdkrtam tantram, 221

bahujana, 131

BahuSrutiyas, 112

Bahvrca, 28 n.

Baladeva, 70, 306

bandha, 207

Baudhayana, 70

Badarayana, 70, 223, 279, 422, 423, 429,

43o, 433 bddha, 488 bddhita, 361 Bahva, 45 bdhya, 409 ».

bahyabhdvabhdvopalaksanatd, 150 Balaki Gargya, 33, 34 balopacarika, 150 Behar, 308 «. Benares, 39, 181 »., 432 Bengal, 40, 256, 306, 308 Bengal Asiatic Society's Journal, 129 «.

Bengali, 40

Besarh, 173

Bhadanta, 120

Bhadrabahu, 170, 181 »., 186«., 309

Bhadrayanikas, 112

Bhagavadgitd, 8, 64, 227, 421, 422, 436

Bhagavatl, 171

Bhaktdparijfid, 171 ».

bhakti, 11

Bhandarkar, 423

Bharadvdja-vrtti, 306

Bhartrhari, 231

Bhartrmitra, 370

Bkasmajdbdla, 28 n.

Bhattacintamani, 371, 417

bhatta-?nata, 69

bhautika, 216, 299 ».

bhava, 85, 87, 89, 90 «., 92; meaning of,

85 ».; meaning of, discussed, 90 ». bhavacakra, 86 Bhavadasa, 370 bkavdsava, 99, 100 Bhagavata, 434 bhdgya, 220 n.

Bhdmati, w^n., 143;;., 418, 421 n. Bharuci, 433 Bhasarvajna, 305 n., 309 bhdsa, 195, 199 n. Bhdsdpariccheda, 280, 281, 307, 322 n.,

339 »■ bhdsya, 86«., 89 »., 90 w., 306, 369, 418,

419, 432, 433 bhasyakara, 433 Bhdsyasukti, 306 Bhdsya vdrttika, 63 Bhattas, 462

bhava, 142, 146, 287, 312 »., 357 bhdvabandka, 193 bhdva-karma, 191 bhdva-lesyd, 191 bhdvand, 28 n., 201, 316 bhdvanirjard, 195 bkdvapdratantryat, 312 «. bhdvarupa, 453 bhdvasamvara, 194, 195 bhdvasvabhdvaiunyatd, 149 bhdvatva, 453 bkdvdbkdvasamdnatd, 147 Bhavaganesa, 212, 243 «. bhdvdsrava, 193, 194 bheda, 462 Bhedadhikkdra, 420 bhedakalpand, 340 ». Bhiksu, 224, 271 »., 415 Bhiksuka, 28 n. bhoga, 224, 259, 268, 273 bhogdrtham, 424 bhogopabhogamdna, 200 Bhoja, 212, 230, 233 »., 235, 236 bhrama, 337 Bhurisrsti, 306 bhuta, 328 bkutas, 214, 310 bkutatatkatd, 130, 134

Index

bhiitadi, 249, 251, 253

bhuyodariana, 347, 348

Bi-bhautik, 329

Bibliotheca Indica, 337 «., 346 n.

Birth, 84, 89; determined by last thought, 90

Blessedness, 61

Bodas, 276, 279

bodha, 412

bodtiabodhasvabhava, 412

Bodhayana, 433

Bodhayana b/idsya, 433

bod/ii, 173

bodhibhavana, 202

bodhisattva, 127, 150, 151 n.

Bodhisattvas, 136, 137

Bombay, in., 18 n., 317 n.

brahmabhuta, 215 n.

Brahmabindu, 28 n.

brahtnacarya, 199, 200, 226, 227 «., 236, 270, 283

Brahmahood, 55

Brahmajalasiitta, 65 «., 236

Brahma-knowledge, 491

Brahman, 20, 21, 23, 28 n., 32, 34, 35, 3*% 43> 52, 54. 55. 5 8 » 60, 80, in, 144, 168, 202,211, 215,228, 234,235,239, 301 «., 430, 431, 434, 436, 437, 438, 440,443,444, 445, 446, 447, 451, 452, 457. 45 8 , 461, 4 6 8, 469, 481, 482, 483, 489, 491; as highest bliss, 48; as immanent and transcendent, 50; as ordainer, 49; as silence, 45; as supreme principle in Satapatha, 20; as the cause of all, 48; as ultimate cause, 53; dualistic conception of, 48; equivalent to atman, 45; identified with natural objects, 44; instruction of Praja-pati on, 46; meanings of, 20; negative method of knowing, 44; positive definition of, impossible, 44; powers of gods depended on, 37; powers of natural objects depended on, 37; priest, i3«.; quest after, 42; substitutes of, inadequate, 43; transition of the meaning of, 37; three currents of thought regarding, 50; universe created out of, 49; unknowability of, 44

Brahmanaspati, 23, 32, 43

Brahma Samaj, 40

Brahma-sutra, 45 »., 86 »., 91 «., 143 «.,

43°> 432. 47° Bra/imasutras, 62, 64, 70, 121 «., 223,

279, 418, 420, 421, 422, 429, 431, 433,

439 "• > Vaisnava commentaries of, 8 Brahma-sutrabhasya, 319 n. Brahmavidya, 28 n. brahmavidya, 34 n. brahmavihara, 103, 144 Brahmayana, 126 n. Brahma, 126 «., 324 Brahmins, 10, 11, 12, 31, 35 Brahmanas, 6, 12, 13, i3»-, 25, 27, 28,

29. 3°» 3'. 33. 35. 208, 404, 429;

atman as supreme essence in, 27; character of, 13; composition of, 13; creation and evolution theory combined in, 25; development of, into Upanisads, 31; karma doctrine of, 72; meaning of, 13 n.

Brahmana thought, transition of, into Aranyaka thought, 35

Brahmanism, 169

Breath, 272

British, 11, 371

Bruno, 40 n.

Brhadaranyaka, 14, 28 «., 31, 33, 34 «.,

35» 37"-» 39. 42 «m 45»-> 49«-» 5°> 55» 56, 57, 61, 88«., no«., m«., 226, 263 «., 432 «., 469, 470; rebirth in, 87

Brhadratha, 227

Brhajjabala, 28 n.

Brhaspati, 79

Brhatl, 370

Brhatkalpa, 171 n.

Brhatsamhita, 327 n.

Buddha, 7, 64, 65, 67, 79, 80, 84, 86, 86«., 93, 94, 102, 107, 109, no, 112, 118, 119, 125, 127, 133, 142, 144, 147, 169, 173, 174, 227, 263 «.; his life, 81

Buddhacaritakavya, 129 n.

Buddhadeva, 115, 116

Buddhaghosa, 82, 83, 92 »., 94, 96, 99, 105, 161, 470; his view of name and form, 88; his view of vinfiana, 89; on theory of perception, 97

Buddhahood, 84, 136, 137

Buddhapalita, 128

Buddhas, 136, 137, 424

Bttddkavamsa, 83

Buddhayana, 125 n.

buddhi, 213, 214, 216, 218 «., 224, 225, 240«., 242, 249, 251, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 271, 273, 275, 276, 281, 295, 299, 311, 316,

33°. 33i» 332 «•, 3 68 , 399. 4>5> 41 6 . 460

buddhi-mrmana, 256 «., 311

buddhiniicaya, 409 n.

Buddhism, 1, 9, 74, 75, 78, 83, 95, 108, no, in, 129, 138, 155, 161, 165, 168, '69, 175, 208, 209, 212, 219, 237«., 238, 274, 312, 322 «., 417, 465; at-makhyati theory of illusion, 385; causation as tadatmya and tadutpatti, 345; criticism of momentariness by Nyaya, 274; criticism of the nirvikalpa perception of Nyaya, 339 ff.; currents of thought prior to, 80; denial of the existence of negation, 357 ff.; denial of wholes, 380 n. ; Dharmakirtti's contribution to the theory of concomitance, 351 ; Dinnaga's doctrine of universal proposition and inference, 350«.; Dinnaga's view of the new knowledge acquired by inference, 388 «.; doctrine of matter, 95; doctrine of momentariness, 158; doctrine of non-

501

self, 161 ff.; doctrine of momentariness and the doctrine of causal efficiency, 163ff.; doctrine of pancakdrani as determining cause-effect relation, refuted by Vacaspati, 352; doctrine of tddatmya and tadutpatti as grounds of inference refuted by Vacaspati, 352; epistemologyoftheSautrantikas, 408 ff.; evolution of thought in, 166; heretical schools prior to, 79; identity and recognition, 162; influence on Mlmamsa logic, 388, 390; nature of existence, 163; no-soul doctrine in, 93; onto-logical problems, 164ff.; relation of substance and quality, 164; relation of universals and particulars, 164; relation of the whole and the part, 164; relation of cause and effect, 164; relation of inherence, 165; relation of power to the power-possessor, 165; relation to Upanisads, 80; schools, rise of, 112; sense-data and sensations in, 95; state of philosophy prior to, 78; the khandha-doctrine, 93; Theravada schools, 112; views on sdmdnya, 3i8«.; vydpti by negative instances, 389 n. ; Yogacara epistemology, 41 iff.

Buddhism (early), avijjd in, 99; causal connection, 84; definition of samadhi, 101; four noble truths, 101; importance of feeling, 97; kamma, classification of, 108; kamma, the doctrine of, 106; karma and desire, 108; khan-dhas as "I," 98; kilesas in, 100; meditation in, stages of, 105; meditation of human body as impure, 103; meditation of universal friendship, pity etc., 103; niwana and heresy in, 109; niwdna, theory of, 108; no-self doctrine, contrasted with Upanisad self-doctrine, no; objects of concentration, 104; pessimism in, 102 n. ; preparatory measures for meditation, 102; science of breath, 103; sense-contact theory in, 97; sila and samadhi in, 100; theory of cognition in, 96; Upanisads, relation with, 109; volition in, 98

Buddhism in Translations, 88 «., 89«., 90«., 99«., 107 «., 108«., ni«.

Buddhismus, 218 n.

Buddhist, 130/z., 161, 163, 169, 177, 178, 230, 233, 237, 278, 299, 300, 378, 389 n., 390, 394, 406, 423, 429, 434, 437, 465; canonical works, 82; council, 129; doctrines, 281; literature, 78, 82, 92; logic, 120, 155, 157, 309; missionaries, 301 n. ; philosophy, 3, 7, 84, 145, 164, 210; psychology, 96, 96 n.

Buddhistic, 81, 427«.; doctrines, 82, 100; texts, 109

Buddhists, 7, 68, 68«., 75,112, 129, 147, 167, 173, 174, 182, 185, 186, 187, 196, 203, 229, 240«., 257, 274, 279, 296, 301, 307, 309, 310, 318, 325, 331, 332,

339» 340, 341. 345. 346, 347. 348. 35o,

352, 357. 3 62 » 363, 3 8o «-. 3 8 5. 4".

413 buddhitattva, 249, 2-;o Bulletin de I Acacttmie des Sciences de

Russie, ii9«. Burgess, J., 170/z. Biihler, 170 n., 276

caitasikakarrna, 123

cailta, 121 .

caittadharma, 121

caittasamskrta dharmas, 124

caittikas, 112

cakrabhramivaddhrtaiartrak, 268

Cakradatta, 231

cakraka, 205

Cakrapani, 213 «., 231, 235, 236

Cakrapanidatta, 230

cakravartti, 91 n.

CakravarttI, Mr, 308 n.

Calcutta, 165 n., 168

Calcutta University, 121, 208 «., 213

Cambridge, 155 «.

Candrakanta Tarkalarnkara, 279

Candrakirti, 85^., 86 «., 87, 90^., 109,

125«., 128, 129, 138, 140, 166; his

interpretation of nama, 88 n. Candraprajnapti, 171 n. Candrika, 212 Canddvija, 171 n. Capacity, 159, 160 Caraka, 91 «., 212, 213, 216, 217, 218,

219, 224, 231, 280, 281, 287«., 302,

304 n. ; his view of soul, 91 n. ; system

of Sarnkhya in, 214 Caraka karikd, 280 Caraka samhita, 302 Caraka, s'drira, 280 n. Carake Patanjalih, 235 carv, 79 Carydpitaka, 83 Categories, 281, 283, 287, 312, 313, 365,

413, 461, 492 Category, 317, 378 n., 398, 442.443. 493 cattidhdtuvavatthdnabJidvand, 102 catuhsutri, 70 catuhiarana, \"]\n. catukiataka, 129 caturamika, 326 cauryya, 193 Causal activity, 165; collocations, 341;

efficiency, 163, 168; movement, 320 Causation, 466, 468; as real change,

53 Cause, 326

Cause-collocation, 274, 275 cdgamissati, 102 cdmara, 172 cdritra, 195, 199 Carvaka, 68, 71, 87, 302 Carvakas, 78, 79, 325, 332, 345, 362, 394;

philosophy of, 79 Central India, 172

Index

cesta, 264

cetana karma, 123

cetana, 96, 97, 98, 101, 108, 213, 214,

228 n. cetas, 217 cetasika, 101 cetati, 124 cetovimutti, 106 chala, 294, 296, 302, 360, 362 Channagarikas, 112 Chandogya, 28 «., 30, 33, 3 4 »., 35 /?., 36,

39, 4 6«., 47«., 49«., 5i«., 53, 54 «.,

88«., now., mn., i33«., 173, i74«.,

226 «., 263 «., 432 «., 433 Chayavyakhya, ill Chedasutras, 171 Childers, 99«., 263 «. China, 278

Chinese, 4, 119,122/2., 125??., 128, 138 n. Chinese translations, 120 Christian, 21

cinmatrairitam ajnanam, 457 cit, 75. 2 3 8 , 2 40, 241, 260, 299, 416,

450, 453. 457. 458, 47 2 . 4 8l > 482, 486, .487» 488 citra, 313 Citsukha, 238«., 445, 462, 465, 485 «.,

492 «Vta, 76, 89, 91 «., 96, 106, 113, 121,

124, 129, 140, 146, 258, 260, 261, 262,

262«., 263, 264, 265, 266, 268, 269,

272, 426, 427, 428, 460 cittabhumi, 268 cittadharma, 121 cittasamprayuktasamskara, 86 n. cittavimukta, 151 cittaviprayukta, 121 cittaviprayuktasamskara, 86 n. cittaviprayuktasatnskaradharma, 121 cittaviiuddhiprakarana, 129 cittavrttinirodha, 235 codanalaksanah arthah, 427 ». Co-effects, 321 Collocation, 255, 256, 257, 274, 320,

33o, 33*. 332, 342, 412, 413, 416, 467 Collocations, 160, 363, 367, 374, 466 Commentaries, 63, 67, 285 «., 308, 422,

470; their method of treatment, 66 Commentary, 70, 306, 309, 433 Commentators, 64, 65; elaborations made

by, 66 Compendium, 85 «., 86 n. Compendiums, 2

Compound concepts, 94; feelings, 94 Concentration, 103, 104, 105, 227, 234 n.,

268, 271, 272, 342, 437, 490 Concomitance, 157, 159, 160, 308, 322,

3 2 5> 344. 345. 346, 347. 348, 349, 351,

352, 353, 354, 356, 358, 364, 388,

389 «., 390, 393, 456 Conformations, 86 Conglomeration, 163 Consciousness, 94, 161, 214, 239, 240,

2 43> 353. 366, 368, 378, 379, 380,

399, 400, 412, 415, 416, 417, 428, 438, 444. 445._ 447. 44 8 » 449. 450« 45i. 454, 455, 45 6 « 457. 458, 460, 472, 481, 482, 485, 491

Consciousness-stuff, 250

Copernican, 31

Cornell University, 3

Cosmology, 221, 276

Cosmos, 325

Cowell, 2

Craving, 107

Creation, 206, 324, 326

Creator, 326, 364

Cullavagga, 108 n.

dabbasambharasadisa, 96

Daksa, 23

daksina, 36

Daksmanr&rtti, 28 n.

dama, 490

dandanlti, "ill

dariana, 189, 190; meaning of, 68 n.

dariandvaranlya, 190, 193, 196

dariandvaranlya karma, 194

Dasgupta, S. N., 397 n.

Dafasrutaskandka, 171 n.

Daiavaikalika, 171

Daiavaikalikaniryukti, 186 «., 280 «.,

309 Dattatreya, i9>n. daurmanasya, 86 n. dana, 283 danaparamita, 127 danasamiti, 199 n. Darashiko, 28 n., 39 Death, 50, 58, 59, 84, 103, 201 Debate, 406, 407 Deccan, 432 Delhi, 39

Demerit, 264, 281, 317, 324, 325, 342 Desire, 108, 225, 228, 295, 299, 300, 311,

3 2 5. 4" defapabandha, 256 deiavakaiikabrata, 200 deHta, 423 Determinate, 185, 225, 261, 262, 337,

379. 4 I2 » 4*3. 4i6, 424; cognition,

343 n. ; perception, 331, 334, 378 Deussen, 26 «., 29, 32 »., 38, 39 «.,

45 w., 49«., 52, 58«., 423, 438«.,

439 «• Devadatta, 117, 118, 176, 290, 391, 392,

393, 4". 483 Devaksema, 120 Devananda, 170, 173 Deva Suri, 172, 309 devaytlna, 34, 54, 58, I25«. Devendrastava, 171 n. Devi, 28 n. d/iam»ia, 82, 102; different meanings of,

84 dhammadesana, 84 «. Dhammapada, 83 dhammas, 104, 166

503

Dhammasahgani, 82, 83, 94, 95«., 99, ioo«.

dhammavisesatthena, 82

dhammatireka, 82

Dhanapala, 172

dharma, 56, 122, 131, 136, 137, 145, 161, !95> *9li I 98. 202, 256, 257, 281, 282, 285,286 «-, 291, 292,316,31 6m., 317 m., 322, 323, 383, 403, 404, 405, 423, 424, 427 m., 428; meaning of, 84 n.

dharmadhdtu, 130, 131, 137

Dharmaguptikas, 112

dharmakdya, 132, 137

Dharmakirti, 151, 155, 168, 309, 340 n., 351, 362, 409 «., 4io».; theory of inference, i55ff.; theory of perception, 151 ff.

dharmaparinama, 256

Dharmarajadhvarlndra, 67, 419, 420, 470 «., 471

Dharmasarngraha, 86 «., 94

dharmaskandha, 120

dharmasvdkhydtatdbhavand, 202

dharmaiastras, 278

Dharmatrata, 115, 120

dharmastikaya, 195

Dharmottara, 151, i52«., i53«., 154. '55. 163 «., 168, 181, 309

Dharmottarlyas, 112

Dhar, 230, 308

dharana, 272

Dhdrandidstra, 229 «.

dhdtu, 121, 127, 149, 213

Dhdtukathd, 83

Dhdtukdya, 120

dhruva, 175

dhrti, 122

Dhurtta Carvakas, 78, 79, 362

dhutangas, 101

dhvamsabhdva, 293 «., 359

dhydna, 81, 102«., 145, 150, 202, 203, 236, 272

Dhydnabindu, 28 «., 228

dhydnaparamitd, 127

dhydndgnidagdhakarnia, 201

Dhydyitamusti sutra, 125 «.

Dialectic, 407, 435, 492

Dialectical, 421

Dialogues of the Buddha, gin., io6m., 107 «.

Difference, 462, 463, 464

Differentiation, 225

Digambaras, 170, 172

Digambara Jain Iconography, 170 n.

Dignaga, 350 n.

digvirati, 200

digviratibrata, 200

dik, 311, 316, 322

Dinakari, 307, 322 n.

Dirinaga, 63, 120, 155 «., 167, 307, 309, 35°"-> 351, 355 «., 362, 388 n.

Disputes, 66

Dissolution, 324

ditthasava, 99, 100

ditthi, 68 «., 100

Divergence, 464

Digha, 80 m., 81 «., 91 «., 108 n.

Digha Nikdya, 83, 106

Dipavamsa, 83M., ii2«., 119

dirgha, 314 «., 315

dlrghaparimana, 316

ofcja, 100, 294, 300, 301, 365, 452, 453,

484, 486, 487 dosas, 228 ft., 295 Doubt, 225, 262, 294, 295 drastd, 444, 445 dravatva, 280, 285 n. Dravidacarya, 433 dravya, 175, 197, 198,231,232,285,286,

287, 294, 304,3o6«., 312,313,317,318,

3 2 °> 334. 34°. 3 8o "-» 428 draziyabandha, 193 dravyakalpand, 34OM. dravya karma, 191 dravyaleiya, 191 dravyanaya, 177 dravyanirjara, 195 dravyaparamdnu, 121 Dravyasamgraha, 171, 193 a., 203 «. Dravyasamgrahavrtti, 192«., 194/?.,

197 «., 198/;., 199 «. dravyasamvara, 194 dravyatva, 287, 312 dravyasrava, 194 Dream, 425, 442, 451, 470, 488 Drdhadhyaiayasancodanasutra, 125 m.

*"*! 447. 45°

a>-/, 68 «.

dWj/tf, 444, 447, 450, 451

driyatva, 445

<*b/ fl » 349

drstanta, 185, 186 «., 294, 295, 302, 350,

■389 drstantabhasa, 390 ^f-j/?, 68 m. drstisr^tivdda, 420 dtihkha, 86 m., 106, 133, 276, 316, 342,

426 duhkhabahulah samsarah heyah, 265 «. duhkham vivekinah, 365 duhkhaskandha, 86 m. dustarakunibandhapankamagnanam , 307 dutiyam jhdnam, 105 dvandva, 288 «. dvadasdnga, 92 Dvaraka, 306

dvesa, 93M., 143, 144, 220«., 267, 316 dvipaddm varavi, 423 dvitva, 314 dvipas, 235

dvyanuka, 314, 323, 324, 326, 327 Dyads, 314, 315

Earth, 23

Earth ball, 104, 106

Eastern Rajputana, 172

East India, 120 «.

Effect, 164, 165, 325, 326, 331, 332, 345,

Index

347. 348, 349» 359«•» 364. 400, 4 2 7> 439, 465, 466, 467, 468

Effect-collocation, 274, 275

Efficiency, 116

Eggeling, 13 n., ion., 24 n.

Ego, in, 133, 134, 225, 458

Egoism, 301

Egyptians, 4

eka, 18

ekacittasmim, 97

ekaggata, 105, 106

ekaprthaktva, 293

ekasamagryadhlnah, 114

ekatvabhavana, 202

ekatvanyatva, 148

Ekavyavaharikas, 112, 113

ekayana, 12 $n.

ekagra, 268

Ekaksara, 28 /*.

ekanta, 193

Ekanti, 421, 422

ekdrammana, 101

ekatmapratyayasara, 425

eklbhava, 409 «.

ekodibhavam, 105

Emancipation, ror, 107, 127, 201, 203, 225, 236, 273, 362, 366, 419, 436, 441, 445, 490; as optimism, 76

Embryo, 57

Empirical induction, 348

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 26 «., 36 «., 80 «., 108 «., 119 «., 169«., 170W., 172 «., 173«., 190/;.,

2II».

Energy, 255, 251, 253, 254, 321

Energy-stuff, 242, 244

English, 40

Epigraphica Indica, 170 n.

Epistemological, 2, 3, 406, 408, 410

Epistemology, 299, 415, 419, 431

Equilibrium, 245, 246, 248, 255, 258, 259

Eschatological, 304

Essential identity, 345

esana, 195

Eternal, 290, 292

Europe, 1, 6, 40, 62

European, c, 6, 9, 121, i$on., 169;

philosophy, 62 evambhiita-naya, 178 n. Evolution, 225, 245, 246, 247, 259, 311 Evolutionary course, 256; process, 259 Existence, 164, 168; Buddhist definition

of, 160

Faizabad, 39

Fallacies, 312, 390

Fallacy, 361

Feeling-substances, 243

Flame, 162

Forces of Nature adored, 17

Gacchas, 170

Gadadhara Bhattacarya, 308

Gaganaganja, iif,n.

gaganopamam, 423

gamaka, 388, 389

gamya, 388, 389

gandka, 313

Gandharvas, 55

gandha tanmatra, 252

Ganges, 136

Gaftganatha Jha, Dr, 384 n.

Gaftgesa, 63, 308, 309, 322«., 332«.,

334 «•» 338, 342 «•, 343 «•» 347 "• Ganapati, 28 n. Ganivlja, 171 n. Garbe, 33, 34, 218 Garbha, 28«., 31 n. Garuda, 28 n. Gaudabrahmanandi, 420 Gaudapada, 212, 222, 223, 242/2., 243 «.,

418, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429,

435. 437 Gautama, 59, 63, 65, 71, 81, 186 «., 279,

289 «., 306 gavaya, 354, 391, 486 Gaga Bhatta, 371, 417 n. gam, 396/397 Geiger, 112 n. Genus, 156, 285, 286, 287, 313, 317, 345,

378, 379- 389 Germany, 40

Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, 35 «. Geschichte des Buddhismus, iiyn. ghanapratarabhedena, 196 ghatatva, 412

Ghoshal, S. C, 193 «., 203 n. Ghosa, 115, 116 Ghosaka, 120 Gift,'36 Gnostics, 14

go, 39 r > 396

God, ro, 17, 49, 204, 205, 206, 233, 234, 288, 325, 326, 394, 396M., 399, 403,404

Goldstiicker, 227 n, 279

Gopalapurvatapini, 28 «.

Gopalottartapini, 28 n.

gotra, 193

gotra-karma, 191, 194

gotva, 317

gotvajati, 317

Gough, 2

Govardhana, 329, 330 n.

Govinda, 418, 423, 432

Govindananda, 85 «., 86 n., 89 «., 90 «., 91 «., 419

grahya, 409

Greek gods, 16

Greek literature, 40

Greek philosophy, 42

Greeks, 4

Guhadeva, 433

Gujarat, 120W., 172

guna, 84, 196, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224, 228, 244, 245, 246, 258, 259, 273, 273«., 280, 281, 285, 286, 287, 304, 306»., 312, 313, 316, 317, 318, 320, 3"> 334. 339. 413

505

gunakalpana, 340 n.

Gunamati, 120

Gunaratna, 2, 3, 7, 78«., 79, 114, 11572., H9«., 162 «., 163 »., 170 «., 175 «., i76«., i86«., 194«., 203«., 2o6»., 213, 217, 218, 220, 222, 223

Gunas, 323

gunasanniveiaviiesa, 255

gunasthdnas, 192 ».

gunatva, 287, 290

gundntarddhdna, 232

^■K/ri, 195

guru, 69, 422

gurukulavdsa, 283

guru-mata, 69,370; story relating to, 69 ».

gurutva, 281, 285 «., 291, 316

Gurvavali, 171

Haimavatas, 112

Haldane, 40 «.

Hamsa, 28 «., 228

Haribhadra, 2, 7, 68 «., 222

Harinatha VUarada, 213 ».

Harivarman, 124 ».

Harvard University, 231

Hastabdlaprakaranavrtti, 129

Hastikdkhyasutra, 125 ».

Hathayoga, 229

Haug, 10, 20, 21, 22, 36

Hayagriva, 28 n.

Heaven, 17, 23, 76, 394, 399, 405

Hemacandra, 172, 180«., 199, 203 ».,

237

Henotheism, 17, 18, 19

Heresies, 65, 78, 236

Heresy, 109

Heretical opinions, 68

Heretics, 138, 150, 151, 167

Heterodox, 83

hetu, 79, 84, 93, 95, 185, 186«., 293, 296, 3°3- 343. 344. 345. 346, 347. 348. 349. 35o, 353. 389. 393. 427

hetupratyaya, 139

Hetuvadins, 112

hetuvibhakti, 186 n.

hetupanibandha, 143

hetvdbhdsa, 294, 296, 344, 360

heyopddeydrthavisayd, 163 n.

Hillebrandt, 36, 211 n.

Himavat, 282 n.

Himalaya, 282 n.

himsd, 193, 200

himsopakdriddna, 200

Hinayana, 124 «., 125, 126

Hindi, 40

Hindu, 1, 7, 8, 14, 29, 57, 84, 151 «., 155 »-. 163 «., 279, 309, 323, 394, 422, 429, 430, 440; law, 11,69; Nyaya, 309; philosophy, 41, 167; philosophy— mythological, 4; philosophy—not influenced by Pali Buddhism, 83; schools of thought, 412; six systems of thought, 7; thinkers, 470; thought, 78, 113, 145; writers, 129; yoga, 203

Hindu Chemistry, 251 «., 321, 322«., 327 n.

Hindu monism, 33«., 34 n.

Hindus, 4, 10, n, 41, 67, 236, 237, 301, 309. 37i. 43°

Hiranyagarbha, 23, 32,52; hymn in praise of, 19

Historical Survey of Indian Logic, 276 n.

History of Hindu Chemistry, 254 n.

History of Indian Literature, 13 «., 230 n.

History of Indian Philosophy, attempt possible, 4; chronological data, 6; development, 5; different from history of European philosophy, 6; method of study, 64

History of Sanskrit Literature, 13 n.

hita, 12

hitatd, 136

Hoernle, 8o«., 173 n.

hotr, 36

hrasva, 314, 315

h rasvaparitndna, 314 n., 315

hymns, 283

Hyper-trsna, 90 «.

Hypothetical, 157, 158

icchd, 316, 325

idam, 449

Idealism, 128

Identity, 160, 162; of essence, 322, 347,

352 Ignorance, 59, 74, in, 132, 133, 134,

137. 139. >43, 259, 267, 268, 276,

3°o. 3 6 5> 455. 457. 47 2 ihdmutraphalabhogaviraga, 43 7 Illusion, 140, 146, 237, 260»., 261«.,

269, 303, 331, 332«., 337, 384, 385,

386, 411, 420, 440, 441, 446, 450,

45i. 452, 453. 457. 459. 469. 485. 486, 488, 489, 493 Illusory, 127, 129, 139, 142, 147, 161, 168, 240, 257»., 373, 375. 385. 386,

412, 425, 435, 439, 440, 443, 445,

448, 449' 45 1 - 45 2 . 453> 455. 458, 467, 468, 470, 472, 488, 489, 491

Illusory perception, 152

Images, 262

Imagination, 225, 269

Imagining, 299

Immaterial cause, 376, 380

Immortal, 58

Irnpermanence, 126

Implication, 185, 391

Implicatory communications, 94

Indefinable, 429, 467, 468, 487, 493

Indeterminate, 185, 213, 225, 245, 261, 262, 331, 334, 339, 378, 379, 412,

413, 416

India, 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 46, 47, 50, 62, 6 if 64, 66, 67, 77, 78, 81, 164, 172,

394 Indian Antiquary, ijon., 277 «., 419 n. Indian ideas, similarity with European

Index

ideas, 9; languages, 121; logic, 172, 309, 350, 388 n. ; Medieval School, 309 «.; mind, 31 Indian philosophy, 62, 67, 113, 197, 232,

355. 36o, 380, 3 8 5. 4°7» 465; association and conflict of systems in, 6 ; difficulties, 3 ; historical records, 5; history of, 3, 5; later stages, 5, 6 ; method of treatment different, 62 ; not popularised, 1; not translatable, 1; optimism of, 76; order of systems of, 9; texts published, 1

Indians, 1, 3, 74, 160«., 169

Indian, scholars, 41; system, 64, 144;

thinkers, 3 ; thought, 22 ; wisdom,

40 Indian systems, 75, 180, 185, 394,418;

karma theory, general account of, 71;

pessimistic attitude of, 75; points of

agreement between, 71, 77 Individual, 117, 118, 119, 122 Indo-European, 10 Indra, 18, 21, 272

indriya, 123, 184«., 193, 228/?., 472 indriyartka, 214, 288 Inertia, 246 Inference, 155, 156, 159, 160, 185, 269,

280, 285, 287, 289, 293, 297, 298, 303,

308, 331, 33 2 » 333> 343. 344» 345, 346,

347, 348, 35o, 35i, 35 2 , 353, 354, 355,

356, 360, 363, 364, 376, 384, 3 8 7, 388, 389, 390, 393, 404, 412, 414, 447, 454, 456, 470, 482, 483; (Buddhist), conditions of concomitance, 156

Infiniteness, 58

Infinite regress, 160 n.

Infinitude, 61

Inherence, 165, 285, 312, 319, 336, 349,

381, 382, 403, 450, 483 Injunction, 396, 397, 403, 404, 405, 430,

436, 437, 49°

Inorganic, 51

Instrumental cause, 274

Intelligence, 61

Intelligence-stuff, 241, 244, 248

Invariability, 320

Invariable, 321, 322, 352, 465, 466

Isomaric, 328

isana, 199 ».

itaretaraiunyata, 149

iti, 230

Itivuttaka, 83

Itsing, i20«.

iryd, 195, 199 n.

ISa, 28 «., 31, 39, 50, in n., 432 n.

Isana, 50

ihjara, 68, 145, 203, 220, 223, 234 n., 248 «., 255, 258, 259, 267, 271, 282 «., 284, 300, 304, 307, 311, 322, 323, 324, 3 2 5. 3 26 « 327, 355, 363, 365, 438, 469,

. 493

Isvarakrsna, 212, 218, 219, 222

iivara-prartidhdna, 270

Jivardnumdna, 308 n., 326 n., 365 n.

Jdbdla, 28W., 31 «., 35 n. Jdbdladariana, 28 n. Jdbdli, 28 n.

Jacobi, Prof., 169 «., 170W., 172, 173«-, 190«., 277, 278, 279, 307, 421

jadatva, 445

Jagadisa Bhattacarya, 306, 308

jagatprapaiica, 443

Jaiglsavya, 229 n.

Jaimini, 69, 281, 282, 369, 370, 427, 429

Jaimini sutra, 430

Jain, 79, 258, 309

Jaina, 65, 68, 74, 280«., 394,401, 434; literature, 169; logic, 309; logicians, 186 «.; Maharastrl, 171; philosophy, 210; prakrit, 171; religion, 169; scriptures, 186

[ainatarkavartika, 171, 183«., 18472., 186 «., 188 «., 197 n.

Jainism, 3, 9, 175, 192, 208, 209, 212; atheism in, 2036°.; classification of karma, 191; cosmography, 199; division of living beings, 189; doctrine of emancipation, 207; doctrine of karma, igoff.; doctrine of matter, 195 ff.; doctrine of nayas, 176; doctrine of ten propositions, 186 «.; doctrine of senses, i84«.; doctrine of syadvada, 179; doctrine of universals, 196, 197; ethics of, 199 ff.; its ontology, 1730".; literature of, 171; monks in, 172; nature of knowledge, t8iff.; nature of substance, 174; non-perceptual knowledge, 185; origin of, 169; relative pluralism, 175 ff.; relativity of judgments, i/9ff.; sects of, 170; soul-theory, i88ff.; standpoints of judgment, 177; theory of being, 187; theory of illusion, 183, 183/?.; theory of perception, 183ff.; validity of knowledge, 188; yoga, 199

Jains, 7, 73, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180, 184, 185, 186, 197, 198, 209, 212, 240, 309, 325, 330, 350, 363, 364; some characteristics of, 172

Ja/pa, 294, 296, 302, 360

Jamlmdvipaprajnapti, 171 n.

Janaka, 34

janrna, 294

Japan, 278

Japanese, 303

jard, 86 n.

jardmarana, 86, 89, 92

Jayanta, 67, 79, 160«., 307, 321, 326 «., 330 «-, 337> 355 »•, 362

Jayaditya, 231

Janaklnatha Bhattacarya, 308

jdta, $ii

Jdtaka, 83

jati, 84, 89, 92, 294/296, 298, 301, 302, 304/z., 317, 318, 319, 339, 360, 362, 378, 379, 38o, 381, 382, 403. 424, 445, 483, 49 2

507

jatikalpand, 340 n

jatirindriyagocara, 382

jatyadisvarupdvagdhi, 338

Jhalkikar, Bhlmacarya, 2 n.

Jha Ganganatha, Dr, 370, 372, 378 n., 397 »., 405 n.

j'kana, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106; preparatory measures for, 102

jhana-samddhi, 102

jijnasa, 302

jina, 144, 199

fiva, 75, 188, 189, 198, 238, 425, 457, 461, 469, 482

■>ivanmukta, 492

jivanmukti, 268

Jlvanmuktiviveka, 419

flvabhigama, \l\n.

jwdstikdya, 189

/nana, 189 «., 190, 199, 367, 413, 414, 416, 417, 437, 445, 455

j nana- karma-samuccayabhdvah ,437

jnanakanda, 436

jnana-karana, 448

jnanalaksana, 341, 342

jndna-mdrga, 29, 436

Jnanaprasthana iastra, 120

jnanaiakti, 402, 460

jnanasamavayanibandhanam, 363

jnanabhava, 456

jnanavaranlya, 190, 193, 196

/ndnavaranlya karma, 194

jnanin, 68 «.

Jnanottama Mi£ra, 419

Jnata clan, 173

fnatadharmakathas, 171

jfiatata, 416, 448

jneydvarana, 132

Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society, 278, 276M., 279

fournal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 281 «., 303 «., 308 «., 310 «.

jyotisam jyotih, 54

Kaegi, 15, 16, 17/*., 18/2., 19W., 20M.,

24 «. kaivalya, 28W., 266 «. Kaiyyata, 231 kalala, 328

kalala-budbudavastha, 91 «. Kaldpa Vyakarana, 282 «. Kalisantarana, 28 «. kalpana, 129, 153, 408, 409?;. kalpandpodha, 408, 409 «. kalpan&podhamabhrdntam, 153 kalpas, 138 kalpasutra, 171 Kalpataru, 418 Kalpatariiparimala, 418 Kalpavatamsikd, i"jin. kalpita samvrti, 428 kamma, 101, 106 kammabhava, 87, 90 «. Kaniska, 129W. Kant, 42

Kantian, 409/2.

Kanada, 65, 68«., 71, 282, 284, 286, 287, 288, 289«., 291 «., 305, 316 «.,

349- 350, 35i, 382

Kanada-Rahasya, 306

kapardin, 433

Kapila, 68, 216, 218, 220, 221, 222, 233

Kapilavastu, 81

karanadosajndna, 375

&w»mi, 54, 55, 56, 57, 72, 74, 75, 80, 86 «., 87, 90, 90«., 91, 107, 108, in, "3. 131. i33» 148, 19*' '93. 194. 195.

-202, 203, 206, 207, 2IO, 214, 215, 228«., 233, 248, 266, 267, 268, 285, 286, 287, 291, 294, 3OO, 3OI, 3O4,

3o6«., 312, 313, 316M., 317, 318,

319. 320, 324, 327, 330,363.3 66 >440;

different kinds of, 73; Jaina view of, 73; matter, 73, 99M., 190, 191, 192, 193, 239; Yoga-view and Jaina-view compared, 74; marga, 29; vargand, 192

karmakdnda, 430, 436

karmaphala, 210

karmas, 201, 259, 325, 491

karmasdmarthyam, 316 n.

karmatva, 287

karmavijndna, 133, 135

karmasrava, 193

karmdiaya, 267

Karmins, 436

kartcnd, 103, 104, 136, 203, 236, 270

Karunapundarika, 12 5 n.

Kashmere, 39, i20»., 256

kasinam, 104

Kassapa, 106

kasaya, 191, 193, 201, 313

Kathavatthu, 83, 108 «., 112, 113, 119, 120 n., 157, 158 «., 465

Kathenotheism, 18

Katha, zSn., 39, 45^., 59, 60 n., 106, 211 «., 226W., 227, 432 n. ; school, 31

Katharudra, 28 w.

*«.'«> 313

kaumudi, 245 «.

kausidya, 144

Kaasitaki, 28«., 30, 39«., 50, 57«.,

263 «.; school, 30 Kautilya, 227, 277, 278, 279 &>fo, 175, 195, 198, 310, 311, 316, 322 Kaldgnirtidra, 28 «. kdldpabandha, 256 kaldtita, 360 kdlatyaydpadista, 344 Kalidasa, 277 «. kama, 57, 88, 144 kdmacchanda, 105 kdmaloka, 134 kamasava, 99, 100 kdmya-karma, 489 KancI, 418 Kapila Samkhya, 68 Kapya Patamchala, 230 karakavyapara, 257

Index

karana, 258 «., 319, 322, 427

kdrana-dkdia, 2J3

kdrana-buddki, 250

kdrana-sd?nagri, 322

karanasvalaksandnyathabhavah, 468

karanaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi, 358

kdraiiaviruddhopalabdhi, 358

karananupalabdhi, 358

kari'kd, 67, 224, 273 «., 342 «., 423

karmafarira, 73

kamianaJarira, 192

kdrya, 257, 258W., 286^., 319, 427

kdryakdrana-bhdva, 320

kdryakdranabhdvadva, 352 w.

karyatva-prayojaka, 322

karyaviruddhopalabdhi, 358

kdryakdia, 253

kdrydnupalabdhi, 358

KdSika, 263 «., 371

Kasyapa, 349

Ka^yapiyas, 112

Katyayana, 230, 279

Katyayaniputtra, 120

Kdthaka, 31

Kavya, 172

kdyagatdsati, 103

kdyagtipti, 199 w.

kdyendriya, 123

kdyika, 108

kdyikakarma, 124

kdyikavijnapti karma, 124

Keith, Prof., 36«., 351

Kemp, 40 «.

Kena, 28 «., 30, 37, 39, 432 «.

Ke£ava Mi£ra, 307

kevala, 173, 266

kevalajnana, 191 «., 207

kevalavyatireki, 353

kevaldnvayi, 353, 354

kevalin, 207

khandha, 89, 93, 95, 104, 106, 161

Khandha Yamaka, 94, 95 «.

kkantisamvara, 101

Khanabhanga siddhi, 68 «.

Khandanakhandakhddya, 318 «., 419, 462

khanikattd, 104

Kharatara Gacchas, 170

£M 427

kkindsava, 105

Khuddaka nikdya, 83

Khuddaka pdtha, 83

khydti vijiiana, 145

kilesas, 100

Kinetic, 246

Kiranavall, 306

Kirandvallbhdskara, 306

A7VaA Pdtanjal, 233

£&/ez, 142, 267, 301, 365

kletevarana, 132

klist a, 269

Knowledge as movement, 416

Knowledge-moments, 411, 412; -stuff,

240 kramabkdva, 186

kratu, 88

kriyd, 340

kriydkalpand, 340 ».

kriydiakti, 460

kriddrtham, 424

krodka, 201

krsna, 28 «., 73, 74, 266

Krsna yajurveda, 227

Krsnayajvan, 371

Kritikd, 387

ksana, 257 «., 40972.

Ksanabhangasiddhi, 163 n.

ksaiiasamtdiia, 409 «.

ksanasya prdpayitutnaiakyatv&t, 410 «.

ksanika, 161

ksanikatvavydpta, 159

ksanikdh, 114

Ksattriya, 34, 35, 173, 208

ksanti, 202

ksantiparamitd, 127

ksdyika, 192

ksdyopas'amika, 192

ksetra, 214, 217

ksetrajiia, 214

ksipta, 268

^W, 51, 252, 255, 310, 313, 314, 328

Ksurika, 28 n.

Kukkulikas, 112, 113

Kumarajiva, 122 «., 128, 166

Kumarasambhava, 277 «.

Kumarila, 67, 69, 129, 145, 151 «., 167, 209«., 284, 355, 359, 369, 370, 371, 37 2 » 37 8 , 379- 380, 382, 384, 386, 387, 3 g 8, 3 8 9» 39 1 . 39 2 » 395. 39 6 . 397. 399. 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 416, 417, 432,

459.. 484 Kundika, 28 n.

Knsumanjali, 307, 326 «., 365 «. kuialamula, 136

laksanaparindma, 256

laksanaJunyatd, 149

Laksandvali, $12 n.

Lahkavatdra, 84«., 125 «., I26«., 128, 130«., 138, 145 «., 14672., 147, 148 «., 149, 150, 151 «., 280, 423, 426 «., 429,

47o /aye, 426 layayoga, 229 Le Gentil, 39 Leipsig, 203 «. £>/pa, 73, 191 Liberation, 273, 317 w. Life-functions, 262 /wigra, 152, 156, 157, 249, 293«., 331,

343. 344. 345. 348, 351. 356, 359.

412 linga-pardinars'a, 351 /»&*«. 345 /«/«, 324 Lildvati, 306 lobha, 100, 201 Logic, 172, 277 /0&Z, 197, 198, 199

509

lokabhavand, 202 Lokaprakdia, \yon. lokas, 235

lokdkdia, 189, 197, 199 Lokayata, 78«., 227, 277 Lokottaravadins, 112 Lumbini Grove, 81

Macdonell, 12, 13/*., 18, \gn., 22,23,

25»., 26 «. mada, 144 madas'akti, 79 Madhusudana, 492 Madhusudana SarasvatI, 67, 420 Madhva, 70, 168 madhya, 199

madhyamaka, its meaning, 144 Madhyamaka philosophy, 138 madhyama-parimdna, 189 Magadha, i20«. Magic, 127, 142, 424, 426, 428, 435,

469 Magical, 80, 229; force, 37; verses,

36 mahat, 45, 213, 225, 226, 248, 249, 254,

255. 276, 290, 3i 4 «., 315, 431 mahatparimdna, 315 mahat-tattva, 249 Mahd, 28 n. Makdbhdrata, 79, 216, 217, 218, 219,

224, 279 Mahabhasya, 219, 230, 231, 232, 233,

235. 465 mahabhuta, 94, 95, 122 Mahdbodhivamsa, 112 makdbrata, 200 mahdkarund, 138 Mahdlavikdraidstra, 12 9 n. Mahamaya, 81 mahdmoha, 220 n. mahdn, 292

Mahdndrayana, 31, 39 «. Mahanidana suttanta, 92 «. Mahdniiltha, 17x11. Mahdparinibbdnasuttanta, 81 «. Mahdpratydkhyana, 171 «. Mahasangha, 112 Mahasaiighikas, 112, 113, 125 Mahdsatip at t liana Sutta, 107 Mahdvdkya, 28 w. mahdvdkya, 439 Mahdvibhdsd, i?o Mahavira, 79, 169, 170, 171; his life,

173

Mahdvyutpatti, 120 «.

Mahayana, 125, 166, 424; its difference from Hinayana, 126; literature, 125 «.; meaning of, 125

Mahdydnasamparigrahaidstra, 128

Mafidydnasutrdlamkdra, 125, 128, i$6n., 147 «., 151 «.

Mahayana sutras, 125, 128, 279, 421; their doctrine, 127

Mahayanism, 125

Mahayanists, 126

Mahisasakas, 112, 119

Mahommedan, 39

Maiirayani, 28»., 31, 39««, 211, 227,

236 Maitreyi, 28 n. Maitreyl, 35«., 61

maitri, g$n., 136, 203, 226«., 236, 270 Majjhima Nikdya, 83, 93«., 99«., 100,

inn. Major, 351 Makaranda, 307 Makkhali Gosala, 79 Malabar, 432 Malebranche, 40 n. Mallinatha, 277 «., 308, 362 n. Mallisena, 171 man, 68

Man, as universe, 23 manahparydya, 191 «., 207 manahiuddhi, 201 manana, 490 wa/zof, 25, 26, 43, 133, 146, 189, 213,

214, 215, 225, 261, 262, 289, 291, 292,

295. 298, 300, 303, 311, 316, 365, 377,

378, 402, 413, 460, 472 n. manaskara, 134 mano, 89, 96, 124 manogupti, 199 n. manomaya, 60 manomaya at man, 46 manovijfidna, 124, 134, 408 mantra, 211 mantradrastd, 10

mantras, 36, 69, 71, 283, 404, 405 mantrayoga, 229 manvate, 124

Mandalabrdhmana, 28«., 228 Mandana Misra, 371, 418, 432 Maniprabhd, 318 «., 419, 485 «. tnarana, 86 w. maranabhava, 91 wz arandn ussati, 102 marut, 252, 255, 310 Mass-stuff, 242, 244 mata, 68 n. Material cause, 274, 286, 322, 323, 376,

377. 445, 453 Mathura Bhattacarya, 308 mati, 207 ?tiatijndna, 191 «. Matter, 196 Maudgalyana, 120 Maulikya Samkhya, 217, 218 Max Miiller, 10, i3»., 18, 38, 39«.,

4°«., 45 «• Mayukhamdlikd, 371 Madhava, 68«., 79, 305 «., 371, 405 «.,

418, 419, 457, 469 Madhava Deva, 308 Madhavacarya, \\$n. mddhyamika, 127, 138, 429 Mddhyamika kdrikd, 125 «., 138, 426 n. Madhyamikas, 113

Index

Mddhyamika vrtti, 85 w., 86«., 88«., 90W., gm. t 141/2., 142 «., 143W., 14472., 425 «.

MddhyamikaSdstra, 12272.

mddhyastha, 203

mana, 100, 144, 201

mdnam, 356

mdnasa-pratyaksa, 343, 400

mdnasika, 108

Mdndukya, 28 «., 31 «., 39, 418, 424, 432 ».

Afandukya kdrikd, 418, 422

Manikya Nandi, 309

Mdradamanasutra, 125*2.

mardava, 202

mdtsaryya, 144

Mdtharabhdsya, 213

maya, 50, 127, 141, 142, 144, 146, 149,

151, 201, 241, 258, 273«., 424, 426,

431' 435. 437. 43 8 . 442, 443. 461,465.

467, 468, 469, 470, 492, 493 mayahastl, 428 mdydkdra, 94 Mechanical, Physical and Chemical

Theories of the Ancient Hindus, 213 Meditation, 103, 104, 105, 115, 161, 173,

201, 202, 227, 234, 235, 317 n. megka, 220 n. Memory, 185, 269, 316 »., 340; causes of,

2l6«.

Mental perception, 400

Mercury, 287 n.

Merit, 264, 281, 312, 317, 324, 325, 342

Metaphysical, 406

Metaphysics, 161, 166, 403, 414, 415

Metempsychosis, 25, 234

mettd, 103

mettabhavana, 104

Middle, 351, 362

Middle India, 120 n.

Milinda, 83

Milindapaiiha, 83, 88, 89, 107, 163 n.

Mindfulness, 101, 103

Mind stuff, 240 n.

Minor, 351, 362

Mirok, 278, 303

Misery, 295 n.

Mithila, 308

mithyddrsti, 145

mithydjndna, 294, 365

mithydsatydbhiniveia, 148

mithydtva, 193

mithydtvanirukti, 444 n.

Mimamsa, 7, 9, 68, 129, 188, 189, 209 «., 276,' 280, 281, 284, 303, 320, 323, 343 «•» 344 »•> 346, 357. 363. 3 6 7> 369. 37°> 37i, 372, 375. 376, 382, 383. 3 8 5> 3 8 6, 390, 391, 394, 396, 400, 403, 404, 406, 412, 417, 429, 430, 433,

435. 44°. 448, 47". 484. 485. 486, 49°» 497; agreement with Nyaya Vai^esika, 403; akhyati theory of illusion, 386; anvilabhidhdnav&da and abhihitdnva-yavdda, 395; comparison with other

systems, 367 ff.; conceptions of jaii and avayavin, 379 ff.; conception of Sakti, 402 n. ; consciousness of self, how attained, Kumarila and Prab-hakara, 400 ff.; denial of sphota, 397 n. ; doctrine of samavdya, 381 ; epistemology of Kumarila, 416 ff.; epistemology of Prabhakara, 415 ff.; general account of, 69; indeterminate and determinate perception, 378ff.; inference, 387 ff.; influence of Buddhist logic on Mimamsa logic, 388, 390; Kumarila and Prabhakara, 372 ; Kumarila's view of self-luminosity, 4595 legal value of, 69; literature, 369ff.; non-perception, 397 ff.; Nyaya objections against the self-validity of knowledge, 372 ff.; perception, sense-organs and sense-contact, 375 ff.; Prab-hakara's doctrine of perception contrasted with that of Nyaya, 343«.; Prabhakara's view of self-luminosity, 459; Sabda pramana, 394 ff.; self, 399ff.; self as jndnaiakti, 402; self-revealing character of knowledge, 382 ff.; self-validity of knowledge, 3 7 3 ff.; upamana and arthdpatti, 391 ff.; vidhis, 404 ff.; view of negation, 355 ff.

Mimdmsdbdlaprakds'a, 371

Mimdmsdnukramanl, 371

Mimdmsd-tiydya-prakdia, 371

Mimdmsdparibhdsd, 371

Mimamsa sutras, 280, 281, 282, 285, 370,

372,'394 Mimamsist, 359 mleccha, 294 »., 304 modamdna, 220 n. Moggallana, 108, 263 n. moha, 100, 122, 143, 220«., 276, 300 mohaniya, 191, 193 mohaniya karma, 194 moksa, 115, 170, 173, 190, 192, 195, 198,

199, 207, 215, 216, 217, 283, 305, 3 i7«. moksavada, 401 n. mokse nivrttirnikhsd, 216 Molar, 321

Molecular motion, 321 Molecules, 327 Momentariness, 158, 161, 164, 168, 209,

212 Momentary, 104, 114, 141, 152, 159, 160,

165, 174, 187, 274, 299, 316«., 325,

33 2 > 339» 408, 471 Monk, 172, 173 Monotheism, 17 Monotheistic, 33 Mudgala, 28 n. muditd, 103, 220 «., 236, 270 Muir, ion., 23 n., 32 «., 33 n. mukta, 73 mukta-jlva, 189 Muktavali, 307, 322 n. mukti, 58, 202, 248, 261, 269, 273, 305 «.,

324, 366, 424, 440, 491 ; general ac-

5ii

count of, 74; general agreement of

Indian systems in, 74 Muklika, 28«., 263 «. tnumuksutva, 437 Mttndaka, 28 ft., 39, 49, 56, 432 MCila Sarvastivada, 120 Mulasutras, 171 Mystic, 229

na asti, 67

Naciketas, 59, 60

na-ekdnta t 175

naigamana, 186 «.

naigamanaya, iyj

naimittika-karma, 489

nairdtmya, 147, 149

Naiskarmyasiddhi, 419

Naiyayika, 197, 203, 305, 332»., 333,

,347; 355, 3 6 *. 365. 381, 462, 49* Nandivardhana, 173 na nirodho na cotpattih, 425 Narasimhacarya, 419 n. Narbuda, 432 Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus,

213

Nature, 43

Navadvipa, 306, 308

Navya-Nyaya, 308, 353

naya, 176, 179, 187

Nayanaprasadini, 419

nayabhasa, 178, 181

Nadabindu, 28«., 228

Nagasena, 107

Nagarjuna, 109, 125 «., 126, 128, I29«., 138, 144, 155 «., 166, 215 «., 233, 235, 279, 421, 423, 425 n., 427, 429, 465, 470, 493 ; essencelessness of all things, 141; ethics of, 144; his doctrine that nothing exists, 140; Nirvana in, 142; pratityasamutpdda in, 139, 143

Nagesa, 212, 231, 235

ndma, 86«., 91, 193, 340

ndmakalpand, 340 n.

ndma-karma, 191, 194

namarupa, 85, 86«., 88, 89, 90, 122,

174, 439 ndmarupa-padattkanam, 89 namayati, 91 Nandl, 171

Naradaparivrajaka, 28 ». Narayana, 28 ». Narayanatlrtha, 212, 242 n. nasti na prakaiate, 458 nastika, 67, 68, 208

Nataputta Varddhamana Mahavira, 169 Negation, 147, 293, 304, 316, 318, 335,

336, 355. 356, 357, 358, 359. 39».

399' 444. 453. 454. 455. 456, 464,

485, 488 Negative, 461

Nemicandra, 171, 193, 19472. Nepal, 81

nescience, 449, 450, 452, 461 netineti, 44, 45, 61, 65, no

New York, 3 n.

ni, 38

Nibandhakara, 370

nidariana, 350, 351

nidarianabhasa, 351

Niddesa, 83

nididkyasana, 490

nidrd, 193, 269

nigawana, 185, 296, 350, 353

Nigantha, 169

niggama, 157

nigodas, 190

nigrahasthdna, 294, 296, 301, 302, 360, 362

Nihilism, 138, 143

Nihilistic, 80; doctrine, 140

nihsvabhdva, 142, 146

nihsvabhdvatvam, 141

nihsvarupatd, 464

nihireyasa, 282, 285, 294, 305

Nikaya, 83

nimitta, 274, 323

nimitta-kdrana, 254, 438

nimittattkiti, 93

nimtttdpabandka, 256

nirabhilapyaiiinyatd, 149

niratUaydh cetandh, 228 «.

niravayava, 380 «.

JViraydvali, 171».

JVird/amba, 28 ».

nirdUali, 124

Niri^vara Samkhya, 259

nirjard, 192, 195

nirmmitapratimohi, 145

nirnaya, 294, 296, 360

Nirnaya-Sagara, 28 «.

nirodka, 149, 268, 272

nirodha samddki, Z"ji

Nirvana, 28«., 75, 81, 100, 119M., 126, 127, 128, 13^ 135, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145. i49»_ I 5i. r6 9> '9°. 215»., 423

Nirvdnapariksa , 425 «.

nirvicdra, 271

nirvikalpa, 334, 337, 378, 408, 412, 416,

483. 4 8 4 nirvikalpa-dvitva-guna, 314 nirvikalpahprapancopaiamah, 426 nirvikalpajndna, 153 «., 182 nirvikalpaka, 339 nirvikalpa praiyaksa, 261 nirvikalpikd, 337 nirvitarka, 271 nissatta nijjiva, 84 nissdya, 94 niicaya, 409 «. Niiitka, 171 «. ntsed/ia, 29 nisiddha-karma, 489 Niskantaka, 308, 362 «. nitya, 290, 316 nitya-karma, 489 nilydnitya, 148 nitydnityavastteviveka, 436 nivrtti, 488

Index

niwana, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109 niyama, 155, 235, 270, 317 «., 345 niya??ia-vidhi, 404 niyatapurvavarttita, 320 «*, 277

nilabodha, 41011. nilatvajati, 317 nirufakhya, 124 Noble path, 124 nodanaviiesa, 291 Non-existence, 356, 357 Non-perception, 261, 356, 358, 359, 397,

485 North-western Province, 172 Nrsinihapiirvatdpini, 28 n., 32 n. Nrsimhasrama Muni, 419, 420 Number, 291, 292, 305, 306 «., 315 Nyaya, 7, 9, 63, 68, 75, 87 «., 157, 159, 161,168, 177, 219, 26gn., 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 294, 296, 297, 299, 303,

304. 3°5» 3°7> 3°8, 309. 3^, 3 I2 «->

320, 321, 325, 326, 327, 328, 331, 332,

333. 335. 337. 338, 339. 340, 343. 344«., 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 353, 354. 356i 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 367, 368, 369, 372, 373. 376, 377. 378 «•, 380, 381, 382, 385, 391, 394, 396«., 397, 403, 406, 412, 413, 4'4» 415, 4'6, 4'7> 43!. 434. 440, 446, 455- 459' 462, 465, 466, 484, 488, 492; nature of the self, 459 n.\ notion of time, 466

Nydyabindu, 151, 152 «., 154 «., 155 «., 168, 181, 309, 358 «., 410 n.

Nyayabindutika, i$in., 15472., i55«-, i56«-, 359»., 4io«.

Nyayabindtttikatippani, 151 «., 152 n., I54«.

Nyayabodhini, 330 n.

Nydyakatidall, 306, 310 n., 311«., 312 «., 314«., 316 n., l\in., ii^n., 7,i6n., 328;/., 337 n., 338 «., 351 «., 355 n.,

359"-Nyayakanika, 371 Nyayakoia, 2 «. Nyayalilavati, 317 «. Nyayamakaranda, 420, 486 Nyayamanjari, 67, 79, i6o«., 161, i62».,

163M., 2i2w., 276, 307, 311 «., 320,

321, 322 «., 326, 327 «.,330«., 332 »., 33 6 > 337 "•» 340«-, 345 «•» 347' 353. 355 «•» 358«-. 359 "•» 3 62 >362«.,363. 365 «., 366«., 373«-. 380«., 4H"-» 417 »., 459 «., 467

Nyayamanjarisara, 308 Nyayamalavistara, 371, 405 «. Nyayanibandhaprakaia, 63, 307 Nydyanirnaya, 307, 418 Nydyapradlpa, 308 NyayapraveSa, 309 Nydyaralnamdla, 371, 417 «. Nyayaratnakara, 370, 378^., 388, 389«.,

390 «. Nydyasara, 308, 309 Nydyasiddkdntadipa, 308

Nydyasiddhdntamanjari, 308

Nyaya siici, 278

Nydyasudhd, 371

Nyaya sutra, 228 «., 229 «., 277, 297 «., 300«., 302, 306, 307, 342 «., 362, 430

Nyaya sutrabhasya, 186 «.

Nyaya sutras, 71, 120, 276,278, 279, 294, 301, 303. 305. 3 2 7"-> 36o

Nyayasidravivaraiia, 307

Nyayasiitroddhdra, 278

Nydyatatparyamandana, 63, 307

Nydyatdtparyatlkapariiuddhi, 63

Nyaya-Vaisesika, 167, 178, 256 »., 281, 284, 2947/., 305, 310, 311, 312, 313, 318, 319, 320, 323, 326, 330, 335, 341, 355. 366, 3 6 7. 37 1 . 403. 49 2 5 antiquity of the Vaiiesika sutras, 280 ff.; argument from order and arrangement, in favour of the existence of God, 363 ff.; arguments against the Buddhist doctrine of causation as tadaimya and tadutpatti, 345 ff.; atomic combination, 326; Buddhist criticism of mrvikalpa and Vacas-pati's answer, 339ff.; Caraka and the Nyayasutras, 302 ; causes of recollection, 300; causation as invariable antecedence, 321 ; causation as molecular motion, 321; causation as operative conditions, 322; classification of inference, 353 ff.; classification of negation, 359; conception of wholes, 380 n. ; criticism of momentariness, 274; criticism of the Samkhya and the Buddhist view of pramana, 331 ff.; criticism of Samkhya satkaryavada, etc., 275 ff.; criticism of the theory of causation by Vedanta, 466; debating devices and fallacies, 360 ff.; discussion on the meaning of upamana, 355«.; discussion on the sutras, 276 ff.; doctrine of dissolution, 323; doctrine of inference, 343 ff.; doctrine of illusion, 337; doctrine of paratahprdmanya, 372 ff.; doctrine of perception, 333; doctrine of soul, 362 ff.; doctrine of substance (dravya), 310 ff.; doctrine of upamana and iabda, 354ff.; doctrine of vydpti, 345 ff.; epistemology, 412 ff.; erroneous perception, 336; fallacies of hetu, 344; five premisses of Pra^astapada, 350; formation of radicles, 329; four kinds of pramanas, 332ff.; Gangesa's definition of perception, 334»., 342 n. ; general epistemological situation as compared with Mimamsa, 367; indeterminate and determinate perception, 334; inference from effects to causes, 297; inference of a creator, 325 ff.; literature, 307 ff.; merits and demerits operating as teleological causes of atomic combination, 323 ff.; Mimamsa doctrine of negation, 355 ff.; miraculous, intuitive and mental perception,

5*3

342 ff.; modes of atomic combination at the time of creation, 324; mode of operation of heat-light rays, 329; mode of sense-contact as contrasted with that of Samkhya-yoga, 378 n. ; molecular changes and heat, 327 ff.; nature of pleasure and pain, 342; notion of time compared with the Samkhya notion of time, 311; Nyaya inference of cause, 297 n. ; object of Nyaya studies, 277 ff.; philosophy of the Vaihsika sutras, 285 ff.; pramdna as collocation and causal operation, 330; Prasastapada's classification of cognition, 332 n. ; Prasastapada's classification of svar-thanumana and pardrthanumdna, 350; Prasastapada's doctrine of example compared with that of Dinnaga, 350 n. ; Prasastapada's interpretation of Kanada's doctrine of inference, 348 ff.; Prasastapada's view of atomic combination, 328; principle on which the categories are admitted, 312; relations directly apprehended by perception, 335 ; salvation through knowledge, 365 ff.; samavdyi and asamavdyi kdrana, 322; science of Nyaya (nyaya vidyd), 2776°.; self compared with Samkhya and Mimamsa, 368; sense-contact and perception, 335 ff-; six kinds of sense-contact, 334; theory of anuvyavasaya contrasted with the tri-putlpratyaksa doctrine of Prabhakara,

343, 343 n. ; transcendental contact, 341; transmission of qualities from causes to effects, 323; unconditional concomitance and induction, 347 ff.; Vacaspati's refutation of identity of essence and causality as being grounds of inference, 352; Vacaspati, Sri-dhara and Gangesa on indeterminate perception, 337 ff.; Vaidesika an old school of Mimamsa, 282 ff.; Vatsya-yana, Udyotakara, Vacaspati, Dinnaga and Dharmakirtti on the doctrine of concomitance, 351 ff.; view of motion contrasted with Samkhya, 330; view of negation, 359; view of perception contrasted with that of Prabhakara,

343 w -j view of sdmdnya contrasted with that of the Buddhists, 318 ».; viparitakhydti theory of illusion, 385; will of God and teleology, 324 ff.

Nydyavdrttika, 307, 337 n. Nydyavdrttikatdtparyatlkd, 63, 277, 307 nydyavidyd, 277 Nydydnusdra, 120 Nydydvatdra, 171, 309 iidnasanwara, 101

odd tarn, 94 ojahpradesa, 196 Oldenburg, 83 «., 237 n. Om, 36

Omniscience, 173 Ontological, 2, 3, 340 Oral discussions, 65 Order, 364 Organic, 51 Organic affections, 94 Oriental, 34 Oupanikhat, 40 Ovum, 328 Oxford, 40 n.

paccabhinnd, 98

paccaya, 93, 95

paddrtha, 282, 312, 313, 317«., 319,

365 Paddrthadkarmasamgraka, 306 n. Paddrthatattvaniriipana, 308 n. Padmanabha Mis>a, 63, 306, 307 Padmapada, 418, 419 Paingala, 28«., 31 n. paksa, 156 «., 343, 344, 349, 362, 388 paksasattva, 156 «., 349 paksdbkdsa, 390 pakti, 122

Pancadasi, 419, 492 n* Pancakalpa, 171 n. paiicakdranl, 352 Pancapddikd, 418, 419 Paiicapddikddarpana, 419 Paiicapddikdtikd, 419 Paiicapddikdvivarana, 419, 456 n. Paficaratra Vaisnavas, 220 Paficadikha, 216, 217, 219, 221 pancavijndnakdya, 146 pancdgnividyd, 37 pan/id, 100, 101, 166 paiifidsampadam, 82 Pandita Asoka, 168, 297«., 313M., 318?*.,

380 n. para, 220«., 280, 281 parabhdva, 141 Parabrahma, 28 n. parajdti, 317 Paramakamsa, 28 n. Paramahamsaparivrdjaka, 28 n. paramamakat, 292, 316 paramamahdn, 292 parajndnava, 380 n.

paramdnu, 121, 122, 123, 251, 252, 314//. Paramartha, 120«., 128, 149, 2i8«.,i428 paramdrthasat, 409 «., 410/2. paramdrthasattd, 144 paratndrthatah, 425 paramdtman, 214 paratah-pramanya, 372 paratva, 316 pardpara, 220 n. pardrthdnumdna, 155, 156, 186 n., 3*0,

353»389 paribhoganvaya punya, 119 n. paricchinna, 445 paricckmndkdJa, 104 paridevand, 86 n. parigrahdkdnksd, 193

Index

parikdra, 302

parikalpa, 148

parikamma, 102 n.

parikarma, 270

parimandala, 292

parimandala parimana, 314

parimana, 315, 316, 323

parimiti, 314

parindma, 53, 193, 196, 468, 487

parindtnakramaniyama, 256

parindmavdda, 258

parisankkyd-vidhi, 4O4

parispanda, 320, 321, 329

pariiesamdna, 353

Pariiistaparvan, 171

parisahajaya, 195

pariksaka, 295

pariksd, 447

Pariksdmukhasutra, 182 «., 309

Pariksdmukhasutravrtti, 171, 181 «., 183 «., 186 «.

Parmenides, 42

paroksa, 183, 185

Part, 165

Parthasarathi Misra, 371, 378 «.

parydya, 187, 198

parydyanaya, 177, 178

passdsa, 103

paiutva, 317

Patafijali, 68, 203, 212, 219, 222, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 268, 279, 317 «., 365, 465; his date and identification, 230 ff.; his relation with yoga, 226 ff.

Patanjalicarita, 230

pathamam jhdnam, 105

Patna, 173

pathavl, 106

paticcasamuppanna, 94

paticcasamuppdda, 84, 166; as manifestation of sorrow, 92; extending over three lives, 92

patighasantid, 96

patiloma, 158

Patisambhidamagga, 83, 93 n.

Pattdvali, 171

pada, 70, 333, 433

paka, 329 pdkajotpatti, 327

Pali, 3, 82, 84, 87, 92 «., 108, in, 114, r 39> 263 «., 470; literature, 161

/<"», 333

Panini, i2«., 226, 227«., 230, 232, 263W., 279 «., 465

papa, 195, 264, 266

pdpand, 157

pdpopadeia, 200

pdramdrthika, 439, 487 pdramitd, 127, 138 Parsva, 129, 169, 173 Pdhtpatabrahma, 28 «. Pdiupatadariana, 235 «. Patafijala, 233, 235 Patafijala mahdbhdsya, 231

pdtanjalamahdbhdsyacarakapratisamskr-taih, 235

Patafijala Samkhya, 68, 221

Patafijala school, 229

Pdtaiijalatantra, 231, 235

Patafijala Yoga sutras, 68

Patimokkhasamvara, 101

Pathak, 423

Payasi, 106, 107

Perception, 269, 297, 298, 318, 332, 333, 334, 335. 336, 34°. 34i. 342. 344, etc.

Perfuming, 137; influence, 134, 135; power, 131

Persian, 233

Pessimism, 76

Pessimistic, 237

Petavatthu, 83

Petrograd, 409 n.

phala, 413, 427

phalajndna, 373

phassa, 85, 95, 96

phassakdya, 85 11.

phassdyatana, 85 ft.

Phenomena, 84, 89, no, 127, 128, 133, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 166, 167, r68, 217, 276, 282, 29 2 > 332, 368, 373- 4". 45°. 45L 452, 460, 465, 466, 467, 468, 481, 482, 486

Phenomenal, 435, 450, 458, 461, 484

Philosophic literatures, 66; different classes of, 67; growth of, 65

Philosophy of the Upanishads, 3272., 38«., 45«., 49 11., 54//., 58 «.

Physical characters, 328

Physics, 403

pilupdka, 305, 306 «., 327

Pindaniryukti, 171

Pitdputrasamdgamasutra, 125 n.

Pitrs. 55

pitrydna, 34, 54, 56, 58, 125 n. pitta, 452

pitakas, 68 n., 263 n. pitharapdka, ^2"j piti, 105, 106 Plato, 42 Pluralism, 175 Poly-bhautik, 329 Polytheism, 17

Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 213, 246?*., 251 «., 322 n., 326, 328 n. posadhabrata, 200 Potencies, 272, 273 Potential, 254, 255, 258 «., 275, 468 Potentials, 252 Poussin, De la Vallee, 85 n., 90, 91 «.,

108, ngn. Prabahana Jaibali, 33, 34 Prabhd, 308 Prabhacandra, 171, 309 Prabhakara, 69, 189, 209«., 369, 370, 37i» 372, 37 6 . 379' 38o, 382, 384, 386, 389, 39°. 39'. 392, 395. 39 6 >397> 39 8 -399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 415, 416, 417, 448, 459

515

Prabhdkaramimdmsd, 378 ft., 384 ft.,

397 »., 405 n. Prabhasa, 306 pracchanna Bauddha, 437 pradariakatva, 416 pradeia, 194 pradhdna, 217 Prajapati, 19, 20, 26, 32, 36, 43, 46, 47,

55 prajiiapti, 427 Prajnaptisdstra, 120 Prajhaptivddins, ri2, 113 prajfia, 55, 131, 145, 271, 272, 273,

424 Prajnapand, 171 w. Prajiidpanopdhgasutra, 196 Prajndpdramitd, 127, 128, 421 Prakaranapaiicikd, 370, 378«., 379«.,

386 «., 390 «., 392 «., 397 «. Prakaranapdda, 120 prakaranasama, 344, 360 prakdia, 243, 307, 326 «. Praka^ananda, 420, 469 Praka&itman, 419, 490 Praka&itman Akhandananda, 468 Prakirnas, 171

prakrti, i 4 5, 194, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220 «., 223, 238, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 2£i, 253, 254, 255, 258, 259, 261, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270,272, 273, 276, 3 2 5. 3 6 7, 415. 43i. 433.441, 49°> 493 . prakrtUcdstadhatuki, 214 w. pralaya, 214, 223, 247, 248, 26r, 323,

3 2 4. 403 pramd, 336, 406, 415, 416, 471, 482, 484 pramdda, 193 pramaddcarana, 200

pramdna, 154, 268, 277, 294, 296, 298, 304. 33°. 33t» 332, 333. 343. 354, 355. 350, 365, 39°. 39'» 394, 397, 398, 399, 404, 406, 409 n., 410, 412, 413, 414 «.,

415, 4 l6 > 417"-, 444, 47°, 484, 492 pramanabhedah, 333 n. pramdnairarthapariksanam ,277 Pramdna-Mlmdmsd, 184 n. Pramdnanayataitvdlokdlamkara, 1 72,

181 n., 182 »., 183 n„ 309 pramdnaphala, 154, 409, 410, 413 Pramdnasamuccaya, 120, 153 »., 155 ».,

r 67, 307, 309 pramdnavdda, 407 Pramdnavdrtlikakarikd, 309 pramdtd, 406, 482 pyratneya, 2jj, 294, 365, 406 Prameyakamalamdrtanda, 171, 185,

188 «., 189 «., 197 «., 309 prameyatva, 344, 354, 384 pramoda, 203, 220 w. pramudha, 268 prapaiica, 425 prapancapravrtti, 142 prapahcopaiama, 425 prasiddhipurvakatva, 304, 349

prasiddhipurvakatvdl, 289, 303 Pra£astapada, 305, 306, 312«., 3i4«., 316«., 317 »., 328, 332w., 337, 348,

349- 350, 35i, 355«•> 359"-, 3 62 Praiastapada-bhasya, 67, 306 PraJna, 28 «., 31 «., 39, 432, 470 Prainavyakarana, 171 pratibandha, 155 pratibhdnajndna, 343 pratijna, 185, t86«., 296, 302, 350, 353,

389 pratijnabhdsa, 390 pratijndmdtram, 114 Pratijndsutra, 370 pratijndvibhakti, i86«. pratipaksabhavand, 270, 365 pratisamkhydvirodha, 121, 124 pratisancara, 247 pratisthapand, 302 pratitantrasiddhdnta, 295 pratiyogi, 357 pratika, 43 pratitya, 93, 138, 139 pratityasamutpada, 86 «., 92, 122, 138,

'39, x 43, 147, 42r; meaning of, 93 pratyabhijndnirdsa, 162 w. Pratyagrupa, 419 pratyaksa, 153, 183, 294, 308, 332, 333,

342, 343. 344, 383, 3 8 4, 409«•, 4i7«-pratyaksabalotpanna, 41072. pratyaksa-pramd, 482 Pralyaksasutra, 378 «., 382 pratyaksatodrstasambandha, 389 pratyaksavisayatva, 409 pratyayas, 124 pratyayopanibandha, 143 pratydhdra, 236 pratydmnaya, 350 pratyekabuddha, 137, 150, 151 Pratyekabuddhayana, 125 w. praudhivdda, 220

Pravacanabhasya, i\i, 245 «., 259a. pravicayabttddhi, 148 pravrtti, 90«., 228«., 243, 294, 295,

301, A=i, 375 pravrttwijndna, 134, 146 prayatna, 280, 281, 295, 330 prayoga nirdeia, 124 prayojana, 278 «., 294, 295, 302 prddurbhdva, 93 pragabhava, 293 «., 359 Prakrit, 171, 172 prdmdnya, 182, 188, 406, 485 pramdnyavdda, 332 w. Prana, 20, 36, 43, 55, 250, 424 prdnamaya atman, 46 prdnamaya kosa, 60 prdnavdyu, 262 Prdndgnihotra, 28 w. prdndydma, 227, 236, 272 prOpana, 332 prdpyakdritva, 378 w. pratibha-pratyaksa, 343 prdtibhdsika, 445, 487

Index

Pratimoksa, 145 pratitika-satta, 442

Preceptor, 66

Premisses, 280, 293, 295

preraka, 197

Presumption, 392, 393

prlti, 144

Probandum, 157

Propositions, 156M.

prthakprasthana, 277, 278

prthaktva, 316, 382, 464

prthivl, 51, 143, 295

prthivimatra, 51

Psychological, 273, 338, 406, 451; processes, 97

Psychosis, 88, 222

Ptolemaic, 31

pubbangama, 89

pudgala, 114, 117, 119 «., 195, J 98; Buddhist, 195 n.

pudgalanairatmya, 150

pudgalastikaya, 195

Puggalapaniiatti, 83

Punjab, 172

punya, 195, 264, 266

punya-papa, 266

Punyayasas, 129

Purana, 1, 16, 172, 223; gods of the, 16

purusa, 20, 21, 32, 33, 43, 52, 75, 213, 214, 216, 219, 223, 224, 225, 228;/., 234«., 241, 242, 244, 247, 248, 249, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265, 266, 267, 272, 273. 276, 330, 331, 368, 415, 441, 490,

493 purusartha, 269 n., 408 pumsarthata, 258 Purusa-sukta, 21 n., 32 purusdvasthamavyaktam, 216 Puspaculika, 171 n. Puspika, 171 n. Puma, 120

Purva-Mimamsa, 7, 68, 429 Purvas, 171

purvavat, 26gn., 281, 294, 302 »., 303, 353

Quest, 27 on.

Radical, 291

Raghunatha Siromani, 308, 326 «.,

365 «., 419 rajas, 214, 215, 224, 242, 244, 245, 246,

249, 250, 251, 492, 493 rajo-guna, 244 ramyaka, 220 n. Rarigarajadhvarindra, 418 Ranaranganialla, 231 rasa, 313, 403 rasa tanmatra, 252 rasayana, 235 raianam, 404

Ratnacudapariprcchasutra, 125 «. Katnakirti, 68«., I5S«., 158, 159, 160, 161, 163 »., 164, 168

Ratnakutasutra, 125 »., 140 Ratnameghasutra, 125M. Ratnaprabha, 89 w., cpn., 306, 418 RatnaraHsutra, 125 ». Ratnakarasutra, 125 w.

Ratnakarasanti, 156, 168, 346«.

Ray, Dr P. C, 251 «., 254 «., 321 «., 322 «., 327//.

Ray Rammohan, 40

Radha, 306

ra^a, 143, 144. ^ 220 h., 267, 300

rdgadvesa, 201

Rahu, 218

Rajagaha, 81

Rajamrganka, 231

Rajaprainiya, 171 «.

rajasika ahamkara, 249

Rajavarttika, 219

Rajayoga, 229

Raja, 212

Rajgir, 81

Ramabhadra Diksita, 230

Ramakrsna, 371, 470 «.

Ramakrsnadhvarin, 419

RamapurvatapinI, 28 «.

Ramarahasya, 28 «.

Ramarudri, 307

Ramatirtha, 419

Ramanuja, 50, 70, 71, 168, 433

Ramanuja-mata, 429

Ramayatas, 70

Ramottaratapini, 28 n.

Rastavara, 13072.

ra/z", 215

Rastrapalapariprcchasiitra, 125 ».

Ravana, 147

Ravana-bhasya, 306

Reality, in, 418, 428, 442, 443, 446, 448, 449, 458, 462, 465, 467, 468, 470, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490

Reals, 223, 258, 259, 368

Rebirth, 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 75, 86, 106, 107, 108, 140, 201, 215, 263, 265, 283, 286 «., 292, 366, 422; Buddhistic compared with Upanisadic, 87

Recognition, 185

Relative pluralism, 175

Rhys Davids, Mrs, 92 n., 96, 99 n., 108 n., 112, 120M., 158M.

Right knowledge, 296, 297, 471

Rishi, 24

Rohini, 387

ropana, 158

Roth, 20

Roer, 45 n.

Rucidatta, 307

Rudrahrdaya, 28 w.

Rudraksajabala, 28 n.

rnpa, 85M., 88«., 91, 94, 95, 96, no,

I2I> 3i3» 403 rupadharmas, 121 rupa-khandha, 95; meaning of, 94 rupaloka, 134 ritpasamskara, 290

517

rupa tanmdtra, 252

rupatva, 313, 334

Rg-Veda, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23,

24, 26, 32, 36, 45, 52, 226, 469 rjusutra, 178 rjntd, 202 Rjuvimald, 370 Rsabha, 169 ?•«", 294 w., 304 rta, 36, 37, 72; (order), 22, 26; Law of

Karma derived from, 26

sabbasangahikavasena, 98

Sabbatthivadins, 119, 120, 121; their doctrine, 121; their doctrine of matter, 121

Sacrifice, 8i, 208, 316«., 397; creation due to, 22; eternal, 22; fruits of, not gifts of gods, 21; has a mystical potency, 22; magical character of, i\; minute ritualistic details of, 21; not propitiatory, 22

Sacrifices, 71, 264, 276, 369, 372, 489; as karma and law, 22; replaced by meditations, 37

Sacrificial, 209, 211, 369, 370, 436

sad, 38

sadasantah nidyopamdh, 147

saddmudita, 220 n.

Sadananda Vyasa, 420

Sadananda Yati, 420

Saddharmapundarika, 125 «., 128

sadrupa, 397

sadrsa-parindma, 248

sadvilaksana, 444

Sage, 105, 107

sahabkdva, 186

sahakdri, 250, 274, 323, 324, 336, 469

sahakdri-iakti, 254

sahopalambhaniyamdt abhedonllataddhi-yoh, 411

Saimhaguhya, 129

Saint, 101

Sainthood, 100

sakaddgdmibhdva, 100

scdila, 220 n.

salt, 61

Salvation, 77, 115, 126, 234«.,^35i 3°°> 301. 3°5. 3*6, 3i7"-. 363. 399» 4% 44 o, 487, 490

saldyatana, 85 n., 88

sam, 12

samabh irudha - nay a , 17 8 n.

Samardicca-kahd, 172

samatd, 130, 135, 137, 138

saniatva, 201, 202, 203

samavdya, 143, 165, 171, 263«., 285, 290 «., 304, 306 «., 312, 313, 319, 3", 334, 335, 381, 403, 413, 448, 450, 483. 492

samavdyi, 286

samavdyi-kdra?ia, 322, 376

samaveta-samavdya, 335

samaya, 198

Satnayapradipa, 120

samddhdnam, 101

samddhi, 82, too, 101, 103, 136, 166,

271, 272 samddhirdjasutra, 125 «. Samadhi school, 236 Samadhisutra, 125 n. samdkhydsambandhapratipattih, 355 «. samdnaprasavdtmikd jdtih, 298, 304 //. samdna-rupatd, 196 sambhava, 298, 304 sambhuyakdri, 121 sambuddha, 423 samiti, 195 Sammitiyas, 112, 119; their doctrines,

H9«. Sammitlyaidstra, 119 samprajiidta, 271 samprayukta hetu, 122 samutpdda, 93 samyagbadha, 217 samyagjfidna, 151, 181, 408 samyagjndnapurvikd sarvapurusdrtha-

siddhi, 152 sddhana, jj, 489 sddhdrana, 361 sddhdrana-kdraiia, 322 sddhya, 156«., 157, 303, 343, 344, 345,

346, 353. 393 sddkyasama, 360 sddriya, 318 «. sdgaras, 235

sdksdtkdrijndnam , 41 o «. sdksdtkdritvam, 334 «. J5&7, 438, 455, 457 sdksicaitanya, 455, 486 sdmagri, oo, 330, 413, 467 sdman, 36

Samaveda, 12, 30, 36 Sdmannapkala-sutta, 80 «. sdmarthya, 159, 317 «. sdmayikabrata, 200 sdmdnya, 164, 196, 203, 281, 285, 286,

3o6«., 312, 313, 317, 318, 319, 320,

4'3

Samdnyadusatmdikprasdrita, 3[8 «.

Sdmcnyalaksana, 341

sdmanyatodrsta, 269/1., 287, 289, 294,

302 «., 303, 349, 350, 353, 363 sdmdnyatodrsiasambandha, 389 sdnidnyavis'esasamnddyo, 380 «. sdmdnyavUesdtmaka, 231 sdmdnydbhdva, 293 «. sdmydvasthd, 246 sainghdtaparamdnii, 121 samgraha, 122 samqrahanaya, 177 samhdreccho, 323 Samhita, 12, 13, ion., 43, 72 samjitd, 127, 133 samjndkarma, 288 samjndmdtram, 114 samjnin, 190 samkalpa, 225

Index

samkkydbhdva, 284 n.

samkleia, 427

Samksepasankarajaya, 305 n.

Samksepaidriraka, 419, 468

Samnydsa, 28 n.

samsara, 109, 130, 131, 135, 140, 141,

201, 237, 248, 258, 261, 269, 273,

428 samsdra-dukkha, 99 n. samsdrin, 189 samskaroti, 263 n. samskara, 86«., 91, 122, 263, 264, 273,

'281, 285 «., 290 n., 303, 316, 323, 340,

45 1 . 456 samskaras, 127, 139, 143, 266, 272 samskrta, 121, 142, 151 samskrtadharmas, 121 samsrstaviveka, 247 Samstdra, 171 «. samstkdna, 123

samiaya, 193, 277, 294, 332 «., 360 samtdna, 409 samvara, 101, 202 satnvdda, 188, 373 samvddakatva, 408 samvddi, 416, 417 samvedana, 383 sanrvedyalva, 384 satnvid, 383 samvrtamdtram, 114 samvrti, 428 samvrtisatya, 144 satnvrtisatyatd, 146 samyama, 202 samyoga, 83, 224,316, 3!9»334 5 3 8o > 4°3»

415, 448, 450 samyukta-sa?navdya, 334 samyukta-sa maveta-samavdya ,335 samyuktavihsana, 335 SamyuktdbkidharmaJdstra, 120 Samyittta Nikdya, 83, 84, 91«., 94,95,96,

98 «., 108 «., now., Ill w. Sanaka, 222 Sananda, 222 Sanandana, 418 Sanatana, 222 sandhdna, 89 sandigdha, 289, 349 sanmdtra-visayam pratyaksam, 382 sannidkdndsannidhdndbhydmjndnaprati-

bhdsabhedah, \\on. sannidhi, 224 sanniveia-vihstatd, 364 Sanskrit, 66, 86 «., 119, 121, 125, 128,

'53«-. '55' '7°, '7 1 . J 7 2 » 3°9> 4°6, 407 ; language, 38, 39 ; literature, 40, 302

Sanskrit Philosophy, technical and abstruse, 1

Sanskrit Texts, 20 «., 23 «., 32 «.,

33 «•

Santanantarasiddhi, 151 «. santosa, 236 sang/ia, 102

Sanghabhadra, 120

Sangitiparyydya, 120

sankkdra, 86, 90, 92 «., 93, 94, 96, 263«.;

discussion of the meaning of, 86 w.;

meaning of, 96 sankhdrakkhandha, 86«., 95, 100 Sankrantikas, 112 safind, 94, 95, 96,97, 98; different stages

of, 96 saniidkkhandha, 95, 100 sapaksasatta, 344 sapaksasattva, 156 w., 349 saptabhangi, 180, 181 w. Saptadasabhumisiitra, 128 Saptapaddrthi, 308 Sarasvati, 301 w. Sarasvatirahasya, 28 w. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, 2, 68«., 79,

114W., 235 «., 305 «., 322 «. Sarvadarianavdcyo'rthak, 68 w. sarvajna, 426

Sarvajnatmamuni, 419, 468 sarvakalpandvirahitam, 151 sarvaloka, 137 sarvasamskdrah, 114 Sarvasara, 28 «. sarvatantrasiddhdnta, 295 sarvavikalpalaksanavinivrttam, 147 Sarvahammani Hiranyagarbha, 32 «. Sarvastivada, no». Sarvastivadins, 112, 113, 115, 117, 119,

120, 122, 128, 167; their theory of the

senses, 123; their doctrine of karma,

124; their doctrine of mind, 124 jfl/, 75, 163, 175, 183«., 257, 258«.,

317, 381, 443, 444, 446, 449, 491 jaft', 101

Satipatthdna sutta, 227 satisamvara, 101 satkdranavada, 258 «., 468 satkdryavdda, 257, 258, 468 satkhydti, 183 «., 384 satparicchedakam, 356 satpratipaksa, 361 az//<z, 287, 317, 381, 491 sattva, 158, 160, 163«., 224, 241, 242,

244. 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 259, 415,

446, 492, 493 sattva-guna, 244 satya, 236, 270 Satyakama, 35 «. Satyasiddhi school, 124 «. Saiibhdgvalaksmi, 28 «. Sautranta-vijnanavada, 409 w. Sautrantika, 116, 120, 151, 161, 168,

188, 302, 313W., 408, 409*2., 411;

Buddhists, 165; notion of time in,

116; theory of inference, 155 ff.; theory

of perception, 151 Sautrantikas, 112, 113, 115, 167; distinguished from the Vaibhasikas, 114 ;

their philosophy according to Guna-

ratna, 114 savana, 36

519

savudra, 271

savikalpa, 334, 337* 33 8 > 34°. 3?8, 4»6, 483, 484

savikalpajnd?ia, 153 w.

savikalpapratyaksa, 261, 334

savipdka, 195

savitarka, 271

savyabhicdra, 360

Samkhya, 7, 9, 51, 53, 68, 71, 75, 78, 8o, 95, 116, 165, 167, 168, 178, 188, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 233, 235 «•» 236, 237, 238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262, 264, 265, 268 «., 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 281, 284«., 299, 302, 311, 312, 314,

3 21 - 3 2 5> 33o. 33 J » 363. 367. 368, 369, 382, 385, 403, 412, 414, 415, 416, 417, 422, 432, 434, 435, 440, 468, 492, 493; an early school, 213ft".; axiom, 320; discussion of the different schools of, 218 ff. ; discussions on Samkhya kdrikd, Sdtnkkya sutra, Vaca-spati and Bhiksu, 222 ff.; distinguished from yoga, 68; relation with the Upanisads, 211; theory of viparyyaya, etc., 220 n.

Samkhya karika, 67, 212, 218 «., 219, 221, 222, 223, 266 n.

Sdtnkhyapravacanabhdsya, 223

Sdmkhyasdra, 212

Samkhya sutra, 212, 222

Samkhyatattvavivecaiia, 212

Sdmkhyatattvaydthdrthyadipana, 212

Samkhya-Yoga, 196,232, 254, 256*/., 260, 266 n., 273, 286 n., 317W., 329, 378M., 394; analysis of knowledge, 239 ff.; atheism and theism, 258 ft".; causation as conservation of energy, 254 ff.; causation contrasted with Vedanta, 258 «.; conception of time, 256 «.; conception of thought and matter, 241 ff.; conception of wholes (avayavi), 380 «.; criticism of satkdryavdda etc., 275 ft".; development of infra-atoms and atoms, 251 ff.; dissolution and creation, 247ff.; doctrine of validity of knowledge and inference, 268«.; episte-mology, 4i4ff.; evolution of the categories, 248ff.; feelings as ultimate substances, 242 ft".; fruits of karma, 267; general epistemological situation as compared with Mlmamsa, 367 ff.; indiscernible nature of gunas, 273«.; meaning of guna, 243; means of uprooting sorrow in, 2650".; meditation, 271 ff.; methods of discipline, 270; modes of ignorance, 267; mode of sense-contact as contrasted with that of Nyaya, 378 n. ; nature of evolutionary change, 255 ff.; nature of illusion, 260 n. ; nature olprakrti, 245 ff.; nature of subconscious mind, 263ff.; nature of the gunas, 244; perceptual

process, 261 ff.; pessimism of, 264ft".; purusa doctrine, 238 ft".; obstructions of perception, 273 «.; relation with Buddhism and Jainism, 208ff.; sams-kdra and vdsand, T.6$n. ; self and mind, 259ff.; self compared with Nyaya and Mimamsa, 368; states and tendencies of citta (mind) 268 ff.; theory of causation, 257; Vatsayana's distinction of, 228 «.; view of motion contrasted with Nyaya, 330; wisdom and emancipation,

273

sa?nkkyayogaparinamava~da, 468

Sdnka, 233

Sariputtra, 120

sari ha, 280

sariipyam, 154

sdsnd, 349

sdsvata, 109

sdttvika ahamkdra, 250

sdvayava, 203

Sdvitri, 28 n.

Sayana, 20, 36

Schiefner, 129W.

Schools of philosophy, 63

Schopenhauer, 39, 40

Schrader, 109

Schroeder, 39 n.

Scotus Erigena, 40 n.

Seal, B. N., 213, 246, 251 «., 253;/., 321, 322 n., 326, 327/;., 328 n.

Secret doctrine, 38

Seers, 68 n.

Self, 33, 34, 55, 58, 60, 61, 76, no, in, 161, 162, 187, 215, 217, 218, 239, 240, 260, 261, 285, 290, 295, 298, 300, 303, 312, 317 «., 330, 335, 343 «., 362, 363, 365. 366, 368, 383, 399, 400, 401, 402, 413, 414, 416, 417, 424, 425, 433, 434, 435' 437> 438, 458, 460, 465, 482, 490, 494; and death, 55; as a compound of the khandhas, 94; as found in dreams, 47; as in deep sleep, 47; doctrine of sheaths of, 46

Self-conscious, 368, 369

Self-consciousness, 363, 417

Self-knowledge, 59

Self-luminosity, 493

Self-luminous, 444, 446, 450, 452, 458, 459, 460, 461, 482, 487

Self-modification, 173

Self-restraint, 101

Self-revealing, 369, 416

Self-valid, 384, 386, 387, 403

Self-validity, 372, 373, 374, 389,396, 483,

484 . Sensation, 165, 312, 318, 411 Sense-affections, 94 Sense-contact, 336, 342 n. Sense-data, 94, 239, 240 «., 262 n. Sense-functions, 262 Sense-materials, 225 Senses, 94 Sensus communis, 96

Index

Separateness, 293

SesVara Samkhya, 259

Sex-desire, 57

Shah Jahan, 39

Shuja-uddaulah, 39

siddha, 68 n.

Siddhasena, 183 n.

Siddhasena Divakara, 171, 309

siddhdnta, 294, 295

Siddhdntacandrikd, 390 «.

Siddhdntaleia, 420, 491 n.

SiddMntamuktavali, 339, 339 «., 342 n., 469

Siddhantatattva, 420

Siddhartha, 173

siddhi, 163 «., 220

siddhis, 234

Siddhivydkhyd, 420

Similarity (Nyaya), 318 n.

Sindh, \ion.

Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, 68 «., 163 «., 165 «., 168, 297 »., 313 «., 3187*., 346«., 371 «., 380«.

Simananda, 212

Sita, 28 n.

Skambha, 24

Skanda, 28 //.

skandha, 89, 93, 149, 196; in Chandogya,

93 "•

skandhas, 85/?., 88 »., 114, 11972., 121, 122, 127, 142, 143, 146, 148, 161, 263 n.

smrti, 69, 130, 131, 134, 263»., 269, 316 «., 370, 371, 372

stidna, 283

sneha, 148, 281, 285, 316

snigdha, 287

Sogen Yamakami, 121, 122 »., 124 «.

Soma, 36

Somadeva, 172

Somanatha, 371

Somasarma, 306

SomesVara, 371

Sophistical, 80

Sorcery, 81

Sorrow, 75, 76, 107, [08, no, in, 140, 166, 191, 201, 210, 237, 264, 265, 266, 2 95>3oi, 3 2 4i 366, 426, 459; as ultimate truth, 75

sotdpannabhdva, 100

Soul, 25, 26, 74, 75, 93, 114, £15, 117, 166, 168, 184, 188, 191, 192, 193, T94, 201, 207, 234, 276, 281, 285, 288, 289, 2 9 2 , 2 99, 300, 307, 311, 316, 317, 363, 367. 376, 377, 378, 399, 4°o, 4i3' 4H. 4 2 5> 439> 457> 461; general account of, 75

Souls, 197, 238, 244, 323, 324, 472, 493

South India, 120/z., 316 n.

Southern India, 172

spandita, 428

spars'a, 90, 92, 143, 314

sparfa tanmdtra, 252

Species, 156, 285, 287, 317, 345, 389

Specimens of Jaina sculptures from Ma-

tkura, 17077,. sphota, 238 «., 397 n. sphotavdda, 232 Spider, 49 Spinoza, 40 n.

*«/*'• 3 2 3, 403

Stcherbatsky, Prof., 114, 1 ry «., 119/?., 121, 351, 4097?.

sthaviravdda, 83, 112

Sthavirdvali, 171

Sthdna, 171

sthiti, 194

sthiti-sthdpaka, 316

Study of Patanjali, 208 n., 213, 226 »., 238 «., 397 n.

Study of Sanskrit, 40

Subdla, 28 11.

Sub-Commentary, 307

Sub-conscious, 124, 263 n.

Subhuti, 127

Subodhini, 371, 420

Substance, 165, 174, 175, 285, 287«., 388,319,367,368

Substances, 223, 367, 378

Sucarita MisVa, 371

Suddhodana, 81

Suffering, 207, 237, 324

Suhrllekha, 144

sukha, 105, 106, 276, 305//., 316, 342, 414

sukha duhkha, 144

sukham, 426

sukhasddhanatvasmrti, 336

Sukhdvativyuha, 125 n.

Sumafigalavilasitii, gin.

Sun, 23

supara, 11011.

SuresVara, 67, 418, 419

sunrta, 199, 200, 202

Surya, 18, 20, 28 n.

Sutyaprajnapti, 171/z.

Su&ksita Carvakas, 78, 79, 362

susupti, 424

sutdra, lion.

sutra, 280, 281, 284 «., 285, 19m., 294, 296

Sutrakrta, 171

Sutrakrtahganiryukti, 181 n.

Sutrakrtdiigasutra, 237

siitras, 61, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 79, 233, 236, 278, 279, 293 n., 294, 297 «., 306, 430, 433; as lecture-hints, 62; developed by commentators, 64; how they were written, 65; traditionally explained, 63

Sutrasthdna, 280

Sutta, 82

Sutta Nipdta, 83

Sultapitaka, 120 n.

suttas, 82, 83, 166

Suvarnaprabhdsa sutra, 125 n., 301 n.

Suzuki, 128, 1297/., 130/z., 138 «., 161

Svabhdva, 78,424

52i

svabkdvanirdesa, 124 svabhava pratibandha, 155, 156 svabhavatah, 427 svabhdvaviruddkopalabdhi, 358 svabhdvdbhdvotpatti, 149 svabhdvdnupalabdhi, 358 svabhdvdt, 145 svacitta, 146

svacittadrsyabhdvand, 1 50 svalaksana, 378, 409, 410 «. svalaksanam, 154 svaniicitdrtha, 350 svapna, 332 «., 424, 426 svaprakdfa, 444, 445, 459 «. svapratydryyajndnddhigamdbhinnalaksa -

natd, 150 svariipa, 153, 464 svariipa-b/u'da, 462 svarupasattd, 382 svarupaviJesa, 464 svariipdsiddha, 361 svatah aprdmdnya, 268 «-, 415 svatahprdmdnya, 188, 268 «., 372, 373,

374. 375. 376, 415. 484. 4 8 5«-svatah-prdmdnya-nirnaya, 4 r 7 «. svatahprdmanyavdda, 303, 380 Svayambhu, 21 svayamprakdsa, 401 svddhydya, 270

svdrthdmimdna, 155, i86w., 350, 353 svdtantryena, 320 syddasti, 179, 180 syddasti-cdvaktavyas'ca, 179 syddasti-sydnndsti, 179 syddasti-sydnndsti-syddavaktavyalca, 179 syddavaktavya, 179 syddvdda, 181 Syddvadamanjari, 171, 177 w., 179«.,

180 «. sydnndstt, 180 jya/, 179

Syllogism, 156 «., 186, 293 Symbolic meditations, 35 Synthesis, 261 Synthetic activity, 262 System of the Veddnla, 438 «., 439 «. Systems, 66

Systems of Buddhistic TJiought, 121 «. Systems of Philosophy, general accounts

of, 68 ff.; interrelated, 67 ; two classes

of, 67 Sahara, 69, 369, 370, 371, 372, 387, 405 Sabara-bhdsya, 370 Sabarasvamin, 370 i«&/rt, 284, 294, 304, 308, 314, 331, 332,

333. 354. 355. 394. 483. 484. 492 iabdanaya, 178 w.

iabdapramana, 334, 354, 394, 397, 404 iabda-tanmatra, 252, 253 iabdatva, 335 SftbddnttiasaneuHj 232 Saiva, 39, 70, 228, 235, 434 Saiva Thought, 8, 28 «. iaktdiaktasvabhdvatayd, 159

iata', 165, 264, 270, 321, 322, 335 iaktiman, 165 iaktipratibandha, 323 iamadamddisddhansampat, 437 Sankara, 30, 38, 39, 42, 457*., 48, 50, 51, 52, 64, 70, 86 «., 89/*., 90?*., 9t«-, 121 «., 143 «., 145, i48«., 151 «., 165, 167, 168, 211, 237, 319«., 370, 371, 371 n.y 407, 418, 420, 421, 421 «., 423, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 437, 438,

. 465, 47°. 49 2 » 493. 494

Sankara-bhdsya, 492 n.

Sankara Bhatta, 371

Sankara-digvijaya, 432

Sankara-jaya, 432

Sankara Misra, 63, 284 «., 288 «., 291 «., . 3°6, 307, 419

Sankara Vedanta, 468

Sankara-vijaya, 418

Sankara-vijaya-vildsa, 432

Sankaracarya, 369

Sarabha, 28 n.

iarlramadhydt, 481

iaririnah, 218

Sasadhara, 308

Sataka, 427 n.

Satapatha Brahmana, 20 «., 24, 25, 31, 226, 230; creation in, 24; doctrine of r rebirth in, 25

Satasdhasrikdprajndpdramitd, 125 n.

iauca, 202, 236

Saunaka, 31 n.

Sakha, 30; origin of the, 30 n.

Sdkta, 28//., 228

6akya, 81

Sakyayana, 228

Salikanatha Misra, 370, 397 n.

Sdlistambhasutra,gon., 125;;., 143M., 421

Santabhadra, 152M., 168

San/am, 425, 428

Santyacaryya, 171

Sdndilya, 28«., 228

Sdrira, 39, 91 ».

Sdriraka, 28 «., 433

Sdriraka-sutras, 62

iastra, 344

Sdstradipikd, 114W., 370, 371, 379«.,

386 «., 390 «., 401 «. Sastrl Haraprasada, 129«., 278, 303,

37i«. idsvata, 127, 428 idJvatavdda, 143, 236 Idt/iya, 144 Sdthydyaniya, 28 «.

iesavat, 269/z., 281, 294, 302 «., 303, 353 Sesanantacarya, 308 Sikhdmani, 318 «., 419, 484 «., 485 Hksdpadabrata, 200 Siva, 39, 432 Sivabhuti, 170 Sivadasa, 231, 235 Sivaguru, 432 Sivani, 425 Sivarama, 230

Index

Sivaditya, 308

ilia, 144, 166, (slid) 100, 102, 104; and

sainthood, 100; what it consists of,

101 iilabrataparamaria, 145 Slokavdrttika, 67, 151 n., 218 n., 355 72.,

37°. 37 1 , 378«-, 3 8 °, 382, 3 86 »->

39O 72., 397 «., 4OI «., 4I7 72.

io^a, 86 n.

iraddhd, 58, 199, 271, 317 n.

Sraddhotpdda idstra, 128, 138/2., 161

fravana, 490

irdvaka, 125*1., 137, 150, 151

Sravakayana, 125 n.

Sridhara, 306, 312, 313, 316 n., 317 *.,

. 337, 338, 359 «•> 379 «•

Sriharsa, 419, 462, 465, 492

Srikantha, 70

Srilabha, 90

Srimadbhagavadgitd, 421

Srimalasimhanada, 128

Srivatsacarya, 306

iru, 11

iruta, 207

iruti, 11, 12, 191 «., 447

iubha, 202

htddham pratyaksam, 409 «.

htddhakalpana, 409/2.

Sukarahasya, 28 /2.

htkla, 73, 74, 266

iukla-krsna, 73, 266

/*W, 488, 489

.towya, 131, 141, 167, 257, 465, 493

iunyatd, 130, 131, 147, 149

Sunyavada, 126, 127, 129, 140, 166, 167, 279, 418, 421, 429, 465, 494; compared with Vijnanavada, 127

Sunyavadin, 113, 127, 128, 129, 140, 145,

. 3°i

Svetaketu, 33, 34, 49, 439 Svetambaras, 170, 172, 173 Svetdivatara, 28/2., 31, 32/2., 3972., 49,

50, 52, 787*., 211, 227, 281, 282/2.,

422, 469 sadayatana, 90, 92, 143 saddariana, 68 Saddarianasamuccaya, 2, 68 m., 114,

170/2., 17272., 17 5 «-, 176/2., 186//.,

206/2., 217, 222 Sastitantra, 220, 221 SastitantraJdstra, 219, 222 Sastitantroddhdra, 220, 222

tadutpatti, 345, 351

tadyogyata, 458

laijasa ahavikdra, 249

taijasa atma, 424

tairthika, 68/2., 138

Taittirlya, 2Sn., 31, 39, 46/2., 51, 226/2.,

432.«. Taittiriya Aranyaka, 26 Taittirlya Brahmana, 23, 26, 226 «. Taittiriya school, 30 Takakusu, 119, 120/2., 1287/., 218

Talavakaras, 30

Talavakara Upanisad, 30

tamas, 215, 224, 242, 244,246,249,252,

264, 269, 492, 493 tamisrd, 220 n. tamo, 220 n. tamo-guna, 244 tamnatra, 51, 214, 216, 225, 226, 251,

253. 254, 271, 273, 276 tantra, 71, 229, 235 Tantraratiia, 371 Tantra thought, 8 Tantravarttika, 371 Tandulavaiyall, 1 71 n. tanha, 85, 87, 88, 107 tanha-jata, 100

tapas, 54, 58, 201, 202, 226, 270 tarka, 294, 296, 360 Tarkabhasd, 307 Tarkapdda, 371 Tarkarahasyadipikd, 79, 114, 115/2.,

162 72., 163 72., 203 72., 217 72., 218 72. Tarkasamgraka, 307, 322, 330 72. Tarkavaglsa, K., 332 72. tathatd, 127, 128, 135, 136, 138, 147,

150, 166, 167, 421; philosophy, i2gff. tathatdlambana, 150 Tathagata, 12672., 150, 166 Tathdgatagarbha, 131, 137, 147, 149 Tathdgataguhyasutra, 12572. Tathagatayana, 12672. tatprakdrakanubhava, 337 tattva, 216 Tattvabindu, 397 72. Tattvacintdmani, 308, 33272., 337 72.,

339 «•> 342 «., 34372., 34772. Tattvadipana, 419, 45672. Tattvadipikd, 419, 465 Tattvakaumudl, 212, 23972., 24372.,

25772., 262 72., 26472. Tattvapradipika, 238 72. Tattvasamdsa, 212 Tattvavaiidradi, 212, 23972., 24572.,

254«•» 256/2., 257/2., 259/2., 263/2.,

26472., 26672., 26772. Tattvaydtharthyadlpana, 243 72. tattvdiitara, 378/2. tattvdntarapariiidma, 247 tattvdnyatvdbhyd?n anirvacanlya, 442 Tattvdrthadhigamasiitra, 171, 175/2.,

176/2., 184/2., 195/2., 237, 309 tddatmya, 156, 345, 351, 352 tamasika ahamkara, 249 Tandins, 30 /rtz-a, 220/2. Taranatha, 12972. Tdrasdra, 28/2. tdratdra, 22011. Tdrkikaraksd, 362 /2., 308 tdtparya, 484 Tdtparyatikd, 63/2., 161, 218/2., 229/2.,

269/2., 330/2., 337/2., 338/2., 347/2.,

352 «-, 353«-,.388«-Tdtparyatikaparihiddhi, 307

523

Teachers, traditional transmission from,

2,8 Technical, 66, 77, 304, 308, 309 Technical terms, different in meaning,

invented, 2; elastic in Pali Buddhism, 3 tejas, 51, 252, 255, 295, 310, 313, 314,

323. 329. 377 tejas-a.tom, 253 Tejobindu, 28 «. Telang, 421, 423 «. Teleology, 247, 248, 254, 258, 267, 269,

325 Testimony, 332, 333 The Early History of Indian Philosophy,

277 n. The History of Navya Nyaya in Bengal,

310 «. Theism, 33, 50, 258 Theistic, 220, 221, 223 Theistic systems, 8 Theragdthd, 83 Theravada, 83, 112, 113, 119, 120, 125,

150 Theravadins, 125 The Rigveda, 15 n., 18, i9«., ion.,

24 n. Therigdtha, 83

Thiorie des Douze Causes, 90 n. Thilly, Frank, 3 thina, 100 thinamiddham, 105 Thomas, E. J., 84 «., 155 n. Thomas, F. W., 129M. Thought-photograph, 241 Thought-stuff, 241, 242 Tibetan, 121, 128, 144, 218 tikta, 313

Tilak, Bal Gaiigadhar, 10 Tilakamanjarl, 172 Time, 311 tirohita, 257

Tirthaiikara, 169, 170, 173 tiryag-gamana, 329 tiryaksdmdnya, 196 Traditionary explanations, 65 Transcendental contact, 341; power , 335 Transcendent influence, 331 Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka, 36 n. Translation of the Upanisads, 38 n. Transmigration, 26, 27, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58 trasarenu, 323 trayt, 277 trikandaka, 92 n.

Tripadmbhidimakanarayana, 28 «. Tripura, 28 n. Tripurdtdpini, 28 n. triputi, 459

tripiitipratyaksa, 343 «., 384, 400 Trisala, 170, 173 Triisikhibrahmana, 28 n. tryanuka, 314, 315, 324, 326 trsna, 85 «., 87, 90, 92, 143, I45, I48,

215 trsnd-vaipulya, 90;/.

trtiya-linga-pardmaria, 346

tttccha, 443

tuldjfidna, 458

Turiyatlta, 28 n.

tusti, 220

Tvastr, 21

tydgdnvaya, 119 n.

Taiika, 433

thdpana, 157

tkiti, 93

Tuptfkd, 371

ubhaydfiubhaya, 148

tucheda, 428

ucchedavdda, 143

Udayana, 63,306, 307, 312 «., 326«., 329,

365"-

uddharana, 157, 296, 353

Udana, 83, 108 «.

uddsina, 197

udbkava, 290 «.

udbhutarupavattva, 290 «., 303

udbhulavrtti, 254

uddhaccakukkuccam, 105

Udgltha, 36

udkacca, 100

Udyotakara, 63, 228«., 269 «., 298 «., 305. 3°7- 3°9> 327 «•» 3 28 > 33° "•» 337 »•» 342 «-, 35', 353 «•> 355"-

Uktha, 36

Uluka, 71, 305

Umasvati, 171, 237, 309

Unconditional, 321, 322, 465

Unconditionality, 320

Universals, 165

Unmanifested, 275

upacdrasamddki, 102, 103

Upadeia, 128

upadhdranam, 101

upajivya, 447

upalabdkihetu, 330 «.

upalambha, 302

upamdna, 294, 297, 302, 304, 308, 333, 354. 355. 39', 412

upamana iabda, 471

Upamitabhavaprapaiicakathd, 172

tipamiti, 492

upanaya, 185, 296, 350, 353

tipanayana, 157

Upanisad, 418, 422, 433, 434, 436, 441, 445, 494; causation in, 173; meaning of the word, 38

Upanisads, 1, 7, 8, 12, 14, 27, 28, 29, 30, 64, 65, 70, 72, 79, 80, 87, 88, 107, 110, in, 125«., 174, 175, 208, 210, 211, 212, 223, 227, 234, 239, 263«., 276, 421, 423, 429, 430, 431, 432, 437, 438, 442, 447, 470, 490, 493, etc.; accident as cause, 78; age of the, 39; Atharva-veda, 31; atheistic creeds referred to in, 78; circles of philosophy outside of, 65; composition of, 38; creation in, 51 ; desire as cause of re-birth, 56; different classes of, 39; doctrine of

Index

self, no; doctrine of transmigration, 53; duty of a modern interpretor of, 42 ; emancipation in, 58 ff.; interpretations of, 41; karma-doctrine in, compared with Buddhistic, 107; ksattriya influence on, 31; matter-combinations as cause, 78; matter produced by compounding, 51; nature as cause, 78; names of, according to subjects, 31; not a systematic philosophy, 48; place in Vedic literature, 28; revival of, 39; self as aggregation of categories, 56; self as highest truth, 60; self as knowledge, 58; self unchangeable, 60; self as unity of moral, psychological and physical elements, 56; subtler elements in, 51; superior to reason, 41; theory of karma, 55; three kinds of birth, 57 ; time as cause, 78; two theories of causation, 53 ; vidya and avidyd, meaning of, in; wise man becomes Brahman, 58; world as field of karma, 56; world in, 51; world-soul, 52

upapatti, 91

upapddukasattva, 91 n.

uparati, 490

upasamatmssati, 102

Upaskara, 282?*., 283, 284«., 285«., 286w., 288 m., 290 »., 291 «., 292 «., 293 n., 306, 314 «.

upastha, 333

upastambha, 329

upastambkaka, 291

Upavarsa, 370

updddna, 85, 87, 90, 92, 274, 453, 468, 469

upaddna-kdrana, 438

updddnanisthatyantdbhdvapratiyogitva-laksanamithydtvasiddh ih, 445

updddritpam, 94

upadhi, 181, 347, 348, 352, 39°' 45°

Updngas, 171

Cfpdsakadafds, 171

upalrayas, 173

updydsa, 86 «.

upekkhd, 103, 106

upekkhako, 105

upeksd, 236, 270, 271

Uruvela, 81

Usas, 14

Utpala, 327 n.

utpatti, 374

utpada, 138, 175

utpadasthitibhangavarjjam, 146

utpddasthitibhangavivarjjancUd, 150

utpreksa, 182

utsargasamiti, 199 n.

uttaniambkas, lion.

Uttaradhyayana, 171

Uttarddhyaya.7iasutra, 169, 236

Uttara Mimamsa, 7, 70, 429

Uttarasailas, 112

Uttara Samkhya, 217

Uttanapada, 23

Uvdsagadasao, ij$n. Uha, 313 urdkva, 199 urdhvaloka, 199 urdhvamfda, 234 urdhvasamanya, 197

Vaibhasika, 116,117, 161, 168; literature, 120; notion of time in, 116

Vaibhasikas, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 167; their philosophy according to Gunaratna, 114

Vaibhasika Sarvastivadins, their difference from other Buddhists, 122

vaidharmya, 462, 464

vaikdrika aharnkdra, 249, 250

vaindhka, 257

Vaipulyasutras, 125

vaird^ya, 271

Vaisali, 173

Vaisesika, 7, 9, 68, 177, 280, 281, 283, 285, 289, 290, 302»., 303, 304, 305, 314 n., 327, 328, 332, 337, 338, 339, 340, 35o, 35'. 354, 355. 359, 361, r 379»-> 385. 394. 403, 434. 44°. 462

Vaitesika sutras, 68n., 71, 276, 279, 280, 281, 282,284, 285, 291, 301, 303,305, 306, 312 n., 327 n., 332 n., 355, 359

vazhidnara agni, 34

vatfvdnara dtma, 424

vaisamya, 246

Vaisnava, 8, 21, 28 k., 70, 77, 221, 420, 422

vaitatkya, 424

Vajjiputtakas, 112

Vajracchedikdsittra, 12572.

Vajrasucikd, 28 72.

Validity, 268//.

Vallabha, 70, 317 n.

Vallabha-mata, 429

Vanavdda, 380

Varadaraja, 308, 362 n.

Varaha, 28«., 228

Varddhamana, 63, 173, 307

Varddhamdna-purdna, 193 »., 194 n.

Varddhamanendu, 63, 307

Varuna, 18

vas, 16$ n.

Vassilief, 112, 218 n.

vastu, 176

vastunastatsamatt&ko'nyathdbhd.vah pari-ndniah tadvisamasattdkak vivarttah, 468 ' '

vastuprativikalpavijfidna, 145

vastuvddi, 424

Vasubandhu, n 4, 117, 120, 124, 128, 167, 21872., 233, 421, 423; soul-doctrine criticised by, 117

Vasubhadra, 12072.

Vasumitra, 112, 115, 116, 120

Vaskali, 45

Vacaspati, 63, 86«., 143 «., 161, 212, 21872., 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 229, 233, 260, 261, 262, 26972., 27172.,

525

■277. 2 78, 3°7. 33o«-, 337. 338, 34°. 34i» 35i>352, 355«-.37i> 397«-.4i5, 418, 421«., 433, 457, 469, 490; his differences with Bhiksu, 223 ff.

vdcika, 108

vdcikakarma, 124

vacikavijiiaptikarma, 124

vticyatva, 354

vtiJa, 294, 296, 360

vtiggupti, 199 n.

vtigvtkalpa, 148

Vajapyayana, 232

Vajasaneyi school, 31

vak, 333

vtikovakya, 2-j6

vakyadosa, 302

vakyaprasamsti, 302

Vtikyarthamtitrktivrtti, 397 «.

Vamana, 231

vtinaprastha, 283

vartta, 277

Vtirttika,d~,, 230, 307, 309, 327/*., 3?3»., 418, 419

Varttikakara, 372

Varttikakarapada, 370

Vtirttika-ttitparyatikti, 63

versanti, 73, 128, 1307*., 150, 151, 167, 263, 411

Vasavadatta, 230

Vtisudcva, 28 n.

Vata, 17

Vatsiputtriya, 112, 117, 119 72.; doctrine of soul of, 117

Vatsyayana, 63, 120, 167, 186 «., 229 «., 269 »., 277, 278, 280, 294 «., 295 »., 296 n., 298«., 301 «., 304, 307,

3 2 7 »■• 350. 35•> 353 «•> 355 »■• 467; his distinction of Samkhya and Yoga,

228«.

Vatsyayana bhtisya, 6$, 297 n., 306, 309 vtiyu, 20, 37, 43, 50, 213, 262, 287, 289,

290. 2 95> 321, 323. 3 2 4, 3 28 , 3 2 9

vdyu-alom, 253

Vtiyu purtina, 306

vdyu tamnatra, 1^1

Veda, 397, 422, 436; literature, 429

vedand, 85, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, r^7

vedanakkhandka, 100

vedantya, 191, 193

vedamya karma, 194

Vedanta, 1, 7, 20, 29, 30, 41, 42, 48, 50, 52, 62, 68, 71, 75, 138, 161, 168, 177, 178, 211, 215 n., 235, 237, 238, 239, 241, 258, 319 n., 341, 343, 371, 402, 407, 408, 419, 420, 429, 430, 431, 432, 436. 439> 447» 448. 45°> 45i» 452, 453» 454» 455. 459» 461. 466, 468, 470, 471, 472 n., 482, 483, 486, 488, 489. 49 2 ; ajnana as the material cause of illusion, 453 > ajiidna and vrtlijhana, 481 ; ajnana established by perception and inference, 454(1.; ajiidna not negation, 455; anirvacyavtida, 461 ff.; antahka-rana and its vrttis, 472; titman, 474;

at man and jiva, 475; titman as self-luminous, 460; Brahman as the adhi-sthtina of illusion, 451; cessation of illusion as btidha and nivrtti, 488; cit not opposed to ajnana, 457; consciousness as illumination, 449; controversy of the schools, 406; creation of an illusory object, 487; criticism of the Nyaya doctrine of causation, 466; definition of ajnana, 452 ff.; definition of perception, 473; dialectic, 419, 420, 461; dialectical arguments, 465; different kinds of illusion, 487; discussions with Kumarila and Prabhakara on the nature of self-luminosity of knowledge, 459; doctrine of duties, 489; doctrine of inference, 473; doctrine of jivastiksi, 480; dualistic interpretations of, 70; ekajiva doctrine, 477; epistemology of Kumarila, 416 ff.; epistemology of Prabhakara Mlmamsa, 415 ff.; epistemology of the Sautrantika Buddhists, 408 ff.; examination of the category of difference, 462 ff.; existence of the objective world, 480; function of vrtti-jhana in perception, 481; general account of, 70; history of the doctrine of mtiyd, 469-470; indefinable character of the world-appearance, 461; indefinable nature of ajnana, 479; literature, 418 ff.; locus and objects of ajiiana, 457 ff.; mtiyti and avidyti, 469, 475, 476; methods of controversy, 407; nature of ahamktira, 458, 460; nature of antahkarana, 460 ; nature of emancipation, 491; nature of /svara, 476; nature of perception, 483; nature of pramti, 482; necessary qualifications, 489; nirvikalpa perception, 483; Nyaya epistemology, 412 ff.; objections against the view that world-appearance is illusion, 451; drstisrsti doctrine, 478; perception of ajiidna in the sleeping state, 456; philosophy, 70; pratibimba, avaccheda and uptidhi, 475; refutation of the Mlmamsa theory of illusion, 485; relation with other systems, 492 ff.; relation with Vedic duties, 490; Samkhya epistemology, 4i4ff; self-validity of knowledge, 484; Sahkara, theBra/i-ma-sutras and the Upanisads, 429 ff.; similarity not essential for illusion, 452; theory of causation, 465 ff.; theory of illusion, 486 ff.; theory of perception, 470ff.; three functions of the subject, 480; three stages of jiva, 476; views on samavtiya, 319 «.; vivartta and pari-ntima, 468; vrtti and consciousness, 449, 450; world-appearance not a subjective creation, 452; Yogacara epistemology.

Vedantakalpataru, 86 «., 114M.

Vedantaparibktisti, 67, 3i8«., 419, 460 «., 484, 485 n.

Index

Vedantasara, 420, 490 n. VedantasiddhantamuktavalZ, 420 Vedanta sutras, 70, 71 ; as interpretations

of Upanisad texts, 70 Vedantatattvadipika, 420 Vedantatlrtha Vanamall, Prof., 281 n.,

3°5 »•

Vedantic, 433, 465

Vedantins, 257

Vedantism, 175, 229, 371, 418

Vedarthasamgraha, 433

Vedas, 1, 6, n, 13, 14, 20, 24, 25, 40, 67, 69, 186, 208, 209 n., 234, 277, 278, 282, 284, 285, 291, 294, 297, 304. 3^6, 333 »•» 355, 394, 401, 403, 404, 405, 426, 430, 431, 435, 489; allegiance of Hindu philosophy to, 11; atman in the, 26; authorship of, 10; bearing of, to Hindu law, n; classification of, 12; doctrine of karma, 210; earliest record, 10; idea of morality, 210; influence of, on later thought, 10; learnt by hearing, 10; monotheistic tendency in, 19; transmigration not developed in, 53

Vedic, 1, 6, 10, n, 14, 264, 265, 292, 396, 404, 436; belief in another world, 25; belief in punishment of evildoers, 25 ; commandments do not depend on reason, 29; conception of manas as seat of thought, 26; conception of the origin of the world, 25; cosmogony (mythological), 23 ; cosmogony (philosophical), 23; creation hymn, 24; doctrine of atman, 25; doctrine that soul could be separated, 25; duties, different from Upanisads, 29; escha-tology, 2 5; law of karma, 21; moral idea, 25; obligatory ceremonies, 11; sacrifices and rituals, 11; teaching as karnia-mdrga, 29

Vedic duties, 371, 437, 489, 490, 492; for inferior persons, 30

Vedic gods, 16; contrasted with Greek gods, 16 ; contrasted with Purana gods, 16; have no fixed leader, 18; instruments of sacrifice, 22

Vedic hymns, 18, 22, 31; two tendencies, 6 ; different from the Upanisads, 31

Vedic literature, 41, 211, 268

Vedic mythology, i8»., 19/*., 22 »., 23 «., 25 n., 26 n.

Vedic sacrifices, 271

Vedic texts, 68, 69, 276, 372, 399

vega, 286, 316

vegasamskara, 291

Vehkata, 222

VehkateSvara, 423

Vesali, 112

vibhdga, 316

Vibhajjavadins, 112, 115; schools of, 115; their notion of time, 115

Vibhahga, 83, 90/2.

Vibhasa, lion.

vibhu, 189, 363 vibhuti, vjv, 424 Vibratory, 327 vicara, 105, 144, 213, 271 vicikiccha, 100, 105 vicikitsa, 145

Vicious infinite, 160, 319 n. vidhi, 29, 404, 405 vidhi-vdkya, 405 vidkiviveka, 371 vidklyate, 146 Vidvanmanoranjini, 420 vidya, m, 277, 278, 293, 332 «. Vidyabhusana, DrS.C, 128/*., 172, 279,

3°9 "•» 35° »-, 3 8 8 «-. 421

Vidyaranya, 419

viharas, 173

vijanana, 89

vijnapti, 94, 124

vijiiana, 86 n., 90, 91 »., 123, 124, 132, 143, 146, 40972., 428, 460; determining namarupa, 91; in relation to skandhas, 91; meaning of, in Sanskrit works, 86 n.

Vijflana Bhiksu, 212, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 229, 257 »., 260, 262, 494; his differences with Vacaspati, 223 ff.

Vijnanakaya, 120

vijndnamaya, 60

vijiianamaya atman, 46 Vijnanamatrasiddhi, 128

vijiianaskandha, 124

Vijfianavada, 86 n., 127, 128, 145, 166, 167, 302, 417, 421, 429, 465, 493, 494; aspects of nothingness, 149; Bodhi-sattva doctrine, 150; categories of the understanding, 148; consciousness, two functions of, 145; doctrine of dhyana, 150; doctrine of essencelessness, 147; doctrine of illusion {maya), 147; nir-z>rt«a-doctrine, 151; doctrine of nai-ratmya and tathagatagarbha, 149 ; doctrine of pratttyasamutpdda, 148; doctrine that all things are mental creations, 146; its literature, 128

Vijftanavadin, 113, 127, 128, 147, 167,

184, 233, 301, 332, 409 »., 415 Vijiianamrta bkasya, 220, 223, 239 n., 243 ».

vikalpa, 129, 151, 261, 269

vikalpalaksanagrahabhinivesapratisthapi-kabuddhi, 148

vikalpapratyaya, 410/2.

vikalpita, 409/2.

vikatha, 193

vikara, i?,i

vikaritvam, 203

Vikramaditya, 370

viksepa, 472

viksipta, 268 Vimalakirti, 128 Vimalaklrtinirdeiasutra, 125 n. Vimanavatthu, 83 Vinaya, 82

vtnaya, 193

5 2 7

Vindhyavasin, 218 Vinltadeva, 152 «., 163 «., 168 viiindna, 85, 86, 94, 96, 109 viniidnakkhandha, 100 vipaksa, 186 »., 344 vipaksa-pratisedha, 186 ». vipaksa-vyavrtti, 344 vipaksasattva, 156ft., 349 viparita, 193

viparitakkydtiy 337, 384, 385 viparyaya, 220, 269, 332 «., 337 viparyydsa, 140 Vipdka, 171 viriyasamvara, 101 Virocana, 46 virodha, 357 viruddha, 360 viruddkakaryopalabdhi, 358 viruddhavydptopalabdhi, 358 visadriaparindma, 247 Visibility, 292 Visuddkimagga, 83, 88, 99/z., 101«.,

102 »., 103 »., 104 «., 105, 106»., in,

161 viiesa, 246, 253, 285, 286, 287, 304,

3o6«., 312, 313, 318, 319, 320, 382 vifesana,szi, 455 vtiesanajndna, 412 vtiesanatdvacchedaka, 339 vtiesanatdvacchedakaprakdrain, 339 vUesanaviiesyabkdvdvagdhif 338 Visesdvasyakabhdsya, 171, 176 »., 178 ».,

179 «. viiesyaviiesana, 359 viiista, 455 viiistabuddhi, 412 viHstavaiHstyajiidnam, 339 Visuddhadvaitavada, 70 viiva, 424

Visvakarma, 19, 20, 32, 43, 52 Visvanatha, 281, 307, 339 Viivandtha-vrtti, 307 visaya, 135, 457 visdda, 243 Visnu, 18, 39 Visnupurdna, 433 vitakka, 105

vitandd, 294, 296, 302, 360, 407 vitarka, 271 VittkaleiopddhydyT, 420 VivaranabhdvaprakdHkd, 419 Vivaranaprameya, 457 Vivaranaprameyasarngraka, 419, 457,

486 w. vivartta, 468, 487 vivarttavada, 258, 468 Virastava, 171 «. virya, 271 vlryapdramita, 117 Vodhu, 222 Void, 127

Voidness, 126, 147, 166 Vows, 74 Vrjin, 112

VrsnidaJds, fjm.

vrtti, 146, 268, 269, 378«., 444, 448, 449, 450, 457, 460, 472, 481, 482,

483 vrttijnana, 455, 458, 481 vyakti, 298 vyatireka, 353 vyatirekavydpti, 346 vyavahara, 148, 171 «., 446 vyavahdramdtram, 114 vyavahdranaya, ijj, 178 vyavakdrika, 148/;., 439, 446, 487 vyavasdya, 302, 343 «. vyavastkdpyavyavastkdpakabkdvena, 154 vyaya, 175 Vyadi, 232 vydghdta, 347 vydpaka, 388

vydpakaviruddhopalabdhi, 358 vydpakdnupalabdki, 358 vydpddo, 105 vydpdra, 330 ». z/ya//*', 160, 186 »., 303, 304, 346, 347,

348,354» 3 8 9«-vyaptigraka, 346, 347 vydpti-niyama, 353 vydpya, 388, 389 vydpyatvdsiddka, 361 Vyasa, 212, 222, 231, 234 «. Vydsabkdsya, 225, 229, 231, 232, 233 «.,

235i 236, 237 »., 239 «., 254 »., 256 «.,

257 »., 263 «., 266 »., 267 »., 269,

273 »-, 380 »• vydsajyavrtti, 380 ». vyoman, 252, 255 Vyomasekharacarya, 306 Vyomavati, 306 vyiikana, 122

Warren, 88«., 89«., 90^., 99»., 107 ».,

108«., rim. Weber, I3«., 230 Wr# fl/j W7/Zf ««rf Vorstellung, 40

Wenzel, 144

West, 3

Western, 4, 5

Western Rajputana, 172

Whole, 165

Windisch, 203 ».

Winternitz, 34, 35 »., 39 ».

Woods, Prof., 231, 233

World-appearance, 441, 442, 443, 446,

447. 449> 45'. 45 2 > 4 6r » 4 6 8, 469. 47°.

489. 49» World-soul, its mythical character, 52

yajna, 283

Yajriadatta, 176, 290

Yajur-Veda, 12, 30

>w«a, 59, 106, 235, 236, 270, 317 "■

yamaka, 83, 157

Yantrikd, 28 ».

Yasastilaka, 172

Index

Yasoda, 173

Yasomitra, 114, 120, 167

yatna, 316

yatharthah pratyayah, 485

Yadavacarya, 308

Yajnavalkya, 28 «., 34 «., 35 n., 44, 54

yana, 54, 125 «., 126

!%"«. 7. 9» 28 «-» 39> 68 ' 74. 75' ?8, 80, 93 «., 192 «., 193, 199, 201, 203, 208,

215, 217, 220, 221, 222, 223, 226, 228, 229, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 248 «., 255, 259, 26l, 262, 263, 264,

265 n., 266, 268, 273, 277, 278, 292,

293. 3°'» 3°3» 3!7«-» 325. 385. 434.

440, 490, 492 ; compilation of the

sutras, 229 ft".; different types of, 228;

its early origin, 227; its meaning, 226;

its relation with Buddhism, 236 ff.;

pessimism in, 76; the school mentioned

by Alberuni, 233 ff. Yogacaryabhwniiastra, 128 Yoga compilation, 230 Yogacudamani, 28 n. Yoga discipline, 235, 237 Yoga editor, 231, 233 Yoga ethics, 269 yogaja, 341

Yogakundali, 28 «., 228 Yoga meditation, 270, 271 Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian

systems of thought, 203 «., 211«., 213,

238 n. Yoga Psychology, 270 n.

Yoga sutra, 219, 230, 233, 234, 235, 263 n., 268

Yoga sutras, 212, 236, 237, 238, 266 n. Yoga system, 77

YogaJastra, 172, 203 11., 237

YogaHkha, 28 «.

Yogatattva, 28 «., 228 Yoga Upanisads, 228

Yogavarttika, 212,-223, 239M., 243«., 245 "■» 254 «., 256;*., 257 w., 259 «., 261 »., 262 «., 263 «., 264 w. Yogacara, 113, 128, 145, 411, 421 yogantdasanam, 232 >^*'«, 76, 215, 227, 234«., 256, 266,

270, 271, 272, 273, 293, 342; 426 yogyata, 182, 224, 260, 358, 415 yoyo aggima so so dhiimava, 157 Yudhisthira, 79 yugmapradesa, 196 yugya, 226 yuj, 226

yuj samddhau, 226, 227 yujir yoge, 226, 227

Yuktisnehapicrani, 390 w.

Yuktisnekapicrani - siddkdnta - candrika,

371 yutasiddha, 246, 319 yutasiddhyabhavat, 293

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesell-

schaft, 203 «. Zend-Avesta, 39 Zeus, 18

PRINTED IN ENGLAND BY J. B. 1'EACE, M.A. AT THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

A HISTORY

OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D.

PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA

VOLUME II

CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London Office: Bentley House, N.w. I American Branch: New York

Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan

First printed 1932 Reprinted 1952

First printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Reprinted by qffset-litho by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd

PREFACE

Nine years have passed away since the first volume of this work was published, and the present volume has been in the press for more than two years. During the last seven years bad health has been responsible for many interruptions. In the first volume manuscripts were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred to. These could not be collected easily, and it took time to read them; many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, however, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manuscripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascertained only after long and patient study, since records of them were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused in the writing of this volume by the fact that large portions of what will appear in the third volume had to be compiled before the manuscripts had left the author's hands. In any event, the author offers his sincere apologies for the delay.

The manuscript of the third volume has made good progress and, barring illness and other accidents, will soon be sent to press. This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy of the Paiica-ratra, Bhaskara, Yamuna, Ramanuja and his followers, Madhva and his followers, the Bhagavata-purana and the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism. The fourth and the fifth volumes will deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known schools of Vaisnavism, the philosophy of the Puranas, Tantras, the different schools of Saivas, Saktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philosophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found their expression in some of the leading vernaculars of India.

A new impression of the first volume is now in the press. The present volume contains four chapters on Sankara Vedanta, the Medical Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy of the Yoga-vasistha and the Bhagavad-gita. A good deal of the Sankara Vedanta, especially in regard to its controversy with

Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and their followers, still remains to be treated in the third volume.

A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion in a work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had not grown into a separate science; whatever biological ideas were current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient India which may be regarded as constituting an experimental science. It was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some distinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, development and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and their relations to the logical categories of Nyaya are very instructive.

No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the real philosophical issues. The study here presented is strictly faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits of the present writer's capacities. Often the ground covered has been wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and first-hand study of all available texts and manuscripts. Nevertheless some sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation, exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers.

Since the publication of the first volume of the present work, many treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and elsewhere. But it has not been possible to refer to many of these. The present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in controversy; and, since the author takes upon himself the responsibility of all the interpretations of the texts that he has used, and since

he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow-workers in the field. Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to borrow the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some 3000 pages when completed.

The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gita may appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed excusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian chronology. In the chapter on the Gita, some repetition of the same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the looseness of the structure of the Gita, which is an ethico-religious treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-vdsistha nor the Gita are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them.

I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs. My thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest), Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish Chandra Das Gupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript

ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA Calcutta, 1931

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XI THE ^ANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA (continued)

and

i The World-Appearance ........

2 Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta

3 ^aiikara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayana Bhartrprapafica .........

4 Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta ......

5 Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness

6 Vedantic Cosmology ......

7 &aiikara and his School

8 Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa ....

9 Mandana (a.d. 8oo)

io Suresvara (a.d. 8oo)

ii Padmapada (a.d. 820)

12 Vacaspati Misra (a.d. 840)

13 Sarvajnatma Muni (a.d. 900)

14 Anandabodha Yati (eleventh or twelfth century a.d.)

15 Maha-vidyd and the Development of Logical Formalism

16 Vedanta Dialectic of SVlharsa (a.d. 1150)

17 Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts

18 Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of Jsankara Vedanta (a.d 1220)

19 The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic

20 Dialectical Criticisms of ^antaraksita and Kamalasila (a.d. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics

(a) Criticisms of Samkhya Parinama Doctrine .

(b) Criticism of Isvara .....

(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory

(d) Refutation of the Mimamsa Theory of the Self

(e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self (/) Refutation of the Upanisad View of the Self (g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities (i) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaisesika Categories

21 Dialectic of ^ankara and Anandajnana

22 Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivarana (A

23 Vimuktatman (a.d. 1200) .

24 Ramadvaya (a.d. 1300)

25 VidySranya (a.d. 1350)

26 Nrsimhasrama Muni (a.d. 1500)

27 Appaya Diksita (a.d. 1550)

28 Prakassananda (a.d. 1550—1600)

29 Madhusudana SarasvatI (a.d. 1500)

PAGE

I

13

36 46 58 73 77 82

87 98 102 106 in 116 118 12s 133

147 163

171 171 176

178 179 181 181 182

185 187

189

196

198

204 214 216

218

220

CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VASISTHA

PAGE

i Yoga-vasistha 228

2 The Ultimate Entity 232

3 Origination ........... 235

4 Karma, Manas and the Categories 237

5 The World-Appearance 240

6 Nature of Agency Kartrtva) and the Illusion of World Creation . . 242

7 The Stage of the Saint (JfJvan-tnukta) 245

8 Energy of Free-will (Paurusa) ........ 252

9 Prdna and its Control ......... 256

10 Stages of Progress .......... 264

11 Methods of Right Conduct 267

12 Yoga-vasistha, Ssarikara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijnanavada . . 268

CHAPTER XIII

SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS

1 Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda ....... 273

2 Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda ..... 284

3 Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda ..... 288

4 Practice of Medicine in the Atharva- Veda ..... 293

5 The Foetus and the Subtle Body ....... 302

6 Foetal Development . . . . . . . . .312

7 Growth and Disease ......... 319

8 Vdyu, Pitta and Kapha ......... 325

9 Head and Heart 340

10 The Circulatory and the Nervous System ..... 344

11 The Nervous System of the Tantras ...... 352

12 The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry . . . . -357

13 The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories . . 366

14 Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute . 373

15 Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Ayur-veda Physicians? . 392

16 Ayur-veda Ethics 402

17 Springs of Action in the Caraka-samhita . . . . . .411

18 Good Life in Caraka 418

19 Ayur-veda Literature 423

CHAPTER XIV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA

PAGE

i The Gltd Literature . -437

2 Gltd and Yoga 443

3 Samkhya and Yoga in the Gltd- -455

4 Samkhya Philosophy in the Gltd . . . . . . .461

5 Avyakta and Brahman ......... 470

6 Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gltd 479

7 Sense-control in the Gltd ........ 488

8 The Ethics of the Gltd and the Buddhist Ethics .... 493

9 Analysis of Action 515

10 Eschatology . . . . . . . . . . .517

11 God and Man ........... 523

12 Visnu, VSsudeva and Krsna ........ 535

13 Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gltd ....... 545

INDEX . . 553

CHAPTER XI

THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA {continued)

The treatment of the school of Sankara Vedanta in the preceding chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary purposes. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high, and so many people are interested in it, that it was pointed out to me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study of it. An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be found in the regrettable fact that, though numerous elementary and half-informed treatises have been published both in this country and in Europe, I do not know of any systematic study of the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the great thinkers of this school who followed Sankara and developed his system in a remarkably recondite manner. The comparatively small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand; but still it may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable, though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work.

The World-Appearance.

The Upanisads, called also the Vedanta, contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upanisads before Sankara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Sankara's commentaries or the works of other, later, commentators. As an example I may refer to Bhartrprapanca, who tried to give a realistic interpretation of the Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad by treating the world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman 1 .

1 Fragments of Bhartrprapanca from the writings of Sankara and his commentator Anandajnana and from Suresvara's Varttika have been collected by Prof. Hiriyanna, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.

Sahkara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the Upanisads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but, being under the influence of Gaudapada, differed from them on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elaborately in all his commentaries on the Upanisads and the Brahma-silt ras.

The main thesis of Sahkara, as has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the Upanisads; but in the Upanisads there are many passages which are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Sahkara's thesis. Sahkara therefore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyava-harika) and a philosophic view (pdramarthika), and explains the Upanisads on the supposition that, while there are some passages in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of view, there are many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real God as creator. Sahkara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upanisads, but also in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Judging by the sutras alone, it does not seem to me that the Brahma-sutra supports the philosophical doctrine of Sahkara, and there are some sutras which Sahkara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions found in the sutras or in the Upanisad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though on the basis of Sahkara's own statements, as well as those of his later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Sahkara's philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Sahkara's philosophy was realistic 1 . That there was some amount of realism in Sahkara is proved by his own confession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists {vijnana-vadins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (sunya-vadins).

1 Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyaratna, published by the Calcutta University Press, 1924.

I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according to the Vedanta, from the point of view of the Sahkara school of Vedanta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Sahkara's own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is one of the most important points of the Sahkara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.

But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it seems desirable that Sahkara's doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Sahkara. Taking the Sunya-vada theory of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Thus Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika-sutras that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth, truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense presuppositions and judgments (samvrti-satya) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (paramartha-satya) 1 . The word samvrti literally means "closed." Candrakirti explains samvrti as meaning "closing on all sides " and says that it is ignorance (ajnana) which is denoted by the term samvrti here, because it covers the truth of all things 2 . In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not contradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and

1 dve satye samupdsritya buddhdndm dharma-desand loka-samvrti-satyam ca satyam ca paramdrthatah.

Mddhyamika-sutra, xxiv. 8, p. 492, B.B. edition.

2 Ajndnam hisamantdt sarva-paddrtha-tattvdvacchddandt samvrtir ity ucyate. Ibid. Candrakirti however gives two other meanings of the word samvrti, which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the two meanings samvrti means interdependent origination or pratltya-samutpada, and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known— samvrtih samketo loka-vyavahdrah, sa ca abhidhdndbhidheya-jndna-jneyddilak-sanah.

so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (svabhava) of anything as it is. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the products are never by themselves self-existent, but exist only through the coming together of different entities. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own. The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term loka-samvrta. This is spoken of also as tathya-samvrti (real ignorance), as distinguished from mithya-samvrti (false ignorance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic, mirage reflections, etc. 1 Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called mithya-samvrta, because their falsehood is discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances, however, can be realized only when their real nature (paramdrtha-rupd) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes is properly understood. The world holds good and remains uncontradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these phenomena have no nature of their own that they are considered false. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances, subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid of essence. The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignorance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-samvrta. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert). But a question arises—if the world-appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question Nagarjuna's answer is that the appearance of the world is like the 1 Bodhi-caryavatara-panjikd, p. 353, Biblotheca Indica Series, 1902.

appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their own, but still present an objective appearance of reality 1 . The world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare's horn, which are simply non-existent (avidyamdna). Thus there is not only the ultimate truth {paramartha) ; there is also the relative truth of the phenomenal world (loka-samvrti-satya) ; there are, further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are. contradicted in ordinary experience {aloka-samvrta or mithya-samvrta), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare's horn. The error (viparyasa) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul as having a soul 2 . And this error is due to ignorance (avidya). Candraklrti quotes a passage from the Arya-drdhasaya-pariprccha, in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have perceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none 3 .

Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing; but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objectively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware—experiences through which we pass, though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It was here that Sankara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sutra he says that the essence of all illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another. Illusion is defined as the false appearance in some object of something

1 Madhyamika-sutra, xxm. 8.

2 Iha catvaro viparyasa ucyante: tadyathd pratiksana-vinasini skandha-pancake yo nityam iti grahah sa viparyasah. . .duhkhatmake skandha-pancake yah sukham iti vipanto grahah so 'paro viparyasah,... sartram asuci-svabhavam tatra yo sucitvena grahah sa viparyasah,.. .panca-skandham niratmakam tasmin ya atma-grahah anatmani atmabhinivesah sa viparyasah. Candraklrti's commentary on ibid. xxin. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sutra, n. 5, Anandasrama Series.

3 Candraklrti's commentary on the Madhyamika-sutra, xxin. 13.

experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the non-apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (viparita-dharmatva) ; but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons 1 . Sankara then suggests that, since the universal self (pratyag-atman) is felt through our feeling of "I" and since it is immediate in all experience (aparoksa), it is not absolutely unrelated and unindicated (avisaya) in experience, and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (anatman) and its characteristics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (avidya).

In his commentary on Gaudapada's Karika, I. 17, Sankara says that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appearance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake, which later on became non-existent when right knowledge supervened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence at all 2 . Sankara in commenting on Gaudapada's Karika explains with approval Gaudapada's view that the world of common experience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet, when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of experiences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore

1 Sankara's Adhyasa-bhasya on the Brahma-sutra, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904.

2 Rajjvdm sarpa iva kalpitatvat na tu sa vidyate. . .na hi rajjvdm bhranti-buddhya kalpitah sarpo vidyamanah san vivekato nivrttah; tathedam prapafi-cakhyam mdya-tnatram. Gaudapada's Karika, 1. 17, Anandasrama Series.

fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other well-known instances of illusion—the mirage, for example. Since it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the pragmatic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations 1 . But Gaudapada and Sankara differ from the Sunyavadin Buddhists in this—that they think that even false creations must have some basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis of truth (aspada) underlying them 2 . Nagarjuna, it will be remembered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called "nothingness" or sunyata by Nagarjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom creations; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth anywhere. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Sankara nor Gaudapada appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.

1 Sankara's commentary on Gaudapada's Kdrikd, n. 1-12.

2 Na hi nirdspadd rajju-sarpa-?nrgatrsnikddayah kvacit upalabhyante. Ibid. 1.6.

Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experiences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing appearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed—and this basis is the self (atman), or Brahman, which is the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit, negating all differences and duality (visuddha-vijnapti-matra-satta-dvaya-riipena) 1 . Just as the false creation of " snake " appears in the case of the " rope," so all such judgments as " I am happy," " I am unhappy," "I am ignorant," "I am born," "I am old," "I am with a body," "I perceive," etc., are all merely false predications associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining independently by itself.

By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratltya-samntpada, Nagarjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Sankara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it for granted, since the Upanisads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself? Sankara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due to ignorance (avidya) ; it could not be spoken of as either existing or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver. ButPadmapada, who wrote the commentary known as Panca-padika on the first four sutras of Sarikara's commentary on the Brahma-sutras, says that the precise meaning of the term " false conception " (mithya-jnand) in Sankara's introduction to his commentary on the Brahma-sutras is that there is a force or power or potency (sakti) of

1 Gaudapada's Karikd, II. 17.

nescience which constitutes materiality {jadatmika avidya-saktih), and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff (upadana) of the world-appearance 1 . It is well to remember in this connection that, according to Sankara's philosophy, it is not only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance, but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "I," this ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts—the one, pure intelligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objectivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence, thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man 2 ." This avidya-sakti, or power of avidya, subsists in the pure self and, on the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman, and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary experience 3 . The illusion consists in the association of the psychological qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the transcendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological determinations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows—so these psychological determinations in a beginning-less cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self 4 .

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as Padmapada or Prakasatman explains, ajnana or nescience is some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have come into being. This ajnana is not the ajnana of the Buddhists, i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyasa, or illusion,

1 Panca-pddikd, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.

2 asmat-pratyaye yo 'nidam-amsas cid-eka-rasah tasmims tad-bala-nirbhdsita-tayd laksanato yusmad-arthasya manusydbhimdnasya sambhedaivdvabhdsah sa eva adhydsah. Ibid. p. 3.

3 atah sa pratyak-citi brahma-svarupdvabhdsam pratibadhndti ahamkdrdd-y-atad-rupa-pratibhdsa-nimittam ca bhavati. Ibid. p. 5.

4 Prakasatman's Panca-padika-vivarana, p. 10, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1892.

is not the viparyaya of Nagarjuna; for here it is a positive power or stuff. Thus PrakaSatman argues that all effects have at their back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up; and ajnana, lying in the transcendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause 1 . This avidya-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. This positive ajnana is directly perceived in such immediate perceptions as "I do not know myself or others," and can also be inferred or comprehended by implication 2 . The fact that ajnana or avidya is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon; avidya is not, however, a power, but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and objective ; yet it is called a power, or sakti , because of its dependence (para-tantrata) on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration of the entire dependence of avidya and its transformations on the self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects— the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind 3 . The self thus not only holds the ajnana within it as a dependent function, but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the ajnana with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be veiled by this ajnana and made the underlying basis of all world-appearances of fl/nflnfl-transformations 4 .

Appaya Diksita, referring in his Siddhanta-lesa to the view of the writer of the Padartha-tattva, summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Maya form together the material cause (ubhayam upadanam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are two distinct characteristics, "being" (satta) from Brahman and materiality (jadya) from Maya. Brahman is the cause, as the unchanging basis of the Maya, which is the cause as being the

1 sarvarn ca kdryam sopadanam bhdva-kdryatvdt ghatddivad ity anumanat ... tasmdn mithyartha-taj-jnanatmakam mithyd-bhutam adhydsam upadana-karana-sapek$am... mithyd-jndnam eva adhyasopdddnam. Panca-padika-vivarana,

pp.11-12.

2 Ibid. p. 13.

3 saktir ity dtma-para-tantratayd dtmanah sarva-kdryopdddnasya nirvodh-rtvam. Ibid. p. 13. Atma-kdranatva-nirvodhrtvdd dtma-para-tantratvd ca sakti-matydm api sakti-sabda upacdritah. Akhandananda Muni's Tattva-dlpana, p. 65, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1902.

4 atah svaprakdse 'pi dtmani vicitra-sakti-bhdva-rupdvidyd-prayuktam dva-ranam durapahnavam. Ramananda Sarasvati's Vivaranopanydsa, p. 16, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.

xi] The World-Appearance n

stuff that actually undergoes transformation 1 . Vacaspati Misra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidya, to be the material cause of the world (avidyd-sahita-brahmopadanam) 2 . In his adoration hymn at the beginning of his Bhdmatl he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable avidya, the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe 3 . Sarva-jnatma Muni, however, does not wish to give maya the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Maya; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a remote and modified sense (upalaksana), through the instrumentality of maya 4 . The author of the Siddhanta-muktdvall is referred to by Appaya Diksita as holding that it is the maya and maya alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of maya and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause 5 .

It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between maya and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these questions do not seem to have arisen in Sahkara's mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidya and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of maya to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term

1 Siddhanta-lesa, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890.

2 Bhamati on Sarikara's Bhasya, 1. 1.2, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904.

? Anirvdcydvidya-dvitaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivartd yasyaite viyad-anila-tejob-avanayah. ibid. p. 1.

4 Samksepa-sdrlraka, 1. 333, 334, Bhau Sastri's edition.

avidya (formed by compounding the negative particle a and vidya " knowledge ") may mean either absence of knowledge {vidya-bhavah) or false knowledge {mithya-jnanam) ; and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made 1 . The answer given by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidya is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (anady-anirvdcydvidyasra-yanat). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instrumental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (upadana-karana) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedantists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent 2 . Anandabodha in his Pramana-mala quotes approvingly from the Brahma-tattva-samlksa of Vacaspati to show that avidya is called avidya or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither "is" nor "is not," and is therefore unintelligible; avidya signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category 3 . Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of avidya is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance—considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be regarded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not

1 avidya hi vidydbhavo mithyd-jndnam vd na cobhayam kasya cit samavdyi-kdranam adravyatvat. Anandabodha's Nydya-makaranda, p. 122, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.

2 Ibid. pp. 122-124.

3 sad-asad-ubhaydnubhayddi-prakdraih anirvacanlyatvam eva hy avidydndm avidydtvam. Brahma-tattva-samlksa as quoted in Pramana-mald, p. 10, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1907.

make this concept either intelligible or consistent 1 . The concept of avidya is thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent.

Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta.

The Vedanta takes a twofold view of things; the first view refers to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure intelligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an objective content; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless. The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equivalent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I" as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain relation which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object; for both the character-appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see, or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes previously; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or

1 Vailaksanya-vdco-yaktir hi pratiyogi-mrupanad yauktikatva-prakatana-phala na tv evam-rupatdydh sdmanjasya-sampddandya ity avocdma. Pramdna-tndld, p. 10.

becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of consciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I remember that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons, through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say that "A is A" means that one A becomes itself over again. It is owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it can be called a relation. When it is said that A is identical with A, it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or otherness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubiquitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from " now " and " then," " here " and " there," " such " or " not such " and " this " or " that." Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive

of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are revealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known.

" Is cognizing an act or a fact?" Before this can be answered the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact; for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or wake, whether we experience an. illusion or a truth, revelation is always there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By this continuity the Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the ego or the "I" is as much a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time without the corresponding "I perceive" being explicitly revealed at the same time. The notion of ego or "I" does not refer to an everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is as changing as any other objective content. The " I" has no definite real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the

mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep reveals both the "this" and the "I." So far as the revelation appears as revealing the "this" and the "I," it is manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or "mine," " thou " or " thine," falls outside it. They are all contents, having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident, but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. We have already seen that this principle cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considerations of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is revealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me; but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been designated as the" Self "or atman, but only in the sense of denoting its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all— the Brahman.

Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted of a substanceless indefinable stuff called may a. In some schools of Sankara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion, that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them; this school has been designated the Drsti-srsti school, a doctrine which has been

briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work 1 . One of the most important texts of this school is the Siddhanta-muktdvali by Prakasananda 2 . Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration from the Yoga-vdsistha, and he denied the existence of things when they are not perceived (ajnata-sattvdnabhyupagama). He tried to show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference between perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness, the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (dtmdsrayatva). If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindicated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a constituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object" directly and immediately—which comes to the same thing as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self-

1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I. pp. 477-478, by S. N. Dasgupta, published by the Cambridge University Press, 1922.

2 Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman's (a.d. 1200) Panca-pddikd-vivarana and Sarvajfiatma Muni's (a.d. 900) Samksepa-sarlraka and refers approvingly to Suresvara, the author of the Nuiskarmya-siddhi. Appaya Dlksita (A.D. 1620) refers to Prakasanandainhis5 , irf^a«ta-/ej'fl(pp. 13,72). Nana Dlksita, a follower of the school of Prakasananda and author of the Siddhdnta-dlpikd, in a commentary on the Siddhanta-muktdvali, gives a list of Vedanta teachers. In this list he mentions the names of Prakasanubhavananda, Nrsimha and Raghavendra Yati. Venis thinks (see The Pandit, 1890, pp. 487-490) thatPrakasanubhavais the same as Prakasatman and Nrsimha the same as Nrsimhasrama Muni, who is said to have converted Appaya Dlksita to Sarikara Vedanta, and thinks that Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged in between Nrsimha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived some time towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. Prakasananda's doctrine of Drsti-srsti is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the Veddnta-paribhasd, a work of the early sixteenth century, Hdoes not seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakasananda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century.

dependence 1 . If it is held that the complex quality (" difference-of-awareness-from-the-object") is directly perceived in the object through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the said complex quality existed in the object even before the production of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. For such an inference has to take form thus—" the object is different from its own awareness, because it is associated with entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics 2 ." But how could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness, since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved by perception or any other means ? Prakasananda further says that the argument by implication (arthdpatti), that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any knowledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object, Prakasananda raises the question whether such an implication of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the production (utpatti) of knowledge, its persistence {sthiti) or its secondary cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakasananda says that according to the Vedanta consciousness is ever-existent and is never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for its production. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an external object is to be considered necessary in the production of inferential knowledge—a fact which shows that the presence of an external object is not indispensable for the production of knowledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said

1 Siddhanta-muktdvall, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247—249.

2 vimato visayah sva-visaya-jiianad bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmasrayatvat. Ibid. p. 252.

that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or substance {asrayd) y in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to persist; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything, that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer itself—as in the Nyaya view, where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (asraya) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object), there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized objects are different.

In the above account of Prakasananda's views it is clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. It could not legitimately be held that awareness (pratiti) was different from its object (pratyetavya). The whole universe, as we perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness, without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of awaking consciousness 1 . The world has thus no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere awareness {vijnana-matra or bhava-matrd).

This scheme of Vedanta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (a.d. 280-360), as taught in his Vimsatika with a short commentary of his own and in his Trimsika with a commentary by Sthiramati 2 . According to this idealism

1 pratyetavya-pratltyos ca bhedah prdmdnikah kutah

pratiti-matram evaitad bhdti visvam cardcaram jndna-jneya-prabhedena yathd svapnam pratlyate vijnana-mdtram evaitat tathdjdgrac cardcaram.

Siddhdnta-muktdvatt, p.258.

2 Vijnapti-mdtratd-siddhi, containing two treatises, Vimsatika and Trimsika,

(vijiiana-vada) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation (vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corresponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual {anabhilapyenatmana) thought, which the saints realize, is also false 1 . It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another; but in all such cases where the awarenesses are significant (arthavati) there is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an example, we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, since wholes would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of atoms cannot be proved 2 . For, if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have

Paris, 1925. It seems probable that Vasubandhu flourished inA.D. 280-360 rather than in a.d. 420-500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the Tattva-samgraha.

1 yo balair dhdrmdndm svabhdvo grahya-grdhakddih parikalpitah tena kalpiten-atmana tesam nairdtmyam na tv anabhilapyenatmana. yo buddhdndm visaya iti. Commentary on Vimsatika, p. 6.

2 Ndpi te samhatd vi$ayl-bhavanti, yasmat paramanur ekam dravyam na sidhyati. Ibid. p. 7.

no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (vitatha-vikalpabhyasa-vasana-nidraya), and in their dreams they construct the objective world; it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokoltara-nirvikalpa-jnana-labhat prabuddho bhavati) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes, which is called death 1 . So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthir-amati this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijfia.na.-parina.ma). The transformation (parinama) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation of the causal moment 2 . There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but these are imposed upon it (vijnana-svariipe parikalpita eva atma dharmas ca). All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken for something else; there cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so it has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self, etc. have been made upon the transformations of pure intelligence 3 . Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who

1 para-vijnapti-visesadhipatyat paresdm fivitendriya-virodhinl kacit rihriya utpadyate yayd sabhdga-santati-viccheddkhyam maranam bhavati. Commentary on Vimsatika, p. 10.

2 kdrana-ksana-nirodha-sama-kdlah kdrana-ksana-vilaksana-kdryasya dtma-labhah parinaniah. Sthiramati's commentary on Trimsika, p. 16.

3 upacdrasya ca niradharasydsambhavdd avaiyam vijnana-parinamo vastuto 'sty upagantavyo yatra atma-dharmopacarahpravartate. Ibid. Compare Sarikara's commentary on Gaudapada's Karika, " na hi niraspada tnrgatrsnikddayah."

deny also the reality of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or relativity (samvrti) 1 . Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (vijnapti-matrata) is the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity, which by its inherent power (s'akti) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent indeterminate inner change (vipaka), which again produces the two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles {visa.ya-vijna.pti). The apprehension of all appearances or characterized entities (dharma) as cognized objects and that of selves as cognizers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived, are due to the threefold transformations of vipaka, manana and visaya-vijnapti. The ultimate consciousness (vijnapti-matra) which suffers all these modifications is called alaya-vijnana in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukha) ; for what is not eternal is painful, and this, being eternal, is happy 2 . When a saint's mind becomes fixed (pratisthita) in this pure consciousness (vijnapti-matra), the tendency to dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grahya-grahakanusaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nir-vikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (klesa) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called anasrava. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable,because it is,on the one hand,pure self-consciousness (pratyatma-vedya) and omniscience (sarvajnata) , as it is divested of all limitations (avarana), and, on the other hand, it is unique in itself 3 . This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (sarva-bija), and, when its first indeterminate and indefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and

1 Thus Lankdvatara, one of the most important works on Buddhistic idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or alaya-vijnana. See Lankdvatara, p. 46, published by the Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1923.

2 dhruvo nityatvdd aksayatayd; sukho nityatvdd eva yad anityam tad duhkham ayam ca nitya iti asmdt sukhah. Sthiramati's commentary on Trimiikd, p. 44.

3 Alaya-vijnana in this ultimate state of pure consciousness {vijnapti-matrata) is called the cause (dhdtu) of all virtues, and, being the ultimate state in which the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost all their limitations it is called the dharma-kaya of the Buddha (mahd-munih bhumi-pdramitddi-bhdva-nayd klesa-jneydvarana-prahdndt... sarva-dharma-vibhutva-ldbhatas ca dharma-kaya ity ucyate). Ibid.

also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another, and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean, where each is as much the product of others as well as the generator of others 1 . In this view thought (vijnana) is regarded as a real substance, and its transformations are also regarded as real; and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterized appearances 2 . The first type of transformations, called vipaka, is in a way the ground of the other two transformations, which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But, as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The vipaka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpa-vasana) of the selves as cognizers,the constructive instincts of colours, sounds, etc., the substantive basis (asraya) of the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts, as well as the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations {sthana-vijnapti or bhajana-loka-sannivesa-vijnapti). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriya), sense-object (visaya) and cognition (and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding to the effective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one-to-one relation), attention {manaskara), discrimination (samjna), volition (cetana) and feeling (vedana) 3 . The vipaka transformations have no determinate or limited forms (aparicchinnalambanakara), and there are here no

1 tac ca varttate srotasaughavat. Ibid. p. 21.

2 avaiyam vijnana-parinamo vastuto 'sty upagantavy oyatrdtmadharmopacarah pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16.

3 Fee\\r\g{vedana) is distinguished here as painful,pleasurable and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se {vedana. anubhava-svabhdvd sd punar visayasya dhlddaka-paritdpaka-tadubhaya-kara-vivikta-svarupa-sdksatkarana-bhedat). This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipaka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called "feeling as indifference (upeksd)" and undifferentiated (avydkrta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipaka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhasubha-karma-vipdka). Good and bad (subhdsubka) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.

actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like, which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The vipaka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties, etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized forms. The second grade of transformations, called manana, represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions; it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (attna-stieha) and egoism (atma-mana). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations, which is associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states, such as desire (chandah) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimoksa) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory, attentive reflection (samadhi), wisdom (prajiia), faith and firm will for the good (sraddha), shamefulness (hri) for the bad, etc. The term alaya-vijnana is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the eternal and unchangeable pure thought {vijnapti-matrata).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these

abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the "awareness," but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grahaka-graha) and a relation with the object which is known (grahya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply onto-logical objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but, since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

Sahkara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, 11. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by Santaraksita in his Tattva-samgraha (commented upon by Kama-lasila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu's Trimsikd. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an external world constituted by partless atoms are the same 1 . But

1 Vacaspati, however, in his Bhdmatl commentary, II. ii. 28, introduces some new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance constituting a forest {gandha-rasa-sparsa-paramdnv-antaritd hi te rupa-paramdnavo na nirantardh ; tasmdd drat sdntaresu vrksesu eka-ghana-pratyayavad esa sthilla-pratyayah paromdnusu sdntaresu bhrdnta eva).

it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them; and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical with it 1 . When one of them is not perceived the other also is not perceived. If they were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the be-ginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots {vasana) which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without any external real objects; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the instinctive sub-conscious roots {vasana), without which no ideas, whether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced; so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas, are the cause of all ideas 2 .

1 This simile is adduced by Vacaspati probably from a quotation from Dirinaga— sahopalambha-niyamdd abhedo riila-tad-dhiyoh bhedas ca bhranti-vijnanair drsyetendav ivadvaye.

Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same; for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the difference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This argument of sahopalambha-niyama is absent in Vasubandhu's Vimsatika and TrimUka.

2 Vacaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrantikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corresponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrantikas runs thus: When, the old causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called vasana (tat-pravrtti-vijndna-janana-sak-

Sarikara in refuting the above position says that such a view is untenable because it contradicts our experience, which always distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. We are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was existing outside 1 . Sankara argues thus: if externality is absolutely non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Visnumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many extraneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many; and, since the objects are many,

tir vasana), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (paripdka), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular momentshould have a power altogether different from other moments; for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects.

1 iSarikara says yad antar-jneya-rUpam tad bahirvad avabhasate. This seems to be a quotation from Dinnaga. Dirinaga's verse, as quoted by Kamalaslla in his commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows: yad antar-jneya-rupam tu bahirvad avabhasate so 'rtko vijndna-rupatvdt tat-pratyayatayapi ca.

This shows that iSarikara had Dinnaga in his mind when he attempted to refute the Buddhist idealists.

they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many 1 . Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be explained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly objects—dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but the waking experiences are never found contradicted.

It is curious to note here the contradictions in Sankara's own statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his commentary on Gaudapada's Kdrikd built a powerful argument for the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Santarak-sita (a.d. 705) and Kamalaslla (a.d. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Sankara—that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness itself—argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal those objects is constant and unchangeable 2 . Kamalaslla therefore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Sarikara's view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gaudapada's Kdrikd be admitted to be a work of Sankara, then it may be urged that Sankara's views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the Brahma-sutra; for in the commentary on Gaudapada's Kdrikd he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since

1 dvdbhydm ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmdc ca dvayoh; tasmdd artha-jndnayor bhedah. Ankara's Bhdsya, II. ii. 28, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904.

2 tad yadi nityaika-jnana-pratibhdsdtmakd ami sabdadayah syus tadd vicitrds-tarana-pratibhdsavat sakrd eva pratibhdseran; tat-pratibhdsdtmakasya jndnasya sarvadd vasthitatvdt. Kamalaslla's commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, si. 331. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1926.

Neither Santaraksita nor Kamalaslla seems to be familiar with Sankara.

illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the Brahma-sutra the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vacaspati in his Bhamatl commentary distinguishes the position of Sankara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedanta holds that the " blue " is not an idea of the form of blue, but" the blue " is merely the inexplicable and indefinable object 1 .

In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the Vimsatika and Trimsika it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he repudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought-stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness, they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Sankara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that "blue" (nila) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (alatnbana) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. According to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the idea therefore expresses itself as a subject-object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside; for even space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants

1 na hi brahma-vddino nlladyakaram vittim abhyupagacchanti, kintii amr-vacanlyam nlladlti. Bhamatl, n. ii. 28.

of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Sankara says anything to refute such a view. Sankara's position in the commentary on Gaudapada's Karika seems to have been the same sort of view as that of Dinnaga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, and as such it was opposed to the view of Nagarjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahma-sutra-bhasya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and independently—only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their independent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedanta teachers of the Sankara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with the object of perception through the specific sense is considered indispensable 1 .

Prakasatman (a.d. 1200) in his Panca-padika-vivarana raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahayanists and the Vedantins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (visaya) have neither any separate existence nor any independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences 2 . Both Padmapada and Prakasatman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which remains constant {anuvrtta) and that which changes (vyavrttd) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded as being only a modification of the idea 3 . It is suggested that the Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed; for there is no such

1 See Veddnta-paribhdsd, ch. i, Srlvenkatesvar Press, Bombay, 1911.

2 tattva-darsinas tu advitlydt samvedanat abhede 'pi visayasya bhedendpi artha-kriyd-sdmarthya-sattvam sthdyitvam cdbddhitam astlti vadanti. Panca-pddikd-vi-varana, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakasatman also wrote two independent commentaries on Brahma-sutra called £driraka-mimdmsd-nydya-sam-graha and Laukika-nydya-muktdvall.

3 anuvrttasya vydvrttdn na bhedo 'nuvrttatvad dkdsa-ghafddivat. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 73.

specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object 1 . The Vedantist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be interpreted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities 2 . Thus the fact that "I perceive blue" is not to be interpreted as a conscious relationing of "I," "the blue" and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, because all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic-

1 tasmdt svdbhdvikdsddharandbhedasambandhdd eva vijndne nllam avabhdsate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74.

Arguing from a similar point of view, Santaraksita and Kamalasila urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some immutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (tdddtmya) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedantists. There cannot be the law of causality here; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. Tattva-samgraha and Panjikd, 2030, 2031.

2 tad vdsand-sameta-samanantora-pratyaya-samuttham sankalandtmakam pra-tyaydntaram etan neha sambandhdgamah. Padmapada's (a.d. 820) Panca-pddikd, p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedantic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakasatman's Paiicapddikd-vivarana, Pan-ca-pddikddhydsa-bhdsya-vydkhyd,Panca-pddikd-sdstra-darpana by Amrtananda, Tattva-dipana by Amrtanandanatha, and also a commentary by Anandapurna Yati. Prakasatman's commentary on it, called Pancapadikd-vivarana, was commented upon by Akhandananda Muni in his Tattva-dipana, by Ramananda SarasvatI in his Vivaranopanydsa, and by Nrsimhasrama in his Panca-pddikd-vivarana-bhdva-prakdsikd.

ally, the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a momentary appearance could subsist long enough to have the possibility of being relationed to the self and the awareness, as in " I know the blue "; and, if the blue was not considered to be identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness'.

Padmapada points out that the main point with the Buddhists is the doctrine of causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva), or the maxim that that alone exists which can prove its existence by effecting some purpose or action. They hold further that this criterion of existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose or action 2 . Padmapada urges in refutation of this that, if causal efficiency means the productivity of its own awareness {sva-visaya-jnana-jananam), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it does not produce any other knowledge of itself {samvidam sva-visaya-jnana-jananadasallaksanatvam), and the awareness of one cannot be known by others except by inference, which again would not be direct cognition 3 . If causal efficiency means the production of another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment is proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that account cease to exist 4 . On such a basis Prakasatman points out

1 ndnubhavam asritya samvedandd abhinnam nllam brumah kintu vijndnena riilasya pratibhasdnyathanupapattyii; ksanikasya tv dgantuka-sambandhdbhave... pratibhdsa eva na sydt. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74.

2 See the first volume of this work, pp. 163-164, where the reasons in justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

8 Padmapada derives the possibility of one's being aware of an awareness, which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness, being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate it. na ca samvit sanwido visayah samvid-dtmand bheddbhdvdt pradtpasyeva pradipdntaram. Panca-pddikd, p. 27.

4 ndrtha-kriyd-kdritva-laksanam sattvam kintu svdbhavikam itisakrt kdryyam krtvd tusnlmbhutasydpisthdyinah sattvam na virudhyate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 80.

that the supposed three notions of "I," "awareness" and the object are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on account of their similarity, but all the three are joined together in one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity is proved by the fact that they are recognized (pratyabhijna) to be so. We are, again, all conscious of our own identity, that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and that, though our ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same; and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this identity, a notion of which can be produced only by a relationing of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this cannot be done by the Vedantic self, which is pure self-revealing consciousness that cannot further be made an object of any other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and there cannot be in it a consciousness of relationing between a past state and a present state through the sub-conscious impressions of memory 1 . The mere persistence of the same consciousness is not the recognition of identity; for the recognition of identity would be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present; and, since there is no one to perceive the relation of identity, the appearance of identity is false. The Vedantic answer to such an objection is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind (anlahkarana-visista) may behave as an individual who can recognize his own identity as well as that of others. The mind is associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego (ahamvrtti-samskara-sahitam), due to the experience of the self as associated with a past time; being responsible for the experience of the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the present. A natural objection against such an explanation is that, since the Vedanta does not admit that one awareness can be the object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness is

1 purvdnubhava-sarnskdra-sahitdd iddnimtana-vastu-pramiti-kdrandj jdtam ekasya kdla-dvaya-sambandha-visayakam pratyaksa-jndnam pratyabhijna iti cet, na tarhi dtmani sd sambhavati. . .vijndna-svabhdvasya hy dtmanah. . .jiidndnta-rdgamyatvdt. .. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 75.

impossible, without which recognition of identity would be impossible. The answer of the Vedantist is that, just as an idea is remembered through its sub-conscious impressions, so, though recognition of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious impressions at a later moment 1 . According to the Vedanta the pure consciousness is the only unchanging substance underlying; it is this consciousness associated with mind {antahkarana) that behaves as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness associated with the previous and later time that appears as the objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known to be identical with the knower—the mind-associated consciousness. We all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as " I am the same"; and the only way in which this can be explained is on the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal, can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the diverse nature of its associations, by which it seems to transform itself as the knower and the thousand varieties of relations and objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in connection with this realization of the identity of the self is that the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed in the past; but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing at the present moment? Knowledge of identity of the self is something different from the experience of self in the past and in the present. But the process consists in this, that the two experiences manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through both the experiences, and this new experience makes the self known in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that is remembered; so it is the self as associated with the different time relations that is apprehended in an experience of the identity of self.

From all these discussions one thing that comes out clearly is that according to the Sankara Vedanta, as explained by the Vivarana school of Padmapada and his followers, the sense-data and the objects have an existence independent of their being perceived; and there is also the mind called antahkarana, which operates in its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the 1 Panca-padika-vivarana, p. 76.

mind? But what then are the objects? and the Sankarite's answer is that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It is easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the Buddhistic idealism of Dinnaga or the Lankavatara on the one hand and that of Vasubandhu in his Trimsika on the other. For in the case of the former there were no objects independent of their being perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are transformations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Sankara Vedanta, however, the stuff of world-objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of maya, which is indescribable (anirvacya) in itself, but which is always related to pure consciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure consciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already described, the Sunyavadins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test of criticism, considered them as being essenceless {nihsvabhava). The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribableness of the Sankara school is that this "indescribable" is yet regarded as an indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Sankara Vedanta does not believe in the sahopalam-bha-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual; it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self-revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and

3-2

when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes being (abadhita-svayam-prakasataiva asya satta) 1 . All being is pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object-forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable stuff of maya, which is not "being," but dependent on "being"; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of maya popularly intelligible; and this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position.

Sarikara's Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of Badarayana and Bhartrprapafica.

Sankara's defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of the objections that may be made against the Vedantic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the followers of Samkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which is believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jada and acetana) and impure (asuddha). And it is only because the world is so different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly be of any use to each other—two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them. Sarikara's answer to this objection is that it is not true that the effect should in every way be similar to the cause—there are instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow-dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being. It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such

1 Vacaspati Misra's Bhdmatt, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara edition, 1904.

an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be true—it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman 1 . The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that, since the Upanisads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world, the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not by reason, but by the testimony of the Upanisads. Another objection supposed to be raised by Samkhya against Vedanta is that at the time of dissolution (pralaya), when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure. Sankara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it. Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether untouched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality as all the changing states is mere false show (maya-matram), like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution.

These arguments of Sankara in answer to a supposed objection

1 trim hi yac caitanyenananvitam tad abrahma-prakrtikam drstam iti brahma-vddinam praty uddhriyeta samastasya vastujdtasya brahma-prakrtikatvdbhyu-pagamdt. Sankara's Bhdsya, n. i. 6.

that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere may a and magic and has no essence (vastutva), the best course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the parinama view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show, the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an objection would have validity only with those who believed in the real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philosopher like Sankara, who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Sankara failed to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parinama view of causation is to be adopted, the vivarta view is to be given up. It seems however that Sankara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the "vivarta view of unreality of effects in the commentary on sutras which could only yield a realistic interpretation. The sutras here seem to be so convincingly realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upanisads hold that this impure and unintelligent world had come out of Brahman; and that, since the Upanisads assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason. In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of causes is further supported by the sutra which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations. Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have

an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also Sarikara has to follow the implication of the sutra in his interpretation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this sutra, says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation, there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out, however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incompatible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here also Sankara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the sutra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it.

In the next section the sutras seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect, " because of the possibility of the effect, because the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upanisads." Such a meaning is quite in keeping with thegeneralmeaningoftheprevioussections. Sankara,however, interprets the sutra as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His being the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity; for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no Isvara who is the omniscient creator of the world 1 . Sarikara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upanisad texts (e.g. mrttiketyeva satyam, etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the sat-karya-vada theory, or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the parinama view of real transformation and the vivarta view, in two different ways. It is curious however that he should support the sat-karya-vada theory on parinama lines, as against the generative view of a-sat-karya-vdda of the Nyaya, but not on vivarta lines, where effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he

1 kuta-stha-brohnidtma-vtidinah ekatvaikdntydt isitrlsitavyabhdvah isvaro-kdrana-pratijiid-virodha iti ret; na; avidydtmaka-ndma-riipa-bija-vydkaranapek-saivdt sarvajiiatvasya. Sankara's Bhdsya on Brahma-sutra. n. i. 14.

na tdttvikam aisvaryyam sarvajiiatvam ca brahmanah kintv avidyopddhikam iti tadasrayam pratijiid-sutram, tattvusrayam tu tad ananyatva-sutram. Bhdmati on the above Bhds\a.

says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation consists in the special power or capacity (sakti) in the cause (e.g. the milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the effect. Arguing against the Nyaya view that the cause is different from the effect, though they are mutually connected in an inseparable relation of inherence (samavaya), he says that, if such a samavaya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect, then this also may require a further something to connect the samavaya with the cause or the effect and that another and that another ad infinitum. If it is urged that samavaya, being a relation, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything else, it may well be asked in reply how "conjunction" (samyoga), which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation of inherence (samavaya) to connect it with the objects which are in conjunction (samyogin). The conception of samavaya connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary; for the latter always appear identified with the former (tdddtmya-pratlti). If the effect, say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be invisible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts should have other parts and these others; and thus there would be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the parts at the same time, then there would be many wholes. If it exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but

a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect is non-existent before its production, then, production being an action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is impossible—for, since the effect is non-existent before its production, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without any agent. If, however, production is not defined as an action, but as a relationing of an effect with its cause {svakarana-satta-samavayd) y then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause.

But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity of the causal operation (karaka-vyapara)} The answer to such a question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elaboration of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause; and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation; but in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing in the cause as its potency or power.

There are seven other smaller sections. In the first of these the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. Here also Sankara adds as a supplementary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. But the sutras gave him no occasion for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the previous sections, here also his maya theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the sutras, and his remarks have to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport of the sutras.

In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot without the help of any other accessory agents create the world; the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else.

In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman; for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is undergoing the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves; for Samkhya also admits the transformation of the formless prakrti.

In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His Ilia or play. Sankara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the maya theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sutras, which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the sutra as attributing the world-creation to God's playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the self and Brahman.

The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Badarayana's philosophy was some kind of bhedabheda-vada or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman)—even in the light of Sankara's own commentary. He believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman, or rather of His powers and energies (sakti). God Himself was not exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the master creator who by His play created the world and who could by His own powers create the world without any extraneous assistance. The world was thus a real transformation of God's powers, while He Himself, though remaining immanent in the

world through His powers, transcended it at the same time, and remained as its controller, and punished or rewarded the created mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds.

The doctrine of bheddbheda-i'dda is certainly prior to Sankara, as it is the dominant view of most of the pur anas. It seems probable also that Bhartrprapanca refers to Bodhayana, who is referred to as vrttikara by Ramanuja, and as vrttikara and Upavarsa by Sarikara, and to Dramidacarya, referred to by Sankara and Ramanuja; all held some form of bheddbheda doctrine 1 . Bhartrprapanca has been referred to by Sankara in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad \ and Anandajnana, in his commentary on Sankara's commentary, gives a number of extracts from Bhartrprapanca's Bhasya on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the Third Oriental Congress in Madras, 1924, and there he describes Bhartrprapanca's philosophy as follows. The doctrine of Bhartrprapanca is monism, and it is of the bheddbheda type. The relation between Brahman and the jlva, as that between Brahman and the world, is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view is that both the jlva and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be described as Brahma-parindma-vdda. On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the antarydmin and the jiva\ on the physical side into avyakta, sutra, virdj and devatd, which are all cosmic; and jdti and pinda, which are not

1 Prof. S. KuppusvamI Jsastrl, in an article read before the Third Oriental Conference, quotes a passage from Verikata's Tattva-tika on Ramanuja's commentary on the Brahma-sutras, in which he says that Upavarsa is a name of Bodhayana— vrttikdrasya Bodhdyanasyaiva hi Upavarsa iti sydn ndma — Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924. The commentators on Sankara's Bhasya say that, when he refers to Vrttikara in I. i. 9, 1. i. 23,1. ii. 23 and in. iii. 53, he refers to Upavarsa by name. From the views of Upavarsa referred to in these sutras it appears that Upavarsa believed in the theory of jnana-karma-samuccaya, held also by Bhaskara (an adherent of the bheddbheda theory), Ramanuja and others, but vehemently opposed by Jsarikara, who wanted to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself fit for Brahma-knowledge.

References to Dramidacarya's commentary on the Chdndogya Upanisad are made by Anandagiri in his commentary on Sankara's commentary on the Chandogya Upanisad. In the commentary of Sarvajnatma Muni's Sarnksepa-sarlraka , ni. 217-227,byNrsimhasrama,the Vakyakara referred to bySarvajnatma Muni as Atreya has been identified with Brahmanandin or Taiika and the bhasyakara (a quotation from whose Bhasya appears in Samksepa-sdrlraka, in. 221, "antar-gund hhagavatl paradevateti," is referred to as a quotation from Dramidacarya in Ramanuja's Veddrtha-samgraha, p. 138, Pandit edition) is identified with Dramidacarya, who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin's Chdndogyo-panisad-vdrttiha.

cosmic. These are the avasthds or modes of Brahman, and represent the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. They are again classified into three rdsis,para-matma-rasi, jiva-rasi and murttdmurtta-rdsi, which correspond to the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy, viz. God, soul and matter. Bhartrprapafica recognized what is known as pramdna-samuccaya, by which it follows that the testimony of common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upanisads). Hence the ultimate truth is dvaitddvaita. Moksa, or life's end, is conceived as being achieved in two stages—the first leading to apavarga, where sarnsdra is overcome through the overcoming of dsanga; and the second leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of avidyd. This means of reaching either stage is jndna-karma-samuccaya, which is a corollary on the practical side to pramdna-samuccaya on the theoretical side.

It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics of Badarayana's bheddbheda doctrine of Vcdanta; but there is very little doubt that it was some special type of bheddbheda doctrine, and, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, even Sankara's own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks, which are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary and the context of the sutras, as well as with their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows that it was so. If, however, it is contended that this view of real transformation is only from a relative point of view (vyavahdrika), then there must at least be one sutra where the absolute (pdra-mdrthika) point of view is given; but no such sutra has been discovered even by Sankara himself. If experience always shows the causal transformation to be real, then how is one to know that in the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If, however, it is contended that there is a real transformation (parindma) of the mdyd stuff, whereas Brahman remains always unchanged, and if mdyd is regarded as the power (sakti) of Brahman, how then can the sakti of Brahman as well as its transformations be regarded as unreal and false, while the possessor of the sakti (or the saktimat, Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedantic writers of the Sankara school. Thus Appaya Diksita in his Sid-dhdnta-lesa refers to the author of Paddrtha-nirnaya as saying that

Brahman and maya are both material causes of the world-appearance—Brahman the vivarta cause, and maya the parinama cause. Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate between vivarta and parindma by defining material cause as that which can produce effects which are not different from itself {svd-bhinna-karyajanakatvam upddanatvam). The world is identical with Brahman inasmuch as it has being, and it is identical with nescience inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. So from two different points of view both Brahman and maya are the cause of the world. Vacaspati Misra holds that maya is only an accessory cause (sahakari), whereas Brahman is the real vivarta cause 1 . The author of the Siddhdnta-muktdvall, Prakasananda, however, thinks that it is the maya energy (maya-sakti) which is the material cause of the world and not Brahman. Brahman is unchangeable and is the support of maya ; and is thus the cause of the world in a remote sense. Sarvajnatma Muni, however, believes Brahman alone to be the vivarta cause, and maya to be only an instrument for the purpose 2 . The difficulty that many of the sutras of Badarayana give us a parinama view of causation was realized by Sarvajnatma Muni, who tried to explain it away by suggesting that the parinama theory was discussed approvingly in the sutras only because this theory was nearest to the vivarta, and by initiating people to the parindma theory it would be easier to lead them to the vivarta theory, as hinted in sutra 11. i. 14 3 . This explanation could have some probability, if the arrangement of the sutras was

1 Vacaspati Misra flourished in about A.D. 840. In addition to his Bhdmatl commentary on the Brahma-sutra he wrote many other works and commentaries on other systems of philosophy. His important works are: Tattva-bindu, Tattva-vaisdradl (yoga), Tattva-samiksa Brahma-siddhi-tlkd, Nyaya-kanika on Vidhi-viveka, Nyaya-tattvaloka, Nyaya-ratna-tlka, Nydya-vdrttika-tdtparya-tlkd, Brahma-tattva-samhitoddlparil, Yukti-dlpikd (Sdmkhya), Sdmkhya-tattvo-kaumudt, Veddnta-tattva-kaumudl.

2 He lived about A.D. 900 during the reign of King Manukuladitya and was a pupil of Devesvara.

3 vivarta-vddasya hi purva-bhumir vedanta-vdde parinama-vddah vyavasthite 'smin parindma-vdde svayam samdydti vivarta-vddah.

Samksepa-sdrlraka, 11. 61. updyam dtisthati purvam uccair upeyam dptum janatd yathaiva srutir munindras ca vivarta-siddhyai vikdra-vddam vadatas tathaiva. Ibid. 11. 62.

vikdra-vddam Kapilddi-paksam

upetya vddena tu sutra-kdrah

srutis ca samjalpati purvabhumau

sthitvd vivarta-pratipddandya. Ibid. 11. 64.

such as to support the view that the parinama view was introduced only to prepare the reader's mind for the vivarta view, which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view; but it has been shown that the content of almost all the sutras of 11. i. consistently support the parinama view, and that even the sutra 11. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of causation as the right one, since the other sutras of the same section have been explained by Sankara himself on the parinama view; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this sutra also has to be explained on the parinama view of bhedabheda type.

Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta.

The central emphasis of Sankara's philosophy of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra is on Brahman, the self-revealed identity of pure consciousness, bliss and being, which does not await the performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realization. A right realization of such Upanisad texts as "That art thou," instilled by the right teacher, is by itself sufficient to dispel all the false illusions of world-appearance. This, however, was directly against the Mimamsa view of the obligatoriness of certain duties, and Sankara and his followers had to fight hard on this point with the Mimamsakas. Different Mimamsa writers emphasized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with Brahma-wisdom; and a brief reference to some of these has been made in the section on Suresvara. Another question arose regarding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts (e.g. "that art thou") of the Vedanta; and later Vedanta writers have understood it differently. Thus the author of the Prakatartha, who probably flourished in the twelfth century, holds that it is only by virtue of the mandate of the Upanisads (such as "thou shouldst listen to these texts, understand the meaning and meditate") that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen to the Vedanta texts—a view which is technically called apurva-vidhi. Others, however, think that people might themselves engage in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain salvation and that they might go on the wrong track; and it is just to draw them on to the right path, viz. that of listening to the unity texts of the Upanisads, that the Upanisads direct men to listen to the unity texts—this view is technically called niyama-vidhi.

The followers of Sarvajfiatma Muni, however, maintain that there can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of Brahma-knowledge, and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the holding of discussions for the clarification of one's understanding; and the meaning of the obligatory sentence "thou shouldst listen to" means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarification of his intellect. Other followers of Suresvara, however, think that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of Vedanta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedanta texts without any interruption; and this view is technically called parisamkhya-vidhi. Vacaspati Misra and his followers, however, think that no obligation of duties is implied in these commands; they are simply put in the form of commands in order to show the great importance of listening to Vedanta texts and holding discussions on them, as a means of advancement in the Vedantic course of progress.

But the central philosophical problem of the Vedanta is the conception of Brahman—the nature of its causality, its relation with maya and the phenomenal world of world-appearance, and with individual persons. Sankara's own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answer; and many passages in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined. Appaya Dlksita notes in the beginning of his Siddhanta-lesa that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity of the self and the Brahman, and neglected to explain clearly the order of phenomenal appearance; and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after Saftkara's death we have four important teachers, Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajfiatma Muni, Padmapada and Vacaspati Misra, who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpretation of the Vedanta. Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajfiatma Muni held that maya was only an instrument (dvara), through which the one Brahman appeared as many, and had its real nature hidden from the gaze of its individual appearances as individual persons. In this view maya was hardly recognized as a substance, though it was regarded as positive; and it was held that maya had, both for its object and its support, the Brahman. It is the pure Brahman that is the real cause underlying all appearances, and the maya only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing

appear as many unreal appearances. It is easy to see that this view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical explanations of phenomenal appearance, and is only concerned to emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. Vacaspati's view gives a little more substantiality to maya in the sense that he holds that maya is coexistent with Brahman, as an accessory through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance is possible; maya hides the Brahman as its object, but it rests on individual persons, who are again dependent on maya, and maya on them, in a beginningless cycle. The world-appearance is not mere subjective ideas or sensations, but it has an objective existence, though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and indescribable ; and at the time of dissolution of the world (or pralaya) its constitutive stuff, psychical and physical, will remain hidden in avidya, to be revived again at the time of the next world-appearance, otherwise called creation. But the third view, namely that of Padmapada, gives maya a little more substantiality, regarding it as the stuff which contains the double activity or power of cognitive activity and vibratory activity, one determining the psychical process and the other the physical process, and regarding Brahman in association with maya, with these two powers as Isvara, as the root cause of the world. But the roots of a very thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the writings of Sankara himself. Thus in the Brhadaranyaka-bhasya he says that, leaving aside theories of limitation {avaccheda) or reflection (pratibimba), it may be pointed out that, as the son of KuntI is the same as Radheya, so it is the Brahman that appears as individual persons through beginningless avidya; the individual persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance through their own avidya. It will be pointed out in a later section that Mandana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after Sankara in the ninth century. Thus in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedantic development, which began to expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one or the other of these schools; and some additional tendencies also developed. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in the field of the Vedanta, and, excepting probably Jfianottama Misra, who wrote a commentary on Suresvara's Varttika, no writer of great reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other fields of philosophical development also this century was more or

less barren, and, excepting Udayana and Sridhara in Nyaya-Vaisesika, Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Saivism, probably no other persons of great reputation can be mentioned. There were, however, a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this period, such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi, the author of Nyaya-loka-siddhi, Prajnakara Gupta of Vikramasila, author of Pramana-vartikalankara and Sahopalambha-niscaya, Acarya Jetari of Rajshahi, the author of Hetu-tattvopadesa, Dharma-dharmi-viniscaya and Balavatara-tarka, Jina, the author of Pramana-vartikalankara-tika, Ratnakirti, the author of the Apoha-siddhi, Ksana-bhanga-siddhi and Sthira-siddhi-dusana, and Ratna Vajra, the author of the Yukti-prayoga. The eleventh century also does not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedanta philosophy. The only author of great reputation seems to have been Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, who appears to have lived probably in the latter half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century. The mahavidya syllogisms of Kularka Pandita, however, probably began from some time in the eleventh century, and these were often referred to for refutation by Vedantic writers till the fourteenth century, as will be pointed out in a later section. But it is certain that quite a large number of Vedantic writers must have worked on the Vedanta before Anandabodha, although we cannot properly trace them now. Anandabodha says in his Nyaya-makaranda that his work was a compilation (samgraha) from a large number of Vedantic monographs (nibandha-puspanjali). Citsukha in his commentary on the Nyaya-makaranda points out (p. 346) that Anandabodha was refuting a view of the author of the Brahma-prakasika. According to Govindananda's statement in his Ratna-prabhd, p. 311, Amalananda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of the author of the Prakatartha. The author of the Prakatartha may thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the twelfth century. It was a commentary on Sarikara's Bhasya, and its full name was Sariraka-bhasya-prakatartha ; and Anandajnana (called also Janardana) wrote his Tattvaloka on the lines of Vedantic interpretation of this work. Mr Tripathi says in his introduction to the Tarka-samgraha that a copy of this work is available in Tekka Alatha; but the present writer had the good fortune of going through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library, and a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a separate section. In the Siddhanta-lesa of Appaya Dlksita we

hear of a commentary on it called Prakatdrtha-vivarana. But, though Anandajfiana wrote his Tattvdloka on the lines of the Prakatdrtha, yet the general views of Anandajfiana were not the same as those of the author thereof; Anandajflana's position was very much like that of Sarvajflatma Muni, and he did not admit many ajnanas, nor did he admit any difference between mdyd and avidya. But the author of the Prakatdrtha, so far as can be judged from references to him in the Siddhdnta-lesa, gave a separate place to the antahkaranas of individual persons and thought that, just as the jivas could be cognizers through the reflection of pure intelligence in the antahkarana states, so Isvara is omniscient by knowing everything through mdyd modifications. The views of the author of the Prakatdrtha regarding the nature of vidhi have already been noted. But the way in which Anandajfiana refers to the Prakatdrtha in Mundaka, p. 32, and Kena, p. 23, shows that he was either the author of the Prakatdrtha or had written some commentary to it. But he could not have been the author of this work, since he refers to it as the model on which his Tattvdloka was written; so it seems very probable that he had written a commentary to it. But it is surprising that Anandajfiana, who wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of Sankara, should also trouble himself to write another commentary on the Prakatdrtha, which is itself a commentary on Sankara's commentary. It may be surmised, therefore, that he had some special reasons for respecting it, and it may have been the work of some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line. However it may be, it is quite unlikely that the work should have been written later than the middle of the twelfth century 1 .

It is probable that Gangapuri Bhattaraka also lived earlier than Anandabodha, as Citsukha points out. Gangapuri must then have lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh century. It is not improbable that he may have been a senior contemporary of Anandabodha. His work, Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya, was commented on by Anandajfiana. According to him both mdyd and Brahman are to be regarded as the cause of the world. All kinds of world-phenomena exist, and being may therefore be attributed to them; and being is the same whatever may be the nature of things that exist. Brahman is thus the changeless cause in the world or the vivarta-kdrana ; but all the 1 See Tripathi's introduction to the Tarka-samgraha .

changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded as products of the transformation of some substance, and in this sense may a is to be regarded as the parinami-karana of the world. Thus the world has Brahman as its vivarta-karana and maya as its parinami-kar ana. The world manifests both aspects, the aspect of changeless being and that of changing materiality; so both maya and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different ways {Brahma maya ca ity ubhayopadanam ; sattva-jadya-rupobhaya-dharmanugaty-upapattis ca). Tarka-viveka and Siddhanta-viveka are the names of two chapters of this book, giving a summary of Vaisesika and Vedanta philosophy respectively. The view of Gangapuri in the Padartha-tattva-nirnaya just referred to seems to have been definitely rejected by Anandabodha in his Pramana-mala, p. 16.

When Kularka had started the maha-vidya syllogisms, and great Nyaya authors such as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth centuries had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philosophy and were trying to define all that is knowable, the Vedantic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably losing its hold; and it is probable that works like Anandabodha's Pramana-mala and Nyaya-dipavali in the eleventh century or in the early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold fast to the Vedantic position on logical grounds. It was Sriharsa who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyayikas. Sriharsa's work was carried on in Citsukha's Tattva-pradipika in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Anandajiiana in the latter part of the same century in his Tarka-samgraha and by Nrsimhasrama Muni in his Bkeda-dhikkara in the sixteenth century. On the last-named a pupil, Narayanasrama, wrote his Bheda-dhikkara-satkriya, and this had a sub-commentary, called Bheda-dhikkara-satkriyojjvala. The beginnings of the dialectical arguments can be traced to Sankara and further back to the great Buddhist writers, Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Candrakirti, etc. Interest in these dialectical arguments was continuously kept up by commentaries written on these works all through the later centuries. The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the sections on Sriharsa, Citsukha and Anandajiiana.

Moreover, the lines of Vedanta interpretation which started with Suresvara, Padmapada and Vacaspati were vigorously

4-2

continued in commentaries and in independent works throughout the later centuries. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth century Vacaspati's Bhdmati was commented on by Amalananda in his Kalpa-taru ; and this Kalpa-taru was again commented on by Appaya Dlksita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and by Laksmlnrsimha in his Abhoga towards the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth 1 .

Padmapada's Panca-padika was commented on by Prakasatman in the thirteenth century in his Panca-padika-vivarana ,by Akhan-dananda in the fourteenth century in his Tattva-dipana, by Vidya-ranya in the same century in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha y by Anandapurna and Nrsimha in the sixteenth century and by Rama Tirtha in the seventeenth century 2 . The line of Suresvara also continued in the summary of his great Varttika (called Vart-tika-sara) by Vidyaranya and its commentaries, and also in the commentaries on the Samksepa-sariraka from the sixteenth century onwards. Many independent works were also written by persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvajfiatma Muni 3 . The philosophy of drsti-srsti-vada Vedanta, which was probably started by Mandana, had doubtless some adherents too; but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line, except Prakasananda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nana Dlksita. The Vedanta-kaumudl is an important work which is

1 Allala Suri, son of Trivikram5cSrya, wrote a commentary on the Bhdmatl, called the Bhdmatl-tilaka.

2 Samyagbodhendra Samyamin, pupil of Girvanendra (a.d. 1450), wrote a summary of the main contents of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana in six chapters (var-naka), and this work is called by two names, Advaita-bhusana and Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. There are again two other commentaries on Prakasatman's Panca-padika-vivarana: the Riju-vivarana by Visnubhatta, son of Janardana Sarvajfta and pupil of Svamlndrapurna, and the Ttkd-ratna by Anandapurna. The Riju-vivarana had again another commentary on it, called the Trayyanta-bhava-pradipika, by Ramananda, pupil of BharatI Tirtha.

There are, however, two other commentaries on the Panca-padika called Panca-padika-vyakhya (by an author whose name is not definitely known) and the Prabandha-parisodhim by Atmasvarupa, pupil of Nrsimhasvarupa. Dharma-rayadhvarindra also wrote a commentary on Panca-padika, called the Panca-pddika-tlkd.

3 Apart from the two published commentaries on the Samkfepa-sdrlraka, there is another work called the Samkfepa-sdrlraka-sambandhokti by Vedananda, pupil of Vedadhyaksa-bhagavat-pujyapada, in which the author tries to show the mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. Nrslmha-srama also wrote a commentary on the Samksepa-sariraka, called the Tattva-bodhiril. One Sarvajfiatma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedantic work, called Paiica-prakiiyd; but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajfiatma Muni.

referred to by Appaya Diksita in his Siddhanta-lesa. In this work the omniscience of Brahman consists in the fact that the pure consciousness as Brahman manifests all that exists either as actually transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently transformed, as the past in the may a; and it is the Paramesvara who manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness (saksin) in individual persons, manifesting the ajnana transformations in them, and also their potential ajnana in dreamless sleep. Many other important Vedanta views of an original character are expressed in this book. This work of Ramadvaya has been found by the present writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate section has been devoted to its philosophy. From references in it to followers of Madhva it may be assumed that the Vedanta-kaumudl was written probably in the fourteenth century.

From the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number of Vedanta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the notable exception of Prakasananda, Madhusudana SarasvatI in his Advaita-siddhi (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyasa Tlrtha against the monistic Vedanta in the sixteenth century) and probably Vidyaranya's Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and Dhar-marajadhvarlndra's Paribhasa, and its Sikhamani commentary by Ramakrsna, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any great originality in Vedantic interpretations. Most of the writers of this later period were good compilers, who revered all sorts of past Vedantic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their works. The influence of the Panca-padika-vivarana, however, is very strong in most of these writers, and the Vivarana school of thought probably played the most important part in Vedantic thought throughout all this period.

These Vedantic writers grew up in particular circles inspired by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their own families or among their pupils; a few examples may make this clear. Thus Jagannathasrama was a great teacher of south India in the latter half of the fifteenth century; he had a pupil in Nrsimh-asrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedanta in the early half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one hand by the Vivarana and on the other by Srlharsa and Citsukha and Sarvajnatma Muni: he wrote a number of Vedanta works, such as Advaita-dipika (his pupil, Narayanasrama, wrote a commentary called Advaita-dlpika-vivarana on it), Advaita-panca-

ratna, Advaita-bodha-dlpikd, Advaita-ratna-kosa, Tattva-bodhinl, a commentary on the Samksepa-sdriraka, Tattva-viveka (which had two commentaries, Tattva-viveka-dipana of Narayanasrama and Tattva-vivecana of Agnihotra, pupil of Jnanendra SarasvatI), Pan-ca-pddika-vivarana-prakdsikd , Bheda-dhikkdra, Advaita-ratna-vyd-khydna (a commentary on Mallanarodlya's Advaita-ratna), and Vedanta-tattva-viveka. The fact that he could write commentaries both on Sarvajnatma Muni's work and also on the Vivarana, and also write a Bheda-dhikkdra (a work on dialectic Vedanta on the lines of Srlharsa's dialectical work) shows the syncretistic tendencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the school were all accepted as different views of one Vedanta, and in which people were more interested in Vedanta as a whole and felt no hesitation in accepting all the Vedantic ideas in their works. Nrsimhasrama had a pupil Dharmarajadhvarlndra, who wrote a Veddnta-paribhdsd, a commentary called Tarka-cuddmani on the Tattva-cintdmani of Gangesa, and also on the Nyaya-siddhdnta-dlpa of Sasadhara Acarya, and a commentary on the Paiica-padikd of Padmapada. His son and pupil Ramakrsna Dlksita wrote a commentary on the first, called Vedanta-sikhamani; and Amaradasa, the pupil of Brahmavijnana, wrote another commentary on this Sikhdmani of Ramakrsna 1 . Ramakrsna had also written a commentary on Rucidatta's Tattva-cintdmani-prakdsa, called Nydya-sikhdmani, and a commentary on the Veddnta-sdra. Other authors, such as Kaslnatha Gastrin and Brahmendra SarasvatI, had also written separate works bearing the name Veddnta-paribhdsd after the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmaraja in the seventeenth century. Under the sphere of Nrsimha's influence, but in the Saiva and Mimamsaka family of Rangaraja Adhvarin,was born Appaya Dlksita, who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. His works have all been noted in the section devoted to him. He again was a teacher of Bhattojl Dlksita, who in addition to many works on grammar, law and ritual (smrti) wrote two important works on Vedanta, called Tattva-kaustubha and Veddnta-tattva-dipana-vydkhyd, the latter a commentary on the commentary, Tattva-viveka-dipana, of Narayanasrama (a pupil of Nrsimhasrama) on the latter's work, Vedanta-tattva-viveka. This Narayanasrama had also written another commentary on

1 Petta Dlksita, son of Narayana Dlksita, also wrote a commentary on the Vedanta-paribhdsd, called Veddnta-paribhdsa-prakasika.

Nrsimhasrama's Bheda-dhikkara, called Bheda-dhikkara-satkriya; and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was written on Nrsimha's Bhcda-dhikkara, called Advaita-candrika, by Narasimha Bhatta, pupil of Ramabhadrasrama and NagesVara in the eighteenth century. BhattojT Dlksita's son BhanujI Dlksita was a commentator on the Amara-kosa (Vyakhya-sudha or Subodhini). BhattojT was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of Nrsimhasrama Muni. Bhattoji's younger brother and pupil, Ran-goji Bhatta, wrote two works, the Advaita-cintamani and the Ad-vaita-sastra-saroddhara, more or less on the same lines, containing a refutation of Vaisesika categories, a determination of the nature of the self, a determination of the nature of ajiiana and the nature of the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmahood is to be attained. His son Konda Bhatta was mainly a grammarian, who wrote also on Vaisesika. Again Madhusudana SarasvatI, who ,was a pupil of Visvesvara SarasvatI (pupil of Sarvajna Visvesa and pupil's pupil of Govinda SarasvatI), lived in the early half of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of Nrsimhasrama, who is reputed to have defeated Madhusudana Sarasvatl's teacher, Madhava SarasvatI. Madhusudana had at least three pupils, Purusottama, who wrote on Madhusudana's commentary the Siddhanta-tattva-bindu a commentary called Siddhanta-tattva-bindn-tlka 1 ; the others were Balabhadra and Sesagovinda (the latter of whom wrote a commentary on Sankara's Sarva-darsana-siddhanta-samgraha, called Sarva-siddhanta-raha-sya-tika). Again Sadananda, the author of the Vedanta-sara, one of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedanta, was a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama; Nrsimha SarasvatI wrote in 1588 a commentary thereon, called Subodhini. Devendra, the author of the Svanubhuti-prakasa, was also a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakasananda was probably a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama, though he does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how some of the foremost Vedanta writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries grew up together in a Vedantic circle, many of whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of Nrsimhasrama and Appaya Dlksita.

1 Brahmananda wrote on the Siddhdnta-bindu another commentary, called Siddhanta-bindu-tikd.

Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhaskara Dlksita, who lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary, Ratna-tulika, on the Siddhanta-siddhanjana of his teacher Krsnananda. The Siddhanta-siddhanjana is an excellent syncretistic work on Vedanta, which contains most of the important Vedanta doctrines regarding the difference oi dhar ma-vicar a and brahma-vicara, the relation of Mlmamsa theories of commands, and the need of Brahma-knowledge; it introduces many Mlmamsa subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedanta topics. It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from the influence of the Vivarana, and it does not enter into theories of perception or the nature of the antahkarana and its vrtti. It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the sixteenth century in the circles of Nrsimha or Appaya. Krsnananda lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had for teacher Ramabhadrananda; and Ramabhadrananda was taught by Svayamprakasananda, the author of the Vedanta-naya-bhusana, a commentary on the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Vacaspati MiSra's Bhamati. This Svayamprakasa must be distinguished from the other Svayamprakasa, probably of the same century, who was a pupil of Kaivalyananda Yoglndra and the author of the Rasabhi-vyanjika, a commentary of Advaita-makaranda of Laksmidhara Kavi. Ramabhadrananda had as his teacher Ramananda SarasvatI, the author of the Vedanta-siddhanta-candrika, on which a commentary was written by Gangadharendra SarasvatI (a.d. 1826), pupil of Ramacandra SarasvatI and pupil's pupil of Sarvajna SarasvatI, and author of the Samrajya-siddhi with its commentary, the Kaivalya-kalpadruma. Prakasananda was a pupil of Advaitananda, author of the Brahma-vidyabharana, a commentary on Sankara's Sariraka-bhasya —Advaitananda was a disciple of Ramatlrtha, author of the Anvaya-prakasika (a commentary on the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni) and a disciple of Krsnatlrtha, a contemporary of Jagannathasrama, the teacher of Nrsimhasrama. Ramatlrtha's Anvaya-prakasika shows an acquaintance with Madhusudana's Advaita-siddhi; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Svayamprakasananda, again, had for pupil Mahadevananda, or Vedantin Mahadeva, the author of the Advaita-cinta-kaustubha or Tattvanusandhana. It seems very clear that these writers of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth

centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedantic ideas, where the views of Vacaspati, Suresvara and Sarvajnatma Muni had greater influence than the authors of the Vwar ana school of Vedanta. Another important syncretistic Vedanta writer is Sada-nandaKasmlraka, author of the A dvaita-brahma-siddhi, who lived in the early part of the eighteenth century. The Advaita-brahma-siddhi is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedanta doctrines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedantic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers. Narahari's Bodha-sara may be mentioned as one of the important products of the late eighteenth century 1 .

The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyaranya was a contemporary of Amalananda in the fourteenth century, as both of them

1 A number of other important Vedanta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanatha, son of Sarvajnanarayana and grandson of Nrsimhasrama, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-muktd-sara with a commentary on it called Kanti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote the Advaita-siddhdnta-vidyotana; Gopalananda Sarasvati, pupil of Yogananda, wrote the Akhanddtma-prakdsika; Harihara Paramahamsa, pupil of Sivarama, pupil of Visvesvarasrama, wrote the Anubhava-vildsa, and early in the nineteenth century Samin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called Brahmdnanda-vildsa. In this connection it may not be out of place to mention the names of some important works of Vedanta dialectics in refutation of oth°r systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialectical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ananda-pu na(A.D. 1600), who commented on SVlharsa's Khatidana-khanda-khddya, wrote the Nydya-candrikd in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyaya, Mimamsa and Vaisesika; Anandanubhava, pupil of Narayana Jyotisha, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Paddrtha-tattvo-nirnaya; Jnanaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (prakarana), called Tattva-sttddhi ; fSrlnivasa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the Vc.dd-vall in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Visistadvaita and Dvaita views; Bhavanlsaiikara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhdnta-dlpikd. As examples of semi-popular Vedanta works of a syncretistic type, such works as the Tattva-bodha of Vasudevendra, the Guna-traya-viveka of Svayamprakasa Yoglndra, the Jagan-mithydtva-dlpikd of Ramendra Yogin, the Anatida-dlpa of SivanandaYati (which had a commentary called Ananda-dlpa-tlkdr by Ramanatha), the Svdtma-yoga-pradipabyYogiSvara (which had a commentary by Amarananda) and the Veddnta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-vdsistha and Gauda-p-.lda) by Varada Pandita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later than Prakasananda's Veddnta-siddhd7ita-?nuktavali, which followed the same line of thought.

were pupils of Sankarananda and Anubhavananda respectively; these in turn were both pupils of Anandatman. Sankarananda was the author of the Gita-tatparya-bodhini and of a number of commentaries on the various Upanisads, and also of a summary of the Upanisads, called Upanisad-ratna. Amalananda, however, had as teacher not only Anubhavananda, but also Sukhaprakasa Muni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of Gaudesvara Acarya (called also Jfianottama).

Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness.

One of the most important points of Sankara's criticism of Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave as the enjoyer of experiences and the controller of all thoughts and actions.

The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition, as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense-faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispensable for the purpose 1 . Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called skandhas. What one calls self (atmari) cannot be anything more than a mere apparent cognitional existence (prajnapti-sat) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had the apparent self been something as different from the psychological elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be regarded as an individual (pudgala) ; but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajnapti-sat) 2 . The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though

1 The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his Ahhidharma-kosa, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky's translation of the appendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniscaya, and Yasomitra's commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from VisvabharatI, Santini-ketan, Bengal.

2 yadi yatha rupddih sabddder bhdvdntaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyu-pogato bhavati bhinna-laksanam hi rupam sabddd ityddi kslradivat samudayas cet prajnaptitah. Abhidharma-kosa-vyakhyd, VisvabharatI MS. p. 337.

milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper combination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the psychological elements (skandha), though it may appear to have a separate and independent existence. The Vatslputriyas, however, think that the individual is something different from the skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from the nature of them. The Vatslputriyas deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala) as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the name "individual" (pudgala) is given to something conditioned by the skandhas at a given moment in a personal life 1 . Vasuban-dhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on mere vacuous space, they are of use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a determiner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled by accepting it 2 . The Vatslputriyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vatslputriyas meant that the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support 3 . What is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological elements are present, the pudgala is also present there 4 . But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual; for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the

1 Stcherbatsky's translation of the Pudgala-viniscaya, Bulletin de VAcademie des Sciences de Russie, p. 830.

The exact text of Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note,runs thus: grhita-pratyutpanndbhyantara-skandham updddya pudgala-prajnaptih. Ibid, p. 953.

2 Vdtsiputrlydndm tirthika-drstih prasajyate nisprayojanatvam ca

varsdta-pdbhydm kirn vyomnas carmany-asti tayoh phalam carmopamas cet sa nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah.

MS. of Yasomitra's commentary, p. 338.

3 dsraya-bhutah saha-bhutas ca. Ibid.

1 rupasydpi prajnaptir vaktavyd caksur-ddisu satsu tasyopalambhat, tdni cak-sur-ddlny updddya rupam prajiidpyate. Ibid.

existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced? For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense-datum : for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated psychological elements 1 . The Vatsiputriyas argue that, since the psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the individual 2 . But it is not so maintained; the sense-datum of sounds and colours is always regarded as being different from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and says "this is sound," "this is colour" and "this is individual 3 ." But the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound. The principle of difference or distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a colour is* different from a sound because it is experienced at a different moment, while the psychological elements and the individual are not experienced at different moments 4 . But it is argued in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither different nor identical (ratio essendi), so their cognition also is neither different nor identical in experience (ratio cognoscendi) 5 . But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then it might as well be taken in all cases wherever there is any conglomeration 6 . Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited

1 yathd rupadlny eva samastdnisamuditdni kstram iti udakam iti vd prajndpyate, tathd skandhds ca samastd pudgala iti prajfidpyate, iti siddham. MS. of Yaso-mitra's commentary, p. 339 A.

2 yathd rupam pudgalopalabdheh kdranam bhavati sa ca tebhyo 'nyo na vaktavyah dloka-caksur-manaskdrd api rupopalabdheh kdranam bhavati tad api tad-abhinna-svabhdvah pudgalah prdpnoti. Ibid. 3 Ibid. p. 339 B.

4 svalaksandd api ksandntaram any ad ity uddhdryam. Ibid.

5 yathd rupa-pudgalayor anydnanyatvam avaktavyam evam tadupalabdhyor api anydnanyatvam avaktavyam. Ibid.

8 yo 'yam siddhantah pudgala eva vaktavyah so 'yam bhidyate samskrtam api avaktavyam iti krtvd. Ibid.

to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon Buddha is supposed to say: "A visual consciousness depends upon the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced. It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such as a sentient being, a man, Manu's progeny, a son of Manu, a child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to them the expression is used 'he sees the object with his own eyes/ it is false imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are current as ' that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age.' These O brethren! accordingly are mere words, mere conventional designations.

' Expressions are they, (but not truth)! Real elements have no duration: Vitality makes them combine In mutually dependent apparitions 1 .'"

The Vatsiputriyas however refer to the Bhara-hara-sutra, in which Buddha is supposed to say: " O brethren, I shall explain unto you the burden (of life), and moreover I shall explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is....What is the burden? All the five aggregates of elements—the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden? The force of craving for a continuous life, accompanied by passionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion to it, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier? We must answer: it is the individual, i.e. 'this venerable man having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, who after a

1 Stcherbatsky's translation in Bulletin de VAcademie des Sciences de Russie.

life of such length will pass away having reached such an age 1 .'" But Vasubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is the momentary group of elements of the preceding moment that is designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding one the carrier of the burden (bhara-hdra) 2 .

The Vatslputriyas again argue that activity implies an active agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower who knows, just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta who walks. But Vasubandhu's reply to such a contention is that there is nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta: what we call Devadatta is but a conglomeration of elements. " The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved. Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the existence of material elements. We say matter 'is produced,' 'it exists'; but there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness (there is nothing that cognizes, apart from the evanescent flashing of consciousness itself) 3 ."

It is easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the Vedanta philosophy of the Sankara school is entirely different from this. The Vedanta holds that the fact of consciousness is entirely different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and it is only at a particular moment that the cognition of an object arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of conditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of

1 Stcherbatsky's translation.

2 Yasomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from the collection of the skandhas— bhdrdddnavan na skandhebhyo 'rthdntara-bhutah pudgala ity arthah. Abhidharma-kosa-vydkhyd, VisvabharatI MS.

3 Stcherbatsky's translation in Bulletin de VAcademic des Sciences de Russie, pp.938-939.

any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or characteristic is pure self-revelation. The so-called momentary flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the consciousness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy {aparoksatva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it. Consciousness (samvid) is one. It is neither identical with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as consciousness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness, as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal {pratyak) and constant (anuvrtta), while the latter are particular (apratyak) and alternating (vyavrtta). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of knowledge, but because of the changing association of consciousness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate existence and spheres of operation 1 . Consciousness is one and unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that

1 tatlva-darsT tu mtyam advitiyam vijiidnam vifayds ca tatrddhyastdh prthag-artha-kriyd-samarthds tefdm cabddhitam sthdyitvam astlti vadati. Vivarana-prameya-saTngraha, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893.

they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different awarenesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness successively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that qualitatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momentary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different consciousnesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (samvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedah), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the nonappearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it

presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous 1 . It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (pratyabhijna), which is self-evident.

It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis of the fact of recognition. They hold that perception reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception, whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as associated with the impressions (samskara) of previous experience, then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity of the self as " I am he "—for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts—"I" and "that"— and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as persisting through time. To this the Vedantic reply is that, though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness, yet the self as associated with the mind (antahkarana) can well have impressions (samskara), and so recognition is possible 2 . But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double role of knower and the known; for it is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together

1 Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 76.

2 kevale cidatmani janya-jnana-tat-samskdrayor asambhave 'py antahkarana-visiste tat-sambhavdd ukta-pratyabhijnd kim na sydt. Ibid. p. 76.

dii 5

play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions together with the self that form the content of recognition also— and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded as one. But in reply to this Vidyaranya Muni urges that all systems of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the body; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyaranya says that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time 1 . Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that, since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two moments; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to knowledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in accordance with the Prabhakara view, that the existence of the permanent "this self" is admitted merely on the strength of the recognizing notion of "self-identity"; for the self which abides through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment. Again, if it is argued that memory, such as "I had an awareness of a book," shows that the self was existing at the past time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of

1 antahkarana-visistatayazvatmanah pratyabhijndtrtvam purvapara-kdla-vi-sistataya ca pratyabhijiieyatvam. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 77.

two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition, which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as "I am he." It cannot be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition; for, when one remembers " I had an experience," that very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception, yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the perception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness, when remembered, expresses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that it also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self-revealed. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance 1 So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the Prabhakaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as " I am he," it has to be admitted that it is only through the process of recognition (pratyabhijna) that the persistence of the self is established. The main point that Vidyaranya Muni urges in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is that the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be explained by any assumption of two separate concepts, such as the memory of a past cognition or cognizer and the present awareness.

1 svayamprakasamanam hi samvedanam asrayam sddhayati na tu sntrti-visayatayd para-prakasyam. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 78.

5-2

We all feel that our selves are persisting through time and that I who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new pleasures to-day are identical; and the only theory by which this notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by supposing that the self exists'and persists through time. The Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly inadequate, as has already been shown. The perception of self-identity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a permanently existing self.

Again, the existence of self is not to be argued merely through the inference that cognition, will and feeling presuppose some entity to which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self; for, if that were the case, then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. For, if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition, will, etc., then how does one recognize one's own cognition of things as differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my experience from that of others? My self must be immediately perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself. So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all experience; without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all experience the difference between an experience as being my own and as belonging to others could not be explained. It may be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself, but only because, in self-consciousness, the self is an object of the cognizing operation (samvit-karma). But this is hardly valid; for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness, but also in itself in all cognitional operations. The self cannot be also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. It is not true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the book or at any different time from it. For it is true that the cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same point of time; for the same awareness cannot comprehend two different kinds of objects at the same time. If this was done at different points of time, then that would not explain our experience—"I have known this." For such a notion implies a relation between the knower and the known; and, if the knower and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points of time, there is nothing which could unite them together in the

same act of knowledge. It is also wrong to maintain that the self is manifested only as the upholder of ideas; for the self is manifested in the knowing operation itself. So, since the self cannot be regarded as being either the upholder or cognizer of ideas or their object, there is but one way in which it can be considered as self-manifesting or self-revealing (sva-prakasa). The immediacy of the self is thus its self-revealing and self-manifesting nature. The existence of self is thus proved by the self-luminous nature of the self. The self is the cognizer of the objects only in the sense that under certain conditions of the operation of the mind there is the mind-object contact through a particular sense, and, as the result thereof, these objects appear in consciousness by a strange illusion; so also ideas of the mind, concepts, volitions and emotions appear in consciousness and themselves appear as conscious states, as if consciousness was their natural and normal character, though in reality they are only illusorily imposed upon the consciousness— the self-luminous self.

Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya, from whom Vidyaranya often borrows his arguments, says that the self-luminosity of the self has to be admitted, because it cannot be determined as being manifested by anything else. The self cannot be regarded as being perceived by a mental perception (tnanasa pratyaksa); for that would involve the supposition that the self is the object of its own operation; for cognition is at any rate a function of the self. The functions of cognition belonging to the self cannot affect the self itself 1 . The Vedanta has also to fight against the Prabhakara view which regards cognition as manifesting the object and the self along with itself, as against its own view that it is the self which is identical with knowledge and which is self-manifesting. Anandabodha thus objects to the Prabhakara view, that it is the object-cognition which expresses both the self and the not-self, and holds that the self cannot be regarded as an object of awareness. Anandabodha points out that it may be enunciated as a universal proposition that what is manifested by cognition must necessarily be an object of cognition, and that therefore, if the self is not an object of cognition, it is not manifested by cognition 2 . Therefore the self or the cognizer is not manifested by cognition; for, like

1 tatha sati svadhara-vijiidna-vrtti-vydpyatvad dtmanah karmotve sviitmani vrtti-virodhad itibrumah. Nydya-makaranda, p. 131.

2 Ibid. pp. 134-135.

cognition, it is self-manifested and immediate without being an object of cognition 1 .

The self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Anandabodha. He says that, if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself, though it manifests its objects, it may be replied that, if it were so, then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If anyone is asked whether he has seen a certain person or not, he is sure about his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it. It is therefore certain that, when an object is revealed by any cognition, the cognition is itself revealed as well. If it is argued that such a cognition is revealed by some other cognition, then it might require some other cognition and that another and so on ad infinitum) and thus there is a vicious infinite. Nor can it be held that there is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized. For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different awarenesses of the type discussed. If at a later moment, then, there is mind-activity, cessation of one mind-contact, and again another mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact, that would imply many intervening moments, and thus the cognition which is supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at a much later moment, when the awareness which it has to reveal is already passed. It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself self-luminous and that, while manifesting other objects, it manifests itself also. The objection raised is that the self or the cognition cannot affect itself by its own functioning (vrtti) ; the reply is that cognition is like light and has no intervening operation by which it affects itself or its objects. Just as light removes darkness, helps the operation of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other light, so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects, and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself. This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary flashes, on the ground that, when there is the blue awareness, there is not the yellow awareness; for apart from the blue awareness, the

1 samvedita na samvid-adhlna-prakdsah samvit-karmatam antarena aparok-satvdt samvedanavat. Nyaya-makaranda, p. 135. This argument is borrowed verbatim by Vidyaranya in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 85.

yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural basic awareness or consciousness, which cannot be denied. It would be wrong to say that there are only the particular awarenesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment; for, had there been only a series of particular awarenesses, then there would be nothing by which their differences could be realized. Each awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite character, and, as it passed away, would give place to another, and that again to another, so that there would be no way of distinguishing one awareness from another; for according to the theory under discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses, and thus there would be no way by which their differences could be noticed; for, even though the object of awareness, such as blue and yellow, differed amongst themselves, that would fail to explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow awareness could be apprehended. So the best would be to admit the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness.

It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedanta had to refute three opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent and not momentary. The first opponent was the Buddhist, who believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any pure permanent consciousness. The Buddhist objection that there was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedanta by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity—which could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition of two separate notions of a past "that self" and the present "I am." Nor can consciousness be regarded as being nothing more than a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses; for on such a theory it would be impossible to explain how we can react upon our mental states and note their differences. Consciousness has thus to be admitted as permanent. Against the second opponent, the Naiyayika, the Vedanta urges that the self is not the inferred object to which awarenesses, volitions or feelings belong, but is directly and immediately intuited. For, had it not been so, how could one distinguish his own experiences as his own and as different from those of others? The internalness of my own experiences shows that they are directly intuited as my own, and not merely supposed as belonging to some self who was the possessor of his experiences. For inference cannot reveal the

-]z The Sankara School of Veddnta [ch.

internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent, the Mlmamsaka, the Vedanta urges that the self-revealing character belongs to the self which is identical with thought—as against the Mlmamsa view, that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed the self and the objects as different from it. The identity of the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also urged; and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left to us.

This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal, unlimited and infinite. In order to make it possible that this one self should appear as many individuals and as God, it is supposed that it manifests itself differently through the veil of maya. Thus, according to the Siddhanta-lesa, it is said in the Prakatartha-vivarana that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the beginningless, indescribable maya, it is called Isvara or God. But, when it is reflected through the limited parts of maya containing powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called avidya), there are the manifestations of individual souls or jivas. It is again said in the Tattva-viveka of Nrsimhasrama that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the pure sattva qualities, as dominating over other impure parts of prakrti, there is the manifestation of God. Whereas, when the pure consciousness is reflected through the impure parts of rajas and tamas, as dominating over the sattva part of prakrti (called also avidya), there are the manifestations of the individual selves or jivas. The same prakrti in its two aspects, as predominating in sattva and as predominating in rajas and tamas, goes by the name of maya and avidya and forms the conditioning factors (upadhi) of the pure consciousness, which on account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of maya and avidya appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant individual souls. Sarvajnatma Muni thinks that, when the pure consciousness is reflected through avidya, it is called Isvara, and, when it is reflected through mind (antahkarana), it is called jlva.

These various methods of accounting for the origin of individual selves and God have but little philosophical significance. But they go to show that the principal interest of the Vedanta lies in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and unattached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which

can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all our conscious experiences. All that is limited, be it an individual self or an individual object of awareness, is in some sense or other an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious principle on the principle of consciousness. The Vedanta is both unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the world-process in all its details, in which philosophy and science are equally interested. Its only interest is to prove that the world-process presupposes the existence of a principle of pure consciousness which is absolutely and ultimately real, as it is immediate and intuitive. Reality means what is not determined by anything else; and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality—and all else is indescribable—neither real nor unreal; and the Vedanta is not interested to discover what may be its nature.

Vedantic Cosmology.

From what has been said above it is evident that maya (also called avidya or ajnana) is in itself an indefinable mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence, but also an ontological existence as well. It is this ajnana which on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real), and on the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective universe. This ajnana has two powers, the power of veiling or covering (avarana) and the power of creation (viksepa). The power of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature, cover up the infinite, unchangeable self by veiling its self-luminosity as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoyments and functioning as individual selves 1 . It is through this covering power of ajnana that the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of

1 vastuto 'jndnasydtmdchddakatvdbhdve 'pipramdtr-buddhimdtrdchddakatvena ajndnasydtmdchddakatvam upacdrdd ucyate. Subodhinl on Veddnta-sdra, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1916.

rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden self the manifold world-appearance. As the ajnana is supposed to veil by its veiling power (avarana-sakti) only the self-cognizing and self-revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world-appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure consciousness, veiled as it is by ajnana with its two powers, can be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta), when its nature as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world-appearance is emphasized; it can be regarded as the material cause, when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the ajnana. It is like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers (viksepa-sakti) of ajnana are characterized as being threefold, after the manner of Samkhya prakrti, as sattva, rajas and tamas. With the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative power of ajnana predominating in tamas y space (akasa) is first produced; from akasa comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded state that in the Samkhya and the Puranas are called tan-matras. It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the subtle bodies 1 . The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts,

1 As to how the subtle elements are combined for the production of grosser elements there are two different theories, viz. the trivrt-karana and the paiicl-karana. The trivrt-karana means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements) are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two halves, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements. Vacaspati and Amalananda prefer trivrt-karana to panct-karana; for they think that there is no point in admitting that air and akasa have also parts of other elements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of trivrt-karana and not of pahci-karana. The paiicl-karana theory holds that the five subtle elements are divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle element is combined with the one-fourth of each half of all the other elements excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the Veddnta-paribhdfd and its Sikhamani commentary, p. 363.

excluding the subtle elements, and are called suksma-sarlra or linga-sarira. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five vdyus or biomotor activities, buddhi (intellect) and manas, together with the five subtle elements in tanmatric forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the sattva parts of the five elements, dkdsa, vayu, agni, ap and prthivl respectively. Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state of determination or affirmation {niscaydtmika antahkarana-vrtti). Manas means the two mental functions of vikalpa and sankalpa or of sankalpa alone resulting in doubt 1 . The function of mind (citta) and the function of egoism (ahamkdra) are included in buddhi and manas 2 . They are all produced from the sattva parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the compounded sattva parts of all the elements, they have the revealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. Buddhi with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge (vijndnamaya-kosa). Manas with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of manas (manomaya-kosa). It is the self as associated with the vijndnamaya-kosa that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy or unhappy, the individual self (jiva) that passes through worldly experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from the rajas parts of the five elements. The five vdyus or biomotor activities are called Prdna or the breathing activity, Uddna or the upward activity and Samdna or the digestive activity. There are some who add another five vdyus such as the Naga, the vomiting Apdna troydnes activity, Kurma, the reflex activity of opening the eyelids, Krkala, the activity of coughing, Devadatta, the activity of yawning, and Dhananjaya, the nourishing activity. These pranas

1 The Vedanta-sara speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa, and this is explained by the Subodhini as meaning doubt. See Vedanta-sara and Subodhini, p. 17. The Vedanta-paribhasa and its commentators speak of sankalpa as being the only unction of manas, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 a nd 358.

2 smaranakara-vrttimad antahkaranam cittam (Veddnta-paribhdsd-Mani-prabhd, p. 89). anayor eva cittahamkarayor antarbhavah {Vedanta-sara, p. 17). But the Vedanta-paribhasa says that manas, buddhi, ahamkdra and citta, all four, constitute the inner organ (antahkarana). See Vedanta-paribhasa, p. 88. The Vedanta-sara however does not count four functions buddhi, manas, citta, ahamkdra; citta and ahamkara are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas. Thus according to the Vedanta-sara there are only two categories. Eut since the Vedanta-paribhasa only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between it and the Vedanta-sara.

together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prana (prdnamaya-kosa). Of these three sheaths, the vijnanamaya, mano-maya and pranamaya, the vijnanamaya sheath plays the part of the active agent (kartr-rilpah) ; the manomaya is the source of all desires and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrumental function; the pranamaya sheath represents the motor functions. These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the suksma-sarira. Hiranyagarbha (also called Sutrdtmd or prana) is the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the subconscious impressions from which our conscious experience is derived, are therefore called a dream {jSgrad-vdsanamayatvdt svapna).

The process of the formation of the gross elements from the subtle parts of the elements is technically called pancikarana. It consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of compounding that each element possesses some of the properties of the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper worlds (Bhuh, Bhuvah, Svar, Mahar,Janah, Tapah and Satyam), seven lower worlds (Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasdtala, Taldtala, Mahdtala and Pdtdla) and all the gross bodies of all living beings. There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virat. There is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Visva.

The ajhdna as constituting antahkarana or mind, involving the operative functions of buddhi and matins, is always associated with the self; it is by the difference of these antahkaranas that one self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states of these antahkaranas that the veil over the self and the objects are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects. The antahkarana is situated within the body, which it thoroughly pervades. It is made up of the sattva parts of the five rudimentary elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body, another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole.

The interior part of the antahkarana is the ego or the agent. The intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also vrtti-jndna. The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of the sense-objects, has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. The antahkarana of three parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three different parts of the antahkarana in three different ways, as the cognizer {prama.tr), cognitive operation (pramana) and the cognition, or the percept (pramiti). In each of the three cases the reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself through the three different modifications of the antahkarana. The sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness, brahman, as forming their substance. The difference between the individual consciousness (jiva-caitanya) and the brahman-consciousness (brahma-caitanya) is that the former represents pure consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the antahkarana, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of maya are made. The covering of avidyd, for the breaking of which the operation of the antahkarana is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by "I do not know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge, perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular cognition arises 1 .

Sankara and his School.

It is difficult to say exactly how T many books were written by Sankara himself. There is little doubt that quite a number of books attributed to Sankara were not written by him. I give here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine works, though it is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain.

1 See Madhusudana Sarasvati's Siddhanta-bindu, pp. 132-150; and Brah-mananda Sarasvati's Nydya-ratnavali, pp. 132-150, SrlvidyS Press, Kumba-konam, 1893.

j8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [ch.

I have chosen only those works which have been commented on by other writers, since this shows that these have the strength of tradition behind them to support their authenticity. The most important works of Sankara are his commentaries on the ten Upanisads, Isd, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, Mdndukya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Chdndogya and Brhad-aranyaka and the Sariraka-mimamsa-bhasya. The main reasons why a number of works which probably were not written by him were attributed to him seem to be twofold; first, because there was another writer of the same name, i.e. Sankaracarya, and second, the tendency of Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing them to great writers of the past. The attribution of all the Puranas to Vyasa illustrates this very clearly. Sankara's Isopanisad-bhasya has one commentary by Anandajnana and another, Dipika, by the other Sankara Acarya. His Kenopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, Kenopanisad-bhasya-vivarana and a commentary by Anandajnana. The Kathakopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and by Balagopala Yoglndra. The Prasnopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Narayanendra Sarasvatl. The Miindakopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvatl. The Mandukyopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and Mathuranatha Sukla, and a summary, called Mandukyopanisad-bhasyartha-samgraha, by Raghavananda. The Aitareyopanisad-bhasya has six commentaries, by Anandajnana, Abhinavanarayana, Nrsimha Acarya, Balakrsnadasa, Jnanamrta Yati, and Visvesvara Tlrtha. The Taittiriyopanisad-bhasya seems to have only one commentary on it, by Anandajnana. The Chandogyopanisadhas two commentaries, called Bhasya-tippana, and a commentary by Anandajnana. The Brhad-aranyakopanisad-bhasya has a commentary by Anandajnana and a big independent work on it by Suresvara, called Brhad-aranyakopanisad-bhasya-varttika, or simply Varttika, which has also a number of commentaries; these have been noticed in the section on Suresvara. His Aparoksanubhava has four commentaries, by Sankara Acarya, by Balagopala, by Candesvara Varman {Anubhava-dipika), and by Vidyaranya. His commentary on Gauda-pada's Mandukya-karika, called Gaudapadiya-bhasya or Agama-sastra-vwarana, has two commentaries, one by Suddhananda and orie by Anandajnana. His Atma-jndnopadesa has two commentaries, by Anandajnana and by Purnananda Tlrtha; the Eka-sloka has a

xij Sankara and his School

79

commentary called Tattva-dipana, by Svayamprakasa Yati; no commentary however is attributed to the Viveka-cudamani, which seems to be genuinely attributed to Sankara; the Atma-bodha has at least five commentaries, by Advayananda, Bhasurananda, Bodhendra (Bhava-prakdsika), Madhusudana Sarasvatland RamanandaTlrtha; The Atmandtma-viveka has at least four commentaries, by Padma-pada, Purnananda Tirtha, Say ana and Svayamprakasa Yati. The Atmopadesa-vidhi is said to have a commentary by Anandajnana; the Ananda-lahari has about twenty-four commentaries, by Appaya Dlksita, Kaviraja, Krsna Acarya (Manju-bhdsini), Kesava-bhatta, Kaivalyasrama {Saubhagya-vardhinl), Gangahari (Tattva-dipika), Gangadhara, Goplrama, Goplkanta Sarvabhauma(Ananda-laharl-tari), Jagadlsa?, Jagannatha Pancanana, Narasimha, Brahma-nanda (Bhdvartha-dipika), Malla Bhatta, Mahadeva Vidyavaglsa, Mahadeva Vaidya, Ramacandra, Ramabhadra, Ramananda Tirtha, Laksmldhara Desika and Visvambhara and Srlkantha Bhatta and another called Vidvan-manorama. The Upadesa-sahasrl has at least four commentaries, by Anandajnana, by Rama Tirtha {Pada-yojanika), Bodha-vidhi by a pupil of Vidyadhaman, and by Sahkara-carya. His Cid-ananda-stava-raja, called also Cid-ananda-dasasloki or simply Dasa-sloki, has also a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, such as the Siddhanta-taltva-bindu by Madhusudana Sarasvatl; Madhusudana's commentary was commented on by a number of persons, such as Narayana Yati {Laghu-tika), Purusottama Sarasvatl (Siddhanta-bindu-sandipana), Purnananda Sarasvatl (Tattva-viveka), Gauda Brahmananda Sarasvatl (Sid-dhanta-bindii-fiydya-ratnavali), by Saccidananda and Sivalala Sar-man. Gauda Brahmananda's commentary, Siddhanta-bindu-nyaya-ratndvali, was further commented on by Krsnakanta (Siddhdnta-nydya-ratna-pradipika). Sankara's Drg-drsya-prakarana was commented on by Ramacandra Tirtha; his Panakarana-prakriyd has again a number of commentaries—that by Suresvara is Pancl-karana-vdrttika, and this has a further commentary, called Panci-karana-vdrttikdbharana, by Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvatl, pupil of Jnanendra Sarasvatl. Other commentaries on the Panakarana-prakriyd are Pancikarana-bhdva-prakdsikd, Pandkarana-tika-tattva-candrikd, Pancikarana-tdtparya-candrikd and Pancikarana-vivarana by Anandajnana, Pancikarana-vivarana by Svayamprakasa Yati and by Prajnanananda, and a sub-commentary called Tattva-candrikd. Sankara also commented on the Bhagavad-

gita\ this commentary has been examined in the chapter on the Bhagavad-gita in the present volume. His Laghu-vakya-vrtti has a commentary called Puspanjali y and another, called Laghu-vakya-vrtti-prakasikd, by Ramananda SarasvatI; his Vakya-vrtti has a commentary by Anandajnana, and another commentary, called Vakya-vrtti-prakdh'kd, by Visvesvara Pandita. He starts his Vakya-vrtti in the same manner as Isvarakrsna starts his Samkhya-karika, namely by stating that, suffering from the threefold sorrows of life, the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding the ways in which he may be liberated from them. Suresvara in his Naiskarmya-siddhi also starts in the same manner and thus gives a practical turn to the study of philosophy, a procedure which one does not find in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya. The answer, of course, is the same as that given in so many other places, that one is liberated only by the proper realization of the Upanisad texts that declare the unity of the self with Brahman. He then goes on to show that all external things and all that is called mind or mental or psychical is extraneous to self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness; he also declares here that the effects of one's deeds are disposed by God (Isvara), the superior illusory form of Brahman, and not by the mysterious power of apurva admitted by the Mlmamsists. He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the fact that, though the unity texts (advaita-sruti) of the Upanisads, such as " that (Brahman) art thou," may have a verbal construction that implies some kind of duality, yet their main force is in the direct and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intellectual process as implied by relations of identity. The Vakya-vrtti is thus conceived differently from the Aparoksanubhuti, where yoga processes of posture and breath-regulations are described, as being helpful for the realization of the true nature of self. This may, of course, give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of the Aparoksanubhuti, though it may be explained as being due to the different stages of the development of Sankara's own mind; divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing idealism in his commentary on Gaudapada's Karika, where the waking life is regarded as being exactly the same as dream life, and external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever, being absolutely like dream-perceptions—as contrasted with his Sdriraka-mimamsd-bhasya, where external objects are considered to have an indescribable existence, very different from dream-

creations. The Upadesa-sahasri, which in its nineteen chapters contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas, is more in a line with the Vakya-vrtti, and, though the well-known Vedanta topics are all slightly touched upon, greater emphasis is laid on the proper realization of the Vedantic unity texts, such as "that art thou," as means to the attainment of Brahmahood. There are also a number of short poems and hymns attributed to Sankaracarya, such as the Advaitanubhuti, Atma-bodha, Tattvopadesa, Praudhdnubhuti, etc., some of which are undoubtedly his, while there are many others which may not be so; but in the absence of further evidence it is difficult to come to any decisive conclusion 1 . These hymns do not contain any additional philosophical materials, but are intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour of the monistic faith. In some cases, however, the commentators have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedantic doctrines which cannot be said to follow directly from them. As an illustration of this, it may be pointed out that out of the ten slokas of Sankara Madhusiidana made a big commentary, and Brahmananda SarasvatI wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusiidana and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedanta which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves. But Sankara's most important work is the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya y which was commented on by Vacaspati Misra in the ninth century > Anandajfiana in the thirteenth, and Govindananda in the fourteenth century. Commentaries on Vacaspati's commentary will be noticed in the section on Vacaspati Misra. Subrahmanya wrote a verse summary of Sankara's commentary which he calls Bhasyartha-nydya-mdld; and BharatI Tlrtha wrote also the Vaiydsika-nydya-mala, in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara's commentary. Many other persons, such as Vaidyanatha Diksita, Devarama Bhatta, etc., also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara's commentary, called Nyaya-mala or Adhikarana-maid. But many other persons were inspired by Sankara's commentary (or by the commentaries of Vacaspati Misra and other great writers of the Sankara school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra merely repeated what was contained in these. Thus

1 The Atma-bodJw. was commented upon by Padmapada in his commentary Atma-bodha-vyakhyana, called also Vedanta-sara.

Amalananda wrote his £astra-darpana imitating the main lines of Vacaspati's commentary on Sankara's commentary; and Svayam-prakasa also wrote his Vedanta-naya-bhusana, in which for the most part he summarized the views of Vacaspati's Bhamati commentary. Hari Diksita wrote his Brahma-sutra-vrtti, Sankarananda his Brahma-sutra-dipika and Brahmananda his Vedanta-sutra-mukta-vali as independent interpretations of the Brahma-sutra, but these were all written mainly on the lines of Sankara's own commentary, supplementing it with additional Vedantic ideas that had been developed after Sankara by the philosophers of his school of thought or explaining Sankara's Bhasya 1 .

Mandana, Suresvara and Visvarupa.

General tradition has always identified Mandana with Suresvara and Visvarupa; and Col. G. A. Jacob in his introduction to the second edition of the Naiskarmya-siddhi seems willing to believe this tradition. The tradition probably started from Vidyaranya's Sankara-dig-vijaya, where Mandana is spoken of as being named not only Umbeka, but also Visvarupa (vm. 63). He further says in x. 4 of the same work that, when Mandana became a follower of Sankara, he received from him the name Suresvara. But the Sankara-dig-vijaya is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Suresvara was

1 Some of these commentaries are: Brahma-siitra-bhdsydrtha-samgraha by Brahmananda Yati, pupil of Visvesvarananda, Brahma-sutrdrtha-dlpikd by Verikata, son of Gaurl and Siva, Brahma-sutra-vrtti (called also Mitdksard) by Annam Bhatta, and Brahma-sutra-bhasya-vydkhya (called also Vidyd-srl) by Jftanottama Bhattaraka, pupil of Jnanaghana. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jiva-vada line that the present writer could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned, such as Brahma-sutra-vrtti by Dharma Bhatta, pupil of Ramacandrarya and pupil's pupil of Mukundasrama, Sutra-bhdsya-vydkhydna (called also Brahma-vidyd-bharana) by Advaitananda, pupil of Ramananda and pupil's pupil of Brahmananda, Brahma-sutra-bhasya-vydkhya (called also Nydya-raksd-mani) by Appaya Diksita, Brahma-tattva-prakdsikd (which is different from an earlier treatise called Brahma-prakdsika) by Sadasivendra SarasvatI, Brahma-sutro-panydsa by Ramesvara BharatI, by a pupil of Ramananda, Sdrlraka-mlmdmsd-sutra-siddhdnta-kaumudi by Subrahmanya Agnicin Makhlndra, Veddnta-kaustu-bha by Sitarama; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. But Ananyanubhava, the teacher of Prakasatman (a.d. 1200), seems to have written another commentary, called Sdriraka-nydya-mammald. Prakasatman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Sankara's Bhasya called Sdriraka-mlmdmsd-nydya-samgraha, and Krsnanubhuti, in much later times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called Safiraka-mlmdmsd-samgraha.

the author of a Varttika, or commentary in verse, on Sankara's Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad (which was also summarized by Vidya-ranya in a work called Varttika-sara, which latter was further commented on by Mahesvara Tlrtha in his commentary, called the Laghu-samgraha). The Varttika of Suresvara was commented on by at least two commentators, Anandagiri in his Sastra-prakasika and Anandapurna in his Nyaya-kalpa-latika. In a commentary on the Parasara-smrti published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a quotation from this Varttika is attributed to Visvarupa; but this commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on Vidyaranya's testimony that Visvarupa and Suresvara were identically the same person. Vidyaranya also, in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, p. 92, quotes a passage from Suresvara's Varttika (iv. 8), attributing it to Visvarupa. But in another passage of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha (p. 224) he refers to a Vedanta doctrine, attributing it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. But the work has not yet been published, and its manuscripts are very scarce: the present writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work, and it was commented on by Vacaspati in his Tattva-samiksa, by Anandapurna in his Brahma-siddhi-vyakhya-ratna, by Sankhapani in his Brahma-siddhi-tika, and by Citsukha in his Abhipraya-prakasika. But only the latter two works are available in manuscripts. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi (Brahma-siddhi-kara). But in none of these references, so far as it is known to the present writer, has the author of Brahma-siddhi been referred to as Suresvara. The Brahma-siddhi was written in verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha's Tattva-pradipika (p. 381, Nirnaya-Sagara Press) and Nyaya-kanika (p. 80) are in verse, while there are other references, such as Tattva-pradlpika (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is, however, little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by Mandana or Mandana Misra; for both Sridhara in his Nyaya-kandali (p. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradipika (p. 140) refer to Mandana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Of these the evidence of Sridhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century, ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Mandana; whoever Mandana may have been,

since he lived after Sankara (a.d. 820), he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is, therefore, definitely known that the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Vdrttika were written by SuresVara, and the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana. The question regarding the identity of these two persons may be settled, if the views or opinions of the Brahma-stddhi can be compared or contrasted with the views of the Naiskarmya-siddhi or the Varttika. From the few quotations that can be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions 1 .

Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the Brahma-siddhi in the Vwarana-prameya-samgraha (p. 224). It is said there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the individual persons (jivdh, in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (svdvidyaya) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with the mdyd, or as reflection in mdyd, is Brahman the cause of the world (Brahma na jagat-karanam). The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance, and individual false experiences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illusions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance; this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons. Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive experiences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience is not the same (samvddas tu bahu-purusavagata-dvitiya-candravat sddrsydd upapadyate). If this account is correct, as may well be supposed, then Mandana Misra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedantic doctrine of drsti-srsti-vdda, which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakasananda. Again, in Prakasatman's Panca-padikd-vivarana (p. 32), it is held that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi both mdyd and avidyd are nothing but false experiences {avidya mdyd mithyd-pratyaya iti). About the function

1 A copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents, I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvami Sastrl, and I consulted the tarka-pada of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof, isastrl in Madras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of Mandana's Brahma-siddhi.

of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the Nydya-kandali, p. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the Nyaya-kanika (p. 80) it is said that Mandana held that reality manifests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality, whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again, in the Laghu-candrikd (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) Mandana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmahood. According to Sarikara, as interpreted by many of his followers, including Suresvara, the dissolution of ignorance {avidya-nivrtti) is not a negation, since negation as a separate category has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brahman. But according to Mandana there is no harm in admitting the existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance; for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (bhdvadvaita). The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajnatma Muni in his Samksepa-sariraka (11.174) says that ignorance (avidyd) is supported (asraya) in pure consciousness (cin-matrasrita-visayam ajndnatri),and that, even where from the context of Sankara's Bhdsya it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jiva) as being the support of ajnana, it has to be interpreted in this sense. Objections of Mandana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration; for Mandana's views lead to quite different conclusions (parihrtya Mandana-vacah taddhy anyathdprasthitam) 1 . The commentator of the Samksepa-sariraka, Ramatlrtha Svamin, also, in commenting on the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of Mandana with that of Suresvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective bahu-sruta in the Samksepa-sariraka text, and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajnatma Muni, as against the views of Mandana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Mandana are not shared by Suresvara, as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not therefore appear that Mandana Misra and Suresvara were the same

1 Mr Hiriyanna, inJ.R.A.S. 1923, mentions this point as well as the point concerning avidya-nivrtti in Mandana's view as admission of negation.

person. But, if Vidyaranya, who knows so much about the views of Mandana, had identified them in the £ankara-dig-vijaya, that might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyanna seems to have removed this difficulty for us by his short note in J.R.A.S. 1924, where he points out that Vidyaranya in his Varttika-sara refers to the author of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of the Varttika, viz. Suresvara. Now, if Vidyaranya, the author of the Varttika-sara, knew that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, he could not have identified them in his Sankara-dig-vijaya. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyaranya who was the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and the Varttika-sara was not the same Vidyaranya as the author of &ankara-dig-vijaya. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyaranya (the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha) could not have written the Sankara-dig-vijaya. Anandatman had two disciples, Anubhavananda and Sarikara-nanda. Anubhavananda had as his disciple Amalananda, and Sarikarananda had Vidyaranya as his disciple. So Amalananda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyaranya. Now Amalananda had another teacher in Sukhaprakasa, who had Citsukha as his teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the grand teacher (parama-guru), Anandatman, of Vidyaranya. If this was the case, he could not have written in his Sankara-dig-vijaya (xiii. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapada, was a disciple of Padmapada. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the Sankara-dig-vijaya was not the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. Now, if this is so, our reliance on the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha a passage from the Varttika of Suresvara (iv. 8) is attributed to Visvarupa Acarya. It may therefore be concluded that Mandana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, unless we suppose that Mandana was not only a Mimamsa writer, but also a Vedanta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Sankara meant only that he changed some of his Vedantic views and accepted those of Sankara, and it was at this stage that he was called Suresvara. On this theory his Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to Sankara's views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct, and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the

Brahtna-siddhi; for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by Vacaspati in his Nyaya-kanika is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. It may also be concluded that in all probability VisvarQpa was the same person as Suresvara, though on this subject no references of value are known to the present writer other than by the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha.

Mandana (a.d. 800).

Mandana Misra's Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of Sari-khapani is available in manuscript, and Mahamahopadhyaya Kup-pusvami Sastrl of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastrl the present writer had an opportunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Sankhapani's commentary 1 . The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters, Brahma-kanda, Tarka-kanda, Niyoga-kanda, and Siddhi-kanda, in the form of verses (karikd) and long annotations (vrtti). That Mandana must have been a contemporary of Sankara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Sankara, such as Sahara, Kumarila or Vyasa, the author of the Yoga-sutra-bhasya, and makes profuse references to the Upanisad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Sarikara 2 . Vacaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva-samiksa, on Mandana's Brahma-siddhi; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been

1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jnanottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Anandapurna also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi, called Bhdva-suddiii.

2 Mandana's other works are Bhdvand-viveka, Vidhi-viveka, Vibhrama-viveka and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati Misra in his Nyaya-kanika, and the Sphota-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadasa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-vibhdvand, on Vacaspati Misra's Tattva-bindu. The commentary on the Sphota-siddhi is called Gopdlika. Mandana's Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the discussion of the four theories of illusion (khydti),dtma-khydti, asat-khydti, anyathd-khydti and akhydti. Up till now only his Bhavand-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published.

discovered. In the Brahma-kanda chapter Mandana discusses the nature of Brahman; in the Tarka-kanda he tries to prove that we cannot perceive "difference" through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upanisad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kanda, he tries to refute the Mlmamsa view that the Upanisad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mlmamsa principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter, the Siddhi-kanda y is the shortest: Mandana says here that the Upanisad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidya oijlva.

In the Brahma-kanda the most important Vedantic concepts are explained by Mandana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (drastr) and the object (drsya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality 1 . Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antahkarana); but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure unchangeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antahkarana, then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate

1 ekatva evdyam dra$tr-drsya-bhavo 'vakalpate, dra$tur eva cid-atmanah tatha tatha viparindmad vivartandd vd; ndndtve tu vivtkta-svabhdvayor asamsrsta-paraspara-svarupayar asambaddhayoh kldrso drastr-drsya-bhdvah. Kuppusvami Sastrl's edition of Brahma-siddhi, p. 7. (In the press.)

and independent existence from the self 1 . Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit) ; for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two 2 .

According to Mandana avidya is called maya, or false appearance, because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhava) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidya; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience {na vyavahara-bijam) such as avidya has; it has thus to be admitted that avidya is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacaniya) 3 .

According to Mandana avidya belongs to the individual souls (jlva). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, avidya being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with jlva should also be incon-

1 ekdntahkarana-samkrantav asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, citeh suddhatvdd aparindmad aprati-samkramdc ca; driya buddhih citi-sannidhei chdyaya vivartata iti ced at ha keyam tac chdyatd? a-tad-atmanah tad-avabhasah; na tarhiparamdrthato dfsyarn drsyate, paramdrthatas ca drsyamdnam drastr-vyatiriktam asti iti dur-bhanam. Ibid. Jsankhapani in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antahkarana or durbhanam and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified: na tu sphatikopame cetasi indriya-pranali-samkrdntdndm arthandm tatraiva samkrantena atma-caitanyena sambaddhdndm tad-drsyatvam ghatisyate. Adyar MS. p. 75.

It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapada, Prakasatman, as developed later on by Dharmarajadhvarlndra, which held that the mind {antahkarana) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Samkhya doctrine of cic-chayapatti in perception, which was somehow forced into Sankara's loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Mandana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Sahkara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary interpretation of Padmapada. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit).

2 tathd hi darpana-tala-stham dtmdnam vibhaktam ivdtmanah pratyeti; cites tu vibhaktam asamsrstam tayd cetyata iti dur-avagamyam. Ibid.

8 Ibid. p. 9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Anandabodha's argument in his Nydya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidya, which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Mandana.

sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidya with the jlvas arises as follows: the jlvas are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jlvas is due to imagination {kalpana) ; but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasya vidyatmanah kal-pana-sunyatvat) ; it cannot be the imagination of the jlvas, since the jlvas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination 1 . Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word maya implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not maya 2 . Secondly, it may be said that from avidya come the jlvas and from the jlvas comes the avidya, and that this cycle is begin-ningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the jlvas or of the avidya 3 . This view is held by those who think that avidya is not the material cause of the world: these are technically called avidyopadana-bheda-vadins. It is through this avidya that the jlvas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidya is natural to the jlvas, since the jlvas themselves are the products of avidya*. And it is through listening to the Vedantic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the avidya is destroyed; it was through this avidya that the jlvas were separated from Brahman ; with its destruction they attain Brahma-hood 5 .

In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Sankhapani the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition 6 . He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously

1 itaretarasraya prasangdt kalpanddhmo hi

jiva vibhdgah, jlvdsrayd kalpana. Ibid. p. 10.

2 anupapadyamdndrthaiva hi maya; upapadyamdndrthatve yathartha-bhavan na maya sydt. Ibid.

3 anddhvdn netaretardsrayatva-dosah. Ibid.

1 na hi jlvesu nisarga-jd vidydsti, avidyaiva hi naisargikl, dgantukyd vidydydh pravilayah. Ibid. pp. 11-12.

5 avidyayaiva tit brahmano jivo vibhaktah, tan-nivrttau brahma-svarupam eva bhavati, vathd ghatddi-bhede tad-dkdsam parisuddham paramakasam eva bhavati. Ibid.

6 duhkha nivrttir vd tad-visist.dtmopalabdhir vd sukham astu, sarvatha sukham noma na dharmdntaram asti. Adyar MS. of the Sankhapani commentary, p. 18.

and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simultaneously {sukha-duhkhe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure 1 . Sankhapani then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (vtsaya-prdptim vina kama eva duhkham atah tan-nivrttir eva sukham bhavisyati) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them 2 . An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition 3 . Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Sankhapani points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated 4 . If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness 5 . So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an

1 Ibid. pp. 20, 21. z Ibid. p. 22.

3 sahajo hi ragah sarva-pumsdm asti sa tu visaya-visesena dvir-bhavati. Ibid. P- 23.

* atah kama-nivrtteh prag-bhavi sukhu-vastu-bhutam estavyam. Ibid. p. 27. 5 Ibid. p. 25.

experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss 1 .

Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra and in his commentaries on some of the Upanisads and the Mandukya-karika had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Sriharsa, Anandajfiana and Citsukha, of the Sankara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Sankara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Sankara school, Anandabodha, Sriharsa, Anandajfiana, Citsukha, Nrsimhasrama and others, was Mandana. Mandana's great dialectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kanda chapter of his Brahma-siddhi.

The argument arose as follows: the category of difference {bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upanisad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of "difference." Against such a view-point Mandana undertakes to prove that "difference," whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (pratyaksa) 2 . He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz. (i) that it manifests a positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects, (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects 3 . In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object 4 . If by perception differences

1 yadi duhkha-bhavah sukham syat tatah syad evam bhavantare tu sukhe duhkhabhave ca tatha syad eva. Ibid. p. 161.

2 This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter.

8 tatra pratyakse trayah kalpah, vastu-svarupa-siddhih vastv-antarasya vya-vacchedah ubhayam va. Brahma-siddhi, 11.

4 ubhayasminn api traividhyam, yattgapadyam, vyavaccheda-purvako vidhih, vidhi-piirvako vyavacchedah. Ibid.

from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that " difference " is presented in perception; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any presentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upanisads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument.

Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be interpreted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea 1 . If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two 2 . In the case of the discovery of one's own illusion, such as "this is not silver, but conch-shell," only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was

1 kutascin nimiltad buddhau labdha-rupdnam bahir ni§edhah kriyate.

Brahma-siddhi, II.

2 kramah satngacchate yuktya naika-vijndna-karmanoh

na sannihita-jatti tac ca tadanyamarsi jayate. Ibid. II. Karika 3.

only when the presented object was perceived as "this before" that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch-shell. There is no negative concept without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept 1 . This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences 2 .

Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anya-vyavacchedahf. Against such a view Mandana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities.

There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva bhinna bhavah), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as

1 purva-vijndna-vihite rajatddau "idam " iti ca sannihitdrtha-samanye nisedho vidhi-purva eva, suktikd-siddhis tu virodhi-nisedha-purva ucyate; vidhi-purvatd ca niyamena nisedhasyocyate, na vidher nisedha-purvakatd nisidhyate. Brahtna-siddhi, ii. Kdrikd 3.

2 na ca tatra eka-jndnasya kramavad-vydpdratd ubhaya-rupasya utpatteh. Ibid.

3 nllasya nirvikalpaka-darsanasya yat sdmarthyam niyataika-kdranatvam tena anddi-vdsana-vasat pratibhdsitam janitam idam nedatn iti vikalpo bhdvdbha-va-vyavahdram pravartayati.. .satyam jiidna-dvayam idam savikalpakam tu nirvikalpakam tayor mula-bhutam tat pratyaksam tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anya-vyavaccheda iti bruma iti. iaankhapani's commentary, ibid.

"difference" has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many 1 . In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others {parapeksam vastuno bheda-svabhdvah natmapeksam), but not in relation to itself. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relationing is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things 2 . If relationing with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others—they would depend on one another for their existence (itaretarasraya-prasangat). In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Mandana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (apeksa) ; for it does not produce the object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects {nanapeksa-pratiyoginatn bhedah pratiyate). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation; it is only when there is an oppositional relation between objects already experienced that difference manifests

1 na bhedo vastuno rupam tad-abhdva-prasangatah arupena ca bhinnatvam vastuno navakalpate.

Brahma-siddhi, u. 5.

2 ndpeksd nama kascid vastu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthdpyeran, na khalu sva-hetu-prapitodayesu sva-bhava-vyavasthitesu vastusu sva-bhdva-sthitaye vastv-antardpeksd yujyate. Ibid. 11. 6, vrtti.

itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive 1 . But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. To this Mandana's reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence. In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Mandana's reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedanta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedantist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience 2 . Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is not valid, because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (avacchinna) qualities

1 pauruseylm apeksdm na vastv anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhdvah. Ibid.

2 atha nir-anvaya-vindsdndm apt kalpana-visayad abheddt kdryasya tulyata hanta tarhi bheddd eva kcdpand-visaydt kdrydbheda-siddher mUdhd kdrana-bheda-kalpand. Ibid.

or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency {samarthyatisaya) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances.

Again,-it is held by some that "difference" consists in the negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of all things in all places would make them empty. If, however, specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarasraya) and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that the notion of " difference " arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that "difference," as apart from- mutual negation, can be definitely experienced. Again, if unity of all things as "existents" {sat) was not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms itself into various notions of difference 1 . In this connection Mandana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also

1 pratyekam annbiddhatvad abhedena mrsa matah bhedo yathd taranganam bhedad bhedah kalavatah.

Brahma-siddhi, u. Karikd 31.

the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dia-lectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception 1 .

In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi, called the Niyoga-kanda, Mandana refutes the Mlmamsa view that the Vedantic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mlmamsa canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the Siddhi-kanda, Mandana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upanisad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its manifestation is due to the ignorance (avidya) of the individual souls (jlva). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upanisad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upanisads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained.

Suresvara (a.d. 800).

Suresvara's chief works are the Naiskarmya-siddhi and Brhad-dranyakopanisad-bhasya-varttika. The Naiskarmya-siddhi has at least five commentaries, such as the Bhava-tattva-prakasika by Citsukha, which is based on Jnanottama's Candrikd. This Candrikd is thus the earliest commentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi. It is difficult to determine Jnanottama's date. In the concluding verses of this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jnanottama occur; and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to the Naiskarmya-siddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajna-pltha of Conjee veram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil,

1 ekasyaivastu mahitnd yan naneva prakasate

laghavdn na tu bhinndndm yac cakdsaty abhinnavat.

Brahma-siddhi, 11. Kdrikd 32.

and according to the list of teachers of that Matha Jnanottama was the fourth from Sankara. This would place Jnanottama at a very early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but inserted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since Citsukha's commentary was based on Jiianottama's commentary Candrika. Another commentary is the Vidya-surabhi of Jnanamrta, the pupil of Uttamamrta; another is the Naiskarmya-siddhi-vivarana of Akhilatman, pupil of Dasarathapriya; and there is also another commentary, called Sardrtha, by Ramadatta, which is of comparatively recent date.

Suresvara's Naiskarmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedantic wisdom. Avidya is here defined as the non-perception in one's experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation {tan-naso muktir dtmanali). The Mlmamsists think that, if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (kdmya-karma) and prohibited actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma, and since no other new karmas accumulate, the person will naturally be emancipated from karma. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. As against this Mlmamsa view Suresvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing, in the way of purifying one's mind, but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Suresvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the Vidya-surabhi commentary, that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahman, as propounded in Vedanta texts, but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the right apprehension of the Upanisadic passages on the identity of the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all one's obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perform them, this

7-2

would be a transgression of one's duties and would naturally produce sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties (jndna-karma-samuccaya), which is vehemently opposed by Sankara. Another view which occurs also in the Varttika, and is there referred to by the commentator Anandajnana as being that of Mandana, is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedantic texts is verbal and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge, but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. The Varttika refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (jndna-karma-samuccaya), some regarding jnana as being the more important, others regarding karma as more important, and still others regarding them both as being equally important, thus giving rise to three different schools of jndna-karma-samuccaya. Suresvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing, and that it does not in the least require the performance of any kind of Vedic duties. Suresvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of karma and jnana on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartrprapanca, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. Suresvara's refutation of this view is based upon two considerations, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference 1 .

The second chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi is devoted to the exposition of the nature of self-realization, as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upanisads by a 1 See also Prof. Hiriyanna's introduction to his edition of the Naifkarmya-siddki.

xi] Suresvara

101

proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the distracting effects of the antahkarana. When true knowledge dawns, the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajnana on the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unperturbed unity of this pure self. It is the antahkarana, or the intellect, that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects is not a substantive entity like the prakrti of the Samkhya; for its appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world-appearance is only a product of nescience {ajnana) or false and indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real substance as the Samkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell as soon as truth is realized.

In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajnana, its relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself a product of ajnana (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded as its support or object; so the ajnana has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is possible—the entire field of objective appearance being regarded as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Suresvara, unlike Vacaspati Misra and Mandana, the avidya is based not upon individual persons (jiva), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajnana, as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is experienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to

see that this view of the relation of ajiidna to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Mandana, as noticed in the previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much an extraneous product of ajnana as the so-called external objects, then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To this Suresvara replies that, when the antahkarana or mind is transformed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (ahamkara) is produced to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres, and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The category of the ego, being immediately and intimately related to the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objectivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the pure intelligence is reflected through the ajiidna product of the category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it, and all that is associated with it is experienced as the "this," the object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed in the realization of Brahman, when Vedantic texts of unity are realized. In the third chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Varttika Suresvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to enter into these details.

Padmapada (a.d. 820).

Padmapada is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Sankaracarya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Sankaracarya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Sankaracarya. There are many traditional stories about him and his relations with Sankaracarya; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the Panca-padika, which is a commentary on

Sankara's commentary on the first four sutras of the Brahma-sutra and Sankara's introduction to his commentary known as the adhyasa and the sambhavana-bhasya, and the Atma-bodha-vyakhyana, called also Vedanta-sara. This Panca-padika is one of the most important of the Vedanta works known to us. It was commented on by Prakasatman (a.d . 1200) in his Paiica-padikd-vivarana x . The Panca-padika-vivarana was further commented on by Akhandananda (a.d. 1350), a pupil of Anandagiri, in his Tattva-dlpana. Ananda-purna (a.d. 1600), who wrote his Vidyd-sagari commentary on Sriharsa's Khandana-khatida-khadya and also a commentary on the Maha-vidya-vidambana, wrote a commentary on the Panca-padikd. Nrsimhasrama also wrote a commentary on the Panca-padika-vivarana, called the Panca-pddikd-vivarana-prakdsikd, and Srikrsna also wrote one on the Panca-pddika-vivarana. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalananda as Panca-pddikd-sdstra-dar-pana ; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Sastra-darpana, which is noticed below. Amalananda was a follower of the Vacaspati line and not of the line of Padmapada and Prakasatman. Ramananda Sarasvati, a pupil of Govindananda, the author of the Ratna-prabha commentary on the Sankara-bhasya, wrote his Vivaranopanyasa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivarana) as a commentary on Sahkara's Bhasya; but this was strictly on the lines of the Paiica padika-vharana, though it was not a direct commentary thereon. Vidyaranya also wrote a separate monograph, called Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, in which he interpreted the Vedantic doctrines on the lines of the Panca-padika-vivarana. Of all these the Vivaranopanyasa of Ramananda Sarasvati was probably the last important work on the Vivarana line; for Ramananda's teacher Govindananda, the pupil of Gopala Sarasvati and the pupil's pupil of Sivarama, refers in his Ratna-prabha commentary to Jagannathasrama's commentary on the Saiikara-bhasya, called the Bhasya-dipika, and also to Anandagiri's commentary as "vrddhah" p. 5 (Nirnaya-Sagara Press, 1904). Jagannatha was the teacher of Nrsimhasrama; Govindananda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Ramananda may

1 Prakasatman also wrote a metrical summary of Sankara's Bhasya and a work called Sabda-nirnaya, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testimony as valid cognition.

2 As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana, it seems that Anandapurna lived after 5§ankara Misra (a.d. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 586 (Chowkhamba).

therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindananda himself also in his Ratna-prabhd commentary followed the Vivarana line of interpretation, and he refers to Prakasatman with great respect as Prakdsdtma-sri-caranaih (Ratna-prabhd, p. 3).

Padmapada's method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakasatman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta. It is not therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections regarding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still a few words on Padmapada's philosophy may with advantage be read separately. Padmapada says that mdyd, avydkrta, prakrti, agrahana, avyakta, tamah, kdrana, lay a, sakti, mahdsupti, nidrd, ksara and akasa are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with avidya. It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (avidya), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (piirva-prajna-samskara) produce the individual persons (jlvatvdpddika). Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (vijiidna-kriyd-sakti-dvaydsraya) and functions as the doer of all actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikd-dhdrah). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brahman it is the complex of these transformations which appears as the immediate ego (ahamkdra). It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called antahkarana, manas, buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aham-pratyayin) on the side of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity (spanda-saktyd), it is called prdna or biomotor functions. The association of the ego with the pure dtman, like the association of the redness of zjapd flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidya stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (sambhinnobhaya-riipatvdt).

On the question as to whether avidya has for both support (dsraya) and object (visaya) Brahman Padmapada's own attitude does not seem to be very clear. He only says that avidya manifests itself in the individual person (jlva) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the

Brahman by its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless avidya is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But Prakasatman introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that Brahman is both the support and the object of avidya as against the view of Vacaspati Misra that avidya has the Brahman as its object and the jiva as its support (asraya). This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the Vivarana line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vacaspati line. In this Prakasatman agrees with the view of Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajnatman, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajnatman draws some nice distinctions which are not noticed by Suresvara.

Padmapada draws a distinction between two meanings of falsehood (mithya), viz. falsehood as simple negation (apahnava-vacana) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacani-yata-vacana). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajnana or avidya as being of a material nature (jadatmika) and of the nature of a power (jadatmika avidya-sakti), and interpreted Sarikara's phrase " mithya-jnana-nimittah" as meaning that it is this material power of ajnana that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance. Prakasatman, however, elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that avidya is something positive (bhdva-rupa). These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work. Padmapada is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedantic perception which was later on elaborated by Prakasatman and later writers, and his views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the Vedanta-paribhdsa of Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra in the sixteenth century. Describing this process, Padmapada says that, as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is concerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (jnaturjneya-sambandhah). The antahkarana, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (aparoksa) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the antahkarana. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (pramatr) through its connection

with the underlying consciousness. Prakasatman, however, elaborates it by supposing that the antahkarana goes out to the objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. Hence what Padmapada conceived merely as the change of the antahkarana states through the varying relation of the antahkarana with its objects, is interpreted in the definite meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial superposition of the antahkarana on its objects. In inference, however, there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through relations with the reason (linga). Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge; for it is defined as being the manifestation of the object (artha-prakdsa).

On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapada says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the Brahman, is the cause of the world. On this point Prakasatman offers three alternative views, viz. (i) that, like two twisted threads in a rope, maya and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world, (2) that that which has maya as its power is the cause, and (3) that the Brahman which has maya supported on it is the cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with Brahman, since maya is dependent thereon. Brahman is sarva-jna (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it, and it is the Brahman that through its maya appears as the world of experience. The doctrines of avaccheda-vada and pratibimba-vada explained in the first volume of the present work are also at least as old as Padmapada's Pafica-padika, and both Padmapada and Prakasatman seem to support the reflection theory {prati-bimba-vadd), the theory that the jiva is but a reflected image of Brahman 1 .

Vacaspati Misra (a.d. 840).

Vacaspati Misra, the celebrated author of a commentary called Bhamation Sankara's commentary, is the author of a Tattva-samiksa, a commentary on Mandana's Brahma-siddhi; he also commented on the Sdmkhya-kdrika, Vidhi-viveka, Nyaya-varttika, and he was

1 See volume I, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Diksita gives a fairly good summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala, pp. 335-343, &ri Vani Vilasa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or Vacaspati to any one of these views.

the author of a number of other works. In his Nyaya-sucini-bandhahe gives his date as 898 (vasv-anka-vasu-vatsare), which in all probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-samvat, and consequently he can safely be placed in a.d. 842. In his commentary called Bhamati he offers salutation to Martanda-tilaka-svamin, which has been understood to refer to his teacher. But Amala-nanda in commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a compound of the two names Martanda and Tilakasvamin, belonging to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one's actions. Tilakasvamin is referred to in Yajnavalkya, 1.294 as a god, and the Mitdksara explains it as being the name of the god Karttikeya or Skanda. Udayana, however, in his Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-pari-s'uddhi (p. 9), a commentary on Vacaspati's Tatparya-tika, refers to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vacaspati, and Vardhamana in his commentary on it, called Nyaya-nibandha-prakdsa, confirms this: Vacaspati himself also refers to Trilocanaguru, whom he followed in interpreting the word vyavasdya (Nyaya-sutra, 1. i. 4) as determinate knowledge {savikalpa) 1 . It is however interesting to note that in the Nyaya-kanika (verse 3) he refers to the author of the Nyaya-maiijari (in all probability Jayanta) as his teacher {vidya-taru) 2 . Vacaspati says at the end of his Bhamati commentary that he wrote that work when the great king Nrga was reigning. This king, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been historically traced. Bhamati was Vacaspati's last great work; for in the colophon at the end of the Bhamati he says that he had already written his Nyaya-kanika, Tattva-samiksa, Tattva-bindu and other works on Nyaya, Samkhya and Yoga.

Vacaspati's Vedantic works are Bhamati and Tattva-samiksa (on Brahma-siddhi). The last work has not yet been published. Aufrecht, referring to his work, Tattva-bindu, says that it is a Vedanta work. This is however a mistake, as the work deals with the sphota doctrines of sound, and has nothing to do with Vedanta. In the absence of Vacaspati's Tattva-samiksa, which has not been published, and manuscripts of which have become extremely scarce, it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the special features of Vacaspati's view of Vedanta. But his Bhamati

1 trilocana-gurunnita-mdrgdnugamanonmukhath yathamdnam yathd-vastu vydkhyatam idam idriam.

Nydya-vdrttika-tdtparya-tlkd, p. 87. Benares, 1898.

2 ajndna-timira-iamanlm nydya-manjarlm rucirdm prasavitre prabhavitre vidyd-tarave namo gurave.

Nyaya-kanika, introductory verse.

commentary is a great work, and it is possible to collect from it some of the main features of his views. As to the method of Vacaspati's commentary, he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text. The Bhamati commentary on Sankara's Bhasya is a very important one, and it had a number of important sub-commentaries. The most important and earliest of these is the Vedanta-kalpa-taru of Amalananda (a.d. i 247-1260), on which Appaya Dlksita (about a.d. 1600) wrote another commentary called Vedanta-kalpa taru-parimala 1 . The Vedanta-kalpa-taru was also commented on by Laksminrsimha, author of the Tarka-dlpika, son of Konda-bhatta and grandson of Rangojl Bhatta, towards the end of the seventeenth century, and this commentary is called Abhoga. The Abhoga commentary is largely inspired by the Vedanta-kalpa-taru-parimala, though in many cases it differs from and criticizes it. In addition to these there are also other commentaries on the Bhamati, such as the Bhamati-tilaka, the Bhdmati-vilasa, the Bhamatl-vyakhya by Srirariganatha and another commentary on the Vedanta-kalpa-taru, by Vaidyanatha Payagunda, called the Vedanta-kalpa- taru-tnanjarl.

Vacaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation (sva-prakasata) which is never contradicted (abadhita). Only the pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. He thus definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the class-concept of being, as the Naiyayikas hold, or capacity of doing work [artha-kriya-karitva), as the Buddhists hold. He admits two kinds of ajnana, as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Sankara-

1 Amalananda also wrote another work, called Sastra-darpana, in which, taking the different topics {adhikaranas) of the Brahma-sutras, he tried to give a plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into much discussion on the interpretations of the different sutras on the topic. These general lectures on the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutras did not, however, reveal any originality of views on the part of Amalananda, but were based on Vacaspati's interpretation, and were but reflections of his views, as Amalananda himself admits in the second verse of the Sastra-darpana (Vdcaspati-mati-vimbi-tam adarsam prdrabhe vimalam) —!§ri Vani Vilasa Press, ioi3,Srirangam, Madras.

xi] Vdcaspati Misra

109

bhasya, 1. iii. 30, that at the time of the great dissolution {tnaha-pralaya) all products of avidya, such as the psychical frame (antahkarana), cease to have any functions of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged in the indescribable avidya, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities {suksmena sakti-rupena) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. When the state of maha-pralaya is at an end, moved by the will of God, they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of frogs which have remained inert and lifeless all the year round, and then, being associated with their proper tendencies and impressions, they assume their particular names and forms as of old before the maha-pralaya. Though all creation takes place through God's will, yet God's will is also determined by the conditions of karma and the impressions produced by it. This statement proves that he believed in avidya as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (anirvacya avidya), into which all world-products disappear during the maha-pralaya and out of which they reappear in the end and become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong impressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of the maha-pralaya. Avidya thus described resembles very much the prakrti of Yoga, into which all the world-products disappear during a maha-pralaya together with the fivefold avidya and their impressions, which at the time of creation become associated with their own proper buddhis. In the very adoration hymn of the Bhamatl Vacaspati speaks of avidya being twofold (avidya-dvitaya), and says that all appearances originate from Brahman in association with or with the accessory cause (sahakari-karana) of the two avidyas [avidya-dvitaya-sacivasya). In explaining this passage Amalananda points out that this refers to two avidyas, one as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding series of beginningless false impressions {anya purvapurva-bhrama-samskarah). There is thus one aspect of avidya which forms the material stuff of the appearances; but the appearances could not have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with the immediate and pure self-revelation (sva-prakasa cit). Each individual person (jlva) confuses and misapprehends his psychical frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves, and it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states

no The Sankara School of Vedanta [ch.

attain any meaning as appearances; for otherwise these appearances could not have been expressed at all. But how does the person come in, since the concept of a person itself presupposes the very confusion which it is supposed to make? To this Vacaspati's reply is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false confusion, and that to another previous false confusion (cf. Man-dana). So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false confusion, and that another false confusion and so on in a beginning-less series. It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions that all the later states of confusion are to be explained. Thus on the one hand the avidya operates in the individual person, the jlva, as its locus or support (asraya), and on the other hand it has the Brahman or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object (visaya), which it obscures and through which it makes its false appearances to be expressed, thereby giving them a false semblance of reality, whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifestations of reality 1 . It is easy to see how this view differs from the view of the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni; for in the opinion of the latter, the Brahman is both the support (asraya) and the object (visaya) of ajiiana, which means that the illusion does not belong to the individual person, but is of a transcendental character. It is not the individual person as such (jlva), but the pure intelligence that shines through each individual person (pratyak-cit), that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances in a transcendental manner. In Vacaspati's view, however, the illusion is a psychological one for which the individual person is responsible, and it is caused through a beginningless chain of illusions or confusions, where each succeeding illusory experience is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience, and that by another and so on. The content of the illusory experiences is also derived from the indescribable avidya, which is made to appear as real by their association with Brahman, the ultimately real and self-revealing Being. The illusory appearances, as they are, cannot be described as being existent or non-existent; for, though they seem to have their individual existences, they are always negated by other existences, and none of them have that kind of reality which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction; and it is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be

1 It is in the latter view that Vacaspati differs from Mandana, on whose Brakma-siddhi he wrote his Tattva-samikfd.

ultimately real. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the fact that they are negated and contradicted; and yet they are not absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, since, had they been so, they could not have been experienced at all. So in spite of the fact that the appearances are made out of avidya, they have so far as any modified existence can be ascribed to them, the Brahman as their underlying ground, and it is for this reason that Brahman is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. As soon as this Brahman is realized, the appearances vanish; for the root of all appearances is their illusory confusion with reality, the Brahman. In the Bhamatl commentary on Sankara's commentary, n. ii. 28, Vacaspati points out that according to the Sankara Vedanta the objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature {anirvacanlyam niladi) and not mere mental ideas (na hi brahma-vadino nllady-akaram vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacanlyam niladi). The external objects therefore are already existent outside of the perceiver, only their nature and stuff are indescribable and irrational (anirvacya). Our perceptions therefore refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers, and they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated from within, without the aid of such external objects.

Sarvajnatma Muni (a.d. 900).

Sarvajfiatma Muni was a disciple of Suresvaracarya, the direct disciple of Sankara, to whom at the beginning of his work Samk-sepa-sarlraka he offers salutation by the name Devesvara, the word being a synonym of the word sura in Suresvara. The identification of Devesvara with Suresvara is made by Rama Tlrtha, the commentator on the Samksepa-sariraka, and this identification does not come into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajfiatma Muni either from the text of his work or from other references to him in general. It is said that his other name was Nityabodhacarya. The exact date of neither Suresvara nor "Sarvajnatma can be definitely determined. Mr Pandit in his introduction to the Gauda-vaho expresses the view that, since Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kumarila, Kumarila must have lived in the middle of the seventh century, and, since Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila (on the testimony of the Sankara-dig-vijaya)> he must have lived either in the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. In the

first volume of the present work Sankara was placed between a.d. 780-820. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point for consideration. His theory that Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kuma-rila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts, where, at the end of an act of the Malati-Mddhava, it is said that the work was written by a pupil of Kumarila. This evidence, as I have noticed elsewhere, is very slender. The tradition that Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila, based as it is only on the testimony of the §ankara-dig-vijaya, cannot be seriously believed. All that can be said is that Kumarila probably lived not long before Sankara, if one can infer this from the fact that Sankara does not make any reference to Kumarila. Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally accepted view that Sankara was born in Samvat 844, or a.d. 788, or Kali age 3889, should be given up 1 . Taking the approximate date of Sankara's death to be about a.d. 820 and taking into consideration that Suresvara, the teacher of Sarvajnatman, occupied his high pontifical position for a long time, the supposition that Sarvajnatman lived in a.d. 900 may not be very far wrong. Moreover, this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vacaspati, who probably wrote his earlier work the Nyaya-sucl-nibandha in a.d. 842, also wrote his commentary on Mandana's Brahma-siddhi when Suresvara was occupying the pontifical position.

Sarvajnatma Muni was thus probably a younger contemporary of Vacaspati Misra. In his Samksepa-sariraka he tries to describe the fundamental problems of the Vedanta philosophy, as explained by Sankara. This work, which is probably the only work of his that is known to us, is divided into four chapters, written in verses of different metres. It contains, in the first chapter 563 verses, in the second 248, in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. In the first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (dvara) of ajnana. The ajnana, which rests on (dsraya) the pure self and operates on it as its object {visaya), covers its real nature (acchddya) and creates delusory appearances (viksipati), thereby producing the threefold appearances of God (Isvara), soul (jlva) and the world. This ajnana has no independent existence, and its effects are seen only through the pure self (cid-atman) as its ground and object, and its creations are all false. The pure self is directly perceived in the state of dreamless sleep as being of the nature

1 See Arya-vidyd-sudhd-kara, pp. 226, 227.

of pure bliss and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow; and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else; such is also the pure self, which cannot be regarded as being a means to anything else; moreover, there is the fact that everyone always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which he loves above anything else. Such an infinite love and such an ultimate end cannot be this limited self, which is referred to as the agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns of life. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upanisads also confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. The illusory impositions on the other hand are limited appearances of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (na vastavam tat). When the Brahman is associated with ajnana there are two false entities, viz. the ajnana and the Brahman as associated with the ajnana) but this does not imply that the pure Brahman, which underlies all these false associations, is itself also false, since this might lead to the criticism that, everything being false, there is no reality at all, as some of the Buddhists contend. A distinction is drawn here between adhara and adhisthana. The pure Brahman that underlies all appearances is the true adhisthana (ground), while the Brahman as modified by the false ajnana is a false adhara or a false object to which the false appearances directly refer. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced. Thus in the experience "I perceive this piece of silver" (in the case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated with the "this" element before the perceiver, and the "this" element in its turn, as the false object, becomes associated with the false silver as the "this silver." But, though the objectivity of the false silver as the "this" before the perceiver is false, the "this" of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. It is the above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known as parasparadhyasa. It is only the false object that appears in the illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. The inner psychical frame (antahkarana) to a certain extent on account of its translucent character resembles pure Brahman, and on account of this similarity it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure

self is mistaken for the antahkarana. It may be contended that there could be no antahkarana without the illusory imposition, and so it could not itself explain the nature of illusion. The reply given to such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its consequences are beginningless and there is no point of time to which one could assign its beginning. Hence, though the present illusion may be said to have taken its start with the antahkarana, the antahkarana is itself the product of a previous imposition, and that of a previous antahkarana, and so on without a beginning. Just as in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell, though there is the piece of conch-shell actually existing, yet it is not separately seen, and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver, so the real Brahman exists as the ground, though the world during the time of its appearance is felt to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is not felt to be existent separately from it. Yet this ajnana has no real existence and exists only for the ignorant. It can only be removed when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns, and it is only through the testimony of the Upanisads that this knowledge can dawn; for there is no other means of insight into the nature of Brahman. Truth again is defined not as that which is amenable to proof, but as that which can be independently and directly felt. The ajnana, again, is defined as being positive in its nature (bhava-rupam) and, though it rests on the pure Brahman, yet, like butter in contact with fire, it also at its touch under certain circumstances melts away. The positive character of ajnana is felt in the world in its materiality and in ourselves as our ignorance. The real ground cause, however, according to the testimony of the Upanisads, is the pure Brahman, and the ajnana is only the instrument or the means by which it can become the cause of all appearances; but, ajnana not being itself in any way the material cause of the world, Sarvajnatman strongly holds that Brahman in association and jointly with ajnana cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world. The ajnana is only a secondary means, without which the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible, but which has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. He definitely denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect that that which is the cause of the production, existence and dissolution of the world is Brahman, since the nature of Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. He indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upanisads

can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of reality as Brahman.

The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further elucidation of these doctrines. In that chapter Sarvajnatma Muni tries to show the difference of the Vedanta view from the Buddhist, which difference lies mainly in the fact that, in spite of the doctrine of illusion, the Vedanta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman, which is not admitted by the Buddhists. He also shows how the experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams. He then tries to show that neither perception nor other means of proof can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes the philosophic views of the Samkhya, Nyaya and other systems. He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajnana and points out that the association of ajnana is not with the one pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (pratyaktva) ; for it is only in connection with this that the ajnana appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge pure Brahman as one is realized, the ajnana is not felt. It is only in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the ajnana is perceived, as when one says,"I do not know what you say "; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and every individual soul 1 . The true light of Brahman is always there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the ajnana. In the third chapter Sarvajnatman describes the ways (sadhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajnana and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood.

The Samksepa-sarlraka was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus Nrsimhasrama wrote a commentary called Tattva-bodhini, Puru-sottama t>Iksita wrote another called Subodhinl, Raghavananda another called Vidyamrta-varsini, Visvadeva another called Sid-dhanta-dipa, on which Rama Tirtha, pupil of Krsna Tirtha,

1 najnanam advayasamdsrayam istam evam nddvaita-vastu-visayam nisiteksandndm ndnanda-nitya-visaydsrayam istam etat pratyaktva-mdtra-visaydsrayatdnubhuteh.

Samksepa-sdrfraka, n. 211.

based his commentary Anvayartha-prakasika. Madhusudana Sara-svatl also wrote another commentary, called Samksepa-sariraka-

sara-samgraha. _

Anandabodha Yati.

Anandabodha is a great name in the school of Sankara Vedanta. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century 1 . He refers to Vacaspati's Tattva-samlksa and criticizes, but without mentioning his name, Sarvajnatman's view of the interpretation of the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on barikara Vedanta, viz. Nyaya-makaranda, Nyaya-dipavali and Pramana-mala. Of these the Nyaya-makaranda was commented upon by Citsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakasa in works called Nyaya-makaranda-tika and Nyaya-makaranda-vivecani. Sukhaprakasa also wrote a commentary on the Nyaya-dipavali, called \yaya-dipavall-tatparya-tikd. Anubhutisvariipa Acarya (late thirteenth century), the teacher of Anandajnana, also wrote commentaries on all the three works of Anandabodha. Anandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his time 2 . He starts his Nyaya-makaranda with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do the' Upanisads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity {kalpanika-purusa-bheda), even though in reality there is but one soul. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity, Anandabodha tries to refute the argument of the Samkhya-karika that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (bheda) cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally

1 Mr Tripathi in his introduction to Anandajnana's Tarka-samgraha gives Anandabodha's date as a.d. 1200.

' Ndnd-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavdvaddta-

nydydpadesa-makaranda-kadamba esa.

Nyaya-makaranda, p. 359.

cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which it can operate for the comprehension of difference; neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time, there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the perception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.; for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences; for this is directly against all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities, then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Moreover, differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether difference is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form "the difference of the jug from the pillar," or "the jug is different from the pillar," in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of which the category of difference is realized.

Anandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyaya, Mlmamsa, Buddhism, etc. and supports the anirva-canlya theory of error 1 . In this connection he records his view as to why nescience (avidya) has to be admitted as the cause of world-appearance. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence, since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal, it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidya 2 .

1 See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485.

2 Nyaya-makaranda, pp. 122, 123.

He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness (atmanah samvid-riipatva). This he does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow? Referring to avidya, he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman, because avidyd, being indefinable in its nature, i.e. being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidyd, since all relations are of the nature of avidya and there cannot be any omniscience without a knowledge of the relations. In his Nyaya-dipavall he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advaita-siddhi of Madhusudana SarasvatI at a much later period. There is practically nothing new in his Pramana-mala. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the arguments of the Nyaya-makaranda in a somewhat different form and with a different emphasis. Most of Anandabodha's arguments were borrowed by the later writers of the Vedanta school. Vyasatlrtha of the Madhva school of Vedanta collected most of the standard Vedanta arguments from Anandabodha and Prakasatman for refutation in his Nyayamrta, and these were again refuted by Madhusudana's great work, the Advaita-siddhi, and these refuted in their turn in Rama Tirtha's Nyayamrta-taranginl. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work.

Maha-vidya and the Development of Logical Formalism.

The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nagarjuna. But this was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyayikas had also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings

of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati, Udayana and others. Sarikara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of Buddhistic, Jaina, Vaisesika and other systems of Indian philosophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nagarjuna's arguments, there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nagarjuna's logical arguments, viz. the attempt to formulate definitions with the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that overemphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their culmination in the writings of later Nyaya writers such as Raghunatha Siromani, Jagadisa Bhattacarya, Mathuranatha Bhattacarya and Gadadhara Bhattacarya. It is generally believed that such methods of overstrained logical formalism were first started by Gangesa Upadhyaya of Alithila early in the thirteenth century. But the truth seems to be that this method of logical formalism was steadily growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries. One notable instance of it is the formulation of the maha-vidya modes of syllogism by Kularka Pandita in the eleventh century. There is practically no reference to this maha-vidya syllogism earlier than Sriharsa (a.d. 1187) 1 . References to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Acarya (a.d. 1220), Amalananda, called also Vyasasrama (a.d. 1247), Anandajnana (a.d. 1260), Venkata (a.d. 1369), Sesa Sarngadhara (a.d. 1450) and others 2 . The maha-vidya syllogisms were started probably some time in the eleventh century, and they continued to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century, though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by Gangesa or any of his followers, such as Raghunatha, Jagadisa and others, in their discussions on the nature of kevalanvayi types of inference.

1 gandhe gandhdntara-prasanjikd na ca yuktir asti ; tadastitve vd kd no hdnih ; tasyd apy asmdbhih khandamyatvdt. isrlharsa's Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 1181, Chowkhamba edition.

2 athavd ayam ghatah etadghatdnyatve sati vedyatvdnadhikarandnya-paddr-hatvdt patavad ity-ddimahdvidyd-prayogair apt vedyatva-siddhir apy uhanlyd. —

Citsukha Acarya's Tattva-pradipikd,p. 13, also p. 304. The commentator Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan mentions Kularka Pandita by name, evam sarvd mahavidyds tac-chdyd vanye prayogdh khandanlyd iti. —Amalananda's Veddnta-kalpa-taru, p. 304 (Benares, 1895). sarvdsv eva mahdvidydsu, etc.—Anandajnana's Tarka-samgraha, p. 22. Also Vehkata's Nydya-pariiuddhi, pp. 125, 126, 273-276, etc., and Tattva-muktd-kaldpa with Sarvdrtha-siddhi, pp. 478, 485, 486-491. Mr M. R. Telang has collected all the above references to maha-vidya in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1920.

In all probability maha-vidya syllogisms were first started by Kularka Pandita in his Daia-iloki-maha-vidya-sutra containing sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of maha-vidya syllogisms. Assuming that Kularka Pandita, the founder of maha-vidya syllogisms, flourished in the eleventh century, it may well be suggested that many other writers had written on this subject before Vadlndra refuted them in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Not only does Vadlndra refer to the arguments of previous writers in support of maha-vidya and in refutation of it in his Maha-vidya-vidambana, but Bhuvana-sundara Suri also in his commentary on the Maha-vidya-vidambana refers to other critics of maha-vidya. Recently two different commentaries have been discovered on maha-vidya^ by Purusottama-vana and Purnaprajna. Verikata in his Nyaya-parisuddhi refers to the Maha-vidya, the Mana-manohara and the Pramana-manjarl, and Snnivasa in his commentary Nyaya-sara on the Nyaya-parisuddhi describes them as works which deal with roundabout syllogisms (vakranumana) 1 . This shows that for four or five centuries maha-vidya syllogisms were in certain quarters supported and refuted from the eleventh century to the sixteenth century.

It is well known that the great Mimamsa writers, such as Kumarila Bhatta and his followers, believed in the doctrine of the eternity of sounds, while the followers of the Nyaya and Vaisesika, called also Yaugacaryas, regarded sound as non-eternal (anitya). Maha-vidya modes were special modes of syllogism, invented probably by Kularka Pandita for refuting the Mimamsa arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. If these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would also have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving of other theories and doctrines. The special feature of the maha-vidya syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by the kevalanvayi method. Ordinarily concomitance (vyapti) consists in the existence of the reason (hetu) in association with the probandum and its non-existence in all places where the pro-ban dum is absent (sadhyabhavavad-avrttitvam). But the kevalanvayi form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyayikas applies to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is no case where it is absent, and consequently it cannot have a reason (hetu) whose concomitance with it can be determined by 1 See M. R. Telang's introduction to the Maha-vidya-vidambana.

its non-existence in all cases where the probandum is absent and its existence in all cases where the probandum is present. Thus in the proposition, "This is describable or nameable (idam abhi-dheyam) because it is knowable (prameyatvat)" both the probandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where their concomitance can be tested by negative instances. Maha-vidya syllogisms were forms of kevalanvayi inference of this type, and there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage associated with them, that, they being kevalanvayi forms of syllogism, it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum, as no negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it possible that a kevalanvayi form of syllogism should be applicable for affirming the non-eternity of sound, Kularka tried to formulate propositions in sixteen different ways so that on kevalanvayi lines such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as the only consequence, other possible alternatives being ruled out. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by the critics of maha-vidya styled roundabout syllogism. Thus maha-vidya has been defined as that method of syllogism by which a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint method of agreement and difference (3, anvaya-vyatireki-sadhya-visesam vady-abhimatam sadhayati)is proved by the necessary implication of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular subject (2, pakse vyapaka-pratitya-paryavasana-balat), affirmed by the existence of hetu in the subject on kevalanvayi lines (1, kevalan-vayini vyapakepravartama.no hetuh). In other words, a reason which exists in a probandum inseparably abiding in a subject (paksa) without failure (proposition 1) proves (sadhayati), by virtue of the fact, that such an unfailing existence of that probandum in that subject in that way is only possible under one supposition (proposition 2), namely, the affirmation of another probandum in another subject (e.g. the affirmation of the probandum "non-eternity "to the subject "sound"), which is generally sought to be proved by the direct method of agreement and difference (proposition 3). This may be understood by following a typical maha-vidya syllogism. Thus it is said that by reason of knowability {meyatva) as such the self, dissociated from the relations of all eternal and non-eternal qualities of all other objects excepting

sound, is related to a non-eternal entity (atma sabdetardnitya-nitya-yavrttitvanadhikarananitya-vrtti-dharmavdn meyatvdd ghatavat) . Now by the qualifying adjunct of "self " the self is dissociated from all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal objects excepting sound, and the consequence is that it is left only with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound, as this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct, which did not take sound within its purview. Since many relations are also on the Nyaya view treated as qualities, such a non-eternal relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or their mutual negation {anyonydbhdvd). Now, if the self, which is incontestably admitted to be eternal, has such a non-eternal quality or relation to sound, then this can only be under one supposition, viz. that sound is non-eternal. But, since all other non-eternal relations that the self may have to other non-eternal objects, and all other eternal relations that it may have to other eternal objects, and all other such relations that it may have to all eternal and non-eternal objects jointly, except sound, have already been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase, the inseparable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have, in the absence of any negative instances, is in relation to sound; but, if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound, then this can be so only under one supposition, viz. that sound is itself non-eternal; for the self is incontestably known as eternal. This indirect and roundabout method of syllogism is known as mahd-vidyd. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the sixteen types of propositions of mahd-vidyd syllogism, as they are all formed on the same principle with slight variations.

Vadlndra in his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana refuted these types of syllogism as false, and it is not known that any one else tried to revive them by refuting Vadlndra's criticisms. Vadlndra styles himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana " Hara-kinkara-nydydcdrya-parama-pandita-bhatta-vddindra," and in the concluding verse of his work refers to Yoglsvara as his preceptor. The above epithets of Hara-kinkara, nydydcdrya, etc. do not show however what his real name was. Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana that his pupil Bhatta Raghava in his commentary on Bhasarvajna's Nydya-sdra, called Nydya-sdra-vicdra, refers to him by the name Mahadeva. Vadlndra's real name, then, was Mahadeva,

and the rest of the epithets were his titles. Bhatta Raghava says that the name of Vadlndra's father was Sarariga. Bhatta Raghava gives his own date in the Saka era. The sentence however is liable to two different constructions,giving us two different dates, viz. a.d. 1252 and 1352. But, judging from the fact that Vadlndra was a religious counsellor of King Srisimha (also called Singhana), who reigned in Deva-giri a.d. 1210-1247, and that in all probability he lived before Venkata (a.d. 1267-1369),who refers to his Maha-vidya-vidambana, Mr Telang suggests that we should take a.d. 1252 to be the date of Bhatta Raghava; and, since he was a pupil of Vadlndra, one may deduct about 27 years from his date and fix Vadlndra's date as a.d. 1225. Mr Telang points out that such a date would agree with the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Srlsimha. Vadlndra refers to Udayana (a.d. 984) and Sivaditya Misra (a.d. 975-1025). Mr Telang also refers to two other works of Vadlndra, viz. Rasa-sara and Kanada-sutra-nibandha, and argues from allusions contained in Vadlndra's Maha-vidya-vidambana that he must have written other works in refutation of maha-vidya. Vadlndra's Maha-vidya-vidambana consists of three chapters. In the first chapter he gives an exposition of the maha-vidya syllogisms; the second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllogisms. Vadlndra's Maha-vidya-vidambana has two commentaries, one called Maha-vidya-vidambana-vyakhyana, by Anandapurna (a.d. 1600), and the other, called Vyakhyana-dipika, by Bhuvana-sundara Suri (a.d. 1400). In addition to these Bhuvanasundara Suri also wrote a small work called the Laghu-maha-vidyd-vidam-bana and a commentary, Maha-vidya-vivarana-tippana, on a Maha-vidya-dasaslokl-vivarana by an unknown author.

The main points of Vadlndra's criticisms may briefly be stated as follows: He says that it is not possible that there should be a proper reason (hetu) which has no negative instances (kevaldnvayi-hetor eva nirvaktum asakyatvdt). It is difficult to prove that any particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should not be any instance or case where it does not occur. In the third chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have kevalanvayi hetus, but that even in arguments on the basis of such kevalanvayi hetu there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction (sva-vydghdta) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term {anaikdntikatva) and the like. He also shows how all these fallacies apply to all the maha-vidya syllogisms invented by Kularka Pandita.

It is needless for our present purposes to enter into any elaborate logical discussion of Vadlndra; for the present digression on maha-rsidya syllogisms is introduced here only to show that scholastic logicisms were not first introduced by Sriharsa, but had already come into fashion a few centuries before him, though Sriharsa was undoubtedly the most prominent of those who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy.

It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the employment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was inherited by the Naiyayikas and Vedantists alike from Buddhists like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva and others in the third and the fourth centuries and their later successors in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries. But during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries one notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent Nyaya writers such as Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Misra and Udayana and Vedantic authors such as the great master Sankaracarya, Vacaspati Misra and Anandabodha Yati. But the school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly begun with Kularka Pandita, or the authors of the Mana-manohara and Pramana-manjarl in the latter part of the eleventh century, and to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers, until we come to Gangesa of the early thirteenth century, who enlivened it with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction of the new concepts of avacchedakata, which may be regarded as a new turning point after vyapti. This work was further carried on extremely elaborately by his later successors, the great writers of this new school of logic (navya-nyaya), Raghunatha Siromani, Jagadlsa Bhattacarya, Gadadhara Bhattacarya and others. On the Vedanta side this formalism was carried on by Sriharsa (a.d. i 187), Citsukha of about a.d. 1220 (of whom Vadlndra was a contemporary), Anandajnana or Anandagiri of about a.d. i 260 and through a number of minor writers until we come to Nrsimhasrama and Madhusudana SarasvatI of the seventeenth century. It may be surmised that formal criticisms of Srlharsa were probably largely responsible for a new awakening in the Naiyayikas, who began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data, new experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of enquiry, which is so essential for the development of true philo-

sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it became essential for all Vedantists also to master the ways of this new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedanta system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedanta with the Buddhists, Mlmamsists and Naiyayikas were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Vedantic standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the controversy was largely with the Nyaya and Vaisesika and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above everything else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than criticisms of Nyaya and Vaisesika definitions. Parallel to this a new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the writings of Ramanuja and his followers, and in the succeeding centuries the followers of Madhva, the great Vaisnava writer, began to criticize the Vedantists (of the Sankara school) very strongly. It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century the Vedantic attack was largely directed against the followers of Ramanuja and Madhva. A history of this controversy will be given in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by this time that, though the Vaisnavas brought in many new considerations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions.

Vedanta Dialectic of Sriharsa (a.d. 1150).

Sriharsa flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth century a.d. Udayana, the great Nyaya writer, lived towards the end of the tenth century, as is evident from the colophon of his Laksanavali 1 . Sriharsa often refutes the definitions of Udayana, and therefore must have flourished after him. Again, the great logician Gahgesa of Mithila refers to Sriharsa and refutes his

1 tarkambaranka(go6)pramitesv atltesu sakdntatah

varsesudayanas cakre subodhdm laksanavallm. Laksanavali, p. 72, Surendralal Gosvamin's edition, Benares, 1900.

views, and, since Gangesa lived in a.d. 1200, Sriharsa must have lived before that date. Accordingly Sriharsa was after Udayana and before Gangesa, i.e. between the tenth and twelfth centuries a.d. At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by the King of Kanauj {Kanyakubjesvara). It is probable that this king may be Jayacandra of Kanauj, who was dethroned about a.d. 1195 1 . In his poetical work Naisadha-carita he mentions at the end of the several chapters many works of his, such as Arnava-varnana, Gaudorvisa-kula-prasasti, Nava-sahasanka-carita, Vijaya-prasasti, Siva-sakti-siddhi, Sthairya-vicarana, Chandah-prasasti, and also Isvarabhisandhi and Pancanaliya kavya' 1 . The fact that he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gauda leads one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmans invited by Adisura of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of the eleventh century, in which case Sriharsa would have to be placed at that time, and cannot be associated with Jayacandra, who was dethroned in a.d. 1195. Sriharsa's most important philosophical contribution was the Khandana-klianda-khadya (lit. "the sweets of refutation"), in which he attempts to refute all definitions of the Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure consciousness 3 . His polemic is against the Nyaya, which holds that

1 Anandapurna in his commentary on the Khandana-khanda-hhddya, called Khandana-phakkikd, explains Kanyakubjesvara as Kasiraja, i.e. King of Kasi or Benares.

2 None of these however are available.

3 isriharsa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it extremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says:

grantha-granthir iha kvacit kvacid apt nydsi prayatndn maya prdjiiammanya-mand hathena pathitlmasmin khalah khelatu, sraddhdrdddha-guruh slathikrta-drdha-granthih samasadayat tv etat-tarkarasorm?ni-majjana sukhefv asanjanam sajjanah. Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 1341. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot,

Benares, 1914. Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people, e.g. Khandana-mandana by Paramananda, Khandana-mandana by Bhavanatha, Dldhiti by Raghunatha Siromani, Prakdsa by Vardhamana, Vidya-bharanl by Vidyabharana, Vidyd-sagart by Vidyasagara, Khandana-tlkd by Padmanabha Pandita, Ananda-vardhana by Sankara Misra, &n-darpana by faubharikara, Khandana-mahd-tarka by Caritrasimha, Khandana-khandana by Pragalbha Misra, Sisya-hitaisinl by Padmanabha, Khandana-kuthdra by Goku-lanatha Upadhyaya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiya-yikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (a.d. 1350) from Bengal, called Khandanoddhdra.

whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Srlharsa's main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyaya, yet, since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nagarjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools; but both Sriharsa and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems 1 .

He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of the Vedanta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even excepting cognitions {vijnand) ; while the Vedanta makes an exception of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent (sad-asadbhyam vilaksanam) and is unreal 2 . This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences {rneya-svabhavanugaminyam anirvacaniyata), and no amount of ingenuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Sriharsa undertakes to show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the Nyaya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyayika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other words, that ho definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences

1 Sriharsa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nagarjuna and says: " tathd hi yadi darsanesu sunya-vdddnirvacanlya-paksayor dsrayanam tada tavad amOfdm nir-badhaiva sdrva-pathlnatd," etc. Khandana-khanda-khddya, pp. 229-230, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

2 By the idealistic Buddhists Srlhars? here means the idealism of the Lankdvatdra, from which he quotes the following verse:

buddhyd vivicyamdndndm svabhdvo ndvadhdryute ato nirabhilapyds te nissvabhdvds ca desitdh.

Lankdvatdra-sutra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923.

of it are indefinable. So the Vedantist can say that the unreality of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find out what is true by resorting to arguments; for the arguments can be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Sriharsa are open to the same objection and are not true, then that would only establish his own contention. For Srlharsa does not believe in the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. It can be contended that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the pramanas or valid means of proof; and the employment of the pramanas would require further arguments, and thest; further employment of the pramanas and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false, this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedantic arguments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedanta is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedanta, the Vedanta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real.

Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Srlharsa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized, no one could think of asking for a proof of it. Now, if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (pratita), then the question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (prama) or error (aprama). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedantist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that, though the Naiyayika considers it false, it is regarded by the Vedantist as true and hence the Vedantist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedantist would readily deny; for, even though the idea of the absolute oneness may

be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedantist says that the Upanisadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality.

The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upanisad texts, cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of "many." For our perception deals with individual things of the moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past, present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the Upanisads. Again, as Sriharsa says, in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature of the perceived objects themselves as svarupa-bheda, or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced—if that were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way Sriharsa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger, proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our progressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upanisads). If perception cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upanisads. In our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always impressed with the concept of difference; but Sriharsa says that the

mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things.

Again, the concept of " difference " can hardly be defined. If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ, then difference would be identical with the nature of the things that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ, then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this might require another connection, and that another, and so we should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference" may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view. Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things. But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. If by "book" we mean its difference from table, then the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning in speaking of "difference" as being the thing, when such differences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If "difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book, is realized as being different from a table—the nature of the difference may here be described as being "the quality of being distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distinguished " would have no meaning or locus standi, unless " the table " were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with "the quality of being distinguished from," then this will invariably include "the table" also within the essence of the book, as "the table" is a constituent of the complex quality "to be distinguished from," which necessarily means "to be distinguished from a table." So on this view also" the table " and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things—a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different

from the notion that" the book differs from the table." For understanding the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should understand previously its difference from a table. Moreover, even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things—say between a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go) —that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so considers an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of difference may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference.

In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental negation" or "otherness" (anyonyabhava), this "otherness" (say of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with the table is denied. Sriharsa here raises the objection that, if the identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the hare's horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaningless. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharma) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom Sriharsa's arguments are directed, does not admit that class-concepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the book),since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having

9-2

any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case regarding negation as otherness (anyonyabhava). Again, if difference is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya), then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another, and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the backward series would be meaningless and all things would be identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time. If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference unnecessary 1 .

It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upanisad texts. Sriharsa does not deny that we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their

1 prathama-bheddsvlkdra-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahdrdder dvittya-bheddd eva siddheh prathatna-bhedo vyarthah sydd eva, dvitlya-bhedddi-prayojanasya trtlya-bhedddinaiva siddheh so pi vyarthah sydt. Vidyd-sdgari on Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 206. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to avidya or nescience alone 1 .

The chief method of Srlharsa's dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakraka), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a know r er is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an independent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories.

Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts.

Srlharsa first takes for his criticism the definitions of right cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition 2 . It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object {yatharthanubhavah prama) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object. The real nature of

1 na vayam bhedasya sarvathaivdsattvam abhyupagacchamah, kirn ndma na paramarthikam sattvam; avidya-vidyamanatvam tu tadtyam isyata eva. Khan-dana-khanda-khadya, p. 214.

2 E.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another man's hand, or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance—his judgment may be right though his inference may be false.

an object is indeterminable, and so correspondence of awareness with the object may rather be defined as similarity of the former to the latter. If this similarity means that the awareness must have such a character as is possessed by the object {jnana-visayikrtena rupena sadrsyam), then this is clearly impossible; for qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness —there may be an awareness of two white hard marbles, but the awareness is neither two, nor white, nor hard 1 . It may be urged that the correspondence consists in this, that the whiteness etc. belong to the object as qualities possessed by it, whereas they belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals 2 . But that would not hold good in the case of illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; the awareness of "before me" in the perception of "before me the silver" has to be admitted as being a right cognition. If this is admitted to be a right cognition, then it was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence; it might as well have been defined as mere cognition, since all cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. If, however, entire correspondence of thought and object be urged, then partial correspondence like the above can hardly be considered satisfactory. But, if entire correspondence is considered indispensable, then the correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored, whereas it is admitted by the Naiyayika that, so far as reference to an object is concerned, all cognitions are valid; only the nature of cognition may be disputed as to right or wrong, when we are considering the correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature characterized by the awareness of the object. If entire correspondence with the object is not assured, then cognition of an object with imperfect or partial correspondence, due to obstructive circumstances, has also to be rejected as false. Again, since the correspondence always refers to the character, form or appearance of the thing, all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the characters are supposed to belong would be false.

Referring to Udayana's definition of right cognition as samyak paricchitti, or proper discernment, Sriharsa says that the word

1 dvau ghatau suklav ityatra rupa-samkhyddi-samavdyitvam na jnanasya gunatvad atah prakds'amdna-rupena artha-sddrsyam jnanasya nasti — asti ca tasya jnanasya tatra ghatayoh pramatvam. Vidyd-sdgarl on Khandana, p. 398.

2 arthasya hi yathd samavdydd rupam visesanlbhavati tathd visayabhdvdj jnanasydpi tad-visesanam bhavaty eva. Khandana, p. 399.

"samyak" (proper) is meaningless; for, if samyak means "entire," then the definition is useless, since it is impossible to see all the visible and invisible constituent parts of a thing, and no one but an omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters, properties or qualities. If right discernment means the discernment of an object with its special distinguishing features, this again is unintelligible; for even in wrong cognition, say of conch-shell as silver, the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks of silver in the conch-shell. The whole point lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not, and there is no way of determining this. If, again, the distinguishing features be described as being those characteristics without the perception of which there can be no certain knowledge and the perception of which ensures right cognition, then it may well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not wrong. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances and conceives them all to be right. It may be urged that in the case of right perception the object is perceived with its special distinguishing features, as in the case of the true perception of silver, whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. But even in this case it would be difficult to define the essential nature of the distinguishing features; for, if any kind of distinguishing feature would do, then in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. If all the particular distinguishing features are insisted on, then there will be endless distinguishing features, and it would be impossible to make any definition which would include them all. The certitude of a cognition which contradicts a previous wrong cognition would often be liable to the same objection as the wrong cognition itself, since the nature of the special distinguishing features which would establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of right knowledge.

Arguing against the definition of right cognition as "apprehension which is not incorrect or not defective" (avyabhicari anubhavah), Sriharsa says that "not incorrect" or "not defective" cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when the object exists; for then inferential cognition, which often refers

to past and future things, would be false. Neither can it mean that the cognition coexists in space with its objects; nor can it mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects, since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is not possible that there should be any case in which it would be similar thereto in all respects. And, if the view that an awareness and its object are one and the same be accepted, then this would apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived as another; and hence the word "avyabhicari" is not sufficient to distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition.

Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as "an apprehension which is not incompatible (avisamvadi) with the object known," Srlharsa tries to refute the definition in all the possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which determines wrong knowledge. If the definition is supposed to restrict right cognition to cognition which is cognized by another cognition as being in agreement with its object, then a wrong cognition, repeated successively through a number of moments and found to be in agreement with its object through all the successive moments until it is contradicted, would also have to be admitted as right, because in this case the previous cognition is certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. If, again, right cognition is defined as a cognition the incompatibility of which with its object is not realized by any other cognition, then also there are difficulties in the way. For even a wrong cognition may for some time be not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as white may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced eye as yellow. If it is urged that the contradiction must be by a faultless later cognition, then it may be pointed out that, if there had been any way of defining faultless cognition, the definition of right cognition would have been very easy. On the other hand, unless right cognition is properly defined, there is no meaning in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. If right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency, that in fact is not a proper definition; for even the wrong cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If it is urged that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in which it is perceived, then it is very difficult to ascertain this; and there may be a false cognition of causal effi-

ciency also; hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. Sriharsa points out again that in a similar way Dharmaklrti's definition of right cognition as enabling one to attain the object (artha-prapakatva) is also unintelligible, since it is difficult to determine which object can be actually attained and which not, and the notion that the thing may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case of the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell. If right cognition is defined as cognition which is not contradicted, then it may be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the time of perception only, in which case even the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition, since it is uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced. If it is urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the Tightness of any cognition; for it is impossible to be certain that any particular cognition will never at any time be contradicted.

After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (pramd) Sriharsa tries to show that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (karana) or their operative action (zyapara) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramana). Sriharsa attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by Sriharsa, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that Srlharsa refuted the concept of "instrumentality" as a separate agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of "karana" or instrument, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily justified 1 .

In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyaya as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense with its object; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production

1 Among many other definitions Jariharsa also refutes the definition of karana as given by Uddyotakara— "yadvan eva karoti tat karanam." Khandana, p. 506.

of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other hand with the external objects, Sriharsa urges by a series of arguments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specification of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness, Sriharsa supposes that, if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its permanent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized, there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and, if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preceding determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception is also negatived. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incomprehensible. Sriharsa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions.

Citsukha Acarya, a commentator on Sriharsa's Khandana-khanda-khadya, offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition of perception by Aksapada as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating circumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously and independently, and the collocating circumstances would contain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can

produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravrtti-samarthya) ; for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the result is no test for the Tightness of the cognition; for a man may see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous 1 . In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of the cognitions.

Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Srlharsa in refutation of the definitions of inference (anumdna) as linga-para-marsa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (paksa, e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (linga, e.g. smoke) which is always concomitant with the major term (sadhya, e.g. fire), or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the major term (sadhya, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (vyapti), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in vyapti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is impossible. The Naiyayika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called samanya-pratyasatti, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept "smoke " when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Sriharsa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-concepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept " knowable " we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities; for the

1 drsyate hi mani-prabhdydm mani-buddhyd pravartamanasya mani-prdpteh pravrtti-sdmarthyam na cdvyabhicdritvam. Tattva-pradlpikd, p. 218. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.

class-concept" knowable " would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely know-able. To this Sriharsa answers that the class-concept "knowable" would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be involved within the meaning of the term "knowable."

Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals, how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance, then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this invariable concomitance be defined as avinabhava, which means that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance between "earth" and "possibility of being cut"; yet in akasa there is absence of earth and also the absence of "possibility of being cut." If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the absence of the other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such universal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again, if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense-knowledge or by any other means.

Now tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possibilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomitance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdependence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then

there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (badhakas tarkah), namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all, which is impossible. But Sriharsa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely, that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference impossible. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong, then the possibility of such a doubt (sanka) must be supported by inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate, there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be entertained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and, if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would be impossible 1 . Sriharsa, however, replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana's own karika, in which he says that, so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid; if there is no doubt, this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never remove doubts 2 .

Sriharsa also objects to the definition of "invariable concomitance" as a natural relation (svabhavikah sambandhah). He rejects the term "natural relation" and says that invariable concomitance

1 sanka ced anumdsty eva na cec chanka tatastaram vyaghatavadhir dsanka tarkah sankdvadhir matah.

Kusumdnjali, ill, 7. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1912.

2 vydghdto yadi sankdsti na cec chanka tatastaram vyaghatavadhir dsanka tarkah sankdvadhth kutah.

Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 693.

would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as (i) depending on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhdva-srita), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-sva-bhava-janya), (iii) not different from the nature constituting the re-latedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the definition of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon conditional circumstances (upddhi). Without entering into the details of Sriharsa's argument it may be pointed out that it rests very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations cannot be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality of relations.

Sriharsa's brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony, as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point of view, and need not be detailed here.

Turning now to Sriharsa's refutation of the Nyaya categories, we note that he begins with the refutation of " being " or positivity (bhavatva). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing; both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives of the verb "exists." Again, each existing thing being unique in itself, there is no common quality, such as " existence " or " being," which is possessed by them all. Again, "being" is as much a negation of "non-being" as "non-being" of "being"; hence "being" cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and non-being may be expressed in a negative form.

Turning to the category of non-being (abhava), Sriharsa says that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of being (bhdvdbhdvayor dvayor apt paraspara-pratiksepdtmakatvdt). Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being; for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e.g. in " there is no jug

on the ground" the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in respect of which the jug is denied); if non-being opposes some existent things, then that does not differentiate negation; for there are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g. the horse and the bull).

In refuting the Nyaya definition of substance (dravya) as that which is the support of qualities, Sriharsa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two or three colours, of a colour being deep or light, mixed or primary —and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (asraya) of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (gunatva), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would be the meaning here of the particle "in"? How would one distinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (samavayi-karana), since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not; for number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or many colours.

Furthermore, the Nyaya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible; for the definition involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined. Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours, have numeral qualities; for we speak of one, two or many colours. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand, and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being endowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be called qualities; for qualities belong according to definition only to

substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyayika could point to as an example of quality.

Speaking of relations, Sriharsa points out that, if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as "in" or "herein" is not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container (ddhara) is dependent on the notion of the concept of "in" or "herein," and that concept again depends on the notion of a container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as "there is a grape in this vessel" or "the absence of horns in a hare" would be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation {visaya-visayi-bhavd) of knowledge.

In refuting the definition of cause Sriharsa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence; for immediate antecedence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which is impossible. Further, "operation" cannot be qualified as being itself produced by the cause; for it is the meaning of the concept of cause that has still to be explained and defined. If, again, cause is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the not-cause, then this again would be faulty; for one cannot understand

the "not-cause" of the definition without understanding what is the nature of cause, and vice-versa. Moreover, space, being a permanent substance, is always present as a not-cause of anything, and is yet regarded as the cause of sound. If, again, cause is defined as that which is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent, this would not explain the causality of space, which is never known to be absent. If, again, cause is defined as invariable antecedence, then permanent substances such as space are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects. If, however, invariable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional antecedence, then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot; for neither does the colour condition taste, nor does the taste condition colour. Moreover, if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as cause, then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their invariable antecedence. Again, causality cannot be regarded as a specific character or quality belonging to certain things, which quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. Thus we may perceive the stick of the potter's wheel to be the cause of the particular jugs produced by it, but it is not possible to perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other thing. If causality existed only with reference to things in general, then it would be impossible to conceive of the production of individual things, and it would not be possible for anyone to know which particular cause would produce a particular effect. On the other hand, it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects; for until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible to perceive them, since perception involves sense-contact as its necessary condition. It is not necessary for our present purposes to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which Sriharsa seeks to refute: the above examination is expected to give a fairly comprehensive idea of the methods of Sriharsa's refutation of the category of cause.

Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the various categories accepted in Nyaya philosophy, or of all the various ways in which Sriharsa sought to refute them in his

Khandana-khanda-khadya. I have therefore attempted to give here only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical argument. The chief defect of Sriharsa's criticisms is that they often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent's definitions and do not do him the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. It is easy to see how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the Nyaya roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyayikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts, by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the attack of Srlharsa and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the criticisms of Sriharsa and some of his followers had done a great disservice to the development of later Nyaya thought; for, unlike the older Nyaya thinkers, later Nyaya writers, like Gangesa, Raghunatha and others, were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualificatory adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms of their opponents, could be avoided. If these criticisms had mainly been directed towards the defects of Nyaya thought, later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal expressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. Sriharsa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyaya thought.

Another defect of Srlharsa's criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyaya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories of thought. It ought, however, in all fairness to Sriharsa to be said that, though he took the Nyaya definitions as the main objective of his criticisms, yet in dealing with the various alternative variations and points of view of such definitions he often gives an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for example, in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the definitions of relation as container and contained, as inherence, and as subject-object relation of cognitions, and leaves out many other varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with. Another characteristic feature of his refutation is, as has already been pointed out, that he has only a destructive point of view and is

not prepared to undertake the responsibility of defining any position from his own point of view. He delights in showing that none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way, and that thus, being indescribable, they are all false. But incapacity to define or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the thing is false. Sriharsa did not and could not show that the ways of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of defining the different categories. They could probably be defined in other and better ways, and even those definitions which he refuted could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory phrases. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that, in whatever way one might try to define, one could not escape from those inner contradictions, which were inherent in the very nature of the concepts themselves. Instead of that he turned his attention to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the Nyaya and sometimes by Prabhakara and tried to show that these definitions were faulty. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show that the things defined are wrong. It is, no doubt, true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the refutation of the concepts involved in those definitions; but the refutation of the particular way of presentation of the concept does not mean that the concept itself is impossible. In order to show the latter, a particular concept has to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrences, and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis have to be shown.

Citsukha's Interpretations of the Concepts of Sankara Vedanta.

Citsukha (about a.d. 1220), a commentator on Sriharsa, had all Sriharsa's powers of acute dialectical thought, but he not only furnishes, like Srlharsa, a concise refutation of the Nyaya categories, but also, in his Tattva-pradipikd, commented on by Pratyagbha-gavan (a.d. 1400) in his Nayana-prasadtnl 1 , gives us a very acute

1 Citsukha, a pupil of Gaudesvara Acarya, called also Jnanottama, wrote a commentary on Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya's Nydya-makaranda and also on Sriharsa's Khandana-khanda-khadya and an independent work called Tattva-pradipikd or Cit-sukhi, on which the study of the present section is based. In this work he quotes Udayana, Uddyotakara, Kumarila, Padmapada, Vallabha (Lllavati), Salikanatha, SuresVara, Sivaditya, Kularka Pandita and Srldhara

analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts of Sankara Vedanta. He is not only a protector of the Advaita doctrine of the Vedanta, but also an interpreter of the Vedantic concepts 1 . The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedanta concepts of self-revelation (sva-prakdsa), the nature of self as consciousness (atmanah samvid-rupatva), the nature of ignorance as darkness, the nature of falsity (mithyatva), the nature of nescience (avidya), the nature of the truth of all ideas {sarva-pratyayanam yatharthatvam), the nature of illusions, etc. In the second chapter he refutes the Nyaya categories of difference, separateness, quality, action, class-concepts, specific particulars (visesa), the relation of inherence (samavaya), perception, doubt, illusion, memory, inference, invariable concomitance (vyapti), induction (vyapti-graha), existence of the reason in the minor term (paksa-dharmata), reason (hetu), analogy (upamana), implication, being, non-being, duality, measure, causality, time, space, etc. In the third chapter, the smallest of the book, he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman and the nature of release through knowledge. In the fourth chapter, which is much smaller than the first two, he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of emancipation.

Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most fundamental concept of the Vedanta, namely the concept of self-revelation or self-illumination (sva-prakasa). Both Padmapada and Prakasatman in the Panca-padika and Panca-padika-vivarana had distinguished the self from the ego as self-revelation or self-illumi-

(Nyaya-kandati). In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya of Sankara, called Bhdsya-bhdva-prakdsikd, Vivarana-tdtparya-dlpikd, a commentary on the Pramana- maid of Anandabodha, a commentary on Mandana's Brahma-siddhi, called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd, and an index to the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutra, called Adhikarana-manjari. His teacher Jftanottama wrote two works on Vedanta, called Nydya-sudhd and Jhdna-siddhi; but he seems to have been a different person from the Jftanottama who wrote a commentary on Suresvara's Naiskarmya-siddhi; for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder's title, misra), and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauda, as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his Tattva-pradtpikd. He is also said to have written the Brahma-stuti, Vimu-purdna-tlkd, Sad-darsana-samgraha-vrtti,Adhikarana-sangati (awork explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sutra) and a commentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi, called the Naiskarmya-siddhi-tlkd or the Bhdva-tattva-prakdsikd. His pupil Sukhaprakasa wrote a work on the topics of the Brahma-sutra, called Adhtkarana-ratna-mdld.

1 Thus Pandita Harinatha Jjarma in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattva-pradtpikd or Cit-sukhl speaks of this work as advaita-siddhdnta-raksako 'py advaita-siddhdnta-prakdsako vyutpddakai ca.

nation(svayam-prakdsa). Thus Prakasatmansays that consciousness {samvid) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to any other self-revealing cause 1 . It is on account of this natural self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self-revealing 2 . Padmapada also says the same thing, when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness; when this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and manifests them, it is called experience (anubhava), and, when it is by itself, it is called the self or atman 3 . But Citsukha was probably the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self-revelation.

Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparoksa-vyavahara-yogya), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve y pi)*. It may be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedanta epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc. are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing consciousness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the

1 samvedanam tu svayam-prakdsa eva na prakdsdntara-hetuh. Paiica-pddikd-vivarana, p. 52.

2 tasmdd anubhavah sajdtiya-prakdsdntara-nirapeksah prakdsamdna eva visaye prakds'ddi-vyavahdra-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhdnena visaye prakasd-di-vyavahdra-nimittaWat. Ibid.

3 tasmdt cit-svabhava evdtmd tena tena prameya-bhedena upadhlyamdno 'nubha-vdbhidhdmyakam labhate avivaksitopddhir dtmddi-sabdaih. Paiica-padikd, p. 10.

4 avedyatve saty aparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatvatn svayam-prakdsa-laksanum. Cit-sukhl, p. 9.

experience of these states is possible only through a process of illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediate 1 . So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper yogyata, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self-revealing consciousness, and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self-revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition; for on the Vedanta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be called immediate, and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing feature of the self-revealing consciousness; the epithet "immediate " is therefore also unnecessary. To such an objection Citsukha's reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet avedyatva successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called immediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing consciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing consciousness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self-revealing consciousness.

The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an independent self-revealing consciousness is admitted, there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cognition ; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood, then that also might require another process, and that another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover, that the pure experience is self-revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own experience or stands in need of any further corroboration or confirmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected

1 avedyatve 'pi naparoksa-vyavahara-yogyata tesdm, adhyastatayaiva tesam siddheh. Cit-sukhl, p. 10. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.

that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (anu-vyavasaya), and in such a case the self-revealing consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha's reply to this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity, then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I know that I know the jug—and hence such a cognition cannot be said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness, which could not have stayed through so many moments 1 . Again, since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self-revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and there would be no self-revelation. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of awareness, but only of the cognized object 2 . If the previous awareness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being known by the self {svasyapi svena vedyatvapatat) —a theory which would accord not with the Vedanta idealism, but with the Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing consciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state; but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects illuminated by it.

The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness (dtmanah samvld-rupatvd). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since this view had been maintained in the Upanisads and repeated by Sankara, Padmapada, Prakasatman and others. Citsukha says that, like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition, and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one doubts about his own self; for the self always stands directly and

1 ghata-jndnodaya-samaye manasi kriyd tato vibhdgas tatah purva-samyoga-vi-ndsas tata uttara-samyogotpattis tato jtidndntaram iti aneka-ksana-wlambena utpa-dyamdnasya jndnasya aparoksatayd purva-jndna-grdhakatvdnupapatteh. Cit-sukhl, p. 17.

2 indito ghata ity atra anuvyavasdyena ghatasyaiva viditatvam avaslyate na tu vitteh. Ibid. p. 18.

immediately self-revealed. Self and knowledge being identical, there is no relation between the two save that of identity {jnanatmanoh sambandhasyaiva abhavat).

Citsukha defines falsity {mithyatva) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause 1 . He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts 2 . Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (drk), and the objects which are cognized (drsya). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-con tact; for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) cannot explain it, since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplain-able. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object re\ation(visaya-visayi-bhava) in knowledge, Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject-object relation means that knowledge produces some change in the object (visaya) and that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as jnatatd, or the character of being known, how can such a character be by my knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects, then there would be no fixed law according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a reference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the dross contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical

1 sarvesdm api bhd-vdndm asrayatvena sammate

pratiyogitvam atyantdbhdvam prati mrsdtmatd. Cit-sukhl, p. 39. Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusudana's Advaita-siddhi, a work composed much later than the Cit-sukhl.

2 amsinah svdmsa-gdtyantdbhdvasya pratiyoginah amsitvdd itardmsiva... vimatah patah etat-tantu-nisthdtyantdbhdva-pratiyogl avayavitvdt patdntaravat. Cit-sukhl, pp. 40, 41.

drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge, and hence the subject-object relation of knowledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition. The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in consciousness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness mean ? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the object is contained in it; for, consciousness being internal and the object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness; for in that case the object may as well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity be defined as that which can induce knowledge, then even the senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form; for, knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed.

Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajnana) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge 1 . Nescience is different from the conception of positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative 2 . Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of knowledge; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something different from what one would understand by negation of right knowledge 3 . Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance becomes apparent when we say that" We do not know whether what you say is true." Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that

1 anddi-bhdva-rupam yad-vijndnena vihyate tad ajnanam iti prajfid-laksanam sampracaksate anaditve sati bhdva-rupam vijnana-nirdsyam ajnanam iti laksanam iha vivaksitam. Cit-sukhl, p. 57.

2 bhdvdbhdva-vilaksanasya ajndnasya abhdva-vilaksanatva-mdtrena bhdvatvo-pacdrdt. Ibid.

3 vigltam Deva-datta-nistha-pramdna-jndnam Devadatta-nistha-pramdbhdva-tiriktdnddernivarttakam pramdnatvdd Yajnadattddigata-pramdna-jnanavad ity anumanam. Ibid. p. 58.

what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is valid 1 . Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact, which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or sense-processes, but directly by the self-revealing consciousness— the saksin. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object there is ignorance (ajfidna), and the object, as qualified by such an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as known or as unknown 2 . Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as a state in which we did not know anything (na kimcid-avedisam) is also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dreamless state.

One of the chief tenets of Vedanta epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The opposite view is that of Prabhakara, that the false is never presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things which are not presented in experience as related. This false association is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a failure to note that no such association was actually presented in experience (asamsargagraha). According to Prabhakara, the great Mlmamsa authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one, and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is no false presentation in experience. Whatever is known is true; falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences.

Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation

1 tvadukte 'rthe pramana-jnanam mama ndsti ity asya visista-visaya-jndnasya pramdtvdt. Cit-sukhi, p. 59.

2 asman-mate ajnanasya sdksi-siddhataya pramdndbodhyatvdt, pramdna-jnano-daydtprdk-kdle ajridnam tad-visesito 'rthah sdksi-siddhah ajiidta ity anuvdda gocarah . . .sarvam vastu jndtatayd ajndtatayd vd sdksi-caitanyasya visayah. Ibid. p. 60.

can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the proposition, "There are false apprehensions and false presentations"; if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhakara's contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false, and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing with a real association and not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asamsarga-grahd). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce false appearance 1 . Thus in the case of the illusory perception of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that forms the object (alambana) of false perception? It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (asat), since that which is absolutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception, and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false perception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent; for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception, and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there was no silver in the past—it was only the conch-shell that appeared as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that constitutes the indefinable nature (anhvacaniyata) of all illusions 2 .

1 tathd dosanam api yathdrtha-jndna-pratibandhakatvam ayathdrtha-jiiana-janakatvam ca kim na syat. Cit-sukhl, p. 66.

2 pratyekam sad asattvdbhyam vicdta-padavlm na yad gdhate tad anirvdcyam dhur veddnta-vedinah. Ibid. p. 79.

It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedanta which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume 1 of this work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyaya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Srlharsa's great work Khandana-khanda-khadya, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Srlharsa. Citsukha's general approach to such refutations is also slightly different from that of Sriharsa. For, unlike Srlharsa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedanta, and his refutations of the Nyaya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.

Thus, in refuting time {kala), Citsukha says that time cannot be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor can it be apprehended by the mind [manas), as the mind only operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and duration, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the connection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time 1 . To this Citsukha replies that, since the self itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time. Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedantist. They may be regarded as the im-

1 tarani-parispanda-visesanarn yuva-sthavira-sarirddi-pindesu mdsddi-vicitra-buddhi-janana-dvdrena tad-upahitesu paratvdparatvddi-buddhi-janakatvam na ca tair asambaddhanam tatra buddhi-janakatvam, na ca sdksdt sambandho ravi-parispanddndm pindair asti atah tat-sambandhakatayd kascid astadravya-vilaksano dravya-visesah svikartavyah, tasya ca kdla iti samjnd. (This is Vallabha's view of time.) Nayana-prasddinl commentary on Cit-sukht, p. 321, by Pratyak-svarupa-bhagavat. Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1915.

pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibrations. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. From considerations of some data relative space (dik) has to be discarded; for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of experience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relativity (apeksd-buddhi), and, given that sense of relativity, the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category.

In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas Citsukha says that there is no ground for admitting the Vaisesika atoms. If these atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible, then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called irasarenus) may equally be regarded as the last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyaya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of the trasarenus could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible. Moreover, if the atoms were partless, how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again, it is not indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then repeats Sankara's refutation of the concept of wholes and parts, saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they must be in the parts or they would not be there; if they are not in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly or partly in them; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found; and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes and parts would appear.

Again, the concept of contact (samyoga) is also inexplicable. It

cannot be denned as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (apraptayoh prdptih samyogah) ; for, until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot understand the meaning of the phrase "not in contact." If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then contact (samyoga) would include even the relation of inherence, such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (anityah sambandhah janyatva-visesito va), then cases of beginningless contact would not be included, and even the possession of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time. It cannot be objected that "possession" is not a relation, since a relation to be such must be between two things; for, if the objection were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms, then there are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (avydpya-vrttitva-visesito), then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhaga) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two, three and the like.

Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we perceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (apeksa-buddhi) we associate them together and form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively produced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers of mental association 1 .

1 dropita-dvitva-tritvddi-visesitaikatva-samuccaydlambana buddhir dvitvadi-janiketi cet; na; tathabhutdya eva buddher dvitvadi-vyavahara-janakatvopapattau dvitvady-utpddakatva-kalpand-vaiyarthydt. Nayana-prasddiril, p. 300.

Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jati) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by inference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept. If it is said that, when in perceiving one individual animal we have the notion of a cow, and in perceiving other individual animals also we have the same notion of cow, there is jati, then it may be replied that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow; for, just as one individual had certain peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow, so the other individuals had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called cows. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. What constitutes the essentials of the concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal characteristic of cows; if one such characteristic could be found, then there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow. For it would then be an individual characteristic, and one would recognize it as a cow everywhere, and there would be no necessity of admitting a separate class-concept. If one admits a class-concept, one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates the class-concept. Then again one could not get at this trait or quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept independently of it, and this mutual dependence v/ould make the definition of either of them impossible. Even if one admits the class-concept, one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it in each case, and, if such essentials have to be found in each case, then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of admitting a class-concept? Again, even if a class-concept be admitted, it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related to the individuals. It cannot be a relation of contact, identity, inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. If all class-concepts existed everywhere, there would be a medley of all class-concepts together, and all things would be everywhere. Again, if it is held that the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing cows, then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor has the class-concept any parts, so as to be partly here and partly there. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each of the individual cows, then there would be a number of class-concepts ; and, if each class-concept of cow were spread out over all the individual cows, then, unless all the individual cows were

brought together, one could not have the notion of any class-concept.

Speaking of the refutation of cause (fozrarca), Citsukha says that cause cannot be defined as mere antecedence (purva-kala-bhavitva) ; for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman and on the back of which the washerman carries his clothes might be regarded as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the washerman's house and thus as a cause of fire. If this antecedence be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the effect, then also the washerman's ass may be considered to satisfy the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the fire in the washerman's house (when the washerman is away from the house with his ass, the fire in the washerman's house is also absent, and it is again kindled when he returns to his house with his ass). If " unconditionality " (ananyathd-siddha) is further added as a qualifying condition of antecedence, even then the ass and the common abiding elements such as space, ether and the like may be regarded as causes of the fire. If it be argued that the ass is present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors, the same may be said of seeds, earth, water, etc., which are all however regarded as being causes for the production of the shoots of plants. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether (akasa) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its being a common, abiding and all-pervasive element, then the same argument ought to stand as an objection against the soul (which is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyaya view as the cause of the production of pleasure and pain. The cause cannot be defined as that which being there the effect follows; for then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the plant, since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the help of other co-operating factors, such as earth, water, light, air, etc. Cause, again, cannot be defined as that which being present in the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories {sahakari), the effect follows; for an irrelevant thing, like an ass, may be present among a number of co-operating circumstances, but this would not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. Moreover, such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint operation of many co-operating entities the effect is produced. Furthermore, unless the cause can be properly defined, there is

no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which not being there there is no effect (sati bhavo 'saty abhava eva) ; for such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies: to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply that the different effects belong to different classes; for the differences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again, a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so far been possible to define what is meant by "cause." The phrase " collocation of causes " will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it may be asked whether a collocation of causes (samagri) be something different from the causes, or identical with them. If the former alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the collocation, the individuals being there, there is always the collocation and so always the effect, which is absurd. Again, what does this collocation of causes mean ? It cannot mean occurrence in the same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent; for the Nyaya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms, souls, etc., which have no cause.

Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (karya) be satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends upon the notion of cause.

In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities and a substance is believed by the Naiyayikas to be without any quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot

properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (gunavattvaty-antabhdvdnadhikaranata), then also it may be objected that such a definition would make us regard even negation (abhdva) as a quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself a negation, cannot exist in a negation 1 . It may again be asked whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities; in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distinguish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness 2 . If it is argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities, there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities of number and separateness cannot be said to have any further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the class-concept of substances 3 . Gold and mud and trees are all regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the substances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in them all 4 .

Referring to qualities (guna), Citsukha deals with the definition of guna in the Vaisesika-bhasya of Prasastapada. There Prasastapada defines guna as that which inheres in a substance, is associated with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality

1 tatraiva atyantdbhave'tivydpteh; sopi hi gunavattvdtyantdbhdvas tasyddhi-karanam svasya svasminnavrtteh. Cit-sukhl, p. 176.

2 asminnapi vakra-laksane gunddisu api samkhyd-prthaktva-gunayoh pr.atlteh katharn ndtivydptih. Ibid. p. 177.

8 •jdtim abhyupagacchata tajjdti-vyanjdkam kimcid-avasyam abhyupeyam na ca tannirupanam susakam. Ibid. p. 178.

* dravyam dravyam iti anugata-pratyayah pramdnam iti cenna suvarnam-upalabhya mrttikdm-upalabhyamdnasya laukikasya tad evedam dravyam iti pratyayd-bhavdt parlkfakdndm cdnugata-pratyaye vipratipatteh. Ibid. p. 179.

and which has no motion (niskriya) 1 . But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase "without a quality"; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the guna is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase "which has no motion" is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities.

It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, however, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criticizing the definitions given by the Naiyayikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Srfharsa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyaya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedanta. Sankara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyaya and other systems in his commentary on the Vedanta-sutras, 11. 11.

The Dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic.

The dialectic of Srfharsa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in may a. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nagarjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyaya definitions) Srlharsa's method was a continuation of Nagarjuna's, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyaya-Vaisesika. But the most important part of Nagarjuna's method was deliberately ignored by Srlharsa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nagarjuna's conclusions. Nagarjuna's main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in

1 rupddindm gundndm sarvesdm gunatvdbhisambandho dravydsritatvam mrgunatvam niskriyatvam. Prasastapdda-bhdsya, p. 94, The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.

themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nagarjuna was followed by Aryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nagarjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddha-ghosa of the fourth century a.d. does not refer to them. During the Gupta empire, in the fifth century a.d., Asariga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century a.d the relativist philosophy of Nagarjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapalita, of Valabhl in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhavaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhavya was called Madhyamika-Sautrantika on account of his supplementing Nagarjuna's arguments with special arguments of his own. At this time the Yogacara school of Mahayana monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness {vijnana) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency 1 . It seems very probable that Sriharsa was inspired by these Yogacara authors, and their relativist allies from Nagarjuna to Bhavya, and Candrakirti, the master commentator on NsLgSLr'pina'sMadhyamika-karika. Buddhapalita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhavaviveka sought to establish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakirti finally supported Buddhapalita's scheme as against the scheme of Bhavaviveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Madhyamika scheme of Candrakirti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.

In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nagarjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomeration (samagri) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nagarjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapalita holds that things cannot arise

1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp. 66-67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927.

of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhavaviveka, criticizing Buddhapalita, says that the refutation of Buddhapalita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candrakirti objects to this criticism of Bhavaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Samkhyists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Samkhya sat-karya-vada view; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Samkhya view. Thus Aryadeva says that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality 1 . This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Sriharsa. Sriharsa says that the Vedantists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various categories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedanta view could be attacked. The Vedanta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nagarjuna writes in his Vigraha-vyavartani thus:

When I have these (of my own to prove),

I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving);

But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent).

If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things,

I could then make an affirmation or a denial

Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).

But these (separate) things do not exist for me.

Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis 2 .

1 sad asat sad-asac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate updlambhas cirendpi tasya vaktum na sakyate.

Madhyamika-vrtti, p. 16.

2 anyat pratltya yadi noma paro 'bhavisyat jdyeta tarhi bahulah sikhino 'ndhakdrah sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvatas ca

tulyam paratvam akhile 'janake 'pi yasmat. Ibid. p. 36.

Candraklrti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Madhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirmations contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Madhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents' theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Madhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents.

Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. darkness from light 1 . And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without any cause (ahetutah).

The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are un-produced, the Madhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But, if the thesis that "all existents are unproved" is a mere assertion without any proof to support it, then any number of counter-assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown; and, if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. The Madhyamika answer to such an objection, as formulated by Candraklrti, is that the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule's horn. Since there is no thesis, the Madhyamika has nothing to

1 Madhyamika-vrtti, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky's The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs.

say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramana) or their number. But it may well be asked why, if the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are unproduced (sarve bhava anutpannah)} To this the Madhyamika replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers.

It is not out of place here to mention that the Madhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcendental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are admitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakirti with Dinnaga regarding the nature of sense-perceptions. While Dinnaga urges that a thing is what it is in itself {sva-laksana), Candrakirti holds that, since relations are also perceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. The "thing in itself" of Dinnaga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true; that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakirti thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyayikas, since, so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go, the Nyaya logic is quite competent to deal with them and give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Dinnaga, in defining perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself {sva-laksana) and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are extraneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose; for the definition of perception as given by Dinnaga is not from the transcendental point of view. If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the Nyaya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedantists, who on the one hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other

hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedantists on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Madhyamikas. The attempts of Srlharsa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyaya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyaya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the Naiyayikas used to think. But, while the Madhyamikas, who had no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic definitions of the Nyaya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked, the Vedanta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedanta therefore could not agree with Nyaya interpretations of experience and their definitions. But, as the Vedanta was unable to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it.

Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nagar-juna and Candraklrti hold that collocations of causal conditions which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is held by the Hlnayana Buddhists; for, since the effect is not perceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle which Nagarjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all. That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of anything else 1 .

Nagarjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space

1 Mddhyamika-vrtti, p. 90, 1. 6.

traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be associated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there must be two actions and not one; and, if there are two actions, that implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer; but, if there is no going without the goer and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition "the goer goes" (ganta gacchati) there is only one action of going, and that is satisfied by the verb "goes"; what separate "going" is there by virtue of association with which a "goer" can be so called? and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer. Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it cannot be urged that "going" must exist, since its opposite, "remaining at rest" (sthiti), exists; for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes; he who is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is no reality in going. " Going" stands here for any kind of passage or becoming, and the refutation of "going" implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (niskarsana) as well. If seeds passed into the state of shoots (ankura), then they would be seeds and not shoots; the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea, yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless reflected image of a woman's face may rouse attachment in fools,

so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attachment.

It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately Nagarjuna's method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhistic and other categories. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nagarjuna's dialectic with that of Sriharsa. Neither Nagarjuna nor Srlharsa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nagarjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Sriharsa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nagarjuna and Sriharsa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the reconstruction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Siiharsa attacked only the definitions of the Nyaya, Nagarjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Sriharsa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyaya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyaya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyaya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nagarjuna's methods differ considerably from those of Sriharsa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nagarjuna's criticisms are, however, largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore

very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Srlharsa; but at the same time they are fundamentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Srtharsa's dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and Candraklrti, Srlharsa's criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture.

Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalaslla (ad. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics.

(a) Criticisms of the Samkhya Parinama Doctrine.

In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedanta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nagarjuna and Candraklrti on Sankara and some of his followers, such as Srlharsa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nagarjuna and Candraklrti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Santaraksita's Tattva-samgraha with Kamalaslla's commentary Panjika, is a remarkable instance of this. Santaraksita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalaslla was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalasvatara, a follower of the Lokayata school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (a.d. 100), Dharmatrata (a.d. 100), Ghosaka (a.d. 150), Buddhadeva (a.d. 200), the Naiyayika Vatsya-yana (a.d. 300), the Mlmamsist Sabarasv?min (a.d. 300), the Samkhyist Vindhyasvamin (a.d. 300), the Buddhist Saiighabhadra (a.d. 350), Vasubandhu (a.d. 350), the Samkhyist Isvarakrsna (a.d. 390), the Buddhist Dirinaga (a.d. 400), the Jaina Acaryasuri (a.d. 478), the Samkhyist Mathara Acarya (a.d. 500), the Naiyayika Uddyotakara (a.d. 600), the rhetorician Bhamaha (a.d. 640), the Buddhist Dharmaklrti (a.d. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (a.d. 650), the Mlmamsist Kumarila Bhatta (a.d. 680),

the Jaina Subhagupta (a.d. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (a.d. 700), the Naiyayika Aviddhakarna (a.d. 700), Sankarasvamin (a.d. 700), Pra£astamati (a.d. 700), Bhavivikta (a.d. 700), the Jaina Patrasvamin (a.d. 700), Ahrika (a.d. 700), Sumati (a.d. 700), and the Mlmamsist Uveyaka (a.d. 700) 1 . It is not possible here, of course, to enter into a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla; yet some of the important points of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before Sankara and by which Sankara and his followers, like Sriharsa, Citsukha or Anandajnana, were in all probability greatly influenced.

In criticizing the Samkhya views they say that, if the effects, the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhana, why should they be produced from the pradhana ? If they are identical, then the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhana as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of parinama, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme of the Samkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal transformation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be asked whether such qualities are different from the causal substance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is undergoing transformations (parinama). If the changing qualities and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are given in favour of the sat-karya-vada (existence of the effect in the cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist

1 These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya's foreword to the Tattva-samgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper discussions, does not take responsibility for them.

in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific characteristic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the sat-karya-vada theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Samkhya in favour of sat-karya-vada, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible.

Again, according to Samkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-karya-vada theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application of all Samkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but decisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-karya-vada theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (niscaya) is already existent before the application of the argumentative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Samkhyist may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (abhivyakti). This manifestation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhavatisaya) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between

two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavastha). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the sat-h.arya-va.da theory, that knowledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Samkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation.

Santaraksita and Kamalaslla then urge that, though the above refutation of the sat-karya-vada ought naturally to prove the a-sat-karya-vada (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words maybe said in reply to the Samkhya refutation of a-sat-karya-vada. Thus the argument that that which is nonexistent has no form (nairiipya) and therefore cannot be produced is false; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkaryavadins think that out of the same three gunas different kinds of effects may be produced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karana-sakti-pratiniyamat), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately fundamental. The name a-sat-karya-vada, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being 1 . Production in reality means nothing more than the characteristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time 2 . The meaning of a-sat-karya-vada is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately

1 na hy asan-nama kificidasti yadutpattim dviset, kintu kdlpaniko 'yam vyava-hdro yad asad utpadyata iti ydvat. Tattva-samgraha-panjika, p. 33.

2 vastundm purvapara-koti-sunya-ksana-matravasthayl svabhdva eva utpadah ity ucyate. Ibid.

after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operation.

Refuting the other Samkhya doctrines, Santaraksita and Kamalaslla point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (sakti), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Samkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously impossible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects themselves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are regarded as being made up of three gunas, there is no reason for admitting one eternal prakrti as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non-eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakrti; but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakrti of the Samkhyists.

(b) Criticism of I wara.

One of the chief arguments of the Naiyayika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Santaraksita and Kamalaslla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaningless to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense-data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong;

for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God's will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other phenomena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argument's sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argument for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.

The arguments urged in refutation of prakrti and Isvara would also apply against the Patanjala-Samkhya, which admits the joint causality of Isvara and prakrti; for here also, prakrti and Isvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous production of all effects. If it is urged that the three gunas behave as accessory causes with reference to God's operation, then also it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga) the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution, there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that, though all kinds of forces are existent in prakrti, yet it is only those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of prakrti operative, while others are inoperative, and this would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of purusa

and prakrti is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false; for, had it been so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to nonexistent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent. Had He been independent, He wouldnothave allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. If He created the world out of mere playful instincts, then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play, then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and destroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that, just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider's webs is false, since the spider does not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God, however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent.

(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory.

The Nyaya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is objected to by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumination; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again, desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would

require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self, though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. It is sometimes argued that the existence of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since, unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its connection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some, however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience; if it had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be. On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say, " I am white "), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, " I am deaf "), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that its reference to body or to senses is only indirect; for no other permanent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience. Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The conclusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human beings. The supposed eternal "soul is so different from the body that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the soul theory of the Nyaya and Vaisesika.

(d) Refutation of the Mlmamsa Theory of the Self

Kumarila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. To this Santaraksita and Kamalasila reply that, if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then knowledge or the knowing faculty (buddhi) ought also to be regarded as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumarila does not

consider buddhi to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire, though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects are presented to it; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them(selves). If the change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be regarded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of consciousness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations, when there are no objects? Moreover the Mlmamsist does not think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms (nirakara buddhih). The fact that there may be cognitions without a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cognitions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since there is not one fire that is constant; the analogy of the reflecting mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle, the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory cognition. Again, the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again, if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from

the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self, that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness.

(e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self.

Against the Samkhya view of the self it is pointed out that the Samkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to buddhi and the purusa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with purusa, then with their change the purusa also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the purusa cannot be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the prakrti concentrates all its activities for the enjoyment of the purusa, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from purusa, why should the purusa suffer for what is done by the buddhP. If, again, the nature of purusa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an enjoyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable.

(/) The Refutation of the Upanisad View of the Self

The Upanisadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal consciousness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Santaraksita and Kamalasila that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipation. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained.

(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities. Santaraksita and Kamala&la point out that the Naiyayikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (krtaka) and unproduced (a-krtaka), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vatslputriyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Santa-raksita and Kamalaslla urge that whatever is produced is momentary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not depend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyayika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If produced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being negation, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the interference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruction is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions 1 .

1 The word ksanika, which is translated as "momentary," is, according to £antaraksita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately after production, is technically called ksana, and whatever has this quality is called ksanika (utpadanantara-vinasi-svabhavo vastunah ksana ucyate, sa yasyasti sa ksanika iti. Tattva-samgraha, p. 142); ksana therefore does not mean time-moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (ksana) cannot be called ksanika, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term ksanika, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license.

Kumalaslla and Santaraksita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriya-samartha). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If anv purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive accessories (kraminah sahakarinah), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by producing a special modification (atisayadhana) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (tadatmya and tad-utpatti), and neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavaya; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavaya). If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara) nor of the nature of an essence

identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samavaya, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samavdya relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the persisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting.

Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Santaraksita and Kamalasila reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (ekdrtha-kriya-karita) and, secondly, as mutual help (parasparopakdritd). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series.

The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same. The objector's argument that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid; for it is well known that even in ordinary perception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be

the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary.

(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities.

It is objected by the Naiyayikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another ? How, again, can it be understood that a momentary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Santaraksita and Kamalasila say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (dharma-samketa) for all production is, "this happening, that happens"; "this being produced, that is produced." It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Santaraksita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal

efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production 1 . The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha-bhutam karyam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyapara), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause 2 . If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another operation, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be admitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary antecedence 3 . Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception, if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has nothing to do with their determination 4 . There are in reality no agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental phenomena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddyotakara, that, if the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (vasana) by deeds {karma), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification

1 The Vaibhasikas are spoken of by Santaraksita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced by the destroyed cause.

8 idam eva hi karyasya kdrandpeksd yat tad-anantara-bhavitvam. Tattva-samgraha, p. 177.

3 na hi vayam dnantarya-mdtram kdrya-kdrana-bhdvddhigati-nibandhanam .. .yasyaivdnantaram yad bhavati tat tasya kdranam ifyate. Ibid. p. 180.

4 Santaraksita and Kamalaslla are Buddhists who style themselves nirdkdra-vijnana-vddin.

(vasana) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (avidya) and other mental causes, and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.

(1) Refutation of the Nyaya Vaisesika Categories.

Santaraksita and Kamalasila attempt to refute the categories of substance (dravya) with its subdivisions, quality (guna), action (karma), generality, or class concepts (samanya), specific peculiarities (visesa), relation of inherence (samavaya), and the connotation and denotation of words (sabdartha). This refutation may briefly be set out here.

Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature, all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation of wholes (avayavi), which has already been effected, also goes against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four substances earth, water, air and fire, which are ordinarily regarded as substantive—wholes made up of atoms—also stand refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due, like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate from the sense-organs, but they do not admit its existence as an eternal and single entity.

The refutation of substances implies the refutation of gunas,

which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the substances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in which relation the gunas are supposed to exist in substances. There is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The perception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. In a similar manner Santaraksita and Kamalasila proceed with the refutation of the other Nyaya qualities.

Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma), they hold that, if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. The main principle involved in the refutation of gunas and karmas consists in the fact that the gunas and karmas are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories inhering in them. Whatever may be the substance, that is also the quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion which it is supposed to execute.

Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there is no one character "cooking" by virtue of which the class-nature of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when

he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead any thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures.

Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (visesa) it is held that, if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as different from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties, then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves.

Regarding the refutation of samavaya, or relation of inherence, the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent samavaya relation, though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth) was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyayikas suppose.

Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajfiana.

It is well known that Sankaracarya in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, 11. ii 11-17, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the analogy of even the critics of the Vedanta, the Vaisesikas. The Vaisesikas hold that in the production of the dvy-anuka (containing two atoms) from the paramanu (single atom) and of the catur-anuka (containing four atoms) from the dvy-anuka, all other qualities of the paramanu and the dvy-anuka are transferred to the dvy-anuka and catur-anuka respectively, excepting the specific measures of parimandalya (specific atomic measure) and anu-hrasva (specific measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to paramanu and dvy-anuka respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of paramanus pass over to dvy-anukas produced by their combination, yet the specific parimandalya measure of the paramanus does not pass to the dvy-anukas, which are of the anu-hrasva parimana. So also, though all the qualities of dvy-anukas would pass on to the catur-anukas made out of their combination, yet their own specific anu-hrasva parimana would not pass on to the catur-anukas, which are possessed of their own measure, viz. the mahat parimana, uncaused by the parimana of the dvy-anukas. This shows that the

Vaisesikas believe that the pdrimandalya measure {parimdna) of the paramanus may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the dvy-anukas, and so the anu-hrasva measure of the dvy-anukas may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the catur-anukas, viz. the mahat parimdna. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaisesikas have nothing to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the paramdnu cannot pass on to the dvy-anuka only because its passage is rendered impossible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the anu-hrasva parimdna), then a similar reply may be given in the case of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover, since, according to the Vaisesika theory, all products remain for a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the dvy-anuka was produced, the pdrimandalya measure should not pass on to it. At that moment, since the pdrimandalya measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that the passing of the pdrimandalya measure is opposed by the other parimdna, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities (guna) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances. Sankara's second thesis is that the Vaisesika view that atoms combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. Moreover, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort, and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort, and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot themselves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such a contact. Sankara's third point is that the relation of samavdya upheld by the Vaisesikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two different objects the relation of samavdya is needed, then samavdya, being itself different from them, would require another samavdya to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum. If the relation of contact requires a further relation of samavdya to connect it with the objects in contact, there is no reason why samavdya should not require some other relation

in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining, then there can be no dissolution (pralaya), and, if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible. Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Moreover, it is not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternality, this must imply eternality and that therefore the atoms must be eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of eternality, it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does not imply eternality. Again, the Vaisesikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other categories depend on substance for their existence or manifestation. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (dravyatmakata gunasya). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their in-separableness (ayuta-siddhatva) from it. This inseparableness cannot be inseparableness of space; for, when threads constitute as their product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect, they are to be regarded as ayuta-siddha, or inseparable; and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of character or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaisesikas that their relation is one of samavaya, since they are inseparable in their nature.

Sankara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaisesikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that

result from some of the important Vaisesika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism of Sriharsa in his Khandana-khanda-khadya, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyaya logicians. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyaya modes of definition of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory. Citsukha's attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only the Nyaya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaisesika metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements, too, about the Vedanta doctrine itself. Anandajfiana's Tarka-samgraha is another important work of negative criticism of the Vaisesika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more elaborate scale of Citsukha's criticisms of the Vaisesika categories. The importance of the Vaisesika was gradually increasing, as it was gradually more and more adopted by Vaisnava realistic writers, such as Madhva and his followers, and it was supposed that a refutation of the Vaisesika would also imply a refutation of the dualistic writers who draw their chief support from Vaisesika physics and metaphysics.

Anandajfiana, also called Anandagiri, was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr Tripathi points out in his introduction to Anandajfiana's Tarka-samgraha that Anandajfiana was a spiritual head of the Dvaraka monastery of Sankara, of which Suresvaracarya was the first teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhutisvarupacarya and Suddhananda. Anubhutisvarupacarya wrote five works, viz. (1) a grammatical work called Sarasvata-prakriya, (2) a commentary on Sahkara's commentary on Gaudapada's Mandukya-karika, (3) a commentary on Anandabodha Yati's A^tfja-raflfozrawJa, called Nyaya-makaranda-samgraha, (4) a commentary, called Candrikd, on Anandabodha's Nyaya-dlpavali, and (5) another commentary, called Nibandha, on Anandabodha's Pramana-mala. Nothing is known about his other teacher, Suddhananda, who is different from the other Suddhananda, the teacher of Svayamprakasa of the

seventeenth century, author of the Advaita-makaranda-tlka. One of the most distinguished of Anandagiri's pupils was Akhandananda, author of the Tattva-dipana, a commentary on Prakasatman's Panca-padikd-vivarana, as he refers to him as srimad-ananda-saildhva-pancdsyam satatam bhaje in the fourth verse of his Tattva-dipana. Anandagiri wrote a large number of works, which are mostly commentaries. Of these his Isdvdsya-bhasya-tippana, Kenopanisad-bhdsya-tippana, Vdkya-vivarana-vydkhyd, Kathopanisad-bhdsya-tikd,Mundaka-bhdsya-vyakhyana,Mdndukya-Gaudapadiya-bhdsya-vyakhya, Taittiriya-bhdsya-tippana, Chdndogya-bhasya-tikd, Tait-tiriya-bhasya-vdrttika-tikd, Sastra-prakasika, Brhad-aranyaka-bhdsya-varttika-tika, Brhad-dranyaka-bhdsya-tikd, Sdriraka-bhdsya-tikd (called also Nydya-nirnaya), Gitd-bhdsya-vivecana , Pancikarana-vivarana, with a commentary called Tattva-candrikd by Rama Tlrtha, a pupil of Jagannathasrama (latter part of the fifteenth century), and Tarka-samgraha have already been printed. But some of his other works, such as Upadesa-sahasri-vizrti, Vakya-vrtti-tika, Atma-jnanopadesa-tika, Svarupa-nirnaya-tika, Tripurl-prakarana-tlka , Padartha-tattva-nimaya-vivaran a an d Tattvaloka, still remain to be printed. It will thus be seen that almost all his works are but commentaries on Sahkara's commentaries and other works. The Tarka-samgraha and Tattvaloka (attributed to "Janardana," which was probably the name of Anandagiri when he was a householder) seem to be his only two independent works 1 . Of these the manuscript of the second work, in which he refutes the doctrines of many other philosophers, including Bhaskara's parmama doctrines, has, unfortunately, not been available to the present writer. The Tarka-samgraha is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the Vaisesika philosophy. The book is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, dealing with the criticism of substances (dravya), he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality, reality (tattva), existence (sattva) i non-existence, positivity (bhaza) and negativity (abhava). Anandojnana then passes on to a refutation of the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds (according to the Vaisesika philosophy). He then criticizes the first substance, earth, and its diverse forms, as atoms (paramdnu) and molecules ( dvyanuka), and its grosser forms and their modified states,

1 See Mr Tripathi's introduction to his edition of the Tarka-samgraha, Baroda, 1917.

dii 13

as bodies, senses and sense-objects, and continues to criticize the other substances such as water, fire, air, and the theory of creation and dissolution, dkdsa, time, space, self (dtman) and manas. In the second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (guna), such as colour (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparsa), the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through molecular or atomic changes (pllu-pdka and pithara-paka), number (sankhya), measure (parimana), separateness (prthaktva), contact (samyoga), separation (vibhdga), the nature of knowledge, illusion and dreams, the nature of right knowledge and its means (pramdna and prama), perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), concomitance (vydpti), reason (hetu), fallacies (hetv abhasa), examples (drstanta), discussions, disputations and wranglings, testimony of the scriptures (agama), analogy (iipamana), memory, pleasure, pain, will, antipathy (dvesa), effort (prayatna), heaviness, liquidity (dravatva), virtue, vice, etc. In the third chapter he refutes the notion of action, class-concept or universality (jdti), the relation of inherence (samavdya) and different kinds of negation. The thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as that of Sriharsa or Citsukha, viz. that in whatsoever manner the Vaisesikas have attempted to divide, classify or define the world of appearances they have failed.

The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of criticisms and refutations reminds us of Anandabodha's conclusions in his Nydya-makaranda, on which a commentary was written by his teacher Anubhutisvarupa Acarya, to which reference has already been made when Anandabodha's views were under discussion. Thus Anandajnana says that an illusory imposition cannot be regarded as existent (sat) ; for, since it is non-existent in the substratum (adhisthdna) of its appearance, it cannot be existent anywhere else. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (atyantdsat) ; for, had it been so, it would not have appeared as immediately perceived (aparoksa-pratiti-virodhdt) ; nor can it be regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. The only alternative left is that the illusory imposition is indescribable in its nature 1 . This indescribability (anirvdcyatva) means that, in whichever way one may try to describe it, it is found that none of those ways can be affirmed of it or, in other words, that it is indescribable

1 pdrisesydd anirvacyam dropyam upagamyatdm sattvadinam prakdrdnam prdg-ukta-nydya-bddhandt. Tarka-sarngraha, p. 135.

in each and every one of those ways 1 . Now, since all appearances must have something for their cause and since that which is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause (na ca avastuno vastu upadanam upapadyate), and, since they are all indescribable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature, the nescience of the substratum 2 .

He then asserts that this nescience (ajnana), which is the material out of which all appearances take their form, is associated with Brahman; for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all {sarva-jna) without its association with ajnana, which is the material stuff of the all (the knower, the means of knowledge, the objects and their relations) 3 . Everything else that appears except the one reality, the self, the Brahman, is the product of this ajnana. This one ajnana then can explain the infinite kinds of appearances, and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting a number of ajnanas in order to explain the diversity or the plurality of appearances. The many selves are thus but appearances produced by this one ajnana in association with Brahman 4 . It is the one ajnana that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as well as of the waking state. It is the one ajnana which produces all kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of operation. If there is only one reality, which through one ajnana appears in all diverse forms of appearances, how is the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-recognition to be explained? To this difficulty Anandajfiana's reply is that both the perceiving and the perceived self are but false appearances in the antahkarana (an ajnana product), and that it does not in any way infect the one true self with any kind of activity. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless, indescribable ajnana in connection with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage, as it were, and again appears liberated, as it were, through the

1 yena yena prakdrena paro nirvaktum icchati

tena tendtmana 'yogas tad-anirvdcyatd matd. Tarka-samgraha, p. 136.

2 tastndd rupyddi-karyasydnirvdcyatvdt tad-updddnam api adhisthdnajnanam upddeyam. Ibid. p. 137.

8 pramdnatah sarvajnatve 'pi pramdtrtvasya pramana-prameya-sambandhasya cdjndna-sam.band.ham antarenasiddheh tasmin ajndnavattvam avasyam dsrayita-vyam anyathd sarvajnatvdyogdt. Ibid. pp. 137, 138.

* ekas tdvad dtmd dvayor api avayoh sampratipanno 'sti, tasya svdjndndd eva avivada-siddhad ekasmdd atiriktam sarvatn pratibhdti;. . .samastasyaiva bheda-bhanasydparamarthikasyaikajnana-samarthydd eva sambhavdn najnana-bhede hetur asti. Ibid. pp. 138, 139.

13-2

realization of the Vedantic truth of the real nature of the self 1 . In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.

In view of the above it may be suggested that Anandajfiana is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajnana to Brahman which was upheld by Vacaspati and Anandabodha. Anandajfiana's position as an interpreter of Sankara's philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Sankara and also from the references made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers, as Prajfianananda, Sesa Sarngadhara, Vadivagisvara, Vadindra, Ramananda Sarasvati, Sadananda Kasmiraka (a.d. 1547), Krsnananda (a.d. 1650), Mahesvara Tirtha (a.d. 1650) and others.

Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivarana (a.d. 1200).

The Prakatartha-vivarana (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work— prarabhyate vivaranam prakatartham etat) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Sarikara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakatar or to the author of the Prakatartha (prakatartha-kara), and not to the author's personal name 2 . This work has been referred to by Anandajfiana, of the thirteenth century (Mundaka, p. 32; Kena, p. 23; Ananda-srama editions a.d. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth

1 Advitlyam dtma-tattvam, tatra ca anddy anirvdcyam ekam ajndnam ananta-bheda-pratibhana-niddnam, tatas cdnekdrtha-kalusitam dtma-tattvam baddham ivdnubhuyamdnam,veddnta-vdkyottha-tattva-sdksdtkdra-pardkrta-sakdrydjndnam muktam iva bhdti; paramdrthato na bandho na muktir iti sakarydjiidna-nivrtty-upalaksitam paripurnam dtma-tattvam eva paratna-purusdrtha-rupam sidhyati. Tarka-samgraha, p. 141.

2 The colophon of the work runs as follows:

jnatvdpi yasya bahu-kdlam acintanena vydkhydtum ak$amatayd paritdpi cetah tasyopatdpa-harandya mayeha bhdsye prarabhyate vivaranam prakatartham etat.

MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.

century. He certainly preceded Ramadvaya, the author of the Vedanta-kaumudi, who not only refers to the Prakatdrtha, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work 1 . The author of the latter holds that the indefinable mayd in association with pure consciousness {cin-mdtra-sambandhini) is the mother of all existence (bhuta-prakrti). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in mayd is produced Isvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahma, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahma that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the mayd. Maya or ajtidna is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajndnam ndbhdva updddnatvdn mrdvat). But, being of the nature of veiling {dvaranatvdt) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakdsa-heyatvdt), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions 2 . The well-known Vedantic term svaprakdsa is defined in the Prakatdrtha as illumination without the cognition of its own idea {sva-samvin-nairapeksena sphuranam). The self is to be regarded as self-revealing ; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable 3 . The author of the Prakatdrtha then criticizes the Kumarila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (dtma-samavdyi visaya-prakdso jndnam), and the Bhaskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this manas which, being helped by the moral destiny {adrstddi-sahakrtam), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the

1 Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, p. 99.

2 dvaranatvdt prakdsa-heyatvdd vd tamovat-svarupena pramdna-yogyatve 'py abhdva-vydvriti-bhrama-kdranatvddi-dharma-viiistasya prdmdnikatvam na viru-dhyate. MS. p. 12.

3 dtmd sva-prakdsas tato 'nyathd'nupapadyamdnatve sati prakdiamdnatvdn na ya evam na sa evam yathd kumbhah. Prakatdrtha MS.

revelation of an object {manah-parinamah samvid-vyanjakojnanam) 1 . In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas there, being in direct touch with the reason or the linga, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed 2 . The author of the Prakatartha accepted the distinction between may a and ajnana as conditioning Isvara and jiva.

Vimuktatman (a.d. 1200).

Vimuktatman, a disciple of Avyayatman Bhagavat Pujyapada, wrote his Ista-siddhi probably not later than the early years of the thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by Madhusudana in his Advaita-siddhi and by Ramadvaya in his Vedanta-kaumudi of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jnanottama, the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called Ista-siddhi-vyakhya or Ista-siddhi-zivarana. For reasons stated elsewhere Jnanottama could not have flourished later than the latter half of the thirteenth century. Vimuktatman wrote also another work, called Pramana-vrtti-nirnaya, to which he refers in his Ista-siddhi (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published, and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Naduvil Matham, Cochin State, and which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedanta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Siddhis, such as the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana, the Naiskarmya-siddhi by Suresvara,

1 MS. P . 54.

2 upalabdha-sambandhdrtha karena parinatam mono 'ndvabhdsa-vydvrtti-mdtraphalam, na tu samvid-vyanjakam lingddi-samvid-vyavadhdna-pratibandhat. MS. p. 54.

It is easy to see how Dharmarajadhvarindra elaborated his Vedantic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his predecessors.

the hta-siddhi by Vimuktatman and the Advaita-siddhi by Madhusudana. Hitherto only the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Advaita-siddhi have been published. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work.

The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless, incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self-joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness (anubhuti). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless; but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginningless, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects is this, that, while the latter can be described as the "this" or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (drk) and the perceived (drsya); for the former is unperceived (adrsyatvai). No difference can be realized between a perceived and an unperceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities. But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (na svarupa-drstih prati-yogy-apeksa). The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (dharma) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours, tastes, etc. 1 But this view also is not correct, since it is difficult to admit "difference" as an entity different from the

1 tasmat kathancit bhinno jnanantara-gamyo rupa-rasddivad bhedo 'bhyupeyah. Adyar Igta-siddhi MS. p. 5.

differing entities; for such a difference would involve another difference by which it is known, and that another and that another, we should have an infinite regress; and the same objection applies to the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how "difference" or mutual negation between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized; for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this "difference," or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles, could be perceived 1 . Moreover, the self-luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible that it could be negated—a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of difference or mutual negation. Therefore, "difference" or "mutual negation" cannot be established, either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics; and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics. Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception, and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (drk and drsya) cannot be differentiated from each other. The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be characteristic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience. It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both

1 evarn ca sati na drg-drsyayor bhedo drastum sakyah

napy anyonyabhdvah na hi drsah svayam drsteh prati-yogy-apeksa-drsty-antara-drsyam rupantaram svam samasti svayam drstitva-hdnat. MS. p. 6.

experienced simultaneously {sahopalambha-niyamat) ; but the reply is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two their difference is also manifested 1 . In spite of such obvious contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the identity of the perceiver and the perceived 2 . The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous, secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the perceived, and, thirdly, though the "perceived" cannot be revealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the perceived. When a perceived object A is illuminated in consciousness, the other objects B, C,D, etc. are not illuminated, and, when the perceived object B is illuminated, A is not illuminated, but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated; so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed 3 . Moreover, each particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cognition; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object, like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness, cannot be identified with its object 4 . It has already been pointed out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both identical and different (which is the bhedabheda view of Bhaskara and Ramanuja and others), and Vimuktatman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the

1 abhede saha-bhanayogad dvayor hi saha-bhdnam na ekasyaiva na hi drsaiva drk saha bhdtlti bhavatdpy ucyate, ndpi drsyenaiva drsyam saha bhdtlti kintu drg-drsyayoh saha bhanam ucyate atas tayor bhedo bhaty eva. MS. p. 25.

2 tasmdt sarva-vyavahdra-lopa-prasangdn na bhedo drg-drsyaoh. Ibid.

3 kim vidyud-visesitatd ndma samvidah svarupam uta samvedyasya, yadi samvidah sdpi bhaty eva samvid-bhdndt samvedya-svarupam cet tada bhdndn na samvido bhanam. Ibid. p. 27.

4 asamvedyaiva samvit samvedyam casamvid eva, atah samvedyasya ghata-sukhadeh samvidas cdbheda-gandho 'pi na pramdnavdn. Ibid. p. 31.

perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. The upholder of the bhedabheda view is supposed to say that, though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman is in another form, then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman; and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their difference they have any form in which they are one and identical. If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical entity should have two different forms, then also the question arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would not be different; in the second they would not be one with the entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any particular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms; for then these different forms would not be different from one another; and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can one distinguish the entity {rupiri) from the forms {rupd) ? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. In the first case each form would have two forms, and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress: and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman.

If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu) ; for, if it had any substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three

ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To this Vimuktatman's reply is that, since the world is admitted to be made up of maya (maya-nirmitatvabhyupagamat), and since the effects of maya canot be regarded either as substantial or as unsubstantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. Since the manifold world is not a substance, its admission cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial, the facts of experience may also be justified 1 . As an instance of such an appearance which is neither vastu (substance) nor avastu y one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not-substance, but because they are contradicted in experience. Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world-appearance, which is but a painting of maya on it 2 .

Maya is unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacaniya), not as different from both being and non-being, but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (avidya-sakti) which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jadopddana-bhuta). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to

1 prapancasya vastutvabhavan nddvaita-honih avastutvabhdvdc capratyaksddy-aprdmdnyam' apy-ukta-do$dbhdvdt. MS. p. 64.

2 yatha citrasya bhittih sdkfdt nopdddnam ndpi sahajam citram tasydh napy-avasthdntaram mrda iva ghatddih ndpi gundntardgamah dmrasyeva raktatddih na cdsydh janmddis citrdt prdg Urdham ca bhdvdt, yady apt bhittim vind citram na bhdti tathdpi na sd citram vind bhdti ity evam-ddy-anubhutir bhitti-jagac-citrayor yojyam. Ibid. p. 73.

shine in its own radiance 1 . The functions of the pramanas, which are all mere processes of ignorance, ajnana or avidya, consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent akasa or space; the pramanas have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling ajnana 1 . So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last remnants of ajnana, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of ajnana , also ceases of itself. This cessation of ajnana is as unspeakable as ajnana itself. Unlike Mandana, Vimuktatman does not consider avidya to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations. Vimuktatman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (khyati), and more particularly to the criticism of anyathakhyati. These contain many new and important points; but, as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktatman, which do not involve any new point of view in Vedantic interpretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedantic topics of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedanta; but, as there are not here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left out in the present work.

Ramadvaya (a.d. 1300).

Ramadvaya, a pupil of Advayasrama, wrote an important work, called Vedanta-kaumudl, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedantic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Sarikara's commentary on the first four topics of the Brahma-sutra. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government

1 MS. p. 137. 2 Ibid. p. 143.

Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Ramadvaya also wrote a commentary on his Vedanta-kaumudi, called Vedanta-kaumudi-vyakhyana, 2. manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the writing of the copy of the Vedanta-kaumudi-vyakhyana is given by the copyist Sesanrsimha as a.d. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Ramadvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyaya and Vedanta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktatman, author of the Ista-siddhi, has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Ramadvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his Vedanta-kaumudi-vyakhyana (MS. p. 14) refers to Janardana, which is Anandajnana's name as a householder; but Janardana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Ramadvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century.

In the enunciation of the Vedantic theory of perception and inference Ramadvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the Prakatartha ; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration 1 . Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable avidya and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work 2 . Such a conditioning factor is found in

1 See Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47.

2 Ramadvaya refers here to the daharadhikarana of Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra, presumably to 1. 3, 19, where !§ankara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (jtva) and Brahman. Here Sankara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upanisadic interpreters, which regard individual souls as real (apare tu vddinah paramdrthikam eva jaivatn rupam iti manyante asmadlyas ca kecit). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of

manas, which is of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas, being propelled by the moral destiny (adrstadi-ksubdham), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself 1 . The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the antahkarana {antahkaranavacchinnam caitanyam), does by such a process remove its veil of avidya, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this avidya formed its own body), and the object also being in contact with it is manifested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (vrtti) there, are joined together in the same cognition as "this object is known by me" (vrtter ubhayasamlagnatvac ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanya-syapi tathatvena mayedam viditam iti samslesa-pratyayah) ; and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antahkarana, transformed into the form of the process {vrtti) of right knowledge (prama), appears as the cognizer {vrtti-laksana-pramasraydntah-karanavacchinnas tat-pramatetyapi vyapadisyate) 2 . The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (karma-karakabhivyaktam ca tat prakasatmana phala-vyapadesa-bhdk). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the vrtti transformation of the antahkarana; but, as it is illusorily identified with the antahkarana (antahkarana-caitanyayor aikyadhyasat), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the vrtti transformation of the antahkarana, and, as the vrtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the vrtti it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (evam vrtti-vyanjakam api tapta-yah-pinda-nyayena tad-ekatam ivaptam vrttivad-visaya-prakatyat-mana sampadyate) 3 . The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Ramadvaya may thus be described. The

the self as the only reality which through avidya manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as paramesvara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Paramesvara, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through avidya. There is no consciousness other than this {eka eva paramesvarah kutastha-nityo vijnana-dhatur avidyaya-mayaya mayavivad anekadhd vibhavyate ndnyo vijnana-dhatur asti).

1 This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakatartha, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Veddnta-kaumudl and the Prakatartha borrowed it from the Panca-pddika-vivarana.

2 Veddnta-kaumudl, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.

3 Ibid, p. 37.

sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (adrsta) to stir up the antahkarana, and, as a result thereof, the antahkarana or mind is transformed into a particular state called vrtti. The pure consciousness underlying the antahkaranaw&s lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transformation of the antahkarana into a vrtti, the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The vrtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the vrtti is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vrtti transformation. Now, since the vrtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (samslesa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition "this object is known by me"; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the antahkarana as transformed into the vrtti, and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. In the Vedanta-paribhasa we hear of three consciousnesses (caitanya), the pramdtr-caitanya (the consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana), the pramana-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the vrtti of the antahkarana), and the visaya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (pratyaksa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jnana-gata-pratyaksatva) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramana-caitanya from the visaya-caitanya through spatial super-imposition of the vrtti on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (visaya-gata-pratyaksatva) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the pramdtr-caitanya or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana. This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antahkarana (ghatdder antahkarandva-cchinna-caitanyabhedah), is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned

by the antahkarana — antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya) but with the cognition (pramana-caitanya or vrtti-caitanya); for the cognition or the vrtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and the object is in immediate contact with the vrtti and not with the perceiver {antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya). That this is so is also admitted by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, son of Ramakrsna Adhvarin, in his Sikha-mani commentary on the Vedanta-paribhasa 1 . But he tries to justify Dharmaraja Adhvarindra by pointing out that he was forced to define visaya-gata-pratyaksatva as non-distinction of the object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakasatman's Vivarana and also in other traditional works on Vedanta 2 . This however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vivarana to which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view 3 . It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge {samvid)*. That other traditional Vedantic interpreters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual process given by Ramadvaya. Ramadvaya says, as has just been pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the vrtti, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-predicate form "this is known by me." The object is thus illuminated by the vrtti, and it is not directly with the subject, but with the vrtti, that the object is united. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book, one should feel " I am the book," and not " I perceive the book "; in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process

1 yad vd yogyatve sati visaya-caitanydbhinna-pramdna-caitanya-visayatvam ghatader visayasya pratyaksatvam tathdpi visayasydparoksatvam samvida-bheddt iti vivarane tatra tatra ca sdmpraddyikaih pramatrabhedasyaiva visaya-pratyaksa-laksanatvendbhidhdndd evam uktatn. Sikhd-mani on Vedanta-paribhasa, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.

* Ibid.

3 Tasmdd avyavadhdnena sanwid-upddhitayaparoksata visayasya. Panca-padika-vivarana, p. 50, Benares, 1892.

4 It should be noted here that samvid means cognitional idea or sense-knowledge and not the perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya), as the author of the Sikhdmani says. Thus Akhandananda in his Tattva-dipana commentary explains the word samvid as samvic-chabdena indriydrtha-samprayoga-ja-jndnasya vivaksitatvdt. Tattva-dipana, p. 194, Benares, 1902.

there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion "I am the book" 1 . This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of avidya on one distinctionless pure consciousness ; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-object experience. The difference of the Vedantic view of perception, as expounded in the Panca-pddika-vivarana, from the Buddhist idealism (vijndna-vdda) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts, the Vedanta accepted the independent manifestation of the objects in perception in the external world 2 . There is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object; but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhdnena samvid-upddhita aparoksata visayasya — Vivarana, p. 50). The object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness, whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference (prameyam karmatvena aparoksam pramdtr-pramiti punar aparokse eva kevalam na karmatayaf.

The views of the Vedanta-kaumudi, however, cannot be regarded as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the exposition of the subject in Padmapada's Panca-pddika and Praka-satman's Panca-pddika-vivarana. The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the Panca-pddikd-vivarana y since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled by avidya ; that, as the antahkarana is transformed into states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antahkarana transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely

1 Veddnta-paribhdsd, pp. 76, 77.

2 na ca mjndnabheddd eva dparoksyam avabhdsate bahistvasydpi rajatdder dparoksydt. Panca-pddika-vivarana, p. 50.

3 Panca-pddika, p. 17, Benares, 1891.

d 11 14

of the antahkarana transformations (called vrtti in the Veddnta-kaumudi, and Vedanta-paribhasa and pure consciousness); to the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antahkarana (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the antahkarana modification (or vrtti), there would be nothing to explain the duality in perception (e.g. " I perceive the book," and not "I am the book," and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Praka-satman's reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness with the antahkarana-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the vrtti of the antahkarana and, since the antahkarana is one with its vrtti, the vrtti operation is rightly attributed to the antahkarana as its agent, and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the antahkarana resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the vrtti is directed in spatial superimposition—the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the vrtti with reference to the subject and the object 1 . This is exactly the interpretation of the Veddnta-kaumndi, and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the Vedanta-paribhasa are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific antahkaranas) and individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidya materials constituting the objects) through the vrtti, it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects 2 . This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of ajfiana-veite, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one ajnana corresponding to the illumination of one object 3 . But this also is not an original contribution of Ramadvaya, since it was also propounded by his predecessor Anandajfiana in his Tarka-

1 See Panca-pddika-vivarana, p. 70, and Tattva-dipana, pp. 256-259, Benares, 1902.

2 etat pramdtr-caitanydbhinnatayaiva abhivyaktam tad vi$aya-caitanyam na pramdtr-antara-caitanydbhedena abhivyaktam ato na sarvesdm avabhdsyatvam. Panca-pddika-vivarana, p. 71.

3 yavanti jndndni tavanti sva-tantrdni para-tantrdni vd ajndndni tato na dosah. Veddnta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 43.

samgraha and by others 1 . The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyaya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jnatata), as Kumarila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (visayabhivyaktir noma vijndne tad-akarollekha-matram na bahir-anga-rUpasya vijnanabhivyaptih),2is is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antahkarana) 2 . Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each

1 The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajnana-veils; as soon as there is the vrift'-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illuminated ; the next moment there is again an ajiiana-xeil covering the object, and again there is the wm'-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vrtti-vijndnasya sdvayavatvdc ca hrdsa-dasdydm dlpa-jvdldyd iva tamo 'ntaram mohdntaram dvaritum visayam pravartate tato 'pi kramamdnam ksandntare sdmagry-anusdrena vijna.ndntara.rn visay Svarana-bhangenaiva sva-kdryam karoti, tathd sarvdny apt atisaighrydt tu jnana-bhedavad dvarandntaram na laksyate. Veddnta-kaumudl, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the Veddnta-kaumudl is different from the view of the Veddnta-paribhdsd, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vrtti and not different vrttis removing different ajndnas {kin ca siddhdnte dhdrd-vdhika-buddhi-sthale na jndnd-bhedah kintu ydvdd ghata-sphuranam tdvad ghatdkdrdntahkarana-vrttir ekaiva na tu nana vrtteh sva-virodhi-vrtty-utpatti-paryantam sthdyitvdbhyupagamdt. Veddnta-paribhdsd, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 191 1).

2 atah sdvayava-sattvdtmakam antahkaranam eva anudbhuta-riipa-sparsam adrsyam asprsyam ca visaydkdrena parinamate. Veddnta-kaumudl, MS. copy, p. 42.

14-2

dispelling an intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of momentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time 1 . According to Ramadvaya the definition of perception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of perception ; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process.

Ramadvaya's definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Ramadvaya defines right knowledge {prama) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object {yatharthanubhavah prama) , and he defines the instrument of right knowledge as that which leads to it 2 . Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, with whom the two conditions of prama or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted 3 . The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Ramadvaya's definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction (Dharmaraja Adhvarindra's condition) and want of wrong representation (Ramadvaya's condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact

1 na kalah pratyak$a-gocarah. . .stambhddir eva prdg-abhdva-nivrtti-pradhvam-sdnutpatti-rupo vartamdnah tad-avacchinah kdlo 'pi vartamdnah sa ca tathd-vidho 'neka-jndna-sddhdrana eva, na caitdvatd jndna-yangapadydpattih suksma-kdldpeksayd krama-sambhavdt, na ca suksma-kalopddhtndm apratltih kdrya-kramenaiva unnlyamdnatvdt. Veddnta-kaumudl, MS. copy, pp. 20-22.

2 Ibid. p. 16.

3 tatra smrti-vydvrttam pramdtvam anadhigatdbddhttdrtha-vifaya-jndnatvam. Veddnta-paribhdsd, p. 20.

that the Vedanta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the antahkarana (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedanta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedanta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of prama by Ramadvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yatharthd-nubhava) of objects could not be-found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedanta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Ramadvaya refers to the Ista-siddhi to justify his view on this point.

As to the other point, viz. that a prama must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata), Ramadvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion 1 . He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhigatatva as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Ramadvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antahkarana with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the antahkarana is in touch only with the reason orthe/m^a (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (lingadi-bala-labdhakarollekha-matrena) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference 2 .

1 ajnata-jnapanam pramdnam iti tad asaram. Veddnta-kaumudl, MS. copy, p. 18.

2 Ibid. p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedantic view of inference occurs in the Prakatartha-vivarana, to which the Veddnta-kaumudl is in all probability indebted.

On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge {svatah-pramanyd) Ramadvaya does not, like Dharmarajadhvarlndra, include the absence of defects (dosabhava) in the definition of watah-pramanya. It may well be remembered that Dharmaraja Adhvarindra defines validity (pramanya) of knowledge as an awareness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakaraka-jnanatvatn), while self-validity (svatah-pramanya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying saksi consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective conditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects 1 . Ramadvaya, however, closely follows Rumania's view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources 2 . Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumarila and already discussed 3 . In this connection Ramadvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us 4 .

Vidyaranya (a.d. 1350).

In addition to the Sarva-darsana-samgraha Madhava wrote two works on the Sankara Vedanta system, viz. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and Pancadasl; and also Jlvan-mukti-viveka. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakasatman's Panca-padika-vivarana, in which Madhava elaborates the latter's arguments in his own way. His other work, Pancadasl, is a popular compendium in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of

1 dosabhdve sati ydvat-svdsraya-grdhaka-sdmagfl-grdhyatvam; svdsrayo vrtti-jridnam, tad-grdhakam sdksi-jndnam tendpi vrtti-jndne grhyamdne tad-gata-prdmdnyam apt grhyate. Veddnta-paribha§d, pp. 336, 337.

2 vijndna-sdmagri-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvam tad-abhdvasyaiva svatastvokty-angikdrdt. Veddnta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 52.

jnaptdvapijndTM-jndpaka-sdmagn-mdtra-jndpyatvam svatastvam. Ibid. p. 61.

3 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 372-375.

* prdkatyena yuktasydpi tasya na sarvair viditatvam sva-prakdsam api prdkatyam kasyacid evddrsta-yogat sphurati na gunatve jndnasya kathancid artha-yogah samastlti. Veddnta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.

their clear and forcible style and diction. Vidyaranya is reputed to be the same as Madhava, brother of Sayana, the great Vedic commentator. He was a pupil of Sankarananda, who had written some works of minor importance on the Upanisads 1 .

Vidyaranya in his Pancadasi repeats the Vivarana view of the Vedanta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the experience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self-luminous and neither rises nor sets 2 . This self is pure bliss, because nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoyment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects. Maya is the cause of this obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (sakti), cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and maya. The existence or being of all things is the Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the maya part. Maya as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations and interactions 3 . He compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white paste for the inner controller (antaryamin), the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (sutratmari) and the coloration for

1 Bharatltlrtha and his teacher Vidyatlrtha also were teachers of Vidyaranya. Vidyaranya thus seems to have had three teachers, BharatI Tlrtha, Vidya Tlrtha and Jsarikarananda.

2 nodeti nastamety eka samvid esa svayam-prabhd. Pancadasi, i. 7, Basumati edition, Calcutta, 1907.

3 saktir asty aisvarl kdcit sarva-vastii-niyamikd. 38. .. .cic-chaydvesatah saktis cetaneva vibhdti sa. 40. Ibid. ill.

the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (virat), and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through the mdyd, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification of subjectivity—a product of mdyd —with the underlying pure consciousness—Brahman. Vidyaranya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedanta, which have already been dealt with. The chief and important feature of Vidyaranya's Pancadasl is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedantic principles in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedantic ways of self-realization 1 . His Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is a more scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in Panca-pddikd-vivarana, which has generally been followed as the main guide in the account of Vedanta given in this and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyaranya to the development of Vedantic thought, no separate account of its contents need be given here 2 . The Jivan-mukti-viveka, the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x, volume 1 of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more or less the same ground as the Naiskarmya-siddhi of Suresvara.

Nrsimhasrama Muni (a.dT 1500).

NrsimhaSrama Muni (a.d. 1500) was a pupil of Glrvanendra Sarasvati and Jagannathasrama and teacher of NarayanaSrama, who wrote a commentary on his Bheda-dhikkdra. He wrote many works, such as Advaita-dlpikd,Advaita-panca-ratna,Advaita-bodha-dipikd, Advaita-vdda y Bheda-dhikkara, Vdcdrambhana, Vedanta-tattva-viveka, and commentaries on the Samksepa-sdrlraka and Panca-

1 There are four commentaries on the Pancadasl: — Tattva-bodhiril, Vrtti-prabhdkara by Niscaladasa Svamin, Tatparya-bodhinl by Ramakrsna and another commentary by Sadananda. It is traditionally believed that the Pancadasl was written jointly by Vidyaranya and BharatI Tirtha. Niscaladasa Svamin points out in his Vrtti-prabhakara that Vidyaranya was author of the first ten chapters of the Pancadasl and BharatI Tirtha of the other five. Ramakrsna, however, in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter, attributes that chapter to BharatI Tirtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyaranya and the other nine by Bharatltlrtha.

2 He also wrote another work on the Vivarana, called Vivaranopanyasa, which is referred to by Appaya Diksita in his Siddhdnta-lesa, p. 68— Vivaranopanycse Bharatltlrtha-vacanam.

padika-vivarana, called Tattva-bodhinl and Panca-pddikd-vivarana-prakdsikd. Nrsimhasrama was very well reputed among his contemporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedanta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and constitution of maya and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (pratipannopadhav abhdva-pratiyogitva) 1 . When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent and real {sat), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence (na tavad rajata-svarupam sat). So also, when we take the world-appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus necessarily false 2 . So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are entirely different and cannot be identified. Nrsimhasrama, however, cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (ahamkara, which he also calls antah-karana or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of the Upanisads to prove this point, which is of fundamental importance for the Vedanta thesis. In explaining the nature of the perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given by his pupil Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra in his Veddnta-paribhdsd, as described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work 3 . He considers the self to be bliss itself (sukha-rupd) and does not admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (sa cdtma sukhan na bhidyatey. His definition of ajndna is the same as that of Citsukha, viz. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause, which is removable by true knowledge 5 . There is thus practically

1 Vedanta-tattva-viveka, p. 12. The Pandit, vol. xxv, May 1903. This work has two important commentaries, viz. Tattva-viveka-dipana, and one called Tattva-viveka-dlpana-vyakhya by BhattojT.

2 Vedanta-tattva-viveka, p. 15.

3 yada antahkarana-vrttya ghatdvacchinnam caitanyam upadhtyate tada antahkaranavacchinna-ghatavacchinna-caitanyayor vastnta ekatve 'py upadhi-bheddd bhinnayor abhedopadhi-sambandhena aikyad bhavaty abheda ity antahkara-navacchinna-caitanyasya visayabhinna-tad-adhisthana-caitanyasydbheda-siddhy-artham vrtter nirgamanam vacyam. Ibid. p. 22.

4 Ibid. p. 29.

5 anddy upadanatve sati jndna-nivartyam ajndnam, nikhila-prapancopddana-brahma-gocaram eva ajndnam. Ibid. p. 43.

no new line of argument in his presentation of the Vedanta. On the side of dialectical arguments, in his attempts to refute " difference " (bheda) in his Bheda-dhikkara he was anticipated by his great predecessors Sriharsa and Citsukha.

Appaya Diksita 1 (a.d. 1550).

Appaya Diksita lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth century, as he refers to Nrsimhasrama Muni, who lived early in that century. He was a great scholar, well-read in many branches of Sanskrit learning, and wrote a large number of works on many subjects. His grandfather was Acarya Diksita, who is said to have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to the south point of India: the name of his father was Rangaraja Makhlndra (or simply Raja Makhlndra). There is, however, nothing very noteworthy in his Vedantic doctrines. For, in spite of his scholarship, he was only a good compiler and not an original thinker, and on many occasions where he had opportunities of giving original views he contents himself with the views of others. It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two different periods of his life, Saiva and the Vedanta. But of this one cannot be certain; for he was such an all-round scholar that the fact that he wrote a Saiva commentary and a Vedantic commentary need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. In the beginning of his commentary Sivarka-mani-dipika on Srikantha's Saiva commentary to the Brahma-sutra he says that, though the right interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is the monistic interpretation, as attempted by Sankara and others, yet the desire for attaining this right wisdom of oneness (advaita-vasana) arises only through the grace of Siva, and it is for this reason that Vyasa in his Brahma-sutra tried to establish the superiority of the qualified Brahman Siva as interpreted by Srikanthacarya. This shows that even while writing his commentary on Srikantha's Saiva-bhasya he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Sankara, and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Saiva doctrine of qualified Brahman (saguna-brahma) as Siva with the Sankara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. It is possible,

1 He was also called Appayya Diksita and Avadhani Yajva, and he studied Logic (tarka) with Yajnesvara Makhlndra. See colophon to Appaya Dlksita's commentary on the Nydya-siddhdnta-manjarl of Janaklnatha, called Nydya-siddhanta-manjan-vydkhydna (MS.).

however, that his sympathies with the monistic Vedanta, which at the beginning were only lukewarm, deepened with age. He says in his Sivdrka-mani-dipikd that he lived in the reign of King Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sadasiva, maharaja of Vijayanagara, a.d. 1566 to 1575; vide Hultzsch, S.I. Inscriptions , vol. 1), under whose orders he wrote the Sivdrka-mani-dlpika commentary on Snkantha's commentary. His grandson Nllakantha Dlksita says in his Siva-lildrnava that Appaya Dlksita lived to the good old age of seventy-two. In the Oriental Historical Manuscripts catalogued by Taylor, vol. 11, it is related that at the request of the Pandya king Tirumalai Nayaka he came to the Pandya country in a.d. 1626 to settle certain disputes between the Saivas and the Vaisnavas. Kalahasti-sarana-Sivananda Yoglndra, in his commentary on the Atmarpana-stava, gives the date of Appaya Dlksita's birth as Kali age 4654, or a.d. 1554, as pointed out by Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit introduction to the £Hva-lildrnava. Since he lived seventy-two years, he must have died some time in 1626, the very year when he came to the Pandya country. He had for his pupil Bhattojl Dlksita, as is indicated by his own statement in the Tantra-siddhdnta-dipika by the latter author. Bhattojl Dlksita must therefore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Dlksita, as is also evidenced by his other statement in his Tattva-kaustubha that he wrote this work at the request of King Keladl-Venkatendra, who reigned from 1604 to 1626 {vide Hultzsch's second volume of Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts) 1 .

It is said that Appaya Dlksita wrote about four hundred works. Some of them maybe mentioned here: Advaita-nirnaya, Catur-mata-sdra-samgraha (containing in the first chapter, called Nydya-muktdvali, a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva, in the second chapter, called Naya-mayukha-mdlika, the doctrines of Ramanuja, in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from the point of view of Srikantha's commentary called Naya-mani-mdld and in the fourth chapter, called A T aya-ma?7jari, decisive conclusions in accordance with the views of Sankaracarya); Tattva-muktavall, a work on Vedanta; Vydkarana-vdda-naksatra-mdld, a work on grammar; Purvottara-mlmamsd-vada-naksatra-mdld (containing various separate topics of discussion in Mimamsa and

1 See Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri's introduction to the Siva-llldrnava, Srirangam, 1911.

Vedanta); Nyaya-raksa-mani, a commentary on the Brahma-sutra following the monistic lines of Sankara; Veddnta-kalpa-taru-parimala, a commentary on Amalananda's Veddnta-kalpa-taru, a commentary on Vacaspati's Bhdmatl commentary; Siddhdnta-lesa-samgraha, a collection of the views of different philosophers of the monistic school of Sankara on some of the most important points of the Vedanta, without any attempt at harmonizing them or showing his own preference by reasoned arguments, and comprising a number of commentaries by Acyutakrsnananda Tirtha (Krsnd-lamkdra), Gangadharendra Sarasvati (Siddhdnta-bindu-sikara), Ramacandra Yajvan (Gudhdrtha-prakdsa), Visvanatha Tirtha, Dharmaya Diksita and others; Sivdrka-mani-dipika, a commentary on Srlkantha's Saiva-bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra ; Siva-karndmrta ; §iva-tattva-viveka ; §iva-purdna-tdmasatva-khandana ; Sivddvaita-nirnaya; Sivananda-lahari-candrikd, a commentary on Sankara's Sivdnanda-lahari ; Sivdrcana-candrikd ; &ivoikarsa-can-drikd; Sivotkarsa-manjari; Saiva-kalpa-druma; Siddhdnta-ratnd-kara; Madhva-mukha-bhanga, an attempt to show that Madhva's interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is not in accordance with the meaning of the texts of the Upanisads; Rdmdnuja-mata-khandana ; Rdmdyana-tdtparya-nirnaya; Rdmdyana-tdtparya-samgraha; Rd-mdyana-bhdrata-sdra-samgraha ; Rdmdyana-sdra ; Rdmdyana-sdra-samgraha; Rdmdyana-sdra-stava; Mlmdmsddhikarana-mdld Upa-krama-pardkrama, a short Mimamsa work; Dharma-mimdmsd-paribhdsd ; Ndma-samgraha-mdlikd ; Vidhi-rasdyana ; Vidhi-rasd-yanopajivanl; Vrtti-vdrttika, a short work on the threefold meanings of words; Kuvalaydnanda, a work on rhetoric on which no less than ten commentaries have been written; Citra-mimdmsd, a work on rhetoric; Jayolldsa-nidhi, a commentary on the Bhdgavata-purdna ; Yddavdbhyudaya-tlkd, a commentary on Venkata's Yddard-bhyudaya ; a commentary on the Prabodha-candrodaya ndtaka, etc.

Prakasananda (ad. 1550—1600).

It has been pointed out that the Vedanta doctrine of monism as preached by Sankara could not shake off its apparent duality in association with mdyd, which in the hands of the later followers of Sankara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world-appearance could be explained. The Vedantists held that this mdyd,

though it adhered to Brahman and spread its magical creations thereon, was unspeakable, indescribable, indefinable, changeable and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the self-revealing, unchangeable Brahman. The charge of dualism against such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of Vedanta only by holding that, since Brahman was the ultimate reality, may a was unreal and illusory, and hence the charge of duality would be false. But when one considers that may a is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance, it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of maya as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given up, if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept. Almost all the followers of Sankara had, however, been interpreting their master's views in such a way that the positive existence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of the development of Vedanta doctrine in the hands of these Vedanta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the maya, has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. Prakasananda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedanta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (drsti). The central doctrine of Prakasananda has already been briefly described in chapter x, section 15, of volume 1 of the present work, and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter.

Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience (avidya), again, cannot be called a cause of the world; for causality is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the outcome of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside the scope of the Vedanta (karya-karana-vadasya vedanta-bahir-bhutatvat). When in reply to the question, "what is the cause of

the world?" it is said that nescience (ajnana —literally, want of knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however, be proved by any of the pramanas ; for it is like darkness and the pramanas or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which cannot be known except through something else, by its relation to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one's own consciousness: so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed when the identity of the self with the immediately presented Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean its cessation together with its products, as Prakasatman holds in the Vivarana; for such a definition would not apply, whether taken simply or jointly. Prakasananda, therefore, defines it as the conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. This view is different from the anyatha-khyati view, that the surmised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is immediately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called badha. The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it appears (pratipannopadhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam). This negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one form it is negation and in another form this negation, being included within "all else except Brahman," is itself an illusory imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that, since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle existing side by side with Brahman 1 .

True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way

1 Brahmany adhyasyamdnam sarvam kdlatraye ndstltiniscayasya asti rupadva-yam ekam bddhdtmakam aparam adhyasyamdnatvam; tatra adhyasy amanatvena rupena sva-visayatvam; bddhatvena visayitvam iti ndtmdsraya ity arthah tathd ca nddvaita-ksatih. Compare also Bhdmatl on Adhydsa-bhdsya. Nana Dlksita seems to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhdmatl. See his commentary on the Siddhdnta-muktdvatl. The Pandit, 1890, p. 108.

This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakasananda. Thus Citsukha writes thesame thing in his Tattva-dlpikd (also called Pratyak-tatt-

that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily existence; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there will be no competent Vedanta teacher. To this Prakasananda replies that, even though the Vedanta teacher may be himself an illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products, may lead any one to the right path 1 .

On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (ananda) he differs from Sarvajnatma Muni's view that what is meant by the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self. Bliss, according to Sarvajnatma Muni, thus means the absence of the negation of bliss (an-ananda-vyamtti-matram anandatvam) 2 . He differs also from the view of Prakasatman that ananda, or bliss, means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object that we really desire. Prakasatman holds that it is the self on which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness, but that which is blissful. Prakasananda holds that this view is not correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as painful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (visistasyaiva ananda-padarthatvat) 3 . If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self, it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakasananda holds that the self is naturally of a blissful character.

Prakasananda raises the question regarding the beholder of the

va-pradipika), p. 39, as follows: "sarvesdm apibhdvdnam dsrayatvena sammate pratiyogitvam atyantdbhdvam "prati mrsdtmatd," which is the same as prati-pannopddhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam. Compare also Vedanta-paribhd$d, pp. 219 and 220, mithydtvam ca svdsrayatvendbhimata-ydvannisthdtyantdbhdva-prati-yogitvam. In later times Madhusudana freely used this definition in his Advaita-siddhi.

1 kalpito 'pyupadestd sydd yathd-sdstram samddiset na cdvinigamo doso 'vidydvattvena nirnaydt.

The Pandit, 1890, p. 160.

2 Samksepa-sdnraka, I. 1. 174.

3 Siddhdnta-muktdvati. The Pandit, 1890, p. 215.

experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists,yet there is no actual modification or transformation {parinama) of Brahman into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the objections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in impossible consequences. The vivarta view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So vivarta really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one substance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is absolutely characterless (nisprakarikayah saprakarakatvena bhavah). Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the Vedanta admits the vivarta view of causation; for, strictly speaking, there is no causation at all (vivartasya bala-vyutpatti-prayojana-taya) 1 . If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedantic monism would be disturbed. If one looks at may a in accordance with the texts of the Vedas, may a will appear to be an absolutely fictitious non-entity (tuccha), like the hare's horn; if an attempt is made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (anirvacaniya), though common people would always think of it as being real (vastavi) 2 . Prakasananda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedanta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world, that maya is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to fight with Sarvajnatma Muni, Prakasatman, and with others who developed a more realistic conception of maya transformation; but it was he who, developing probably on the lines of Mandana, tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedanta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedanta as

1 balan prati vivarto 'yam brahmanah sakalam jagat avivarttitam anandam dsthitdh krtinah sadd.

The Pandit, 1890, p. 326.

2 tucchdnirvacanlyd ca vastavi cety asau tridha

jneyd may a tribhir bodhaih irauta-yauktika-laukikaih.

Ibid. p. 420.

preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philosophy 1 . Prakasananda wrote many other works in addition to his Siddhdnta-muktdvali, such as Tdrd-bhakti-taranginl, Manorama tantra-rdja-tlkd y Maha-laksmi-paddhati and Srl-vidya-paddhati y and this shows that, though a thoroughgoing Vedantist, he was religiously attached to tantra forms of worship. Nana Dlksita wrote a commentary on the Muktdvali, called Siddhdnta-pradipikd, at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakasananda 2 .

Madhusudana Sarasvati (a.d. 1500) 3 .

Madhusudana Sarasvati, who was a pupil of Visvesvara Sarasvati and teacher of Purusottama Sarasvati, in all probability flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. His chief works are Vedanta-kalpa-latika, Advaita-siddhi, Advaita-manjari, Advaita-ratna-raksana, Atma-bodha-tikd, Ananda-manddkinl, Krsna-kutuhalanataka,Prasthdna-bheda,Bhakti-sdmdnya-nirupana, Bhagavad- gltd- gudhdrtha- dlpikd, Bhagavad- bhakti- rasdyana y Bhdgavata -purdna - prathama - sloka - vydkhyd, Veda - stuti- tlkd y §dndilya-sutra-tlkd,§dstra-siddhdnta-hsa-tikd,Samksepa-sdrlraka-sdra-samgraha, Siddhanta-tattva-bindu, Hari-lild-vydkhyd. His most important work, however, is his Advaita-siddhi ', in which he tries to refute the objections raised in Vyasatlrtha's Nydydmrta*

1 veddnta-sara-sarvasvam ajneyam adhundtanaih asesena mayoktam tat purusottama-yatnatah. ■

The Pandit, 1890, p. 428.

2 yacchisya-sisya-sandoha-vyaptd bharata-bhiimayah vande tarn yatibhir vandyam Prakasdnandam isvaram.

Ibid. p. 488.

3 Ramajfia Pandeya in his edition of Madhusudana's Vedanta-kalpa-latika suggests that he was a Bengali by birth. His pupil Purusottama Sarasvati in his commentary on the Siddhanta-bindu-tikd refers to Balabhadra Bhattacarya as a favourite pupil of his, and Pandeya argues that, since Bhattacarya is a Bengali surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali, he also must have been a Bengali. It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (Kula-panjikd) of Kotalipara of Faridpur, Bengal, Madhusudana's father is said to have been Pramodapurandara Acarya, who had four sons—Srlnatha Cudamani, Yada-vananda Nyayacarya, Kamalajanayana and Vagisa Gosvamin. Some of the important details of Madhusudana's philosophical dialectics will be taken up in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in the third volume of the present work in connection with Madhusudana's discussions with Vyasatirtha.

4 The Advaita-siddhi has three commentaries, Advaita-siddhy-upanydsa, Brhat-tlka, and Laghu-candrikd, by Brahmananda Sarasvati.

dii 15

against the monistic Vedanta of Sankara and his followers. Materials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6, 7,8,9 and io of the tenth chapter of the present work. More will be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy between Vyasatlrtha and Madhusudana, which is the subject-matter of Advaita-siddhi. Madhusudana's Siddhanta-bindu does not contain anything of importance, excepting that he gives a connected account of the perceptual process, already dealt with in the tenth chapter and also in the section " Vedantic Cosmology " of the present volume. His Advaita-ratna-raksana deals with such subjects as the validity of the Upanisads: the Upanisads do not admit duality; perception does not prove the reality of duality; the duality involved in mutual negation is false; indeterminate knowledge does not admit duality; duality cannot be proved by any valid means of proof, and so forth. There is practically nothing new in the work, as it only repeats some of the important arguments of the bigger work Advaita-siddhi and tries to refute the view of dualists like the followers of Madhva, with whom Madhusudana was in constant controversy. It is unnecessary, therefore, for our present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. It is, however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed monist in his philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of bhakti, or devotion, as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed. These works, however, have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedanta, with which we are concerned in the present chapter. Madhusudana's Vedanta-kalpa-latika was written earlier than his Advaita-siddhi and his commentary on the Mahimnah stotra 1 . Ramajna Pandeya points out in his introduction to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika that the Advaita-siddhi contains a reference to his Glta-nibandhana; the Gita-nibandhana and the Srimad-bhagavata-tika contain references to his Bhakti-rasayana, and the Bhakti-rasayana refers to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika ; and this shows that the Vedanta-kalpa-latika was written prior to all these works. The Advaita-ratna-raksana refers to the Advaita-siddhi and may therefore be regarded as a much later work. There is nothing particularly new in the Vedanta-kalpa-latika that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedantic thought. The special feature of the work consists in the frequent

1 He refers to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika and Siddhanta-bindu in his Advaita-siddhi, p. 537 (Nirnaya-Sagara edition). See also Mahimnah-stotra-tlkd, p. 5.

brief summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy and contrasts them with important Vedanta views. The first problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (moksa) and the ways of realizing it: Madhusudana attempts to prove that it is only the Vedantic concept of salvation that can appeal to men, all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. But it does not seem that he does proper justice to other views. Thus, for example, in refuting the Samkhya view of salvation he says that, since the Samkhya thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed, sorrow, being an existent entity, cannot be destroyed, so there cannot be any emancipation from sorrow. This is an evident misrepresentation of the Samkhya; for with the Samkhya the destruction of sorrow in emancipation means that the buddhi, a product of prakrti which is the source of all sorrow, ceases in emancipation to have any contact with purusa, and hence, even though sorrow may not be destroyed, there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from sorrow. It is unnecessary for our present purposes, however, to multiply examples of misrepresentation by Madhusudana of the views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem. In the course of the discussions he describes negation {abhava) also as being made up of the stuff of nescience, which, like other things, makes its appearance in connection with pure consciousness. He next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge, and then, since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through the Upanisadic propositions of identity, he passes over to the discussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of abhihitan-vaya-vada, anvitabhidhana-vada and the like. He then treats of the destruction of nescience. He concludes the work with a discussion of the substantial nature of the senses. Thus the mind-organ is said to be made up of five elements, whereas other senses are regarded as being constituted of one element only. Manas is said to pervade the whole of the body and not to be atomic, as the Naiyayikas hold. Finally, Madhusudana returns again to the problem of emancipation, and holds that it is the self freed from nescience that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation.

CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VASISfHA

The philosophical elements in the various Puranas will be taken in a later volume. The Yoga-vasistha-Ramayana may be included among the puranas, but it is devoid of the general characteristics of the puranas and is throughout occupied with discussions of Vedantic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the Vedantic doctrines as interpreted by Sarikara. This extensive philosophical poem, which contains twenty-three thousand seven hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger than the Srlmad-bhagavad-gita, is a unique work. The philosophical view with which it is concerned, and which it is never tired of reiterating, is so much like the view of Sankara and of Vijiianavada Buddhism, that its claim to treatment immediately after Sankara seems to me to be particularly strong. Moreover, the various interpretations of the Vedanta-sutra which will follow are so much opposed to Sankara's views as to make it hard to find a suitable place for a treatment like that of the Yoga-vasisiha unless it is taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Sankara.

The work begins with a story. A certain Brahmin went to the hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge or work was the direct cause of salvation (moksa-sadhana). Agastya replied that, as a bird flies with its two wings, so a man can attain the highest (paramam padam) only through knowledge and work. To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Karunya, the son of Agnivesya, having returned from the teacher's house after the completion of his studies, remained silent and did no work. When he was asked for the reason of this attitude of his, he said that he was perplexed over the question as to whether the action of a man in accordance with scriptural injunction was or was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than following a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness {tyaga-matra). On hearing this question of Karunya Agnivesya told him that he could answer his question only by narrating a story, after hearing which he might decide as he chose. A heavenly damsel (apsarah), Suruci by name, sitting on one of the peaks of the

Himalayas, once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky. She asked him where he was going. In reply he said that a certain king, Aristanemi by name, having given his kingdom to his son and having become free from all passions, was performing a course of asceticism (tapas), and that he had had to go to him on duty and was returning from him. The damsel wanted to know in detail what happened there between the messenger and the king. The messenger replied that he was asked by Indra to take a well-decorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven, but while doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and defects of heaven, on hearing which he would make up his mind whether he would like to go there or not. In heaven, he was answered, people enjoyed superior, medium and inferior pleasures according as their merits were superior, medium or inferior: when they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment, they were reborn again on earth, and during their stay there they were subject to mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments. On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven, and, when this was reported to Indra, he was very much surprised and he asked the messenger to carry the king to Valmiki's hermitage and make Valmiki acquainted with the king's refusal to enjoy the fruits of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the attainment of right knowledge, leading to emancipation (moksa). When this was done, the king asked Valmiki how he might attain moksa, and Valmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of Vasistha and Rama (Vasistha-rama-samvada) on the subject.

Valmiki said that, when he had finished the story of Rama— the work properly known as Ramayana —and taught it to Bharadvaja, Bharadvaja recited it once to Brahma (the god), and he, being pleased, wished to confer a boon on him. Bharadvaja in reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would enable people to escape from sorrow. Brahma told him to apply to Valmiki and went himself to him (Valmiki), accompanied by Bharadvaja, and asked him not to cease working until he finished describing the entire character of Rama, by listening to which people will be saved from the dangers of the world. When Brahma disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction, Bharadvaja also asked Valmiki to describe how Rama and his wife, brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity.

In answer to the above question Valmlki replied that Rama, after finishing his studies, went out on his travels to see the various places of pilgrimage and hermitages. On his return, however, he looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause of his sorrow. King Dasaratha, Rama's father, became very much concerned about Rama's sadness and asked VaSistha if he knew what might be the cause of it. At this time the sage Visvamitra also visited the city of Ayodhya to invite Rama to kill the demons. Rama's dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety, and Visvamitra asked him the cause of his dejection.

Rama said in reply that a new enquiry had come into his mind and had made him averse from all enjoyments. There is no happiness in this world, people are born to die and they die to be born again. Everything is impermanent (asthira) in this world. All existent things are unconnected (bhavdh...parasparam asanginah). They are collected and associated together only by our mental imagination (manah-kalpanaya). The world of enjoyment is created by the mind (manah), and this mind itself appears to be nonexistent. Everything is like a mirage.

Vasistha then explained the nature of the world-appearance, and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. When Valmlki narrated this dialogue of Vasistha and Rama, king Aris-tanemi found himself enlightened, and the damsel was also pleased and dismissed the heavenly messenger. Karunya, on hearing all this from his father Agnive^ya, felt as if he realized the ultimate truth and thought that, since he realized the philosophical truth, and since work and passivity mean the same, it was his clear duty to follow the customary duties of life. When Agastya finished narrating the story, the Brahmin Sutiksna felt himself enlightened.

There is at least one point which may be considered as a very clear indication of later date, much later than would be implied by the claim that the work was written by the author of the Ramayana. It contains a sloka which may be noted as almost identical with a verse of Kalidasa's Kumar a-sambhava 1 . It may, in my opinion, be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it from Kalidasa, and it is true, as is generally supposed, that Kalidasa

1 Yoga-vdsistha, in. 16. 50:

atha tarn atimatra-vihvalarri sakrpa.haiabha.va sarasvatl sapharlm hrada-sosa-vihvalam prathama vrstir ivdnvakampata.

lived in the fifth century a.d. The author of the Yoga-vasistha, whoever he may have been, flourished at least some time after Kalidasa. It may also be assumed that the interval between Kalidasa's time and that of the author of the Yoga-vasistha had been long enough to establish Kalidasa's reputation as a poet. There is another fact which deserves consideration in this connection. In spite of the fact that the views of the Yoga-vasistha and Sahkara's interpretation of Vedanta have important points of agreement neither of them refers to the other. Again, the views of the Yoga-vasistha so much resemble those of the idealistic school of Buddhists, that the whole work seems to be a Brahmanic modification of idealistic Buddhism. One other important instance can be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism and modify it on Brahmanic lines, viz. the writings of Gauda-pada and Sahkara. I am therefore inclined to think that the author of the Yoga-vasistha was probably a contemporary of Gaudapada or Sahkara, about a.d. 800 or a century anterior to them.

The work contains six books, or prakaranas , namely, Vairagya, Alumuksu-vyavahara, Utpatti, Sthiti, Upasama and Nirvana. It is known also by the names oiArsa-Ramayana,Jnana-vasistha, Maha-Ramayana, Vasistha-Ramayana or Vasistha. Several commentaries have been written on it. Of these commentaries I am particularly indebted to the Tatparya-prakasa of Anandabodhendra.

The Yoga-vasistha is throughout a philosophical work, in the form of popular lectures, and the same idea is often repeated again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical imagery. But the writer seems to have been endowed with extraordinary poetical gifts. Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery; the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to the ear, and they often produce the effect of interesting us more by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought which they are intended to convey.

The Yoga-vasistha had a number of commentaries, and it was also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had commentaries written upon them. Thus Advayaranya, son of Narahari, wrote a commentary on it, called Vasistha-Ramayana-candrika. Anandabodhendra Sarasvati, pupil of Gangadharendra Sarasvati of the nineteenth century, wrote the Tatparya-prakasa. Gangadharendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same name. Ramadeva and Sadananda also wrote two commentaries on

the work, and in addition to these there is another commentary, called Yoga-vdsistha-tdtparya-samgraha, and another commentary, the Pada-candrikd, was written by Madhava Sarasvatl. The names of some of its summaries are Brhad-yoga-vdsistha, Laghu-jndna-vdsi-stha, Yoga-vdsistha-slokdh and Yoga-vasistha-samksepa by Gauda Abhinanda of the ninth century, Yoga-vdsistha-sara or Jnana-sdra, Yoga-vdsistha-sdra-samgraha and Vdsistha-sdra or Vdsistha-sdra-gudhdrthd by Ramananda Tirtha, pupil of Advaitananda. The Yoga-vasistha-samksepa of Gauda Abhinanda had a commentary by Atmasukha, called Candrikd, and another called Samsdra-tarani, by Mummadideva. The Yoga-vdsistha-sara also had two commentaries by Purnananda and Mahldhara. Mr Sivaprasad Bhattacarya in an article on the Yoga-vdsistha-Rdmdyana in the Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference of 1924 says that the Moksopdya-sdra, which is another name for the Yoga-vdsistha-sara , was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with Gauda Abhinanda. But he misses the fact that Gauda Abhinanda had also written another summary of it, called Yoga-vasistha-samksepa. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the Yoga-vdsistha is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. For, if a summary of it was written by Gauda Abhinanda of the ninth century, the Yoga-vdsistha must have been written at least in the eighth century. The date of the Yoga-vdsistha may thus be regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.

The Ultimate Entity.

The third book of the Yoga-vdsistha deals with origination (utpatti). All bondage (bandha) is due to the existence of the perceptible universe (drsya) y and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (susupti). What is left is deep and static (stimita-gambhlra), neither light nor darkness, indescribable and unmanifested (andkhyam anabhivyaktam), but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (svayam anya ivollasan) ; and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind (manas) —like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diversified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent,

it could not cease under any circumstances 1 . It does not exist at all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure extinction {nirvdna-ma.tr a) f or pure intelligence (paro bodhah), remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations or modifications. Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (svatd), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements (spanda) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving or imagining (samkalpa-purnsa) 2 . The Muni held that what appears before us is due to the imagination of manas, like dreamland or fairyland (yathd samkalpa-nagaram yathd gandharva-pattanam). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all—it is all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (moksa). This manas, however, by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a name, mere nothingness 3 . It does not exist outside or subjectively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding us everywhere. That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas, though this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance proceed, though these dreams and manas are merely the same and

1 Yoga-vasistha, in. 3.

2 sarvesam bhuta-jatdnam samsdra-vyavakdrindm prathamo 'sau pratispandas citta-dekak svatodayah asmdt purvdt protispanddd ananyaitat-svarupira iyam pravisrtd srstih spanda-srstir ivdnilat.

»i- 3- 14, IS-

3 rdtnasya manaso riipam na kimcid api drsyate ndma-mdtrdd rte vyomno yathd sunya-jaddkrteh.

in. 4. 38.

it is impossible to distinguish between them 1 . Avidya, samsrti, citta, manaSy bandha, mala, tatnas are thus but synonyms for the same concept 2 . It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perceptions, no vacuity (siinya), no matter, no spirit or consciousness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman 3 . Its nature is that of pure cessation (santa),andh is this that the Samkhyists call purusa, the Vedantins call "Brahman," the idealistic Buddhists call "pure idea" {vijnana-matra) and the nihilists " pure essencelessness " (siinya)*. It is of the nature of pure annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer world 5 . It is described as that essencelessness {sunya) which does not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance {yasmin sunyam jagat sthitam), and which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless 6 . The illusory world-appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (spanddspandatmaka) 7 ; it is indescribable and un-nameable (kitnapy avyapadesatma) and neither being nor non-being nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming (na bhavo bhavatiam na ca). The similarity of the philosophy of the Yoga-vasistha to the idealistic philosophy of the Lankavatara-sutra is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the Lankavatara in the first volume of the present work. On Vedanta lines it is very similar to Prakasananda's interpretation of the Vedanta in later times, called drsti-srsti-vada, which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gaudapada or Mandana. Prakasatman refers to the Yoga-vasistha as one of his main authorities.

1 purne piirnarn prasarati sdnte sdntam vyavasthitam vyomany evoditam vyoma brahmani brakma tisthati na drsyam asti sad-rupam na drastd na ca darianam na sunyam najadam no etc chdntam evedam atatam.

in. 4. 69, 70.

2 in. 4. 46. 3 in. 5. 6-7. 4 ndsa-rupo vinaiatma. in. 5. 16. 5 hi. 7. 22. 6 in. 9. 59. 7 in. 9. 49.

Origination.

The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now, nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in any real sense 1 . But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course, of the nature of pure cessation (santa), as described above. The order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-appearance can be described in this way: At first there is something like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood. Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected. It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence (at). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete (ghana-samvedand), other conditions of soul (jiva) arise out of it. At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative movement (bhavana-matra-sara). The first objectivity is akasa y manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (ahamta) and time (kala). This creation is, however, in no sense real, and is nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious movement {sva-samvedana-matrakam) of the ultimate being. All the network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of existing. Thought (samvit), which at this moment is like the akasa and the ego and which is the seed (blja) of all the conceivings of thought (bhavana), formulates by its movement air 2 . Again,

1 bandhya-putra-vyoma-bane yathd na stah kaddcana jagad-ddy akhHam drsyam tathd ndsti kaddcana

na cotpannam na ca dhvamsi vat kilddau na vidyate

utpattih kldrsl tasya ndsa-sabdasya kd hatha. in. n. 4, 5-

2 manah sampadyate lolam kaland-kalanonmukham; kalayantl manah saktir ddau bhdvayati ksandt. dkdsa-bhdvandmacchdm sabda-blja-rasonmukhlm;

tatas tdm ghanatdm jdtam ghana-spanda-kramdn manah.

iv. 44. 16, 17. A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhdvand, and each successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative movements is said to be ghana, or concrete. Ghana has been paraphrased in the Tdtparya-prakasa as accretion (upacaya). Bhdvdna is the same as spanda; as the result of each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (ghana), and corresponding to each ghana there was a semi-statical creation, and following each ghana there was a spanda (ghana-spanda-kramat).

following the akasa moment and from it as a more concrete state (ghanibhiiya), comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-matra). This sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the conceivings of the other tan-matras of sparsa, tejas, rasa and gandha follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the self-conscious thought 1 . The stages then are, that in the state of equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an un-manifested state, there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent in it (satas cetyamsa-cetanat)\ next arises the soul, where there is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection of objectivity (cetya-samyoga-cetanat) instead of the self-directed consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the illusory notion of subjectivity, through which the soul thinks that it is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object (cetyaika-parata-vasat). This moment naturally leads to the state of the subjective ego, which conceives actively (buddhitvakalanam), and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective conceptions of the different tan-matras and the world-appearance. These are all, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is purely conceptual (vikalpa), they cannot be real at any time. All that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual activity of thought. Through its desire, "I shall see," there comes the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul, far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (jivas). In reality, however, the jivas have no other existence than the conceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings of thought (citta-camatkdra).

Manas, according to this theory, is nothing but that function of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual

1 in. 12.

part and its objectivity aspect the material part 1 . In its objectivity also the cit perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to perceive something other than itself (svam evanyataya drstva), and this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood (ahamta).

But to the most important question, namely, how the original equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the Yoga-vasistha is that it is by pure accident (kakataliya-yogena) that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have ultimately to depend on accident for its origin 2 . It is considered irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of the ultimate cause, the Brahman 3 .

Karma, Manas and the Categories.

Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the manas. The active states of mafias are again determined by their preceding moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the succeeding moments. When any particular state determines any succeeding state, it maybe considered as an agent, or karta; but, as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state, otherwise called the karma, it may be said that the karma generates the karta, the karta by its activity again produces karma, so that karma and karta are mutually determinative. As in the case of the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the seed, the cycle proceeds on from karta to karma and from karma to karta, and no ultimate priority can be affirmed of any one of them 4 . But, if this is so, then the responsibility of karma ceases; the root desire (vdsana) through which a man is born also makes him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it; but, if karta and karma spring forth together, then a particular birth ought not to be determined by the karma of previous birth, and this would mean

1 cito yac cetya-kalanam tan-manastvam udahrtam cid-bkago 'trdjado bhago jadyam atra hi cetyatd. in. 91. 37.

2 m. 96. 15, iv. 54. 7.

3 Brahmanah karanam kirn sydd iti vaktum na yujyote svabhavo nirvisesatvdt paro vaktum na yujyate. iv. 18. 22.

4 yatha karma ca karta ca parydyeneha samgatau karmand kriyate kartd kartrd karma prantyate btjdnkurddivan-nydyo loka-vedokta eva sah. III. 95. 19, 20.

that man's enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his karma. In answer to such a question, raised by Ramacandra, Vasistha says that karma is due not to atman, but to manas. It is the mental movement which constitutes karma. When first the category of manas rises into being from Brahman, karma also begins from that moment, and, as a result thereof, the soul and the body associated with it are supposed to be manifested. Karma and manas are in one sense the same. In this world the movement generated by action (kriya-spanda) is called karma, and, as it is by the movement of manas that all effects take place, and the bodies with all their associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced, so even the body,which is associated with physical, external karma, is in reality nothing but the manas and its activity. Manas is essentially of the nature of karma, or activity, and the cessation of activity means the destruction of manas (karma-nose mano-nasah) 1 . As heat cannot be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium, so movement and activity cannot be separated from manas. If one ceases, the other also necessarily ceases. Manas means that activity which subsists between being and non-being and induces being through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and passes by the name of manas. It is by the activity of manas that the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego. Manas thus consists of this constantly positing activity (ekanta-kalanah). The seed of karma is to be sought in the activity of manas (karma-bijam manah-spanda), and the actions (kriya) which follow are indeed very diverse. It is the synthetic function (tad-anusandhatte) of manas that is called the functioning of the conative senses, by which all actions are performed, and it is for this reason that karma is nothing but manas. Manas, buddhi, ahamkara, citta, karma, kalpand, samsrti, vasana, vidya, prayatna, smrti, indriya, prakrti, may a and kriya are different only in name, and they create confusion by these varied names; in reality, however, they signify the same concept, namely, the active functioning of manas or citta. These different names are current only because they lay stress on the different aspects of the same active functioning. They do not mean different entities, but only different moments, stages or aspects. Thus the first moment of self-conscious activity leading in different directions is called manas. When, after such oscillating movement, there is

1 in. 95.

the position of either of the alternatives, as "the thus," it is called buddhi. When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as " I," it is called ahamkara. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory of the past and the anticipations of the future, it is called citta. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point, it is called karma. When, leaving its self-contained state, it desires anything, we have kalpana. When the citta turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being previously experienced, we have what is called memory (smrti). When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the root inclinations (vasana). In the realization that there is such a thing as self-knowledge, and that there is also such a thing as the false and illusory world-appearance, we have what is called right knowledge (vidya). When the true knowledge is forgotten and the impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground, we have what are called the impure states (mala). The functions of the five kinds of cognition please us and are called the senses (indriya). As all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest self, it is called the origin (prakrti). As the true state can neither be called existent nor non-existent, and as it gives rise to all kinds of appearance, it is called illusion (maya) 1 . Thus it is the same appearance which goes by the various names of jiva, manas, citta and buddhi 2 .

One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philosophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers, by repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kalidasa.

1 in. 96. 17-31.

2 Jlva ity ucyate loke mana ity apt kathyate cittam ity ucyate saiva buddhir ity ucyate tatha.

hi. 96. 34.

The World-Appearance.

The Yoga-vasistha is never tired of repeating that this world is like a hare's horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in itself cannot have anything else {brahma-tattve 'nyata nasti). But, though there is this change into manas, and through it the production of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory; for during all the time when this change makes its appearance and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, changeless and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all appearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas, can the order of the world-appearance be explained ? The natural answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain other dream series 1 . But in reality they are all empty dream constructions of one manas. It is by the dream desires that physical objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance [desa-kala-hriya-dravyaih).

The d'fference between the ordinary waking state and the dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as associated with permanent convictions (sthira-pratyaya), whereas the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis. Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,

1 tnelanam apisvakiya-paraklya-svapndndtn daivdt kvacit samvddavat svantah-kcdpandltnakam eva. Yoga-vdsistha-tdtparya-prakdsa, IV. 18. 46.

comes to be regarded as permanent, whereas, if even our waking conceptions come to be regarded as changeful, they lose their validity as representing permanent objects, and our faith in them becomes shaken. If the dream experiences persisted in time and the waking experiences were momentary, then the waking state would be considered as a dream and the dream experiences would be considered as ordinary experiences in the dream state. It is only with the coming of the waking state that there is a break of the dream experiences, and it is then that the latter are contradicted and therefore regarded as false. But so long as the dream experiences lasted in the dream state, we did not consider them to be false; for during that time those dream experiences appeared somehow to be permanent and therefore real. There is thus no difference between dream states and waking states except this, that the latter are relatively persistent, continuous and permanent (sthira), while the former are changeful and impermanent (aslhira) 1 .

There is within us a principle of pure consciousness, which is also the vital principle (jiva-dhatu), vitality (virya), and body heat (tejas). In the active condition, when the body is associated with manas, action and speech, the vital principle moves through the body, and on account of this all sorts of knowledge arise, and the illusion of world-appearance inherent in it is manifested as coming from outside through the various sense apertures. This being of a steady and fixed character is called the waking state (jagrat). The susupta, or deep sleep state, is that in which the body is not disturbed by the movement of the manas, action or speech. The vital principle remains still in itself, in a potential state without any external manifestation, as the oil remains in the sesamum (taila-samvid yatha tile) 2 . When the vital principle {jiva-dhatu) is very much disturbed, we have experiences of the dream state.

Whenever the manas strongly identifies itself with any of its concepts, it appears to itself as that concept, just as an iron ball in fire becomes itself like fire. It is the manas that is both the perceiver {purusa) and the perceived universe (visva-rupataf.

1 jagrat-svapna-dasa-bhedo na sthirastkirate vina samah sadaiva sarvatra samasto 'nubhavo 'nayoh svapno 'pi svapna-samaye sthairyajjdgrattvam rcchati asthairydt jagrad evaste svapnas tddrsa-bodhatah.

iv. 19. 11, 12.

2 iv. 19. 23. s iv. 20. 4.

DII !6

The followers of the Samkhya consider manas to be pure consciousness ; they have also explained their doctrines in other details, and they think that emancipation cannot be attained by any way other than that which the Samkhya suggests. The followers of the Vedanta also consider that emancipation is attained if one understands that all this world is Brahman and if there is self-control and cessation of desires together with this knowledge, and that this is the only way of salvation. The Vijnanavadins (Idealistic Buddhists) think that, provided there is complete self-control and cessation of all sense desires, one may attain emancipation, if he understands that the world-appearance is nothing but his own illusion. Thus each system of thought thinks too much of its own false methods of salvation (svair eva niyama-bhramaih), springing from the traditional wrong notions. But the truth underlying all these conceptions is that manas is the root of all creations. There is nothing intrinsically pleasurable or painful, sweet or bitter, cold or hot, and such appearances arise only through the habitual creations of the mind. When one believes and thinks with strong faith in any particular manner, he begins to perceive things in that particular manner during that particular time 1 .

Nature of Agency (Kartrtva) and the Illusion of World Creation.

Whenever we ascribe agency {kartrtva) to any person in respect of deeds producing pleasure or pain, or deeds requiring strenuous exercise of will-power, as those of the Yoga discipline, we do it wrongly; for agency consists in the grasp of will and resolution, and so it is an internal determination of the mind, of the nature of dominant and instinctive desires and inclinations (vasanabhidhanah) 2 . The inner movement of feeling in the person towards the enjoyment of experiences takes place in accordance with these fixed desires or inclinations leading him to specific forms of enjoyment. All enjoyment is thus a natural consequence of our nature and character as active agents. Since all active agency (kartrtva) consists in the

1 na jneneha padarthesu rupam ekam udtryate drdha-bhavanaya ceto yad yatha bhavayaty alam tat tat-phalam tad-akaram tdvat-kalam prapasyati. na tad asti na yat satyam na tad asti na yan mrsa.

iv. 21.56,57.

2 yohyantara-sthayah manovrtter nistayah upadeyata-pratyayo vasanabhidha-natatkartrtva-sabdenocyate. iv. 38. 2.

inner effort of will, the enjoyment following such an inner exercise of will is nothing but the feeling modifications of the mind following the lead of the active exercise of the will. All action or active agency is thus associated with root inclinations (vasana), and is thus possible only for those who do not know the truth and have their minds full of the root inclinations. But those who have no vasana cannot be said to have the nature of active agents or of enjoying anything. Their minds are no doubt always active and they are active all the time; but, as they have no vasana, they are not attached to fruit, and there is the movement without any attachment. Whatever is done by manas is done, and what is not done by it is not done; so it is the manas that is the active agent, and not the body; the world has appeared from the mind {citta or manas), is of the essence of manas, and is upheld in manas. Everything is but a mental creation and has no other existence.

Ultimately, everything comes from Brahman; for that is the source of all powers, and therefore all powers (saktayah) are seen in Brahman—existence, non-existence, unity, duality and multiplicity all proceed from Brahman. The citta, or mind, has evolved out of pure consciousness (cit) or Brahman, as has already been mentioned, and it is through the latter that all power of action (karma), root desires (vasana), and all mental modifications appear. But, if everything has proceeded from Brahman, how is it that the world-appearance happens to be so different from its source, the Brahman? When anything comes out of any other thing, it is naturally expected to be similar thereto in substance. If, therefore, the world-appearance has sprung forth from Brahman, it ought to be similar in nature thereto; but Brahman is sorrowless, while the world-appearance is full of sorrow; how is this to be explained? To such a question the answer is, that to a person who has a perfect realization of the nature of the world-appearance, as being a mere conceptual creation from the Brahman and having no existence at all, there is no sorrow in this world-appearance nor any such quality which is different from Brahman. Only in the eyes of a person who has not the complete realization does this difference between the world-appearance and Brahman seem to be so great, and the mere notion of the identity of Brahman and the universe, without its complete realization, may lead to all sorts of mischief. On this account instruction in the identity of the Brahman and the world-appearance should never be given to

16-2

anyone whose mind has not been properly purified by the essential virtues of self-control and disinclination to worldly pleasures 1 . As in magic (indrajala), non-existent things are produced and existent things are destroyed, a jug becomes a cloth, and a cloth becomes a jug, and all sorts of wonderful sights are shown, though none of these appearances have the slightest essence of their own; so is the entire world-appearance produced out of the imagination of the mind. There is no active agent (kartr) and no one enjoyer (bhoktr) of the pleasures and sorrows of the world, and there is no destruction whatsoever 2 .

Though the ultimate state is the indescribable Brahman or cit, yet it is from manas that all creation and destruction from cycle to cycle take their start. At the beginning of each so-called creation the creative movement of manas energy is roused. At the very first the outflow of this manas energy in the direction of a conceptual creation means an accumulation of energy in manas, called ghana, which is a sort of statical aspect of the dynamical energy [spandd). At the next stage there is a combination of this statical state of energy with the next outflow of energy, and the result is the stabilized accretion of energy of the second order; this is again followed by another outflow of energy, and that leads to the formation of the stabilized energy of the third order, and so on. The course of thought-creation is thus through the interaction of the actualized energy of thought with the active forms of the energy of thought, which join together, at each successive outflow from the supreme fund of potential energy. Thus it is said that the first creative movement of manas manifests itself as the akasa creation, and that, as a result of this creative outflow of energy, there is an accretion of energy in manas; at this moment there is another outflow (spanda) or movement on the part of manas, as modified by the accretion of energy of the previous state, and this outflow of manas thus modified is the creation of air. The outflow of this second order, again, modifies manas by its accretion, and there is a third outflow of energy of the manas as modified by the previous accretion, and so on. This process of the modification of energy by the outflow of the manas modified at each stage by the accretion of the outflow of energy at each of the preceding states is called

1 adau soma- dama-prayair gunaih sisyam visodhayet pascat sarvam idam brahma suddhas tvam iti bodhayet.

IV. 39. 23.

2 natra kascit karta na bhokta na vinasam eti. IV. 39. 41.

ghana-spanda-krama 1 . The creation of all the so-called tan-matras (subtle states) of akasa, vayu, tejas, ap and ksiti takes place in this order, and afterwards that of the ahamkara and buddhi, and thus of the subtle body {pury-astaka); thereafter the cosmic body of Brahman is formed and developed in accordance with the root desire (vasana) inherent in manas. Thus here we have first the akasa tan-matra, then the vayu tan-matra from the akasa tan-mdtra plus the outflow of energy, then, from the akasa tan-matra plus the vayu tan-matra plus the outflow of energy of the third order, iejas tan-matra, and so on. Then, after the tan-matra,the. ahamkara and the buddhi, we have the subtle body of eight constituents (five tan-matras, ahamkara, buddhi and the root manas), called the pury-astaka of Brahma. From this develops the body of Brahma, and from the creative imagination of Brahma we have the grosser materials and all the rest of the world-appearance. But all this is pure mental creation, and hence unreal, and so also are all the scriptures, gods and goddesses and all else that passes as real.

The Stage of the Saint (Jivan-mukta).

Emancipation (mukti) in this system can be attained in the lifetime of a person or after his death; in the former case it is called sa-deha-muktata, or jlvan-muktata. The jivan-mukta state is that in which the saint has ceased to have any desires {apagatai-sanah), as if he were in a state of deep sleep (susuptavat). He is self-contained and thinks as if nothing existed. He has always an inward eye, even though he may be perceiving all things with his external eye and using his limbs in all directions. He does not wait for the future, nor remain in the present, nor remember the past. Though sleeping, he is awake and, though awake,he is asleep. He may be doing all kinds of actions externally, though he remains altogether unaffected by them internally. He internally renounces all actions, and does not desire anything for himself. He is full of bliss and happiness, and therefore appears to ordinary eyes to be an ordinary happy man; but in reality, though he may be doing all kinds of things, he has not the delusion of being himself an active agent (tyakta-kartrtva-vibhramah). He has no antipathy, grief, emotions, or outbursts of pleasure. He is quite neutral to all who

1 iv. 44. 13-30.

do him ill or well; he shows sympathetic interest in each person in his own way; he plays with a child, is serious with an old man, an enjoyable companion to a young man, sympathetic with the sorrows of a suffering man. He is wise and pleasant and loving to all with whom he comes in contact. He is not interested in his own virtuous deeds, enjoyments, sins, in bondage or emancipation. He has a true philosophic knowledge of the essence and nature of all phenomena, and, being firm in his convictions, he remains neutral to all kinds of happenings, good, bad, or indifferent. But from the descriptions it appears that this indifference on the part of a saint does not make him an exclusive and unnatural man; for, though unaffected in every way within himself, he can take part in the enjoyment of others, he can play like a child and can sympathize with the sorrows of sufferers 1 .

Jlvan-miikli, or emancipation while living, is considered by Sankara also as a possible state, though he does not seem to have used the term in his works. Thus, on the basis of Chandogya, vi. 14. 2, he says that knowledge destroys only those actions which have not already begun to yield their fruits; those actions which have already begun to yield fruits cannot be destroyed by true knowledge, and so it is not possible for anyone to escape from their effects, good or bad; and it has to be admitted that even after the dawning of true knowledge the body remains until the effects of the actions which have already begun to yield fruits are exhausted by enjoyment or suffering. In explaining such a condition Sankara gives two analogies: (1) as a potter's wheel goes on revolving when the vessel that it was forming is completed, so the body, which was necessary till the attainment of true knowledge, may continue to exist for some time even after the rise of knowledge; (2) as, when a man through some eye-disease sees two moons instead of one, he continues to do so even when he is convinced that there are not two moons but one, so, even when the saint is firmly convinced of the unreality of the world-appearance, he may still continue to have the illusion of world-appearance, though internally he may remain unaffected by it 2 . Of the Upanisads only the later Muktika Upanisad, which seems to have drawn its inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha, mentions the word jivan-mukta, meaning those saints who live till their fruit-yielding

2 Sankara's Sariraka-bhdsya or the Brahma-sutra, iv. 1. 15, 19.

actions {prarabdha-karma) are exhausted 1 . But, though the word is not mentioned, the idea seems to be pretty old.

The conception of sthita-prajfia in the Srlmad-bhagavad-glta reminds us of the state of ajivan-mukta saint. A sthita-prajfia (man of steady wisdom) has no desires, but is contented in himself, has no attachment, fear or anger, is not perturbed by sorrow nor longs for pleasure, and is absolutely devoid of all likes and dislikes. Like a tortoise within its shell, he draws himself away from the sense-objects 2 . This conception of the Srimad-bhagavad-gita is referred to in the Yoga-vasistha, which gives a summary of it in its own way 3 . But it seems as if the conception of the saint in the Yoga-vasistha has this advantage over the other, that here the saint, though absolutely unaffected by all pleasures and sufferings, by virtue and vice, is yet not absolutely cut off from us; for, though he has no interest in his own good, he can show enjoyment in the enjoyment of others and sympathy with the sufferings of others; he can be as gay as a child when with children, and as serious as any philosopher when with philosophers or old men. The Srimad-bhaga-vad-glta, though it does not deny such qualities to a saint, yet does not mention them either, and seems to lay stress on the aspect of the passivity and neutral character of the saint; whereas the Yoga-vasistha, as we have already said, lays equal stress on both these special features of a saint. He is absolutely unattached to anything, but is not cut off from society and can seemingly take part in everything without losing his mental balance in any way. The Glta, of course, always recommends even the unattached saint to join in all kinds of good actions; but what one misses there is the taking of a full and proper interest in life along with all others, though the saint is internally absolutely unaffected by all that he may do.

The saint in the Yoga-vasistha not only performs his own actions in an unattached manner, but to all appearance mixes with the sorrows and joys of others.

The question whether a saint is above the tyranny of the effects of his own deeds was also raised in Buddhist quarters. Thus we find in the Katha-vatthu that a discussion is raised as to whether a saint can be killed before his proper time of death, and it is said that no one can attain nirvana without enjoying the

1 Muktika Upanisad, I. 42, also 11. 33, 35, 76.

2 Srlmad-bhagavad-gitd, II. 55-58. 3 Yoga-vasistha, vi. 52-58.

fruits of accumulated intentional deeds 1 . A story is told in the Dhamma-pada commentary (the date of which, according to E. W. Burlingame, is about a.d. 450), how the great saint Moggallana was torn in pieces by thieves, and his bones were pounded until they were as small as grains of rice; such a miserable death of such a great saint naturally raised doubts among his disciples, and these were explained by Buddha, who said that this was due to the crime of parricide, which Moggallana had committed in some previous birth; even though he had attained sainthood (arhattva) in that life, he could not escape suffering the effect of his misdeeds, which were on the point of bearing fruit 2 . This would naturally imply the view that sainthood does not necessarily mean destruction of the body, but that even after the attainment of sainthood the body may continue to exist for the suffering of the effects of such actions as are on the point of bearing fruit.

The different Indian systems are, however, not all agreed regarding the possibility of the jivan-mukta state. Thus, according to the Nyaya, apavarga, or emancipation, occurs only when the soul is absolutely dissociated from all the nine kinds of qualities (will, antipathy, pleasure, pain, knowledge, effort, virtue, vice and rooted instincts). Unless such a dissociation actually occurs, there cannot be emancipation; and it is easy to see that this cannot happen except after death, and so emancipation during the period while the body remains is not possible 3 . The point is noticed by Vatsyayana in a discussion on Nyaya-sutra, iv. 2. 42-45, where he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge of external objects through the senses and denies it by declaring that in emancipation {apavarga) the soul is dissociated from the body and all the senses, and hence there is no possibility of knowledge; and that with the extinction of all knowledge there is also ultimate and absolute destruction of pain 4 . The Vaisesika holds the same view on the subject. Thus Srlharsa says that, when through right knowledge {par amartha-darsand) all merit ceases, then the

1 Kathd-vatthu, xvn. 2.

2 Buddhist Legends by E. W. Burlingame, vol. n. p. 304. The same legend is repeated in the introduction to Jdtaka 522.

3 tad evam navdndm dtma-gundndm nirmulocchedo 'pavargah tad evedam uktatn bhavati tad-atyanta-viyogo ""pavargah.

Nydya-manjarl, p. 508.

4 yasmdt sarva-duhkha-bijam sarra-duhkhayatanam cdpavarge vichidyate tasmdt sarvena duhkhena vimuktih

apavargo no nirbljam nirayatanam ca duhkham utpadyate.

Vatsyayana on Nyaya-sutra, IV. 2. 43.

soul, being devoid of the seeds of merit and demerit, which produce the body and the senses, etc., and the present body having been destroyed by the exhaustive enjoyment of the fruits of merit and demerit, and there being no further production of any new body by reason of the destruction of all the seeds of karma , there is absolute cessation of the production of body, like the extinction of fire by the burning up of all the fuel; and such an eternal non-production of body is called moksa (emancipation) 1 .

Prabhakara seems to hold a similar view. Thus Salikanatha, in explaining the Prabhakara view in his Prakarana-pancika, says that emancipation means the absolute and ultimate destruction of the body, due to the total exhaustion of merit and demerit 2 . The difficulty is raised that it is not possible to exhaust by enjoyment or suffering the fruits of all the karmas accumulated since be-ginningless time; he who, being averse to worldly sorrows and all pleasures which are mixed with traces of sorrow, works for emancipation, desists from committing the actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions, which produce sins, exhausts by enjoyment and suffering the good and bad fruits of previous actions, attains true knowledge, and is equipped with the moral qualities of passionless tranquillity, self-restraint and absolute sex-control, exhausts in the end all the potencies of his karmas (nihsesa-karmasaya) and attains emancipation 3 . This view, however, no doubt has reference to a very advanced state in this life, when no further karma is accumulating; but it does not call this state moksa during life; for moksa, according to this view, is absolute and ultimate non-production of body.

The Samkhya-karika, however, holds that, when true knowledge is attained (samyagjnanadhigama), and when in consequence none of the karmas of undetermined fruition (aniyata-vipaka), accumulated through beginningless time, are able to ripen for bearing fruit, the body may still continue to remain simply by the inertia, as it were, of the old avidya; just as even after the potter has ceased to operate the potter's wheel may continue to move as a

1 yatha dagdhendhanasydnalasyopasamah punar aniitpada evarn punah sari-ranutpado moksah. Nyaya-kandah, p. 283.

Prasastapada also writes: tada nirodhat nirbijasydtmanah sarJradi-nivrttih punah safirddy-anutpattau dagdhendhandnalavad upasamo moksa iti. Prasastapdda-bhasyh, p. 282.

2 dtyantikas tu dehocchedo nihsesa-dharmddharma-pariksaya-nibandhano moksa iti. Prakarana-pancika, p. 156.

3 Ibid. p. 157.

result of the momentum which it has acquired (cakra-bhramivad dhrta-sarirah) 1 .

The word jlvan-mukta is not used either in the Karika or in the Tattva-kaumudl or in the Tattva-vibhakara. The Samkhya-siitra, however, uses the term and justifies it on the same grounds as does Vacaspati 2 . The Samkhya-sutra, more particularly the Pravacana-bhasya, raises the threefold conception of manda-viveka (feeble discrimination), madhya-viveka (middle discrimination), and viveka-nispatti (finished discrimination) 3 . The stage of manda-viveka is that in which the enquirer has not attained the desired discrimination of the difference between prakrti and purusa, but is endeavouring to attain it; the madhya-viveka stage is the state of the jivan-mukta. But this is an asamprajnata state, i.e. a state in which there is still subject-object knowledge and a full conscious discrimination. The last stage, viveka-nispatti, is an asamprajnata state in which there is no subject-object knowledge, and therefore there cannot in this stage be any reflection of pleasure or sorrow (due to the fructifying karma — prarabdha-karmd) on the purusa.

The Yoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the Samkhya on the subject. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases to have doubts about the nature of the self, and begins to re-live the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being entirely different from his psychosis (sattva); but, as a result of the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and instincts, there may, in the intervals of the flow of true discriminative knowledge, emerge other ordinary cognitive states, such as "I am," "mine," "I know," "I do not know"; yet, inasmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been, burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce further new impressions. The general impressions of cognition (jnana-samskara), however, remain until the final destruction of citta. The point here is that, the roots in the world of subconscious impressions being destroyed, and the occasional appearance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced by some of the old impressions, the roots of which have already

1 Samkhya-karika, 67,68. The Tattva-kaumudl here essays to baseits remarks on Chdndogya, VI. 14. 2, as !§aftkara did in his bha~$ya on the Brahma-sutra. The Tattva-vibhakara of Vamsldhara Misra, in commenting on Vacaspati's Tattva-kaumudl, quotes Mundaka Upanisad, 11. 2. 8, and also !§rtmad-bhagavad-gita, iv. 37, for its .support. Compare Yoga-vdsistha : ghand na vdsand yasya punar-janana-varjita.

2 Samkhya-sutra, in. 77-83. 3 Ibid. in. 77, 78.

been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like passing shadows which have no basis anywhere; they cannot, therefore, produce any further impressions and thus cannot be a cause of bondage to the saint. With the advance of this state the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of concentration, and there is only discriminative knowledge; this state of samadhi is called dharma-megha. At this stage all the roots of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed, and in such a state the sage, though living (jivann eva), becomes emancipated (vimukta). The next stage is, of course, the state of absolute emancipation {kaivalya), when the citta returns back to prakrti, never to find the purusa again 1 .

Among later writers Vidyaranya wrote on this subject a treatise which he called Jivan-mukti-viveka 2 . It is divided into five chapters. In the first he deals with the authorities who support jwan-mukti ; in the second, with the nature of the destruction of instinctive root inclinations (vasana) ; in the third, with the destruction of manas (mano-nasa) ; in the fourth, with the final object for which jlvan-mukti is sought; and in the fifth, with the nature and characteristics of those saints who have attained jlvan-mukti by wisdom and right knowledge (vidvat-samnyasa), and have virtually renounced the world, though living. The work is more a textual compilation from various sources than an acute philosophical work examining the subject on its own merits. The writer seems to have derived his main inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha, though he refers to relevant passages in several other works, such as Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad, Maitreyi-brdhmana, Kahola-brahmana, Sarlra-brahmana, Jdbdla-brdhmana, Katha-valli, Gltd, Bhdgavata, Brhas-pati-smrti, Siita-samhitd, Gauda-pdda-kdrikd, Sankara-bhasya, Brahma-sutra, Panca-pddikd, Visnu-purdna, Taittirlya-brdhmana, Yoga-sutra, Naiskarmya-siddhi, Kausitaki, Pancadasi, Antarydmi-brahmana, Vydsa-bhdsya, Brahma-upanisad, the works of Yama, Parasara, Bodhayana, Medhatithi, Visvarupa Acarya, etc.

Disinclination to passions and desires (virakti) is, according to him, of two kinds, intense (tivra) and very intense (tivratara).

1 Yoga-sutra and Vydsa-bhdsya, iv. 29-32.

2 This Vidyaranya seems to be later than the Vidyaranya who wrote the Pancadasi, as quotations from the chapter Brahmdnanda of the Pancadasi are found in it (chap. 11, pp. 195, 196, Chowkhamba edition). So my identification of the Vidyaranya of the Pancadasi with the writer of Jlvan-mukti-viveka in the first volume (p. 419) of the present work seems to be erroneous.

Intense virakti is that in which the person does not desire anything in this life, whereas very intense virakti is that in which the person ceases to have any desires for all future lives 1 . Vidyaranya takes great pains to prove, by reference to various scriptural texts, that there are these two distinct classes of renunciation (sannydsiri), though one might develop into the other 2 . As regards the nature of jivan-mukti, Vidyaranya follows the view of the Yoga-vdsistha, though he supports it by other scriptural quotations. On the subject of bodiless emancipation (videha-mukti) also he refers to passages from the Yoga-vdsistha. Jlvan-mukti is the direct result of the cessation of all instinctive root desires (vdsand-ksaya), the dawning of right knowledge (tattva-jndna) t and the destruction of manas (mano-tidsa). Vidyaranya, however, holds that on account of steady right knowledge even the seeming appearance of passions and attachment cannot do any harm to a jivan-mukta, just as the bite of a snake whose fangs have been drawn cannot do him any harm. Thus he gives the example of Yajiiavalkya, who killed Sakalya by cursing and yet did not suffer on that account, because he was already a jivan-mukta, firm in his knowledge of the unreality of the world. So his anger was not real anger, rooted in instinctive passions, but a mere appearance (dbhdsa) of it 3 .

Energy of Free-will (Paurusa).

One of the special features of the Yoga-vdsistha is the special emphasis that it lays upon free-will and its immense possibilities, and its power of overruling the limitations and bondage of past karmas. Paurusa is defined in the Yoga-vdsistha as mental and physical exertions made in properly advised ways {sddhupadista-

1 If the ascetic has ordinary desires he is called hamsa ; if he desires emancipation, he is called parama-hamsa. The course of their conduct is described in the Pardsara-smrti, Jlvan-mukti-viveka, 1. 11. When a man renounces the world for the attainment of right knowledge, it is called vividisd-samnydsa (renunciation for thirst of knowledge), as distinguished from vidvat-samnydsa (renunciation of the wise) in the case of those who have already attained right knowledge. The latter kind of samnydsa is with reference to those who are jlvan-mukta.

2 It is pointed out by Vidyaranya that the Arunikopanisad describes the conduct and character of vividisd-samnydsa, in which one is asked to have a staff, one loin-cloth and to repeat the Aranyakas and the Upanisads only, and the Parama-hamsopanisat describes the conduct and character of vidvat-samnydsa, in which no such repetition of the Upani§ads is held necessary, since such a person is fixed and steady in his Brahma knowledge. This makes the difference between the final stages of the two kinds of renunciation {Jlvan-mukti-viveka, 1. 20-24).

3 Jlvan-mukti-viveka, pp. 183-186.

margena), since only such actions can succeed 1 . If a person desires anything and works accordingly in the proper way, he is certain to attain it, if he does not turn back in midway 2 . Paurusa is of two kinds, of the past life (praklatia) and of this life {aihika), and the past paurusa can be overcome by the present paurusa 3 . The karma of past life and the karma of this life are thus always in conflict with each other, and one or the other gains ground according to their respective strength. Not only so, but the endeavours of any individual may be in conflict with the opposing endeavours of other persons, and of these two also that which is stronger wins 4 . By strong and firm resolution and effort of will the endeavours of this life can conquer the effect of past deeds. The idea that one is being led in a particular way by the influence of past karmas has to be shaken off from the mind; for the efforts of the past life are certainly not stronger than the visible efforts of the moment.

All efforts have indeed to be made in accordance with the direction of the scriptures (sastra). There is, of course, always a limit beyond which human endeavours are not possible, and therefore it is necessary that proper economy of endeavours should be observed by following the directions of the scriptures, by cultivating the company of good friends, and by adhering to right conduct, since mere random endeavours or endeavours on a wrong line cannot be expected to produce good results 5 . If one exerts his will and directs his efforts in the proper way, he is bound to be successful. There is nothing like destiny {daiva), standing as a separate force: it has a continuity with the power of other actions performed in this life, so that it is possible by superior exertions to destroy the power of the actions of previous lives, which would have led to many evil results. Whenever a great effort is made or a great energy is exerted, there is victory. The whole question, whether the daiva of the past life or the paurusa of this life will win, depends upon the relative strength of the two, and any part of the daiva which becomes weaker than the efforts of the present life

1 sddhupadista-mdrgena yan mano-nga-vicestitam

tat paurusam tat saphalam any ad unmatta-cestitam.

Yoga-vdsistha, n. 4. 11. * yo yam artham prarthayate tad-artham cchate kramdt

avasyam sa tarn apnoti na ced ardhan nivartate.

Ibid. 11. 4. 12. 8 Ibid. 11. 4. 17. * Ibid. 11. 5. 5, 7.

5 sa ca sac-chastra-sat-sanga-sad-dcarair mjarn phalam

daddtlti svabhdvo 'yam anyatha ndrtha-siddhaye.

Ibid. II. 5. 25.

in a contrary direction is naturally annulled. It is only he who thinks that destiny must lead him on, and consequently does not strive properly to overcome the evil destiny, that becomes like an animal at the mercy of destiny or God, which may take him to heaven or to hell. The object of all endeavours and efforts in this life is to destroy the power of the so-called destiny, or daiva, and to exert oneself to his utmost to attain the supreme end of life.

The Yoga-vasistha not only holds that paurusa can conquer and annul daiva, but it even goes to the extreme of denying daiva and calling it a mere fiction, that, properly speaking, does not exist at all. Thus it is said that endeavours and efforts manifest themselves as the movement of thought (samvit-spanda), the movement of manas {manah-spandd) , and the movement of the senses {aindriya). Thought movement is followed by movement of the psychosis or cetas\ the body moves accordingly, and there is also a corresponding enjoyment or suffering. If this view is true, then daiva is never seen anywhere. Properly speaking, there is no daiva, and wherever any achievement is possible, it is always by continual strenuous effort of will, standing on its own account, or exercised in accordance with the sastra or with the directions of a teacher 1 . It is for all of us to exert ourselves for good and to withdraw our ininds from evil. By all the pramanas at our disposal it is found that nothing but the firm exercise of will and effort achieves its end, and that nothing is effected by pure daiva ; it is only by the effort of eating that there is the satisfaction of hunger, it is only by the effort of the vocal organs that speech is effected, and it is only by the effort of the legs and corresponding muscles that one can walk. So everything is effected by personal efforts, when directed with the aid of the sastra and proper advisers or teachers. What passes as daiva is a mere fiction; no one has ever experienced it, and it cannot be used by any of the senses; and the nature of efforts being essentially vibratory (spanda), one can never expect such movement from the formless, insensible, so-called daiva, which is only imagined and can never be proved. Visible efforts are all tangible and open to immediate perception; and, even if it is admitted that daiva exists, how can this supposed formless (amurta) entity come in contact with it? It is only fools who conceive the

1 sdstrato gurulas caiva svatas ceti tri-siddhayah

sarvatra purusdrthasya na daivasya kadacana.

Yoga-vasi$tha, II. 7. 11.

existence of daiva, and depend on it, and are ruined, whereas those who are heroes, who are learned and wise, always attain their highest by their free-will and endeavour 1 .

Rama points out to Vasistha in 11. 9 that daiva is fairly well accepted amongst all people, and asks how, if it did not exist, did it come to be accepted, and what does it mean after all? In answer to this Vasistha says that, when any endeavour (paurusa) comes to fruition or is baffled, and a good or a bad result is gained, people speak of it as being daiva. There is no daiva, it is mere vacuity, and it can neither help nor obstruct anyone in any way. At the time of taking any step people have a particular idea, a particular resolution; there may be success or failure as the result of operation in a particular way, and the whole thing is referred to by ordinary people as being due to daiva, which is a mere name, a mere consolatory word. The instinctive root inclinations (vasana) of a prior state become transformed into karma. A man works in accordance with his vasana and by vasana gets what he wants. Vasana and karma are, therefore, more or less like the potential and actual states of the same entity. Daiva is but another name for the karmas performed with strong desire for fruit, karma thus being the same as vasana, and vasana being the same as manas, and manas being the same as the agent or the person (purusa); so daiva does not exist as an entity separate from the purusa, and they are all merely synonyms for the same indescribable entity (durniscaya). Whatever the manas strives to do is done by itself, which is the same as being done by daiva. There are always in manas two distinct groups of vasanas, operating towards the good and towards the evil, and it is our clear duty to rouse the former against the latter, so that the latter may be overcome and dominated by the former. But, since man is by essence a free source of active energy, it is meaningless to say that he could be determined by anything but himself; if it is held that any other entity could determine him, the question arises, what other thing would determine that entity, and what else that entity, and there would thus be an endless vicious regression 2 . Man is thus a free source

1 mudhaih prakalpitam daivam tat-pards te ksayam gatdh prajnas tu paurusarthena padam uttamatdm gatah.

Yoga-vdsistha, 11. 8. 16.

2 anyas Warn cetayati cet tarn cetayati ko 'parah ka imam cctayet tasmad anavastha na vastavl.

Ibid. II. 9. 29.

of activity, and that which appears to be limiting his activity is but one side of him, which he can overcome by rousing up his virtuous side. This view of purusa-kara and karma seems to be rather unique in Indian literature.

Prana and its Control.

The mind {citta), which naturally transforms itself into its states (vrtti), does so for two reasons, which are said to be like its two seeds. One of these is the vibration (parispanda) of prana, and the other, strong and deep-rooted desires and inclinations which construct (drdha-bhavana) 1 . When the prana vibrates and is on the point of passing through the nerves (nadi-samsparsanodyata), then there appears the mind full of its thought processes (samveda-namaya). But when the prana lies dormant in the hollow of the veins (sira-sarani-kotare), then there is no manifestation of mind, and its processes and the cognitive functions do not operate 2 . It is the vibration of the prana (prana-spanda) that manifests itself through the citta and causes the world-appearance out of nothing. The cessation of the vibration of prana means cessation of all cognitive functions. As a result of the vibration of prana, the cognitive function is set in motion like a top (vita). As a top spins round in the yard when struck, so, roused by the vibration of prana, knowledge is manifested; and in order to stop the course of knowledge, it is necessary that the cause of knowledge should be first attacked. When the citta remains awake to the inner sense, while shut to all extraneous cognitive activities, we have the highest state. For the cessation of citta the yogins control prana through pranayama (breath-regulation) and meditation (dhyand), in accordance with proper instructions 3 .

Again, there is a very intimate relation between vasana and prana-spanda, such that vasana is created and stimulated into activity, prana-spanda, and prana-spanda is set in motion through vasana. When by strong ideation and without any proper deliberation of the past and the present, things are conceived to be one's own—the body, the senses, the ego and the like—we have what is

1 Yoga-vdsistha, v. 91. 14.

2 I have translated sir a as veins, though I am not properly authorized to do it. For the difference between veins and arteries does not seem to have been known.

3 Yoga-vdsistha, v. 91. 20-27.

called vasana. Those who have not the proper wisdom always believe in the representations of the ideations of vasana without any hesitation and consider them to be true; and, since both the vasana and the prana-spanda are the ground and cause of the manifestations of citta, the cessation of one promptly leads to the cessation of the other. The two are connected with each other in the relation of seed and shoot (bljdnkuravat) ; from prana-spanda there is vasana, and from vasana there is prana-spanda. The object of knowledge is inherent in the knowledge itself, and so with the cessation of knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases 1 .

As a description of prdna we find in the Yoga-vasistha that it is said to be vibratory activity (spanda-sakti) situated in the upper part of the body, while apdna is the vibratory activity in the lower part of the body. There is a natural prdndydma going on in the body in waking states as well as in sleep. The mental outgoing tendency of the pranas from the cavity of the heart is called recaka, and the drawing in of the pranas (dvddasdnguli) by the apdna activity is called piiraka. The interval between the cessation of one effort of apdna and the rise of the effort of prdna is the stage of kumbhaka. Bhusunda, the venerable old crow who was enjoying an exceptionally long life, is supposed to instruct Vasistha in vi. 24 on the subject of prdna. He compares the body to a house with the ego {ahamkdra) as the householder. It is supposed to be supported by pillars of three kinds 2 , provided with nine doors (seven apertures in the head and two below), tightly fitted with the tendons (sndyu) as fastening materials and cemented with blood, flesh and fat. On the two sides of it there are the two nadis, idd and pingald, lying passive and unmanifested (nimilite). There is also a machine (yantra) of bone and flesh (asthi-mdmsa-maya) in the shape of three double lotuses (padma-yugma-traya) having pipes attached to them running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing upon one another (anyonya-milat-komala-saddala). When it is slowly

1 samulam nasyatah ksipram mula-cchedad iva drumah. samvidam viddhi samvedyam bijam dhiratayd vino, na sambhavati samvedyam taila-hlnas tilo yathd

na bahir ndntare kimcit samvedyam vidyate prthak.

Yoga-vasistha, v. 91. 66 and 67.

2 tri-prakara-maha-sthunam,vi. 24. 14. The commentator explains the three kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine— vayu (air), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm)— vdta-pitta-kapha-laksana-tri-prakdrd mahantah sthuna vistambha-kdsthdni yasya. I am myself inclined to take the three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body— the skull, the trunk, and the legs.

dii 17

filled with air, the petals move, and by the movement of the petals the air increases. Thus increased, the air, passing upwards and downwards through different places, is differently named as prana, apana, samana, etc. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus of the heart (hrt-padma-yantra-tritaye) that all the prana forces operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays from the moon's disc. They go out, return, repulse and draw and circulate. Located in the heart, the air is called prana : it is through its power that there is the movement of the eyes, the operation of the tactual sense, breathing through the nose, digesting of food and the power of speech 1 . The prana current of air stands for exhalation (recaka) and the apana for inhalation (puraka), and the moment of respite between the two operations is called kum-bhaka ; consequently, if the prana and apana can be made to cease there is an unbroken continuity of kumbhaka. But all the functions of the prana, as well as the upholding of the body, are ultimately due to the movement of citta 2 . Though in its movement in the body the prana is associated with air currents, still it is in reality nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought-activity, and these two act and react upon each other, so that, if the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease, the thought-activity will automatically cease, and vice-versa. Thus through spanda-nirodha we have prana-nirodha and through prana-nirodha wehzvespanda-nirodha. In the Yoga-vdsistha, in. 13. 31, twyw is said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (spandateyat sa tad vayuh). In v. 78 it is said that citta and movement are in reality one and the same, and are therefore altogether inseparable, like the snow and its whiteness, and consequently with the destruction of one the other is also destroyed. There are two ways of destroying the citta, one by Yoga, consisting of the cessation of mental states, and the other by right knowledge. As water enters through the crevices of the earth, so air (vata) moves in the body through the nadis and is called prana. It is this prana air which, on account of its diverse functions and works, is differently named as apana, etc.

1 Yoga-vdsistha, VI. 24. It is curious to note in this connection that in the whole literature of the Ayur-veda there is probably no passage where there is such a clear description of the respiratory process. Pupphusa, or lungs, are mentioned only by name in Susruta-samhita, but none of their functions and modes of operation are at all mentioned. It is probable that the discovery of the respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different from that of the medical school.

2 Ibid. VI. 25. 61-74.

But it is identical with citta. From the movement of prdna there is the movement oicitta, and from that there is knowledge (samvid). As regards the control of the movement of prana, the Yoga-vasistha advises several alternatives. Thus it holds that through concentrating one's mind on one subject, or through fixed habits of long inhalation associated with meditation, or through exhaustive exhalation, or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining kumbhaka, or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula 1 , or, again, through concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the two brows, there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and the consequent cessation of prdna activities 2 .

Professor Macdonell, writing on prdna in the Vedic Index, vol. n, says, " prdna, properly denoting 'breath,' is a term of wide and vague significance in Vedic literature." In the narrow sense prdna denotes one of the vital airs, of which five are usually enumerated, viz. prdna, apdna, vydna, uddna and samdna. The exact sense of each of these breaths, when all are mentioned, cannot be determined. The word prdna has sometimes merely the general sense of breath, even when opposed to apdna. But its proper sense is beyond question "breathing forth," "expiration." But, though in a few cases the word may have been used for "breath" in its remote sense, the general meaning of the word in the Upanisads is not air current, but some sort of biomotor force, energy or vitality often causing these air currents 3 . It would be tedious to refer to the large number of relevant Upanisad texts and to try to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each

1 tdlu-mula-gatam yatndj jihvaydkramya ghantikdm urdhva-randhra-gate prone prdna-spando nirudhyate,

Yoga-vasistha, v. 78. 25.

2 It is important to notice in this connection that most of the forms oiprana-ydma as herein described, except the hatha-yoga process of arresting the inner air passage by the tongue, otherwise known as khecarl-mudrd, are the same as described in the sutras of Pataftjali and the bhasya of Vyasa; and this fact has also been pointed out by the commentator Anandabodhendra Bhiksu in his commentary on the above.

3 Difference between prdna and vdyu, Aitareya, II. 4; the ndsikyaprdna, I. 4. Relation of prdna to other functions, Kausitaki, 11. 5; prdna as life, II. 8; prdna connected with vdyu, II. 12; prdna as the most important function of life, 11. 14; prdna as consciousness, Hi. 2. Distinction of ndsikya and mukhya prdna, Chdndogya, 11. 1-9; the function of the five vdyus, m. 3-5; prdna as the result of food, 1. 8. 4; of water, VI. 5. 2, VI. 6. 5, VI. 7. 6; prdna connected with dtman, as everything else connected with prdna, like spokes of a wheel, Brhad-dranyaka, II. 5. 15; prdna as strength, ibid. v. 14. 4; prdna as force running through the susumna nerve, Maitrl, vi. 21; etc.

17-2

case. The best way to proceed therefore is to refer to the earliest traditional meaning of the word, as accepted by the highest Hindu authorities. I refer to the Vedanta-sutra of Badarayana, which may be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed in the Upanisads. Thus the Vedanta-sutra, n. 4. 9 {na vdyu-kriye prihag upadesdt), speaking of what may be the nature of prana, says that it is neither air current (vayu) nor action (kriya), since prana has been considered as different from air and action (in the Upanisads). Sankara, commenting on this, says that from such passages as yahpranah sa esa vdyuh panca 'vtdhah prano pdno vydna udanah samanah (what is prana is vayu and it is fivefold, prana, apdna, vyana, udana,samana), it may be supposed that vayu (air) is prana, but it is not so, since in Chandogya, 111. 18. 4, it is stated that they are different. Again, it is not the action of the senses, as the Samkhya supposes; for it is regarded as different from the senses in Mundaka, 11.1. 3. The passage which identifies vayu with prana is intended to prove that it is the nature of vayu that has transformed itself into the entity known as prana (just as the human body itself may be regarded as a modification or transformation of ksiti, earth). It is not vayu, but, as Vacaspati says, " vdyu-bheda," which Amalananda explains in his Veddnta-kalpa-taru as vayoh parindma-rupa-karya-vtsesah, i.e. it is a particular evolutionary product of the category of vayu. Sankara's own statement is equally explicit on the point. He says, "vayur evayam adhydtmam dpannah panca-vyuho visesatmandvatisthamdnah prano nama bhanyate na tattvantaram napi vdyu-mdtram" i.e. it is vayu which, having transformed itself into the body, differentiates itself into a group of five that is called vayu; prana is not altogether a different category, nor simply air. In explaining the nature of prana in 11. 4. 10-12, Sankara says that prana is not as independent SLSj'lva (soul), but performs everything on its behalf, like a prime minister (raja-mantrivaj jlvasya sarvdrtha-karanatvena upakarana-bhuto na svatantrah). Prana is not an instrument like the senses, which operate only in relation to particular objects; for, as is said in Chandogya, v. 1.6, 7, Brhad-dranyaka, iv. 3. 12 and Brhad-aranyaka, 1. 3. 19, when all the senses leave the body the prana continues to operate. It is that by the functioning of which the existence of the soul in the body, or life (jiva-sthiti), and the passage of the jlva out of the body, or death (jivotkranti), are possible. The five vayus are the five functionings of this vital

principle, just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge, illusion, imagination (vikalpa), sleep and memory are the different states of the mind. Vacaspati, in commenting on Vedanta-sutra t II. 4. 11, says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the senses (dehendriya-vidharana-karanam pranah), though it must be remembered that it has still other functions over and above the upholding of the body and the senses (na kevalatn sarlrendriya-dharanam asya karyam, Vacaspati, ibid.). In Vedanta-sutra, 11. 4. 13, it is described as being atomic (anu), which is explained by Sankara as "subtle" (silksma), on account of its pervading the whole body by its fivefold functionings. Vacaspati in explaining it says that it is called "atomic" only in a derivative figurative sense (upacaryate) and only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable character (duradhigamata), though pervading the whole body. Govindananda, in commenting upon Vedanta-sutra, 11. 4. 9, says that prana is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of life and it has no other direct operation than that (parispanda-rupa-pranananukulatvad avantara-vyaparabhavat). This seems to be something like biomotor or life force. With reference to the relation of prana to the motor organs or faculties of speech, etc., Sarikara says that their vibratory activity is derived from prana (vag-adisuparispanda-labhasyapranayattatvam, 11.4.19). There are some passages in the Vedanta-sutra which may lead us to think that the five vayus may mean air currents, but that it is not so is evident from the fact that the substance of the prana is not air (etat pranadi-pancakam akasadi-gata-rajo- 'msebhyo militebhya utpadyate) , and the rajas element is said to be produced from the five bhutas, and the pranas are called kriyatmaka, or consisting of activity. Rama Tirtha, commenting on the above passage of the Vedanta-sara, says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence of vayu and the other bhutas, but it is not in any sense the external air which performs certain physiological functions in the body (tatha mukhya-prano 'pi vayor bahyasya sutratmakasya vikaro na sarlra-madhye nabhovad vrtti-labha-matrena avasthito bahya-vayur eva) 1 . Having proved that in Vedanta prana or any of the five vayus means biomotor force and not air current, I propose now to turn to the Samkhya-Yoga.

The Samkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedanta in rejecting the view that the prana is in any sense an evolutionary product of the 1 Vidvan-mano-ranjarit, p. 105, Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1916.

nature of vayu. Thus Vijfianabhiksu in his Vijnanamrta-bhasya on Veddnta-sutra, 11. 4. 10, says that prana is called vayu because it is self-active like the latter (svatah kriydvattvena ubhayoh prdna-vdyvoh sdjdtydt). Again, in 11.4.9, he says that prana is neither air nor the upward or downward air current (mukhya-prdno na vdyuh ndpi sdrirasya urdhv-ddho-vgamana-laksand vayu-kriya).

What is prana, then, according to Samkhya-Yoga? It is mahat-tattva, which is evolved from prakrti, which is called buddhi with reference to its intellective power and prana with reference to its power as activity. The so-called five vdyus are the different functionings of the mahat-tattva (sdmdnya-kdrya-sddhdranam yat kdranam mahat-tattvam tasyaiva vrtti-bheddh prdndpdnddayah', see Vijndndmrta-bhdsya, 11.4.11). Again, referring to Sdmkhya-kdrikd, 29, we find that the five vdyus are spoken of as the common functioning of buddhi, ahamkdra and manas, and Vacaspati says that the five vdyus are their life. This means that the three, buddhi, ahamkdra and manas, are each energizing, in their own way, and it is the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold prana which upholds the body. Thus in this view also prana is biomotor force and no air current. The special feature of this view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy consisting of the specific functionings of buddhi, ahamkdra and manas 1 . It is due to the evolutionary activity of antahkarana. In support of this view the Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdsya, 11. 31, Vydsa-bhdsya, in. 39, Vacaspati's Tattva-vaisaradl, Bhiksu's Yoga-varttika, and Nagesa's Chdyd-vydkhyd thereon may be referred to. It is true, no doubt, that sometimes inspiration and expiration of external air are also called prana; but that is because in inspiration and expiration the function of prana is active or it vibrates. It is thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called prana 2 . Ramanuja agrees with Sankara in holding that prana is not air (vayu), but a transformation of the nature of air. But it should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification as can only be known by Yoga methods 3 .

The Vaisesika, however, holds that it is the external air which

1 Gaudapada's bhdsya on the £amkhya-kdrikd, 29 compares the action of prana to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage: compare Sankara's reference to Veddnta-sutra, 11. 4. 9.

2 Rdmdnuja-bhdsya on Veddnta-sutra, II. 4. 8.

3 See the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, 53-55, and also Rdmdnuja-bhdsya and Sruta-prakdsikd, 11. 4. 1—15.

according to its place in the body performs various physiological functions 1 . The medical authorities also support the view that vayu is a sort of driving and upholding power. Thus the Bhdva-prakdsa describes vayu as follows: It takes quickly the dosas, dhdtus and the malas from one place to another, is subtle, composed of rajo-guna; is dry, cold, light and moving. By its movement it produces all energy, regi lates inspiration and expiration and generates all movement and action, and by upholding the keenness of the senses and the dhdtus holds together the heat, senses and the mind 2 . Vahata in his Astanga-samgraha also regards vayu as the one cause of all body movements, and there is nothing to suggest that he meant air currents 3 . The long description of Caraka (1. 12), as will be noticed in the next chapter, seems to suggest that he considered the vayu as the constructive and destructive force of the universe, and as fulfilling the same kinds of functions inside the body as well. It is not only a physical force regulating the physiological functions of the body, but is also the mover and controller of the mind in all its operations, as knowing, feeling and willing. Susruta holds that it is in itself avyakta (unmanifested or unknowable), and that only its actions as operating in the body are manifested (avyakto vyakta-karma ca).

In the Yoga-vasistha, as we have already seen above, prdna or vayu is defined as that entity which vibrates (spandate yat sa tad vdyuh, ill. 13) and it has no other reality than vibration. Prdna itself is, again, nothing but the movement of the intellect as ahamkdra*. Prdna is essentially of the nature of vibration (spanda), and mind is but a form of prdna energy, and so by the control of the mind the five vdyus are controlled 5 . The Saiva authorities also agree with the view that prdna is identical with cognitive activity, which passes through the nddls (nerves) and maintains all the body movement and the movement of the senses. Thus Ksemaraja says that it is the cognitive force which passes in the form of prdna through the nddls, and he refers to Bhatta Kallata as also holding the same view, and prdna is definitely spoken of by him as force (kutila-vdhini prdna-saktih) 6 . Sivopadhyaya in his Vivrti on the

1 Nyaya-kandall of SVldhara, p. 48.

2 Bhava-prakdsa, Sen's edition, Calcutta, p. 47.

3 Vahata's Astanga-samgraha and the commentary by Indu, Trichur, 1914, pp. 138, 212.

4 Yoga-vasistha, m. 14. 6 Ibid. V. 13, 78. G Siva-sutra-vimarsinl, ill. 43, 44.

Vijnana-bhairava also describes prima as force (sakti), and the Vijnana-bhairava itself does the same 1 . Bhatta Ananda in his Vijnana-kaumudi describes prana as a functioning of the mind (citta-vrtti).

Stages of Progress.

It has been already said that the study of philosophy and association with saintly characters are the principal means with which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of salvation. In the first stage (prathama bhumika) the enquirer has to increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons. The second stage is the stage of critical thinking (vicarana); the third is that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions, etc. (asanga-bhavana) ; the fourth stage (vildpani) is that in which through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-appearance shows itself to be false; the fifth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure knowledge and bliss (suddha-samvit-maya-nanda-rupd). This stage is that of the jivan-mukta, in which the saint may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (ardha-supta-prabuddha). The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure bliss; it is a state which is more like that of deep dreamless sleep (susupta-sadrsa-sthiti). The seventh stage is the last transcendental state (turyatita), which cannot be experienced by any saint while he is living. Of these the first three stages are called the waking state (jagrat), the fourth stage is called the dream state (svapna), the fifth stage is called the dreamless (susupta) state, the sixth stage is an unconscious state called the turya, and the seventh stage is called the turyatita 3 .

Desire (iccha) is at the root of all our troubles. It is like a mad elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it. The senses are like its young, and the instinctive root inclinations (vasana) are like its flow of ichor. It can only be conquered by the close application of patience (dhairya). Desire means the imaginations of the mind, such as "let this happen to me," and this is also called sankalpa. The proper way to stop this sort of imagining is to cease by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring in this manner, and for this one has to forget his memory; for

1 Vijnana-bhairava and Vivrti, verse 67.

2 See the Nydya-kandall of SVldhara, p. 48, and also Dinakari and Rdmarudrl on the Siddhdnta-muktavall on Bhdsd-parichcheda, p. 44.

3 Yoga-vdsistha, vi. 120.

so long as memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be stopped. The last stage, when all movement has ceased (aspanda) and all thoughts and imaginations have ceased, is a state of unconsciousness (avedanam) 1 . Yoga is also defined as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedana), the eternal state when everything else has ceased 2 . In this state citta is destroyed, and one is reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness; and thus, being free of all relations and differentiations of subject and object, one has no knowledge in this state, though it is characterized as bodhatmaka (identical with consciousness). This last state is indeed absolutely indescribable (avyapadesya), though it is variously described as the state of Brahman, Siva, or the realization of the distinction of prakrti and purusa 3 . The Yoga-vasistha, however, describes this state not as being.essentially one of bliss, but as a state of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. It is only the fifth state that manifests itself as being of the nature of dnanda ; the sixth state is one of unconsciousness, which, it seems, can somehow be grasped; but the seventh is absolutely transcendental and indescribable.

The division of the progressive process into seven stages naturally reminds one of the seven stages of prajna (wisdom) in Patanjali's Yoga-siitra and Vyasa-bhasya. The seven stages of prajna are there divided into two parts, the first containing four and the second three. Of these the four are psychological and the three are ontological, showing the stages of the disintegration of citta before its final destruction or citta-vimukti* ; . Here also the first four stages, ending with vilapani, are psychological, whereas the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of citta towards its final disruption. But, apart from this, it does not seem that there is any one to one correspondence of the prajna states of the Yoga-vasistha with those of Patanjali. The Yoga-vasistha occasionally mentions the name Yoga as denoting the highest state and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedanam vidur yogam) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire 5 . In the first half of the sixth book, chapter 125, the ultimate state is described as the state of universal negation (sarvapahnava). Existence of citta is pain, and its destruction bliss; the destruction

1 Yoga-vasistha, vi. 126. 2 Ibid. vi. 126. 99. 3 Ibid. vi. 126. 71-72. 4 See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, p. 273. 6 Icchd-visa-vikdrasya viyogam yoga-namakam. Yoga-vasistha, vi. 37. 1; also ibid. vi. 126. 99.

of citta by cessation of knowledge—a state of neither pain nor pleasure nor any intermediate state—a state as feelingless as that of the stone (pasanavat-samam), is the ultimate state aimed at 1 .

Karma, according to the Yoga-vasistha,is nothing but thought-activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. Abandonment of karma therefore means nothing short of abandonment of thought-activity or the process of knowledge 2 . Cessation of karma thus means the annihilation of knowledge. The stirring of karma or activity of thought is without any cause; but it is due to this activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into being; the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of all knowledge, the unconscious, stone-like knowledgeless state 3 .

As there are seven progressive stages, so there are also seven kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their vasands. There are svapna-jagara, sankalpa-jagara, kevala-jagrat-sthita, ciraj-jagrat-sthita, ghana-jagrat-sthita, jagrat-svapna and ksina-jagaraka. Svapna-jagara (dream-awake) persons are those who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all our present states of being and worked as dream persons {svapna-nara). The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not impossible; for everything is present everywhere in the spirit, so it is possible that we, as dream persons of their dream experience, should be present in their minds in their vasana forms (tad-antah-karane vasanatmana sthitahy. As both past and present have no existence except in thought, time is in thought reversible, so that our existence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their having an experience of us in dreams. For the limitations of time and space do not hold for thought, and as elements in thought everything exists everywhere (sarvam sarvatra vidyate) h . By dreams these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to final emancipation. The second class, the sankalpa-jagaras , are those who without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to conceive all sorts of activities and existences, and may ultimately attain emancipation. The third class, the kevala-jagaras, are those who are born in this life for the first time. When such beings pass

1 This turlyatita stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of su$upti, which is often described as a stage of pure bliss.

sarvesdm karmanam evam vedanam bljam uttamam

svarupam cetayitvantas tatah spandah pravartate.

Yoga-vdsi$tha, vi. n. 2. 26. 3 Ibid. III. 15. 16. * Ibid. vi. 2. 50. 9. Tdtparya-prakasa. B Ibid.

through more than one life, they are called cira-jagaras . Such beings, on account of their sins, may be born as trees, etc., in which case they are called ghana-jagaras. Those of such beings suffering rebirth who by study and good association attain right knowledge are called jagrat-svapna-sthita; and finally, those that have reached the turya state of deliverance are called kslna-jagaraka. Bondage (bandha), according to the Yoga-vasistha, remains so long as our knowledge has an object associated with it, and deliverance (moksa) is realized when knowledge is absolutely and ultimately dissociated from all objects and remains in its transcendent purity, having neither an object nor a subject 1 .

Methods of Right Conduct.

The Yoga-vasistha does not enjoin severe asceticism or the ordinary kinds of religious gifts, ablutions or the like for the realization of our highest ends, which can only be achieved by the control of attachment (raga), antipathy (dvesa), ignorance (tamah), anger (krodha), pride (mada), and jealousy (matsarya), followed by the right apprehension of the nature of reality 2 . So long as the mind is not chastened by the clearing out of all evil passions, the performance of religious observances leads only to pride and vanity and does not produce any good. The essential duty of an enquirer consists in energetic exertion for the achievement of the highest end, for which he must read the right sort of scriptures (sac-chastra) and associate with good men 3 . He should somehow continue his living and abandon even the slightest desire of enjoyment (bhoga-gandham parityajet), and should continue critical thinking (vicara). On the question whether knowledge or work, jnana or karma, is to be accepted for the achievement of the highest end, the Yoga-vasistha does not, like Sankara, think that the two cannot jointly be taken up, but on the contrary emphatically says that, just as

1 jnanasya jneyatapattir bandha ity abhidhlyate tasyaiva jneyata-sdntir moksa ity abhidhlyate.

Yoga-vasisfha, vi. 11. 190. 1.

2 sva-paurusa-prayatnena vivekena vikasind

sa devojndyate rdma na tapah-sndna-karmabhih.

Ibid. in. 6. 9. 8 Good men are defined in the Yoga-vasistha as follows:

dese yam sujana-prdyd lokdh sddhum pracaksate

sa viiistah sa sddhuh sydt tarn prayatnena samsrayet.

Ibid. HI. 6. 20.

a bird flies with its two wings, so an enquirer can reach his goal through the joint operation of knowledge and work 1 .

The main object of the enquirer being the destruction of citta, all his endeavours should be directed towards the uprooting of instinctive root inclinations (vasana), which are the very substance and root of the citta. The realization of the truth {tattva-jnana), the destruction of the vasanas and the destruction of the citta all mean the same identical state and are interdependent on one another, so that none of them can be attained without the other. So, abandoning the desire for enjoyment, one has to try for these three together; and for this one has to control one's desires on one hand and practise breath-control (prana-nirodhena) on the other; and these two would thus jointly co-operate steadily towards the final goal. Such an advancement is naturally slow, but this progress, provided it is steady, is to be preferred to any violent efforts to hasten {hatha) the result 2 . Great stress is also laid on the necessity of self-criticism as a means of loosening the bonds of desire and the false illusions of world-appearance and realizing the dissociation from attachment (asanga) 3 .

Yoga-vasistha, Sankara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijnanavada.

To a superficial reader the idealism of the Yoga-vdsistha may appear to be identical with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sankara; and in some of the later Vedanta works of the Sankara school, such as the Jivan-mukti-viveka, etc., so large a number of questions dealt with in the Yoga-vasistha occur that one does not readily imagine that there may be any difference between this idealism and that of Sankara. This point therefore needs some discussion.

The main features of Sankara's idealism consist in the doctrine that the self-manifested subject-objectless intelligence forms the ultimate and unchangeable substance of both the mind {antahka-rand) and the external world. Whatever there is of change and mutation is outside of this Intelligence, which is also the Reality. But, nevertheless, changes are found associated with this reality or Brahman, such as the external forms of objects and the diverse mental states. These are mutable and have therefore a different kind of indescribable existence from Brahman; but still they are

1 Yoga-vasi$tha, i. i. 7, 8. 2 Ibid. v. 92. s Ibid. v. 93.

somehow essentially of a positive nature 1 . Sahkara's idealism does not allow him to deny the existence of external objects as apart from perceiving minds, and he does not adhere to the doctrine of esse estpercipi. Thus he severely criticizes the views of the Buddhist idealists, who refuse to believe in the existence of external objects as apart from the thoughts which seem to represent them. Some of these arguments are of great philosophical interest and remind one of similar arguments put forth by a contemporary British Neo-realist in refutation of Idealism.

The Buddhists there are made to argue as follows: When two entities are invariably perceived simultaneously they are identical; now knowledge and its objects are perceived simultaneously; therefore the objects are identical with their percepts. Our ideas have nothing in the external world to which they correspond, and their existence during dreams, when the sense-organs are universally agreed to be inoperative, shows that for the appearance of ideas the operation of the sense-organs, indispensable for establishing connection with the so-called external world, is unnecessary. If it is asked how, if there are no external objects, can the diversity of percepts be explained, the answer is that such diversity may be due to the force of vasanas or the special capacity of the particular moment associated with the cognition 2 . If the so-called external objects are said to possess different special capacities which would account for the"diversity of percepts, the successive moments of the mental order may also be considered as possessing special distinctive capacities which would account for the diversity of percepts generated by those cognition moments. In dreams it is these diverse cognition moments which produce diversity of percepts.

Sahkara, in relating the above argument of the Buddhist idealist, says that external objects are directly perceived in all our perceptions, and how then can they be denied? In answer to this, if it is held that there is no object for the percepts excepting the sensations, or that the existence of anything consists in its being perceived, that can be refuted by pointing to the fact that the independent existence of the objects of perception, as apart from their being perceived, can be known from the perception itself, since the

1 See the account of £arikara Vedanta in my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, Cambridge, 1922, chapter x.

2 Kasyacid eva jnana-ksanasya sa tadrsah sdmarthydtisayo vasand-parinamah. Bhdmatl, n. 11. 28.

perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknowledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it, admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness? When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied? You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these two cases varies, but the object remains the same 1 .

The above argument of Sankara against Buddhist idealism conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody's knowing them. External objects had an existence different from and independent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts.

But the idealism of the Yoga-vasistha is more like the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Sankara. For according to the Yoga-vasistha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence. Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world having a separate or independent existence. Esse est per dpi is the doctrine of the Yoga-vasistha , while Sankara most emphatically refutes such a doctrine. A. later exposition of Vedanta by Prakasananda, known as Veda, z-siddhanta-muktavali, seems to derive its inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha in its exposition of Vedanta on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vasistha, by denying the existence of objects not perceived (ajnata-sattvanabhyupagatna) 2 . Prakasananda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there is no independent external existence of objects apart from their perception. All objects have only perceptual existence {pratitlka-sattva). Both Prakasananda and the Yoga-vasistha deny the existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Sarikara not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in the same form in which they are known; and this amounts virtually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add

1 Sarikara's bhasya on the Brahma-sutra, 11. 2. 28.

2 Siddhanta-muktavatl. See The Pandit, new series, vol. xi, pp. 129-139.

anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The idealism of Sankara's Vedanta consists in this, that he held that the Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all objects perceived outside of us in the external world. Whatever forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which passes by the name of may a 1 . Sankara Vedanta takes it for granted that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful, though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal in that special sense; may a belongs to a category different from affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite.

The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this maya in Sankara Vedanta is therefore as indefinite as the maya; the real is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their essence, Sankara is not in a position to tell us. The Yoga-vasistha however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate truth; it is said to be the Brahman, tit, or void (silnya); but, whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to Sankara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the operation of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dialectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance {kakataliya). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is here that the system of the Yoga-vasistha is particularly defective. Another important defect of the system is that it does not either criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience. 1 See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, ch. x.

With Sankara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the Yoga-vdsistha is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipation, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood of the Vedanta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost. In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction of prakrti and purusa, pure vijndna and void (sunya), while in truth it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of mukti (emancipation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as pdsanavat or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the Vaisesika view of mukti. On the practical side it lays great stress on paurusa, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically denies daiva as having the power of weakening paurusa or even exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view of karma as meaning only thought-activity. As against Sahkara, it holds that knowledge (jnana) and karma maybe combined together, and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of the Yoga-vdsistha are the study of philosophical scripture, association with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being worse than useless. Its doctrine of esse est percipi and that no experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that there are no external objects to which they correspond and that all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of what this system owes to Vijnanavada Buddhism. But, while an important Vijnanavada work like the Lankdvatdra-sutra tries to explain through its various categories the origin of the various appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the Yoga-vdsistha, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit account of Vijnanavada by Hindu writers, such as Vacaspati and others, these important contributions of the system are never referred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of Vijnanavada and Gaudapada on the Yoga-vdsistha, it seems to have developed in close association with the Saiva, as its doctrine oispanda, or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however, be more fully discussed in my treatment of Saiva philosophy.

CHAPTER XIII SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS

It may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of Indian Philosophy. But the force of such an objection will lose much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in ancient India, was directly and intimately connected with the Samkhya and Vaisesika physics and was probably the origin of the logical speculations subsequently codified in the Nydya-sutras 1 . The literature contains, moreover, many other interesting ethical instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably from that found in works on philosophy; further, it treats of many other interesting details which throw a flood of light on the scholastic methods of Indian thinkers. Those, again, who are aware of the great importance of Hatha Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or contrast the speculations of the medical schools on kindred points of interest. Their speculations regarding embryology, heredity and other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting even to a student of pure philosophy.

Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda.

Susruta says that Ayur-veda (the science of life) is an updnga of the Atharva-Veda and originally consisted of 100,000 verses in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahma before he created all beings {Susruta-samhitd, 1. 1. 5). What updnga exactly means in this connection cannot easily be satisfactorily explained. Dalhana (a.d. iioo) in explaining the word in his Nibandha-samgraha, says that an updnga is a smaller anga (part)— " angam eva alpatvdd updngam." Thus, while hands and legs are regarded as angas, the toes or the palms of the hands are called updnga. The Atharva-Veda contains six thousand verses and about

1 The system of Samkhya philosophy taught in Caraka-samhita, iv. 1, has already been described in the first volume of the present work, pp. 213-217.

one thousand prose lines. If the Ayur-veda originally contained 100,000 verses, it cannot be called an updnga of the Atharva-Veda, if updnga is to mean a small appendage, as Dalhana explains it. For, far from being a small appendage, it was more than ten times as extensive as the Atharva-Veda. Caraka, in discussing the nature of Ayur-veda, says that there was never a time when life did not exist or when intelligent people did not exist, and so there were always plenty of people who knew about life, and there were always medicines which acted on the human body according to the principles which we find enumerated in the Ayur-veda. Ayur-veda was not produced at any time out of nothing, but there was always a continuity of the science of life; when we hear of its being produced, it can only be with reference to a beginning of the comprehension of its principles by some original thinker or the initiation of a new course of instruction at the hands of a gifted teacher. The science of life has always been in existence, and there have always been people who understood it in their own way; it is only with reference to its first systematized comprehension or instruction that it may be said to have a beginning 1 . Again, Caraka distinguishes Ayur-veda as a distinct Veda, which is superior to the other Vedas because it gives us life, which is the basis of all other enjoyments or benefits, whether they be of this world or of another 2 . Vagbhata, the elder, speaks of Ayur-veda not as an updnga, but as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda 3 . The Mahd-bhdrata, 11. 11. 33, speaks of upaveda, and Nllakantha, explaining this, says that there are four upavedas, Ayur-veda, Dhanur-veda, GdndharvaandArtha-sdstra. Brahma-valvarta, a later purdna, says that after creating the Rk, Yajus, Sama and Atharva Brahma created the Ayur-veda as the fifth Veda 4 . Roth has a quotation in his Worterbuch to the effect that Brahma taught Ayur-veda, which was a vedanga, in all its eight parts 5 .

1 Caraka, 1. 30. 24. This passage seems to be at variance with Caraka, 1. 1.6; for it supposes that diseases also existed always, while Caraka, 1. 1. 6 supposes that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. Is it an addition by the reviser Drdhabala?

a Caraka, 1. 1. 42 and Ayur-veda-dlpikd of Cakrapani on it.

3 A$tanga-samgraha, 1. 1.8. Gopatha-Brdhmana, 1. 10, however, mentions five vedas, viz. Sarpa-veda, Pisdca-veda, Asura-veda, Itihdsa-veda and Purdna-veda, probably in the sense of upaveda, but Ayur-veda is not mentioned in this .onnection.

* Brahma-vaivarta-purdna, 1. 16. 9, 10.

8 Brahma veddngam a$tdngam dyur-vedam abhdsata. This quotation, which occurs in the Worterbuch in connection with the word ayur-veda, could not

We thus find that Ayur-veda was regarded by some as a Veda superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a fifth Veda, as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda, as an independent upaveda, as an updnga of the Atharva- Veda and lastly as a veddnga. All that can be understood from these conflicting references is that it was traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as Ayur-veda which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas, was entitled to great respect, and was associated with the Atharva-Veda in a special way. It seems, however, that the nature of this association consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing of diseases and the attainment of long life; the one principally by incantations and charms, and the other by medicines. What Susruta understands by calling Ayur-veda an updnga of the Atharva- Veda is probably nothing more than this. Both the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda dealt with the curing of diseases, and this generally linked them together in the popular mind, and, the former being the holier of the two, on account of its religious value, the latter was associated with it as its literary accessory. Darila Bhatta, in commenting upon Kausika-sutra y 25. 2, gives us a hint as to what may have been the points of contact and of difference between Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda. Thus he says that there are two kinds of diseases; those that are produced by unwholesome diet, and those produced by sins and transgressions. The Ayur-veda was made for curing the former, and the Atharvan practices for the latter 1 . Caraka himself counts penance (prdyas-citta) as a name of medicine (bhesaja) and Cakrapani,in commenting on this, says that as prdyas-citta removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines (bhesaja) also remove diseases, and thus prdyas-citta is synonymous with bhesaja 2 .

But what is this Ayur-veda? We now possess only the treatises of Caraka and Susruta, as modified and supplemented by later revisers. But Susruta tells us that Brahma had originally produced the Ayur-veda, which contained 100,000 verses spread over one thousand chapters, and then, finding the people weak in intelligence and short-lived, later on divided it into eight subjects,

be verified owing to some omission in the reference. It should be noted that veddnga is generally used to mean the six angas, viz. Siksa, Kalpa, Vydkarana, Chandas, Jyotis and Nirukta.

1 dvi-prakdrd vyadhayah ahara-nimittd asubhanimittds ceti; tatra dhdra-samutthanam vaisamya dyurvedam cakdra adharma-samutthdndm tu sdstramidam ucyate. Darila's comment on Kausika-sutra, 25. 2.

2 Caraka, VI. 1. 3 and Ayur-veda-dipikd, ibid.

viz. surgery (salya), treatment of diseases of the head {sdldkya) y treatment of ordinary diseases (kaya-cikitsd), the processes of counteracting the influences of evil spirits (bhiita-vidyd), treatment of child diseases {kaumdra-bhrtya), antidotes to poisons (agada-tantra), the science of rejuvenating the body (rasdyana) and the science of acquiring sex-strength (vdjikarana) 1 . The statement of Susruta that Ayur-veda was originally a great work in which the later subdivisions of its eight different kinds of studies were not differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. The fact that Ayurveda is called an updnga, an upaveda, or a veddnga also points to its existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature was being composed. We hear of compendiums of medicine as early as the Pratisdkhyas 2 . It is curious, however, that nowhere in the Upanisads or the Vedas does the name " Ayur-veda " occur, though different branches of study are mentioned in the former 3 . The Astanga Ayur-veda is, however, mentioned in the Mahd-bhdrata, and the three constituents (dhatu), vdyu (wind), pitta (bile) and slesman (mucus), are also mentioned; there is reference to a theory that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the body decays (etaih kslnais ca ksiyate), and Krsnatreya is alluded to as being the founder of medical science (cikitsitam)*. One of the earliest systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and charms is to be found in the Mahd-vagga of the Vinaya-Pitaka, where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples 5 . These medicines are of a simple nature, but they bear undeniable marks of methodical arrangement. We are also told there of a surgeon, named Akasagotto, who made surgical operations {sattha-katntnd) on fistula (bhagandara). In Rockhill's Life of the Buddha we hear of Jivaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila Univer-

1 Susruta-samhita, 1. 1. 5-9.

2 R.V. Prdtisdkhya, 16. 54 (55), mentioned by Bloomfield in The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana, p. 10. The name of the medical work mentioned is Subhesaja.

3 Rg-vedam bhagavo 'dhyemi Yajur-vedam sama-vedam atharvanas caturtham itihdsa-puranam pancamam veddnam vedam pitryam rasim daivam nidhim vdko-vakyam ekayanam deva vidyam brakma-vidydm bhuta-vidydm k$attra-vidya"m naksatra-vidydm sarpa-deva-jana-vidydm, Chdndogya, vii. 1. 2. Of these bhuta- vidyd is counted as one of the eight tantras of Ayur-veda, as we find it in the Susruta-samhita or elsewhere.

4 Mahd-bhdrata, 11.11. 25,xn.342. 86, 87, xii. 210. 21. Krsnatreya is referred to in Caraka-samhitd, VI. 15. 129, and Cakrapani, commenting on this, says that Krsnatreya and Atreya are two authorities who are different from Atreya Punarvasu, the great teacher of the Caraka-samhitd.

s Vinaya-Pitaka, Mahd-vagga, vi. 1-14.

sity under Atreya 1 . That even at the time of the Atharva-Veda there were hundreds of physicians and an elaborate pharmacopoeia, treating diseases with drugs, is indicated by a mantra therein which extols the virtues of amulets, and speaks of their powers as being equal to thousands of medicines employed by thousands of medical practitioners 2 . Thus it can hardly be denied that the practice of medicine was in full swing even at the time of the Atharva-Veda ; and, though we have no other proofs in support of the view that there existed a literature on the treatment of diseases, known by the name of Ayur-veda, in which the different branches, which developed in later times, were all in an undifferentiated condition, yet we have no evidence which can lead us to disbelieve Susruta, when he alludes definitely to such a literature. The Caraka-satnhita also alludes to the existence of a beginningless traditional continuity of Ayur-veda, under which term he includes life, the constancy of the qualities of medical herbs, diet, etc., and their effects on the human body and the intelligent enquirer. The early works that are now available to us, viz. the Caraka-satnhita and Susruta-satnhita, are both known as tantras 3 . Even AgnivesVs work (Agnivesa-samhita), which Caraka revised and which was available at the time of Cakrapani, was a tantra. What then was the Ayurveda, which has been variously described as a fifth Veda or an upaveda, if not a literature distinctly separate from the tantras now available to us 4 ? It seems probable, therefore, that such a literature existed, that the systematized works of Agnivesa and others superseded it and that, as a consequence, it cameultimately to be lost. Caraka, however, uses the word " Ayur-veda " in the general sense of " science of life." Life is divided by Caraka into four kinds, viz. sukha (happy), duhkha (unhappy), hita (good) and ahita (bad). Sukham ayuh is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental diseases, is endowed with vigour, strength, energy, vitality, activity and is full of all sorts of enjoyments and successes. The opposite of this is the asukham ayuh. Hitam ayuh is the life of a person who is always willing to do good to all beings, never steals others' property, is truthful, self-controlled, self-restrained and works

1 Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, p. 65.

2 Atharva-veda, II. 9. 3, iatam hy asya bhisajah sahasram uta vtrudhah.

3 Gurv-ajnd-labhanantaram etat-tantra-karanam. Cakrapani's Ayur-veda-dlpikd, 1. 1. 1; also Caraka-samhita, I. 1. 52.

4 Cakrapani quotes the Agnivesa-samhita in his Ayur-veda-dlpika, vi. 3. 177-185.

with careful consideration, does not transgress the moral injunctions, takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal, honours revered persons, is charitable and does what is beneficial to this world and to the other. The opposite of this is called ahita. The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such a life 1 .

But, if Ayur-veda means'' science of life," what is its connection with the Atharva-Veda} We find in the Caraka-samhita that a physician should particularly be attached (bhaktir adesya) to the Atharva-Veda. The Atharva-Veda deals with the treatment of diseases (cikitsa) by advising the propitiatory rites (svastyayana), offerings {ball), auspicious oblations (mangala-homa), penances (niyama), purificatory rites (prayas-citta), fasting (upavasa) and incantations (mantra) 2 . Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says that, since it is advised that physicians should be attached to the Atharva-Veda, it comes to this, that the Atharva-Veda becomes Ayur-veda (Atharva-vedasya ayurvedatvam uktam bhavati). The Atharva-Veda, no doubt, deals with different kinds of subjects, and so Ayurveda is to be considered as being only a part of the Atharva-Veda (Atharva-vedaikadesa eva ayur-vedah). Viewed in the light of Cakrapani's interpretation, it seems that the school of medical teaching to which Caraka belonged was most intimately connected with the Atharva-Veda. This is further corroborated by a comparison of the system of bones found in the Caraka-samhita with that of the Atharva-Veda. Susruta himself remarks that, while he considers the number of bones in the human body to be three hundred, the adherents of the Vedas hold them to be three hundred and sixty; and this is exactly the number counted by Caraka 3 . The Atharva-Veda does not count the bones; but there are with regard to the description of bones some very important points in

1 Caraka, 1. 1. 40 and 1. 30. 20-23:

hitahitam sukham duhkham dyus tasya hitdhitam mdnam ca tac ca yatroktam ayur-vedah sa ucyate. In 1. 30. 20 the derivation of Ayur-veda is given as ayur vedayati iti ayur-vedah, i.e. that which instructs us about life. Susruta suggests two alternative derivations— ayur asmin vidyate anena va ayur vindatlty ayur-vedah, i.e. that by which life is known or examined, or that by which life is attained. Susruta-samhitd, 1. 1. 14.

2 Caraka, 1. 30. 20.

3 Trtni sasasthdny asthi-satdni veda-vadino bhdsante; salya-tantre tu trlny eva iatdrti. Susruta-samhitd, in. 5. 18. Trim sasthdni satdny asthnam saha danta-nakhena. Caraka-samhita, iv. 7. 6.

which the school to which Caraka belonged was in agreement with the Atharva-Veda , and not with Susruta. Dr Hoernle, who has carefully discussed the whole question, thus remarks: "A really important circumstance is that the Atharvic system shares with the Charakiyan one of the most striking points in which the latter differs from the system of Susruta, namely, the assumption of a central facial bone in the structure of the skull. It may be added that the Atharvic term pratistha for the base of the long bones obviously agrees with the Charakiyan term adhisthana and widely differs from the Susrutiyan kurca 1 ." The Satapatha-brahmana, which, as Dr Hoernle has pointed out, shows an acquaintance with both the schools to which Caraka and Susruta respectively belonged, counts, however, 360 bones, as Caraka did 2 . The word veda-vadino in Susruta-samhita, III. 5. 18 does not mean the followers of Ayur-veda as distinguished from the Vedas, as Dalhana interprets it, but is literally true in the sense that it gives us the view which is shared by Caraka with the Atharva-Veda, the Satapatha-brahmana, the legal literature and the puranas, which according to all orthodox estimates derive their validity from the Vedas. If this agreement of the Vedic ideas with those of the Atreya school of medicine, as represented by Caraka, be viewed together with the identification by the latter of Ayur-Veda with Atharva-Veda, it may be not unreasonable to suppose that the Atreya school, as represented by Caraka, developed from the Atharva- Veda. This does not preclude the possibility of there being an Ayur-veda of another school, to which Susruta refers and from which, through the teachings of a series of teachers, the Susruta-samhita developed. This literature probably tried to win the respect of the people by associating itself.with the Atharva-Veda, and by characterizing itself as an upanga of the Atharva-Veda?.

Jayanta argues that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that they have been composed by an absolutely trustworthy

1 A. F. Rudolf Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 113.

2 Ibid. pp. 105-106. See also Satapatha-brdhmana, x. 5.4. 12, also xn. 3. 2. 3 and 4, xii. 2. 4. 9-14, viii. 6. 2. 7 and 10. The Ydjnavalkya-Dharma-sastra, Visnu-smrti, Visnu-dharmottara and Agni-Purdna also enumerate the bones of the human body in agreement with Caraka as 360. The source of the last three was probably the first (Ydjnavalkya-Dharma-sdstra), as has been suggested by Dr Hoernle in his Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, pp. 40-46. But none of these non-medical recensions are of an early date: probably they are not earlier than the third or the fourth century A.D.

3 The word upanga may have been used, however, in the sense that it was a supplementary work having the same scope as the Atharva-Veda.

person (dpta). As an analogy he refers to Ayur-veda, the validity of which is due to the fact that it has been composed by trustworthy persons (dpta). That the medical instructions of the Ayurveda are regarded as valid is due to the fact that they are the instructions of trustworthy persons (yato yatrdptavddatram tatra pramanyam iti vydptir grhyate). But it may be argued that the validity of Ayur-veda is not because it has for its author trustworthy persons, but because its instructions can be verified by experience (nanvayiir-vedddau pramanyam pratyaksddi-samvdddt pratipannam ndpta-pramdnyai). Jayanta in reply says that the validity of Ayurveda is due to the fact of its being composed by trustworthy persons; and it can be also verified by experience. He argues also that the very large number of medicines, their combinations and applications, are of such an infinite variety that it would be absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing the experimental methods of agreement and difference. It is only because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their knowledge of things that they can display such superhuman knowledge regarding diseases and their cures, which can be taken only on trust on their authority. His attempts at refuting the view that medical discoveries may have been carried on by the applications of the experimental methods of agreement and difference and then accumulated through long ages are very weak and need not be considered here.

The fourth Veda, known as the Atharva-Veda or the Brahma-Veda, deals mainly with curatives and charms 1 . There is no reason to suppose that the composition of this Veda was later than even the earliest Rg-Vedic hymns; for never, probably, in the history

1 Some of the sacred texts speak of four Vedas and some of three Vedas, e.g. " asya mahato bhutasya nihsvasitam etad rg-vedoyajur-vedah sdma-vedo 'tharvan-girasah" Brh. n. 4. 10 speaks of four Vedas; again " Yam rsayas trayl-vido viduh rcah sdmd?iiyajumsi, '' Taittiflya-brdhmana ,1.11.1.26 speaks of three Vedas. Sayana refers to the Mlmamsa-sutra, 11. 1. 37 " sese Yajuh-iabdah" and says that all the other Vedas which are neither Rk nor Sama are Yajus (Sayana's Upodghata to the Atharva- Veda, p. 4, Bombay edition, 1895). According to this interpretation the Atharva-Veda is entitled to be included within Yajus, and this explains the references to the three Vedas. The Atharva-Veda is referred to in the Gopatha-Brdhmana, II. 16 as Brahma-Veda, and two different reasons are adduced. Firstly, it is said that the Atharva- Veda was produced by the ascetic penances of Brahman; secondlyit is suggested in the Gopatha-Brahmana that all Atharvanic hymns are curative (bhesaja), and whatever is curative is immortal, and whatever is immortal is Brahman—" Ye 'tharvdnas tad bhesajam, yadbhesajam tad amrtam, yad amrtam tad Brahma." Gopatha-brahmana, in. 4. See also Nydya-manjarl, pp. 250-261.

of India was there any time when people did not take to charms and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and injuring enemies. The Rg- Veda itself may be regarded in a large measure as a special development of such magic rites. The hold of the Atharvanic charms on the mind of the people was probably very strong, since they had occasion to use them in all their daily concerns. Even now, when the Rg-Vedic sacrifices have become extremely rare, the use of Atharvanic charms and of their descendants, the Tantric charms of comparatively later times, is very common amongst all classes of Hindus. A very large part of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance of auspicious rites (svastyayana), purificatory penances (prayas-citta), and oblations (homo) for curing chronic and serious illnesses, winning a law-suit, alleviating sufferings, securing a male issue to the family, cursing an enemy, and the like. Amulets are used almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago, and snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things which the medical people find it difficult to combat. Faith in the mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. It may therefore be presumed that a good number of Atharvanic hymns were current when most of the Rg-Vedic hymns were not yet composed. By the time, however, that the Atharva-Veda was compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated with it, the philosophic character of which does not tally with the outlook of the majority of the hymns. The Atharva-Veda, as Sayana points out in the introduction to his commentary, was indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing many other advantages, and the royal priests had to be versed in the Atharvanic practices. These practices were mostly for the alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder, and accordingly the Grhya-sutras draw largely from them. The oldest name of the Atharva-Veda is Atharvangirasah, and this generally suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan and others attributed to Angiras; the former dealt with the holy (santa), promoting of welfare (paustika) and the curatives (bhesajdni), and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy (abhi-carika), also called terrible (ghora). The purposes which the Atharvanic charms were supposed to fulfil were numerous. These may

be briefly summed up in accordance with the Kansika-sutra as follows: quickening of intelligence, accomplishment of the virtues of a Brahmacarin (religious student); acquisition of villages, cities, fortresses and kingdoms, of cattle, riches, food grains, children, wives, elephants, horses, chariots, etc.; production of unanimity (aikamatya) and contentment among the people; frightening the elephants of enemies, winning a battle, warding off all kinds of weapons, stupefying, frightening and ruining the enemy army, encouraging and protecting one's own army, knowing the future result of a battle, winning the minds of generals and chief persons, throwing a charmed snare, sword, or string into the fields where the enemy army may be moving, ascending a chariot for winning a battle, charming all instruments of war music, killing enemies, winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy; performing the coronation ceremony, expiating sins, cursing, strengthening cows, procuring prosperity; amulets for promoting welfare, agriculture, the conditions of bulls, bringing about various household properties, making a new-built house auspicious, letting loose a bull (as a part of the general rites— srdddha), performing the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahayana (the middle of November to the middle of December); securing curatives for various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past life; curing all diseases generally, Fever, Cholera, and Diabetes; stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from weapons, preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different species of evil spirits, such as the bhuta, pisaca, Brahma-raksasa, etc.; curing vata, pitta and slesman, heart diseases, Jaundice, white leprosy, different kinds of Fever, Pthisis, Dropsy; curing worms in cows and horses, providing antidotes against all kinds of poisons, supplying curatives for the diseases of the head, eyes, nose, ears, tongue, neck and inflammation of the neck; warding off the evil effects of a Brahmin's curse; arranging women's rites for securing sons, securing easy delivery and the welfare of the foetus; securing prosperity, appeasing a king's anger, knowledge of future success or failure; stopping too much rain and thunder, winning in debates and stopping brawls, making rivers flow according to one's wish, securing rain, winning in gambling, securing the welfare of cattle and horses, securing large gains in trade, stopping inauspicious marks in women, performing auspicious rites for a new house, removing the sins of prohibited

acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services; preventing bad dreams, removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose influence an infant may have been born, paying off debts, removing the evils of bad omens, molesting an enemy; counteracting the molesting influence of the charms of an enemy, performing auspicious rites, securing long life, performing the ceremonies at birth, naming, tonsure, the wearing of holy thread, marriage, etc.; performing funeral rites, warding off calamities due to the disturbance of nature, such as rain of dust, blood, etc., the appearance of yaksas, raksasas, etc., earthquakes, the appearance of comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon.

The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the performance of Atharvanic rites gives us a picture of the time when these Atharvanic charms were used. Whether all these functions were discovered when first the Atharvanic verses were composed is more than can be definitely ascertained. At present the evidence we possess is limited to that supplied by the Kausika-sutra. According to the Indian tradition accepted by Sayana the compilation of the Atharva-Veda was current in nine different collections, the readings of which differed more or less from one another. These different recensions, or sakhas, were Paippalada, Tanda, Manda, Saunaklya, Jajala, Jalada, Brahmavada, Devadar^a, and Carana-vaidya. Of these only the Paippalada and Saunaklya recensions are available. The Paippalada recension exists only in a single unpublished Tubingen manuscript first discovered by Roth 1 . It has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. The Sauna -klya recension is what is now available in print. The Saunaklya school has the Gopatha-brakmana as its Brahmana and five sutra works, viz. Kausika, Vaitana, Naksatra-kalpa, Angirasa-kalpa and Santi-kalpa 2 ; these are also known as the five kalpas (panca-kalpa). Of these the Kausika-sutra is probably the earliest and most important, since all the other four depend upon it 3 . The Naksatra-kalpa and Santi-kalpa are more or less of an astrological character. No manuscript of the Angirasa-kalpa seems to be available; but from the brief notice of Sayana it appears to

1 Der Atharvaveda in Kashmir by Roth.

2 The Kausika-sutra is also known as Samhita-vidhi and Samhitd-kalpa. The three kalpas, Naksatra, Angirasa and &anti, are actually Parisistas.

3 'tatra Sakalyena samhita-mantranam s"dntika-paustikadisu karmasu viniyoga-vidhanat samhita-vidhir noma Kausikam sutram; tad eva itarair upajlvyatvat. Upodhghdta of Sayana to the Atharva-Veda, p. 25.

have been a manual for molesting one's enemies (abhicara-karma). The Vaitana-sutra dealt with some sacrificial and ritualistic details. The Kausika-sutra was commented on by Darila, Kesava, Bhadra and Rudra. The existence of the Carana-vaidya (wandering medical practitioners) sakha reveals to us the particular sakha of the Atharva-Veda, which probably formed the old Ayur-veda of the Atreya-Caraka school, who identified the Atharva-Veda with Ayur-veda. The suggestion, contained in the word Carana-vaidya, that the medical practitioners of those days went about from place to place, and that the sufferers on hearing of the arrival of such persons approached them, and sought their help, is interesting 1 .

Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda.

The main interest of the present chapter is in that part of the Atharva-Veda which deals with curative instructions, and for this the Kausika-sutra has to be taken as the principal guide. Let us first start with the anatomical features of the Atharva-Veda 2 . The bones counted are as follows: 1. heels (parsni, in the dual number, in the two feet) 3 ; 2. ankle-bones (gidphau in the dual number) 4 ;

1 Is it likely that the word Caraka (literally, a wanderer) had anything to do with the itinerant character of Caraka's profession as a medical practitioner?

2 Hymns 11. 33 and x. 2 are particularly important in this connection.

3 Caraka also counts one parsni for each foot. Hoernle (Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 128) remarks on the fact, that Caraka means the backward and downward projections of the os calcis, that is, that portion of it which can be superficially seen and felt, and is popularly known as the heel. The same may be the case with the Atharva-Veda. Susruta probably knew the real nature of it as a cluster (kiirca) ; for in Sarira-sthana vi he speaks of the astragalus as kurca-siras, or head of the cluster, but he counts the parsni separately. Hoernle suggests that by parsni Susruta meant the os calcis, and probably did not think that it was a member of the tarsal cluster (kiirca). It is curious that Vagbhata I makes a strange confusion by attributing one parsni to each hand (Astanga-samgraha, 11. 5; also Hoernle, pp. 91-96).

* Gulpha means the distal processes of the two bones of the leg, known as the malleoli. As counted by Caraka and also by Susruta, there are four gidphas. See Hoernle's comment on Susruta's division, Hoernle, pp. 81, 82, 102-104. Susruta, in. v. 19, has " tala-kurca-gulpha-samsritdni dasa," which Dalhana explains as tola (5 salakas and the one bone to which they are attached)—6 bones, kiirca —2 bones, gulpha —2 bones. Hoernle misinterpreted Dalhana, and, supposing that he spoke of two kurcas and two gulphas in the same leg, pointed out a number of inconsistencies and suggested a different reading of the Susruta text. His translation of valaya as "ornament" in this connection is also hardly correct; valaya probably means "circular." Following Dalhana, it is possible that the interpretation is that there are two bones in one cluster (kiirca) in each leg, and the two bones form one circular bone (valayasthi) of one gulpha for each leg. If this is accepted, much of what Hoernle has said on the point loses its value and becomes hypercritical. There are two gidphas, or one in each leg, according as the constituent pieces, or the one whole valayasthi, is referred to. On my interpretation Susruta

3. digits {angulayah in the plural number) 1 ; 4. metacarpal and metatarsal bones {ucchlankhau in the dual number, i.e. of the hands and feet) 2 ; 5. base {pratisthaf ; 6. the knee-caps {asthivantau in the dual) 4 ; 7. the knee-joints (jdnunoh sandhi) 5 ; 8. the shanks (janghe in the dual) 6 ; 9. the pelvic cavity (sroni in the dual) 7 ; 10. the thigh bones (uru in the dual) 8 ; 11. the breast bones

knew of only two bones as forming the kurca, and there is no passage in SusVuta to show that he knew of more. The os calcis would be the pdrsni, the astragalus, the kurca-siras, the two malleoli bones and the two gulpha bones.

1 Both Caraka and Susruta count sixty of these phalanges (pdni-pdddnguli), whereas their actual number is fifty-six only.

2 Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (pani-pada-salakd) as twenty, the actual number. Susruta collects them under tola, a special term used by him. His combined tala-kurca-gulpha includes all the bones of the hand and foot excluding the anguli bones (phalanges).

8 Caraka uses the term pani-pada-saldkddhisthana, Yajfiavalkya, sthdna, and Susruta, kurca. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. Kurca means a network of (1) flesh (mdmsa), (2) sira, (3) sndyu, (4) bones (mamsa-sird-sndyv-asthi-jdldni). All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet.

* Hoernle remarks that in the Atharva-Veda asthlvat and janu are synonymous; but the text, x. 2. 2, seems clearly to enumerate them separately. The asthlvat is probably the patella bone. Caraka uses the terms janu and kapdlikd, probably for the knee-cap (patella) and the elbow pan (kapdlikd). Kapdlikd means a small shallow basin, and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow pan. Susruta uses the term kiirpara (elbow pan), not in the ordinary list of bones in Sdrlra, v. 19, but at the time of counting the marma in ibid. vi. 25.

5 This seems to be different from asthlvat (patella).

6 The tibia and the fibula in the leg. Caraka, Bhela, Susruta and Vagbhafa I describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. The Atharva-Veda justly describes the figure made bv them as being a fourfold frame having its ends closely connected together (catustayam yujyate samhitdntam). The corresponding two bones of the fore-arm (aratni) —radius and ulna—are correctly counted by Caraka. Curiously enough, Susruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. The bdhu is not enumerated in this connection.

7 Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity, viz. the os innominatum on both sides. Modern anatomists think that each os innominatum is composed of three different bones: ilium, the upper portion, ischium, the lower part, and the pubis, the portion joined to the other innominate bone. The ilium and ischium, however, though they are two bones in the body of an infant, become fused together as one bone in adult life, and from this point of view the counting of ilium and ischium as one bone is justifiable. In addition to these a separate bhagdsthi is counted by Caraka. He probably considered (as Hoernle suggests) the sacrum and coccyx to be one bone which formed a part of the vertebral column. By bhagdsthi he probably meant the pubic bone; for Cakrapani, commenting upon bhagdsthi, describes it as" abhimukham kati-sandhdna-kdrakam tiryag-asthi" (the cross bone which binds together the haunch bones in front). Susruta, however, counts five bones: four in the guda, bhaga, nitantba and one in the trika. Nitamba corresponds to the two sroni-phalaka of Caraka, bhaga to the bhagdsthi, or pubic bone, guda to the coccyx and trika to the triangular bone sacrum. Susruta's main difference from Caraka is this, that, while the latter counts the sacrum and coccyx as one bone forming part of the vertebral column, the former considers them as two bones and as separate from the vertebral column. Vagbhata takes trika and guda as one bone, but separates it from the vertebral column.

8 Caraka, Susruta and Vagbhata I count it correctly as one bone in each leg. Caraka calls it uru-nalaka.

(uras) 1 ; 12. the windpipe (grivdh in the plural) 2 ; 13. the breast (stanau in the dual) 3 ; 14. the shoulder-blade (kaphodau in the dual) 4 515. the shoulder-bones {skandhan in the plural) 5 ; 16. the backbone (prstih

1 Caraka counts fourteen bones in the breast. Indian anatomists counted cartilages as new bones (taruna asthi). There are altogether ten costal cartilages on either side of the sternum. But the eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are attached to the seventh. So, if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are considered as a single bone, there are altogether seven bones on either side of the sternum. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts. The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately. With him this was the result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without a break. Susruta and Vagbhafa I curiously count eight bones in the breast, and this can hardly be accounted for. Hoernle's fancied restoration of the ten of Susruta does not appear to be proved. Yajnavalkya, however, counts seventeen, i.e. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka's fourteen bones, which included these three. Hoernle supposes that Yajnavalkya's number was the real reading in Susruta; but his argument is hardly convincing.

2 The windpipe is composed of four parts, viz. larynx, trachea, and two bronchi. It is again not a bone, but a cartilage; but it is yet counted as a bone by the Indian anatomists, e.g. Caraka calls it "jatru" and Susruta " kantha-nddt." Hoernle has successfully shown that the word jatru was used in medical books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. Hoernle says that originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the windpipe and the costal cartilages), as we read in the Satapatha-brahmana: "tasntad intd ubhayatra parsavo baddhdh kJkasdsu ca jatrusu" (the ribs are fastened at either end, exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the costal cartilages— -jatru). In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion of the neck, i.e. the windpipe (Caraka), and hence is applied either to the neck generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Susruta). It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A.D. that, owing to a misinterpretation of the anatomical terms sandhi and amsa, it was made to mean clavicle. See Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 168.

3 " Parsvayos catur-vimsatih parsvayos tdvanti caiva sthdlakdni tdvanti caiva sthalakdrbudani," i.e. there are twenty-four bones in the pdrsva (ribs), twenty-four sthdlakas (sockets), and twenty-four sthdlakdrbudas (tubercles). Susruta speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. A rib consists of a shaft and a head; " at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae, and probably this tubercle is arbuda." There are, no doubt, twenty-four ribs. The sthdlakas and arbudas cannot properly be counted as separate bones; but, even if they are counted, the total number ought to be 68 bones, as Hoernle points out, and not 72, since the two lowest have no tubercles.

* Kaphoda probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. Caraka uses the word amsa-phalaka. Caraka uses two other terms, aksaka (collar-bone) and amsa. This word amsa seems to be a wrong reading, as Hoernle points out; for in reality there are only two bones, the scapula and the collar-bone. But could it not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Susruta omits the shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in Sdrira, v. (for this term is aksaka-sarnjne), yet he distinctly names amsa-phalaka in Sdrlra, vi. 27, and describes it as triangular (trika-sambaddhe) ; and this term has been erroneously interpreted as grivdyd amsa-dvayasya ca yah samyogas sa trikah by Palhana. The junction of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called trika.

6 Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. According to modern anatomists there are, however, only seven. He probably counted the transverse processes

in the plural) 1 ; 17. the collar-bones (amsau in the dual) 2 ; 18. the brow (lalata); 19. the central facial bone (kakatika) 3 ; 20. the pile of the jaw (hanu-citya)* ; 21. the cranium with temples (kapalam) 5 .

and got the number fourteen, to which he added the vertebrae as constituting one single bone.

Susruta counts nine bones. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones, which, together with the other six, made the total number nine.

1 Caraka counts forty-three bones in the vertebral column (prstha-gatdstfii), while the actual number is only twenty-six. Each bone consists of four parts, viz. the body, the spinous process, and the two transverse processes, and Caraka counts them all as four bones. Susruta considers the body and the spinous process as one and the two transverse processes as two; thus for the four bones of Caraka, Susruta has three. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four; the five lumbar vertebrae (body + spine + two transverses) make twenty. He adds to this the sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone, thus making the number forty-five; with Susruta we have twelve thoracic vertebrae, six lumbar vertebrae, twelve transverses, i.e. thirty bones. The word klkasa (A.V. 11. 33. 2) means the whole of the spinal column, anukya (A.V. 11. 33. 2) means the thoracic portion of the spine, and udara the abdominal portion.

8 Both Caraka and Susruta call this aksaka and count it correctly as two bones. Cakrapani describes it as " aksa-vivaksakau jatru-sandheh kllakau" (they are called aksaka because they are like two beams—the fastening-pegs of the junction of the neck-bones).

Susruta further speaks of amsa-pltha (the glenoid cavity into which the head of the humerus is inserted) as a samudga (casket) bone. The joint of each of the anal bones, the pubic bone and the hip bone (nitambd) is also described by him as a samudga. This is the "acetabulum, or cotyloid cavity, in which the head of the femur, is lodged " (Susruta, Sarira, v. 27, amsa-pltha-guda-bhaga-mtambesu samudgdh).

8 Lalata is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and kakasika the lower portion, comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with the molar and nasal bones. Caraka counts the two molar (ganda-kuta), the two nasal, and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous bone (ekdsthi nasikd-ganda-kuta-lalatam).

4 According to Caraka, the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone (ekam hanv-asthi), and the two attachments are counted as two bones (dve hanu-mula-bandhane). Susruta, however, counts the upper and the lower jaws as two bones (harwar dve). Though actually each of these bones consists of two bones, they are so fused together that they may be considered as one, as was done by Susruta. Caraka did not count the upper jaw, so he counted the sockets of the teeth (dantolukhala) and the hard palate (tdlusaka). Susruta's counting of the upper harm did not include the palatine process; so he also counts the tdlu (ekam taluni).

6 Sankha is the term denoting the temples, of which both Caraka and Susruta count two. Caraka counts four cranial bones (catvdri sirah-kapdldni) and Susruta six (sirasi sat). The brain-case consists of eight bones. Of these two are inside and hence not open to view from outside. So there are only six bones which are externally visible. Of these the temporal bones have already been counted as sankha, thus leaving a remainder of four bones. Susruta divides the frontal, parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as separate bones, and he thus gets the number six. Both the frontal and occipital are really each composed of two bones, which become fused in later life.

Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoernle, yet he is highly indebted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular section of this chapter.

Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda.

We have no proofs through which we could assert that the writer of the Atharva-Veda verse knew the number of the different bones to which he refers; but it does not seem possible that the references made to bones could have been possible without a careful study of the human skeleton. Whether this was done by some crude forms of dissection or by a study of the skeletons of dead bodies in a state of decay is more than can be decided. Many of the organs are also mentioned, such as the heart (hrdaya), the lungs (kloma) 1 , the gall-bladder (haliksna) 2 , the kidneys (matsnabhyam) 3 , the liver (yakna), the spleen (plihan), the stomach and the smaller intestine (antrebhyah), the rectum and the portion above it (gudabhyah), the

1 Caraka counts kloma as an organ near the heart, but he does not count pupphusa. In another place (Cikitsd, xvu. 34) he speaks of kloma as one of the organs connected with hiccough (hrdayam kloma kantham ca tdlukam ca samdsritd mrdvl sd ksudra-hikveti nrndm sddhyd prakirtita). Cakrapani describes it as pipdsd-sthdna (seat of thirst). But, whatever that may be, since Caraka considers its importance in connection with hiccough, and, since he does not mention pupphusa (lungs— Mahd-vyutpatti, 100), kloma must mean with him the one organ of the two lungs. Susruta speaks of pupphusa as being on the left side and kloma as being on the right. Since the two lungs vary in size, it is quite possible that Susruta called the left lung pupphusa and the right one kloma. Vagbhata I follows Susruta. The Atharva-Veda, Caraka, Susruta, Vagbha^a and other authorities use the word in the singular, but in Brhad-dranyaka, 1. the word kloma is used in the plural number; and Jsankara, in commenting on this, says that, though it is one organ, it is always used in the plural (nitya-bahu-va-candnta). This, however, is evidently erroneous, as all the authorities use the word in the singular. His description of it as being located on the left of the heart (yakrc ca klomdnas ca hrdayasyddhastdd daksinottarau mdmsa-khandau, Br. 1. 1, commentary of £ankara) is against the verdict of Susruta, who places it on the same side of the heart as the liver. The Bhdva-prakdsa describes it as the root of the veins, where water is borne or secreted. That kloma was an organ which formed a member of the system of respiratory organs is further proved by its being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood, such as the throat (kantha) and the root of the palate (tdlu-mula). Thus Caraka says, " udaka-vahdndm srotasdm tdlu-mulam kloma ca.. . .Jihvd-tdlv-ostha-kantha-kloma-sosam .. .drstvd" (Vimdna, v. 10). Sarngadhara, I. v. 45, however, describes it as a gland of watery secretions near the liver (jala-vdhi-sird-mulam trsnd-tchddanakam tilam).

2 This word does not occur in the medical literature. Sayana describes it as " etat-samjnakdt tat-sambandhdt mdmsa-pinda-visesdt." This, however, is quite useless for identification. Weber thinks that it may mean "gall" (Indische Studien, 13, 206). Macdonell considers it to be "some particular intestine" (Vedic Index, vol. 11, p. 500).

3 Sayana paraphrases matsnabhyam as vrkydbhydm. Caraka's reading is vukka. Sayana gives an alternative explanation: "matsnabhyam ubhaya-pdrsva-sambandhdbhydm vrkydbhydm tat-samipa-stha-pittddhdra-pdtrdbhydm." If this explanation is accepted, then matsnd would mean the two sacs of pitta (bile) near the kidneys. The two matsnds in this explanation would probably be the gall bladder and the pancreas, which latter, on account of its secretions, was probably considered as another pittddhdra.

larger intestine (vanisthu, explained by Sayana as sthavirantra), the abdomen (udara), the colon (plasi) 1 , the umbilicus (nabhi), the marrow (majjabhyah), the veins (snavabhyah) and the arteries (dhamanibhyah) 2 . Thus we see that almost all the important organs reported in the later Atreya-Caraka school or the Susruta school were known to the composers of the Atharvanic hymns 3 .

Boiling raises the point whether the Atharva- Veda people knew the difference between the sira and the dhamani, and says, "The apparent distinction between veins and arteries in 1. 17. 3 is offset by the occurrence of the same words in vn. 35. 2 with the more-general sense of 'internal canals' meaning entrails, vagina, etc.— showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such subjects 4 ." But this is not correct; for there is nothing in 1. 17. 3 which suggests a knowledge of the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms, such as is not found in vn. 35. 2. The sukta I. 17 is a charm for stopping the flow of blood from an injury or too much hemorrhage of women. A handful of street-dust was to be thrown on the injured part and the hymn was to be uttered. In 1. 17. 1 it is said, "Those hiras (veins?) wearing red garment (or the receptacles of blood) of woman which are constantly flowing should remain dispirited, like daughters without a brother 5 ." Sayana, in explaining the next verse, 1. 17.2, says that it is a prayer to dhamanis. This verse runs as follows: "Thou (Sayana says 'thou sira 1 ) of the lower part, remain (i.e. 'cease from letting out blood,' as Sayana says), so thou of the upper part remain, so thou of the middle part, so thou

1 Plasi is paraphrased by Sayana as " bahu-cchidrdn mala-pdtrdt" (the vessel of the excreta with many holes). These holes are probably the orifices of the glands inside the colon (mala-patra). The Satapatha-brdhmana, xn. 9. i. 3 enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial instruments— hrdayam evdsyaindrah purodds'ah, yakrt savitrah, klomd varunah, matsne evdsydsvatthani ca pdtram audumbaram ca pittam naiyagrodham antrdni sthalyah gudd updsaydni syena-pdire plihcisandl ndbhih kumbho vatiisthuh pldsih sdtdtrnnd tad yat sd bahudhd vitrnnd bhavati tasmdt pldsir bahudhd vikrttah. Vasti, or bladder, is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A.V. 1.3.6).

2 Sayana says that sndva means here the smaller sirds and dhamanl the thicker ones (the arteries)— suksmdh sirdh sndva-sabdena ucyante dhamani-sabdena sthuluh (A.V. 11. 33).

3 A.V. X. 9 shows that probably dissection of animals was also practised. Most of the organs of a cow are mentioned. Along with the organs of human beings mentioned above two other organs are mentioned, viz. the pericardium (puritat) and the bronchial tubes (saha-kanthikd). A.V. x. 9. 15.

4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, " Diseases and medicine: Vedic."

5 Sayana paraphrases hird as s'ird and describes it as a canal {nudl) for carrying blood (rajo-vahana-nddyah), and the epithet " lohita-vdsasah " as either " wearin g red garment" or " red," or " the receptacle of blood " (rudhirasya nivasa-bhutd.';).

small, so thou the big dhamani 1 ." In the third verse both the hiras and dhamanis are mentioned. "These in the middle were formerly (letting out blood) among a hundred dhamanis and thousands of hiras (and after that) all the other {nadis) were playing with (others which have ceased from letting out blood) 2 ." Hymn vii. 35 is for stopping the issue of a woman who is an enemy. The third verse says, " I close with a stone the apertures of a hundred hiras and a thousand dhamanis." Sayana, in explaining this verse, says that the hiras are fine nadis inside the ovary (garbha-dharanartham antar-avasthitah suksmaya nadyah) and the dhamanis the thicker nadis round the ovary for keeping it steady (garbha-sayasya avastambhika bahya sthula yd nadyah). The only point of difference between this verse and those of 1. 17 is that here sir as are said to be a hundred and dhamanis a thousand, whereas in the latter, the dhamanis were said to be a hundred and the siras a thousand. But, if Sayana's interpretation is accepted, the dhamanis still appear as the bigger channels and the siras as the finer ones. Nddi seems to have been the general name of channels. But nowhere in the Atharva-Veda is there any passage which suggests that the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms was known at the time. In A.V. 1. 3. 6 we hear of two nadis called gavinyau for carrying the urine from the kidneys to the bladder 3 . The gods of the eight quarters and other gods are said to have produced the foetus and, together with the god of delivery (Susa), facilitated birth by loosening the bonds of the womb 4 .

1 The previous verse referred to siras as letting out blood, whereas this verse refers to dhamanis as performing the same function. Sayana also freely paraphrases dhamani as sira (mahl mahatl sthulatara dhamanih sira tisthad it tisthaty eva, anena prayogena nivrtta-rudhira-srdva avatisthatam).

2 Here both the dhamani and the hira are enumerated. Sayana here says that dhamanis are the important nadis in the heart {hrdaya-gatandm pradhana-nddlndm), and hiras or siras are branch nadis {sirdnarn sakhd-nddlndm). The number of dhamanis, as here given, is a hundred and thus almost agrees with the number of nadis in the heart given in the Kapha Upanisad, vi. 16 (satam caika ca hrdayasya nadyah).

The Pras'na Upanisad, in. 6 also speaks of a hundred nadis, of which there are thousands of branches.

3 antrebhyo vinirgatasya mutrasya mutrdsaya-prdpti-sddhane pdrsva-dvaya-sthe nddyau gavinyau ity ucyete. Sayana's Bhasya. In 1. 11. 5 two nadis called gavtnikd are referred to and are described by Sayana as being the two nadis on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (gavlnike yoneh pdrsva-vartinyau nirgamana-pratibandhike nddyau —Sayana). In one passage (A.V. 11. 12. 7) eight dhamanis called manya are mentioned, and Sayana says that they are near the neck. A nadl called sikatdvatl, on which strangury depends, is mentioned in A.V. I. 17. 4.

* Another goddess of delivery, Susani, is also invoked.

The term jarayu is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that when it falls down it is eaten by the dogs and the body is in no way hurt. A reference is found to a first aid to delivery in expanding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two gavinika nadis 1 . The snavas (tendons) are also mentioned along with dha-manis, and Say ana explains them as finer sir as (suksmah sir ah snava-sabdena ucyante), The division of dhamanis, sir as and snavas thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the thicker channels (nadis) were called dhamanis, the finer ones were called sir as and the still finer ones snavas. Their general functions were considered more or less the same, though these probably differed according to the place in the body where they were situated and the organs with which they were associated. It seems to have been recognized that there was a general flow of the liquid elements of the body. This probably corresponds to the notion of srotas, as we get it in the Caraka-samhita, and which will be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2.11 says, "who stored in him floods turned in all directions moving diverse and formed to flow in rivers, quick (tivra), rosy (aruna), red (lohinl), and copper dark (tamra-dhiimra), running all ways in a man upward and downward?" This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid elements in the body. The semen, again, is conceived as the thread of life which is being spun out 2 . The intimate relation between the heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head and heart 3 ." The theory of the vayus, which we find in all later literature, is alluded to, and the prana, apana, vyana and samana are mentioned 4 . It is however difficult to guess what these prana, apana, etc. exactly meant. In another passage of the Atharva-Veda we hear of nine pranas (nava pranan navabhih sammimite), and in another seven pranas are mentioned 5 . In another passage

1 vi te bhinadmi vi yonim vi gavJnike. A.V. I. n. 5.

2 Ko asmin reto nyadadhdt tantwr dtayatdm iti (Who put the semen in him, saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17).

3 Murdhdnam asya samslvydtharvd hrdayam ca yat (A.V. x. 2. 26). See also Griffith's translations.

* Ko asmin prdnam avayat ko apdnam vydnam u samdnam asmin ko deve 'dhi sisraya puruse (Who has woven prana, apana, vyana and samana into him and which deity is controlling him? A.V. X. 2. 13).

6 Sapta pranan astau manyas (or majjnas) tarns te vrscami brahmana (A.V. II. 12. 7). The Taittiriya-brdhmana, 1. 2. 3. 3 refers to seven pranas, sapta vat

19-2

we hear of a lotus with nine gates (nava-dvaram) and covered with the three gunas 1 . This is a very familiar word in later Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses, and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common. But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that it seems to be a direct reference to the guna theory, which received its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Samkhya writers: it is probably the earliest reference to that theory. As we have stated above, the real functions of the prana, etc. were not properly understood; prana was considered as vital power or life and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun and the moon, the Brahmanas and the Ksattriyas, truth and falsehood, the past and the future 2 . A prayer is made to prana and apana for protection from death (pranapanau mrtyor ma patam svahaf. In A.V. in. 6. 8 manas and citta are separately mentioned and Sayana explains manas as meaning antahkarana, or inner organ, and citta as a particular state of the manas (mano-vrtti-visesena), as thought 4 . Here also the heart is the seat of consciousness. Thus in a prayer in in. 26. 6 it is said, " O Mitra and Varuna, take away the thinking power (citta) from the heart (hri) of this woman and, making her incapable of judgment, bring her under my control 5 ." The ojas with which we are familiar in later medical works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. 11. 18, where

slrsanydh prdndh. Again a reference to the seven senses is found in A.V. X. 2. 6: kah sapta khdni vitatarda s'lrsani. In A.V. XV. 15. 16. 17 seven kinds of prana, apana and vydna are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The seven prdnas are agni, dditya, candramah, pavamdna, dpah, pasavah and prajdh. The seven apdnas are paurnamdsi, astakd, amdvdsyd, sraddhd, dlksd, yajna and daksind. The seven kinds of vydna are bhiimi, antariksam, dyauh, naksatrdni, rtavah, drtavdh and samvatsardh.

1 pundarikam nava-dvaram tribhir guncbhir dvrtam

tasmin yad yaksam dhnanvat tad vai Brahma-vido viduh. (Those who know Brahman know that being to be the self which resides in the lotus flower of nine gates covered by the three gunas. A.V. X. 8. 43.) The nddis idd, pitigald and susumnd, which figure so much in the later Tantric works, do not appear in the Atharva-Veda. No reference to prdndydma appears in the Atharva- Veda.

- A.V. 11. 15.

3 Ibid. 11. 16. 1. Prana and apana are asked in another passage to enter a man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sayana calls prana, apana " sartras-dhdraka" (A.V. in. 11. s). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs till old age (in. 11. 6).

1 Manas and citta are also separately counted in A.V. ill. 6. 8.

8 The word cittinah is sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of thinking (cittinah samdna-citta-yuktdh —Sayana. A.V. in. 13. 5).

Agni is described as being ojas and is asked to give ojas to the worshipper 1 .

Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda.

As we have said above, there is evidence to show that even at the time of the Atharva-Veda the practice of pure medicine by professional medical men had already been going on. Thus the verse 11. 9. 3, as explained by Sayana, says that there were hundreds of medical practitioners {satam hy asya bhisajah) and thousands of herbs {sahasram uta vlrudhah), but what can be done by these can be effected by binding an amulet with the particular charm of this verse 2 . Again (11. 9. 5), the Atharvan who binds the amulet is described as the best of all good doctors (subhisaktama). In vi. 68. 2 Prajapati, who appears in the Atreya-Caraka school as the original teacher of Ayur-veda and who learnt the science from Brahma, is asked to treat (with medicine) a boy for the attainment of long life 3 . In the Kausika-sutra a disease is called lingi, i.e. that which has the symptoms (linga), and medicine (bhaisajya) as that which destroys it (upatapa). Darila remarks that this upatapa-karma refers not only to the disease, but also to the symptoms, i.e. a bhaisajya is that which destroys the disease and its symptoms 4 . In the Atharva-Veda itself only a few medicines are mentioned, such as jangida (xix. 34 and 35), gulgulu (xix. 38), kustha (xix. 39) and sata-vara (xix. 36), and these are all to be used as amulets for protection not only from certain diseases, but also from the witchcraft (krtya) of enemies. The effect of these herbs was of the same miraculous nature as that of mere charms or incantations. They did not operate in the manner in which the medicines prescribed

1 Ojo' sy ojo me ddh svdhd (A.V. II. xvm. i). Sayana, in explaining ojah, says, "ojah sarlra-sthiti-kdranam astamo dhatuh." He quotes a passage as being spoken by the teachers (acdryaih) : " ksetrajfiasya tad ojas tu kevaldsraya isyate yathd snehah pradlpasya yathdbhram asani-tvisah" (Just as the lamp depends on the oil and the lightning on the clouds so the ojah depends on the kshetra-jha (self) alone).

2 Satam yd bhesajdni te sahasram samgatdni ca srestham dsrava-bhesajam vasisthatn roga-ndsanam.

(Oh sick person! you may have applied hundreds or thousands of medicinal herbs; but this charm is the best specific for stopping hemorrhage. A.V. vi. 45. 2.) Here also, as in 11. 9. 3, the utterance of the charm is considered to be more efficacious than the application of other herbs and medicines. Water was often applied for washing the sores (vi. 57. 2).

3 Cikitsatu Prajdpatir dirghdyutvdya caksase (vi. 68. 2).

4 Darila's comment on the Kausika-sutra, 25. 2.

in the ordinary medical literature acted, but in a supernatural way. In most of the hymns which appear as pure charms the Kausika-sutra directs the application of various medicines either internally or as amulets. The praise of Atharvan as physician par excellence and of the charms as being superior to all other medicines prescribed by other physicians seems to indicate a period when most of these Atharvanic charms were used as a system of treatment which was competing with the practice of ordinary physicians with the medicinal herbs. The period of the Kausika-sutra was probably one when the value of the medicinal herbs was being more and more realized and they were being administered along with the usual Atharvanic charms. This was probably a stage of reconciliation between the drug system and the charm system. The special hymns dedicated to the praise of certain herbs, such as jangida, kustha, etc., show that the ordinary medical virtues of herbs were being interpreted on the miraculous lines in which the charms operated. On the other hand, the drug school also came under the influence of the Atharva-Veda and came to regard it as the source of their earliest authority. Even the later medical literature could not altogether free itself from a faith in the efficacy of charms and in the miraculous powers of medicine operating in a supernatural and non-medical manner. Thus Caraka, vi. i. 39 directs that the herbs should be plucked according to the proper rites {yatha-vidhi), and Cakrapani explains this by saying that the worship of gods and other auspicious rites have to be performed {mangala-devatarcana.di-purvakatn)\ in vi. 1. 77 a compound of herbs is advised, which, along with many other virtues, had the power of making a person invisible to all beings (adrsyo bhutanam bhavati) ; miraculous powers are ascribed to the fruit amalaka (Emblic Myrobalan), such as that, if a man lives among cows for a year, drinking nothing but milk, in perfect sense-control and continence and meditating the holy gayatrt verse, and if at the end of the year on a proper lunar day in the month of Pausa (January), Magna (February), or Phalguna (March), after fasting for three days, he should enter an amalaka garden and, climbing upon a tree full of big fruits, should hold them and repeat [japan) the name of Brahman till the amalaka attains immortalizing virtues, then, for that moment, immortality resides in the amalaka ; and, if he should eat those amalakas, then the goddess Sri, the incarnation of the Vedas, appears in person to him (svayam

casyopatisthantl srlr vedavdhya-rupini, vi. 3. 6). In vi. 1. 80 it is said that the rasayana medicines not only procure long life, but, if they are taken in accordance with proper rites (yathd-vidhi), a man attains the immortal Brahman. Again in vi. 1. 3 the word prayas-citta (purificatory penance) is considered to have the same meaning as ausadha or bhesaja. The word bhesaja in the Atharva-Veda meant a charm or an amulet which could remove diseases and their symptoms, and though in later medical literature the word is more commonly used to denote herbs and minerals, either simple or compounded, the older meaning was not abandoned 1 . The system of simple herbs or minerals, which existed independently of the Atharva-Veda, became thus intimately connected with the system of charm specifics of the Atharva-Veda ; whatever antagonism may have before existed between the two systems vanished, and Ayur-veda came to be treated as a part of the Atharva-Veda 2 . Prajapati and Indra, the mythical physicians of the Atharva-Veda, came to be regarded in the Atreya-Caraka school as the earliest teachers of Ayur-veda 3 .

Bloomfield arranges the contents of the Atharva-Veda in fourteen classes: 1. Charms to cure diseases and possession by demons (bhaisajyani) ; 2. Prayers for long life and health (dyusyani) ; 3. Imprecations against demons, sorcerers and enemies {abhicari-

1 The A.V. terms are bhesajam (remedy), bhesajl (the herbs), and bhesajth (waters). The term bhaisajya appears only in the Kausika and other sutras and Brahmanas. Bloomfield says that the existence of such charms and practices is guaranteed moreover at least as early as the Indo-Iranian (Aryan) period by the stems baesaza and baesazya (maiithra baesaza and baesazya; haoma baesazya), and by the pre-eminent position of water and plants in all prayers for health and long life. Adalbert Kuhn has pointed out some interesting and striking resemblances between Teutonic and Vedic medical charms, especially in connection with cures for worms and fractures. These may perhaps be mere anthropological coincidences, due to the similar mental endowment of the two peoples. But it is no less likelythat some of these folk-notions had crystallized inprehistorictimes, and that these parallels reflect the continuation of a crude Indo-European folklore that had survived among the Teutons and Hindus. See Bloomfield's The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana, p. 58, and Kuhn's Zeitschrift fiir vergleichende Sprachforschung, xin. pp. 49-74 and 113-157.

2 The Atharva-Veda itself speaks (xix. 34. 7) of herbs which were current in ancient times and medicines which were new, and praises the herb jangida as being better than them all— na tvd purva osadhayo na tvd taranti yd navdh.

3 A.V. vi. 68. 2— Cikitsatu prajdpatir dlrghayutvaya caksase; ibid. xix. 35. 1— Indrasya noma grhnanto rsayah jangidam dadan (The rsis gave jangida, uttering the name of Indra). This line probably suggested the story in the Caraka-samhitd, that Indra first instructed the rsts in Ayur-veda. See ibid. xi. vm. 23— yan matah rathakrJtam amrtam veda bhesajam tad indro apsu prdvesayat tad apo datta bhesajam. The immortalizing medicine which Matali (the charioteer of Indra) bought by selling the chariot was thrown into the waters by Indra, the master of the chariot. Rivers, give us back that medicine!

kani and krtya-pratiharanani) ; 4. Charms pertaining to women (stri-karmdni); 5. Charms to secure harmony, influence in the assembly, and the like (saumanasydni) ; 6. Charms pertaining to royalty (raja-karmani) ; 7. Prayers and imprecations in the interest of Brahmins; 8. Charms to secure property and freedom from danger (paustikdni);g. Charms in expiation of sin and defilement (prayascittani) ; 10. Cosmogonic andtheosophic hymns; 11. Ritualistic and general hymns; 12. The books dealing with individual themes (books 13-18); 13. The twentieth book; 14. The kuntapa hymns 1 ; of these we have here to deal briefly with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9, more or less in the order in which they appear in the Atharva-Veda. A.V. 1. 2 is a charm against fever (jvara), diarrhoea (atisdra), diabetes {atimutra), glandular sores (nddi-vrana) ; a string made of tnuiija grass is to be tied, the mud from a field or ant-hill is to be drunk, clarified butter is to be applied and the holes of the anus and penis and the mouth of the sore are to be aerated with a leather bladder and the charm is to be chanted. The disease asrdva, mentioned in this hymn, is explained by Sayana as meaning diabetes (mutrdtisdra) 2 . 1.3 is a charm against stoppage of urine and stool (mutra-purisa-nirodha). Along with a chanting of the hymn the patient is to be made to drink either earth from a rat's ho'e (musika-mrttika), a piltikd plant, curd, or saw-dust from old wood, or he is to ride an elephant or a horse, or to throw an arrow; a fine iron needle was to be passed through the urinal canal. This is probably the earliest stage of what developed in later times as the vasti-kriyd?. 1. 7 and 1. 8 are charms for driving away evil spirits, ydtudhdnas and kimidins, when a man is possessed by them. 1. 10 is a charm for dropsy (jalodara): a jugful of water containing grass, etc. is to be sprinkled over the body of the patient. 1. 11 is a charm for securing easy delivery. 1. 12 is a charm for all diseases arising from disturbance of vdfa, pitta and slesman — fat, honey and clarified butter or oil have to be drunk. Head-disease (sirsakti) and cough (Jkasa) are specially mentioned. 1. 17

1 Mr Bloomfield's The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana, p. 57.

2 Bloomfield says that asrdva means atisdra or diarrhoea (ibid. p. 59). The same physical applications for the same diseases are directed in A.V. 11. 3. Asrdva denotes any disease which is associated with any kind of diseased ejection. Thus in 11. 3. 2 Sayana says that asrdva means atlsdrdtimutra-nddt-vranddayah.

3 Pra te bhinadmi mehanam vartram vesantyd iva evd te mQtram mucyatdm bahir bdl iti sarvakam (I open your urinal path like a canal through which the waters rush. So may the urine come out with a whizzing sound—A.V. t. 3. 7), All the verses of the hymn ask the urine to come out with a whizzing sound.

is a charm for stopping blood from an injury of the veins or arteries or for stopping too much hemorrhage of women. In the case of injuries a handful of street-dust is to be thrown on the place of injury or a bandage is to be tied with sticky mud 1 . 1. 22 is a charm against heart-disease and jaundice—hairs of a red cow are to be drunk with water and a piece of a red cow's skin is to be tied as an amulet. It is prayed that the red colour of the sun and the red cow may come to the patient's body and the yellow colour due to jaundice may go to birds of yellow colour. 1. 23, which mentions kilasa or kustha (white leprosy) of the bone, flesh and skin and the disease by which hairs are turned grey (palita), is a charm against these 2 . The white parts are to be rubbed with an ointment made of cow-dung, bhrnga-raja, haridra indravaruni and nllika until they appear red. The black medicines applied are asked to turn the white parts black. 1. 25 is a charm against takman, or fever—the patient has to be sprinkled with the water in which a red-hot iron axe has been immersed. The description shows that it was of the malarial type; it came with cold (slta) and a burning sensation {sod). Three types of this fever are described: that which came the next day (anyedyuh), the second day (ubhayedyuh), or the third day (trtiyaka) 3 . It was also associated with yellow, probably because it produced jaundice. 11. 9 and 10 are charms against hereditary (ksetrtya) diseases, leprosy, dyspepsia, etc. 4 Amulets oiarjana wood, barley, sesamum and its flower had also to be tied when the charm was uttered 5 . 11. 31 is a charm against various diseases due to worms. The priest, when uttering this charm, should hold street-dust in his left hand and press it with his right hand and throw it on the patient. There are visible and invisible worms; some of them are called algandu and others saluna; they are generated in the intestines, head and

1 iv. 12 is also a charm for the same purpose.

2 VI. 135-137 is also a charm for strengthening the roots of the hair. Kaka-maci with bhrnga-raja has to be drunk.

3 Namah sltaya takmane namo ruraya socise krnomi

yo anyedynr ubhayedyur abhyeti trtlyakaya namo astu takmane. See also A.V. vn. 123. 10, where the third-day fever, fourth-day fever and irregular fevers are referred to.

* The word ksetrtya has been irregularly derived in Panini's rule, v. 2. 92 (ksetriyac paraksetre cikitsyah). Commentaries like the Kdsika and the Pada-manjart suggest one of its meanings to be "curable in the body of another birth" (janmantara-sarlre cikitsyah), that is, incurable. I, however, prefer the meaning "hereditary," as given by Sayana in his commentary on A.V. 11. 10. 1, as being more fitting and reasonable.

5 Yaksman is also counted as a ksetrtya disease (11. 10. 6).

heels; they go about through the body by diverse ways and cannot be killed even with various kinds of herbs. They sometimes reside in the hills and forests and in herbs and animals, and they enter into our system through sores in the body and through various kinds of food and drink 1 . 11. 33 is a charm for removing yaksman from all parts of the body. hi. 7. 1 is a charm for removing all hereditary (ksetriya) diseases; the horn of a deer is to be used as an amulet, hi. 11 is a charm against phthisis (raja-yaksman) — particularly when it is generated by too much sex-indulgence; the patient is to eat rotten fish 2 , iv. 4 is a charm for attaining virility— the roots of the kapittha tree boiled in milk are to be drunk when the charm is uttered, iv. 6 and 7 are charms against vegetable poisoning—the essence of the krmuka tree is to be drunk, v. 4 is a charm against fever (takmari) and phthisis; the patient is to take the herb kustha with butter when the charm is uttered 3 , v. 11 is a charm against fever 4 , v. 23 is a charm against worms—the patient is given the juice of the twenty kinds of roots 5 , vi. 15 is a charm for eye-diseases; the patient has to take various kinds of vegetable leaves fried in oil, particularly the mustard plant 6 , vi. 20 is a charm against bilious fever (susmino jvarasya) ; it is said to produce a great burning sensation, delirium and jaundice, vi. 21 is a charm for increasing the hair—the hair is to be sprinkled with a decoction of various herbs, vi. 23 is a charm against heart-disease, dropsy and jaundice, vi. 25 is a charm for inflammation of the glands of the neck (ganda-malay '. vi. 85 is a charm against consumption (rdjay-aksman) ; vi. 90 for colic pain (sulci) 8 ; vi. 105 for cough and

1 11. 31. 5. I have adopted Sayana's interpretation.

2 vn. 78 is also a charm for inflammation of the neck (ganda-mdld) and phthisis (yaksmd).

3 Kustha was believed to be good for the head and the eyes (v. 4. 10).

4 Gandhara Mahavrsa, Mufijavan, and particularly Balhika (Balkh), were regarded as the home of fever; so also the country of Anga and Magadha. It was accompanied by cold (slta) and shivering (rurak). It was often attended with cough (kdsa) and consumption (valdsa). It attacked sometimes on the third or fourth day, in summer or in autumn (sdrada), or continued all through the year.

5 This is one of the few cases where a large number of roots were compounded together and used as medicine along with the charms.

8 Some of the other plants are alasala, sildfqald, rtildgalasala.

7 Also vn. 78, where apacit appears as a name for the inflammation of the neck (gala-ganda). Three different types of the disease are described. Apacit is at first harmless, but when it grows, it continues more to secrete its discharges, like boils on the joints. These boils grow on the neck, the back, the thigh-joint and the anus. See further vi. 83, where conch-shell is to be rubbed and applied, vm. 83 is also a charm for it. Blood had to be sucked off the inflamed parts by a leech or an iguana (grha-godhikd).

8 A piece of iron is to be tied as an amulet.

other such diseases due to phlegm (slestna); vi. 109 for diseases of the rheumatic type (vata-vyadhi 1 ). VI. 127 is a charm for abscess (vidradha), phlegmatic diseases (valdsa) and erysipelatous inflammation (visarpa). Various kinds of visarpa in different parts of the body are referred to. Heart-disease and phthisis are also mentioned 2 . There are said to be a hundred kinds of death (mrtyu) (A.V. viii. 5. 7), which are explained by Sayana as meaning diseases such as fever, head-disease, etc. Several diseases are mentioned in ix. 18—first the diseases of the head, sirsakti, sirsamaya, karna-silla and visalpaka, by which secretions of bad smell come out from the ear and the mouth, then fever proceeding from head troubles with shivering and cracking sensations in the limbs. Takman, the dreaded autumnal fever, is so described. Then comes consumption; then come valdsa, kahabaha of the abdomen, diseases of klotna, the abdomen, navel and heart, diseases of the spine, the ribs, the eyes, the intestines, the visalpa, vidradha, wind-diseases (vdtikara), alaji and diseases of the leg, knee, pelvis, veins and head. Boiling, in his article on diseases and medicine (Vedic) in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, makes the following remark concerning the theory of the origin of diseases. "To be noted however is the fact that the Hindu theory of the constitution of the body of three elements, bile, phlegm and wind, does not appear in early Atharvan texts. Vati-krta-nasani of vi. 44. 3 cannot be urged as proof to the contrary, as it means, not destructive of (diseases) produced by the wind in the body {vati-krta-nasani), but destructive of that which has been made into wind. Evidently, from its association with diarrhoea, it refers to wind in the intestines." This does not seem to me to be correct. The phrase which Boiling quotes is indeed of doubtful meaning; Sayana takes it as being composed of two words, vati (healer by aeration) and krta-ndsani (destroyer of evil deeds which brought about the disease). But, however that may be, there are other passages on the subject, which Boiling seems to have missed. Thus in 1. 12. 3 diseases are divided into three classes, viz. those produced by water, by wind, and those which are dry— yo abhraja vataja yas ca susmah 3 . The phlegm of the later medical writers was also considered watery, and the word

1 Pippall is also to be taken along with the utterance of the charm. It is regarded as the medicine for all attacked by the diseases of the wind (vdtl-krtasya bhesafim). It is also said to cure madness (ksiptasya bhesafim).

2 Cipudru is a medicine for valdsa. Clpudrur abhicaksanam (vi. 127. 2).

3 Compare also vdtlkdrasya (ix. 13. 20).

abhraja probably suggests the.origin of the theory of phlegm, as being one of the upholders and destroyers of the body. The word vataja means, very plainly, diseases produced by wind, and the pitta, or bile, which in later medical literature is regarded as a form of fire, is very well described here as susma, or dry. Again in vr. 109 we have pippall as vdtl-krtasya bhesajim. The context shows that the diseases which are referred to as being curable by pippali are those which are considered as being produced by wind in later literature; for "madness" (ksipta) is mentioned as a vati-krta disease. The word susma comes from the root " sus," to dry up, and in slightly modified forms is used to mean a " drying up," "burning," "strength," and "fiery." In one place at least it is used to describe the extremely burning sensation of delirious bilious fever, which is said to be burning like fire 1 . My own conclusion therefore is that at least some Atharvanic people had thought of a threefold classification of all diseases, viz. those produced by wind, those by water, and those by fire, or those which are dry and burning. This corresponds to the later classification of all diseases as being due to the three dosas, wind (vayu), phlegm (kapha or slesma) and bile (pitta). Apart from the ordinary diseases, many were the cases of possession by demons and evil spirits, of which we have quite a large number. Some of the prominent ones are Yatudhana, Kimidin, Pisdca, Pisaci, Amiva, Dvayavin, Raksah, Magundi, Alitnsa, Vatsapa, Palala, Anupalala, Sarku, Koka, Malimluca, Palijaka, Vavrivasas, Asresa, Rksagrlva, Pramilin, Durriama, Sunama, Kuksila, Kusula, Kakubha, Srima, Araya, Karuma, Khalaja, Sakadhumaja, Urunda, Matmata, Kumbhamuska, Sayaka, Nagnaka, Tangalva, Pavlnasa, Gandharva, Brahmagraha, etc. 2 Some of the diseases with their troublous symptoms were (poetically) personified, and diseases which often went together were described as being related as brothers and sisters. Diseases due to worms were well known, in the case of both men

1 vi. 20. 4. For other references where the word susma occurs in more or less modified forms see 1. 12. 3, m. 9. 3, iv. 4. 3, iv. 4. 4, v. 2. 4, v. 20. 2, vi. 65.1, vi. 73. 2, ix. 1. 10, 20, ix. 4. 22, etc.

2 See 1. 28. 35, 11. 9, 11. 14, viii. 6. The last passage contains a good description of some of these beings. There were some good spirits which fought with evil ones and favoured men, such as Pinga, who preserved the babe at birth and chased the amorous Gandharvas as wind chases cloud, viii. 6. 19, 25 says that sometimes the higher gods are also found to bring diseases. Thus Takman was the son of Varuna (vi. 96. 2) and he produced dropsy (1. 10. 1-4, 11. 10. 1, iv. 16. 7, etc.). Parjanya (rain-god) produced diarrhoea, and Agni produced fever, headache and cough.

and of cattle. There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which played a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic India. Many of the diseases were also known to be hereditary (ksetriya). From the names of the diseases mentioned above it will be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed in the Vedic age.

The view-point from which the Vedic people looked at diseases seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering, cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to possess great medical and life-giving properties. There are many hymns which praise these qualities of water 1 . The medicinal properties of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered in other Rg-Vedic texts and Brahmanas. But nothing in these appears to indicate any advance on the Atharva-Veda 2 in medical knowledge. Apart from these curatives there were also the already mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long life and increasing virility, corresponding to the Rasayana and the Vaji-karana chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing in the way of nidana, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. abhraja, vataja and susma, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people had any knowledge of the disturbance of these elements operating as nidanas as they were understood in later medical literature. The three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.

1 apsu antar amrtam apsu bhcsajam (There is immortality and medicine in water—i. 4. 4). See also 1. 5. 6, 33, 11, 3, in. 7. 5, iv. 33, vi. 24. 92, vi. 24. 2, etc.

2 For a brief survey of these Rg-Vedic and other texts see Boiling's article "Disease and Medicine (Vedic)" in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

The Foetus and the Subtle Body.

A human body is regarded by Caraka as a modification of the five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, and it is also the seat of consciousness (cetana) 1 . The semen itself is made of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth; ether is not a constituent of it, but becomes connected with it as soon as it issues forth, since akasa or antariksa (ether) is all-pervading. The semen that is ejected and passes into the ovary is constituted of equal parts of air, fire, water and earth; the ether becomes mixed with it in the ovary; for akasa itself is omnipresent and has no movement of its own 2 ; the semen is the product of six kinds of fluids (rasa). But the foetus cannot be produced simply by the union of the semen of the father and the blood (sonita) of the mother. Such a union can produce the foetus only when the atman with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and manas (mind—the organ involved in all perception and thought), becomes connected with it by means of its karma. The four elements constituting the subtle body of the atman, being the general causes of all productions, do not contribute to the essential bodily features of the child 3 . The elements that contribute to the general features are, (i) the mother's part—the blood, (2) the father's part—the semen, (3) the karma of each individual; the part played by the assimilated food-juice of the mother need not be counted separately, as it is determined by the karma of the individual. The mental traits are determined by the state of mind of the individual in its previous birth. Thus, if the previous state of life was that of a god, the mind of the child

1 garbhas tu khalu antariksa vayv-agrd-toya-bhumi-vikdras cetanddhisthdna-bhutah. Caraka, iv. 4. 6.

2 vdyv-agni-bhumy-ab-guxia-pddavat tat sadbhyo rasebhyah prabhdvai ca tasya. Caraka, iv. 2. 4. dkdsam tu yady-api sukre pdnca-bhautike 'sti tathdpi na purusa-s'arlrdn nirgatya garbhdsayam gacchati, kintu bhuta-catustayam eva kriydvad ydti dkdsam tu vydpakam eva tatrdgatena sukrena sambaddham bhavati. Cakrapini's Ayur-veda-dipikd, iv. 2.4. Susruta however considers sukra (semen) as possessing the qualities of soma, and drtava (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says, however, that particles of the other bhutas (earth, air and ether, as £)alhana enumerates them) are separately associated with them (saumyam sukratn drtavam dgneyam itaresdm apy atra bhutanam sdnnidhyam asty anund visesena parasparo-pakdrdt pardnugrahdt paraspardnupravesdc ca —Susruta, in. 3. 1), and they mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus.

3 ydni tv dtmani suksmdni bhutdni dtivdhika-rupdni tarn sarva-sddhdranatvena avisesa-sddrsya-kdrandnJti neha boddhavydni. Cakrapani's Ayur-veda-dipikd, iv. 2. 23-27.

will be pure and vigorous, whereas, if it was that of an animal, it will be impure and dull 1 . When a man dies, his soul, together with his subtle body, composed of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, in a subtle state and manas, passes invisibly into a particular womb on account of its karma, and then, when it comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the father and mother, the foetus begins to develop 2 . The semen and blood can, however, operate as causes of the production of the body only when they come into connection with the subtle body transferred from the previous body of a dying being 3 . Susruta (ill. 1. 16) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles are manifested (abhivyajyate) when the blood and semen are in union (parama-suksmds cetanavantah sasvata lohita-retasah sanni-patesv abhivyajyante). But later on (in. 3.4) this statement is modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka's account; for there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (bhutatmana). In another passage a somewhat different statement is found (Susruta, in. 4. 3). Here it is said that the materials of the developing foetus are agni, soma, sattva, rajas, tamas, the five senses, and the bhutatma —all these contribute to the life of the foetus and are also called the pranas (life) 4 . Dalhana, in explaining this, says that the agni (fire) spoken of here is the heat-power which manifests itself in the fivefold functionings of digestion (pacaka), viz. brightening of the skin (bhrajaka), the faculty of vision

1 Tesdm vlsesdd balavanti yam

bhavanti mdtd-pitr-karma-jdni tdni vyavasyet sadrsatva-lingam satvatn yathdnukam apt vyavasyet.

Caraka, iv. 2. 27. Anukam prdktandvyavahitd deha-jdtis tena yathdnukam iti yo deva-sartrdd avyavadhdnendgatya bhavati sa deva-satvo bhavati, etc. Cakrapani, iv. 2. 23-27.

3 bhutais caturbhih sahitah su-suksmair

mano-javo dehatn upaiti dehdt karmdt-makatvdn na tu tasya drsydm divyam vind darsanam asti rupam. Caraka, iv. 2. 3.

3 yady apt sukra-rajasl kdrane, tathdpi yadaivdtivahikam suksma-bhuta-rupa-sarlram prdpnutah, tadaiva te sarlram janayatah, ndnyadd. Cakrapani, iv. 2. 36.

* This bhutatma, i.e. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over it, is called by Susruta karma-purusa. Medical treatment is of this karma-purusa and his body (sa esa karma-purusah cikitsddmkrtah —Susruta, in. 1. 16). Susruta (1.1. 21) again says," panca-mahabhuta-sartri-samavdyah purusa ity ucyate; tasmin kriyd so 'dhisthdnam." (In this science, the term purusa is applied to the unity of five elements and the self (sarin), and this is the object of medical treatment.)

{dlocaka), coloration of the blood, the intellectual operations and the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the different constituent elements (dhatu), such as chyle, blood, etc.; the soma is the root-power of all watery elements, such as mucus, chyle, semen, etc., and of the sense of taste; vayu represents that which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of prdna, apdna, samdna, uddna, and vydna. Dalhana says further that sattva, rajas and tamas refer to manas, the mind-organ, which is a product of their combined evolution. The five senses contribute to life by their cognitive functionings. The first passage seemed to indicate that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and blood; the second passage considered the connection of the soul with its subtle body (bhutdtmd) necessary for evolving the semen-blood into life. The third passage introduces, in addition to these, the five senses, sattva, rajas, and tamas, and the place of semen-blood is taken up by the three root-powers of agni, and vayu. These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature, absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-constituents. The reason for these three views in the three successive chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained, except on the supposition that Susruta's work underwent three different revisions at three different times. Vagbhata the elder says that the moment the semen and the blood are united, the life principle (jiva), being moved by manas (mano-javena), tainted, as the latter is, with the afflictions (klesa) of attachment, etc., comes in touch with it 1 .

The doctrine of a subtle body, as referred to in the medical works, may suitably be compared with the Samkhya view. Cakrapani himself, in explaining Caraka-samhita, IV. 2. 36, says that this doctrine of a subtle body (ativdhika sarlra) is described in the dgama, and by dgama the Samkhya dgama is to be understood (tena dgamdd eva sdmkhya-darsana-rupdddtivdhika-sarirdt). The Sdmkhya-kdrikd 39 speaks of a subtle body (suksma deha) and the body inherited from

1 gate purdne rajasi nave 'vasthite iuddhe garbhasyasaye marge ca bijatmana suklam avikrtam avikrtena vdyund preritam anyais ca maha-bhutair anugatam artavena abhimurchitam anvaksam eva rdgddi-klesa-vasdnuvartind sva-karma-coditena mano-javenajivendbhisamsrstamgarbhdsayam vpaydti. Astdnga-samgraha, II. 2. Indu, in explaining this, says, "bijatmana garbha-kdrana-maha-bhuta-svabhdvena.. .suksma-svarupaihmanas-sahacdribhis tanmdtrakhyair maha-bhutair anugatam strl-ksetra-prdptyd karma-vasdd artavena viisrl bhutam anvaksam misrl-bhdva-hlna-kdlam eva... mano-javena jivendbhisamsr$tam prapta-samyogam garbhdsayam suklam upayati" His further explanations of the nature of applications of the jiva show that he looked up Patanjali's Yoga-sutras for the details of avidyd, etc., and the other klesas.

the parents. The suksma continues to exist till salvation is attained, and at each birth it receives a new body and at each death it leaves it. It is constituted of mahat, ahamkara, the eleven senses and the five tan-matras. On account of its association with the buddhi, which bears the impress of virtue, vice, and other intellectual defects and accomplishments, it becomes itself associated with these, just as a cloth obtains fragrance through its connection with campak flowers of sweet odour; and hence it suffers successive rebirths, till the buddhi becomes dissociated from it by the attainment of true discriminative knowledge. The necessity of admitting a subtle body is said to lie in the fact that the buddhi, with the ahamkara and the senses,cannot exist without a supporting body; so in the interval between one death and another birth the buddhi, etc. require a supporting body, and the subtle body is this support 1 . In the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, v. 103, it is said that this subtle body is like a little tapering thing no bigger than a thumb, and that yet it pervades the whole body, just as a little flame pervades a whole room by its rays 2 . The Vyasa-bhasya, in refuting the Samkhya view, says that according to it the citta (mind), like the rays of a lamp in a jug or in a palace, contracts and dilates according as the body that it occupies is bigger or smaller 3 . Vacaspati, in explaining the Yoga view as expounded by Vyasa, says that in the Samkhya view the citta is such that it cannot, simply by contraction and expansion, leave any body at death and occupy another body without intermediate relationship with a subtle body (Utivahika-sarira). But, if the citta cannot itself leave a body and occupy another, how can it connect itself with a subtle body at the time of death ? If this is to be done through another body, and that through another, then we are led to a vicious infinite. If it is argued that the citta is connected with such a subtle body from beginningless time, then the reply is that such a subtle body has never been perceived by anyone (na khalu etad adhyaksa-gocaram); nor can it be regarded as indispensably necessary through inference, since the Yoga view can explain the situation without the hypothesis of any such body. The citta is all-pervading,

1 Sdmkhya-tattva-kaumudl, 39, 40, 41.

2 yathd dlpasya sarva-grha-vydpitve 'pi kalikd-kdratvam... tathaiva linga-dehasya deha-vydpitve 'py angu$tha-parimdiiatvam. Sdtnkhya-pravacana-bhdsya, V. 103.

8 ghata-prdsdda-pradlpa-kalpam sankoca-vikdsi cittam sarira-parimdndkdra-mdtram ity apare pratipanndh. Vydsa-bhdsya on Patanjali's Yoga-sutras, iv. 10.

and each soul is associated with a separate citta. Each citta connects itself with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifestations (vrtti) are seen in that body. Thus the manifestations of the all-pervading citta of a soul cease to appear in its dying body and become operative in a new body that is born. Thus there is no necessity of admitting a subtle body (ativahikatvam tasya na mrsyamahe) 1 .

The Vaisesika also declines to believe in the existence of a subtle body, and assigns to it no place in the development of the foetus. The development of the foetus is thus described by Sridhara in his Nyaya-kandali 2 : "After the union of the father's semen and the mother's blood there is set up in the atoms constituting them a change through the heat of the womb, such that their old colour, form, etc. become destroyed and new similar qualities are produced; and in this way, through the successive formation of dyads and triads, the body of the foetus develops; and, when such a body is formed, there enters into it the mind (antahkarana), which could not have entered in the semen-blood stage, since the mind requires a body to support it (na tu sukra-sonitavasthayam sari-rasrayatvan manasah). Small quantities of food-juice of the mother go to nourish it. Then, through the unseen power (adrsta), the foetus is disintegrated by the heat in the womb into the state of atoms, and atoms of new qualities, together with those of the food-juice, conglomerate together to form a new body." According to this view the subtle body and the mind have nothing to do with the formation and development of the foetus. Heat is the main agent responsible for all disintegration and re-combination involved in the process of the formation of the foetus.

The Nyaya does not seem to have considered this as an important question, and it also denies the existence of a subtle body. The soul, according to the Nyaya, is all-pervading, and the Mahd-bhdrata passage quoted above, in which Yama draws out the purusa

1 Vacaspati's Tattva-vaisdradl, IV. 10. Reference is made to Mahd-bhdrata, in. 296. 17, angustha-mdtram purusam niscdkarsa yamo baldt. Vacaspati says that purusa is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body. It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation of manifestation of citta in the dying body {na cdsya niskarsah sambhavati, ity aupacdriko vydkhyeyas tathd ca cites cittasya ca tatra tatra vrtty-abhdva eva niskarsdrthah) .

The Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdsya, V. 103, says that the thumb-like purusa referred to in Mahd-bhdrata, Hi. 296. 17, which Yama drew from the body of Satyavan, has the size of the subtle body (linga-deha).

- Nydya-kandali, Vizianagram Sanskrit series, 1895, p. 33.

of the size of a thumb, has, according to Nyaya, to be explained away 1 . In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes connected with a particular body (ya eva dehdntara-samgamo 'sya t tarn eva taj-jnah-para-lokam dhuh) 2 .

Candraklrti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the Sdli-stamba-sutra 3 . The foetus is produced by the combination of the six constituents (sannam dhatunam samavdydt). That which consolidates (samslesa) the body is called earth (prthivi-dhdtu); that which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire (tejo-dhdtu) ; that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called air (vayu-dhatu) ; that which produces the pores of the body (antah-sausiryam) is called ether (dkdsa-dhdtu) ; that by which knowledge is produced is called the vijndna-dhdtu. It is by the combination of them all that a body is produced (sarvesam samavayat kayasyotpattir bhavati). The seed of vijnana produces the germ of name and form {nama-rupankura) by combination with many other diverse causes. The foetus is thus produced of itself, not by another, nor by both itself and another, nor by god, nor by time, nor by nature, nor by one cause, nor by no cause, but by the combination of the mother's and the father's parts at the proper season 4 . The combination of father's and mother's parts gives us the five dhatus, which operate together when they are in combination with the sixth dhdtu, the vijnana.

The view that the foetus is the result of the joint effect of the six dhatus reminds us of a similar expression in Caraka, iv. 3. Caraka gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages on the subject of the causes of the formation and development of the foetus: where there is a union between a man with effective semen and a woman with no defect of organ, ovary and blood, if at the time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch with it through the mind, then the foetus begins to develop 5 . When it is taken care of by proper nourishment,etc., then at the right time

1 tasmdn na hrt-pundarike ydvad-avasthanam dtmanah ata eva angustha-mdtram purusam niscakarsa balad yama iti Vydsa-vacanam evam-param avagantavyam (Jayanta's Nydya-manjarl, p. 469).

2 Ibid. p. 473.

8 Mddhyamika-vrtti (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp. 560-61.

4 Ibid. p. 567.

B In the Vaise§ika also the all-pervading atman comes into touch with the foetus through the manas ; but the difference is this, that here the manas is an operative factor causing the development of the foetus, whereas there the manas goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already developed into a body.

the child is born, and the whole development is due to the combined effect of all the elements mentioned above (samudayad esam bha.va.nam). The foetus is born of elements from the mother and the father, the self, the proper hygienic care of the parents' bodies (satmya) and the food-juice; and there is also operant with these the sattva or manas, which is an intermediate vehicle serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves one (aupapaduka) 1 . Bharadvaja said that none of these causes can be considered as valid; for, in spite of the union of the parents, it often happens that they remain childless; the self cannot produce the self; for, if it did, did it produce itself after being born or without being born? In both cases it is ^impossible for it to produce itself. Moreover, if the self had the power of producing itself, it would not have cared to take birth in undesirable places and with defective powers, as sometimes happens. Again, proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause; for there are many who have these, but have no children, and there are many who have not these, but have children. If it was due to food-juice, then all people would have got children. Again, it is not true that the sattva issuing forth from one body connects itself with another; for, if it were so, we should all have remembered the events of our past life. So none of the above causes can be regarded as valid. To this Atreya replied that it is by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child is produced, and not by any one of them separately 2 . This idea is again repeated in iv. 3. 20, where it is said that just as a medical room (kutagaram vartulakaratn grhamjaintaka-sveda-pratipaditam —Cakrapani) is made up of various kinds of things, or just as a chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts, so is the foetus made up of the combination of various entities which contribute to the formation of the embryo and its development (nana-vidhanam garbha-karanatn bliavanam samudayad abhinirvartate) 3 \ The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhistic ring about it.

Bharadvaja, in opposing the above statement of Atreya, asks what, if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes,

1 Caraka-satnhitd, iv. 3. 3.

2 neti bhagavan Atreyah sarvebhya ebhyo bhavebhyah samuditebhyo garbho 'bhinirvartate. Ibid. iv. 3. 11.

3 Ibid. iv. 3. 20.

is the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce the various parts (katham ay am sandhlyate)} Again, how is it that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of any other animal? If, again, man is born out of man, why is not the son of a stupid person stupid, of a blind man blind, and of a madman mad? Moreover, if it is argued that the self perceives by the eye colours, by the ear sounds, by the smell odours, by the organ of taste the different tastes, and feels by the skin the different sensations of touch, and for that reason the child does not inherit the qualities of the father, then it has to be admitted that the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is devoid of it when there are no senses; in that case the soul is not un-changeable,but is liable to change (yatra caitad ubhayam sambhavati jnatvam ajnatvam ca sa-vikaras catma) 1 . If the soul perceives the objects of sense through the activity of the senses, such as perceiving and the like, then it cannot know anything when it has no senses, and, when it is unconscious, it cannot be the cause of the body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently cannot be called the soul, atman. It is therefore simple nonsense to say that the soul perceives colours, etc. by its senses.

To this Atreya replies that there are four kinds of beings, viz. those born from ovaries, eggs, sweat and vegetables. Beings in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms 2 . The forms that the foetus-producing elements (garbha-kara bhavah) assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble. Just as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc. assume the form of any mould in which they are poured, so, when the foetus-producing elements assemble in a particular body, the foetus takes that particular form. But a man is not infected with the defect or disease of his father, unless it be so bad or chronic as to have affected his semen. Each of our limbs and organs had their germs in the semen of the father, and, when the disease or defect of the father is so deep-rooted as to have affected (upatapa) the germ part of any particular organ in the seed, then the child produced out of the semen is born defective in that limb; but, if the defect or disease of the father is so superficial that his semen remains unaffected, then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son. The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents; he alone is responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs; for

1 Caraka-samhita, rv. 3. 21. 2 Ibid. iv. 3. 22, 23.

these are born from his own self (atma-janindriyani). The presence or absence of the sense-organs is due to his own destiny or the fruits of karma (daiva). So there is no definite law that the sons of idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born idiots or be otherwise defective 1 . The self (dtmari) is conscious only when the sense-organs exist. The self is never without the sattva or the mind-organ, and through it there is always some kind of consciousness in the self 2 . The self, as the agent, cannot without the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading to practical work; no practical action for which several accessories are required can be performed unless these are present; a potter who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it unless he has the organs with which to make it 3 . The fact that the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate is well illustrated by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie inoperative 4 . Atreya further says that, when the senses are completely restrained and the manas, or mind-organ, is also restrained and concentrated in the self, one can have knowledge of all things even without the activity of the senses 5 . The self is thus of itself the knower and the agent.

This view of Caraka, as interpreted by Cakrapani, seems to be somewhat new. For the self is neither pure intelligence, like the purusa of the Samkhya-yoga, nor the unity of being, intelligence and bliss, like that of the Vedanta. Here the soul is the knower by virtue of its constant association with manas. In this, however, we are nearer to the Nyaya-Vaisesika view. But in the Nyaya-Vaisesika view the soul is not always in contact with manas and is not always conscious. The manas in that view is atomic. The view that the

1 Caraka-samhita, iv. 3. 25.

2 Ibid. iv. 3. 26, na hy-asattvah kaddcid atma sattva-visesdc copalabhyate jhdna-viiesah. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says that our knowledge of the external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with the mind-organ. If these sense-organs do not exist, we cannot have any knowledge of the external world, but the internal organ of mind is always associated with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present in the self (yat tu kevala-mano-janyam dtma-jndnam, tad bhavaty eva sarvadd). It seems that both sattva and manas are used to denote the mind-organ.

3 The word kdrya-jndnam in Caraka-samhita, iv. 3. 27, has been explained by Cakrapani as kdrya-pravrtti-janaka-bdhya-visaya-jnanam. The knowledge that the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind has no object (nirvisaya); in other words, this knowledge which the self always has is formless.

* Ibid. iv. 3. 31.

B vindplndriyaih samddhi-baldd eva yasmat sarvajno bhavati; tasmdj jna-sva-bhdva eva nirindriyo 'py atma (Cakrapani's Caraka-tdtparya-ftkd, iv. 3. 28-29).

soul has always a formless consciousness has undoubtedly a Vedantic or Samkhyaic tinge; but the other details evidently separate this view from the accepted interpretations of these schools. The theory of the soul, however, as here indicated comes as a digression and will have to be discussed more adequately later on.

On the subject of the existence of subtle bodies we have already quoted the views of different Indian schools of philosophy for the purpose of suggesting comparisons or contrasts with the views of Caraka. Before concluding this section reference must be made to the Vedanta views with regard to the nature of subtle bodies.

According to the Vedanta, as interpreted by Sankara, the subtle body is constituted of five particles of the elements of matter (bhuta-suksmaih), with which are also associated the five vayus, prana, apana, etc. 1 Those who perform good deeds go to the region of the moon, and those who commit sins suffer in the kingdom of Yama and then are again born in this world 2 . Those who, as a reward of their good deeds, go to the kingdom of the moon and afterwards practically exhaust the whole of their fund of virtue and consequently cannot stay there any longer, begin their downward journey to this earth. They pass through akasa, air, smoke and cloud and then are showered on the ground with the rains and absorbed by the plants and again taken into the systems of persons who eat them, and again discharged as semen into the wombs of their wives and are reborn again. In the kingdom of the moon they had watery bodies (candra-mandale yad am-mayam sarlram upabhogartham arabdham) for the enjoyment available in that kingdom; and, when they exhaust their good deeds through enjoyment and can no longer hold that body, they get a body which is like akasa and are thus driven by the air and come into association with smoke and cloud. At this stage, and even when they are absorbed into the body of plants, they neither enjoy pleasure nor suffer pain. A difference must be made between the condition of those who are endowed with plant-bodies as a punishment for their misdeeds and those who pass through the plant-bodies merely as stations on their way to rebirth. In the case of the former the plant life is a life of enjoyment and sorrow, whereas in the case of the latter there is neither enjoyment nor sorrow.

1 The Bhasya of $ankara on the Brahma-sutra, in. i. 1-7.

2 Ibid. in. i. 13.

Even when the plant-bodies are chewed and powdered the souls residing in them as stations of passage do not suffer pain; for they are only in contact with these plant-bodies {candra-mandala-skhalitanam vrihy ddi-samslesa-matram tad-bhavah) 1 .

We thus see that it is only the Samkhya and the Vedanta that agree to the existence of a subtle body and are thus in accord with the view of Caraka. But Caraka is more in agreement with the Vedanta in the sense that, while according to the Samkhya it is the tan-matras which constitute the subtle body, it is the fine particles of the gross elements of matter that constitute the subtle bodies in the case both of the Vedanta and of Caraka. The soul in one atomic moment becomes associated successively with akasa, air, light, heat, water, and earth (and not in any other order) at the time of its entrance into the womb 2 .

Foetal Development 3 .

When the different elements of matter in conjunction with the

subtle body are associated with the self, they have the appearance of

a little lump of mucus (kheta-bhuta) with all its limbs undifferentiated

and undeveloped to such an extent that they may as well be said

1 Bhdsya of Jsankara, III. i. 25, also in. i. 22-27.

2 Caraka-samhitd, iv. 4. 8. Cakrapani, commenting on this, says that there is no special reason why the order of acceptance of gross elements should be from subtler to grosser; it has to be admitted only on the evidence of the scriptures— ayam ca bhuta-grahana-krama dgatna-siddha eva ndtra yuktis tatha-vidhd hrdayangamasti.

8 In the Garbha Upanisad, the date of which is unknown, there is a description of foetal development. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized: the hard parts of the body are earth, the liquid parts are water, that which is hot (usna) is heat-light (tejah), that which moves about is vdyu, that which is vacuous is akasa. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (sad-dsraya), sweet (madhura), acid (amid), salt (lavana), bitter (tikta), hot (katu) and pungent (kasaya), and it is made up of seven dhdtus of chyle (rasa), blood (sonita) and flesh (mdmsa). From the six kinds of rasa comes the sonita, from sonita comes mdmsa, from mdmsa comes fat (medas), from it the tendons (sndyu), from the sndyu bones (asthi), from the bones the marrow (mafia), from the marrow the semen (sukra). By the second night after the union of semen and blood the foetus is of the form of a round lump called kalala, at the eighth night it is of the form of a vesicle called budbuda, after a fortnight it assumes the form of a spheroid, pinda; in two months the head appears, in three months the feet, in four months the abdomen, heels and the pelvic portions appear, in the fifth month the spine appears, in the sixth month the mouth, nose, eyes and ears develop; in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life (jlvena samyukto bhavati), in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. By an excess of semen over blood a male child is produced, by the excess of blood a female child is produced, when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. When air somehow enters and divides the semen into two, twins are produced. If the minds of the parents are disturbed (vydkulita-mdnasah), the issue becomes either blind or lame or dwarf. In the ninth month, when the foetus is well developed

not to exist as to exist. Susruta remarks that the two main constituents of the body, semen and blood, are respectively made up of the watery element of the moon (saumya) and the fiery element (agneya) ; the other elements in atomic particles are also associated with them, and all these mutually help one another and co-operate together for the formation of the body 1 . Susruta further goes on to say that at the union of female and male the heat (tejah) generated rouses the vayu, and through the coming together of heat and air the semen is discharged 2 . Caraka, however, thinks that the cause of discharge of semen is joy (harsa) 3 . The semen is not produced from the body, but remains in all parts of the body, and it is the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the semen into the uterus 4 . Thus he says that, being ejected by the self as joy (harsa-bhiitenatmanodiritas cadhisthitas ca), the semen constituent or the seed, having come out of the man's body, becomes combined with the menstrual product (artava) in the uterus (garbhasaya) after it has entrance thereinto through the proper channel (ucitena patha). According to Susruta the ejected semen enters into the female organ (yonim abhiprapadyate) and comes into association there with the menstrual product 5 . At that very moment, the soul with its subtle body comes into association with it and thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of sattva,

with all its organs, it remembers its previous birth and knows its good and bad deeds and repents that, on account of its previous karma, it is suffering the pains of the life of a foetus, and resolves that, if it can once come out, it will follow the Samkhya-yoga discipline. But as soon as the child is born it comes into connection with Vaisnava vayu and forgets all its previous births and resolutions. A body is called sarira, because three fires reside in it (srayante), viz. the kosthagni, darsandgni and jnanagni. The kosthagni digests all kinds of food and drink, by the darsanagm forms and colours are perceived, by the jnanagni one performs good and bad deeds. This Upanisad counts the cranial bones as being four, the vital spots (marman) as being 107, the joints as 180, the tissues (sndyu) as 109, the sirds, or veins, as 700, the marrow places as 500, and the bones as 300.

1 Susruta-samhitd, in. 3. 3.

2 Ibid. hi. 3. 4, Nirnaya-Sagara edition, 1915. Dalhana, commenting on this, says, " sukha-laksana-vydydmajosma-villnam vidrutam anildc cyutam."

3 Caraka-samhitd, iv. 4. 7.

* Cakrapani, commenting on Caraka-samhitd, iv. 4. 7, says that "nangebhyah sukram utpadyate ttintu sukra-rupatayaiva vyajyate," i.e. the semen is not produced from the different parts of the body, but it exists as it is and is only manifested in a visible form after a particular operation (Susruta, in. 3. 4).

6 As Palhana interprets this, the female organ here means the uterus; thus Palhana says, "yones tritlyavartavasthita-garbhasayydm pratipadyate," i.e. the semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ, the place of the foetus. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber, the preceding two being probably the vulva and the vagina.

rajas and tamas, and godly (deva), demonic (asura), and other characteristics. Caraka, referring to the question of the association of the soul with the material elements, says that this is due to the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (sattva-karana) 1 . Cakrapani, in commenting on the above passage, says that the self (atman) is inactive; activity is however attributed to the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is associated with it. This, however, seems to be a compromise on the part of Cakrapani with the views of the traditional Samkhya philosophy, which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive; but the text of the Caraka-samhita does not here say anything on the inactivity of the soul; for Caraka describes the soul as active {pravartate) as agent (kartr) and as universal performer {visva-karman), and the sattva is described here only as an organ of the soul (sattva-karana).

In the first month, the foetus has a jelly-like form (kalala) 2 ; in the second month, the material constituents of the body having undergone a chemical change (abhiprapacyamana) due to the action of cold, heat and air (sitosmanilaih), the foetus becomes hard {ghana). If it is the foetus of a male child, it is spherical (pinda); if it is of a female child, it is elliptical (pesi) ; if it is of a hermaphrodite, it is like the half of a solid sphere (arbuda) 3 . In the third month five special eminences are seen, as also the slight differentiation of limbs. In the fourth month the differentiation of the limbs is much more definite and well manifested; and owing to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of consciousness becomes also manifested, since the heart is the special seat of consciousness; so from the fourth month the foetus manifests a desire for the objects of the senses. In the fifth month the consciousness becomes more awakened; in the sixth intelligence begins to develop; in the seventh the division and differentiation of

1 Sattva-karano guna-grahandya pravartate — Caraka-samhita, IV. 4. 8. Cakrapani rightly points out that guna here means material elements which possess qualities— gunavanti bhutdni. The word guna is used in all these passages in the sense of material entity or bhuta. Though guna means a quality and gunin a substance, yet the view adopted here ignores the difference between qualities and substances, and guna, the ordinary word for quality, stands here for substance (guna-guninor abhedopacdrdt —Cakrapani, ibid.).

2 Dalhana explains kalala as singhdna-prakhyam.

3 On the meanings of the words pesi and arbuda there is a difference of opinion between Dalhana and Gayl. Thus Gayl says thatpesl means quadrangular {catur-asra) and arbuda means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree {s&lmali-mukuldkdram).

limbs become complete; in the eighth, the vital element (ofas) still remains unsettled, and so, if a child is born at this time, it becomes short-lived 1 .

Caraka, in 'describing the part played by different material elements in the formation of the body, says that from the element akasa are formed sound, the organ of hearing, lightness (laghava), subtleness of structure (sauksmya) and porosity (vireka) ; from vayu (air) are formed the sensation of touch, the organ of touch, roughness , power of movement, the disposition of the constituent elements (dhdtu-vyuhana), and bodily efforts; from fire, vision, the organ of vision,digestion,heat,etc.; from water, thesensation of taste and the taste-organ, cold, softness, smoothness and watery characteristics; from earth, smell, organ of smell, heaviness, steadiness and hardness. The parts of the body which are thus formed from different material elements grow and develop with the accession of those elements from which they have grown 2 . As the whole world is made up of five elements (bhuta), so the human body is also made up of five elements 3 . Caraka maintains that the senses and all other limbs of the body which grow r before birth make their appearance simultaneously in the third month 4 . When, in the third month, the sense-organs grow, there grow in the heart feelings and desires. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard, in the fifth it gets more flesh and blood, in the sixth there is greater development of strength and colour, in the seventh it becomes complete with all its limbs, and in the eighth month there is a constant exchange of vital power (ofas) between the mother and the foetus. The foetus being not yet perfectly developed, the vital fluid passes from the mother to the foetus; but, since the latter cannot retain it, it returns to the mother 5 . Cakrapani, commenting on this, says that such an exchange is only possible because the foetus

1 Susruta-samhita, in. 3. 30.

2 Caraka-samhita, iv. 4. 12.

3 evam ayam loka-sammitah purusah — ydvanto hi loke bhava-visesas tavantah puruse, yavantah puruse tavanto loke (Caraka-samhita, iv. 4. 13). In ibid. iv. 3, it is said that the foetus gets its skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, kloma, spleen, liver, kidneys, bladder, colon, stomach, the larger intestines, and the upper and the lower rectum from the mother, and its hair, beard, nails, teeth, bones, veins and semen from the father; but, however this may be, it is certain that the development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five elements of matter. So the development of the human foetus is, like the development of all other things in the world, due to the accretion of material elements.

* Ibid. iv. 4. 14.

6 mdtur ojo garbham gacchatiti yad ucyate, tad-garbhauja eva matr-sambaddham san matrqja iti vyapadisyate. Cakrapani, iv. 4. 24.

is still undeveloped, and the foetus, being associated with the mother, serves also as the mother's vital power (qjas) ; for otherwise, if the qjas went out altogether from the mother, she could not live.

There is a good deal of divergence of opinion as regards the order of the appearance of the different limbs of the foetus. Two different schools of quarrelling authorities are referred to by Caraka and Susruta. Thus, according to Kumarasiras and Saunaka the head appears first, because it is the seat of the senses; according to Kankayana, the physician of Balhlka, and Krtavlrya the heart appears first, because according to Krtavlrya (as reported in Susruta) this is the seat of consciousness (cetana) and of buddhi and manas ; according to Bhadrakapya (as reported by Caraka) the navel comes first, since this is the place where food is stored, and according to Parasara (as reported in Susruta), because the whole body grows from there. According to Bhadra Saunaka (as reported by Caraka) the smaller intestine and the larger intestine (pakvasaya) appear first, since this is the seat of air (marutadhi-sthanatvat) ; according to Badisa (as reported by Caraka) the hands and feet come out first, because these are the principal organs, and according to Markandeya (as reported by Susruta), because they are the main roots of all efforts (tan-mulatvac cestayah) ; according to Vaideha Janaka (as reported by Caraka) the senses appear first, for they are the seats of understanding (buddhy-adhis-thana); according to Marici (as reported by Caraka) it is not possible to say which part of the body develops first, because it cannot be seen by anyone (paroksatvad acintyam); according to Subhuti Gautama (as reporttd by Susruta) the middle part of the body (madhya-sarira) appears first, since the development of other parts of the body is dependent on it (tan-nibaddhatvat sarva-gatra-sambhavasya); according to Dhanvantari (as reported by both Caraka and Susruta) all the parts of the body begin to develop together {yugapat sarvangabhinirvrtti), though on account of their fineness and more or less undifferentiated character such development may not be properly noticed, as with the parts of a growing bamboo-shoot or a mango frmt(garbhasyasuksmatvdn nopalabhyante vamsankuravat cuta-phalavac ca) 1 . Just as the juicy parts and the stone, which are undifferentiated in a green mango at its early stages, are all found clearly developed and differentiated when it

1 Susruta-samhita, in. 3. 32 and Caraka-samhita, IV. 6. 21.

is ripe, so, when the human foetus is even in the early stages of development, all its undifferentiated parts are already developing there pari passu, though on account of their fineness of structure and growth they cannot then be distinguished.

Referring to the early process of the growth of the foetus, Susruta says that, as the semen and blood undergo chemical changes through heat, seven different layers of skin (kala) are successively produced, like the creamy lay ers(santanika) formed in milk. Thefirst layer, one-eighteenth of a paddy seed (dhanya) in thickness, is called avabhasini ; the second, one-sixteenth of a paddy seed, lohita ; the third, one-twelfth of a paddy seed, sveta; the fourth, one-eighth, is called tamra; the fifth, one-fifth, vedinl; the sixth, of the size of a paddy seed, rohtni; the seventh, of the size of two paddy seeds, mamsa-dhara. All these seven layers of skin come to about six paddy seeds, or roughly one inch. This is said to hold good only in those places of the body which are fleshy. Apart from these seven kalas of skin there are also seven kalas between the different dhatus. A dhatu (from the root dha, to hold) is that which supports or sustains the body, such as chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh (mamsa), fat (medas), bone (asthi), marrow (majja), semen (sukra) and the last vital fluid (ojas). Lymph (kapha), bile (pitta) and excreta (purlsa) have also to be counted as dhatus. These kalas, however, are not visible; their existence is inferred from the fact that the different dhatus must have separate places allotted to them, and the kalas are supposed to divide the layer of one dhatu from another and are covered with lymph and tissues (snayu) 1 . In the first kala, known as the mamsa-dhara, the veins, tissues, etc. of the flesh are found; in the second, the rakta-dhara, is found the blood inside the flesh; in the third, called the medo-dhara, there is the fat which is found in the abdomen and also between the smaller bones 2 . The fourth kala is the slesma-dhara, which exists in the joints; the fifth is the purlsa-dharU, which exists in the intestine (pakvasaya) and separates the excreta; the sixth and the seventh are the pitta-dhara and the sukra-dhara.

SuSruta thinks that the liver and spleen are produced from

1 The kala is defined by Vrddha-Vagbhata as yas tu dhatv dsaydntaresu kledo 'vatisthate yathdsvam usmabkir vipakvah sndyu-slesma-jardyu-cchannah kdstha iva saro dhdtu-sdra-iesol 'patvdt kald-samjnah (Astdnga-sarngraha, Sdrira, v).

2 The fat inside the smaller bones is called medas, whereas that inside the larger ones is called majjd, or marrow, and the fat of pure flesh only is called vapd, or fat.

blood, pupphusa (lungs) from the froth of blood, and unduka (a gland in the colon ?) from the dirt of blood (sonita-kitta-prabhava). The best parts (prasdda) of blood and lymph are acted upon by bile, and vayu works in association therewith; by this process the entrails,rectum and bladder are produced; and, when the heating process goes on in the abdomen, the tongue is produced, as the essence of lymph, blood and flesh. The air, being associated with heat, enters the flesh and changes the currents, the muscles (pest) are differentiated, and by the oily part of fat the vayu produces the veins (sira) and tissues (snayu). From the essential part of blood and fat the kidneys (vrkka) are produced, from the essential part of flesh, blood, lymph and fat the testicles, and from the essence of blood and lymph the heart, which is the centre of the dhamanis through which flows the current of life {prana-vaha). Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the pupphusa, and on the right side the liver and the kloma (right lung?), and this is particularly the place of consciousness. At the time of sleep, when it is covered with slesman having a superabundance of tamas, the heart remains contracted.

The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and also through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air 1 . The navel of the body is the heating centre (jyotih-sthana), and the air, starting from here, continues to inflate the body.

It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several causes operating jointly. A defect of any particular limb at birth is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating causes through the influence of which that particular limb was produced. The cause of foetal development is not a question of organs or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they already existed, in the potential form, in the causes operating jointly. The joint causes did not produce something absolutely new, but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was already inherent in them. Of all the joint causes the self remains unchanged in all changes of the body. The changes of pleasure and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due to the soul are really due either to sattva or manas, or to the body 2 . Cakrapani, commenting on this, says that the fact that a soul may

1 Susruta-samhita, in. 4. 57.

2 nir-vikarah paras tv atma sarva-hhutanam nirvisesa-sattva-sartrayos tu visesad visesopalahdhih. Caraka-samhita, iv. 4. 34.

take its birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is liable to change (paramatma-vikara na bhavanti) ; for such a change is due to the excessive preponderance of sattva, rajas or tamas, which are in reality due to virtue and vice, which in themselves are but the characteristics of mind {sattva-rajas-tamah-prabalata-rupa-vikaraja-manojanya-dharmadharma-janyany eva) x .

There are three kinds of morbid elements (dosa) of the body, viz. vata, pitta and slesman, and two morbid elements which affect the mind (sattva), viz. rajas and tatnas. By the disorder of the first three the body becomes diseased, and by that of the second two the mind becomes affected. These, however, will be dealt with more fully later on.

Growth and Disease.

The three elements, vayu, pitta and kapha, are counted both as constituents {dhatus) and as dosas, or morbid elements. Dhatus are those elements which uphold the body. The body is the conglomeration (samudaya) of the modification of five bhutas, or elements, and it works properly so long as these elements are in proper proportions (sama-yoga-vahin) in the body 2 . The modifications of the five elements which co-operate together to uphold the body are called dhatus. When one or more of the dhatus fall off or exceed the proper quantity {dhatu-vaisamya), one or more dhatus may be in excess or deficient either in partial tendencies or in entirety (akartsnyena prakrtya ca). It has to be noted that, as Cakrapani explains, not every kind of excess or deficiency of dhatus produces dhatu-vaisamya, or disturbance of the equilibrium of the dhatus : it is only when such deficiency or excess produces affections of the body that it is called dhatu-vaisamya. That amount of excess or deficiency which does not produce trouble or affection of the body is called the normal measure of the dhatus (prakrta-mana) 3 . It is indeed obvious that such a definition of prakrta-mana and dhatu-vaisamya involves a vicious circle, since the normal measure or prakrta-mana of dhatus is said to be that which exists when there is no trouble or affection, and dhatu-vaisamya is that which exists when there is trouble

1 Cakrapani's commentary, Caraka, iv. 4.

2 Caraka-samhitd, iv.6.4. Cakrapani, in commenting on the word sama-yoga-vahin, explains sama as meaning ucita-pramdna (proper quantity).

3 etadeva dhatunam prdkrta-mdnam yad avikara-kdri, Cakrapani's comment on Caraka-samhitd, iv. 6. 4.

in the body; the trouble or affection of the body has thus to be defined in terms of dhatu-vaisamya. The only escape from this charge is that dhatu-vaisamya and disease are synonymous, and the prakrta-mana of dhatus is the same as health. When the dhatus are in their normal measure, there cannot be any vaisamya y except of a local nature, as when, for example, the pitta existing in its own proper measure is somehow carried by vayu to a part of the body and there is consequently a local excess. Whatever leads to the increase of any particular dhatu automatically leads also to the decrease of other dhatus which are opposed to it. Things having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily dhatu increase it, and things having a different composition decrease it (samanyam ekatva-karam visesas tu prthaktva-krt) 1 . The normal health of a man is but another name for his dhatu-samya ; a man is said to be unhealthy, or to be in a state of dhatu-vaisamya, when symptoms of disease {vikara) are seen. Slight variations of the due proportion of dhatu do not entitle us to call them instances of dhatu-vaisamya unless there is vikara or symptoms of it externally expressed. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such that the equilibrium of dhatus may be properly maintained. The sole aim of Ayur-veda is to advise diet, medicines, and a course of behaviour, such that, if they are properly followed, a normally healthy person may maintain the balance of his dhatus and a man who has lost the equilibrium of his dhatus may regain it. The aim of Ayur-veda is thus to advise men how to secure dhatu-samya (dhatu-sdmya-kriya cokta tantrasyasya prayojanam) 2 .

If a normally healthy man wishes to keep his health at its normal level, he has to take things of different tastes, so that there may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the body. Diseases are caused through the excessive, deficient, and wrongful administration of sense-objects, the climatic characteristics of heat and cold, and the misuse of intelligence 3 . Thus the sight of objects with powerful light, the hearing of loud sounds like the roaring of thunder, the smelling of very strong odours, too much eating, the touching of too much cold or heat or too much bathing or massage are examples of atiyoga, or excessive association with sense-objects. Not to see, hear, smell, taste or

1 Caraka-satnhita, i. i. 44. 2 Ibid. 1. 1. 52.

8 kdla-buddhlndriydrthdndm yogo mithyd na cdti ca

dvaydsraydndm vyddhlndm. tri-vidho hetu-samgrahah.

Ibid. I. 1. 53.

touch at all would be ayoga, or deficient association with sense-objects. To see objects very near the eye, at a very great distance, or to see frightful, hideous, unpleasant and disturbing sights, would be examples of the improper use (mithya-yoga) of the visual sense. To hear grating and unpleasant sounds would be examples of the improper use of the ear; to smell bad and nauseating odours would be examples of mithya-yoga of the nose; to eat together different kinds of things, which in their combination are so opposed as to be unhealthy, is an example of the improper use of the tongue; to be exposed to sudden heat and cold are examples of the improper use of touch 1 . Similarly, all activities of speech, mind and body, when they are performed to an excessive degree, or not performed at all, or performed in an undesirable or unhealthy manner, are to be considered respectively as examples of atiyoga, ayoga and mithya-yoga of the effort of speech, mind and body (van-manah-sarira-pravrtti) 2 . But these are all due to the misuse of intelligence (prajnaparadha). When a particular season manifests its special characteristics of heat, cold or rains to an excessive degree or to a very deficient degree or in a very irregular or unnatural manner, we have what are called atiyoga, ayoga and mithya-yoga of time (kala) 3 . But the misuse of intelligence, or prajnaparadha, is at the root of all excessive, deficient or wrongful association with sense-objects 4 ; for, when proper things are not taken at the proper time or proper things are not done at the proper time, it is all misuse of intelligence and is therefore included under prajnaparadha. When certain sinful deeds are performed by prajnaparadha, and, by the sins (adharma) associated with those deeds, which become efficient only after a certain lapse of time, illness is produced, the real cause of the illness is primarily adharma or its root cause, prajnaparadha; kala, or time, however, may still be regarded in some sense as the cause through which the adharma is matured and becomes productive.

The principle of growth and decay is involved in the maxim

1 Caraka-samhita, I. n. 37.

2 Ibid. 1. n. 39, 40. Cakrapani says that this includes sinful deeds which produce illness and unhappiness, idrlra-mdnasika-vdcanika-karma-mithyd-yo-germivd-dharmotpdddvdntara-vydpdrenaivddharma-janydndm vikdrdndm kriya-mdnatvdt.

8 Three seasons only are mentioned, Sltosma-varsa-laksandh punar heman-ta-grisma-varsdh. Ibid. 1. 11. 42.

4 Thus Cakrapani, commenting on this, says, " buddhy-aparddhasyaiva indri-ydrthdtiyogddi-hetutvdt." Ibid. 1. 1. 53.

that the different constituents of the body grow when articles of food having similar constituents are taken, and that they decay when articles of food having opposite qualities are taken (evam eva sarva-dhatu-gunanam samanya-yogad vrddhir vipar-y ay add hrasah) 1 . Thus, flesh increases by the intake of flesh, so does blood by taking blood, fat by fat, bones by cartilages, marrow by marrow, semen by semen and a foetus by eggs 2 . But the principle applies not only to the same kind of substances as taken in the above example, but also to substances having largely similar qualities, just as the seminal fluid may be increased by taking milk and butter {samana-guna-bhuyisthanam anyaprakrtinam apy-ahara-vikaranam upayogah) 3 . The ordinary conditions of growth always hold good, namely, proper age of growth, nature, proper diet and absence of those circumstances that retard growth. The assimilation of food is effected by heat which digests, air which collects together all things for the action of heat, water w 7 hich softens, fat which makes the food smooth, and time which helps the process of digestion 4 . As any particular food is digested and changed, it becomes assimilated into the body. The hard parts of the food form the hard parts of the body and the liquid parts form the liquid parts such as blood and the like; and unhealthy food, i.e. food which has qualities opposed to the natural qualities of the body, has a disintegrating influence on the body.

As regards the growth of the body through the essence of the food-juice, there are two different views summed up by Cakrapani (i. 28. 3). Some say that the chyle is transformed into blood, and the blood into flesh, and so forth. As regards the method of this transformation, some say that, just as the whole milk is changed into curd, so the whole chyle is transformed into blood, while others say that this transformation is somewhat like the circulation in irrigation (kedari-kulya-nyaya). The rasa (chyle) produced as a result of the digestive process, coming into association with rasa as the body-constituent (dhatu-riipa-rasa), increases it to a certain extent; another part of the rasa, having the same colour and smell as blood, goes to blood and increases it, and another part similarly goes to flesh and increases it; and the same process takes place with reference to its increasing fat, etc. Here the whole circula-

1 Caraka-samhitd, 1. 1. 43 and 44, also IV 6. 9 and particularly IV. 6. 10.

2 Ibid. iv. 6. 10. Cakrapani explains dma-garbha as anda.

8 Ibid. iv. 6. 11. * Ibid. iv. 6. 14 and 15.

tion begins by the entrance of the entire chyle into the constituent rasa (rasa-dhatu) ; in passing through some part remains in the rasa and increases it, the unabsorbed part passes into blood, and what is unabsorbed there passes into flesh and so on to the other higher constituents of bones, marrow and semen 1 . But others think that, just as in a farm-house pigeons of different descriptions sit together (khale kapota-nyaya), so not all the digested food-juice passes through the channel of the rasa-dhatu, but different parts of it pass through different channels from the very first stage. That part of it which nourishes rasa enters into the channel of its circulation, that part of it which nourishes the blood goes directly into that, and so on. But there is generally this time limitation, that the part which nourishes the blood enters into it only when the part which nourishes rasa-dhatu has been absorbed in it; so again the part which enters into flesh can only do so when the part which nourishes blood has been absorbed in it. Thus the circulatory system is different from the very beginning; and yet the nourishment of blood takes place later than that of rasa, the nourishment of flesh later than that of blood, and so on (rasad raktam tato mamsam ityader ayam arthah yad rasa-pusti-kalad uttara-kalam raktam jay ate, etc.). The upholders of the last view maintain that the other theory cannot properly explain how a nourishing diet (vrsya), such as milk, can immediately increase the seminal fluid, and that, if it had to follow the lengthy process of passing through all the circulatory systems, it could not do its part so quickly; but on the second theory, milk through its special quality (prabhava) can be immediately associated with the seminal fluid and thereby increase it 2 . But Cakrapani remarks that the earlier theory (kedarl-kulya) is as good as the later one. For on that view also it might be held that by milk its special quality (prabhava)

1 There are two kinds of rasa, called dhdtu-rasa and posaka-rasa. See Cakrapani's comment on Caraka-samhita, vi. 15. 14 and 15.

2 parindma-pakse, vrsya-prayogasya raktadi-rupapatti-kramendticirena sukram bhavatiti; ksirddayas ca sadya eva vrsya drsyante, khale-kapota-pakse tu vrsyotpanno rasah prabhdvdc chlgbram eva sukrena santbaddhah san tat-pustim karotlti yuktam (Cakrapani on Caraka-samhita, 1. 28. 3). Elsewhere (ibid. vi. 15. 32) it is said that those articles of food which stimulate semen (vrsya) are, according to some authorities, changed into semen in six days and nights, whereas in the ordinary course, as is said in Susruta, it takes a month for the transformation of ordinary articles of food into semen. But Caraka does not favour any time limitation and urges that, just as the movement of a wheel depends upon the energy spent on it, so the time that a particular food takes for getting itself transformed into semen or into any other dhatu depends upon the nature of the food and the powers of digestion.

passed quickly through the various stages and became associated with the seminal fluid. Nor can it be said that according to the first theory every case of impurity of rasa (rasa-dusti) is also a case of impurity of blood (rakta-dusti), as is argued; for not the whole of rasa is transformed into blood, but only a part of it. So the rasa part may be impure, but still the part that goes to form blood may be pure; thus both theories are equally strong, and nothing can be said in favour of either. In Caraka-samhita, vi. 15. 14 and 15, it is said that from rasa there is rakta (blood), from rakta flesh, from flesh fat, from fat bones, from bones marrow, from marrow semen. The two theories above referred to deal with the supposed ways in which such transformations occur.

In addition to the seven dhatus, or body-constituents, spoken of above there are ten upa-dhatus, which are counted by Bhoja as sir a, snayu, ovarial blood and the seven layers of skin 1 . Caraka says in vi. 15. 15 that from rasa is also produced milk, and from milk ovarial blood; again, the thick tissues or ligaments (kandara) and sir as are produced from blood, and from flesh are produced fat (vasa) and the six layers of skin, and from fat {medas) are produced the five tissues. The chyle, or rasa, becomes tinged with red by the heat of bile. The blood, again, being worked upon by vayu and heat, becomes steady and white, and is called fat {medas). The bones are a conglomeration of earth, heat and air and therefore, though produced from flesh and fat, are hard. They are made porous by vayu running through them, and the pores are filled in by fat, which is called marrow. From the oily parts of marrow, again, semen is produced. Just as water percolates through the pores of a new earthen jug, the semen percolates through the pores of the bones, and there is also a flow of this seminal fluid through the body by way of its own ducts. By the rousing of desires and sex joy and by the heat of the sex act the semen oozes out and collects in the testes, from which it is ultimately liberated through its proper channel 2 .

1 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhita, vi. 15. 14 and 15, a quotation from Bhoja. Ojas is counted as an upa-dhatu.

2 Caraka-samhita, VI. 15. 22-29.

Vayu, Pitta and Kapha.

The qualities of the body are briefly of two kinds, those which make the system foul, the mala, and those which sustain and purify the body, the prasada. Thus in the pores of the body are formed many undesirable bodily growths which seek egress; some constituents of the body, such as blood, are often turned into pus; the vayu (air), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm or lymph) may become less or more than their normal measure (prakupita), and there are other entities which, existing in the body, tend to weaken or destroy it; these are all called malas. Others which go towards the sustenance and the growth of the body are called prasada 1 .

But vayu,pitta and kapha are primarily responsible for all kinds of morbidities of the body, and they are therefore called dosa. It must, however, be noted that the vayu, pitta and kapha and all other malas, so long as they remain in their proper measure (svamana), do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases. So even malas like vayu,pitta and kapha, or sweat, urine, etc., are called dhatus, or body-constituents, so long as they do not exceed their proper measure, and thus instead of weakening the body they serve to sustain it. Both the mala-dhatus and the prasada-dhatus in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining the body 2 . When various kinds of healthy food and drink are exposed in the stomach to the internal fire of the digestive organs, they become digested by heat. The essential part of the digested food is the chyle (rasa), and the impurities which are left out and cannot be assimilated into the body as its constituents are called kitta or mala. From this kitta are produced sweat, urine, excreta, vayu, pitta, slesman and the dirt of ear, eye, nose, mouth and of the holes of the hairs of the body, the hair, beard, hair of the body, nails, etc. 3 The impurity of food is excreta and urine, that of rasa is phlegm (kapha), that of flesh bile (pitta) and that of fat (medas) sweat 4 . This view of vayu, pitta and kapha seems to indicate that these are secretions, waste-products (kitta), like the other vVaste-products of the body. But the theory of waste-products is that, when they are in their proper measure, they serve to sustain the body and perform important functions, but, when

1 Caraka-samhitd, iv. 6. 17.

2 evam rasa-malau sva-pramdndvasthitav dsrayasya sama-dhator dhdtu-sdm-yam anuvartayatah {ibid. 1. 28. 3).

3 Ibid. 1. 28. 3. * Ibid. vi. 15. 30.

they exceed the proper limit or become less than their proper measure, they pollute the body and may ultimately break it. But of all waste-products vayu, pitta and kapha are regarded as being fundamentally the most important entities, and they sustain the work of the body by their mutual co-operation in proper measure, and destroy it by the disturbance of balance due to the rise or fall of one, two or all three of them.

As has already been said, the body is composed of certain constituents, such as rasa and rakta. The food and drink which we take go to nourish the different dhatus. Not all the food and drink that we take, however, can be absorbed into the system, and consequently certain waste-products are left 1 . The question arises, what is it that sustains the system or breaks it? It has already been noticed that the due proportion of the dhatus is what constitutes the health of the body. This due proportion, however, must, as is easy to see, depend on the proper absorption of food and drink in such a way that each of the dhatus may have its due share and that only, neither less nor more. It is also necessary that there should be a due functioning of the causes of waste or accretion, working in a manner conducive to the preservation of the proper proportion of the constituents with reference to themselves and the entire system. Deficiency or excess of waste-products is therefore an invariable concomitant of all disturbances of the balance of dhatus, and hence the deficiency or excess of waste-products is regarded as the cause of all dhatu-vaisamya. So long as the waste-products are not in deficiency or excess, they are the agents which constitute the main working of the system and may themselves be therefore regarded as dhatus. It is when there is excess or deficiency of one or more of them that they oppose in various ways the general process of that working of the system and are to be regarded as dosas or polluting agents. There are various waste-products of the body; but of all these vayu , pitta and kapha are regarded as the three most important, being at the root of all growth and decay of the body, its health and disease. Thus

1 Jsarrigadhara (iv. 5) counts seven visible waste-products which are different from the three malas referred to here as vayu, pitta and kapha. These are (1) the watery secretions from tongue, eyes and cheeks, (2) the colouring pitta, (3) the dirt of ears, tongue, teeth, armpits and penis, (4) the nails, (5) the dirt of the eyes, (6) the glossy appearance of the face, (7) the eruptions which come out in youth, and beards. Radhamalla, in commenting on this, refers to Caraka-samhita, vi. 15. 29-30, in support of the above passage of Jsarrigadhara. Most of the malas are chidra-malas, or impurities of the openings.

Atreya says in answer to Kapyavaca's remarks in the learned discussions of the assembly of the sages, "In one sense you have all spoken correctly; but none of your judgments are absolutely true. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (dharma), wealth (artha) and desires (kama) should all be equally attended to, or just as the three seasons of winter, summer and rains all go in a definite order, so all the three, vata> pitta and slesman or kapha, when they are in their natural state of equilibrium, contribute to the efficiency of all the sense-organs, the strength, colour and health of the body, and endow a man with long life. But, when they are disturbed, they produce opposite results and ultimately break the whole balance of the system and destroy it 1 ." There is one important point to which the notice of the reader should particularly be drawn. I have sometimes translated mala as "polluting agents or impurities" and sometimes as "waste-products," and naturally this may cause confusion. The term mala has reference to the production of diseases 2 . Kitta means waste-products or secretions, and these may be called mala when they are in such proportions as to cause diseases. When, however, a mala is in such proportions that it does not produce any disease, it is not a mala proper but a mala-dhatu {nirbadha-karan maladinprasamde samcaks-mahe) 3 . In another passage of Car aha (1. 28. 3), which has been referred to above, it is said that out of the digested food and drink there are produced rasa and kitta (secretion) called mala (tatrahara-prasadakhya-rasah kittam ca malakhyam abhinirvartate), and out of this kitta is produced sweat, urine, excreta, vayu,pitta and slesman. These malas are also dhatus, inasmuch as they sustain the body as much as the other dhatus, rasa or rakta, etc. do, so long as they are in their proper proportions and balance (te sarva eva dhatavo malakhyahprasadakhyas c«) 4 . Vagbhata, however, takes a different view of this subject. He separates the dosa, dhatu and mala and speaks of them as being the roots of the body. Thus he says that vayu sustains the body, contributing energy (utsaha), exhalation (ucchvasa), inspiration (nihsvasa), mental and bodily movement (cesta), ejective forces (vega-pravartana); pitta helps the body by

1 Caraka-samhitd, I. 12. 13.

2 tatramala-bhutas te ye sarirasyabadhakarah syuh. Caraka-samhitd, IV.6. 17.

3 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd. Compare Sarngadhara, iv. 8: vdyuh pittam kapho dosa dhatavas ca mala matah, i.e. vayu, pitta and kapha are known as dosa, dhatu and mala.

4 Also evam rasa-malau sva-pramanavasthitav dsrayasya sama-dhdtor dhdtu-s amy am anuvartayatah {Caraka-samhitd, 1. 28. 3).

digestive function, heat, the function of sight, imagination (medha), power of understanding (dhi), courage (saurya), softness of the body; and slesman, by steadiness, smoothness, by serving to unite the joints, etc. The functions of the seven dhatus, beginning with rasa, are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper functioning of the senses (prlnana or rasa), the contribution of vitality (jivana), the production of oiliness (sneha), the supporting of the burden (dharana) of the bones (asthi), the filling up of bone cavities (purana or majja) and productivity (garbhotpada of sukra); of males it is said that the excreta has the power of holding the body, while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back 1 . The elder Vagbhata distinguishes the dhatus from vayu, pitta and kapha by calling the latter dosa (polluting agents) and the former dusya (the constituents which are polluted). He further definitely denies that the malas of dhatus could be the cause of disease. He thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to above) as being aupacarika, i.e. a metaphorical statement 2 . The body, according to him, is a joint product of dosa, dhatu and mala 3 . Indu, the commentator on the Astanga-samgraha, however, emphasizes one important characteristic of the dosas when he says that the dynamic which sets the dhatus in motion (dosebhya eva dhatunam pravrttih) is derived from the dosas, and the circulation chemical activities, oiliness, hardness, etc. of the chyle (rasa) are derived from them 4 . Owing to the predominance of one or other of the dosas from the earliest period, when the foetus begins to develop, the child is said to possess the special features of one or other of the dosas and is accordingly called vata-prakrti, pitta-prakrti or slesma-prakrti. Vagbhata further says that disease is not dhatu-vaisamya, but dosa-vaisamya, and the equilibrium of dosas or dosa-samya is health. A disease, on this view, is the disturbance of dosas, and, as dosas are entities independent of the dhatus, the disturbance of dosas may not necessarily mean the disturbance of dhatus 5 . In another passage the elder Vagbhata says

1 Astdnga-hrdaya, 1. 11. 1-5.

2 tajjdn ity-upacarena tan dfiur ghrta-ddhavat rasddisthesu dosesu vyddhayas sambhavanti ye.

Astanga-samgraha, 1. 1.

3 Indu, the commentator on the Astanga-samgraha, puts it as sarlram ca dosa-dhdtu-mala-samuddyah (1. 1).

4 tathd ca dhdtu-posdya rasasya vahana-pdka-sneha-kathinyddi dosa-prasdda-labhyam eva (ibid.).

5 Ayur-veda is closely associated with the Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisesika, which alone deal with some sort of physics in Indian philosophy. It is pointed

that, as the manifold universe is nothing but a modification of the gunas, so all diseases are but modifications of the three dosas, or, as in the ocean waves, billows and foam are seen which are in reality the same as the ocean, so all the different diseases are nothing but the three dosas 1 . The elder Vagbhata uses also in another place the simile of the three gunas with reference to the three dosas. Thus he says, "As the three gunas co-operate together for the production of the world in all its diversity, in spite of the mutual opposition that exists among themselves, so the three dosas also co-operate together, in spite of natural opposition, for the production of the diverse diseases 2 ." In the treatment of the bone system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vagbhata always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka and Susruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or the other. Here also the same tendency is seen. Thus, on the one hand, he explained away as being metaphorical (aupacariki) the expressed views of Caraka that the dhalu-malas are the dosas. On the other hand, he followed the statements of the Uttara-tantra that the three dosas, the dhdtus, excreta and urine sustain a man's body. He further follows the Uttara-tantra in holding that the three dosas are the three gunas (bhinnd dosas trayo gunah). Dalhana identifies vayu with rajas, pitta with sattva and kapha with tamas 3 . In the Sutra-sthana Susruta mentions blood (sonita) as having the same status as vayu, pitta and kapha and holds that the body

out by Narasimha Kaviraja (a writer from the south) in his Vivarana-siddhdnta-cintdmani (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer) that according to Samkhya it is the dosa transforming itself from a state of equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is to be called a disease {vaisamya-sdmydvastha-bhinndvasthd-visesavad dosatvam rogatvam). The Naiyayikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity or substance, which is produced by dosa, but which is not itself a dosa (dravyatve sati dosa-bhinna-dosa-janyatvam rogatvam). So a disease is different from its symptoms or effects. Narasimha further holds that, since Caraka speaks of diseases as being fiery (dgneya) and aerial (vdyavya), he tacitly accepts the diseases as separate substances. That Caraka sometimes describes a disease as being dhdtu-vaisamya is to be explained as due to the fact that, since dhdtu-vaisamyas produce diseases, they are themselves also called diseases in a remote sense (yat tn Carakena dhdtu-vaisamyasya rogatvam uktam tat tesdm tathd-vidha-duhkha-kartrtvdd aupacdrikam. Vivarana-siddhdnta-cintdmani, MS. p. 3).

1 Astdnga-samgraha, 1. 22.

2 dramhhakam virodhe 'pi mitho yad yadguna-trayam

vis'vasya drstam yugapad vyddher dosa-trayam tathd {ibid. 1. 21).

3 rajo-bhuyistho mdrutah, rajo hi pravartakam sarva-bhdvdndm pittam sattvot-katam laghu-prakdsakatvdt,rajo-yuktam vdity eke kaphas tamo-bahulah,guru-prd-varandtmakatvdd ity dhur bhisajah. Yady evam tat katham kapha-prakrtike pumsi sattva-gunopapannatd pathitd, ucyate, guna-dvitayam api kaphe jndtavyam sattva-tamo-bahuld dpa (Dalhana on Susruta, Uttara-tantra, 66. 9).

depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations of vayu,pitta, kapha and sonita in health and disease. Dalhana, in commenting on this, says that, SuSruta's work being principally a treatise on surgery, its author holds that blood with all its impurities plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds 1 . Susruta further speaks of vata, pitta and slesman as the causes of the formation of the body (deha-sambhava-hetavah). The vata, pitta and kapha, situated in the lower, middle and upper parts of the body, are like three pillars which support the body, and blood also co-operates with them in the same work. Dalhana remarks that lata, pitta and kapha are concomitant causes, working in cooperation with semen and blood 2 . Susruta further derives vata from the root va, to move, pitta from tap, to heat, and slesman from sits, to connect together. The Sutra-sthana of Susruta compares kapha, pitta and vayu with the moon (soma), the sun (surya) and air (anild) but not with the three gunas, as is found in the supplementary book, called the Uttara-tantra. In discussing the nature of pitta, he says that pitta is the fire in the body and there is no other fire buj pitta in the body. Pitta has all the qualities of fire, and so, when it diminishes, articles of food with fiery qualities serve to increase it, and, when it increases, articles of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it. Pitta, according to Susruta, is situated between the stomach (amasayd) and the smaller intestines (pakvasaya), and it cooks all food and drink and separates the chyle on the one hand, and the excreta, urine, etc. on the other. Being situated in the above place, between the stomach and the smaller intestines (tatra-stham eva), by its own power (dtma-saktya) it works in other pitta centres of the body and by its heating work (agni-karma) sets up the proper activities at those places. In its function of cooking it is called pacaka, in its function in the liver and spleen, as supplying the colouring matter of blood, it is called "colouring" (ranjaka), in its function in the heart it serves intellectual purposes (sadhakd), in its function in the eyes it is called "perceiving," or locaka, in its function of giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called bhrajaka. It is hot, liquid and blue or yellow, possesses bad smell, and after

1 etad dhi salya-tantram, salya-tantre ca vranah pradhdna-bhutah vrane ca dusyesu madhye raktasya prddhdnyam hi sonitopdddnam (ibid.). Susruta also uses the word dosa to mean pus (puya) (i. 5. 12).

2 Susruta, 1.21. 3 and 4. Dalhana, commenting on this, writes :" sukrdrtavddi sahakdritayd deha-janakd abhipretd)}"

passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. Coming to slesman, Susruta says that the stomach is its natural place; being watery, it flows downwards and neutralizes the bile-heat, which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its excessive heat. Being in amasaya, it works in the other centres of slesman, such as the heart, the tongue, the throat, the head and in all the joints of the body. The place of vayu is the pelvic regions and the rectum (sroni-guda-samsraya) ; the main place of the blood, which is counted as dosa by Susruta, is regarded as being the liver and the spleen 1 . I have noticed above, that in the Atharva-Veda mention is found of three kinds of diseases, the airy {vatajd), the dry (susma) and the wet (abhraja) 2 . In the Caraka-samhita vata, pitta and kapha are regarded as being produced from kitta, or secretions. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the different stages of its assimilation, as chyle, flesh, etc., which have important physiological functions to perform for the preservation of the process of the growth of the body, when they are in due proportions, and they break up the body when they are in undue proportions. What exactly kitta means is difficult to determine. It may mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle, or the part of it unassimilated as blood, and so forth; or it may mean such unassimilated products, together with the secretions from the respective dhatus, which absorb the substantial part of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the unabsorbed material; this at least is what kitta ought to mean, if it is interpreted as dhatu-mala, or impurities of dhatus. These secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the constructive and destructive forces of the body. The watery character of kapha and the fiery character of pitta are not ignored; but their essence or substance is considered to be secretive, or of the nature of waste-product. Susruta, however, does not seem to refer to this secretive aspect, but he seems to have grasped the essential physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of digestion; and the analogy of cooking, as requiring fire, water and air, seems to have been well before his mind. Susruta also seems to

1 Susruta-samhita, I. u. 8-16.

2 Ye abhraja vdtaja yas ca susmo (Atharva- Veda, I. 12.3); again, agner ivdsya dahata eti susminah (ibid. vi. 20. 4).

have leant more towards the view of the physiological operations of the body as being due to elemental activities, the food-juice taking the place of earth and the other three principles being fire {pitta), water (slesman) and air (vata). The reason why the principles of the body are here regarded as being transformations of fire, water and air is not explained by Susruta. The supplementary Uttara-tantra, however, thinks that they are the three gunas. Vagbhata, always fond of taking a middle course in his endeavour to reconcile the different attempts to grasp the principles under discussion, holds that they are comparable to the three gunas, because, though opposed to one another, they also co-operate together; and, because diseases are but modifications of the dosas, he further thinks that dosas, dhatus and dhatu-malas are quite different entities; but he is unable to give any definite idea as to what these dosas are. The person who seems to have had the most definite conception of the dosas was Caraka. In the Uttara-tantra and by Vagbhata the Samkhya analogy of the gunas seems to have had a very distracting influence, and, instead of trying to find out the true physiological position of the dosas, these writers explain away the difficulty by a vague reference to the Samkhya gunas.

Let us now return to Caraka. By him vayu is described as being dry (ruksa), cold (sita), light (laghu), subtle (suksma), moving (cala), scattering everything else in different directions (visada) and rough (khara) 1 . It is neutralized in the body by those things which have opposite qualities. In the healthy constructive process the vayu is said to perform physiological functions as follows: it sustains the machinery of the body (tantra-yantra-dharah), it manifests itself as prana, udana, samana and apana and is the generator of diverse kinds of efforts; it is the force which controls (niyanta) the mind from all undesirables and directs (praneta) it to all that is desirable, is the cause of the employment of the sense-organs, is the carrier of the stimulation of sense-objects, collects together

1 Caraka-samhitd,!. i .58. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says that, though vayu is described as neither hot nor cold according to the Vaisesika philosophy, yet, since it is found to increase by cold and decrease by heat, it is regarded as cold. Of course, when connected with pitta it is found to be hot, but that is on account of its association with the heat of pitta (yoga-vahitvdt). In the Vata-kala-kallya chapter (1. 12. 4), six qualities of vata are mentioned; suksma is not mentioned, however, and, in place of cala, daruna is mentioned. Cakrapani says that daruna means the same as cala. In the same chapter (1. 12. 7) vayu is qualified as susira-kara, i.e. that which makes holes.

the dhatus of the body, harmonizes the functions of the body as one whole, is the mover of speech, is the cause of touch and sounds, as also of the corresponding sense-organs, the root of joy and mental energy, the air for the digestive fire, the healer of morbidities, the ejecter of extraneous dirts, the operating agent for all kinds of circulation, the framer of the shape of the foetus, and is, in short, identical with the continuity of life {ayuso 'nuvrtti-pratyaya-bhuta). When it is in undue proportions, it brings about all sorts of troubles, weakens the strength, colour, happiness and life, makes the mind sad, weakens the functions of the sense-organs, causes malformations of the foetus, produces diseases and all emotions of fear, grief, delirium, etc., and arrests the functions of the p ran as.

It is interesting to note how Vayorvida describes the cosmic functions of air as the upholding of the earth, causing the burning of fire, the uniform motion of the planets and stars, the production of clouds, the showering of rains, the flow of rivers, the shaping of flowers and fruits, the shooting out of plants, the formation of the seasons, the formation of the strata of minerals, the production of the power of seeds to produce shoots, the growing up of crops, etc. 1 In the same discussion Marlci considers fire to be contained in the pitta and productive of all good and bad qualities, digestion and indigestion, vision and blindness, courage and fear, anger, joy, ignorance, etc., according as it is in equilibrium or is disturbed. Kapya maintains that soma, contained in slesman, produces all good and bad qualities, such as firmness and looseness of the body, fatness, leanness, energy and idleness, virility and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, etc. 2

These discussions seem to indicate that before Atreya's treatise was written attempts were made to explain the physiological functions of the body in health and disease by referring them to the operation of one operative principle. The Chandogya Upanisad speaks of earth, water and fire as being world-principles of construction : the different vayus were known as early as the Atharva-Veda, and vayu is regarded in many of the Upanisads as the principle of life. It seems fairly certain that the theory of vdta y pitta and kapha is a later development of the view which regarded air (pavana), fire (dahana) and water {toya) as the fundamental constitutive principles of the body. Thus Susruta refers to this view

1 Caraka-samhita, 1, iz.S. 2 Ibid. i. xz. n and 12.

in in. 4.80: " Some say that the constitution {prakrti) of the human body is elemental (bhautiki), the three constitutive elements being air, fire and water 1 ." The advance of the medical schools of thought over these speculations and over others which consider the body to be a product of one bhuta or of many bhutas is to be sought in this, that, besides allowing the material causes (upadana) of the body to be the dhatus, they emphasized the necessity of admitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the development and decay of the body. This explains how vata, pitta and kapha are regarded both as dhatu and as dosa, as prakrti and as vikrti. Thus Caraka says, as has already been mentioned, that from the time of the formation of the foetus the vata, pitta and kapha are working, but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse systems, with equal vayu, pitta, mala and kapha (sama-pittanila-kaphd) or different degrees of predominance of them as vatala, pittala and slesmala 2 . Men of the slesmala type are generally healthy, whereas vatala and pittala persons are always of indifferent health. Later on, when there is a disease with the predominance of that dosa which is predominant in man's constitution from his birth, the newly collected dosa produces morbidity on the lines on which the predominating dosa of his constitution is working; but this newly collected dosa does not augment the corresponding original dosa. The original dosa is never increased, and, whatever may be the predominance of a dosa due to any disease, the constitutional condition of the dosas remains the same. Thus a vata-prakrti person does not become slesma-prakrti or pitta-prakrti, and vice-versa. The dosas which are constitutional always remain as the

prakrtim iha nardndm bhautiklm kecid ahuh pavana-dahana-toyaih kirtitds tds tu tisrah.

Susruta, in. 4. 80. 2 Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as sama-vata-pitta-slesman (or having equal vata, pitta and ilesman). Since all men take various kinds of diet (visamdhdropayogitvdt), they must be either vata-prakrti, pitta-prakrti, or slesma-prakrti. Against this Caraka says that sama-vata-pitta-slesman is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (aroga). All medicines are applied for attaining this end, and there cannot be any doubt that such a state exists. Again, the terms vata-prakrti, pitta-prakrti and slesma-prakrti are incorrect; for prakrti means health. What they mean by vata-prakrti is that vata is quantitatively predominant (ddhikya-bhdvdt sd dosa-prakrtir ucyate), and quantitative predominance is the same as vikdra; so the proper terms are vatala, pittala, etc. When a vatala person takes things which increase vata, his vata increases at once; but when he takes things which increase pitta or ilesman, these do not increase in him as rapidly as vata does. So in the case of a pittala person pitta increases rapidly when articles which increase pitta are taken, and so with regard to ilesman {Caraka-samhitd, ill. 6. 14-18).

constant part engaged in their physiological operations. The later accretion of the dosas or their deficiency has a separate course of action in producing diseases, and there is no interchange between these later collections of dosas or their deficiency and the constitutional constant parts of the dosas known as prakrti 1 . The only sense (as Cakrapani says) in which a dosa is related to a constitutional {prakrti) dosa is that a dosa grows strong in a system in which a corresponding dosa is constitutionally predominant, and it grows weaker when the opposite is the case 2 . It is not out of place in this connection to say that, though the dosas are mutually opposed to one another, they do not always neutralize one another, and it is possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a system. In the six seasons of rains (varsa), autumn (sarat), late autumn (hemanta), winter (sita), spring (vasanta) and summer (grlsma) there is an alternate collection (caya), disturbance (prakopa) and lowering down (prasama) of the three dosas, pitta, slesman and vayu respectively. Thus, for example, in the rains (varsa) there is collection of pitta, in the autumn (sarat) there is disturbance of pitta, in the harvesting season (hemanta) there is lowering of pitta and collection of slesman, in the summer there is collection of vata, and so forth 3 . Contrasting the functions of the dosas in the normal (prakrti) and abnormal (vikrti) states, Caraka says that in the normal state the heat of

1 Ibid. I. 7. 38-41. The passage prakrti-stham yadd pittam mdrutah slepnanah ksaye (I. 17. 45) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions of dosas affect the prakrti-dosas. But Cakrapani explains it differently. He says that a disease may be caused by a dosa which is not in excess of the constant constitutional quantity (prakrti-mdna) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion or excess, though the total quantity of dosa may not be in excess.

2 samanam hi prakrtim prdpya dosah pravrddha-balo bhavati, asamanam tu prdpya tatha balavan na sydt (Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd, I. 17. 62).

3 Ibid. 1.17.112. See also Cakrapani's comments on these. Dalhana, in commenting on Susruta-samhitd, I. 21. 18, says that sancaya of dosas means aggregation or accumulation in general (dehe 'tirupdvrddhis cayah) ; prakopa of dosas means that the accumulated dosas are spread through the system (vilayana-rupd vrddhih prakopah). The external signs of the caya of vata are fullness of the stomach and want of motions; of pitta yellowish appearance and reduction of heat {mandosnatd); of kapha heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. In all cases of caya there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular dosa of which there has been caya (caya-kdrana-vidvesas ca). The stage of caya is the first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. If the dosas can be removed or neutralized at this stage, there is no further disease. The usual indication of the disturbance (prakopa) of vdyu is disorders of the stomach; of pitta, acidity, thirst and burning; of kapha, aversion to food, palpitation (hrdayotkleda), etc. The prakopa of blood (sonita) is always due to the prakopa of vata, pitta or kapha. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. The

pitta occasions digestion; slesman is strength and vitality, and vayu is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings; but in the abnormal state pitta produces many diseases; slesman is the dirt of the system and the cause of many troubles, and vata also produces many diseases and ultimately death. The places (sthdndni) at which the affections of vata, pitta and kapha are mostly found are thus described by Caraka: of vata the bladder, rectum, waist and the bones of the leg, but the smaller intestine (pakvasaya) is its particular place of affection; of pitta sweat, blood and the stomach, of which the last is the most important; of slesman the chest, head, neck, the joints, stomach and fat, of which the chest is the most important. There are eighty affections of vata, forty of pitta and twenty of slesman 1 . But in each of these various affections of vata, pitta and slesman the special features and characteristics of the corresponding dosas are found. Thus Caraka in 1. 20. 12-23 describes certain symptoms as leading to a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of vata, pitta or kapha. But a question may arise as to what may consistently with this view be considered to be the nature of vayu,pitta and kapha. Are they only hypothetical entities, standing as symbols of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms, and the agents of morbidity, or the dosas, would only be convenient symbols for collecting certain groups of these symptoms under one name. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms, it is to be considered that there is disturbance of vayu; wherever there is another set of symptoms, there is disturbance of pitta, and so

third stage is called prasara. At this stage there is something like a fermentation of the dosas {paryusita-kinvodaka-pista-samavdya ivd). This is moved about by vayu, which though inanimate, is the cause of all motor activities. When a large quantity of water accumulates at any place, it breaks the embankment and flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides; so the dosas also flow, sometimes alone, sometimes two conjointly, and sometimes all together. In the whole body, in the half of it, or in whatever part the fermented dosas spread, there the symptoms of diseases are showered down, as it were, like water from the clouds (doso vikdram nabliasi meghavat tatra varsati). When one dosa, e.g. vayu, spreads itself in the natural place of another dosa, e.g. pitta, the remedy of the latter will remove the former (vdyoh pitta-sthana-gatasya pittavat pratlkdrah). The difference between prakopa and prasara is thus described by Dalhana: just as when butter is first stirred up, it moves a little; this slight movement is like prakopa; but, when it is continuously and violently stirred to flow out, in froths and foams, it may then be called prasara (Susruta-samhxtd, 1. 21. 18-32). The fourth stage is when the purva-rupa is seen, and the fifth stage is the stage of rupa or vyddhi (disease) {ibid. 38, 39). 1 Caraka-samhita, 1. 20. 11.

forth. But there are serious objections against such an interpretation. For, as we have shown above, there are many passages where these dosas are described as secretions and waste-products, which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately break up the system. These passages could not be satisfactorily explained upon the above interpretation. Moreover, there are many passages which describe pitta and kapha as entities having a particular colour and material consistency, and it is also said that there are particular places in the body where they collect, and this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are not real entities, but hypothetical, having only a methodological value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective grasp of different symptoms 1 .

The attribution of a certain number of specific qualities to the dosas is due to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the qualities of causes. So, from the diverse qualities of our bodies considered as effects, the causes were also considered as having those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. Thus, in connection with the description of the qualities of vata, Caraka says that on account of the qualities of rauksya the bodies of those having congenital vata tendency are rough, lean and small, and

1 The secretory character of these dosas is amply indicated by such passages as those which regard vata, pitta and slesman as requiring some space in the stomach for digesting the food materials, e.g. ekam punar vdta-pitta-s'lesmanam (ibid. in. 2. 3); slesma hi snigdha-slaksna-mrdu-madhura-sara-sdndra-manda-stimita-guru-sita-vijjalacchah (slesman is smooth, pleasing, soft, sweet, substantial, compact, inert, benumbed, heavy, cold, moist and transparent— ibid. in. 8. 14. 7.5); pittam usnam tiksnam dravam visram amlam katukam ca (pitta is hot, sharp and liquid, and possesses bad odour, and is acid and pungent and bitter— ibid. ill. 8. 14. 7. 6); vatas tu ruksa-laghu-cala-bahu-sighra-stta-paritsa-visadah (vata is rough, light, moving, manifold, quick; cold, coarse and scattering— ibid. III. 8. 14. 7- 7).

It must, however, be noted that the translation I have given of some of these words cannot be regarded as satisfactory; for in the translation I could only give one sense of a word, which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of senses which the word has. Thus, for example, I have translated ruksa as " rough." But it also means " slim," " lean," " having insomnia," or (of a voice) "broken," and so forth. There is no English synonym which would have so many senses. Mahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Gananatha Sen, of Calcutta, tries to divide the dosas into two classes, invisible (suksma) and visible (sthula) — Siddhanta-nidana, pp. 9-11. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made, it has not been so distinguished in the medical literature, as it is of little value from the medical point of view; it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the dosas. The nature and the functions of the dosas do not depend in the least on their visibility or invisibility, nor can the visible dosa be regarded as always the product of the invisible one.

the voices of such people are rough, weak, grating, slow and broken, and they cannot sleep well (jagariika); again, on account of the quality of lightness of vayu, the movements of a man with congenital vata tendency would be light and quick, and so would be all his efforts, eating, speech, and so forth. It is easy to see that the resemblance of the qualities of vayu to the qualities of the body is remote; yet, since the special features and characteristics of one's body were considered as being due to one or the other of the body-building agents, these characteristics of the body were through remote similarity referred to them.

There is another point to be noted in connection with the enumeration of the qualities of the dosas. The disturbance of a dosa does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited in full strength; it is possible that one or more of the qualities of a dosa may run to excess, leaving others intact. Thus vayu is said to possess the qualities of ruksa, laghu, cala, bahu, sighra, sita, etc., and it is possible that in any particular case the sita quality may run to excess, leaving others undisturbed, or so may sita and ruksa, or sita, ruksa and laghu, and so forth. Hence it is the business of the physician not only to discover which dosa has run to excess, but also to examine which qualities of which dosa have run to excess. The qualities of dosas are variable, i.e. it is possible that a dosa in its state of disturbance will remain a dosa, and yet have some of its qualities increased and others decreased. The nature of the disturbance of a dosa is determined by the nature of the disturbance of the qualities involved (amsamsa-vikalpa) 1 . The natural inference from such a theory is that, since the entities having this or that quality are but component parts of a dosa, a dosa cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. On this view a dosa appears to be a particular kind of secretion which is a mixture of a number of different secretions having different qualities, but which operate together on the same lines. When a particular dosa is in a healthy order, its component entities are in certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to

1 Caraka-samhita, 11.1. 10.4. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says:" tatra dosdndmamsdmsa-vikalpoyathd — vdteprakupite'pikaddcidvdtasyasttdmsobalavdn bhavati, kaddcil laghv-amsah, kaddcid ruksdmsah kaddcil laghu-ruksdmsah." The dosa or dosas which become prominently disturbed in a system are called anubandhya, and the dosa or dosas which at the time of diseases are not primarily disturbed are called anubandha. When three of the dosas are jointly disturbed, it is called sannipdta, and when two are so disturbed it is called samsarga (ibid. 111. 6. 11).

the total dosa. But, when it is disturbed, some of the component secretions may increase i-i undue proportions, while others may remain in the normal state; of course, the quantity of the whole dosa may also increase or decrease. A dosa such as kapha or pitta should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secretions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. It will be easily seen that, on taking into consideration the comparative strengths of the different components of a dosa and the relative strengths of the other components of other dosas and the relative strengths and proportions of each of the dosas amongst themselves, the number of combinations is innumerable, and the diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable. The whole system of Caraka's treatment depends upon the ascertainment of the nature of these affections; the names of diseases are intended to be mere collective appellations of a number of affections of a particular type 1 .

One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the constructive and destructive operations of vdyu, pitta and kapha is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a man's karma and also in unison with a man's mind. The operations of the mind and the operations of the body, as performed by vdyu, pitta and kapha on the materials of the dhdtus, rasa, rakta, etc., run parallel to each other; for both follow the order of human karma, but neither of them is determined by the other, though they correspond to each other closely. This psycho-physical parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka's system. Caraka, in trying to formulate it, says: " sarlram api satvam anuvidhlyate satvam ca sarlram" (the mind corresponds to the body and the body to the mind). It may be remembered in this connection that the ultimate cause of all dhdtu-vaisamya or abhighata (bodily injuries through accidents, a fall and the like) is foolish action (prajnd-parddhd). Again vata, pitta and kapha are found to perform not only physical operations, but also intellectual operations of various kinds. But all intellectual operations belong properly to mind. What is meant by attributing intellectual functions to vdyu, pitta and kapha seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism, mind corresponding to body, body corresponding to mind, and both corresponding to karma.

1 yad vdtdrabdhatvddi-jndnam eva karanam rogdndm cikitsdydm upakdri; ndma-jndnam tu vyavahdra-mdtra-prayojandrtham (Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd, I. 18. 53).

Head and Heart 1 .

The most vital centres of the body are the head, the heart and the pelvis (vasti). The pranas, i.e. the vital currents, and all the senses are said to depend (sritah) on the head 2 . The difference between head (sirsa) and brain (mastiska) was known as early as the Atharva-Veda. Thus in A.V. x. 2. 6 the word sirsa is used in the sense of " head," and in verses 8 and 26 of the same hymn the word mastiska is used in the sense of "brain 3 ." Head-disease is also mentioned in the Atharva-Veda ,1.12. 3, as slrsakti. The brain-matter is called mastulunga in Caraka-samhita, viii. 9. 101; the word mastiska is used in the same chapter in the sense of brain-matter (viii. 9. 80), as has also been explained by Cakrapani 4 . The passage from Caraka, viii. 9.4, quoted above shows that at least Drdhabala considered the head to be the centre of the senses and all sense currents and life currents. Cakrapani, in commenting upon this passage, says that, though the currents of sensation and life pass through other parts of the body as well, yet they are particularly connected with the head (sirasi visesena prabaddhdni), because, when there is an injury to the head, they are also injured. According to Caraka and Drdhabala all the senses are particularly connected with the head, as well as the pranas, but the heart is regarded as the vital centre of the pranas, as well as of the manas, as I shall point out later on. Bhela, who is as old as Caraka, considers the brain to be the centre of the manas, a view which is, so far as I know, almost unique in the field of Sanskrit

1 The different names of the heart in Cardka-samhitd are mahat, artha, hrdaya (1. 30. 3).

2 Cakrapani, however, explains it as sritd iva sritah, i.e. " as if they depended on" (1. 17. 12), because, when the head is hurt, all the senses are hurt. It is said in ibid. vi. 26. 1 that there are one hundred and seven vital centres (manna), and of these the three most important are the head, the heart and the pelvis. Also in viii. 9. 16, hrdi murdhni ca vastau ca nrnam pranah pratisthitdh. In viii. 9. 4 it is distinctly said that all the senses and the currents of senses and prana are dependent on the head as the rays of the sun are dependent on the sun— sirasi indriydni indriya-prdna-vahdni ca srotdmsi suryam iva gabhastayah samsritdni.

8 " Which was that god who (produced) his brain, his forehead, his hindhead (kakdtika), who first his skull, who, having gathered a gathering in man's jaw, ascended to heaven" (A.V. x. 2. 8). " Atharvan, having sewed together his head (murdhdnam) and also his heart, aloft from the brain the purifying one sent (them) forth, out of the head" (ibid. 26). (Whitney's translation, Harvard oriental series.)

4 Mastiskam siro-majjd. Cakrapani, viii. 9. 80 of Caraka-samhita. The word mastiska is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of head, as in the passage quoted by Cakrapani in viii. 9. 80— mastiske 'stdngtdam pattam.

literature. He says that manas, which is the highest of all senses (sarvendriya-param), has its seat between the head and the palate (siras-talv-antara-gatam). Being situated there, it knows all the sense-objects (visayan indriydnam) and the tastes which come near it (rasadikan samlpa-sthdn). The original cause of manas and the energy of all the senses and the cause of all feelings and judgments (buddhi), the citta, is situated in the heart. The citta is also the cause of all motor functions and activities, such that those who are possessed of good cittas follow a good course and those who are possessed of bad cittas follow a bad course. The manas knows the citta, and thence proceeds the choice of action; then comes the understanding, deciding what is worth doing and what is not. Buddhi, or understanding, is the understanding of certain actions as good (subha) and certain others as bad (asubha) 1 * It seems plain that Bhela distinguishes between manas, citta and buddhi. Of these manas is entirely different from citta and, so far as can be made out from Bhela's meagre statements, it is regarded as the cause of all cognitions and as having its seat in the brain. The citta was regarded as the cause of all activities, feelings and judgments, and the heart was regarded as its seat. Buddhi was probably the determinate understanding and judgment which was but a function of the citta. Bhela says that the dosas in the brain affect the manas, and, as a result of this, the heart is affected, and from the affections of the heart the understanding {buddhi) is affected, and this leads to madness 2 . In another passage, while describing the different functions of pitta, Bhela says that there is a special kind of alocaka pitta called the caksur-vaisesika, which, by bringing about the contact of manas with the soul, causes cognition and, transmitting it to the citta, produces the discriminative visual knowledge by which different objects are comprehended by the eye. The

1 siras-talv-antara-gatam sarvendriya-param manah tatra-stham tad dhi visayan indriydnam rasadikan.. . kdranam sarva-buddhinam cittam hrdaya-samiritam kriyanam cetarasam ca cittam sarvasya kdranam. Bhela's chapter on " Unmdda-cikitsitam." Calcutta University edition, p. 149.

2 urdhvam prakupitd dosdh siras-tdlv-antare sthitdh, mdnasam dusayanty dsu tatas cittam vipadyate citte vydpadam dpanne buddhir ndsam niyacchati tatas tu buddhi-vydpattau karydkdryam na budhyate evam pravartate vyddhir

unmddo ndma ddrunah. Ibid. p. 149.

judgmental state, however, is different, and it is produced by a special kind of alocaka pitta called the buddhi-vaisesika, which is situated at the point between the eyebrows, and, being there, holds together the subtle forms emanating from the self (susuksman arthan atma-krtan), associates the data (dharayati), integrates them with other similar known facts (pratyudaharati), remembers the past, and, after producing our knowledge in conceptual and judgmental forms, wills for future realization, generates instructive actions, and is the force which operates in meditation (dhydna) and restraint of thoughts (dharana) 1 .

Susruta does not state anything of importance concerning the brain; but there seems to be little doubt that he knew that particular nerves in the head were connected with particular sense functions. Thus he says in in. 6. 28 that there are two nerves (sira) lower down the ears on their back, called vidhura, which, if cut, would produce deafness; on both sides of the nasal aperture inside the nasal organ there are two nerves called phana, which, if cut, would destroy the sensation of smell; at the back of the eyebrows, below the eyes, there are the nerves called the apanga, which, if cut, would produce blindness. All these cognitive nerves meet in passing at the centre of the eyebrow (srngataka) 2 . He further says that the nerves are attached to the brain inside the skull on the upper part of it {mastakabhyantaroparisthat sira-sandhi-sannipata) and this place, called the romavarta, is the supreme superintendent (adhipati). Caraka says that the head is the place for the senses. It cannot be decided whether he took this in any deeper sense or whether he means simply that the sense-organs of ear, eyes, nose and taste are situated in the head.

Caraka considers the heart (hrdaya) to be the only seat of consciousness 3 . The seats of prana are said to be the head, throat, heart, navel, rectum, bladder, the vital fluid ojas, semen, blood and flesh 4 . In 1. 19. 3 Caraka, however, excludes navel and flesh and includes the temples (sankha) in their place. It is difficult to determine what is exactly meant by prana here. But in all probability the word is used here in a general way to denote the vital parts. In 1. 30. 4 and 5 Caraka says that the whole body with

1 Bhela's chapter on " Purusa-niscaya," p. 81.

2 ohrana-srotruksi-jihva-santarpamndm sirandm madhye sira-sannipatah srngd-takani. Susruta-samhitd, in. 6. 28.

3 Caraka-samhita, IV. 7. 8, hrdayam cetanddhifthanam ekam. 1 Ibid. 9.

the four extremities, the trunk, and the head, collectively called sad-anga, knowledge (vijrlana), the senses, the sense-objects, the self, manas and the objects of thought (cintya), are all supported (samsrita) by the heart, just as a house is supported by pillars and rafters 1 . It is plain, as Cakrapani explains, that the body cannot subsist in the heart. What is meant is that, when all is well with the heart, it is well with all the rest. Caraka holds that the manas and the soul reside in the heart and so also do cognition, pleasure and pain, not, however, in the sense that the heart is the place where these reside, but in the sense that they depend on the heart for their proper functioning; if the heart is wrong, they also go wrong, if the heart is well, they also work well. Just as rafters are supported by pillars, so are they all supported by the heart. But Cakrapani does not seem to agree with this view of Caraka, and he holds that, since the heart is affected by strong thoughts, pleasure and pain, the mind and the soul actually reside in the heart and so do pleasure and pain. The self, which is the cause of all knowledge of sense-objects and the upholder (dhartn) of the system, resides in the heart. It is for this reason that, if a man is struck in the heart, he swoons away, and, if the heart bursts, he dies. It is also the place of the supreme vitality (param oj'as) 2 . The heart is also regarded as the place where all consciousness is concentrated {tatra caitanya-samgrahaK). Caraka says that the heart is the centre of the prana currents (prana-vahanam srotasam hrdayam mulam, ill. 5. 9) and also of the currents of mental activity (11. 7. 3). In the Apasmara-nidana (11. 8. 4) Caraka speaks of the heart as being the supreme place of the inner self {antar-atmanah srestham ayatanam).

It may not be out of place here to point out that the Taittirlya Upanisad{\. 6. 1) also speaks of the heart as being the space where

1 Caraka-sainhita, I. 30. 5.

2 Cakrapani says that the mention of param ojas here proves that Caraka believed in another, aparam ojas. The total quantity of aparam ojas in the bodv is half a handful Utrdhanjali-parimana), while that of param ojas is only eight drops of a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. The dhamams of the heart contain half a handful of aparam ojas, and in the disease known as prameha (urinary disease) it is this ojas that is wasted; but even with waste of this ojas a man may live, whereas with the slightest waste of the param ojas a man cannot live. Ojas ought not to be regarded as the eighth dhatu; for it only supports (dhdrayati) the body, but does not nourish it. Ojas, however, is sometimes used also in the sense of rasa (Caraka-samhita 1. 30. 6, Cakrapani's commentary). See also ibid. 1. 17. 74 and 75 and Cakrapani's comment on the same. Ojas is, however, regarded in the Atharva-Veda, 11. 17, as the eighth dhatu.

manomaya purusa, i.e. the mind-person, resides. In many other Upanisads the heart is the centre of many nadis, or channels 1 . Sankara, in explaining Brh. n. i. 19, says that the nadis or siras, called hita, which are developed out of the food-juice and are 272,000 in number, emanate from the heart and spread over the whole body (purltat) 2 . The buddhi resides in the heart and from there controls the external senses. Thus, for example, at the time of hearing in the awakened state the buddhi passes through these nadis to the ear and from there expands the auditory organ and superintends it. When the buddhi thus expands, we have the state of awakening, when it contracts, the state of deep sleep (susupti).

The Circulatory and the Nervous System.

The names sira (also hira) and dhamani, of two different kinds of channels in the body, seem to have been distinguished at a period as early as the Atharva-Veda z . The Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad describes the hita nadis of the heart as being as fine as a thousandth part of a hair, and they are said to carry white, blue, yellow and green liquids; Sankara, commenting on this, says that these various colours are due to the various combinations of vata, pitta and slesman which the nadis carry 4 . He states that the seventeen elements (five bhutas, ten senses, prana and antahkarand) of the subtle body, which is the support of all instinctive desires, abide

1 See Brh. n. i. 19, IV. 2. 2 and 3, IV. 3. 20, iv. 4. 8 and 9; Chand. vm. 6. 6; Katha, vi. 16; Kaus. iv. 19; Mund. n. 2. 6; Maitrl, Bibliotheca Indica, 1870, vi. 21, vii. 11; Prasna, in. 6 and 7.

2 The word purltat means principally the covering of the heart. But S*ankara takes it here to mean the whole body.

3 satam hirdh sahasram dhamanir uta. Atharva-Veda, vii. 36. 2. Sayana explains hira as garbha-dhdrandrtham antar-avasthitdh silksmd nddyah and dhamanl as garbhdsayasya avastambhika sthiild nddyah. Atharva-Veda, 1. 17. 1, 2, also seems to distinguish hira from dhamanl. In 1. 17. 1 the hirds are described as being of red garments (lohita-vdsasah), which Sayana explains as lohitasya rudhirasya nivdsa-bhutd hi (the abode of blood) and paraphrases as rajo-vahana-nddyah. It seems, therefore, that the larger ducts were called dhamanls. In I. 17. 3 the Atharva-Veda speaks of hundreds of dhamanis and thousands of hirds.

4 Brh. iv. 3. 20, with S"ankara's commentary. Anandagiri, in commenting on the same, quotes a passage from Susruta which is substantially the same as Susruta-samhitd, III. 7. 18, to show that those siras which carry vdta are rosy (aruna), those which carry pitta are blue, those which carry blood are red, and those which carry slesman are white:

arunah sira vata-vahd nllah pitta-vahdh sirdh asrg-vahds tu rohinyo gauryah slesma-vahdh sirdh.

in these nadls. In Brhad-aranyaka, IV. 2. 3 it is said that there is the finest essence of food-juice inside the cavity of the heart; it is this essence which, by penetrating into the finest nadis, serves to support the body. It is surrounded by a network of nadis. From the heart it rushes upwards through the extremely fine hita nadls , which are rooted in the heart. Chandogya, vin. 6. 6 speaks of 101 nadls proceeding from the heart, of which one goes towards the head 1 . In Mund. 11. 2. 6 it is said that, like spokes in a wheel, the nadls are connected with the heart. Prasna, in. 6 and 7, however, says that in the heart there are one hundred nadis and in each of these are twenty-two hundred branches and the vyana vayu moves through these. The Maitri Upanisad mentions the susumna nadi proceeding upwards to the head, through which there is a flow of prana 2 . None of these passages tell us anything definite about the nadls. All that can be understood from these passages is that they are some kind of ducts, through which blood and other secretions flow, and many of these are extremely fine, being about the thousandth part of a hair in breadth. The nada, or hollow reed, is described in the Rg-Veda (vin. 1. 33) as growing in ponds and in the Atharva-Veda (iv. 19. 1) as being varsika, or "produced in the rains." This word may have some etymological relation with nadl 3 . In another place it is said that women break nada with stones and make mats out of them 4 . The word nadi is also used in the Atharva-Veda in the sense of "ducts 5 ." In Atharva-Veda, V. 18. 8 the word nadika is used

1 This passage is sometimes referred to in later literature to show that the susumna nadi, which goes towards the head, was known as early as the Chandogya Upanisad. See also Kapha, vi. 16.

2 Urdhva-gd nadl susumndkhyd prdna-samcdrinl. Maitri, vi. 21. Sayana,in his commentary on A.V. I. 17. 3, quotes the following verse:

madhya-sthayah susumndydh fiarva-pancaka-sambhavdh sdkhopasdkhatdm prdptdh sird lahsa-traydt param ardha-laksam iti prdhuh sanrdrtha-vicdrakdh.

3 Macdonell makes the following remarks in his Vedic Index, vol. 1, p. 433: "Nada is found in several passages of the Rg-Veda (1. 32, 8; 179, 4; 11. 34, 3; vin. 69, 2; x. ir, 2; 105, 4) but its sense" is still obscure. It is identified by Pischel (Zeilschrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft, 35, 717 et seq.; Vedische Studien, 1. 183 et seq.) with Nada, being explained by him in one passage (1. 32. 8). Here Caland and Henry, UAgnistoma, p. 313 would read nalatn. See also Wackernagel, Altindische Grantmatik, I. 173, as a reed boat, which is split, and over which the waters go, etc."

4 yathd nadam kasipune striyo bhindanty asmand (Atharva-Veda, VI. 138.

5).

5 In the Atharva-Veda, vi. 138. 4, the nadis are described as ducts over the testes, through which the seminal fluid flows: ye te nddyau deva-krte yayos tisthati vrsnyam te te bhinadmi{\ break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts of yours

to denote the speech organ (vak). The word dhamani is used in Rg-Veda, n. n. 8 and is paraphrased by Sayana as sound (sabda) and by Macdonell as "reed" or "pipe 1 ." If Sayana's explanations are to be accepted, then in A.V. II. 33. 6 the word snava means fine siras (suksmah-sirah) and dhamani the larger ducts (dhamani-sabdena sthiilah). In vi. 90. 5 one hundred dhamanls are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or gout (sula), and Sayana paraphrases dhamani here as nadl. In Chandogya, in. 19. 2, the rivers are said to be dhamanls {yd dhamanayas ta nddyah), and Sankara paraphrases dhamani as sira. I have already referred to the use of the word hird in the Atharva-Veda; the word is also used in the Rg-Veda 2 .

The above references show that nadis, siras (or hiras) and dhamanls were all ducts in the body, but sometimes the nadis or siras had also the special sense of finer channels, whereas the dhamanls were the larger ducts. I shall now come to Caraka: it will be found that there was not much advance towards a proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and functions.

Caraka plainly regards dhamanls, siras and srotas (secretory currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to them on account of their different functions. He says that the roots of the ten dhamanls are in the heart. These carry throughout the body the ojas, by which all people live and without which they all die. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed, and which goes to the heart at a later stage, when the heart is formed; when it is lost, life also ceases to exist; it is the essence of the body and the seat of the pranas. These ducts are called dhamanls, because they are filled with chyle from outside; they are called srotas, because the chyle, etc. which nourish the body are secreted (sravanat) out of these; and they are called sira,

made by God over your two testes, through which your semen flows). In X. 7. 15 and 16, the hollows of the seas are described as nadis {samudro yasya nddyah), and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (yasya catasrah pradiso nddyah).

1 "Dhamani, 'reed,' appears to denote 'pipe' in a passage of the Rg-Veda (11. 11. 8) and in a citation appearing in the Nirukta (vi. 24)." Vedic Index, vol. 1, p. 390. The word sira is spelt with a palatal "s" in Caraka and with a dental in the Vedas, and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter in different contexts.

2 tvani vrtram aiayanam sirasu maho vajrena sisvapah. R.V. I. 121. 11. The word diumiani is spelt with a long "l" in Caraka and with a short "i" in the A tharva- Veda .

because they go (saranat sirah) to the different parts of the body 1 . The ten dhamanis spread out in manifold branches throughout the body. In the Caraka-samhita srotas means properly the path through which the successive evolutionary products of the body-constituents (dhatus) or other kinds of secretion run and accumulate together with elements of their own types 2 . Cakrapani explains it thus: The transformation into blood takes place in connection with chyle (rasa). The coming together of rasa with blood at a different part of the body cannot take place without a path of transmission, called srotas. So the transformation of dhatus takes place through the function of this path of transmission. So for each kind of product there is a separate srotas. Vay u, pitta and kapha may be said to go about through all the srotas, though there are, no doubt, special channels for each of the three 3 . Gangadhara, however, takes the srotas as being the apertures through which the dhatus and other waste-products flow 4 . In whatever way it may be looked at, the srotas is, according to Caraka, nothing but the duct of the dhamanis. Caraka opposes the view of those who think that the body is nothing but a collection of srotas, for the simple reason that the substances which pass through these srotas and the parts of the body w r here they are attached are certainly different from the srotas themselves. There are separate srotas for the flow of prana, water, food-juice, blood, flesh, fat, bony materials, marrow, semen, urine, excreta and sweat; vata, pitta and slesman, however, flow through the body and all the channels (sarva-srotamsi ayana-bhiltant). For the supply of materials for the suprasensual elements of the body, such as manas, etc., the whole of the living body serves as a channel 5 . The heart is the root of all

1 dhmanad dhamanyah sravanat srotdmsi saranat sirah. Caraka-samhita, I. 30. 11. 2 Ibid. III. 5. 3.

3 Dosanam tu sarva-sarlra-caratvena yatha-sthfda-sroto 'bhidhdne 'pi sarva-srotamsy eva gamandrtham vaksyante. .. vdtddlndm apipradhdna bhutadhamanyah santy eva. Cakrapani's comment on ibid.

4 ahara-parindma-raso hi srotasdm chidra-rupam panthdnam vind gantum na saknoti, na ca srotas chidra-pathena gamanam vind tad-uttarottara-dhatutvena parinamati, etc. Gangadhara 's Jalpa-kalpa-taru on ibid.

5 Gangadhara, in commenting on this passage {Caraka-samhita, in. 5. 7), " tadvad atlndriyandm punah sattvddlndm kevalam cetandvac charlram ayana-bhil-tam adhisthana-bhutam ca," says, "mana dtmd srotra-sparsana-nayana-rasan'a-ghrana-huddhy-ahankdradlndm kevalam cetanavat sajlvam sarlra-sroto 'yana-bhutam adhisthana-bhutam ca." There are several passages in Caraka where we hear of mano-vaha currents (currents carrying manas); if manas, buddhi, ahankdra, etc. can all be carried in currents, they must be considered as having some material spatial existence. These manas, buddhi and ahankdra may be atlndriya, but they are not on that account non-physical.

prana channels, i.e. the channels of the prana vayw, for vayu in general moves through all parts of the body. When these are affected, there is either too much or too little respiration; the respiration may be very slow or very quick, and it is attended with sound and pain. From these signs therefore one can infer that the prana channels have been affected. The source of water channels is the palate, and the seat of thirst is in the heart (kloma) 1 . When these are affected, the tongue, palate, lips, throat and kloma become dried up, and there is great thirst. The stomach is the source of all currents carrying food, and, when these are affected, there is no desire for food, but indigestion, vomiting and the like. The heart is the source, and the ten dhamanls are the paths, of the chyle (rasa) currents. The liver and spleen are the source of blood currents. The tendons and skin are the sources of flesh currents. The kidneys are the sources of fat channels; fat and pelvis, of bone channels; the bones and joints, of marrow channels; the testes and penis, of semen channels; the bladder, the pubic and the iliac regions, of urine channels; the intestines and the rectum, of the excreta channels, and the fat and pores of hairs, of perspiration channels 2 . It is curious, however, to note that, in spite of the fact that here the siras and dhamanls are regarded as synonymous, their number is differently counted in iv. 7. 13, where it is said that there are two hundred dhamanls and seven hundred siras, and the finer endings of these are counted as 29,956. It is reasonable to suppose, in accordance with the suggestions found in theAtharva-Veda, that, though the dhamanls and siras were regarded by Caraka as having the same functions, the former were larger than the latter 3 . Garigadhara, in commenting on this passage, says that siras, dhamanls and srotas are different on account of their being different in number and of their having different functions and different appearances. It is well known that a distinction between siras and dhamanls is drawn by Su^ruta, to which I shall presently refer, but Caraka positively denies any such distinction; and this

1 Caraka-samhita, in. 5. 10. Cakrapani explains it {kloma) as hrdaya-stham pipdsd-sthdnam, and Gangadhara as the point of conjunction between the throat and the heart (kanthorasoh sandhill).

2 The synonyms for srotas given by Caraka are sir a, dhamanl, rasa-vahirii, nddi, panthd, mdrga, sarlra-chidra, sarnvrtdsamvrtani (open at the root, but closed at the end), sthdna, dsaya and niketa.

3 There is one passage of Drdhabala {Caraka-samhita, vi. 29. 23) which seems to draw a distinction between siras and dhamanls; for there, as a symptom of a disease, it is said that the siras have expanded (dydma) and the dhamanls have become contracted (sankoca).

is accepted by his commentator Cakrapani also 1 . Gangadhara is unable to point out any passage in Caraka to prove his opinion or to state more explicitly what is the difference of functions and appearances between the dhamanls and siras. In fact Gangadhara's remarks are directly borrowed from Susruta, in. 9. 3, without acknowledgment, and it is very surprising that he should not know the difference of views on this point between Caraka and Susruta and should try to support Caraka by a quotation from Susruta on the very point on which they materially differ.

Susruta refers to Caraka's view that siras, srotas and dharmanis are the same and opposes it, saying that they are different in appearance, number and functions. Dalhana, in explaining this, says that the siras carry vata, pitta , slesman, blood, etc., and are rosy, blue, white and red, whereas the dhamanls that carry sense-impressions of sound, etc. have no distinctive colour, and the srotas have the same colour as the dhatus which flow through them. Again, the principal siras are forty in number, the principal dhamanls twenty-four and the principal srotas twenty-two in number. The siras permit us to contract or expand our limbs or perform other motor functions, and they allow the mind and senses to operate in their own ways and serve also to fulfil other functions of moving rapidly (prasyandana), etc., when vdyu works in them. When pitta flows through the siras, they appear shining, create desire for food, increase digestive fire and health. When slesman passes through them, they give an oily appearance to the body, firmness of joints and strength. W T hen blood passes through them, they become coloured and filled also with the different dhatus and produce the sense-cognition of touch. Vayu, pitta, slesman and blood—any one of these may flow through any and every sir a 2 . The dhamanls are more like sensory nerves, since they carry sensations of sound, colour, taste and smell (sabda-rupa-rasa-gandha-vahatvadikam dhamanlnam). The srotas carry prana, food, water, chyle, blood, flesh and fat 3 . It is on account of their close proximity, similar functions, fineness (sauksmydi), and also because of the fact that they have been referred to in similar terms by older authorities, that they have sometimes been regarded as performing the same work, though their functions are really different 4 .

1 na ca Carake Susruta iva dhamanl-sira-srotasam bhedo vivaksitah . Cakra-pani's commentary on Caraka, in. 5. 3.

2 Susruta-samhita, in. 7. 8-17. 3 Dalhana on ibid. in. 9. 3. 4 Ibid.

Dalhana, in explaining this, says that, as, when a bundle of grass is burning, the burning of each separate blade of grass cannot be perceived on account of their contiguity, so the siras, dhamanls and srotas are situated so close to one another that it is very difficult to observe their separate functions and work. £ira, srotas , mdrga, kha and dhamanl are the general names used to denote the canals or ducts of the body 1 . It is on account of the similarity of action of all these ducts that their functions are sometimes confused.

The dhamanls start from the navel; ten proceed to the upper part of the body, ten to the lower part and four crosswise (tir-yag-gah). Those ten which go to the upper part of the body, branch out, are divided into three classes, and are thirty in number. Of these there are altogether ten for carrying vata, pitta, kapha, sonita and rasa, two for each; there are eight for carrying sabda, rupa, rasa and gandha, two for each; there are two for the organ of speech, two for making noise (ghosa), as distinguished from speech; two for going to sleep, two for being awake; two for bearing tears, two for carrying milk in women, and it is the same two dhamanls that carry the semen in men. It is by these dhamanls that the body on the upper side of the navel (e.g. sides, back, chest, shoulders, hands, etc.) is held fast to the lower part. The carrying of vata, etc. is the common quality of all these dhamanls.

Those dhamams which branch out downwards are thirty in number. They eject vata, urine, excreta, semen, menstrual blood, etc. downwards. They are connected with the place of pitta (pittasaya), draw downwards the materials not fit for being absorbed, and nourish the body with the assimilable products of digestion. The dhamanls connected with the pittasaya carry the food-juice throughout the body, as soon as it is digested by the action of heat, by supplying it to the upper circulatory dhamanls and through them to the heart, which is designated as the seat of rasa (rasa-sthdna) 2 . Ten dhamanls carry vata, pitta, sonita,

1 Thus Dalhana remarks:

akaslyavakasanam dehe namani dehinam sir ah srotamsi margah kham dhamanyah.

2 Susruta, Sarlra, IX. 7 and 8; see also Dalhana's commentary on it. The apertures of some dhamanls by which the food-juice is circulated through the body are as fine as lotus fibres, and some grosser than them, as the apertures of lotus stalks. Thus some dhamanls have very fine apertures, and others grosser apertures.

yatha svabhavatah khani mrnalesu bisesu ca

dhamanlnam tatha khani raso yair upaciyate. Ibid. ix. 10.

kapha and rasa; two, connected with the intestines, carry the food-juice; two carry water; two are connected with the bladder for ejecting urine; two are for the production of semen (sukra-pradur-bhava), two for its ejection, and it is these which regulate the menstrual flow in the case of women; two, connected with the larger intestines, eject the excreta; there are eight others which carry perspiration. It is by these dhamanis that the intestines, waist, urine, excreta, rectum, bladder and penis are held together. Each of the other four dhamanis , which go crosswise (tiryag-gah), has hundreds and thousands of branches, which, innumerable as they are, are spread all over the body, like so many windows; their mouths are at the holes of the hairs, through which perspiration goes out and which nourish the body with rasa, and through these the effective principles (virya) of oil, watery sprinklings, ointments, etc. enter the body after being acted on by bhrajaka (heat of the skin) 1 . It is again these which carry the pleasurable and painful sense-impressions of touch 2 . The dhamanis direct the five senses to the five sense-objects for their cognition. There is the cognizer (mantr) and the manas organ; the dhamanl which is connected with manas on one side and the dhamanis which carry the different sense-impressions on the other make the sense-data cognized by the self 3 . The various sensory and motor dhamanis are further named in Susruta, in. vi. 28. Down below the back of the ear there are two dhamanis, called vidhura, which, when injured, produce deafness; inside the two nostrils there are the two dhamanis called phana which, when hurt, arrest the sensation of smell. Below the eyebrows on the two sides of the eye there are the two dhamanis, called apanga, which, when hurt, produce blindness: there are also two other dhamanis, above the eyebrows and below them, called avarta, which, when hurt, also produce blindness. Susruta also speaks in this connection of a place inside

1 Susruta, Sarlra, ix. 7 and 8; see also Dalhana's commentary on it.

2 Dalhana, in commenting on this passage of Susruta, in. ix. 9, says: " fair eva mano-nugataih sukhdsukha-rupam sparsam karmdtmd grhnlte." (It is through these dhamanis, as connected by manas, that the self, as associated with the subtle body, receives the pleasurable and painful impressions of touch.)

3 pancabhibhutas tv atha panca-krtvah pancendriyam pancasu bhavayanti pancendriyam pancasu bhdvayitvd

pancatvam dydnti vindsa-kdle. Susruta, in. ix. 11.

Dalhana, in commenting on the above, says: " mantd hi sarire eka eva, mano 'py ekam eva, tena manasd yaiva dhamanl sabdddi-vahdsu dhamamsv abhiprapannd saiva dhamanl sva-dharmam grdhayati mantdram ndnyeti."

the skull on the upper part of the brain, where all the sir as have met together, as the adhipati superintendent.

In describing the siras (700 in number) Susruta says that these are like so many canals by which the body is watered and by the contraction and expansion of which the movements of the body are rendered possible. They start from the navel and branch out like so many fibres of leaves. The principal siras are forty in number; of these ten are for the circulation of vata, ten for pitta, ten for kapha and ten for rakta (blood). The siras of vata circulation again branch out into 175 siras, and the same is the case with those which circulate pitta, kapha and rakta. We have thus altogether 700 siras. When vata is properly circulated through the siras, it becomes possible for us to move our limbs without obstruction and to exercise our intellectual functions. But it should be noted that, though some siras are regarded as mainly circulating vayu or pitta or kapha, yet they all, at least to some extent, circulate all three 1 .

There are 900 snayus, and these have also holes within them (susirah), and these, as well as the kandaras, which are also but special kinds of snayus, serve to bind the joints of the body, just as the several pieces of planks are held together in a boat. Susruta also mentions five hundred muscles. The marmas are vital spots in flesh, sira, snayu and bones which are particularly the seats of prana: when persons are hurt in these places, they may either lose their lives or suffer various kinds of deformity. The srotas are again described by Susruta as being ducts, other than sira and dhamani, which start from the cavity of the heart and spread out through the body 2 . These srotas carry the currents of prana, food-juice, water, blood, flesh, fat, urine, excreta, semen and menstrual blood.

The Nervous System of the Tantras.

The nerve system of the Tantras, however, is entirely different

from that of the medical systems of Caraka and Susruta. It starts

with the conception of the spinal column (meru-danda), which is

regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of

1 na hi vatam sirah kascin na pittam kevalam tatha slesmanam va vahanty eta atah sarvavahdh smrtdh.

Susruta, in. vii. 16.

2 Susruta, Sdrlra, ix. 13:

mulat khad antaram dehe prasrtam tv abhivahi yat srotas tad iti vijneyam sira-dhamatH-varjitam.

the neck. In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve (nadi), called susumna, which is again in reality made up of three nadis, susumna, vajrd and citrini 1 . All nadis start from the root at the end of the vertebral column, called kanda, and they proceed upwards to the highest cerebral nerve-plexus, called sahasrara, and are seventy-two thousand in number. The place of the root of these nadis (kanda) is an inch above the anus and an inch below the root of the penis. If susumna is the central nerve of the spinal cord, then on its extreme right side is the ida, and then parallel to it towards the susumna are the gdndhari, stretching from the corner of the left eye to the left leg, hasti-jihvd, stretching from the left eye to the left foot, sankhini, branching on the left, kuhu (the pubic nerve on the left) and also the visvodara, the lumbar nerves. On the extreme left of it is the pingala, and between it and the susumna are the pusa, stretching from below the corner of the right eye to the abdomen, pasyanti, the auricular branch or the cervical plexus, sarasvati and varana (the sacral nerve). The sankhini (the auricular branch or the cervical plexus on the left) goes parallel to the susumna, but takes a turn in the region of the neck and passes on to the root of the left ear-holes; in another branch it passes through the inner side of the region of the forehead, where it gets joined with the citrini nadi and enters into the cerebral region. The susumna nadi is a sort of duct inside the spine, which encases within it the vajra nadi, and that again encases within it the citrini nadi, which has within it a fine aperture running all through it, which is the fine aperture running through the spinal cord 2 . This inner passage

1 But according to the Tanira-cuddmani, susumna is not inside the spinal column but outside it. Thus it says," tad-bdhye tu tayor madhye susumna vahni-samyuta ." This, however,is against the view of the Sat-cakra-nirupana , which takes susumna to be inside the passage of the spine. According to the Nigama-tattva-sara-tantra, idaand pingala are both inside the spine, but this isenti rely against the accepted view. Dr Sir B. N. Seal thinks that susumna is the central passage or channel of the spinal cord and not a separate nadi {The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 219, 226, 227). Mr Rele in his The Mysterious Kundalinl (PP- 3 5.3 6) thinks that it is anddi which is situated centrally and passes through the spinal column {meru-danda) ; but, judging from the fact that it is said to originate in the sacrum, from which it goes upwards to the base of the skull, where it joins with the plexus of a thousand nerves called brahma-cakra (cerebrum in the vault of the skull) and is divided at the level of the larynx (kantha) into anterior and posterior parts between the two eyebrows (djnd-cakra) and the cavity in the brain (Jbrahma-randhra) respectively, Rele thinks that this susumna nadi is nothing but the spinal cord.

2 iVa<ft is derived by PurnanandaYati, in his commentary on the Sat-cakra-niru-pana, from the root nad, to go, as a passage or duct (nadagatau itidhdtor nadyate gamy ate 'nayd padavyd iti nadi). Mahamahopadhyaya Gananatha Sen makes a

dm 23

within the citrinl nddl is also called brahma-nddl; for there is no further duct or nddl within the citrinl 1 . The susumnd thus in all probability stands for our spinal cord. The susumnd, however, is said to take a turn and get connected with the sankhinl in the inside region of the forehead, whence it becomes connected with the aperture of the sankhinl (sankhinl-ndlam dlambya) and passes to the cerebral region. All the nddls are connected with the susumnd. Kundalinl is a name for supreme bodily energy, and, because the channel of the susumnd, the brahma-nddl, is the passage through which this energy flows from the lower part of the trunk to the regions of the nerve-plexus of the brain, susumnd is sometimes called kundalinl', but kundalinl itself cannot be called a nerve, and it is distinctly wrong to call it the vagus nerve, as Mr Rele does 2 . The idd nddl on the left side of the susumnd outside the spine goes upwards to the nasal region, and pingald follows a corresponding course on the right side. Other accounts of these nddls hold that the idd proceeds from the right testicle and the pingald from the left testicle and passes on to the left and the right of the susumnd in a bent form (dhanur-dkdre). The three, however, meet at the root of the penis, which is thus regarded as the junction of the three rivers, as it were (trivenl), viz. of susumnd (compared to the river Ganga), idd (compared to Yamuna) and pingald (compared to Sarasvati). The two nddls, idd and pingald, are also described as being like the moon and the sun respectively, and susumnd as fire 3 . In addition to these nddls the Yogi-ydjnavalkya mentions the name of another nddl, called alambusd, making the number of the important nddls fourteen, including susumnd and counting susumnd as one nddl (i.e. including vajrd and citrinl), though the total number of nddls is regarded as being seventy-two thousand. Srikanada in his Nddl-vijndna counts the number of nddls as thirty-five millions. But, while the Tantra school, as represented in the works Sat-cakra-nirupana, Jndna-samkalinl, Yogi-ydjnavalkya, etc., regards the nddls as originating from the nerve-plexus

very serious mistake in his Pratyaksa-sarlraka when he thinks that the nddls are to be regarded as being without apertures (nlrandhra). They are certainly not so regarded in the Ayur-vedaor in the Sat-cakra-nirupana and its commentaries. In Yoga and Tantra literature the term nddl generally supersedes the term sird of the medical literature.

1 Sabda-brahma-rupdyah kundalinydh parama-siva-sannidhi-gamana-patha rupa-citrinl-nddy-antargata-sunya-bhdga iti. Purnananda's commentary on Sat-cakra-nirupana, St. 2.

8 Susumndyai kundalinyai. Hatha-yoga-pradlpikd, IV. 64.

3 Sat-cakra-nirupana, St. 1 and Yogi-ydjiiavalkya-samhitd, p. 18.

lying between the root of the penis and the anus, and while Caraka regards them as originating from the heart, Srikanada regards them as originating from the region of the navel (nabhi-kanda) and going upwards, downwards and sideways from there. Srikanada, however, compromises with the Tantra school by holding that of these thirty-five millions there are seventy-two thousand nadis which may be regarded as gross and are also called dhamanls, and which carry the sense-qualities of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound (pancendriya-gunavaha). There are again seven hundred nadis with fine apertures, which carry food-juice by which the body is nourished. Of these again there are twenty-four which are more prominent.

The most important feature of the Tantra school of anatomy is its theory of nerve-plexuses {cakra). Of these the first is the adhara-cakra, generally translated as sacro-coccygeal plexus. This plexus is situated between the penis and the anus, and there are eight elevations on it. It is in touch with the mouth of the susumna. In the centre of the plexus there is an elevation called svayambhu-linga, like a fine bud with an aperture at its mouth. There is a fine thread-like fibre, spiral in its form, attached to the aperture of the svayambhu-linga on one side and the mouth of the susumna on the other. This spiral and coiled fibre is called kula-kundalini ; for it is by the potential mother-energy, as manifested in its movement of a downward pressure of the apana vayu and an upward pressure of the prana vayu, that exhalation and inhalation are made possible and life functions operate. Next comes the svadhisthana-cakra, the sacral plexus, near the root of the penis. Next comes the lumbar plexus (mani-pura-cakra), in the region of the navel. Next is the cardiac plexus (anahata-cakra or visuddha-cakra), in the heart, of twelve branches. Next is the laryngeal and pharyngeal plexus, at the junction of the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata, called the bharatl-sthana. Next comes the lalana-cakra, opposite the uvula. Next to this is the ajna-cakra between the eyebrows, within which is the manas-cakra, the centre of all sense-knowledge and dream-knowledge, and the seat of manas, the mind-organ. Vijnanabhiksu says in his Yoga-varttika that one branch of the susumna goes upwards from here, which is the nadi for carrying the functions of manas and is called mano-vaha nadi; the Jnana-sarnkalini tantra calls it jnana-nadi. It seems, therefore, that it is through this nadi that connection is established

between the soul, residing in the brain, and the manas, residing in the manas-cakra. Sankara Mi£ra argues in his commentary on the Vaisesika-sutras, v. 2. 14 and 15, that the nadls are themselves capable of producing tactile impressions; for, had it not been so, then eating and drinking, as associated with their corresponding feelings, would not have been possible, as these are effected by the automatic functions of prana 1 . Above the ajna-cakra comes the soma-cakra, in the middle of the cerebrum, and finally, in the upper cerebrum, there is the sahasrara-cakra, the seat of the soul. The process of Yoga consists in rousing the potential energy located in the adhara-cakra, carrying it upwards through the aperture of the citrini or the brahma-nadl, and bringing it to the brahma-randhra or the sahasrara. This kundalinl is described as a fine fibre like a lightning flash (tadid iva vilasat tantu-rupa-svarupd), which raises the question whether this is actually a physical nerve or merely a potential energy that is to be carried upwards to the upper cerebrum in the sahasrara-cakra; and it cannot, I think, be yet satisfactorily explained. But, judging from a wide comparison of the texts, it seems pretty certain that it is the kundall sakti or the kundall energy which is carried upwards. If the kundall energy is inexhaustible in its nature, the whole discussion as to whether the adhara-cakra is depleted or not or whether the kundalinl herself rises or her eject, as raised in Sir John's Serpent Power, pp. 301-320, loses its point. How far the cakras can themselves be called nerve-plexuses is very doubtful, since the nerve-plexuses are all outside the spinal aperture; but, if the kundalinl is to pass through the aperture of the citrini nadi and at the same time pass through the cakras, the cakras or the lotuses (padma) must be inside the spinal cord. But, supposing that these nerve-plexuses represent the corresponding places of the cakras inside the spinal cord, and also because it has become customary to refer to the cakras as plexuses, I have ventured to refer to the cakras as such. But it must be borne in mind that, as the kundalinl is a mysterious power, so also are the cakras the mysterious centres in the path of the ascent of the kundalinl. A nerve-physical interpretation of them as nerve-plexuses would be very unfaithful to the texts. A more detailed discussion on these subjects will be found in the treatment of Tantra philosophy in a later volume of this work. The chief interest of the present section is only to show that the Tantra 1 See Dr Sir B. N. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 222-225.

anatomy is entirely different in its conception from the Ayur-veda anatomy, which has been the subject of our present enquiry. Another fact of importance also emerges from these considerations, namely, that, though in Drdhabala's supplementary part of the Siddhi-sthanathe head is associated with sensory consciousness, Caraka's own part refers to the heart as the central seat of the soul. But the Tantra school points to the upper cerebrum as the seat of the soul and regards the spinal cord and its lower end as being of supreme importance for the vital functions of the body.

The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry.

The theory of Rasas or tastes plays an important part in Ayur-veda in the selection of medicines and diet and in diagnosing diseases and arranging their cures. In 1. 26 of Caraka we hear of a great meeting of sages in the Caitraratha Forest, attended by Atreya, Bhadrakapya, Sakunteya, Purnaksa Maudgalya, Hiranyaksa Kausika, Kumarasiras Bharadvaja, Varyovida, the Vaideha king Nimi, Badisa and Kankayana, the physician of Balkh, for the purpose of discussing questions of food and tastes.

Bhadrakapya held that taste, or rasa, was that which could be perceived by the organ of the tongue and it was one, viz. that of water. Sakunteya held that there were two rasas, nutritive (upa-samanlya) and denutritive (chedaniya). Purnaksa held that there were three rasas, upasamaniya, chedaniya and neutral (sadharana). Hiranyaksa held that there were four rasas, sweet and good, sweet and harmful, distasteful and good, distasteful and harmful. Kumarasiras held that there were five rasas, earthy, watery, fiery, airy and ethereal (antariksa). Varyovida held that there were six rasas, heavy {guru), light (laghu), cold (sita), hot (usna), smooth (snigdha) and dry (ruksa). Nimi held that there were seven rasas, sweet (madhura), sour (amid), salt (lavana), hot (katu), bitter (tikta), pungent (kasaya) and alkaline (ksara). Badisa added one more to these, viz. unmanifested (avyakta), and held that there were eight rasas. Kankayana held that the rasas were of infinite variety and could not be counted, on account of the diversity of substances in which they are located (asraya), their specific properties as light or heavy (guna), their action in developing or reducing the constituents of the body (karma) and their diversity as apparent to the organ of taste. Atreya Punarvasu held that there are six rasas only,

sweet (madhura), acid (amid), saline (lavana), hot and pungent (katu), bitter (tikta) and astringent (kasaya). The source (yoni) of all these rasas is water. Its actions are sedative (upasamana) and denutritive (chedana), and a basis of equilibrium (sadharanatva) of the rams is reached when those having the above opposite actions are mixed together. Pleasantness (svddu) or unpleasantness (asvadu) of taste depends on liking or disliking. The seats of rasas are the essences of the five elements (panca-mahd-bhuta-vikarah) modified in accordance with five conditions, viz. (1) specific nature of the substance (prakrti); (2) as acted upon by heat or other agents (vikrti) ; (3) association with other things (vicdra) ; (4) the place in which the substance is grown (desa); (5) the .time at which it is produced (kala) 1 . The gunas of heaviness, lightness, cold, warm, moisture and dryness belong to the things to which the rasas belong. The alkaline (ksdra) should not be counted as a separate rasa, as it is made up of more than one rasa and affects more than one sense-organ; for it has at least two important rasas (of "hot and pungent" and "saline") and it affects not only the organ of taste, but also that of touch, and does not naturally belong to any substance, but has to be created by artificial processes. There is no such separate rasa which can be called unmanifested (avyakta). Water is the origin of all rasas; so all rasas may be considered as existing in an unmanifested state in water, but that is no reason why we should say that water has a separate taste called " unmanifested "; moreover, when a substance has two rasas, one dominant and the other extremely feeble, the feeble rasa may be regarded as unmanifested; or, when in a compound of different rasas, say, of a syrup, a slight hot taste is added, this may be considered as unmanifested; but certainly there is no rasa to which the name "unmanifested" (avyakta) could be given. The view that there is an infinite number of rasas is untenable; for, though it may be urged that the same rasa may occur differently in different objects, that would only go to show that there are various grades of forms of each particular rasa and not prove that with each variety of a particular rasa the rasa itself is wholly different. Again,

1 Thus mudga (a sort of kidney-bean), which is a bhuta-vikara, has the rasas of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature, though one would expect it to be heavy on account of its rasas of astringent and sweet. Vikrti is best exemplified in the case of fried paddy, which is lighter than rice. It is well known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the product. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time of plucking.

if different rasas are mixed together, the mixed rasa itself is not entitled to be counted as a separate rasa ; for its qualities are just as the sum total of the qualities of the different rasas which are its constituents, and no independent work can be attributed to this mixed rasa (na samsrstanam rasdnam karmopadisanti bud-dhimantah), as in the case of a compound of two or more substances, as mentioned above (vicara).

Though on account of the predominance of one or the other of them they are called earthy (pdrthiva), watery (dpya), fiery {dgneyd)> airy (vdyavya) or ethereal (akasatmaka), yet all substances are compounded of the five elements. All substances, whether animate or inanimate, are to be considered as medicines (ausadha), provided they are applied in the proper way (yukti) and for specific purposes (artha). A substance can be a medicine only when it is applied in the proper way and for specific purposes; nothing can unconditionally be considered a medicine. The medicative influence is exerted both by virtue of the specific agency of a substance (dravya-prabhava) and by the specific agency of its qualities, as also by their joint influence 1 . The action of medicines is called karman, its potency virya, the place where they operate adhi-karana, the time of operation kdla t the mode of operation updya, and the result achieved phala.

As regards the origin of rasas y it is suggested that water gets mixed with the five elements in the air and also after its fall on the ground. These rasas nourish the bodies of all plants and animals. All the five elements are present in all rasas; but in some rasas some of the elements predominate, and in accordance with this there are differences among the various rasas. Thus, with the predominance of soma there is a sweet taste, with the predominance of earth and fire an acid taste, with water and fire a saline taste, with air and fire, hot and pungent, with air and dkdsa, bitter, with air and earth, astringent. The different elements

1 The medicinal effect of substances may be distinguished from the medicinal effect of qualities, as when by certain stones (mani) poison may be removed or by the use of certain amulets certain diseases may be cured. Again, there may be cases where simply by the application of heat a certain disease may be cured, irrespective of the substance which possesses heat as its property. It seems that only the sense-properties and mechanical properties are here counted as gunas; other kinds of properties were considered as being due to the thing (dravya) itself. For, in addition to the sense-properties, the twenty qualities, guru, laghu, stta, usna, snigdha, ruksa, tnanda, tlksna, sthira, sara, mrdu, kathina, visada, picchila, slaksna, khara, suksma, sthula, sdndra and drava, are counted as gunas (Caraka-samhitd, I. i. 48; 1. 25. 35; 1. 26. 11).

which take part in the formation of rasas are said to be instrumental causes (nimitta-karana) of the rasas; this explains how, though fire has no rasa, yet it may help the generation of a particular rasa 1 . Destiny or unknown cause (adrsta) is, however, the general cause of such combinations of elements with water.

In the very first chapter of the Caraka-samhita, substances (dravya) are counted as being the five elements, viz. akasa, air, light, heat, water and earth, together with soul, manas, time and space. Of these those substances which possess sense-organs are called animate and those which do npt are called inanimate 2 . The gunas are the sense-properties of hearing, touch, colour, taste and smell, the mechanical and other properties which all elements have in common, such as heaviness, lightness, cold, heat, and moisture, dryness, dullness, sharpness, steadiness, mobility, softness, hardness, motion, slipperiness, smoothness, roughness, grossness, fineness, thickness, liquidity, etc., and desire, hatred, pleasure, pain and effort, intelligence (including memory), consciousness, patience, egoism, etc., distance (para), nearness (apara), combination (yukti), number, contact, disjunction (vibhaga), separateness, measure, inertia (samskara) and repetition (abhyasa). The definition of substance {dravya) is, that which possesses quality (guna) and action (karma) in the relation of inherence and is also the inseparable material cause (samavayi-kdrana) of all effects. Gunas are things which are themselves inactive and exist in dravyas in an inseparable relation of inherence. The gunas themselves cannot contain any further gunas 3 .

The above being the theory of dravya and guna, the question arises as to the way in which medicines operate in human bodies. The most general and obvious way in which the different medicmes were classified was by their different tastes, which were considered primarily to be six in number, as has already been pointed out. Each of the tastes was considered as being capable of producing certain good or bad physiological effects. Thus the sweet taste is

1 Iha ca karanatvarn bhutanam rasasya madhuratvddi-visefa eva tdmitta-kdranatvam ucyate. Cakrapani on Caraka, 1. 26. 38.

2 Caraka-samhita, 1. 1. 47. Even trees were regarded as being possessed of senses and therefore animated or cetana. Cakrapani says that, since the sunflower continues to turn its face towards the sun, it may be regarded as being possessed of the sense of sight; again, since the lavah (Averrhoa acida) plant fructifies through hearing the sound of thunder, the plants have auditory organs, etc.

8 Ibid. I. 1. 47, 48 and 50, with Cakrapani's commentary.

said to increase blood, flesh, fat, marrow, semen, life, to do good to the six senses, and to produce strength and colour of the body; to do good to the skin and throat, to destroy pitta, poison and maruta (morbidity of air), and to produce moistening, cold and heaviness, etc. The acid {amid) is said to rouse digestion, develop the body, and to remove vata; it is light, warm, moist, etc. The saline taste is digestive; it removes vata, secretes kapha ; and it is moist, warm, etc. And so on with the other tastes. But, of course, all these qualities cannot belong to the tastes; as has already been pointed out, the gunas cannot possess further gunas, and the tastes (rasa) are themselves gunas; so, when certain functions or properties are attributed to the rasas, they must be considered as belonging to the substances which possess those specific rasas (rasa iti rasa-yuktani dravyani) 1 .

From Susruta's statements it appears that there was a great difference of opinion regarding the relative prominence of dravya and its properties 2 . There were some who held that dravya was the most important, since dravya remained permanent, whereas rasa, etc. are always changed; so dravya is relatively permanent. Again, dravya is grasped by the five senses, and not its gunas. The dravya is also the support of the rasas, etc. All operations have to be done with the dravya, and the authoritative texts also speak of operations with the dravyas, and not with the rasas; the rasas depend largely on the nature of the dravyas. Others hold that rasas are the most important, since it is of them that we become directly aware when we take our food, and it is said that they remove the various morbidities of vata, etc. Others hold that the potency (virya) of things is the most important, since it is by their potency that medicines act 3 . This potency is of two kinds, hot (usna) and cold (sita); some think that it is of eight kinds, hot (usna), cold (sita), moist (snigdha), dry (ruksa), moving (visada), slippery (picchila), soft (tnrdu) and sharp (tlksna). Sometimes potency or vlrya overcomes rasa by its power and makes its own tendencies felt; thus, though sugar-cane ought to remove vata on account of its sweetness, it really increases it on account of its being sita-vlrya (of cold

1 Caraka-samhitd, I. 26. 39, Cakrapani's commentary.

2 Susruta, Sutra-sthdna, 40.3. Dravya is denned by Susruta as kriyd-gunavat samavdyi-kdranam .

3 ihausadha-karmdni urdhvddho-bhdgobhayabhdga-samsodhana-samsamana-samgrdhakdgni-&paina-prapidana-lekhana-vnnhana-rasdyana-vdjikarana-svaya-thukara-vilayana-dahana-ddrana-mddana-prdnaghna-visa-prasamandni vlrya-prddhanydd bhavanti. Susruta, 1. 40. 5.

potency) 1 . Others say that the rasa, as digested by the stomach (paka), is most important, since things can produce good or bad effects only when they are digested. Some hold that each rasa remains unchanged by digestion, though according to others there are only three kinds of rasa resulting from digestion or paka, viz. sweet, acid and hot (katu); whereas Susruta held that there were only two kinds of rasa resulting from digestion, viz. sweet and hot; for, in his view, acid was not the result of digestion {atnlo vipako nasti). According to Susruta it is the pitta which is turned into acid. Those objects which have more of earth and water in them are turned into sweet taste, whereas those which have tejas, air and akasa as their ingredients are turned into hot taste (katu).

Speaking of the differences of view regarding the relative importance of dravya, rasa, vlrya and vipaka, Susruta says that they are all important, since a medicine produces effects in all those four ways according to its ow r n nature 2 . The view of Susruta, as explained by Cakrapani in the Bhanumati, seems to be that food, drink and medicine are all products of the five maha-bhutas, and rasa, vlrya and vipaka are dependent on the dravya and are like its potency (sakti), through which it works 3 . Cakrapani, commenting on this in the Bhanumati, says that even in those cases where certain rasas are said to remove or increase certain morbidities (dosa) it is only because of their importance that they are so described; the real agent in all such cases is the dravya, since the rasa, etc. are always dependent on the dravya. Apart from the sakti as manifested in rasa, etc., the dravya also operates by itself in an unthinkable way (acintya), which is also called prabhava and which is comparable with the attractive force exerted by magnets on iron. The dravya by itself is thus differentiated from its sakti, and it is said to have a peculiar operative mode of its own, as distinguished from that of its sakti or potency, as manifested in rasa, vlrya or vipaka, and this mode of operation is considered to

1 etani khalu vlrydni sva-bala-gunotkarsdt rasam abhibhuydtma-karma kurvanti. Susruta, ibid. The vlrya is said to remain both in the dravya and in the rasa. Thus in Susruta, 1. 40.5-8, it is said that, if in those rasas which remove vdta there is dryness (rauksya), lightness (Idghava) and cold (saitya), then they will not remove vdyu ; so, if in those which remove pitta there is sharpness (taiksnya), heat (ausnya) and lightness (laghutd), then they will not remove pitta, and so on.

2 caturnam api sdmagryam icchanty atra vipascitah. Susruta, 1. 40. 13.

8 dravya-iakti-rupakd rasa-vlrya-vipdkd yathd-yogam nimitta-karanatam samavdyi-kdranatdm vd bhajanto na kartrtayd vyapadisyante dravya-pard-dhlnatvat. Bhanumati, 1. 40. 13.

be quite unthinkable (acintya) as to the way in which it operates 1 . Thus some medicines operate by rasa, some by vipdka, or the rasa resulting from the digestive operation (e.g. sunthi, which, though hot in taste and hot in virya, is sweet after digestive operation), some by virya (e.g. kulattha, though pungent, yet removes vayu on account of its hot virya), some by both rasa and vipdka, some by dravya-prabhdva, virya and rasa, some by dravya-prabhdva, virya, rasa and vipdka.

Caraka, however, differs from Sugruta in this view of drayva and rasa, virya and vipdka; for, according to him, rasa, virya and vipdka, themselves being gunas, cannot possess further gunas. He does not admit a sakti as different from the dravya. Thus in the case of prabhdva, while Susruta holds that it is a specific sakti, or the thing operating in unaccountable ways, Caraka thinks that this sakti is identical with the thing itself. Thus Cakrapani in explaining Caraka-samhitd, 1. 26. 72, says, " saktir hi svarupam eva bhdvdndm, ndtiriktam kincid dharmdntaram bhdvdndtn" (potency is the nature of things and is no separate property distinct from them). Virya in its general sense means "the potency or power of medicines to produce effects," and as such includes within it both rasa and vipdka ; but, since these have special names, the term virya is not applied to them 2 . Apart from this there is special virya in a technical sense (pdribhdsika). In the view which considers this virya to be of two kinds, snigdha and ruksa, these are to be taken as specific characteristics; but in the view which considers the virya to be of eight kinds, these are to be taken as a different set of characteristics of dravya or substance 3 . This virya is believed to be more powerful than rasa, so that, when the virya and rasa of a thing come into conflict, it is the virya which predominates and not the rasa.

Vagbhata junior makes some remarks in support of the name virya, as given to the characteristics which go by that name. He says that, since the virya characteristics of things remain unchanged even after digestion, and since the things are primarily

1 dravyam dtmand saktyd prabhdvdkhyayd dosam hanti.. .atra dravya-sakti-kdryoddharanamyathdkarsaka-manir loha-salyam dkarsati. Bhanumatl, 1.40.13.

2 tasya pdkasya tad-rasasya vipdkasya ca prthan-nirdesdn na vlrya-vyavahdrah sdstre.. .Carake tu sdmdnya-vlrya-sabdena te *pigrhltdh. Ibid. I. 40. 5.

8 yada dvividham vlryam tadd snigdha-ruksddlndm.. . rasddi-dharmata-yaiva kdrya-grahanam vaksyati hi madhuro rasah snigdha ity ddi astavidha-vlrya-pakse tu.. .balavat-kdrya-kartrtva-vivaksayd vlryatvam iti sthitih. Ibid. 1.40. 4-

in use for medical purposes and each of them would include many substances and rasas, this character justly deserves to be called virya, or the potency-in-chief for producing medical effects 1 . He further says that rasa is baffled by vipaka, that rasa and vipaka can baffle virya, if they work in the same direction, and that they may all be baffled by prabhava. These remarks, however, are true only in those cases where rasa, virya and vipaka exist in the same proportion, and it must be borne in mind that some objects may have rasa of such a predominant type that it may overcome the vipaka or the virya 2 . As regards the relative priority of virya and vipaka, Sivadasa in commenting on Cakrapani's Dravya-guna-samgraha says that virya is prior to vipaka; and this would imply that, as virya can supersede rasa, so vipaka may supersede virya. If we look back to the earliest history of the development of Indian medical ideas in the Atharva-Veda, we see that there were two important classes of medicines, viz. the amulets, manis and water. Atharva-Veda, 1. 4.4,1. 5,1. 6,1. 33, vi. 24,-vi. 92, etc. are all in praise of water as medicine, and water is regarded there as the source of all rasa or taste. Thus from the earliest times two different kinds of medicines were used. Of these the amulets were more or less of a miraculous effect. It was not possible to judge which kind of amulet or mani would behave in which way; their mode of operation was unthinkable (acintya). It is easy to see that this mode of operation of medicines was what was considered a prabhava by Caraka and Susruta. With them prabhava means the mysterious operation of a medicine acting in an unaccountable way, so that, though two medicines might be exactly similar in rasa, virya and vipaka, they might behave differently with regard to their medicinal effects 3 . Such an effect was thus naturally considered as unthinkable. But the analogy of the old manis was fresh in the minds of these medical thinkers when conceiving this prabhava, and it was in reality an extension of that idea to other unaccountable effects of medicines 4 . As none of the chemical effects

1 Astanga-hrdaya, 1. 9. 15. 2 Ibid. 1. 28.

3 rasa-vlrya-vipdkdnam samanyam yatra lak$yate visesah karmanam caiva prabhdvas tasya ca smrtah. Caraka-samhita, I. 26. 69. Cakrapani, in commenting on this, says, " rasddi-kdryatvena yan ndvadhdrayitum sakyate kdryam tat pra-bhdva-krtam iti sucayati; ata evoktam'prabhavo 'cintya ucyate' rasa-vlrya-vipdka-taydcintya ity arthah."

* manlnam dharantyandm karma yad vividhatmakam, tat-prabhdva-krtam te§am prabhavo 'cintya ucyate. (The various actions of amulets are to be considered as being due to a prabhava which is unthinkable— ibid. 1. 26. 72.)

(in the modern sense) of medicines on human organs were known, the most obvious way in which the medical effects of herbs, roots, etc. could be classified was on the basis of taste, and by Caraka and Susruta we are told the effects of the different rasas on the different morbidities of the body, vayu, pitta and kapha. As the main source of all diseases was unequal increase or decrease of vayu, pitta and kapha, a classification which described the rasas in such a way that one could know which rasa increased or decreased which of the morbidities was particularly useful. But it is obvious that such a classification, though simple, could not be universally true; for, though the taste is some indication of the medicinal property of any substance, it is not an infallible one. But no other mode of classification was known; it was supposed that the taste (rasa) of some substances changed altogether after digestion and that in such cases the taste which changed after digestion (paka) would be operative. Cakrapani says that in those cases where the taste on the tongue (rasa) agrees with the taste as produced after the digestive process, the effect in that direction becomes very strong, but in the case where the latter differs from the former the operation of rasa becomes naturally weak, because the force of the taste produced by the final operation of the digestive process is naturally strong 1 . Caraka thought that there were only three rasas as the result of digestion, viz. katu, madhura and amla; Susruta rejected the last, as has already been described. But even this was not sufficient; for there were many other effects of medicine which could not be explained on the above suppositions. In explaining this, the theory of vlrya was introduced. In addition to taste substances were considered to possess other properties of heat and cold, as judged by inference, tactual properties of slipperiness, movement, moisture and dryness, etc., sharpness, etc. as manifested by odour, and these were supposed to produce effects in supersession of rasa and vipaka. It was only in the cases where no sensible data of any kind could be found to indicate the medical properties of the thing that the idea of prabhava was introduced. The chapters in Ayur-veda on dravya

1 Cakrapani on Caraka, i. 26. 65. Cakrapani points out that the hot (katu) taste is at first useful in cleaning the phlegm of the throat, but, since it becomes sweet after digestion, it acts as a nutrient (vrsya). But, except in the case of such local actions, it is difficult to understand why the rasa which was altered by digestion should have any such effect as CakrapSni suggests (viparyaye tu durbalam iti jneyam).

and guna deal with the enumeration of prabhava and also of rasa, vipdka and virya wherever there is a divergence among them, as determined by empirical observation. This is very necessary not only for the selection of medicines and diet in the cure of diseases, but also for prevention of diseases. It is well to remember that many diseases were supposed to arise through eating together things which are opposed to each other in rasa, vipaka or virya.

The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories.

Caraka in the eighth chapter of the Sutra-sthana counts the senses as being five in number. Though both the Samkhya and the Vaisesika systems, to which Ayur-veda is largely indebted for its philosophical ideas, admit manas, or mind-organ, as a separate sense (indriya), Ayur-veda here differs from them and, as Cakrapani says, separates manas from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other senses (caksur-adibhyo 'dhika-dharma-yogitaya) 1 . Caraka himself, however, in another place speaks incidentally of a sixth sense {sad-indriya) in connection with the description of sweet taste 2 . Manas is, however, here described as transcending the senses {atindriya). Cakrapani, in explaining the atlndriya character of manas, says that it is called atindriya because it is not a cause of the knowledge of external objects like the other senses. Manas is, indeed, the direct cause of pleasure and pain, but it is the superintendent of all the senses (adhisthayaka). Manas is also called sattva and cetas. The self is, however, the permanent subject of all acts of consciousness (cetana-pratisandhata). When the manas comes into contact with its objects, viz. pleasure or pain or the objects of thought, and the self makes an effort at grasping these objects, then there is a movement on the part of manas, by which it feels pleasure or pain, or thinks the objects of thought, or moves the sense-organs. Thus, when the self makes an effort and the objects of pleasure or pain or thought are present, then the manas turns to these as its objects and moves the senses, and the senses, guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their knowledge.

1 Cakrapani's commentary on Caraka-samhita, 1. 8. 3.

2 Caraka-samhita, 1. 26. 41, tatramadhuro rasah...sad indriya-prasadanah.

The one manas appears as diverse on account of the diversity of its objects of thought (e.g. the mind may sometimes take religious thoughts and appear religious and at other times take lustful thoughts and appear lustful), diversity of sense-objects with which it is associated (e.g. the mind may grasp colour, smell or sound, etc.), and diversity of ways of imagination (e.g. "This will do good to me" or "This will do me harm," etc.). In the same man the mind may sometimes appear as angry, ignorant or virtuous. But in reality the manas is one and the same for each person; all these differences do not appear at the same time with the same person, as might have been the case if there were many minds for one and the same person. Moreover, the manas is atomic; for otherwise many different objects or functions could be performed by one and the same manas at the same time.

It may be asked, if one and the same manas can show different kinds of moral propensities, sattva, rajas or tamas, how can any person be characterized as sattvika, rajasika or tamasikal The answer is that a man is called sattvika, rajasika or tamasika according as predominance of one or other of these gunas is observed in that man.

Manas is supposed to move the senses, which are constituted of akasa, air, light, heat, water and earth; and the seats of the senses are the physical sockets of the eye, the ear, the nostrils, the tongue and the skin. The five sense-cognitions are produced through the contiguity of the senses, the sense-objects, manas and soul. They are short-lived {ksanika), but not exactly momentary, as the Buddhists would like to have them 1 . They also are of determinate nature (niscayatmikah). As Cakrapani says, it is quite possible for transitory sense-cognitions to give a determinate report of their objects. Though all the senses are made up of the five elements, yet those senses which contain any element in a preponderating degree were conceived as made up of that element. The sense that has a particular element in a preponderating degree is regarded as having by virtue of that a special capacity for grasping that particular element 2 .

The connection of the body, me senses, the manas and the self

1 Cakrapani's commentary on Caraka-sanihitd, i. 8. n. Kfanikd ity dsutara-vinasinyah na tu bauddha-siddhantavad eka-ksandvasthayinyah.

2 tatra yad-yad-dtmakam indriyam visesdt tat-tad-dtmakam evdrtham anu-grhrfdti tat-svabhdvdd vibhutvdc ca. (Caraka, i. 8. 14.)

is called life (jivita) 1 . The self is everywhere regarded as the agent which unites the acts of consciousness (jnana-pratisandhata). Cakrapani says that, since the body is momentary (sarirasya ksanikatvena), it may be argued that the union of the self with the body is also momentary. The answer that Cakrapani gives to such an objection is that, though the body is momentary, yet, since the momentary bodies are repeated in a series, the series as a whole may be looked upon as one; and, though the union of the self with each term of the series is momentary, yet, since the series may be looked upon as one, its union with the self may also be regarded as one (santana-vyavasihito 'yam ekataya ucyate) 2 . In another place Caraka says that the manas, the self and the body are connected together like a tripod, on which life rests; if any one of the components is missing, the unity is broken 3 .

It has already been pointed out that, according to Caraka, the self is active and that by its activity the mind moves; and it is by the operation of mind that the senses move. The self is also regarded as being cetana (conscious). But this consciousness does not belong to the self in itself, it is attained only by its connection with the senses through manas*. It is, however, necessary to note that apart from this self there is, according to Caraka, another transcendent self (parah atma), different from the self which participates in the union of the body and the senses (which is also technically called the samyogi-purusa) 5 . The subtler, or transcendent, self is unchangeable (nir-vikara). Knowledge implies a process and a change, and this self manifests consciousness only in those parts where it becomes associated with manas and the senses. Thus, though the self is eternal, yet the rise of consciousness in it is occasional. The unchangeableness of the self consists in its being able to unite with itself its past and future states 6 . If the self were not permanent, it could not unite with itself all its past experiences. The sufferings and enjoyment

1 Caraka, 1. 1. 41. The other synonyms of life are dhari, nityaga and anubandha. 2 Ibid. 1. 1. 41.

s sattvam atma sarlram ca trayam etat iri-dandavat

lokas tisthati samyogdt tatra sarvam pratisthitam. Ibid. 1.1. 45.

* idam eva cdtmanas cetanatvam, yad indriya-samyoge sati jndna-sdlitvam, na nikrstasydtmanas cetanatvam. Cakrapani on Caraka, I. 1. 47.

5 mrvikarah paras tv atma satva-bkuta-gunendriyaih. Caraka, 1. 1. 55. tena sattva-sarlrdtma-melaka-rupo ya dtma-sabdena ucyate tarn vydvartayati. Cakrapani on the above.

* nityatvam cdtmanah purvdpardvasthdnubhutdrtha-pratisandhdndt. Cakrapani on Caraka, 1. 1. 55.

that affect us should not be attributed to the self, but to manas (drsyamana-ragadi-mkaras tu manasi).

The special feature of this view of self is that it is permanent and unchangeable; this self seems to hold within it all the individual egos which operate in association with their respective senses, manas and body. It becomes endowed with consciousness only when it is in association with the senses. Pleasure, pain and the movements involved in thought-processes are attributed to manas, though the manas is also considered to derive its activity from the self. The states of consciousness that are produced are all united in the self. The self, thus diverted in its subtler aspect from the senses and manas, is eternal and unchangeable, whereas in its aspect as associated with manas and the senses it is in the sphere of change and consciousness. This view is therefore different from those of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy.

It is well to note in this connection that the Caraka-samhita begins with an enumeration of the Vaisesika categories, and, though it often differs from the Vaisesika view, it seems to take its start from the Vaisesika. It enumerates the five elements, manas, time, space and self as substances (dravya) ; it enumerates the gunas, such as the sensible qualities, the mechanical or physical qualities given in the list beginning with heaviness (gurv adayah), intelligence (buddhi), and those beginning with remoteness (para) and ending with effort (prayatna). But what is this gurv adi list? There is no such list in the Vaisesika-sutras. Cakrapani, however, refers to an enumeration given in a later chapter (1.25. 35) by Caraka, where however these gunas are not enumerated as belonging to all substances, but only to the food and drink that we take 1 . But the list referred to as par adi (beginning with paradi) prayatnanta (ending in prayatna) is not to be found anywhere in the Caraka-samhita. This may be a reference to the Vaisesika-sutra, 1. 1. 6 2 . But, if this is so, it leaves out a number of other gunas enumerated in the Vaisesika-sutra which were counted there in the paradi list 3 . Caraka himself gives a list of gunas beginning with para which includes some of those gunas included in the Vaisesika-sutra already

1 dhdratvam dhdrasyaikavidham arth.dbh.eddt sa punah...vimsati-gtino guru-laghu-s'ltosna-snigdha-ruksa-manda-tlksna-sthira-sara-mrdu - kathina - vis'ada -pic-cMla-slaksna-khara-suksma-sthula-sdndra-dravanugamat. Caraka-samhita, 1.5.35.

2 paratvaparatve buddhayah sukha-duhkhe icchd-dvesau prayatnas ca gundh. Vaisesika-sutra, 1. 1.6.

3 rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsah samkhyd-parimdndni prthaktvam samyoga-vibhdgau paratvaparatve. Ibid.

d ii 24

referred to and some more. The gunas enumerated are para, apara, yukti, samkhya, samyoga, vibhdga, prthaktva, parimana, samskara, and abhydsa 1 . Para means "superiority" or "importance" (pra-dhdnd), apara means "inferiority" or "unimportance" (apra-dhana). This importance or unimportance is with reference to country, time, age, measure, the rasa resulting from digestion (paka), potency (vlrya) and taste (rasa). Thus, a dry country is called para and a marshy one apara; the rains (visarga) of early and late autumn (sarat and hemanta) are called para, whereas the season of drought (winter, spring and summer) is called apara; with reference to paka, virya and rasa, para and apara mean "suitability " and "unsuitability "—that which is suitable to one is para and that which is unsuitable to him is apara. Yukti means proper selection of medicines with reference to certain diseases (dosady-apeksaya bhesajasya samiclna-kalpand); samkhya means "number"; samyoga, the mixing up or compounding of two or more substances; vibhdga, separation; prthaktva, difference. The mountains Himalaya and Meru are prthak, because they are situated in different places and cannot unite; again, even though a pig and a buffalo may meet together, they always remain different from each other; and again, in the same class, say in a collection of peas, each pea is different in identity from the other; in the last case difference in number constitutes a difference in identity; thus, wherever there is a numerical difference (anekatd) , there is difference in identity. Prthaktva thus stands for three kinds of difference, spatial difference, difference of characters and difference of identity due to numerical distinction. Parimana means measurement by weight, samskara means the production of new qualities and abhydsa means habit due to constant practice (satata-kriya). It is evident from the above that, though the terms used are the same as those used by Kanada in the Vaiiesika-sutra, yet they are mostly used in different senses in accordance, probably, with medical tradition. But this list does not end with prayatna; it seems therefore that paradi and prayatndnta stand for two different lists and should not be combined together. We have above the paradi list. The prayatndnta is a different list of gunas. It includes, as Cakrapani says, iccha (desire), dvesa (hatred), sukha

1 Paraparatve yuktis ca samkhya samyoga eva ca, vibhagas ca prthaktvam ca parimariam athapi ca, samskardbhydsa ity ete gunah jneyah parddayah. Caraka-samhitd, i. 26. 27-29.

(pleasure), duhkha (pain) and prayatna (effort). Prayatna means that particular quality by the rise of which in the soul the manas is moved to activity.

Karma (movement) is described as prayatnadi-cestitam, i.e. a movement of the nature of conscious effort; the word adi in prayatnadi is explained by Cakrapani as meaning "of the nature of 1 ."

Samavaya means the relation of inseparable inherence, as in the case of qualities and substances. Cakrapani, in explaining the nature of samavaya, says that it is eternal, so that, even when in a particular case it may disappear, it continues to exist in other cases. It is never destroyed or created anew, but only its appearance is or is not manifested in particular cases 2 . In the case of samanya and visesa, again, Caraka seems to add a new sense to the words. In the Vaisesika systems the word samanya means a class concept; but here it means the concrete things which have similar constituents or characteristics; and visesa, which means in Vaisesika ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from another, means in Caraka concrete things which have dissimilar and opposite constituents or characteristics. Samanya and visesa thus have a significance quite different from what they have in the Vaisesika-sutras. The principle of samanya and visesa is the main support of Ayur-veda; for it is the principle which underlies the application of medicines and the course of diets. Substances having similar constituents or characteristics will increase each other, and those having dissimilar constituents or characteristics will decrease each other. Thus a substance having the characteristics of vata will increase vata and decrease slesman, which is dissimilar to it, and so on. Samanya is thus defined as tulyarthata, i.e. performing similar purposes. Instead of having only a conceptual value, samanya and visesa are here seen to discharge a pragmatic work of supreme value for Ayur-veda. As regards the theory of substances {dravya) also, though Caraka borrowed the enumeration of categories, Cakrapani says that the simpler bhutas formed parts of the complex ones (bhutantardnupravesa), and in support of this idea he quotes a sutra from the Nydya-sutra, which, however, there occurs as an opponent's view, since the theory of bhutanupravesa was not believed in by the Nyaya-

1 ddi-iabdah prakdravacl. Cakrapani's commentary on Caraka-samkita, I. 1.48. 2 Ibid. 1. 1. 49.

24-2

Vaisesika school; with that school none of the elements entered into any other, and their qualities were fixed in themselves. However, in spite of these modifications, the relation of Nyaya-Vaisesika with Caraka seems to be close. But the detailed description of the school of Samkhya, in iv. i ,as has already been mentioned and explained in the first volume of the present work, in the chapter on Samkhya, does not seem to have much bearing on the needs of Ayur-veda; and so the whole chapter does not appear to fit in with the rest of the work, and it is not referred to in other parts of the book. It is not improbable that this chapter was somehow added to the book from some other treatise.

Susruta does not, like Caraka, enumerate the categories of the Vaisesika, and his account of Samkhya is very faithful to the traditional account given in Isvarakrsna's Karika and in the Samkhya-sutra. Having described the Samkhya theory, Susruta says that according to medical science the causes of things are sixfold, viz. (i) nature of things (svabhava), (2) God (Is'vara), (3) time (kala), (4) accidental happenings (yadrccha), (5) destiny (niyati) and (6) evolution (parinama) 1 . As Dalhana points out, Susruta has in several places referred to the operation of all these causes. Thus the formation of the limbs of the body in the foetus-state is said to be due to nature (svabhava) ; God as fire is said to operate as the digestive fire in the stomach and to help digestion; time as seasons is said to be the cause of the increase and decrease of dosas; destiny means virtue and vice, and diseases and recovery from them are sometimes attributed to these. Jejjata, in commenting on Susruta (as reported by Dalhana), says that all the above six causes, with the exception of God, are but different names of prakrti. Gayi, however, thinks that the above six causes represent the instrumental cause, though prakrti may still be considered as being the material cause (upddana-karana).

As Dalhana and Gayi think, there is no reason to suppose that Susruta described the Samkhya doctrine; for, immediately after describing the sixfold causes, he speaks of the elements as being constituted of the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas. Even the senses are regarded as being material. Souls are according to Ayurveda eternal, though they are limited to their bodies and are not all-pervasive. They are manifested when the semen and the blood combine, and it is this bodily self, suffering transmigration owing

1 Susruta-samhitd, in. 1. 11.

to virtue and vice (called karma-purusa), with which medical science is concerned. When the self is in association with manas, it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, prana and apdna (the upward current of breath and the downward force acting in the direction of the rectum), the opening and closing of the eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision or buddhi (niscaya), imagination (samkalpd), thought (vicarana), memory (smrti), scientific knowledge (vijnana), energy (adhya-vasaya) and sense-cognitions (visayopalabdhi). The qualities of manas are divided into three classes, viz. sattvika, rajasa and tamasa; of these the sattvika ones are kind actions, the desire of enjoying gradually, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-knowledge, retentive power (medha), intelligence {buddhi), self-control (dhrti), and sense of duty for the sake of duty (anabhisanga) ; the rajasa qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness, cruelty, boastfulness, conceit (mdna), joy, passion and anger; the tdmasa qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power, idleness and sleepiness.

Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute.

Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat), and they can be investigated by the four pramanas, viz. the testimony of trusty persons (aptopadesa), perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms of probability (yukti) 1 .

Those whose minds are free from the impurities of rajas and tamas through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess unlimited knowledge extending through the past, present and future, are to be considered as trustworthy (apta). Such persons neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trusty (apta), and their testimony may be regarded as true 2 .

The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of the relation of self, senses, manas and sense-objects is called "perception." This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by Cakrapani as being of five kinds, viz. (1) contact with the dravya (substance), called samyoga; (2) contact with the gunas

1 Caraka-samhitd, I. n. 17. z Ibid. I. 11. 18, 19.

(qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samavdya) in which they inhere by samavaya (inseparable) relation; (3) contact with the gunas (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (rupatva), which exist in the gunas in the samavaya relation; this is called samyukta-samaveta-samavaya since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour is in the thing by samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by samavaya relation; (4) the contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is akasa, and the sound exists in akasa by the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya; (5) the generic character of sound as the sound universal (sabdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. It is only immediately resulting (tadatve) cognition of such a contact that is called perception (pratyaksa); for inference, memory, etc. also may come in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other successive processes (paramparya).. Cakrapani further notes that the four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, "knowledge that results as the effect of sense-contact" would be a sufficient definition of pratyaksa; so in the perception of pleasure, though none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all kinds of cognition 1 . It is easy to see that the above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in the Nyaya system. The nir-vikalpa perception is not taken into consideration; for there is nothing corresponding to the term avyapadesya in the Nyaya-sutra 2 . Inference must be based on perception, by which the concomitance of the hetu can first be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from karya (effect) to kardna (cause), as the inference of cohabitation from pregnancy; from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of

1 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 20.

2 The definition of pratyaksa given in Caraka-samhitd, 1. 11. 20, is:

dtmendriya-mano-'rthdndm sannikarsdt pravartate

vyaktd tadatve yd buddhih pratyaksam sd nirucyate. The definition of pratyaksa in the Nydya-sutra is as follows:

indriydrtha-satmikarsotpannam jndnam avyapadesyam

avyabhicdri vyavasdydtmakam pratyaksam. For a discussion thereon see vol. 1, pp. 333-343.

fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke 1 .

Yukti is not counted as a separate pramana by any other system of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called yukti 2 . As Cakrapani points out, this is not in reality of the nature of a separate pramana; but, since it helps pramanas, it is counted as a pramana. As an example of yukti, Caraka mentions the forecasting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapani rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is properly called uha and is current among the people by this name. It is here counted as a separate pramana. It is in reality an inference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called tri-kala, valid in all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says.

The Buddhist, writes Santaraksita in discussing Caraka's doctrine of yukti as a separate pramana, holds that yukti consists in the observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since, when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a drstanta, or example, in Nyaya inference (e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen). It is held, as Kamalaslla interprets, that the cause-effect idea is derived from the idea of "this happening, that happens," and there is no other idea in the notion of causality; if in any case any particular example is given, then another example might be asked for, and after that another, and we should have regressus

1 pratyaksa-purvam tri-vidham tri-kalam cdnumiyate vahnir rdgudho dhiimena maithunam garbha-darsandt. Evarn vyavasyanty atltam btjdt phalam anagatam drstva bljat phalam jdtam ihaiva sadriam budhdh.

Caraka-samhitd, I. u. 21, 22.

2 buddkih pasyati yd bhdvdn bahu-kdrana-yogajdn

yuktis tri-kdla sdjneyd tri-vargah sddhyate yaya. Ibid. 1. 11. 25.

ad infinitum 1 . These arguments in support of yukti as the concluding of the cause-effect relation from " this happening, that happens " relation are refuted by Santaraksita and Kamalasila, who point out that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the relation of "this happening, that happens" with the cause-effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause-effect relation is the same as "this happening, that happens." It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and unconditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations of the potter and his wheels. If this is yukti, then it is not a different source of knowledge.

Cakrapani, however, points out that these criticisms are all beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not karya-karanata from tad-bhava-bhavita ; it is the arriving at a conclusion as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note that in in. 4. 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of pramanas, viz. pratyaksa, anumana and sabda, and describes anumana as being tarka depending on yukti. Tarka is explained by Cakrapani as being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (tarko 'pratyaksa-jnanam), and yukti is here paraphrased by Cakrapani as the relation of a-vina-bhava. It is said in this connection that a disease is to be determined by pratyaksa, the medical texts (apto-padesa) and inference. But in 111. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts aitihya as dptopadesa, though ordinarily aitihya is considered in

1 drstdnte 'py ata eva tad-bhdva-bhdvitvdt kdryatd-pratipattih, tatrdpi drstdnto 'nyo 'nvesanlyah, tatrdpy apara ity anavasthd. Kamalasila as quoted by Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd, i. n. 25.

Santaraksita misrepresents Caraka's view of yukti in a very strange manner. He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is present B is present and in all cases when A is absent B is also absent one thinks A to be the cause of B, this is regarded by Caraka as the new pramdna of yukti. iSantaraksita's exact words are:

asmin sati bhavaty eva na bhavaty asatlti ca tasmdd ato bhavaty eva yuktir esd 'bhidhlyate pramdndntaram eveyam ity aha carako munih ndnumdnam iyatn yasmdd drstdnto 'tra na labhyate.

Tattva-samgraha, p. 482. This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by Cakrapani in his commentary on Caraka-samhitd. Caraka's idea of yukti is the logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called yukti, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted pramanas, it is to be counted as a separate pramdna. So far as I know, this is the only example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought.

Indian philosophy as being "tradition" or long-standing popular belief, different from dptopadesa; upamana, under the name of aupamya, is also referred to.

It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to perception referred to in the Samkhya-karika are all mentioned here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour (riipa) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed up in any homogeneous medium indistinguishable from them, or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle 1 .

Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diagnosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes, such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the Nyayfi-sutra. In the Caraka-samhita almost the whole of the chapter called the " Roga-bhisag-jitiya-vimana" (in. 8) is devoted to this purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes and fallacies are mentioned in the Nyaya-sutra, and it will be useful to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the Caraka-samhita or the Susruta-samhita.

The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the Nyaya-sutra are tarka, vada, jalpa and vitanda. Tarka is said to be the same as uha, and this is explained as a process of reasoning carried on in one's mind before one can come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirmation or denial (nirnaya) is made. Disputes are said to be of three kinds, vada, jalpa and vitanda. Vada means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, jalpa a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and vitanda a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vada is thus essentially different in its purpose from jalpa and vitanda; for vada is an academical discussion with pupils,

1 Caraka-samhita, I. n. 8.

teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain 1 . Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument.

Caraka, in in. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions (sambhasa) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for knowledge (samharsa) y clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (sandhaya sambhasa) and hostile (vigrhya sambhasa). A friendly discussion is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant over the other's defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or misstate the other's views.

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes. Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior (para) to him and also the nature of the assembly (parisat) in which the discussion is undertaken. A parisat may be learned (jnanavati) or ignorant (mudha), and these again may be friendly (suhrt), neutral (udasina), or hostile (pratinivista). When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament, or of a fearful nature, etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not.

1 vadam ca nirnaya-phaldrtkibhir eva sisya-sabrahmacari-gurubhih saha vlta-rdgaih, na khydti-ldbha-rabhasa-prativardhamdna-spardhdnubandha-vidhuTdtma-bhir drabheta. Nydya-maiqar%, p. 594.

No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant, friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by proceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by reciting long sutras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were, by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection with such disputes. Like the Nyaya, Caraka divides such hostile disputes (vada) into two classes, jalpa and vitanda. Pratijna is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. "The purusa is eternal." Sthapana is the establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, drstanta, upanaya and nigamana. Thus the above thesis {pratijna), "The purusa is eternal," is to be supported by a reason (hetu), "because it is uncreated"; by an example (drstanta), "The sky is uncreated and it is eternal"; by a proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz." Just as the akas'a is uncreated, so the purusa is also uncreated "; and finally by establishing the thesis (nigamana), "Therefore the purusa is eternal 1 ."

Pratisthapana is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus, when the thesis of the sthapana is "Purusa is eternal," the pratisthapana proposition would be " Purusa is non-eternal," because "it is perceivable by the senses," and "The jug which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal," and " Purusa is like the jug," so "Purusa is non-eternal."

Caraka defines hetu as "the cause of knowledge" (hetur noma upalabdhi-karanam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramanas of pratyaksa, anumana, aitihya and aupamya. The definition of hetu in the Nyaya-sutra refers only to the perceived hetu in the case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a

1 It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions that are admitted in the Nyaya-sutra.

relation is established by inference 1 . Here Caraka points out that a hetu may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when it leads to knowledge, it is called a hetu. Thus, when I say, "The hill is fiery, because it smokes" (parvatovahniman dhumavattvdt), the smoke is the hetu, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when I say," He is ill, because he is of low digestion," the hetu is not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one's being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when it is said, " Purusa is eternal, because it is uncreated" {nityah purusah a-krtakatvat), the uncreatedness (a-krtakatva) is the hetu, but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the testimony of the scriptures. Again, in the proposition, "His face is most beautiful, because it has been compared with the moon " (asya mukham kantatamam candropamatvat), the fact of being compared with the moon is the hetu and it is known by upamd 2 . Thus Caraka's definition of hetu does not really come into conflict with that of Gautama: he only says that a hetu may be discovered by any of the pramanas, and, by whichever pramana it may be discovered, it may be called a hetu, if it is invariably and unconditionally (a-vina-bhava) associated with the major term (sddhydf. Caraka then proceeds to describe uttara, which is in purport the same as the jati of the Nyaya-sutras . When an opponent wants to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the hetu, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis by showing its dissimilarity to the hetu. Thus one may say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold 4 .

1 uddharana-sddharmydt sddhya-sddhanam hetuh

tathd vaidharmydt. Nydya-sutra, 1. 1. 34, 35.

2 See Garigadhara''s Jalpa-kalpa-taru, m. 8. 122.

3 hetid cdvinabhdva-linga-vacanani yady api, tathdpiha linga-pragrdhakdni pratyaksadi-pramanany eva yathokta-hetu-miilatvena hetu-sabdendha.

Cakrapani on Caraka, m. 8. 6. 25.

* sddharmya-vaidharmydbhydmpratyavasihdnam jdtih. Nydya-sutra, 1. 2. 18. There are twenty-four kinds of this jdti, e.g. (1-2) sddharmya-vaidkarmya-sama, (3-8) utkarsdpakarsa-varnydvarnya-vikalpa-sddhya-sama, (9-10) prdpty-aprdpti-sama, (11-12) prasanga-pratidrstdnta-sama, (13) anutpatti-sama, (14) samsaya-sama, (15) prakarana-satna, (16) ahetu-sama, (17) arthdpatti-sama, (18) avisesa-sama, (19) upapatti-sama, (20) upalabdhi-sama, (21) anupalabdki-sama, (22) nitya-sama, (23) anitya-sama, (24) kdrya-sama.

Sddharmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on

The long list of jatis given in the Nyaya-sutra and explained in the commentaries and in the Nyaya-manjari is not referred to

the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain hetu, it is pointed out that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity or dissimilarity with other hetus. Thus, when it is said, " Sabda is non-eternal, because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is non-eternal, as a jug," it may be answered, " Sabda is eternal, because it is partless: a partless entity like the dkdsa is found to be eternal; there is no special reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal, and not eternal owing to its similarity to dkdsa." An escape from the dilemma is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and invariable (avyabhicdri) similarity.

Utkarsdpakarsa-varnydvarnya-vikalpa-sddhya-sama is that in which similarity is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug, it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort {prayatndntaflyaka). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though sabda is as much a product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal. Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be argued that a jug is like sound; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as sound itself (yadi yathd ghatas Xathd sabdah prdptam tarhi yathd sabdah tathd ghata iti sabdas cdnityatayd sddhya iti ghato 'pi sddhya eva sydd anyathd hi na tena tulyo bhavet — Nydya-manjafi, p. 624). In answer to these kinds of fault-finding the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits, and an example (drstdntd) should not be considered to have the same status as a probandum (sddhya); for an example is that which is already agreed upon among the disputants and the common people (laukika-pariksakdndm yasminn arthe buddhi sdmyam sa drstdntah).

Prdpty-aprdpti-sama is that in which it is urged that, if the hetu and the probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they are separate, hetu cannot lead us to the sddhya. The answer to this is that a hetu can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the syena sacrifice can destroy an enemy from a distance).

Prasariga- sama is that in which a reason for the hetu is asked. Thus, if the character of immediately following an effort {prayatndntariyakatva) is the cause of non-eternality, what can establish the prayatndntariyakatva of a jug, etc.? The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts that produce it is directly experienced and does not require any argument or reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp.

Drstdnta-sama is that in which from the same hetu two different conclusions are seen to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and dkdsa have the character of immediately following an effort (e.g. as by digging new space is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid earth without space— kupa-khanana-prayatnanantaram tad-upalambhdt —and this character is therefore to be regarded as prayatndntariyakd) ; yet, as a jug is non-eternal and dkdsa eternal, so sabda, though it immediately follows an effort, is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate hetu has to be given, which is not done in the present case.

If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage

by Caraka; nor does the technical name of jati find any place in Caraka's description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of jati

possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternality is absent. This objection is called anutpatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound is in existence, its eternality or non-eternality cannot be discussed. If it is non-existent, of what is the eternality to be affirmed by the opponent?

Again, it may be argued that sabda has prayatnantarlyakatva, and therefore it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt is called samsaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.

Prakarana-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatnanta-rJyakatva and niravayavatva (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.

Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu; for, if there is no sadhya (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again, if there is no hetu before the sadhya, how can the sadhya be produced? So, as hetu is only a concomitant of sadhya, no inference is possible from it. The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu the non-existing sadhya should be produced. Arthapatti-sama is where, for example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to akasa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatnantarlyaka. Avisesa-sama is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of prayatnantarlyakatva, sabda and ghata are said to be equally non-eternal, then, owing to all things having the same quality of existence (sattd), they are all the same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality in all respects.

Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing to its prayatnantarlyakatva and eternal owing to its being partless like akasa. Upalabdhi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort {prayatnantarlyakatva), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between prayatnantarlyakatva and non-eternality and not between non-eternality and prayatnantarlyakatva; so that all that is produced by human effort is non-eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatnantarlyakatva emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are produced. Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that, if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal, then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some similarity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The nitya-sama objection runs as follows: Is non-eternality in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal. If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.

The karya-sama objection suggests that prayatnantarlyakatva leads to production in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatnantarlyakatva applies to sabda.

The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta's Nyaya-manjarl.

were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed them over without referring to them.

An example (drstdnta) is that on which the common folk and the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot, water is liquid, the earth is firm. A siddhdnta, or conclusion, is that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and demonstration by proper reasons. This siddhdnta is of four kinds, viz. (1) sarva-tantra-siddhdnta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g. "There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones can be cured "; (2) prati-tantra-siddhdnta, or conclusions which are not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons: e.g. some say that there are eight rasas, others say that there are six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six;

(3) adhikarana-siddhdnta, or conclusions which being accepted or proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted: e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits of karma, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the existence of soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted;

(4) abhyupagama-siddhdnta, or conclusions which are accepted only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined critically nor considered as proved 1 .

Sabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz. (1) drstdrtha —of experienced purport (e.g. "The dosas lose their equilibrium through three causes"); (2) adrstartha —of unper-ceivable purport (e.g." There is after-life; there is emancipation "); (3) satya, or truth, that which tallies With facts (e.g. "There is Ayur-veda; there are means for curing curable diseases "); (4) anrta, the opposite of truth, untruth 2 . Samsaya, or doubt, occurs with reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether in this world death happens timely or untimely. Prayojana, or the object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may

1 All these siddhantas occur under the same names in the Nydya-sutra, 1. 1. 28, 29, 30, 31.

2 The first two divisions, drstdrtha and adrstartha, occur in the Nydya-sutra, I. 1. 8, sa dvividho drsfddrstdrthatvdt.

not touch me 1 . Sa-vyabhicdra means variability, e.g. "This may or may not be a medicine for this disease 2 ." Jijndsd means experimenting ; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments {jijndsd). Vyavasdya means decision (niscaya), e.g. "This is a disease due to predominance of vdyu ; this is the medicine for this disease." Artha-prdpti is the same as the well-known arthdpatti, or implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g. the statement, "This disease cannot be cured by allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink," implies that it can be cured by fasting, or, if it is said, "He should not eat during the day," this means that" He should eat during the night 3 ." Sambhava is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six dhdttis may be considered as the sambhava of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease; and right course of treatment, of health.

Anuyojya means a faulty answer which omits such details as should have been given in the answer, e.g. "This disease can be cured by purificatory action "; such an answer is faulty, as it does not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting or purging. Ananuyojya is what is different from anuyojya. Anuyoga is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned colleague: e.g. a learned man says," Purusa is eternal," and another learned man asks, "What is the reason? " Such a question is called anuyoga. A counter-question, such as "What is the reason for your asking such a question?" is called praty-anuyoga.

Vakya-dosa, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. nyuna, adhika, anarthaka, apdrthaka and viruddha. Nyuna, or the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of

1 Prayojana, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the Nyaya-sutra, 1. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by Vatsyayana as that which goads men to action (yena prayuktah pravartate). Uddyotakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (sukha-prdpti-diihkha-hdni).

2 anaikantikah sa-vyabhicarah. Nydya-sutra, 1. 2. 5. E.g. "sound is eternal" because it is untouchable; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are shortlived.

3 Cakrapani says that Caraka does not think that artha-prdpti is a separate pramdna ; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of pramdnas.

reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus several reasons are given in support of the eternality of purusa, viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, un-changeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving only one, is an instance of nyuna. Adhika is where, when Ayurveda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different words may be used. Anarthaka and aparthaka mean the use of meaningless and unconnected words or expressions. Viruddha, or contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the example (drstanta-viruddha) or the accepted conclusion (siddhanta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a medical man (vaidya) says that medicine does not cure diseases.

Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the accepted conclusions of any particular sastra. Thus, for example, if a Mimamsaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation (moksa-sastra) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of that sastra. Vakya-prasamsa is that kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in vakya-dosa do not occur.

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent is wilfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, vak-chala and samanya-chala. The word nava means "nine" as well as "new," and if, when one says about one's opponent, "This physician is nava-tantra" (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies, "I have not nine text-books, I have one text," the other person objects, "I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are navabhyasta-tantra" (have newly learnt the texts), navabhyasta-tantra might also mean " read nine times "; and then the opponent might well say, " I have several times read the texts, and not nine times, as you say." This is an example of vak-chala.

Again, when a physician says "Medicine cures diseases," the opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms

DII 25

and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since bronchitis exists (san kasah) and consumption exists {son ksayah), bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent entity, consumption. This is called samanya-chala 1 .

Fallacies (a-hetu) are of three kinds, prakarana-sama y samsaya-sama and varnya-sama 2 . Prakarana-sama is where that which

1 Chala is treated in the Nydya-sutra exactly on the same lines as here. Thus the definition of chala there {Nydya-sutra, i. 2. 10) is vacana-vighdto 'rtha-vikalpopapattyd chalam (to attack one's speech by a wilful misinterpretation of it is chala). This is divided into three classes, vdk-chala, samanya-chala and upacdra-chala; of these vdk-chala is exactly the same as in Caraka-samhitd, and so also the samanya-chala (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures, a vrdtya (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in some sense). Upacdra-chala, which, however, resembles vdk-chala, is not mentioned in the Caraka-samhitd. Its definition in the Nydya-sutra, 1.2.14,is dharma-vikalpa-nirdese 'rtha-sad-bhdva-pratisedha upacdra-chalam (to make one's statement impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary one was intended). Thus, if it is said, " This porter is an ass," it may be objected that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama, however, tentatively raises the objection that chalas should be regarded as three in number and not two, taking upacdra-chala within samanya-chala. This means a criticism in view of Caraka's division of chala into two classes. For Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity upacdra-chala should be included within samanya-chala, and chalas should be counted as being of two kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity chalas may as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific differences that exist between the chalas, they should be regarded as being of three kinds.

2 Nydya-sutra, 1. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (hetv-dbhdsa) as of five kinds, sa-vyabhicdra, viruddha, prakarana-sama, sddhya-sama and kdldtita.

Sa-vyabhicdra hetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the probandum, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable concomitance with eternality; for an atom is touchable and at the same time eternal, and thoughts (buddhi) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal. Viruddha hetu is where the reason (hetu) demolishes the very theory on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (vikdro) disappears (vyakter apaiti), because it is non-eternal (nityatva-prattsedhat); but, though it disappears (apeto 'pi), yet it exists (asti), because it is not destructible (vindsa-pratisedhdt). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible. Destructibility and eternality cannot abide together.

Prakarana-sama is where two opposite hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much force that "sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things," as that " sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal things"; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these hetus.

Sddhya-sama is where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument, "shadow is a substance because it moves," the movability of shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places ?

Kdldtita is where the hetus in the case of the accepted example and the case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the hetu is not properly a

is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged (as by the Carvaka school of philosophers) that both the points, viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the hetu, are themselves to be proved; for according to the Carvakas the body is endowed with consciousness and is non-eternal. A reference to the footnote below shows that this prakarana-sama is different from the prakarana-sama of the Nyaya-sutra. Samsaya-sama is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a passage from Ayur-veda—is he or is he not a physician? Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Ayur-veda leaves us in doubt as to the man's being a physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion and if it is said, " He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from Ayur-veda," it becomes a case of samsaya-sama. Gautama speaks of samsaya-sama as an instance of jati; but the former is a case where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these characteristics. Here, however, samsaya-sama is used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a particular conclusion.

Varnya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous affirmation, e.g. "Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is untouchable, like the latter." But the non-eternality of sound stands as much in need of proof as that of buddhi, and the former affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is

hetu; for the hetu and sadhya exist in two successive moments and are therefore not concomitant; but in the former case they are concomitant and simultaneous, e.g. sound is eternal, because it is manifested, like colour, owing to a particular contact, like light, being manifested by the contact of a stick and a drum, just as colour is manifested by the contact of light with a thing. But the similarity fails; for, while colour is manifested simultaneously with the contact of light and the things, sound is heard at a moment different from that at which actual contact of the stick and the drum takes place.

25-2

similar to the jdti called sadhya-sama and the fallacy sadhya-sama of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.

Atita-kdla is that in which that which should be said first is said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijna, should be stated first and the conclusion, or nigamana, last; if instead the nigamana is stated first and the pratijna after, then we have the fault of kalatita.

Upalambha (criticism) is the finding fault with the hetus, also called a-hetu, as described above, or hetv-dbhasas. Parihara (reply) means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent; e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different from the body and is eternal. Pratijna-hani (to give up one's thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to give up one's original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis that purusa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and say that purusa is not eternal. Abhyanujna (to bring a countercharge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects 1 . Hetv-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is where, when the cause of some root fact (prakrti) is asked, the reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations (vikrti) of that root fact 2 . Arthantara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given 3 . Nigraha-sthana is where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-sthanas many of the cases which have already been enumerated and described. Thus he counts pratijna-hani, abhyanujna, kalatita , a-hetu, nyuna, atirikta, vyartha, aparthaka, punar-ukta, viruddha, hetv-antara, arthantara*.

1 This corresponds to matdnujnd of the Nydya-sutra, v. 1. 42.

2 In Nydya-sutra, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hetv-antara, but that seems to be different from this. The significance of hetv-antara, as it stands there, may be illustrated as follows. An adherent of Samkhya says that all this world of things is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause. To this the Samkhya adherent replies that only those which are associated with pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one root cause; but this is an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.

3 This is also mentioned in the Nydya-sutra, v. 2. 7.

* The nigraha-sthdnas mentioned in the Nylya-mtra, v. 2.1, are the following: pratijnd-hdni, pratijndntara, pratijnd-virodha, pratijnd-sannydsa, hetv-antara,

After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a knowledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the subject-matter of Ayur-veda. These are karana (the agent or the mover), karana (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring about an effort), karya-yoni (the material cause by the modification of which effects are produced), karya (that for the production of which the mover makes his effort), karya-phala (that for which a particular effect is intended by the agent), anubandha (the good or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the production of the effect), desa (place), kala (the seasons, days, etc.), pravrtti (the effort and the action needed for the production of the effect) and updya (the passivity and special aptitude of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can make the effect possible). The physician is the cause (karana), the medicines the instruments (karana) ; the want of equilibrium of the dhatus the karya-yoni; the restoration of the equilibrium of the dhatus the karya; the happy state of body and mind the karya-phala; length of life, anubandha; the place and the diseased person, desa; the year and the condition of the diseased person, kala; the efforts of the physician, pravrtti; the qualifications of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc., updya.

It may be pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-tantra of Susruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in establishing their own points, which are called tantra-yukti 1 . These are said to be adhikarana, yoga, paddrtha, hetv-artha, uddesa, nirdesa, upadesa, apadesa, pradesa, atidesa, apavarja, vakya-sesa, arthdpatti , viparyaya, prasanga, ekdnta, anekdnta, purva-paksa, nirnaya, anu-mata, vidhdna, andgatdveksana, atikrdntdveksana, samsaya, vyd-khydna,sva-samjnd, nirvacana, nidarsana, niyoga, samuccaya, vikalpa and uhya. But these technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mimamsa, and are not points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house,

arihantara, nirarthaka, avijndtdrtha, aparthaka, aprdpta-kdla, nyuna, adhika, punar-ukta, ananubhasana, ajndna, apratibha, vikfepa, matdnujnd, paryanuyqjyo-pekfena, niranuyqjydnuyoga, apa-siddhdnta, hetv-dbhdsa. Many of these, however, are not mentioned by Caraka.

1 asad-vddi-prayuktdndm vdkydndm pratisedhdnam sva-vdkya-siddhir apt ca kriyate tantra-yuktitah. Susruta-samhitd, Uttara-tantra, 65. 5.

for the illumination or the expression of the subject of discourse 1 . This remark very much resembles the remark of Vatsyayana that anmksikl (logic) is like a light to all sciences (pradipah sarva-vi-dyanam). But the difference between tantra-yukti and anviksiki is this, that, while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to technical modes of expression in medical science in general and in the Susruta-samhita in particular. They therefore refer to the ways of deducing the inner meaning or intention of the medical texts from their abbreviated forms of expression. Thus, when one reads in the text, "about rasa or dosa" and nothing else is said, one understands that this style of expression signifies that it is an adhikarana (topic of discourse) and that something is going to be related about rasa or dosa, though it is not explicitly so stated. Now the maxim (tantra-yukti) of yoga means that the verb at a distant part of the sentence may be joined with its relevant ca*>e in another part of the sentence 2 . The maxim of padartha means that, when a word having two or more senses is used, then that meaning alone has to be accepted which suits the previous and the later contexts. Thus, when it is said in a medical text that we shall now describe the origin of the Veda, then only Ayur-veda is to be meant and not Rg, Yajus or Atharva. The maxim of hetv-artha illustrates the condition of invisible things by visible and known examples. Thus it is said that, just as a muddy ball becomes dissolved and sticky through water, so do milk and other drugs dissolve a boil by their application. The maxim of uddesa is the method of briefly touching a subject without going into details. Thus, when one says "disease" (salya), it means both internal and external diseases without any kind of specification. The maxim of nirdesa is the method of describing a thing in detail. The maxim ofupadesa is the method of giving a general instruction. Thus it is said that one should not sit up at night nor sleep during the day. This is, however, only a general instruction which has its exceptions. The

1 yathambwa-vanasydrkah pradlpo vesmano yathd prabodhyasya prakdsdrihas tatha tantrasya yuktayah.

Susruta-samhita, Uttara-tantra, 65. 7.

2 tailam pivec cdmrta-valli-nimba-kimsrdbhayd-vrksaka-pippalibhih siddham baldbhydm ca sa-devada.ru hitaya nityam gala-ganda-roge.

Ibid. 9, 10. In the above verse it is enjoined that a particular medical decoction is to be made with a number of drugs which are to be boiled {siddham), and this boiled decoction has to be drunk (pivet). But the word pivet is in the first line and the word siddham is in the third line, and it is allowed that these two distant words may be combined (yoga).

maxim of apadesa is the method of showing the reasons of things. Thus it is said that phlegm (slesman) increases through the taking of sweet things (madhurena slesma 'bhivardhate). The maxim of pradesa is the analogy by which a present difficulty is solved in the way in which a past difficulty was solved {prakrtasya atikrantena sadhanam pradesah). Thus it may be said that, since this has cured Devadatta in this way in the past, it would also cure Yajnadatta in a similar way now. The maxim of atidesa is that of anticipating a future event from a present indication or prognostication. Thus from the fact of the increase of uprising wind in a man's system it may be predicted that he will have a specific bowel-disease (udavarta). The maxim of apavarja consists in allowing exceptions to general directions (e.g. cases of poisoning should not be fomented, except in the case of poisoning through the bites of insects). The maxim of vakya-sesa consists in supplying an idea suggested by the context, but not expressly mentioned. Thus when it is said "of the head, hands, feet, sides, back, belly, heart," it is the whole man that is to be understood though it is not expressly stated in the context. That which is understood, by implication, though not directly mentioned, is called the maxim of arihapatti. Thus, when a man says "I shall eat rice," it is understood that he is not thirsty, but hungry. The maxim of viparyaya is that by virtue of which from a positive or a negative assertion its contrary is asserted also, e.g. when it is said that those who are lean, weak and of fearful temperament are difficult to be cured. The maxim of prasanga is that by virtue of which allusion is made to things repeatedly described in another chapter. The maxim of ekanta allows of affirming a specific action of things unexception-ably (e.g. madana fruit induces vomiting, i.e. under all circumstances). The maxim of anekanta is that by virtue of which one understands that different opinions prevail on a particular subject. Thus some teachers think that substances are the most important, while others think that rasa is so; others, again, think that the inner essence (virya) is the most important, while still others think that chemical action through digestion (vipaka) is so. The maxims of purva-paksa and uttara-paksa allow of discussing a matter in the form of question and answer. The maxim of anumata is that by virtue of which it is to be understood that, when the opinion of other authorities is referred to and not contradicted, it is signified that it is approved. The maxim of vidhana is that by virtue of

which one understands that, when certain descriptions follow certain enumerations, the former are to be taken in the order in which the latter are related. The maxim of anagataveksana allows of leaving certain things for future description and elaboration, and atikrantaveksana permits alluding to things described before (e.g. it is said in the Sloka-sthana that this matter will be described in the Cikitsa chapter, and about another matter it may be said in the Cikitsa chapter that it has been described in the Sloka-sthana). The maxim of samsaya allows a way of statement which may create doubt and confusion in the mind of the reader. The method of elaborate description is called vyakhyana. The method of using words in a sense different from what they have in other literatures is called sva-samjna, i.e. technical use (e.g. mithuna in Ayur-veda means honey and clarified butter). A definition is called nirvacana. The maxim of nidarsana allows of describing anything after the analogy of other things. Thus it may be said that, just as fire in a room grows bigger and bigger with wind, so does a boil grow with vata, pitta and kapha. Niyoga means a direction (e.g. "only what is good to the system is to be taken"). Samuccaya means the taking of two or more things together as having equal value. Vikalpa is the method of giving alternative or optional directions. Uhya is the maxim by which things which are apparent from the context can be understood.

It is easy to see that of these thirty-two maxims some are ways of interpreting ideas, others are ways of interpreting the arrangement and manner of textual words and their connections, while there are others which are but descriptions of specific peculiarities of style. The redactor (Nagarjuna) says that he has collected all these maxims as general principles of textual understanding, and he calls them sabda-nyayartha, i.e. the meaning of the maxims of verbal interpretation.

Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Ayur-veda Physicians?

Dr Mahamahopadhyaya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan in his History of Indian Logic supposes without adducing any reason that the Caraka-samhita gives a summary of the principal doctrines of AnviksikI, possibly as propounded by Medhatithi Gautama. He further says that the doctrines of AnviksikI evidently did not con-

stitute a part of the original Ayur-veda of Punarvasu Atreya, and that these doctrines seem to have been incorporated into the Caraka-samhita by the redactor Caraka, in whose time they were widely known and studied. Dr Vidyabhusan's theory is that both Caraka and Aksapada borrowed the Nyaya doctrines from Medha-tithi Gautama, but, while Caraka accepted them in their crude forms, Aksapada pruned them thoroughly before they were assimilated in the Nyaya-sutra 1 .

But Dr Vidyabhusan's Medhatithi Gautama is more or less a mythical person, and there is no proof that he ever wrote anything, or that Caraka borrowed anything from a Medhatithi Gautama, or that the Nyaya doctrines found in the Caraka-samhita were not contained in the original treatise of Agnivesa, now lost. Dr Vidya-bhusan refers to the evidence of a number of works, such as the Kusumanjali, Naisadha-carita and Nyaya-sutra-vrtti, which refer to Gautama as being the founder of Anvlksikl. But none of these authorities are earlier than the tenth century. He refers also to the authority of the Padma-purana, Skanda-purana and Gandharva-tantra, none of which can be regarded as a work of any considerable antiquity. Vatsyayana himself refers to Aksapada as the person to whom Nyaya (the science of Logic) revealed itself 2 . Uddyotakara also refers to Aksapada as the utterer of the Nyaya-sastra, and so also does Vacaspati 3 . There is therefore absolutely no reason why the original authorship of Nyaya should be attributed to a Gautama, as against Aksapada, on evidence which cannot be traced to any period earlier than the tenth century and which is collected from Purana sources directly contradicted by the earliest Nyaya authorities. The Nyaya-sastra, therefore, cannot be traced on the evidence of the earliest Nyaya authorities to any earlier Gautama; for, had this been so, it would certainly have been mentioned

1 History of Indian Logic, pp. 25 and 26, by Mahamahopadhyaya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan. Calcutta University, 1921.

8 Yo 'ksapadam rsint nydyah pratyabhdd vadatam varam

tasya Vatsyayana idant bhasya-jatam avartayat.

Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, 2. 24, a.d. 400. Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of it as "The Nyaya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Aksapada " is inexact.

8 yad Aksapadah pravaro munlndm

iamaya sdstram jagato jagdda. NySya-varttika of Uddyotakara (a.d. 600). Opening lines. atha bhagavata Aksapadena nih&reyasa-hetau s'dstre pranite. Nydya-vdrttika-tat-parya-flkS. of Vacaspati. Dr Vidyabhusan's translation of the Nydya-vdrttika word sdstra as "Nyaya^astra in a systematic way" is again inexact.

by either Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara or Vacaspati. Jayanta also attributes the elaborate Nyaya work to Aksapada and does not seem to know that this elaborate treatise, the Nyaya-sutra, was based on the teachings of an earlier authority 1 . If any such authorities were known, they would certainly have been mentioned for the dignity and the prestige of the Sastra. Gautama is an old name, and we find it attached to one of the Rsis of the Rg-veda (i. 62. 78. 85; iv. 4); he is mentioned in the Satapatha-brahmana (1.4.1. 10; in. 3.4.19, etc.); in the Taittiriya-pratisdkhya (1. 5), in the Asvalayana-srauta-sutra (1. 3; n. 6, etc.) and in other similar older works; but nowhere is he spoken of as being the author of the Nyaya-sastra. Gautama is also mentioned in the Maha-bharata several times, but nowhere is he referred to as the author of the Nyaya-sastra. The passage of the Maha-bharata on which Dr Vidyabhusan bases his theory of a Medhatithi Gautama does not say that Medhatithi was the author of Anviksikl or Nyaya, nor does it say that Medhatithi and Gautama were identical persons 2 . The name Gautama is a patronymic, and the passage of the Maha-bharata referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan clearly means that the highly wise Medhatithi of the Gautama race was engaged in asceticism. This is corroborated by the fact that the passage of Bhasa referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan mentions Medhatithi as a teacher of Nyaya-sastra and does not call him Gautama, nor does it say that Medhatithi was the originator of Nyaya 3 . Dr Vidya-bhusan's theory, therefore, of Medhatithi Gautama being the originator of the Nyaya-sastra falls down like a house of cards. His identification of Medhatithi Gautama's birthplace as Mithila, his ascertainment of his date, his identification of Persian references to Medhatithi Gautama and his so-styled references to Medhatithi Gautama in the Anguttara-nikaya and the Brahma-jala-sutta are no less fictitious 4 . The Gautama tradition of Nyaya need not be followed; but it may incidentally be mentioned that an Atreya Gautama, who is described as being Samkhya (probably in the sense of wise, philosopher, or learned), is counted in the list of the

1 Aksapdda-pranlto hi vitato Nydya-pddapah.

Opening lines of the Nydya-manjarl of Jayantabhatta (a.d. 880).

2 Medhdtithir mahd-prdjno Gautamas tapasi sthitah vimrsya tena kdlena patnydh samsthya-vyatikramam.

Maha-bharata, Santi-parva, 265.45, Vangavasi edition.

3 Medhatither Nydya-sdstram (having learnt Nyaya-sastra from Medhatithi). Bhasa's Pratima-ndtaka, Act v, p. 79. M. M. Ganapati Sastri's edition.

4 History of Indian Logic, by Dr Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan, pp. 17-21.

sages who assembled together to discover the causes and remedies of diseases; side by side with this Atreya, another A trey a is also mentioned as hhiksu Atreya 1 . A number of sages are mentioned in the Caraka-samhita as persons who discussed the problem of the rise of diseases and how they could be removed. Among these Bharadvaja volunteered to proceed to Indra to learn from him the science of healing. Indra instructed him in the subject, being learned in the three subjects of the (hetu) causes (of diseases), knowledge of the (linga) signs (of diseases) and the knowledge of medicines. Bharadvaja, having learnt this elaborate science in three divisions, repeated it to the sages in exactly the same manner in which he learnt it. After this it is said that Punarvasu taught Ayur-veda to his six disciples, Agnivesa, Bhela and others. Cakra-pani, the commentator, says that Punarvasu was the disciple of Bharadvaja, and quotes as his authority a statement of Harita. But on this point Caraka himself is silent.

But one thing emerges from this half-mythical account of the origin of Ayur-veda, viz. that the Ayur-veda was occupied from the beginning with the investigation of the nature of causes (hetu) and reasons (linga) for legitimate inferences in connection with the enquiry into the causes of diseases and the apprehension of signs or indications of the same. In the Nida.na-stha.na of Caraka eight synonyms for reason (hetu) are given, viz. hetu, nimitta, ayatana, kartr, karana, pratyaya, samutthana and nidana. It is curious enough that the words pratyaya and ayatana are used, which are presumably Buddhistic. The word pratyaya, in the sense of cause, is hardly found in Indian philosophy, except in Buddhism. The use of so many terms to denote cause evidently suggests that before Caraka's redaction there must have been an extensive literature which had used these words to denote cause. As a matter of fact, the word pratyaya is hardly ever used in the Caraka-samhita to signify cause, though it is counted here as one of the synonyms of hetu, or cause. The natural implication of this is that the word pratyaya was used for hetu in some earlier literature, from which Caraka collected it; so with other words, such as samutthana, ayatana, which are counted in the list as synonyms for hetu, but are not actually used in the body of the text. This may lead us to think that the discussion of hetu under

1 Atreyo Gautamah samkhyah. In this passage Atreya may, however, be taken as a man separate from the wise Gautama.

various names is an old subject in Ayur-veda literature existing before Caraka, from which Caraka collected them.

We know that Ayur-veda was primarily concerned with three questions, viz. how diseases originated, how they were known, and what were their cures. It was in this connection that the principle of causality was first from a practical necessity applied in Ayur-veda. Thus, if it is known that a person has been exposed to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast, then, since it is known that cold leads to fever and over-feeding to indigestion, with the very first symptoms of uneasiness one may at once infer that the patient is likely to get fever or to have diarrhoea or acute indigestion. Or, if it is known that the patient has a strong diarrhoea, then it can similarly be inferred that he has eaten indigestible articles. Thus the two principal kinds of inference which were of practical use to the Ayur-veda physicians were inference of the occurrence of a disease from a knowledge of the presence of the causes of that disease, i.e. from cause to effect, and inference of the specific kinds of unhygienic irregularity from the specific kind of disease of the patient, i.e. from the effect to the cause. The other and third kind of inference is that of inference of disease from its early prognostications (purva-rUpa). Cakrapani, in commenting on the possibility of inference of specific diseases from their early specific prognostications, compares it with inference of rain from an assemblage of dark clouds or of the future rise of the Krttika constellation from the rise of the constellation Rohini, which immediately precedes it. Both these are cases of inference of future occurrences of causation or coexistence. The prognostication may, however, be of the nature of an immediately and invariably associated antecedent which may drop altogether when the disease shows itself. Thus before a high fever the hair of the patient may stand erect; this standing erect of the hair in a specific manner is neither the cause nor is it coexistent with fever, since it may vanish when the fever has actually come. It is, however, so invariably associated with a specific kind of fever that the fever can be inferred from it 1 . Again, when there is any doubt among a number of causes as to which may be the real cause of the disease, the physician has to employ the method of difference or

1 These two kinds of purva-rupa are thus described by Cakrapani in his commentary on Caraka-samhita, 11. 1. 7: tac ca purva-rupam dvi-vidham ekam bhavi - vyadhy-avyakta - lingam .. .dvitlyam tu dofa - du$ya - sammurchana -jany am avyakta-lingdd anyad eva yathd jvare bala-pradvesa-roma-harfddi.

the method of concomitant variation for its proper ascertainment. That similar things produce the same kind of effects and opposite things produce opposite results are two of the accepted postulates of the law of samanya and visesa in the Caraka-samhita 1 . Now, applying these two principles, it is held that in a case of doubt as to any kind of irregularity being the cause of any particular disease it has to be found out by experiment whether the application of the suspected cause (e.g. cold) increases the disease (e.g. fever); if it does, and if the application of its opposite (e.g. heat) decreases the disease, then cold is to be regarded as the cause of the disease. If the application of any particular kind of element increases an effect (a particular kind of disease) and the application of its opposite decreases it, then that particular element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Caraka holds that the three methods, viz. the cause and effect relation (nidana), the method of invariable prognostication (purva-rupa) and the method of concomitant variation (upasaya, which includes anupasaya also) are to be employed either jointly or separately for the ascertainment of the nature of diseases which have already occurred or which are going to happen in the near future 2 . Caraka thus urges that the physician should examine carefully the causes of diseases by the application of all these methods, so that they may be ascertained from their visible effects. Caraka then goes on to give examples of a number of diseases and the causes or prognostications by which their nature can be ascertained. He then says that a disease which is at first only an effect of some other causes may act as a cause of other diseases and may thus be regarded both as an effect and as a cause. There is therefore no absolute difference between a cause and an effect, and that which is a cause may be an effect and that which is an effect may also in its turn be a cause. Sometimes a disease may behave as cause of another disease and then cease to exist itself, whereas again, one disease may exist side by side with another disease which it has produced and aggravate its effects. Then, again, a disease (cause) may produce a disease (effect), and that effect another effect. Thus one cause may produce one effect as well as many effects, and one effect may be due to one or to many causes, and

1 Caraka-samhita, I. I. 44.

2 The other two methods of samprapti and rupa need not be discussed in this connection.

again many causes may jointly produce many effects. Thus, though fever, delirium, etc. may all be produced by dryness (riiksa), yet under certain circumstances fever alone may be produced by it. Again, fever may also be produced by the combination of a number of causes which under other circumstances may produce jointly a number of diseases. So one entity may be an invariable concomitant (liriga) of one event or of many events, and there may also be a number of invariable concomitants of one event. Thus fever is the invariable concomitant of hygienic irregularities in general, and all fevers have heat as their invariable concomitant. From certain kinds of hygienic irregularities fever can be inferred; but these can also be associated with a number of other diseases 1 .

Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of invariable concomitance were an indispensable necessity for the Ayur-veda physicians in connection with the diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes and cures. It was for this reason that Caraka divided inference into three classes, from causes to effects, from effects to causes and from the association of other kinds of invariable concomitants. The Nyaya-sutra of Aksapada contains expressions which seem to have been borrowed from Nagarjuna's Madhyamika-karika and from the Lankavatara-sutra and the regulations of Buddhistic idealism, and hence it is generally believed to have been composed in the second or the third century a.d. 2 In this fundamental and earliest work of Nyaya philosophy inference (anumana) is described as being of three kinds, viz. from cause to effect (purvavat), from effect to cause (sesavat), and inference from similarities (samanyato-drsta) not comprehended under the cause-effect relation. Now it is exactly these three forms of inference that are described in the Caraka-samhitd, and, so far as is known to the present writer, this is the earliest work which describes inference in such a systematic manner, and so it

1 See Caraka-samhita, n. 8. 22-27.

2 H. Ui's The Vaisesika Philosophy, p. 16. L. Suali's Filosofia Indiana, p. 14. Jacobi, article in J.A.O. Society, vol. xxxi, p. 29, 1911.

A commentary on Nagarjuna's Pramdna-vidhvamsana called Pratnana-vidhvamsana-sambhdsita-vrtti reproduces Nagarjuna's definition of the categories, which are the same as the categories enumerated in the first sutra of Aksapada's Nyaya-sutra. But, as Walleser points out in his Life of Nagarjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, it is impossible to fix Nagarjuna's date exactly. He may have lived at any time between the second and the fourth centuries a.d. So no fruitful result can be attained by considerations of this kind.

may naturally be regarded as the source from which Aksapada drew his ideas. Now Caraka's work may be regarded as a revision of Agnivesa's work, based on Atri's teachings, based on Bhara-dvaja's instructions. Agnivesa's work is now lost, and it is not known what exactly were the contributions of Caraka in his revision of Agnivesa's work; but, since we find no work of an earlier date, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, which treats of the logical subjects found in the Caraka-samhita, and since these logical discussions seem to be inextricably connected with medical discussions of diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes, it seems very natural to suppose that Caraka got his materials from Agnivesa, who probably got them from still earlier sources. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Jayanta, in his Nyaya-manjari, discussing the question of the probable sources from which Aksapada drew his materials, suggests that he probably elaborated his work from what he may have gathered from some other science (sdstrantardbhyasat) ; but it is difficult to say whether by sastrantara Jayanta meant Ayur-veda. The Nyaya-sutra, however, expressly justifies the validity of the Vedas on the analogy of the validity of Ayur-veda, which is a part of the Vedas 1 .

The similarity of the Nyaya-sutra definition of inference to Caraka's definition is also very evident; for while the former begins tat-purvakam tri-vidham (where tat-pUrvakam means pratyaksa-pUrvakam), the latter begins pratyaksa-piirvakam tri-vidham tri-kalam. But, while Caraka knows only the three forms of inference, he has no names for these three types such as are supplied by Aksapada, viz. purvavat (related to pilrva, the prior, or the cause), sesavat (related to sesa, the later, or the effect) and samanyato-drsta (from observed similarity in the past, present and future, which is also emphasized by Caraka in the same manner) 2 . From the con-

1 Mantrdyurveda-prdmdnyavac ca tat-pramanyam dpta-prdmdnydt.

Nyaya-sutra, n. i. 68. Jayanta enters into a long discussion in his Nydya-manjart, trying to prove that it was through his omniscience that Caraka could write his work and that he neither discovered the science by inductive methods nor derived it from previous traditional sources.

2 Evam vyavasyanty atitam btjdt phalam andgatam drstvd btjdt phalatn jdtam ihaiva sadrsam budhdh.

Caraka-samhita, i. n. 22. VatsySyana, in his commentary on the Nyaya-sutra, illustrates purvavat (from cause to effect) as the inference of rain from the rise of clouds, sesavat (from effect to cause) as the inference of rain in the uplands from the flooding of the river in the lower regions and sdmdnyato-drsta(from similar behaviour) as the inference of the motion of heavenly bodies from their changes of position in the sky at

siderations detailed in the preceding footnote it may well be assumed that Aksapada's contribution to the definition of inference consists in his giving names to the types of floating inference described in Caraka-satnhitd. It is not improbable that the Nyaya-sutra derived its theory of five propositions, and in fact most of the other logical doctrines, from Caraka, as there are no earlier works to which these can be traced 1 . Caraka's definition of perception as the knowledge

different times. But he also gives another meaning of these three terms purvavat, sesavat and sdmdnyato-drsta. He interprets purvavat here as the inference of fire from smoke "on the analogy of past behaviour of co-presence," sesavat as the inference of the fact that sound is quality because it is neither substance nor action, by the method of residues (sesa), and sdmdnyato-drsta as the inference of the existence of soul from the existence of desire, which is a quality and as such requires a substance in which it would inhere. This is not an inference from similarity of behaviour, but from the similarity of one thing to another (e.g. that of desire to other qualities), to extend the associations of the latter (inherence in a substance) to the former (desire), i.e. the inference that desire must also inhere in a substance.

In the case of the terms purvavat and sesavat, as these two terms could be grammatically interpreted in two different ways (with matup suffix in the sense of possession and vati suffix in the sense of similarity of behaviour), and as the words purva and sesa may also be used in two different ways, Vatsyayana interprets them in two different ways and tries to show that in both these senses they can be justified as modes of inference. It seems obvious that the names purvavat, sesavat and sdmdnyato-drsta were given for the first time to the threefold inference described by Caraka, as this explains the difficulty felt by Vatsyayana in giving a definite meaning to these terms, as they had no currency either in traditional or in the contemporaneous literature of Vatsyayana. Uddyotakara, in his commentary on Vatsyayana, contributes entirely original views on the subject. He takes Aksapada's sutra, atha tat-purvakam tri-vidham anumdnam purvavac chesavat sdmdnyato-drstam ca, and splits it up into atha tat-purvakam tri-vidham anumdnam and purvavac chesavat sdmdnyato-drstam ca; by the first tri-vidha he means inference from positive instances (anvayi), from negative instances (vyatireki) and from both together (anvaya-vyatireki). He gives two possible interpretations of the terms purvavat, sesavat and sdmdnyato-drsta, one of which is that purvavat means argument from cause to effect, sesavat that from effect to cause and sdmdnyato-drsta is the inference on the basis of relations other than causal. The Sdmkhya-karikd also mentions these kinds of inference. The Mdthara-vrtti again interprets the threefold character of inferences {tri-vidha anumdna) in two ways; it says, firstly, that tri-vidha means that an inference has three propositions, and, secondly, that it is of three kinds, viz. purvavat (from the effect, e.g. flooding of the river, to the inference of the cause, e.g. showers in the upper region), sesavat (from part to whole, e.g. tasting a drop of sea-water to be saline, one infers that the whole sea is saline), and sdmdnyato-drsta (inference from general association, e.g. by seeing flowering mangoes in one place one infers that mangoes may have flourished in other places as well). Curiously enough, the Mdthara-vrtti gives another example of sdmdnyato-drsta which is very different from the examples of sdmdnyato-drsta hitherto considered. Thus it says that, when one says, "It is illuminated outside," another replies, "The moon must have risen."

1 For more or less fanciful reasons Mr Dhruva suggests that the terms purvavat and sesavat were borrowed in the Nyaya-sutra from the Mlmdmsa-sutra and that this sutra must therefore be very old (Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922). This argument is invalid for more

that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Aksa-pada's definition of perception, which adds three more qualifications to make the meaning more complex and precise 1 . The idea that in the first instance perception is indeterminate {nir-vikalpa or a-vyapadesya) is a later development and can hardly be traced in Hindu philosophy earlier than the Nydya-sutra' 2 . The similarity of the various categories of vdda,jalpa, vitandd, chala,jdti, nigraha-sthdna, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the Nydya-sutra has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elaboration is that Caraka's treatment, being the earlier one, is less full and less complex than that of Aksapada.

The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed together, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from even a very superficial study of the Caraka-samhitd. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion are great, they are all noted, and Atri's own opinion on them is given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific way, but also by sophistic wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the logical tricks of chain, jati and nigraha-sthdna developed into a regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates, discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the

than one reason. Firstly, granting that the Mlmdmsd-sutra is very old (which is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of tri-vidha anumdna in the Nydya-sutra is either its own contribution or very old. Mr Dhruva's arguments as to the Mdthara-vrtti being subsequent to Vatsyayana's commentary are also very weak and do not stand criticism.

1 indriydrtha-sanmkarsotparmamjndnam avyapadesyam avyabhicdri vyavasd-ydtmakdm pratyaksam. Nydya-sutra, i. 1.4. •

2 Caraka uses the word vikalpa in 11. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction {bheda) of superiority and inferiority {utkarsa-prakarsa-rupa).

dii 26

Caraka-samhita \ but nowhere was the acquirement of this art deemed so much a practical necessity for earning a living as among the medical men. And, since there is no mention of the development of this in any other earlier literature, it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in Caraka's work. The origin of the logical art of debate in the schools of Ayur-veda is so natural, and the illustrations of the modes of dispute and the categories of the art of debate are so often taken from the medical field, that one has little reason to suspect that the logical portions of the Caraka-samhita were collected by Caraka from non-medical literature and grafted into his work.

Ayur-veda Ethics.

The length of the period of a man's lifetime in this iron age (kali-yuga) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as poisoning, diseases and the like, afe present. If these physical causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks down. Medicines may, however, in the case of those who are not cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers differ from all other theories of karma that flourished on the soil of India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought except that of Caraka. In spite of the many differences that prevail amongst these theories, they may still be roughly divided into four classes. Thus there are, first, the paurusa-vadins, such as those who follow the Yoga-vasistha school of thought and are idealists of the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of previous karma, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can produce any change of any kind in the development of our future well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible for all our actions,'and that He makes those whom He wants to

raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the downward path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that God rewards or praises us in accordance with our good or bad deeds, and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act as we choose. There if= a further view, elaborately dealt with in Patanjali's Yoga-sutra, that our deeds determine the particular nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences, while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense eclecticism that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the administration of proper medicines and the like. This implies that our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the ordinary course of the fruition of our karma. Thus, according to the effects of my ordinary karma I may have fallen ill; but, if I take due care, I may avoid such effects and may still be in good health. According to other theories the laws of karma are immutable. Only the fruits of unripe karma can be destroyed by true knowledge. The fruits of ripe karma have to be experienced in any case, even if true knowledge is attained. The peculiar features of Caraka's theory consist in this, that he does not introduce this immutability of ripe karmas. The effects of all karmas, excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the observance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of karma implies the theory of a moral government of the universe in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one's own karma. We may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life, excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is predestined to undergo in accordance with the karma of a previous birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that

determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of karma thus involves a belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the sinful and virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punishment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves, is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these karmas. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was predestined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth, that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences are due to the ripening of the karmas of the previous births falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted, and the cases where even our best efforts are attended with failure are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect anything, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings, and the term of our life are already predestined, then none of our efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense ways of belief one refers to "fate" or "destiny" only when the best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka's theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law of karma be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his teaching 1 .

He seems to regard the "good," or the all-round manifold

1 Caraka-samkita, in. 3. 28-38.

utility (hita) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not; if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they are harmful, he ought not to do it 1 . Our ultimate standard of good actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active. Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to avoid the atiyoga, miihya-yoga and a-yoga of all thoughts, as just described. "Self-good," or dtma-hita, which is the end of all our actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life, but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life. Right conduct (sad-vrtta) leads to the health and well-being of body and mind and secures sense-control (indriya-vijaya).

The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation (pranaisana), our desire for the materials of comfort {dhanaisana), and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life (paralokaisana). We seek our good not onty in this life, but also in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed up in our threefold desire—for self-preservation, for the objects that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right conduct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right knowledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but errors of right judgment or of right thinking (prajnaparadha). First and foremost is our desire for life, i.e. for health and prolongation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is

1 buddhya samyag idam mama hitam idam mamahitam ity areksydveksya kar-manam pravrttlnam samyak pratipadanena ity ahita-karma-paritytlgena hita-karmacaranena ca. Cakrapani on Caraka, i. 8. 17.

the desire for a blessed after-life. In this connection Caraka introduces a discussion to prove the existence of a future state of existence. He says that a wise man should not entertain doubts regarding the existence of a future life, since such doubts might hinder the performance of right conduct. The mere fact that we cannot experience its existence with our senses is not a sufficient negative proof. For there are few things which can be directly experienced by the senses, and there are many which exist, but are never experienced by the senses. The very senses with which we experience other things cannot themselves be subject to sense-experience 1 . Even sensible things cannot be perceived if they are too near or too distant, if they are covered, if the senses are weak or diseased, if the mind is otherwise engaged, if they are mixed up with similar things, if their light is overcome by stronger light, or if they are too small 2 . It is therefore wrong to say that what is not perceived by the senses does not exist. If, again, it is argued that the foetus must derive its soul from the parents, then it may be pointed out that, if the soul of the foetus migrated from either of the parents, then, since the soul is without parts, it could not have migrated in parts, and such a total migration would mean that the parents would be left without any soul and would die. As the soul could not migrate from the parents to the child, so neither can the mind nor the intellect be said to have so migrated. Moreover, if all life must be derived from the migration of other souls, then how can insects come into being, as many do, without parent insects 3 ? Consciousness exists as a separate and be-ginningless entity, and it is not created by anyone else. If, however, the supreme soul be regarded as its cause, then in that sense it may be conceived as having been produced therefrom 4 . The theory of the after-life consists according to Caraka principally in the view that the soul is existent and uncreated, and that it is associated with the foetus at a certain stage of its development in the womb. He also refers to the evidence of rebirth which we

1 yair eva tdvad indriyaih pratydksam upalabhyate tany eva sand cdpratyak-sdni. Caraka, I. n. 7.

2 satam ca rupdndm ati-sannikarsdd ati-viprakar$dd dvarandt karana-daurba-lydn mano 'navasthdndt samdndbhihdrdt abhibhavdd ati-sauksmydc ca pratyaksdnu-palabdhih. Ibid. 11. 8.

3 samsveda-jdndm maiakddlndm tathodbhij-jdndtn gandupadddindm cetandndm mdta-pitarau na vidyete tatas tesdm acaitanyam sydn mdtd-pitroi cetana-kdranayorabhdvdt. Cakrapani on Caraka, 11. 11.

4 On this point Cakrapani gives a different interpretation in 1. 11. 13.

have in the difference of the child from the parents; in the fact that, though other causes are more or less the same, two children differ in colour, voice, appearance, intelligence and luck; in the fact that some are servants, whereas others are their rich masters; in the fact that some are naturally in good health, while others are in bad, or are different in the length of life; from the fact that infants know how to cry, suck, smile or fear without any previous instruction or experience; that with the same kind of efforts two persons reap two different kinds of results; that some are naturally adepts in certain subjects and dull in others; and that there are at least some who remember their past lives; for from these facts the only hypothesis that can be made is that these differences are due to the karma of one's past life, otherwise called daiva, and that the fruits of the good and bad deeds of this life will be reaped in another. It has also been pointed out in a previous section that a child does not owe his or her intellectual parts to the father or to the mother. These gifts belong to the soul of the child, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that the son of an intellectually deficient person will on that account be necessarily dull.

Caraka further urges that the truth of rebirth can be demonstrated by all possible proofs. He first refers to the verdict of the Vedas and of the opinions of philosophers, which are written for the good of the people and are in conformity with the views of the wise and the virtuous and not in opposition to the opinions of the Vedas. Such writings always recommend gifts, penances, sacrifices, truthfulness, non-injury to all living beings and sex-continence as leading to heavenly happiness and to liberation (moksa). The sages say that liberation, or the cessation of rebirth, is only for those who have completely purged off all mental and bodily defects. This implies that these sages accepted the theory of rebirth as true; and there have been other sages who also have distinctly announced the truth of rebirth. Apart from the testimony of the Vedas and of the sages, even perception (pratyaksa) also proves the truth of rebirth. Thus it is seen that children are often very different from their parents, and even from the same parents the children born are often very different in colour, voice, frame of body, mental disposition, intelligence and luck, as described above. The natural inference to be based on these data directly experienced is that no one can avoid the effects of the

deeds he has performed, and that therefore what was performed in a past birth is indestructible and always follows a man in his present birth as his daiva, or karma, the fruits of which show in his present life. The deeds of the present birth will again accumulate fruits, which will be reaped in the next birth. From the present fruits of pleasurable or painful experiences their past seeds as past karma are inferred, and from the present deeds as seeds their future effects as pleasurable or painful experiences in another birth are also inferred. Apart from this inference other reasons also lead to the same condition. Thus the living foetus is produced by the combination of the six elements, to which connection with the self from the other world is indispensable; so also fruits can only be reaped when the actions have been performed and not if they are not performed—there cannot be shoots without seeds. It may be noted in this connection that in no other system of Indian thought has any attempt been made to prove the theory of rebirth as has here been done. A slight attempt was made in the Nyaya system to prove the theory on the ground that the crying, sucking and the natural fear of infants implies previous experience. But Caraka in a systematic manner takes up many more points and appeals to the different logical proofs that may be adduced. Again, we find the nature of the fruits of action (karma) discussed in the Vyasa-bhasya on the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali. It is said in the Yoga-sutra, n. 13, that the karmas of past life determine the particular birth of the individual in a good or bad or poor or rich family and the length of life and pleasurable or painful experiences. But that physical differences of body, colour, voice, temperament, mental disposition and special intellectual features are also due to the deeds of the past life seems to be a wholly new idea. It is, however, interesting to note that, though Caraka attributes the divergence of intelligence to deeds of the past life, yet he does not attribute thereto the weakness or the strength of the moral will.

Caraka further refers to the collective evil effects of the misdeeds of people living in a particular locality, which may often lead to the outbreak of epidemics. Speaking of the outbreak of epidemic diseases, he says that they are due to the pollution of air and water, and to country and climatic revolutions. The pollution of air consists in its being unnatural for the season, dull and motionless, too violent, too dry, too cold, too warm, stormy, of the nature of whirlwind, too humid, dusty, smoky, impure or of

bad smell. The pollution of water consists in its being of unnatural colour, bad smell, bad taste, containing impurities (when devoid of its natural qualities), which are often avoided by water birds, and being unpleasant, and having its sources largely dried up. The pollution of a particular locality occurs when it is infested with lizards, wild animals, mosquitoes, flies, insects, mice, owls, predatory birds or jackals, or when it is full of wild creepers, grass, etc., or when there is a failure of crops, the air smoky, etc. The pollution of time consists in the happening of unnatural climatic conditions. The cause of these epidemic conditions is said to be the demerit (adharma) due to the evil deeds of past life, the commission of which is again due to bad deeds of previous life. When the chief persons of a country, city or locality transgress the righteous course and lead the people in an unrighteous manner, the people also in their conduct continue to grow vicious and sinful. And, as a result of the misdeeds of the people of the locality, the gods forsake that place, there is no proper rain, the air, water and the country as a whole become polluted and epidemics break out. Thus the misdeeds of a people can, according to Caraka, pollute the whole region and ultimately ruin it. When a country is ruined by civil war, then that also is due to the sins of the people, who are inflated with too much greed, anger, pride and ignorance. Thus epidemics are caused by the conjoint sins of the people of a particular region. But even at the time of the outbreak of such epidemics those who have not committed such bad actions as to deserve punishment may save themselves by taking proper medicines and by leading a virtuous life. Continuing to establish his theory that all climatic and other natural evils are due to the commission of sins or adharma, Caraka says that in ancient times people were virtuous, of strong and stout physique and extremely long-lived, and on account of their virtuous ways of living there were no climatic disturbances, no famines, no failure of crops, no drought and no pollutions leading to epidemics and diseases. But at the close of the satya-yuga, through over-eating some rich men became too fat, and hence they became easily tired, and hence became lazy, and on account of laziness they acquired the storing habit {sancayd) y and, through that, the tendency to receive things from others (parigraha), and, through that, greed (lobha). In the next, Treta, age, from greed there arose malice, from malice lying, from lying desire, anger, conceit, antipathy, cruelty.

violence (abhighata), fear, sorrow and anxiety. Thus in the Treta age dharma diminished by a quarter, and so the earthly production of harvest, etc. also diminished by a quarter, and the bodies of living beings lost their vitality accordingly; their length of life diminished, and diseases began to grow. So in the Dvapara age there was a further diminution of the quantities of earthly productions and a further weakening of human constitution and shortening of the length of life.

It may be remembered that in Su£ruta, hi. i, it is said that many persons of the medical school of thought had conceived this world to have come into being either through time {kala) y in the natural process by a blind destiny (niyati), or through a mere nature (svabhdva), accidental concourse of things (yadrccha), or through evolution (parinama) by the will of God; and they called each of these alternatives the prakrti, or the origin of the world 1 . But the notion of the Samkhya prakrti holds within it all these concepts, and it is therefore more appropriate to admit one prakrti as the evolving cause of the world. Gayi, in interpreting this, holds that prakrti is to be regarded as the evolving material cause, whereas time, natural process, etc. are to be regarded as instrumental causes for the world-manifestation. According to Susruta the selves (ksetra-jna) are not in the medical school regarded as all-pervasive (a-sarva-gata), as they are in the Samkhya system of thought. These selves, on account of their virtues or vices, transmigrate from one life to another as men or as different animals; for, though not all-pervasive, they are eternal and are not destroyed by death. The selves are not to be regarded as self-revealing, as in Samkhya or the Vedanta; but they can be inferred, as the substance or entity to which the feelings of pleasure and pain belong, and they are always endowed with consciousness, though they may not themselves be regarded as of the nature of pure consciousness. They are cetanavantah (endowed with con-

1 The primary use of prakrti may have been due to the idea of an enquiry regarding the source and origin of the world. Prakrti literally means "source" or "origin." So the term was probably used in reference to other speculations regarding the origin of the world before it was technically applied as a Samkhya term. The ideas of svabhava, kala, etc. seem to have been combined to form the technical Samkhya concept of prakrti, and two schools of Samkhya, the Kapila and the Patafijali schools, arose in connection with the dispute as to the starting of the evolution of prakrti accidentally (yadrcchd) or by the will of God. The idea of prakrti was reached by combining all the alternative sources of world-manifestation that were current before, and so they are all conserved in the notion of prakrti.

sciousness) and not dt-svarupah (of the nature of consciousness). They are extremely subtle or fine (parama-suksma), and this epithet is explained by Dalhana as meaning that the selves are as small as atoms. But, being always endowed with consciousness, they can also through self-perception (pratyaksa) be perceived as existing. The transmigration of these selves is regulated by the merit and demerit of their deeds. Dalhana says that through excessive sins they are born as animals, through an admixture of virtues and sins they are born as men, and through a preponderance of virtues they are born as gods. But according to Caraka not only is the nature of transmigration controlled by the good or bad deeds of a man, but even the productivity of nature, its purity or pollution; and the thousand and one things in which nature is helpful or harmful to men are determined by good and bad deeds (dharma and adharma). Dharma and adharma are therefore regarded as the most important factors in determining most of the human conditions of life and world-conditions of environment. Such a view is not opposed to the Samkhya theory of world-creation; for there also it is held that the evolution of prakrti is determined by the good or bad deeds of the selves; but, though implied, yet in no Samkhya work is such a clear and specific determination of world-conditions and world-evolution through the merit and demerit of human beings to be found. Freedom of human will is almost wholly admitted by Caraka, and, where the fruits of previous actions are not of a confirmed character, they can be averted or improved.by our efforts. Our efforts thus have on the one hand a cosmical or universal effect, as determining the conditions of the development of the material world, and on the other hand they determine the fate of the individual. The fruits of our actions determine our birth, our experiences and many intellectual gifts; but they do not determine the nature of our will or affect its strength of application in particular directions.

Springs of action in the Caraka-samhita.

The chief feature of Caraka's springs of action consists in the fact that he considers three primary desires as the motive causes of all our actions. These are, as has already been said, the desire for life, the desire for riches and the desire for future life. In this Caraka seems to have a view uniquely different from that of most

of the systems of philosophy, which refer to a number of emotions as the root causes prompting us to action. Thus the Vai^esika regards attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain as the cause of all our actions. Pleasure is defined as being a sort of feeling which is approved and welcomed and towards which an attraction is naturally felt. Pleasures, therefore, when they arise, must always be felt, and there cannot be anything like unfelt pleasures. Apart from sensory pleasures, Sridhara in his Nydya-kandali discusses the existence of other kinds of pleasure, due to the remembering of past things, or to calmness and contentedness of mind or self-knowledge. Pleasures are, however, regarded as the fruits of meritorious deeds (dharma) performed before. Pain, the reverse of pleasure, may be defined as an experience from which we are repelled and which is the result of past misdeeds. Desire, as the wish to have what is unattained (aprapta-prarthana), may be either for the self (svartha) or for others (parartha). Such desires may be prompted by any of the following: longing for happiness in heaven or on earth (kama), appetites (abhilasa), longing for the continuation and recurrence of the enjoyment of pleasurable objects, compassion for others (karuna), disinclination to worldly enjoyment (vairagya), intention of deceiving others (upadha), subconscious motives (bhava). Prasastapada, however, distinguishes between desires for enjoyment and desires for work. But he does not include the positive Buddhist virtues of friendship (maitri) and a feeling of happiness in the happiness of others (mudita), and he is content with only the negative virtue of compassion (karuna). He also counts anger, malice, suppressed revengefulness (manyu), jealousy of the good qualities of others (aksama), and envy arising from a sense of one's inferiority (atnarsd). But, in spite of this elaborate classification, Prasastapada makes in reality two broad divisions, namely, desires arising from attachment to pleasures, and those from aversion to pain. Pain is as much a positive feeling as pleasure and cannot be regarded as mere negation of pleasure. Though Prasastapada knows that there is such a thing as desire for work, yet he does not give it any prominent consideration, and the net result of his classification of the springs of action is that he thinks that all desires are prompted by attachment to feelings of pleasure and antipathy to pain. Feelings, therefore, are to be regarded here as fundamentally determining all desires and through them all actions. The Naiyayikas think that attachment and antipathy can be

traced to a more fundamental root, viz. ignorance or delusion (moha). Thus Vatsyayana, by tracing attachment or antipathy to ignorance, tends to intellectualize the psychological basis of Prasastapada. For moha would mean want of knowledge, and, if attachment and antipathy be due to want of knowledge, then one can no longer say that feelings ultimately determine our actions, as it is the absence of right knowledge that is found to be ultimately the determinant of the rise of all feelings and emotions. Jayanta, however, in his Nyaya-manjarl, counts ignorance {moha), attachment {raga) and antipathy (dvesa) as being three parallel defects (dosa) which prompt our efforts 1 . Under attachment he counts sex-inclination (kama), disinclination to part with that which would not diminish by sharing with others (matsara), jealousy (sprha), inclination towards birth again and again (trsna) and inclination towards taking forbidden things (lobha). Under dvesa he counts emotional outbursts of anger with burning bodily conditions, envy (irsya), jealousy at the good qualities of others (asuya), injuring others (droha) and concealed malice (manyu). Under ignorance he counts false knowledge (mithya-jnana), perplexity due to indecision (vicikitsa), sense of false superiority (mada) and mistakes of judgment (pramada). But he adds that of the three defects, raga, dvesa and moha, moha is the worst, since the other two arise through it. For it is only the ignorant who are under the sway of attachment and antipathy. To the objection that in that case moha ought not to be counted as a defect in itself, but as the source of the other two defects, Jayanta replies that, though it is a source of the other two defects, it of itself also leads people to action and should therefore be counted as a defect in itself. It is no doubt true that all defects are due to false knowledge and are removed by right knowledge; yet it would be wrong to count the defects as being of only one kind of false knowledge (mithya-jnana); for the three defects are psychologically felt to have three distinctive characteristics. Jayanta, while admitting that the feelings of attachment or antipathy are due to ignorance, considers them to be psychologically so important as to be regarded as independent springs of action. Thus, while he was in nominal agreement with Vatsyayana in regarding attachment and antipathy as being due to moha, he felt their independent

1 Tesam dosdndm trayo rasayo bhavanti rago dveso moha iti. Nyaya-manjarl, p. 500-

psychological importance and counted them as parallel defects prompting our efforts.

Patanjali divides all our actions into two classes, vicious (klistd) and virtuous (aklista). The virtuous actions are prompted by our natural propensity towards emancipation, while the vicious ones are prompted by ignorance (avidya), egoism (asmita), attachment (raga), antipathy (dvesa) and the will to live (abhinivesa). The latter four, though of the nature of feeling, are yet regarded as being only manifestations of the growth and development of ignorance (avidya). It is a characteristic peculiarity of the Samkhya philosophy that thoughts and feelings are not regarded there as being intrinsically different; for the gunas form the materials of both thoughts and feelings. What is thought in one aspect is feeling in another. It was on this account that false knowledge could be considered to have developed into the feelings of egoism, attachment and antipathy, and could be regarded as being of the same stuff as false knowledge. In the Nyaya psychology, thought and feelings being considered intrinsically different, a difficulty was felt in reconciling the fact that, while ignorance could be regarded as being the cause of the feelings of attachment and antipathy, the latter could not be regarded as being identical with ignorance (moha). Jayanta, therefore, while he traced raga and dvesa to moha, ontologically considered them as parallel factors determining our actions psychologically. In the Samkhya-Yoga metaphysics this difficulty could be obviated; for that school did not consider feelings to be different from thoughts, since the thoughts are themselves made up of feeling-stuff; hence even false knowledge {avidya) need not be regarded as being wholly an intellectual element, since it is itself the product of the feeling-stuff— the gunas.

It is needless to refer in detail to the theories of the springs of action in other systems of Indian thought. From what has already been said it would appear that most systems of Indian Philosophy consider false knowledge to be at the root of all our worldly activities through the mediation of feelings of attachment, antipathy and self-love. There is an inherent pessimism in most systems of Indian thought, which consider that normally we are all under the evil influence of false knowledge and are all gliding on the downward path of sins and afflictions. They also consider that all attachments lead to bondage and slavery to passions, and thereby lead us away from the path of liberation. Actions are

judged as good or bad according as they lead to liberation or bondage; their efficacy is in securing the transcendental realization of the highest truth and the cessation of rebirth, or obscuration of the nature of reality and exposure to the miseries of rebirth.

But Caraka gives us a scheme of life in which he traces the springs of all our actions to the three fundamental motives or biological instincts of life-preservation, worldly desire of acquiring riches for enjoyment, and other worldly aspirations of self-realization. According to him these three fundamental desires sum up all springs of action. On this view will appears to be more fundamental than feeling or knowledge. Caraka does not seem to begin from the old and stereotyped idea that false knowledge is the starting-point of the world. His is a scheme of a well-balanced life which is guided by the harmonious play of these three fundamental desires and directed by perfect wisdom and unerring judgment. Evil and mischief creep in through errors of judgment, by which the harmony of these desires is broken. All kinds of misdeeds are traced, not to feelings of attachment or antipathy, but to errors of judgment or foolishness (prajnaparadha). This prajnaparadha may be compared to the moha or avidya of the Nyaya and Yoga. But, while the Nyaya and Yoga seem to refer to this moha or avidya as a fundamental defect inherent in our mental constitution and determining its activities as a formative element, Caraka's prajnaparadha is not made to occupy any metaphysical status, but expresses itself only in the individual lapses of judgment.

Caraka, however, did not dare to come into conflict with the prevailing ethical and philosophical opinions of his time, and we find that in Sarira, 1 he largely accepts the traditional views. He says there that it is the phenomenal self {bhutatman or samyoga-purusa) that feels pleasure and pain, and in connection with the duty of a physician to remove all physical sufferings produced by diseases he says that the ultimate healing of all pain consists in the permanent naisthiki (removal) of pain by the removal of grasping (upadha) 1 . He says there that grasping (upadha) is itself sorrowful and the cause of all sorrows. All sorrows can be removed by the removal of all grasping tendencies. Just as a silkworm draws out its cocoon thread to its own destruction, so does

1 Cakrapani interprets upadha as desire (trsnd) ; but it seems to me that it would have been more correct to interpret it as the Buddhist upadana, or grasping. Cakrapani on Caraka, iv. r. 93.

the miserable man of ignorance draw desires and longings from the objects of sense. He is wise indeed who considers all objects as fire and withdraws himself from them. With the cessation of all actions (anarambha) and dissociation from sense-objects there is no more fear of being afflicted with sorrows. Sorrows, again, are said to proceed from four causes, namely, the wrong notion of non-eternal things (e.g. sense-objects) as eternal (buddhi-vibhratnsa), the want of the power of controlling the mind from undesirable courses (dhrti-vibhramsa), forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge (stnrti-vibhramsa) and the adoption of unhygienic courses (asatmya-arthagama). Prajnaparadha is defined here as a wrong action that is done through the confusion of intelligence and want of self-control and right knowledge (dhi-dhrti-smrti-vibhrasta), and this is supposed to rouse up all maladies and defects (sarva-dosa-prakopana). Some of the offences that may be counted under prajnaparadha are as follows: to set things in motion, to try to stop moving objects, to let the proper time for doing things pass by, to begin an action in the wrong manner, not to behave in the accustomed manner, not to behave modestly and politely, to insult respected persons, to go about in wrong places or at wrong times, to take objects which are known to be harmful, not to abide by the proper course of conduct described in the Caraka-samhita, I. i. 6; the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance, egoism, errors, all actions prompted by these and whatever else that is prompted by ignorance (moha) and self-ostentation (rajas). Prajnaparadha is further defined as error of judgment (visama-vijnana) and as wrong enterprise (visama-pravartana), proceeding out of wrong knowledge or erroneous judgment. It will thus appear that it is wise to take prajnaparadha in the wider sense of error of judgment or misapplied intelligence, regarding it as the cause of all kinds of moral depravity, unhealthy and unhygienic habits and accidental injuries of all kinds. As Caraka admitted the existence of the self and of rebirth and regarded moral merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) as the causes of all human enjoyment and sufferings, and of the productivity or unproductivity of the ground, and the hygienic or unhygienic conditions of water, air and the seasons, he had to include within prajnaparadha the causes that led to vices and sins. The causes of all sorrows are, firstly, wrong consideration of the non-eternal as eternal and of the injurious as good; secondly, want of self-control; and, thirdly, the defect of

memory (smrti-bhramsa), through which the right knowledge and right experience of the past cannot be brought into effect. Thus, though in a sense Caraka compromises with the traditional schools of philosophy in including philosophical ignorance or misconception within prajnaparddha, and though he thinks that philosophical ignorance produces sins, yet he takes prajnaparddha in the very wide sense of error of judgment, leading to all kinds of transgression of laws of health and laws of society and custom, risky adventures, and all other indiscreet and improper actions. Prajnaparddha, therefore, though it includes the philosophical moha of the traditional school of philosophy, is yet something very much more, and is to be taken in the wider sense of error of judgment. Caraka, no doubt, admits jealousy, vanity, anger, greed, ignorance (moha), etc., as producing improper action, but he admits many other causes as well. But the one supreme cause of all these subsidiary causes is prajnaparddha, or error of judgment, taken in its wide sense. It will not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that, according to Caraka, all proper actions are undertaken through the prompting of three fundamental desires, the desire for life, the desire for wealth and enjoyment, and the desire for spiritual good. And all improper actions are due to improper understanding, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence (prajnaparddha). The three fundamental desires, unassociated with any error of judgment or lack of understanding, may thus be regarded as the root cause of all proper actions. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in giving full play to the functioning of the three fundamental desires, so long as there is no misdirected understanding and confusion to turn them into the wrong path. Caraka does not seem to agree with other systems of philosophy in holding the feelings of attachment and antipathy to be the springs of all actions. Actions are prompted by the normal active tendencies of the three fundamental desires, and they become sinful when our energies are wrongly directed through lack of understanding. Though Caraka had to compromise with the acknowledged view of the systems of Indian Philosophy that the cessation of all sorrows can be only through the cessation of all actions, yet it seems clear that the course of conduct that he approves consists in the normal exercise of the three fundamental desires, free from the commission of any errors of judgment (prajnaparddha). Thus Caraka does not preach the ideal of leaving off desires,

DII 27

attachments, feelings and actions of all kinds, nor does he advocate the Gita ideal of the performance of duties without attachment. His is the ideal of living one's life in a manner that is most conducive to health, long life, and proper enjoyment. Our only care should be that we do not commit any mistake in eating, drinking and other actions of life which may directly or indirectly (through the production of sins) produce diseases and sufferings or jeopardize our life and enjoyment in any way. This unique character of Caraka's ethical position is very clearly proved by the code of conduct, virtues and methods of leading a good life elaborated by Caraka. He no doubt shows a lip-sympathy with the ideal of giving up all actions {sannyasd) ; but his real sympathies seem to be with the normal scheme of life, involving normal enjoyments and fruition of desires. A normal life, according to Caraka, ought also to be a virtuous life, as vices and sins are the sources of all sorrows, sufferings and diseases in this life and the next.

Good Life in Caraka.

It is well worth pointing out at the outset that "good life" in Caraka means not only an ethically virtuous life, but a life which is free from diseases, and which is so led that it attains its normal length. Moral life thus means a life that is free from the defect of prajnaparddha. It means wise and prudent life; for it is only the want of wisdom and prudence that is the cause of all physical, social, physiological, moral and spiritual mischiefs. To be a good man, it is not enough that one should practise the ethical virtues: a man should practise the physical, physiological and social virtues as well. He must try to live a healthy and long life, free from diseases and sufferings and free from reproaches of any kind. It is important to note that Caraka does not believe in the forced separation of the physical life from the mental and the moral. Physical diseases are to be cured by medicines, while mental diseases are to be cured by right and proper knowledge of things, self-control and self-concentration. The close interconnection between body and mind was well known from early times, and even the Maha-bharata (xn. 16) says that out of the body arise the mental diseases and out of the mind arise the bodily diseases. Caraka also thinks that a physician should try to cure not only the bodily diseases but also the mental diseases.

The Maha-bharata further says in the same chapter that there are three elements in the body, viz. heat, cold and air; when they are in a state of equipoise, the body is healthy, and when any one of them predominates, there is disease. The mind is constituted of sattva, rajas and tamas ; when these are in a state of equipoise, the mind is in proper order, and when any one of them predominates, it becomes diseased. Caraka, however, thinks that it is only when rajas and tamas predominate that the mind gets diseased. But, whatever these differences may be, it is evident that, when Caraka speaks of life, he includes both mind and body, and it is the welfare of both that is the chief concern of the physician. Caraka's prohibitions and injunctions are therefore based on this twofold good of body and mind that ought to be aimed at.

After speaking of the harmfulness of attempting to control some of the bodily excretory movements, he recommends the necessity of attempting to control certain other mental and bodily tendencies. Thus he forbids all persons to indulge rashly in their unthinking tendencies to eommit mistakes of mind, speech and action. A man should also control his passion of greed, and his feelings of grief, fear, anger, vanity, shamelessness, envy, attachment and solicitude. He should not speak harshly or talk too much or use stinging words or lie or speak irrelevantly or untimely. He should not injure others by his body, indulge in unrestricted sex-gratifications, or steal. Injury to living beings (himsa) is supposed to produce sins and thereby affects one's longevity. Non-injury is thus described as being the best way of increasing life (ahimsa prana-vardhananam). The man who follows the above right course of life is called virtuous, and he enjoys wealth, satisfies his desires, abides by the laws (dharma) of a good life, and is happy. Along with the proper and well-controlled exercise of the moral functions Caraka advises people to take to well-controlled bodily exercises {vyayatna). When moderately performed, they give lightness, power of doing work, steadiness (sthairya) and fortitude (duhkha-sahisnuta). Avoidance of unwise courses and non-commission of errors of judgment (tyagah prajnaparadhanam), sense-control, remembrance of past experiences (smrti), due knowledge of one's own powers, due regard to proper time and place and good conduct prevent the inrush of mental and bodily diseases; for it is these which are the essentials of a good life, and a wise man always does what is good for himself. Caraka further advises

27-2

that one should not keep company with those who are sinful in character, speech and mind, or with those who are quarrelsome, greedy, jealous, crooked, light-minded or fond of speaking ill of others or cruel or vicious, or with those who associate with one's enemies. But one should always associate with those who are wise, learned, aged, with men of character, firmness, self-concentration, ready experience, with those who know the nature of things and are full of equanimity, and those who direct us in the right path, are good to all beings, possess a settled character and are peaceful and self-contented. In these ways a man should try, on the one hand, to secure himself against the inrush of mental troubles which upset one's moral life and, on the other hand, properly to attend to his bodily welfare by taking the proper kind of food at the proper time and attending to other details of physical well-being 1 .

The rules of good conduct (sad-vrtta) are described in detail by Caraka as follows 2 :

A man should respect gods, cows, Brahmanas, preceptors (guru), elderly persons, saints and teachers (acarya), holdauspicious amulets, bathe twice and clean all the pores of the body and feet and cut his hair, beard and nails three times in a fortnight. He should be well-dressed, should always oil his head, ears, nose and feet, comb his hair, scent himself and smoke (dhuma-pa). He should recognize others with a pleasant face, help others in difficulties, perform sacrifices, make gifts, talk delightfully, nicely and for the good of others, be self-controlled {vasyatmari) and of a virtuous temperament. He should envy the cause of another's prosperity in the form of his good character and other causes of his personal efficiency (hetav irsyu), but should not be jealous of the fruits of these in the form of a man's prosperity or wealth (phale nersyii). He should be of firm decision, fearless, susceptible to the feeling of shame, intelligent, energetic, skilful, of a forgiving nature, virtuous and a believer (astika). He should use umbrellas, sticks, turbans and shoes, and should at the time of walking look four cubits of ground in front of him; he should avoid going to impure, unclean and dirty places; he should try to appease those who are angry, soothe the fears of those who have become afraid, help the poor, keep his promises, bear harsh words, be self-controlled, remove the causes of attachments and antipathy (raga-dvesa) and behave as the friend of all living beings. Again, 1 See Caraka-samhito, I. 7. 2 Ibid. I. 8.

one should not tell lies, or take that which belongs to others, should not commit adultery, or be jealous at other people's wealth, should not be given to creating enemies, should not commit sins, or do wrong even to a sinner, or speak about the defects or secrets of others; should not keep company with the sinful or with those who are the king's enemies or with madmen, the mean, wicked, outcast, or those who make abortions. One should not climb into bad vehicles, lie on hard beds, or beds without sheets or pillows, should not climb steep mountain sides or trees or bathe in fast flowing rivers with strong currents; one should not go about places where there are great fires raging, or laugh loudly or yawn or laugh without covering the face, or pick one's teeth. Again, one should not break the laws ordained by a large number of persons, or other laws in general; should not go about at night in improper places, or make friends with youngsters, old or greedy people, fools, sinners or eunuchs; one should not be fond of wines, gambling, prostitutes, divulge secrets, insult others, be proud or boastful or speak ill of old people, teachers, kings or assemblages of persons, or talk too much; one should not turn out relations, friends or those who know one's secrets. One should attend at the proper time to every action, should not undertake to do anything without properly examining it, or be too procrastinating, or be under the influence of anger and pleasure; one should not be very down-hearted in afflictions, or too elated in success, or too disappointed in failures; should practice sex-continence, try to be wise, make gifts, be friendly and compassionate to all and always contented. It is needless to continue to enumerate all the qualities, which would commonly be included within the requisites of a good life. In this Caraka seems to cut an absolutely new way, and in no other branch of Indian thought can we note such an assemblage of good qualities of all the different kinds necessary not only for a virtuous life, but for the healthy and successful life of a good citizen.

It has already been pointed out that error of judgment or delusion, in whichever sphere it may be exercised, is the root of all mischiefs and all troubles. And Caraka demonstrates this by enumerating in his schedule of good conduct proper behaviour in all the different concerns and spheres of life. To Caraka the conception of life is not as moral or immoral, but as good (hita) and bad (ahita). It is true, no doubt, that here and there stray statements are

found in the Caraka-samhita which regard the cessation of all sorrows as the ultimate end of life; but it is obvious that Caraka's main approach to the subject shows very clearly that, though moral virtues are always very highly appreciated, yet the non-moral virtues, such as the proper taking care of the well-being of one's own body and the observance of social rules and forms of etiquette or normal prudent behaviour, are regarded as being equally necessary for the maintenance of a good life. Transgressions and sins are the causes of mental worries, troubles and also of many mental and physical diseases, and one ought therefore to take proper care that they may not enter into one's life; and it is said that the diseases produced by strong sinful acts cannot be cured by the ordinary means of the application of medicines and the like, until with the proper period of their sufferings they subside of themselves. But sins and transgressions are not the only causes of our desires, accidents and other domestic, social and political troubles. It is through our imprudent behaviour and conduct, which are due to error of judgment {prajndparadha), as our other sins and immoral acts are, that all our bodily and mental troubles happen to us. A good life, which is the ideal of every person, is a life of peace, contentment and happiness, free from desires and troubles of all kinds. It is a life of prudence and well-balanced judgment, where every action is done with due consideration to its future consequences and where all that may lead to troubles and difficulties is carefully avoided. It is only such a life that can claim to be good and can be regarded as ideal. A merely moral or virtuous life is not our ideal, which must be good in every respect. Any transgression, be it of the rules of hygiene, rules of polite society, rules of good citizenship, or any deviation from the path which prudence or good judgment would recommend to be wise, may disturb the peace of life. A scheme of good life thus means a wise life, and observance of morality is but one of the many ways in which wisdom can be shown.

Ayur-veda, or the Science of Life, deals primarily with the ways in which a life may be good (hita), bad (ahita), happy (sukha) or unhappy (asukha). A happy life is described as a life undisturbed by bodily and mental diseases, full of youth and proper strength, vitality, energy, power of launching new efforts, endowed with wisdom, knowledge and efficient sense-organs—a life which is full of all kinds of desirable enjoyments and in which the ventures that

are undertaken are all successful. The opposite of this is what may be called an unhappy life. The happy life thus represents a life so far as it is happy and enjoyable and so far as it satisfies us. The good life is the life as it is moulded and developed by our right conduct. In a way it is the good life that makes a happy life. They who seek a good life should desist from the sins of taking other people's possessions and be truthful and self-controlled. They should perform every action with proper observation, care and judgment, and should not be hasty or make mistakes by their carelessness ; they should attend to the attainment of virtue, wealth and the enjoyments of life without giving undue emphasis to any of them; they should respect those who are revered, should be learned, wise and of a peaceful mind and control their tendencies to attachment, anger, jealousy and false pride; they should always make gifts; they should lead a life of rigour (tapas) and attain wisdom, self-knowledge or philosophy {adhyatma-vidah), and behave in such a way that the interests of both the present life on earth and the life hereafter may be attended to with care and judgment, always remembering the lessons of past experience 1 . It is now clear that the ideal of good life in Caraka is not the same as that of the different systems of philosophy which are technically called the Science of Liberation (moksa-sastra). The fundamental idea of a good life is that a life should be so regulated that the body and mind may be free from diseases, that it should not run into unnecessary risks of danger through carelessness, that it should be virtuous, pure and moral; that it should be a prudent and wise life which abides by the laws of polite society and of good and loyal citizens, manifesting keen alertness in thought and execution and tending constantly to its own good—good for all interests of life, body, mind and spirit.

Ayur-veda Literature.

The systematic development of Indian' medicine proceeded primarily on two principal lines, viz. one that of Susruta and the other that of Caraka. It is said in Susruta's great work, Susruta-samhita, that Brahma originally composed the Ayur-veda in one hundred verses, divided into one thousand chapters, even before he had created human beings, and that later on, having regard to the shortness of human life and the poverty of the human intellect,

1 Caraka-samhitd, I. 30. 22.

he divided it into the eight parts, Salya, Salakya, etc., alluded to in a previous section. But this seems to be largely mythical. It is further said in the same connection in the Susruta-samhita y 1. 1 that the sages Aupadhenava, Vaitarana, Aurabhra, Pauskalavata, Karavirya, Gopuraraksita, Susruta and others approached Dhanvantari or Divodasa, king of KasI, for medical instruction. Susruta's work is therefore called a work of the Dhanvantari school. Though it was revised at a later date by Nagarjuna, yet Susruta himself is an old writer. A study of the Jatakas shows that the great physician Atreya, a teacher of Jlvaka, lived in Taxila shortly before Buddha 1 . It has been said in a preceding section that in the enumeration of bones Susruta shows a knowledge of Atreya's system of osteology. Hoernle has further shown in sections 42, 56, 60 and 61 of his "Osteology," that the Satapatha-Brahmana, which is at least as old as the sixth century B.C., shows an acquaintance with Susruta's views concerning the counting of bones. But, since Atreya could not have lived earlier than the sixth century B.C., and since the Satapatha-Brahmana of about the sixth century B.C. shows an acquaintance with Susruta's views, Hoernle conjectures that Susruta must have been contemporary with Atreya's pupil, Agnivesa 2 . But, admitting Hoernle's main contentions to be true, it may be pointed out that by the term veda-vadinah in Susruta-samhita, in. 5. 18 Susruta may have referred to authorities earlier than Atreya, from whom Atreya also may have drawn his materials. On this view, then, the lower limit of Susruta's death is fixed as the sixth or seventh century B.C., this being the date of the $atapatha-Brahmana,whi\e practically nothing can be said about the upper limit.

But it is almost certain that the work which now passes by the name of Susruta-samhita is not identically the same work that was composed by this elder Susruta (vrddha Susruta). Dalhana, who lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century, says in his Nibandha-samgraha that Nagarjuna was the reviser of the Susruta-samhita? ; and the Susruta-samhita itself contains a supplementary part after the Kalpa-sthana, called the Uttara-tantra (later work). In the edition of Susruta by P. Muralidhar, of Pharuknagar, there is a verse at the beginning, which says that that which was

1 Rockhill's Life of Buddha, pp. 65 and 96.

2 Hoernle's Medicine of Ancient India, Part I, "Osteology," pp. 7 and 8.

3 Pratisamskartapiha Nagarjuna eva. Dalhana's Nibandha-samgraha, 1. 1. 1.

so well taught for the good of the people by the great sage Dhan-vantari to the good pupil Susruta became famous all over the world as Siisruta-samhita, and is regarded as the best and the chief of the threefold Ayur-veda literature, and that it was strung together in the form of a book by no other person than Nagarjuna 1 . Cakra-pani also in his Bhanumatl refers to a reviser (pratisamskartr) ; but he does not mention his name. Gayadasa's panjika on Susruta, Susriita-candrika or Nyaya-candrika, has an observation on the eighth verse of the third chapter of the Nidana-sthana, in which he gives a different reading by Nagarjuna, which is the same as the present reading of Susruta in the corresponding passage 2 . Again, Rhatta Narahari in his Tippanl on the AstMga-hrdaya-samhita, called Vagbhata-khandana-mandana, in discussing mudha-garbha-nidana, annotates on the reading vasti-dvare vipannayah, which Vagbhata changes in borrowing from Susruta's vastimara-'vipanna-yah (11.8.14), andsaysthat zwsti-dvareis the reading of Nagarjuna 3 . That Nagarjuna had the habit of making supplements to his revisions of works is further testified by the fact that a work called Yoga-sataka, attributed to Nagarjuna, had also a supplementary chapter, called Uttara-tantra, in addition to its other chapters, Kaya-cikitsa, Salakya-tantra , Salya-tantra, Visa-tantra, Bhutavidya, Kaumara-tantra, Rasayana-tantra and Vajikarana-tantra. This makes it abundantly clear that what passes as the Susruta-satnhita was either entirely strung together from the traditional teachings of Susruta or entirely revised and enlarged by Nagarjuna on the basis of a nuclear work of Susruta which was available to Nagarjuna. But was Nagarjuna the only person who revised the Susruta-samhita} Dalhana's statement that it was Nagarjuna who was the reviser of the work (pratisamskartaplha Nagarjuna eva) is attested by the verse of the Muralidhar edition {Nagarjunenaiva grathita); but the use of the emphatic word eva in both suggests that there may have been other editions or revisions of Susruta by other writers as well. The hopelessly muddled condition of the readings,

1 Upadistd tu yd samyag Dhanvantari-maharsina Susrutaya susisydya lokdndm hita-vdnchayd sarvatra bhuvi vikhydtd ndmnd Susruta-somhitd Ayur-vedat-raylmadhye sresthd mdnyd tathottamd sd ca Nagarjunenaiva grathita grantha-rupatah.

2 Ndgdrjunas tu pathati; sarkard sikatd meho bhasmdkhyo 'smari-vaikrtam hi. In the Nirnaya-Sagara edition of IQ15 this is II. 3. 13, whereas in Jlvananda's edition it is 11. 3.8. See also Dr Cordier's Recentes DecouvertesdeMSS. Medicaux Sanscrits dans Vlnde, p. 13.

3 ata eva Nagarjunair vasti-dvdra iti pathyate.

chapter-divisions and textual arrangements in the chapters in different editions of the Susruta-samhita is such that there can be no doubt that from time to time many hands were in operation on this great work. Nor it is proper to think that the work of revising Susruta was limited to a pre-Cakrapani period. It is possible to point out at least one case in which it can be almost definitely proved that a new addition was made to the Susruta-samhita after Cakrapani, or the text of Susruta known to Dalhana was not known to Cakrapani. Thus, in dealing with the use of catheters and the processes of introducing medicine through the anus {vasti-kriya) in iv. 38, the texts of the Susruta-samhita commented on by Dalhana reveal many interesting details which are untouched in the chapter on Vasti in the Caraka-samhita ( Uttara-vasti, Siddhi-sthana, xn). This chapter of the Caraka-samhita was an addition by Drdhabala, who flourished in Kasmira or the Punjab, probably in the eighth or the ninth century. When Cakrapani wrote his commentary in the eleventh century, he did not make any reference to the materials found in the Susruta-samhita, nor did he introduce them into his own medical compendium, which passes by the name of Cakradatta. Cakrapani knew his Susruta-samhita well, as he had commented on it himself, and it is extremely unlikely that, if he had found any interesting particulars concerning •vasti-kriya in his text, he should not have utilized them in his commentary or in his own medical work. The inference, therefore, is almost irresistible that many interesting particulars regarding •vasti-kriya, absent in the texts of the Susruta-samhita in the ninth and eleventh centuries, were introduced into it in the twelfth century. It is difficult, however, to guess which Nagar-juna was the reviser or editor of the Susruta-samhita.', it is very unlikely that he was the famous Nagarjuna of the Madhyamika-karika, the great teacher of Sunyavada; for the accounts of the life of this Nagarjuna, as known from Chinese and Tibetan sources, nowhere suggest that he revised or edited the Susruta-samhita.. Alberuni speaks of a Nagarjuna who was born in Dihaka, near Somanatha (Gujarat), about one hundred years before himself, i.e. about the middle of the ninth century, and who had written an excellent work on alchemy, containing the substance of the whole literature of the subject, which by Alberuni's time had become very rare. It is not improbable that this Nagarjuna was the author of the Kaksaputa-tantra, which is

avowedly written with materials collected from the alchemical works of various religious communities and which deals with the eightfold miraculous acquirements (asta-siddhi). But Vrnda in his Siddha-yoga refers to a formula by Nagarjuna which was said to have been written on a pillar in Pataliputra 1 . This formula is reproduced by Cakrapani Datta, Varigasena and by Nityanatha Siddha in his Rasa-ratnakara. But since Vrnda, the earliest of these writers, flourished about the eighth or the ninth century, and since his formula was taken from an inscription, it is not improbable that this Nagarjuna flourished a few centuries before him.

Of the commentaries on the Susruta-samhita the most important now current is Dalhana's Nibandha-samgraha. Dalhana quotes Cakrapani, of a.u. 1060, and is himself quoted by Hemadri, of a.d. 1260. He therefore flourished between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. It has been pointed out that sufficient textual changes in the Susruta-samhita had occurred between Cakrapani and Dalhana's time to have taken at least about one hundred years. I am therefore inclined to think that Dalhana lived late in the twelfth, or early in the thirteenth, century at the court of King Sahapala Deva. Cakrapani had also written a commentary on the Susruta-samhita, called Bhanumati, the first book of which has been published by Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen. Dr Cordier notes that there is a complete manuscript of this at Benares. Niscala Kara and Srikantha Datta sometimes quote from Cakrapani's commentary on the Susruta-satnhita. Dalhana's commentary is called Nibandha-samgraha, which means that the book is collected from a number of commentaries, and he himself says in a colophon at the end of the Uttara-tantra that the physician Dalhana, son of Bharata, had written the work after consulting many other commentaries 2 . At the beginning of his Nibandha-samgraha he refers to Jaiyyata, Gayadasa, Bhaskara's panjika, Srimadhava and Brahmadeva. In his work he further mentions Caraka, Harita, Jatukarna, Kasyapa, Krsnatreya, Bhadrasaunaka, Nagarjuna, the two Vagbhatas, Videha, Hariscandra, Bhoja, Karltika Kunda and others. Hari-scandra was a commentator on the Caraka-samhita. It is curious, however, that, though Dalhana refers to Bhaskara and Srimadhava

1 Ndgdrjunena likhita stambhe Pataliputrake, v. 149.

2 Nibandhdn bahuso vlksya vaidyah Sribhdratdtmojah uttara-sthdnam akarot suspastam Dalhnnn bhisak.

Concluding verse of Dalhana's commentary on Susruta's Uttara-tantra, chap. 66.

at the beginning of his commentary, he does not refer to them in the body of it. Hoernle, however, is disposed to identify Bhaskara and Karttika Kunda as one person. Vijayaraksita and Srikantha Datta, commentators on Madhava's Nidana, refer to Karttika Kunda in connection with their allusions to the Susruta-samhita, but not to Bhaskara. A Patna inscription (E.I.I. 340, 345) says that King Bhoja had given the title of Vidyapati to Bhaskara Bhatta. Hoernle thinks that this Bhaskara was the same as Bhaskara Bhatta. Hoernle also suggests that Vrnda Madhava was the same as Srimadhava referred to by Dalhana. Madhava in his Siddha-yoga often modifies Susruta's statements. It may be that these modifications passed as Madhava's Tippana. Since Gayadasa and Cakra-pani both refer to Bhoja and do not refer to one another, it may be that Gayadasa was a contemporary of Cakrapani. Hoernle thinks that the Brahmadeva referred to by Dalhana was Sribrahma, the father of Mahesvara, who wrote his Sahasanka-carita in a.d. iiii. Mahesvara refers to Hariscandra as an early ancestor of his. It is not improbable that this Hariscandra was a commentator on Caraka. The poet Mahesvara was himself also a Kaviraja, and Heramba Sena's Gudha-bodhaka-samgraha was largely based on Mahesvara's work. Jejjata's commentary passed by the name of Brhal-laghu-panjika; Gayadasa's commentary was called the Susruta-candrika or Nyaya-candrika and Srimadhava or Madhava-Kara's Tippana was called Sloka-varttika. Gayadasa mentions the names of Bhoja, Suranandi and Svamidasa. Gzyadasa's panjika has been discovered only up to the Nidana-sthana, containing 3000 granthas. Among other commentators of SuSruta we hear the names of Gomin, Asadhavarman, Jinadasa, Naradanta, Gadadhara, Baspacandra, Soma, Govardhana and Prasnanidhana.

It may not be out of place here to mention the fact that the Samkhya philosophy summed up in the Sarira-sthana of Susruta is decidedly the Samkhya philosophy of Isvarakrsna, which, as I have elsewhere pointed out, is later than the Samkhya philosophy so elaborately treated in the Caraka-samhitd 1 . This fact also suggests that the revision of Susruta was executed after the composition of Isvarakrsna's work (about a.d. 200), which agrees with the view expressed above that the revision of Susruta was the work of Nagar-juna, who flourished about the fourth or the fifth century a.d. But it is extremely improbable that the elaborate medical doctrines 1 History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 313-322.

of an author who lived at so early a date as the sixth century B.C. could have remained in a dispersed condition until seven, eight or nine hundred years later. It is therefore very probable that the main basis of Susruta's work existed in a codified and well-arranged form from very early times. The work of the editor or reviser seems to have consisted in introducing supplements, such as the Uttara-tantra, and other chapters on relevant occasions. It does not seem impossible that close critical and comparative study of a number of published texts of the Susruta-samhita and of unpublished manuscripts may enable a future student to separate the original from the supplementary parts. The task, however, is rendered difficult by the fact that additions to the Susruta-samhita were probably not limited to one period, as has already been pointed out above.

It is well known that Atri's medical teachings, as collected by Agnivesa in his Agnivesa-tantra, which existed at least as late as Cakrapani, form the basis of a revised work by Caraka, who is said to have flourished during the time of Kaniska, passing by the name of Caraka-samhita 1 . It is now also well known that Caraka did not complete his task, but left it half-finished at a point in the Cikitsa-sthana, seventeen chapters of which, together with the books called Siddhi-stliana and Kalpa-sthana , were added by Kapilabala's son, Drdhabala, of the city of Pancanada, about the ninth century a.d. The statement that Drdhabala supplemented the work in the above way is found in the current texts of the Caraka-samhita 2 . Niscala Kara in his Ratna-prabha describes him as author of the Caraka-parisista , and Cakrapani, Vijayaraksita and Aruna-datta (a.d. 1240), whenever they have occasion to quote passages from his supplementary parts, all refer to Drdhabala as the author. The city of Pancanada was identified as the Punjab by Dr U. C. Dutt in his Materia Medica, which identification was accepted by Dr Cordier and referred to a supposed modern Panjpur,north of Attock in the Punjab. There are several Pancanadas in different parts of India, and one of them is mentioned in the fifty-ninth chapter of the Kasi-khanda; Gangadhara in his commentary identifies this with Benares, assigning no reason for such identification. Hoernle, however, thinks that this Pancanada is the modern village of

1 On Caraka's being the court-physician of Kaniska see S. Levi, Notes sur les Indo-Scythes, in Journal Asiatique, pp. 444 sqq.

2 Caraka-samhita, vi. 30 and Siddhi-sthana, vn. 8.

Pantzinor (" five channels " in Kashmir) and holds that Drdhabala was an inhabitant of this place. There are many passages in Caraka which the commentators believe to be additions of the Kasmlra recension {Kasmlra-patha). Madhava quotes a number of verses from the third chapter of the sixth section, on fevers, which verses are given with the omission of about twenty-four lines. Vijaya-raksita, in his commentary on Madhava's Nidana, says that these lines belong to the Kasmlra recension. Existing manuscripts vary very much with regard to these lines; for, while some have the lines, in others they are not found. In the same chapter there are other passages which are expressly noted by Cakrapanidatta as belonging to Kasmlra recensions, and are not commented upon by him. There are also other examples. Hoernle points out that Jivananda's edition of 1877 gives the Kasmlra version, while his edition of 1896, as well as the editions of Gangadhara, the two Sens and Abinas, have Caraka's original version. Madhava never quotes readings belonging to the Kasmlra recension. Hoernle puts together four points, viz. that Caraka's work was revised and completed by Drdhabala, that there existed a Kasmlra recension of the Caraka-samhita, that Drdhabala calls himself a native of Pancanada city, and that there existed a holy place of that name in Kasmlra; and he argues that the so-called Kasmlra recension represents the revision of the Caraka-samhita by Drdhabala. Judging from the fact that Madhava takes no notice of the readings of the Kasmlra recension, he argues that the latter did not exist in Madhava's time and that therefore Madhava's date must be anterior to that of Drdhabala.

But which portions were added to the Caraka-samhita by Drdhabala? The obvious assumption is that he added the last seventeen chapters of the sixth book {Cikitsa) and the seventh and eighth books 1 . But such an assumption cannot hold good, since there is a great divergence in the counting of the number of the chapters in different manuscripts. Thus, while Jivananda's text marks Arsas, Atisara, Visarpa, Madatyaya and Dvivranlya as the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters of Cikitsa and therefore belonging to the original Caraka, Gahgadhara's text

1 asmin saptddasddhyd kalpah siddhaya eva ca

ndsddyante 'gnivesasya tantre Carakasamskrte tun etun Kapilabalah sesdn Drdhabalo 'karot tantrasyasya mahdrthasya purandrtham yathdyathani.

VI. 30. 274.

calls the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters Unmada, Apasmara, Ksatakslna, Svayathu and Udara. The seventeen chapters attributed to Drdhabala have consequently different titles in the Gangadhara and Jlvananda editions. Hoernle has discussed very critically these textual problems and achieved notable results in attributing chapters to Caraka or Drdhabala 1 . But it is needless for us to enter into these discussions.

Mahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Gananatha Sen, merely on the strength of the fact that the Raja-taranginl is silent on the matter 2 , disputes the traditional Chinese statement that Caraka was the court-physician of Kaniska. There is no ground to believe as gospel truth a tradition, which cannot be traced to any earlier authority than Bhoja (eleventh century), that Patanjali was the author of a medical work, and that therefore Patanjali and Caraka could be identified. His comparisons of some passages from Caraka (iv. 1) with some sutras of Patanjali are hardly relevant and he finally has to rest for support of this identification on the evidence of Ramabhadra Dlksita, a man of the seventeenth or the eighteenth century, who holds that Patanjali had written a work on medicine. He should have known that there were more Patanjalis than one, and that the alchemist and medical Patanjali was an entirely different person from Patanjali, the grammarian.

The most important commentary now completely available to us is the Ayur-veda-dipika, or Caraka-tatparya-tlka, of Cakrapani-datta. Another important commentary is the Caraka-panjika by Svamikumara. He was a Buddhist in faith, and he refers to the commentator Hariscandra. The Caraka-tattva-pradlpika was written in later times by Sivadasasena, who also wrote the Tattva-candrika, a commentary on Cakradatta. We hear also of other commentaries on Caraka by Baspacandra or Vapyacandra, Isana-deva, Isvarasena, Vakulakara, Jinadasa, Munidasa, Govardhana, Sandhyakara, Jaya nandl and the Caraka-candrika of Gayadasa.

Among other ancient treatises we may mention the Kasyapa-samhita, discovered in Kathmandu, a medical dialogue between Kasyapa, the teacher and Bhargava, the student. It is interesting to note that it has some verses (MS., pp. 105-110) which are identical with part of the fifth chapter of the first book of Caraka. There is another important manuscript, called Bharadvaja-

1 J.R.A.S., 1908 and 1909.

2 Pratyaksa-sariram, introduction.

samhita, which contains within it a small work called Bhesaja-kalpa, a commentary by Verikatesa 1 . Agnivesa's original work, the Agnivesa-samhita, which was the basis of Caraka's revision, was available at least up to the time of Cakrapani; Vijayaraksita and Srikanthadatta also quote from it 2 . Jatukarna's work also existed till the time of the same writers, as they occasionally quote from Jatukarna-samhitaP. The Parasara-samhita and Ksdrapdni-samhita were also available down to Srikanthadatta's, or even down to Sivadasa's, time. The Harlta-samhita (different from the printed and more modern text) was also available from the time of Cakrapani and Vijayaraksita, as is evident from the quotations from it in their works. Bhela's work, called Bhela-samhita, has already been published by the University of Calcutta. It may be remembered that Agnivesa, Bhela, Jatukarna, Parasara, Harita and Ksarapani were all fellow-students in medicine, reading with the same teacher, Atreya-Punarvasu; Agnivesa, being the most intelligent of them all, wrote his work first, but Bhela and his other fellow-students also wrote independent treatises, which were read before the assembly of medical scholars and approved by them. Another work of the same school, called Kharanada-samhita, and also a Visvamitra-samhita, both of which are not now available, are utilized by Cakrapani and other writers in their commentaries. The name samhita, however, is no guarantee of the antiquity of these texts, for the junior Vagbhata's work is also called Astdnga-hrdaya-samhitd. We have further a manuscript called Vararuci-samhitd, by Vararuci, and a Siddha-sara-samhita by Ravigupta, son of Durgagupta, which are of comparatively recent date. The Brahma-vaivarta-purana refers to a number of early medical works, such as the Cikitsd-tattva-vijnana of Dhanvantari, Cikitsd-darsana of Divodasa, Cikitsa-kaumudl of Kaslraja, Cikitsa-sara-tantra and Bhrama-ghna of Asvini, Vaidyaka-sarvasva of Nakula, Vyadhi-sindhu-vimardana of Sahadeva, Jnanarnava of Yama, Jivadana of Cyavana, Vaidya-sandeha-bhanjana of Janaka, Sarva-sara of Candrasuta, Tantra-sdra of Jabala, Vedanga-sara of Jajali, Niddna of Paila, Sarva-dhara of Karatha and Dvaidha-nirnaya-tantra of

1 See Dr Cordier's Recentes Decouvertes de MSS. Midicaux Sanserifs dans Vlnde (1898-1902).

2 See Cakrapani's commentary on Caraka-samhita, 11. 2, also fsrlkantha on the Siddha-yoga, Jvaradhikara.

3 Cakrapani's commentary, 11. 2 and 11. 5, also Jsrikantha on the Niddna (Ksudra-roga).

Agastya 1 . But nothing is known of these works, and it is difficult to say if they actually existed.

It is well known that there were two Vagbhatas (sometimes spelt Vahata). The earlier Vagbhata knew Caraka and Susruta. It is conjectured by Hoernle and others that the statement of I-tsing (a.d. 675-685), that the eight arts formerly existed in eight books, and that a man had lately epitomized them and made them into one bundle, and that all physicians in the five parts of India practised according to that book, alludes to the Astanga-samgraha of Vagbhata the elder. In that case Vagbhata I must have flourished either late in the sixth century or early in the seventh century; for I-tsing speaks of him as having epitomized the work " lately," and on the other hand time must be allowed for the circulation of such a work in the five parts of India. A comparison of Susruta and Vagbhata I shows that the study of anatomy had almost ceased to exist in the latter's time. It is very probable that Vagbhata was a Buddhist. The Astanga-samgraha has a commentary by Indu; but before Indu there had been other commentators, whose bad expositions were refuted by him 2 .

Madhava, Drdhabala and Vagbhata II all knew Vagbhata I. Madhava mentions him by name and occasionally quotes from him both in the Siddha-yoga and in the Nidana, and so also does Drdhabala 3 . Hoernle has shown that Drdhabala's 96 diseases of the eye are based on Vagbhata's 94. Vagbhata II towards the end of the Uttara-sthana of his Astanga-hrdaya-samhita definitely expresses his debt to Vagbhata I. But they must all have flourished before Cakrapani, who often refers to Drdhabala and Vagbhata II. If, as Hoernle has shown, Madhava was anterior to Drdhabala, he also must necessarily have flourished before Cakrapani. Hoernle's argument that Madhava flourished before Drdhabala rests upon the fact that Susruta counts 76 kinds of eye-diseases, while Vagbhata I has 94. Drdhabala accepts Vagbhata I's 94 eye-diseases with the addition of two more, added by Madhava, making his list come to 96. Madhava had accepted Susruta's 76 eye-diseases and

1 It is curious to notice that the Brahma-vaivarta-purana makes Dhanvantari, Kaslraja and Divodasa different persons, which is contrary to Susruta's statement noted above.

2 Durvyakhyd-znsa-snptasya Vahatasydsmad-uktayah santu samvitti-ddyinyas sad-agama-pariskrta. Indu's commentar}', I. i.

3 Siddha-yoga, I. 27, Astanga-samgraha, 11. 1, Nidana, 11. 22 and 23, Sam-graha, 1. 266, Caraka-samhita (Jivananda, 1896), Cikitsita-sthana, xvi. 31, Samgruha, 11. 26. Again, Cikitsita-slhdna, xvi. 53, etc., Samgraha, n. 27, etc.

dii 28

added two of his own 1 . The second point in Hoernle's argument is that Madhava in his quotations from Caraka always omits the passages marked by Vijayaraksita as Kasmlra readings, which Hoernle identifies with the revision work of Drdhabala. These arguments of Hoernle appear very inconclusive; for, if the so-called Kasmlra recension can be identified with Drdhabala's revision, both Drdhabala's Kasmlra nativity and his posteriority to Madhava can be proved; but this proposition has not been proved. On the other hand, Cakrapani alludes to a Drdhabala samskara side by side with a Kasmlra reading, and this seems to indicate that the two are not the same 2 . The suggestion of Madhava's anteriority on the ground that he counts 78 eye-diseases is rather far-fetched. Madhava's date, therefore, cannot be definitely settled. Hoernle is probably correct in holding that Drdhabala is anterior to Vagbhata 3 . However, the relative anteriority or posteriority of these three writers does not actually matter very much; for they lived at more or less short intervals from one another and their dates may roughly be assigned to a period between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D.

Vagbhata IPs Astanga-hrdaya-samhita has at least five commentaries, viz. by Arunadatta (Sarvanga-sundari), Asadhara, Candracandana (Padartha-candrika) y Ramanatha and Hemadri (Ayur-veda-rasayana). Of these Arunadatta probably lived in a.d. 1220. Madhava's Rug-viniscaya, a compendium of pathology, is one of the most popular works of Indian Medicine. It has at least seven commentaries, viz. by Vijayaraksita (Madhu-kosa) y Vaidya-vacaspati (Atanka-dipana), Ramanatha Vaidya, Bhavanlsahaya, Naganatha (Nidana-pradipa), Ganesa Bhisaj and the commentary known as Siddhanta-candrikd or Vivarana-siddhanta-candrika, by Narasimha Kaviraja 4 . Vijayaraksita's commentary, however,

1 Hoernle thinks that the total number of 76 eye-diseases ordinarily found in the printed editions of Madhava's Nidana is not correct, as they do not actually tally with the descriptions of the different eye-diseases given by Madhava and do not include paksma-kopa and pak§ma-sdta varieties. Hoernle's "Osteology," p. 13.

2 Cakra's commentary, I. 7. 46-50.

3 See Hoernle's "Osteology," pp. 14-16.

* Narasimha Kaviraja was the son of Nilakantha Bhafta and the pupil of Ramakrsna Bhafta. He seems to have written another medical work, called Madhu-matl. His Vivarana-siddhanta-candrika, though based on Vijaya's Madhu-kosa, is an excellent commentary and contains much that is both instructive and new. The only manuscript available is probably the one that belongs to the family library of the author of the present work, who is preparing an edition of it for publication.

closes with the 33rd chapter, and the rest of the work was accomplished by Srikanthadatta, a pupil of Y T ijayaraksita. Vrnda (who may be the same as Madhava) wrote a Siddha-yoga, a book of medical formulas, well known among medical writers.

In connection with this brief account of Indian medical works the Nava-nitaka, and the other mutilated medical treatises which have been discovered in Central Asia and which go by the name of "Bovver manuscript," cannot be omitted. This manuscript is written on birch leaves in Gupta characters and is probably as old as the fifth century a.d. It is a Buddhist work, containing many medical formulas taken from Caraka, Susruta and other unknown writers. It will, however, be understood that an elaborate discussion of chronology or an exhaustive account of Indian medical works would be out of place in a work like the present." The Ayur-veda literature, and particularly that part which deals with medical formulas and recipes, medical lexicons and the like, is vast. Aufrecht's catalogue contains the names of about 1500 manuscript texts, most of which have not yet been published, and there are many other manuscripts not mentioned in Aufrecht's catalogue. Among the books now much in use may be mentioned the works of Sarngadhara, of the fourteenth century, Sivadasa's commentary on Cakrapani, of the fifteenth century, and the Bhava-prakasa of Bhavamisra, of the sixteenth. Varigasena's work is also fairly common. Among anatomical texts Bhoja's work and Bhaskara Bhatta's Sdrira-padmini deserve mention. The Aupadhenava-tantra, Pauskalavata-tantra, Vaitarana-tantra and Bhoja-tantra are alluded to by Dalhana. The Bhdluki-tantra and Kapila-tantra are mentioned by Cakrapani in his Bhanumati commentary. So much for the anatomical treatises. Videha-tantra, Nimi-tantra, Kankayana-tantra, Satyaki-tantra, Kardla-tantra and Krsnatreya-tantra on eye-diseases are alluded to in Srikantha's commentary on Madhava's Nidana. The Saunaka-tantra on eye-diseases is named in the commentaries of Cakrapani and Dalhana. The Jivaka-tantra, Parvataka-tantra and Bandhaka-tantra are alluded to by Dalhana as works on midwifery. The Hiranydksya-tantra on the same subject is named by Srikantha, whereas the Kasyapa-samhita and Alambdyana-samhita are cited by Srlkantha on toxicology. The Usanas-samhita, Sanaka-samhitd, Ldtydyana-samhita are also mentioned as works on toxicology.

Among some of the other important Tantras may be mentioned

28-2

Nagarjuna's Yoga-sataka, containing the eight regular divisions of Indian Medicine, and Nagarjuna's Jiva-siitra and Bhesaja-kalpa, all of which were translated into Tibetan. Three works on the Astanga-hrdaya, called Astanga-hrdaya-ndtna-vaiduryaka-bhasya, Padar-tha-candrika-prabhasa-nama, Astanga-krdaya-vrtti and Vaidyaka-stanga-hrdaya-vrtter bhesaja-nama-suci, were also translated into Tibetan.

The Ayur-veda-sutra is a work by Yoganandanatha, published with a commentary by the same author in the Mysore University Sanskrit series in 1922, with an introduction by Dr Shama Sastry. It is rightly pointed out in the introduction that this is a very modern work, written after the Bhava-prakasa, probably in the sixteenth century. It contains sixteen chapters and is an attempt to connect Ayur-veda with Patanjali's Yoga system. It endeavours to show how different kinds of food increase the sattva, rajas and tamas qualities and how yoga practices, fasting and the like, influence the conditions of the body. Its contribution, whether as a work of Ayur-veda or as a work of philosophy, is rather slight. It shows a tendency to connect Yoga with Ayur-veda, while the Vira-simhdvalokita is a work which tries to connect astrology with the same.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA

The Gita Literature.

The Gita is regarded by almost all sections of the Hindus as one of the most sacred religious works, and a large number of commentaries have been written on it by the adherents of different schools of thought, each of which explained the Gita in its own favour. Sankara's bhasya is probably the earliest commentary now available; but from references and discussions found therein there seems to be little doubt that there were previous commentaries which he wished to refute.

Sankara in his interpretation of the Gita seeks principally to emphasize the dogma that right knowledge can never be combined with Vedic duties or the duties recommended by the legal scriptures. If through ignorance, or through attachment, a man continues to perform the Vedic duties, and if, as a result of sacrifices, gifts and tapas (religious austerities), his mind becomes pure and he acquires the right knowledge regarding the nature of the ultimate reality—that the passive Brahman is the all—and then, when all reasons for the performance of actions have ceased for him, still continues to perform the prescribed duties just like common men and to encourage others to behave in a similar manner, then such actions are inconsistent with right knowledge. When a man performs actions without desire or motive, they cannot be considered as karma at all. He alone may be said to be performing karma, or duties, who has any interest in them. But the wise man, who has no interest in his karma, cannot be said to be performing karma in the proper sense of the term, though to all outward appearances he may be acting exactly like an ordinary man. Therefore the main thesis of the Gita, according to Sarikara, is that liberation can come only through right knowledge and not through knowledge combined with the performance of duties. Sankara maintains that all duties hold good for us only in the stage of ignorance and not in the stage of wisdom. When once the right knowledge of identity with Brahman dawns and ignorance ceases, all notions of duality, which are presupposed by

the performance of actions and responsibility for them, cease 1 . In interpreting Gita, HI. 1, Sankara criticizes the opinions of some previous commentators, who held that obligatory duties cannot be given up even when true wisdom is attained. In reply he alludes to legal scriptures (smrti-sastra), and asserts that the mere nonperformance of any duties, however obligatory, cannot lead to evil results, since non-performance is a mere negation and of mere negation no positive results can come out. The evil effects of the non-performance of obligatory duties can happen only to those who have not given up all their actions (a-samnyasi-visayatvat pratyavaya-prapteh). But those who have attained true wisdom and have consequently given up all their actions transcend the sphere of duties and of the obligatory injunctions of the Vedas, and the legal scriptures cannot affect them at all. The performance of duties cannot by itself lead to liberation; but it leads gradually to the attainment of purity of mind (sattva-suddhi) and through this helps the dawning of the right knowledge, with which all duties cease 2 . In a very lengthy discussion on the interpretation of Gita, xvin. 67, Sankara tries to prove that all duties presuppose the multiplicity of the world of appearance, which is due to ignorance or nescience, and therefore the sage who has attained the right knowledge of Brahman, the only reality, has no duties to perform. Final liberation is thus produced, not by true knowledge along with the performance of duties, but by true knowledge alone. The wise man has no duties of any kind. Sankara's interpretation of the Gita presupposes that the Gita holds the same philosophical doctrine that he does. His method of interpretation is based not so much on a comparison of textual passages, as simply on the strength of the reasonableness of the exposition of a view which can be consistently held according to his Vedanta philosophy, and which he ascribes to the Gita. The view taken in the present exposition of the Gita philosophy is diametrically opposite to that of Sankara. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the Gita asserts that even the wise man should perform his allotted duties, though he may have nothing to gain by the performance of such duties. Even God Himself as Krsna, though He had no unsatisfied cravings, passions or desires of any kind,

1 laarikara's interpretation of the Glta, 11. 69. Yogasrama edition, Benares, 1910.

2 Ibid. in. 4.

performed His self-imposed duties in order to set an example to all and to illustrate the fact that even the wise man should perform his prescribed duties 1 .

^nandajriana wrote a commentary on Sankara's Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya, called Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya-vivarana, and Ramananda wrote another commentary on that of Sarikara, called Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya-vydkhyd. He is also said to have written another work on the Gitd, called Gitdsaya. After Sankara there seems to have been some pause. We have two commentaries, one in prose and one in verse, by two persons of the same name, Yamunacarya. The Yamunacarya who was the author of a prose commentary is certainly, though a visistddvaita-vddin, not the celebrated Yamuna, the teacher of Ramanuja. His commentary, which has been published by the Sudarsana Press, Conjeeveram, is very simple, consisting mainly of a mere paraphrase of the Gitd verses. He thinks that the first six chapters of the Gitd deal with the nature of true knowledge of God as a means to devotion, the second six with the nature of God as attainable by devotion and adoration, and the third six repeat the same subjects for a further clearing up of the problems involved.

Yamuna, the great teacher of Ramanuja, who is said to have been born in a.d. 906, summarized the subject-matter of the Gitd in a few verses called Gitdrtha-samgraha, on which Nigamanta Maha-desika wrote a commentary known as Gitdrtha-samgraha-raksd. This also was commented on by Varavara Muni, of the fourteenth century, in a commentary called Gitdrtha-samgraha-dipikd y published by the Sudarsana Press, Conjeeveram. Another commentary, called Bhagavad-gitdrtha-samgraha-tikd, by Pratyaksadevayatha-carya, is mentioned by Aufrecht. Yamuna says that the object of the Gitd is to establish the fact that Narayana is the highest Brahman, attained only by devotion (bhakti), which is achieved through caste duties (sva-dharma), right knowledge and disinclination to worldly pleasures (vairdgya). It is said that the first six chapters of the Gitd describe the process of attaining self-knowledge by self-concentration (yoga) through knowledge and action along with self-subordination to God, the performance of all actions for God and detachment from all other things. Nigamanta Mahadesika notes that karma may lead to self-realization either indirectly, through the production of knowledge, or directly by itself.

1 Gitd, III. 22.

From the seventh to the twelfth chapters the processes of the attainment of devotion (bhakti-yoga) by knowledge and by actions are described, and it is held that the true nature of God can be realized only by such devotion. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth chapters, the nature of pradhana, of purusa, of the manifested world and of the supreme lord are described and distinguished along with the nature of action, of knowledge and of devotion. Yamuna then goes on to describe the contents of the chapters of the Glta one by one. Thus he says that in the second chapter the nature of the saint of imperturbable wisdom (sthtta-dhi) is described. Such right knowledge can be achieved only by a knowledge of the self as immortal and the habit of performing one's duties in an unattached manner. In the third chapter it is said that a man should perform his duties for the preservation of the social order (loka-raksa) without attachment, leaving the fruits of all his actions to God, and considering at the same time that the gunas are the real agents of actions and that it is wrong to pride oneself upon their performance. The fourth chapter describes the nature of God, how one should learn to look upon actions as implying no action (on account of unattachment), the different kinds of duties and the glory of knowledge. The fifth describes the advantages and the diverse modes of the path of duties and also the nature of the state of realization of Brahman. The sixth describes the nature of yoga practice, four kinds of yogins, the methods oiyoga, the nature of yoga realization and the ultimate superiority oi yoga as communion with God. The seventh describes the reality of God, how His nature is often veiled from us by prakrti or the gunas, how one should seek protection from God, the nature of the different kinds of devotees, and the superiority of the truly enlightened person. The eighth describes the lordly power of God and the reality of His nature as the unchanged and the unchangeable; it also describes the duties of those who seek protection in God and the nature of the true wisdom. The ninth describes the glory of God and His superiority even when He incarnates Himself as man, and the nature of devotional communion. The tenth describes the infinite number of God's noble qualities and the dependence of all things on Him, for initiating and increasing devotion. The eleventh describes how the true nature of God can be perceived, and demonstrates that it is only through devotion that God can be known or attained. The twelfth

describes the superiority of devotion, methods of attaining devotion, and different kinds of devotion; it is also held that God is highly pleased by the devotion of His devotees. The thirteenth describes the nature of the body, the purification of the self for self-realization, the cause of bondage and right discrimination. The fourteenth describes how the nature of an action is determined by the ties of guna, how the gunas may be made to cease from influencing us, and how God alone is the root of all the ways of the self's future destiny. The fifteenth describes how the supreme lord is different from the pure selves, as well as from selves in association with non-selves, on account of his all-pervasiveness and his nature as upholder and lord. The sixteenth describes the division of beings into godly and demoniac and also the privileged position of the scriptures as the authority for laying the solid foundation of knowledge of the true nature of our duties. The seventeenth distinguishes unscriptural things from scriptural. The eighteenth describes how God alone should be regarded as the ultimate agent of all actions, and states the necessity of purity and the nature of the effects of one's deeds. According to Yamuna karma-yoga, or the path of duties, consists of religious austerities, pilgrimage, gifts and sacrifices; jnana-yoga, or the path of knowledge, consists of self-control and purity of mind; bhakti-yoga, or the path of devotion, consists in the meditation of God, inspired by an excess of joy in the communion with the divine. All these three paths mutually lead to one another. All three are essentially of the nature of the worship of God, and, whether regarded as obligatory or occasional, are helpful for discovering the true nature of one's self. When by self-realization ignorance is wholly removed, and when a man attains superior devotion to God, he is received into God.

Ramanuja, the celebrated Vaisnava teacher and interpreter of the Brahma-sutra, who is said to have been born in a.d. 1017, wrote a commentary on the Glta on visistadvaita lines, viz. monism qualified as theism. Venkatanatha, called also Vedantacarya, wrote a sub-commentary thereon, called Tatparya-candrika. Ramanuja generally followed the lines of interpretation suggested in the brief summary by his teacher Yamuna. On the question of the imperativeness of caste duties Ramanuja says that the Glta holds that the duties allotted to each caste must be performed, since the scriptures are the commands of God and no one can transgress His orders; so the duties prescribed by the scriptures as obligatory

are compulsory for all. The duties have, therefore, to be performed without desire for their fruits and purely because they are the injunctions of the scriptures (eka-sastrarthataya anustheyam). It is only when duties performed simply to please God, and as adoration of Him, have destroyed all impurities of the mind, and when the senses have become controlled, that a man becomes fit for the path of wisdom. A man can never at any stage of his progress forsake the duty of worshipping God, and it is only through such adoration of God that the sins accumulating in him from beginningless time are gradually washed away and he can become pure and fit for the path of knowledge 1 . In interpreting in. 8 Ramanuja says that the path of duties {karma-yoga) is superior to the path of knowledge (jnana-yoga). The path of duties naturally leads to self-knowledge; so self-knowledge is also included within its scope. The path of knowledge alone cannot lead us anywhere; for without work even the body cannot be made to live. Even those who adhere to the path of knowledge must perform the obligatory and occasional (nitya-naimittika) duties, and it is through the development of this course that one can attain self-realization by duty alone. The path of duties is to be followed until self-realization (atmavalokana) and, through it, emancipation are obtained. But the chief duty of a man is to be attached to God with supreme devotion.

Madhvacarya, or Anandatirtha, who lived in the first three-quarters of the thirteenth century, wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad-glta, called Glta-bhasya y commented on by Jayatlrtha in his Prameya-dipika, and also a separate monograph interpreting the main purport of the Gita, called Bhagavad-gita-tatparya-nirnaya, commented on by Jayatlrtha in his Nyaya-dipika. His main emphasis was on the fact that God is different from everything else, and that the only way of attaining our highest goal is through devotion (bhakti) as love and attachment (sneha). In the course of his interpretation he also introduced long discussions in refutation of the monistic theory of Sankara. Since everything is dominated by the will of Hari the Lord, no one ought to feel any attachment to mundane things. Duties are to be performed by all. Krsnabhatta Vidyadhiraja, the sixth disciple from

1 Anabhisamhita-phalena kevala-parama-purusaradhana-rupendnusthitena kar-mana vidhvasta-mano-malo 'vydkulendriyo jndna-nisthayam adhikaroti. Rama-nuja's commentary on the Gltd, in. 3. See also ibid. in. 4. Gujarati Press, Bombay, 1908.

Madhva, who lived in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, wrote a commentary on the Gitd, called Gita-tika. Raghavendra Svamin, who lived in the seventeenth century and was a pupil of Sudhlndra Yati, wrote three works on the Gitd, called Gitd-vtvrti, Gitdrtha-samgraha and Gitdrtha-vivarana. Commentaries were also written by Vallabhacarya, Vijfianabhiksu, Kesava Bhatta of the Nimbarka school (called Gitd-tattva-prakdsikd), Anjaneya (called Hanumad-bhdsya), Kalyana Bhatta (called Rasika-ranjini), Jagaddhara (called Bhagavad-gitd-pradipa), Jayarama (called Gitd-sdrdrtha-samgraha), Baladeva Vidyabhusana (called Gitd-bhusana-bhdsya), Madhusudana (called Gudhdrtha-dipikd), Brahmananda Giri, Mathuranatha (called Bhagavad-gitd-prakdsa), Dattatreya (called Prabodha-candrikd), Ramakrsna, Mukundadasa, Rama-narayana, Visvesvara, Sahkarananda, Sivadayalu Sridharasvamin (called Subodhini), Sadananda Vyasa (called Bhdva-prakdsa), Suryapandita (Paramdrtha-prapd), Nllakantha (called Bhdva-dipikd), and also from the Saiva point of view by Rajanaka and Ramakantha (called Sarvato-bhadra). Many other works were also written on the general purport of the Gitd, such as Bhagavad-gitdrtha-samgraha by Abhinavagupta and Nrsimha Thakkura, Bhagavad-gitdrtha-sdra by Gokulacandra, Bhagavad-gltd-lak-sdbharana by Vadiraja, Bhagavad-gitd-sdra by Kaivalyananda SarasvatI, Bhagavad-gitd-sdra-samgraha by Narahari and Bha-gavad-gitd-hetu-nirnaya by Vitthala Dlksita. Most of these commentaries are written either from the point of view of Sankara's bhdsya, repeating the same ideas in other language, or from the Vaisnava point of view, approving of the hold of normal duties of men in all stages of life and sometimes differing only in the conception of God and His relation with men. These can claim but little originality either of argument or of opinions, and so may well be left out of detailed consideration for our present purposes.

Gita and Yoga.

Whoever may have written the Gitd, it seems very probable that he was not acquainted with the technical sense of yoga as the cessation of mental states (citta-vrtti-nirodha), as used by Patanjali in his Yoga-sutra, 1. 1. I have elsewhere shown that there are three roots, yujir yoge and yuj samddhau, i.e. the root yujir, to join, and the root yuj in the sense of cessation of mental states or one-

pointedness, and yujsamyamane, i.e.yuj in the sense of controlling. In the Gitd the word yoga appears to have been used in many senses, which may seem to be unconnected with one another; yet it may not be quite impossible to discover relations among them. The primary sense of the word yoga in the Gitd is derived from the root yujir yoge or yuj\ to join, with which is connected in a negative way the root yuj in the sense of controlling or restricting anything to that to which it is joined. Joining, as it means contact with something, also implies disjunction from some other thing. When a particular type of mental outlook or scheme of action is recommended, we find the word buddhi-yoga used, which simply means that one has intimately to associate oneself with a particular type of wisdom or mental outlook. Similarly, when the word karma-yoga is used, it simply means that one has to associate oneself with the obligatoriness of the performance of duties. Again, the word yoga is used in the sense of fixing one's mind either on the self (atmari) or on God. It is clear that in all these varying senses the dominant sense is that of "joining." But such a joining implies also a disjunction, and the fundamental and indispensable disjunction implied is dissociation from all desires for pleasures and fruits of action (phala-tydga). For this reason cases are not rare where yoga is used to mean cessation of desires for the fruits of action. Thus, in the Gitd, vi. 2, it is said, "What is called cessation (of desires for the fruits of action) is what you should know, O Pandava, as Yoga: without renouncing one's desires (na hy asamnyasta-sankalpa) one cannot be a yogin 1 ." The reason why this negative concept of cessation of desires should be regarded as yoga is that without such a renunciation of desires no higher kind of union is possible. But even such a dissociation from the fruits of desires (which in a way also means samyamana, or self-control) is to be supplemented by the performance of duties at the preliminary stages; and it is only in the higher stages, when one is fixed in yoga (yogdrudha), that meditative peace (sama) can be recommended. Unless and until one succeeds in conquering all attachments to sense-objects and actions and in giving up all desires for fruits of actions, one cannot be fixed in yoga. It is by our attempts at the performance of our duties, trying all the time

1 Asamnyasto 'parityaktah phala-visayah sankalpo 'bhisandhir yena so 'samnyas-ta-sankalpah. Jsankara's commentary, vi. 2. Na samnyastah phala-sankalpoyena. Jsridhara's commentary on the above. Yogasrama edition, Benares, 1919.

to keep the mind clear from motives of pleasure and enjoyment, that we gradually succeed in elevating it to a plane at which it would be natural to it to desist from all motives of self-interest, pleasure and enjoyment. It is at this stage that a man can be called fixed in yoga or yogarudha. This naturally involves a conflict between the higher self and the lower, or rather between the real self and the false; for, while the lower self always inclines to pathological and prudential motives, to motives of self-interest and pleasure, it has yet within it the higher ideal, which is to raise it up. Man is both a friend and a foe to himself; if he follows the path of his natural inclinations and the temptations of sense-enjoyment, he takes the downward path of evil, and is an enemy to his own higher interests; whereas it is his clear duty to raise himself up, to strive that he may not sink down but may elevate himself to a plane of detachment from all sense-pleasures. The duality involved in this conception of a friend and a foe, of conqueror and conquered, of an uplifting power and a gravitating spirit, naturally involves a distinction between a higher self {paramatmari) and a lower self (atmari). It is only when this higher self conquers the lower that a self is a friend to itself. In a man who has failed to conquer his own passions and self-attachments the self is its own enemy. The implication, however, is that the lower self, though it gravitates towards evil, has yet inherent in it the power of self-elevation. This power of self-elevation is not something extraneous, but abides in the self, and the Glta is emphatic in its command, "Thou shouldst raise thyself and not allow thyself to sink down; for the self is its own friend and its foe as well 1 ."

It is only when the self thus conquers its lower tendencies and rises to a higher plane that it comes into touch with the higher self (paramdtman). The higher self always remains as an ideal of elevation. The yoga activity of the self thus consists, on the one hand, in the efforts by which the yogin dissociates himself from the sense-attachments towards which he was naturally gravitating, and on the other hand, in the efforts by which he tries to elevate himself and to come into touch with the higher self. At the first stage a man performs his duties in accordance with the injunctions of the sastras; then he performs his duties and tries to dissociate himself from all motives of self-interest and

1 vi. 5.

enjoyment, and at the next stage he succeeds in conquering these lower motives and is in touch with the higher self. Even at this stage he may still continue to perform his duties, merely for the sake of duty, or he may devote himself to meditative concentration and union with the higher self or with God. Thus the Glta. says that the person who has conquered himself and is at peace with himself is in touch with paramatman. Such a person is a true philosopher; for he not only knows the truths, but is happy in the inner realization and direct intuitive apperception of such truths; he is unshakable in himself; having conquered his senses, he attaches the same value to gold and to stones; he is the same to friends and to enemies, to the virtuous as to the sinful; he is in union (with paramatman) and is called a yogin 1 . The fact that the word yogin is derived here from the root yuj, to join, is evident from a number of passages where the verb yuj is used in this connection 2 .

The Glta advises a yogin who thus wants to unite himself with paramatman, or God, in a meditative union, to lead a lonely life, controlling his mind and body, desiring nothing and accepting nothing 3 . The yogin should seat himself on level ground, in a clean place, and, being firm on his threefold seat composed of kusa grass, a leopard skin and soft linen, he should control his thoughts, senses and movements, make his mind one-pointed in God (tatra), gather himself up in union, and thus purify himself 4 . The yogin should eat neither too much nor too little, should neither sleep too much, nor dispense with sleep. He should thus

1 Yuktaity ucyateyogisama-lostesma-kdncanah,vi.8. £ankara, however, splits it up into two independent sentences, as follows: ya idrso yuktah samdhita iti sa ucyate kathyate; sa yogi sama-lostdsma-kdncanah. !§rldhara, again, takes a quite different view and thinks it to be a definition of the yogarudha state and believes yukta to mean yogarudha, which in my opinion is unjustifiable. My interpretation is simpler and more direct than either of these and can be justified by a reference to the context in vi. 7 and vi. 10.

2 Yogi yunjlta satatam dtmdnam rahasi sthitah. Ibid. vi. 10. Upavisy dsane yunjydd yogam dtma-visuddhaye. vi. 12. Yukta dslta mat-parah. vi. 14.

Yunjann evam saddtmdnam yogi niyata-mdnasah. VI. 15, etc.

8 Ekdkl yata-cittdtmd nirdslr aparigrahah. vi. 10. The word dtmd in yata-cittdtmd is used in the sense of body (deha), according to !§ankara, Sridhara and others.

4 Both &ankara and Sridhara make tatra an adjective to dsane. Such an adjective to dsane would not only be superfluous, but would also leave ekdgram without an object. The verb yunjydt, literally meaning "should link up," is interpreted by jSridhara as " should practise," apparently without any justification (vi. 12).

lead the middle course of life and avoid extremes. This avoidance of extremes is very unlike the process of yoga advised by Patanjali. Patanjali's course of yoga formulates a method by which the yogin can gradually habituate himself to a condition of life in which he can ultimately dispenfe with food and drink altogether and desist from all movements of body and mind. The object of zyogin in making his mind one-pointed is ultimately to destroy the mind. According to Patanjali the advancement of a yogin has but one object before it, viz. the cessation of all movements of mind {citta-vrtti-nirodha). Since this absolute cessation cannot be effected without stopping all movements of the body, desires and passions are to be uprooted, not only because they would make the mind fly to different objects, but also because they would necessitate movements of the body, which would again disturb the mind. The yogin therefore has to practise a twofold control of movements of body and mind. He has to habituate himself to dispensing with the necessity of food and drink, to make himself used to all kinds of privations and climatic inconveniences of heat and cold and ultimately to prepare himself for the stoppage of all kinds of bodily movements. But, since this cannot be successfully done so long as one inhales and exhales, he has to practise pranayama for absolute breath-control, and not for hours or days, but for months and years. Moral elevation is regarded as indispensable in yoga only because without absolute and perfect cessation of all desires and passions the movements of the body and mind could not be absolutely stopped. The yogin, however, has not only to cut off all new causes of disturbance leading to movements of body and mind, but also to practise one-pointedness of mind on subtler and subtler objects, so that as a result thereof the sub-conscious forces of the mind can also be destroyed. Thus, on the one hand, the mind should be made to starve by taking care that no new sense-data and no new percepts, concepts, thoughts, ideas or emotions be presented to it, and, on the other hand, steps are to be taken to make the mind one-pointed, by which all that it had apprehended before, which formed the great storehouse of the sub-conscious, is destroyed. The mind, thus pumped out on both sides, becomes absolutely empty and is destroyed. The ideal of Patanjali's Yoga is absolute extremism, consisting in absolute stoppage of all functions of body and mind.

The Gita, on the other hand, prescribes the golden middle course

of moderate food, drink, sleep, movements of the body and activity in general. The object of the yogin in the Gita is not the absolute destruction of mind, but to bring the mind or the ordinary self into communion with the higher self or God. To the yogin who practises meditation the Gita advises steadiness of posture; thus it says that the yogin should hold his body, head and shoulders straight, and, being unmoved and fixed in his posture, should avoid looking to either side and fix his eyes on the tip of his nose. The Gita is, of course, aware of the proces~ of breath-control and pranayama; but, curiously enough, it does not speak of it in its sixth chapter on dhy ana-yoga y where almost the whole chapter is devoted to yoga practice and the conduct of yogins. In the fifth chapter, v. 27, it is said that all sense-movements and control of life-movements (prana-karmani) are like oblations to the fire of self-control. In the two obscure verses of the same chapter, v. 29 and 30, it is said that there are some who offer an oblation of prana to apana and of apana to prana and thus, stopping the movement of inhalation and exhalation {pranapana-gati ruddhva), perform the pranayama, while there are others who, taking a low diet, offer an oblation of prana to prana. Such actions on the part of these people are described as being different kinds of sacrifices, or yajna, and the people who perform them are called yajna-vidah (those who know the science of sacrifice), and not yogin. It is difficult to understand the exact meaning of offering an oblation of prana to prana or of prana to apana and of calling this sacrifice. The interpretations of Sankara, Srldhara and others give us but little help in this matter. They do not tell us why it should be called a yajna or how an oblation of prana to prana can be made, and they do not even try to give a synonym for juhvati (offer oblation) used in this connection. It seems to me, however, that there is probably a reference to the mystical substitution-meditations {pratikopasana) which were used as substitutes for sacrifices and are referred to in the Upanisads. Thus in the Maitri Upanisad, vi. 9, we find that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the ego, and in this connection, oblations of the five vayus to fire with such mantras as pranaya svaha, apa.na.ya svaha, etc. are recommended. It is easy to imagine that, in a later process of development, for the actual offering of oblations to fire was substituted a certain process of breath-control, which still retained the old phraseology of the offering of oblations in a sacrifice. If this interpretation is

accepted, it will indicate how processes of breath-control became in many cases associated with substitution-meditations of the Vedic type 1 . The development of processes of breath-control in connection with substitution-meditations does not seem to be unnatural at all, and, as a matter of fact, the practice of pranayama in connection with such substitution-meditations is definitely indicated in the Maitri Upanisad,vi. 18. The movement of inhalation and exhalation was known to be the cause of all body-heat, including the heat of digestive processes, and Krsna is supposed to say in the Gita, XV. 14, "As fire I remain in the body of living beings and in association with prana and apana I digest four kinds of food and drink." The author of the Gita, however, seems to have been well aware that the prana and apana breaths passing through the nose could be properly balanced (samau), or that the prana vayu could be concentrated between the two eyebrows or in the head (murdhni) 2 . It is difficult to say what is exactly meant by taking the prana in the head or between the eyebrows. There seems to have been a belief in the Atharva-siras Upanisad and also in the Atharva-sikha Upanisad that the prana could be driven upwards, or that such prana, being in the head, could protect it 3 . Manu also speaks of the pranas of young men rushing upwards when old men approached them. But, whatever may be meant, it is certain that neither the balancing of prana and apana nor the concentrating of prana in the head or between the eyebrows is a phrase of Patanjali, the Yoga writer.

In describing the course of a yogin in the sixth chapter the Gita advises that the yogin should lead the austere life of a Brahma-carin, withdraw his mind from all mundane interests and think only of God, dedicate all his actions to Him and try to live in communion with Him (yukta asita). This gives to his soul peace, through which he loses his individuality in God and abides in Him

1 See Hindu Mysticism, by S. N. Dasgupta, Chicago, 1927, pp. 18-20.

2 prdndpdnau samau krtvd ndsdbhyantara-cdrinau, V. 27. The phrase samau krtvd is left unexplained here by £arikara. £ridhara explains it as "having suspended the movement of prana and apana" — prdnapdndv urddhvddho-gati-jiirodhena samau krtvd kumbhakam krtvd. It is difficult, however, to say what is exactly meant by concentrating the prana vayu between the two eyebrows, bhruvor madhye prdrtam dvesya samyak (vm. 10). Neither iaarikara nor Sridhara gives us any assistance here. In murdhny ddhdydtmanah prdnam dsthito yoga-dhdrandm (vm. 12) murdhni is paraphrased by Sridhara as bhruvor madhye, or "between the eyebrows."

3 Atharva-siras, 4 and 6 and Atharva-sikha, 1.

d 11 29

in the bliss of self-effacement 1 , K yogin can be said to be in union (with God) when he concentrates his mind on his own higher self and is absolutely unattached to all desires. By his efforts towards such a union {yoga-sevaya) he restrains his mind from all other objects and, perceiving his self in himself, remains in peace and contentment. At this higher state the yogin enjoys absolute bliss {sukham atyantikam), transcending all sense-pleasures by his pure reason, and, being thus fixed in God, he is never shaken away from Him. Such a yogin forsakes all his desires and controls all his senses by his mind, and, whenever the mind itself seeks to fly away to different objects, he tries to control it and fix it on his own self. Patiently holding his mind fixed in his self, he tries to desist from all kinds of thought and gradually habituates himself to shaking off attachments to sense-attractions. At this stage of union the yogin feels that he has attained his highest, and thus even the greatest mundane sorrows cannot affect him in the least. Yoga is thus sometimes defined as the negation of the possibility of all association with sorrows 2 . One can attain such a state only by persistent and self-confident efforts and without being depressed by preliminary failures. When a yogin attains this union with himself or with God, he is like the motionless flame of a lamp in a still place, undisturbed by all attractions and unruffled by all passions 3 . The yogin who attains this highest state of union with himself or with God is said to be in touch with Brahman or to attain Brahmahood, and it is emphatically asserted that he is filled with ecstatic joy. Being in

1 idntim nirvana-par amam mat-samsthdm adhigacchati, VI. 15. The Gltd uses the words santi and nirvana to indicate the bliss of the person who abides in God. Both these words, and particularly the word nirvana, have a definite significance in Buddhism. But the Gltd seems to be quite unacquainted with the Buddhistic sense of the word. I have therefore ventured to translate the word nirvana as " bliss of self-effacement." The word is primarily used in the sense of "extinguishing a light," and this directly leads to the Buddhistic sense of the absolute destruction of the skandhas. But the word nirvana is also used from very early times in the sense of "relief from sufferings" and "satisfaction." Thus the Maha-bhdrata, with which the Gltd is traditionally associated, uses it in this sense in m. 10438:

sa pltvd sltalam toy am pipdsdrtto mahl-patih; nirvdnam agamad dhimdn susukhl cdbhavat tadd.

Again, in the Maha-bhdrata, xii. 7150 and i30i4,Mt'raJwa is described as being highest bliss {paramam sukham), and it is also associated with santi, or peace, as it is in the above passage— sdntim nirvana-par amam. In Maha-bhdrata, vi. 1079, and in another place it is called a "state of the highest Brahman" {paramam brahma — ibid. xn. 13239).

2 tarn vidydd duhkha-samyoga-viyogam yoga-samjmtam, vi. 23.

3 Yathd dtpo nivdta-stho nengate sopamd smrtd, vi. 19.

union with God, he perceives himself in all things, and all things in himself; for, being in union with God, he in one way identifies himself with God, and perceives God in all things and all things in God. Yet it is no mere abstract pantheism that is indicated here; for such a view is directly in opposition to the main tenets of the Gita, so often repeated in diverse contexts. It is a mystical state, in which, on the one hand, the yogin finds himself identified with God and in communion with Him, and, on the other hand, does not cease to have relations with the beings of the world, to whom he gives the same consideration as to himself. He does not prefer his own happiness to the happiness of others, nor does he consider his own misery and suffering as greater or more important or more worthy of prevention than those of others. Being in communion with God, he still regards Him as the master whom he adores, as the supreme Lord who pervades all things and holds them in Himself. By his communion with God the yogin transcends his lower and smaller self and discovers his greater self in God, not only as the supreme ideal of his highest efforts, but also as the highest of all realities. As soon as the yogin can detach himself from his lower self of passions and desires, he uplifts himself to a higher universe, where the distinction of meum and teum, mine and thine, ceases and the interest of the individual loses its personal limitations and becomes enlarged and universalized and identified with the interests of all living beings. Looked at from this point of view, yoga is sometimes defined in the Gita as the outlook of equality (samatva) 1 .

In the Gita the word yoga has not attained any definite technical sense, as it did in Patafijali's Yoga-sutra, and, in consequence, there is not one definition of yoga, but many. Thus yoga is used in the sense of karma-yoga, or the duty of performance of actions, in v. 1, and it is distinguished from the samkhya path, or the path of knowledge, in 11. 39. The word karma-yoga is mentioned in in. 3 as the path of the yogins, and it is referred to in in. 7, v. 2 and xiii. 24. The word buddhi-yoga is also used at least three times, in 11. 49, x. 10 and xvm. 57, and the bhakti-yoga also is used at least once, in xiv. 26. The one meaning of yoga that suits all these different contexts seems to be "association." It has already been said that this primary meaning of the word is the central idea of yoga in the Gita. One of the main teachings of 1 samatvam yoga ucyate, u. 48.

29-2

the Gita is that duties should be performed, and it is this obligatoriness of the performance of duties that in the Gita is understood by karma-yoga. But, if such duties are performed from moti\ r 2S of self-interest or gain or pleasure, the performance could not lead to any higher end. It is advised, therefore, that they should be performed without any motive of gain or pleasure. So the proper way in which a man should perform his duties, and at the same time keep himself clean and untarnished by the good and bad results, the pleasures and sorrows, the praise and blame proceeding out of his own deeds, is to make himself detached from all desires for the fruits of actions. To keep oneself detached from the desires for the fruits of actions is therefore the real art (kausala) of performing one's duties; for it is only in this way that a man can make himself fit for the higher union with God or his own higher self. Here, then, we have a definition of yoga as the art of performing one's duties (yogah karmasu kausalam — ii. 50). The art of performing one's duties, e.g. the art of keeping oneself unattached, cannot however be called yoga on its own account; it is probably so-called only because it is the indispensable step towards the attainment of the real yoga, or union with God. It is clear, therefore, that the word yoga has a gradual evolution to a higher and higher meaning, based no doubt on the primary root-meaning of "association."

It is important to note in this connection that the process of pranayama, regarded as indispensable in Patanjali's Yoga, is not considered so necessary either for karma-yoga, buddhi-yoga, or for the higher kind of yoga, e.g. communion with God. It has already been mentioned that the reference to pranayama is found only in connection with some kinds of substitution-meditations which have nothing to do with the main concept of yoga in the Gita. The expression samadhi is used thrice in the noun form in the Gita, in 11. 44, 53 and 54, and three times in the verb form, in vi. 7, xn. 9 and xvii. 11; but the verb forms are not used in the technical sense of Patanjali, but in the simple root-meaning of sam + a+\/dha, "to give" or "to place" {arpana or sthdpana). In two cases (11. 44 and 53) where the word samadhi is used as a noun it has been interpreted by both Sankara and Sridhara as meaning the object in which the mind is placed or to which it is directed for communion, viz. God 1 . The author of the Gita is well aware of

1 In 11. 44, however, £ahkara considers this object of mind to be antahkarana

the moral conflict in man and thinks that it is only by our efforts to come into touch with our higher self that the littleness of passions and desires for fruits of actions and the preference of our smaller self-interests can be transcended. For, once man is in touch with his highest, he is in touch with God. He has then a broader and higher vision of man and his place in nature, and so he identifies himself with God and finds that he has no special interest of his own to serve. The low and the high, the sinful and the virtuous, are the same in his eyes; he perceives God in all things and all things in God, and it is this state of communion that is the real yoga of the Gita; and it is because in this state all inequalities of race, creed, position, virtue and vice, high and low vanish, that this superior realization of universal equality is also called yoga. Not only is this union with God called yoga, but God Himself is called Yogesvara, or the Lord of communion. As a result of this union, the yogin enjoys supreme bliss and ecstatic joy, and is free from the least touch of sorrow or pain; and this absolute freedom from pain or the state of bliss, being itself a result of yoga, is also called yoga. From the above survey it is clear that the yoga of the Glta is quite different from the yoga of Patanjali, and it does not seem at all probable that the Glta was aware of Patanjali's yoga or the technical terms used by him 1 .

The treatment of yoga in the Glta is also entirely different from its treatment in almost all the Upanisads. The Katha Upanisad speaks of sense-control as being yoga; but sense-control in the Gita is only a preliminary to yoga and not itself yoga. Most of the yoga processes described in the other Upanisads either speak of yoga with six accessories (sad-anga yoga) or of yoga with eight accessories (astanga-yoga), more or less after the manner of Patanjali. They introduce elaborate details not only of breath-control or pranayama, but also of the nervous system of the body, ida, pingala and susumna, the nerve plexus, muladhara and other similar objects, after the manner of the later works on the Sat-

or buddhi. But 3ridhara considers this object to be God, and in n. 53 Sankara and Sridhara are unanimous that the object, or the support of the union or communion of the mind, is God.

1 pasya me yogam aisvaram, IX. 5, etdtn vibhutim yogam ca, x. 7. In the above two passages the word yoga seems to have a different meaning, as it is used there in the sense of miraculous powers; but even there the commentators Ankara and Jsridhara take it to mean "association" (yukti) and interpret aisvaram yogam as "association of miraculous powers."

cakra system. Thus the Amrta-nada enumerates after the manner of Patanjali the six accessories of yoga as restraint (pratydhara), concentration (dhyana), breath-control (pranayama), fixation (dharana), reasoning (tarka) and meditative absorption (samadhi), and describes the final object of yoga as ultimate loneliness of the self (kaivalya). The Amrta-bindu believes in an all-pervading Brahman as the only reality, and thinks that, since mind is the cause of all bondage and liberation, the best course for a yogin to adopt is to deprive the mind of all its objects and thus to stop the activity of the mind, and thereby to destroy it, and bring about Brahma-hood. Brahman is described here as being absolutely indeterminate, uninferable, infinite and beginningless. The Ksurika merely describes pranayama , dhydna, dharana and samadhi in association with the nerves, susumnd, pingald, etc. and the nerve plexuses. The Tejo-bindu is a Vedantic Upanisad of the ultra-monistic type, and what it calls yoga is only the way of realizing the nature of Brahman as one and as pure consciousness and the falsity of everything else. It speaks of this yoga as being of fifteen accessories (paftca-dasdnga yoga). These are yama (sense-control through the knowledge that all is Brahman), niyama (repetition of the same kinds of thoughts and the avoidance of dissimilar ones), tydga (giving up of the world-appearance through the realization of Brahman), silence, a solitary place, the proper posture, steadiness of mind, making the body straight and erect, perceiving the world as Brahman (drk-sthiti), cessation of all states and breath-control (prana-samyamana), perceiving all objects of the mind as Brahman (pratydhdra), fixing the mind always on Brahman {dharana), self-meditation and the realization of oneself as Brahman. This is, however, a scheme of yoga quite different from that of Patanjali, as well as from that of the Gltd. The Trisikha-brdhmana speaks of a yoga with eight accessories (astdnga-yoga), where the eight accessories, though the same in name as the eight accessories of Patanjali, are in reality different therefrom. Thus yama here means want of attachment (vairdgya), niyama means attachment to the ultimate reality (anuraktih pare tattve), dsana means indifference to all things, prana-samyamana means the realization of the falsity of the world, pratydhdra means the inwardness of the mind, dharana means the motionlessness of the mind, dhyana means thinking of oneself as pure consciousness, and samadhi means forgetfulness of dhydnas. Yet it again includes

within its yama and niyama almost all the virtues referred to by Patanjali. It also speaks of a number of postures after the ha-ha-yoga fashion, and of the movement of prana in the nerve plexuses, the ways of purifying the nerves and the processes of breath-control. The object of yoga is here also the destruction of mind and the attainment of kaivalya. The Darsana gives an astanga-yoga with yama, niyama, asana,pranayama, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhi more or less after the fashion of Patanjali, with a supplementary treatment of nerves (nadl) and the movement of the prana and other vayus in them. The final object of yoga here is the attainment of Brahmahood and the comprehension of the world as may a and unreal. The Dhyana-bindu describes the self as the essential link of all things, like the fragrance in flowers or the thread in a garland or the oil in sesamum. It describes a sad-anga yoga with asana, prana-samrodha, pratyahara, dharana, dhyana and samadhi. It also describes the four cakras or nerve plexuses, and speaks of the awakening of the serpent power (kundalini) and the practice of the mudras. It speaks further of the balancing or unifying of prana and apana as leading to yoga 1 . The object of this yoga is the attainment of the transcendent state of liberation or the realization of the paramatman. It is useless to refer to other Upanisads; for what has already been said will be enough to show clearly that the idea of Yoga in the Glta is entirely different from that in the Yoga Upanisads, most of which are of comparatively late date and are presumably linked up with traditions different from that of the Glta.

Samkhya and Yoga in the Gita.

In the Glta Samkhya and Yoga are sometimes distinguished from each other as two different paths, and sometimes they are identified. But though the Glta is generally based on the doctrines of the gunas, prakrti and its derivatives, yet the word samkhya is used here in the sense of the path of knowledge or of philosophic wisdom. Thus in the Glta, 11. 39, the path of knowledge is distinguished from that of performance of duties. Lord Krsna says there that he has just described the wisdom of Samkhya and he is going to describe the wisdom of Yoga. This

1 Tada prdndpdnayor aikyam krtvd; see Dhydna-hindu, 93-5 (Adyar Library-edition, 1920). This seems to be similar to prdndpdnau samau krtvd of the Gitti.

seems to give us a clue to what is meant by Samkhya wisdom. This wisdom, however, seems to be nothing more than elaboration of the doctrine of the immortality of soul and the associated doctrine of rebirth, and also the doctrine that, howsoever the body might be affected and suffer changes of birth, growth and destruction, the self is absolutely unaffected by all these changes; the self cannot be cut or burned; it is eternal, all-pervasive, unchangeable, indescribable and unthinkable. In another passage of the Gita, xni. 25, it is said that there are others who perceive the self in accordance with samkhya-yoga ; and Sankara explains this passage to mean that samkhya-yoga means the realization of the self as being absolutely different from the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas. If this is Samkhya, the meaning of the word yoga in this passage (anye samkhyena yogena) is not explained. Sankara does not expound the meaning of the word yoga, but explains the word samkhya and says that this samkhya is yoga, which seems to be an evasion. Srldhara follows Sarikara's interpretation of samkhya, but finds it difficult to swallow his identification of samkhya with yoga, and he interprets yoga here as the yoga (of Patanjali) with eight accessories, but does not explain how this astanga-yoga can be identified with samkhya. It is, no doubt, true that in the immediately preceding verse it is said that, howsoever a man may behave, if he knows the proper nature of purusa and of the prakrti and the gunas, he is never born again; but there is no reason to suppose that the phrase samkhyena yogena refers to the wisdom recommended in the preceding verse; for this verse summarizes different paths of self-realization and says that there are some who perceive the self in the self through the self, by meditation, others by samkhya-yoga and others by karma-yoga. In another passage it is said that the Samkhyas follow the path of knowledge (jnana-yoga), while the Yogins follow the path of duties {Gita, in. 3). If the word yoga means " association," as it does in various contexts, then samkhya and samkhya-yoga would mean more or less the same thing; for samkhya-yoga would only mean association with samkhya, and the phrase samkhyena yogena might mean either association with samkhya or the union of samkhya. It has already been said that, following the indications of the Gita, 11. 39, samkhya should mean the realization of the true nature of the self as immortal, all-pervasive, unchangeable and infinite. It has also been pointed out that it is such a true realization of the

self, with its corresponding moral elevation, that leads to the true communion of the self with the higher self or God. Thus this meaning of samkhya on the one hand distinguishes the path of samkhya from the path of yoga as a path of performance of duties, and at the same time identifies the path of samkhya with the path of yoga as communion with God. Thus we find that the Gita, v. 4, 5, says that "fools only think Samkhya and Yoga to be different, not so wise men," since, accepting either of them, one attains the fruit of them both. The goal reached by the followers of Samkhya is also reached by the Yogins ; he who perceives Samkhya and Yoga to be the same perceives them in the right perspective. In these passages samkhya and yoga seem from the context to refer respectively to karma-sannyasa and karma-yoga. Samkhya here can only in a secondary way mean the renunciation of the fruits of one's actions (karma-sannyasa). The person who realizes the true nature of his self, and know r s that the self is unchangeable and infinite, cannot feel himself attached to the fruits of his actions and cannot be affected by ordinary mundane desires and cravings. As in the case of the different uses of the word yoga, so here also the word samkhya, which primarily means "true knowledge," is also used to mean "renunciation"; and since karma-yoga means the performance of one's duties in a spirit of renunciation, samkhya and yoga mean practically the same thing and are therefore identified here; and they are both regarded as leading to the same results. This would be so, even if yoga were used to denote "communion"; for the idea of performance of one's duties has almost always communion with God as its indispensable correlate. Thus in the two passages immediately following the identification of samkhya and yoga we find the Gita (v. 6, 7) saying that without karma-yoga it is hard to renounce karma ; and the person who takes the path of karma-yoga speedily attains Brahman. The person who thus through karma-yoga comes into union (with Brahman) is pure in spirit and self-controlled, and, having identified himself with the universal spirit in all beings, he is not affected by his deeds.

One thing that emerges from the above discussion is that there is no proof that the word samkhya in the Gita means the discernment of the difference of prakrti and the gunas from purusa, as Sankara in one place suggests (Gita, xiii. 25), or that it refers to the cosmology and ontology of prakrti, the gunas and their

evolutes of the traditional Kapila-Samkhya. The philosophy of the gunas and the doctrine of purusa were, no doubt, known to the Gita; but nowhere is this philosophy called samkhya. Samkhya in the Gita means true knowledge (tattva-jnana) or self-knowledge (atma-bodha). Sankara, commenting on the Gita, xviii. 13, interprets samkhya to mean veddnta, though in verse xiii. 25 he interprets the word as meaning the discernment of the difference between the gunas and the purusa, which would decidedly identify the samkhya of the Gita with the Kapila-Samkhya.

The Maha-bharata also refers to samkhya and yoga in several places. But in almost all places samkhya means either the traditional school of Kapila-Samkhya or some other school of Samkhya, more or less similar to it: yoga also most often refers either to the yoga of Patanjali or some earlier forms of it. In one place are found passages identifying samkhya and yoga, which agree almost word for word with similar passages of the Gita 1 . But it does not seem that the samkhya or the yoga referred to in the Maha-bharata has anything to do with the idea of Samkhya or yoga in the Gita. As has already been pointed out, the yoga in the Gita means the dedication to God and renunciation of the fruits of one's karma and being in communion with Him as the supreme Lord pervading the universe. The chapter of the Maha-bharata just referred to speaks of turning back the senses into the manas and of turning the manas into ahamkara and ahamkara into buddhi and buddhi into prakrti, thus finishing with prakrti and its evolutes and meditating upon pure purusa. It is clear that this system of yoga is definitely associated with the Kapila school of Samkhya. In the Maha-bharata, xn. 306, the predominant feature of yoga is said to be dhyana, and the latter is said to consist of concentration of mind (ekdgratd ca manasah) and breath-control (pranaydma). It is said that the yogin should stop the functions of his senses by his mind, and the movement of his mind by his reason {buddhi), and in this stage he is said to be linked up (yukta) and is like a motionless flame in a still place 2 . This passage naturally reminds one of the description of dhyana-yoga in the Glta,\\. 11-13,16-19 and 2 5> 2 ^; but the fundamental idea of yoga,

1 yad eva yogdh pasyanti tat samkhyair api drsyate ekam samkhyan ca yogan cayah pasyati sa tattva-vit. Maha-bharata, vil. 316. 4. Compare the Gita, v. 5.

2 Cf. the Gita, vi. 19, yathd dtpo nivdta-sthah, etc.

as the dedication of the fruits of actions to God and communion with Him, is absent here.

It is needless to point out here that the yoga of the Gita is in no way connected with the yoga of Buddhism. In Buddhism the sage first practises sila, or sense-control and mind-control, and thus prepares himself for a course of stabilization or fixation of the mind (samadhdna, upadharana, patittha). This samadhi means the concentration of the mind on right endeavours and of its states upon one particular object (ekarammana), so that they may completely cease to shift and change (sammd ca avikkhippamana). The sage has first to train his mind to view with disgust the appetitive desires for food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man habituates himself to emphasizing the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come. Secondly, the sage has to habituate his mind to the idea that all his members are made up of the four elements, earth, water, fire and wind, like the carcass of a cow at the butcher's shop. Thirdly, he has to habituate his mind to thinking again and again (anussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the Sangha, the gods and the law of the Buddha, about the good effects of sila and the making of gifts (caganussati), about the nature of death (marananussatt) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (upasamanussati). He has also to pass through various purificatory processes. He has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of human carcasses and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are; from this he will turn his mind to living human bodies and convince himself that they, being in essence the same as dead carcasses, are as loathsome as the latter. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as of their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhana, or meditation, by leading his mind away from his body. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passdsa) and the exhaling (assasa) of his breath, so that, instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner, he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark this definitely by counting numbers, so that by

fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may realize the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. Next to this we come to brahma-vthdra, the fourfold meditation of mettd (universal friendship), karuna (universal pity), muditd (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkhd (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, one's friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate himself to meditation on universal friendship, a man should start with thinking how he would himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he would himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to thinking that his friends, his enemies and all those with whom he is not connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he should not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and that of others. Coming to jhdnas, we find that the objects of concentration may be earth, water, fire, wind, colours, etc. In the first stage of concentration on an object there is comprehension of the name and form of the object; at the next stage the relational movement ceases, and the mind penetrates into the object without any quivering. In the next two stages there is a buoyant exaltation and a steady inward bliss, and, as a result of the one-pointedness which is the culminating effect of the progressive meditation, there is the final release of the mind (ceto-vimutti) — the Nibbana.

It is easy to see that, though Patanjali's yoga is under a deep debt of obligation to this Buddhist yoga, the yoga of the Gltd is unacquainted therewith. The pessimism which fills the Buddhist yoga is seen to affect not only the outlook of Patanjali's yoga, but also most of the later Hindu modes of thought, in the form of the advisability of reflecting on the repulsive sides of things {pratipaksa-bhdvand) which are seemingly attractive 1 . The ideas of universal friendship, etc. were also taken over by Patanjali and later on passed into Hindu works. The methods of concentration on various ordinary objects also seem to be quite unlike what we find in the Gltd. The Gltd is devoid of any tinge of pessimism such as we find in the Buddhist yoga. It does not anywhere recommend the habit of brooding over the repulsive

1 See Nydya-manjarl, Vairdgya-sataka, Sdnti-sataka.

aspects of all things, so as to fill our minds with a feeling of disgust for all worldly things. It does not rise to the ideal of regarding all beings as friends or to that of universal compassion. Its sole aim is to teach the way of reaching the state of equanimity, in which the saint has no preferences, likes and dislikes—where the difference between the sinner and the virtuous, the self and the not-self has vanished. The idea of yoga as self-surrendering union with God and self-surrendering performance of one's duties is the special feature which is absent in Buddhism. This self-surrender in God, however, occurs in Patanjali's yoga, but it is hardly in keeping with the technical meaning of the word yoga, as the suspension of all mental states. The idea appears only once in Patanjali's sutras, and the entire method of yoga practices, as described in the later chapters, seems to take no notice of it. It seems highly probable, therefore, that in Patanjali's sutras the idea was borrowed from the Gita, where this self-surrender to God and union with Him is defined as yoga and is the central idea which the Gita is not tired of repeating again and again.

We have thus completely failed to trace the idea of the Gita to any of the different sources where the subject of yoga is dealt with, such as the Yoga Upanisads, Patanjali's Yoga-sutras, Buddhist Yoga, or the Maha-bharata. It is only in the Panca-ratra works that the Gita meaning of yoga as self-surrender to God is found. Thus Ahirbudhnya-samhita. describes yoga as the worship of the heart {hrdayaradhand), the offering of an oblation (havih) of oneself to God or self-surrender to God (bhagavate atma-samarpanam), and yoga is defined as the linking up (samyoga) of the lower self (jivatman) with the higher self (paramatman) 1 . It seems, therefore, safe to suggest that the idea of yoga in the Gita has the same traditional source as in the Panca-ratra works.

Sarnkhya Philosophy in the Gita.

It has been said before that there is no proof that the word sarnkhya in the Gita means the traditional Sarnkhya philosophy; yet the old philosophy of prakrti and purusa forms the basis of the philosophy of the Gita. This philosophy may be summarized as follows:

1 The Ahirbudhnya-samhita, of course, introduces many observations about the nerves (nddl) and the vdyus, which probably became associated with the Panca-ratra tradition in later times.

Prakrti is called mahad brahma (the great Brahma or the great multiplier as procreatress) in the Gita, xiv. 3 1 . It is said there that this prakrti is described as being like the female part, which God changes with His energy for the creation of the universe. Wherever any living beings may be born, the great Brahman or prakrti is to be considered as the female part and God as the father and fertilizer. Three types of qualities are supposed to be produced from prakrti (gunah prakrti-sambhavah) 2 . These are sattva, rajas and tamas, which bind the immortal self in its corporeal body. Of these, sattva, on account of its purity, is illuminating and untroubling {anamayam, which Sridhara explains as nirupadravam or santam), and consequently, on account of these two qualities, binds the self with the attachment for knowledge (jnana-sangena) and the attachment for pleasure (sukha-sangena). It is said that there are no living beings on earth, or gods in the heavens, who are not pervaded by the three gunas produced from the prakrtP. Since the gunas are produced from the prakrti through the fertilization of God's energy in prakrti, they may be said to be produced by God, though God always transcends them. The quality of sattva, as has been said above, associates the self with the attachments for pleasure and knowledge. The quality of rajas moves to action and arises from desire and attachment (trsna-sanga-samudbhavam), through which it binds the self with egoistic attachments for action. The quality of tamas overcomes the illumination of knowledge and leads to many errors. Tamas, being a product of ignorance, blinds all living beings and binds them down with carelessness, idleness and sleep. These three qualities predominate differently at different times. Thus, sometimes the quality of sattva predominates over rajas and tamas, and such a time is characterized by the rise of knowledge in the mind through all the different sense-gates; when rajas dominates sattva and tamas, the mind is characterized by greed, efforts and endeavours for different kinds of action and the rise of passions, emotions and desires; when tamas predominates over sattva and rajas, there is ignorance, lethargy, errors, delusions and false beliefs.

The different categories are avyakta, or the undifferentiated

1 mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbham dadhamy aham. xiv. 3. I have interpreted mahad brahma as prakrti, following Sridhara and other commentators. iSarikara surreptitiously introduces the word mdyd between mama and yoni and changes the whole meaning.

2 Gita, xiv. 5. 3 Ibid, xviii. 40.

prakrti,buddhi (intellect), ahamkara (egohood!), manas (mind-organ) and the ten senses, cognitive and conative. Manas is higher and subtler than the senses, and buddhi is higher than the manas, and there is that (probably self) which transcends buddhi. Manas is regarded as the superintendent of the different senses; it dominates them and through them enjoys the sense-objects. The relation between the buddhi and ahamkara is nowhere definitely stated. In addition to these, there is the category of the five elements (mahabhuta) 1 . It is difficult to say whether these categories were regarded in the Gita as being the products of prakrti or as separately existing categories. It is curious that they are nowhere mentioned in the Gita as being products of prakrti, which they are in Samkhya, but on the other hand, the five elements, manas, ahamkara and buddhi are regarded as being the eightfold nature {prakrti) of God 2 . It is also said that God has two different kinds of nature, a lower and a higher; the eightfold nature just referred to represents the lower nature of God, whereas His higher nature consists of the collective universe of life and spirit 3 . The gunas are noticed in relation to prakrti in in. 5, 27, 29, xm. 21, xiv. 5, xvin. 40, and in all these places the gunas are described as being produced from prakrti, though the categories are never said to be produced from prakrti. In the Gita, IX. 10, however, it is said that prakrti produces all that is moving and all that is static through the superintendence of God. The word prakrti is used in at least two different senses, as a primary and ultimate category and as a nature of God's being. It is quite possible that the primary meaning of prakrti in the Gita is God's nature; the other meaning of prakrti, as an ultimate principle from which the gunas are produced, is simply the hypostatization of God's nature. The whole group consisting of pleasure, pain, aversion, volition, consciousness, the eleven senses, the mind-organ, the five elements, egohood, intellect {buddhi), the undifferentiated {avyakta, meaning prakrti existing, probably, as the sub-conscious mind) power of holding the senses and the power of holding together the diverse mental functions {samghata) with their modifications and changes, is called ksetra. In another place the body alone is called ksetra*. It seems, therefore, that the word ksetra signifies in its broader sense not only the body, but also the entire mental plane, involving

1 Gita, in. 42, xm. 6 and 7, xv. 9. - Ibid. vn. 4.

3 Ibid. vn. 5. 4 Ibid. xm. 2.

the diverse mental functions, powers, capabilities, and also the undifferentiated sub-conscious element. In this connection it may be pointed out that ksetra is a term which is specially reserved to denote the complex of body and mind, exclusive of the living principle of the self, which is called ksetra-jna, or the knower of the ksetra, or ksetrin, the possessor of the ksetra or the body-mind complex. It is said that, just as the sun illuminates this whole world, so does the ksetrin illuminate the whole ksetra 1 .

It will be remembered that it is said in the Gita that God has two different natures, one the complex whole of the five elements, ahamkara, buddhi, etc., and the other the collective whole of life and spirit (jiva-bhuta). It will also be remembered that, by the fertilization of God's power in prakrti, the gunas, or the characteristic qualities, which pervade all that is living, come into being. The gunas, therefore, as diverse dynamic tendencies or characteristic qualities, pervade the entire psychosis-complex of ahamkara, buddhi, the senses, consciousness, etc., which represents the mental side of the ksetra. Ksetra-jna, or the ksetrin, is in all probability the same as purusa, an all-pervading principle as subtle as akasa (space), which, though it is omnipresent, remains untouched by any of the qualities of the body, in which it manifests itself. It is difficult to say what, according to the Gita, prakrti is in itself, before the fertilization of God's energy. It does not seem that prakrti can be regarded as being identical with God. It appears more to be like an ultimate principle coexistent with God and intimately connected with Him. There is, however, no passage in the Gita by which the lower prakrti of God, consisting of the categories, etc., can be identified with prakrti; for prakrti is always associated with the gunas and their production. Again, it is nowhere said in the Gita that the categories ahamkara, senses, etc., are in any way the products of the gunas; the word guna seems to imply only the enjoyable, emotional and moral or immoral qualities. It is these gunas which move us to all kinds of action, produce attachments and desires, make us enjoy or suffer, and associate us with virtues and vices. Prakrti is regarded as the mother-source from which all the knowable, enjoyable, and dynamic qualities of experience, referred to as being generated by the successive preponderance of the gunas, are produced. The categories of the psychosis and the five elements, which form the

1 Gita, xiii. 34.

mental ground, do not, therefore, seem to be products of the gunas or the prakrti. They seem to constitute a group by themselves, which is referred to as being a lower nature of God, side by side with His higher nature as life and spirit. Ksetra is a complex of both the guna elements of experience and the complex categories of body and mind. There seem, therefore, to be three different principles, the apara prakrti (the lower nature), para prakrti or purusa, and prakrti. Prakrti produces the gunas, which constitute experience-stuff; the apara prakrti holds within itself the material world of the five elements and their modifications as our bodies, the senses and the mind-categories. It seems very probable, therefore, that a later development of Samkhya combined these two prakrtis as one, and held that the gunas produced not only the stuff of our experience, but also all the mind-categories, the senses, etc., and the five gross elements and their modifications. Thegunas, therefore, are not the products of prakrti, but they themselves constitute prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium. In the Gitd prakrti can only produce the gunas through the fertilizing energy of God; they do not constitute the prakrti, when in a state of equilibrium. It is hard to realize the connection between the apara prakrti and the prakrtiand thegunas. The connection,however, can be imagined to take place through the medium of God, who is the fertilizer and upholder of them both. There seems to be but one purusa, as the all-pervading fundamental life-principle which animates all bodies and enjoys and suffers by its association with its experiences, remaining at the same time unaffected and untouched by the effects of the gunas. This naturally presumes that there is also a higher and a lower purusa, of which the former is always unattached to and unaffected by the gunas, whereas the lower purusa, which is different in different bodies, is always associated with the prakrti and its gunas and is continually affected by their operations. Thus it is said that the purusa, being in prakrti, enjoys the gunas of prakrti and this is the cause of its rebirth in good or bad bodies 1 . There is also in this body the higher purusa {purusah par ah), which is also called paramdtman, being the passive per-ceiver, thinker, upholder, enjoyer and the great lord 2 . The word purusa is used in the Gitd in four distinct senses, firstly, in the

1 Gitd, xiii. 21.

2 upadrastdnumantd ca bhartd bhoktd mahesvarah paramdtmeti cdpy nkto dehe 'smin purusah par ah. Ibid. xiii. :3.

dii 30

sense of purusottama, or God 1 ; secondly, in the sense of a person 2 ; and the Gita distinctly speaks of the two other purusas as ksara (changeable) and aksara (unchangeable). The ksara is all living beings, whereas the aksara is changeless. It is this higher self (uttamah purusah), different from the other purusa and called also paramatman, that pervades the three worlds and upholds them as their deathless God 3 . God, however, transcends both the ksara purusa and the aksara purusa and is therefore called purusottama*. Both prakrti and the paramatman purusa are beginningless. The paramatman purusa, being changeless and beyond the sphere of the gunas, is neither the agent of anything nor affected by the gunas, though it resides in the body. Prakrti is regarded as the ground through which all causes, effects, and their agents are determined. It is the fundamental principle of all dynamic operations, motivations and actions, whereas purusa is regarded as the principle which makes all experiences of joys and sorrows possible 5 . The paramatman purusa, therefore, though all-pervasive, yet exists in each individual, being untouched by its experiences of joy, sorrow and attachment, as its higher self. It is only the lower self that goes through the experiences and is always under the influence of the gunas. Any attempts that may be made to rise above the sphere of the gunas, above attachments and desires, above pleasures and pains, mean the subordination of the lower self to the pure and deathless higher self. Every attempt in this direction implies a temporary communion (yoga) with the higher self. It has already been pointed out that the Gita recognizes a conflict between the higher and the lower selves and advises us to raise the lower self by the higher self. In all our moral efforts there is always an upward and a downward pull by the higher purusa on the one side, and the gunas on the other; yet the higher purusa does not itself make the pulls. The energy of the downward pull is derived from the gunas and exerted by the lower self. In all these efforts the higher self stands as the unperturbed ideal of equanimity, steadiness, unchange-ableness in good or evil, joys or sorrows. The presence of this superior self is sometimes intuited by self-meditation, sometimes through philosophic knowledge, and sometimes by our moral

1 sandtanas tvam puruso mato me. Gita, xi. 18. tvam adi-devah purusah puranah. Ibid. xi. 38.

For purusottama see ibid. vm. 1, x. 15, xi. 3, xv. 18 and xv. 19.

2 Ibid. 11. 15, 11. 21, 11. 60, in. 4, etc. 3 Ibid. xv. 16 and 17. 4 Ibid. xv. 15 and 18. 8 Ibid. xin. 20.

efforts to perform our duties without attachment and without desires 1 . Each moral effort to perform our allotted duties without attachment means also a temporary communion {yoga) with the higher self or with God. A true philosophic knowledge, by which all actions are known to be due to the operations of the prakrti and its gunas and which realizes the unattached nature of the true self, the philosophic analysis of action and the relation between God, the higher self, the lower self, and the prakrti, and any devotional realization of the nature of God and dedication of all action to Him, and the experience of the supreme bliss of living in communion with Him, mean a communion with the higher self or God, and are therefore yoga.

It is easy to notice here the beginnings of a system of thought which in the hands of other thinkers might well be developed into the traditional school of Samkhya philosophy. It has already been pointed out that the two prakrtis naturally suggested the idea of unifying them into the one prakrti of the Samkhya. The higher and the lower purusas, where the latter enjoys and suffers, while the former remains unchanged and unperturbed amidst all the experiences of joy and sorrow on the part of the latter, naturally remind one of the Upanisadic simile of the two birds in the same tree, of whom the one eats tasteful fruits while the other remains contented without them 2 . The Glta does not seem to explain clearly the nature of the exact relation between the higher purusa and the lower purusa. It does not definitely state whether the lower purusa is one or many, or describe its exact ontological states. It is easy to see how any attempt that would aim at harmonizing these two apparently loosely-connected purusas into one self-consistent and intelligible concept might naturally end in the theory of infinite, pure, all-pervasive purusas and make the lower purusa the product of a false and illusory mutual reflection of prakrti and purusa. The Glta uses the word maya in three passages (vn. 14 and 15, xvm. 61); but it seems to be used there in the sense of an inscrutable power or ignorance, and not in that of illusory or magical creation. The idea that the world or any of the mental or spiritual categories could be merely an illusory appearance seems never to have been

1 dhydnendtmani pasyanti kecid dtmdnam dtmand

anye sdmkhyena yogena karma-yogena cdpare. Glta, xm. 25.

2 Mundaka, in. 1. 1 and Svetdsvatara, 4. 6.

30-2

contemplated in the Gita. It is not, therefore, conceivable that the lower, or the ksara, purusa might be mere illusory creation, accepted as a necessary postulate to explain the facts of our undeniable daily experience. But it is difficult to say how this ksetra-jna purusa can have a separate existence from the para purusa (which is absolutely free from the gunas), as enjoying the gunas of prakrti, unless the former be somehow regarded as the result of the functioning of the latter. Such a view would naturally support a theory that would regard the lower purusa as being only the para purusa as imaged or reflected in the gunas. The para purusa, existing by itself, free from the influence of the gunas, is in its purity. But even without losing its unattached character and its lonely purity it may somehow be imaged in the gunas and play the part of the phenomenal self, the jiva or the lower purusa, enjoying the gunas of prakrti and having the superior purusa as its ultimate ground. It cannot be denied that the Gita theory of purusa is much looser than the later Samkhya theory; but it has the advantage of being more elastic, as it serves better to explain the contact of the lower purusa with the higher and thereby charges the former with the spirit of a higher ideal.

The qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas were regarded as the universal characteristics of all kinds of mental tendencies, and all actions were held to be prompted by specific kinds of sattva, rajas or tamas. Mental tendencies were also designated accordingly as sattvika, rajasa or tamasa. Thus religious inclinations (sraddha) are also described as being of a threefold nature. Those who are of sattvika nature worship the gods, those who are of rajasa nature worship the yaksas and the raksas and those who are of tamasa nature worship ghosts and demons. Those who, prompted by vanity, desires and attachments, perform violent ascetic penances unauthorized by the scriptures and thereby starve and trouble their body and spirit, are really demoniac in their temperament. Again, sattvika sacrifices are those performed solely out of reverence for the scriptural injunctions and from a pure sense of duty, without any desire or motive for any other kind of worldly or heavenly good. Again, rajasa sacrifices are those which are performed for the realization of some benefits or good results or for the satisfaction of some vanity or pride. Tamasa sacrifices are those which are performed without proper faith, with improper ceremonials, transgressing Vedic injunctions. Again, tapas also is described as

being threefold, as of body (sarira), of speech (vanmaya) and of mind (manasa). Adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise men, sincerity and purity, sex-continence and non-injury are known as physical or bodily tapas. To speak in a manner that would be truthful, attractive, and conducive to good and would not be harmful in any way, and to study in the regular and proper way are regarded as the tapas of speech {van-maya tapas). Mental (manasa) tapas consists of sincerity of mind, friendliness of spirit, thoughtfulness and mental control, self-control and purity of mind. The above threefold tapas performed without any attachment for a reward is called sattvika tapas. But tapas performed out of vanity, or for the sake of higher position, respectability in society, or appreciation from people, is called rajasa —such a tapas can lead only to unsteady and transient results. Again, the tapas which is performed for the destruction of others by ignorant self-mortification is called tamasa tapas. Gifts, again, are called sattvika when they are made to proper persons (holy Brahmins) on auspicious occasions, and in holy places, merely out of sense of duty. Gifts are called rajasa when they are made as a return for the good done to the performer, for gaining future rewards, or made unwillingly. Again, gifts are called tamasa when they are made slightingly, to improper persons, in unholy places, and in ordinary places. Those who desire liberation perform sacrifices and tapas and make gifts without aiming at the attainment of any mundane or heavenly benefits. Knowledge also is regarded as sattvika, rajasa and tamasa. Sattvika wisdom consists in looking for unity and diversity and in realizing one unchangeable reality in the apparent diversity of living beings. Rajasa knowledge consists in the scientific apprehension of things or living beings as diverse in kind, character and number. Tamasa knowledge consists in narrow and untrue beliefs which are satisfied to consider a little thing as the whole and entire truth through sheer dogmatism, and unreasonable delusion or attachment. An action is called sattvika when it is performed without any desire for a reward, without attachment and without aversion. It is called rajasa when it is performed with elaborate endeavours and efforts, out of pride and vanity, for the satisfaction of one's desires. It is called tamasa when it is undertaken out of ignorance and without proper judgment of one's own capacities, and when it leads to waste of energy, harm and injury. An agent (kartr) is called sattvika when he is free from attachment

and vanity and absolutely unruffled in success and failure, persevering and energetic. Again, an agent is called rdjasa if he acts out of motives of self-interest, is impure, is filled with sorrow or joy in failure or success, and injures others. An agent is called tamasa if he is careless, haughty, thoughtless, deceptive, arrogant, idle, procrastinating and melancholic. Understanding (buddhi) is said to be sattvika when it grasps how a man has to set himself in the path of virtue, how to refrain from vice, what ought and what ought not to be done, of what one has to be afraid and how to be fearless, what is bondage, and what is liberation. Rajasa understanding is that by which one wrongly grasps the nature of virtue and vice, and of right and wrong conduct. Tamasa understanding is that which takes vice as virtue and out of ignorance perceives all things wrongly. That mental hold (dhrti) is called sattvika which by unfailing communion holds together the sense-functions and bio-motor and mind activities. That happiness which in the beginning appears to be painful, but which is in the end as sweet as nectar, and which is the direct result of gaiety of mind, is called sattvika sukha. The happiness arising out of sense-object contact, which in the beginning is as attractive as nectar, but in the end is as painful as poison, is rajasa. That happiness which arises out of sleep, idleness and errors, and blinds one in the beginning and in the end, is called tamasa. So also the food which increases life, facilitates mind-function, increases powers of enjoyment, makes one healthy and strong, and is sweet, resistible and delightful is liked by the sattvika people. That food is liked by rajasa people which is hot, sour, salt, dry and causes pain and brings on diseases. The food which is impure, tasteless, old and rotten is liked by tamasa people. All this goes to show that the gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas, are determinants of the tendencies of, or rather the stuff of, the moral and immoral, pleasurable and painful planes or characteristics of our experience. Sattva represents the moral and supermoral planes, rajas the ordinary mixed and normal plane, and tamas the inferior and immoral characteristics of our experience.

Avyakta and Brahman.

The word avyakta is primarily used in the Gita in the sense of "the unmanifested." Etymologically the word consists of two parts, the negative particle a meaning "negation," and vyakta meaning "manifested," "differentiated" or "revealed." In this

sense the word is used as an adjective. There is another use of the word in the neuter gender (avyaktam), in the sense of a category. As an illustration of the first sense, one may refer to the Gita, 11. 25 or viii. 21. Thus in 11. 25 the self is described as the unmanifested; unthinkable and unchangeable. In the Upanisads, however, it is very unusual to characterize the self as avyakta or unmanifested; for the self there is pure consciousness and self-manifested. In all later Vedantic works the self is described as anubhuti-svabhava, or as being always immediately intuited. But in the Gita the most prominent characteristic of the self is that it is changeless and deathless; next to this, it is unmanifested and unthinkable. But it does not seem that the Gita describes the self as pure consciousness. Not only does it characterize the self as avyakta or unmanifested, but it does not seem anywhere to refer to it as a self-conscious principle. The word cetana, which probably means consciousness, is described in the Gita as being a part of the changeable ksetra, and not the ksetra-jna 1 . It may naturally be asked how, if the self was not a conscious principle, could it be described as ksetra-jna (that which knows the ksetra)} But it may well be replied that the self here is called ksetra-jna only in relation to its ksetra, and the implication would be that the self becomes a conscious principle not by virtue of its own inherent principle of consciousness, but by virtue of the principle of consciousness reflected or offered to it by the complex entity of the ksetra. The ksetra contains within it the conscious principle known as cetana, and it is by virtue of its association with the self that the self appears as ksetra-jna or the knower.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the term ksetra is never found in the Upanisads in the technical sense in which it is used in the Gita. The term ksetra-jna, however, appears in Svetasvatara, vi. 16 and Maitrdyana, 11. 5 in the sense oi purusa, as in the Gita. The term ksetra, however, as used in the Gita, has more or less the same sense that it has in Caraka's account of Samkhya in the Caraka-samhita, 111.1. 61-63. In Caraka, however, avyakta is excluded from the complex constituent ksetra, though in the Gita it is included within the constituents of ksetra. Caraka again considers avyakta (by which term he means both the Samkhya prakrti and the purusa) as ksetra-jna, whereas the Gita takes only the purusa as ksetra-jna. The purusa of the Gita is further

1 Gita, xiii. 7.

characterized as the life-principle (jiva-bhuta, vn. 5 and xv. 7) by which the whole world is upheld. The Gita does not, however, describe in what particular way the life-principle upholds the world. In Caraka's account also the atman is referred to as the life-principle, and it is held there that it is the principle which holds together the buddhi, the senses, the mind and the objects—it is also the principle for which good, bad, pleasure, pain, bondage, liberation, and in fact the whole world-process happens. In the Caraka-samhita purusa is regarded as cetana-dhatu, or the upholder of consciousness ; yet it is not regarded as conscious by itself. Consciousness only comes to it as a result of the joint operation of manas, the senses, the objects, etc. In the Gita purusa is not regarded as the cetana-dhatu, but cetana or consciousness is regarded as being a constituent of the ksetra over which the purusa presides. Thus knowledge can accrue to purusa as ksetra-jna, only in association with its ksetra. It may well be supposed that purusa as ksetra-jna and as a life-principle upholds the constituents of the ksetra, and it is probable that the purusd's position as a cognizer or knower depends upon this intimate association between itself and the ksetra. Another relevant point is suggested along with the considerations of the nature of the purusa as the cognizer, namely, the consideration of the nature of purusa as an agent (kartr). It will be pointed out in another section that the fruition of actions is rendered possible by the combined operations of adhisthana, kartr, karana, cesta and daiva, and this doctrine has been regarded as being a Samkhya doctrine, though it has been interpreted by Sarikara as being a Vedantic view. But both Samkhya and the Vedanta theories are explicitly of the sat-karya-vada type. According to the sat-karya-vada of the traditional Samkhya philosophy the fruition of actions is the natural result of a course of unfolding evolution, consisting in the actualization of what was already potentially present. On the Vedantic sat-karya-vada view all operations are but mere appearances, and the cause alone is true. Neither of these doctrines would seem to approve of a theory of causation which would imply that anything could be the result of the joint operation of a number of factors. That which is not cannot be produced by the joint operation of a collocation of causes. It may be remembered, however, that the Gita explicitly formulates the basic principle of sat-karya-vada, that what exists cannot be destroyed and that what does not exist cannot crime into being.

This principle was applied for proving the deathless character of the self. It is bound to strike anyone as very surprising that the Gltd should accept the sat-kdrya-vdda doctrine in establishing the immortality of the self and should assume the a-sat-kdrya-vdda doctrine regarding the production of action. It is curious, however, to note that a similar view regarding the production of action is to be found in Caraka's account of Samkhya, where it is said that all actions are produced as a result of a collocation of causes— that actions are the results of the collocation of other entities with the agent (kartr) 1 .

The word avyakta is also used in the sense of " unknowability " or "disappearance" in the Gltd, n. 28, where it is said that the beginnings of all beings are invisible and unknown; it is only in the middle that they are known, and in death also they disappear and become unknown. But the word avyakta in the neuter gender means a category which is a part of God Himself and from which all the manifested manifold world has come into being. This avyakta is also referred to as a prakrti or nature of God, which, under His superintendence, produces the moving and the unmoved—the entire universe 2 . But God Himself is sometimes referred to as being avyakta (probably because He cannot be grasped by any of our senses), as an existence superior to the avyakta, which is described as a part of His nature, and as a category from which all things have come into being 3 . This avyakta which is identical with God is also called aksara, or the immortal, and is regarded as the last resort of all beings who attain their highest and most perfect realization. Thus there is a superior avyakta, which represents the highest essence of God, and an inferior avyakta, from which the world is produced. Side by side with these two avyaktas there is also the prakrti, which is sometimes described as a coexistent principle and as the maya or the blinding power of God, from which the gunas are produced.

The word " Brahman " is used in at least two or three different senses. Thus in one sense it means prakrti, from which the gunas are produced. In another sense it is used as an essential nature of God. In another sense it means the Vedas. Thus in the Gltd,

1 Caraka-samhitd, IV. i. 54.

2 Gltd, ix. io, mayddhyaksena prakrtih suyate sacaracaram.

3 Ibid. via. 20 and vm. 21 ; also ix. 4, where it is said, "AH the world is pervaded over by me in my form as avyakta ; all things and all living beings are in me, but I am not exhausted in them."

hi. i 5, it is said that the sacrificial duties are derived from Brahman (Vedas). Brahman is derived from the eternal; therefore the omnipresent Brahman is always established in the sacrifices 1 . The idea here is that, since the Vedas have sprung from the eternal Brahman, its eternal and omnipresent character is transmitted to the sacrifices also. The word "omnipresent" (sarva-gata) is probably used in reference to the sacrifices on account of the diverse and manifold ways in which the sacrifices are supposed to benefit those who perform them. In the Gita, iv. 32, also the word "Brahman" in Brahmano tnukhe is used to denote the Vedas. But in iv. 24 and 25, where it is said that all sacrifices are to be made with the Brahman as the object and that .the sacrificial materials, sacrificial fire, etc. are to be looked upon as being Brahman, the word "Brahman" is in all probability used in the sense of God 2 . In v. 6, 10, 19 also the word "Brahman" is used in the sense of God or Isvara; and in most of the other cases the word is used in the sense of God. But according to the Gita the personal God as Isvara is the supreme principle, and Brahman, in the sense of a qualityless, undifferentiated ultimate principle as taught in the Upanisads, is a principle which, though great in itself and representing the ultimate essence of God, is nevertheless upheld by the personal God or Isvara. Thus, though in vin. 3 and x. 12 Brahman is referred to as the differenceless ultimate principle, yet in xiv. 27 it is said that God is the support of even this ultimate principle, Brahman. In many places we also hear of the attainment of Brahmahood {brahma-bhuta, v. 24, vi. 27, xvni. 54, or brahma-bhuya, xiv. 26), and also of the attainment of the ultimate bliss of Brahman (Brahma-nirvana, n. 72, v. 24, 25, 26). The word brahma-bhuta does not in the Gita mean the differenceless merging into oneness, as in the Vedanta of Sankara. It is wrong to think that the term "Brahman" is always used in the same sense in which Sankara used it. The word "Brahman" is used in the sense of an ultimate differenceless principle in the Upanisads, and the Upanisads were apprized by all systems of Hindu thought as the repository of all sacred knowledge. Most systems regarded the attainment of a changeless eternal state as the final goal of realization. As an illustration, I may refer to the account of

1 Gita, hi. 15.

2 £rldhara, in interpreting this verse (iv. 24), explains it by saying, tad evam paramesvararddhana-laksanam karma jndna-hetutvena bandhakatvabhavad akar-maiva.

Samkhya given by Caraka, in which it is said that, when a man gives up all attachment and mental and physical actions, all feelings and knowledge ultimately and absolutely cease. At this stage he is reduced to Brahmahood {brahma-bhuta), and the self is no longer manifested. It is a stage which is beyond all existence and which has no connotation, characteristic or mark 1 . This state is almost like a state of annihilation, and yet it is described as a state of Brahmahood. The word "Brahman" was appropriated from the Upanisads and was used to denote an ultimate superior state of realization, the exact nature of which differed with the different systems. In the Gita also we find the word "Brahman" signifying a high state of self-realization in which, through a complete detachment from all passions, a man is self-contented within himself and his mind is in a perfect state of equilibrium. In the Glta y v. 19, Brahman is defined as the faultless state of equilibrium {nirdosam hi samam brahma), and in all the verses of that context the sage who is in a state of equanimity and equilibrium through detachment and passionlessness is said to be by virtue thereof in Brahman; for Brahman means a state of equanimity. In the Glta y xiii. 13, Brahman is described as the ultimate object of knowledge, which is beginningless, and cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent (na sat tan nasad ucyate). It is said that this Brahman has His hands and feet, eyes, head, mouth and ears everywhere in the world, and that He envelopes all. He is without senses, but He illuminates all sense-qualities; Himself unattached and the upholder of all, beyond the gunas. He is also the enjoyer of the gunas. He is both inside and outside of all living beings, of all that is moving and that is unmoved. He is both near and far, but unknowable on account of His subtle nature. Being one in many, yet appearing as many, the upholder of all living beings, the devourer and overpowerer of all, He is the light of all light, beyond all darkness, He is both knowledge and the object of knowledge, residing in the heart of all. It is easy to see that the whole concept of Brahman, as herein stated, is directly borrowed from the Upanisads. Towards the end of this chapter it is said that he who perceives the many living beings as being in one, and realizes everything as an emanation or elaboration from that, becomes Brahman. But in the next chapter Krsna as God says,

1 nihsrtah sarva-bhavebhyas cihnam yasya na vidyate.

Caraka-samhitdyiv. i. 153.

" I am the upholder of the immortal and imperishable Brahman of absolute bliss and of the eternal dharma." In the Gita, xiv. 26, it is said that "he who worships me unflinchingly through devotion, transcends all gunas and becomes Brahman." It has just been remarked that the Gita recognizes two different kinds of avyaktas. It is the lower avyakta nature of God which has manifested itself as the universe; but there is a higher avyakta, which is beyond it as the eternal and unchangeable basis of all. It seems very probable, therefore, that Brahman is identical with this higher avyakta. But, though this higher avyakta is regarded as the highest essence of God, yet, together with the lower avyakta and the selves, it is upheld in the super-personality of God.

The question whether the Glta is a Samkhya or a Vedanta work, or originally a Samkhya work which was later on revised, changed, or enlarged from a Vedanta point of view, need not be elaborately discussed here. For, if the interpretation of the Gita, as given herein, be accepted, then it will be evident that the Gita is neither a Samkhya work nor a Vedanta work. It has been pointed out that the word samkhya, in the Gita, does not mean the traditional Samkhya philosophy, as found in Isvarakrsna's Karika. But there are, no doubt, here the scattered elements of an older philosophy, from which not only the Samkhya of Isvarakrsna or the Sasti-tantra (of which Isvarakrsna's work was a summary) developed, but even its earlier version, as found in Caraka's account, could be considered to have developed. There is no doubt that the Gita's account of Samkhya differs materially from the Samkhya of the Sasti-tantra or of Isvarakrsna, from the Samkhya of Caraka, from the Samkhya of Pancasikha in the Maha-bharata and from the Samkhya of Patanjali and the Vyasa-bhdsya. Ordinarily the Samkhya of Patanjali is described as a theistic Samkhya (sesvara-samkhya) ; but the Isvara of Patanjali is but loosely attached to the system of Samkhya thought as expounded in Yoga. The Isvara there appears only as a supernormal, perfect being, who by his permanent will removes the barriers in the path of the evolution of prakrti in accordance with the law of karma. He thus merely helps the fulfilment of the teleology of the blind prakrti. But in the Gita both the purusas and the root of the cosmic nature are but parts of God, the super-person (purusottama). The prakrti, from which the gunas which have only subjectivistic characteristics are derived, is described as the may a power of God, or like a

consort to Him, who, being fertilized by His energies, produces the gunas. The difference of the philosophy of the Gita from the various schools of Samkhya is very evident. Instead of the one prakrti of Samkhya we have here the three prakrtis of God. The gunas here are subjectivistic or psychical, and not cosmical. It is because the Gita admits a prakrti which produces the subjectivistic gunas by which the purusas are bound with ties of attachment to their experiences, that such a prakrti could fitly be described as gunamayi may a {may a consisting of gunas). The purusas, again, though they are many, are on the whole but emanations from a specific prakrti (divine nature) of God. The purusas are not stated in the Gita to be of the nature of pure intelligence, as in the Samkhya; but the cognizing element of consciousness (cetana) is derived from another prakrti of God, which is associated with the purusa. It has also been pointed out that the Gita admits the sat-karya-vada doctrine with reference to immortality of the self, but not with reference to the fruition of actions or the rise of consciousness. The Samkhya category of tan-matra is missing in the Gita, and the general teleology of the prakrti of the Samkhya is replaced by the super-person of God, who by his will gives a unity and a purpose to all the different elements that are upheld within Him. Both the Samkhya of Kapila and that of Patanjali aim at securing, either through knowledge or through Yoga practices, the final loneliness of the translucent purusas. The Gita, however, is anxious to secure the saintly equanimity and a perfect, unperturbed nature by the practice of detachment of the mind from passions and desires. When such a saintly equanimity and self-contentedness is achieved, the sage is said to be in a state of liberation from the bondage of guna-attachments, or to be in a state of Brahmahood in God. The philosophy of the Gita thus differs materially from the traditional Samkhya philosophy on almost every point. On some minor points (e.g. the absence of tan-matras, the nature of the production of knowledge and action, etc.) the Gita philosophy has some similarities with the account of the Samkhya given in the Caraka-samhita, iv. 1, as already described in the first volume of this work 1 .

The question whether the Gita was written under a Vedantic influence cannot be answered, unless one understands what is exactly meant by this Vedantic influence; if by Vedantic influence

1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I, 1922, pp. 213-222.

one means the influence of the Upanisads, then the Gita must plainly be admitted to have borrowed very freely from the Upanisads, which from the earliest times had been revered for their wisdom. If, however, by Vedantic influence one means the philosophy of Vedanta as taught by Sankara and his followers, then it must be said that the Gita philosophy is largely different therefrom. It has already been pointed out that, though Brahman is often described in Upanisadic language as the highest essence of God, it is in reality a part of the super-personality of God. The Gita, moreover, does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal. The word may a is, no doubt, used in the Gita in three passages; but its meaning is not what Sankara ascribes to it in his famous interpretation of Vedantic thought. Thus in the Gita, vn. 14, may a is described as being of the nature of gunas, and it is said that he who clings to God escapes the grip of the may a or of the gunas. In the Gita, vn. 15, the word maya is also probably used in the same sense, since it is said that it is ignorant and sinful men who, through demoniac ideas, lose their right wisdom under the influence of maya and do not cling to God. In all probability, here also maya means the influence of rajas and tamas; for it has been repeatedly said in the Gita that demoniac tendencies are generated under the preponderating influence of rajas and tamas. In the Gita, xvm. 61, it is said that God resides in the heart of all living beings and moves them by maya, like dolls on a machine. It has been pointed out that the psychical tendencies and moral or immoral propensities which move all men to action are produced under the influence of the gunas, and that God is the ultimate generator of the gunas from the prakrti. The maya, therefore, may well be taken here to mean gunas, as in the Gita, vn. 14. Srldhara takes it to mean the power of God. The gunas are, no doubt, in a remote sense, powers of God. But Sankara's paraphrasing of it as deception (chadmana) is quite inappropriate. Thus it is evident that the Gita does not know the view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of maya or illusion. It has also been pointed out that the word " Brahman " is used in the Gita in the sense of the Vedas, of faultless equanimity, of supreme essence and of prakrti, which shows that it had no such crystallized technical sense as in the philosophy of Sahkara. The word had in the Gita all the looseness of Upanisadic

usage. In the Gita the word avidya, so famous in Sankara's philosophy of the Vedanta, is nowhere used. The word ajnana is used several times (v. 15, 16; x. 11; xm. 11; xiv. 8, 16, 17; xvi. 4); but it has no special technical sense in any of these passages. It has the sense of "ignorance" or "misconception," which is produced by tamas (ajnanam tamasah phalam, xiv. 16) and which in its turn produces tamas (tamas tv ajnana-jam viddhi, xiv. 8).

Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the Gita.

The Vedic view of the obligatoriness of certain kinds of sacrifices or substitution-meditations permeated almost all forms of Hindu thought, excepting the Vedanta philosophy as interpreted by Sankara. The conception of the obligatoriness of duties finds its best expression in the analysis of vidhi in the Mimamsa philosophy. Vidhi means the injunctions of the Vedas, such as," Thou should'st perform such and such sacrifices"; sometimes these are conditional, such as, "Those who wish to attain Heaven should perform such and such sacrifices "; sometimes they are unconditional, such as, "Thou should'st say the three prayers." The force of this vidhi, or injunction, is differently interpreted in the different schools of Mimamsa. Kumarila, the celebrated commentator, in interpreting Jaimini's definition of dharma, or virtue, as a desirable end (artha) or good which is enjoined by the Vedic commands (codana-laksano 'rtko dharmah, Mimdmsa-sutra, 1. 1), says that it is the performance of the Vedic injunctions, sacrifices, etc. (yagadih) that should be called our duty. The definition of virtue, then, involves the notion that only such a desired end (on account of the pain associated with it not exceeding the associated pleasure) as is enjoined by Vedic commands is called dharma. The sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas are called dharma, because these would in future produce pleasurable experiences. So one's abstention from actions prohibited by Vedic commands is also called dharma, as by this means one can avoid the undesirable effects and sufferings of punishments as a result of transgressing those commands. Such sacrifices, however, are ultimately regarded as artha, or desired ends, because they produce pleasurable experiences. The imperative of Vedic commands is supposed to operate in a twofold manner, firstly, as initiating a volitional tendency in obedience to the verbal command (sabdi bhavana), and, secondly, in releasing

the will to the actual performance of the act enjoined by the command (arthi bhavana). The propulsion of verbal commands is not like any physical propulsion; such a propulsion only arises as a result of one's comprehension of the fact that the performance of the acts enjoined will lead to beneficial results, and it naturally moves one to perform those acts out of self-interest 1 . So of the twofold propulsion {bhavana) implied in a Vedic imperative the propulsio;: to act, as communicated by the verbal command, is called sabdi bhavana; and this is followed by the actual efforts of the person for the performance of the act 2 . The prescriptive of the command (vidhi) is comprehended directly from the imperative suffix (tin) of the verb, even before the meaning of the verb is realized. If this is so, it is contended that the imperative, as it is communicated by the command, is a pure con-tentless form of command. This contention is admitted by the Bhatta school, which thinks that, though in the first stage we have communication of the contentless pure form of the imperative, yet at the successive stages the contentless form of duty is naturally supplemented by a more direct reference to the concrete context, as denoted by the verb with which the suffix is associated. So the process of the propulsion of bhavana, though it starts at the first instance with the communication of a pure contentless form, passes, by reason of its own necessity and the incapacity of a contentless form of duty to stand by itself, gradually through more and more concrete stages to the actual comprehension of the duty implied by the concrete meaning of the associated verb 3 . So the communication of the contentless duty and its association with the concrete verbal meaning are not two different meanings, but are

1 adrste tu visaye sreyah-sddhanddhigamah sabdaika-nibandhana iti tad-adhi-gamopdyah sabda eva pravartakah; ata eva sabdo 'pi na svarupa-mdtrena pra-vartako vdyv-ddi-tulyatva-prasaftgdt;.. .arthaprafttim upajanayatah sabdasya pra-vartakatvam. Nydya-manjarl, p. 342. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895-

2 Lin-ddeh sabdasya na pratltt-janana-mdtre vydparah kintu purusa-pravrttav api; sa cdyant lin-ddi-vydpdrah sabda-bhdvand-ndmadheyo vidhir ity ucyate sa eva ca pravartakah.. .yo bhavana-kriyd-kartr-visayah prayojaka-vydpdrah purusa-stho yatra bhavana-kriydydh kartd svargddikarmatdm apadyate so 'rtha-bhdvand-sab-dena ucyate. Ibid. p. 343.

3 Yady apy antsair asamsprstdm vidhih sprsati bhdvandm tathapy asaktito ndsau tan-mdtre paryavasyati anustheye hi visaye vidhih pumsdm pravartakah amsa-trayena cdpurndm ndnuHsthati bhdvandm tasmdt prakrdnta-rupo 'pi vidhis tdvat pratlksate

yavad yogyatvam dpannd bhavana'nydnapeksinl. Ibid. p. 344.

rather the prolongation of one process of communication, just as cooking includes all the different associated acts of putting the pan on the fire, lighting the fire, and the like 1 . These two bhdvands, therefore, mean nothing more than the reasoning of the will and its translation into definite channels of activity, as the performance of the sacrifice, etc., and vidhi here means simply the prompting or the propulsion (vydpdrah prerand-r&pah) ; and it is such prompting that initiates in the performer the will, which is later on translated into concrete action.

Another Mimamsa view objects to this theory of dual bhdvand and asserts that the suffix lift involves the notion of an order to work (prerana), as if the relation of the Vedas to us were one of master and servant, and that the Vedic vidhi as expressed in the lift suffix conveys the command {praisya-praisayoh sambandhah). The vidhi goads us to work, and, being goaded by it, we turn to work. It does not physically compel us to act; but the feeling we have from it that we have been ordered to act constitutes the driving power. The knowledge of vidhi thus drives us to our Vedic duties. When a man hears the command, he feels that he has been commanded and then he sets to work. This setting to work is quite a different operation from the relation of the command and the commanded, and comes after it. The essence of a Vedic sentence is this command or niyoga. A man who has formerly tasted the benefits of certain things or the pleasures they produced naturally intends to have them again; here also there is a peculiar mental experience of eagerness, desire or intention (dkuta), which goads him on to obey the Vedic commands. This akuta is a purely subjective experience and cannot, therefore, be experienced by others, though one can always infer its existence from the very fact that, unless it were felt in the mind, no one would feel himself goaded to work 2 . Niyoga y or a prompting to work {prerana), is the sense of all vidhis, and this rouses in us the intention of working in accordance with the command. The actual performance of an action is a mere counterpart of the intention (dktlta), that is subjectively felt as roused by the niyoga or the

1 Yathd hi sthdly-adhisrayandt prabhrtyd mrdkdnksaudana-nispatter ekaiveyam pdka-kriya salildvaseka-tanduldvapana-darvt-vighattandsrdvanddy-aneka-ksana-samuddya-svabhdvd tathd prathama-pada-jndndt prabhrti a nirdkdnsa-vdkydrtha-pariccheddd ekaiveyam sdbdl pramitih. Nydya-manjarl, p. 345.

2 Ayam api bhautika-vydpdra-hetur dtmdkuta-viseso na pramdndntara-vedyo bhavati na ca na vedyate tat-samvedane sati cestd yadvantam drstva tasydpi tddrk~ prerand'vagamo 'numiyate. Ibid. p. 348.

dii 31

driving power of the vidhi. This view differs from the view of Kumarila in this, that it does not suppose that the propulsion of the Vedic command takes effect in a twofold bhavana, through the whole process of the conception and the materialization of the action in accordance with the Vedic commands. The force of the command is exhausted in prompting us to action and arousing in us the inward resolution (akuta) to obey the command. The actual performance of the action comes as a natural consequence (artha). The force of the vidhi has a field of application only when our ordinary inclinations do not naturally lead us to the performance of action. Vidhi, therefore, operates merely as a law of command which has to be obeyed for the sake of the law alone, and it is this psychological factor of inward resolution to obey the law that leads to the performance of action.

Mandana, in his Vidhi-viveka, discusses the diverse views on the significance of vidhi. He interprets vidhi as a specific kind of prompting (pravartana). He distinguishes the inner volitional intention of attaining an end and its translation into active effort leading to muscular movements of the body. Pravartana here means the inner volitional direction of the mind towards the performance of the action, as well as actual nervous changes which are associated with it 1 . The command of the Vedas naturally brings with it a sense of duty or of " oughtness " (kartavyata), and it is this sense of kartavyata that impels people to action without any reference to the advantages and benefits that may be reaped by such actions. The psychological state associated with such a feeling of "oughtness" is said to be of the nature of instincts (pratibha). It is through an instinctive stimulus to work, proceeding from the sense of "oughtness," that the action is performed.

The Nyaya doctrine differs from the above view of vidhi as a categorically imperative order and holds that the prompting of the Vedic commands derives its force from our desire for the attainment of the benefits that we might reap if we acted in accordance with them. So the ultimate motive of the action is the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and it is only with a view to attaining the desired ends that one is prompted to follow the Vedic

1 Bhdva-dharma eva kascit samihita-sddhandnuguno vydpdra-paddrthah; tad yathd dtmano buddhy-ddi-janana-pravrttasya manah-samyoga evd'yam bhdva-dharmah tadvad atrdpi spandas tad-itaro vd bhdva-dharmah pravrtti-janana'-nukillatayd vydpdra-visesah pravartana. Vacaspati's Nydya-kanikd on Vidhi-viveka, pp. 243, 244.

commands and perform the sacrifices. In this view, therefore, the prompting, or prerana, has not in it that self-evident call of the pure imperative or the rousing of the volitional tendency through the influence of the imperative; the prompting felt is due only to the rise of desires for the end.

Most of the above interpretations of vidhi are of much later date than the Gitd. No systematic discussion of the nature of vidhi which can be regarded as contemporaneous with or prior to the date of the Gitd is now available. But even these latter-day explanations are useful in understanding the significance of the force of the notion of the imperative in the Gitd. It is clear from the above discussion that the notion of the imperative of vidhi cannot be called moral in our sense of the term, as has been done in a recent work on Hindu Ethics 1 . For the imperative of vidhi is limited to the injunctions of the Vedas, which are by no means coextensive with our general notion of morality. According to the Mlmamsa schools just described virtue (dharma) consists in obedience to Vedic injunctions. Whatever may be enjoined by the Vedas is to be considered as virtue, whatever is prohibited by the Vedas is evil and sin, and all other things which are neither enjoined by the Vedas nor prohibited by them are neutral, i.e. neither virtuous nor vicious 2 . The term dharma is therefore limited to actions enjoined by the Vedas, even though such actions may in some cases be associated with evil consequences leading to punishments due to the transgression of some other Vedic commands. The categorical imperative here implied is scriptural and therefore wholly external. The virtuous character of actions does not depend on their intrinsic nature, but on the external qualification of being enjoined by the Vedas.

1 S. K. Maitra's Hindu Ethics, written under Dr Seal's close personal supervision and guidance.

2 Kumarila holds that even those sacrifices which are performed for the killing of one's enemies are right, because they are also enjoined by the Vedas. Prabhakara, however, contends that, since these are performed only out of the natural evil propensities of men, their performance cannot be regarded as being due to a sense of duty associated with obedience to the injunctions of the Vedas. Kumarila thus contends that, though the Syena sacrifice is attended with evil consequences, yet, since the performer is only concerned with his duty in connection with the Vedic commands, he is not concerned with the evil consequences; and it is on account of one's obedience to the Vedic injunctions that it is called right, though the injury to living beings that it may involve will bring about its punishment all the same. Samkhya and some Nyaya writers, however, would condemn the Syena sacrifice on account of the injury to living beings that it involves.

31-2

Whatever is not enjoined in the Vedas or not prohibited in them is simply neutral. It is clear, therefore, that the term dharma can be translated as "virtue" only in a technical sense, and the words "moral" and "immoral" in our sense have nothing to do with the concept of dharma or adharma.

The Glta distinguishes between two kinds of motives for the performance of sacrifices. The first motive is that of greed and self-interest, and the second is a sense of duty. The Glta is aware of that kind of motive for the performance which corresponds to the Nyaya interpretation of Vedic vidhis and also to the general Mlmamsa interpretation of vidhi as engendering a sense of duty. Thus it denounces those fools who follow the Vedic doctrines and do not believe in anything else; they are full of desires and eager to attain Heaven, they take to those actions which lead to rebirth and the enjoyment of mundane pleasures. People who are thus filled with greed and desires, and perform sacrifices for the attainment of earthly goods, move in an inferior plane and are not qualified for the higher scheme of life of devotion to God with right resolution 1 . The Vedas are said to be under the influence of mundane hankerings and desires, and it is through passions and antipathies, through desires and aversions, that people perform the Vedic sacrifices and think that there is nothing greater than these. One should therefore transcend the sphere of Vedic sacrifices performed out of motives of self-interest. But the Glta is not against the performance of Vedic sacrifices, if inspired by a sheer regard for the duty of performing sacrifices. Anyone who looks to his own personal gain and advantages in performing the sacrifices, and is only eager to attain his pleasurable ends, is an inferior type of man; the sacrifices should therefore be performed without any personal attachment, out of regard for the sacred duty of the performance. Prajapati created sacrifices along with the creation of men and said, "The sacrifices will be for your good—you should help the gods by your sacrifices, and the gods will in their

1 Vyavasaydtmika buddhih samddhan na vidhiyate. Glta, 11. 44. The word samadhau is explained by isridhara as follows: samddhis cittaikdgryam, para-mesvarabhimukhatvam iti ydvat; tasmin niscayatmikd buddhis tu na vidhiyate. Samadhi is thus used here to mean one-pointedness of mind to God. But Sarikara gives a very curious interpretation of the word samadhi, as meaning mind (antahkarana or buddhi), which is hardly justifiable. Thus he says, sama-dhiyate 'smin purusopabhogaya sarvam iti samddhir antahkaranam buddhih. The word vyavasaydtmika is interpreted by commentators on 11. 41 and 11. 44 as meaning niscayatmikd (involving correct decision through proper pramdnas or proof). I prefer, however, to take the word to mean "right resolution."

turn help you to grow and prosper. He who lives for himself without offering oblations to the gods and supporting them thereby is misappropriating the share that belongs to the gods."

This view of the Glta is different from that of the later Mimamsa, which probably had a much earlier tradition. Thus Kumarila held that the final justification of Vedic sacrifices or of dharma was that it satisfied our needs and produced happiness— it was artha. The sacrifices were, no doubt, performed out of regard for the law of Vedic commands; but that represented only the psychological side of the question. The external ground for the performance of Vedic sacrifices was that it produced happiness for the performer and satisfied his desires by securing for him the objects of desire. It was in dependence on such a view that the Nyaya sought to settle the motive of all Vedic sacrifices. The Naiyayikas believed that the Vedic observances not only secured for us all desired objects, but that this was also the motive for which the sacrifices were performed. The Glta was well aware of this view, which it denounces. The Glta admitted that the sacrifices produced the good of the world, but its whole outlook was different; for the Glta looked upon the sacrifices as being bonds of union between gods and men. The sacrifices improved the mutual good-will, and it was by the sacrifices that the gods were helped, and they in their turn helped men, and so both men and the gods prospered. Through sacrifices there was rain, and by rain the food-grains grew and men lived on the food-grains. So the sacrifices were looked upon as being sources not so much of individual good as of public good. He who looks to the sacrifices as leading to the satisfaction of his selfish interests is surely an inferior person. But those who do not perform the sacrifices are equally wicked. The Vedas have sprung forth from the deathless eternal, and sacrifices spring from the Vedas, and it is thus that the deathless, all-pervading Brahman is established in the sacrifices 1 . The implied belief of the Glta was that the prosperity of the people depended on the fertility of the soil, and that this again depended upon the falling of rains, and that the rains depended on the grace of gods, and that the gods could live prosperously only if the sacrifices were performed; the sacrifices were derived from the Vedas, the Vedas from the all-pervading Brahman, and the Brahman again forms the main content of the

1 Glta, 111. 15.

Vedas. Thus there was a complete cycle from Brahman to sacrifices, from sacrifices to the good of the gods and from the good of the gods to the good and prosperity of the people. Everyone is bound to continue the process of this cycle, and he who breaks it is a sinful and selfish man, who is not worth the life he leads 1 . Thus the ideal of the Glta is to be distinguished from the ideal of the Mimamsa in this, that, while the latter aimed at individual good, the former aimed at common good, and, while the latter conceived the Vedic commands to be the motives of their action, the former valued the ideal of performing the sacrifices in obedience to the law of continuing the process of the cycle of sacrifices, by which the world of gods and of men was maintained in its proper state of prosperity. When a man works for the sacrifices, such works cannot bind him to their fruits; it is only when works are performed from motives of self-interest that they can bind people to their good and bad fruits 2 .

The word dharma in the Glta does not mean what Jaimini understood by the term, viz. a desirable end or good enjoined by the sacrifices (codand-laksano Wtho dharmah). The word seems to be used in the Glta primarily in the sense of an unalterable customary order of class-duties or caste-duties and the general approved course of conduct for the people, and also in the sense of prescribed schemes of conduct. This meaning of dharma as "old customary order " is probably the oldest meaning of the word, as it is also found in the Atharva-Veda, 18.3. 1 (dharmam pura-nam anupdlayantif. Macdonell, in referring to Maitrayana, iv. 1 9, Kathaka, xxxi. 7 and Taitttrlya, in. 2. 8. 11, points out that bodily defects (bad nails and discoloured teeth) and marrying a younger daughter while her elder sister is unmarried are coupled with murder, though not treated as equal to it, and that there is no distinction in principle between real crimes and what are now regarded as fanciful bodily defects or infringements of merely conventional practices. In the £atapatha-brahmana, xiv. 4. 2. 26, also we find dharma for a Ksattriya 4 is illustrated as being the characteristic duties of a Ksattriya. The central meaning of the word dharma in the Glta is therefore the oldest Vedic meaning of the word, which is

1 Glta, in. 16. 2 Ibid. in. 9.

3 dharma, dharman are the regular words, the latter in the Rg-veda and both later, for "law" or "custom." See Macdonell's Vedic Index, p. 390.

* tad etat ksattrasya ksattram yad dharmah tasmad dharmdt parnm ndsti. Dr Albrecht Weber's edition, Leipzig, 1924.

a much earlier meaning than the latter-day technical meaning of the word as it is found in Mlmamsa. Dharma does not in the Gitd mean sacrifices (yajna) or external advantages, as it does in Mlmamsa, but the order of conventional practices involving specific caste-divisions and caste-duties. Accordingly, the performance of sacrifices is dharma for those whose allotted duties are sacrifices. Adultery is in the Vedas a vice, as being transgression of dharma, and this is also referred to as such (dharme naste, 1. 39) in the Gitd. In the Gitd, 11. 7, Arjuna is said to be puzzled and confused regarding his duty as a Ksattriya and the sinful course of injuring the lives of his relations (dharma-sammudha-cetdh). The confusion of dharma and adharma is also referred to in xviii. 31 and 32. In the Gitd, iv. 7 and 8, the word dharma is used in the sense of the established order of things and conventionally accepted customs and practices. In 11. 40 the way of performing one's duties without regard to pleasures or sorrows is described as a particular and specific kind of dharma (asya dharmasya), distinguished from dharma in general.

The yajna (sacrifice) is said to be of various kinds, e.g. that in which oblations are offered to the gods is called daiva-yajna; this is distinguished from brahma-yajna, in which one dedicates oneself to Brahman, where Brahman is the offerer, offering and the fire of oblations, and in which, by dedicating oneself to Brahman, one is lost in Brahman 1 . Then sense-control, again, is described as a kind of yajna, and it is said that in the fire of the senses the sense-objects are offered as libations and the senses themselves are offered as libations in the fire of sense-control; all the sense-functions and vital functions are also offered as libations in the fire of sense-control lighted up by reason. Five kinds of sacrifices {yajna) are distinguished, viz. the yajna with actual materials of libation, called dravya-yajna, the yajna of asceticism or self-control, called tapo-yajiia, the yajna of union or communion, called yoga-yajna, the.yajna of scriptural studies, called svddhydya-yajna, and the yajna of knowledge or wisdom, called jndna-yajna 2 . It is easy to see that the extension of the application of the term yajna from the actual material sacrifice to other widely divergent methods of self-advancement is a natural result of the extension of the concept of sacrifice to whatever tended towards self-advancement. The term yajna had high and holy associations, and the 1 Gita, iv. 24 and 25. 2 Ibid. iv. 26-28; see also 29 and 30.

newly discovered systems of religious endeavours and endeavours for self-advancement came to be regarded as but a new kind of yajna, just as the substitution-meditations (pratikopasana) were also regarded as being but new forms of yajna. Thus, while thought advanced and newer modes of self-realization began to develop, the older term of yajna came to be extended to these new types of religious discipline on account of the high veneration in which the older institution was held.

But, whatever may be the different senses in which the term yajna is used in the Gita, the word dharma has not here the technical sense of the Mimamsa. The Gita recommends the performance of sacrifices to the Brahmins and fighting to the Ksat-triyas, and thus aims at continuity of conventional practices which it regards as dharma. But at the same time it denounces the performance of actions from desire, or passions or any kind of selfish interest. A man should regard his customary duties as his dharma and should perform them without any idea of the fulfilment of any of his own desires. When a man performs karma from a sense of disinterested duty, his karma is no longer a bondage to him. The Gita does not, on the one hand, follow the old karma-ideal, that one should perform sacrifices in order to secure earthly and heavenly advantages, nor does it follow, on the other hand, the ideal of the Vedanta or of other systems of philosophy that require us to abandon our desires and control our passions with a view to cleansing the mind entirely of impurities, so as to transcend the sphere of duties and realize the wisdom of the oneness of the spirit. The Gita holds that a man should attain the true wisdom, purge his mind of all its desires, but at the same time perform his customary duties and be faithful to his own dharma. There should be no impelling force other than regard and reverence for his own inner law of duty with reference to his own dharma of conventional and customary practices or the duties prescribed by the sastra.

Sense-control in the Gita.

The uncontrollability of the senses was realized in the Kafha Upanisad, where the senses are compared with horses. The Gita says that, when the mind is led on by fleeting sense-attractions, the man loses all his wisdom, just as a boat swings to and fro in deep waters in a strong gale. Even in the case of the wise

man, in spite of his efforts to keep himself steady, the troubled senses might lead the mind astray. By continually brooding over sense-objects one becomes attached to them; out of such attachments there arise desires, out of desires there arises anger, out of anger blindness of passions, through such blindness there is lapse of memory, by such lapse of memory a man's intelligence is destroyed, and as a result of that he himself is destroyed 1 . Man is naturally inclined towards the path of evil, and in spite of his efforts to restrain himself he tends towards the downward path. Each particular sense has its own specific attachments and antipathies, and attachment (raga) and antipathy are the two enemies. The Gita again and again proclaims the evil effects of desires and attachments (kama), anger (krodha) and greed (lobha) as the three gates of Hell, being that which veils wisdom as smoke veils fire, as impurities sully a mirror or as the foetus is covered by the womb 2 . Arjuna is made to refer to Krsna the difficulty of controlling the senses. Thus he says, "My mind, O Krsna, is violent, troubled and changeful; it is as difficult to control it as it is to control the winds 3 ." True yoga can never be attained unless and until the senses are controlled.

The Pali work Dhamma-pada is also filled with similar ideas regarding the control of attachments and anger. Thus it says, "He has abused me, beaten me, worsted me, robbed me—those who dwell not upon such thoughts are freed from hate. Never does hatred cease by hating, but hatred ceases by love; this is the ancient law....As the wind brings down a weak tree, so Mara overwhelms him who lives looking for pleasures, has his senses uncontrolled, or is immoderate in his food, slothful and effeminate. ...As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, so passion will break through an undisciplined mind 4 ." Again, speaking of mind, it says, "As an arrow-maker levels his arrow, so a wise man levels his trembling, unsteady mind, which it is difficult to guard and hold back....Let the wise man guard his mind, incomprehensible, subtle, capricious though it is. Blessed is the guarded mind 5 ." Again, "Not nakedness, nor matted hair, not dirt, nor fastings, not lying on earth, nor ashes, nor ascetic postures, none of these things purify a man who is not free from desires 6 ." Again, " From

1 Gitd, 11. 60, 62, 63. 2 Ibid. in. 34, 37-39; xvi. 21. s vi. 34.

4 Dhamma-pada (Poona, 1923), 1. 4, 5, 7, 13. B Ibid. in. 36, 38.

6 Ibid. x. 141.

attachment (piyato) comes grief, from attachment comes fear; he who is free from attachment knows neither grief nor fear. From affection (pematd) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust {rati) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (kama) come grief and fear. He who is free from lust knows neither grief nor fear. From desire (tanha) come grief and fear. He who is free from desire knows neither grief nor fear 1 ."

It is clear from the above that both the Gita and the Dhamma-pada praise sense-control and consider desires, attachments, anger and grief as great enemies. But the treatment of the Gita differs from that of the Dhamma-pada in this, that, while in the Dhamma-pada there is a course of separate lessons or moral instructions on diverse subjects, the Gita deals with sense-control as a means to the attainment of peace, contentment and desirelessness, which enables a man to dedicate all his actions to God and follow the conventional courses of duties without looking for anything in them for himself. The Gita knows that the senses, mind and intellect are the seats of all attachments and antipathies, and that it is through the senses and the mind that these can stupefy a man and make his knowledge blind 2 . All the sense-affections of cold and heat, pleasure and sorrow, are mere changes of our sensibility, are mere touches of feeling which are transitory and should therefore be quietly borne 3 . It is only by controlling the senses that the demon of desire, which distorts all ordinary and philosophic knowledge, can be destroyed. But it is very hard to stifle this demon of desire, which always appears in new forms. It is only when a man can realize within himself the great being which transcends our intellect that he can control his lower self with his higher self and uproot his desires. The self is its own friend as well as its own foe, and one should always try to uplift oneself and not allow oneself to sink down. The chief aim of all sense-control is to make a man's thoughts steady, so that he can link himself up in communion with God 4 .

The senses in the Gita are regarded as drawing the mind along with them. The senses are continually changing and fleeting, and they make the mind also changeful and fleeting; and, as a result of

1 Dhamma-pada, xvi. 212-216. 2 Gita, hi. 40.

3 Ibid. 11. 14. * Ibid. 11. 61; in. 41, 43; vi. 5, 6.

that, the mind, like a boat at sea before a strong wind, is driven to and fro, and steadiness of thought and wisdom (prajnd) are destroyed. The word prajtid is used in the Gltd in the sense of thought or wisdom or mental inclinations in general. It is used in a more or less similar sense in the Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad, IV. 4. 21, and in a somewhat different sense in the Mdndukya Upanisad, 7. But the sense in which Patanjali uses the word is entirely different from that in which it is used in the Gltd or the Upanisads. Patanjali uses the word in the technical sense of a specific type of mystical cognition arising out of the steady fixing of the mind on an object, and speaks of seven stages of such prajnd corresponding to the stages of yoga ascension. Prajnd in the Gltd means, as has just been said, thought or mental inclination. It does not mean jridna, or ordinary cognition, or vijndna as higher wisdom; it means knowledge in its volitional aspect. It is not the kriydkhya-jndna, as moral discipline of yama, niyama, etc., of the Panca-rdtra work Jayakhya-samhitd. It means an intellectual outlook, as integrally connected with, and determining, the mental bent or inclination. When the mind follows the mad dance of the senses after their objects, the intellectual background of the mind determining its direction, the prajnd is also upset. Unless the prajnd is fixed, the mind cannot proceed undisturbed in its prescribed fixed course. So the central object of controlling the senses is the securing of the steadiness of this prajnd {vase hi yasyendriydni tasya prajnd pratisthitd —11. 57). Prajnd and dhl are two words which seem to be in the Gltd synonymous, and they both mean mental inclination. This mental inclination probably involves both an intellectual outlook, and a corresponding volitional tendency. Sense-control makes this prajnd steady, and the Gltd abounds in praise of the sthita-prdjna and sthita-dhl, i.e. of one who has mental inclination or thoughts fixed and steady 1 . Sense-attachments are formed by continual association with sense-objects, and attachment begets desire, desire begets anger, and so on. Thus all the vices spring from sense-attachments. And the person who indulges in sense-gratifications is rushed along by the passions. So, just as a tortoise collects within itself all its limbs, so the person who restrains his senses from the sense-objects has his mind steady and fixed. The direct result of sense-control is thus steadiness of will, and of mental inclinations or mind (prajnd).

1 "• 54-56.

The person who has his prajna fixed is not troubled in sorrows and is not eager to gain pleasures, he has no attachment, no fear and no anger 1 . He is indifferent in prosperity and in adversity and neither desires anything nor shuns anything 2 . He alone can obtain peace who, like the sea receiving all the rivers in it, absorbs all his desires within himself; not so the man who is always busy in satisfying his desires. The man who has given up all his desires and is unattached to anything is not bound to anything, has no vanity and attains true peace. When a man can purge his mind of attachments and antipathies and can take to sense-objects after purifying his senses and keeping them in full control, he attains contentment (prasdda). When such contentment is attained, all sorrows vanish and his mind becomes fixed (buddkih paryavati-sthatef. Thus sense-control, on the one hand, makes the mind unruffled, fixed, at peace with itself and filled with contentment, and on the other hand, by making the mind steady and fixed, it makes communion with God possible. Sense-control is the indispensable precondition of communion with God; when once this has been attained, it is possible to link oneself with God by continued efforts 4 . Thus sense-control, by producing steadiness of the will and thought, results in contentment and peace on the one hand, and on the other makes the mind fit for entering into communion with God.

One thing that strikes us in reading the Gltd is that the object of sense-control in the Gltd is not the attainment of a state of emancipated oneness or the absolute cessation of all mental processes, but the more intelligible and common-sense ideal of the attainment of steadiness of mind, contentment and the power of entering into touch with God. This view of the object of self-control is therefore entirely different from that praised in the philosophic systems of Patanjali and others. The Gltd wants us to control our senses and mind and to approach sense-objects with such a controlled mind and senses, because it is by this means alone that we can perform our duties with a peaceful and contented mind and turn to God with a clean and unruffled heart 5 . The main emphasis of this sense-control is not on the mere external control of volitional activities and the control of motor propensities

1 Gltd, ii. 56. 2 Ibid. 11. 57.

3 Ibid. 11. 65; see also II. 58, 64, 68, 70, 71. * Ibid. VI. 36.

8 raga-dvesa-vimuktais tu vi?aydn indriyaii caran

dtma-vasyair vidheyatma prasddam adhigacchati. Ibid. n. 64.

in accordance with the direction of passions and appetites, but on the inner control of the mind behind these active senses. When a person controls only his physical activities, and yet continues to brood over the attractions of sense, he is in reality false in his conduct (mithyacdra). Real self-control does not mean only the cessation of the external operations of the senses, but also the control of the mind. Not only should a man cease from committing actions out of greed and desire for sense-gratification, but his mind should be absolutely clean, absolutely clear of all impurities of sense-desires. Mere suspension of physical action without a corresponding control of mind and cessation from harbouring passions and desires is a vicious course 1 .

The Ethics of the Gita and the Buddhist Ethics.

The subject of sense-control naturally reminds one of Buddhism. In the Vedic religion performance of sacrifices was considered as the primary duty. Virtue and vice consisted in obedience or disobedience to Vedic injunctions. It has been pointed out that these injunctions implied a sort of categorical imperative and communicated a sense of vidhi as law, a command which must be obeyed. But this law was no inner law of the spirit within, but a mere external law, which ought not to be confused with morality in the modern sense of the term. Its sphere was almost wholly ritualistic, and, though it occasionally included such commands as "One should not injure anyone" (ma himsydt), yet in certain sacrifices which were aimed at injuring one's enemies operations which would lead to such results would have the imperative of a Vedic command, though the injury to human beings would be attended with its necessary punishment. Again, though in later Samkhya commentaries and compendiums it is said that all kinds of injuries to living beings bring their punishment, yet it is doubtful if the Vedic injunction "Thou shouldst not injure" really applied to all living beings, as there would be but few sacrifices where animals were not killed. The Upanisads, however, start an absolutely new line by the substitution of meditations and self-knowledge for sacrificial actions. In the

1 Cf. Dhamina-pada, i. 2. All phenomena have mind as their precursor, are dependent upon mind and are made up of mind. If a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness accompanies him, just as a shadow follows a man incessantly.

primary stage of Upanisadic thoughts a conviction was growing that instead of the sacrificial performances one could go through a set form of meditations, identifying in thought certain objects with certain other objects (e.g. the dawn as the horse of horse-sacrifice) or even with symbolic syllables, OM and the like. In the more developed stage of Upanisadic culture a new conviction arose in the search after the highest and the ultimate truth, and the knowledge of Brahman as the highest essence in man and nature is put forward as the greatest wisdom and the final realization of truth and reality, than which nothing higher could be conceived. There are but few moral precepts in the Upanisads, and the whole subject of moral conflict and moral efforts is almost silently dropped or passes unemphasized. In the Taittirlya Upanisad, I. n, the teacher is supposed to give a course of moral instruction to his pupil after teaching him the Vedas—Tell the truth, be virtuous, do not give up the study of the Vedas; after presenting the teacher with the stipulated honorarium (at the conclusion of his studies) the pupil should (marry and) continue the line of his family. He should not deviate from truth or from virtue (dharma) or from good. He should not cease doing good to others, from study and teaching. He should be respectful to his parents and teachers and perform such actions as are unimpeachable. He should follow only good conduct and not bad. He should make gifts with faith (sraddha), not with indifference, with dignity, from a sense of shame, through fear and through knowledge. If there should be any doubt regarding his course of duty or conduct, then he should proceed to act in the way in which the wisest Brahmins behaved. But few Upanisads give such moral precepts, and there is very little in the Upanisads in the way of describing a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the fact that man can attain his best only by trying to become great through moral efforts. The Upanisads occupy themselves almost wholly with mystic meditations and with the philosophic wisdom of self-knowledge. Yet the ideas of self-control, peace and cessation of desires, endurance and concentration are referred to in Brhad-aranyaka, I v. 4. 23, as a necessary condition for the realization of the self within us 1 . In Katha, vi. 11, the control of the senses (indriya-dharana) is referred to as yoga, and in Mundaka, in. 2. 2,

1 sdnto danta uparatas titikfuh samahito bhutvatmany eva atmanam pasyati. Brh. IV. 4. 23.

it is said that he who consciously desires the objects of desire is again and again born through desires; but even in this world all desires vanish for him who is self-realized in himself and is self-satisfied 1 . The idea that the path of wisdom is different from the path of desires was also known, and it was felt that he who sought wisdom (mdydbhlpsita) was not drawn by many desires 2 .

The point to be discussed in this connection is whether the central idea of the Gltd, namely, sense-control and more particularly the control of desires and attachments, is derived from the Upanisads or from Buddhism. It has been pointed out that the Upanisads do not emphasize the subject of moral conflict and moral endeavours so much as the nature of truth and reality as Brahman, the ultimate essence of man and the manifold appearance of the world. Yet the idea of the necessity of sense-control and the control of desires, the settling of the mind in peace and contentment, is the necessary precondition for fitness for Vedic knowledge. Thus Sankara, the celebrated commentator on the Upanisads, in commenting on Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 1, says that a man is fit for an enquiry after Brahman only when he knows how to distinguish what is permanent from what is transitory {nitydnitya-vastu-viveka), and when he has no attachment to the enjoyment of the fruits of his actions either as mundane pleasures or as heavenly joys {ihdmutra-phala-bhoga-virdgd). The necessary qualifications which entitle a man to make such an enquiry are disinclination of the mind for worldly joys (sama), possession of proper control and command over the mind, by which it may be turned to philosophy (dama), power of endurance (visaya-titiksd), cessation of all kinds of duties (uparati), and faith in the philosophical conception of truth and reality (tattva-sraddhd). It may be supposed, therefore, that the Upanisads presuppose a high degree of moral development in the way of self-control and disinclination to worldly and heavenly joys. Detachment from sense-affections is one of the most dominant ideas of the Gltd, and the idea of Mundaka, in. 2. 2, referred to above, is re-echoed in the Gltd, 11. 70, where it is said that, just as the waters are absorbed in the calm sea (though poured in continually by the rivers), so the person in whom all desires are absorbed attains peace, and

1 kaman yah kdmayate manyamdnah sa kdmabhir jdyate tatra tatra parydpta-kdmasya krtdtmanas tu ihaiva sarve praviliyanti kamdh. Mundaka, in. 2. 2.

2 Kaiha, 11. 4.

not the man who indulges in desires. The Glta, of course, again and again emphasizes the necessity of uprooting attachments to pleasures and antipathy to pains and of controlling desires (katna) ; but, though the Upanisads do not emphasize this idea so frequently, yet the idea is there, and it seems very probable that the Glta drew it from the Upanisads. Hindu tradition also refers to the Upanisads as the source of the Glta. Thus the Glta-mahatmya describes the Upanisads as the cows from which Kisna, the cowherd boy, drew the Glta as milk 1 .

But the similarity of Buddhist ethical ideas to those of the Glta is also immense, and, had it not been for the fact that ideas which may be regarded as peculiarly Buddhistic are almost entirely absent from the Glta, it might well have been contended that the Glta derived its ideas of controlling desires and uprooting attachment from Buddhism. Tachibana collects a long list of Buddhist vices as follows 2 :

anganam, impurity, lust, Sn. 517.

ahankaro, selfishness, egoism, A. 1. 132; M. ill. 18, 32.

mamankaro, desire, A. 1. 132; M. in. 18, 32.

mamayitam, selfishness, S.N. 466.

mamattam, grasping, egoism, S.N. 872, 951.

apekha, desire, longing, affection, S.N. 38; Dh. 345.

tcchd, wish, desire, covetousness.

eja, desire, lust, greed, craving, S.N. 751; It. 92.

asa, desire, longing, SN. 634, 794, 864; Dh. 397.

pipasa, thirst.

esa, esana, wish, desire, thirst, Dh. 335.

akankha, desire, longing, Tha. 20.

kiiicanam, attachment, S.N. 949; Dh. 200.

gantho, bond, tie, S.N. 798; Dh. 211.

adana-gantho, the tied knot of attachment, S.N. 794.

giddhi, greed, desire, Sn. 328; M. 1. 360, 362.

gedho, greed, desire, Sn. 65, 152.

gahanam, entanglement, Dh. 394.

gaho, seizing, attachment.

jalini, snare, desire, lust, Dh. 180; A. 11. 211.

pariggaho, attachment, Mahanid. 57.

chando, wish, desire, intention, S.N. 171, 203, etc.

jata, desire, lust, S.N. 1. 13; V.M. 1.

jigimsanata, covetousness, desire for, Vibhanga, 353.

nijigimsanata, covetousness, V.M. 1. 23.

tanha, tasina, hist, unsatisfied desire, passion.

1 Sarvopanisado gdvo dogdhd gopdla-nandanah.

2 The Ethics of Buddhism, by S. Tachibana, p. 73.

upadanam, clinging, attachment, Dh. 11. 58, III. 230.

panidhi, wish, aspiration, Sn. 801.

pihd, de,sire, envy, Tha. 1218.

petnatn, affection, love, A. hi. 249.

bandho, thong, bondage, attachment, Sn. 623; Dh. 344.

bandhanam, bond, fetter, attachment, Sn. 522, 532; Dh. 345.

nibandho, binding, attachment, S. 11. 17.

vinibandhanam, bondage, desire, Sn. 16.

anubandho, bondage, affection, desire, M. m. 170 \Jt. 91.

upanibandho, fastening, attachment, K.M. 1. 235.

paribandho, Com. on 77«. p. 242.

rago, human passion, evil, desire, lust, passim.

sarago, sarajjana, sdrajjitattam, affection, passion, Mahanid. 242.

rati, lust, attachment, Dh. 27.

manoratho, desire, wish (?).

ruci, desire, inclination, Sn. 781.

abhildso, desire, longing, wish, Com. on Peta-vattu, 154.

lalasa, ardent desire (?).

alayo, longing, desire, lust, Sn. 535, 635; Dh. 411.

lobho, covetousness, desire, cupidity, Sn. 367; Dh. 248.

lobhanam, greed, Tha. 343.

lubhana, lobhitattam, do. (?).

vanam, desire, lust, Sn. 1131; Dh. 284, 344.

vanatho, love, lust, Dh. 283, 284.

nivesanam, clinging to, attachment, Sn. 470, 801.

sarlgo, fetter, bond, attachment, Sn. 473, 791; Dh. 397.

asatti, attachment, hanging on, clinging, Sn. 777; Vin. 11. 156;

5. 1. 212. visattikd, poison, desire, Sn. 333 ; Dh. 180. santhavam, friendship, attachment, Sn. 207, 245; Z)A. 27. ussado, desire (?), »S«. 515, 783, 785.

sneho, sineho, affection, lust, desire, Sn. 209, 943; Dh. 285. asayo, abode, intention, inclination, V.H. 1. 140. anusayo, inclination, desire, ^4. 1. 132; Sn. 14, 369, 545. stbbani, desire (?), Sn. 1040. kodho, anger, wrath, Sn. 1. 245, 362, 868, 928; Dh. 221-3; It. 4,

12, 109. &0/>o, anger, ill-will, ill-temper, Sn. 6.

aghato, anger, ill-will, hatred, malice, D. 1. 3, 31; S. I. 179. patigho, wrath, hatred, Sum. 116. */oso, anger, hatred, passim, viddeso, enmity, hatred (?). dhumo, anger (?), Sn. 460. upanaho, enmity, Sn. 116.

vyapado, wish to injure, hatred, fury, Sum. 211; It. 111. anabhiraddhi, anger, wrath, rage, D. 1. 3. veram, wrath, anger, hatred, sin, Sn. 150; DA. 3-5, 201. virodho, opposition, enmity (?).

roso, anger (?).

rosanam, anger (?).

vyarosanam, anger, Sn. 148.

annanam, ignorance, It. 62.

moho, fainting, ignorance, folly, passim.

mohanam, ignorance, S.N. 399, 772.

avijja, ignorance, error, passion.

It is interesting to note that three vices, covetousness, hatred and ignorance, and covetousness particularly, appear under different names and their extirpation is again and again emphasized in diverse ways. These three, ignorance, covetousness and hatred or antipathy, are the roots of all evils. There are, of course, simpler commandments, such as not to take life, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, and not to take intoxicating drinks, and of these stealing gold, drinking liquors, dishonouring one's teacher's bed, and killing a Brahmin are also prohibited in the Chandogya Upanisad, v. 10. 9-10 1 . But, while the Chandogya only prohibits killing Brahmins, the Buddha prohibited taking the life of any living being. But all these vices, and others opposed to the atthanga-slla and dasa-kusala-kamma, are included within covetousness, ignorance and hatred. The Glta bases its ethics mainly on the necessity of getting rid of attachment and desires from which proceeds greed and frustration of which produces anger. But, while in Buddhism ignorance (avidya) is considered as the source of all evil, the Gitd does not even mention the word. In the twelvefold chain of causality in Buddhism it is held that oat of ignorance (avijja) come the conformations (sankhdra), out of the conformations consciousness (viiinana), out of consciousness mind and body (nama-rupa), out of mind and body come the six fields of contact (ayatand), out of the six fields of contact comes sense-contact, out of sense-contact comes feeling, out of feeling come desires (tanha), out of desires comes the holding fast to things (updddna), out of the holding fast to things comes existence (bhava), out of existence comes birth (jati), and from birth come old age, decay and death. If ignorance, or avijja, is stopped,

1 There is another list of eightfold prohibitions called atthangdsila; these are not to take life, not to take what is not given, to abstain from sex-relations, to abstain from falsehood, from drinking liquors, from eating at forbidden times, from dancing and music and from beautifying one's 'iody by perfumes, garlands, etc. There is also another list called dasa-kusala-kamma, such as not to take life, not to take what is not given, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, not to slander, not to abuse or talk foolishly, not to be covetous, malicious and sceptical.

then the whole cycle stops. But, though in this causal cycle ignorance and desires are far apart, yet psychologically desires proceed immediately from ignorance, and a frustration of desires produces anger, hatred, etc. In the Gita the start is taken directly from attachment and desires (kdma). The Buddhist word trsnd (tanha) is seldom mentioned in the Gita; whereas the Upanisadic word kdma takes its place as signifying desires. The Gita is not a philosophical work which endeavours to search deepl) into the causes of attachments, nor does it seek to give any practical course of advice as to how one should get rid of attachment. The Vedanta system of thought, as interpreted by Sankara, traces the origin of the world with all its evils to ignorance or nescience (avidyd), as an indefinable principle; the Yoga traces all our phenomenal experience to five afflictions, ignorance, attachment, antipathy, egoism and self-love, and the last four to the first, which is the fountain-head of all evil afflictions. In the Gita there is no such attempt to trace attachment, etc. to some other higher principle. The word ajndna (ignorance) is used in the Gita about six or eight times in the sense of ignorance; but this "ignorance" does not mean any metaphysical principle or the ultimate starting-point of a causal chain, and is used simply in the sense of false knowledge or ignorance, as opposed to true knowledge of things as they are. Thus in one place it is said that true knowledge of things is obscured by ignorance, and that this is the cause of all delusion 1 . Again, it is said that to those who by true knowledge (of God) destroy their own ignorance (ajndna) true knowledge reveals the highest reality (tat par am), like the sun 2 . In another place jnana and ajndna are both defined. Jiidna is defined as unvacillating and abiding self-knowledge and true knowledge by which truth and reality are apprehended, and all that is different from this is called ajiiana 3 . Ajiidna is stated elsewhere to be the result of tamas, and in two other places tamas is said to be the product of ajiidna*. In another place it is said that people are blinded by ignorance (ajndna), thinking, "I am rich, I am an aristocrat, who else is there like me? I shall perform sacrifices make gifts and enjoy 5 ." In another place ignorance is said to

1 ajnanenavrtatn jiianatn tena muhyanti jantavah. v. 15. - jndnena tu iad-ajndnum yesdm nasi tarn dtmanah. V. 16. 3 adhydtma-jndna-nityatvam tnttva-jndnartha-darsanam etaj-jndnam itiprok-tam ajfidnam yad ato 'nyathd. Gitd,xiu.(£Q IJ

1 Ibid. xiv. 16, 17; x. 11; xiv. 8. 5 Ibid. v. 16.

32-2

produce doubts (samsaya), and the Glta lecture of Krsna is supposed to dispel the delusion of Arjuna, produced by ignorance 1 . This shows that, though the word ajnana is used in a variety of contexts, either as ordinary ignorance or ignorance of true and absolute philosophic knowledge, it is never referred to as being the source of attachment or desires. This need not be interpreted to mean that the Glta was opposed to the view that attachments and desires were produced from ignorance; but it seems at least to imply that the Glta was not interested to trace the origin of attachments and desires and was satisfied to take their existence for granted and urged the necessity of their extirpation for peace and equanimity of mind. Buddhist Hinayana ethics and practical discipline are constituted of moral discipline (slla), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna). The slla consisted in the performance of good conduct (caritta) and desisting (varitta) from certain other kinds of prohibited action. Slla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Slla thus means (i) right volition (cetana), (2) the associated mental states (cetasika), (3) mental control (samvara), and (4) the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by way of the preceding three silas, called avitikkama. Samvara is spoken of as being of five kinds, viz. (1) patimokkha-samvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), (2) sati-samvara (the control of mindfulness), (3) nana-samvara (the control of knowledge), (4) khanti-samvara (the control of patience) and (5) viriy a-samvara (the control of active restraint). Patimokkha-samvara means all self-control in general. Sati-samvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations, when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object, a man will,by virtue of his mindfulness (sati), control himself from being tempted by not thinking of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khanti-samvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to sila all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized and stabilized (samadhanam, upadharanam, patittha). The practice of slla is for the practice of jhana (meditation). As a preparatory measure thereto, a man must train himself 1 Gitd, iv. 42; xvni. 72.

continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (dhdre patikula-saniia) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated with seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. He must habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, viz. ksiti (earth), ap (water), etc. He should also think of the good effects of slla, the making of gifts, of the nature of death and of the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena, and should practise brahma-vihdra, as the fourfold meditation of universal friendship, universal pity, happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all, and indifference to any kind of preferment for himself, his friend, his enemy or a third party 1 .

The Gltd does not enter into any of these disciplinary measures. It does not make a programme of universal altruism or hold that one should live only for others, as is done in Mahayana ethics, or of the virtues of patience, energy for all that is good (virya as kusalotsdha), meditation and true knowledge of the essencelessness of all things. The person who takes the vow of saintly life takes the vow of living for the good of others, for which he should be prepared to sacrifice all that is good for him. His vow does not limit him to doing good to his co-religionists or to any particular sects, but applies to all human beings, irrespective of caste, creed or race, and not only to human beings, but to all living beings. Mahayana ethical works like the Bodhi-cary avatar a-panjika or Siksa-samuccaya do not deal merely with doctrines or theories, but largely with practical instructions for becoming a Buddhist saint. They treat of the practical difficulties in the path of a saint's career and give practical advice regarding the way in which he may avoid temptations, keep himself in the straight path of duty, and gradually elevate himself to higher and higher states.

The Gltd is neither a practical guide-book of moral efforts nor a philosophical treatise discussing the origin of immoral tendencies and tracing them to certain metaphysical principles as their sources; but, starting from the ordinary frailties of attachment and desires, it tries to show how one can lead a normal life of duties and responsibilities and yet be in peace and contentment in a state of equanimity and in communion with God. The Gita

1 See A History of Indian Philosophy, by S. N. Dasgupta, vol. i, p. 103.

has its setting in the great battle of the Maha-hharata. Krsna is represented as being an incarnation of God, and he is also the charioteer of his friend and relation, Arjuna, the great Pandava hero. The Pandava hero was a Ksattriya by birth, and he had come to the great battle-field of Kuruksetra to fight his cousin and opponent King Duryodhana, who had assembled great warriors, all of whom were relations of Arjuna, leading mighty armies. In the first chapter of the Gita a description is given of the two armies which faced each other in the holy field (dharma-ksetra) of Kuruksetra. In the second chapter Arjuna is represented as feeling dejected at the idea of having to fight with his relations and of eventually killing them. He says that it was better to beg from door to door than to kill his respected relations. Krsna strongly objects to this attitude of Arjuna and says that the soul is immortal and it is impossible to kill anyone. But, apart from this metaphysical point of view, even from the ordinary point of view a Ksattriya ought to fight, because it is his duty to do so, and there is nothing nobler for a Ksattriya than to fight. The fundamental idea of the Gita is that a man should always follow his own caste-duties, which are his own proper duties, or sva-dharma. Even if his own proper duties are of an inferior type, it is much better for him to cleave to them than to turn to other people's duties which he could well perform. It is even better to die cleaving to one's caste-duties, than to turn to the duties fixed for other people, which only do him harm 1 . The caste-duties of Brahmins, Ksattriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras are fixed in accordance with their natural qualities. Thus sense-control, control over mind, power of endurance, purity, patience, sincerity, knowledge of worldly things and philosophic wisdom are the natural qualities of a Brahmin. Heroism, bravery, patience, skill, not to fly from battle, making of gifts and lordliness are the natural duties of a Ksattriya. Agriculture, tending of cattle and trade are the natural duties of a Sudra. A man can attain his highest only by performing the specific duties of his own caste. God pervades this world, and it is He who moves all beings to work. A man can best realize himself by adoring God and by the performance of his own specific caste-duties. No sin can come to a man who performs his own caste-duties. Even if one's caste-duties were sinful or wrong, it would not be wrong

1 Gita, in. 35.

for a man to perform them; for, as there is smoke in every fire, so there is some wrong thing or other in all our actions 1 . Arjuna is thus urged to follow his caste-duty as a Ksattriya and to fight his enemies in the battle-field. If he killed his enemies, then he would be the master of the kingdom; if he himself was killed, then since he had performed the duties of a Ksattriya, he would go to Heaven. If he did not engage himself in that fight, which was his duty, he would not only lose his reputation, but would also transgress his own dharma.

Such an instruction naturally evokes the objection that war necessarily implies injury to living beings; but in reply to such an objection Krsna says that the proper way of performing actions is to dissociate one's mind from attachment; when one can perform an action with a mind free from attachment, greed and selfishness, from a pure sense of duty, the evil effects of such action cannot affect the performer. The evil effects of any action can affect the performer when in performing an action he has a motive of his own to fulfil. But, if he does not seek anything for himself, if he is not overjoyed in pleasures, or miserable in pains, his works cannot affect him. A man should therefore surrender all his desires for selfish ends and dedicate all his actions to God and be in communion with Him, and yet continue to perform the normal duties of his caste and situation of life. So long as we have our bodies, the necessity of our own nature will drive us to work. So it is impossible for us to give up all work. To give up work can be significant only if it means the giving up of all desires for the fruits of such actions. If the fruits of actions are given up, then the actions can no longer bind us to them. That brings us in return peace and contentment, and the saint who has thus attained a perfect equanimity of mind is firm and unshaken in his true wisdom, and nothing can sway him to and fro. One may seek to attain this state either by philosophic wisdom or by devotion to God, and it is the latter path which is easier. God, by His grace, helps the devotee to purge his mind of all impurities, and so by His grace a man can dissociate his mind from all motives of greed and selfishness and be in communion with Him; he can thus perform his duties, as fixed for him by his caste or his custom, without looking forward to any reward or gain.

The Gitd ideal of conduct differs from the sacrificial ideal of 1 Gitd, xviii. 44-48.

conduct in this, that sacrifices are not to be performed for any ulterior end of heavenly bliss or any other mundane benefits, but merely from a sense of duty, because sacrifices are enjoined in the scriptures to be performed by Brahmins; and they must therefore be performed from a pure sense of duty. The Gltd ideal of ethics differs from that preached in the systems of philosophy like the Vedanta or the Yoga of Patafljali in this, that, while the aim of these systems was to transcend the sphere of actions and duties, to rise to a stage in which one could give up all one's activities, mental or physical, the ideal of the Gltd was decidedly an ideal of work. The Glta, as has already been pointed out, does not advocate a course of extremism in anything. However elevated a man may be, he must perform his normal caste-duties and duties of customary morality 1 . The Gltd is absolutely devoid of the note of pessimism which is associated with early Buddhism. The sila, samddhi and pannd of Buddhism have, no doubt, in the Gltd their counterparts in the training of a man to disinclination for joys and attachments, to concentration on God and the firm and steady fixation of will and intelligence; but the significance of these in the Gltd is entirely different from that which they have in Buddhism. The Gltd does not expound a course of approved conduct and prohibitions, since, so far as these are concerned, one's actions are to be guided by the code of caste-duties or duties of customary morality. What is required of a man is that he should cleanse his mind from the impurities of attachment, desires and cravings. The samddhi of the Gltd is not a mere concentration of the mind on some object, but communion with God, and the wisdom, or prajnd, of the Gltd is no realization of any philosophic truth, but a fixed and unperturbed state of the mind, where the will and intellect remain unshaken in one's course of duty, clear of all consequences and free from all attachments, and in a state of equanimity which cannot be shaken or disturbed by pleasures or sorrows.

It may naturally be asked in this connection, what is the general standpoint of Hindu Ethics? The Hindu social system is based on a system of fourfold division of castes. The Gltd says that God Himself created the fourfold division of castes into Brahmins, Ksattriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras, a division based on characteristic

1 £arikara, of course, is in entire disagreement with this interpretation of the Gltd, as will be discussed in a later section.

qualities and specific duties. Over and above this caste division and its corresponding privileges, duties and responsibilities, there is also a division of the stages of life into that of Brahma-car in — student, grha-stha —householder, vdna-prastha —retired in a forest, and bhiksu —mendicant, and each of these had its own prescribed duties. The duties of Hindu ethical life consisted primarily of the prescribed caste-duties and the specific duties of the different stages of life, and this is known as varndsrama-dharma. Over and above this there were also certain duties which were common to all, called the sadharana-dharmas. Thus Manu mentions steadiness (dhairya), forgiveness (ksamd), self-control (dama), non-stealing (caiirydbhdva), purity {sauca), sense-control (indriya-nigraha), wisdom (dhi), learning (vidyd), truthfulness (satya) and control of anger (akrodha) as examples of sddhdrana-dharma . Prasastapada mentions faith in religious duties (dharma-sraddha), non-injury (ahimsa), doing good to living beings (bhuta-hitatva), truthfulness (satya-vacana), non-stealing (asteya), sex-continence (brahma-carya), sincerity of mind (anupadhd), control of anger (krodha-varjana), cleanliness and ablutions (abhisecana), taking of pure food (suci-dravya-sevana), devotion to Vedic gods (visista-devata-bhakti), and watchfulness in avoiding transgressions (apramdda). The caste-duties must be distinguished from these common duties. Thus sacrifices, study and gifts are common to all the three higher castes, Brahmins, Ksattriyas and Vaisyas. The specific duties of a Brahmin are acceptance of gifts, teaching, sacrifices and so forth; the specific duties of a Ksattriya are protection of the people, punishing the wicked, not to retreat from battles and other specific tasks; the duties of a Vaisya are buying, selling, agriculture, breeding and rearing of cattle, and the specific duties of a Vaisya. The duties of a Sudra are to serve the three higher castes 1 . Regarding the relation between varna-dharma and sadhdrana-dharma, a modern writer says that "the sadharana-dharmas constitute the foundation of the varnasrama-dharmas, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For

1 The Glta, however, counts self-control (sama), control over the mind (dama), purity (sauca), forgiving nature (ksdnti), sincerity (arjava), knowledge (jnana), wisdom (vijnana) and faith (astikya) as the natural qualities of Brahmins. The duties of Ksattriyas are heroism (saurya), smartness (tejas), power of endurance (dhrti), skill (daksya), not to fly in battle (yuddhe ceipy apalayana), making of gifts (dana) and power of controlling others (isvara-bhava). The natural duties of Vaisyas are agriculture, rearing of cows and trade. Glta, xviii. 42-44.

example, the Brahmin in performing religious sacrifice must not appropriate another's property, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community as well as subserves (though in a negative way) the common good of the community—and so, in an indirect way, serves the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process all other communities according to their deserts and needs, and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato, whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realized by each class through its specific duties; but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the sddhdrana-dharmas of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being, which is being correctly realized in specific communities, but the common good as the precondition and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common-in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual. Hence the sddhdrana duties are obligatory equally for all individuals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity 1 ." The statement that the common good (sddhdrana-dharma) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of a conflict, the sadhdrana-dharma, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was a common duty; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives; but it was the duty of a Ksattriya not to turn away from a battle-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Ksattriya he had to fight. Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the Rdmdyana that Sambuka was a Sudra saint (muni) who was performing ascetic penances in a forest. This was a transgression of caste-duties; for a Sudra could not perform tapas, which only the higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the performance of tapas by the Sudra saint Sambuka was regarded

1 Ethics of the Hindus, by S. K. Maitra under Dr Seal's close personal supervision and guidance, pp. 3-4.

as adharma (vice); and, as a result of this adharma, there was a calamity in the kingdom of Rama in the form of the death of an infant son of a Brahmin. King Rama went out in his chariot and beheaded Sambuka for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances could be multiplied to show that, when there was a conflict between the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that had the greater force. The common duties had their force only when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The Gitd is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kuruksetra Krsna tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Ksattriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that the common duties had only a general application, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.

The Gitd does not raise the problem of common duties, as its synthesis of nivrtti (cessation from work) and pravrtti (tending to work) makes it unnecessary to introduce the advocacy of the common duties; for its instruction to take to work with a mind completely detached from all feelings and motives of self-seeking, pleasure-seeking and self-interest elevates its scheme of work to a higher sphere, which would not be in need of the practice of any select scheme of virtues.

The theory of the Gitd that, if actions are performed with an unattached mind, then their defects cannot touch the performer, distinctly implies that the goodness or badness of an action does not depend upon the external effects of the action, but upon the inner motive of action. If there is no motive of pleasure or self-gain, then the action performed cannot bind the performer; for it is only the bond of desires and self-love that really makes an action one's own and makes one reap its good or bad fruits. Morality from this point of view becomes wholly subjective, and the special feature of the Gitd is that it tends to make all actions non-moral by cutting away the bonds that connect an action with its performer. In such circumstances the more logical course would be that of Sankara, who would hold a man who is free from desires and attachment to be above morality, above duties and above responsibilities. The Gitd, however, would not advocate

the objective nivrtti, or cessation of work; its whole aim is to effect subjective nivrtti, or detachment from desires. It would not allow anyone to desist from his prescribed objective duties; but, whatever might be the nature of these duties, since they were performed without any motive of gain, pleasure or self-interest, they would be absolutely without fruit for the performer, who, in his perfect equanimity of mind, would transcend all his actions and their effects. If Arjuna fought and killed hundreds of his kinsmen out of a sense of his caste-duty, then, howsoever harmful his actions might be, they would not affect him. Yudhisthira, however, contemplated an expiation of the sin of killing his kinsmen by repentance, gifts, asceticism, pilgrimage, etc., which shows the other view, which was prevalent in the Maha-bharata period, that, when the performance of caste-duties led to such an injury to human lives, the sinful effects of such actions could be expiated by such means 1 . Yudhisthira maintained that of asceticism (tapas), the giving up of all duties (tyaga), and the final knowledge of the ultimate truth (avadhi), the second is better than the first and the third is better than the second. He therefore thought that the best course was to take to an ascetic life and give up all duties and responsibilities, whereas Arjuna held that the best course for a king would be to take upon himself the normal responsibilities of a kingly life and at the same time remain unattached to the pleasures of such a life 2 . Regarding also the practice of the virtues of non-injury, etc., Arjuna maintains that it is wrong to carry these virtues to extremes. Howsoever a man may live, whether as an ascetic or as a forester, it is impossible for him to practise non-injury to all living beings in any extreme degree. Even in the water that one drinks and the fruits that one eats, even in breathing and winking many fine and invisible insects are killed. So the virtue of non-injury, or, for the matter of that, all kinds of virtue, can be practised only in moderation, and their injunctions always imply that they can be practised only within the bounds of a commonsense view of things. Non-injury may

1 Maha-bharata, xil. 7. 36 and 37.

2 Thus Arjuna says :

asaktah saktavad gacchan nihsango mukta-bandhanah samah satrau ca mitre ca sa vai mukto mahlpate ; to which Yudhisthira replies:

tapas tydgo 'vadhir iti niscayas tv esa dhlmatam parasparam jyaya esdm yesdm naihsreyasl matih.

Ibid. xn. 18. 31 and xn. 19. 9.

be good; but there are cases where non-injury would mean doing injury. If a tiger enters into a cattle-shed, not to kill the tiger would amount to killing the cows. So all religious injunctions are made from the point of view of a practical and well-ordered maintenance of society and must therefore be obeyed with an eye to the results that may follow in their practical application. Our principal object is to maintain properly the process of the social order and the well-being of the people 1 . It seems clear, then, that, when the Gitd urges again and again that there is no meaning in giving up our normal duties, vocation and place in life and its responsibilities, and that what is expected of us is that we should make our minds unattached, it refers to the view which Yudhisthira expresses, that we must give up all our works. The Gitd therefore repeatedly urges that tydga does not mean the giving up of all works, but the mental giving up of the fruits of all actions.

Though the practice of detachment of mind from all desires and motives of pleasure and enjoyment would necessarily involve the removal of all vices and a natural elevation of the mind to all that is high and noble, yet the Gitd sometimes denounces certain types of conduct in very strong terms. Thus, in the sixteenth chapter, it is said that people who hold a false philosophy and think that the world is false and, without any basis, deny the existence of God and hold that there is no other deeper cause of the origin of life than mere sex-attraction and sex-union, destroy themselves by their foolishness and indulgence in all kinds of cruel deeds, and would by their mischievous actions turn the world to the path of ruin. In their insatiable desires, filled with pride, vanity and ignorance, they take to wrong and impure courses of action. They argue too much and think that there is nothing greater than this world that we live in, and, thinking so, they indulge in all kinds of pleasures and enjoyments. Tied with bonds of desire, urged by passions and anger, they accumulate money in a wrongful manner for the gratification of their sense-desires. "I have got this to-day," they think, "and enjoy myself; I have so much hoarded money and I shall have more later on"; "that enemy has been killed by me, I shall kill other enemies also, I am

1 Loka-ydtrdrtham evedam dharma-pravacanam krtam

ahimsd sddhu himseti sreydn dharma-parigrahah ndtyantam gunavat kimcin na cdpy atyanta-nirgunam ubhayam sarva-kdryesu driyate sddhv asddhu vd.

Mahd-bhdrati, xii. 15. 49 and 50.

a lord, I enjoy myself, I am successful, powerful and happy, I am rich, I have a noble lineage, there is no one like me, I perform sacrifices, make gifts and enjoy." They get distracted by various kinds of ideas and desires and, surrounded by nets of ignorance and delusion and full of attachment for sense-gratifications, they naturally fall into hell. Proud, arrogant and filled with the vanity of wealth, they perform improperly the so-called sacrifices, as a demonstration of their pomp and pride. In their egoism, power, pride, desires and anger they always ignore God, both in themselves and in others 1 . The main vices that one should try to get rid of are thus egoism, too many desires, greed, anger, pride and vanity, and of these desire and anger are again and again mentioned as being like the gates of hell 2 .

Among the principal virtues called the divine equipment {daivi sampat) the Gita counts fearlessness (abhaya), purity of heart (sattva-samsuddhi), knowledge of things and proper action in accordance with it, giving, control of mind, sacrifice, study, tapas, sincerity (drjava), non-injury (ahimsa), truthfulness (satya), control of anger (akrodha), renunciation (tyaga), peacefulness of mind (santi), not to backbite (apaisuna), kindness to the suffering (bhutesu day a), not to be greedy (alolupatva), tenderness (mardava), a feeling of shame before people in general when a wrong action is done {hri), steadiness (acapala), energy {te*as) y a forgiving spirit (ksanti), patience (dhrti), purity (sauca), not to think ill of others (adroha), and not to be vain. It is these virtues which liberate our spirits, whereas vanity, pride, conceit, anger, cruelty and ignorance are vices which bind and enslave us 3 . The man who loves God should not hurt any living beings, should be friendly and sympathetic towards them, and should yet be unattached to all things, should have no egoism, be the same in sorrows and pleasures and full of forgivingness for all. He should be firm, self-controlled and always contented. He should be pure, unattached, the same to all, should not take to actions from any personal motives, and he has nothing to fear. He is the same to friends and enemies, in appreciation and denunciation; he is the same in heat and cold, pleasure;and pain; he is the same in praise and blame, homeless and always satisfied with anything and everything; he is always unperturbed and absolutely unattached to all things 4 . If one carefully goes through

1 Gltd, xvi. 8-18. 2 Ibid. xvi. 21.

3 Ibid. xvi. 1-5. 4 Ibid. xn. 13-19; see also ibid. xm. 8-11.

the above list of virtues, it appears that the virtues are preeminently of a negative character—one should not be angry, hurtful to others, egoistic, proud or vain, should not do anything with selfish motives, should not be ruffled by pleasure and pain, heat and cold and should be absolutely unattached. Of the few positive virtues, sincerity and purity of heart, a forgiving spirit, tenderness, friendliness, kindness, alertness and sympathy seem to be most prominent. The terms maitra (friendliness) and karuna (compassion) might naturally suggest the Buddhist virtues so named, since they do not occur in the Upanisads 1 . But in the Glta also they are mentioned only once, and the general context of the passage shows that no special emphasis is put on these two virtues. They do not imply any special kind of meditation of universal friendship or universal piety or the active performance of friendly and sympathetic deeds for the good of humanity or for the good of living beings in general. They seem to imply simply the positive friendly state of the mind that must accompany all successful practice of non-injury to fellow-beings. The Glta does not advocate the active performance of friendliness, but encourages a friendly spirit as a means of discouraging the tendency to do harm to others. The life that is most admired in the Glta is a life of unattachedness, a life of peace, contentment and perfect equanimity and unper-turbedness in joys and sorrows. The vices that are denounced are generally those that proceed from attachment and desires, such as egoism, pride, vanity, anger, greediness, etc. There is another class of virtues which are often praised, namely those which imply purity, sincerity and alertness of mind and straightness of conduct. The negative virtue of sense-control, with its positive counterpart, the acquirement of the power of directing one's mind in a right direction, forms the bed-rock of the entire superstructure of the Glta code of moral and virtuous conduct.

The virtue of sameness (samatva), however, seems to be the great ideal which the Glta is never tired of emphasizing again and again. This sameness can be attained in three different stages: subjective sameness, or equanimity of mind, or the sameness in joys and sorrows, praise and blame and in all situations of life; objective sameness, as regarding all people, good, bad or indifferent, a friend or an enemy, with equal eyes and in the same

1 The term maitra occurs only once in the Muktikopanisat, n. 34, and the Muktika is in all probability one of the later Upanisads.

impartial spirit; and the final stage of the achievement of this equanimity is the self-realized state when one is absolutely unperturbed by all worldly things—a state of transcendence called gunatita. Thus in the Gita, n. 15, it is said that he whom sense-affections and physical troubles cannot affect in any way, who is unperturbable and the same in joys and sorrows, attains immortality. In 11. 38 Krsna asks Arjuna to think of joys and sorrows, gain and loss, victory and defeat as being the same, and to engage himself in the fight with such a mind; for, if he did so, no sin would touch him. In 11. 47 Krsna says to Arjuna that his business is only to perform his duties and not to look for the effects of his deeds; it is wrong to look for the fruits of deeds or to desist from performing one's duties. In 11. 48 this sameness in joys and sorrows is described as yoga, and it is again urged that one should be unperturbed whether m success or in failure. The same idea is repeated in 11. 55, 56 and 57, where it is said that a true saint should not be damped in sorrow or elated in joy, and that he should not be attached to anything and should take happiness or misery indifferently, without particularly welcoming the former or regretting the latter. Such a man is absolutely limited to his own self and is self-satisfied. He is not interested in achieving anything or in not achieving anything; there is no personal object for him to attain in the world 1 . To such a man gold and stones, desirables and undesirables, praise and blame, appreciation and denunciation, friends and foes are all alike 2 . Such a man makes no distinction whether between a friend and foe, or between a sinner and a virtuous man 3 . Such a man knows that pleasures and pains are welcomed and hated by all and, thinking so, he desires the good of all and looks upon all as he would upon himself—on a learned Brahmin of an elevated character, on a cow, an elephant, a dog or a candala ; and the wise behave in the same way 4 . He sees God in all beings and knows the indestructible and the immortal in all that is destructible. He who knows that all beings are pervaded by all, and thus regards them all with an equal eye, does not hurt his own spiritual nature and thus attains his highest 5 . As the culmination of this development, there is the state in which a man transcends all the corporeal and mundane characteristics of the threefold gunas, and, being freed from birth, death, old age and

1 Gita, in. 17, 18. 2 Ibid. xiv. 24, 25. 3 Ibid. vi. 9.

* Ibid. vi. 31; also v. 18. 5 Ibid. xm. 28.

sorrow, attains immortality. He knows that the worldly qualities of things, the gunas, are extraneous to his own spiritual nature, and by such thoughts he transcends the sphere of all worldly qualities and attains Brahmahood 1 .

Apart from the caste-duties and other deeds that are to be performed without any attachment, the Glta speaks again and again of sacrifices, tapas and gifts, as duties which cannot be ignored at any stage of our spiritual development. It is w r ell worth pointing out that the Glta blames the performance of sacrifices either for the attainment of selfish ends or for making a display of pomp or pride. The sacrifices are to be performed from a sense of duty and of public good, since it is only by the help of the sacrifices that the gods may be expected to bring down heavy showers, through which crops may grow in plenty. Physical tapas is described as the adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise men, as purity, sincerity, sex-continence and non-injury; tapas in speech is described as truthful and unoffending speech, which is both sweet to hear and for the good of all, and also study; mental tapas is described as serenity of mind (manah-prasada), happy temper (saumyatva), thoughtfulness (mauna), self-control (atma-vini-graha) and sincerity of mind; and the higher kind of tapas is to be performed without any idea of gain or the fulfilment of any ulterior end 2 . Gifts are to be made to good Brahmins in a holy place and at an auspicious time, merely from a sense of duty. This idea that gifts are properly made only when they are made to good Brahmins at a holy time or place is very much more limited and restricted than the Mahayana idea of making gifts for the good of all, without the slightest restriction of any kind. Thus it is said in the Siksa-samuccaya that a Bodhisattva need not be afraid among tigers and other wild animals in a wild forest, since the Bodhisattva has given his all for the good of all beings. He has therefore to think that, if the wild animals should eat him, this would only mean the giving his body to them, which would be the fulfilment of his virtue of universal charity. The Bodhisattvas take the vow of giving away their all in universal charity 3 .

Thus the fundamental teaching of the Glta is to follow caste-duties without any motive of self-interest or the gratification of sense-desires. The other general duties of sacrifices, tapas and

1 Glta, xiv. 20, 23, 26. 2 Ibid. xvi. 11-17.

3 Siksd-samiiccaya, ch. xix, p. 349.

DII 33

gifts are also to be practised by all and may hence be regarded in some sense as being equivalent to the sadharana-dharmas of the VaiSesika and Smrti literature. But, if caste-duties or customary duties come into conflict with the special duties of non-injury (ahimsa), then the caste-duties are to be followed in preference. It does not seem that any of the other special duties or virtues which are enjoined can come into conflict with the general caste-duties; for most of these are for the inner moral development, with which probably no caste-duties can come into conflict. But, though there is no express mandate of the Glta on the point, yet it may be presumed that, should a Sudra think of performing sacrifices, tapas or gifts or the study of the Vedas, this would most certainly be opposed by the Glta, as it would be against the prescribed caste-duties. So, though non-injury is one of the special virtues enjoined by the Glta, yet, when a Ksattriya kills his enemies in open and free fight, that fight is itself to be regarded as virtuous (dharmya) and there is for the Ksattriya no sin in the killing of his enemies. If a person dedicates all his actions to Brahman and performs his duties without attachment, then sinfulness in his actions cannot cleave to him, just as water cannot cleave to the leaves of a lotus plant 1 . On the one hand the Glta keeps clear of the ethics of the absolutist and metaphysical systems by urging the necessity of the performance of caste and customary duties, and yet enjoins the cultivation of the great virtues of renunciation, purity, sincerity, non-injury, self-control, sense-control and want of attachment as much as the absolutist systems would desire to do; on the other hand, it does not adopt any of the extreme and rigorous forms of self-discipline, as the Yoga does, or the practice of the virtues on an unlimited and universalist scale, as the Buddhists did. It follows the middle course, strongly emphasizing the necessity of self-control, sense-control and detachment from all selfish ends and desires along with the performance of the normal duties. This detachment from sense-pleasures is to be attained either through wisdom or, preferably, through devotion to God.

1 Glta, v. 10.

Analysis of Action.

The consideration of the Gltd ethics naturally brings in the problem of the analysis of the nature of action, volition and agent. The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be found in the Nyaya-Vaisesika works. Prasastapada divides animal activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature and originate automatically from life-functions {jivana-purvaka) and subserve useful ends (kam api artha-kriyam) for the organism, and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhakara holds that volitional actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that something has to be done (kdryatd-jndna), which Gangabhatta in his Bhatta-cintamani explains as meaning not merely a general notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the specific notion that an action must be done by him—a sense which can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the power or capacity of performing the action (krti-sddhyatd-jndna). This belief of krti-sddhyatd-jndna leads to desire (cikirsd). The Prabhakaras do not introduce here the important factor that an action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent. Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accomplished by him—an action is desired only as a kind of self-realization. The Nyaya, however, thinks that the fact that an action is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an essential condition of its performance.

The Gltd seems to hold that everywhere actions are always being performed by the gunas or characteristic qualities of prakrti, the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that one thinks himself to be the agent 1 . In another place it is said that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal elements or the all-controlling power of God (daiva) 2 . All actions

1 Gltd, in. 27 ; xiii. 29.

2 adhisthanam tathd kartd karanam ca prthag-vidham

vividhds ca prthak cestd daivam caivdtra pancamam. Ibid. xvm. 14.

33-2

being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only performer of actions. Thus it is said that, this being so, he who thinks the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly 1 . Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body, speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes 2 . The philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the Glta consists in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily through the movement of the characteristic qualities of prakrti, and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors mentioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore, sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake a work or cease from doing works. For the prakrti, or primal matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want to perform. So Krsna says to Arjuna that the egoism through which you would say that you would not fight is mere false vanity, since the prakrti is bound to lead you to action 3 . A man is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape. He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. Prakrti, or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper that one should perform one's normal duties. There are no duties and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold collocation, a person can determine his actions? The general implication of the Glta seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a direction to these actions; if a man wishes to dissociate himself from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all his actions to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God helps him to attain his noble aim.

1 Glta, xvm. 16. 2 Ibid. xvm. 15. 3 Ibid, xviii. 59.

Eschatology.

The Gita is probably the earliest document where a definite statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the Vyasa-bhasya on Patafijali-sutra, iv. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both the Vedantist and the Samkhyist seem to base their philosophies on an ontological principle known as sat-karya-vada, which holds that the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedanta holds that the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence; the cause alone is truly existent. The Samkhya, on the other hand, holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance, and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause before the starting of the causal operation (karana-vydpara). Both these systems strongly object to the Buddhist and Nyaya view that the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known as a-sat-kdrya-vada. Both the Samkhya and the Vedanta tried to prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that their doctrines are based upon an a priori proposition which is the basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be proved by reference to a posteriori illustration. Thus, the Samkhya says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g. oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g. sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of sat-karya-vada, but only implies it; for the doctrine of sat-karya-vada rests on an a priori principle such as that formulated in the Gita —that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist cannot come into being 1 . The Gita does not try to prove this proposition, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could

1 nasato vidyate bhdvo nabhavo vidyate satah. Gita, u. 16.

challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this principle, which underlies the ontological position of the Samkhya and the Vedanta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle only to the nature of self (atman). Thus it says, "O Arjuna, that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self; therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destructible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again.... Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dissolve it and air cannot dry it." The immortality of self preached in the Glta seems to have been directly borrowed from the Upanisads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe the spirit of the Upanisads not only in idea, but also in the modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not seem to have been formulated in the Upanisads. Its formulation in the Glta in support of the principle of immortality seems, therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upanisadic philosophy in this direction.

The first argument urged by Krsna to persuade Arjuna to fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle of Kuruksetra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death, when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is accepted. Our bodies are always changing, and, though the different stages in» this growth in childhood, youth and old age represent comparatively small degrees of change, yet these ought to prepare our minds to realize the fact that death is also a similar change of body only and cannot, therefore, affect the unperturbed nature of the self, which, in spite of all changes of body at successive

births and rebirths, remains unchanged in itself. When one is born one must die, and when one dies one must be reborn. Birth necessarily implies death, and death necessarily implies rebirth. There is no escape from this continually revolving cycle of birth and death. From Brahma down to all living creatures there is a continuous rotation of birth, death and rebirth. In reply to Arjuna's questions as to what becomes of the man who, after proceeding a long way on the path of yoga, is somehow through his failings dislodged from it and dies, Krsna replies that no good work can be lost and a man who has been once on the path of right cannot suffer; so, when a man who was proceeding on the path of yoga is snatched away by the hand of death, he is born again in a family of pure and prosperous people or in a family of wise yogins; and in this new birth he is associated with his achievements in his last birth and begins anew his onward course of advancement, and the old practice of the previous birth carries him onward, without any effort on his part, in his new line of progress. By his continual efforts through many lives and the cumulative effects of the right endeavours of each life the yogin attains his final realization. Ordinarily the life of a man in each new birth depends upon the desires and ideas that he fixes upon at the time of his death. But those that think of God, the oldest instructor, the seer, the smallest of the small, the upholder of all, shining like the sun beyond all darkness, and fix their life-forces between their eyebrows, and control all the gates of their senses and their mind in their hearts, ultimately attain their highest realization in God. From the great Lord, the great unmanifested and incomprehensible Lord, proceeds the unmanifested (avyakta), from which come out all manifested things (vyaktayah sarvah), and in time again return to it and again evolve out of it. Thus there are two forms of the unmanifested (avyakta), the unmanifested out of which all the manifested things come, and the unmanifested which is the nature of the eternal Lord from whom the former come 1 . The ideas of deva-yana and pitr-yana, daksinayana and uttarayana, the black and the white courses as mentioned in the Upanisads, are also referred to in the Gita. Those who go through smoke in the new-moon fortnight and the later six months (when the sun is on the south of the equator), and thus take the black course, return again; but those who take the white course of fire

1 Gita, viii. 16-23.

in the full-moon fortnight and th^ former six months (when the sun is on the north of the equator) do not return again 1 . No very significant meaning can be made out of these doctrines. They seem to be but the perpetuation of the traditional faiths regarding the future courses of the dead, as referred to in the Chdndogya Upanisad. The Gita, again, speaking of others, says that those who follow the sacrificial duties of the Vedas enjoy heavenly pleasures in heaven, and, when their merits are exhausted by the enjoyments of the good fruits of their actions, they come back to earth. Those who follow the path of desires and take to religious duties for the attainment of pleasures must always go to heaven and come back again—they cannot escape this cycle of going and coming. Again, in the Gita, xvi. 19, Krsna says, " I make cruel vicious persons again and again take birth as ferocious animals." The above summary of the eschatological views of the Gita shows that it collects together the various traditionally accepted views regarding life after death without trying to harmonize them properly. Firstly, it may be noted that the Gita believes in the doctrine of karma. Thus in xv. 2 and in tv 9 it is said that the world has grown on the basis of karma, and the Gita believes that it is the bondage of karma that binds us to this world. The bondage of karma is due to the existence of attachment, passions and desires. But what does the bondage of karma lead to? The reply to such a question, as given by the Gita, is that it leads to rebirth. When one performs actions in accordance with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of beneficial fruits, desire for such fruits and attachment to these desirable fruits is the bondage of karma, which naturally leads to rebirth. The proposition definitely pronounced in the Gita, that birth necessarily means death and death necessarily means birth, reminds us of the first part of the twelvefold causal chain of the Buddha—"What being, is there death? Birth being, there is death." It has already been noticed that the attitude of the Gita towards Vedic performances is merely one of toleration and not one of encouragement. These are actions which are prompted by desires and, like all other actions similarly prompted, they entail with them the bonds of karma; and, as soon as the happy effects produced by the merits of these actions are enjoyed and lived through, the performers of these actions come down from heaven to the earth and

1 Gita, vin. 24-26.

are reborn and have to pass through the old ordeal of life. The idea that, there being birth, there is death, and that, if there is death there is also rebirth, is the same in the Gita as in Buddhism; but the Gita form seems to be very much earlier than the Buddhistic form; for the Buddhistic form relates birth and death through a number of other causal links intimately connected together in an interdependent cycle, of which the Gita seems to be entirely ignorant. The Gita does not speak of any causal chain, such as could be conceived to be borrowed from Buddhism. It, of course, knows that attachment is the root of all vice; but it is only by implication that we can know that attachment leads to the bondage of karma and the bondage of karma to rebirth. The main purpose of the Gita is not to find out how one can tear asunder the bonds of karma and stop rebirth, but to prescribe the true rule of the performance of one's duties. It speaks sometimes, no doubt, about cutting asunder the bonds of karma and attaining one's highest; but instruction as regards the attainment of liberation or a description of the evils of this worldly life does not form any part of the content of the Gita. The Gita has no pessimistic tendency. It speaks of the necessary connection of birth and death not in order to show that life is sorrowful and not worth living, but to show that there is no cause of regret in such universal happenings as birth and death. The principal ideas are, no doubt, those of attachment, karma, birth, death and rebirth; but the idea of Buddhism is more complex and more systematized, and is therefore probably a later development at a time when the Gita discussions on the subject were known. The Buddhist doctrine that there is no self and no individual anywhere is just the opposite of the Gita doctrine of the immortality of the self.

But the Gita speaks not only of rebirth, but also of the two courses, the path of smoke and the path of light, which are referred to in the Chandogya Upanisad 1 . The only difference between the Upanisad account and that of the Gita is that there are more details in the Upanisad than in the Gita. But the ideas of deva-yana and pitr-yana do not seem to fit in quite consistently with the idea of rebirth on earth. The Gita y however, combines the idea of rebirth on earth with the deva-yana-pitr-yana idea and also with the idea of ascent to heaven as an effect of the merits

1 Chandogya Upanisad, v. 10.

accruing from sacrificial performances. Thus the Gita combines the different trains of ideas just as it finds them traditionally accepted, without trying to harmonize them properly. It does not attempt to discuss the point regarding the power of karma in determining the nature of rebirths, enjoyments and sufferings. From some passages (iv. 9 or vi. 40-45) it might appear that the bonds of karma produced their effects independently by their own powers, and that the arrangement of the world is due to the effect of karma. But there are other passages (xvi. 19) which indicate that karma does not produce its effects by itself, but that God rewards or punishes good and bad deeds by arranging good and bad births associated with joys and sorrows. In the Gita, V. 15, it is said that the idea of sins and virtues is due to ignorance, whereas, if we judge rightly, God does not take cognizance either of vices or of virtues. Here again there are two contradictory views of karma: one view ii» which karma is regarded as the cause which brings about all inequalities in life, and another view which does not attribute any value to good or bad actions. The only way in which the two views can be reconciled in accordance with the spirit of the Gita is by holding that the Gita does not believe in the objective truth of virtue or vice {punya or papa). There is nothing good or bad in the actions themselves. It is only ignorance and foolishness that regards them as good or bad; it is only our desires and attachments which make the actions produce their bad effects with reference to us, and which render them sinful for us. Since the actions themselves are neither good nor bad, the performance of even apparently sinful actions, such as the killing of one's kinsmen on the battle-field, cannot be regarded as sinful, if they are done from a sense of duty; but the same actions would be regarded as sinful, if they were performed through attachments or desires. Looked at from this point of view, the idea of morality in the Gita is essentially of a subjective character. But though morality, virtue and vice, can be regarded from this point of view as subjective, it is not wholly subjective. For morality does not depend upon mere subjective conscience or the subjective notions of good and bad. The caste-duties and other duties of customary morality are definitely fixed, and no one should transgress them. The subjectivity of virtue and vice consists in the fact that they depend entirely on our good or bad actions. If actions are performed from a sense of obedience to scriptural commands, caste-

duties or duties of customary morality, then such actions, in spite of their bad consequences, would not be regarded as bad.

Apart from these courses of rebirth and ascent to heaven, the last and best and ultimate course is described as being liberation, which transcends all that can be achieved by all kinds of merits attained by sacrifices, gifts or tapas. He who attains this highest achievement lives in God and is never born again 1 . The highest realization thus consists in being one with God, by which one escapes all sorrows. In the Glta liberation (moksa) means liberation from old age and death. This liberation can be attained by true philosophic knowledge of the nature of ksetra, or the mind-body whole, and the ksetra-jna, the perceiving selves, or the nature of what is truly spiritual and what is non-spiritual, and by clinging to God as one's nearest and dearest 2 . This liberation from old age and death also means liberation from the ties of karma associated with us through the bonds of attachment, desires, etc. It does not come of itself, as the natural result of philosophic knowledge or of devotion to God; but God, as the liberator, grants it to the wise and to those who cling to Him through devotion 3 . But whether it be achieved as the result of philosophic knowledge or as the result of devotion to God, the moral elevation, consisting of dissociation from attachment and the right performance of duties in an unattached manner, is indispensable.

God and Man.

The earliest and most recondite treatment regarding the nature and existence of God and His relation to man is to be found in the Glta. The starting-point of the Glta theism may be traced as far back as the Purusa-sukta, where it is said that the one quarter of the purusa has spread out as the cosmic universe and its living beings, while its other three-quarters are in the immortal heavens 4 . This passage is repeated in Chandogya, in. 12. 6 and in Maitrayani, vi. 4, where it is said that the three-quarter Brahman sits root upward above (urdhva-mulam tripad Brahma). This idea, in a slightly modified form, appears in the Katha Upanisad, vi. 1, where it is said that this universe is the eternal Asvattha

1 Glta, viii. 28; ix. 4. 2 Ibid. vii. 29; xm. 34. 3 Ibid. xvm. 66.

4 pddo 'sya visvd bhutdm

tripad asydmrtam divi. Purusa-siikta.

tree which has its root high up and its branches downwards (ilrdhva-mulo 'vak-sakhah). The Gita borrows this idea and says, " This is called the eternal Asvattha (pipul tree) with its roots high up and branches downwards, the leaves of which are the Vedas; and he who knows this, he knows the Vedas" (xv. i). Again it is said, " Its branches spread high and low,its leaves of sense-objects are nourished by the gunas, its roots are spread downwards, tied with the knots of karma, the human world" (xv. 2); and in the next verse, it is said," In this world its true nature is not perceived; its beginning, its end, and the nature of its subsistence, remain unknown; it is only by cutting this firmly rooted Asvattha tree with the strong axe of unattachment {asanga-sastrena) that one has to seek that state from which, when once achieved, no one returns." It is clear from the above three passages that the Glta has elaborated here the simile of the Asvattha tree of the Kapha Upanisad. The Gita accepts this simile of God, but elaborates it by supposing that these branches have further leaves and other roots, which take their sap from the ground of human beings, to which they are attached by' the knots of karma. This means a duplication of the Asvattha tree, the main and the subsidiary. The subsidiary one is an overgrowth, which has proceeded out of the main one and has to be cut into pieces before one can reach that. The principal idea underlying this simile throws a flood of light on the Gita conception of God, which is an elaboration of the idea of the Piirusa-sukta passage already referred to. God is not only immanent, but transcendent as well. The immanent part, which forms the cosmic universe, is no illusion or maya: it is an .emanation, a development, from God. The good and the evil, the moral and the immoral of this world, are all from Him and in Him. The stuff of this world and its manifestations have their basis, an essence, in Him, and are upheld by Him. The transcendent part, which may be said to be the root high up, and the basis of all that has grown in this lower world, is itself the differenceless reality—the Brahman. But, though the Brahman is again and again referred to as the highest abode and the ultimate realization, the absolute essence, yet God in His super-personality transcends even Brahman, in the sense that Brahman, however great it may be, is only a constitutive essence in the complex personality of God. The cosmic universe, the gunas, the purusas, the mind-structure composed of kuddhi, ahamkara, etc., and the Brahman,

are all constituents of God, having their separate functions and mental relations; but God in His super-personality transcends them all and upholds them all. There is, however, one important point in which the Gltd differs from the Upanisads—this is, its introduction of the idea that God takes birth on earth as man. Thus in the Gltd, iv. 6 and iv. 7, it is said that "whenever there is a disturbance of dharma and the rise of adharma, I create myself; though I am unborn, of immortal self and the lord of all beings, yet by virtue of my own nature (prakrti) I take birth through my own may a (blinding power of the gunas)." This doctrine of the incarnation of God, though not dealt with in any of the purely speculative systems, yet forms the corner-stone of most systems of religious philosophy and religion, and the Gltd is probably the earliest work available to us in which this doctrine is found. The effect of its introduction and of the dialogue form of the Gltd, in which the man-god Krsna instructs Arjuna in the philosophy of life and conduct, is that the instruction regarding the personality of God becomes concrete and living. As will be evident in the course of this section, the Gltd is not a treatise of systematic philosophy, but a practical course of introduction to life and conduct, conveyed by God Himself in the form of Krsna to His devotee, Arjuna. In the Gltd abstract philosophy melts down to an insight into the nature of practical life and conduct, as discussed with all the intimacy of the personal relation between Krsna and Arjuna, which suggests a similar personal relation between God and man. F01 the God in the Gltd is not a God of abstract philosophy or theology, but a God who could be a man and be capable of all personal relations.

The all-pervasive nature of God and the fact that He is the essence and upholder of all things in the world is again and again in various ways emphasized in the Gltd. Thus Krsna says, "There is nothing greater than I, all things are held in me, like pearls in the thread of a pearl garland; I am the liquidity in water, the light of the sun and the moon, manhood (paurusa) in man; good smell in earth, the heat of the sun, intelligence in the intelligent, heroism in the heroes, strength in the strong, and I am also the desires which do not transgress the path of virtue 1 ." Again, it is said that "in my unmanifested (avyakta) form I pervade the whole world; all beings exist completely in me, but

1 Gltd, vil. 7-11.

I am not exhausted in them; yet so do I transcend them that none of the beings exist in me—I am the upholder of all beings, I do not exist in them and yet I am their procreator 1 ." In both these passages the riddle of God's relation with man, by which He exists in us and yet does not exist in us and is not limited by us, is explained by the fact of the threefold nature of God; there is a part of Him which has been manifested as inanimate nature and also as the animate world of living beings. It is with reference to this all-pervasive nature of God that it is said that "as the air in the sky pervades the whole world, so are all beings in ' me' (God). At the end of each cycle (kalpa) all beings enter into my nature {prakrtim yanti mamikam), and again at the beginning of a cycle I create them. I create again and again through my nature (prakrti) ; the totality of all living beings is helplessly dependent on prakrti? ." The three prakrtis have already been referred to in the previous sections— prakrti of God as cosmic matter, prakrti as the nature of God from which all life and spirit have emanated, and prakrti as maya, or the power of God from which the three gunas have emanated. It is with reference to the operation of these prakrtis that the cosmic world and the world of life and spirit may be said to be existent in God. But there is the other form of God, as the transcendent Brahman, and, so far as this form is concerned, God transcends the sphere of the universe of matter and life. But in another aspect of God, in His totality and super-personality, He remains unexhausted in all, and the creator and upholder of all, though it is out of a part of Him that the world has come into being. The aspect of God's identity with, and the aspect of His transcendence and nature as the father, mother and supporter of the universe, are not separated in the Gita, and both the aspects are described often in one and the same passage. Thus it is said, " I am the father, mother, upholder and grandfather of this world, and I am the sacred syllable OM, the three Vedas, Rk, Saman and Yajus; I am the sacrifice, the oblations and the fire, and yet I am the master and the enjoyer of all sacrifices. I am the final destiny, upholder, matter, the passive illuminator, the rest, support, friend, the origin, the final dissolution, the place, the receptacle and the immortal seed. I produce heat and shower, I destroy and create, I am both death and the deathless, the good and the bad 3 ." With reference to His transcendent part it is 1 Glta, ix. 3-5. 2 Ibid. ix. 6-8. * Ibid. ix. 16-19, 24.

said, "The sun, the moon and fire do not illuminate it—it is my final abode, from which, when once achieved, no one returns 1 ." And again, immediately after, it is said, " It is my part that forms the eternal soul-principle (jlva-bhuta) in the living, which attracts the five senses and the manas which lie buried in prakrti, and which takes the body and goes out of it with the six senses, just as air takes out fragrance from the flowers 2 ." And then God is said to be the controlling agent of all operations in this world. Thus it is said, "By my energy I uphold the world and all living beings and fill all crops with their specific juices; as fire in the bodies of living beings, and aided by the biomotor prana functions, I digest the four kinds of food; I am the light in the sun, the moon and fire." Again it is said, "I reside in the hearts of all; knowledge, forgetfulness and memory all come from me; I alone am to be known by the Vedas; I alone know the Vedas, and I alone am the author of the Vedanta 3 ." From these examples it is evident that the Glta does not know that pantheism and deism and theism cannot well be jumbled up into one as a consistent philosophic creed. And it does not attempt to answer any objections that may be made against the combination of such opposite views. The Glta not only asserts that all is God, but it also again and again repeats that God transcends all and is simultaneously transcendent and immanent in the world. The answer apparently implied in the Glta to all objections to the apparently different views of the nature of God is that transcendentalism, immanentalism and pantheism lose their distinctive and opposite characters in the melting whole of the super-personality of God. Sometimes in the same passage, and sometimes in passages of the same context, the Glta talks in a pantheistic, a transcendental or a theistic vein, and this seems to imply that there is no contradiction in the different aspects of God as preserver and controller of the world, as the substance of the world, life and soul, and as the transcendent substratum underlying them all. In order to emphasize the fact that all that exists and all that is worthy of existence or all that has a superlative existence in good or bad are God's manifestation, the Glta is never tired of repeating that whatever is highest, best or even worst in things is God or

1 Gita, xv. 6.

2 Ibid. xv. 7 and 8. It is curious that here the word Isvara is used as an epithet oijlva.

3 ibid. xv. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15.

God's manifestation. Thus it is said, *I am the gambling of dice in all deceptive operations, I am victory in all endeavours, heroism of the heroes and the moral qualities (sattva) of all moral men {sattvavatam)"\ and after enumerating a number of such instances Krsna says that, wherever there are special gifts or powers or excellence of any kind, they are to be regarded as the special manifestation of God 1 . The idea that God holds within Himself the entire manifold universe is graphically emphasized in a fabulous form, when Krsna gives Arjuna the divine eye of wisdom and Arjuna sees Krsna in his resplendent divine form, shining as thousands of suns burning together, with thousands of eyes, faces and ornaments, pervading the heavens and the earth, with neither beginning nor end, as the great cosmic person into whose mouths all the great heroes of Kuruksetra field had entered, like rivers into the ocean. Krsna, after showing Arjuna his universal form, says, "I am time (kala), the great destroyer of the world, and I am engaged in collecting the harvest of human lives, and all that will die in this great battle of Kuruksetra have already been killed by rne; you will be merely an instrument in this great destruction of the mighty battle of Kuruksetra. So you can fight, destroy your enemies, attain fame and enjoy the sovereignty without any compunction that you have destroyed the lives of your kinsmen."

The main purport of the Glta view of God seems to be that ultimately there is no responsibility for good or evil and that good and evil, high and low, great and small have all emerged from God and are upheld in Him. When a man understands the nature and reality of his own self and its agency, and his relation with God, both in his transcendent and cosmic nature, and the universe around him and the gunas of attachment, etc., which bind him to his worldly desires, he is said to have the true knowledge. There is no opposition between the path of this true knowledge (jnana-yoga) and the path of duties; for true knowledge supports and is supported by right performance of duties. The path of knowledge is praised in the Glta in several passages. Thus it is said, that just as fire burns up the wood, so does knowledge reduce all actions to ashes. There is nothing so pure as knowledge. He who has true faith is attached to God, and he who has controlled his senses, attains knowledge, and having attained it, secures peace. He who

1 Gita, x. 36-41.

is foolish, an unbeliever, and full of doubts, is destroyed. He who is always doubting has neither this world, nor the other, nor does he enjoy any happiness. Even the worst sinner can hope to cross the sea of sins in the boat of knowledge 1 . In the Gita, iv. 42, Krsna says to Arjuna, "Therefore, having destroyed the ignorance of your heart by the sword of knowledge, and having cut asunder all doubts, raise yourself up." But what is this knowledge? In the Gita, iv. 36, in the same context, this knowledge is defined to be that view of things by which all beings are perceived in this self or God. The true knowledge of God destroys all karma in the sense that he who has perceived and realized the true nature of all things in God cannot be attached to his passions and desires as an ignorant man would be. In another passage, already referred to, it is said that the roots of the worldly Asvattha tree are to be cut by the sword of unattachment. The confusion into which Arjuna falls in the Gita, in. 1 and 2, regarding the relative excellence of the path of karma and the path of knowledge is wholly unfounded. Krsna points out in the Gita, in. 3, that there are two paths, the path of knowledge and the path of duties (jnana-yoga and karma-yoga). The confusion had arisen from the fact that Krsna had described the immortality of soul and the undesirability of Vedic actions done with a motive, and had also asked Arjuna to fight and yet remain unattached and perform his duty for the sake of duty. The purpose of the Gita was to bring about a reconciliation between these two paths, and to show that the path of knowledge leads to the path of duties by liberating it from the bonds of attachment; for all attachment is due to ignorance, and ignorance is removed by true knowledge. But the true knowledge of God may be of a twofold nature. One may attain a knowledge of God in His transcendence as Brahman, and attain the philosophic wisdom of the foundation of all things in Brahman as the ultimate substance and source of all manifestation and appearance. There is another way of clinging to God as a super-person, in a personal relation of intimacy, friendship and dependence. The Gita admits that both these ways may lead us to the attainment of our highest realization. But it is the latter which the Gita prefers and considers easier. Thus the Gita says (xn. 3-5) that those who adore the indefinable, unchangeable, omnipresent, unthinkable, and the un-manifested, controlling all their senses, with equal eyes for all

1 Gita, iv. 37-41.

and engaged in the good of all, by this course attain Him. Those who fix their mind on the unmanifested (avyakta) find this course very hard. But those who dedicate all their actions to God and, clinging to Him as their only support, are devoted to Him in constant communion, them He saves soon from the sea of death and rebirth 1 .

The most important point in which the Gita differs from the Upanisads is that the Gita very strongly emphasizes the fact that the best course for attaining our highest realization is to dedicate all our actions to God, to cling to Him as our nearest and dearest, and always to be in communion with Him. The Gita draws many of its ideas from the Upanisads and looks to them with respect. It accepts the idea of Brahman as a part of the essence of God, and agrees that those who fix their mind on Brahman as their ideal also attain the high ideal of realizing God. But this is only a compromise; for the Gita emphasizes the necessity of a personal relation with God, whom we can love and adore. The beginning of our association with God must be made by dedicating the fruits of all our actions to God, by being a friend of all and sympathetic to all, by being self-controlled, the same in sorrow or happiness, self-contented, and in a state of perfect equanimity and equilibrium. It is through such a moral elevation that a man becomes apt in steadying his mind on God and ultimately in fixing his mind on God. In the Gita Krsna as God asks Arjuna to give up all ceremonials or religious courses and to cling to God as the only protector, and He promises that because of that God will liberate him 2 . Again, it is said that it is by devotion that a man knows what God is in reality and, thus knowing Him truly as He is, enters into Him. It is by seeking entire protection in God that one can attain his eternal state 3 .

But, though in order to attain the height at which it is possible to fix one's mind on God, one should first acquire the preliminary qualification of detaching oneself from the bonds of passions and desires, yet it is sometimes possible to reverse the situation. The Gita thus holds that those whose minds and souls are full of God's love, who delight in constantly talking and thinking of God and always adore God with love, are dear to Him, and God, through His great mercy and kindness, grants them the proper wisdom and destroys the darkness of their ignorance by the light of knowledge 4 .

1 Gita, xii. 6, 7. 2 Ibid. xvm. 66. 3 Ibid, xviii. 55, 62. * Ibid. x. 9-11.

In the Glta, xviii. 57-58, Krsna as God asks Arjuna to leave all fruits of actions to God and to fill his mind with God, and He assures him that He will then, by His divine grace, save him from all sorrows, troubles or difficulties. Again, in ix. 30-32 it is said that, even if a man is extremely wicked, if he adores God devotedly, he becomes a saint; for he has adopted the right course, and he soon becomes religious and attains eternal peace of mind. Even sinnefs, women, Vaisyas and Sudras who cling to God for support, are emancipated. Krsna as God assures Arjuna that a devotee (bhakta) of God can never be lost 1 . If a man clings to God, no matter whether he has understood Him rightly or not, no matter whether he has taken the right course of approaching Him or not, God accepts him in whichever way he clings to Him. No one can be lost. In whichever way one may be seeking God, one is always in God's path 2 . If a man, prompted by diverse desires, takes to wrong gods, then even unto those gods God grants him true devotion, with which he follows his worship of those gods, and, even through such worship, grants him his desires 3 . God is the Lord of all and the friend of all beings. It is only great-souled men who with complete constancy of mind worship God, and with firm devotion repeat the name of God, and, being always in communion with Him, adore Him with devotion. God is easily accessible to those who always think of God with inalienable attachment 4 . In another passage (vn. 16, 17) it is said that there are four classes of people who adore God: those who are enquiring, those who are in trouble, those who wish to attain some desired things, and those who are wise. Of these the wise (jnaniri), who are always in communion with Him and who are devoted to Him alone, are superior; the wise are dear to Him and He is dear to them. In this passage it has been suggested that true wisdom consists in the habit of living in communion with God and in being in constant devotion to God. The path of bhakti, or devotion, is thus praised in the Glta as being the best. For the Glta holds that, even if a man cannot proceed in the normal path of self-elevation and detach himself from passions and desires and establish himself in equanimity, he may still, simply by clinging to God and by firm devotion to Him, bring himself within the sphere of His grace, and by grace alone acquire true wisdom and

1 Glta, ix. 30-32. 2 Ibid. iv. n.

3 Ibid. vii. 20-22. * Ibid. iv. 13-15; v. 29; vn. 14.

achieve that moral elevation, with little or no struggle, which is attained with so much difficulty by others. The path of bhakti is thus introduced in the Gita, for the first time, as an independent path side by side with the path of wisdom and knowledge of the Upanisads and with the path of austere self-discipline. Moral elevation, self-control, etc. are indeed regarded as an indispensable preliminary to any kind of true self-realization. But the advantage of the path of devotion (bhakti) consists in this, that, while some seekers have to work hard on the path of self-control and austere self-discipline, either by constant practice or by the aid of philosophic wisdom, the devotee makes an easy ascent to a high elevation—not because he is more energetic and better equipped than his fellow-workers in other paths, but because he has resigned himself completely to God; and God, being pleased with his devotees who cling fast to Him and know nothing else, grants them wisdom and raises them up through higher and higher stages of self-elevation, self-realization and bliss. Arjuna treated Krsna, the incarnation of God on earth, as his friend, and Krsna in the role of God exhorted him to depend entirely on Him and assured him that He would liberate him—He was asking him to give up everything else and cling to Him as his only support. The Gita lays down for the first time the corner-stone of the teachings of the Bhagavata-purana and of the later systems of Vaisnava thought, which elaborated the theory of bhakti and described it as the principal method of self-elevation and self-realization.

Another important feature of the Gita doctrine of devotion consists in the fact that, as, on the one hand, God is contemplated by His devotees in the intimate personal relation of a father, teacher, master and friend, with a full consciousness of His divinity and His nature as the substratum and the upholder of the entire animate and inanimate cosmic universe, so, on the other hand, the transcendent personality of God is realized not only as the culmination of spiritual greatness and the ultimate reconciliation of all relative differences, of high and low, good and bad, but as the great deity, with a physical, adorable form, whom the devotee can worship not only mentally and spiritually, but also externally, with holy offerings of flowers and leaves. The transcendent God is not only immanent in the universe, but also present before the devotee in the form of a great deity resplendent with brightness, or in the personal form of the man-god Krsna, in whom

God incarnated Himself. The Glta combines together different conceptions of God without feeling the necessity of reconciling the oppositions or contradictions involved in them. It does not seem to be aware of the philosophical difficulty of combining the concept of God as the unmanifested, differenceless entity with the notion of Him as the super-person Who incarnates Himself on earth in the human form and behaves in the human manner. It is not aware of the difficulty that, if all good and evil should have emanated from God, and if there be ultimately no moral responsibility, and if everything in the world should have the same place in God, there is no reason why God should trouble to incarnate Himself as man, when there is a disturbance of the Vedic dharma. If God is impartial to all, and if He is absolutely unperturbed, why should He favour the man who clings to Him, and why, for his sake, overrule the world-order of events and in his favour suspend the law of karma} It is only by constant endeavours and practice that one can cut asunder the bonds of karma. Why should it be made so easy for even a wicked man who clings to God to release himself from the bonds of attachment and karma, without any effort on his part? Again, the Glta does not attempt to reconcile the disparate parts which constitute the complex super-personality of God. How are the unmanifested or avyakta part as Brahman, the avyakta part as the cosmic substratum of the universe, the prakrti part as the producer of the gunas, and the prakrti part as the jlvas or individual selves, to be combined and melted together to form a complex personality ? If the unmanifested nature is the ultimate abode (paramdhama) of God, how can God as a person, who cannot be regarded as a manifestation of this ultimate reality, be considered to be transcendent? How can there be a relation between God as a person and His diverse nature as the cosmic universe, jlva and the gunas} In a system like that of Sahkara Brahman and Isvara, one and the many could be combined together in one scheme, by holding Brahman as real and Isvara and the many as unreal and illusory, produced by reflection of Brahman in the maya, the principle of illusoriness. But, howsoever Sankara might interpret the Glta, it does not seem that it considered IsVara or the world as in the least degree illusory. In the Upanisads also the notion of Isvara and the notion of Brahman are sometimes found side by side. As regards God as Isvara, the Glta not only does not think him to be

illusory, but considers him the highest truth and reality. Thus there is no way of escaping from any of the categories of reality— the two azyaktas, prakrti, jlva and the super-personality of Isvara comprehending and transcending them all. The concepts of Brahman, jlva, the unmanifested category from which the world proceeds, and the gunas are all found in the Upanisads in passages which are probably mostly unrelated. But the Glta seems to take them all together, and to consider them as constituents of Isvara, which are also upheld by Him in His superior form, in which He transcends and controls them all. In the Upanisads the doctrine of bhakti can hardly be found, though here and there faint traces of it may be perceived. If the Upanisads ever speak of Isvara, it is only to show His great majesty, power and glory, as the controller and upholder of all. But the Glta is steeped in the mystic consciousness of an intimate personal relation with God, not only as the majestic super-person, but as a friend who incarnates Himself for the good of man and shares his joys and sorrows with him, and to whom a man could cling for support in troubles and difficulties and even appeal for earthly goods. He is the great teacher, with whom one can associate oneself for acquisition of wisdom and the light of knowledge. But He could be more than all this. He could be the dearest of the dear and the nearest of the near, and could be felt as being so intimate, that a man could live simply for the joy of his love for Him; he could cling to Him as the one dear friend, his highest goal, and leave everything else for Him; he could consider, in his deep love for Him, all his other religious duties and works of life as being relatively unimportant; he could thus constantly talk of Him, think of Him, and live in Him. This is the path of bhakti or devotion, and the Glta assures us that, whatever may be the hindrances and whatever may be the difficulties, the bhakta (devotee) of God cannot be lost. It is from the point of view of this mystic consciousness that the Glta seems to reconcile the apparently philosophically irreconcilable elements. The Glta was probably written at a time when philosophical views had not definitely crystallized into hard-and-fast systems of thought, and when the distinguishing philosophical niceties, scholarly disputations, the dictates of argument, had not come into fashion. The Glta, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right conduct and right perspective of things in the light of a mystical approach to God in self-resignation, devotion, friendship and humility.

Visnu, Vasudeva and Krsna.

Visnu, Bhagavat, Narayana, Hari and Krsna are often used in a large section of Indian religious literature as synonymous names of the supreme lord. Of these Visnu is an important god of the Rg-Veda, who is one of the adityas and who makes three strides in the sky, probably as he manifests himself in the eastern horizon, as he rises to the zenith and as he sets in the west. He is also represented in the Rg-Veda as a great fighter and an ally of Indra. It is further said that he has two earthly steps and another higher step which is known only to himself. But in the Rg-Veda Visnu is certainly inferior to Indra, with whom he was often associated, as is evident from such names as Indra-visnu (R.V. iv. 55. 4; vii. 99. 5; viii. 10. 2, etc.). According to later tradition Visnu was the youngest, the twelfth of the adityas, though he was superior to them all in good qualities 1 . His three steps in the Rg-Vedic allusion have been explained in the Nirukta as referring to the three stages of the sun's progress in the morning, at midday and at evening. One of the names of Visnu in the Rg-Veda is Sipivista, which Durgacarya explains as "surrounded with the early rays" (sipi-samjnairbala-rasmibhiravistdf . Again, the sage praises Visnu in the Rg-Veda in the following terms: "I, a master of hymns and knowing the sacred customs, to-day praise that name of thine, Sipivista. I, who am weak, glorify thee, who art mighty and dwellest beyond this world 3 ." All this shows that Visnu was regarded as the sun, or endowed with the qualities of the sun. The fact that Visnu was regarded as dwelling beyond this world is probably one of the earliest signs of his gradually increasing superiority. For the next stage one must turn to the Satapatha-brahmana. In 1. 2. 4 of that work it is said that the demons (asura) and the gods were vying with one another; the gods were falling behind, and the demons were trying to distribute the world among themselves; the gods followed them, making Visnu the sacrifice as their leader (te yajnatn eva Visnum puraskrtyeyuh), and desired their own shares; the demons felt jealous and said that they could give only so much ground as would

1 Ekadasas tatha Tvasta dvddaso Visnur ucyate jaghanyajas tu sarvesdm dditydndm gunddhikah.

Mahd-bhdrata, 1. 65. 16. Calcutta, Bangavasi Press, second edition, 1908.

2 Nirukta, v. 9. Bombay edition, 1918.

3 Rg-Veda, vii. 100. 5, translated by Dr L. Sarup, quoted in Nirukta, v. 8.

be occupied by Visnu when he lay down, Visnu being a dwarf {vamano ha Visnur asa). The gods felt dissatisfied at this, and they approached him with various mantras and in consequence attained the whole world. Again, in xiv. 1 of the same work, Kuruksetra is referred to as being the place of the sacrificial performances of the gods, and it is said there that in industry, rigorism (tapas), faith, etc. Visnu was the best of all gods and was regarded as being superior to them all (tasmad ahur Visnur devanam sresthah), and was himself the sacrifice. Again, in Taittirlya-samhita, 1. 7. 5. 4, in Vdjasaneyi-samhita, 1. 30; 11. 6. 8; v. 21, in Atharva-Veda, v. 26. 7; vin. 5. 10, etc., Visnu is referred to as the chief of the gods {Visnu-mukha deva). Again, Visnu as sacrifice attained unlimited fame. Once he was resting his head on the end of his bow; and, when some ants, perceiving that, said, " How should we be rewarded, if we could gnaw the strings of the bow," the gods said that they would then be rewarded with food; and so the ants gnawed away the strings, and, as the two ends of the bow sprang apart, Visnu's head was torn from his body and became the sun 1 . This story not only shows the connection of Visnu with the sun, but also suggests that the later story of Krsna's being shot with an arrow by an archer originated from the legend of Visnu's being killed by the flying ends of his bow. The place of Visnu (Visnu-pada) means the zenith, as the highest place of the sun, and it is probable that the idea of the zenith being the place of Visnu led also to the idea that Visnu had a superior place transcending everything, which was, however, clearly perceived by the wise. Thus, at the beginning of the daily prayer-hymns of the Brahmans, known as sandhya, it is said that the wise see always that superior place of Visnu, like an open eye in the sky 2 . The word vaimava is used in the literal sense of "belonging to Visnu" in the Vajasaneyi-samhita, v. 21, 23, 25, Taittiriya-satnhita,v . 6.9. 2. 3, Aitareya-brahmana, in. 38, Satapatha-brahmana, 1. 1. 4. 9; in. 5. 3. 2, etc.; but the use of the word in the sense of a sect of religion is not to be found anywhere in the earlier literature. Even the Glta does not use the word, and it is not found in any of the earlier Upanisads; it can be traced only in the later parts of the Maha-bharata.

1 Satapatha-brdhmana, xiv. 1.

2 tad Visnoh paramam padam sadd pasyanti surayah divlva cak$ur atatam. Acamana-mantra of the daily sandhya prayer-hymn.

Again, it is well known that the supreme man, or purusa, is praised in very high terms in the man-hymn (Purusa-sukta) of the Rg- Veda, X. 90, where it is said that purusa is all that we see, what is past and what is future, and that everything has come out of him; the gods performed sacrifice with him with the oblations of the seasons, and out of this sacrifice purusa was first born, and then the gods and all living beings; the various castes were born out of him; the sky, the heavens and the earth have all come out of him; he is the creator and upholder of all; it is by knowing him that one attains immortality; there is no other way of salvation. It is curious that there should be a word ndrayana, similar in meaning (etymologically nara + phakybom in'the race or lineage of man) to purusa, which was also used to mean the supreme being and identified with purusa and Visnu. In Satapatha-brdhmana, xiv. 3. 4, purusa is identified with narayana (purusam ha narayanam Prajdpatir uvaca). Again, in Satapatha-brahmana, xiii. 6. 1, the idea of the purusa-sukta is further extended, and the purusa narayana is said to have performed the panca-ratra sacrifice (pancardtram ya-jna-kratum) and thereby transcended everything and become everything. This panca-ratra sacrifice involves the (spiritual) sacrifice of purusa (purusa-medho yajna-kratur bhavati, xiii. 6. 7). The five kinds of sacrifice, five kinds of animals, the year with the five kinds of seasons, the five kinds of indwelling entities (panca-vidham adhydtmam) can all be attained by the panca-ratra sacrifices. The sacrifice was continued for five days, and the Vedic habit of figurative thinking associated each of the days of the sacrifice with various kinds of desirable things, so that the five-day sacrifice was considered to lead to many things which are fivefold in their nature. The reference to the five kinds of indwelling entities soon produced the panca-ratra doctrine of the manifestation of God in various modes as the external deity of worship (area), inner controller (antar-yamin), as various manifestations of His lordly power (vibhava), as successive deity-forms in intimate association as vyiiha and as the highest God (para). This idea is also found in the later Panca-ratra scriptures, such as Ahirbudhnya-samhita (1. 1) and the like, where God is described as having his highest form along with the vyiiha forms. Purusa is thus identified with narayana, who, by sacrifice of purusa (purusa-medha), became all this world. The etymological definition of narayana as " one who has descended from man (nara)," as herein suggested in accordance

with Panini, iv. 1. 99, is not, however, accepted everywhere. Thus Manu, 1. 10, derives narayana from nara, meaning "water," and ayana, meaning "abode," and nara (water), again, is explained as "that which has descended from nara" or supreme man 1 . The Maha-bharata, in. 12,952 and 15,819 and xn. 13,168, accepts Manu's derivation; but in v. 2568 it says that the supreme God is called narayana because he is also the refuge of men 2 . The Taittiriya-Aranyaka, x. 1. 6, identifies narayana with Vasudeva and Visnu 3 . It may be suggested in this connection that even the Upanisad doctrine of the self as the supreme reality is probably a development of this type of ideas which regarded man as supreme God. The word purusa is very frequently used in the Upanisads in the sense of man, as well as in that of the highest being or supreme reality. In the Maha-bharata nara and narayana are referred to as being the forms of the supreme lord. Thus it is said, "The four-faced Brahma, capable of being understood only with the aid of the niruktas, joined his hands and, addressing Rudra, said, "Let good happen to the three worlds. Throw down thy weapons, O lord of the universe, from desire of benefiting the universe. That which is indestructible, immutable, supreme, the origin of the universe, uniform and the supreme actor, that which transcends all pairs of opposites and is inactive, has, choosing to be displayed, been pleased to assume this one blessed form (for, though double, the two represent but one and the same form). This nara and narayana (the displayed forms of supreme Brahman) have taken birth in the race of dharma. The foremost of all deities, these two are observers of the highest vows and endued with the severest penances. Through some reason best known to Him I myself have sprung from the attribute of His Grace Eternal, as thou hast; for, though thou hast ever existed since all the pure creations, thou too hast sprung from His Wrath. With myself then, these deities and all the great Rsis, do thou adore this displayed form of Brahman and let there be peace unto all

1 dpo nara iti proktd dpo vai nara-sunavah

ta yad asydyanam purvam tetta ndrdyanah smrtah. Manu, 1. 10. Water is called nara; water is produced from man, and, since he rested in water in the beginning, he is called narayana. Kulluka, in explaining this, says that nara, or man, here means the supreme self, or Brahman.

2 Nardndm ayandc cdpi tato ndrdyanah smrtah. Maha-bharata, v. 2568.

3 Ndrdyandya vidmahe vdsudevdya dhlmahi tan no Visnuh pracodaydt. Taittiriya Aranyaka, p. 700. Anandasrama Press, Poona, 1898.

the worlds without any delay 1 ." In the succeeding chapter (i.e. Maha-bharata, Santi-parva, 343) nara and narayana are described as being two foremost of sages (rsi) and two ancient deities engaged in the practice of penances, observing high vows and depending upon their own selves and transcending the very sun in energy.

The word bhagavat in the sense of blissful and happy is a very old one and is used in the Rg-Veda, 1.164. 40; vn. 41.4; x. 60.12 and in the Atharva-Veda, 11. 10. 2; v. 31. 11, etc. But in the Maha-bharata and other such early literature it came to denote Visnu or Vasudeva, and the word bhagavata denoted the religious sect which regarded Visnu as Narayana or Vasudeva as their supreme god. The Pali canonical work Niddesa refers to various superstitious religious sects, among which it mentions the followers of Vasudeva, Baladeva, Punnabhadda, Manibhadda, Aggi, Naga, Suparna, Yakkha, Asura, Gandhabba, Maharaja, Canda, Suriya, Inda, Brahma, dog, crow, cow, etc. It is easy to understand why a Buddhist work should regard the worship of Vasudeva as being of a very low type; but at any rate it proves that the worship of Vasudeva was prevalent during the period when the Niddesa was codified. Again, in commenting upon Panini, iv. 3.98 (Vasudevar-junabhyam vuri), Patanjali points out that the word Vasudeva here does not denote the Vasudeva who was the son of Vasudeva of the Ksattriya race of Vrsnis, since, had it been so, the suffix vun, which is absolutely equivalent to vun, could well be by Panini, iv. 3. 99 (gotra-ksattriyakhyebhyo bahulam vun), by which vun is suffixed to names of Ksattriya race. Patanjali thus holds that the word Vasudeva is in this rule not used to refer to any Ksattriya race, but is a name of the Lord (satnjtlaisa tatra bhagavatah). If Patanjali's interpretation is to be trusted, for which there is every reason, Vasudeva as God is to be distinguished from the Ksattriya Vasudeva, the son of Vasudeva of the race of Vrsnis. It was well established in Panini's time that Vasudeva was God, and that His followers were called Vasudevaka, for the formation of which word by the vun suffix Panini had to make the rule (iv. 3. 98). Again, the Ghosundi inscription in Rajputana, which is written in Brahmi, an early form of about 200-150 B.C., contains a reference to the building of a wall round the temple of Vasudeva and Samkarsana. In the Besnagar inscription of about 100 b.c.

1 Maha-bharata, Sdnti-parva, 342. 124-129. P. C. Roy's translation, Moksa-dharma-parva, p. 817. Calcutta.

Heliodorus, son of Diya, describes himself as a great devotee of Bhagavat (parama-bhagavata), who had erected a pillar bearing an image of Garuda. In the Nanaghat inscription of ioo B.C. Vasudeva and Samkarsana appear together as deities to whom adorations are addressed along with other gods. If the testimony of Patafijali is accepted, the religious sect of Vasudevas existed before Panini. It is generally believed that Patafijali lived in 150 B.C., since in course of interpreting a grammatical rule which allowed the* use of the past tense in reference to famous contemporary events not witnessed by the speaker he illustrates it by using a past tense in referring to the Greek invasion of the city of Saketa (arunad Yavanah Saketam); as this event took place in 150 B.C., it is regarded as a famous contemporary event not witnessed by Patafijali. Patafijali was the second commentator of Panini, the first being Katyayana. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar points out that Patafijali notices variant readings in Katyayana's Varttikas, as found in the texts used by the schools of Bharadvajlyas, Saunagas and others, some of which might be considered as emendations of the Varttikas, though Patafijali's introduction of them by the verb pathanti, " they read," is an indication that he regarded them as different readings 1 . From this Sir R. G. Bhandarkar argues that between Katyayana and Patafijali a considerable time must have elapsed, which alone can explain the existence of the variant readings of Katyayana's text in Patafijali's time. He therefore agrees with the popular tradition in regarding Panini as a contemporary of the Nandas, who preceded the Mauryas. Katyayana thus flourished in the first half of the 5th century B.C. But, as both Goldstuckerand Sir R.G. Bhandarkar have pointed out, the Vdrttika of Katyayana notices many grammatical forms which are not noticed by Panini, and this, considering the great accuracy of Panini as a grammarian, naturally leads to the supposition that those forms did not exist in his time. Goldstucker gives a list of words admitted into Panini's sutras which had gone out of use by Katyayana's time, and he also shows that some words which probably did not exist in Panini's time had come to be used later and are referred to by Katyayana. All this implies that Panini must have flourished at least two or three hundred years before Katyayana. The reference to the Vasudeva sect in Panini's sutras naturally suggests its existence before his time. The allusions

1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Early History of the Deccan, p. 7.

to Vasudeva in the inscriptions referred to above can be regarded as corroborative evidence pointing to the early existence of the Vasudeva sect, who worshipped Vasudeva or Bhagavat as the supreme Lord.

Turning to literary references to Vasudeva and Krsna, we find the story of Vasudeva, who is also called-by his family name Kanha and Kesava (probably on account of his bunch of hair), in the Ghata-jataka. The story agrees in some important details with the usual accounts of Krsna, though there are some new deviations. A reference to the Vrsni race of Ksattriyas is found in Panini, iv. 1. 114 (rsy-andhaka-vrsni-kurubhyas ca). The word is formed by an unadi suffix, and it literally means "powerful" or "a great leader 1 ." It also means "heretic" (pasanda) and one who is passionately angry (canda). It is further used to denote the Yadava race, and Krsna is often addressed as Varsneya, and in the Glta, x. 37, Krsna says, " Of the Vrsnis I am Vasudeva." The Vrsnis are referred to in Kautilya's Artha-sastra, where the group of Vrsnis (vrsni-sangha) is said to have attacked Dvaipayana. The Ghata-jataka also has the story of the curse of Kanha Dvaipayana as the cause of the destruction of the Vrsnis. But the Maha-bharata (xvi. 1) holds that the curse was pronounced by Visvamitra, Kanva and Narada upon Samba, the son of Krsna. Two Vasudevas are mentioned in the Maha-bharata : Vasudeva, the king of the Paundras, and Vasudeva or Krsna, the brother of Samkar-sana, and both of them are mentioned as being present in the great assemblage of kings at the house of King Drupada for the marriage of Draupadl; it is the latter Vasudeva who is regarded as God. It is very probable that Vasudeva originally was a name of the sun and thus became associated with Visnu, who with his three steps traversed the heavens; and a similarity of Krsna or Vasudeva to the sun is actually suggested in the Maha-bharata, xii. 341. 41, where Narayana says, "Being like the sun, I cover the whole world with my rays, and I am also the sustainer of all beings and am hence called Vasudeva."

Again, the word Satvata also is used as a synonym of Vasudeva or Bhagavata. The word Satvata in the plural form is a name of a tribe of the Yadavas, and in the Maha-bharata, vn. 7662, the phrase Satvatam varah is used to denote Satyaki, a member of the Yadava race, though this appellation is applied to Krsna in a

1 Yuthena vrynir ejati, Rg-Veda, i. 10. 2.

large number of places in the Mahd-bhdrata 1 . In the later Bhdga-vata-purdna (ix. 9. 50) it is said that the Satvatas worship Brahman as Bhagavan and as Vasudeva. In the Mahd-bhdrata, vi. 66. 41, Samkarsana is said to have introduced the sdtvata rites in worshipping Vasudeva. If Satvata was the name of a race, it is easy to imagine that the persons may have had special rites in worshipping Vasudeva. Yamunacarya, the great teacher of Ramanuja in the tenth century a.d., says that those who adore God (bhagavat), the supreme person, with purity (sattva), are called bhdgavata and sdtvata 2 . Yamuna strongly urges that Satvatas are Brahmanas by caste, but are attached to Bhagavat as the supreme lord. Yamuna, however, seems to urge this in strong opposition to the current view that Satvatas were a low-caste people, who had not the initiation with the holy thread and were an outcast people originated from the Vaisyas 3 . The Satvatas are said to be the fifth low-caste people, who worship in the temples of Visnu by the orders of the king, and are also called Bhagavatas 4 . The Satvatas and Bhagavatas are those who make their living by worshipping images and are hence low and disreputable. Yamuna urges that this popular view about the Bhagavatas and the Satvatas is all incorrect; for, though there are many Satvatas who make a living by worshipping images, not all Satvatas and Bhagavatas do so; and there are many among them who worship Bhagavat, as the supreme person, solely by personal devotion and attachment.

From Patanjali's remarks in commenting on Panini, iv. 3. 98, it is seen that he believed in the existence of two Vasudevas, one a leader of the Vrsni race and the other God. as Bhagavat. It has already been pointed out that the name Vasudeva occurs also in the Ghata-jdtaka. It may therefore be argued that the name Vasudeva was an old name, and the evidence of the passage of the Niddesa, as well as that of Patanjali, shows that it was a name of God or Bhagavat. The later explanation of Vasudeva as "the son of Vasudeva" may therefore be regarded as an

1 Mahd-bhdrata, V. 2581, 3041, 3334, 3360, 4370; ix. 2532, 3502; x. 726; xii. 1502, 1614, 7533.

2 tatas ca sattvdd bhagavan bhajyate yaih parah pumdn te sdtvata bhdgavata ity ucyante dvijottamaih.

Yamuna's Agama-prdmdnya, p. 7. 6. 8 Thus Manu (x. 23) says:

vaisydt tu jay ate vrdtydt sudhanvdcdrya eva ca

kdrusas ca vijanma ca maitras sdtvata eva ca. 4 pancamah sdtvato ndma Visnor dyatanam hi sah

pujayed ajnayd rdjndm sa tu bhdgavatah smftah. Ibid. p. 8.

unauthorized surmise. It is very probable that Vasudeva was worshipped by the race of Yadavas as a tribal hero according to their own tribal rites and that he was believed to be an incarnation of Visnu, who was in his turn associated with the sun. Megas-thenes, in his account of India as he saw it, speaks of the Sourasenoi —an Indian nation in whose land are two great cities, Methora and Kleisobora, through which flows the navigable river Jobares— as worshipping Heracles. "Methora" in all probability means Mathura and "Jobares" Jumna. It is probable that Heracles is Hari, which again is a name of Vasudeva. Again in the Mdha-bharata, vi. 65, Bhlsma says that he was told by the ancient sages that formerly the great supreme person appeared before the assembly of gods and sages, and Brahma began to adore Him with folded hands. This great Being, who is there adored as Vasudeva, had first created out of Himself Samkarsana, and then Pradyumna, and from Pradyumna Aniruddha, and it was from Aniruddha that Brahma was created. This great Being, Vasudeva, incarnated Himself as the two sages, Nara and Narayana. He Himself says in the Maha-bharata, vi. 66, that "as Vasudeva I should be adored by all and no one should ignore me in my human body "; in both these chapters Krsna and Vasudeva are identical, and in the Gita Krsna says that "of the Vrsnis I am Vasudeva." It has also been pointed out that Vasudeva belonged to the Kanhayana gotra. As Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, " It is very probable that the identification of Krsna with Vasudeva was due to the similarity of the gotra name with the name of Krsna l ." From the frequent allusions to Vasudeva in Patanjali's commentary and in the Maha-bharata, where he is referred to as the supreme person, it is very reasonable to suppose that the word is a proper noun, as the name of a person worshipped as God, and not a mere patronymic name indicating an origin from a father Vasudeva. Krsna, Janardana, Kesava, Hari, etc. are not Vrsni names, but were used as personal appellations of Vasudeva. Patanjali in his commentary on Panini, iv. 3. 98, notes that Vasudeva, as the name of a Ksattriya king of the race of Vrsnis, is to be distinguished from Vasudeva as the name of God. This God, worshipped by the Satvatas according to their family rites, probably came to be identified with a Vrsni king Vasudeva, and some of the personal characteristics of this king became also personal

1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaisnavism and Saivism, pp. 11-12.

characteristics of the god Vasudeva. The word Krsna occurs several times in the older literature. Thus Krsna appears as a Vedic rsi, as the composer of Rg-Veda, viii. 74. In the Maha-bharata Anukramanl Krsna is said to have descended from Angiras. Krsna appears in the Chandogya Upanisad (in. 17) as the son of DevakI, as in the Ghata-jataka. It is therefore probable that Vasudeva came to be identified with Krsna, the son of DevakI. The older conception of Krsna's being a rtvij is found in the Maha-bharata, and Bhisma in the Sabha-parva speaks of him as being a rtvij and well-versed in the accessory literature of the Vedas (vedanga). It is very probable, as Dr Ray Chaudhury points out, that Krsna, the son of DevakI, was the same as Vasudeva, the founder of the Bhagavata system; for he is referred to in the Ghata-jataka as being Kanhayana, or Kanha, which is the same as Krsna, and as Devakl-putra, and in the Chandogya Upanisad, in. 17. 6, also he is referred to as being Devakl-putra. In the Ghata-jataka Krsna is spoken of as being a warrior, whereas in the Chandogya Upanisad he is a pupil of Ghora Angirasa, who taught him a symbolic sacrifice, in which penances (tapas), gifts {dona), sincerity (arjava), non-injury (ahimsa) and truthfulness (satya-vacana) may be regarded as sacrificial fees (daksina). The Maha-bharata, 11. 317, describes Krsna both as a sage who performed long courses of asceticism in Gandhamadana, Puskara and Badari, and as a great warrior. He is also described in the Maha-bharata as Vasudeva, Devakl-putra and as the chief of the Satvatas, and his divinity is everywhere acknowledged there.. But it is not possible to assert definitely that Vasudeva, Krsna the warrior and Krsna the sage were not three different persons, who in the Maha-bharata were unified and identified, though it is quite probable that all the different strands of legends refer to one identical person.

If the three Krsnas refer to one individual Krsna, he must have lived long before Buddha, as he is alluded to in the Chandogya, and his guru Ghora Angirasa is also alluded to in the Kausttaki-brahmana, xxx. 6 and the Kathaka-samhita, 1. 1, which are pre-Buddhistic works. Jaina tradition refers to Krsna as being anterior to Parsvanatha (817 B.C.), and on this evidence Dr Ray Chaudhury thinks that he must have lived long before the closing years of the ninth century B.C. 1

1 Early History of the Vaisnava Sect, p. 39.

Bhagavata and the Bhagavad-gita.

The Maha-bharata (xn. 348) associates the Bhagavad-gita with the doctrines of the Ekanti-Vaisnavas. It is said there that the God Hari {bhagavan Hart) always blesses those that are devoted to God without any idea of gain {ekantin) and accepts their adorations, offered in accordance with proper rites (vidhi-prayukta) 1 . This ekanta religion {ekanta-dhar ma) is dear to Narayana, and those who adhere to it attain to Hari, as Nilakantha, the commentator on the Maha-bharata, points out, without passing through the three stages of Aniruddha, Pradyumnaand Samkarsana. The ekantin faith leads to much higher goals than the paths of those that know the Vedas and lead the lives of ascetics. The principles of this ekantin faith were enunciated by the Bhagavat himself in the battle of the Pandavas and the Kurus, when Arjuna felt disinclined to fight. This faith can be traced originally to the Sama-veda. It is said that, when Narayana created Brahma, he gave him this satvata faith, and from that time forth, as the Maha-bharata states, there has been a host of persons who were instructed in this faith and followed it. It was at a much later stage briefly described in the Hari-gita 2 . This faith is very obscure and very difficult to be practised, and its chief feature is cessation from all kinds of injury. In some places it is said to recognize one vyiiha: in other places two, and in others three, vyuhas are mentioned. Hari, however, is the final and absolute reality; he is both the agent, the action and the cause, as well as the absolute beyond action (akarta). There are, however, but few ekantins in the world: had the world been filled with ekantins, who never injured anyone, were always engaged in doing good to others and attained self-know-

1 Ekantino niskama-bhaktah, Nilakantha's commentary on the Maha-bharata, xil. 348. 3.

2 kathito hari-gitdsu samasa-vidhi-kalpitah, Hari-glta. 53. The traditional teaching of the Glta doctrines is represented as ancient in the Glta itself (iv. 1-3), where it is said that Bhagavan declared it to Vivasvan, and he related it to Manu, and Manu to Iksvaku, and so on, until after a long time it was lost; it was again revived by Krsna in the form of the Bhagavad-gita. In the Maha-bharata, xn. 348, it is said that Sanatkumara learned this doctrine from Narayana, from him Prajapati, from him Raibhya and from him Kuksi. It was then lost. Then again Brahma learned it from Narayana, and from him the Barhisada sages learned it, and from them Jyestha. Then again it was lost; then again Brahma learned it from Narayana, and from him Daksa learned it, and from him Vivasvan, and from Vivasvan Manu, and from Manu Iksvaku. Thus the tradition of the Bhagavad-gita, as given in the poem itself, tallies with the Maha-bharata account.

ledge, then the golden age, krta yuga, would have come again. This ekanta religion is a faith parallel to that of the Samkhya-yoga, and the devotee who follows it attains Narayana as his ultimate state of liberation. From this description in the Maha-bharata it seems that the doctrine of the Glta was believed to be the ekantin doctrine originally taught by Narayana to Brahma, Narada and others long before the recital of the Glta by Krsna in the Maha-bharata battle. It is further known that it had at least four or five different schools or variant forms, viz. eka-vyuha, dvi-vyuha, tri-vyuha, catur-vyiiha and ekanta, and that it was known as the Satvata religion.

Yamunacarya in his Agama-pramanya tries to combat a number of views in which the Bhagavatas were regarded as being inferior to Brahmins, not being allowed to sit and dine with them. The Satvatas, again, are counted by Manu as a low-caste people, born from outcast Vaisyas and not entitled to the holy thread 1 . The Satvatas were, of course, regarded as the same as Bhagavatas, and their chief duties consisted in worshipping for their living in Visnu temples by the order of the king 2 . They also repaired or constructed temples and images for their living, and were therefore regarded as outcasts. That the Bhagavatas did in later times worship images and build images and temples is also evident from the fact that most of the available Panca-ratra works are full of details about image-building and image-worship. The Glta (ix. 26) also speaks of adoration with water, flowers and leaves, which undoubtedly refers to image-worship. Samkarsana, as the brother or companion of Krsna, is mentioned in Patanjali's Maha-bhasya (11. 2. 24) in a verse quoted by him, and in 11. 2. 34 he seems to quote another passage, in which it is related that different kinds of musical instruments were played in the temple of Dhana-pati, Rama and Kesava, meaning Balarama, Samkarsana and Krsna 3 .

As Yamuna points out, the opponents of the Bhagavata school urge that, since the ordinary Brahminic initiation is not deemed

1 vaisydt tu jdyate vratydt sudhanvdcdrya eva ca _

karusas ca vijanma ca maitrah sasvata eva ca. Agama-pramanya, p. 8. 8 pancamah satvato noma Vi$nor ayatanam hi sa

pujayed djnaya rajndm sa tu bhdgavatah smrtah. Ibid. 8 Sankarsana-dvitlyasya balam Krsnasya ardhitam.

Mahd-bhdsya, n. z. 27.

mrdanga-sankha-panavdh prthan nadanti samsadi

prdsdde dhana-pati-rdma-kes'avdndm. Ibid. 11. 2. 34.

a sufficient qualification for undertaking the worship of Visnu, and since special and peculiar forms of initiation and ceremonial performances are necessary, it is clear that the Bhagavata forms of worship are not Vedic in their origin. The fourteen Hindu sciences, viz. the six vedangas on Vedic pronunciation (siksa), ritual (kalpd), grammar (zyakarana), metre (chandas), astronomy (jyotisa), lexicography (nirukta), the four Vedas, Mlmamsa, argumentative works or philosophy (nyaya-vistara), the mythologies (purana) and rules of conduct (dharma-sdstra), do not refer to the Panca-ratra scriptures as being counted in their number. So the Bhagavata or the Panca-ratra scriptures are of non-Vedic origin. But Yamuna contends that, since Narayana is the supreme god, the Bhagavata literature, which deals with his worship, must be regarded as having the same sources as the Vedas; the Bhagavatas also have the same kind of outer dress as the Brahmins and the same kinds of lineage. He further contends that, though satvata means an outcast, yet satvata is a different w r ord from satvata, which means a devotee of Visnu. Moreover, not all Bhagavatas take to professional priestly duties and the worshipping of images for their livelihood; for there are many who worship the images through pure devotion. It is very easy to see that the above defence of the Bhagavatas, as put forward by one of their best advocates, Yamunacarya, is very tame and tends to suggest very strongly that the Bhagavata sect was non-Vedic in its origin and that image-worship, image-making, image-repairing and temple-building had their origin in that particular sect. Yet throughout the entire scriptures of the Panca-ratra school there is the universal and uncontested tradition that it is based on the Vedas. But its difference from the Vedic path is well known. Yamuna himself refers to a passage (Agama-pramanya, p. 51) where it is said that Sandilya, not being able to find his desired end (purusartha) in all the four Vedas, produced this scripture. The Gita itself often describes the selfish aims of sacrifices, and Krsna urges Arjuna to rise above the level of the Vedas. It seems, therefore, that the real connection of the Panca-ratra literature is to be found in the fact that it originated from Vasudeva or Visnu, who is the supreme God from whom the Vedas themselves were produced. Thus the Isvara-samhita (1. 24-26) explains the matter, and states that the Bhagavata literature is the great root of the Veda tree, and the Vedas themselves are but trunks of it, and the followers of Yoga are but its branches. Its

main purpose is to propound the superiority of Vasudeva, who is the root of the universe and identical with the Vedas 1 .

The affinity of this school of thought to the Upanisad school becomes apparent when it is considered that Vasudeva was regarded in this system as the highest Brahman 2 . The three other vyfihas were but subordinate manifestations of him, after the analogy of prajna, virat, visva and taijasa in monistic Vedanta. Patanjali's Mahd-bhasya does not seem to know of the four ryiihas, as it mentions only Vasudeva and Samkarsana; and the Gita knows only Vasudeva. It seems, therefore, that the vyuha doctrine did not exist at the time of the Gita and that it evolved gradually in later times. It is seen from a passage of the Maha-bharata, already referred to, that there were different variations of the doctrine and that some accepted one vyuha, others two, others three and others four. It is very improbable that, if the vyuha doctrine was known at the time of the Gita, it should not have been mentioned therein. For the Gita was in all probability the earliest work of the ekantin school of the Bhagavatas 3 . It is also interesting in this connection to note that the name Narayana is never mentioned in the Gita, and Vasudeva is only identified with Visnu, the chief of the adityas. Thus Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, " It will be seen that the date of the Bhagavad-gitd, which contains

1 mahato veda-vrksasya mCda-bhuto mahan ayatn skandha-bhutd rg-ddyds te sdkhd-bhutas ca yoginah jagaii-miilasya vedasya Vdsudevasya mukhyatah praiipddakatd siddhd mfda-veddkhyata dvijdh.

Isvara-samhitd, 1. 24-26.

2 yasmdt samyak paratn brahma Vdsudevdkhyam avyayam asmdd avapyate sdstrdj jndna-pfirvena karmana.

Pauskardgama, as quoted in Rdmdnuja-bhdsya, n. 2. 42.

The Chdndogya Upanisad (vn. 1. 2) refers also to the study of ekdyana, as in

the passage vdko-vdkyam ekdyanam ; ekdyana is also described as being itself a

Veda in Sriprasna-samhitd, 11. 38, 39:

vedam ekdyanam noma vedandm s'irasi sthitam tad-arthakam panca-rairam moksa-dam tat-kriydvatdm yasminn eko moksa-mdrgo vede proktah sandtanah mad-dradhana-rupena tasmdd ekdyanam bhavet.

See also the article "The Panca-ratras or Bhagavata-sastra," by Govindacarya

S\amin,Jf.R.A.S. 1911.

3 That the ekantin faith is the same as the Satvata or the Panca-rdtra faith is evident from the following quotation from the Pddma-tantra, iv. 2. 88:

suris suhrd bhagavatas sdtvatah parica-kdla-vit ekdntikas tan-mayas ca panca-rdtrika ity api.

This faith is also called ekdvana, or the path of the One, as is seen from the

following passage from the Isvara-samhitd, 1. 18:

moksayanaya vai panthd etad-anyo na vidyate tasmdd ekdyanam noma pravadanti manlsinah.

no mention of the vyuhas or personified forms, is much earlier than those of the inscriptions, the Niddesa and Patanjali, i.e. it was composed not later than the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era; how much earlier it is difficult to say. At the time when the Gita was conceived and composed the identification of Vasudeva with Narayana had not yet taken place, nor had the fact of his being an incarnation of Visnu come to be acknowledged, as appears from the work itself....Visnu is alluded to as the chief of the Adityas and not as the supreme being, and Vasudeva was Visnu in this sense, as mentioned in chapter x, because the best thing of a group or class is represented to be his vibhuti or special manifestation 1 ."

The date of the Gita has been the subject of long discussions among scholars, and it is inconvenient for our present purposes to enter into an elaborate controversy. One of the most extreme views on the subject is that of Dr Lorinser, who holds that it was composed after Buddha, and several centuries after the commencement of the Christian era, under the influence of the New Testament. Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation of the Bhagavad-gitd points out—as has been shown above—that the Bhagavad-glta does not know anything that is peculiarly Buddhistic. Attempt has also been made to prove that the Gita. not only does not know anything Buddhistic, but that it also knows neither the accepted Samkhya philosophy nor the Yoga of Patanjali's Yoga-sutra. This, together with some other secondary considerations noted above, such as the non-identification of Vasudeva with Narayana and the non-appearance of thezyuha doctrine, seems to be a very strong reason for holding the Gita to be in its general structure pre-Buddhistic. The looseness of its composition, however, always made it easy to interpolate occasional verses. Since there is no other consideration which might lead us to think that the Gita was written after the Brahma-sutras , the verse Brahma-sutra-padais caiva hetumadbhir viniscitaih has to be either treated as an interpolation or interpreted differently. Sankara also thought that the Brahma-sutra referred to the Gita as an old sacred writing (smrti), and this tallies with our other considerations regarding the antiquity of the Gita. The view of Dr Lorinser, that the Bhagavad-gitd must have borrowed at least some of its materials from Christianity, has been pretty successfully refuted by

1 Vaisnavism and Saivism, p. 13.

Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation, and it therefore need not be here again combated. Dr Ray Chaudhury also has discussed the problem of the relation of Bhagavatism to Christianity, and in the discussion nothing has come out which can definitely make it seem probable that the Bhagavata cult was indebted to Christianity at any stage of its development; the possibility of the Gita being indebted to Christianity may be held to be a mere fancy. It is not necessary here to enter into any long discussion in refuting Garbe's view that the Gita was originally a work on Samkhya lines (written in the first half of the second century B.C.), which was revised on Vedantic lines and brought to its present form in the second century a.d.; for I suppose it has been amply proved that, in the light of the uncontradicted tradition of the Maha-bharata and the Panca-ratra literature, the Gita is to be regarded as a work of the Bhagavata school, and an internal analysis of the work also shows that the Gita is neither an ordinary Samkhya nor a Vedanta work, but represents some older system wherein the views of an earlier school of Samkhya are mixed up with Vedantic ideas different from the Vedanta as interpreted by Sarikara. The arbitrary and dogmatic assertion of Garbe, that he could clearly separate the original part of the Gita from the later additions, need not, to my mind, be taken seriously. The antiquity of the Bhagavata religion is. as pointed out by Tilak, acknowledged by Senart ( The Indian Interpreter, October 1909 and January 1910) and Biihler {Indian Antiquary, 1894), and the latter says, "The ancient Bhagavata, Satvata or Panca-ratra sect, devoted to the worship of Narayana and his deified teacher Krsna Devaki-putra, dates from a period long anterior to the rise of the Jainas in the eighth century B.C." And assuredly the Gita is the earliest available literature of this school. As regards external evidence, it may be pointed out that the Gita is alluded to not only by Kalidasa and Bana, but also by Bhasa in his play Karna-bhara 1 . Tilak also refers to an article by T. G. Kale in the Vedic Magazine, vn. pp..528-532, where he points out that the Bodhayana-Grhya-sesa-sutra, 11. 22. 9, quotes the Gita, IX. 26,

1 Tilak quotes this passage on page 574 of his Bhagavad-gltd-rahasya (Bengali translation of his Marathi work) as follows:

hato 'pi labhate svargam jitvd tu labhate yaiah

ubhe bahumate loke nasti nisphalata rane, which repeats the first two lines of the Gita, 11.37.

and the Bodhdyana-Pitr-medha-sutra, at the beginning of the third prasna, quotes another passage of the Gltd 1 . Incidentally it may also be mentioned that the style of the Gltd is very archaic; it is itself called an Upanisad, and there are many passages in it which are found in the Isa (Isa, 5, cf. the Bhagavad-gitd, xin. 15 and vi. 29), Mundaka (Mund. 11. 1. 2, cf. the Gltd, xm. 15), Kdthaka (11. 15, 11. 18 and 19 and 11. 7, cf. the Gltd, vm. 11; 11. 20 and 29) and other Upanisads. We are thus led to assign to the Gltd a very early date, and, since there is no definite evidence to show that it was post-Buddhistic, and since also the Gltd does not contain the slightest reference to anything Buddhistic, I venture to suggest that it is pre-Buddhistic, however unfashionable such a view may appear. An examination of the Gltd from the point of view of language also shows that it is archaic and largely un-Paninean. Thus from the root yudh we have yudhya (vm. 7) for yudhyasva; yat, which is dtmane-pada in Paninean Sanskrit, is used in parasmai-pada also, as in vi. 36, vn. 3, ix. 14 and xv. 11; ram is also used in parasmai-pada in x. 9. The roots kdnks, vraj, vis and ing are used in Paninean Sanskrit in parasmai-pada , but in the Gltd they are all used in dtmane-pada as well— kdnks in 1. 31, vraj in 11. 54, vis in xxiii. 55 and ing in vi. 19 and xiv. 23. Again, the verb ud-vij, which is generally used in dtmane-pada^ is used in parasmai-pada in v. 20; nivasisyasi is used in xn. 8 for nivatsyasi, ma sucah for ma soclh in xvi. 5; and the usage of prasavisyadhvam in in. 10 is quite ungrammatical. So yamah samyamatdm in x. 29 should be yamah samyacchatdm, he sakheti in xi. 41 is an instance of wrong sandhi, priydydrhasi in xi. 44 is used for priydydh arhasi, sendnlndm in x. 24 is used for sendnydm 2 . These linguistic irregularities, though they may not themselves be regarded as determining anything definitely, may yet be regarded

1 Bodhdyava-Grhya-sesa-sutra:

tad aha bhagavdn,

patram puspam phalam toyam yo me bhaktyd prayacchati tad aham bhakty-upahrtam asndmi prayatdtmanah. Also Bodhdyana-Pitr-medha-siitra: yatasya vai numusyasya dhruvam maranam

iti vij drily at tasmdj jclte na prahrsyen mrte ca na visldeta. Compare the Gltd, jdtasya hi dhruvo nirtyuh, etc.

N.B. These references are all taken from Tilak's Bhagavad-gltd-rahasya pp. 574, etc.

2 For enumeration of more errors of this character see Mr V. K. Rajwade's article in the Bhandarkar commemoration volume, from which these have been collected.

as contributory evidence in favour of the high antiquity of the Glta. The Gita may have been a work of the Bhagavata school written long before the composition of the Maha-bharata, and may have been written on the basis of the Bharata legend, on which the Maha-bharata was based. It is not improbable that the Gita, which summarized the older teachings of the Bhagavata school, was incorporated into the Maha-bharata, during one of its revisions, by reason of the sacredness that it had attained at the time.

abddhita, 108

abddhita - svayam - prakdsataiva asya

sattd, 36 Abdomen, 289, 353 abhaya, 510

abhilva, 142, 162, 193, 227 abheda, 207

abhedo nila-tad-dhiyoh, 26 n. abhicdra-karma, 284 Abhidharma-kosa, 58 n. Abhidharma-kosa-zydkhyd, 58 «., 62 «. abhidhanabhidheya -jfidna -jneyddilak-

sanah, 3 n. abhighdta, 339, 410 abhihitdnvaya-vdda, 227 abhildso, 497 abhilasa, 412 Abhinanda, 232 Abhinavagupta, 49, 443 Abhinavanarayana, 78 Abhina\anarayanendra Sarasvati, 78,

79 abhinivesa, 414 abhiprapacyamdna, 314 Abhiprdya-prakdsikd, 83, 87 «., 148 «. abhisecana, 505 abhivyajyate, 303 abhivyakti, 173 abhraja, 300, 301, 331 ;/. abhyanujnd, 388 abhydsa, 360, 370 abhyupagama-siddhdnta, 383 Ablutions, 267, 505 Abnormal states, 335 Abode, 497 Abscess, 299 Absence, 19

Absolute destruction, 248 Absolute oneness, 128 Absolute truth, 3 Absolutist, 514 Abstract idea, 211 Abstraction, 28 Abuse, 498 n. Academic dispute, 373 Academy of Sciences, 164 n.

acapala, 510 Acceptance of gift, 505 Accessories, 160, 1S3, 1S4 Accessory cause, 109, 186 Accidental happenings, 372 Accretion, 235 n., 320; of energy,

244 Acetabulum, 287 n. 2 ace tana, 36

Acid, 337 w., 358, 359, 361, 362 Acidity, 335 n. acintya, 362-364 Action, 148, 187, 194, 241, 360, 403-

405, 412, 421, 440, 441, 467, 488,

507, 508,515,516 Active agent, 244 Active functioning, 23S Active operation, 154 Active restraint, 500 Activity, 238, 256, 341, 368, 369, 481,

504, 515; of the self, 197 Act of knowledge, 69 Acts, 15

Actual, 23 «.; data, 214 Acyutakrsnananda Tlrtha, 220 Additional assistance, 1S3 adharma, 321, 409, 411, 416, 484, 487,

507, 525 adhika, 384, 385, 389 n. adhikarana, 108 //., 359, 390 Adhikarana-maiijarl', 148 n. Adhikarana-mdld, 81 Adhikarana-ratmi-iiidld, 148 n. Adhikarana-saivjdli, 14S //. adhikarana-siddhdnta, 383 adhimohsa, 24 adliipati, 342, 352 adhisthdna, 113, 194, 279, 472 adhisthdyaka, 366 adhyaimsdya , 373 adhydsa, 9, 103 Adhydsa-bhdsya, 6 «., 222 //. adliydtma-viduh, 423 ad infinitum, 40, 70, 376 Adoration, 439 adroha, 510

1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.

Index

adrsta, 207, 306, 360 adrstddi-ksubdham, 206 adrstadi-sahakrtam ,197 adrsldrtha, 383 Adultery, 498 n. Advaita-bhusana, 52 n. Advaita-bodha-dlpikd, 54, 216 Advaita-brahma-siddki, 5 7 Advaita-candrikd, 55 Advaita-cinta-kaustiibha, 56 Advaita-cintamani, 55 Advaita-dipikd, 53, 216 Advaita-dtpikd-vivarana, 53 Advaita-makaranda, 56 Advaita-makaranda-tlka, 193 Advaita-manjart, 225 Advaita-muktd-sdra, 57 w. Advaita- nirnaya ,219 Advaita-panca-ratna, 53, 216 Advaita Philosophy, 2 w. Advaita-ratna, 54 Advaita-ratna-kosa, 54 Advaita-ratna-raksana, 225, 226 Advaita-ratna-vydkhydna, 54 Advaita-siddhdnta-vidyotana, 57 n. Advaita-siddhi, 53, 56, 118, 198, 199,

223 w., 225, 226 Adi'aita-siddhy-upanydsa, 225 w. Advaita-sdstra-sdroddhdra, 5 5 adimita-sruti, 80 Advaita-vada, 216 advaita-vasand, 218 Advaitananda, 56, 82 «., 232 Advaitanubhuti, 81 Advancement, 519 Advayananda, 79 Advayaranya, 231 Advayasrama, 204 Adyar, 49, 84 w., 87 Affection, 490, 497 Affections of 7;<7f«, 336 Affective tone, 23 Affirmations, 75, 166, 271, 387 Afflictions, 22, 304, 414, 499 agada-tantra, 276 Agasti, 228, 230 Agastya, 433 Age, 370 Agent, 77, 169, 310, 314, 358, 368,

441,469,470, 515, 516 Aggi, 539

Agni, 75, 292 w., 300 n. 2, 303, 304 Agnihotra, 54 agm-karma, 330 Agni-Purdna, 279 «. Agnistoma, L\ 345 n. Agnivesa. 393, 395, 399, 424, 429,

432

Agnivesa-samhitd, 277, 432

Agnivesa-tantra, 429

Agnivesya, 228, 230

agrahana, 104

Agrahayana, 282

Agriculture, 502, 505

ahumkdra, 75, 102, 104, 217, 238, 239, -245. 257, 262, 305, 347, 458, 463, 464, 496, 524

ahamtd, 235, 237

a-hetu, 386

ahetu-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 w.

ahetutah, 166

ahimsd, 505, 510, 514, 544

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, 461, 537

ahita, 277, 278, 421, 422

aihika, 253

aikamatya, 282

aindriya, 254

Air, 74, 187, 194, 235, 302, 325, 330-334. 359, 360, 362, 419

Airy, 357, 359

Aitareya, 78, 259 n. 3

Aitareya-brahmana, 536

Aitareyopanisad-bhasya, 78

aitihya, 376, 379

Ajita, 61

ajnana, 3, 9, 10, 50, 55, 73, 74, 76, 101, 102, 108, no, 112, 113, 115, 153, 154, 195, 196, 204, 217, 222, 389, 479, 499, 500; its nature, dependence on self and transformation into world-appearance, 10; its notion in Padmapada or Prakasatman different from that of Nagarjuna, 9; its transformations, 10, 53; Vacas-pati's view of its causality, n

ajfidnam ndbhdva updddnatvdn mrdvat, 197

ajndta-sattvdnabhyupagama, 17, 270

akartd, 545

Akhandananda, 52, 103, 193

Akhandananda Muni, 10, 31 n.

Akhanddtma-prakdsikd, 57 n.

Akhilatman, 99

akhydti, 87 n.

aklista, 414

akrodha, 505, 510

a-krtaka, 182

aksaka-samjne, 286 n. 4

Aksapada, 393, 394, 398-401

alaji, 299

alambusd, 354

alasdla, 298 n. 6

Alberuni, 426

Alchemy, 426

Alertness, 511; of mind, 511

algandu, 297

555

Allmsa, 300

Alkaline, 357, 358

All, 195

Allala Suri, 52 n.

All-pervading, 16, 372, 525, 526

All-pervasive, 160

aloka-samvrta, 5

alolupatva, 510

Alternating, 63

Alternative, 18, 377

Altindische Grammatik, 345 n.

Amalananda, 52, 57, 58, 74 «. 86, 103,

107-109, 119, 260 Amaradasa, 54 Amara-kosa, 55 amarsa, 412 amdvdsyd, 292 n. Amiva, 300

amla, 312 n. 3, 357, 358, 361 Amrtananda, 31 w., 454 Amulets, 277, 281, 282, 293, 294, 301,

5_64 anturta, 254 atnsa, 286 m. 2, 287 amsa-phalaka, 286 n. 4 amsa-pitha, 287 n. 2 amsamsa-vikalpa, 338 anabhilapyendtmand, 20 anabhiraddhi, 497 anabhisanga, 373 anadhigata, 212, 213 anadhigatatva, 213 avaikantikatva, 123 Analogy, 36, 42, 148, 155, 180, 189,

391; of dreams, 28; of play, 42 Analysis, 65; of consciousness, 62 ananubhdsana, 389 «. ananuyojya, 384 ananyathdsiddha, 160 Ananyanubhava, 82 «. anarthaka, 384, 385 Anatomical texts, 435 Anatomical treatises, 435 Anatomy, 355, 433 anazasthd, 174

anddy-amrvdeydvidydsrayandt, 12 andgatdveksanu, 389, 392 avdhota-cakra, 355 andkhyam anabhivyaktam , 232 andmayam, 462 andrambha, 416 andsrava, 22 andtman, 6 anekatd, 370 anekdnta, 389 anekdntha, 391 Anger, 267, 333, 373, 409, 492, 4^7,

499, 509-Si1

Angry, 367

11 nil a, 330

Animal, 359, 513

Animate, 359, 360

Aniruddha, 543, 545

anirvacanlyam nllddi, 111

anirvacamyatd. 155

anirvacanlyatd-vacana , 105

anirzacaniyd, 89, 117, 203, 224

anirvdeya, 35, 111

anirvdeyatva, 194

anirvdeya avidyd, 109

anitya, 22 ?*., 120

anitya-sama, 380 w. 4

aniyata-vipdka, 249

Ankle-bones, 284

Annam Bhatta, 82 «.

Annihilation, 266

Annotations, 87

anrta, 383

antahkarana-caitanyayor aikyddhydsdt. 206

antahkaranas, 34, 50, 56, 65, 72, 75 «., 76, 77, 88, 89 n., 101, 104-106, 109, 113, 114, 206-210, 217, 268, 292, 295, 3°6, 344, 452, 484 n. 1

antahkarana-visista, 33

antahkaranavacchinnatn caitanyam, 206

antah-sausiryam, 307

antariksam, 292 n.

Antarydmi-brdhmana, 251

antarydmin, 215, 537

Antecedence, 160, 172

Antipathy, 24, 101, 245, 248, 267, 409, 412-414, 490, 498, 499

antrebhyah, 288

amibandha, 338 n., 368 n., 389, 497

cmubandhya, 338 n.

anubhava, 149

Anubhava-dlpikd, 78

Anubhava-vildsa, 57 w.

Anubhavananda, 58, 86

anubhnti, 199

anubhiiti-svabhdva, 471

Anubhutisvarupacarya, 116, 192, 194

anumata, 389, 391

anumdna, 139, 194, 373, 376, 379, 398, 401 «.

anupadhd, 505

anupalabdhi-sama, 380 n. 4

anupasaya, 397

Anupatdla, 300

anus, 296, 426

amisayo, 497

amitpatti-sama, 380 n. 4

anuvrtta, 63

anu-zyavasdya, 151

anuyoga, 384

Index

anuyojya, 384

anukya, 287 u. 1

Anvaya-prakdsikd, 56

anvaya-vyatireki, 400 n.

anvaya - vyatireki - sddhya - visesam

vddy-abhimatam sadhayati, 121 Anvaydrtha-prakdsikd, 116 anvayi, 400 n. anvitdbhidhdna-vdda, 227 anyathd-khyati, 87 w., 204, 222 any a purvdpiirva - bhrama - samskdrah,

109 anyedyuh, 297

anyonya-milat-komala-saddala, 257 anyonydbhdva, 122, 131, 132 angam eva alpatvdd updrigam, 273 anganam. 496 Arigiras, 281, 544 At'igirasa-kalpa, 283 angulayah, 285 Anguttara-nikdya, 394 aiikura, 169 aiindnam, 498 a«M, 261 ami-hrasvo, 189 anu-hrasi'a measure, 190 anithrasva parimdna, 189 anda, 322 n.

a/>, 75, 501

a pari t, 298 «. 7

apadesa, 389, 391

apagataisanah, 245

apahnava-vacana, 105

a peri sunn, 510

opara, 360, 370

aparam ojas, 343 «.

apard prakrti, 465

aparicchinndlambandkdra, 23

apuraksa, 6, 63, 105

aparoksa-pratiti-virodhdt, 194

aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogya, 149

Aparoksdnubhava, 78

Aparo'tsdnubhfiti, 80

apa-siddhdnta, 389 «.

Apasmara, 431

apazarga, 44, 248

apavarja, 389, 391

apdna, 258-260, 291, 311, 332, 373,

448. 449, 455 apdna vdyu, 355 apdndya svdhd, 448 apdtiga, 342, 351 apdrtluika, 384, 385, 388, 389 M. apekhd, 496 apeksd, 95

apekm-buddhi, 157, 158 Aperture, 354 n., 355, 356 Apoha-siddhi, 49

o posteriori, 517

Apparatus, 180

Apparent reality, 4

Appaya Diksita, 10, 11, 17, 44, 47, 49, 52-56, 79, 82 w., 106 «., 108, 216 w., 218, 219; his date, lineage and works, 218 ff.

Appearance, 3, 5, 8, 13, 20-22, 28, 31, 37, 101, 105, 109, 194, 195, 232, 235, 236, 239, 252, 371, 438, 517; of unity, 65

Appetites, 493

Appetitive desire, 501

Appreciation, 512

Apprehension, 22

apradhdna, 370

apramd, 128

apramdda, 505

apratibhd, 389 w.

apratyak, 63

aprdpta-kdla, 389 w.

aprapta-prdrthand, 412

aprdptayoh prdptih samyogah, 158

o priori, 517

apsardh, 228

apiirva, 80

apurva-vidhi, 46

Ardya, 300

arbuda, 286 w. 3,314

orfrt, 537

Ardent desire, 497

ardha-supta-prabuddha, 264

ardhdnjali-parimdna, 343 w.

Argument, 18, 26 m., 29, 278, 376

arhatattva, 248

Aristanemi, 229

Arjuna, 487, 489, 500, 502, 507, 508, 512, 516, 518, 525, 529-532,

545 Armpits, 326 «. Arnava-varnana, 126 arog-a, 334 w. arpatia, 452 Arrogant, 510 Arsas, 430

Arteries, 256 n., 289, 290 or/Art, 327, 34f, 359, 479, 482, 485 artha-kriya-karitva, 32, 108 artha-kriyd-sdmarthya, 183 artha-kriyd-sdmarthya-sattvam, 30 «. artha-prdpakatva, 137 artha-prdpti, 384 Artha-sdstra, 274, 541 artliavatl, 20 arthdntara, 388, 389 m. arthdpatti, 18, 389, 391 arthdpatti-sama, 380 m. 4, 382 «. Artificial process, 358

557

Arunadatta, 429, 434 arund, 291, 344 n. asamprajiidta, 250 asamsargdgraha, 154, 155 Asariga, 164 asanga, 268 asaiiga-bhavand, 264 asanga-sastrena, 524 a-sarva-gata, 410

«*«*, 155. 373

a-sat-kdrya-vdda, 39, 179, 473, 517

asat-khyati, 87 n.

asdtmya-arthdgama, 416

Ascetic, 373; life, 508; postures, 489

Asceticism, 229, 267, 508

Asiatic Society of Bengal, 205

asmita, 414

aspanda, 265

Aspects, 238

Aspiration, 497

Ass, 160, 386 n.

Assembly, 378

Assimilation, 331

Associated, 501

Association, 15, 21, 25, 34, 156, 169,

183, 188, 195, 239, 321, 358, 369,

375, 45i, 452, 456, 500 asteya, 505 asthi, 317, 328 asthi-mdmsa-maya, 257 as t J lira, 230, 241 asti, 386 n. Astragalus, 284 n. 3 Astringent, 358, 359 Astrology, 436 Astronomy, 49 asukha, 422 asukham ayuh, 277 asura, 314, 535, 539 Asura-vtda, 274 n. 3 asilyd, 413 asvadu, 358 asubha, 341 asuddha, 36 Asvattha, 524 Asvattha tree, 523, 524 astakd, 292 asta-siddhi, 427 Astanga Ayur-veda, 276 Astdnga-hrdaya, 364 «., 436 Astanga - hrdaya - ndma - vaiduryaka-

bhdsya, 436 Astdnga-hrdaya-samhitd, 425, 432-

434 Astdnga-hrdaya-vrtti, 436 Astdnga-samgraha, 263, 274 w. 3, 284

«■ 3, 304 n. 1,317 n. 1, 328, 329 n.,

433

astanga-yoga, 453-455

asthlvantau, 285

asthlvat, 285 «. 4

Atala, 76

Atharva, 274, 390

Atharvan texts, 299

Atharvanic charms, 281

Atharvanic hymns, 289

Atharvanic rites, 283, 294

Atharva-sikhd Upanisad, 449

Atharva-siras Upanisad, 449

Atharva-Veda, 273-275, 277-280, 283, 284, 288, 290, 291, 293-295, 301, 331, 34°, 343 "■> 344-346, 364. 486, 536, 539; as Atharva and Angiras, 281; Ayur-veda an iipdnga of it, 273 ; Ayur-veda its upaveda, 274; diseases and their symptoms in, 301 ff.; diseases mentioned in, 296 ff.; distinguishes hird and dhamanl, 344 n.; head and brain in, 340; its bone system critically compared and contrasted with that of Caraka, Susruta, Vagbhata, 284 ff.; its contents as arranged by Bloomfield, 295 ff.; its principal contents, 281 ff.; its probable priority to Rg-veda, 280, 281; its relation with Ayur-veda, 275 ; its sdkhds, 283 ff.; its theory of vayus, 291, 292; on sird and dhamani, 289 ff.; rivalry between drugs and charms in, 293 ff.; theory of the origin of diseases in, 299 ff.; vdyu, pitta and kapha in, 331; what nddt means in, 345

Atharva- Veda andGopatha-Brdhmana, 2Q5 n. 1, 296 n. 1

Atharvaveda in Kashmir, 283 n.

Atharvdngirasah, 281

atidesa, 389, 391

atikrdntaveksana, 389, 392

atimutra, 296

atirikta, 388

atisayddhdna, 183

atiyoga, 320, 321, 405

atlndriya, 347, 366

atlsdra, 296, 430

Atlta-kdla, 387

Atomic, 367; changes, 194; measure, 189;theory, 151, 189

Atoms, 20, 25, 157, 187-790, 193, 199, 306, 371

Atri, 399, 401, 429

Attachment, 24, 101, 243, 304, 412-414, 489, 490, 497-499, 501, 503, 504, 5o7, 5xo, 511, 513, 514, 516, 521-523

Attention, 23, 24

Index

Attentive reflection, 24

Attock, 429

Attractions, 239

atyantdsat, 194

atthanga-slla, 498

Auditory organ, 344

Auditory sense, 374

Aufrecht, Th., 435, 439

aupacdrika, 328, 329

Aupadhenava, 424

Aupadhenava-tantra, 435

aupamya, 377, 379

aupapdduka, 308

Aurabhra, 424

Auricular, 353

Auspicious rites, 281

Austerities, 441

ausadha, 295

ausadhi, 359

ausnya, 362 n.

Authenticity, 78

Autumn, 335, 370

Autumnal fever, 299

avabhdsim, 317

avaccheda, 105

avacchedakatd, 124

avaccheda-vdda, 106

avacchinna, 96

Avadhani Yajva, 218 n.

avadhi, 508

avasthd, 44

az'astu, 202, 203

avayavl, 187

avedanam, 265

avedyatva, 149, 150

avedyatve satyaparoksa - vyavahdra -yogyatvam, 149 w.

Averrhoa acida, 360 w.

Aversion, 335, 515

Aviddhakarna, 172

avidyamdna, 5

avidyd, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 44, 48, 50, 72, 73, 84, 85, 88-90, 98, 99, 104, 105, 109-111, 117, 118, 148, 187, 204-206, 209, 221, 234, 249, 304, 414, 415, 479, 498, 499; described as sakti by Gaudapada, 8; in neither of its senses can be material cause, 12; its meanings, 12; nature of its causality according to Anandabodha, also according to Vacaspati's Brahma-tattva-samiksd, 12; not psychological ignorance, but special technical category, 12; Pad-mapada's interpretation regarding the creative power of, 9; so called because of its unintelligibility, 12

avidyd-dvitaya, 109 avidyd-dvitaya-sacivasya, 109 avidyd mayd mithyd-pratyaya iti, 84 avidyd-nivrtti, 85 avidyd-potency, 10 avidyd-sahita-brahmopdddnam, 11 avidyd stuff, 104 avidyd-sakti, 9, 203 avidyopdddna-bheda-vddins, 90 avijjd, 498 avijndtdrtha, 389 n. avindbhdva, 140, 376, 380 avisamvddi, 136 avisesa-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n. avisaya, 6 avitikkafna, 500 avyabhicdri, 136, 381 n. avyabhicdrl anubhavah, 135 avyakta, 43, 104, 263, 357, 358, 462,

463, 470, 47i, 473, 476, 519, 525,

53°,533 avyakto vyakta-karmd, 263 avyapadesdtmd, 234 avyapadesya, 265, 374, 401 Avyayarman Bhagavat Pujyapada,

198 avydkrta, 23 n., 104 avydpya-vrttitva-visesito, 158 Awaking consciousness, 19 Awareness, 13, 14, 17-20, 25-30, 31 n.,

32, 63-65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 117,

118, 134, 151, 197, 201, 206, 211,

212, 214; of blue, 27 Ayodhya, 230 ayoga, 321, 405 ayuta-siddha, 191 ayuta-siddhatva, 191 dbhdsa, 252 dbhicdrika, 281 Abhoga, 52, 108 deary a, 420 Acarya Dlksita, 218 Acarya Jetari, 49 Acaryasuri, 171 dechddya, 112 dddna-gantho, 496 ddhdra, 113, 144 ddhdra-cakra, 355, 356 Adisura, 126 ddityas, zqz n., 535, 549 dgama, 304 Agama-prdmdnya, 542 w. 2, 546,

_ 547 Agama-sdstra-vivarana, 78 dghdto, 497

dgneya, 313, 329 w., 359 dhdre patikula-sannd, 501

559

Ahrika, 172

djnd-cakra, 353 //., 355, 356 dkdnksd, 496

akasa, 74, 75, 104, 160, 194, 204, 235, 244- 302, 312, 315, 360, 362, 367,

371, 374. 379

akasa-dhatu, 307

Akasagotto, 276

Akasa tan-matra, 245

dkdsdtmaka, 359

akuta, 481, 482

dlambana, 29, 155

Alamvdyana-samhitd, 435

dlaya-vijfidna, 22, 24

dloyo, 497

dlocaka, 304, 341

dlocaka-pitta, 342

dma-garbha, 322 w.

dmalaka, 294

Amalananda, 82

dmdsaya, 330, 331

ananda, 223

Anandabodha, 50, 51, 70, 89 «., 92, 116, 117, 124, 148?!., 194, 196; his doctrine oiavidyd probably borrowed from Mandana, 90; as inspirer of many later works of Vedanta, 118; his date and works ,116; his interpretation of the nature of the self, 118; his refutation of "difference," 116, 117; his view of the nature of avidyd,

_ "7

Anandabodha Bha^tarakacarya, 12, 49,

69, 147 n. Anandabodhendra, 231 Anandabodhendra Bhiksu, 259 n. 2 Anandabodhendra Sarasvati, 231 Ananda-dipa, 57 n. Ananda-dlpa-tikd, 57 n. Anandagiri, 43 «., 83, 103, 124, 192,

_ 193, 344

Anandajnana, 1 n., 43, 49-51, 78-81, 92, ioo, 116, 119, 124, 172, 189,

192, 194, 196, 205, 210, 439; contents of his work Tarka-samgraha,

193, 194; his criticism of Nyaya-Vaisesika categories, 193, 194; his interpretation of the indescribable-ness of world-appearance and ajnd-na, 194, 195; his teachers, 192; his works, 193

Ananda-laharl, 79 Ananda-laharl-tarl, 79 Ananda-manddkinl, 225 Anandapurna, 52, 57, 83, 87 w., 103,

123, 126 n. Anandatlrtha, 442

Ananda-vardhana, 126 n. Anandanubhuva, 57 n. Anandasrama, 196 Anandatman, 58, 86 antariksa, 357 Anvlksikl, 390, 392 Anjaneya, 443 dpah, 292 n. apta, 280, 373 dptopadesa, 373, 376, 377

<ipya, 359

drambhakam, 329 n.

drjava, 505 n., 510, 544

Ana-Rdmdyana, 231

drtava, 313

drtavdh, 292 n.

drthl bhdvand, 480

Arunikopanisad, 252 n.

Aryadeva, 51, 124, 164, 165

Arya-drdhdsaya-pariprcchd, 5

Arya-vidyd-sudhd-kara, 112 n.

dsana, 454, 455

dsahga, 44

dsatti, 497

dsayo, 497

dsd, 496

dspada, 7

dsrdva, 296

dssdsa, 459

dstika, 420

dstikya, 505 n.

Asadhara, 434

dsraya, 19, 23, 85, 357

dsraya-bhutah, 59 n.

Asresa, 300

Asvaldyana-srauta-sutra, 394

AsvinI, 432

Asadhavarman, 428

Atanka-dlpana, 434

dtivdhika sartra, 305

Atma-bodha, 79, 81

Atma-bodha-vydkhydna, 81 w., 103

dtma-dharmopacdrah, 21 n.

dtma-jdnlndriydni, 310

Atma-jndnopadesa, 78

Atma-jndnopadesa-tikd, 193

dtma-khydti, 87 n.

dtma-mdna, 24

dtman, 8, 21, 58, 149, 194, 238, 302,

307*1.5, 309, 310, 405, 444, 445,

472, 518 dtmanah samvid-rupatva, 118, 148,

151 dtma-samavayl visaya-prakdso jnanam,

197 atma-sneha, 24 Atmasukha, 232

Index

AtmasvarQpa, 52 n.

dtma-saktya, 330

dtma-vinigraha, 513

Atmdndtma-viveka, 79

Atmdrpana-stava, 219

dtmdsrayatva, 17

dtmdvalokana, 442

Atmopadesa-vidhi, 79

Atreya, 277, 308, 310, 327, 333, 395, 424

Atreya bhiksu, 395

Atreya-Caraka, 284, 293, 295

Atreya-Caraka school, 289

Atreya Gautama, 394

Atreya Punarvasu, 276 n., 357, 432

dvarana, 22, 73

dvarana-sakti, 74

dvaranatvdt, 197

dvartta, 351

dyatana, 395, 498

dydma, 348 w.

Ayur-veda, 258 «., 273-276, 278, 280, 2S8, 293, 295, 320, 328 n., 354 «., 357, 365, 366, 371, 372, 383, 385, 387, 389, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396, 398, 399, 402, 422, 423, 436; an upaveda of Atharva-Veda, 274; a part of Atharva-Veda, 278; apertures of the dhamanls in, 350; application of inductive methods for the discovery of cause in Caraka, 396 ff.; are vayu, pitta and kapha only hypothetical entities? 336 ff.; as a science of life, 277; a separate Veda superior to theotherVedas, 274, 275; a veddnga, z~]$; brain the centre of manas in, according to Bhela, 340; brain the seat of sensations, 346; Caraka school closely associated with Atharva-Veda, 278, 279; Caraka's view of nddl, sird, dhamanl and srotas as ducts, 346 ff.; categories of Caraka and Vaisesika, 369-372; causes of things according to Sus-ruta, 372; circulation of dhdtu in growth, 322, 323; cognitive currents in, 347; constructive and destructive operations of vayu, pitta and kapha, 339; control of body and mind, 419, 420; Drdhabala's distinction of sirds and dhamanls, 348 w.; dhamanls in relation to cognition according to Susruta, 351 ff.; dhdtu-mala in, 331; different functions of vayu, pitta and kapha, 337, 338; different kinds of ducts in, 347; dispute, methods of, 377 ff.; disputes, terms of, 379 ff.; disturb-

ance of dosas according to seasons, 335; divergent views on the development of the foetus referred to in Caraka-samhitd, 307,308; divergent views regarding vayu as narrated in Caraka, 332 ff.; dosa as prakrti, 334; dravya, rasa, vlrya, vipdka, pra-bhdva, 362-366; early references to, 276, 277; epidemics caused by collective evil effects, 408 ff.; equilibrium of dhdtus, 327; ethical position of Caraka, 418; fallacies, 380 ff.; foetal development in Susruta and Caraka, its different stages, 313 ff.; formation of foetus in Caraka, Susruta and Vagbhafa, 302-304; freedom of will in, 411; Ayur-veda, function of dhamanls in, according to Susruta, 350 ff.; function of the different ducts, 347 ff.; future life, belief in, 406; good, conception of, 404, 405; good life and happy life, 422,423; good life in Caraka, 418 ff.; good of the body and of the mind, 418, 419; heart in the Upanisads contrasted with, 344; heart the vital centre of the prdnas in, 340; hetu-vidyd in Caraka, 395; inference in, compared with Nyaya and Sam-khya, 399,400; is beginningless,274; its relation with Atharva- Veda, 275; its theory of dhdtu-sdmya and dhdtu-vaisamya, 319 ff.; its unbroken tradition, 274; jdti fallacy, conception of, compared with Nyaya, 380-382; yukti, misrepresentation by Jsantarak-sita, 376; yukti pramdna of, 375; yukti pramdna refuted by !§antarak-sita, 375, 376; life, its definition, 367; literature, 422 ff., 435; manas and the senses, 367; manas, its theory, 366, 367; meaning of ojas in, 343 n. ; medical discussions in, 378; nddl, sird and dhamanl as ducts in, 345, 346; natural place of vayu, pitta and kapha, 331, 336; nature of pitta, 330, 331; necessity of logical tricks in, 401, 402; number of sird, srotas and dhamanl according to Susruta, 349; number of sirds in, according to Susruta, 352; number of sndyus in, according to Susruta, 352; origin in the knowledge of hetu and linga, 395; origin of the world, Susruta on, 410; par am and aparam ojas in, 343; perception, obstruction of, 377; perception theory of, 373, 374; period of life in, 402; possible existence of

;6i

a pre-Caraka literature of it, 277; prajndparadha, according to Caraka, 416,417 \pramdnas in, 373 ; prana in, 263 ; principles of growth, 321, 322; psychological theories of perception of Bhela in, 341; psycho-physical parallelism in, according to Caraka, 339; rasas, their number, 357~359; rasas, their origin, 359, 360; rebirth, nature of, determined by past life, 406, 407; rebirth, proofs of, 407, 408; relation of head and heart in, 343; right conduct, rules of, according to Caraka, 420 ff.; samyogi-purusa, its conception, 368; sancaya and prakopa of dosas, 335; scheme of life in Caraka, 415; seat of prana according to Caraka, 342; secretory character of vayu, pitta and kapha, 338; self and the body, 368; self and knowledge, 368; self and manas, 369; self and the transcendent self (parah citma), 368; self, in association with manas, 373; self, nature of, according to Susruta, 410; sorrows, cause of, according to Caraka, 415, 416; soul, conception of, 372; special categories in Caraka, 389; special categories in Susruta, 389 ff.; springs of action and right conduct in, 405 ; springs of action in Caraka compared with those of other systems, 411 ff.; substance and qualities, 360-362; subtle body and self in Caraka, 310; Susruta and Samkhya, 372; Susruta's distinction of sir as and dhamams, 348. ff.; Susruta's views regarding brain as the seat of cognitive and conative nerves, 342; synonyms for srotas, 348 n.; the combination of the dosas in different relations, 338; the organs in relation to the ducts, 348; theory of dfidtus and upa-dhdtus, 322-324; theory of dosa according to Susruta, 329, 330; theory of the formation of the body, 334; theory of karma in, compared with other theories of karma, 402-404; theory of mala-dhdtus, 325 ff.; theory of prabhdva, 323 ; three classes of inference in Caraka, 398, 399; transgressions {prajndparadha) the obstacle to good life, in Caraka, 421, 422; transmigration determined by dharma and adharma, 411; ultimate healing in, 415; updnga of Atharva-Veda, 273; validity of the Vedas established through it, 279, 280;

views of the different Upanisads regarding the nddis contrasted with, 345 ; vayu, pitta and kapha and their operations in the building of the body, 334 ff.; what is its nature? _ 276 Ayur-veda-dipikd, 274W. 2, 275 n., 302,

_43i Ayur-veda-rasayana, 434 Ayur-veda-sutra, 436 dyuso 'nuvrtti-pratyaya-bhiita, 333 dyusydni, 295

Backbite, 510

Backbone, 286

Bad, 246; deeds, 411

Badness, 507

Badisa, 316, 357

baesaza, 295 n. 1

baesazya, 295 n. 1

bahu-sruta, 85

Balabhadra Bhattacarya, 225 n.

Baladeva, 539

Baladeva Vidyabhusana, 443

Balance, 326

bali, 278

Balkh, 357

bandha, 232, 234,267

Bandhaka - tantra ,435

bandhanam, 497

bandho, 497

Barren woman, 234

Basic concept of mind, 24

Basic entity, 23 n.

Basis, 11, 29; of truth, 11

Battle, 505

Battle-field, 522

Badarayana, 45, 260; his philosophy,

42; his philosophy is some kind of

bheddbheda-vdda or immanence in

transcendence, 42 bddha, 222 bddhakas tarkah, 141 bdhu, 285 n. 6, 338 Balabhadra, 55 Balagopala, 78 Balagopala Yogindra, 78 Balakrsnadasa, 78 Bdldvatdra-tarka, 49 Balhika, 298 n. 4, 316 Bana, 550

Baspacandra, 428, 431 Beard, 325 Beginningless, 12, 195, 217, 454; avid-

yd, 48; contact, 158; series, 184;

time, 249 Being, 10, 36, 46, 148, 203, 234, 238,

5°i

36

Index

Bcing-non-being, 234 Benares, 429 Bengal, 126, 225 n. Besnagar, 539 Bhadanta Yogasena, 184 Bhadra, 2S4 Bhadrakapya, 316, 357 Bhadrasaunaka, 427 bhaga, 285 n. 7 bhagandara, 276 Bhagavad-bhakti-rasdyana, 225 Bhagavad-gitd, 79, 442 Bhagavad-gtta-bhdsya, 439 Bhagavad-gltd-bhdsya-vivarana, 439 Bhagavad-gltd-bhdsya-vyakhyd, 439 Bhagavad-gitd-gudhdrtha-dlpika, 225 Bhagavad-gltd-hetu-nirnaya, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-laksdbharana, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-pradlpa, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-prakdsa, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-rahasya, 550, 551 n. 1 Bhagavad-gltdrtha-samgraha, 443 Bhagavad-gltdrtha-samgraha-tlkd, 439 Bhagavad-gltdrtha-sdra, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-sdra, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-sdra-samgraha, 443 Bhagavad-gltd-tdtparya-nirnaya, 442 Bhagavat, 539-542; and Visnu, 539,

540 bhagdsthi, 285 n. 7 bhaisajya, 293, 295 6/wfoi, 226, 442, 439, 531, 532, 534 Bhakti-rasdyana, 226 bhaktir ddes'yd, 278 Bhakti-sdmdnya-nirupana, 225 bhakti-yoga, 440, 441, 451 Bhandarkar, R. G., 540, 543, 548 Bharadvaja, 229, 308, 395, 399 Bharata, 427 Bhartrhari, 171 Bhartrprapanca, 1, 36, 43, 44, 100;

his philosophy of bheddbheda, 43 Bhattacarya Sivaprasad, 232 Bhattacharya, B., 20 n., 172 n. Bhatta Ananda, 264 Bhafta Kallafa, 263 Bhafta Narahari, 425 Bhatfa Raghava, 122, 123 Bhattojl Dlksita, 54, 55, 217, 219 bhautikt, 334 bhava, 498

Bhavabhuti, 111, 112 Bhavadasa, 87 n. Bhavanatha, 126 n. Bhavanlsahaya, 434 Bhavya, 164 Bhagavata, 251, 544-547, 552; and the

ekdntins, 545; sect, 545 ff.

Bhdgavata-purana, 220, 532, 542 Bhagavata -purana - prathama - sloka -

vyakhyd, 225 Bhagavatism, 550 bhdjana-loka-sannivesa-vijnapti, 23 Bhdluki-tantra, 435 Bhdmaa, 11, 25 n., 29, 36, 52, 56,

82, 106-109, in, 171, 215 n., 220,

222 n., 269 n. 2, 427 Bhdmatt-tilaka, 52 n., 108 Bhdmatl-vildsa, 108 Bhantati-vydkliyd, 108 Bhanujl Dlksita, 55 Bhdnumatl, 362, 363 n., 425, 435 Bhd.radvdja-samh.ita, 431 Bharadvajlyas, 540 bhdra-hdra, 62 Bhdra-hdra-sUtra, 61 Bharata legend, 552 bhdratl sthdna, 355 Bharati Tlrtha, 52 n., 81, 216 n. Bhargava, 431 Bhasa, 394, 550 Bhasarvajfia, 122

Bhaskara, 43 n., 193, 201, 427, 428 Bhaskara Bhatfa, 435 Bhaskara Diksita, 56 Bhasurananda, 79 Bhdsa-pariccheda, 263 n. 1 Bhdsya-bhdva-prakdsikd, 148 n. Bhdsya-dtpikd, 103 Bhdsya-tippana, 78 Bhdsydrtha-nydya-mdld, 81 Bhdtta-cintdntani, 515 Bhau £astri, 11 n. bhdva, 193, 412 Bhdva-dtpikd, 443 bhdva-mdtra, 19 Bhavamisra, 435 bhdvand, 235, 480-482 bhavand-mdtra-sdra, 235 Bhdvand-viveka, 87 «. Bhdva-prakdsa, 263, 288«. 1, 433,

435,436 Bhdva-prakdsikd, 79 bhdva-rupa, 105, 114 Bhdva-suddhi, 87 n. Bhdva-tattva-prakdsikdy 98, 148 bhdvatva, 142 Bhavaviveka, 164, 165 bhavdbhdvayor dvayor apt paraspara-

prattksepdtmakatvat, 142 bhdvddvaita, 85 Bhdvdrtha-dlpika, 79 Bhavivikta, 172 bheda, 92, 116, 218, 401 n. Bheda-dkikkdra, 51, 54, 55, 216, 218

563

Bheda-dhikkdra-satkriyd, 51, 55 Bheda-dhikkdra-satkriyojjvald, 51 bheddbheda, 44, 46, 201, 202; earliest

references to, 43; philosophy of

Bhartrprapafica, 43 bheddbheda-vdda, 42, 43 Bhela, 285 n. 6, 340, 341, 395, 432;

his psycho-physiological theories,

340 ff. Bhela-samhitd, 432 bhe$aja, 2^5, 295, 370 Bhesaja-kalpa, 432, 436 bhesajdni, 281 bhik$u, 505 Bhisma, 543

bhoga-gandham pc rityajet, 267 Bhoja, 324 n., 427, 428, 435 Bhoja-tantra, 435 bhoktr, 244 Bhrama-ghna, 432 bhrdjaka, 303, 330, 351 bhruvor madhye, 449 n. 2 bhrnga-rdja, 297 Bhusunda, 257 Bhuvah, 76

Bhuvanasundara Suri, 120, 123 £//m/j, 76 bhumi, 292 n. bhuta, 261, 282, 302 m. 2, 314 «., 315,

3'9, 334, 37i bhuta-hitatva, 505 bhuta-prakrti, 197 bhuta-suksmaih, 311 bhuta-vidyd, 276, 425 bhuta-vikdra, 358 w. bhutdtman, 303, 304, 415 bhutefu day a, 510 Bibliotheca Indica, 344 w. Bile, 276, 317, 325 Bilious fever, 298 Billows, 329 Binding, 497 Biomotor, 261, 515: forces, 75, 259,

262; functions, 104 Birth, 498, 512, 519 Bitter, 242, 337 n., 357, 359 btja, 235

bijankuravat, 257 Blackness, 238

Bladder, 289, 290, 336, 348, 351 Blame, 512 Blind, 309 Biindness, 333, 342 Bliss, 46, 450, 504; of mind. 513 Elissfulness, 223 Blood, 282, 298, 304, 307, 313, 317,

318, 322-324, 329-331, 335, 347,

349, 352, 361, 372; currents, 348

Bloomfield, 276 n., 295

Blue, 13, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30-32, 71,

117, 176, 330, 344; 349; awareness, 70, 71

Boastfulness, 373

Bodha-sdra, 57

Bodha-vidhi, 79

bodhdtmaka, 265

Bodhayana, 43, 251

Bodhdyana-Grhya-sesa-sutra, 550

Bodhayana-Pitr-medha-sutra, 550

Bodhendra, 79

Bodhi-caryavatara-panjikd, 4 n., 501

Bodhisattva, 513

Bodiless emancipation, 252

Bodily, 500; exercises, 419

Body, 248, 261, 320, 325, 327, 331,

340, 352, 365, 387, 447, 4 6 9, 498,

501 Body-building, 338 Boiling, 289, 299, 301 n. 2 Bond, 497 Bondage, 174, 181, 187, 204, 232, 246,

252, 267, 415, 470, 488, 497, 520 Bone, 278, 279, 317, 324, 348, 352;

channels, 348 Bony materials, 347 " Bower Manuscripts," 435 brah.ma-bh.uta, 474, 475 brahma-bhuya, 474 brahma-caitanya, 77 brahma-cakra, 353 n. brahma-carya, 505 Brahmacarin, 282, 449, 505 Brahmadatta, 99 Brahmadeva, 427, 428 Brahmagraha, 300 Brahmahood, 37, 55, 81, 92, 450, 475,

477, 513 Brahma-jdla-sutta, 394 Brahma-knowledge, 43, 47, 56, 85,

87, 100, 115, 203, 204, 223, 227,

252 Brahman, 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 16, 28, 36-39,

41, 42, 45-48, 5 1 , 73, 80, 84, 88, 90,

96, 99-102, 104-106, no, 112-115,

118, 126, 128, 156, 163, 168, 170, 190, 191, 195, 196, 202, 203, 205, 215, 217, 221, 222, 234, 236-238, 240, 243-245, 265, 271, 275, 340, 386, 437, 439, 440, 448, 450, 454, 473-476, 485, 486, 494, 495, 514,

523, 524, 53°, 533, 534, 538, 548;

nature of causality, 10, 11 Brahma najagat-kdranam, 84 Brahmanandin, 43 n. brahma-nadt, 354, 356 6ra/imaM-consciousness, 77

Index

Brahma-nirvana, 4.74 Brahmano mukhe, 474 Brahma-parindma-vdda, 43 Brahma-prakasika, 49, 82 n. brahma-randhra, 353 n., 356 Brahma-rdksasa, 282 Brahma-siddhi, 83, 84, 86-88, 92, 93,

95, 98, 106, 117, lion., H2, 178,

198, 199 Brahma-siddhi-flkd, 45, 83 Brahma-siddhi-vydkhyd-ratna, 83 Brahma-stuti, 148 n. Brahma-sutra, 2, 5, 6, 8, 25, 28, 29,

43 n., 46, 56, 82, 92, 103, 108 n., 148 n. y 189, 196, 204, 205, 218, 220, 246 n., 250 n., 251,391, 495, 549; discussion as to whether it professes pure monism or bheddbheda,

44 ff.; does not support Sarikara's philosophy, 2

Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, 30, 80, 81,

148 n. Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd, 82 n. Brahma - sutra - bhdsydrtha - samgraha,

82 n. Brahma-sutra-dlpikd, 82 Brahma-sutra-vrtti, 82 Brahma-siitro-panydsa, 82 w. Brahma-tattva-prakdsikd, 82 n. Brahma-tat fca-samlksd, 12 Brahma-tattva-samhitoddlpanl, 45 n. Brahma-vaivarta, 274, 432, 433 «. Brahmavada, 283 Brahma-Veda, 280 w. brahma-vicdra, 56 Brahma-vidydjbharana, 56, 82 w. brahma-vihdra, 460, 501 Brahmavijnana, 54 brahma-yajiia, 487 Brahma, 197, 229, 245, 274, 423, 519,

539, 546 Brahmananda Giri, 443 Brahmananda Sarasvati, 54, 57 n., 77 «.,

79, 81, 82, 251 w., 252 «. Brahmdnanda-vildsa, 57 «. Brahmananda Yati, 82 Brahmin Sutiksna, 230 Brahnopanisat, 251 Brain, 340, 353 n., 356 Bravery, 502

Brahmanas, 292, 295 n. 1, 301, 420 Brahmins, 228,469,488,498, 502, 504,

505-507, 512, 513, 539 Breast, 286 Breath, 259 Breath-control, 268, 444, 447, 448,

455 . Breathing activity, 75

Breathing forth, 259

Breath-regulation, 256

Breeding, 505

Broken, 337, 338

Bronchi, 286 n. 2

Bronchial tubes, 289 n. 3

Bronchitis, 386

Brow, 287

Brhad-dranyaka-bhdsya-ttkd, 193

Brhad-dranyaka-bhdsya-vdrttika - ttkd, 193

Brhad-dranyaka Upamsad, 1, 73, 78, 83, 251, 259 n. 3, 260, 288 n. 1, 344, ,. 345, 391, 394

Brhad-dranyakopanisad-bhdsya, 48, 78

Brhad-dranyakopanisad-bhdsya-vartti-ka, 78, 98

Brhad-yoga-vasiftha, 232

Brhal-laghu-panjikd, 428

Brhaspati-smrti, 251

budbuda, 312 n. 3

Buddha, 22 «., 61, 276, 424, 459, 498, 520

Buddhadeva, 171

Buddhaghosa, 164

Buddhapalita, 164, 165

Buddhas, 3

Buddhi, 75, 76, 104, 109, 179-181, 238, 239, 245, 262, 305, 341, 344, 347 n., 369, 373, 386, 387, 458, 463, 464, 484??. i, 524

Buddhism, 58, 117, 228, 450 n. 1, 459, 461, 495, 498, 504, 521; analysis of recognition, 65; and Vedanta on the notion of self-consciousness and recognition of identity, 33 ff.; avidyd in, and in Git d, 498-500; criticisms of the concept of God of Nyaya and Yoga, 176-178; criticism of the Samkhya parindma doctrine, 171 ff.; development of the foetus in the J§dli-stam-bd-sutra, 307; ideal life of Mahayana, 501; its arguments against the self as individual entity, 58 ff.; its attempt to interpret self-identity by the assumption of two separate concepts, 68; its criticism of Nyaya-Vaisesika categories, 187 ff.; its criticism of the Vedantic identity of self as shown in memory, 66; its doctrine of momentariness and artha-kriyd-kdritd, 182 ff.; its idealism compared with that of Sahkara and Yoga-vdsistha, 268 ff.; its refutation of criticism of the non-permanency of entities by heretical thinkers, 185 ff.; refutation of the soul theory of various systems of Indian thought in,

565

178-181; slla in, 500, 501; status of the object in, 35; the Vatsiputrlyas doctrine of soul, 59 ff.; Vasubandhu's refutation of the soul theory of the Vatsiputrlyas in, 58 ff.; views, list of, in, 496 ff. Buddhist arguments, 176, 188 Buddhistic, 119, 151, 170, 395, 521,

Buddhistic idealism, 2, 3, 22 n., 25-27, 29. 3°, 35. 205, 270, 398; its explanation of the apparent duality of object and awareness, and the diversity of objects, 26; its theory that things simultaneous are identical, 26 n.; that all ideas are due to vdsands, 26

Buddhistic nihilism, 2, 3

Buddhist Legends, 248 n.

Buddhist logicians, 166, 170

Buddhists, 5, 9, 31, 32, 33, 65, 67, 68, 71, 96, 108, 113, 115, 118, 124, 125, 136, 171, 172, 186-189, 269, 367. 375. 399. 4*2, 415, 433, 435. 496, 499-501, 511, 514, 517, 521; deny any being as the ground of world-appearance which is like dreams, 5; their quarrel with the Vedantins regarding the nature of existence as causal efficiency, 32

Buddhist subjective idealists, 211

Buddhist writers, 51, 171

buddhitvakalanam, 236

buddhi-vaisesika, 342

buddhi-vibhramsa, 416

buddhi-yoga, 444, 451, 452

buddhy-adhisthana, 316

Bulletin de VAcademie des Sciences de Russie, 59 «., 61 n., 62 n.

Burlingame, E. W., 248

Burning, 97. 335 "•

Buhler, G., 550

caitanya, 207

Caitraratha Forest, 357

cakra, 355, 455

cakra-bhramivad-dhrta-sarlrah, 250

Cakradatta, 426, 431

Cakrapanidatta, 275, 276 n., 277, 302 n., 303 «., 304, 308, 310, 312 n., 313 n., 314, 315, 318, 319 n., 322 n., 323, 32471., 32771., 33272., 335, 338 n., 339 n. y 340, 343, 347, 348 72., 349. 36072., 36172., 362-371, 373-376, 380 n., 384 n., 395, 396, 405 n., 406 n., 415 n., 425-428, 430-435

Cakra system, 454

caksur-vaisesika ,341

cola, 332, 338

Caland, W., 345 n.

Calcutta University, 2 n.

Camphor, 91

Canals, 352

Canda, 539

Candracandana, 434

Candragomin, 49

Candraklrti, 3, 51, 164-168, 171, 307; and Dinnaga, 167

candramdh, 292 n.

Candrikd, 98, 99, 192, 232

Canvas, 199

canddla, 512

Candesvara Varman, 78

Capacity, 40

Caraka, 263, 274, 275, 279, 285 n., 28671., 287 n., 292, 301, 302, 304, 307. 312, 314-316, 322 n., 327, 329, 332, 334-33 6 . 339. 34°. 342, 343,

346, 348, 349, 352, 355-357, 359 "-, 360 n., 363-366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376, 378-380, 382, 383, 384 n., 386 n., 388, 389, 393, 395-397, 399. 400, 401-409, 411, 415, 417-423, 427-429, 431-435. 471-473. 475

Caraka-candrika, 431

Caraka-paiijikd, 431

Caraka-parisista, 429

Caraka-samhitd, 273 n., 277, 278, 291, 302 n., 308 n., 310 n., 313 n., 314, 315 n., 318 n., 31971., 3237/., 324, 326 n., 32771., 331, 332 72., 334 72., 335 "•> 336 n., 339 n., 340, 342 n.,

347, 348 w., 360, 361 n., 363, 366 n., 367 7z., 369, 37072., 371, 37372. 374 «•> 375 «-, 376 n., 377, 386 72., 392, 393. 395, 39D72., 397-402, 411, 416, 422, 426, 427, 429, 471, 472,

473 "•> 477 Caraka-tattva-pradlpika, 431 Caraka-tdtparya-tlkd, 310 n., 431 Cardiac plexus, 355 Caritrasirnha, 126 n. caritta, 500 Cartilages, 286 72., 322 Caste, 501, 503, 505 Caste-duty, 486, 487, 502-505, 507,

508,513, 514 Categorical imperative, 493 Category, 12, 15, 24, 146, 147, 157,

163, 170, 187, 191, 237, 366, 369,

372, 389 Cattle, 301 Cattle-shed, 509 catur-anuka, 189, 190 Catur-mata-sdra-santgraha, 219

Index

caurydbhdva, 505

Causal, 176, 521; agent, 74, 177; apparatus, 182; complexes, 4; efficiency, 32, 95, 136, 137, 185; forces, 174; moment, 185; nature, 184; operation, 25,41,144, 173, 175, 186, 517; state, 37; substance, 172; transformation, 44, 172

Causality, 31 n., 148, 172, 186, 221, 396; of Brahman, 106; of the world due jointly to Brahman and Maya according to Paddrtha-tattva, 10

Causation, 164, 168

Cause, 3, 11, 22 n., 38-40, 95, 144, 145, 152, 160, 161, 166, 183, 186, 188, 190, 191, 195, 203, 215, 337, 366, 372, 374, 375, 389, 396-398, 516, 517; and effect, 191; of atoms, 187; of the world, 37; unknown, 360

Cause-effect, 375, 376

Causeless, 161, 187

Cavity, 352

caya, 335

caya-karana-vidvesa, 335 n.

cdgdnussati, 459

Carana-vaidya, 283, 284

Carvaka, 387, 402

Central Asia, 435

Central seat, 357

Centres, 16

Cerebral region, 353, 354

Cerebrum, 353 n., 356, 357

Ceremonies, 468

Cervical plexus, 353

Cessation, 21, 234, 242; from work, 507; of desires, 444; of work, 508

cetfa, 327, 472

cestitam, 371

cetand, 23, 36, 302, 316, 360 n., 368, 471, 477. 500

cetand-dhdtu, 472

cetand-pratisandhdtd, 366

cetandvantah, 410

cetas, 254, 366

cetasika, 500

ceto-vimutti, 460

cetya-samyoga-cetandt, 236

cetyatva, 236

Ceylonese, 164

chadmand, 478

chala, 385, 386 n., 401

Chandah-prasasti, 126

Chandas, 24, 275 n., 496, 547

Change, 45

Changeable, 16, 221

Changeful, 241

Changeless, 11, 13, 240; being, 51

Changing, 189; association, 63; contents, 15; materiality, 51; objects, 33; states, 33

Channel, 291, 324, 344, 347

Character, 15, 18, 27 n., 132, 187, 188

Character-appearance, 13

Characteristic, 4, 6, 18, 38, 162, 176, 182,199,200,228,233,251,371,512

Characterized appearances, 22 n., 23; entities, 22

Characterless entity, 271

Chariot, 229

Charm, 280,281, 293-299, 301; system,

294 Chdndogya, 78, 246, 250 n., 259 n.,

260, 276 n., 345, 346, 520 Chdndogya-bhasya-tikd, 193 Chdndogya Upamsad,^ n -> 333, 344 ft.,

345 "•> 498, 521, 544. 548 n. Chdndogya-Upamsad-varttika, 43 n. Chdyd-vydkhyd, 262 chedana, 358 chedantya, 357 Cheeks, 326 n. Chemical changes, 317 Chemistry. 357 Chest, 336 chidra-malas, 326/1. Chimerical, 131 Chintamani, T. R., 196 Cholera, 282 Christianity, 550 Church Street, 14 Chyle, 317, 322-324, 328, 330, 331,

348, 349 cic-chdydpatti, 89 n. Cid-dnanda-dasaslokt, 79 Cid-dnanda-stava-rdja, 79 cid-dtman, 112 cikitsd, 278, 288 «., 392, 430 Cikitsd-darsana, 432 Cikitsd-kaumudi, 432 Cikitsd-sdra-tantra, 432 Cikitsd-sthdna, 429 Cikitsd-tattva-vijndna, 432 cikitsitam, 276 ciklrsdy 515

cin-mdtra-sambandhtnl, 197 cin-mdtrdsrita-visayam ajndnam, 85 Cinnabomma, 219 cintya, 343 cira-jdgara, 267 cirdj-jdgrat-sthita, 266 Circular bone, 284 n. 4 Circulation, 323 Circulatory system, 323 Circumstance, 233

5 6 7

cit, 89, 89 n., 235, 243, 244, 271

citra-bhitti, 104

Citra-mlmdfnsd, 220

citrinl, 353, 356

citrinl nddl, 354, 356

Citsukha, 49-51, 53, 58, 83, 86, 87 «., 92, 116, 119, 124,138, 147,148, 149 n., 150 n., 152, 154, 156, 157, 160-163, 171, 172, 192, 194, 198, 217, 218, 222 n.\ awareness of awareness impossible, 150, 151; his analysis of illusion, 155; his criticism of the atomic theory, 157, 158; his criticism of "cause" (kdrana), 160 ff.; his criticism of Nyaya categories, 156; his date and works, 148; his definition of self-revealing consciousness, 148—150; his quarrel with Prabhakara on the subject of illusion, 154 ff.; his refutation of the category of time, 156, 157; his refutation of class-concepts (jdti), 160; his refutation of dravya, 161, 162; his refutation of numbers, 158; his refutation of qualities (gund), 162, 163; his refutation of space, 157; his treatment of the falsehood of the world-appearance, 152, 153; his treatment of nescience (ajndna), 153; main content of his Tattva-pradlpikd, 148 n. ; nature of self, 151, 152

Citsukha Acarya, his refutation of the Nyaya definition of perception, 138

cit-svarupdh, 411

citta, 75, 234, 238, 239, 243, 250, 256, 258, 265, 292, 305, 306, 341

citta-catnatkdra, 236

citta-vimukti, 265

citta-vrtti, 264

cittmah, 292 n. 5

Clpudru, 299 n. 2

Class-concept, 40, 108, 131, 132, 139, 148, 159, 162, 163, 187, 188, 194,

37i Class-duties, 486 Class-nature, 188, 189 Clavicle, 286 n. 2 Cleanliness, 505 Clinging, 497 " Closed," 3 Cloth, 189 Clouds, 205 Coarse, 337 n. Coccyx, 285 n., 287 n. Cognition, 18-21, 23, 70, 136, 149,

153, 180, 188, 214, 239, 243, 274 Cognitional character, 29

Cognitional existence, 58

Cognitive activities, 256

Cognitive functions, 256

Cognitive nerves, 342

Cognitive operation, 211

Cognitive process, 206

Cognitive relation, 213

Cognitive senses, 76, 500

Cognitive states, 151, 250, 251

Cognized object, 19, 22

Cognizer, 19, 22, 23, 351

Cognizing, 15; activity, 104, 149;

faculty, 180 Coherence, 15 Cola country, 148 n. Cold, 242, 301, 320, 321, 332, 337 n.,

357, 358, 360, 361, 362 m., 365, 408,

419, 500, 510,511 Colic, 346; pain, 298 Collar bone, 286 n., 287 Collocating, 138, 160; conditions,

161 Collocation, 168, 174, 187, 516; of

causes, 161, 472, 473; of things,

161 Collyrium, 238 Colour, 24, 60, 181, 186, 188, 191, 194,

199, 289, 327, 330, 355, 360, 367,

377; cognition, 180; particles, 25 n. Colouredness, 374 Colouring pitta, 326 n. Combination, 189, 360 Combinations of atoms, 20 Command, 48 Commentary, 27 «., 29, 38, 43, 52, 54,

99, 102, 103, 107, 108, 196, 219,

232, 354 n. Commentator, 51, 164 Common duty, 505-507 Common good, 506 Common self, 181 Commonsense, 3; view, 2, 508 Common well-being, 506 Communion, 451, 457-459, 466, 467,

470, 490, 492, 501, 503, 504, 530 Community, 506 Compact, 337 n. Compassion, 511 Compendium, 214 Compilation, 49 Compilers, 53 Complex, 4, 25, 65, 215; quality, 17,

18 Compounding, 370 Conative senses, 75 Conceit, 373, 409, 510 Conceive, 254 Concentration, 460, 500, 504

Index

Concept, 234; of contact, 158

Conception, 236, 247, 524

Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, The, 164 n., 166 n.

Concepts of duality, 193

Conceptual, 7.36; activity, 236; creation, 237, 243, 244

Conch-shell, 6, 101, 114, 134-137,

155 Conclusion, 163, 173, 373, 37 6_ 378,

383, 387

Concomitance, 19, 121, 140, 141, 194, 374, 388 n., 397

Concrete, 25, 23571.; duration, 212; individual, 239; state, 236

Conditional, 142

Conditionality of relations, 142

Conditioning knowledge, 18

Conditions, 16, 182, 184

Conduct, 500, 503

Conformations, 498

Congenital vdta, 337

Conglomeration, 164, 166

Conjeeveram, 98

Conjunction, 40

Connection, 355

Connotation, 475

Conscious, 15, 371; centre, 16; moments, 62; states, 13, 187

Consciousness, 14, 18, 28, 30, 33, 35, 62-65, 69, 71, 72, 148, 149, 153, 164, 199, 201, 205-207, 209, 210,

213, 215, 222, 234, 271, 3IO, 314, 318, 360, 366, 368, 369, 387, 406,

471, 477, 498, 532; of relationing, 33; pure, 22

Consequence, 183

Conservation of energy, 517

Constant, 63

Constituent, 17, 18, 74,322,371,525; elements, 59, 304

Constitution, 334

Constitutional, 335

Constitutive stuff, 48

Constructive, 331; instincts, 23 ; principles, 333; tendencies, 24

Consumption, 298, 386

Contact, 190,194,360,373, 374, 381 n.; of atoms, 190

Contact-points, 188

Container, 22, 144

Contemporary, 50

Contentless, 182

Contentment, 490, 492, 501, 503

Content of recognition, 66

Contiguity, 367

Continuity, 15, 21; of consciousness, 180

Continuous, 241; appearance, 25 «.;

perception, 213 Contradiction, no, 137, 147 Contrary, 17 Control, 256, 419; of anger, 505, 510;

of mind, 505, 510 Controller, 215 Controversy, 125 Cooking, 97, 188, 331 Co-operant, 184 Co-operation, n, 326 Cordier, Dr P., 425 w., 427, 429 Co-religionists, 501 Coronation ceremony, 282 Corporeal, 512 Correspondence, 134 Cosmic universe, 524 Cosmic world, 526 Costal cartilages, 286 n. 1 Cotyloid cavity, 287 n. Cough, 296, 298, 300 n. Country, 370 Courage, 328, 333 Course, 519 Covetous, 498, 498 n. Covetousness, 497, 498 Cow, 159, 420, 509, 512 Cranial bones, 287 n. Cranium, 287 Craving, 504

Creation, 72, 178, 234, 235, 242 Creationism, 1 Creative power, 74 Creative thought movement, 235 n. Creator, 2, 39, 41, 176, 177 Creed, 501 Critical thinking, 264 Criticism, 35, 146, 156, 165, 166, 171,

192, 204, 388; of qualities, 194 Cruelty, 373, 409, 510 Cupidity, 497 Curatives, 280 Curator, 205 Curd, 40 Cures, 280

Currents of sensation, 340 Cursing, 282

Customary morality, 504, 523 Customs, 127, 489, 503 Cyavana, 432 Cycle, 526

dahana, 333

daharddhikarana, 205 n.

daiva, 253-255, 310, 407, 408, 472,

515 daiva yajna, 487 daivJ sampat, 510

5 6 9

daksina, 292, 544

daksindyana, 519

dama, 495, 505

Damsel, 229

Dancing, 498 n.

dantolukhala, 287 n. 4

darsana, 455

dasa-kusala-kamma, 498

Dasgupta, S. N., 17, 449 n. 1, 501 n.

Dasarathapriya, 99

Dasa-sloki-mahd-vidyd-sutra, 120

Dasa-slokl, 79

Data of experience, 157

Dattatreya, 443

Datum of perception, 212

Days, 156

ddksya, 505 n.

dana, 505 n., 544

Darila, 284, 293

Darila Bhafta, 275

ddruna, 332 n.

Death, 248, 299, 336, 498, 501, 512,

523, 526 Deathless, 518, 526 Debate, 377 Decay, 498 Deccan, Early History of the, 540

n. 1 Decisions, 24, 373, 384 Decoction, 390 n. Deeds, 242, 248 Deep sleep, 232 Defeat, 512 Defects, 38, 214 Deficiency, 319, 326, 335 Definition, 127, 136, 143, 145, 159-

161, i92;of cause, 186;ofperception,

137 deha, 446 n. 3

deha-sambhava-hetavah, 330 Dejection, 230 Delirium, 298, 333 Deliverance, 267 Delivery, 290 n. 3 Delusion, 170, 245, 499, 500, 510 Demerit, 249, 409, 416 Demons, 230, 295, 300, 468, 478,

535

Denotation of words, 187

Denunciation, 512

Denutritive, 357, 358

Dependence, 10, 529

Dependent on being, 36

Desirable, 512

Desire, 24, 91, 178, 179, 252, 264, 324, 360, 370, 373, 375, 409, 411, 412, 422, 442, 450, 451, 453, 477, 484, 488, 495, 498, 501, 503. 504,

507-511, 516, 519, 520, 522, 529;

bonds of, 268; for life, 405 Desirelessness, 228, 490 Desisting, 500

Destiny, 253, 354, 360, 370, 404, 526 Destroyed cause, 186 n. Destructibility, 386 n. Destructible, 197, 512 Destruction, 182, 235, 238; of the

atoms, 191; of citta, 268; of mind,

448 Destructive, 331; play, 178 desa, 358, 389

desa-kdla-kriyd-dravyaih, 240 Detached, 452 Detachment, 475 Determinant of causality, 186 Determinate, 23; perception, 97;

thought, 25 Determination, 23 «., 55, 75, 186 Determine, 23 deva, 314 Devadatta, 62, 75 Devagiri, 123 Devaki, 544 Devakl-putra, 544 Devarama Bhatfa, 81 devata, 43 deva-ydna, 519, 521 Devadarsa, 283 Devendra, 55 Devesvara, in Devotee, 532 Devotion, 439-441, 503, 523, 531, 534,

547; to Vedic gods, 505 dhairya, 264, 505 dhamaniij), 289, 290, 343, 344 n., 346-

35°, 35i "•, 352, 355; its pre-Cara-

kian senses discussed, 345, 346 Dhamma-pada, 248, 489, 490, 493 dhanaisand, 405 Dhanaiiiaya, 75 dhanur-dkdre, 354 Dhanur-veda, 274

Dhanvantari, 316, 424, 425, 432, 433 dharma, 21, 22 «., 131, 199, 327, 410—

412, 416, 419, 479, 483, 484, 486-

488, 494, 503, 525, 538 Dharma-dharnii-viniscaya, 49 dharma-kdya, 22 n. Dharmaklrti, 137, 171 dharma-ksetra, 502 dharma-megha, 251 Dharma-mimdmsd-paribhdsd, 220 Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, 52 «., 53, 54,

89 71., 105, 198 «., 208, 212, 214, 217 dharma-samketa, 185 dharma-sdstra, 547

Index

dharma-sraddha, 505

DharmatrSta, 171

dharma-vicdra, 56

Dharmaya Diksita, 220

dharmya, 514

dhdnya, 317

dharana, 328, 342, 454, 455

dhdrin, 343, 368 n.

dhdtu, 22 n., 276, 304, 307, 317, 319,

320, 324-329, 331-333. 343, 347,

349, 389 dhatu-mala, 331, 332 dhdtu-rasa, 323 n. dhdtu-rupa-rasa, 322 dhdtu-sdmyam, 327 n. dhdtu-vaisamya, 319, 320, 326, 328,

329,339 dhdtu-vyuhana, 315 <#h, 328, 505

dhl-dhrti-$mrti-vibhra§ta, 416 Dhruva, Mr, 400 n. dhruvo, 22 n.

dhrti, 373, 470, 505 «., 510 dhrti-vibhramsa ,416 dhuma-pd, 420 dhiimo, 497

dhydna, 256, 342, 454, 455 Dhydna-bindu, 455 dhydna-yoga, 448, 458 Diabetes, 282, 296 Diagnosis, 301 Dialectic, 118, 127, 170, 171, 225/1.;

criticism, 156; methods, 119; Na-

garjuna and Vedanta, 163; of fsari-

kara, 189; Sriharsa and Nagarjuna,

163 ff. Dialectical, 51, 72, 146; arguments,

218; criticism, 92; subtleties, 192;

thought, 147 Diarrhoea, 206, 299, 300 n. 2 Diet, 384 Difference, 14, 17, 18, 26 n., 27, 30,

63, 65, 76, 88, 92, 95-97, "6, 117,

127, 130-132, 148, 161, 199, 200,

202, 209, 210, 370; numerical, 14;

of characters, 370; of identity, 370 Difference - between - awareness - and -

object, 17 Difference - of - awareness - from - the -

object, 18 Different, 28, 64, 358, 359; classes,

161; effects, 161; measure, 190 Differentiate, 143 Differentiation, 23 n. Digestion, 303, 322, 323 n., 336, 361-

3 6 3, 365 n., 370 Digestive fire, 333 Digestive function, 328

Digits, 285

Dihaka, 426

dik, 157

Dinakarl, 264 n.

Diiinaga, 26 «., 27 n., 30, 35, 167, 171;

and Candraklrti, 167 Direct cognition, 32 Direct perception, 374 Disciplinary measure, 501 Discipline, 514 Discoveries, 280 Discrimination, 23, 24, 250 Discriminative knowledge, 250, 251,

3°S

Discussion, 99, 129, 377, 378, 392

Disease, 280, 301, 320, 327-332, 335 «-, 336 «., 337, 359, 366, 370, 372, 376, 377, 384, 385, 390, 393, 397J as modifications of do$as, 329; its causes, 320 ff.; its theory according to Samkhya and Nyaya, 328, 329 n.

Diseases of the legs, 299

Disgust, 501

Disinclination, 244, 251, 504

Disintegrating, 191, 265, 306

Disjunction, 360

Disliking, 358

Dispute, 377, 379

Dissection, 288

Dissociation, 248, 268, 523

Dissolution, 37, 109, 177, 191, 194, 526; of ignorance, 85

Distance, 360

Distasteful, 357

Distinct entities, 31

Distinction, 14, 15, 401 n.

Disturbance, 335

Diverse, 367

Diversity, 26, 38, 39, 195, 357, 367; of contents, 14

Divine equipment, 510

Divodasa, 424, 432, 433 n. 1

Dldhiti, 126 n.

diksd, 292 n.

Dlpikd, 78

Doctrine, 227, 375, 501, 517, 520, 521,

525 Dogs, 291, 512

Doing good to living beings, 505 Dominant, 358 Dormant, 164 do?a, 300, 319, 325, 327, 328,332,334-

337, 339, 34i, 362, 366, 372, 383,

390,413, 497; according to Susruta,

329,330 dofa-prakrtih, 334 n. dofdbhdva, 214 Doubt, 141, 148, 377, 383, 500

57i

Dramidacarya, 43

drastr, 88

drava, 359 n.

dravya, 187, 193, 359-363, 365, 369,

371> 373 Dravya-guna-samgraha, 364 dravya-prabhdva, 359, 363 dravya-yajna, 487 dravydtmakatd gunasya, 191 Dream appearances, 203 Dream conceptions, 240 Dream construction, 21, 240 Dream experience, 6, 8, 28, 241, 266 Dream ideas, 26 Dream knowledge, 310, 355 Dreamless sleep, 53, 101, 154, 215 Dream life, 80 Dream objects, 36 Dream perceptions, 80 Dream persons, 266 Dream state, 195, 240 Dreams, 5, 19-21, 25, 26, 194, 269,

270, 283 Drink, 330, 501 droha, 413 Dropsy, 282 Drought, 370 Drugs, 277 Drug system, 294 Drupada, 541

Dry, 332, 357, 361, 408; country, 370 Dryness, 358, 360, 362 n., 365 Drdhabala, 348 «., 359, 426, 429-431,

433, 434 Drdhabala samskara, 434 drdha-bhdvand, 256 Drg-drsya-prakarana, 79 drk, 152, 199 drk and drsya, 200 drk-sthiti, 454 drsah adrsyatvat, 199 drsya, 88, 152, 199, 232 drsyamdna, 369

drstdnta, 194, 375, 378, 381 n., 383 drstdnta-sama, 381 n. drstdnta-viruddha, 385 drstdrtha, 383 drsti, 221 Drsti-srsti, 17 n. Drsti-srsti school, 16 drsti-srsti-vdda, 52, 84, 364 Dual experience, 213 Dualistic, 2; writers, 192 Duality, 95, 101, 148, 221, 224, 226,

243 ; of subject and object, 88 Ducts, 344 «., 345, 346 duhkha, 277, 371 duhkha-sahisnutd, 419

duhkham, 22 n.

duhkha.bha.ve, 92 n.

Dullness, 303, 360, 373, 408

duradhigamata, 261

Duration, 156

Durgacarya, 535

Durgagupta, 432

durniscaya, 255

Durndmd, 300

Duryodhana, King, 502

Dusty, 408

Dutt, Dr U. C, 429

Duty, 373, 438, 439, 442, 444, 445,

457, 480, 484, 501, 505-508, 520-

523 dusya, 328

Dvaidha-nirnaya-tantra, 432 Dvaita, 57 n. dvaitddvaita, 44 Dvaydvin, 300 dvddasdnguli, 257 Dvapara age, 410 dvdra, 47, 112 Dvaraka monastery, 192 dvesa, 267, 370, 413, 414 Dvivrahlya, 430 dvy-anuka, 189, 190, 193 Dyads, 189, 306 dyauh, 292 n. Dying, 182 n. Dynamical, 234, 238 Dynamic principle, 334 Dalhana, 273, 277, 279, 286 n. 4, 302

n. 2, 303, 313 n. 2., 314 n. 2, 329,

330, 336 «., 349, 350, 351 n., 372,

411,424-428,435

Ear, 325, 326 n.

Earth, 74, 187, 302, 359, 360, 362,

367, Soi

Earthquake, 283

Earthy, 357, 359

Eating, 338, 501

Eclipses, 283

Ecstatic joy, 450, 453

Effect, 3, 12, 38, 39, 41, 145, 161, 174-176, 183, 184, 186, 190, 329 n., 359 «., 360, 374, 396-398, 508, 517

Effective tones, 23

Effectuation, 27 n.

Efficiency, 186, 327

Effort, 248, 253, 254, 360, 369, 371,

373 Egg (born from), 309, 322 Ego, 15, 77, 101, 102, 104, 179, 233,

235, 266, 369 Ego-feeler, 104 Egoism, 24, 75, 360, 414, 510, 511

Index

Egoistic, 217, 511

ejd, 496

Ejective forces, 327

eka-jlva-vdda, 82 n.

Eka-sloka, 78

eka-vidhir eva anyavyavacchedah, 94

ekdnta, 389, 391, 546

ekdnta-dharma, 545

ekdnta-kalanah, 238

ekdntin, 545

Ekanti-Vaisnavas, 545

ekdrammayia, 459

ekdrtha-kriyd-kdritd, 184

ekdyana, 548 w. 3

Element, 227, 302, 344, 358-360, 369,

372, 408, 501, 515, 516 Elemental, 334; body, 303 ; world, 215 Elephant, 512 Elevation, 532 Eliminatory, 140 Emanations, 1, 524 Emancipation, 92, 99, 100, 115, 148,

181, 185, 204, 227, 229, 234, 242,

245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 266, 383,

3«5 Emblic Myrobalan, 294 Embryology, 273 Emotional, 464

Emotions, 149, 152, 153, 245, 411 Empirical, 366 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,

289 n. 4, 299, 301 n. 2 Endeavour, 255 Endurance, 495, 502, 505 n. Enemy, 295, 501, 509-511, 514 Energy, 244, 327, 333, 373, 510 Enjoyable, 464 Enjoyer, 181, 186, 526 Enjoyment, 181, 229, 238, 246, 368,

446, 470, 509, 522 Enmity, 497 Entity, 12, 15, 20, 21, 31, 31 «., 68,

187, 233, 236 Entrails, 289 Envy, 497 Epidemics, 408 Epistemological, 32, 89 n. Epistemologically, 36 Equanimity, 475, 477, 500, 501, 504,

508, 511,512, 530, 531; of mind, 511 Equilibrium, 236, 237, 327, 329«.,

333.358, 530 Erroneous, 64; appearance, 65; impositions, 21 Error, 5, 417; of judgment, 416 Eruptions, 326 n. Erysipelatous inflammation, 299 esand, esd, 496

Eschatological, 520

Eschatology, 517

esse est percipi, 268, 272

Essence, 38,40, 129, 164,168,236,24?, 358

Essenceless, 8,35,169,233 ; products, 4

Essencelessness, 7, 35, 234

Essentials, 159

Established, 19

Eternal, 24, 63, 73, 121, 179, 180, 188, 369, 372, 379, 380; consciousness, 181; entities, 187; soul, 179; substances, 161; thing, 191

Eternality, 191, 386 n.

Eternity of atoms, 187

Ether, 302

Ethereal, 357, 359

Ethical ideas, 496

Ethics, 500, 501, 514

Ethics of Buddlrism, The, 496 n. 2

Ethics of the Hindus, 506 n.

Ever-existent, 18

Evil, 445, 497, 498; effects, 408

E volutes, 172

Evolution, 16, 24, 372, 410 n.

Excitants, 29

Excitation, 198

Excitement, 409, 410

Excreta, 317, 325, 327-330, 347, 35©-352; channels, 348

Exhalation, 258, 449, 459, 460

Existence, 26«., 32, 183, 193, 243, 498, 517; of the soul, 383

Existent, 12, 155, 194, 234, 239, 373; entity, 232

Existing entity, 181-183

Experience, 20, 22, 27, 33, 34, 44, 58, 66, 68, 72, 75, 84, 94, 101, in, 129 138, 149, 15c, 167, 179, 187, 203, 266, 270, 271, 280, 368, 404, 465, 468, 470, 499

Experimenting, 384

Expiating sins, 282

Expiation, 508

Expiration, 259, 262

External, 271; characteristics, 21; karma, 238; object, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, 27, 151, 269, 270, 272, 282, 366; senses, 156, 344; sensibles, 22; world, 25, 26, 26 «., 209, 211, 270

Extinction, 249, 501

Extra-individual reality, 89 n.

Extra-mental, 24

Extreme, 508; idealists, 21

Extremism, 504

Eye, 325, 326 n.

Eyebrows, 342, 353 «., 355

Eye-diseases, 246, 298

573

Fact, 236

Factor, 516

Fainting, 498

Faith, 24, 373, 494, 505, 512

Fallacies, 17, 123, 194, 377, 378, 386,

387.

Fallacious argument, 175

False, 20, 27, 65, 129, 152, 155, 178, 182, 213, 217; appearance, 6, 25 n., 96,-113, 156, 233; association, 154; cognition, 136; creations, 7, 8; experience, 102, 154, 155; ignorance, 4; knowledge, 8, 12, 155, 233, 414; object, 113; perception, 155, 224; predications, 8; presentations, 155; relationing, 154; show, 37, 38

Falsehood, 154, 217,498 «.; two meanings of, 105

Falsity, 152; of the world, 454

Faridpur, 225 n.

Fasting, 278, 497

Fat, 317, 318, 322, 324, 325, 336, 347-349. 352, 3 6r '» channel, 348

Fatality, 404

Fate, 404

Fatness, 333

Faults of expression, 146

Faulty answer, 384

Faulty statement, 384

Fear, 333, 492, 510

Feeble discrimination, 250

Feeling, 23 n., 24, 71, 178, 179, 263, 341, 412, 414, 498; as indifference, 23 n. ; of disgust, 461

Feeling-stuff, 414

Fellow-being, 511

Ferm en cation, 336 n.

Fetter, 497

Fever, 282, 300, 396, 398

Fibula, 285 n. 6

Fiery, 357, 359; character, 331

Filosofia Indiana, 398 n.

Fineness, 360

Finished discrimination, 250

Finitude, 16

Fire, 74, 140, 141, 160, 187, 194, 238, 302,331-334. 359, 526

Firm will, 24

Fistula, 276

Five vayus, 75

Fixation of will, 504

Flame, 182, 184

Flashing, 64

Flesh, 291, 317, 322, 324, 331, 342, 347, 349, 352, 361; currents, 348

Flies, 409

Flowers, 333

Fluids, 302

Foam, 329

Foe, 512

Foetal development, 318; according to Atreya, 309, 310; divergences of view referred to, 316; in the Garbha Upanisad, 312//.; its processes in Caraka and Susruta, 317 ff.

Foetus, 290, 302, 303, 306-308, 314-3i7. 322, 333, 346, 384, 406, 408

Folklore, 295 n. 1

Folk-notions, 295 n. 1

Folly, 498

Food, 330, 348, 349, 436,501

Food-juice, 308, 331, 345, 347, 350-352, 355

Foolishness, 415, 509, 522

Force, 253

Forehead, 354

Forgiveness, 505, 510

Forgiving nature, 505 n.

Forgiving spirit, 510, 511

Formalism, 119, 124, 125

Formative, 415

Formless, 254

Foundation, 506

Free-will, 252, 255

Friend, 510-512

Friendly, 378, 511

Friendship, 460, 497, 529, 534

Frogs, 109

Fruition, 255; of actions, 472

Fruits, 333

Fruit-yielding actions, 246, 247

Fuel, 249

Full-moon, 520

Function, 31, 179, 239, 366, 367, 525; of thought, 14

Fury, 497

Gadadhara, 428

Gadadhara Bhattacarya, 119, 124 gahanam, 496 Gain, 503, 508, 512 gala-ganda, 298 n. Gall-bladder, 288 gandha, 194, 236, 350 Gandhabba, 539 Gandhamadana, 544 Gandharva, 300 gandharva-pattanam, 233 Gandharva-tantra, 393 ganta gacchati, 1 69 gantho, 496 Gangabha^ta, 515 Gaftga, 354

Gaiigadhara, 79, 347~349. 380 n. 2., 429-431

Index

Garigadharendra SarasvatI, 56,220,231 Garigahari, 79

Gaftgapuri Bnaftaraka, 50, 51 Gangesa, 54, 125, 126, 146 Gangesa Upadhyaya, 119 Gananatha Sen, Mahamahopadhyaya,

337 "-,353 n. ganda-mald, 298 Ganesa Bhisaj, 434 Garbe, R., 550 garbha-kard bhdvah, 309 Garbha Upanisad, 312 n. 3 garbhdsaya, 313 garbhotpdda, 328 Garland, 498 n., 525 Garuda, 540 Gauda, 126

Gauda Abhinanda, 232 Gauda Brahmananda SarasvatI, 79 Gaudapada, 2, 7, 21 «., 28, 30, 57 «.,

78, 80, 231, 234, 262 n. 1, 272 Gauda-pdda-kdrikd, 6, 251 Gaudapddlya-bhdsya, 78 Gaudavaho, 1^11 Gaudesvara Acarya, 58 Gaadorvlsa-kula-prasasti, 126 Gaurl, 82 n.

Gautama, 380, 386 n., 387, 394 gavaya, 131 gavinikd, 290 n. 3 gavlnyau, 290

Gayadasa, 425, 427, 428, 431 Gayl, 372, 410 gdho, 496

Gandhara, 274, 298 n. 4 gdndhdrl, 353 gdyatrl, 294 gedho, 496 Generality, 187 Generator, 23 Generic, 374 Genesis, 235 ghana, 235 «., 244, 314 ghana-jdgaras, 267 ghana-jdgrat-sthita, 266 ghana-samvedana, 235 ghana-spanda-kramdt, 235 n., 245 ghambhuya, 236 Ghata-jdtaka, 541, 542, 544 ghora, 281 Ghosundl, 539 gfowa, 350 Ghosaka, 171 giddhi, 496

Gifts, 267, 437, 441, 501, 513, 514 Glrvanendra SarasvatI, 52 n., 216 Gtta, 251, 418, 437-439. 443-448,

450 n. 1, 452-455. 457~459, 462-

468, 470-473. 475-479, 483-488, 490, 492, 495, 496, 498-505, 507-517, 519-526, 529, 531-534, 536, 54L 545, 546, 548, 549, 55i, 552; analysis of how actions are performed, 515, 516; avidyd in and in Buddhism, 498-500; Asvattha simile of the Upanisads, how applied in, 523, 524; avyakta, its meanings in, 470 ff.; Brahman, its meanings in, 473 ff.; clinging to God, necessity of, 529, 530; conception of sddhd-rana-dharma and varna-dharma, 505 ff.; conflict between caste-duties and other duties, 513, 514; conservation of energy principle applied to the problem of immortality, 518; conservation of energy principle in, compared with that of Yoga, Ve-danta and Nyaya, 517; crude beginnings of Samkhya in, 467 ff.; ethical ideas compared with those of the Upanisads and Buddhism,493 ff.; ethics, basis of, 498; God and his doctrine in, 530 ff.; God, his nature in,464 ff., 524 ff.; idea of God in, and in the Upanisads, 530; ideal as performance of sva-dharma in, 501, 502; ideal in, compared with the sacrificial and other ideals, 503, 504; ideal of self-surrender, 503 ; ideal of tapas, 513 ; immortality in, 518, 519; important commentaries on, 443; interpretation by Madhva, 442; interpretation by Ramanuja, 441, 442; interpretation by ^ankara, 437, 438; interpretation by Yamuna, 439; its conception of dharma and sacrifices, 486 ff.; its date, 549 ff.; its difference from Mlmamsa, 483 ff.; its relation to Samkhya, 476,477; its relation to Vedanta, 477 ff.; karma, rebirth, and liberation, 520 ff.; ksetra and ksetra-jna theory of, 463, 464; meaning of Yoga in, 443 ff.; path of knowledge and of duty, 528, 529; performance of duties with unattached mind in, 507 ff.; prakrti, purusa and God in, 464-466; prakr-ti-puru$a philosophy in, 461 ff.; principal virtues in, 510 ff.; purufa-sukta conception of God and the conception of God in, 524; rebirth and life after death, 519, 520; sattva, rajas and tamas in, 468 ff.; Samkhya, its meaning different from that of classical Samkhya in, 457, 458; sdmkliya-yoga, discussion on the

575

meaning of, in. 455-457; sense-control in, 488 ff.; sense-control in, different from that of Buddhism, 490; sense-control in, different from that of Patafijali, 491, 492; some vicious tendencies denounced in, 509, 510; standpoint of ethics in, compared with the general standpoint of Hindu ethics, 504 ff.; virtue of sameness, 511, 512; yoga in, akin to that of Panca-rdtrayoga, 461; yoga in Patafijali, indebted to yoga in, 460, 461; yoga of, different from that of Patafijali, 451 ff.; yoga of, different from the Upanisad yoga, 453 ff- J yoga instructions in, 446 ff.; yoga, its meaning different from that of Buddhism in, 459, 460; yogin, his characteristics, 449, 450; yogin, his relation with God, 450, 451

Gitd-bhdsya, 442

Gitd-bhdsya-vivecana, 193

Gitd-bhusana-bhd§ya, 443

Gltd-nibandhana, 226

Gltartha-samgraha, 439, 443

Gltartha-samgraha-dtpikd, 439

Gltdrtha-vivarana, 443

Gitd-sdrdrtha-samgraha, 443

Gitdsaya, 439

Gltd-tattva-prakdsikd, 443

Gttd-tdtparya-bodhirii, 58

Gild-tlka, 443

Gltd-vivrti, 443

Glandular sores, 296

Glenoid cavity, 287 n. 2

go, 131

God, 1, 44, 72, 80, 112, 176-178, 197, 229, 254, 372, 402, 403, 410 n., 438-

444, 446, 447, 450-453, 457, 459,

461-467, 473, 474, 476, 477, 484,

490, 492, 499, 501-504, 509, 510,

512, 514-516, 519, 522-526, 529,

533, 537, 542, 545, 547 Goddesses, 245 God's powers, 42 God's will, 109 Gods, 245, 420, 487 Going, 169 Gokulacandra, 443 Gokulanatha Upadhyaya, 126 n. Gold, 37, 512 Goldstucker, Th., 540 Gomin, 428 Good, 21,246,271,405; and bad, 23 n.\

deeds, 411; life, 422 Goodness, 507 Gopatha-Brdhmana, 274 n. 3, 276 «.,

280 «., 283

Gopala SarasvatI, 103

Gopalananda SarasvatI, 57 n.

Gopdlika, 87 n.

Gopikanta Sarvabhauma, 79

Gopirama, 79

Gopuraraksita, 424

Govardhana, 428, 431

Government, 204

Govinda SarasvatI, 55

Govindananda, 49, 8r, 103, 104, 261

Grace, 503

Grammarian-philosopher, 171

Grammatical, 142

granthi, 104

Grass, 350

Grating, 338

grdhaka-graha, 25

grdhya-grdhakdnusaya, 22

Greed, 409, 497, 498, 510

Greediness, 511

Greedy, 510

Grief, 247, 333

Griffith, 291 n.

grlsma, 335

grtvdh, 286

Gross, 355

Grossness, 360

Grounds, 17

Growing, 36

Growth, 29; of the body, 322

grha-godhikd, 298 n. 7

grha-stha, 505

Grhya-sutras, 281

guda, 285, n. 7

guddbhyah, 288

Gujarat, 192

gulgulu, 393

gulpha, 284 n. 4

gulphau, 284

guna, 162, 174, 175, 187, 188, 190, 194, 292, 314 n., 329, 330, 332, 357, 358, 359 n., 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 369, 370, 372-374, 414, 440, 44L 455-458, 462, 465-467, 476-478, 512,

515, 524, 525 guna-attachments, 477 gunamayl mdyd, 477 Guna-traya-viveka, 57 n. gunatva, 143 gunavattvdtyantdbhdvdnadhikaranatd,

162 gundtita, 512 gunin, 314 n. 1 Gupta empire, 164, 435 guru, 357, 359 «., 420 gurv-adayah, 369 gurv-ddi, 369 Gudha-bodhaka-samgraha, 428

Index

Gudhartha-dtpikd, 443 Gudhdrtha-prakdsa. 220

Hair, 325

haliksna, 288

Hallucinations, 5, 180

harnsa, 252 n.

Handful, 343 n.

hanu-citya, 287

Hanumad-bhdsya, 443

hanvor dve, 287 n. 4

Happiness, 113, 501, 512, 530

Happy, 277; temper, 513

Hara-kinkara, 122

Hara - kinkara - nyayacarya - parama-

pandita-bhatta-vddtndra, 122 Hardness, 328, 360 Hare's horn, 5, m, 240 Hari, 442, 535, 543 Hari Diksita, 82 haridrd indravarunl, 297 Hari-gitd, 545

Harihara Paramahamsa, 57 n. Hari-lila-vydkhya, 225 Harinatha Carina, 148 n. Hariscandra, 427, 431 Harmful, 357 harsa, 313 hasti-jihvd, 353 Hate, 489

Hatred, 360, 370, 373, 497~499 hatha, 268

Hatha-Yoga, 373, 455 Hatha-yoga-pradipikd, 354 n. havih, 461 Harita, 397, 427 Hdrlta-samhitd, 432 Head, 297, 336, 340, 343 Headache, 300 n. 2 Head disease, 296, 340 Health, 330, 384 Hearing, 236, 360 Heart, 288, 290 n. 2, 316, 340, 344 «.,

345, 347. 352,355 Heart diseases, 299 Heat, 194, 238, 241, 320, 321, 325,

328, 331, 358, 360, 362 n., 365, 419,

500, 510, 511 Heaven, 229, 503, 520, 523 Heaviness, 335 n., 358, 360, 361, 369 Heavy, 337 «., 357 Heels, 284 Heliodorus, 540 Hell, 91, 489, 510 hemanta, 335, 370 hemanta-grlsma-varsdh, 321 n. Hemadri, 427, 434 Hemorrhage, 289; of women, 297

Heracles, 543

Heramba Sena, 428

Herb, 298, 358 n., 365

Heredity, 273

Hermaphrodite, 312 n. 3

Hermitage, 229

Heroism, 502, 505 «., 525

hetdv irsyu, 420

hetu, 120-123, 148, 194, 374, 379, 380,

381 «., 386 «., 387, 388, 395 Hetu-tattvopadesa, 49 hetv-antara, 388 hetv-artha, 389, 390 hetv-dbhdsa, 194, 386 n., 388, 389 n. Higher self, 453, 466 Himalayas, 229, 370 hirnsa, 419 Hindu Ethics, 483, 504; standpoint of,

504 ff. Hindu Mysticism, 449 n. 1 Hindu philosophy, 515 Hiranyagarbha, 76 Hiranyaksa Kausika, 357 Hiranyaksya-tantra, 435 hira, 289, 290, 344, 346 Hiriyanna, 1 «., 43, 85 «., 86, 98,

100 n. History 0/ Indian Logic, 392 History of Indian Philosophy, 1, 17,

265 n. 4, 269 n. 1, 271 n. 1, 4.JJ n. 1,

501 n. History of the Vaisnava Sect, Early,

544 n. hitd, 277, 344, 405, 420, 422 hitd nddts, 345 Hinayana, 500 Hinayana Buddhists, 168 Hoernle, R., 279, 284 n. 3, 285 n. 4, 286

n. 1, n. 2, n. 3, n. 4, 287 n. 5, 329,

424,428-431,433,434 Holes, 332 n. homa, 281

Homogeneous, 14, 377 Horns, 191 Hostile, 378 Hot, 242, 312«., 357-359, 361-363,

365«. Householder, 505 hrdsah, 322 hrl, 24, 510 hrdaya, 288, 340 n. hrdaya-stham pipdsd-sthdnam, 348 n. hrdayotkleda, 335 n. hrt, 292

hrt-padma-yantra-tritaye, 258 Hultzsch, E., 219 Human body, 278, 302 Humanity, 506

577

Human passion, 497

Human self, 42

Humid, 408

Humility, 534

Hunger, 254

Hygienic habits, 308

Hypothesis, 12, 26, 64

Hypothetical, 337; entities, 233, 336

icchd, 264, 370, 496

Idea, 26, 30, 31, 182, 186, 375, 501,

5i°, 525 Ideal, 503, 504; creations, 236 Idealism, 19, 21, 25, 35, 102, 213, 221,

256, 268, 270; refutation of, 269 Idealistic, 231; Buddhism, 231, 234,

242; monism, 164; philosophy, 234 Idealists, 402 Ideation, 20, 31 Identical, 15, 26, 27, 30, 31 n., 32,

33, 36, 38, 64, 68, 90, 152, 153, 169, 172, 173, 183, 184, 202, 224; entity,

34, 202; object, 176; point, 20 Identity, 14, 31, 33, 34, 65, 72, 131,

152, 227, 370, 526; as a relation, 14; function of thought, 14; in diversity, 172; of the awareness, 32, 165; of cause and effect, 165; of the self, 34, 47, 65, 67

Idleness, 333, 373

ida, 257, 292 «., 353, 453

ida nadi, 354

Ignorance, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 24, 73, 74, 98,101,104,148, 153,154, 185,187, 203, 204, 251, 267, 333, 409, 413, 414, 416, 462, 479, 498-500, 509, 510, 522, 529, 530

Ignorant, 367, 378

ihdmutra-phala-bhoga-virdga, 495

Iliac, 348

Ilium, 285 71. 7

Ill-temper, 497

Illumination, 62, 178, 204, 210, 211 «., 212

Illuminator, 526

Illusion, 3, 6, 9, n, 16, 25, 29, 32, 36, 47, 64, 69, 101, no, 114, 148, 194, 197, 198, 200, 204, 223, 239, 241, 261, 524; difference in the theory of, between NagSrjuna and ^ankara and Gaudapada, 7

Illusoriness, 533

Illusory, 26, 28, 73, 101, 109, 181, 221, 234, 240; appearances, 101, 113; character, 217; cognition, 180; creation, 468; experience, 185; images, 180; impositions, 30, 113, 114, 150, 194; knowledge, 139; perception,

73, J34, 152; products, 223; silver,

118; snake, 206 n. Ill-will, 497 Image, 14, 546 Imaginary, 271 Imagination, 90, 233, 261, 266, 328,

367,373 Imaginative construction, 21 Immanent, 42, 524; self, 271 Immediacy, 13, 14, 63, 69, 105 Immediate, 149, 150; antecedence,

144; contact, 211 Immediateness, 138 Immoral, 23 n., 464, 478, 484, 501 Immortal, 473, 476, 502, 512, 525,

526 Immortality, 294, 456, 512, 513, 518,

521, 537 Immutable law, 31 n. Impatience, 373 Imperative, 483 Imperishable, 476, 517, 518 Impermanent, 230, 241 Implication, 18, 148, 384, 521 Importance, 370 Impossible, 159, 169, 188 Impotency, 333 Imprecations, 295 Impressions, 65, 239, 250 Improper use, 321 Impure, 36, 37, 38, 303, 408; states,

239 Impurities, 327, 503, 504 Inactive, 360 Inanimate, 36, 359, 360 Incantations, 278, 281 Incarnation, 502, 525 Inclinations, 23Q, 242, 251, 497 Incomprehensible, 164 Inconsistencies, 166 Inda, 539

Indefinability of nescience, 222 Indefinable, 12, 16, 22, 29, 51, 118,

127, 128, 156, 163, 164, 205, 221,

224, 499, 529; nature, 155; stuff,

221 Indefinite existence, 16 Independent co-operation, 184 Independent existence, 59 Indescribable, 35, 36, 48, 147, 164,

194, 195, 203, 221, 232-234, 236,

265, 271; nature, 109 Indescribableness, 35 Indestructible, 33, 512, 538 Indeterminable, 134 Indeterminate, 22,401,454; cognition,

94; experience, 97; knowledge, 21;

materials, 23

Index

Index, 148 n.

India, 402

Indian anatomists, 286 n. 2

Indian Antiquary, 550

Indian Interpreter, The, 550

Indian literature, 256

Indian medical men, 377

Indian Medicine, 423, 436

Indian philosophy, 119, 227, 273, 369, 377, 395.4H, 4*7 1 pessimism in, 414

Indian thought, 375, 376 n., 408, 421

Indifference, 246, 501

Indigestion, 348

Indignation, 333, 497

Indische Studien, 288 n. 2

Indispensable, 18, 523

Indistinguishable, 377

Individual, 33, 58-60, 115, 131, 139, 159, 189, 369; consciousness, 77; good, 485; ignorance, 84; members, 188; persons, 84, 109; self, 75; soul, 72, 205 71.

Individuality, 449

Indivisible, 157, 199

Indo-Iranian, 295 n. 1

Indra, 229, 295 n. 3, 304, 328, 433

indrajdla, 244

Indrd-visnu, 535

indriya, 23, 238, 239, 366

indriya-dharana, 494

indriya-nigraha, 505

indriya-vijaya, 405

Indu,304,328, 433

Induction, 148

Indulgence, 509

Inequality, 229

Inert, 337 n.

Inertia, 360

Inexhaustible, 356

Inexplicable, 20, 29, 48, 156, 158, 185

Inference, 18, 26 n., 32, 63, 66, 68, 72, 106, 118, 120, 129, 139, 141, 148, *59, 167, 176, 192, 194, 198, 213, 302, 365, 373-376, 380, 396, 398, 408

Inferential, 77; cognition, 135; knowledge, 18

Inferior, 378

Inferiority, 370, 401 n.

Infinite, 16, 63, 73, 113, 454; consciousness, 77; differences, 132; number, 358; regressus, 202; time, 132

Inflammation, 282

Inhalation, 258, 259, 449, 459, 460

Inherence, 360

Inherent, 22; movement, 20

Inhering cause, 144

Initiation, 547

Injunction, 509, 520

Inner change, 22

Inner consciousness, 26 n.

Inner dynamic, 24

Inner law of thought, 29

Inner psychoses, 22

Inner states, 185

Inoperative, 177, 269

Inscriptions, S.I., 219

Insects, 409

Insensible, 254

Inseparable, 191, 374; inherence, 183,

37i Inseparableness, 191; of character,

191; of space, 191; relation, 360;

relation of inherence, 40 Insomnia, 337 n. Inspiration, 262 Instinctive passions, 252 Instinctive subconscious roots, 26 Instincts, 415 Instructions, 21, 229, 501 Instrument, 45 Instrumental cause, 12, 360, 372,

410 Instrumentality, n, 112 Instruments of cognition, 137 Intellect, 75, 373, 406 Intellectual, 378; states, 179 Intelligence, 89, 268, 320, 321, 360,

369, 373. 375, 504, 516 Intelligent, 36, 38 Intelligible, 36 Intense, 251 Intention, 497 Interdependence, 7, 8, 22 Interdependent origination, 3 n. Internal canals, 289 Internal organ, 310 n. 2 Interpretation, 1, 356 Intervening, 144 Intestine, 288, 297, 348, 351 Intimate relation, 40 Intoxicating drinks, 498 Intrinsically, 242 Intrinsic difference, 201 Introduction, 49 Intuitive, 73; consciousness, 154, 199;

perception, 113 Invalid, 18, 141, 184, 186 Invariability, 31 n. Invariable, 172, 186; antecedence, 145,

186, 326, 386, 398; concomitance,

139-142, 148; connection, 176;

power, 185; prognostication, 397 Invariably and unconditionally associated, 380

579

Invariably associated, 396

Invisible, 337 n.

Inward resolution, 482

Iron age, 402

Irrelevant, 160

Ischium, 285 n. 7

itaretarasraya, 97

itaretardsraya-prasangdt, 95

Itihdsa-veda, 274 n. 3

1-tsing, 433

Irsyd, 413

Ha Upanisad, 551

Ijd, 78

Is'dvasya-bhdsya-tippana, 193

Iiopanisad-bhdsya, 78

Isvara, 3Q, 48, 50, 72, 80, 112, 176, 177, 197, 372, 474, 533J its criticisms by Kamalasila, 176 ff.

isvara-bhdva, 505 n.

Isvarakrsna, 80, 171, 372, 428, 476

Isvara-samfntd, 547, 548 n. 1

Isvarasena, 431

Hvardbhisandhi, 126

Ista-siddhi, 198, 199, 205, 213

Ista-siddhi-vivarana, 198

Ista-siddhi-vydkhyd, 198

Jackals, 409

Jacob, G. A., 82

Jacobi, H., 398 n.

jada, 36

jaddtmikd, 105

jaddtmikd avidyd-sakti, 105

Jagaddhara, 443

Jagadlsa, 79

Jagadlsa Bhattacarya, 119, 124

jagan-mithydtva-dtpikd, 57 n.

Jagannatha Paficanana, 79

Jagannathasrama, 53, 56, 103,193, 216

Jaimini, 479, 486

Jaina, 98, 119, 171, 172, 399, 544. 55°

Jaiyyata, 427

Jalada, 283

jalpa, 377-379. 4°i

Jalpa-kalpa-ta.ru, 347 «., 380 n. 2

Jonah, 76

Janardana, 49, 205, 543

JanSrdana Sarvajfia, 52 n.

janghe, 285

jangida, 293, 294, 295 n. 3

Japan, 294

jardyu, 291

jatru, 286 n. 2

Jatukarna, 427, 432

Jatukarna-samhitd, 432

jatd, 496

Jaundice, 282, 297, 298

Jaundiced eye, 143

Jayacandra, 126

Jayanandi, 431

Jayanta, 51, 107, 279, 280, 307 m. i,

394, 399, 413, 4H Jayarama, 443 Jayatirtha, 442 Jaydkhya-samhitd, 491 Jayolldsa-nidki, 220 Jabdla-brdhmana, 251 jddya, 10 jdgaruka, 338

jdgrad-vdsandmayatvdt svapna, 76 jdgrat, 241, 264 jdgrat-svapna, 266 jdgrat-svapna sthita, 267 Jajala, 283, 432 jdlinl, 496 Janaklnatha, 218 n. jdnu, 285 n. 4 jdnunoh sandht, 285 Jdtaka, 248 «., 424 jdti, 43, 159, 194, 380-382, 387, 401,

498 Jealousy, 267 Jejjata, 372, 428 jhdna, 459, 460, 500 jigimsanatd, 496 jijndsd, 384 Jina, 49, 50, 72, 75, 84, 85, 88-90,

205 n., 235, 236, 239, 304 Jinadasa, 428, 431 ftva, 104, 105, 109, no, 112 jiva-bhuta, 464, 472 jtva-caitanya, 77 jtva-dhdtu, 241 Jlvaka, 276, 424 Jlvaka-tantra, 435 jlvana, 328 jivana-purvaka, 515 fivan-mukta, 245-247, 250 jivan-mukta state, 248 jlvan-muktatd, 245 Jivan-mukti, 246, 251, 252 Jivan-mukti-viveka, 214, 216, 251,

252 n., 268 jlvann eva, 251 fiva-rdsi, 44 jtva-sthiti, 260 Jlva-sutra, 436 jivatvdpddikd, 104 Jtvddana, 432 Jlvananda, 430, 431 jlvdtman, 461 jivita, 368

jimtendriya-virodhini, 21 n. jlvotkrdnti, 260

./nana, 100, 272, 491, 499, 505 n. jndna-gata-pratyaksatva, 207

Index

Jnanaghana, 82 n. jndna-karma-samuccaya, 44, 100 jndna-nddl, 355 jnana-pratisandhata, 368 Jndna-samkalinl, 354, 355 jndna-samskdra, 250 Jndna-sdra, 232 yiidna-siddki, 148 n. jiidnavatl, 378 Jnana-vasistka, 231 jndna-vi$aytkrtena rupena sddrsyam,

134 jnana-yoga, 441, 442, 456, 487, 529 Jnanamrta, 99 Jnanamrta Yati, 78 Jnandrnava, 432 Jnanendra Sarasvati, 54, 79 jndnin, 531 Jfianottama, 58, 87 «., 98, 99, 148 «.,

198 Jfianottama Bhaftaraka, 82 n. Jfianottama Misra, 48 jndtatd, 152, 211 jndtur jneya-sambandhah ,105 Jobares, 543 Joint causality, 177 Joint nature, 184 Joint operation, 472 Joints, 331, 336, 348 Joy, 333, 373, 467, 495, 504, S".

512 Judgments, 341 Jug, 143, 151 juhvati, 448 jvara, 296 jyotih-sthdna, 318 Jyotis, 275 n. jyotisa, 547

Kahola-brdhtnana, 251

kaivalya, 251, 454

Kaivalya-kalpadruma, 56

Kaivalyananda Sarasvati, 443

Kaivalyananda Yoglndra, 56

Kaivalyasrama, 79

kakdtikd, 287

Kakfaputa-tantra, 426

Kakubha, 300

kalpa, 275 n., 526, 547

kalpand, 90, 238, 239, 312 «., 314, 37°

Kalpa-sthdna, 424, 429

Kalpa-taru, 52

Kalyana Bhafta, 443

Kamalajanayana, 225 n.

Kamalasila, 25, 27 n., 28, 31 «., 171, I 72, 175, I 7°, 178, 179, 181-185, 186 n., 187, 188, 375,376; criticisms

against the non-permanency of entities answered by, 185 ff.; Yogasena's criticisms against the doctrine of momentariness answered by, 184; his criticism of the concept of God, 176 ff.; his criticism of the concept of Isvara or God, 176ff.; his treatment of the different views of the nature of momentariness, 186; his criticism of the doctrine of soul (Nyaya), 178, 179; his criticism of the soul theory of Kumarila, 179 ff.; his criticism of the Yoga concept of God, 177 ff.; his doctrine of momentariness, 182 ff.; his refutation of Nyaya-Vaisesika categories, 187 ff.; his refutation of the Samkhya theory of soul, 181; his refutation of the theory of the persistence of entities, 182 ff.; his refutation of the Upanisad theory of self, 181; his theory of causal efficiency {artha-kriyd-samarthd), 183 ff.

Kamalasila and ^antaraksita, their criticisms of the Samkhya doctrine of parindma, 172 ff.; writers mentioned in their work Tattva-satn-graha and its Panjikd, 171

Kambalasvatara, 171

kamma, 500

Kanauj, 126

Kanha, 541, 544

Kanhayana, 544

Kanada, 370

Kandda-sutra-nibandha, 123

kandard, 324, 352

Kaniska, 429 n. 1, 431

kantha, 353 n.

kantha-nddt, 286 n. 2

kanthorasoh sandhih, 348 n.

kapdlam, 287

kapdltkd, 285 n. 4

kapha, 257 n. 2, 300, 317, 325-331, 333, 334, 335 «•, 336, 337, 339, 350-352, 361, 365, 392

kaphoda, 286 n. 4

kaphodau, 286

Kapila, 410 n., 477

Kapilabala, 429

Kapila-SSmkhya, 458

Kapila-tantra, 435

karana, 389

karana-sakti-pratiniyamdt, 174

Kara^ha, 432

Karavirya, 424

Kardla-tantra, 435

karma, 101, 104, 185-188, 237-239, 243, 249, 253, 255, 256, 302, 310,

581

339. 357. 359, 360, 371, 383, 402-404, 408, 437, 439, 488, 520-522,

524, 533 karma-bljam manah-spanda, 238 karma-nase mano-ndsah, 238 karma-purusa, 303 n., 373 karma-sannydsa, 457 karma-yoga, 441, 442, 444, 451, 45*.

457, 529 Karna-bhdra, 550 karna-sula, 299 kartavyatd, 482 karta, 237, 314 kartr, 244, 395, 4^9, 472, 473 kartrtva, 242

kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikd-dhdrah , 104 Karuma, 300 karuna, 412, 460, 511 kasaya, 312 n., 357, 358 Katha-vatthu, 247, 248 n. Kapha Upanisad, 78, 290 n. 2, 344 «.,

345, 453, 488, 494, 523, 524 Katha-valtl, 251 kathina, 359 n.

Kathopani$ad-bhdsya-tlkd, 193 fca/u, 312 n. 3, 357, 358, 362, 365 n. kaumdra-bhrtya, 276 Kaumara-tantra, 425 kausala, 452

Kausika-sutra, 275, 282-284, 293 Kausltaki, 251, 259 n. 3, 283 Kausltaki-brahmana, 544 Kausttaki-Upanifad, 344 n. Kautilya, 541

Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen, 427 Kaviraj Gananatha Sen, 431 Kaviraja, 79 kahabaha, 299 kakatattya, 271 fca/a, 156, 235, 317, 321, 358, 359, 372,

389, 410 Kalahasti-Sarana-Sivananda Yoglndra,

219 kalatlta, 386 «., 387 Kalidasa, 230, 231, 239, 402, 550 kalpanika-purusa-bheda, 116 kdma, 327, 412, 413, 489, 490, 496,

499 ham api-artha kriyam, 515 kdmya-karma, 99 kanti, 57 n. Kanyakubjesvara, 126 KankSyana, 316,357 Kankayana-tantra, 435 kanda, 353 Kapya, 333 Kapyavaca, 327 kdraka-vydpara, 41

kdrana, 104, 137, 160, 374, 389, 395,

472 kdrana-kfana-nirodha-sama-kdlah , 21«. kdrana - kfana - vilakfana - kdryasya,

21 n. kdrana-vydpdra, 517 Kdrika, 21 w., 28, 30, 87, 250, 370 Karttika Kunda, 427, 428 Karttikeya, 107 Karunya, 228, 230 kdrya, 161, 374, 389 kdrya-jndnam, 310 n. 3 kdrya-kdranatd, 376 kdrya - kdrana - vddasya veddnta -

bahir-bhutatvdt, 221 kdrya-phala, 389 kdrya-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n. kdryatd-jndna, 515 kdrya-yoni, 389 &»a, 296, 298 n. 4 Kdsika, 297 n. 4 KasI, 424 KdH-khanda, 429 KasInStha Gastrin, 54 Kaslraja, 432, 433 n. 1 Kasmlra, 434 Kdsmlra-pdtha, 430 Kasyapa, 427

Kdsyapa-samhitd, 431, 435 Kdthaka, 486, 551 Kdthaka-samhitd, 544 Kdthakopanifad-bhdsya, 78 Kathmandu, 431 KatySyana, 540 Kdya-cikitsd, 276, 425 keddrl-kulyd, 323 Kenopanisad, 78, 196 Kenopanisad-bhasya, 78 Kenopanisad-bhdsya-tippana, 193 Kenopanisad-bhdsya-vivarana, 78 Kesava-bhafta, 79, 284, 443, 541, 543 kevala-jdgaras, 266 kevala-jdgrat-sthita, 266 kevaldnvayi, 120, 121, 123 kevaldnvayi-hetor eva nirvaktum asak-

yatvdt, 123 kevaldnvayini vydpake pravartamdno

hetuh, 121 Khalaja, 300 khale-kapota-nydya, 323 khanti-samvara, 500 Khandana-khanda-khddya, 57 n., 103,

119 n., 126, 127, 132, 133 n., 134,

141, 146, 156, 192 Khandana-khandanam, 126 n. Khandana-kuthdra, 126 n. Khandana-mahd-tarka, 126 n. Khandana-mandanam, 126 n.

Index

Khandana-phakkikd, 126 n.

Khandana-tlkd, 126 n.

Khandanoddhara, 126 n.

khara, 332, 359 n.

Kharanada-samhitd, 432

hha-tan~ma.tra, 236

khydti, 87 «., 204

Kidney, 288, 348

Kidney-bean, 358 n.

kildsa, 297

Kimldin, 296, 300

Kindness, 511; to the suffering, 510

King Aristanemi, 230

King Dasaratha, 230

King Kejadi-Verikafendra, 219

King of Cauda, 148 n.

King of Kanauj, 126

kincanam, 496

kitta, 325, 327, 331

ktkasdsu, 286 n. 2

Kleisobora, 543

klesa, 304

klesa-jneydvarana, 22 n.

kitsta, 414

kloma, 288, 318, 348

Knowability, 140

Knowable, 140

Knower, 34, 152

Knowing, 263; faculty, 179, 180

Knowledge, 18, 19, 66, 127, 148, 151-153, 228, 246, 248, 256, 266, 272, 333, 368, 373, 374, 376, 378, 403, 437, 44°, 462, 469, 475, 499, 500-502, 505 «., 508, 510, 523, 529, 534

Knowledge situation, 25

kodho, 497

Koka, 300

Konda Bhafta, 55, 108

kopo, 497

Kotalipara, 225 n.

kraminah sahakdrinah, 183

kriyd, 238, 260

kriydkh.ya-jnd.na, 491

kriyd-spanda, 238

kriydtmaka, 261

krodha, 267, 489

krodha~varjana, 505

Krkala, 75

krmuka, 298

Krsna, 438, 449, 455, 489, 500, 502, S°3, 5°7, 512, 516, 518-520, 525, 529-532, 535. 54i. 543, 544, 546, 547; and Vasudeva, 541 ff.

Krsna Acarya, 79

Krsnabhafta Vidyadhiraja, 442

Krsna Devaki-putra, 550

Krsnakanta, 79

Krsna-kutuhala ndtaka, 225

Krsnatirtha, 56, 115

Kr$ndlamkdra, 220

Krsnananda, 196

Krsnanubhuti, 82 n.

Krsnatreya, 276, 427

Krfndtreya-tantra, 435

krtaka, 182

krta-ndsant, 299

Krtavirya, 316

krta yuga, 546

krti-sddhyatd-jndna, 515

Krttika, 396

krtyd, 293

ksamd, 505

k$ana, 182 n.

Ksana-bhanga-siddhi, 49

kfanika, 182 n., 367

ksanikasya, 32 n.

ksanikatva, 368

ksara, 104

kfara purusa, 468

Ksatakslna, 431

Ksatriya, 292, 486, 487, 502-507, 514

ksdnti, 505 «., 510

ksara, 357, 358, 466

Ksdrapdni-samhitd, 432

Ksemaraja, 263

ksetra, 463-465, 471, 472, 523

ksetra-jna, 293, 410, 464, 468, 523

ksetrin, 464

ksetrlya, 297, 298, 301

ksipta, 300

ksiti, 245, 501

kstna-jdgaraka, 266, 267

Ksurika, 454

kuhu, 353

Kuksila, 300

kula-kundalini, 355

Kula-panjikd, 225 n.

kulattha, 363

Kularka Pandita, 49, 51, 119-121, 123,

124, 147 n.; introduction of his

Mahd-vidyd syllogisms, 120-122 Kulluka, 538 n. 1 Kumdra-sambhava, 230 Kumarasira Bharadvaja, 357 Kumarasiras, 316 Kumarila, 87, in, 112, 120, 147, 171,

179, 197, 214, 479, 482, 483, 485 kumbhaka, 257, 258 Kunhan Raja, Dr, 87 kuntdpa, 296 KuntI, 48

kundalinl, 354, 356, 455 kundati energy, 356 kundall sakti, 356 Kuppusvami Sastri, 43 n., 84 «., 87,

188 n.

583

Kuruksetra, 502, 507, 518, 536

Kurus, 545

Kusumdnjali, 141, 393

Kusula, 300

kus'a grass, 446

kusalotsdha, 501

kustha, 293, 294, 297, 298

Kuvalayanunda, 220

kurca, 279, 284 n. 3

kurca-siras, 284 n. 3

KGrma, 75

kurpara, 285

/ag/iu, 332, 338, 357, 359 n. Laghu-candrikd, 85, 225 n. Laghu-jiidna-vdsistha, 232 Laghu-mahd-vidyd-vidambana, 123 Laghu-samgraha, 83 laghutd, 362 7i. Laghu-tikd, 79 Laghu-vdkya-vrtti, 80 Laghu-vdhya-vrtti-prakdsikd, 80 Laksandvalt, 125 LaksmJdhara Desika, 79 Laksmidhara Kavi, 56 Laksmlnrsimha, 52, 108 laland-cakra, 355 laldta, 287 Lankdvatara-sutra, 22 n., 35, 127, 234,

272, 398 Larger intestine, 289 Laryngeal plexus, 355 Larynx, 286 n. 2, 353 n. Laukika-nydya-muktdvall, 30 n. lavall, 360/1. lavana, 312 «. 3, 357, 358 Law, 493; of causality, 31 n. lay a, 104 Laziness, 335 Idghava, 315, 362 n. Idlasd, 497

Ldtydyana-samhitd, 435 . Lean, 337 w. Leanness, 333 Learned, 378 learning, 505 Legal literature, 279 Leprosy, 297 Levi, S., 429 n. 1 Liberation, 187, 414, 415, 437, 438,

455, 469, 470, 523, 546 Lie, 498 n.

Life, 360, 368, 405, 498 n. Life-functions, 515 Life of Ndgdrjuna from Tibetan and

Chinese Sources, 398 n. Life of the Buddha, 276, 424 n. 1 Life-principle, 472

Ligaments, 324

Light, 70, 153, 332, 357, 360; of consciousness, 207 Lightness, 358, 360, 362 n. Liking, 358

Limitations, 14, 22, 200, 252 Limited forms, 23 Limited self, 113 Limited truth, 3 Limitless, 73 Linguistic, 167 lift, 480

linga, 106, 139, 198, 293, 39s, 398 linga-deha, 306 n. 1 linga-pardmarsa, 139 linga-sartra, 75 lingddibala-labdhdkdrollekha-matrena,

213

lingi, 293

Lips, 348

Liquid, 337 n.

Liquidity, 360

Liquors, 498

Literature, 377

Liver, 288, 318, 348

Living beings, 36

Lizards, 409

llld, 42

Llldvatl, 147 n.

lobha, 409, 413, 489, 497

lobhanam, 497

lobhitattam, 497

locaka, 330

Localization, 23

Locus, 19, no

Locus standi, 130

Logic, 377, 390, 392; of probability, 376 n.

Logical, 191, 373; apparatus, 51; argument, 164; categories, 389; consequence, 12; dialectic, 191; discussions, 127; disputes, 401; fallacy, 17; formation, 118, 119, 125, 129; methods, 51; tricks, 401

Logically, 19

lohinl, 291

lohita-vdsasah, 344 n.

lohitd, 317

Lokanatha, 57 n.

loka-raksd, 440

loka-samvrta, 4

loka-samvrti-satya, 5

loka-vyavahdrah, 3 n.

Lokayata, 171

lokottara, 22

loko ttara-nirvikalpa-jndna-ldbhdt, 21

Longing, 497

Looseness, 333

Index

Lord, 442; of communion, 453

Lorinser, Dr, 549

Loss, 512

Lotus, 356; in the sky, 5, 240; stalks,

3SO n. Love, 497 Lower prakrti, 464 Lower puru$a, 465, 467, 468 lubhana, 497 Lumbar nerve, 353 Lumbar plexus, 355 Lumbar vertebrae, 287 n. 1 Lungs, 288, 318 Lust, 490, 497 Lustful, 367 Lymph, 317, 318, 325

Macdonell, A. A., 259, 288 n., 345, 346, 486

mada, 267, 413

madana, 391

Madatyaya, 430

Madhu-kosa, 434

Madhu-matl, 434 n. 4

madhura, 312 n. 3, 357, 358

Madhusudana SarasvatI, 53, 55, 56, 77 «., 79, 81, 116, 118, 124, 198, 199, 223 n., 226, 227, 443; his lineage, date and works, 225, 226; his philosophy in his Veddnta-kalpa-latika, 227

Madhva, 125, 192, 442, 443

Madhva-mukha-bhanga, 220

Madhva school, 118

madhya-sarlra, 316

madhya-viveka, 250

Madras, 84 n., 87

Magic, 37, 38, 244; rites, 281

Magical creations, 37, 38, 467

Magician, 37, 38, 206 n.

Magundl, 300

mahad brahma, 462

mahat, 305, 340 n.

mahat parimdna, 189

Mahd-bhdrata, 274, 276, 306, 394, 418, 419, 450 n., 458, 461, 476, 502, 508 n., 535 n., 536, 538, 539, 541-546, 548, 550, 552

Maha-bharata Anukratnanl, 544

Mahabharata period, 508

Mahd-bhdfya, 546, 548

mahdbhuta, 362, 463

Mahadeva, 122

Mahadeva Vaidya, 79

Mahadeva Vidyavaglsa, 79

Mahd-lakpni-paddhati, 225

MahamahopSdhyaya Kuppusvami, 219

mahd-munih, 22 n.

mahd-pralaya, 109

Maharaja, 539

Maha-Ramayana, 231

mahdsupti, 104

Mahdtala, 76

Maha-vagga, 276

Maha-vidya, 49, 51, 115, 119-124;

nature of its syllogisms, 120-122;

referred to, defended and criticized

by Nyaya and Vedanta writers, 118-

120; syllogisms refuted by VSdln-

dra, 122-124 Maha-vidyd-dasaslofd-vivarana, 123 Maha-vidyd-vidambana, 103, 119/1.,

120, 122 Mahd- vidyd- vidambana - vydkhydna,

123 Maha-vidyd-vivarana-tippana, 123 MahSvrsa, 298 n. 4 Mahd-vyutpatti, 288 n. 1 Mahayana, 501, 513 Mahayana monism, 164 Mahayanists, 30 Mahesvara, 428 Mahesvara Tlrtha, 83, 196 Mahimnah Stotra, 226 Mahidhara, 232 maitra, 511

Maitra, S. K., 483 n. 1, 506 n. Maitrdyana, 471 Maitrayanl, 486, 523 Maitreyt-brdhmana, 251 Maitrl Upanisad, 259 n., 344 n., 345,

412, 448, 449 majja, 317, 328 majjdbhyah, 289 Major term, 139

mala, 234, 239, 325, 327, 328, 334 mala-dhatu, 325, 327 tnala-pdtra, 289 n. 1 Malformations, 333 Malice, 497 Malicious, 498 n. Malimluca, 300 Malla Bhatta, 79 Malleoli, 284 n. 4 mamankaro, 496 mamattam, 496 mamdyitam, 496 Man, 445 Manah, 230 manah-kalpanayd, 230 manah - parindmah samvid - vyanjako

jndnam, 198 manah-prasdda, 513 manah-spanda, 254 manana, 22, 24

585

manas, 23, 75, 76, 104, 156, 187, 194, 196, 206, 227, 232-234, 236-239, 241, 243, 244, 246, 255, 262, 292, 303. 304. 307 n. 5, 308, 341, 343, 347 "•> 35i n., 355, 356, 358, 360, 366, 367-369. 37i, 373, 458, 463

manasi, 369

manas-cakra, 355

manda, 359 n.

manda-viveka, 250

Man-god, 525, 532

Manhood, 525

Man-hymn, 537

Manifestation, 23,174,23 5; of mind ,256

Manifests, 51

Manifold world, 203

mano-javena, 304

manomaya, 76

manomaya-kosa, 75

manomaya purusa, 344

mano-ndsa, 251, 252

Manoramd tantra-rdja-tikd, 225

manoratho, 497

mano-vaha, 347 n.

mano-vahd-nddl, 355

mantra, 277, 278, 536

mantr, 351

Manu, 61, 449, 505, 542 n. 3, 546

Manukuladitya, 45 n.

Manuscript, 49, 112, 204, 205

many a, 290 n. 3

manyu, 412, 413

mangala-homa, 278

Manju-bhdp.nl , 79

Mandana, 52, 82-87, 96-102, 110,112, 148 n., 198, 204, 224, 283, 335 «., 482; all relations are mental in, 95, 96; Brahma-kdnda of Brahma-siddhi holds that perception does not apprehend diversity of objects, 88, 89; his divergence of view from Sarvajflatma Muni, 85; his identity with Suresvara the author of the Naiskarmya-siddhi disproved, 86; his refutation of the category of difference, 92 ff.; his refutation of "difference as negation," 97; his view of avidyd and mdyd, 89; his view of Brahman as pure bliss, as elaborated by Sankhapani, 90; references to his doctrine by other Vedantic writers, 84, 85; the author of Brahma-siddhi, 83; the content of the Niyoga-kdnda and Siddhi-kdnda chapters of the Brahma-siddhi of, 98; the general content of the fourth chapter of his Brahma-siddhi, 87, 88

mani, 359 n., 364

Manibhadda, 539

mani-pura-cakra, 355

marandnussatiy 459

Marbles, 134

marma, 340 n.

marman, 313/1.

Marrow, 289, 291, 317, 322, 324, 347,

348, 361 Marshy, 370 mastakdbhyantaroparisthdtsird-sandhi-

sannipdta, 342 Master, 526 mastiska, 340

mastiskam siro-majjd, 340 n. mastulunga, 340 matdnujnd, 388 n. Material, 10; cause, 10-12, 45, 51, 74,

114, 143, 195, 197, 334, 360, 372,

389, 410; objects, 178; power, 105;

staff, 11, 76, 195, 217; stuff, 109;

things, 175; world, 21, 108 Materiality, 10, 45, 114, 236 Materia Medica, 429 Mathuranatha, 443 Mathuranatha Bhattacarya, 119 Mathuranatha £ukla, 78 ma tsar a, 413 matsnd, 288 n. 3 matsndbhydm, 288 Matter, 44, 312, 526 matup, 400 n. mat ha, 99 Matmata, 300 mauna, 513 Mauryas, 540 Maxim, 27, 32, 66, 161, 389, 391, 392;

of identity, 201 Madhava, 214, 215, 428, 433-435 Madhava Sarasvati, 232 Madhva-Kara, 428 Madhyamika, 165-167 Mddhyamika-kdrikd, 164, 398, 426 Madhyamika-Sautrantika, 164 Mddhyamika-sutra, 3,5/1. Mddhyamika-vrtti,ibsn., i66w., 168 «.,

307 n. 3 mdgha, 294 ma hirnsydt, 493 Mdlati-Mddhava, 112 mamsa, 285, 312 n. 3, 317 mdmsa-dhara, 317 mdna, 373

Mdna-manohara, 120, 124 mdnasa, 469 mdnasa pratyaksa, 69 Mdndukya, 78 Mdndukya - Gaudapddlya - bhdsya -

vydkhyd, 193

Index

Mdndukya-kdrikd, 78, 92, 192 Mdndukya-Upanisad-bhdfya, 78 Mdndukya- Upanisad - bhdfydrtha-sam-

graha, 78 Mara, 489 mdrdava, 510 mdrga, 348 «., 350 Marici, 316, 333 Markandeya, 316 Martanda-tilaka-svamin, 107 mdruta, 361

mdrutddhisthdnatvdt, 316 mdtsarya, 267 Mathara Acarya, 171 Mdthara-vrtti, 400 n., 401 w. moya, 10, 11, 16, 36, 41, 44, 45, 47,

48, 50, 51. 72, 73, 77, 84, 89, 104,

106, 163, 197, 215, 217, 221, 224,

238, 239, 271, 473, 477, 524, 525, 533; alone the cause of the world, 11; as an instrumental cause (Brahman being the material cause) according to Sarvajnatma Muni, 11; differences of view regarding its relation with Brahman, 11; scholastic disputes as to the nature of its causality, 11

mdyd-mdtram, 37

mdyd-nirmitatvdbhyupagamdt, 203

tndyd power, 476

mdyd theory, 42

Measure, 148, 194, 360, 370

Mechanical, 360, 369

medos, 312 n. 3, 317, 324, 325

medhd, 328, 373

Medhatithi, 251, 394

Medhfitithi Gautama, 393

Medical, 358 «., 372, 373, 376, 378; formulas, 435; herbs, 277, 294; literature, 295, 300, 301, 354".; practitioners, 277; science, 276; system, 352; treatment, 303 n. 4; writers (later), 299

Medicinal, 359 n.

Medicine, 275, 279, 280, 320, 357, 359, 360, 363-365, 370, 371, 389,

403 Medicine of Ancient India, 424 n. 2 Meditation, 90, 256, 259, 447, 460,

493,494, 500, 501, 511 Meditative union, 446 Medium, 229 medo-dhard, 317 Medulla oblongata, 355 Megasthenes, 543

Memory, 24, 148, 261, 264, 373, 374 Mendicant, 505 Menstrual blood, 350, 352

Menstrual flow, 351

Menstrual product, 313

Mental, 24, 500, 504; causes, 187; contact, 139; control, 500;creation, 233, 235, 243, 245; diseases, 418; functions, 464; inclinations, 491; modifications, 243; movement, 238; operations, 22; phenomena, 186; state, 15, I 53, I 87, 258, 500; tendencies, 468

Mercy, 373

Merit, 248, 249, 416

Meru, 370

merit danda, 352, 353 n.

Messenger, 230

Metacarpal, 285

Metaphorical, 329

Metaphysical, 191, 192, 499, 501, 502,

5i4 Metatarsal, 285 Method of interpretation, 2 Methodological, 337 Methods, 29, 166 Methora, 543 mettd, 460 meya - svabhdvdnugdminydm anirva -

canlyatd, 127 meyatva, 121 Mice, 409

Middle discrimination, 140, 250 Migration, 406

Milk, 59, 60, 97, 175, 322-324, 350 Mind, 35, 76, 154, 156, 217, 232, 243,

256, 33i, 339, 355, 367, 368, 377,

406, 419, 447, 469, 498, 500-502,

508, 512, 530 Mind activities, 470 Mind-associated consciousness, 34 Mind-body, 523 Mind-contact, 70 Mindfulness, 500 Mind-object contact, 69 Mind-organ, 227, 310, 314, 366 Mind-person, 344 Mind-structure, 524 Mineral, 333 Minor term, 139 Miraculous, 294; effect, 364 Mirage, 5, 29, 230, 234; stream, 233 Mirror, 180 Misconception, 479 Misdeeds, 408 Misery, 41, 178 Mitdksard, 82 n., 107 Mithila, 119, 125, 394 mithuna, 392 withy a, 105 mithydcdra, 493 mithyd-jnanam, 8, 12, 413

587

mithya-jndna-nimittah, 105

mithyd-samvrta, 4, 5

mithyatva, 148, 152

mithyd-yoga, 321, 405

Mitra, 292

Mixed rasa, 359

Mixing up, 370

Mimamsaka, 46, 54, 72, 385

Mimamsa, 46, 56, 57 n., 86, 88, 98, 117, 120, 154, 219, 389, 441, 479, 483-488, 577; vidhi conception, 479 ff.; vidhi conception, diverse views on, 481, 482

Mimdmsddhikarana-mdla, 220

Mlmdmsd-sutra, 280 n., 400 «., 401 n.,

479

Mimamsa view, 99

Mimamsists, 80, 99, 125, 171, 172, 180

Mode of mind, 15

Modes of Brahman, 44

Modification, 22, 25, 30, 101, 183, 186, 210, 215, 233, 243, 372

Modifications of may a, 35

Moggallana, 248

moha, 413-417, 498

mohanam, 498

Moist, 337 n., 361

Moistening, 361

Moisture, 358, 360, 365

moksa, 44, 227, 229, 249, 267, 407, 523

moksa-sadhana, 228

moksa-sdstra, 385, 423

Moksopdya-sara, 232

Molecular, 194

Momentariness, 66, 184, 186

Momentary, 5, 32, 63, 70, 71, 96, 177, 182, 184-186, 201, 367, 368; appearance, 32; cause, 185; character, 182 n.; existents, 32; flashing, 31, 63; ideas, 30; imaginations, 233; individuals, 59

Moments, 15, 26 n., 27 n., 60, 65, 151, 182, 184, 206, 211 n., 236, 238

Mongolia, 164

Monism, 43

Monistic, 204; interpretation, 218; type, 228; Vedanta, 219; view, 203

Moon, 6, 26, 330, 525

Moral, 23 n., 24, 378, 404, 464, 484, 511, S 23; conflict, 45 3, 495 ; destiny, 206, 207; discipline, 500; efforts, 466, 467; elevation, 447, 457; injunctions, 278; life, 418; precepts,

494. Morality, 522

Morbid elements, 319

Morbidities, 325

Morbidity, 336, 360, 362, 365

Mosquitoes, 409

Mother-energy, 355

Motion, 163, 360

Motionless, 408

Motor dhamani, 351

Motor organs, 261

Mouth, 156, 325

Movement, 188, 235, 352, 365, 371;

of thought, 254 Moving, 332, 361 mrdu, 359 n., 361 mrgatrmikddayah, 21 n. mrtyu, 299 Mucus, 276 Mudga, 358 n. muditd, 412, 460 mudrds, 455 mukhya, 259 n. 3 Muktdvall, 225 mukti, 245, 272 Muktika, 511 n.

Muktika-Upanisad, 246, 247 «., 511 n. Mukundadasa, 443 Mukundasrama, 82 n. Multiplicity, 243 Mummadideva, 232 Mumuksu-vyavahdra, 231 Mundane, 512 muni, 233, 506 Munidasa, 431 munja grass, 296 Munjavan, 298 n. 4 Mundaka, 345, 551 Mundaka-bhdsya-vyakhyana, 193 Mundaka-Upamsad, 50, 78, 250

260, 344 «., 345, 494, 495. 551 Mundaka-Upanisad-bhdsya, 78 Muralidhar, P., 424 Muscles, 254 Music, 498 n. Mutual dependence, 159 Mutual help, 184 Mutual interdependence, 140 Mutual negation, 122, 200, 226 Mutual reference, 158 Mutual relations, 204 mudhd, 378 muladhara, 453 murdhni, 449 murttdmurtta-rasi, 44 mutratisara, 296 Mysterious centre, 356 Mysterious Kundalinl, The, 353 n. Mysterious operation, 364 Mysterious power, 356

Index

Mystic, 534

Mystical cognition, 491

Mystical state, 451

nada, 345 Nagnaka, 300 Nails, 325, 326 n. nairupya, 174 Naisadha-carita, 126, 393 Naiskarmya-siddhi, 17, 80, 82, 84, 99, 100, 102, 148 n.. 198, 199, 216, 251 Naifkarmya-siddhi-plkd, 148 n. Naifkarmya-siddki-vivarana, 99 naifthikl, 415

Naiyayika, 51, 71, 108, 118, 120, 124, 127, 128, 131, 134, 139, 144, 146, 163, 167, 171, 172, 176, 182, 185, 189, 227, 329, 412 na kimcid avedifam, 154 Naksatra-kalpa, 283 Nakula, 432 nalam, 345 n. Nara, 537, 543 Naradanta, 428 Narahari, 57, 231, 443 Narasimha, 79 Narasimha Bhafta, 55 Narasimha Kaviraja, 329 «., 434 na svarupa-drstih prati-yogy-apek$d,

199 Natural forces, 185 Natural quality, 502 Nature, 358 n., 501, 525; of consciousness, 64; of knowledge, 194; of things, 372

Nauseating, 501

nava, 385

nava-dvaram, 292

Nava-nltaka, 435

Nava-sdhasdnka-carita, 126

nava-tantra, 385

navdbhyasta-tantra, 385

Navel, 318, 342, 350, 352, 355

navya-nyaya, 124

na vyavahara-bljam, 89

Naya-mani-mala, 219

Naya-mayukha-mdlikd, 219

Nayana-prasddirit, 147, 156 n.

ndbhi, 289

ndbhi-kanda, 355

nddl, 257, 263, 28971., 290, 291, 344-346, 348, 353-356; its meaning, 345; its number, 345 n. t 348; its pre-Carakian senses, 345, 346

nddlka, 345

nddl-samsparsanodyata, 256

Nddl-vijndna, 354

nddl-vrana, 296

Naduvil Matham, 198

Naga, 75, 539

NaganStha, 434

Nagarjuna, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 30, 51, 119, 124, 127, 163-165, 168, 170, 171, 372, 398, 424-428, 436; his criticism of causation as interpreted by Bhavya and CandrakTrti, 164, 166; his criticism of causation contrasted with that of the Hinayanists, 168; his criticism of the concept of "going," 168 ff.; his distinction of limited truth (samvrta) and absolute truth (paramdrtha), 3; his view regarding production and nature of things, 41; his main thesis of "no thesis," 163, 164, 166, 167

NageSa, 262

Nagesvara, 55

ndksatrdni, 292 n.

ndma-rupa, 498

ndma-rupdnkura, 307

Ndma-samgraha-malikd, 220

Nana Dlksita, 17, 52, 222 n., 225

ndndpek§a-pratiyogindm bhedah pratl-yate, 95

nara, 538

narayana, 439,535,537,539,541, 543, 545, 546, 548, 549; conception of,

537.538 Narayana Dlksita, 54 n. Narayana Jyotisha, 57 n. Narayana Yati, 79 Narayanasrama, 53, 54, 216 Narayanendra SarasvatI, 78 ndsikya, 259 n. 3 nana-samvara, 500 Nearness, 360 Necessary antecedence, 186 Neck, 336 Negation, 85,91,95,97, no, 117, 131,

132, 143, 162, 182, 194, 222, 223,

271, 438 Negative, 117, 121,153; criticism, 192;

instances, 121; pleasures, 90 Negativity, 193 Neither-real-nor-unreal, 117 Neo-realist, 269 Nepal, 58 n. Nerve-physical, 356 Nerve-plexus, 353-356, 453, 455 Nerves, 256, 342, 356 Nervous system, 344, 352, 453 Nescience, 6, 9, 45, 101, 117, 148,153,

195, 221, 222, 227, 449 Neutral, 357, 378 New bones, 286 n. 1 New moon, 519

589

New Testament, 549

Nibandha, 192, 497

nibandha-puspdnjali, 49

Nibandha-samgraha, 273, 424, 427

nibbana, 460

nidarsana, 389, 392

Niddna, 301, 395, 397, 428, 430, 432,

433 Niddna-pradxpa, 434 Niddna-sthdna, 395, 425, 428 Niddesa, 539, 542, 549 nidrd, 104 nigamana, 379, 387 Nigama-tattva-sdra-tantra, 353 w. Nigamanta Mahadesika, 439 nigraha-sthdna, 388, 401 Nihilists, 127, 234 nihsvabhdva, 35 nihsesa-karmdsaya, 249 nihsvasa, 327 nijigimsanatd, 496 Nimbarka school, 443 Nimi, 357 Nimi-tantra, 435 nimitta, 74, 395 nimitta-kdrana, 360 mtrillite, 257

niranuyojydnuyoga, 389 w. nirarthaka, 389 n. nirdkdrd buddhih, 180 nirdspadd, zi n. nirdesa, 389, 390 nirnaya, 389

Nirukta, 275 «., 346 «., 535, 547 nirvacana, 389, 392 nirvana, 231, 247, 450 w. 1 nirvdna-mdtra, 233 nir-vikalpa, 22, 374, 401 nir-vikdra, 368 Niscaladasa Svamin, 216 n. Niscala Kara, 427, 429 rdscaya, 173, 373, 384 niscaydtmikd, 484 w. 1 niscaydtmikd antahkarana-vrtti, 75 niscaydtmikdh, 367 niskarsana, 169 niskriya, 163 nisprakdrikdydh saprakdrakatvena bha-

vah, 224 nitamba, 285_w. 7, 287 w. 2 Nityabodha Acarya, 111 nityaga, 368 «. nitya-naimittika, 442 Nityanatha Siddha, 427 nitya-sama, 380 w. 4, 382 n. nityatva-pratisedhdt, 386 n. nityatvdd, 22 n. nitydnitya-vastu-viveka, 495

nivasisyasi, 551

nivesanam, 497

nivrtti, 507, 508

niyama, 278, 454, 455, 491

niyatna-viddhi, 46

ntyantd, 332

niyati, 372, 410

niyoga, 392, 481

Niyoga-kdnda, 87, 88, 98

rcf/a, 29

Nilakantha, 274, 443, 545

Nllakantha Bhafta, 434 w . 4

Nilakantha Diksita, 219

nlldgalasdld, 298 n. 6

nllikd, 297

nlrandhra, 354 w.

Non-appropriation, 506

Non-being, 143, 148, 203, 238

Non-Buddhistic, 164

Non-distinction, 207-209

Non-eternal, 120-122, 386 n., 387

Non-eternality, 191

Non-existence, 28, 193, 217, 243, 517

Non-existent, 12, 28, 32, 41, in, 120, 121, 152, 155, 161, 173, 194, 224, 234, 235, 244, 259, 517

Non-existing effects, 174

Non-injury,469,505,506,508-511,514

Non-momentary, 182

Non-moral, 403

Non-perception, 200

Non-permanency of entities, 185

Non-pleasurable-painful, 23 w.

Non-production, 249

Non-self, 6, 101; elements, 24

Non-stealing, 505

Non-transgression, 500

Normal, 335; duty, 509, 514, 516; measure, 319; state, 339

Nose, 325

Nostrils, 367

Nothingness, 16

Nourishment, 307

Nrga, 107

Nrsimhasvarupa, 52 n.

Nrsimha Thakkura, 443

Nrsimhasrama Muni, 17, 31, 43 «., 51-56, 57 n., 72, 78, 92, 103, 124, 216-218; his date and works, 216; nature of his Vedantic interpretations, 217

Number, 158, 162, 188, 360, 370

Numerical, 14; difference, 370; qualities, 162

Nutrient, 365 n.

Nutritive, 357, 358; elements, 185

Nyaya, 19, 40, 51, 57 n., 107, 115, 117, 120, 122, 125-127, 137, 143, 146,

Index

Nyaya (cont.)

147, 160, 161, 168, 170, 179, 192, 205, 2ii, 248, 306, 307, 375, 379, 393, 394, 415, 482, 483 n. 2, 484, 485, 515, 517; its arguments in favour of the existence of God criticized by Kamalasila, 176 ff.; its idea of emancipation, 248; its theory of the subtle body, 306; origin of, 392 ff.; springs of action in, 412,413

Nyaya, categories, 147, 148, 156, 192; definitions, 163; logic, 167; logicians, 192; perceptions, 168; philosophy, 145, 398; psychology, 414; school, 167; system, 374, 408; view, 178; writers, 124, 127, 146, 157

Nydya-candrikd, 57 n., 425, 428

Nydya-dipdvali, 51, 116, 118, 192

Nydya-dlpdvalt-tdtparya-tlkd, 116

Nydya-dipikd, 442

Nydya-kalpa-latikd, 83

Nyaya-kandall, 83, 85, 249 n., 263 n. 1, 306, 412

Nydya-kanikd, 45 n., 83, 85, 87, 107, 482 n. 1

Nydya-loka-siddhi, 49

Nydya-makaranda, 12, 49, 69 n., 70 n., 89 n., 116-118, 147 «., 192, 194

Nydya-makaranda-samgraha, 192

Nydya-makaranda-tlkd, 116

Nydya-makaranda-vivecanZ, 116

Nydya-manjarl, 107, 248 «., 278 n., 307 n. 1, 381, 382/1., 394 n., 399, 413, 460 n. 1, 480 n. 1

Nydya-mdld, 81

Nydya-muktdvall, 219

Nydya-nibandha-prakdsa, 107

Nydya-nirnaya, 193

Nydya-parisuddhi, 119, 120

Nydya-raksd-mani, 82 n., 220

Nydya-ratna-tika, 45 n.

Nydya-ratndvatl, 77 n.

Nydya-sdra, 120, 122

Nydya-sdra-vicdra, 122

Nydya-siddhdnta-dlpa, 54

Nyaya-siddhdnta-manjarl, 218 n.

Nydya-siddhdnta-manjari-vydkhydna, 218 w.

Nydya-sudhd, 148 n.

Nydya-suci-nibandha, 107, 112

Nydya-sutra, 107, 248, 273, 371, 374, 377, 379-38i, 383 "• 1, 386 w., 387, 388 w., 393, 394, 398-401

Nyaya-sutra-vrtti, 393

Nydya-sdstra, 393, 394

Nydya-sikhamani, 54

Nydya-tattvdloka, 45 n.

Nyaya-Vaise§ika, 49, 163, 197, 310,

328, 371, 372, 515; analysis of volition, 515; criticism of its categories by Srlharsa,_i27 ff.; its categories criticized by Anandajnana, 193,194; its categories refuted by Citsukha, 157 ff.; its categories refuted by Kamalasila, 187 ff.; its categories refuted by Sankara, 189 ff.

Nydya-vdrttika, 106

Nyaya - vdrttika - tdtparya - parisuddhi, 107

Nydya-vdrttika-tdtparya-tika, 45 n.

nydya-vistara, 547

nydyacdrya, 122

Nydydmrta, 118, 225

Nydydmrta-tarangini, 118

nyuna, 384, 385, 388,389

Object, 17, 19, 25, 27, 29-31, 35, 88, 358, 367, 401; of awareness, 20, 29, 209; of consciousness, 64; of knowledge, 27

Object-consciousness, 149

Objection, 31, 101, 153

Objective, 21, 22, 24, 508; consciousness, 236; content, 15; entities, 25; existence, 21, 149; experience, 102; ignorance, 77; plane, 73; self, 34; world, 20, 236

Objectively, 236

Objectivity, 29, 101, 153

Oblations, 448, 526

Obligatoriness, 46

Obligatory duty, 99, 506

Observation, 174, 366, 375

Obstacle, 377

Occasion, 377

Occasional, 368

Occipital, 287 n. 5

Ocean waves, 329

Odour, 320, 3ss, 365

Oiliness, 328

qjas, 293, 315-317, 324 «•, 343, 34°

Old age, 512, 523

Older literature, 104

OM, 494, 526

Omnipresent, 204, 529

Omniscience, 22, 39, 53

Omniscient, 50, 118, 177; being, 135; God, 72

Oneness, 224; of reality, 129

Ontological, 36, 265, 366, 517, 518; existence, 73; objectivity, 25

Operation, 144, 177, 198

Operative, 177; action, 137; functions, 76; principle, 333

Opposite quality, 190

Opposition, 497

591

Oppositional relation, 95 Oppositional term, 95 Organ, 357, 358, 365 Organism, 515 Organized, 500 Organizer, 176

Oriental Historical Manuscripts, 219 Oriental Manuscript Library, 205 Origin, 239, 410 n., 526 Origination, 4, 161, 235; of the substratum, 12 Orissa, 164 Orthodox school, 369 Os calcis, 284 n. 3 Oscillating movement, 238 Oscillation, 158 Os innominatum, 285 n. 7 "Osteology," 424, 434 Otherness, 131, 132 Oughtness, 482 Outbursts of pleasure, 245 Ovary, 290, 302, 307, 309 Owls, 409

Pada-candrikd, 232, 434

Pada-manjarl, 297 n. 4

Pada-yqjanikd, 79

paddrtha, 389, 390

Paddrtha - candrikd - prabhasa - ndma, 436

Paddrtha-nirnaya, 44

Paddrtha-tattva, 10

Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya, 50, 51, 57 n.

Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya-vivarana , 193

Paddy, 358 n.

padma, 356

Padmanabha Pandita, 126 n.

Padmapada, 8, 9, 30, 31 n., 32, 34, 47, 48, 51, 54, 79, 86, 89 n., 102, 106, 147-149, 151, 209; causality of Brahman, 106; his followers, 102, 103; his view of perception, etc., 105, 106; meaning of ajndna, 104, 105; quarrel with Buddhists regarding the nature of existence, 32; regarding the nature of self-consciousness, 33 ff.

Padma-purdna, 393

padma-yugma-traya, 257

Paila, 432

Pain, 175, 181, 203, 242, 248, 343, 360, 366, 369, 371, 373, 412, 463, 470, 510-512 Painful, 23 «., 242 Painting, 203 Paippalada, 283

paksa, i2i, 139

paksa-dharmatd, 148

pakse vyapaka-pratltya-paryavasana-

baldt, 121 pakvds'aya, 316, 317, 330, 336 Palate, 348

Palatine process, 287 n. 4 palita, 297 Pahjaka, 300 Pancreas, 288 n. 3 Pandit, 17 n., 217, 222 n., 223 n., 224M.,

225 n., 270 n. Pandit, Mr, 111, 112 Panjpur, 429 pant ha, 348 n. Pantheism, 451 Pantheistic, 1 Pantzinor village, 429, 430 panca-dasanga yoga, 454 Pancadaii, 214, 215, 216 n., 251 n. panca-mahd-bhuta-vikdrdh, 358 Paficanada, 429 Pahcanallya kdvya, 126 Panca-pddikd, 8, 31 n., 52, 54, 102,

103, 106, 148, 209, 251 Panca-pddikd-dhydsa-bhdsya-vydkhyd,

31 n. Panca-pddikd-sdstra-darpana, 31 n.,

103 Panca-pddikd-vivarana, 17, 30, 31 n.,

32, 33 n., 34 n., 52, 53, 79, 84, 103,

148, 149, 193, 206 n., 208-210, 214,

216 Panca-pddikd-vivarana-bhdva-prakdsi-

kd, 31 n. Panca-pddikd-vivarana-prakdsikd, 54,

103, 217 Panca-pddikd-vydkhyd, 52 n. Panca-prakriyd, 52 «. Panca-rdtra, 461, 491, 546, 547,

548 n. Pancasikha, 476 panca-vidham adhydtman, 537 pancendriya-gundvahd, 355 panclkarana, 74 n., 76 Pancikarana-bhdva-prakdsikd, 79 Panclkarana-prakriyd, 79 Pancikarana-tdtparya-candrikd, 79 Panclkarana-tlkd- tattva-candrikd, 79 Panclkarana-vdrttika, 79 Panclkarana-varttikdbharana, 79 Panctkarana-vivarana, 79, 193 Panjikd, 31 n., 171 pannd, 500, 504 panidhi, 497 para, 360, 369, 370,378 parah dtmd, 368 paralokaisand, 405 parama-guru, 86 parama-hamsa, 252 m.

Index

Parama-hamsa-Upanisad, 2,52, n.

paramam padam, 228

parama-suk$ma, 411

Paramananda, 126 n.

paramdnu, 189, 193

paramdrtha, 5

paramdrtha-darsana, 248

paramdrtha-prapd, 443

paramdrtha-rupa, 4

paramdrtha-satya, 3

paramdtman, 445, 446, 455, 461, 465,

466 paramdtma-rdsi, 44 Paramesvara, 53, 206 param ojas, 343 par am dhdma, 533 para puru$a, 468 parasparddhydsa, 113 parasparopakdritd, 184 para-tantratd, 10

para-vijnapti-vife$ddhipatyat, zi n. parddi, 369 />ar<z prakrti, 465 parartha, 412 Parasara, 251 Pardsara-samhitd, 432 Pardsara-smrti, 83, 252 «. paribandho, 497 Paribhdsd, 53 Parietal, 287 «. 5 pariggaho, 496 parigraha, 409 parihdra, 388 Parimala, 106 «. parindma, 21, 38, 39, 44, 46, 172, 190,

193, 194, 224, 370, 372, 410; cause,

45; doctrine, 171; view of causation,

45 parindmi-kdrana, 51 paripdka, 27 «. parisamkhyd-vidhi, 47 parispanda, 256 parisat, 378 Parjanya, 300 w. 2 paroksatvdd acintyam, 316 Particles, 157 Particular, 63

Partless, 157, 158, 190, 199 Parts, 40

Parvataka-tantra, 435 paryanuyqjyopek$ana, 389 w. Passion, 229, 373, 414, 419, 451, 453,

459, 477, 489, 493, 497, 498, 529,

53i Passionlessness, 475 Passive, 24 pasavah, 292 m. pasyantt, 353

Patanjali, 259 m., 265, 304 n., 403, 408, 410 n., 414, 431, 436, 443, 447, 451-455, 458, 460, 461, 476, 477. 49i. 492, 504, 539, 540, 542, 543, 546, 548, 549_

Patanjali-sutra, 517

Patella bone, 285 «. 4

Path of wisdom, 495

Pathology, 434

Patience, 360, 500-502, 510

Patient, 296

patitthd, 459, 500

patigho, 497

paurnamdsl, 292 n.

paurusa, 252-254, 272, 525

paurusa-vddins, 402

Pausa, 294

Pauskalavata, 424

Pauskaldvata-tantra, 435

paustika, 281, 296

pavamdna, 292 n.

pavana, 333

PaiMnasa demon, 300

pdcaka, 303,330

Pddma-tantra, 548 n. 3

pdka, 362 365, 370

Pandava, 502, 545

Pandya, 219

Panini, 297 n., 538-540, 542, 543

pdni-pdda-saldkddhisfhdna, 285 «. 3

pdni-pdddnguli, 285 «. 1

papa, 522

pdramdrthika, 2, 44

pdramparya, 374

Parasarya, 316

pdribhd$ika, 363

pdrimdndalya, 189; measure, 190

Parsvanatha, 544

parent, 284

pdrthiva, 359

pd§anda, 541

pdsdnavat-samam, 266

Patafyala-Samkhya, 177

pdtdla, 76, 300

Patrasvamin, 172

Pataliputra, 427

pdtimokkha-sanwara, 500

Pea, 169

Peace, 444, 450, 490, 500, 501, 503,

5ii Peacefulness of mind, 510 Pearl, 525 Peculiarities, 159 Pelvic bone, 287 «. 1 Pelvic cavity, 285 Pelvis, 340, 348 pemam, 497 Penances, 539

593

Penis, 296, 326 n.

People, 509

Perceived universe, 241

Perceiver, 22, 67, 135, 139, 155, 200-

202, 209, 234, 341 Perceiving, 330; power, 200; principle,

199 Perceiving-self, 200 Perception, 17, 18, 20, 21, 65, 88, 92,

116, 117, 135, 145, 148, 159, 167,

180, 187, 192, 194, 200, 202, 205,

207, 208, 212, 213, 226, 234, 254, 269, 270, 302, 373, 374, 377, 401, 407; of identity, 65

Percepts, 270

Perceptual, 77; data, 156; experience, 105; knowledge, 77, 192; process,

208, 217 Percipi, 19 Performance, 502 Perfumes, 498 n. Pericardium, 284 n. 3 Permanence, 186

Permanent, 22, 179, 241, 368, 369; consciousness, 71; convictions, 240; entity, 22; perceiver, 187; self, 71, 179; subject, 366; substance, 145

Persistence, 18, 67; of knowledge, 18

Persistent, 188, 241

Persisting cause, 183

Persisting entity, 183, 184

Person, 252, 255, 367

Personality, no, 524

Perspiration, 351; channels, 348

Pessimism, 414, 504

Pessimistic tendency, 521

pest, 314, 318

Petta Dlksita, 54 n.

phala, 359

phala-tyaga, 444

phale nersyu, 420

Phantom show, n

phana, 342, 351

Pharmacopoeia, 277

Pharyngeal plexus, 355

Phalguna, 294

Phenomena, 177, 501

Phenomenal, 126, 127, 167, 499; appearance, 48; reality, 167; self, 415

Phenomenon, 374

Philosopher, 38, 446

Philosophic, 502; analysis, 467; knowledge, 246, 523; truth, 504; view, 2; wisdom, 494

Philosophical, 228, 501; development, 48; idea, 366; ignorance, 417; truth, 230

Philosophy, 44, 51, 66, 73, 228, 504,

509, 517, 525; of Badarayana, 36 Phlegm, 299, 300, 325, 365, 391 Phlegmatic diseases, 299 Physical, 238, 369, 404, 504; diseases,

418; process, 48; propulsion, 480;

sciences, 273; trouble, 512; world,

270 Physician, 277, 278, 328 n., 338, 357,

387, 389, 392, 415 Physiological activity, 331 Physiological effects, 360 Physiological functions, 261, 263, 331,

333 Physiological operations, 332, 335 Physiological position, 332 picchila, 359 n., 361 pihd, 497

Pilgrimage, 230, 441, 508 Pillar, 26 pingald, 257, 292, 353 n., 354, 453,

454 pirida, 43, 312 n., 314 pipdsd, 496 pipdsd-sthana, 288 n. 1 Pipe, 346 pippall, 299 n. 1 Pischel, R., 345 n. Pisaca, 282, 300 Pisaca-veda, 274 n. 3 pitr-ydna, 519, 521 pitta, 257, 276, 282, 296, 300, 317,

319, 320, 325-337, 339, 34i, 344,

347, 349, 35o, 361, 362, 365, 392,

524; nature of, 330, 331 pitta-dhard, 317 pittala, 334 n. pitta-prakrti, 328, 334 pittdsaya, 350 pithara-pdka, 194 piyato, 490 pilu-paka, 194 Placenta, 291 Planet, 333 Plant, 333, 359 Plato, 506 Playful activity, 42 Playful instincts, 178 pldsl, 289 Pleasantness, 358 Pleasing, 337 n. Pleasurable, 23 n., 242; experience,

91; state, 181 Pleasure, 68, 175, 247, 248, 343, 360,

366, 369, 371, 373, 374, 4°4, 412,

452, 463, 487, 504, 508-512, 520 Pleasure-seeking, 507 Plexus, 353 «., 356

Index

phhan, 288

Pluralistic experience, 204

Plurality, 38, 39, 95, 161, 195; of causes, 161

Points of dispute, 389

Poison, 359"-, 361, 497

Polemic, 126, 127

Polemical, 204

Poles, 208

Politics, 385

Polluting agents, 326-328

Pollution, 408, 409

Popular belief, 377

Positive, 47; cause, 197; entity, 182; experience, 154; knowledge, 154; quality, 152; unity, 153

Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, 253 n., 35671.

Positivity, 193

Possession, 158

Postures, 455

posaka-rasa, 323 n.

Potency, 8, 31, 175, 359, 361-363, 37o

Potency-in-chief, 364

Potential, 23 n.; ajfiana, 53; energy, 356

Potentialities, 24

Potter, 249

Potter's wheel, 246

Power, 8, 22, 215, 243, 510; of controlling others, 505 n.; of productivity, 26 n.

Prabandha-parisodhinl, 52 n.

Prabhakara, 66, 67, 69, 147, 154, 155, 197, 249, 483, 515; his analysis of illusion, 154; his idea of emancipation, 249

prabhdva, 323, 362, 364-366

Prabodha-candrikd, 443

Prabodha-candrodaya ndtaka, 2,20

Practical action, 152

Practical discipline, 500

Practical movement, 155

Practice, 487, 500, 514

pradeia, 389, 391

pradhdna, 172, 370, 440

Pradyumna, 543, 545

Pragalbha Misra, 126 n.

Pragmatic, 371; basis, 152

Praise, 512

praisya-praisayoh sambandhah, 481

prajdh, 292 n.

Prajapati, 484

prajnapti-sat, 58

prajna, 24, 265, 491, 504, 548

Prajfiakara Gupta, 49

Prajnaninanda, 79, 196

prajndparddha, 321, 339, 405, 415-418, 422

prakarana, 57 «., 231

Prakarana-pancika, 249

prakarana-sama, 38071., 38271., 386,387

Prakatartha-vivarana, 46, 49, 50, 72, 196-198, 205, 206, 213; its philosophy, dates, etc., 196-198

prakdsa-heyatvdt, 197

Prakasananda, 17-19, 31 «., 52, 53, 55t 56, 84, 221,223-225,270; Brahma and the world in, 224; discussions regarding awareness in, 17-19; discussions regarding subjective idealism in, 17; may a in, 224; nature of ajfiana in, 222; nature of ananda in, 223; negative dialectics of, 18, 19; quarrel with Vasubandhu of, 19; theory of causality in, 221-223; view-point of his work, 220, 221; works of, 225

Prakasanubhavananda, 1771.

Prakasatman, 9, 10, 17, 30, 33, 82, 84, 89, 103-106, 118,148, 149, 151,193, 208-210, 214, 222-224, 234; his quarrel with the Buddhists regarding nature of objects, 30, 31

Prakdsdtma-sri-caranaih, 104

prakopa, 335 n.

prakrti,42, 72, 101, 104, 109, 175, 177, 181, 238, 239. 2SO. 258, 265, 272, 334. 335, 372, 388, 410, 440, 455, 457. 461-465, 467, 473, 477, 478, 482, 515, 5i6, 525, 526, 533, 534

prakrti-dosas, 335 n.

prakrti-mana, 335 n.

prakrtim yanti mdmikdm, 526

pralaya, 37, 48, 191

prama, 128, 137, 194, 206, 212, 213

pramada, 413

pramana, 77, 128, 137, 167, 194, 204, 222, 254, 373, 375, 376, 379, 380, 384/1.

pramana-caitanya, 207, 208

Pramdna-manjafl, 120, 124

Pramana-mala, 12, 13, 51, 116, 118, 148, 192

pramana-samuccaya, 44

Pramdna-vdrttikdlankara, 49

Pramdna-vdrttikdlankdra-tikd, 49

Pramdna-vidhvatnsana, 398 n.

Pramdna-zridhvamsana-sambhdsita-vr-tti, 398 n.

Pramdna-vrtti-nirnaya, 198

pramdtr, 77, 105

prameha, 343 n.

Prameya-dlpikd, 442

prameyatvdt, 121

595

pramiti, 77

Pramodapurandara Acarya, 225 n.

pranetd, 332

prasanga, 389, 391

prasanga-pratidrstdnta-sama, 380 n. 4

prasanga-sama, 381 w.

prasdda, 318, 325, 492

prasdda-dhdtu, 325

prasdra, 336 m.

Prasthdna-bheda, 225

prasyandana, 349

prasama, 335

Prasastamati, 172

Prasastapada, 162, 249, 412, 413, 505,

5 IS Prasastapdda-bhdfya, 163 «. Prasnanidhana, 428 Prasna-Upanisad, 78, 290«., 344 «.,

345 Prasna- Upanisad-bhdsya, 78 prathamd-bhumikd, 264 pratibandha, 176 pratibimba, 48 pratibimba-vdda, 106 pratijnd, 379, 387 pratijnd-hdni, 388 pratijndntara, 388 w. pratijnd-sannydsa, 388 w. Pratimd-ndtaka, 394 m. pratinivistd, 378 pratipaksa-bhdvand, 460 pratipannopddhau nisedha - pratiyogit-

vam, 222 pratipannopddhdva-pratiyogitva, 217 pratisamskartr, 425 pratisthd, 279, 285 pratisthdpand, 379 prati-tantra-siddhdnta, 383 pratlkopdsand, 448, 488 pratlta, 19, 128 pratltya-samutpdda, 3 m., 8 pratyabhijnd, 33, 65, 67 pratyag dtman, 6 Pratyagbhagavan, 147 Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan, 119/1. pratyak, 63 pratyak-cit, no pratyak-citi, 9

Pratyak-svarupa-bhagavat, 156 «. pratyaksa, 92, 194, 207, 373, 374, 376,

379,407,4" Pratyaksadevayathacarya, 439 Pratyaksa-sdftram, 354 m. Pratyak-tattva-pradlpikd, 222 m., 223 «. pratyaktva, J15 praty-anuyoga, 384 pratyaya, 395 pratydhdra, 454, 455

pratydtma-vedya, 22

pratyetavya, 19

pratyuddharati, 342

Praudhdnubhutiy 81

Pravacana-bhdsya, 250

pravartand, 482

pravartate, 314

pravrtti, 389, 507

pravrtti-sdmarthya, 130

prayatna, 238, 369-371

prayatnddi, 371

prayaUidnta, 369, 370

prayatndntariyaka, 381 «.

prayatndntarlyakatva, 382 n.

prayojana, 383, 384 m. i

prdkrta-mdna, 319, 320

prdktana, 253

prdmdnya, 214

prdna, 75, 76, 104, 258-260, 262, 291, 292, 3°3, 3", 332, 3*33, 34o, 342, 344,346,347,349,352,356,373,448, 449; as depending on the head, 340; as vibration, 263 ; as vital parts, 342; channels of, 347, 348; heart the centre of, 340; history of the meaning of, 259 ff.; seat of, according to Caraka, 342

prdnaisand, 405

prdna-harmdni, 448

prdnamaya-kosa, 76

prdna-nirodha, 258, 268

prdna-samyamana, 454

prdna-spanda, 256, 257

prdna-vahd, 318

prdna-vahdndm srotasdm hrdayam tnu-lam, 343

/»wuj voyw, 348, 355

prdndpdna-gatl ruddhvd, 448

prdndya svdhd, 448

prdndydma, 256, 257, 447-449, 452-455, 458_

prapty-aprapti-sama, 380 m. 4, 381 m.

prdrabdha-karma, 247, 250

Prdtisdkhyas, 276

prdtlttka-sattva, 270

prdyas-citta, 275, 278, 281, 295, 296

Pre-condition, 405, 506

Predatory birds, 409

Predominance, 367

Preferment, 501

Preparatory measure, 500

prerana, 481

Presentation of the false, 154

Pride, 267, 373, 409, 509-511

Principle of consciousness, 20, 22

Principle of difference, 60

Principle of intelligence, 20

Principle of thought, 35

Index

Privilege, 505

prlnana, 328

Probability, 373

Probandum, 120, 121, 139, 140

Probans, 139

Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 400 n.

Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference, 232

Process, 256, 377

Procreator, 525

Product, 13, 18, 23, 331; complexes, 4

Production, n, 18, 25, 32, 37, 38, 41, 62,166,168,173,174,177,182,184, 186, 187, 190, 235, 236; of action, 473; of knowledge, 18

Prognostication, 396, 397

Prohibitions, 504

Projection of objectivity, 25

Proof, 128

Proper discernment, 134

Proper measure, 325

Proper proportion, 327

Property, 357-360, 365, 506

Propulsion, 481, 482

Prosperity, 501

Protection, 505

Proud, 510,511

prstha-gatdsthi, 287 n. 1

prstih, 286

prthak, 370

prthaktva, 194, 370

prthivl, 75

Psychical frame, 105

Psychical process, 48

Psychological, 108, 265, 366; appearance, 32; constituents, 58; duality of awareness, 29; elements, 58-60; entities, 59; existence, 73; experience, 170; ignorance, 12, 109; necessity, 25; objectivity, 25; objects of awareness, 29; self, 9; thought,

35 Psychologically, 31 Psycho-physical parallelism, 339 Psychosis, 24, 29, 250, 254, 464 Psychosis-transformations, 22 Pthisis, 288, 299 Pubic, 348; bone, 285 n. 7; nerve,

353 Pubis, 285 n. 7 Public good, 485 pudgala, 58, 59 Pudgala-viniscaya, 58 n., 59 n. punar-ukta, 388, 389 n. Punarvasu, J95 Punarvasu Atreya, 393 Pungent, 337 n., 357-359, 363

Punnabhadda, 539

puny a, 522

pupphusa, 258 n., 318

Purana, 43, 74, 78, 228, 279, 328,

547

Purana-veda, 274 n. 3

Pure, 36, 303; annihilation, 234; awareness, 33; being, 13; bliss, 13, 90, 113, 215, 223; blissfulness, 92, cessation, 234; consciousness, 22, 3°, 33-35, 46, 65, 71-74, 77, 101, 105, 118, 179, 181, 197, 203-207, 209, 211, 227, 235, 236, 238, 241-243; essencelessness, 234; extinction, 233; happiness, 22; idea, 234; intelligence, 8, 13, 21, 22, 50, 89 «., 102, no, 233, 477; negation, 234; thought, 24; vacuity, 235

Purificatory rites, 278

Purity, 469, 502, 505, 510, 511, 513, 514, 542; of heart, 510; of mind,

438, 44i purisa, 317 purlsa-dhard, 317 purttat, 344 purusa, 181, 234, 241, 250, 251, 255,

265, 272, 379, 380, 385, 388, 440,

457, 458, 461, 465-467, 472, 477,

524, 537 purusah par ah, 465 purusa-kara, 256 purusa-ndrdyana, 537 Purusa-niscaya, 342 n. Purusa-sukta, 523, 524, 537 purusdrtha, 547 purusottama, 55, 416, 466 Purusottama Diksita, 115 Purusottama SarasvatI, 79, 225 Purusottama vana, 120 pury-astaka, 245 Pus, 325, 330 Puspdnjali, 80 puraka, 257, 258 Purnaprajna, 120 Purrraksa Maudgalya, 357 Purnananda, 232, 354 n. Purnananda SarasvatI, 79 Purnananda Tlrtha, 78, 79 Purnananda Yati, 353 «. purva, 400 n. purva-kdla-bhavitva, 160 purva-paksa, 389, 391 purva-prajnd-samskdra, 104 purva-rupa, 336 n., 396, 397 purvavat, 398-400 Purvottara - mlmdmsd-vada - naksatra-

mdld, 219 pusd, 353

597

putikd, 296 piiya, 33° n -

Qualification, 186

Qualitative change, 15

Qualities, 5, 143, 148, 152, 158, 161,

162, 187, 190, 359, 360, 3 6 9-374»

378, 462, 501, 505 n., 515 Quick, 337 n. Quickness, 156

Race, 501

Radius, 285 n. 6

Rage, 497

Raghunatha, 146

Raghunatha £iromani, 119, 124,

126 n. Rains, 59, 321, 327, 335, 370 rajas, 72, 74, 75, 303, 314, 319, 329,

367. 372, 419, 436, 456, 468 rajas element, 261 rajo-vahana-nddyah, 344 n. Rajputana, 539 Rajshahi, 49 Rajwade, V. K., 551 «. Raksah, 300

rakta, 317, 324, 326, 327, 339, 352 rakta-dhard, 317 rakta-dusti, 324 ram, 551

Rangaraja Adhvarin, 54 Rangaraja Makhlndra, 218 Rangojl Bhafta, 55, 108 ranjaka, 330 rasa, 194, 236, 302, 312 n. 3, 317, 322-

325, 327, 328, 339, 343 «., 347, 348,

35o, 357-366, 390, 391 rasa-dhatu, 323 rasa-dusti, 324 Rasa-ratndkara, 427 Rasa-sdra, 123 rasa-sthdna, 350 rasa-vahim, 348 «. Rasdbhivyanjikd, 56 Rasdtala, 76 rasdyana, 276, 301 Rasdyana-tantra, 425 Rasika-ranjim, 443 rati, 490, 497 Ratnakirti, 49

Ratna-prabhd, 103, 104, 429 Ratna-tulikd, 56 Ratna Vajra, 49 rauksya, 337, 362 n. Ravigupta, 432

Ray Chaudhury, Dr, 544, 550 Radheya, 48 Radhamalla, 326/1.

rdga, 267, 413, 414, 489, 497

rdga-dvesa, 420

rdgddi, 369

Raghavananda, 78, 115

Raghavendra Svamin, 443

Raghavendra Yati, 17 n.

rdja-harmdni, 296

Raja Makhlndra, 218

rdjasa, 367, 373, 468-470

Raja-tarangint, 431

Rajanaka, 443

rdksasas, 283

Rama, 229, 230, 255, 507, 546

Ramabhadra, 79

Ramabhadra Diksita, 431

Ramabhadrananda, 56

Ramabhadrasrama, 55

Ramacandra, 79, 238

Ramacandra Tirtha, 79

Ramacandra Yajvan, 220

Ramacandrarya, 82 n.

Ramadatta, 99

Ramadeva, 231

Ramakantha, 443

Ramakrsna, 53, 216 n., 443

Ramakrsna Adhvarin, 208

Ramakrsna Bhatta, 434 n. 4

Ramakrsna Diksita, 54

Ramanarayana, 443

Ramanatha, 57 «., 434

Ramanatha Vaidya, 434

Rdmarudn, 264 n.

Ramatlrtha, 52, 56, 79, 85, in, 115, 118, 193

Ramadvaya, 197, 198, 204, 205, 208, 212-214; ajndnas as many, 210, 211; continuity of perception through a rapid succession ajndna covering and its removal in, 211; his date and work, 204, 205; his definition of right knowledge different from that of Veddnta-paribhdsd, 212; his relation with Panca-pddikd, 209, 210; his theory of Vedantic perception in contrast to that of Veddnta-paribhdsd and Sikhdmani, 225 ff.; his view different from that of the Veddnta-paribhdsd on the subject of the continuity of perception, 211; his view of time, 211, 212; movement of vrtti and perception, 208-210; place of antahkarana in perception, 208-212; pure consciousness and perception, 211

Ramajna Pandeya, 225 n., 226

Ramananda, 52 «., 82 «., 439

Ramananda Sarasvati, ro, 31 n., 56, 80, 103, 196

Index

Ramanandatlrtha, 79, 232 Ramanuja, 43, 125, 201, 219, 262, 439,

441, 442, 542 Ramdnuja-bhasya, 262 n. 2 Ramanuja-mata-khandana, 220 Rdmdyana, 229, 230, 506 Rdmdyana-bhdrata-sdra-samgraha t zzo Ramayana-sara, 220 Rdmayana-sdra-samgraha, 220 Rdmdyana-sdra-stava, 2.2.0 Rdmdyana-tdtparya-nirnaya, 220 Rdmdyana-tdtparya-samgraha, 220 Ramendra Yogin, 57 n. RameSvara BharatI, 82 «. rdsi, 44 React, 23 Real, 117, 167,271; God, 2; ignorance,

4; objects, 26; souls, 2; substance,

23; transformation, 38, 39, 44;

world, 2, 20 Realism, 271 Realistic, 1, 2, 213; definitions, 163,

168; interpretation, 38; logic, 167;

transformation, 38, 39, 44 Reality, 5, 15, 20, 73, 115, 165, 181,

186, 193, 195, 206 «., 236, 245, 268,

499 Realization, 233, 239, 524 Rearing, 505; of cows, 505 n. Reason, 120, 121, 123, 139, 148, 194,

375 Reasoning, 24, 376, 377 Rebirths, 75, 90, 305, 407, 465, 520-

523,53° recaka, 257, 258 Recentes Decouvertes de MSS. Medi-

caux Sanscrits dans I'Inde, 425 «. Receptacle, 179, 526 Recognition, 65, 67, 184 Recognition of identity, 33, 34, 66; in

Buddhism and Vedanta, 33 ff. Rectum, 288, 318, 331, 336, 348, 351 Red, 27, 344 n., 349 Reed, 346 Reflection, 50, 55 Refutation, 127, 146, 147, 160, 188,

189, 192; of action, 188 Relation, 15,22, 24, 25, 34,44, 96,106,

121, 144, 146, 152, 158, 159, 167,

173, 191, 203, 204, 372, 374, 397;

of identity, 34; of inherence, 148,

158, 187-189; of inseparability,

194 Relationing, 31 Relationship, 152 Relative concept, 91 Relative space, 157 Relativistic, 164, 213; philosophy, 164

Relativity, 157

Rele, 353 «., 354

Religion, 525

Religious, 367, 509, 525; discipline,

488; duty, 505; endeavours, 488 Remoteness, 369 Renunciation, 252, 444, 457, 458, 510,

514

Repentance, 508

Repetition, 360

Reply, 388

Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts, 219

Repository, 22

Repulsions, 239

Resemblance, 131

Resolution, 253

Respiratory process, 258 n. 1

Responsibility, 501, 505, 507, 508

Result, 376

Retentive power, 373

Revelation, 13-16, 197

Reward, 503

Rhetoric, 220

Rhetorician, 171

Ribs, 286 n. 2

Rice, 358 n.

Right cognition, 134, 136, 137

Right conduct, 405, 406, 423

Right knowledge, 99, 153, 181, 187, 194, 206, 212, 213, 229, 239, 248, 251, 261

Right perception, 135

Right thinking, 90

Right volition, 500

Ritual, 547

Ritualistic, 284

Rockhill, W., 276, 277, 424 n. 1

roga-bhisag-jitlya-vimdna, 377

rohinl, 317, 396

romdvarta, 342

Root, 347, 365; desires, 243; inclinations, 243, 255

Rooted instincts, 248

Root-impression, 31

Rope, 7, 37. 73, i°6

Rosy, 349

Roth, 274, 283

Rough, 332, 338

Roughness, 360

ruci, 497

Rudimentary element, 76

Rudra, 538

Rug-viniscaya, 434

ruksa, 332, 338, 357, 359, 361, 363,

398 rupa, 377 rupatva, 374 rupin, 202

599

rurah, 298 n. 4

Rg-Veda, 281, 345, 346, 394, 486, 535,

537 Rg-Vedic, 301; hymns, 280; sacrifices,

281 Rju-vivarana, 52 n. Rk, 274, 390, 526 Rksagrlva, 300 Tfi, 295 n. 3, 394, 539 rtavah, 292 «.

sabhdga-santati-viccheddkhyam, 21 n.

Sabhd-parva, 544

sac-chastra, 267

Saccidananda, 79

Sacral nerve, 353

Sacral plexus, 355

Sacrifice, 353 n., 437, 441, 448, 473,

479, 483. 485, 487, 5oi, 504-506,

510, 513, 514, 523, 526, 535, 537 Sacrificial, 43 n., 494; actions, 493;

duties, 474, 479; performance, 522 sacro-coccygeal plexus, 355 Sacrum, 285 n., 287 n. sad-asadbhyam vilak§anam> 127 Sadananda, 55, 231 Sadananda Kasmlraka, 57, 196 Sadananda Vyasa, 443 Sadasiva, 219

Sada&vendra Sarasvati, 82 n. sa-deha-muktata, 245 sad-vrtta, 405, 420 Sages, 395, 539 saguna-brahma, 218 sahabhutam karyam, 186 Sahadeva, 432 saha-kanthikd, 289 «. 3 sahakari, 160 sahakdri-kdrana, 109 Sahapala Deva, 427 sahasrdra, 353, 356 sahasrdra-cakra, 356 sahopalambha-niscaya, 49 sahopalambha-myatna, 26 n., 35 sahopalambha-niyamdd, 26 n. Saint, 247, 420, 501, 506 Saintly persons, 264 Saline, 358, 359 Salt, 357

Salvation, 228, 305 sama, 236

sama-dhdtoh, 327 n. sama-pittdnila-kapha, 334 samatva, 451, 511 sama-vata-pitta-slesman, 334 n. samavdya, 40, 148, 183, 184, 187, 189-

191, 194, 371, 374; relation, 374 samavayi-kdrana, 143, 360

samaveta-samavaya, 374

samaya-viruddha, 385

sama-yoga-vdhin, 319

samddhdna, 459, 500

samddhi, 24, 251, 452, 454, 455, 484 "•, 500, 504

satndna, 75, 258, 260, 291, 332

sambandhi-svabhdva-janya, 142

sambandhi-svabhdva-srita, 142

sambhdvand-bhdsya, 103

Sameness, 511; in all situations of life, 511; in blame, 511; in joy, 511; in praise, 511; in sorrow, 511

samlclna, 370

samuccaya, 389, 392

samudga, 287

samutthdna, 395

Samyagbodhendra Samyamin, 52 n.

samyagjndnddhigama, 249

samyak, 135

samyak-paricchitti, 134

sambhava, 384

sambhdsd, 378

sambhinnobhaya-rupatvdt, 104

samghdta, 463

samgraha, 49

samharfa, 378

Samhitd-kalpa, 283 m.

Samhitd-vidhi, 283 m.

samjnd, 23

samkalpa, 373

samkalpa-nagaram, 233

samkalpa-puru$a, 233

Samkarsana, 539, 542, 543, 545, 546,

548 samkhyd, 370 Samk§epa-sdrlraka, n«., 17, 43«.,

45 w-. 52, 54. 56, 85, 110-112, 115,

216, 223 M. Samk§epa-sdrlraka-sambandhokti, 52 m. Samk$epa-sdr%raka-sdra-samgraha,i 16,

225 samprdpti, 397 «. samsarga, 338 m. samsdra, 44 Samsdra-taranJ, 232 samskdra, 65, 360, 370 samsrti, 234, 238 samsaya, 383, 389, 392, 500 samsaya-sama, 380 m., 382 m., 386, 387 samslesa, 307 samslefa-pratyaya, 207 samvara, 500 samvatsardh, 292 «. samvedanamaya, 256 satnvid, 63, 149, 201, 208, 235, 259 satnvit-harma, 68 samvit-spanda, 254

Index

samvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedah, 64

samvrta, 3

samvftdsamvrtani, 348 «.

samvrti, 3, 22; as mithyd-samvrti and loka-samvrti, 4; its meanings, 3

satnvrti-satya, 3

samyamana, 444

samyoga, 40, 158, 194, 373

samyoga-purusa, 415

samyoga-vibhdga, 370

samyogin, 40

samyogi-purusa, 368

samyiikta-samavdya, 374

samyukta-samaveta-samavdya, 374

Sanaka-samhitd, 435

sandhdya sambhdsd, 378

sandhi, 286 w. 2

Sandhyakara, 431

saw hdsah, 386

saw ksayah, 386

sannipdta, 338 «.

sannydsa, 418

sannydsin, 252

santdnikd, 317

santhavam, 497

Sahgha, 459

Sarighabhadra, 171

sango, 497

sankalpa, 75, 264

sankalpa-jdgara, 266

sankhdra, 498

sankhyd, 194

sankoca, 348 w.

sancaya, 409

sarandt sirdh, 347

Sarasvati, 354

sarasvatl, 353

sarga, 177

Sarpa-veda, 274 m. 3

sarva-btja, 22

Sarva-darsana-satngraha, 214

Sarva-darsana-siddhdnta-samgraha, 5 5

Sarva-dhara, 432

sarva-dosa-prakopana, 416

sarva-gata, 474

sarva-jadopdddna-bhutd, 203

sarva-jna, 106, 195

Sarvajnanarayana, 57 m.

Sarvajna-pltha, 98

Sarvajfia Sarasvati, 56

sarvajnatd, 22

Sarvajfia Visvesa, 55

Sarvajfiatma Bhagavat, 52 «.

Sarvajnatma Muni, ir, 17, 43 m., 47, 50, 52-54, 57, 72, 85, 105, 110-112, 115, 116, 223, 224; ajndna and truth, 114; ajndna in relation with Brahman, 112 ff.; association of

ajndna in, 115; commentaries on his Samksepa-sdriraka, 115, 116; difference of his view with that of Man-dana, 85; his date, 112; his view of the causality of may a, 11; nature of ajndna, 112; nature of Brahman, 114; Vedanta and Buddhism in, "5

sarva-pratyaydndm yathdrthatvam, 148

Sarva-siddhdnta-rahasya-tlkd, 55

sarva-srotdmsi ayana-bhutdni, 347

sarva-tantra-siddhdnta, 383

Sarvato-bhadra, 443

Sarvdnga-sundafi, 434

sarvdpahnava, 265

Sarvdrtha-siddhi, 119 n.

sarve bhdvd anutpanndh, 167

sarvendriya-param, 341

«rt, 194, 373

satax cetydmsa-cetandt, 236

satata-krtyd, 370

safr", 500

sati-samvara, 500

sat-kdrya-vdda, 39, 165, 172-174, 472, 473» 477» 517; its criticisms by Kamalasila and &antaraksita, 172 ff.

sattd, 10

satthakamma, 276

sattva, 72, 74, 183, 193, 197, 206, 250, 303, 308, 313, 319, 329, 366, 367, 372, 419, 436, 456, 462, 468, 542

sattva-samsuddhi, 510

sattva stuff, 211

sattva-suddhi, 438

tttfya, 4, 76, 383, 505, 510

Satyabodha, 98

satya-vacana, 505, 544

Satyavan, 306 m. i

satya-yuga, 409

Saubhdgya-vardhirii, 79

sauksmya, 315

sauksmydt, 349

saumanasydni, 296

sawnya, 313

saumyatva, 513

Saunagas (grammarians), 540

Sautrantikas, 26 m.

sa-vikalpa, 107

sa-vyabJiicdra, 384, 386 m.

sa-vyabhicdra hetu, 386 m.

sddhaka, 330

sddhana, 115

sddharmya-vaidharmya-sama, 380 «. 4

sddhdrana, 357, 506

sddhdrana-dharma, 505, 506, 514

sddhdranatva, 358

sddhupadista-mdrgena, 252, 253

601

sddhya, 139, 380, 381 72., 388 n.

sadhya-sama, 386 72., 387

sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam, 120

Sdhasdhka-carita, 428

Saketa (city), 540

safoi consciousness, 214

saksin, 53, 154

Sama, 274

samagfi, 161, 164

Saman, 526

sdmarthydtisaya, 97

samdnya, 371, 397

sdmdnya-chala, 385, 386

samdnya-pratydsatti, 139

sdmdnyato-drsta, 398, 399, 400 72.

Samin, 57 72.

Samkhya, 36, 37, 42, 74, 89 72., 101, 107, 115, 165, 172-175, 181, 227, 242, 250, 260, 292, 300, 304, 312, 314, 328 «., 329 72., 332, 372, 388 72., 394, 4io, 411, 414, 451, 455-458, 461, 463, 465, 467, 468, 472, 473, 475-477, 493, 5*7, 5*8, 549, 550; arguments, 173; its general criticisms by Kamalasila, 175; philosophy, 27372., 428; physics, 273; prakrti, 74; refutation of its soul theory by Kamalasila, 18 1 ; system, 366

Samkhya and Nyaya, on the theory of dosas, 328, 329 72.

Sdmkhya-kdrikd, 80, 106, 116, 249, 250 72., 262, 304, 377, 400 72.

Samkhya parindtna, criticisms of, by Santaraksita and Kamalasila, 171 ff.

Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdsya, 262, 305, 306 72. 1

Sdmkhya-sutra, 250, 372

Sdmkhya-tattva-kaumudl, 45 72., 305 72.

Samkhya-Yoga, 261, 262, 310, 313 72., 414, 546; its doctrine of subtle body, 304, 305; its idea of emancipation, 249, 250; prdna in, 261, 262

Samkhyic, 311

Samkhyist, 165, 171, 173, 234, 517

Sdmrdjya-siddhi, 56

sdndra, 359 72.

sdra, 359 72.

sdrajjand, 497

sdrajjitattam, 497

Saranga, 123

Sdrasvata-prakriyd, 192

sdrdgo, 497

SdrSrtha, 99

sdttnya, 308

sdttvika, 367, 373, 468

Sdtvata, 541-543, 546, 547

Satyaki, 541

Sdtyaki-tantra, 435

Sayana, 79, 187, 215, 280 72., 281, 283,

288 72., 289, 290, 292, 293, 298 72.,

299, 344 n., 345 72., 346 Scapula, 286 72. 4 Scattering, 337 72. Sceptical, 498 72. Scheme of life, 415 Scholastic, 11, 124; logicism, 124 Scholasticism, 119 Science, 73 ; of life, 278 Scriptural command, 522 Scriptural injunction, 228 Scriptural text, 252 Scriptures, 114, 253, 267 Seal, Dr Sir B. N., 356 72., 483 n.,

506 72.

Seasons, 389

Seat of consciousness, 302

Second moon, 26

Secretions, 288 72., 325, 327, 331, 337-

339, 345

Secretive aspect, 331

Secretory character, 337 72.

Secretory currents, 346

Seed, 160, 185, 235

Seeds of memory, 187

Seeming appearances, 235

Self, 1, 8, 16, 21, 23, 24, 33, 34, 42, 65, 68, 71, 73, 76, 101, 112, 148, 152, 156, 180, 181, 194, 197, 206 72., 211, 215, 217, 223, 308-310, 343, 351, 367-369, 373, 387, 388, 401, 444-446, 462, 471, 473, 512, 516, 518,

525 Self-abnegation, 228 Self-alienation, 240 Self-cognizing, 74 Self-conscious, 235; ego, 238 Self-consciousness, 22, 68, 181, 195,

236 Self-contained, 14; state, 239 Self-contentedness, 477 Self-contradiction, 123 Self-control, 242, 244, 277, 373, 441,

448, 493, 5oo, 505, 513, 514 Self-controlled, 420 Self-criticism, 272 Self-dependence, 17 Self-directed, 236; consciousness, 236 Self-dissociated, 121 Self-evident, 13, 16, 483 Self-flashing, 236 Self-gain, 507 Self-good, 405 Self-hood, 24 Self-identity, 34, 66-68, 71 Self-illumination, 148

Index

Self-interest, 470, 486, 507, 508, 513

Selfish interest, 485

Selfishness, 503

Self-knowledge, 227, 239, 373, 437,

442, 493, 499 Self-love, 24, 414, 507 Self-luminosity, 70, 73, 104 Self-luminous, 8, 65, 68, 70, 126, 168,

199-201, 217; consciousness, 204 Self-manifesting, 8, 69 Self-meditation, 466 Self-mortifications, 469 Self-ostentation, 416 Self-perception, 67, 73 Self-persistence, 67, 68 Self-realization, 456, 515, 532 Self-realized state, 512 Self-recognition, 195 Self-reflecting, 235 Self-restrained, 277 Self-revealed, 152, 180, 201 Self-revealing, 69, 72, 74, 104, no,

156, 197, 201, 221; consciousness,

33, 150,152, 154 Self-revelation, 63, 109, no, 129, 148,

149, 151 Self-same, 97 Self-satisfied, 512 Self-seeking, 507 Self-shining, 15 Self-shiningness, 36 Self-surrendering, 461 Self-thinking, 235

Self-validity, 214; of knowledge, 214 Selling, 505 Semen, 302, 304, 307, 313, 317, 322,

323 n., 330, 347, 352, 361, 372;

channels, 348 Seminal fluid, 322-324 Semi-statical creation, 235 n. Senart, £., 550

Sensation, 48, 269; of smell, 342 Sense, 23, 35, 151, 153, 194, 239, 254,

261, 292, 344, 360, 366, 368, 369,

401,406,489,493 Sense-affections, 512 Sense-attraction, 450, 488 Sense-channels, 89 n. Sense-cognition, 58, 73, 349, 367,

373 Sense-contact, 138, 145, 152, 154, 374,

498 Sense-control, 453, 459, 487, 490, 491,

502, 505,511,514 Sense-data, 34, 58, 60, 176, 180, 188,

35i Sense-desire, 513 Sense-enjoyments, 73

Sense-experiences, 24 Sense-faculties, 23, 24, 58 Sense-functioning, 24 Sense-gates, 462 Sense-gratification, 510 Sense-illusions, 5 Sense-impressions, 349, 351 Sense-knowledge, 25, 208, 355 Sense-modifications, 23 Sense-object, 23, 62, 76, 77, 180, 194, 206, 207, 215, 320, 321, 332, 343,

35i, 367, 373, 463 Sense-organ, 138, 187, 213, 269, 309,

3io, 315, 327, 332, 333, 358, 360,

366, 515 Sense-perception, 23, 24, 30, 116, 167 Sense-pleasure, 514 Sense-property, 199, 359 n., 360 Sense-quality, 355 Sense-uncontrollability, 488 Sensible, 28, 29, 369 Sensory consciousness, 357 Sensory dhamanJ, 351 Sensory nerves, 349 Sentence, 236

Separateness, 148, 162, 194, 360 Separation, 194, 370 Sequence, 20 Series, 23, 26 n. Serpent Power, 356 Sesamum, 97 sesvara-sdmkhya, 476 Sex-attraction, 509 Sex-continence, 421, 469, 505, 513 Sex joy, 324 Sex-relation, 498 n. Sex-strength, 276 Sex-union, 509 Shama Sastry, Dr, 436 Shamefulness, 24 Sharp, 361

Sharpness, 360, 362 n., 365 Sheath of knowledge, 75 Shivering, 294 n., 301 Shoots, 160, 169 Shoulder-blade, 286 sibbeml, 497 siddham, 390 Siddha-sdra-samhitd, 432 Siddha-yoga, 427, 428, 433, 435 siddhdnta, 383, 385 Siddhdnta-bindu, 77 n., 226 Siddhdnta-bindu-nydya-ratnavaU, 79 Siddhdnta-bindu-sandlpana, 79 Siddhdnta-bindu-sikara, 220 Siddhdnta-bindu-akd, 225 n. Siddhdnta-candrikd, 434 Siddhdnta-dipa, 115

603

Siddhanta-dipika, 17, 57 n.

Siddhdnta-lesa, 10, n, 17, 44, 47, 49, 5°. 53, 72, 216 w.

Siddhanta-lesa-samgraha, 220

Siddhanta-mnktavail, 11, 17, 1872., 222 «., 223 «., 225, 263 w.; its view that may a alone is the cause of world-appearance; and Brahman the basis of may a, 11

Siddhanta-nidana, 337 n.

Siddhdnta-nydya-ratna-pradtpikd, 79

Siddhdnta-ratndkara, 2.2.0

Siddhdnta-siddhdnjana, 56

Siddhdnta-tattva-bindu, 55, 79, 225

Siddhdnta-tattva-bindu-tlkd, 55

Siddhdnta-viveka, 51

Siddhi-kanda, 87, 88, 98

Siddhi-sthdna, 357, 426, 429

Significance, 504

sikatdvatl, 290 72. 3

sildnjdld, 298 w.

Silver, 37, 113, 135

Similarity, 131, 134

Simile, 26 72., 329

Simultaneity, 156

Simultaneous, 31 n., 388 w.; production, 178

Simultaneously, 26, 27, 31 n., 178

Sin, 246, 404, 409, 414, 422, 442, 508, 522

Sincerity, 469, 502, 505 n., 510, 511, 513, 514; of mind, 505

sineho, 497

Sinful, 409

Sinner, 512

Sitarama, 82 n.

Skanda, 107

Skanda-purdna, 393

skandha, 58, 59, 286, 450 n.

Skeleton, 288

Skill, 502, 505 n.

Skin, 317, 324, 330, 348, 361, 367

Skull, 279, 352, 353 n.

Slander, 498 n.

Sleep, 257, 261

Sleepiness, 373

Slim, 337

Slipperiness, 360, 365

Slippery, 361

Slow, 338

Smaller intestine, 336

Smaller self, 451

Smartness, 505 n.

Smell, 194, 236, 330, 360, 367

Smoky, 160, 408

Smooth, 337 n., 357

Smoothness, 328, 360

smrti, 54, 238, 239, 373, 514. 549

smrti-bhramsa, 417

smrti-sdstra, 438

smrti-vibhramsa, 416

Snake, 7, 37, 74

Snake-charms, 281

sndva, 289, 346

sndyu, 257, 285 n., 312 n., 313 n., 318,

352 sneha, 328, 442, 497 snigdha, 357, 359 n., 361, 363 Social order, 509 Society, 509 Sockets, 286 n. Soft, 337 n., 361 Softness, 360

Solar, 145, 148; vibrations, 156, 157 soma, 303, 330, 333, 359, 428 soma-cakra, 356 Sorcery, 301 Sorrow, 249, 295, 311, 416, 467, 504,

5"-5i3» 53°

Soul, 44, 178, 236, 248, 303, 306, 309, 3", 314, 343, 356, 357, 360, 367, 371, 372,406, 530

Soul theory (Kumarila), criticized by Kamalasila, 179 ff.

Soul theory (Nyaya), criticized by Kamalasila, 178, 179

Sound, 24, 60, 182, 355, 367, 382 n., 386/2., 387

Sound-cognition, 180

Sound-potential, 236

Sour, 331, 357

Sourasenoi, 543

Source, 358, 410 n.

South India, 53

Space, 168, 194, 360, 369, 381 n.

Space-determinations, 23

Space-locations, 29

spanda, 235 n., 244, 254, 263

spanda-sakti, 104, 257

spanddspanddtmaka, 234

spars'a, 194, 236

Spatial, 16; difference, 370; extension, 25 n.

Special capacity, 175

Special efficiency, 97

Special power, 40

Specific, 357, 374; agency, 359; caste-duty, 506, 507; duty,505, 506, 514; ignorance, 77; nature, 358; particulars, 148; peculiarities, 187; purpose, 359; qualities, 139, 189; relation, 31

Speculation, 373, 410 n.

Speech,241, 254,333, 338,469;organ, 346

Sphota-siddhi, 87 n.

Index

Spider, 74, 178

Spider's webs, 178

Spinal column, 287 n., 352, 353

Spinal cord, 353, 355-357

Spine, 353 n.

Spiral, 355

Spirit, 234, 282

Spiritual categories, 467

Spleen, 288, 348

Spring, 335, 370

Springs of action, 411, 413

sprhd, 413

srotas, 291, 346-350, 352

Stabilized, 500

Stage, 236, 238

stana, 286

Star, 333

State, 236, 250; of deep sleep, 245

Statical, 234

Stcherbatsky, 58 «., 59 n., 61 n., 166 n.

Steadiness, 328, 360, 419, 505, 510; of

mind, 492 Steady, 491 Sternum, 286 n. sthairya, 419 Sthairya-vicdrana, 126 sthavitantra, 289 sthalakas, 286 n. 3 sthalakarbudas , 286 n. 3 sthdna-vijnapti, 23 sthdndni, 336 sthapana, 452 sthapana, 379 sthira, 241, 359 n. Sthiramati, 19, 21, 22 n. sthira-pratyaya, 240 Sthira-siddhi-dusana, 49 sthita-dhl, 440, 491 sthita-prajiia, 247, 491 sthiti, 18, 169, 177, 231 sthiila, 337 72., 359 72. stitnita-gambhira, 232 Stomach, 330, 331, 336, 362 Stone, 512 Stormy, 408

Straightness of conduct, 511 Strength, 327, 336 stft-karmdni, 296 Student, 505 Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India,

279 72., 284 72., 286 72.

Study, 505, 510, 514

Stuff, 10; of world-objects, 35

Suali, L., 398 n.

Sub-conscious,21,33,34; impressions,

33, 250 Subhesaja, 276 72. subhisaktama, 293

Subhuti Gautama, 316

Subject, 27, 29, 31, 35, 88

Subject-consciousness, 149, 211

Subjective, 22, 24, 180, 187, 204, 377, 508, 522; act, 197; character, 522; cognition, 19; conscience, 522; ego, 236; experiences, 102, 149; ideas, 21, 48; idealism, 48; ignorance, 77; illumination, 206; mental, 16; sameness, 511; states, 149; thought, 236

Subjectively, 217, 233

Subjectivistic, 213

Subjectivity, 9

Subject-object awareness, 29, 33

Subject-object consciousness, 24

Subject-object knowledge, 250, 266

Subject-objectless, 235, 238, 271

Subject-object relation, 88, 105, 144, 146, 152, 153

SubodhinJ, 55, 73, 75 72., 115, 443

Subrahmanya, 81

Subrahmanya Agnicin Makhlndra,82 72.

Substance, 19, 47, 51, 117, 143, 158, 161, 162, 167, 172, 187, 188, 191, 193, 194, 203, 261, 358-360, 363, 369-371, 373

Substanceless, 16, 233

Substance-stuff, 12

Substantial, 337 72.

Substantiality, 38, 48

Substantive, 187; basis, 23 ; reality, 20

Substitution-meditation, 449,452,479, 488

Substratum, 19, 194, 195

Subtle, 332, 377; states, 245

Subtle body, 75, 245, 302, 306, 351 72.; in Samkhya-yoga, Vaisesika and Nyaya, 304-306; agreement of the Vedanta and Caraka, 312

Subtler, 368

Success, 512

Succession, 20, 156, 179

Successive processes, 374

Sudhlndra Yati, 443

Suffering, 238, 247, 368, 373,404, 479, 522

Sufficient cause, 18

Sugar-cane, 361

suhrt, 378

Suitability, 370

Suitable, 370

sukha, 22, 277, 370, 422

sukha-duhkhe yugapaj janyete, 91

sukham ayuh, 277

Sukhaprakasa Muni, 58,86,116, 148 72.

sukha-rupa, 217

sukha-sanga, 462

Sumati, 172

605

Summer, 327, 335, 370

Sun, 330, 499, 525

Sundma (demon), 300

Suparna, 539

Superficial changes, 24

Super-imposed, 206

Super-imposition, 149, 209, 213

Superior, 178

Superiority, 370, 401 n.

Super-person, 476, 529, 533

Super-personality, 478, 524, 525

Support, 143 ; of mdyd, 45

Supposition, 18, 31

Supreme bliss, 453

Supreme essence, 16

sura, in

Suranandi, 428

Surat, 164

Suresvaracarya, 1 n., 17, 46, 48, 51, 52, 57, 78-80, 82-87, 98-102, 105, in, 112, 147 72., 148 72., 192, 198, 216; karma and emancipation in, 99; karma and jndna, 100; nature of ajndna, 101, 102; nature of self and self-realization, 100, 101

Surgery, 276, 330

Suriya, 539

susuksmdn, 342

Susruta, 263, 273, 275-279, 284 n., 285 «., 286 n., 287 n., 302 72., 303 72., 304,316,317, 329 w., 330-333,33472.,

342, 344 72., 348, 349, 350 72., 351,

352, 361 n., 362-365, 372, 389, 4JO, 423-426, 429, 433, 435; his description of the apertures of the dhamants, 350; his description of the function of the dhamants, 350 ff.; on dhdtu-mala, 331; his view regarding the relation of dhamants to cognition, 351 ff.; his view regarding sirds and dhamants, 349; his view that the cognitive and cona-tive nerves are attached to the brain, 342; his view that sonita is a dosa, 329

Susruta-candrikd, 425, 428

Susruta-samhitd, 258 72., 273, 276 n.,

277,279,3 I 3 72., 3 15 72., 3 l8 72., 33 I 72.,

335 «•, 336 n., 342 72., 344 72., 349 72.,

372 72., 377 72., 389 72., 390, 423-429

Susruta school, 289 Susruta-Sutra-sthdna, 361 72. susirdh, 352

susumnd, 292, 353-355, 453, 454 susumnd nddi, 345 susupta, 241, 264 susupta-sadrsa-sthiti, 264 susuptavat, 245 susupti, 232, 344

Sutala, 76

suksma, 305, 332, 337, 359

suksma-deha, 304

suksma-sartra, 75, 76

suksmdh-sirdh, 346

Suryapandita, 443

Susa, 290

Susani, 290 72. 4

Suta-samhitd, 251

Sutra-bhdsya-vydkhydna, 82 72.

Sutras, 38, 39, 41, 44

Sutra-sthdna, 329, 330, 366

sutrdtman, 76, 215

svabhdva, 4, 89, 372, 410

svabhdvdtisaya, 173

sva-dharma, 439, 502

svakdrarta-sattd-samavdya, 41

sva-laksana, 167

sva-mdna, 325

svapna, 264

svapna-jdgara, 266

svapna-nara, 266

sva-prakdsa, 69, 148, 197

sva-prakasatd, 108

sva-prakdsa cit, 109

Svar (world), 76

svarupa-bheda, 129

Svarupa-nirnaya-ftkd, 193

sva-samjnd, 389

sva-samvedana-mdtrakam, 235

sua - samvin - nairapeksena sphuranam,

197 svastyayana, 278, 281 svasyapi svena vedyatvdpdtdt, 151 svatah-prdmdnya, 214 sva-visaya-j'ndna-jananam, 32 sva-vydghdta, 123 svayambhu-linga, 355 svayam-prakdsa, 149 Svayamprakasa, 56, 82, 192 Svayamprakasa Yati, 79 Svayamprakasa Yoglndra, 57 72. Svayamprakasananda, 56 svdbhdvikah sambandhah, 141 svdbhinna - kdrya -janakatvam upddd-

natvam, 45 svddhisthdna-cakra, 355 svddu, 358 Svamidasa, 428 Svamikumara, 431 Svamlndrapurna, 52 72. Svdnubhuti-prakdsa, 55 svdrtha, 412

Svdtma-yoga-pradlpa, 57 72. svdvidyayd, 84 Sweet, 242, 309, 325, 327, 337 72., 347,

357-359, 362, 365 72., 366 Sweetness, 361

Index

Syllogism, 119-122, 373

Symbolic sacrifice, 544

Symbolic syllables, 499

Symbols, 337

Sympathy, 247, 511

Symptoms, 293, 295, 320, 329 n., 336,

337, 34 8 »■

Syncretistic, 54; works, 55

Synonymous, 348

Syrup,358

System, 375, 525

Systematic study, 1

Systematized, 500

!§abara, 87, 171

sabda, 346, 376, 381 n., 383

sabda-brahma, 354 n.

Sabda-nirnaya, 103 n.

sabda-nyayartha, 392

sabdatva, 374

sabdartha, 187

saitya, 362 n.

£aiva, 54, 218, 219, 443; authorities, 263; commentary, 218; philosophy, 272

Saiva-bhasya, 218, 220

Saiva-kalpa-druma, 220

Saivism, 49

Sakadhumaje (demon), 300

saktayah, 243

sakti. 8, 10, 22, 40, 44, 104, 175, 215, 218, 362, 363

saktimat y 44

sal una, 297

salya, 276, 390, 424

Salya-tantram , 330 n., 425

sama, 444, 495, 505 n.

^ambuka, 506, 507

£aiikara, 2, 5-9, 11, 21, 25, 27-30, 35, 37-39, 41-44, 46, 48, 51, 77-79, 81, 85-87, 89, 92, 99, 100, 102, 105,108, in, 112, 119, 124, 151, 171, 172, 189, 191, 196, 218-221, 228, 231, 246, 250, 260-262, 267, 268, 270,

272, 288 72., 311, 344, 346, 437, 438,

44 2 , 443, 446, 448, 449, 452, 453, 456-458, 474, 478, 495, 499, 504, 507, 533, 549; and some Buddhists differ regarding the ontology of illusion, 5; attempts to prove that his philosophy was realistic, 2; bhe-ddbheda interpretation prior to, 43; contradicts his own view on idealism, 28 did not elaborate the exact nature of the causality of avidyd or of Brahman, 11; emphasizes that waking experience is as false as dream experience in Gaudapada's commentary, 28, 29; his assertion

that the world-appearance is mere illusion is dogmatic, as also the doctrine that the self is the only ground on which all illusions are imposed, 8; his commentary cannot satisfactorily convince that the sutras professed unqualified monism, 42; his criticism of the atomic theory, 189 ff.; his criticism of the theory of samavdya, 190; his definition of illusion, 5, 6; his dialectic arguments, 189 ff.; his explanation as to the illusory creation by ignorance: interpretation of his explanation by his other followers, 8; his explanation of the causal theory on realistic lines as against Nyaya, 39-41; his four important followers and the divergence of their views, 47, 48; his idealism compared with that of Yoga-vasistha and Buddhist idealism, 268 ff.; his interpretation of the Brahma-sutra and the Upanisads as reconciliation of the pantheistic and dua-listic tendencies, 2; his interpretation of illusion in Gaudapada's Kari-ka, 6; his realistic interpretation of the Brahma-sutras with parenthetic reservation, how far justifiable, 39; his refutation of Buddhist idealism, 269, 270; his refutation of Buddhistic idealism, 27; his refutation of the charge of the incompatibility of the production of the impure world from the pure Brahman, 37; his refutation of the Samkhya criticism of Vedanta, 36, 37; his two different analogies regarding the production of the world from Brahman, 37; his view of the nadis and the heart, 344; his views regarding sird anddhamani, 344 n. ; his works and followers, 77-82; how far he is justified in sometimes taking parindma analogies and sometimes the view of magical creation, 38; originator of Vedanta dialectics, 163; special nature of his dialectic as distinguished from that of !§rlharsa and Citsukha, 191, 192

Sankara-bhdsya, n, 103, 108, 251

Sankara-dig-vijaya, 82, 86, 112

!§ankara Misra, 103 n., 126 n., 356

!§ankara school, 3, 30, 44, 62

!§ankarasvamin, 172

&ankara Vedanta, 11, 16, 17, 34, 35, in, 148, 214

Sankara-vijaya, m

!§ankarananda, 82, 86, 215, 443

607

satikd, 141

sankha, 287 72., 342

Sankhapani, 83, 87, 89/2., 90, 91, 94,

353.354 sarat, 335

sarlra-cbidra, 348 n. sariri, 303 72. 4 Sarku (demon), 300 ^asadhara Acarya, 54 Satapatha-brdhmana, 279, 286, 289,

368, 394, 424. 486, 535-537 sauca, 505, 510 !§aunaka, 316 Saunaka-tantra, 435 !§aunaklya, 283 saurya, 328, 370, 505 n. sdbdl bhavand, 479, 480 !§akalya, 252 sdkhd, 283

sdkhd-nddtndm, 290 n. 2 !§akunteya, 357 sdldkya, 276, 424 Sdldkya-tantra, 425 &alikanatha, 147 n., 249 Sdli-stamba-sutra, 307 sdnta, 234, 235, 281 !§antaraksita, 25, 28, 31 72., 58 72.^ 171,

172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 181-188,

375. 376; his argument against the

Upanisadic view similar to that of

^ankara, 28 sdnti, 450 72., 510 Santi-kalpa, 283 Sdnti-sataka, 460 72. 1 Sdndilya-sutra-tlka, 225 sdrada, 298 72.

Sdrtra, 35072., 35i«-, 352"., 4*5, 469 Sarlra-brdhmana, 251 Sdfiraka-bhdsya, 56, 246 72. Sdriraka-bhdsya-prakatdrtha, 49 SdrTraka-bhdsya-tikd, 193 Sdrlraka-mimdmsd-bhdsya, 56, 78, 80 Sdriraka-mlmdmsd - nydya - samgraha,

30 72., 82 Sdriraka-mimdmsd-samgraha, 82 72. Sdriraka - mimdmsd - sutra - siddhdnta-

kaumudl, 82 72. Sdrlraka-nydya-manimdld, 82 «. Sdfira-padminl, 435 Sdfira-sthdna, 284 72. ^arngadhara, 288 n., 326 n., 327 72.,

435; his view of mala, 326 Aptra, 253, 254. 385, 445 Sdstra-darpana, 82, 103, 108 72. Sdstra-prakdsikd, 83, 193 Sdstra-siddhdnta-lesa-tikd, 225 : sdstrdntara, 399 s'esa, 400 72.

S>esagovinda, 55

Sesanrsimha, 205

Sesa !§arrigadhara, 119, 196

sesavat, 398, 399, 400 n.

Sikhdmani, 53, 54, 74 n., 208

siksd, 547

£iksd, 275 72.

Siksd-samuccaya, 501, 513

!§irighana, 123

Sipivista, 535

n>a.?2 fat, 287 72.

siras-tdlv-antara-gatam, 341

«ra, 256, 289, 291, 318, 342, 344,346,

## 348-350, 352, 354

sira-sarani-kotare, 256

Sisya-hitaisitd, 12672. »

&va, 82 72., 218, 265

Sivadayalu orldharasvamin, 443

givadasa, 364, 431, 432, 435

Siva-karndmrta, 220

!§ivalala barman, 79

Siva-lildrnava, 219

Siva-purdna-tdmasatva-khandanay 220

Sivarama, 57 n., 103

Siva-sutra-vimarsim, 263 72.

Siva-sakti-siddhi, 126

Siva-tattva-viveka, 220

^ivaditya, 147 72.

!§ivaditya Misra, 123

Sivddvaita-nirnaya, 220

Sivdnanda-laharl, 220

Sivdnanda-lahafl-candrikd, 220

!§ivananda Yati, 57 72.

Sivdrcana-candrikd, 220

Sivdrka-mani-dlpikd, 219, 220

Ssivopadhyaya, 263

Sivotkarsa-candrikd, 220

Sivotkarsa-manjarl, 220

Mgfcra, 338

«/a, 459, 500, 501, 504

sfrsa, 340

slrsakti, 296, 299, 340

slr$dmaya, 299

&ta, 332, 33s, 338, 357, 359, 361

sita-virya, 361

sltosma-varsa-laksandh, 321 72.

sitosmdnilaih, 314

slaksna, 359 72.

slesma, 299

slesma-dhard, 317

slesmala, 334

slesman, 276, 282, 296, 319, 325, 327,

328, 330-333. 335, 33°. 337 "•, 344,

347, 349, 37i, 39i slepna-prakrti, 328, 334 sle$md, 299 s/zs, 330 sloka, 230

Index

Sloka-sthdna, 392

Sloka-varttika, 428

soci, 297

sonita, 302, 312 n., 329, 330, 335 n., 35o

sraddhd, 292, 468, 494

srdddha, 282

Srima (demon), 300

sritdh, 340

!§ri, 294

{Sribrahima, 428

$rl-darpana y 126 M.

{Srldhara, 49, 147 n., 264 n., 306, 412, 444, 446, 449 «-, 452, 453 «•» 456, 462, 474, 478, 484

Sriharsa, 24, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 83, 92, 103, 119, 124-129, 131-133, 135, 137-139, 141, 143-147, 163, 164, 168, 170-172, 192, 194, 218, 248; awareness and its object cannot be similar, 134; Buddhist precursors of pre-^ankara Vedanta dialectic, Ka-malasila and &antaraksita, 171 ff.; compared and contrasted with Nagarjuna, 170, 171; his assertion of indefinability of all appearances is a direct challenge to Nyaya-Vaisesika, which thinks that all that is know-able is definable, 127; his criticism of " being," 142; his criticism of the Buddhist definition of right cognition, 136; his criticism of the definition of "invariable concomitance," 141, 142; his criticism of the nature ofconcomitance (vydpti), 139, 140; his criticism of non-being, 142; his criticisms often refer to Nyaya definitions rather than to Nyaya thought, 146; his criticism of the Nyaya definition of "cause," 144; his criticism of the Nyaya definition of right cognition, 133 ff.; his criticism of the Nyaya theory of relation, 144; his criticism of the possibility of knowing the class-concepts, 139, 140; his criticism of substance and quality, 143; his criticism of tarka, 140, 141; his criticism of Udayana, 141; his date, works and followers, 125, 126; his dialectic compared with that of Nagarjuna, 163; his dialectic distinguished from that of &ahkara, 191, 192; his difference with the Madhyamika position, 168; his difference with Vacaspati and Mandana, 101; his ontologic argument for the existence of Brahman, 128; his refutation of analogy,

142; his refutation of " difference," 129; his refutation of the category of "difference," 129 ff.; his refutation of the definition of cause, 143-145; his refutation of the definition of perception, 137, 138; his refutation of the notion of instruments of knowledge in, 137; his view that all definitions may be proved false, 128 ff.; his view that world-appearances are false because all definitions of any of their categories are self-contradictory, 147; method of his dialectic, 133; perception cannot challenge the instruction of the Upanisads, 129; precursors of his dialectic, Kamalaslla and 6antarak-§ita, 171 ff.; responsible for the growth of verbalism in the new school of Nyaya, 146; similarity of his dialectic to that of Nagarjuna, 127

Srikanada, 354, 355

&rlkantha, 218, 219

{Srlkantha Bhatta, 79, 427, 432

{arlkantha Datta, 428, 435

srimad-dnanda-saildhva-panedsyam sa-tatam bhaje, 193

Srlmad-bhagavad-gitd, 228, 247, 250

Snmad-bhdgavata-tlkd, 226

^rimadhava, 427, 428

!§rinatha Cudamani, 225 n.

!§rlnivasa, 120

!§rinivasa Yajvan, 57 n.

^riranganatha, 108

^risimha, 123

Sri-vidyd-paddhati, 225

sroni-guda-samsraya, 331

sroni, 285

sronl-phalaka, 285 n. 7

Sruta-prakdsikd, 262 n.

srngdtaka, 342

subha, 341

^ubhagupta, 172

{Subhankara, 126 n.

subhdsubha, 23 n.

subhdsubha-karma-vipdka, 23 n.

suci-dravya-sevana, 505

suddha, 36

suddha-samvit-mayd-nanda-rUpa, 264

&uddhananda, 192

sukra, 312 n., 317, 328

sukra-dhara, 317

sukra-pradur-bhdva, 351

sunt hi, 363

susira-kara, 332 n.

su§ma, 300, 301, 331

susmino jvarasya, 298

Sudra, 502, 504, 506, 514, 531

C09

sula, 298, 346

sQnya, 234, 271, 330

sunyata, 7

Sunya-vdda, 426

Sunya-vada theory, 3

sunya-vddin, 2, 35

Sunya-vddin Buddhists, 7

£vayathu, 431

svetd, 317

Svetdsvatara, 4.71

syena sacrifice, 381 n. t 483 «.

sad-anga, 343

sad-anga yoga, 453, 455

sad-dsraya, 312/1.

Sad-darsana-samgraha-vrtti, 148 n.

sad-indriya, 366

Sasti-tantra, 476

Sat-cakra-nirupatta, 353 w., 354

Tachibana, 496

Tactile, 176

Tactual particles, 25 w.

Tactual sense, 156

ta</ anusandhatte, 238

taddtve, 374

tad-bhdva-bhdvitd, 376

tad-utpatti, 183

tadvati tat-prakdraka-jnanatvam, 214

taijasa, 548

taiksnya, 362 w.

Taittirlya, 78, 486

Taittirlya-Aranyaka, 538

Taittirlya-bhdsya-tippana, 193

Taittirlya-bhdsya-vdrttika-tlkd, 193

Taittirlya-brdhmana, 251, 280/2., 291/2.

Taittirlya-prdtiidkhya, 394

Taittirlya-samhitd, 536

Taittirlya Upanisad, 494

Taittirlyopanisad-bhdsya, 78

Taking of pure food, 505

takman, 298, 299, 300 n. 2

tala-kurca-gulpha, 285 w.

Taldtala, 76

*<wmw, 72, 74, 104, 234, 267, 303, 304,

3i4» 3i8, 319, 329, 367, 372, 419,

436. 456, 4 6 2, 468, 499 tan-matras, 74, 236, 245, 305, 477 tannasomuktir dtmanah, 99 tantra, 276 n., 352 Tantra anatomy, 356, 357 Tantra-cuddmani, 353 n. Tantra literature, 354/2. Tantra philosophy, 356 Tantra physiology, 273 Tantras, nddl-cakras in, 354-356; «<-

sumnd, its position in, 353, 353 /2.,

354; system of nacfo in, 352-354 Tantra-sdra, 432

Tantra school, 354, 355, 357

Tantra-siddhdnta-dlpika, 219

tantra-yantra-dharah, 332

tantra-yukti, 389, 390

Tahgalva, 300

Tahka, 43 /2.

tanhd, 490, 496, 499

tapah, 76,229,423, 437, 469,506,508,

510, 513, 514, 523, 536, 544 tapo-yajna, 487 tarka, 140, 141, 376, 454 Tarka-cuddmani, 54 Tarka-dipikd, 108 Tarka-kdnda, 87, 88, 92 Tarka-pdda, 84 n. Tarka-samgraha, 49, 50/2., 51, 116/2.,

119 M., 192, 193, 194«., 210, 211,

377 Tarka-viveka, 51, 79 far/eo 'pratyaksa-jnanam, 376 taruna asthi, 286 /z. Taste, 181, 194, 199, 236, 355, 357-

360,362-366, 370 Taste cognition, 180 tathya-samvrti, 4 faf param, 499 tattva, 193

Tattva-bindu, 45 /z., 87 n., 107 Tattva-bodha, 57 w. Tattva-bodhinl, 52 n., 54, 115, 216/2.,

217 Tattva-candrikd, 79, 193, 431 Tattva-cintamani, 54 Tattva-cintdmani-prakdsa, 54 Tattva-dlpana, 10, 52, 79, 103, 193,

208 /z., 210 Tattva-dlpikd, 79, 222 /z. tnttva-jndna, 252 Tattva-kaumudl, 250 Tattva-kaustubha, 54, 219 Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, 119/2., 262 «. 3 Tattva-muktdvali, 219 Tattva-pradlpikd, 51, 83, 119/2., 139,

147, 148 /2. Tattva-samlksd, 45 «., 83,87,106,107,

110/2., 116 Tattva-samgraha, 20 /z., 25, 27 w., 28 w.,

31 M., 171, 172 m., 182 M., 186 «. Tattva-samgraha-panjika, 174/2. tattva-sraddhd, 495 Tattva-suddhi, 57 w. tattva-tikd, 43 /2.

Tattva-vaisdradl, 45 n., 262, 306 w. Tattva-vibhdkara, 250 Tattva-vibhdvand, 87/2. Tattva-vivecana, 54 Tattva-viveka, 54, 72 Tattva-viveka-dlpana, 54, 217 n.

Index

Tattvaloka, 49, 50, 193

Tattvdnusandhdna, 56

Tattvopadesa, 81

Taxila, 276, 424

Taylor, 219

tddatmya, 31 n., 183

tdddtmya-pratiti, 40

tdlu, 287 n. 4

talu-mula, 288 72. 1

tdlufaka, 287 n. 4

tdmasa, 373, 468

tdmasika, 367

tdmrd, 317

Tantric charms, 281

Tanda, 283

Tdrd-bhakti-taranginl, 225

Tdtparya-bodkini, 216 n.

Tdtparya-candrikd, 441

Tdtparya-prakdsa, 231, 235 72., 266

Tdtparya-ttkd, 107

Teacher, 254, 378, 420, 513, 534

Teaching, 378, 505

Technical term, 377

Teeth, 326 n.

tejas, 236, 241, 245, 312, 313, 362,

505 n., 510 Tejo-bindu, 454 tejo-dhdtu, 307 Tekka Ma^ha, 49 Telang, K. T., 122, 123, 549, 550 Temperament, 378 Temples, 287 Temporal, 15, 16, 342; bones, 287

n. 5; determinations, 187 Temptation, 501

Tendons, 348, 501, 510, 511, 516 Term, 373 Terminology, 14 Testicles, 318

Testimony, 39, 114, 170, 373 Texts, 17 Theist, 226 Theistic, 1 Theology, 525 Theory, 357, 501; of creation, 194;

of momentariness, 31; of pain, 91;

of perception, 168; of substances ,371 Thesis, 19, 21, 29, 163, 165, 166, 170,

183, 189, 194, 232, 387 Thickness, 360 Thing, 359 n., 498, 510 Third Oriental Conference, 1 n. Thirst, 335 72., 348 Thoracic vertebrae, 286 n., 287 n. 1 Thought, 23, 189, 191, 236, 266, 302,

367, 373. 4o5.4*4 Thought-activity, 235, 240, 272 Thought-creation, 235/2., 244

Thoughtfulness, 513

Thought-movement, 235 «., 254

Thought-principle, 35

Thought-processes, 21, 256, 369

Thought-stuff, 29

Thought-substance, 24

Throat, 331, 348, 361, 365

Tibet, 164

Tibetan, 59 n., 164

Tibia, 285 n. 6

Tiger, 509, 513

tikta, 312 n. 3, 350, 357, 358

Tilak, 550, 551 72.

Tilakasvamin, 107

Time, 68, 148, 156, 157, 187, 194, 321, 358, 360, 369, 370, 372; and space, 266

Tirumalai Nayaka, 219

tiryag-ga, 351

tlksna, 359, 361

tlvratara, 251

tlvrd, 291

Tongue, 326 72., 331, 348, 367

Topic, 377

Tortoise, 109

Touch, 194, 236, 355, 358, 360

Toxicology, 435

toya, 333

Trachea, 286 72. 2

Trade, 505 72.

Tradition, 78, 102, 377

Tranquillity, 229

Transcendence, 512

Transcendent, 21, 22, 524, 526; reality, 16; self, 10, 368; state, 455

Transcendental, 168; principle, 72

Transformation of Brahman, 42

Transformations, 20-23, 25, 35, 36, 38, 51, 88, 104, 114, 171, 177, 198,

2o6, 207, 2IO, 211, 221, 224, 232,

233. 332, 347. 5°i Transgression, 100, 275, 405, 422, 505 Transitory, 490 Transmigration, 372, 411 Transparent, 337 n. trasarenu, 157

Trayyanta-bhava-pradlpikd, 52 n. Treta age, 409, 410 Triads, 306 Trickery, 378 trika, 285 72. 7 trika-sambaddhe, 286 72. 4 tri-kdla, 375 Trilocana, 107 Trilocanaguru, 107 Trimsikd, 21, 22 n., 25, 26 72., 29, 35 Trinity College, 14 Trinity Street, 14

6n

Tripathi,49,50w., 116, 192, 193 n., 196

tri-prakdra-maJui-sthunam, 257 n. 2

Tripurl-prakarana-tlkd, 193

Trisikha-brdhmana, 454

Triune, 23

trivent, 354

tri-vidha, 401 w.

Trivikramacarya, 52 «.

trivrt-karana, 74 «.

Troubles, 501

True associations, 155

True experience, 155

True knowledge, 164, 174, 246, 457

True proposition, 155

True recognition, 155

Trunk, 343

Truth, 3, 114, 118, 378, 494, 495, 534

Truthful, 513

Truthfulness, 373, 505, 510

trsna, 413, 415 n., 499

trttyaka, 297

Tubercles, 286 n. 3

tuccha, 224

tulydrthatd, 371

turya, 264, 267

tnrydtita, 264, 266 n,

Tubingen, 283

tyakta-kartrtva-vibhramah, 245

tyaRa, 505, 508, 510

tyaga-matra, 228

Tippana, 425, 428

Tika-ratna, 52 n.

ubhayedyuh, 297

Ubiquitous, 14

ucchlankhaa, 285

ucchvasa, 327

ucitena patha, 313

Udara, 431

udara, 287 «. 1, 289

Udayana, 49, 51, 107, 119, 123-126, 134, 140, 141, 147 n.\ criticized by farlharsa on the subject of tarka, 141

udana, 75, 259, 260,332

uddslnd, 378

uddvarta, 391

uddesa, 389, 390

Uddyotakara, 119, 124, 137 n., 147 «., 171, 182 «., 186, 384 «., 393, 394, 400 n.

Ui, H., 398 n.

Ulna, 285 «. 6

Ultimate, 233, 236; being, 235; causality, 106; cause, 111, 114, 237; consciousness, 22 ; entity, 232-234; principle, 474; reality, 8, 13, 22, 42, 98, 168, 199, 221, 271, 454; specific properties, 371; truth, 15, 494, 508

Umbilicus, 289

Unaffected, 42

Unattached, 510, 511

Unattachedness, 511

Unattachment, 524

Uncaused, 63

Unchangeable, 24, 33, 42, 45, 63, 73, 164, 179, 206 ?/., 221, 240, 271, 368, 369, 476; consciousness, 181

Uncompounded, 74

Unconditional, 176

Unconditionality, 160

Unconnected, 230

Unconscious, 181

Unconsciousness, 265

Uncontradicted existence, 30

Undemonstrable, 22

Underlying consciousness, 53, 206, 207, 209

Undesirable, 512

Undetermined fruition, 249

Undifferentiated, 23 «., 474; awareness, 211

Unhappy, 277

Unhealthy, 320

Uniform motive, 178

Unimportance, 370

Uninferable, 454

Unintelligent, 36-38

Unintelligible, 12, 138, 143

Uninterrupted succession, 25 n.

Unique, 13, 228; relation, 31

Unity, 85, 243; of consciousness, 179; texts, 46, 81

Universal, 63, 139, 374; altruism, 501;characteristic, 159; compassion, 461; concomitance, 140; duty, 506; friendship, 501, 511; piety, 511; pity, 501; self, 6, 9; spirit, 457

Universality, 85, 194

Universe, n

Unknowable, 263

Unlimited, 63

Unmanifested, 232, 263, 357, 358,471, Si9» S25, 53o; state, 236

Unmada, 431

Unmdda-cikitsitam, 341 n.

Unnameable, 234

Un perceivable, 138

Unperceived, 199

Unperturbed, 500, 510, 512

Unperturbedness, 511

Unproduced, 63, 182

Unreal, 127, 271; appearances, 48

Unreality, 128, 165, 246, 252

Unreasonable, 186

Unrighteous, 409

Unspeakable, 35, 89 n., 203, 204, 221

(m

Index

Unsubstantial, 202, 203

Unsuitable, 370

Unsuitability, 370

Untenable, 358

Unthinkable, 22, 221, 362-364, 529

Untruthfulness, 373

unddi, 541

unduka, 318

ttpacaryate, 261

upacaya, 235 11.

upacdra-chala, 386 n.

upadesa, 389, 390

Upadesa-sfihasn, 79, 81

Upadesa-sahasrl-vivrti, 193

upadhil, 412, 415

upadhdrana, 459, 500

upa-dhdtu, 324

upakara, 183

Upakrama-parakrama, 220

upalabdhi-sama, 380 «., 382 n.

upalaksana, 11

lipoma, 380

upamana, 148, 377

upanaya, 379

upanaho, 497

upanibandho, 497

Upanisadic, 205 «., 494, 499; simile, 467

( Ipunisad-ratna, 58

Upanisads, 1, 2, 8, 37-30, 46, 58, 78, 92,98, 100, 113, 114, 116, 129, 151, 215, 226, 259, 260, 276, 333, 344, 44«» 453. 455, 47*» 475, 47«, 493, 495, 496, 5" »•> 5i8, 520, 525, 530, 53 2 > 536, 54^, 55 1 1 as one consistent philosophy borrowed by Sahkara from his predecessors, 2; commentators before 5§ankara, 1; ethical ideas in, 494, 495; heart in, 344; nature of its philosophy under Gau-dapada's influence, 2; their view of self criticized by Kamalasila, 181; their views regarding the nadis,

344 ff-Upanisad texts, 80, 87, 88, 98, 132 upapatti-sama, 380 n. 4, 382 n. uparati, 495 upasamanussati, 459 Upasama, 231 upasamana, 358 upasamonlya, 357 upasoya, 397 upatapa, 293, 309 Upavarsa, 43 upavdsn, 278 upareda, 274, 276 upddana, 9, 334, 497, 498 upadana-kiirana, 12, 372

upddhi, 72, 142

updlambha, 388

upanga, 273, 274, 276, 279

updya, 359, 389

upekkhd, 460

upeksd, 23 n.

Upholder, 526

Upodghdta, 280 n., 283 n.

Upper worlds, 76

uras, 286

Urinal canal, 296

Urinary disease, 343

Urine, 325, 327-330, 347, 35°-352

Urunda, 300

ussado, 497

Usanas-samhitd, 435

uma, 312 n., 357, 359 «., 361

Uterus, 313

utkarsa-prakarsa-rupa, 401 n.

utkarsdpakarsa-varnydvarnya-vikalpa-

sddhya-sama, 380 «., 381 «. Utpala, 49 Utpatti, 231 utpatti, 232 utsdha, 327 uttamah purusah, 466 Uttamamrta, 99 nttara, 380, 391 UtUira-sthdna, 433 Uttara-tantra, 329, 330, 332, 389, 424,

425, 427, 429 Uttara-vasti, 426 uttardyana, 519 Uveyaka, 172 Uvula, 259, 355 «A<i, 375, 377 i/Aja, 389, 392 urdhva-gd nddi, 345 m. urdhva-mulam tripdd Brahma, 523 uru-nalaka, 285 m. 8 z7ru, 285

Vacuity, 21, 234

Vacuous space, 59

Vagina, 289, 290 n., 291, 313 n.

vahana-pdka-sneha, 328 n.

Vaibhasikas, 186 n.

Vaideha Janaka, 316

Vaideha king, 357

vaidharmya, 132

vaidya, 385

Vaidyaka-sarvasva, 432

Vaidyakdstanga - hrdaya - vrtter bhe -

saja-ndma-sucl, 436 Vaidyanatha Dlksita, 81 Vaidyavacaspati, 434 Vain, 511 vairdgya, 231, 412, 439, 454

613

Vairdgya-sataka, 460 n.

Vaisesika, 51, 55, ug, 120, 125, 157, 179, 189-192, 194, 248, 262, 272, 302, 307 n., 369, 412, 514; categories, 55, 192; its theory of the subtle body, 306; philosophy, 193, 332 «., 398 n.; physics, 192, 273; springs of action in, 412; system, 366, 371; theory, 190

Vaisesika-bhasya, 162

Vaisesika-sutras , 356, 369-371

Vaisya, 502, 504, 505, 531, 542, 546

vaisamya, 320

Vaisnava, 125, 192, 219, 441, 443, T 532

Vaisnavism and Saivism, 543 n., 549 n.

Vaitarana, 424

Vaitarana-tantra, 435

vaitdna, 283

Vaitana-sntra, 284

Vaiyasika-nyaya-mala, 81

Vajra, 353. 354

vakrdnumdna, 120

Vakulakara, 431

Valabhl, 164

valaya, 284 n. 4

valaydsthi, 284 n. 4

valdsa, 298 n., 299

Valid, 12, 158, 166, 184; means of proof, 236; proofs, 167

Validity, 166, 170

Vallabhacarya, 147 n., 156 n., 443

Vamsldhara Misra, 250 n.

vanam, 497

vanatho, 497

vanisthu, 289

Vanity, 509-511

Varigasena, 427, 435

Varada Pandita, 57 n.

Vararuci, 432

Vararuci-samhitd, 432

Vardhamana, 107, 126 n.

Variability, 384

varna-dharma, 505

varnaka, 52 n.

varndsrama-dharma, 505

varnya-sama, 386, 387

varsd, 335

Varuna, 292, 300 n. 2

Varying states, 180

vasanta, 335

Vasisfha, 229, 257

vasti, 289 n. 1, 340, 426

vasti-kriyd, 296, 426

vastu, 203

vastutva, 38

Vasubandhu, 19-21, 25, 26 «., 29, 35, 58-60, 62, 164, 171; admits pure

knowledge, 20; arguments of Sari-kara for psychological duality of awareness do not apply to Vasubandhu, 29; central features of his philosophy, 24, 25; did not deny objectivity of objects of awareness, but regarded objects as awarenesses, 29; experiences like dreams, 20; his date, 20 n.; his denial of the doctrine of pure vacuity, 21; his idealistic conceptional space, 25; his idealistic explanation of physical events, 21; his refutation of the atomic theory, 20; his theory of dlaya-vijiidna , 22; his theory of pure consciousness and its power, 22; his theory of thought transformations, 21; his view of thought as real substance and its threefold transformations, 23 If.; his view that illusory impositions must have an object, 21; perceptual knowledge of the material world not trustworthy, 20; sahopalambha-niyama absent in, 26 n. 1; world-construction as false as dream-construction, 21

Vasumitra, 171

vasv-aiika-vasu-vatsare, 107

Vasistha-rdma-samvdda, 229

vasydtman, 420

vati, 400 n.

Vatsapa, 300

Vavrvdsas, 300

vd, 330

Vacaspati Misra, 11,12, 25 n., 29,36/2., 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 56, 57, 74 "•, 81-83, 87,101, 103, 105, 106,109,III, 112, 116, 119, 124, 126 «., 196, 220, 250, 260, 262, 272, 305, 306 «., 393, 394; admits jlva as the locus of avidyd and Brahman as its object, no; admits two kinds of ajndna, 108; discussions regarding his date and teachers, 107; his account of the Sautrantika view of the existence of the external world, 26 n. 2; his definition of truth, 108, 109; his difference with Sarvajnatma Muni, no; his explanation regarding the nature of object, 29; his followers, 108; his reference to other Buddhistic arguments regarding the falsity of space, 28 n. ; his view of illusion ,110; his view of the status of the object of knowledge, 111; method of his commentary, 108; on the Sarpkhya-Yoga theory of the subtle body, 305

Index

Vacdrambhana, 216

vdda, 377, 379, 401

Vadavah, 57 n.

Vadiraja, 443

Vadivaglsvara, 196

Vadindra, 120, 122-124, X 9 D ; his date

and works, 122, 123 Vagbhata, 274, 284 n. 3, 285 n. 6, 286 n. 1, 288 n.1, 304, 327, 329, 332, 425, 427, 432-434; diseases as modifications oidosas, 329; his view of dofa, dhdtu and dhatu-mala, 332; his view of dosa, dhdtu and mala, 327 ff. Vagbhata junior, 363 Vdgbhata-khandana-mandana, 425 Vagisa Gosvamin, 225 n. Vahata, 263, 433 Vajasaneyi-samhitd, 536 vdjikarana, 276, 301 Vajikarana-tantra, 425 vdk, 346

vdk-chala, 385, 386 n. vdkya-dosa, 384, 385 Vakyakara, 43 n. vdkya-prasamsd, 385 vdkya-sesa, 389, 391 Vdkya-vivarana-vydkhyd, 193 Vdkya-vrtti, 80, 81 Vdkya-vrtti-prakasika, 80 Vdkya-vrtti-ttkd, 193 Valmlki, 229, 230 vdna-prastha, 505 vdn-manah-sartra-pravrttiy 321 vdnntaya, 469 Vapyacandra, 431 vdrand, 353 vdritta, 500 vdrsika, 345

Vdrttika, 1 «., 48, 52, 78, 83, 84, 100, 102

Varyovida, 357

vdsana, 26, 27 «., 186, 187, 237-239, 243, 245, 251, 255-257, 264, 266, 268, 269

vdsandbhidhanah, 242

vasana-ksaya, 252

Vasistha, 230, 231, 238, 255

Vdsistha-Rdmuyana, 231

Vdsistha-Rdmdyana-candrikd, 231

Vasistha-sdra, 232

Vdsistha-sdra-gudhdrthd, 232

ttostattf, 224

Vasudeva, 535, 538-544, 548,549; and Krsna, 541 ff.

Vdsudevaka, 539

Vasudevendra, 57 w.

»<2ta, 258, 282, 296, 319, 327, 330-

334. 335 n., 336, 337 n., 339, 344,

349, 35°. 352, 361, 362 n., 371,

392 vdtaja, 300, 301, 331 Vdta-kald-kaliya, 332 «. vdtala, 334 vdta-prakrti, 328, 334 »<zfi, 299 vdtikdra, 299 vdti-krta-ndiatn, 299 vdti-krtasya-bhesajlm, 300 Vatslputriyas, 59, 60, 62, 182 Vatsyayana, 119, 124, 171, 248, 384

n. 1., 390, 393, 399 n., 40ow.,40i «.,

413

Vayorvida, 333

vdyu, 75, 245, 257 «., 259 n., 260, 262, 263, 276, 291, 300, 304, 311, 313, 3i5, 318, 325-331. 332 n., 333-336, 338, 339, 345, 348, 349, 362 n., 363, 365, 384; according to Caraka, 332 ff.

vedand, 23

Vedas, 44, 224,236,274,275,277,279, 280, 294, 333, 390, 405, 407, 438, 478, 481, 484, 487, 493, 494, 514, 520, 524, 526, 545, 547, 548

Veda-stuti-tlkd, 225

vedavddinah, 424

Vedadhyaksa - bhagavat - pujyapada, 52 n.

Vedananda, 52 n.

Vedanta, 1, 3, 13, 15, 18, 19, 29, 33,

34, 37. 44, 47, 53, 54. 56, 57, 69, 71-73, 86, 96, 107, 115, 118, 124, 125, 127, 128, 156, 168, 192, 198, 205, 208, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 227, 231, 234, 242, 261, 271, 310, 311, 410, 438, 472, 474, 476, 478, 479, 488 : 499, 504, 512, 518, 548, 550; ajnana and prakrti in, 74; all subjective notions are only contents, and therefore outside the revelation in, 16; analysis of consciousness in, 63 ff.; apprehension of objects involving objective characters, objects and the gure immediacy of revelation in, 13; Anandabodha's arguments in favour of the self-luminosity of the self and its criticism of the Prabhakara in, 69, 70; beginnings of the dialectical arguments in, 51; Buddhist criticism of the identity of the self and its reply in, 66, 67, cognitional revelation not a product in, 13; continuation of the school of Vacaspati up to the seventeenth century in, 51, 52; continuation of the schools of

615

Suresvara, Padmapada and Mandana up to the fourteenth century in, 52, 53; continuity of conscious life in, 15; criticism of Buddhistic analysis of recognition in, 65; difference between pure intelligence and cog-nitional states in, 13 ; does not admit any relation between the character and the object, but both are manifested in one simple revelation, 13; eleventh century writers in, 49; everything else which is not a principle of revelation is maya in, 16; existence of self cannot be proved by inference in, 68; existence of self is only proved through its immediacy and self-revelation in, 68, 69; general writers after the fourteenth century greatly under the influence of the Vivarana school in, 53;idea of jlvan-mukti in, 251; in what sense cognizing is an act, in what sense it is a fact in, 15; " I" only a particular mode of mind in, 15; its account of the antahlioiana, 75; its account of the kosas, 75, 76; its account of the possibility of recognition, 65, 66; its account of the universe, 76; its account of the vayus, 75; its central philosophical problem, 47; its chief emphasis is on the unity of the self, 72, 73; its conception of identity differentiated from the ordinary logical concept of identity, 14; its cosmology, 73-77; its difference with the Mahayanists regarding nature of objects in theVivarana school, 30; its theory of the subtle body, 311; its three opponents, Buddhist, Nai-yayika and Mlmamsaka, 71, 72; its twofold view, 13; logical explanation as regards the nature of identity in, 14; meaning of cognizing in, 15; meaning of prdna in, 260, 261; memory does not indicate awareness of awareness in, 67; mental states and revelation in, 15; nature of ajiidna and its powers in. 73, 74; nature of the antahkarana in, 76, 77; nature of the obligatoriness of its study in, 46; no cognition canrfot be cognized again in, 14; notion of " I " as content in, 15 ; possible borrowing of its theory of perception from £amkhya by Padmapada in, 89 n. ; principle of revelation designated as self or dttnan in, 16; principle of revelation is self-con-

tent, infinite and non-temporal in, 16; principle of revelation neither subjective nor objective in, 16; quarrel with the Prabhakaras on the subject of revelation in, 67; reasons adduced as to why cognition cannot be cognized in, 14; refutation of the arguments against the self-luminosity of the self in, 68, 69; revelation cannot be individuated, 16; revelation identical with self in, 15; self-identity proved through memory in, 67; seventeenth and eighteenth century-writers more under the influence of Vacaspati, Suresvara and Sarvajfmt-ma than of the Vivarana in, 56, 57; Srlharsa, Citsukha and the mahd-vidyd syllogism of Kularka in, 51: status of the object in, 35; tenth century writers in and Buddhism in, 48, 49; the evolution of the micro-cosmos and macrocosmos from ajiidna, 74, 75; the self limited by maya behaves as individuals and as God in, 72; the theory of trivrt-karana and paSici-karana in, 74; Vidyaranya's analysis of the recognizer in, 66; Vidyaranya's contention that the self-identity cannot be explained by the assumption of two separate concepts in, 67, 68; writers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century in, 57 n. 1; writers inspired by Jagannathasrama Nrsim-ha and Appaya in, 55; writers inspired by Krsnananda of the seventeenth century in, 56; writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in, 55 Vedanta arguments, 118, 128 Vedanta dialectic, 125; history of its rise and growth, 124, 125; maha-vidyd syllogisms of Kularka as its direct precursor in, 124, 125 Vedanta dialectics, 57 n., 163, 171;

forerunners of, 171 if. Vedanta epistemology, 149, 154 Veddnta-hrdaya, 57 n. Vedanta idealism, 151 Veddnta-kalpa-latikd, 225, 226 Veddnta-kalpa-taru, 108, 119H., 260 Veddnta-kalpa-taru-manjarl, 108 Veddnta-kalpa-tarii-parimala, 108, 226 Veddnta-kaumndl, 52, 53, 197, 198,

204-206, 209, 210, 211 n. Vedanta -kaumudi-vydkhydna ,205 Veddnta-kaustuhha , 8.-> w. Veddnta-naya-bhusana , 56, 82

Index

Veddnta-paribhdsd, 17 n., 30 «., 54, 74 m., 75 «., 105, 207, 208, 209 n., 211 w., 217, 223 n.

Veddnta-paribhdsd-prakdsikd, 54 w.

Vedanta philosophy, ig, 51, 62, 112

Vcddnta-sdra, 54, 55,73 n., 75 «., 81 m., 103, 261

Veddnta-siddhdnta-candrikd, 56

Veddnta-siddhdnta-muktdvali, 57 w., 270

Vedanta-sutra, 228, 260-262

Vcddnta-sulra-muktdvati, 82

Veddnta-silthdmani, 54

Veddnta-tattva-dipava-vydkhyd, 54

Veddnta-tattva-kaumadi, 45 /».

Veddnta-tattva-viveka, 54, 216, 217 w.

Vedanta teachers, 17, 30

Vedanta texts, 47

Vedanta topics, 81

Vedanta writers, 55

Vedantaoarya, 441

Vedantic, 31 «., 52 w., 92, 311; attack, 125; circle, 55; concept of salvation, 227; concepts, 148; cosmology, 73, 226; development, 48; doctrines, 228; idealism, 36; influence, 477, 478; interpretation, 49; interpretation by Bhartrprapanca, 1; interpreters, 208; monism, 224; problems, 228; self, 33; texts, 90, 98, 99, 102; writers, 44, 53

Vedantin, 30, 234

Vcdantist, 12,31,96, 124, 125, 128,157, 167, 168, 225, 517

vedanga, 274, 276

Veddiiga-sdra, 432

Veddrtha-samgraha , 43 n.

Vedic commands, 479, 481-486

Vedic commentator, 215

Vedic dliarma, 533

Vedic duties, 43 n., 46, 99, 100, 437

Vedic index, 345 «., 346 n., 486 n. 3

Vedic India, 301

Vedic injunctions, 468

Vedic knowledge, 495

Vedic religion, 493

Vedic texts, 74 //., 98, 129

Vedische Studien, 345 n.

vega-provartana, 227

Vegetables (born from), 309

Veins, 256, 289, 290, 518

Venis, 17 n.

Venkata, 43 «., 82 n., 119, 120, 123, 200

Veiikatanatha, 441

Venkatesa, 432

veram, 497

Verbal command, 479

Verbal definitions, 146

Verbalism, 171

Verbal nature, 163

Verbal repetition, 385

Verbal sophisms, 146

Verbal usage, 184

Vertebrae, 287 n. 1

Vertebral column, 285 n. 1, 287 n. x,

353 vibhova, 537 vibhdga, 158, 194, 360 Vibhrama-viveka, 87 n. I'ibhiiti, 549

Vibration, 256; of the prdna, 256 Vibratory, 254; activity, 257, 258, 261;

movement, 188 vicdra, 358, 359 vicar ana, 264, 373 Vice, 194, 248, 305, 373, 487, 493,

498, 507, 510, 511, 522 ricilutsd, 413 Vicious, 22,23,409, 414; endless scries,

130; infinite, 40, 70, 117, 132, 162,

174, 178, 185; infinite regress, 128,

255

Viciousness, 373

Victory, 512

viddesn, 497

Videha, 427

videha-mukti, z^z

Videha-tantra, 435

vidhdna, 389, 391

vidhi, 50, 479-483

Vidhi-rasdyana, 220

Vidhi-rasdyanopajivanl, 220

Vidhi-viveka, 45 n., 86, 87, 106, 482

vidhura, 351

vidhurd, 342

vidradha, 299

Vidvan-manoramd, 79

Vidvan-mano-raiijanl, 261 n. 1

vidvat-satnnydsa, 251, 252 n.

Vidyabhusan, Dr, 393, 394

vidyd, 12, 238, 239, 505

Vidydbharana, 126 n.

vidydbhdva, 12

vidydbhipsita, 495

Vidyadhaman, 79

Vidydmrta-varsini, 115

Vidyaranya, 52, 53, 57, 69, 70 n., 78, 82, 83, 86, 103, 214, 216, 251, 252; a follower of the Vivarana view, 215; his date and works, 214, 216; his idea of Jivan-mukti, 251; his view that may a and Brahman are the joint cause of the world-appearance, 215; the writer of Pancadasl and of the Jlvan-mukti-viveka , 251 n.

617

Vidyaranya Muni, 66, 67

Vidyaratna, K., 2 n.

Vidya sdgarl, 103, 126?/., 132, 134 n.

Vidyd-surabhi, 99

Vidyd-srl, 82 n.

vidyd-tarti, 107

Vidyatlrtha, 215 n.

View, 366, 369, 378; of things, 13

Vigorous, 303

Vigraha-zydvartani, 165

vigrhya-satnbhdsd, 378

Vijayanagara, 219

Vijoya-prasasti, 126

Vijayaraksita, 428-430, 432, 434, 435

vijiiapti, 20

vijiiapti-mdtratd, 22, 24

Vijtiapti-vidtratd-siddhi, 19 n.

vijndna, 23, 127, 164, 307, 343, 373, 491, SOS n.

Vijndna-bhairava, 264

Vijfmnabhiksu, 262, 443

vijndna-dhdtti, 307

Vijfidna-kaumudi, 264

vijiidna-kriyd-sakti-dvaydsraya, 1 04

vijfidnomaya, 76

vijiidnamaya-kosa, 75

vijiidna-mdtra, 19, 22, 234

vijndna-pariiidma, 21

tijiidna-vdda, 20, 209, 228, 272

vijndna-vddins, 2, 242

Vijiidndmrta-bhdsya , 262

vikalpa, 75 m., 236, 261, 389, 392, 401 M.

vikalpo-vdsand, 23

vikdra, 320, 369

Vikrama-samvat, 107

Vikramasila, 49

uifo-tf, 334, 335, 358, 386 m., 388

viksepa, 73, 389 n.

viksepa-sakti, 74

viksipati, 112

vilayana-rupdvrddhihprakopah, 335 m.

tildpani, 264, 265

vimukta, 251

Vimuktatman, 198, 199, 201, 203-205; criticism of the bhcddbheda view by, 201,202; criticism of the sahopa-lambha-niyamdt by, 201; his date and works, 198; his refutation of " difference," 199, 200; nature of pure consciousness in, 199; tries to prove an intrinsic difference between awareness and its object, 201; world-appearance like a painting on a canvas in, 203

Vimsatihd, 19, 20 n., 21 «., 26 «., 29

Vinaya-Pitaka, 276

vindsa-pratK"dhdt, 386 n.

Vindhyasvamin, 171

vinibandhanam, 497

vinnana, 498

Violent, 408

viparlta-dharmatvn, 6

viparyaya, 10, 381, 391

viparydsa, 5; (error), four kinds of, 5

vipdka, 22-24, 362-364, 366, 391

virakti, 251, 252

Mm;', 43

virat, 215, 548

tnreka, 315

Virility, 301, 333

viriya-samvara, 500

virodho, 497

Virtue, 194, 248, 305, 373, 404, 493,

508, 510, 511, 514, 522 Virtuous, 23, 367, 414, 511, 512, 514;

deeds, 246 viruddha, 384, 385, 386 «., 388 viruddha hetu, 386 n. visalpa, 299 visalpaka, 299 visarga, 370 tnsarpa, 299, 430 visattikd, 497

Visible, 157, 337 m.; </r>«z, 337 m. Vision, 333 Visual, 176; consciousness, 61; organ,

31; perception, 20, 25 //.; sense, 156 vis'ada, 332, 359 n., 361 visesa, 148, 187, 189, 371, 397 visista-devatd-bhakti, 505 risistasyaiva antmda-padarthatvdt, 223 Visistadvaita, 57 n., 441 visistddvaita-vddin , 439 rihtddlia-cakra, 355 visva, 76, 548 Visvabharati, 58 ?i. Visvadeva, 115 Visvambhara, 79 Visvanatha Tirtha, 220 Visvarupa Acarya, 82, 83, 86, 87, 251 visva-rupatd, 241 Visvamitra, 230, 541 Visvdmitra-samhitd, 432 Visvesvara, 443 Visvesvara Pandita, 80 Visvesvara SarasvatI, 55 Visvesvara Tlrtha, 78 Visvcsvarananda, 82 n. Visvesvarasrama, 57 n. visvodard, 353 visama-pravartand, 416 visama-vijiidna, 416 visamdhdropayogitvdt, 334 n. Visa-tantra, 425 visaya, 23, 30, 104, no, 112, 152

Index

vi§aya-caitanya, 207 vi§aya-gata-pratyak§atva, 208 visaya-titiksa, 495 visaya-vijnapti, 22 visaya-visayi-bhava, 144, 152 visaydn indriydndm, 341 visayopalabdhi, 373 Visnu, 535, 536, 538, 546-549; and

bhagavat, 539, 540; conception of,

535» 53°; conception of, and of

narayana, 537,538 Visnubhafta, 52 n. Visnu-dharmottara, 279 n. Visnu-mukhd, 536 Visnu-pada, 536 Visnu-purana, 251 Visnu-purana-tlka, 148 w. Visnu-smrti, 279 «. Vital centres, 340 Vital currents, 179 Vital element, 315, 316 Vital functions, 357, 487 Vitality, 241, 328, 336 Vital parts, 342 Vital powers, 21 Vital principle, 241 vitandd, 211 > 379» 4 DI Vifthala Dikstta, 443 Vivarana, 53, 54, 56, 103, 208, 209,

216 «., 222; line, 104; school, 34, 53,

57 Vivarana-prameya-samgraha, 52, 53,

63 n., 65 n., 66 n., 67, 70 «., 83, 84,

86, 87, 103, 214, 216 I r ivarana-siddhdnta-candrika, 434 Vivarana-siddhanta-cintamani, 329 n. Virarana-tutparya-dlpikd, 148 n. Vivaranopanyasa, 10, 31 n., 103, 216 n. Vivaranopanyase Bharatltlrtha-vaca-

nam, 216 n. vivarta, 38, 39, 224; cause, 45; view,

46, 215; view of causation, 224 vivarta-kdrana, 50, 51 Viveka-cuddmani, 79 viveka-nispatti, 250 vividisd-samnydsa, 252 n. Virasimhdvalokita, 436 vtrya, 241, 351, 359, 361-366, 370,

39 1 . 5oi vita, 256

Vocal activities, 500 Vocal organs, 254 Void, 272 Volition, 23, 24, 71, 152, 153, 463,

515 Volitional states, 179, 180 Volitional tendency, 479 Voluntary, 515

Vomiting, 348

vranah, 330 n.

Vrddha-Vagbhata, 317 n. 1

vrddhdh, 103

vrddhi, 322

vrkka, 318

Vrnda, 427, 435

Vrsnis, 539, 541, 543

WSya, 323, 365 n.

vrtti, 56, 70, 87, 206, 207, 210, 256,

306 vrtti-caitanya, 208 vrtti-jndna, 77 vrttikdra, 43 Vrtti-prabhdkara, 216 n. vrtti transformation, 206 Vrtti-vdrttika, 220 vyakta, 470 vyakter apaiti, 386 n. vyartha, 388 vyatireki, 400 n. vyavasdya, 107, 384 vyavasdydtmikd, 484 m. i vyddhi, 336 m.

Vyddhi-sindhu-vimardana, 43 2 Vydkarana, 275 m., 547 Vydkarana-vdda-naksatra-mdld, 219 vyakhydna, 389, 393 Vydkhydna-dtpikd, 123 Vydkhyd-sudhd, 55 vydkulita-mdnasah, 312 w. 3 vydna, 259, 260, 291 vydpddo, 497 vydpdra, 137, 186 vydpdrah prerand-rupah, 481 vydpti, 120, 139, 148, 194 vydpti-graha, 148 vydrosanam, 498 Vyasa, 78, 87, 259 n. 2 Vydsa-bhdsya, 251, 262, 265, 305, 408,

476, 517 Vyasatlrtha, 118, 225, 226 Vyasasrama, 119 vydvahdrika, 2, 44 vydvrtta, 63 vydydma, 419 i;yi2Aa, 545, 546, 548

Wackernagel, 345 w.

Waking experiences, 6, 8, 28

Waking ideas, 26

Waking life, 80, 115

Waking state, 26, 240, 241, 257

Walleser, 398 n.

Warm, 358, 361, 408

Washerman, 160

Waste-products, 325, 327, 331, 337

Watchfulness, 505

619

Water, 74,187,194, 302, 331-334, 347.

349, 352, 357-36o, 362, 364, 367,

501; channels, 348 Watery, 331, 357, 359; character, 331 Way, 115, 367 Weak, 338 Wealth, 510

Weber, Dr Albrecht, 288 n., 486 n. Well-being, 509 Whirlwind, 408 White, 349; leprosy, 282 Whitney, W. D., 340 n. Whole, 20, ^o, 152, 157, 187 Will, 149, 248, 402, 415; force of, 264;

to live, 414 Willing, 263 Will-power, 242 Windpipe, 286 Winter, 327, 335, 370 Wisdom, 24, 257, 442, 444, 491, 494,

500, 502, 504, 505, 514, 530, 532 Wise, 378, 531 Wish, 497

World, 1, 3, 11, 51, 114, 230, 236 World-appearance, 1, 5, 9-12, 19, 45,

46,48, 55. 74, 98, 101,105, 106, no,

in, 117, 118, 147, 152, 168, 170,

215, 217, 221, 224, 230, 233-236,

239-245, 256, 268 World-construction, 21 World-creation, 39, 42, 242 World-experience, 3, 4, 170 Worldly life, 521 World-manifestation, 410 n. World-objects, 21, 28, 36 World-order, 533 World-phenomena, 50 World-process, 73, 170 Worms, 297, 298, 300 Worship, 537 Wounds, 330 Wrath, 497

Wrong construction, 154 Wrong notion, 9 Wrong perception, 137

yad antar-jneya-rupam, 27 n.

yadrcchd, 372, 410

yajna, 292 n., 448, 487, 488

yajna-vidah, 448

Yajnesvara Makhlndra, 218 n.

Yajus, 274, 390, 526

Yakkha, 539

yakna, 288

yaksas, 283, 468

yaksman, 297 n. 5, 298

Yama, 251, 311, 432, 454, 455, 491

yantra, 257

yasmin sunyam jagat sthitam, 234 Yasomitra, 58 w., 62 yatharthanubhava, 213 yathdrthdnubhavah pratnd, 133, 212 yathd-vtdhi, 294, 295 Yaugacaryas, 120 Yadava, 541, 543

Yadavdbhyudaya, 220

Yddavdbhyudaya-tlkd, 220 Yadavananda Nyayacarya, 225 n. Yajnavalkya, 107, 252, 286 n. 1

Ydjiiavalkya-Dharma-sastra, 279 n. Yamunacarya, 439-441, 541, 546, 547 ydtudhdnas, 296, 300 Yellow, 27, 176, 330; awareness, 70,

7i

Yellowness, 143

Yoga, 107, 109, 250, 258, 265, 356, 389, 390, 415, 439, 440, 443-445, 447, 451-453, 456, 457, 460, 461, 466, 467, 489, 499, 504, 512, 514, 5 X 9> 547; concept of God criticized, 177; springs of action in, 414

yoga-dhdrand, 449 n. 2

Yoga discipline, 242

Yoga literature, 354 n.

Yoga practices, 273, 436, 440, 448, 477

Yoga processes, 453

yoga-sevd, 450

Yoga-sutra, 5 n., 251, 265, 304 «., 403, 408,443,451,461, 549

Yoga-sutra-bhdsya, 87

Yoga system, 436

yoga-sataka, 425, 436

Yoga Upanisads, 455, 461

yoga-vdhitvdt, 332 n.

Yoga-vdrttika, 262, 355

Yoga-vdsistha, 17, 57 n., 228, 230 «., 231-234, 237, 240, 246, 247, 250 n., 251-254, 259, 263, 264 n., 265-268, 270-272, 402 n.; citta and movement, 258; conception of jlvan-mukti, 245 ff.; denial of daiva in, 255; energy and its evolution, 343 ff.; energy and world-appearance, 243 ff.; estimate of its philosophy, 271, 272; free-will and destiny, 253; its doctrine of prdrabdha-karma, 246, 247; its idealism compared with that of Prakasananda, 270, 271; its idealism compared with that of faarikara and Buddhist idealism, 268 ff.; jivan-miikti and Nyaya emancipation, 248; jlvan-mukti and the Prabhakara idea of emanicpation, 249; jlvan-mukti and the Samkhya idea of emancipation, 249, 250; ji-

Index

Yoga-vdsislha (cont.) van-mukti and the Samkhya-yoga idea of emancipation, 249-251 \jlvan-mukti and Vidyaranya's doctrine of jivan-mukti, 251; jivan-mukti compared with Buddhist sainthood, 247, 248; jivan-mukti compared with sthita-prdjna, 247; karma, manas and the categories, 237-239; nature of kartrtva, 242 ff.; nature of the work, other works on it and its date, 228-232; origination of the world through thought-movement, 235-237; place of free-will in, 254; prana and prdndydma in, 257 ff.; prana vibration and knowledge in, 256; right conduct and final attainment in, 267, 268; stages of progress towards saintliness in, 264 ff.; theory of spanda, 235-237; ultimate reality is pure intelligence, 232,233 ; vdsand and prana vibration in, 256, 257; world-appearance is entirely mental creation and absolutely false, 233,

234 Yoga-vdsistha-Ramayana, 228, 232 Yoga-vdsistha-samksepa, 232 Yoga-vdsistha-sdra, 232 Yoga-vdsistha-sdra-samgraha, 232 Yoga-vdsistha-slokdh, 232

Yoga-vdsiftha-tdtparya-prakdsa, 240 n. Yoga-vdsiffha-tdtparya-samgraha, 232 Yogacara, 164 Yogananda, 57 n. Yoganandanatha, 436 yogdrudha, 444, 445, 446 n. Yogesvara, 453 Yogins, 189, 256, 440, 444, 446-451,

454 Yogi-yajnavalkya-samhitd, 354

Yoglsvara, 57 «., 122

yogyatd, 150

yoni, 358

yuddhe cdpy apaldyana, 505 n.

yudh, 551

Yudhisthira, 508, 509

Yugasena, 172

yuj, 443. 444. 446

yujir, 443, 444

yujiryoge, 443, 444

yuj samddhau, 443

yukta, 446 n. 1, 458

yukta dstta, 449

yukti, 359, 360, 370, 373, 375, 376

Yukti-dlpikd, 45 n.

Yukti-prayoga, 49

yunjydt, 446 n. 4

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandi-schen Gesellschaft, 345 n.

A HISTORY

OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA, M.A.,

Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.), D.Litt. (Hon.) (Rome)

F.R.S.L., I.E.S.

VOLUME III

CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUHI. I SHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London Office: Bentley House, N.w. I American Branch: New York

Agents for Canada. India, and Pakistan: Macmillan

First published 1940 Reprinted 1952

First Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Reprinted by offset-lit ho by Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd.

To the HON. SRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

who went through great sufferings and hardships all his life in the cause of the liberation of his countrymen, and who is still labouring with almost superhuman effort for the unification of the subcontinent of India, and who is working with steady devotion and faith for the establishment of peace at home and among the nations of the world, the foremost Indian who is piloting the progress of the country through troubled waters in the most hazardous period of India's history, this work is most respectfully dedicated as a tribute of personal gratefulness

PREFACE

The second volume of this work was published as long ago as 1932. Among the many reasons which delayed the publication of this volume, one must count the excessive administrative and teaching work with which the writer is saddled; his continued illness; the regrettable failure of one eye through strenuous work, which often makes him depend on the assistance of others; and the long distance between the place of publication and Calcutta. The manuscript of the fourth volume is happily ready.

In writing the present volume the author has taken great trouble to secure manuscripts which would present a connected account of the development of theistic philosophy in the South. The texts that have been published are but few in number and the entire story cannot be told without constant reference to rare manuscripts from which alone the data can be collected. So far, no work has been written which could throw any light on the discovery and interpretation of a connected history of Vaisnava thought. It would have been well if the Tamil and Telegu works could have been fruitfully utilized in tracing the history of Vaisnavism, not only as it appeared in Sanskrit but also as it appeared in the vernaculars of the South. But the author limited himself as far as possible to Sanskrit data. This limitation was necessary for three reasons: first, the author was not master of the various vernaculars of South India; secondly, the inclusion and utilization of such data would have made the present book greatly exceed its intended scope; and thirdly, the inclusion of the data from the vernacular literature would not have contributed materially to the philosophical problems underlying the theistic speculations dealt with in this work. Looked at from the strictly philosophical point of view, some of the materials of the present book may be regarded as somewhat out of place. But, both in the present volume and the volume that will follow it, it will be impossible to ignore the religious pathology that is associated with the devotional philosophy which is so predominant in the South and which so much influenced the minds of the people not only in the Middle Ages but also in the recent past and is even now the most important element of Indian religions.

Philosophy in India includes not only morality but religion also. The most characteristic feature of religion is emotion or sentiment associated with a system of beliefs, and as such in the treatment of the dominant schools of philosophy that originated in South India one cannot help emphasizing the important pathological developments of the sentiment of devotion. The writer hopes, therefore, that he may be excused both by those who would not look for any emphasis on the aspect of bhakti or religious sentiment and also by those who demand an over-emphasis on the emotional aspect which forms the essence of the Vaisnava religion. He has tried to steer a middle course in the interest of philosophy, which, however, in the schools of thought treated herein is so intimately interwoven with religious sentiment.

The writer has probably exceeded the scope of his treatment in dealing with the Arvars, whose writings are in Tamil, but there also he felt that without referring to the nature of the devotional philosophy of the Arvars the treatment of the philosophy of Ramanuja and his followers would be historically defective. But though the original materials for a study of the Arvars are in Tamil, yet fortunately Sanskrit translations of these writings either in manuscript or in published form are available, on which are almost wholly based the accounts given here of these Tamil writers.

The treatment of the Pancaratra literature offered some difficulty, as most of these works are still unpublished; but fortunately a large volume of this literature was secured by the present writer in manuscript. Excepting Schrader's work, nothing of any importance has been written on the Pancaratra School. Though there are translations of the bhasya of Ramanuja, there has been no treatment of his philosophy as a whole in relation to other great philosophers of his School. Practically nothing has appeared regarding the philosophy of the great thinkers of the Ramanuja School, such as Venkata, Meghanadari and others, most of whose works are still unpublished. Nothing has also been written regarding Vijnanabhiksu's philosophy, and though Nimbarka's bhasya has been translated, no systematic account has yet appeared of Nimbarka in relation to his followers. The writer had thus to depend almost wholly on a very large mass of published and unpublished manuscript literature in his interpretation and chronological investigations, which are largely based upon internal evidence;

though, of course, he has always tried to utilize whatever articles and papers appeared on the subject. The subjects treated are vast and it is for the scholarly reader to judge whether any success has been attained in spite of the imperfections which may have crept in.

Though the monotheistic speculations and the importance of the doctrine of devotion can be traced even to some of the Rg-veda hymns and the earlier religious literature such as the Gitd and the Mahdbhdrata and the Visnupurdna, yet it is in the traditional songs of the Arvars and the later South Indian philosophical writers, beginning from Yamuna and Ramanuja, that we find a special emphasis on our emotional relation with God. This emotional relation of devotion or bhakti differentiated itself in many forms in the experiences and the writings of various Vaisnava authors and saints. It is mainly to the study of these forms as associated with their philosophical perspectives that the present and the succeeding volumes have been devoted. From this point of view, the present and the fourth volumes may be regarded as the philosophy of theism in India, and this will be partly continued in the treatment of Saiva and Sakta theism of various forms. The fourth volume will deal with the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in their bitter relation with the monistic thought of Sarikara and his followers. It will also deal with the theistic philosophy of the Bhagavatapurana and the theistic philosophy of Vallabha and the followers of Sri Caitanya. Among the theistic philosophers the followers of Madhva, Jayatlrtha and Vyasatlrtha occupied a great place as subtle thinkers and dialecticians. In the fifth volume, apart from the different schools of Saiva and Sakta thinkers, the Tantras, the philosophy, of grammar, of Hindu Aesthetics, and of Hindu Law will be dealt with. It is thus expected that with the completion of the fifth volume the writer will have completed his survey of Hindu thought so far as it appeared in the Sanskrit language and thus finish what was begun more than twenty years ago.

A chapter on the Cdrvdka materialists has been added as an appendix, since their treatment in the first volume was practically neglected.

The writer has a deep debt of gratitude to discharge to Dr F. W. Thomas—the late Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and a highly esteemed friend of his who, in spite of his various activities,

pressure of work and old age, has been a true jnanabandhu to the author, helping him with the manuscript and the proofs, and offering him valuable suggestions as regards orthography, punctuation and idiomatic usage. Without this continued assistance the imperfections of the present work would have been much more numerous. The author is specially grateful to his wife, Dr Mrs Surama Dasgupta, Sastri, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab.) for the continued assistance that he received from her in the writing of this book and also in reading a large mass of manuscripts for the preparation of the work. Considering the author's great handicap in having only one sound eye it would have been impossible for him to complete the book without this assistance. He is also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., for the help that he received from him from time to time.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

June 1939

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XV THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

PAGE

i Date of Bhaskara .......... i

2 Bhaskara and £ankara ......... 3

3 The Philosophy of Bhaskara's Bhdsya ...... 6

CHAPTER XVI THE PANCARATRA

1 Antiquity of the Paficaratra . . . . . . . .12

2 The Position of the Paficaratra Literature . . . . .14

3 The Paficaratra Literature . . . . . . . .21

4 Philosophy of the Jaydkhya and other Samhitds .... 24

5 Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd . . . . . .34

CHAPTER XVII THE ARVARS

1 The Chronology of the Arvars ........ 63

2 The Philosophy of the Arvars ........ 69

3 Arvars and Sri-vaisnavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas ............ 85

CHAPTER XVIII

AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VIS~ISTADVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

1 The Aragiyas from Nathamuni to Ramanuja ..... 94

2 Ramanuja ........... 100

3 The Precursors of the Visistadvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Ramanuja . . . . . . .105

4 Ramanuja Literature . . . . . . . . .114

5 The Influence of the Arvars on the followers of Ramanuja . .134

CHAPTER XIX THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNACARYA

1 Yamuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others . . 139

2 God and the World . . . . . . . . . -152

3 God according to Ramanuja, Venkatanatha and Lokacarya . . 155

4 Visistadvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Veh-kafanatha . . . . . . . . . .159

CHAPTER XX PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMANUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

PAGE i &ahkara and Ramanuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or unqualified 165

2 Refutation of Ssahkara's avidya ...... 175

3 Ramanuja's theory of Illusion—All knowledge is Real . 179

4 Failure of theistic proofs . • . . . . . . .189

5 Bhaskara and Ramanuja ...... . . 192

6 Ontological position of Ramanuja's Philosophy ... 195

7 Vehkatanatha's treatment of Pramdna ..... 201

8 Verikatanatha's treatment of Doubt ... ... 207

9 Error and Doubt according to Vehkatanatha . . . . .210

10 Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Ramanuja School .......... 220

11 Vehkatanatha's treatment of Inference ...... 225

12 Epistemology of the Ramanuja School according to Meghanadari and others 235

13 The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge ..... 247

14 The Ontological categories of the Ramanuja School according to Vehkatanatha ....... ... 251

(a) Substance . . . . . . . . . . -251

(6) Criticism of the Samkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence

of Prakrti 256

(c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nydya in relation to Whole

and Part ........ . . 262

(d) Criticism of the Samkhya Theory of Sat-kdrya-vdda . . . 265

(e) Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness . . 268 (/) Refutation of the Carvaka criticism against the Doctrine of

Causality ........... 276

280 282 284 286

(g) The Nature of the Senses according to Vehkatanatha

(h) The Nature of dkdsa according to Vehkatanatha

(i) Nature of Time according to Vehkatanatha

(j) The Nature of Soul according to Vehkatanatha .

(k) The Nature of Emancipation according to Vehkatanatha 292

15 God in the Ramanuja School ...... . 296

16 Dialectical criticism against the £ahkara School . 304

17 Meghanadari ....... . 346

18 Vatsya Varada ........ . 349

19 Ramanujacarya II alias Vadi-Hamsa-Navamvuda .... 352

20 Ramanujadasa alias MahacSrya . . . . . . .361

21 Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Srlvacana-bhufana of LokacSrya

and Saumya Jamatr Muni's Commentary on it . . . . 374

22 Kasturl-Rahgacarya . . . . . . . . . .381

23 Saila Ssrinivasa ........... 384

24 Rahgacarya ........... 395

CHAPTER XXI THE NIMBARKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

PAGE

1 Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbarka School . . . . -399

2 A General Idea of Nimbarka's Philosophy ..... 404

3 Controversy with the Monists by Madhava Mukunda . . .416

(a) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Vedanta are untenable . . . . . . . . . .416

(b) Refutation of the £ankara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects 422

(c) Refutation of the £ahkarite View of Ajndna .... 424

4 The Pramdwas according to Madhava Mukunda .... 426

5 Criticism of the views of Ramanuja and Bhaskara .... 429

6 The Reality of the World 435

7 Vanamall Misra .......... 440

CHAPTER XXII THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJNANA BHIKSU

1 A General Idea of Vijnana Bhiksu's Philosophy. .... 445

2 The Brahman and the World according to Vijnana-mrta-bhasya . 454

3 The Individual .......... 460

4 Brahma-Experience and Experience ...... 465

5 Self-Luminosity and Ignorance ....... 468

6 Relation of Samkhya and Vedanta according to Bhiksu . . . 471

7 Maya and Pradhana . 476

8 Bhiksu's criticism of the Samkhya and Yoga ..... 479

9 Isvara-gltd, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijnana Bhiksu . . 482

CHAPTER XXIII

PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURANAS

1 Visnu Purdna ... . ..... 497

2 Vdyu Purdna ........... 502

3 Mdrkandeya Purdna . . . . . . . . .506

4 Naradlya Purdna .......... 507

5 Kurma Purdna .......... 509

APPENDIX TO VOLUME I The Lokdyata, Ndstika and Cdrvdka . ... 512-550

INDEX 551

CHAPTER XV

THE BHASKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Date of Bhaskara.

Udayana, in his Nydya-kusumdnjali, speaks of Bhaskara as a commentator on the Vedanta in accordance with the traditions of the tridanda school of Vedanta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes 1 . Bhattojl Dlksita also, in his Tattva-viveka-tikd-vivarana, speaks of Bhatta Bhaskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (bheddbhedd) 2 . It is certain, however, that he flourished after Sankara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Sankara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra. Thus, at the very beginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the sutra, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the mdyd doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views 3 . But, though he was opposed to Sankara, it was only so far as Sankara had introduced the mdyd doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through mdyd. For

1 Tridanda means " three sticks." According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks.

Pandita Vindhyesvari Prasada Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to Bhaskara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra, says that the Vaisnava commentators on the Brahma-sutra prior to Ramanuja, Tahka, Guhadeva, Bharuci and Yamunacarya, the teacher of Ramanuja, were all tridandins. Such a statement is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority from which he drew this information.

2 " Bhattabhdskaras tu bhedd-bheda-veddnta-siddhdnta-vddl" ; Bhattojl Dik-sita's Veddnta-tattva-tlkd-vivarana, as quoted by Pandita Vindhyesvari Prasada in his Introduction to Bhaskara's commentary.

3 sutrd-bhiprdya-samvrtyd svdbhiprdyd-prakdsandt vydkhydtam yair idam sdstram vydkhyeyam tan-nivrttaye.

Bhaskara's Commentary, p. i.

Also "ye tu bauddha-matdvalambino mdyd-vddinas te' pi anena nydyena sutra-kdrenai va nirastdh." Ibid. II. 2. 29.

In another place Sahkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahayana Buddhists— vigltam vicchinna-mulam mdhdydnika-bauddha-gdthitam mdyd-vddam vydvarnayanto lokdn vydmohayanti. Ibid. 1. 4. 25.

both Sarikara and Bhaskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (updddna and nimitta) Sarikara would maintain that this was so onlv because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that miiyd, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was substantially thf same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a may a transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhaskara maintained that there was no mayd, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pancaratras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vasudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agreement with the Bhagavatas, and he says that he does not find anything to be refuted in the Paiicaratra doctrine 1 . But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman 2 .

Again, though one cannot assert anything verv positively, it is possible that Bhaskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahminic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the Veddnta-siitra may rightly be taken as the view of the tridandi Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (dsrama), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas 3 .

Madhavacarya, in his Sankara-vijaya, speaks of a meeting of Sahkara with Bhatta Bhaskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable 4 . From the fact that Bhaskara refuted £ahkara and was himself referred to by Ldayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Pandita Vindhyesvari Prasada refers to a copper-plate found by the

1 Vasudeva eva iipadiina-karanam jagato nimitta-karanam ceti te manyante. . tad etat sarvam sruti-prasiddham eva tasmdn natra nirdkaramyam pasyamah. Bhclskara-bhasya, II. 2. 41.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. III. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Pandita Vindhyesvarl's Introduction. * Saiikara-vijaya, xv. So.

late Dr Bhawdajl in the Maratha country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhaskara Bhatta of the lineage (gotra) of Sandilya, son of KavicakravartI Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyapati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhaskaracarya of Sandilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhanta-siromani; and he maintains that this senior Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhatta was the commentator on the Brahma-sutra 1 . But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names 2 , it is not definitely known whether this Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhatta ever wrote any commentary on the Brahma-sutra. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree ot definiteness, is that Bhaskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Ramanuja 3 .

Bhaskara and Sankara.

There is a text of the Chdndogya Upanisad, vi. i. i, which is treated from two different points of view by Sankara and Bhaskara in connection with the interpretation of Brahma-sutra, II. i. 14 4 . Saiikara's interpretation of this, as Vacaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay-materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (vikdra), but mere expressions of speech (vdcdrambhanam), mere names (ndmdheyam) having no real

1 Pandita Vindhyesvarl Prasada's Introduction.

2 We hear of several Bhaskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhaskara, Srantabhaskara, Haribhaskara, Bhadantabhaskara, Bhaskaramisra, Bhaskara-sastri, Bhaskaradiksita, Bhattabhaskara, Pandita Bhaskaracarya, Bhattabhas-karamisra, Trikandamandana, Laugaksibhaskara, Sandilyabhaskara, Vatsa-bhaskara, Bhaskaradeva, Bhaskaranrsirnha, Bhaskararanya, Bhaskaranandanatha, Bhaskarasena.

3 He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of Sandilya as a great author of the Bhagavata school. He refers to the four classes of Mahesvaras, Pasupata, Saiva, Kapalika and Kathaka-siddhantin, and their principal work Pancddhyayi-sastra; he also refers to the Pdncardtrikas, with whom he is often largely in agreement.

4 tad-ananyatvam arambhana-sabdddibhyah. Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14. yathd saumya ekena mrt-pinden asarvam mrnmayam vijndtam syddvdcdram-bhanam vikdro ndmadheyam mrttike'ty'eva satyam (Ch. vi. 1. 1).

entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all 1 .

Bhaskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects {karya) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, involving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause remains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifestations, it is said that the cause alone is true—the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it 2 . The effect, the name {tulma-dheya), is real, and the scriptures also assert this 3 .

Bhaskara argues against Sahkara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of may a (tnayavddin) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (adraita). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (avidyd); and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition

1 Bhamati, Brahma-sutra, n. i. 14. Rahu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head; but still we use, for con\enience of language, the expression " Rahu's head" (Rdhoh sirafi); similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply—they simply do not exist at all—but are mere vikalpa; vdcd kevalarn drabhyate vikdra-jdtam no tu tattvato'sti yato ndmadheya-matram etat;. . .yathd rdhoh sirah. . .sabda-jridnd'-nupdtl vastu-sunyo vikalpa iti; tathd cdW'astutayd am tarn vikdra-jdtam.

2 vag-indriyasya ubhayam drambhanam vikdro ndmadheyam. . . iibhayam dlambya vdg-vyavaharah pravartate ghatena udakarn chare 1 ti mrnmayam ity asya idam vydkhydnam. . .kdranam eva karya-ttnana ghatavad avatisthate. . .kdrana-syii'vasthd-mdtram kdryam vyatiriktd'vyatiriktam sukti-rajataz'ad dgamdpdya-dharmitzdc ca anrtam anityam iti ca vyapadisyate. Bhdskara-bhusya, 11. 1. 14.

3 atha ndma-dheyam satyasya satyamiti, etc. Ibid.

of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upanisads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare's horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare's horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake someone experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from something false that he dies; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the falsehood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all language would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be nonexistent.

Further, what is this "avidyd" if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described 1 . If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictor)'. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of mayd is false.

What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipotence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God's transforming Himself into the world, though He is partless;

1 yasyah haryam idam krtsnam vyavaharaya kalpate

nirvaktum so na sakye ti vacanam vacandr-thakam. Bhaskara-bhdsya.

for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them according to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (bhogya-sakti), and by the other the individual souls, the enjoyers (bhoktr); but in spite of this modification of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modification of the world as the enjoyable and the enjoyer takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same 1 .

The Philosophy of Bhaskara's Bhasya.

From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhaskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real" modifications or transformations (parindma) of Brahman's own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhaskara's answer to such a question is that "difference" (bheda) has in it the characteristic of identity (abheda-dharmas ca) —the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea's own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference 2 .

The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time 3 . Just as the dkdsa, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the dkdsa inside a vessel or a house is not just the same dkdsa as the boundless space, but may in some

1 Bhdskara-bhdsya, n. i. 27, also I. 4. 25.

2 abheda-dharmas ca bhedo yatha mahodadher abhedah sa eva tarariqddy-atmand vartamano bheda ity ttcyate, na hi tarangd-dayah pdsdnd-disu drsyante tasyaiva tdh saktayah sukti-saktiniatos ca ananyatvam anyatvam cu-palaksyate yatha gner dahana-prakdsand-di-saktayah.. . .tasmdt sarvam ekd-nekd-tmakam ruV tyantam abhinnam bhinnam vd. Ibid. 11. 1. 18.

3 Ibid. 1. 4. 21.

sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five prdnas, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (paramdtman) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage 1 . This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the presence of those objects 2 . Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of buddhi, ahamkdra, the five senses and the five vdyus it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the buddhi, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions.

In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures 3 . It is not true, as Sankara says, that those who are fit to

1 rago hi paramdtma-visayo yah sa mukti-hetuh visaya-visayo yah sa bandha-hetuh. Bhaskara-bhdsya.

2 Ibid. II. 3. 18, 22, 23.

3 Bhaskara-bhdsya, I. i. i. In holding the view that the Brahma-sutra is in a sense continuous with the Alimdmsd-sutra, which the former must follow— for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former—and that the Brahma-sutras are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, Bhaskara seems to have followed Upa-varsa or Upavarsacarya, to whose commentary on the Mimdmsd-sutra he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (sdstra-sampraddya-pravartaka). Ibid. I. 1. 1, and II. 2. 27. See also I. 1. 4: dtma-jndnd-dhikrtasya karmabhir vind apavargd-nupapatter jixdnena karma samucciyate.

have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Sarikara that there cannot be any combination (samuccaya) of knowledge (jndna) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (karma) is false. Bhaskara admits that pure karma (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (jndna) combined with the regular duties, i.e. jndna-samuccita-karma, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures—a vidhi —the self is to be known (dtmd vd are drastazyah, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Sahkara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the studv of Yedanta by purifving us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhaskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

Bhaskara draws a distinction between cognition (jndna) and consciousness (caitanya), more particularlv, self-consciousness (dtma-caitanya). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (anubhava) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, manas, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (samskdra). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition 1 . Bhaskara is therefore positivelv against the contention of Kumarila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known bv itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per-

1 jildna-kriyd-kalpandydm pramdnd-bhdvdt.. . . dlokendriya-manah-samskdresu hi satsu samvedanam utpadyate iti tad-abhdve notpadyate, yadi punar apurum jndnam kalpyate tasydpy anyat tasydpy anyad ity nnavasthd; na ca jiidna-kriydnumdne lingam asti, samvedanam iti cen na,agrhlta-sambandhatvdt. Bhdskara-bhdsva, 1.1 i.

ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (anavasthd). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (anubhava) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhaskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyaya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Sarikarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom 1 . It may also be noted that, unlike Dhar-marajadhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, Veddnta-paribhdsd, Bhaskara considers manas as a sense-organ 2 . On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhaskara thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (svatah-pramdna), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside {paratah pramdnaf.

As has already been said, Bhaskara does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken 4 . The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness 5 . A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes 6 . It is as omniscient,

1 kecid ahuh atma pramdydm indriya-dvdropddhi-nirgatna-visayefu vartate. .. tad idam asamyag darsanam;. . . dlokendriyddibhyo jndnam utpadyamdnam ... cdnyad iti yuktam. Bhaskara-bhdsya. 2 Ibid. II. 4. 17.

3 Ibid. 1. 4. 21. * Ibid. III. 4. 26.

6 Ibid. iv. 4. 8. • Ibid. iv. 4. 12.

omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself 1 . The attachment (raga) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (samara-dhana) or devotion (bhakti), while bhakti is said to be attendance on God by meditation {dhyanadina paricarya). Bhakti is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later Vaisnava literature, but as dhyana or meditation 2 . A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this Bhaskara's answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman's being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual manifestation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual. Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (nisprapanca brahman), the Brahman which is transcendent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water 3 . This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (sal-laksana and bodha-laksana)* . He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, vet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their substance. A substance does not become different bv virtue of its qualities 5 .

Bhaskara denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (jivan-mukti); for so long as the body remains as a result of the

1 muktah kdrami-tmiinam praptah tndz'adevasarvii-jiiahsarva-saktih. lihaskara-bhdsya, iv. 4. 7.

2 Ibid. in. 2. 24.

3 Ibid. 11. 2. 11, 13, 17. * Ibid. m. 2. 23.

6 na dharma-dharmi-bhedcna svarupa-bheda iti; mi hi gumi-rahitam dravvam asti na dravya-rahito gunah. Ibid. 111. 2. 23.

xv] The Philosophy of Bhdskara's Bhasya n

previous karmas, the duties assigned to the particular stage of life (dsrama) to which the man belongs have to be performed; but his difference from the ordinary man is that, while the ordinary man thinks himself to be the agent or the doer of all actions, the wise man never thinks himself to be so. If a man could attain liberation during lifetime, then he might even know the minds of other people. Whether in mukti one becomes absolutely relationless (nihsam-bandhah), or whether one becomes omniscient and omnipotent (as Bhaskara himself urges), it is not possible for one to attain mukti during one's lifetime, so it is certain that so long as a man lives he must perform his duties and try to comprehend the nature of God and attend on Him through meditation, since these only can lead to liberation after death 1 .

CHAPTER XVI

THE PANCARATRA.

Antiquity of the Pancaratra.

The Pancaratra doctrines are indeed very old and are associated with the purusa-sukta of the Rg-veda, which is, as it were, the foundation stone of all future Yaisnava philosophy. It is said in the Sata-patha Brdhmana that Narayana, the great being, wishing to transcend all other beings and becoming one with them all, saw the form of sacrifice known as pancaratra, and by performing that sacrifice attained his purpose 1 . It is probable that the epithets "puruso ha ndrdyanah" became transformed in later times into the two rsis Xara and Narayana. The passage also implies that Narayana was probably a human being who became a transcending divinity by performing the Pancaratra sacrifice. In the later literature Narayana became the highest divinity. Thus Venkata SudhI wrote a Siddhanta-ratnavali in about 19,000 lines to prove by a reference to scriptural texts that Narayana is the highest god and that all other gods, Siva, Brahma, Visnu, etc., are subordinate to him 2 . The word Brahman in the Upanisads is also supposed in the fourth or the last chapter of the Siddhanta-ratnavali to refer to Narayana. In the Mahdbhdrata (Sdnti-parvan, 334th chapter) we hear of Nara and Narayana themselves worshipping the unchanging Brahman which is the self in all beings; and yet Narayana is there spoken of as being the greatest of all. In the succeeding chapter it is said that there was a king who was entirely devoted to Narayana, and who worshipped him according to the sdtvata rites 3 . I le was so devoted to Narayana that he considered all that belonged to him, riches, kingdom, etc., as belonging to Narayana. lie harboured in his house great saints versed in the Pancaratra system. When under the patronage of this king great saints performed sacrifices, they were unable to have a vision of the great Lord Narayana, and Brhaspati became angry.

' Sata-patha Brahmana xm. 6. i.

2 The Siddhanta-ratnavali exists only as a MS. which has not yet been published.

3 We have an old Pancaratra-samhita called the Satvata-samhita, the contents of which will presently be described.

Other sages then related the story that, though after long penance they could not perceive God, there was a message from Heaven that the great Narayana was visible only to the inhabitants of Sveta-dvlpa, who were devoid of sense-organs, did not require any food, and were infused with a monotheistic devotion. The saints were dazzled by the radiant beauty of these beings, and could not see them. They then began to practise asceticism and, as a result, these holy beings became perceivable to them. These beings adored the ultimate deity by mental japa (muttering God's name in mind) and made offerings to God. Then there was again a message from Heaven that, since the saints had perceived the beings of Sveta-dvlpa, they should feel satisfied with that and return home because the great God could not be perceived except through all-absorbing devotion. Narada also is said to have seen from a great distance Sveta-dvlpa and its extraordinary inhabitants. Narada then went to Sveta-dvlpa and had a vision of Narayana, whom he adored. Narayana said to him that Vasudeva was the highest changeless God, from whom came out Sarikarsana, the lord of all life; from him came Pradyumna/ called manas, and from Pradyumna came Aniruddha, the Ego. From Aniruddha came Brahma, who created the universe. After the pralaya, Sarikarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha are successively created from Vasudeva.

There are some Upanisads which are generally known as Vaisnava Upanisads, and of much later origin than the older Pancaratra texts. To this group of Upanisads belong the Avyakto-panisad or Avyakta-nrsimhopanisad, with a commentary of Upanisad-brahmayogin, the pupil of Vasudevendra, Kali-santaranopanisad, Krsnopanisad, Garudopanisad, Gopdlatdpaini Upanisad,Gopdlottara-tdpani Upanisad, Tdrdsdropanisad, Tripdd-vibhuti-mahdndrdyana Upanisad, Dattdtreyopanisad, Ndrdyanopanisad, Nrsimha-tdpini Upanisads Nrsimhottara-tdpinl Upanisad, Rdmatdpinl Upanisad, Rdmottarottara-tdpini Upanisad, Rama-rahasya Upanisad, Vdsudevo-panisad, with the commentaries of Upanisad-brahmayogin. But these Upanisads are mostly full of inessential descriptions, ritualistic practices and the muttering of particular mantras. They have very little connection with the Pancaratra texts and their contents. Some of them^like the Nrsimha-tdpini, Gopdlatdpani, etc.—have been utilized in the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism.

The Position of the Paficaratra Literature.

Yamuna, in his Agama-pramanya, discusses the position of the Paficaratras as follows. It is said that any instruction conveyed through language can be valid either by itself or through the strength of the validity of some other proofs. No instruction of any ordinary person can be valid by itself. The special ritualistic processes associated with the Paficaratra cannot be known by perception or by inference. Only God, whose powers of perception extend to all objects of the world and which are without any limitation, can instil the special injunctions of the Paficaratra. The opponents, however, hold that a perception which has all things within its sphere can hardly be called perception. Moreover, the fact that some things may be bigger than other things does not prove that anything which is liable to be greater and less could necessarily be conceived to extend to a limitless extent 1 . Even if it be conceived that there is a person whose perception is limitless, there is nothing to suggest that he should be able to instruct infallibly about the rituals, such as those enjoined in the Paficaratra. There are also no agamas which prescribe the Paficaratra rites. It cannot be ascertained whether the authors of the Paficaratra works based them on the teachings of the Yedas or gave their own views and passed them on as being founded on the Yedas. If it is argued that the fact that the Paficaratra, like other texts of Smrti of Manu, etc., exist proves that they must have a common origin in the Yedas, that is contradicted by the fact that the Paficaratra doctrines are repudiated in the smrti texts founded on the Yedas. If it is said that those who follow the Paficaratra rites are as good Brahmins as other Brahmins, and follow the Yedic rites, the opponents assert that this is not so, since the Pancaratrins may have all the external marks and appearance of Brahmins, but yet thev are not so regarded in society. At a social dinner the Brahmins do not sit in the same line with the Bhiigavatas or the followers of the Paficaratra.

1 at ha ekasmin satisaye kendpyanyena niratisayena bhatntavyam iti dhnsvit samdna-jdtiyend'nyena nir-atisaya-dasdm adhirudluna bhavitavyam iti:

na tdvad agrimah kalpah kalpyate'nupalambhatah na hi drstam sardrddi vyomeva prdpta-vaibhavam.

Agama-prdmdnya, p. 3.

The very word sdtvata indicates a lower caste 1 , and the words bhdgavata and sdtvata are interchangeable. It is said that a sdtvata of the paiicama caste who by the king's order worships in temples is called a bhdgavata. As a means of livelihood the satvatas worship images and live upon offerings for initiation and those made to temple gods; they do not perform the Vedic duties, and have no relationship with the Brahmins, and so they cannot be regarded as Brahmins. It is also said that even by the sight of a man who takes to worship as a means of livelihood one is polluted and should be purified by proper purificatory ceremonies. The Pancaratra texts are adopted by the degraded satvatas or the bhagavatas, and these must therefore be regarded as invalid and non-Vedic. Moreover, if this literature were founded on the Vedas, there would be no meaning in their recommendation of special kinds of rituals. It is for this reason that Badarayana also refutes the philosophical theory of the Pancaratra in the Brahma-sutra.

It may, however, be urged that, though the Pancaratra injunctions may not tally with the injunctions of Brahminic Smrti literature, yet such contradictions are not important, as both are based upon the Vedic texts. Since the validity of the Brahminic Smrti also is based upon the Vedas, the Pancaratra has no more necessity to reconcile its injunctions with that than they have to reconcile themselves with the Pancaratra.

The question arises as to whether the Vedas are the utterances of a person or not. The argument in favour of production by a person is that, since the Vedas are a piece of literary composition, they must have been uttered by a person. The divine person who directly perceives the sources of merit or demerit enjoins the same through his grace by composing the Vedas for the benefit of human beings. It is admitted, even by the Mlmamsakas, that all worldly affairs are consequent upon the influence of merit and demerit. So the divine being who has created the world knows directly the sources of merit and demerit. The world cannot be produced directly through the effects of our deeds, and it has to be admitted that there must be some being who utilizes the effects of our deeds, producing the world in consonance with them. All the scriptural

1 Thus Manu says:

vais'yat tu jdyate vrdtydt sudhanvdcdrya eva ca bhdrufas ca nijanghas ca maitra-sdtvata eva ca.

Agama-prdmdnya, p. 8.

texts also support the admission of such an omnipotent and omniscient God. It is this God who, on the one hand, created the Vedas, directing the people to the performance of such actions as lead them to mundane and heavenly happiness, and on the other hand created the Pancaratra literature for the attainment of the highest bliss by the worship of God and the realization of His nature. There are some who deny the legitimate inference of a creator from the creation, and regard the Vedas as an eternally existent composition, uncreated by any divine being. Even in such a view the reason why the Vedas and the consonant Smrtis are regarded as valid attests also the validity of the Pancaratra literature. But, as a matter of fact, from the Vedas themselves we can know the supreme being as their composer. The supreme God referred to in the Upanisads is none other than Vdsudeva, and it is He who is the composer of the Pancaratra. Further, arguments are adduced to show that the object of the Vedas is not only to command us to do certain actions or to prohibit us from doing certain other actions, but also to describe the nature of the ultimate reality as the divine person. The validity of the Pancaratra has therefore to be admitted, as it claims for its source the divine person Narayana or Vasudeva. Yamuna then refers to many texts from the Vardha, Linga and Rlatsya Puranas and from the Manu-samhitd and other smrti texts. In his Purusa-ninnaya also, Yamuna elaborately discusses the scriptural arguments by which he tries to show that the highest divine person referred to in the Upanisads and the Puranas is Narayana. This divine being cannot be the Siva of the Saivas, because the three classes of the Saivas, the Kapalikas, Kalamukhas and Pasupatas, all prescribe courses of conduct contradictory to one another, and it is impossible that they should be recommended by the scriptural texts. Their ritualistic rites also are manifestly non-Vedic. The view that they are all derived from Rudra does not prove that it is the same Rudra who is referred to in the Vedic texts. The Rudra referred to by them may be an entirely different person. He refers also to the various Puranas which decry the Saivas. Against the argument that, if the Pancaratra doctrines were in consonance with the Vedas, then one would certainly have discovered the relevant Vedic texts from which they were derived, Yamuna says that the Pancaratra texts were produced by God for the benefit of devotees who were impatient of following elaborate details described in the

Vedic literature. It is therefore quite intelligible that the relevant Yedic texts supporting the Pancaratra texts should not be discovered. Again, when it is said that Sandilya turned to the doctrine of bhakti because he found nothing in the four Vedas suitable for the attainment of his desired end, this should not be interpreted as implying a lowering of the Vedas; for it simply means that the desired end as recommended in the Pancaratras is different from that prescribed in the Vedas. The fact that Pancaratras recommend special ritual ceremonies in addition to the Vedic ones does not imply that they are non-Vedic; for, unless it is proved that the Pancaratras are non-Vedic, it cannot be proved that the additional ceremonies are non-Vedic without implying argument in a circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the Pancaratra ceremonies are really antagonistic to all Vedic ceremonies. It is also wrong to suppose that Badarayana refuted the Pancaratra doctrines; for, had he done so, he would not have recommended them in the Mahdbhdrata. The view of the Pancaratras admitting the four vyuhas should not be interpreted as the admission of many gods; for these are manifestations of Vasudeva, the one divine person. A proper interpretation of Badarayana's Brahma-sutras would also show that they are in support of the Pancaratras and not against them. Even the most respected persons of society follow all the Pancaratra instructions in connection with all rituals relating to image-worship. The arguments of the opponents that the Bhaga-vatas are not Brahmins are all fallacious, since the Bhagavatas have the same marks of Brahmahood as all Brahmins. The fact that Manu describes the pancatna caste as sdtvata does not prove that all satvatas are pancamas. Moreover, the interpretation of the word sdtvata as pancatna by the opponents would be contradictory to many scriptural texts, where satvatas are praised. That some satvatas live by image-building or temple-building and such other works relating to the temple does not imply that this is the duty of all the Bhagavatas. Thus Yamuna, in his Agama-prdmdnya and Kdsmirdgama-prdtndnya, tried to prove that the Pancaratras are as valid as the Vedas, since they are derived from the same source, viz. the divine Person, Ndrdyana 1 .

1 The Kdsmlrdgama is referred to in the Agama-prdmdnya, p. 85, as another work of Yamuna dealing more or less with the same subject as the Agama-prdmdnya, of which no MS. has been available to the present writer.

From the tenth to the seventeenth century the Saivas and the Srivaisnavas lived together in the south, where kings professing Saivism harassed the Srivaisnavas and maltreated their temple-gods, and kings professing Srivaisnavism did the same to the Saivas and their temple-gods. It is therefore easy to imagine how the sectarian authors of the two schools were often anxious to repudiate one another. One of the most important and comprehensive of such works is the Siddhanta-ratnavali, written hv Yenkata Sudhi. Yenkata Sudhi was the disciple of Yeiikatanatha. He was the son of Srisaila Tiitavarya, and was the brother of Sri Saila Srlnivasa. The Siddhanta-ratnavali is a work of four chapters, containing over 300,000 letters. I le lived in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, and wrote at least two other works, Rahasya traxa-sdra and Siddhdnta-vaijaxanti.

Many treatises were written in which the Pancaratra doctrines were summarized. Of these Gopalasuri's Pancardtra-raksd-samgraha seems to be the most important. Oopalasuri was the son of Krsnadesika and pupil of \ edantaramanuja, who was himself the pupil of Krsnadesika. His Pancardtra-raksd deals with the various kinds of rituals described in some of the most important Pancaratra works.

It thus seems that the Pancaratra literature was bv many writers not actually regarded as of Yedic origin, though among the Srivaisnavas it was regarded as being as authoritative as the \ edas. It was regarded, along with the Samkhya and Yoga, as an accessory literature to the Yedas 1 . Yamuna also speaks of it as containing a brief summary of the teachings of the Yedas for the easv and immediate use of those devotees who cannot afford to studv the vast Yedic literature. The main subjects of the Pancaratra literature are directions regarding the constructions of temples and images,

1 Thus Yeiikatanatha, quoting Yyasa, says:

idantmahn-panisiidam c<itur-vcda-sam-anvit<nn sdmkhya-yoga-krtantena puma-rutrd-nu-sahditum.

Scivdra-^Iimdrtisd, p. '19. Sometimes the Pancaratra is regarded as the root of the Yedas, and sometimes the Yedas are regarded as the root of the Pancaratras. Thus Yeiikatanatha in the ahove context quotes a passage from Yyasa in which Pancaratra is regarded as the root of the Yedas— "muhutn vcdti-rrksusya mula-bhutn malum uyum." He quotes also another passage in which the Yedas are regarded as the root of the Pancaratras—" srutimidam idam tantram pramdna-kalpu-sutrarat." In another passage he speaks of the Pancaratras as the alternative to the Yedas—" idiibhe veda-mantrdniim ptinca-rutro-ditena vii."

descriptions of the various rituals associated with image-worship, and the rituals, dealing elaborately with the duties of the Srl-vaisnavas and their religious practices, such as initiation, baptism, and the holding of religious marks. The practice of image-worship is manifestly non-Vedic, though there is ample evidence to show that it was current even in the sixth century B.C. It is difficult for us to say how this practice originated and which section of Indians was responsible for it. The conflict between the Vedic people and the image-worshippers seems to have been a long one; yet we know that even in the second century B.C. the Bhagavata cult was in a very living state, not only in South India, but also in Upper India. The testimony of the Besnagar Column shows how even Greeks were converted to the Bhagavata religion. The Mahdbhdrata also speaks of the sdtvata rites, according to which Yisnu was worshipped, and it also makes references to the Vyuha doctrine of the Pancaratras. In the Ndrdyaniya section it is suggested that the home of the Pancaratra worship is Sveta-dvipa, from which it may have migrated to India; but efforts of scholars to determine the geographical position of Sveta-dvlpa have so far failed.

In the Purdnas and the smrti literature also the conflict with the various Brahminic authorities is manifest. Thus, in the Kurma purdna, chapter fifteen, it is said that the great sinners, the Pancaratrins, were produced as a result of killing cows in some other birth, that they are absolutely non-Vedic, and that the literatures of the Saktas, Saivas and the Pancaratras are for the delusion of mankind 1 . That Pancaratrins were a cursed people is also noticed in the Pardsara purdna 1 . They are also strongly denounced in the Vasistha-samhitd, the Samba-purdna and the Suta-samhitd as great sinners and as absolutely non-Vedic. Another cause of denouncement was that the Pancaratrins initiated and admitted within their

1 kapalam garudam sdktam, bhairavam purva-pascimam, panca-ratram, pasupatam tathdnyani sahasrasah.

Kurma-purana, Ch. 15.

(As quoted in the Tattva-kaustubha of Dlksita but in the printed edition of the B.J. series it occurs in the sixteenth chapter with slight variations.) The Skanda-purana also says:

paiicaratre ca kapale, tatha kdlamukeh'pi ca. sakte ca dlksita yuyam bhavela brahmanadhamah.

2 dvitiyam paiicaratre ca tantre bhagavate tatha dlksitds ca dvijd nityam bhaveyur garhitd hareh.

(As quoted by Bhat^oji Diksita in his Tattva-kaustubha, MS. p. 4.)

sect even women and Sudras. According to the Asvaldyana-smrti, no one but an outcast would therefore accept the marks recommended by the Pancaratras. In the fourth chapter of the Vrhan-ndradiya-purdna it is said that even for conversing with the Pancaratrins one would have to go to the Raurava hell. The same prohibition of conversing with the Pancaratrins is found in the Kurma-purana, and it is there held that they should not be invited on occasions of funeral ceremonies. Hemadri, quoting from the Vdyit purdna, says that, if a Brahman is converted into the Pancaratra religion, he thereby loses all his Vedic rites. The Lihga-purdna also regards them as being excommunicated from all religion (sarza-dharma-vahiskrta). The Aditya and the Agni-purdnas are also extremely strong against those who associate themselves in any way with the Pancaratrins. The Visnu, Sdtdtapa, Hdrila, Bodhdyana and the Yama samhilds also are equally strong against the Pancaratrins and those who associate with them in any way. The Pancaratrins, however, seem to be more conciliatory to the members of the orthodox Vedic sects. They therefore appear to be a minority sect, which had always to be on the defensive and did not dare revile the orthodox Vedic people. There are some Puranas, however, like the Mahd-bhdrata, Bhdgavata and the Vimu-purdna, which are strongly in favour of the Pancaratrins. It is curious, however, to notice that, while some sections of the Puranas approve of them, others are fanatically against them. The Puranas that are specially favourable to the Pancaratrins are the Visnu, Ndradiya, Bhdgavata, Gdruda, Pad ma and Vardha, which are called the Sdttvika puranas 1 . So among the smrtis, the Vdsistha, Hdrita, Vydsa, Pdrasara and Kdsyapa are regarded as the best 2 . The Pramdna-samgraha takes up some of the most important doctrines of the Pancaratrins and tries to prove their authoritativeness by a reference to the above Puranas and smrtis, and also to the Mahdbhdrata, the Gitd, Visnudharmottara, Prdjdpatya-smrti, Itihdsasamuccaya, Harivamsa, Vrddha-manu, Sdndilya-smrti, and the Brahmdnda-purdna.

1 Thus the Pramdna-samgraha says:

raisnavam naradiyam ca tathd bhagavatam subham gdrudam ca tathd pddmam vdrdham subha-darsane sdttvikdni purdndni vijneydni ca satprthak.

2 Ibid. p. 14. Tattva-kaustubha, MS. p. 13.

The Pancaratra Literature.

The Pancaratra literature is somewhat large and only a few works have been printed. The present writer, however, had the opportunity of collecting a large number of manuscripts, and an attempt will here be made to give a brief account of this literature, which, however, has no philosophical importance. One of the most important of these samhitas is the Satvata-sarnhita. The Sdtvata is referred to in the Mahdbhdrata, the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, the Isvara-samhitd and other samhitas. In the Satvata-sarnhita we find that the Lord (Bhagavdn) promulgates the Pancaratra-^ dstr a at the request of Samkarsana on behalf of the sages 1 . It consists of twenty-five chapters which describe the forms of worshipping Narayana in all His four Vyuha manifestations (vibhava-devatd), dress and ornaments, other special kinds of worship, the installation of images and the like. The Isvara-samhitd says that the Ekdyana Veda, the source of all Vedas, originated with Vdsudeva and existed in the earliest age as the root of all the other Vedas, which were introduced at a later age and are therefore called the Vikdra-veda. When these Vikdra-vedas sprang up and people became more and more worldly-minded, Vasudeva withdrew the Ekdyana Veda and revealed it only to some selected persons, such as Sana, Sanatsujati, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkumara, Kapila and Sanatana, who were all called ekdntins. Other sages, Marici, Atri, Arigirasa, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasistha and Svayambhuva, learnt this Ekdyana from Narayana, and on the basis of it the Pancaratra literature on the one hand was written, in verse, and the various Dharma-sdstras on the other hand were written by Manu and other rsis. The Pancaratra works, such as Sdtvata, Pauskara, and Jaydkhya and other similar texts, were written at the instance of Samkarsana in accordance with the fundamental tenets of the Ekdyana Veda, which was almost lost in the later stage. Sandilya also learnt the principles of the Ekdyana Veda from Samkarsana and taught them to the rsis. The contents of the Ekdyana Veda, as taught by Narayana, are called the Sdtvika-sdstra; those Sastras which are partly based on the Ekdyana Veda and partly due to the contribution of the sages themselves are called the Rdjasa-Sastra; those which are merely the contribution of

1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1902.

human beings are called the Tdmasa Sdstra. The Rdjasa Nostra is of two kinds, the Pancaratra and the Vaikhanasa. Sdttata, Pauskara and Jaydkhya were probably the earliest Pancaratra works written by the sages, and of these again the Satvata is considered the best, as it consists of a dialogue between the Lord and Samkarsana.

The Isvara-samhitd consists of twenty-four chapters, of which sixteen are devoted to ritualistic worship, one to the description of images, one to initiation, one to meditation, one to mantras, one to expiation, one to methods of self-control, and one to a description of the holiness of the Yadava hill 1 . The chapter on worship is interspersed with philosophical doctrines which form the basis of the Srlvaisnava philosophy and religion.

The Hayaslrsa-samhitd consists of four parts; the first part, called the Pratisthd-kdnda, consists of forty-two chapters; the second, the Samkarsana, of thirty-seven chapters; the third, the Linga, of twenty chapters; and the fourth, the Saura-kdnda, of forty-five chapters 2 . All the chapters deal with rituals concerning the installation of images of various minor gods, the methods of making images and various other kinds of rituals. The Visnu-tattva-samhitd consists of thirty-nine chapters, and deals entirely with rituals of image-worship, ablutions, the holding of Vaisnava marks, purificatory rites, etc. 2 The Parama-samhitd consists of thirty-one chapters, dealing mainly with a description of the process of creation, rituals of initiation, and other kinds of worship 3 . In the tenth chapter, however, it deals with yoga. In this chapter we hear of jndna-yoga and karma-yoga. Jndna-yoga is regarded as superior to karma-yoga, though it may co-exist therewith. Jndna-yoga means partly practical philosophy and the effort to control all sense-inclinations by that means. It also includes samddhi, or deep concentration, and the practice of prdndydma. The word yoga is here used in the sense of "joining or attaching oneself to." The man who practises yoga fixes his mind on God and by deep meditation detaches himself from all worldly bonds. The idea of karma-yoga does not appear to be very clear; but in all probability it means worship of Visnu. The Pardsara samhitd, which was also available

1 Published at Conjeeveram, 1921.

2 It has been available to the present writer only in MS.

3 This samhitd has also been available to the present writer only in MS.

only in manuscript, consists of eight chapters dealing with the methods of muttering the name of God.

The Padma-samhitd, consisting of thirty-one chapters, deals with various kinds of rituals and the chanting of mantras, offerings, religious festivities and the like 1 . The Paramesvara-samhitd, consisting of fifteen chapters, deals with the meditation on mantras, sacrifices and methods of ritual and expiation 2 . The Pauskara-samhitd, which is one of the earliest, consists of forty-three chapters, and deals with various kinds of image-worship, funeral sacrifices and also with some philosophical topics 2 . It contains also a special chapter called Tattva-samkhyana, in which certain philosophical views are discussed. These, however, are not of any special importance and may well be passed over. The Prakdsa-samhitd consists of two parts. The first part is called Parama-tattva-nirnaya, and consists of fifteen chapters; the second, called Para-tattva-prakasa, consists of twelve chapters only 2 . The Mahd-sanatkumdra-samhita, consisting of four chapters and forty sections in all, deals entirely with rituals of worship 2 . It is a big work, containing ten thousand verses. Its four chapters are called Brahma-rdtra, Siva-rdtra, Indra-rdtra and Rsi-rdtra. The Aniruddha-samhitd-mahopanisad contains thirty-four chapters and deals entirely with descriptions of various rituals, methods of initiation, expiation, installation of images, the rules regarding the construction of images, etc. 2 The Kdsyapa-samhitd, consisting of twelve chapters, deals mainly with poisons and methods of remedy by incantations 2 . The Vihagendra-samhitd deals largely with meditation on mantras and sacrificial oblations and consists of twenty-four chapters. In the twelfth chapter it deals extensively with prdndydma, or breath-control, as a part of the process of worship 2 . The Sudarsana-samhitd consists of forty-one chapters and deals with meditation on mantras and expiation of sins. Agastya-samhitd consists of thirty-two chapters. The Vasistha contains twenty-four chapters, the Visvdmitra twenty-six chapters and the Visnu-samhitd thirty chapters. They are all in manuscripts and deal more or less with the same subject, namely, ritualistic worship. The Visnu-samhitd is, however, very much under the influence of Samkhya and holds Purusa to be all-pervasive. It also invests Purusa with dynamic

1 It has been available to the present writer only in MS.

2 These works also were available to the present writer only in MS.

activity by reason of which the prakrtt passes through evolutionary changes. The five powers of the five senses are regarded as the power of Visnu. The power of Visnu has both a gross and a transcendental form. In its transcendental form it is power as consciousness, power as world-force, power as cause, power by which consciousness grasps its objects and power as omniscience and omnipotence. These five powers in their transcendental forms constitute the subtle body of God. In the thirtieth chapter the Visnu-samhitd deals with yoga and its six accessories (sad-anga-yoga), and shows how the yoga method can be applied for the attainment of devotion, and calls it Bhagavata-yoga. It may be noticed that the description of human souls as all-pervasive is against the Srivaisnava position. The astdnga yoga {yoga with eight accessories) is often recommended and was often practised by the early adherents of the Srivaisnava faith, as has already been explained. The Markandeya-samhitd consists of thirty-two chapters, speaks of 108 samhitds, and gives a list of ninety-one samhitds 1 . The Visvaksena-samhita consists of thirty-one chapters. It is a very old work and has often been utilized by Ramanuja, Saumya Jamatr muni and others. The Hiranya-garbha-samhitd consists of four chapters.

Philosophy of the Jayakhya and other Samhitas.

The Pancaratra literature is, indeed, vast, but it has been shown that most of this literature is full of ritualistic details and that there is very little of philosophy in it. The only samhitds (so far as they are available to us) which have some philosophical elements in them are the Jaydkhya-samhitd, Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, Visnu-samhitd, Vihagendra-samhitd, Parama-sarnhitd and Pauskara-samhitd\ of these the Ahirbudhnya and the Jayakhya are the most important.

The Jaya starts with the view that merely by performance of the sacrifices, making of gifts, study of the Vedas, and expiatory penances, one cannot attain eternal Heaven or liberation from bondage. Until we can know the ultimate reality (para-tattva) which is all-pervasive, eternal, self-realized, pure consciousness, but which through its own will can take forms, there is no hope of salvation. This ultimate reality resides in our hearts and is in itself

1 These are also in MS. Schrader enumerates them in his Introduction to Pancaratra.

devoid of any qualities (nir-guna), though it lies hidden by the qualities (guna-guhya) and is without any name (a-namaka).

A number of sages approached Sandilya in the mountain of Gandhamadana with inquiry concerning the manner in which this ultimate reality may be known. Sandilya in reply said that this science was very secret and very ancient, and that it could be given only to true believers who were ardently devoted to their preceptors. It was originally given to Narada by Visnu. The Lord Visnu is the object of our approach, but He can be approached only through the scriptures (£dstra); the £dstra can be taught only by a teacher. The teacher therefore is the first and primary means to the attainment of the ultimate reality through the instructions of the scriptures.

The Jaydkhya-samhitd then describes the three kinds of creation, of which the first is called Brahma-sarga, which is of a mythological character; it is stated that in the beginning Brahma was created by Visnu and that he, by his own egoism, polluted the creation which he made and that two demons, Madhu and Kaitabha, produced from two drops of sweat, stole away the Vedas and thus created great confusion. Visnu fought with them by His physical energies, but was unsuccessful. He then fought with them by His "mantra" energy and thus ultimately destroyed them.

The second creation is that of the evolution of the Samkhya categories. It is said in the Jaydkhya-samhitd that in the pradhdna the three gunas exist together in mutual unity. Just as in a lamp the wick, the oil and the fire act together to form the unity of the lamp, so the three gunas also exist together and form the pradhdna. Though these gunas are separate, yet in the pradhdna they form an inseparable unity {bhir.nam ekdtma-laksanam). These gunas, however, are separated out from this state of union, and in this order of separation sattva comes first, then rajas and then tamas. From the threefold unity of the gunas the buddhi-tattva is evolved, and from this are produced the three kinds of ahamkdra, prakdsdtmd, vikrtydtmd and bhutdtmd. From the first kind of ahamkdra, as taijasa or as prakdsdtmd, the five cognitive senses and the manas are produced. From the second kind of ahamkdra the five conative senses are evolved. From the ahamkdra as bhutdtmd the five bhuta-yoni or sources of elements (otherwise called the five tan-mdtra) are produced, and from these are derived the five gross elements. The prakrti is unintelligent and material in nature, and

so, as may well be expected, the evolution from prakrti is also material in nature. The natural question in this connection is: how can matter begin to produce other material entities? The answer given to this question is that, though both a paddy seed and a piece of rice are material by nature, yet there is productivity in the former, but not in the latter; so, though the prakrti and its evolutes are both material in nature, yet one is produced out of the other. The products of the unintelligent prakrti, being suffused with the glow of the self as pure consciousness, one with Brahman, appear as being endowed with consciousness 1 . Just as a piece of iron becomes endowed with magnetic powers, so the prakrti also becomes endowed with intelligence through its association with the intelligent self in unity with Brahman. The question, however, arises how, since matter and intelligence are as different from each other as light from darkness, there can be any association between the unconscious prakrti and the pure intelligence. To this the reply is that the individual soul (jiva) is a product of a beginningless association of vdsand with pure consciousness. For the removal of this vdsand a certain power emanates from Brahman and, impelled by Mis will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the pure consciousness in the jiva is ultimately freed from the vdsand through the destruction of his karma, and he becomes ultimately one with Brahman. The karma can bear fruits only when they are associated with their receptacle, the vdsand. The self, or the soul, is brought into association with the gunas by the energy of God, and it can thereby come to know its own vdsand, which are non-intelligent by nature and a product of the guna 2 . So long as the self is in association with the covering of mdyd it experiences good and evil. The association of consciousness with matter is thus effected through the manifestation of a special energy of God by which the self is made to undergo the various experiences through its association with mdyd. As soon as the bond is broken, the self as pure consciousness becomes one with Brahman.

1 cid-rupam dtma-tattvam yad abhinnam brahmani sthitam tenaitac churitam bhdti acic cinmayuvad dvija.

Jayakhya-samhitd (MS.), m. 14. When this section was written the Jayakhya-samhitd was not published. It has since been published in the Gaekwad's oriental series.

2 mdyamaye dviid-dhdre guna-dhdre tato jade

saktyd samyojito hy dtmd vetty dtmiyds ca vdsandh. Ibid. in. 24.

The third creation is the pure creation (suddha-sarga), in which God, otherwise called Vasudeva, evolved from out of Himself three subsidiary agents, Acyuta, Satya and Purusa, which are in reality but one with Him and have no different existence. In His form as Purusa God behaves as the inner controller of all ordinary gods, whom He goads and leads to work. And it is in this form that God works in all human beings bound with the ties ofvdsand, and directs them to such courses as may ultimately lead them to the cessation of their bondage.

God is pure bliss and self-conscious in Himself. He is the highest and the ultimate reality beyond all, which is, however, self-existent and the support of all other things. He is beginning-less and infinite and cannot be designated either as existent or as non-existent (na sat tan nasad ncyate). He is devoid of all gunas, but enjoys the various products of the gunas, and exists both inside and outside us. He is omniscient, all-perceiving, the Lord of all and all are in Him. He combines in Him all energies, and is spontaneous in Himself with all His activities. He pervades all things, but is yet called non-existent because He cannot be perceived by the senses. But, just as the fragrance of flowers can be intuited directly, so God also can be intuited directly 1 . All things are included in His existence and He is not limited either in time or in space. Just as fire exists in a red-hot iron-ball as if it were one therewith, so does God pervade the whole world. Just as things that are imaged on a mirror may in one sense be said to be in it and in another sense to be outside it, so God is in one sense associated with all sensible qualities and in another sense is unassociated therewith. God pervades all the conscious and the unconscious entities, just as the watery juice pervades the whole of the plant 2 . God cannot be known by arguments or proof. His all-pervading existence is as unspeakable and undemonstrable as the existence of fire in wood and butter in milk. He is perceivable only through direct intuition. Just as logs of wood enter into the fire and are lost in it, just as rivers lose themselves in the ocean, so do the Yogins enter into the essence of God. In such circumstances there is difference between the rivers and the ocean into which they fall, yet the dif-

1 sva-samvedyam tu tad viddhi gandhah puspddiko yatha.

Jaydkhya-samhitd, IV. 76.

2 cetand-cetandh sarve bhutdh sthdvara-jangamdh

puritdh paramesena rasenausadhayo yathd. Ibid. IV. 93.

ference cannot be perceived 1 . There is thus both a difference between the waters of the rivers and the ocean and an absence of difference, even as between the devotees of God and God. The doctrine here preached is thus a theory of bheddbheda or unity-indifference.

Brahman is here described as being identical with consciousness, and all objects of knowledge (jneya) are regarded as existing inside the mind 2 . The true knowledge is unassociated with any qualifications, and it can rise only through the process of Yogic practice by those who have learnt to be in union with God 3 .

When through the grace of God one begins to realize that all the fruits of actions and all that one does are of the nature of the gunas of prakrti, there dawns the spiritual inquiry within one, as to one's own nature, and as to the nature of the essence of sorrow, and one approaches the true preceptor. When the devotee continues to think of the never-ending cycle of rebirths and the consequent miseries of such transitoriness and other afflictions associated with it, and also undergoes the various bodily disciplines as dictated by his Gurus, and is initiated into the "mantras " his mind becomes disinclined to worldly joys and pure like the water in the autumn, or the sea without any ripple, or like a steady lamp unfluttered by the wind. When the pure consciousness dawns in the mind, all possible objects of knowledge, including the ultimate object of knowledge, arise in the mind, and the thought and the object become held together as one, and gradually the Supreme knowledge and cessation that brings "Nirvana" are secured. All that is known is in reality one with the thought itself, though it may appear different therefrom. This ultimate state is indescribable through language. It can only be felt and realized intuitively without the application of logical faculty or of the sense-organs. It can be referred to only by means of images. It is transcendental by nature, ultimate and absolutely without any support. It is the mere being which reveals itself in the joy of the soul. Of the two ways of

1 sarit-samghad yatha toyam sampravistam maho-dadhau alaksyas co' doke bhedah parasmin yoginam tatha.

Jayakhya-samhita, iv. 123.

2 brahma-bhinnam vibhor jfianam srotum icchami tattvatah

yena samprapyate jfieyam antah-karana-sarmthitam. Ibid. iv. 1. 8 sarz'o'-pddhi-vinirTnuktam jfianam ekanta-nirmalam

utpadyate hi yuktasya yogdbhyasdt kramena tat. Ibid. v. 2.

Samddhi which proceed through absorptive emotions (bhdva-ja) and the way of the practice of mantras it is the latter that is the more efficacious. The practice of mantras removes all obstacles to self-realization produced by mdya and its products.

In describing the emanation of Acyuta, Satya and Purusa from Vasudeva, the Jaydkhya-sainhitd holds that such an emanation occurs only naturally and not as a result of a purposive will; and the three entities, Acyuta, Satya and Purusa, which evolve out of Vasudeva, behave as one through mutual reflections, and in this subtle form they exist in the heart of men as the operative energy of God, gradually leading them to their ultimate destination of emancipation and also to the enjoyment of experiences.

The Jaydkhya-samhitd describes knowledge as two-fold, as sattdkhya (static) and as kriydkhya (dynamic). The kriydkhya-jndna involves the moral disciplines of yama and niyama, and it is by the continual habit and practice of the kriydkhya-jndna of yama and niyama that the sattdkhya-jiidna, or wisdom, may attain its final fulfilment. The yama and the niyama here consist of the following virtues: purity, sacrifice, penance, study of the Vedas, absence of cruelty, and ever-present forgiveness, truthfulness, doing good to all creatures including one's enemies, respect for the property of others, control of mind, disinclination of mind to all things of sensual enjoyment, bestowing gifts upon others according to one's own power, speaking true and kind words, constancy of mind to friends and enemies, straightforwardness, sincerity and mercifulness to all creatures. The equilibrium of the three gunas is called Avidyd, which may be regarded as the cause of attachment, antipathy and other defects. Atman is the term used to denote the pure consciousness, as tinged with gunas, avidyd and mdya.

The position described above leads to the view that God emanates from Himself as His tripartite energy, which forms the inner microcosm of man. It is by virtue of this energy that the pure consciousness in man comes into association with his root-instincts and psychosis in general, by virtue of which the psychical elements, which are themselves unconscious and material, begin to behave as intelligent. It is by virtue of such an association that experience becomes possible. Ultimately, however, the same indwelling energy separates the conscious principle from the unconscious elements and thereby produces emancipation, in which the conscious element

of the individual becomes merged in Brahman. The association of the conscious element with the unconscious psychosis, which has evolved from prakrti, is not due to a false imaging of the one or the other, or to an illusion, but to the operative power of the indwelling energy of God, which exists in us. The individual, called also the Atman, is the product of this forced association. When the complex element is disassociated from the psychosis and the root-instincts, it becomes merged in Brahman, of which it is a part and with which it exists in a state of unity-in-difterence. The difference between this view and that of the Samkhya is that, though it admits in general the Samkhya view of evolution of the categories from prakrti, yet it does not admit the theory of Purusa and the transcendental illusion of Purusa and prakrti, which is to be found in the classical Samkhya of Isvara krsna. There is no reference here to the teleology in prakrti which causes its evolution, or to the view that the prakrti is roused to activity by God or by Purusa. Prakrti is supposed here to possess a natural productive power of evolving the categories from out of itself.

The Jaydkhya-samhitd speaks of the devotee as a yogin and holds that there are two ways of arriving at the ultimate goal, one through absorptive trance, and the other through the practice of concentration on the mantras. In describing the process of Yoga, it holds that the yogin must be a man who has his senses within his absolute control and who is devoid of antipathy to all beings. Full of humility, he should take his seat in a lonely place and continue the practice of prandydma for the control of mind. The three processes of prandydma, viz. pratydhdra, dhydna, and dhdrand, are described. Then, Yoga is stated to be of three kinds, prdkrta, paurusa and aisvarya, the meaning of which is not very clear. It may, however, be the meditation on prakrti's ultimate principle, or on Purusa, or the Yoga, which is intended for the attainment of miraculous power. Four kinds of asanas are described, namely, that of Paryamka, Kamala, Bhadra and Svastika. The logic posture is also described. The control of the mind, which again is regarded as the chief aim of yoga, may be of two kinds, namely, of those tendencies of mind which are due to environments and of those that are constitutional to the mind. It is by increasing the sattva quality of the mind that it can be made to fix itself upon an object. In another classification we hear of three kinds of yoga, sakala

niskala and Visnu, or sabda, vyoma and sa-vigraha. In the sakala or the sa-vigraha type of yoga the yogin concentrates his mind on the gross idol of the deity; and then gradually, as he becomes habituated, he concentrates his mind on the notion of a glowing circular disc; then on the dimension of a pea; then on the dimension of a horse-hair; then on a human hair of the head; then on the human hair of the body; and as a consequence of the perfection of this practice the path of the brahma-randhra opens up for him. In the niskala type of yoga the yogin meditates upon the ultimate reality, with the result that his own essence as Brahman is revealed to him. The third form consists in the meditation on the mantras, by which course also the ultimate reality is revealed to the yogin. Through the process of the yoga the yogin ultimately passes out by the channel of his brahma-randhra and leaves his body, after which he attains unity with the ultimate reality, Vasudeva 1 .

In the fourth chapter of the Visnu-Samhitd (Manuscript) the three gunas are supposed to belong to Prakrti, which, with its evolutes, is called Ksetra, God being called Ksetrajna 2 . The prakrti and God exist together as it were in union 3 . The prakrti produces all existences and withdraws them within it in accordance with the direction or the superintendence of the Purusa*, though it seems to behave as an independent agent. Purusa is described as an all-pervading conscious principle.

The Visnu-samhitd, after describing the three kinds of egoism as sdttvika, rdjasa and tdmasa, speaks of the rdjasa ahamkdra not only as evolving the conative senses but also as being the active principle directing all our cognitive and conative energies. As the cognitive energy, it behaves both as attention directed to sense-perception and also to reflection involving synthetic and analytic activities. The Visnu-samhitd speaks further of the five powers of God, by which the Lord, though absolutely qualityless in Himself, reveals Himself through all the sensible qualities. It is probably in this way that all the powers of prakrti exist in God, and it is in this

1 Jaya.khya-samh.itd, Ch. 33. In Ch. 34 the process of yoga by which the yogin gradually approaches the stage of the final destruction of his body is described.

2 ksetrdkhya prakrtir jneyd tad-vit ksetra-jna isvarah.

Visnu-samhitd, iv. 8 ubhayam cedam atyantam abhinnam iva tisthati. Ibid. 4 tan-niyogdt svatantreva sute bhdvdn haraty api. Ibid.

sense that the ksetra or the prakrti is supposed to be abhinna, or one with God. These powers are (i) cic-chakti 1 , that is, power of consciousness, which is the unchangeable ground of all works. Second is His power as the enjoyer, or purusa. The third power is the causal power, manifested as the manifold universe. The fourth power is the power by which sense-objects are grasped and comprehended in knowledge. The fifth power is that which resolves knowledge into action. The sixth power is the power that reveals itself as the activity of thought and action 2 . It seems, therefore, that what has been described above as purusa, or enjoyer, is not a separate principle, but the power of God; just as prakrti itself is not a separate principle, but a manifestation of the power of God.

The process of Bhdgavata-yoga described in Visnu-samhita consists primarily of a system of bodily and moral control, involving control of the passions of greed, anger, etc., the habit of meditation in solitary places, the development of a spirit of dependence on God, and self-criticism. When, as a result of this, the mind becomes pure and disinclined to worldly things, there arises an intellectual and moral apprehension of the distinction of what is bad and impure from what is good and pure, whence attachment, or bhakti, is produced. Through this attachment one becomes self-contented and loyal to one's highest goal and ultimately attains true knowledge. The process of prdndydma, in which various kinds of meditations are prescribed, is also recommended for attainment of the ultimate union with God, which is a state of emancipation. The view here taken of bhakti, or devotion, shows that bhakti is used here in the simple sense of inclination to worship, and the means to the fruition of this worship is yoga. The so-cilled bhakti-school of the Bhagavatas was so much under the influence of the yoga-system that a bhakta was required to be a yogin, since bhakti by itself was not regarded as a sufficient means to the attainment of salvation. In the tenth chapter of the Parama-samhitd the process of yoga is described in a conversation between Brahma and Parama. It is said there that the knowledge attained by yoga is better than any other

1 cic-chaktih sarva-kdrydbdih kutasthah paramesthy asau dvitiyd tasya yd saktih fnirusakhyddi-vikriyd visvd'-khyd vividhd-bhdsd trtiyd ktitiincf-tmikd

caturthi visayam prdpya nivrtty-dkhyd tathd pur.ah. Visnu-samhitd.

2 purvd-jndna-kriyd-saktih sarvdkhyd tasya paiicaml. Ibid.

3 tasnidt sarva-prayatnena bhdkto yogi bhavet sadd. Ibid. Ch. 30.

kind of knowledge. When deeds are performed without yoga wisdom, they can hardly bring about the desired fruition. Yoga means the peaceful union of the mind with any particular object 1 . When the mind is firmly fixed on the performance of the deed, it is called karma-yoga 2 . When the mind is unflinchingly fixed on knowledge, it is called jndna-yoga z . He, however, who clings to the Lord Visnu in both these ways attains ultimately supreme union with the highest Lord. Both the jndna-yoga and the karma-yoga, as the moral discipline oiyama and niyama on the one hand and vairdgya (disinclination) and samadhi on the other, are ultimately supported in Brahman. It may be remembered that in the Gitd, karma-yoga means the performance of the scriptural caste-duties without any desire for their fruits. Here, however, the karma-yoga means yama and niyama, involving vrata, fasting (upavasa) and gifts (ddna), and probably also some of the virtues of diverse kinds of self-control. The term vairdgya means the wisdom by which the senses are made to desist from their respective objects; and the term samadhi means the wisdom by which the mind stays unflinchingly in the Supreme Lord. When the senses are through vairdgya restrained from their respective objects, the mind has to be fixed firmly on the Supreme Lord, and this is called yoga. Through continual practice, as the vairdgya grows firm, the vdsands, or the root-instincts and desires, gradually fall off. It is advised that the yogin should not make any violent attempt at self-control, but should proceed slowly and gently, so that he may, through a long course of time, be able to bring his mind under complete control. He should take proper hygienic care of himself as regards food and other necessities for keeping the body sound and should choose a lonely place, free from all kinds of distractions, for his yoga practice. He should not on any account indulge in any kind of practice which may be painful to his body. He should further continue to think that he is dependent on God and that birth, existence and destruction are things which do not belong to him. In this way the pure bhakti will rise in his mind,

1 yat karoti samadhanam cittasya visaye kvacit anukulam a-samksobham samyoga iti kirtyate.

Parama-samhita, Ch. 10 (MS.).

2 yadi karmdni badhnanti cittam askhalitam naram karma-yogo bhavaty esah sarva-papa-pranasanah. Ibid.

8 yadi tu jnana evdrthe cittam badhnati nirvyathah

jnana-yogah sa vijneyah sarva-siddhi-karah subhah. Ibid.

through which he will gradually be able to extract the root of attachment. He should also train himself to think of the evils of alluring experiences which have not yet been enjoyed, and he should thus desist from attaching himself to such experiences.

As regards the preference of karma-yoga to jndna-yoga and vice versa, the view maintained here is that there can be no rule as regards the preference. There are some who are temperamentally fitted for karma-yoga and others for jndna-yoga. Those who are of a special calibre should unite both courses, karma-yoga and jiidna-yoga.

Philosophy of the Ahirbudhnya-samhita.

In the Ahirbudhnya-samhita Ahirbudhnya says that after undergoing a long course of penance he received from Samkarsana true knowledge and that this true knowledge was the science of Sudar-sana, which is the support of all things in the world 1 . The ultimate reality is the beginningless, endless and eternal reality, which is devoid of all names and forms, beyond all speech and mind, the omnipotent whole which is absolutely changeless. From this eternal and unchangeable reality there springs a spontaneous idea or desire (samkalpa). This Idea is not limited by time, space or substance. Brahman is of the nature of intuition, of pure and infinite bliss (nihsima-sukhdmtbhaza-laksaria), and He resides everywhere and in all beings. He is like the waveless sea. He has none of the worldly qualities which we find in mundane things. He is absolutely self-realized and complete in Himself, and cannot be defined by any expressions such as "this" or "such." He is devoid of all that is evil or bad and the abode of all that is blissful and good. The Brahman is known by many names, such as " paramdtman" " dtman" "bhagavdn," "vdsudeva" " avyakta" "prakrti" iK pra-dhana" etc. When by true knowledge the virtues and sins accumulated during many lives are destroyed, when the root-instincts or tendencies called vdsand are torn asunder and the three gunas and their products cease to bind a person, he directly realizes the nature of Brahman or the absolute reality, which can neither be described

1 sudarsana-svaruparn tat procyamanam mayo, irnu

srute yatra khiladhdre samsayas te na santi vai.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, m. 2. 5.

nor defined by language as "this" or as "such." The Brahman intuitively perceives all things and is the soul of all, and therefore, the past, present and the future have all vanished away from Him. Brahman does not exist therefore in time, as He is beyond time. Similarly He is beyond all primary and secondary qualities, and yet he possesses the six qualities. Of the qualities knowledge is regarded as the first and the foremost. It is spiritual and self-illuminating ; it enters into all things and reflects them, and is eternal. The essence of Brahman is pure consciousness, and yet He is regarded as possessing knowledge as a quality 1 . The power (sakti) of Brahman is regarded as that by which He has originated the world 2 . The spontaneous agency (kartrtva) of God is called His majesty (aisvarya). His strength {bald) is that by virtue of which He is never fatigued in His untiring exertion. His energy (virya) is that by virtue of which, being the material cause of the world, He yet remains unchanged in Himself. His self-sufficiency (tejas) is that by virtue of which He creates the world by His own unaided efforts. These five qualities are, however, all regarded as qualities of knowledge, and knowledge alone is regarded as the essence of God. When such a Brahman, which is of the nature of knowledge and is endowed with all qualities, resolves Himself into the idea of splitting Himself into the many, it is called Sudarsana.

The powers of all things are in themselves of an unspeakable nature and cannot exist separately (a-prthak-sthita) from the substances in which they inhere. They are the potential or subtle states of the substance itself, which are not perceived separately in themselves and cannot be defined as "this" or "not this" in any way, but can only be known from their effects 3 . So God has in Him the power (sakti) which exists as undifferentiated from Him, as the moonbeam from the moon. It is spontaneous, and the universe is but a manifestation of this power. It is called bliss (d?ianda), be-

1 ajadam sva-tma-sambodhi nityam sarvd-vagdhanam jnanam noma gunarn prahuh prathamam guna-cintakdh svarupam brahmanas tac ca gunas ca pariglyate.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, in. 2. 53.

2 jagat-prakrti-bhavo yah sa saktih pariktrtita. Ibid. 2. 57.

8 saktayah sarva-bhdvdndm acintyd a-prthak-sthitah

svarupe naiva drsyante drsyante kdryatas tu tdh sukpnavastha hi sa tesdm sarva-bhdvd-nugdnu.nl idantayd vidhatum sa na niseddhum ca iakyate. Ibid. 2, 3.

3-2

cause it does not depend on anything (nirapeksataydnanda); it is eternal (nitya), because it is not limited in time; it is complete (purna), because it is not limited by any form; it manifests itself as the world and is therefore called Laksmi 1 . It contracts itself into the form of the world and is therefore called Kundalini; and it is called Visnu-sakti because it is the supreme power of God. The power is in reality different from Brahman; but yet it appears as one therewith. With this power He is always engaged in an eternal act of creation, untired, unfatigued, and unaided by any other agent (satatam kurvato jagaf) 2 . The power of God manifests itself in two ways, as static entities such as avyakta, kala and purusa and as activity. Sakti, or power of God as activity (kriyd), is spontaneous and of the nature of will and thought resulting in action 3 . This is also called samkalpa, or the Idea, which is irresistible in its movement whereby it produces all material objects and spiritual entities, such as avyakta, kala and purusa*. It is this power, which is otherwise designated as laksmi or visnu-sakti, that impels the avyakta into the course of evolution, and the purusa to confront the products of prakrti and run through the experiences. When it withdraws these functions from these entities, there is pralaya or dissolution. It is by the force of this power that at the time of creation the prakrti as the composite of the three gunas is urged into creative evolution. The association of the purusa with the prakrti also is brought about by the same power. This Idea is vibratory by nature and assumes diverse forms, and thus by its various transformations produces various categories 5 .

In the original state all the manifold world of creation was asleep, as it were, in an equilibrium in which all the qualities of God were completely suspended, like the sea when there are no waves ruffling its breast. This power, which exists in an absolutely static or suspended state, is pure vacuity or nothingness (sunyatva-rupini) ; for it has no manifestation of any kind. It is self-dependent

1 jagattayd laksyamdnd sd laksmlr iti glyate. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, ill. 9.

2 Ibid. 11. 59.

8 svdtantrya-mula icchd-tmd preksa-rupah kriyd-phalah.

Ibid. in. 30. 4 vnmeso yah susamkalpah sarvatrdvydhatah krtau

avyakta-kdla-pum-rupdm cetcmdcetandtmikdm. Ibid. in. 30, 31. 6 so'yam sudarsanam ndma samkalpah spandand-tmakah

vibhajya bahudhd rupain bhdve bhdve'vatisthate. Ibid. in. 39.

and no reason can be assigned as to why it suddenly changes itself from a potential to an actual state 1 . It is one and exists in identity with the Brahman, or the ultimate reality. It is this power which creates as its own transformation all categories pure and impure and all material forms as emanations from out of itself. It manifests itself as the kriyd, the virya, tejas and the bala of God, mere forms of its own expression and in all forms of duality as subject and object, as matter and consciousness, pure and impure, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the experiencer and the experienced, and so on. When it moves in the progressive order, there is the evolutionary creation; and, when it moves in the inverse order, there is involution.

From a pair of two different functions of this power the dif-r ferent forms of pure creation come into being. Thus from knowledge (jndna) and the capacity for unceasing work of never-ending creation (bala) we have the spiritual form of Samkarsana. From the function of spontaneous agency (aisvarya) and the unaffectedness in spite of change (virya) is generated the spiritual form of Prad-yumna; and from the power that transforms itself into the world-forms (sakti) and the non-dependence on accessories (tejas) is produced the form as Aniruddha. These three spiritual forms are called vyuha (conglomeration) because each of them is the resultant of the conglomeration of a pair of gunas. Though the two gunas predominate in each vyuha, yet each vyuha possesses the six qualities (sad-guna) of the Lord; for these are all but manifestations of Visnu 2 . Each of these forms existed for 1600 years before the next form emanated from it, and at the time of the involution also it took 1600 years for each lower form to pass into the higher form. Schrader, alluding to the Maha-Sanatkumara-Samhita, says: " Vasudeva creates from His mind the white goddess Santi and together with her Samkarsana or Siva; then from the left side of the latter is born the red goddess Sri, whose son is Pradyumna or Brahman; the latter, again, creates the yellow SarasvatI and to-

tasya staimitya-rupd yd saktih sunyatva-rupinl svdtantrydd eva kasmdc cit kvacit sonmesam rcchati dtma-bhutd hi yd saktih parasya brahmano hareh.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, v. 3 and 4.

vydpti-mdtram guno' nmeso murtti-kdra iti tridhd cdtur-dtmya-sthitir visnor guna-vyatikaro-dbhavd. Ibid. v. 21.

gether with her Aniruddha or Purusottama, whose Sakti becomes the black Rati, who is the threefold Aldyd-kosa." 1 Schrader further draws attention to the fact that these couples are all outside the brahmdnda and are therefore different in nature from the mundane gods, such as Siva, etc. The vyuhas are regarded as fulfilling three different functions, (1) the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world; (2) the protection of the mundane beings; and (3) lending assistance to those devotees who seek to attain the ultimate emancipation. Samkarsana exists as the deity superintending all the individual souls and separates them from the prakrti 2 . The second spiritual form superintends the minds (?nanas) of all beings and gives specific instruction regarding all kinds of religious performances. He is also responsible for the creation of all human beings and from among them such beings as have from the beginning dedicated their all to God and become absolutely attached to Him 3 . As Aniruddha, he protects the world and leads men to the ultimate attainment of wisdom. He is also responsible for the creation of the world, which is an admixture of good and evil {misra-varga-srstim ca karoti) 4 . These three forms are in reality but one with Yasudeva. These avatdras are thus the pure aratdras of Visnu.

In addition to these there are two other forms of manifestation, called dvesdvatdra and sdksdd-avatdra. The former is of two kinds, svarupdvesa (as in the case of avatar as like Parasurama, Rama, etc.) and sakty-dvesa (as the influx of certain special functions or powers of God, e.g. in the case of Brahma or Siva, who are on special occasions endowed with certain special powers of God). These secondary dvesavatdras are by the will of God produced in the form of human beings, as Rama, Krsna, in the form of animals, as the Boar, the Fish and the Alan-lion, or even as a tree (the crooked mango tree in the Dandaka forest). These forms are not the original transcendental forms of God, but manifest divine functions

1 Introduction to the Pancaratra by Schrader, p. 36.

2 so'yam samasta-jlvanam adhisthdtrtaya sthitah samkarsanas tu deveso jagat srsti-mands taiah jiva-tattvam adhisthaya prakrtes tu vivicya tat.

Quoted from Visvaksena-samhita from Varavara's commentary on Lokacarya's Tattva-traya, p. 125.

3 See quotations from Visvaksena-samhita in Tattva-traya, pp. 126, 127. « Ibtd. p. 128.

through the will of God 1 . The primary forms (sdksdd-avatdra) of incarnation are derived directly from the part of the Lord just as a lamp is lighted from another, and they are thus of a transcendent and non-mundane nature. Those who seek to attain liberation should worship these transcendent forms, but not the others 2 . The Visvaksena-samhitd quoted in the Tattva-traya considers Brahman, 6iva, Buddha, Vyasa, Arjuna, Pavaka and Kuvera as inspired persons or dvesdvatdras who should not be worshipped by those who seek liberation. Another samhitd quoted there includes Rama, Atreya and Kapila in the list.

Again, from each vyuha three subsidiary vyuhas are said to appear. Thus from Vasudeva we have, Kesava, Narayana, and Madh'ava; from Samkarsana arise Govinda, Visnu and Mad-husudana; from Pradyumna arise Trivikrama, Vamana and Sridhara, and from Aniruddha arise Hrslkesa, Padmanabha and Damodara. These are regarded as the deities superintending each month, representing the twelve suns in each of the rdsis. These gods are conceived for purposes of meditation. In addition to these, thirty-nine vibhava (manifesting) avatdras (incarnations) also are counted in the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd?. The objects for which these incarnations are made are described by Varavara as, firstly, for giving com-

1 mad-icchaydhigaunatvammanusyatvamive'cchayd. . . a-prdkrta-sva-sadhdr-ana-vigrahena saha ndgatam. . .gaunasya nianusyaWd-divad aprdkrta-divya-soTTisthdnam itara-jdtlyatn krtvd avatdra-rupatvd-bhdvdt sva-rupena na gatam iti siddham. Tattva-traya, p. 130.

2 pradurbhavas tu mukhya ye mad-amsatvad visesatah ajahat-svabhava vibhava divya-prakrta-vigralidh dlpad dlpa ivotpanna jagato raksandya te

arcya eva hi senesa sanisrty-uttarandya te

mukhya updsydh senesa anarcydn itardn viduh.

Ibid. p. 131. s Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, p. 46. According to the Visvaksena-samhitd all the avatdras have come straight from Aniruddha or through other avatdras. Thus Brahman comes from Aniruddha and from him Mahesvara; Hayaslrsa comes from Matsya, a manifestation of Krsna. According to the Padma-tantra, Matsya, Kurma and Varaha come from Vasudeva, Nrsimha, Vamana, Srlrama, and Parasurama from Samkarsana, Balarama from Pradyumna and Krsna and Kalki from Aniruddha {Padma-tantra, 1. 2. 31, etc.). But according to the Laksml-tantra (11. 55) all the vibhavas come from Aniruddha. There is another kind of avatdra, called arcdvatdra. The image of Krsna, Nrsimha, etc., when duly consecrated according to the Vaisnava rites, becomes possessed with the power of Visnu and attains powers and influences which can be experienced by the devotee {Visvaksena-samhitd, quoted in Tattva-traya). In the aspect in which Aniruddha controls all beings as their inner controller, he is regarded as the antarydmy-avatdra. There are thus four kinds of avatdras, vibhava, dvesa, area and antary-dmin. The thirty-nine vibhava avatdras are Padmanabha, Dhruva, Ananta,

panionship in mundane forms to those saints who cannot live without it, and this is the interpretation of the word paritrdna (protection) in the Gttd\ secondly, for destroying those who are opposed to the saints; thirdly, for establishing the Vedic religion, the essence of which is devotion to God 1 .

In the form as antarydmin, or the inner controller, the Lord resides in us as the inner controller of the self, and it is through His impulsion that we commit evil deeds and go to Hell or perform good deeds and go to Heaven. Thus we cannot in any way escape

fSaktyatman, Madhusudana, Vidyadhideva, Kapila, Visvarupa, Vihahgama, Krodatman, Vadavavaktra, Dharma, Vaglsvara, Ekarnavasayin, Kamathesvara, Varaha, Narasimha, Piyusaharana, Srlpati, Kantatman, Rahujit, Kalanemighna, Parijatahara, Lokanatha, kantatman, Dattatreya, Nyagrodhasayin, Ekasrhgatanu, Vamanadeva, Trivikrama, Nara, Narayana, Hari, Krsna, Parasurama, Rama, Vedavid, Kalkin, Patalasayana. They are of the nature of tejas and are objects of worship and meditation in their specific forms, as described in the Sdtvata-samhitd (xn), or in the Ahirbudhya-samhitd (lxvi). In the Narayanlya section of the Mahdbharata Vihahgama or Hamsa, Kamathesvara or Kurma, Ekasrhgatanu or Matsya, Varaha, Nrsimha, Vamana, Parasurama, Rama, Vedavid and Kalkin are mentioned as the ten avatdras. The avatdra Krodatman, Lokanatha and Kantatman are sometimes spoken of as Yajna Varaha, Manu Vaivasvata and Kama respectively. The latter is sometimes spoken of probably as Dhanvantari (see Schrader's Pancaraira, p. 45). The twenty-three avatdras spoken of in the Bhdgavata-purana (1. 3) are all included in the above list. It is, however, doubtful whether Vaglsvara is the same as Hayaslrsa, and kantatman as Sanaka or Narada, as Schrader says. The vibhava-avatdras mentioned in Rupa's Laghu-bhdgavatd-mrta are mostly included in the above list, though some names appear in slightly different form. Following the Brahma-samhitd, Rupa, however, regards Krsna as the real form (svayam-rilpa) of God. According to him, being one with God, He may have His manifestations in diverse forms. This is called avatdra as ekdtma-rupa. This ekdtma-rupa-avatdra may again be of two kinds, sva-vildsa and svd-msa. When the avatdra is of the same nature as the Lord in powers and other qualities, He is called a svdmsd-vatdra. Thus, Vasudeva is called a sva-vildsa-avatdra. But when the avatdra has inferior powers, He is called a svd-msa-avatdra. Samkarsana, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Matsya, Kurma, etc., are thus called svd-msa-avatdra. When God, however, infuses one only with parts of His qualities, he is called an dvesa-avatdra. Narada, Sanaka, etc., are called dvesa-avatdras. The manifestation of the Lord in the above forms for the good of the world is called avatdra.

purvo-kta-visva-kdryd-rthdm a-purvd iva cet svayam dvard-ntarena va" vih-syur avatdras tadd smrtdh

Laghu-bhdgavatdmrta, p. 22.

The amsavatdra is sometimes called purusdvatdra, while the manifestation of special qualities as in Brahma, Visnu, biva, etc., is called gundvatdras. The vibhavdvatdras are generally regarded as ttldvatdras; vide also Sdtvata-samhitd, Ch. ix (77-84) and Ch. xn.

1 Tattva-traya, p. 138. The word sddhu is here denned as "nirmatsardh mat-samdsrayane pravrttdh man-ndma-karma-svarupdndm vdn-manasd-gocaratayd mad-darsanena vind dtma-dhdrana-posanadikam alabhamdndh ksana-mdtra-kdlam kalpa-sahasram manvdndh prasithila-sarva-gdtrd bkaveyuh."

from this inner controller. In another of His forms He stays within our heart as the object of our meditation 1 . Again, when certain images are made of earth, stone, or metals, and they are properly installed with proper ceremonials, these are inspired with the presence of God and with His special powers. These are called arcdvatdras, or image-incarnations, for purposes of worship by which all desirable ends may be achieved. There are thus five kinds of existence for the Lord: firstly as his absolute state (para), secondly as vyuha, thirdly as vibhavdvatdra (primary and secondary), fourthly as antarydmin, and fifthly as arcdvatdra 2 .

In the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd we hear also that by the power of sudarsana, or the divine Idea (by the activity of which the vyuha forms are produced), a divine location is produced which is of the nature of knowledge and bliss radiant with its (sudarsana's) glow. All the experiences that are enjoyed here are blissful in their nature, and the denizens of this transcendent spiritual world who experience them are also blissful in their nature, and their bodies are constituted of knowledge and bliss 3 . The denizens of this world are souls emancipated in the last cycle. They remain attached, however, to the form of the deity to which they were attached in the mundane life 4 .

The Lord in the highest form is always associated with His power (Sakti) LaksmI or Sri 5 . In the Tattva-traya and its commentary by Varavara we hear of three consort deities, LaksmI, Bhumi and Nlla. Schrader points out that these deities are identified (in the Vihagendra-samhitd and in the Sitd-upanisad) with will (icchd), action (Kriya), and the direct manifesting power (sdksdt-sakti). In the Sitd-upanisad, to which Schrader refers, Sitd is described as the MahalaksmI which exists in the three forms, icchd, jndna and kriyd. Slta is there regarded as the power which exists different from, and as one with, the supreme Lord, constituting within herself all the conscious and unconscious entities of the universe. It exists also in three forms as LaksmI, Bhumi and

1 Tattva-traya, 139, 140.

2 See quotation from Visvaksena-samhita quoted in Tattva-traya, p. 122.

3 suddha purvodita srstir yd sa vyuhd-di-bhedinl sudarsand-khydt samkalpdt tasya eva prabho-jjvald. jnandnandamayl styana desa-bhdvam vrajaty' uta

sa desah paramam vyoma nirmalam purusdt par am, etc.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 21-22. * Ibid. vi. 29. 6 Ibid. vi. 25.

Nila, as benediction, power, and as the Sun, the Moon and Fire. The third form is responsible for the development of all kinds of vegetation and all temporal determinations 1 .

In the sixth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd the intermediate creation is described. It is said there that the power of God as the supreme ego is at once one and different from Him. The Lord cannot exist without His power nor can the power exist without Him. These two are regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. The manifestations that are revealed as the vyiihas and the zibhavas are regarded as pure, for through their meditations the yogins attain their desired end'-. From the vyuha and the vibhcvua proceed the impure creation (suddhetard-srsti) 2 . Power is of two kinds, i.e. power as activity, and power as determinants of being or existence (bhuti-sakti). This bhuti-sakti may be regarded as a moving Idea (samkalpamayi murti). The process of activity inherent in it may be regarded as manifesting itself in the form of ideas or concepts actualizing themselves as modes of reality. The impure creation is of a threefold nature as purusa, guna and kdla (time). Purusa is regarded as a unity or colony of pairs of males and females of the four castes, and these four pairs emanate from the mouth, breast, thighs and legs of Pradyumna. From the forehead, eyebrows, and ears of Pradyumna also emanate the subtle causal state of time and the gunas (suksma-kdla-gund-rasthd). After the emanation of these entities the work of their growth and development was left to Aniruddha, who by the fervour of his Yoga evolved the original element of time in its twofold form as kdla and niyati. lie also evolved the original energy as guna into the three forms of sattva,

1 Certain peculiar interpretations of the iccha-sakti, kriya-sakti and sdksat-sakti are to be found in the Sltd-upanisad. The Sdtvatu-samhitd (ix. 85) describes twelve other energies such as

laksmih, pustir, day a nidru, ksoma, kantis sorosvotl,

dhrtir moitrl ratis tustir matir dvadasdnil smrta. See also Schrader's Introduction to Pancaratra, p. 55. The theory of these energies is associated with the avatara theory.

2 Schrader, on the evidence of Padma-tantra, says that god as para or ultimate is sometimes identified with and sometimes distinguished from the vyuha Vasudeva. The para Vasudeva becomes vyuha Vasudeva with His one half and remains as Narayana, the creator of the primeval water (jnaya). Pancaratra, P- 53-

3 bhutih suddhetara visrtoh puruso dvi-caturmayah sa maniinam samahdro brahma-ksattrddi-bhedindm.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 8-9.

rajas and tamas in succession, i.e. the original primeval energy as guna (called sometimes prakrti in cognate literature) was first evolved into sattva guna ; from it evolved the rajas, and from the rajas evolved the tamas. This original undeveloped guna produced from Pradyumna (which, in other words, may be termed prakrti) receives impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, and thereby evolves itself first into sattva, then into rajas, and then into tamas. This doctrine can therefore be regarded as sat-kdrya-vdda only in a limited sense; for without this further impregnation from the fervour of Aniruddha, it could not by itself have produced the different gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas 1 .

Aniruddha, however, was directed by Pradyumna not only to develop the unconscious power (sakti) but also the purusa which exists as it were inside that power, which shows itself as niyati (destiny) and kdla (time). From the unconscious power as destiny and time evolves first the sattva and from it the rajas and from the rajas the tamas. According to the Visvaksena-samhitd, Aniruddha created Brahma and Brahma created all the men and women of the four castes 2 .

Buddhi evolves from tamas and from that ahamkdra and from that evolve the five tan-mdtras, and also the eleven senses. From the five tan-mdtras the five gross elements are produced, and from these, all things, which are the modifications of the gross elements.

The word purusa is used here in a special sense, and not in the ordinary Samkhya sense. Purusa here signifies a colony of selves, like cells in a honeycomb 3 . These selves are associated with the beginningless vdsands or root-impressions. They are but the special

1 antahstha-purusdm saktim tarn dddya sva-murti-gdm samvardhayati yogena hy anirudhah sva-tejasd.

Ahirbiidhnya-samhitd, vi. 14.

2 The Visvaksena-samhitd criticizes in this connection the Vedic people, who did not believe in the monotheistic God but depended on the Vedic sacrificial rituals and work for the attainment of Heaven and ultimately fell down to the course of mundane life (samsdra):

trayi-mdrgesu nisndtdh phala-vdde ramanti te devddln eva manvdna na ca mam tnenire param tamah-prdyds tv ime kecin mama ninddm prakurvate samlapam kurvate vyagram veda-vddesu nisthitdh mam na jdnanti mohena mayi bhakti-pardnmukhdh svargd-disu ramanty ete avasdne patanti te.

Tattva-traya, p. 128.

sarvdtmandm samastir yd koso madhu-krtdm iva.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 33.

manifestations (bhuti-bheddh) of (Jod and are in themselves omniscient; hut they are permeated by azidyd (ignorance) and the afflictions which are involved in its very nature, through the power of God acting in consonance with His thought-movement 1 . These selves thus rendered impure and finite are called jivas, and it is they who thus suffer bondage and strive for salvation, which they afterwards attain. The purusa, being made up of these selves (jizas), which are impure, is also partly impure, and is therefore regarded as both pure and impure {suddhy-asuddhimaya, vi. 34). This purusa contains within it the germs of all human beings, which are called mamts. They are in themselves untouched by afflictions (klesa) and the root-impression (dsaya), and are omniscient and impregnated through and through by God. Their association with azidyd through the will of God is therefore external. The germ of the caste-distinction and distinction as male and female is regarded as primordial and transcendent (compare purusa-sukta), and the distinction is said to exist even in these manus which are said to be divided in four pairs. The azidyd imitates the spiritual movement of thought, and through it the individual selves, though pure in themselves, are besmeared with the impurities of root-impressions. These selves remain in the stage of conglomeration or association through the desire of Visnu, the Lord, and this stage is called purusa (purusa-pada) 1 . They are made to appear and disappear from the nature of God. Being a manifestation of His own nature, they are uncreated, eternally existing, entities which are the parts of the very existence (bhuty-amsah) of God.

Through the impulse or motivation of the thought-activity of God, an energy (s'akti) is generated from Aniruddha. Moved again by the desire of God, the aforesaid manus descend into this energy and remain there as a developing foetus (tisthanti kalalibhutdh, vi. 45). The energy of Yisnu is of a twofold nature, as dvnamic activity {kriydkhya) and as determining being (bfnlti), the latter being the result of the former 3 . This dynamic activity is different

1 atmano bhuti-bhedds te siirva-jilah sarvato-mukhdh bhagavac-chakti-mayaivam maiida-llvrddl-bhdvayd tat-tat-sudursano-nmesa-nimesd-nukrtd-tmana sarzato'vidyayd liddhdh klesamaya vaslkrtdh.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 35, 36.

2 visntih samkalpa-riipena sthittdsmin pouruse pade. Ibid. vi. 41.

3 kriydkhyo ytSyam unmesah sa bhuti-parivartakah. Ibid. vi. 29.

from God, the possessor of this energy. It is designated variously Laksmi and desire (samkalpa) or free will (svdtantrya-mula icchdtmd). This will operates as an intellectual visualization (pteksd-riipah kriyd-phalah), which again produces the other manifestations of God as avyakta, kdla and purusa. At the time of each creation He associates the avyakta with the evolutionary tendencies, the kdla with its operative movement (kalana) and the purusa with all kinds of experiences. At the time of dissolution these powers are withdrawn.

In the foetus-like condition of the manus in the energy (sakti) of God there exist the entities oiguna and kdla. Through the operation of the supreme energy or will of God ( Visnu-samkalpa-coditali) there springs up from time-energy (kdla-sakti) the subtle Destiny (niyati), which represents the universal ordering element (sarva-niydmakah). The time and guna exist in the womb of the sakti. The conception of this sakti is thus different from that of prakrti of the Samkhya-Patafijala in that the gunas are the only root-elements, and time is conceived as somehow included in the operation of the gunas. As the niyati is produced from the time-energy, the manus descend into this category. Later on there springs from niyati, time (kdla) through the will of God, and then the manus descend again into this category 1 . It has already been said that the kdla energy and guna are co-existing elements in the primordial sakti of God. Now this guna-potcntia\ manifests itself in a course of gradual emergence through time. As the saitva-guna first manifests itself through time, the manus descend into that category and later on, with the emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas, they descend into the rajas and the tamas. The emergence of rajas from sattva and of tamas from rajas is due to the operation of the will-activity of God (visnu-samkalpa-coditdt). Though the will-dynamic of Visnu is both immanent and transcendent throughout the process of succeeding emergents, yet Visnu is regarded as specially presiding over sattva, Brahma over rajas, and Rudra over tamas. Tamas is regarded as heavy (guru), agglutinative (vistam-

1 In describing the process of dissolution it is said that at one stage the universe exists only as time {kdla). The energy manifested in time (kdla-gata-saktih) is called kdla, and it is this energy that moves all things or behaves as the transformer of all things (asesa-prakdlim). Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, iv. 48. Time is described also as the agent that breaks up all things, just as the violence of a river breaks its banks: Kalaycty akhilam kdlyatn nadl-kidam yathd rayah. Ibid. vi. 51.

bhana), delusive {mohana) and statical (aprazrttimat); rajas is always moving and sorrowful; sattva is described as light, transparent and devoid of impurities or defects and pleasurable 1 . With the development of the three gunas through the will of God, a part of these gunas attains sameness of character, and this part is the unity of the three gunas (traigunyd), the equilibrium of gunas (guna-samya), ignorance (avidya), nature (svabhdva), cause (yoni), the unchangeable (aksara), the causeless {ayoni), and the cause as guna (guna-yoni) 2 .

This participation in equal proportions (anyunanatirikta) of the gunas in a state of equilibrium (guna-samya), which is essentially of the nature of tamas (tamomaya), is called the root (mula) and the prakrti by the Samkhyists, and the manus descending into that category by gradual stages are known by the names conglomeration (satnasti), purusa, the cause (yoni), and the unchangeable (kutastha). The category of time, which is the transforming activity of the world (jagatah samprakalanam), associates and dissociates the purusa and the prakrti for the production of the effects. The thought power of God, however, works through the tripartite union of time, prakrti and the manus, behaving as the material cause, like a lump of clay, and produces all the categories beginning with mahat to the gross elements of earth, water, etc. Like water or clay, the prakrti is the evolutionary or material cause, the purusa is the unchangeable category that contributes to the causal operation merely by its contiguity 3 . The category of time is the internal dynamic pervading the prakrti and the purusa. The trinity of prakrti, purusa and kdla is the basis for the development of all the succeeding categories. In this

1 sattvam tatra laghu svaccham guna-rupam andmayam. Ahirbudhnya-satnhitd, vi. 52; tad etat pracalam duhkham rajah sasvat pravrttimat. Ibid. vi. 57; guru vistambhanarn sasvan mohanam cdprai'rttimat. Ibid. VI. 60.

2 sudarianamayenai'va samkalpena tra vai harch codyamdne'pi srsty-artham pur nam guna-yugam tadd

am sat ah samyam dydti visnu-samkalpa-coditam. Ibid. vi. 61-62. The passage is somewhat obscure, in so far as it is difficult to understand how the gunas become partially (amsatali) similar. The idea probably is that, when the gutias are moved forward for creative purposes, some parts of these gunas fail to show their distinctive features, and show themselves as similar to one another. In this stage the specific characters of only these evolving gunas are annulled, and they appear as one with tamas. The proportion of sattva that appears to be similar to tamas is also the proportion in which tamas becomes similar to rajas.

3 payo-mrd-ddivat tatra prakrtih parindmini pumdn aparindml san sannidhdnena kdtanam

kalah pacati tattve dve prakrtim purusam ca ha. Ibid. vn. 5, 6.

trinity prakrti is the evolutionary cause that undergoes the transformation, purusa, though unmoved in itself, is that which by its very presence gives the occasion for the transformation, and time is the inner dynamic that behaves as the inner synthetic or structural cause. But these causes in themselves are not sufficient to produce the development of the trinity. The trinity is moved to develop on the evolutionary line by the spiritual activity of God. Purusa is regarded as the adhisthdna-kdrana, kdla as the principle of inner activity, and the spiritual activity of God as the transcendent and immanent agent in which the causal trinity finds its fundamental active principle. As the first stage of such a development there emerges the category of mahat, which is called by different names, e.g. vidyd, gauh, yavani, brdhml, vadhu, vrddhi, matt, madhuy akhydti, isvara, and prajnd. According to the prominence of tamas, sattva and rajas, the category of mahat is known by three different names, kdla, buddhi and prdna, in accordance with the moments in which there are special manifestations of tamas, sattva and rajas 1 . Gross time as moments, instants or the like, the in-telligizing activity of thought {buddhi) and the volitional activity {prdna) may also be regarded as the tripartite distinction of mahat 2 . There seems to be a tacit implication here that the activity implied in both thought and volition is schematized, as it were, through time. The unity of thought and volition is effected through the element of time; for time has been regarded as the kalana-kdrana, or the structural cause. The sattva side of the mahat manifests itself as virtue {dharma), knowledge (Jndna), disinclination {vairdgya), and all mental powers {aisvarya). The opposite of these is associated with that moment of mahat which is associated with the manifestation of tamas.

With the evolution of the mahat the manus descend into it. From the mahat and in the mahat there spring the senses by which the objects are perceived as existent or non-existent 3 . Again, from and in the mahat there springs the ahamkdra through the influence

1 kdlo buddhis tathd prdna iti tredhd sa glyate tatnah-sattva-rajo-bheddt tat-tad-unmesa-sanjnayd.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vii. 9.

2 kdlas truti-lavddy dtmd buddhir adhyavasdyinl

prdnah prayatandkdra ity' eta mahato bhiddh. Ibid. vii. 11. 8 bodhanam ndma vaidyam tadindriyam tesu jdyate

yendrthdn adhyavasyeyuh sad-asat-pravibhdginah. Ibid. VII. 14.

of the spiritual energy of God 1 . This ahamkara is also called by the names of abhimdna, prajdpati, abhimantd and boddhd. The ahamkara is of three kinds, vaikarika, taijasa and bhutddi, in accordance with the predominance of sattva, rajas or tatnas. The ahamkara manifests itself as will, anger, greed, mind (manas), and desire (trsd). When the ahamkara is produced, the manas descend into it. From ahamkara there is then produced the organ of thinking (cintandtmakam indriyam) of the manus called mafias. It is at this stage that the manus first become thinking entities. From the tamas side of ahamkara as bhutddi there is produced the sabda-tan-mdtra, from which the akdsa is produced. Akdsa is associated with the quality of sabda and gives room for all things. Akdsa is thus to be regarded as unoccupied space, which is supposed to be associated with the quality of sound 2 . With the emergence of akdsa the manus descend into that category. From the vaikarika ahamkara there spring the organs of hearing and of speech 3 . The manus at this stage become associated with these senses. Then from the bhutddi, by the spiritual desire of God, the touch-potential is produced, and from this is produced the air (vdyu). By the spiritual desire of God the sense-organ of touch and the active organ of the hand are produced from the vaikarika ahamkara. At this stage the manus become associated with these two receptive and active senses. From the bhutddi there is then produced the light-heat potential from which is produced the gross light-heat. Again, from the vaikarika ahamkara the visual organ and the active organ of the feet are produced, and the manus are associated with them. From the bhutddi the taste-potential is produced, and from it is produced water. Further, from the vaikarika ahamkara there is produced the taste-organ and the sex-organ, and the manus are associated with them. From the bhutddi thjre is produced the odour-potential and from it the earth. Also, from the vaikarika ahamkara there arises the cognitive sense of smelling and the active sense of secretion. The manus at this stage descend into this category through the spiritual creative desire of God 4 .

1 vidyayd udare tatrdhamkrtir nama jdyate. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, \u. 15. " sabdai'-ka-gunani dkdsam avakdsapraddyi ca. Ibid. vn. 22. 3 tadn vainnrikdt punah srotram vdg iti vijndna-karme-ndriya-yugam mune. Ibid. vn. 23-24.

* Ibid. vn. 39, 40.

The process of development herein sketched shows that one active sense and one cognitive sense arise together with the development of each category of matter, and with the final development of all the categories of matter there develop all the ten senses (cognitive and conative) in pairs. In the chapter on the gradual dissolution of the categories we see that with the dissolution of each category of matter a pair of senses also is dissolved. The implication of this seems to be that there is at each stage a co-operation of the material categories and the cognitive and conative senses. The selves descend into the different categories as they develop in the progressive order of evolution, and the implication of this probability is that the selves, having been associated from the beginning with the evolution of the categories, may easily associate themselves with the senses and the object of the senses. When all the categories of matter and the ten senses are developed, there are produced the function of imagination, energy of will (samrambha), and the five prdnas from tnanas, ahamkdra and buddhi; and through their development are produced all the elements that may co-operate together to form the concrete personality 1 . The order followed in the process of development in evolution was maintained in an inverse manner at the time of dissolution.

The above-mentioned manus produce in their wives many children, who are called mdnavas. They in their turn produce many other children who are called the new manavas^ or the new men, in all the four castes. Those among them who perform their work for a hundred years with true discriminative knowledge enter into the supreme person of Hari. Those, however, who perform their karmas with motives of reaping their effects pass through rebirths in consonance with their actions. As has been said before, the manus may be regarded as the individuated forms of the original kutastha purusa. All the jivas are thus but parts of Visnu's own self-realizing being {bhuty-amsd). Now the prakrti, which is also called vidyd,

1 samkalpas caiva samrambhah prdndh pancavidhds tathd

manaso'hamkrter buddher jdyante purvam eva tu evam sampiirna-sarvangdh prdndpdnddi-samyutdh sarve-ndriya-yutds tatra dehino manavo mune.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vn. 42, 43. Thus from bhutddi, acting in association with taijasa ahamkdra, are produced successively the five tan-mdtras of sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa and gandha, from each of which in the same order are produced the five bhtitas of dkdsa, vdyu, tejas, ap and prthivl. Again, from the associated work of taijasa and vaikdrika ahamkdra there are produced the five cognitive and conative senses.

and which at the time of the creative process showers itself as rain and produces the food-grains, and which at the beginning of the dissolution shows itself as a drying force, begins to manifest itself as showering clouds and produces the food-grains. By consuming the food thus produced by nature men fall from their original state of perfect knowledge (jndna-bhramsam prapadyante). At such a stage the original manus produce the scriptures for the guidance of those men who have fallen from their original omniscience. Thence men can only attain their highest goal by following the guidance of the scriptures 1 . It thus appears that the power of Visnu as consciousness, bliss and action splits itself into twofold form as the realizing activity and the object, called respectively the bhdvaka and the bhdvya. The former is the thought-activity of the Lord and the latter is that part of Him which manifests itself as the object of this activity. This leads to the pure and the impure creation. The kutastha purusa of the four manus stands intermediate between the pure and the impure creation 2 . There is nothing whatsoever outside the sphere of the Sudarsana sakti of the Lord.

On the central question of the relation of God with the jivas the general view of the Paficaratra, as well as that of the Ahirbudhnya, seems to be that at the time of dissolution they return to God and remain in a potential form in Him, but again separate out at the time of the new creation. At the time of emancipation, however, they enter into God, never to come out of Him. But though they enter into Him, they do not become one with Him, but have an independent existence in Him or enter into the abode of Visnu, the Vaikuntha, which is often regarded as identical with Him. This is probably a state of what is found in many places described as the sdlokya-mukti. In the fourteenth chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd mukti is described as the attainment of Godhood (bhaga-vattd-mayi mukti, or vaisnavam tad viset padanif. The means by

tat tu vaidyam payah prasya sarve mdnava-manavah jndna-bhramsam prapadyante sarva-jnah svata eva te.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, vn. 61, 62.

Compare this with the Jewish Christian doctrine of the fall of man, as suggested

by Schrader's introduction to the Paficaratra, p. 78.

amsayoh puruso madhye yah sthitah sa catur-yugah suddhe-tara-mayam viddhi kutastham tarn maha-mune. Ibid. vn. 70. Compare the view of the Gaudlya school, which regards the jlva as the tatasthd sakti of God, which is between the antarangd and the vahiranga sakti. 3 Ibid. xiv. 3, 4 and 41.

which mukti can be attained is said to be a virtuous course of action without seeking any selfish ends 1 . The jivas are described as begin-ningless, infinite, and as pure consciousness and bliss, and as being largely of the nature of God (bhagavanmaya); but still they are described as owing their existence to the spiritual energy of God (bhagavad-bhdvitdh sadd) 2 . This idea is further clarified when it is said that side by side with the bhdvya and the bhdvaka powers of God we have a third power called the putn-sakti, of which we hear in the Gitd as Ksetrajna-sakti and in the Gaudlya school as tatastha sakti 3 . Apart from the three powers of God as creation, maintenance and destruction, He has a fourth and a fifth power called favour (anugraha) and disfavour (nigraha). The Lord is, of course, self-realized and has no unachieved end, and has absolutely unimpeachable independence; but still in His playful activity He acts like a king just as He wishes 4 . This idea of krldd is repeated in the Gaudlya school as llld. All these activities of His are but the different manifestations of His thought-activity called sudarsana. In His own playful activity as disfavour He covers up the natural condition of the jlva, so that in place of His infinitude, he appears as atomic, in place of His omnipotence, he can do but little, in place of His omniscience, He becomes largely ignorant and possesses but little knowledge. These are the three impurities and the three types of bondage. Through this covering activity the jlva is afHicted with ignorance, egoism, attachment, antipathy, etc. Being afHicted by ignorance and the passions, and being goaded by the tendency towards achieving the desirable and avoiding the undesirable, He performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He thus undergoes the cycle of birth and rebirth, and is infested with different kinds of root-instincts (vdsand). It is through the power of this bondage and its requirements that the powers of creation, maintenance and destruction are roused and made active to arrange for rewards and punishments in accordance with the karmas of the jlvas. As proceeding from the very playful nature of God, which precedes time (kdla), and is beginningless, the bondage also is said to be beginningless. The above description of bondage as happening

1 sddhanam tasya ca prokto dharmo nirabhisandhikah.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xiv, 4.

2 Ibid. 3 pum-s'aktih kalamayy any a pumdn so'yam udlritah. Ibid. xiv. to. 4 sarvair an-anuyojyam tat svdtantryam divyam isituh

avdpta-visva-kdmo'pi krldate rdjavad vast. Ibid. xiv. 13.

4-2

at some time through a process of fall from original nature is by way of analysis of the situation. Through the power of God as anugraha, or grace, God stops the course of karma for ajlva on whose condition of sorrow and suffering He happens to take pity. With the cessation of the good and bad deeds and their beneficent and harmful results through the grace of God the jiva looks forward to emancipation and is moved by a feeling of disinclination and begins to have discriminative knowledge. He then turns to scriptures and to teachers., follows the course of action dictated by Samkhya and Yoga, and attains the Vedantic knowledge, finally to enter the ultimate abode of Visnu.

LaksmI is regarded as the ultimate eternal power of Visnu, and she is also called by the names Gaurl, Sarasvati and Dhenu. It is this supreme power that manifests itself as Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Thus, these separate powers are observable only when they manifest themselves, but even when they do not manifest themselves they exist in God as His great supreme power LaksmI. It is this LaksmI that is called Brahma, Visnu, or Siva. The vyakti, avyakti, purusa and kala or samkhya and yoga are all represented in the LaksmI. LaksmI is the ultimate supreme power into which all the others resolve themselves. As distinct from the other manifested powers it is often called the fifth power. The emancipated person enters into this LaksmI, which is regarded as the highest abode of Visnu (param dhama or paramam padam), or the highest Brahman. This power (sakti) is also regarded as having an inner feeling of bliss; and yet it is of the nature of bliss, and is designated as the bhdva form of Visnu and also as the ujjvala (shining). This sakti is also regarded as discharging the five functions (panca-krtya-kari) of creation, maintenance, destruction, grace and disfavour mentioned above. Brahman, as associated with this sakti, is called the highest Visnu as distinguished from the lower Visnu, the god of maintenance. This sakti is always in a state of internal agitation though it may not be observed as such from outward appearance. This internal agitation and movement are so subtle that they may appear to be in a state of absolute calmness like that of the ocean 1 . Thus sakti is also called the may a of Visnu 2 .

1 sada pratayamana'pi suksmair bhavairalaksanaih. nirvyapareva sa bhati staimityam iva co'dadheh. tayai vo'pahitam Brahma nirvikalpam mranjanarn.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, li. 49.

2 miiyd'scarya-karatvena panca-krtya-kari sada. Ibid. li. 58.

It is a part of this power that transforms itself as the bhdvya and the bhdvaka sakti, of which the latter is also known by the name sudoriana. The bhdvya shows itself as the world, and its objective import is the world.

The thought-activity by which the concept shows itself in the ideal and in the objective world as thought and its significance, the object, is the epitome of the power of Sudarsana. When all the external movement of the objective is ideally grasped in the word, we have also in it the manifestation of the power of Sudarsana, or the supreme thought-activity of God. All the causality of the objective world is but a mode of the manifestation of the Sudarsana power. Thus not only all the movements of the external world of nature and the movement implied in speech, but the subjective-objective movement by which the world is held together in thought and in speech are the manifestation of the Sudarsana power. All expressions or manifestations are either in the way of qualities or actions, and both are manifestations of the Sudarsana power of God. Our words can signify only these two ways of being. For this reason they refer only to the Sudarsana, which is attributive to God, but cannot express the nature of God. Words, therefore, cannot reveal the nature of God. The word may hold the universe within it as its mystic symbol and may represent within it all its energies, but, in any case, though it may engulf within it the whole universe and secure the merging of the universe in itself and can identify itself with God, "such identification can only be with the Sudarsana power of God, and the entrance into God, or the realization of Him through the word or thought, can only be through the Sudarsana power, which is a part of Laksml. Thus unity with God can only mean union with Sudarsana, or entrance into Laksml 1 .

Adoration (namah) means the spontaneous acceptance of the highest Lord as the master on the part of a man who has achieved it through a wise enlightenment 2 . Superiority (j'ydydn) consists of greatness of qualities and existence in earlier time 3 . God alone is superior, and everything else is inferior. The relation between the latter and the former is that the latter exists for the former or is dependent on the former. This relation is called (sesa-sesitd). The

1 Ahirbudhnya-samhita, LI. 69—78.

2 preksavatah pravrttir yd prahvi-bhdvd-tmikd svatah uikrstatn param uddisya tan namah pariglyate. Ibid. LI I. 2.

s kalatu gunatas caiva prakarso yatra tisthati

sabdas tarn mukhyayd vrttyd jydydn ity avalambate. Ibid. Lll. 4.

relation between the two is that one should be the adorer and the other the adored {nantr-nantavya-bhavd). True adoration is when such an adoration proceeds naturally as a result of such a relation, without any other motive or end of any kind—the only idea being that God is supremely superior to me and I am absolutely inferior to Him 1 . This process of adoration not only takes the adorer to God, but also brings God to him. The presence of any motive of any kind spoils the effectuation of the adoration. This adoration is the first part of the process of prapatti, or seeking the protection of God 2 . Now on account of the presence of beginningless root-impressions (vdsand), and of natural insignificance of power and association with impurity, man's power of knowledge or wisdom becomes obstructed; and when a man becomes fully conscious of such weakness, he acquires the quality of kdrpanya or lowliness. A feeling or consciousness of one's independence obstructs this quality of lowliness. The great faith that the supreme God is always merciful is called the quality of maha-zisvasa. The idea that God is neutral and bestows His gifts only in proportion to one's deeds obstructs this quality. The idea that, since He is all-merciful and all-powerful, He would certainly protect us, produces the quality of faith in God's protective power. The notion that God, being qualityless, is indifferent to any appeal for protection obstructs this quality. Acceptance of the Lord as the supreme master whose commands should on no account be disobeyed produces the quality of docility (prdtikulya-vivarjana). Service of God in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures obstructs this quality. The strong resolve of the mind to work in accordance with God's wishes, with the full conviction that the sentient and the non-sentient of the world are but parts of His nature, produces the quality of submission. An inimical disposition towards the beings of the world obstructs this quality. A true adoration {namah) to God must be associated with all the aforesaid qualities. True adoration must carry with it the conviction that the sense of possession that we have in all things, due to beginningless instinctive passions and desires, is all false, and the adorer should feel that he has neither independence nor anything that he may call his own. "My body, my

1 upddhi-rahitend' yam yena bhdvena cetanah namati jyayase tasmai tad vd namanam ticyate.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, lii. q.

2 phalepsd tad-virodhinl. Ibid. lii. 15.

riches, my relations do not belong to me, they all belong to God"; such is the conviction that should generate the spirit with which the adoration should be offered. The adorer should feel that the process of adoration is the only way through which he can obtain his highest realization, by offering himself to God and by drawing God to himself at the same time. The purpose of adoration is thus the supreme self-abnegation and self-offering to God, leaving nothing for oneself. The world comes out of God and yet exists in a relation of inherence, so that He is both the agent and the material cause of the world, and the adorer must always be fully conscious of the greatness of God in all its aspects.

The above doctrine of prapatti, or nyasa, or sarana-gati, as the means of winning God's grace, has also been described in Chapter xxvii and it virtually means the qualities just described 1 , sarand-gati is here defined as prayer for God's help in association with the conviction of one's being merged in sin and guilt, together with a belief in one's absolute helplessness and a sense of being totally lost without the protecting grace of God 2 . The person who takes to the path of this prapatti achieves the fruits of all tapas, sacrifices, pilgrimages and gifts, and attains salvation easily without resorting to any other methods 3 . It is further said that on the part of the devotee following the path of prapatti all that is necessary is to stick firmly to the attitude of absolute dependence on God, associated with a sense of absolute helplessness. He has no efforts to make other than to keep himself in the prayerful spirit; all the rest is done by God. Prapatti is thus a updya-jnana and not a updya; for it is a mental attitude and does not presuppose any action. It is like a boat on which the passenger merely sits, while it is the business of the boatman to do the rest 4 .

1 sodhd hi veda-viduso vadanty enam mahd-mune anukulyasya samhalpah pratikulvasya varjanatn raksisyatl ti visvdso goptrva-varanam tathd. dtma-niksepa-kdrpanye sad-vidhd sarand-gatih.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xxxvii. 27, 28.

2 aham asmy aparddhdndm dlayo'kincano' gatih tvam ei'o 'pdyabhiito me bhave'ti prdrthand-matih. sarandgatir ity-ukla sd deve'smin prayujyatdm.

Ibid, xxxvn. 30, 31.

3 Ibid, xxxvn. 34 and 35.

4 atra ndvi' ti drstdntdd updya-jndnam eva lu narena krtyarn anyat tu ndvikasyeva taddhareh.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd.

Describing the process of pure creation, it is said that at the time of pralaya all effects are reduced to a dormant state, and there is no movement of any kind. All the six qualities of the Lord, namely jnana, sakti, bala, aisvarya, vlrya and tejas described above, are in a state of absolute calmness like the sky without a puff of air in it 1 . This assemblage of powers in a state of calmness is LaksmI, which exists as it were like the very void. From its own spontaneity it seems to wish to burst forth and turn itself into active operations. This power of God, though differentiated from Him, may be regarded as being His very nature. It is only when it thus comes out in activfe forms that it can be recognized as power, or sakti. When embedded in the potential form, it is indistinguishable from the Lord Himself. These gunas of God should not, however, be confused with the gunas of prakrti, which evolve at a much lower stage in the course of the process of impure creation.

As regards the vyiihas, it is said that Samkarsana carries in him the whole universe, as if it were a spot at the parting of the hairs {tilakdlaka). The universe as it exists in Samkarsana is still in an unmanifested form. He is the support of the universe (asesa-bhuvana-dhara) 2 . The tnanus, time and prakrti came out of Prad-yumna 3 . It is through the influence of Pradyumna that men are actuated to perform their work in accordance with the sdstras*. Aniruddha, also called Maha-visnu, is the god of power and energy, and it is through his efforts that the creation and the maintenance of the world are possible. It is he who makes the world grow 5 . It is through him that the world lives without fear and ultimate salvation is possible. According to Sarikara's account Samkarsana stands for the individual soul, Pradyumna for manas and Aniruddha for the Ego (ahamkdray. Such a view is rather rare in the existing Pancaratra literature. In the Visvaksena-samhita, as quoted in the Tattva-traya, it is said that Samkarsana acts as the superintendent

1 purna-stimita-sad-gunyam asamlrd-mvaro-pamam.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, v. 3.

2 All the sastras are said to have been produced by Samkarsana, and it is in him that they disappear at the time of pralaya. Ahirbudhnya, lv. 16.

3 Ibid. vi. 9-12. * Ibid. lv. 18. Pradyumna is also called Vira.

6 There are, however, many conflicting views about these functions of the different vyiihas. See Laksml-tantra, iv. 11-20, also Visvaksena-samhita, as quoted in the Tattva-traya.

6 Vedanta-sutra, 11. 2. 42, £ankara's commentary.

of the souls, and Pradyumna is described as manomaya or the mind, but nothing is said about Aniruddha. In the Laksmi-tantra, vi. 9-14, it is said that Samkarsana was like the soul, buddhi and manas and Vasudeva, the playful creative activity. In the Visvaksena-samhitd Aniruddha is regarded as the creator of the misra-varga (pure-impure creation, such as niyati), etc., and Samkarsana is regarded as the being who separated the principle of life from nature and became Pradyumna. But in the Ahirbudhnya the difference between the purusa and prakrti starts in the Pradyumna stage, and not in the Samkarsana stage, and Aniruddha is regarded in the Ahirbudhnya as the superintendent of the sattva and therethrough of all that come from it and the manus 1 . According to the Ahirbudhnya LaksmI is described as the power of God, but according to Uttara-ndrdyana we have LaksmI and Bhumi, and according to the Tattva-traya LaksmI, Bhumi and Nlla. In the Vihagendra-samhitd, 11. 8, these three are regarded as icchd, kriyd and sdksdt-sakti of the Devi. In the Sitd-upanisad also we have the same interpretation, and this is also associated there with Vaikhdnasa tradition. The Vihagendra speaks of the eight saktis of Sudarsana, kirti, srl, vijaya, sraddhd, smrti, medhd y dhrti and ksamd, and in the Sdtrata-samhitd (ix. 85) we hear of the twelve saktis emanating from the Srivatsa of Visnu: these are laksmi, pusti, dayd, nidrd, ksamd, kdnti, sarasvati, dhrti, maitrl, rati, tusti and mati.

The Pancaratra is based partly on the Vedic and partly on the Tantric system 2 . It therefore believes in the esoteric nature of the mantras. It has already been said that the world has come into being from the Sudarsana power; so all the natural, physical and other kinds of energies and powers of all things in the world are but manifestation of the Sudarsana. The power of the Sudarsana also manifests itself in the form of all living beings and of all that is inanimate, of the course of bondage and also of emancipation. Whatever is able to produce is to be regarded as the manifestation of Sudarsana 3 . The mantras are also regarded as the energy of

1 Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vi. 57.

2 veda-tantramayo-dbhuta-ndna-prasavasalinl. Ibid. vi. 9.

3 sudarsanahvaya devl sarva-krtya-karl vibhoh tan-mayam viddhi samarthyam sarvarn sarva-padarthajam dharmasyarthasya kdmasya mukter bandha-trayasya ca yad yat sva-kdrya-sdmarthyam tat-tat-saudarsanam vapuh.

Ibid. xvi. 4 and 6.

<;8 The Pancardtra [ch.

Visnu as pure consciousness 1 . The first manifestation of this power, like a long-drawn sound of a bell, is called ndda, and it can only be perceived bv the great yogins. The next stage, like a bubble on the ocean, is called bitidu, which is the identity of a name and the objective power denoted by it. The next stage is the evolution of the objective power (ndmx-udaxa), which is also called Sabda-brahman. Thus, with the evolution of every alphabetic sound there is also the evolution of the objective power of which it is the counterpart. Ahirbudhnya then goes on to explain the evolution of the different vowel and consonant sounds from the bindu-powcr. By fourteen efforts there come the fourteen vowels emanating through the dancing of the serpent power (Kundalt-sakti) of Visnu'-. By its twofold subtle power it behaves as the cause of creation and destruction. This power rises in the original locus (milld-dhdra) and, when it comes to the stage of the navel, it is called pusxantl and is perceived by the yog ins. It then proceeds to the lotus of the heart and then passes through the throat as the audible sound. The energy of the vowel sounds passes through the susumnd nddi. In this way the different consonant sounds are regarded as the prototvpes of different manifestations of world-energv, and these again are regarded as the symbols of different kinds of gods or superintendents of energy 3 . An assemblage of some of these alphabets in different orders and groups, called also the lotus or the wheel {cakra), would stand for the assemblage of different tvpes of complex powers. The meditation and worship of these cakras would thus be expected to bring the objective powers typified by them under control. The different gods are thus associated with the different cakras of mantras; and by far the largest portion of the Pancaratra literature is dedicated to the description of the rituals associated with these, the building of corresponding images, and the temples for these subsidiary deities. The meditation of these mantras is also regarded as playing diverse protective functions.

In consonance with the ordinary method of the Tantric works

1 sdksdd visnnfi kriyd-saktih suddha-sumrinnni puru.

.lhirbudfinyn-stimhitd. xvi. 10. This hiyd-sakti is also called samarthya or yuga or pdramesthwi or nuihatcjai or maya-yagu. Ibid. xvi. 32.

natl'va kunduh-iaktir ddyd visitor lijrmbhate. Ibid. xvi. 55.

risnu-snkliniayil varnd vnnu-uimkalpa-jrmbhitdh

adhisthitd yathd bhdvtiis tuthd tan vie niidmaxa. Ibid. xvn. 3.

the Ahirbudhnya describes the nervous system of the body. The root (kdnda) of all the nerves is said to be at about nine inches above the penis. It is an egg-shaped place four inches in length and breadth and made up of fat, flesh, bone and blood. Just two inches below the penis and about two inches from the anus we have a place which is called the middle of the body {sarira-madhyd), or simply the middle (madhya). It is like a quadrilateral figure, which is also called the dgneya-mandala. The place of the root of the nddis is also called the navel-wheel {ndbhi-cakra), which has twelve spokes. Round the ndbhi-cakra there exists the serpent (kundali) with eight mouths, stopping the aperture called brahma-randhra of the susumnd by its body 1 . In the centre of the cakra there are the two nddis called the alambusa and susumnd. On the different sides of the susumnd there are the following nddis: Kuhu, Varuna, Yasasvini, Pirigald, Pusd, Payasvini, Sarasvati, Saiikhini, Gdndhdri, Ida, Hasti-jihvd, Viszodard. But there are on the whole 72,000 nddis in the body. Of these, Ida, Pinguid and susumnd are the most important. Of these, again, susumnd, which goes to the centre of the brain, is the most important. As a spider remains inside the meshes of its thread, so the soul, as associated with prdna or life-force, exists inside this navel-wheel. The susumnd has five openings, of which four carry blood, while the central aperture is closed by the body of the Kundali. Other nddis are shorter in size and are connected with the different parts of the body. The Ida and the Pirigald are regarded as being like the sun and the moon of the body.

There are ten vdyus, or bio-motor forces of the body, called prdna, apdna, samdna, uddna, zydna, ndga, kurma, krkara, deva-datta and dhanaiijaya. The prdna vdyu remains in the navel-wheel, but it manifests itself in the regions of the heart, mouth ard the nose. The apdna vdyu works in the anus, penis, thighs, the legs, the belly, the testes, the lumbar region, the intestines, and in fact performs the functions of all the lower region. The vydna exists between the eyes and the ears, the toes, nose, throat and the spine. The uddna works in the hands and the samdna through the body as a whole, probably discharging the general circulation 2 . The func-

1 Ahirbudhnya-samhita, xxxn. n. This is indeed different from the description found in the Sakta Tantras, according to which the Kundali exists in the place down below described as the sarlra-madhya.

2 Ibid. xxxn. 33-37. These locations and functions are different from what we find in the Ayur- Veda or the Sakta Tantras.

tion of the prdna is to discharge the work of respiration; that of the vydna, to discharge the work of turning about towards a thing or away from it. The function of the uddna is to raise or lower the body, that of the samdna, to feed and develop it. The function of eructation or vomiting is performed by the ndga zdyu, and devadalta produces sleep and so on. These nddis are to be purified by inhaling air by the idd for as long as is required to count from i to 16. This breath is to be held long enough to count from i to 32, and in the interval some forms of meditation are to be carried on. Then the y ogin should inhale air in the same manner through the pinguid and hold that also in the same way. He should then exhale the breath through the Ida. He should practise this for three months thrice a day, three times on each occasion, and thus his nddis will be purified and he will be able to concentrate his mind on the rdyus all over his body. In the process of the prdndydma he should inhale air through the Ida long enough to count from 1 to 16. Then the breath is to be retained as long as possible, and the specific mantra is to be meditated upon; and then the breath is to be exhaled out by the pingald for the time necessary to count from 1 to 16. Again, he has to inhale through the Pingald, retain the breath and exhale through the Ida. Gradually the period of retention of the breath called kumbhaka is to be increased. He has to practise the prdndydma sixteen times in course of the day. This is called the process of prdndydma. As a result of this, he may enter the stage of samddhi, by which he may attain all sorts of miraculous powers, just as one may by the meditation of the wheel of mantras.

But before one begins the purification of the nddis described above one should practise the various postures (asanas) of which cakra, padma, kurma, mayiira, kukkuta, vira, szastika, bhadra, simha, mukta and gomukha are described the Ahirbudhnya. The practice of these postures contributes to the good health of the yogins. But these physical practices are of no avail unless one turns to the spiritual side of yoga. Yoga is defined as the union of the lower and the higher soul 1 . Two ways for the attainment of the highest reality are described in the Ahirbudhnya —one is that of self-offering or self-abnegation (dtma-samarpana or hrd-ydga) through the meditation on the highest in the form of some of His powers, as this

1 samyngo yoga ity uktu jivatm-parama-tmanoh.

Ahirbudhnya-samhito, xxxi. 15.

and that specific deity, by the practice of the mantras \ and the other is that of the yoga 1 . Ahirbudhnya, however, concentrates its teachings on the former, and mentions the latter in only one of its chapters. There are two types of soul, one within the influence of the prakrti and the other beyond it. The union with the highest is possible through karma and yoga. Karma is again of two kinds, that which is prompted by desires (pravartaka) and that which is prompted by cessation of desires (nivartaka). Of these only the latter can lead to emancipation, while the former leads to the attainment of the fruits of desires. The highest soul is described as the subtle (suksma), all-pervading (sarva-ga), maintaining all (sarva-bhrt), pure consciousness (jndna-rupa), without beginning and end (anddy-ananta), changeless (a-vikdrin), devoid of all cognitive or conative senses, devoid of names and class-notions, without colour and quality, yet knowing all and pervading all, self-luminous and yet approachable through intuitive wisdom, and the protector of all 2 . The yoga by which a union of our lower souls with this highest reality can be effected has the well-known eight accessories, yama, niyama, dsana, prdnaydma, pratydhdra, dhdrana, dhydna and samddhi.

Of these, yama is said to consist of beneficial and yet truthful utterance (satya), suffering at the sufferings of all beings (dayd), remaining fixed in one's path of duty even in the face of dangers (dhrti), inclination of all the senses to adhere to the path of right conduct {sailed), absence of lust (brahma-carya), remaining unruffled even when there is a real cause of anger or excitement (ksamd), uniformity of thoughts, deeds and words (drjava), taking of unprohibited food (mitdhdra), absence of greed for the property of others (asteya), cessation from doing injury to others by word, deed or thought (ahimsd) 3 . Niyama is described as listening to Vedantic texts (siddhdnta-sravana), gifts of things duly earned to proper persons (ddna), faith in scriptural duties (mati), worship of Yisnu through devotion (isvara-pujana), natural contentment with

1 yad va bhagavate tasmai svakiydtma-samarpanam visista-daivatdyd' smai cakra-riipdya mantratah viyuktam prahrteh suddham dadydd dtma-havih svayam.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, xxx. 4, 5.

2 Ibid. xxxi. 7-10.

3 Ibid. 18-23. The list here given is different from that of Patafijali, who counts ahimsd, satya, asteya, brahma-carya and aparigraha as yamas. See Yoga-siitra, II. 30.

whatever one may have (santosa), asceticism (tapah), faith in the ultimate truth being attainable only through the Vedas (dstikya), shame in committing prohibited actions (hrl), muttering of mantras (japa), acceptance of the path dictated by the good teacher (vrata) 1 . Though the Yoga is here described as the union of the lower and the higher soul, the author of the Ahirbudhnya was aware of the yogdnusdsana of Patanjali and his doctrine of Yoga as the repression of mental states (citta-vrtti-nirodhaf':

The Ahirbudhnya defines pramd as the definite knowledge of a thing as it really exists (yathdrthd-vadhdranam), and the means by which it is attained is called pramdna. That which is sought to be discovered by the pramdnas as being beneficial to man is called pramdndrtha. This is of two kinds, that which is supremely and absolutely beneficial, and that which indirectly leads thereto, and as such is called hita and sddhana. Oneness with God, which is supremely blissful, is what is called supremely beneficial {hita). Two ways that lead to it are those of dharma andjndna. This knowledge is of two kinds, as direct intuition (sdksdtkdra) and as indirect or inferential (paroksa). Dharma is the cause of knowledge, and is of two kinds, one which leads directly, and the other indirectly, to worship of God. Self-offering or self-abnegation with reference to God is called indirect dharma, while the way in which the Yogin directly realizes God is called the direct dharma, such as is taught in the Pancaratra literature, called the sdtvata-sdsana. By the Samkhya path one can have only the indirect knowledge of God, but through Yoga and Vedanta one can have a direct intuition of God. Emancipation (moksa) is as much an object of attainment through efforts (sddhya) as dharma, artha and kdma, though the last three are also mutually helpful to one another 3 .

1 Ahirbudhnya-samJtita, pp. 23-30. This list is also different from that of Patanjali, who counts sauca, santosa, tapah, svadhyaya and isvara-pranidhana only as niyamas. See Yoga-sutra, 11. 32.

2 Ibid. xiii. 27, 28.

3 Ibid. xiii.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ARVARS.

The Chronology of the Arvars.

In the Bhagavata-purdna, xi. 5. 38-40, it is said that the great devotees of Visnu will appear in the south on the banks of Tamra-parnl, Krtamala (Vaigai), PayasvinI (Palar), Kaverl and MahanadI (Periyar) 1 . It is interesting to note that the Arvars, Namm'-arvar and Madhura-kaviy-arvar, were born in the TamraparnI country, Periy-arvar and his adopted daughter Andal in the Krtamala, Poygaiy-arvar, Bhutatt'-arvar, Pey-arvar and Tiru-marisai Piran in the PayasvinI, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar and Tiru-mangaiy-arvar in the Kaverl, and Periy-arvar and Kula-sekhara Perumal in the Mahanada countries. In the Bhdgavata-mdhdtmya we find a parable in which Bhakti is described as a distressed woman who was born in the Dravida country, had attained her womanhood in the Carnatik and Maharastra, and had travelled in great misery through Guzerat and North India with her two sons Jndna and Vairdgya to Brindaban, and that owing to the hard conditions through which she had to pass her two sons had died. This shows that at least according to the traditions of the Bhagavata-purdna Southern India was regarded as a great stronghold of the Bhakti cult.

The Arvars are the most ancient Vaisnava saints of the south, of whom Saroyogin or Poygaiy-arvar, Piitayogin or Bhutatt'-arvar, Mahadyogin or Pey-arvar, and Bhaktisara or Tiru-marisai Piran are the earliest; Namm'-arvar or Sathakopa, Madhura-kaviy-arvar, Kula-sekhara Perumal, Visnucittan (or Periy-arvar) and Goda (Andal) came after them and Bhaktanghrirenu (Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar), Yogivaha (Tiru-pan-arvar) and Parakala (Tiru-mangaiy-

1 This implies Jhat the Bhagavata-purdna in its present form was probably written after the Arvars had flourished. The verse here referred to has been quoted by Venkatanatha in his Raliasya-traya-sdra. The Prapanna-mrta (Ch. 77) however refers to three other Vaisnava saints who preceded the Arvars. They were (i) Kasarayogin, born in KancI, (ii) Bhutayoglndra, born in Mallipura, (iii) Bhranta-yoglndra called also Mahat and Maharya who was the incarnation of Visvaksena. It was these sages who advised the five samskaras of Vaisnavism (tdpah paundras tathd ndma mantro yagas ca pancamah). They preached the emotional Vaisnavism in which Bhakti is realized as maddening intoxication associated with tears, etc. They described their feelings of ecstasy in three works, comprising three hundred verses written in Tamil. They were also known by the names of Madhava, Dasarya and Saroyogin.

arvar) were the last to come. The traditional date ascribed to the earliest Arvar is 4203 B.C., and the date of the latest Arvar is 2706 B.C. 1 , though modern researches on the subject bring down their dates to a period not earlier than the seventh or the eighth century a.d. Traditional information about the Arvars can be had from the different " Guru-parampard" works. According to the Guru-parampard, Bhutatt-, Poygaiy- and Pey-arvars were incarnations of Visnu's Gadd, Sankha and Xandaka, and so also Kadan-mallai and Mayilai, while Tiru-marisai Piran was regarded as the incarnation of the cakra (wheel) of Visnu. Namm'-arvar was incarnation of Visvaksena and Kula-sekhara Peru-mal of the Kaus-tubha of Visnu. So Periy-arvar, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar and Tiru-marigaiy-arvar were respectively incarnations of Garuda, Vanamala and Sdrnga of Visnu. The last Arvar was Tiru-pan-arvar. Andal, the adopted daughter of Periy-arvar, and Madhura-kaviy-arvar, the disciple of Namm'-arvar, were also regarded as Arvars. They came from all parts of the Madras Presidency. Of these seven were Brahmins, one was a Ksattriya, two were sudras and one was of the low Panar caste. The Guru-paramparas give incidents of the lives of the Arvars and also fanciful dates B.C. when they are said to have flourished. Apart from the Guru-par ampar as there are also monographs on individual Arvars, of which the following are the most important: (1) Divya-suri-carita by Garuda-vahana Pandita, who was a contemporary of Ramanuja; (2) Guru-parampard-prabhdvam of Pinb'-aragiya Peru-mal Jlyar, based on the Divya-suri-carita and written in mani-pravdla style, i.e. a mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil; (3) Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaivu of Anbillai Kandadai-yappan, written in Tamil; (4) Upadesa-ratna-mdlai of Manavaja Ala-muni, written in Tamil, contains the list of Arvars; (5) Yatindra-pravana-prabhdvam of Pillai Lokacaryar. The other source of information regarding the Arvars is the well-known collection of the works of Arvars known as Ndl-ayira-divya-prabandham. Among these are the commentaries on the Divya-prabandham and the Tiru-vdy-mori of Namm'-arvar. In addition to these we have the epigraphical evidence in inscriptions scattered over the Madras Presidency 2 .

1 Early History of Vaimavism in South India, by S. K. Aiyangar, pp. 4-13; also Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaimavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Sects, pp. 68, 69.

Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-natha Rau, 1923.

Manavala Ma-muni, in his Yatindra-pravana-prabhavam, says that the earliest of the Arvars, Pey-arvar, Bhutatt'-arvar, Poygaiy-arvar, and Tiru-marisai Piran, flourished at the time of the Pallavas, who came to Kanci about the fourth century a.d. Again, Professor Dubreuil says that Mamallai, the native town of Bhutatt'-arvar, did not exist before Narasimhavarman I, who founded the city by the middle of the seventh century. Further, Tiru-mangaiy-arvar praised the Vaisnava temple of Kanci built by Paramesvarvarman II. It seems, therefore, that the .Srvars flourished in the eighth century a.d., which was the period of a great Vaisnava movement in the Cola and the Pandya countries, and also of the Advaitic movement of Sankara 1 .

According to the traditional accounts, Namm'-arvar was the son of Kari, holding a high post under the Pandyas, and himself bore the names of Karimaran, Parankusa and Sathakopa, that his disciple was Madhura-kaviy-arvar, and that he was born at Tirukkurgur. Two stone inscriptions have been found in Madura of which one is dated at Kali 3871, in the reign of King Parantaka, whose uttara-mantrin was the son of Mara, who was also known as Madhura-kaviy-arvar. The other is dated in the reign of Maran-jadaiyan. The Kali year 3871 corresponds to a.d. 770. This was about the year when Parantaka Pandya ascended the throne. His father Parankusa died about the year a.d. 770. Marankari continued as uttara-mantrin. Namm'-arvar's name Karimaran shows that Kari the uttara-mantrin was his father. This is quite in accordance with the accounts found in Guru-parampard. These and many other evidences collected by Gopi-natha Rau show that Namm'-arvar and Madhura-kaviy-arvar flourished at the end of the eighth century a.d. or in the first half of the ninth century. Kula-sekhara Peru-mal also flourished probably about the first half of the ninth century. Periy-arvar and his adopted daughter Andal were probably contemporaries of Srivallabhadeva, who flourished about the middle of the ninth century a.d. Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar was a contemporary of Tiru-mangaiy-arvar and Tiru-pan-arvar. Tiru-mangaiy-arvar referred to the war drum of Pallavamalla, who reigned between a.d. 717 and a.d. 779, and these Arvars could not have flourished before that time. But Tiru-mangaiy-arvar, in his praise

1 Sir Subrahmanya Ayyar Lectures, by the late T. A. Gopi-natha Rau, 1923, p. 17.

D in 5

of Visnu at KancI, refers to Vairamegha Pallava, who probably flourished in the ninth century. It may therefore be supposed that Tiru-marigaiy lived about that time. According to Mr S. K. Aiyangar the last of the Arvars flourished in the earlier half of the eighth century a.d. 1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar holds that Kula-sekhara Peru-mal flourished about the middle of the twelfth century. He was a king of Travancore and in his Mukunda-mdld he quotes a verse from the Bhdgavata-purdna (xi. 2. 36). On the basis of the inscriptional evidence that Permadi of the Senda dynasty, who flourished between 1138-1150, conquered Kula-sekharaiika, and identifying Kula-sekhara Peru-mal with Kula-sekhararika, Bhandarkar comes to the conclusion that Kula-sekhara Peru-mal lived in the middle of the twelfth century a.d., though, as we have already seen, Air Rau attempts to place him in the first half of the ninth century. He, however, does not take any notice of the views of Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, who further thinks that the earliest Arvars flourished about the fifth or the sixth century a.d. and that the order of the priority of the Arvars as found in the Guru-parampara lists is not reliable. One of the main points of criticism used by Aiyangar against Bhandarkar is the latter's identification of Kula-sekhara Peru-mal with Kula-sekhararika. The works of the Arvars were written in Tamil, and those that survive were collected in their present form in Ramanuja's time or in the time of Natha-muni; this collection, containing 4000 hymns, is called Ndl-dyira-dwya-prabandham. But at least one part of it was composed by Kuruttalvan or Kuruttama, who was a prominent disciple of Ramanuja, and in a passage thereof a reference is made to Ramanuja also 2 . The order of the Arvars given in this work is somewhat different from that given in the Guru-parampard referred to above, and it does not contain the name of Namm'-arvar, who is treated separately. Again, Pillan, the disciple and apostolic successor of Ramanuja, who commented on the Tiru-vdy-mori of Namm'-arvar, gives in a verse all the names of the Arvars, omitting only

1 Indian Antiquary, Vol. xxxv, pp. 228, etc.

2 This part is called Ramanuja-nurrundadi. The order of the Arvars given here is as follows: Poygaiy-arvai, Bhutatt'-arvar, Pey-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar, Tiru-marisai Piran, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Kula-sekhara, Periy-arvar, Anda], Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar. Vehkatanatha, however, in his Prabandha-saram records the Arvars in the following order: Poygaiy-arvar, Bhutatt'-arvar, Pey-arvar, Tiru-vnarisai Piran, Namm'-arvar, Madhura-kaviy-arvar, Kula-sekhara, Periy-arvar, Andal, Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-pan-arvar, Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar.

Andal 1 . Thus it appears that Kula-sekhara was accepted as an Arvar in Ramahuja's time. In V'enkatanatha's (fourteenth-century) list, contained in one of his Tamil Prabandhams, all the Arvars excepting Andal and Madhura-kaviy-arvar are mentioned. The Prdbandham contains also a succession list of teachers according to the Vadakalai sect, beginning with Ramanuja 2 .

Kula-sekhara, in his Mukunda-mdld, says that he was the ruler of Kolli (Uraiyur, the Cola capital), Kudal (Madura) and Kongu. Being a native of Travancore (Vanjikulam), he became the ruler of the Pandya and Cola capitals, Madura and Uraiyur. After a.d. 900, when the Cola king Parantaka became supreme and the Cola capital was at Tanjore instead of at Uraiyur, the ascendency of the Travancore country (Kerala) over the Cola and the Pandya kingdoms would have been impossible. It could only have happened either before the rise of the great Pallava dynasty with Narasimhavarman I (a.d. 600) or after the fall of that dynasty with Nandivarman (a.d. 800). If Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar, the contemporary of Vairamegha, be accepted as the last Arvar, then Kula-sekhara must be placed in the sixth century a.d. But Gopi-natha Rau interprets a passage of Kula-sekhara as alluding to the defeat and death of a Pallava king at his hands. He identifies this king with the Pallava king Dantivarman, about a.d. 825, and is of the opinion that he flourished in the first half of the ninth century a.d. In any case Bhandarkar's identification of Kula-sekhara with Kula-sekharanka (a.d. 1150) is very improbable, as an inscription dated a.d. 1088 makes a provision for the recital of Kula-sekhara's " Tettarumtiral." 3 Aiyangar further states that in several editions of the Mukunda-mdld the quotation from the Bhdgavata-purdrja referred to by Bhandarkar cannot be traced. We may thus definitely reject the view of Bhandarkar that Kula-sekhara flourished in the middle of the twelfth century a.d.

There is a great controversy among the South Indian historians and epigraphists not only about the chronological order of the

1 Bhutam Saras ca Mahad-anvaya-Bhattanatha-$rl-Bhaktisa~ra-Kulasekhara-Yogivahdn Bhaktdnghrirenu-Parakdla-Yatlndramisran Srl-niat-Pardnkusa-munim pranato'smi nityam.

Verse quoted from Aiyangar's Early History of Vaisnavism.

2 Ramanuja's preceptor was Periya Nambi, then come Alavandar, Manakkal Nambi, Uyyakkondar, Nathamuni, Sathakopa, Visvaksena (Senai Nathan), Mahalaksmi and Vi§nu. Aiyangar, Early History of Vaisnavism, p. 21.

8 Ibid. p. 33.

5-2

different Arvars, but also regarding the dates of the first and the last, and of those who came between them. Thus, while Aiyangar wished to place the first four Arvars about the second century a.d., Gopi-natha Rau regards them as having flourished in the middle of the seventh century a.d. 1 Again, Namm'-arvar is placed by Aiyangar in the middle of the sixth century, while Gopi-natha Rau would place him during the first half of the ninth century. While Aiyangar would close the history of the Arvars by the middle of the seventh century, Gopi-natha Rau would place Kula-sekhara in a.d. 825, Periy-arvar in about the same date or a few years later, and Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-mangaiy-arvar and Tiru-pan-arvar (contemporaries) about a.d. 830. From comparing the various matters of controversy, the details of which cannot well be described here, I feel it wise to follow Gopi-natha Rau, and am inclined to think that the order of the Arvars, except so far as the first group of four is concerned, is not a chronological one, as many of them were close contemporaries, and their history is within a period of only 200 years, from the middle of the seventh century to the middle of the ninth century.

The word Arvar means one who has a deep intuitive knowledge of God and one who is immersed in the contemplation of Him. The works of the Arvars are full of intense and devoted love for Visnu. This love is the foundation of the later systematic doctrine of prapatti. The difference between the Arvars and the Aragiyas, of whom we shall speak later on, is that, while the former had realized Brahman and had personal enjoyment of His grace, the latter were learned propounders who elaborated the philosophy contained in the works of the Arvars. Poygaiy, Bhutatt' and Pey composed the three sections of one hundred stanzas each of Tiru-vantddi 2 . Tiru-marisai Piran spent much of his life in Triplicane, Conjeevaram and Kumbakonam. His hymns are the Nan-mukham Tiru-vantadi, containing ninety-six stanzas, and Tiru-chanda-vruttam. Namm'-arvar was born of a Sudra family at Kurukur, now Alvartirunagari in the Tinnevelly district. He was the most voluminous writer

1 These are Pey-arvar, Bhutatt'-arvar, Poygaiy-arvar and Tiru-marisai Piran, the first three being known as Mudal-ajrvars among the Srivaisnavas.

2 As a specimen of Tiru-vantadi one may quote the following passage: "With love as lamp-bowl, desire as oil, mind melting with bliss as wick, with melting soul I have kindled the bright light of wisdom in the learned Tamil which I have wrought for Narayana."—Bhutam, quotation from Hooper's Hymns of the Alvdrs, p. 12, n.

among the Arvars and a great mass of his poetry is preserved in the Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham. His works are the Tiru-vruttam, containing one hundred stanzas, Tiru-vdsiriyam, containing seven stanzas, the Periya tiru-vantddi of eighty-seven stanzas, and the Tiru-vdy-mori, containing 1102 stanzas. Namm'-arvar's whole life was given to meditation. His disciple Madhura-kavi considers him an incarnation of Visnu. Kula-sekhara was a great devotee of Rama. His chief work is the Peru-mdl-tiru-mori. Periy-arvar, known as Visnucitta, was born at Sribittiputtur. His chief works are Tiru-palV-dndu and Tiru-mori. Andal, adopted daughter of Periy-arvar, was passionately devoted to Krsna and considered herself as one of the Gopis, seeking for union with Krsna. She was married to the God Rahganatha of Srirahgam. Her chief works are Tiru-pdvai and Nacchiydr. Tirumori Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar was born at Mandangudi. He was once under the seduction of a courtesan called Devadevi, but was saved by the grace of Rahganatha. His chief works are Tiru-mdlai, and the Tiru-palliy-eruchi. Tiru-pan-arvar was brought up by a low-caste childless panar. His chief work was Amalan-ddibirdn in ten stanzas. Tiru-mahgaiy was born in the thief-caste. His chief works are Periya-tiru-mori, Tiru-kurun-ddndakam, Tiru-nedun-ddndakam, Tiru-verugutt-irukkai, Siriya-tiru-madal and Periya-tiru-madal. Tiru-mahgaiy was driven to brigandage, and gained his divine wisdom through the grace of Rahganatha. The Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham, which contains the works of the Arvars, is regarded in the Tamil country as the most sacred book and is placed side by side with the Vedas. It is carried in procession into the temple, when verses from it are recited and they are recited also on special occasions of marriage, death, etc. Verses from it are also sung and recited in the hall in front of the temple, and it is used in the rituals along with Vedic mantras.

The Philosophy of the Arvars.

As the hymns of the Arvars have only a literary and devotional form, it is difficult to utilize them for philosophical purposes. As an illustration of the general subject-matter of their works, I shall try to give a brief summary of the main contents of Namm'-arvar's (Sathakopa) work, following Abhiramavaracarya's Dramidopanisat-tdtparya 1 . The feeling of devotion to God felt by Sathakopa

1 MS. from Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras.

The Arvdrs [ch.

could not be contained within him, and, thus overflowing, was expressed in verses which soothed all sufferers; this shows that his affection for suffering humanity was even greater than that of their own parents. Sathakopa's main ideal was to subdue our so-called manhood by reference to God (purusottama), the greatest of all beings, and to regard all beings as but women dependent on Him; and so it was that Sathakopa conceived himself as a woman longing for her lover and entirely dependent on him. In the first of his four works he prayed for the cessation of rebirth; in the second he described his experiences of God's great and noble qualities; in the third he expressed his longings to enjoy God; and in the fourth he described how all his experiences of God's communion with him fell far short of his great longings. In the first ten stanzas of his first centum he is infused with a spirit of service (ddsya) to God and describes his experiences of God's essential qualities. In the next ten stanzas he describes the mercy of God and recommends every one to give up attachment to all other things, which are of a trifling and temporary nature. Then he prays to God for his incarnation on earth with Laksmi, His consort, and pays adoration to Him. He continues with a description of his mental agonies in not attaining communion with God, confessing his own guilt to Him. He then embraces God and realizes that all his failings are his own fault. He explains that the spirit of service (ddsya) does not depend for its manifestation and realization on any elaborate rituals involving articles of worship, but on one's own zeal. What is necessary is true devotion (bhakti). Such a devotion, he says, must proceed through an intense enjoyment of the nature of the noble qualities of God, so that the devotee may feel that there is nothing in anything else that is greater than them. With a yielding heart he says that God accepts the service of those who, instead of employing all the various means of subduing a crooked enemy, adopt only the means of friendliness to them 1 . God is pleased with those who are disposed to realize the sincerity of their own spirit, and it is through this that they can realize God in themselves. God's favour does not depend on anything but His own grace, manifesting itself in an all-embracing devotion. He says, in the second sataka, that the devotee, having,

1 kautilyavatsu karana-tritaye'pi jantusv

atmlyam era karana-tritayaika-rupyam sandarsya tanapi harih sva-vaslkarotlty acasta sandra-karuno munir astamena.

Dramidopanisat-tatparya. MS.

on the one hand, felt the great and noble qualities of God, and yet being attached to other things, is pierced through with pangs of sorrow in not realizing God in communion, and feels a bond of sympathy with all humanity sharing the same grief. Through the stories of God related in the Puranas, e.g. in the Bhdgavata, Sathakopa feels the association of God which removes his sorrow and so increases his contact with God. He then describes how the great saints of the past had within their heart of hearts enjoyed an immersion in the ocean of God's bliss, which is the depository of all blissful emotion; and he goes on to express his longings for the enjoyment of that bliss. Through his longings for Him there arose in Sathakopa great grief of separation, devoid of any interest in furthering unworthy ends; he communicated to Him his great sorrow at his incapacity to realize Him, and in so doing he lost consciousness through intensity of grief. As a result God Krsna appeared before him, and he describes accordingly the joy of the vision of God. But he fears to lose God, who is too mighty for him, and takes refuge in his great attachment to Him. Next he says that they only realize God who have a sense of possession in Him. He describes God's noble qualities, and shows that the realization of the proximity of God is much more desirable than the attainment of emancipation. He says that the true definition of moksa is to attain the position of God's servant 1 .

In the beginning of the third centum he describes the beauty of God. Then he bemoans the fact that, on account of the limitations of his senses and his mind, he is unable to enjoy the fullness of His beauty. Next he describes the infinitude of God's glory and his own spirit of service to Him. Then he envisages the whole world and the words that denote the things of the world as being the body of God 2 . Then he expresses the pleasure and bliss he feels in the service of God, and says that even those who cannot come into contact with God in His own essence can find solace in directing their minds to His image and to the stories of Krsna related in the

1 moksddaram sphutam aveksya munir mukunde moksam praddtum sadrksa-phalam pravrtte dtme-stam asya pada-kinkarataika-rupam moksd-khya-vastu navame nirandyi tena.

Dramidopanisat-tdtparya. MS.

2 sarvam jagat samavalokya vibhos sarlram tad-vdcinas ca sakaldn api sabda-rdsln

tarn bhuta-bhautika-mukhdn kathayan paddrthan ddsyam cakdra vacasaiva munis caturthe. Ibid.

The Arvdrs [ch.

Puranas. He then absorbs himself in the grief of his separation from God and hopes that by arresting all the inner senses he may see God with his own eyes. He also regrets the condition of other men who are wasting their time in devotion to gods other than Krsna. He goes on to describe the vision of God and his great joy therein.

In the fourth centum he describes the transitoriness of all things considered as enjoyable, and the absolute superiority of the bliss of pleasing God. He goes on to explain how, through cessation of all inclination to other things and the increase of longing for God in a timeless and spaceless manner, and through the pangs of separation in not realizing Him constantly, he considers himself as a woman, and through the pangs of love loses his consciousness 1 . Then he describes how Hari is pleased with his amour and satisfies his longings by making Him enjoyable through the actions of mind, words and body by His blissful embraces 2 . Next he shows how, when he attempted to realize Krsna by his spiritual zeal, Krsna vanished from his sight and he was then once more filled w T ith the grief of separation. Again he receives a vision of God and feels with joy His overwhelming superiority. He further describes how his vision of God was like a dream, and how, when the dream ceased, he lost consciousness. To fill up the emptiness of these occasional separations, he sorrowfully chanted the name of God, and earnestly prayed to Him. He wept for Him and felt that without Him everything was nothing. Yet at intervals he could not help feeling deep sympathy for erring humanity which had turned its mind away from God. According to him the real bondage consists in the preference man gives to things other than God. When one can feel God as all-in-all, every bond is loosened.

In the fifth centum he feels that God's grace alone can save man. He again describes himself as the wife of God, constantly longing for His embrace. In his grief and lamentation and his anxiety to meet God, he was overcome by a swoon which, like the night, dimmed all his senses. At the end of this state he saw the orna-

1 tarn purusd-rtham itard-rtha-rucer nivrttyd sdndra-sprhah samaya-desa-viduragam ca ipsuh sued tad-an-avdpti-bhuvd dvitlye strl-bhdvandm samadhigamya munir mumoha.

Dramidopanisat-1dtparya. MS.

2 prltdh param harir amusya tadd svabhdvdd etan-mano-vacana-deha-krta-kriydbhih srak-candana-pramukha-sarva-vidha-svabhogyah samslistavdn idam uvdea munis trtiye. Ibid.

ments of God, but could not see Him directly, and was thus rilled both with grief and happiness. As a relief from the pangs of separation he found enjoyment in identifying himself in his mind with God and in imitating His ways, thinking that the world was created by him 1 . In a number of verses (seventy or eighty) he describes how he was attached to the image of the God Krsna at Kumbha-konam and how he suffered through God's apathy towards him in not satisfying him, His lover, with embraces and other tokens of love, and how he became angry with His indifference to his amorous approaches and was ultimately appeased by God, who satisfied him with loving embraces and the like. Thus God, who was divine lord of the universe, felt sympathy and love for him and appeased his sorrows in the fashion of a human lover 2 . He describes his great bliss in receiving the embrace of God. Through this rapturous divine love and divine embrace he lost all mundane interest in life. In the ninth centum the sage, finding he could not look at the ordinary things of life, nor easily gain satisfaction in the divine presence of God in the whole world, fixed his mind on His transcendental form {aprdkrta-vapuh) and became full of wailing and lamentation as a means of direct access to it. A great part of this centum is devoted to laments due to his feeling of separation from God. He describes how through constant lamentation and brooding he received the vision of God, but was unhappy because he could not touch Him; and how later on God took human form in response to his prayers and made him forget his sufferings 3 . In many other verses he again describes the emotions of his distress at his separation and temporary union with God; how he sent messages to God through birds; how he felt miserable because He delayed to meet him; how he expected to meet Him at appointed times, and how his future actions in Heaven should be repeated in

1 s'okam ca tarn pari-jihlrsur ivakhilandm sarga-di-kartur anukara-rasena saureh tasya pravrttir akhila racitd maye' ti tad-bhava-bhavita-mand munir aha sasthe.

Dramidopanhat-tdtparya. MS.

2 kopam mama pranaya-jam prasamayya krsna svd-dhlnatdm atanute' ti sa-vismayah sah svyldm viruddha-jagad-dkrtitdm ca tena sandarsitdm anubabhuva munis trttye. Ibid.

3 sangam nivarttya mama samsrti-mandale mam samsthdpayan katham ast' ty anucoditena ascaryya-loka-tanutam api darsayitva vismdritah kila sucam harina' stame' sau. Ibid.

The Arvdrs [ch.

earth and how his behaviour to God was like that of the Gopis, full of ardent love and eagerness. In the concluding verses, however, he says that the real vision of God can come only to a deeply devoted mind and not to external eyes.

Hooper gives some interesting translations from the Tiru-vruttam of Namm'-arvar, a few of which may be quoted here to illustrate the nature of his songs of love for God 1 :

Long may she love, this girl with luring locks, Who loves the feet that heavenly ones adore, The feet of Kannan, dark as rainy clouds: Her red eyes all abrim with tears of grief, Like darting Kayal fish in a deep pool 2 . Hot in this village now doth blow the breeze Whose nature coolness is. Hath he, this once, The rain-cloud hued, his sceptre turned aside To steal the love-glow from my lady, lorn For tulasl, with wide eyes raining tears? 3

In separation from the lord the Arvar finds delight in looking at darkness, which resembles Krsna's colour:

Thou, fair as Kannan's heaven, when he's away What ages long it is! He here, a span! Whether friends stay for many days, or go, We grieve. Yet, be this spreading darkness blest In spite of many a cunning trick it has 4 . What will befall my girl with bracelets fair, With tearful eyes like gleaming Kayal big, Who wanders with a secret pain at heart For blooms of tulasl fresh from the Bird's Lord Who with that hill protected flocks in storm? 5

The Arvar then laments and pleads with swans and herons to take his message:

The flying swans and herons I did beg, Cringing: "Forget not, ye, who first arrive, If ye behold my heart with Kannan there Oh, speak of me and ask it ' Sir not yet Hast thou returned to her? And is it right?'"

1 Hymns of the Alvars, by J. S. M. Hooper, pp. 61-88. The maid who is represented as speaking here stands for Arvar's disciple, and the lady in love is the mistress, and Kannan is Krsna, the Lord. s This is also a speech from the maid, and tulasl stands for Krsna. The time of separation is felt to be too long, and the time of union is felt to be too short.

6 Lamentation of the mother for the girl, the Arvar.

The Arvar then laments that the clouds will not take his message. He speaks of the resemblance between the clouds and the Lord:

Tell me, ye clouds, how have ye won the means That we are thus like TirumaTs blest form? Bearing good water for protecting life, Ye range through all the sky. Such penance, sure, As makes your bodies ache, has won this grace!

The friend speaks of the callousness of the lord:

E'en in this age-long time of so-called night When men must grope, he pities not that she Stands in her deep immitigable grief.... The jungle traversed by the fawn-eyed girl With fragile waist, whom sinful I brought forth After long praise of Kannan's lotus feet....

The Arvar sees a likeness of his lord in the blue water-lily, and sees the lord's form everywhere:

All places, shining like great lotus pools On a blue mountain broad, to me are but The beauties of his eye—the lord of earth Girt by the roaring sea, heaven's lord, the lord Of other good souls, black-hued lord—and mine!

The AYvar speaks of the greatness of the lord:

Sages with wisdom won by virtuous toil Assert "His colour, glorious beauty, name, His form—are such and such." But all their toil Has measured not the greatness of my lord: Their wisdom's light is but a wretched lamp.

The foster-mother pities the mistress unable to endure the length of the night:

This child of sinful me, with well-formed teeth, Round breasts and rosy mouth, keeps saying, "These Fair nights eternal are as my desire For tulasl!"...

Again the foster-mother pities the girl as too young for such ardent love:

Breasts not yet full, and short her tresses soft; Skirt loose about the waist; with prattling tongue And innocent eyes....

Again the lord replies to a friend's criticism of his infatuation for his mistress:

Those lilies red, which are the life of me— The eyes of her who's like the heaven of him....

The mistress is unable to endure the darkness and is yet further vexed by the appearance of the moon:

Oh, let the crescent moon which cleaves the dark Encompassing of night, cleave me as well! Ah, does it issue forth in brightness now, That happy bloom may come to desolate me Who only long for flowers of tulasl ?

The mistress's friend despairs at the sight of her languishing:

... Ah! as she sobs and lisps The cloud-hued's names, I know not if she'll live Or if her frame and spirit mild must pass!

Again in Kula-sekhara's Tirumal-Tiru-mori, C. 5:

Though red fire comes itself and makes fierce heat, The lotus red blooms not Save for the fierce-rayed one Who in the lofty heavens has his seat. Vitruvakodu's Lord, Thou wilt not remove My woe, my heart melts not save at Thy boundless love....

With gathered waters all the streams ashine

Must spread abroad and run

And enter the deep sea And cannot stand outside. So refuge mine, Save in the shining bliss of entering Thee, is none, Vitruvakodu's Lord, thick cloud-hued, virtuous one! 1

Again from the same book 2 :

No kinship with the world have I

Which takes for true the life that is not true. "For thee alone my passion burns," I cry, "Rahgan, my Lord!"

No kinship with this world have I—

With throngs of maidens slim of waist: With joy and love I rise for one alone, and cry " Rahgan, my Lord!"

1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 48. 2 Ibid. p. 44.

Again in the Tiru-pdvai, a well-known section of the Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham, the poetess Andal conceives herself as a Gopi, requesting her friends to go with her to wake the sleeping Krsna,

After the cows we to the jungle go

And eat there—cowherds knowing nought are we,

And yet how great the boon we have, that thou

Wast born among us! Thou who lackest nought,

Govinda, kinship that we have with thee

Here in this place can never cease!—If through

Our love we call thee baby names, in grace

Do not be wroth, for we—like children—we

Know nought—O Lord, wilt thou not grant to us

The drum we ask? Ah, Elorembavay! 1

Again Periy-arvar conceives himself as Yasoda and describes the infant Krsna as lying in the dust and calling for the moon!

(1) He rolls round in the dust, so that the jewel on his brow keeps swinging, and his waist-bells tinkle! Oh, look at my son Govinda's play, big Moon, if thou hast eyes in thy face—and then, be gone!

(2) My little one, precious to me as nectar, my blessing, is calling thee, pointing, pointing, with his little hands! O Big Moon, if thou wishest to play with this little black one, hide not thyself in the clouds, but come rejoicing! 2

Again, Tiru-mangaiy says:

Or ever age creep on us, and we need The staff's support; ere we are double bent With eyes fix'd on the ground in front, and feet That totter, sitting down to rest, all spent:

We would worship Vadari

Home of him who mightily

Suck'd his feigned mother's breast

Till she died, ogress confest.

Again Andal says:

Daughter of Nandagopal, who is like

A lusty elephant, who fleeth not,

With shoulders strong: Nappinnai, thou with hair

Diffusing fragrance, open thou the door!

Come see how everywhere the cocks are crowing,

And in the mathavi bower the Kuyil sweet

Repeats its song.—Thou with a ball in hand,

Come, gaily open, with thy lotus hands

And tinkling bangles fair,jhat we may sing

Thy cousin's name! Ah, Elorembavay!

1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 57. Ibid. p. 37.

Thou who art strong to make them brave in fight, Going before the three and thirty gods, Awake from out thy sleep! Thou who art just, Thou who art mighty, thou, O faultless one, Who burnest up thy foes, awake from sleep! O Lady Nappinnai, with tender breasts Like unto little cups, with lips of red And slender waist, Lakshmi, awake from sleep! Proffer thy bridegroom fans and mirrors now, And let us bathe! Ah, Elorembavay! 1

In describing the essential feature of the devotion of an Arvar like Namm'-arvar, called also Paraiikusa or Sathakopa, Govinda-charyar, the author of The Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints and The Holy Lives of the Azhvdrs, says that according to Namm'-arvar, when one is overcome by bhakti-exultation and self-surrendering devotion to God he easily attains truth 2 . Namm'-arvar said that God's grace is the only means of securing our salvation, and no effort is required on our part but to surrender ourselves to Him. In the following words Namm'-arvar says that God is constantly trying to woo us to love Him:

Blissful Lord, heard I; anon my eyes in floods did run, Oh what is this? I asked. What marvel this? the Perfect one, Through friendly days and nights, elects with me to e'er remain, To union wooing me, His own to make; nor let me "lone."

Namm'-arvar again writes that God's freedom is fettered by His mercy. Thus he says: "O mercy, thou hast deprived God of the freedom of His just will. Safe under the winds of mercy, no more can God Himself even of His will tear Himself away from me; for, if He can do so, I shall still exclaim, I am Victor, for He must purchase the freedom of His will by denying to Himself mercy." Illustrating the position, he refers to the case of a devout lady who clasped the feet of the Lord in Varadaraja's shrine at KancI and said: "God I have now clasped thy feet firmly; try if thou canst, spurn me and shake thyself off from me."

Namm'-arvar used the term Tuvalil or Ninru kumirume, a Tamil expression of love, which has been interpreted as signifying a continuous whirling emotion of love boring deeper and deeper, but never scattering and passing away. This circling and boring of

1 Hooper, op. cit. p. 55.

2 Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. 1, p. 571, as quoted in Govindacharyar's Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints.

love in the heart is mute, silent and incapable of expression; like the cow, whose teats filled with milk tingle, cannot withal express by mouth her painful longing to reach her calf who is tethered away from her. Thus, true love of God is perpetual and ever growing 1 . The difference between the love of Namm'-arvar and of Tiru-mahgaiy-arvar is said to have been described by Yamuna, as reported in the Bhagavad-vishayam^ as of two different kinds. Tiru-mangaiy-arvar's love expresses the experience of a constant companionship with God in a state of delirious, rapturous reciprocation of ravishing love. He was immersed in the fathomless depth of love, and was in the greatest danger of becoming unconscious and falling into a stupor like one under the influence of a narcotic. Namm'-arvar, however, was in a state of urgent pursuit after God. He was thus overcome with a sense of loneliness and unconscious of his individual self. He was not utterly intoxicated. The energy flowing from a mind full and strong with the ardent expectation of meeting his bridegroom and beloved companion still sustained him and kept him alive 2 . This state is described in Tiru-vay-mori in the following manner: Day and night she j cnows not s i ee p,

In floods of tears her eyes do swim. Lotus-like eyes! She weeps and reels, Ah! how without thee can I bear; She pants and feels all earth for Him.

This love of God is often described as having three stages: recollection, trance and rallying. The first means the reminiscence of all the past ravishment of soul vouchsafed by God. The second means fainting and desolation at such reminiscences and a consciousness of the present absence of such ravishing enjoyments. The third is a sudden lucidity whilst in" the state of trance, which being of a delirious nature may often lead to death through the rapid introduction of death-coma 3 .

The Arvars were not given to any philosophical speculation but only to ecstatic experiences of the emotion of love for God; yet we sometimes find passages in Namm'-arvar's works wherein he reveals his experience of the nature of soul. Thus he says: " It is not possible to give a description of that wonderful entity, the soul

1 Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints, pp. 127-128.

* See the Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vi, p. 2865 ; also Divine Wisdom, pp. 130,

131-

3 Bhagavad-vishayam, Bk. vn, p. 3194; also Divine Wisdom, p. 151.

So The Arvars [ch.

(dtmd) —the soul which is eternal, and is essentially characterized by intelligence (jiidna) —the soul which the Lord has condescended to exhibit to me as His mode, or I related to Him as the predicate is to the subject, or attribute is to substance (or consonants to the vowel A)—the soul, the nature of which is beyond the comprehension of even the enlightened—the soul, which cannot be classed under any category as this or that—the soul whose apperception by the strenuous mental effort called yoga (psychic meditation) is even then not comparable to such perception or direct proof as arises from the senses conveying knowledge of the external world— the soul (as revealed to me by my Lord) transcending all other categories of things, which could be grouped as 'body' or as 'the senses,' or as 'the vital spirit' (prdna), or as 'the mind' (matias), or as 'the will' {buddhi), being destitute of the modifications and corruptions to which all these are subject;—the soul, which is very subtle and distinct from any of these;—neither coming under the description 'good,' nor 'bad.' The soul is, briefly, an entity which does not fall under the cognizance of sense-knowledge 1 ."

Soul is here described as a pure subtle essence unassociated with impurities of any kind and not knowable in the manner in which all ordinary things are known. Such philosophical descriptions or discussions concerning the nature of reality, or an investigation into the logical or epistemological position of the religion preached by them, are not within the scope and province of the Arvars. They sang songs in an inspired manner and often believed that they themselves had no hand in their composition, but that it was God who spoke through them. These songs were often sung to the accompaniment of cymbals, and the intoxicating melody of the music was peculiar to the Arvars and entirely different from the traditional music then current in South India. A study of the works of the Arvars, which were collected together by the disciples of Ramanuja at his special request, and from which Ramanuja himself drew much inspiration and food for his system of thought, reveals an intimate knowledge of the l'uranic legends of Krsna, as found in the Vimu-purdna and the Rhdgavata' 1 . There is at least one passage, already referred to, which may well be interpreted as

1 Divine Wisdom, p. 169; also Tiru-vay-mori, vm. 5-8.

2 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar notes that the Arvar Kula-sekhara, in his work Mukunda-mdla, quotes a passage from the Bhagavata-purtina (xi. 2. 36) (The

alluding to Radha (Nappinnai), who is described as the consort of Krsna. The Arvars refer to the legends of Krsna's early life in Brindavan and many of them play the role either of YoSoda, the friends of Krsna, or of the Gopls. The spiritual love which finds expression in their songs is sometimes an earnest appeal of direct longing for union with Krsna, or an expression of the pangs of separation, or a feeling of satisfaction, and enjoyment from union with Krsna in a direct manner or sometimes through an emotional identification with the legendary personages associated with Krsna's life. Even in the Bhdgavata-purdna (xi, xn) we hear of devotional intoxication through intense emotion, but we do not hear of any devotees identifying themselves with the legendary personages associated with the life of Krsna and expressing their sentiment of love as proceeding out of such imaginary identification. We hear of the Gopi's love for Krsna, but we do not hear of any person identifying himself with GopI and expressing his sorrow of separation. In the Visnu-purdna, Bhdgavata-purdna and the Harivamsa, the legendary love tales are only episodes in the life of Krsna. But they do not make their devotees who identified themselves with the legendary lovers of Krsna realize their devotion through such an imaginary identification. All that is therein expressed is that the legendary life of Krsna would intensify the devotion of those who were already attached to Him. But the idea that the legend of Krsna should have so much influence on the devotees as to infuse them with the characteristic spirits of the legendary personages in such a manner as to transform their lives after their pattern is probably a new thing in the history of devotional development in any religion. It is also probably absent in the cults of other devotional faiths of India. With the Arvars we notice for the first time the coming into prominence of an idea which achieved its culmination in the lives and literature of the devotees of the Gaudlya school of Bengal, and particularly in the life of Caitanya, which will be dealt with in the fourth volume of the present work. The trans-

Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, p. 70). This has been challenged by S. K. Aiyangar, in his Early History of Vaisnavism in South India, who says that this passage is absent from all the three editions (a Kannada, a Grantha, and a Devanagarl Edition) which were accessible to him (p. 28). It is further suggested there that the allusion in the passage is doubtful, because it generally occurs at the end of most South Indian books by way of an apology for the faults committed at the time of the recitation of holy verses or the performance of religious observances.

fusion of the spirits of the legendary personages in the life-history of Krsna naturally involved the transfusion of their special emotional attitudes towards Krsna into the devotees, who were thus led to imagine themselves as being one with those legendary personalities and to pass through the emotional history of those persons as conceived through imagination. It is for this reason that we find that, when this spirit was emphasized in the Gaudlya school and the analysis of erotic emotions made by the rhetorical school of thinkers from the tenth to the fourteenth century received recognition, the Gaudlya Yaisnavas accepted the emotional analysis of the advancing stages of love and regarded them as indicating the stages in the development of the sentiment of devotion. As is well illustrated in Rupa Gosvaml's Ujjvala-nila-fnam, the transition from ordinary devotion to deep amorous sentiment, as represented in the legendary lives of Gopis and Radha, was secured by sympathetic imitation akin to the sympathetic interest displayed in the appreciation of dramatic actions. The thinkers of the rhetorical school declare that a spectator of a dramatic action has his emotions aroused in such a manner that in their excess the individual limitations of time and space and the history of individual experiences which constitute his ordinary personality vanish for the time being. The disappearance of the ordinary individual personality and the overflow of emotion in one direction identify the person in an imaginary manner not only with the actors who display the emotion of the stage, but also with the actual personalities of those dramatic figures whose emotions are represented or imitated on the stage. A devotee, may, by over-brooding, rouse himself through autointoxication to such an emotional stage that upon the slightest suggestion he may transport himself to the imaginary sphere of a GopI or Radha, and may continue to feel all the earnest affections that the most excited and passionate lover may ever feel.

It seems fairly certain that the Arvars were the earliest devotees who moved forward in the direction of such emotional transformation. Thus King Kula-sekhara, who was an Arvar and devotee of Rama, used to listen rapturously to the Ramayana being recited to him. As he listened he became so excited that, when he heard of Rama's venturing forth against Ravana, his demon opponent, he used to give orders to mobilize his whole army to march forward towards Lanka as an ally of Rama.

The devotional songs of the Arvars show an intense familiarity with the various parts of the legendary life of Krsna. The emotions that stirred them were primarily of the types of parental affection (as of a mother to her son), of friends and companions, servants to their masters, sons to their father and creator, as also that of a female lover to her beloved. In the case of some Arvars, as that of Namm'-arvar and Tiru-mangaiy-arvar, the last-mentioned type assumes an overwhelming importance. In the spiritual experiences of these Arvars we find a passionate yearning after God, the Lord and Lover; and in the expressions of their love we may trace most of the pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been so intensely emphasized in the writings of the Vaisnavas of the Gaudlya school. In the case of the latter, the human analogy involving description of the bodily charms of the female lover is often carried too far. In the case of the Arvars, however, the emphasis is mostly on the transcendant beauty and charm of God, and on the ardent longings of the devotee who plays the part of a female lover, for Krsna, the God. The ardent longing is sometimes expressed in terms of the pitiable pathological symptoms due to love-sickness, sometimes by sending messengers, spending the whole night in expectation of the Lord, and sometimes in the expressions of ravishing joy felt by the seemingly actual embrace of the Lord. We hear also of the reciprocation of love on the part of the Lord, who is described as being infatuated with the beauty and charms of the beloved, the AYvar. In the course of these expressions, the personages in the legendary account of Krsna's life are freely introduced, and references are made to the glorious episodes of His life, as showing points that heighten the love of the lady-lover, the Arvar. The rapturous passions are like a whirlpool that eddies through the very eternity of the individual soul, and expresses itself sometimes in the pangs of separation and sometimes in the exhilaration of union. The AYvar, in his ecstatic delight, visualizes God everywhere, and in the very profundity of his attainment pines for more. He also experiences states of supreme intoxication, when he becomes semi-conscious, or unconscious with occasional breaks into the consciousness of a yearning. But, though yearning after God is often delineated on the analogy of sex-love, this analogy is seldom carried to excess by studied attempts at following all the pathological symptoms of erotic love. It therefore represents a very

6-2

chaste form of the expressions of divine love in terms of human love. The Arvars were probably the pioneers in showing how love for God may be on terms of tender equality, softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love. The Saivism of South India flourished more or less at the same time. The hymns of the Saivas are full of deep and noble sentiments of devotion which can hardly be excelled in any literature; but their main emphasis is on the majesty and the greatness of God and the feeling of submission, self-abnegation and self-surrender to God. The spirit of self-surrender and a feeling of clinging to God as one's all is equally dominant among the Arvars; but among them it melts down into the sweetness of passionate love. The Saiva hymns are indeed pregnant with the divine fire of devotion, but more in the spirit of submissive service. Thus, Manikka-vachakar, in his Tiru-vacha kam, speaking of Siva, says l :

And am I not Thy slave} and did'st Thou not make me Thine own,

I pray? All those Thy servants have approached Thy Foot; this body full of sin I may not quit, and see Thy face—Thou Lord of ^iva-world!—I fear, And see not how to gain the sight!

Ml false am I; false is my heart; and false my love; yet, if he weep, May not Thy sinful servant Thee, Thou Soul's Ambrosial sweetness,

gain? Lord of all honied gladness pure, in grace unto Thy servant teach The way that he may come to Thee!

There was no love in me towards Thy Foot, O I lalf of Her with beauteous fragrant locks!

By magic power that stones to mellow fruit converts, Thou mad'st me lover of Thy Feet.

Our Lord, Thy tender love no limit knows. Whatever sways me now, vvhate'er my deed, Thou can'st even yet Thy Foot again to me display and save, O Spotless Heavenly One!

The devotee also felt the sweetness of God's love and the fact that it is through Divine Grace that one can be attracted towards Him and can love Him:

1 Pope's translation of the Tim vacha-kam, p. 77.

Honey from any flower sip not, though small

as tiniest grain of millet seed! Whene'er we think of Him, whene'er we see,

whene'er of Him our lips converse, Then sweetest rapture's honey ever flows,

till all our frame in bliss dissolves! To Him alone, the mystic Dancer, go;

and breathe His praise, thou humming-bee!

Arvars and &ri-vaisnavas on certain points of controversy in religious dogmas.

The Aragiyas Nathamuni, Yamuna, Ramanuja and their adherents largely followed the inspirational teachings of the Arvars, yet there were some differences of opinion among them regarding some of the cardinal points of religious faith. These have been collected in separate treatises, of which two may be regarded as most important. One of them is called Astddasa-rahasydrtha-vivarana, by Ramanuja himself, and the other is called Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya 1 . Verikatanatha and others also wrote important treatises on the subject. Some of these points of difference may be enumerated below.

The first point is regarding the grace of God (svdmi-krpd). It is

suggested by the Arvars that the grace of God is spontaneous and

does not depend on any effort or merit on the part of the devotee.

If God had to depend on anything else for the exercise of His

divine prerogative grace, it would be limited to that extent. Others,

however, say that God's grace depends on the virtuous actions of

the devotees. If that were not so, all people would in time be

emancipated, and there would be no need of any effort on their part.

If it was supposed that God in His own spontaneity extended His

grace to some in preference to others, He would have to be regarded

as partial. It is therefore to be admitted that, though God is free in

extending His mercy, yet in practice He extends it only as a reward

to the virtuous or meritorious actions of the devotee. God, though

all-merciful and free to extend His mercy to all without effort on

their part, does not actually do so except on the occasion of the

meritorious actions of His devotees. The extension of God's mercy

is thus both without cause (nirhetuka) and with cause (sahetuka) 2 .

1 Both these are MSS.

a krpd-sva-rupato nir-hetukah, raksana-samaye cetavd-krta-sukrtena sa-hetuko bhutvd rakfati. (Astadasa-bheda-nirnaya, MS. p. 2.)

Here the latter view is that of Ramanuja and his followers. It must, however, be pointed out in this connection that the so-called differences between the Arvars and the Ramanujists on the cardinal points of religious faith are a discovery of later research, when the writings of the Arvars had developed a huge commentary literature and Ramanuja's own writings had inspired many scholars to make commentaries on his works or to write independent treatises elucidating his doctrines. The later scholars who compared the results of the Arvar and the Ramanuja literatures came to the conclusion that there are some differences of view between the two regarding the cardinal faith of religion. This marks a sharp antithesis between the Arvaric Tengalai school and the Vadagalai school, of which latter Yehkata was the leader. These differences are briefly narrated in the Astadasa-bheda-nirnaya. The cardinal faith of religion according to Ramanuja has been narrated in the Astadasa-rahasyartha-vivarana. The main principle of religious approach to God is self-surrender or prapatti. Prapatti is defined as a state of prayerfulness of mind to God, associated with the deep conviction that He alone is the saviour, and that there is no way of attaining His grace except by such self-surrender 1 . The devotee is extremely loyal to Narayana and prays to Him and no one else, and all his prayers are actuated by deep affection and no other motive. The virtue of prapatti involves within it universal charity, sympathy and friendliness even to the most determined enemy 2 . Such a devotee feels that the Lord {svami), being the very nature of his own self, is to be depended on under all circumstances. This is called the state of supreme resignation (nirbharatva) in all one's affairs 3 . The feeling of the devotee that none of the assigned scriptural duties can be helpful to him in attaining the highest goal

1 an-anya-sddhye svdbhlste mahd-visvdsa-purvakam tad-eko' pdyatd ydcnd prapattih sarand-gatih.

Astadasa-rahasyartha-vivarana, p. 3. Ramanuja, in his Gadya-trayam, says that such a state of prayerfulness of mind is also associated with confessions of one's sins and shortcomings and derelictions, and with a feeling that the devotee is a helpless servant of God extremely anxious to get himself saved by the grace of the Saviour. See the Gadya-trayam, Sarand-gati-gadyam, pp. 52—54.

2 This is technically known as Prapatti-naisthikam {Astadasa-rahasyartha-vivarana, pp. 3-7). Cf. the parables of the pigeon and the monkey in the above section.

3 The interpretation is forced out of the conception of the word "svamin," which etymologically involves the word " svam" meaning "one's own."

is technically called " updya-sunyatd" i.e. the realization of the use-lessness of all other means. The devotee always smiles at all the calamities that may befall him. Considering himself to be a servant of God, he cheerfully bears all the miseries that may be inflicted on him by God's own people. This is technically called "pdra-tantrya" or supreme subordination. The devotee conceives his soul as a spiritual essence which has no independence by itself and is in every respect dependent on God and exists for God 1 . The Vaisnavas are often called ekantins y and have sometimes been wrongly considered as monotheists; but the quality of ekdntitva is the definite characteristic of self-surrender and clinging to God in an unshaken manner—the fullest trustfulness in Him under all adverse circumstances. The devotee's mind is always exhilarated with the divine presence of the Lord who animates all his senses—his inclinations, emotions and experiences. The fullness with which he realizes God in all his own activities and thoughts, and in everything else in the universe, naturally transports him to a sphere of being in which all mundane passions—antipathy, greed, jealousy, hatred—become impossible. With the divine presence of God he becomes infused with the spirit of friendship and charity towards all beings on earth 2 . The devotee has to take proper initiation from the preceptor, to whom he must confess all that is in his mind, and by abnegating all that is in him to his preceptor, he finds an easy way to conceive himself as the servant of Visnu 3 . He must also have a philosophical conception of the entirely dependent relation of the human soul and all the universe to God 4 . Such a conception naturally involves realization of the presence of God in all our sense activities, which

1 jndna-mayo hi dtmd seso hi paramd-tmanah iti jnana-nandamayo jndnd-nanda-gunakah san sva-rupam bhagavad-adhlnam sa tad-artham eva tisthatl' ti jiidtvd' vatisthate iti yad etat tad-a-prakrtatvam.

Astddasa-rahasydrtha-vivaranam, p. n.

2 This virtue is technically called nitya-rangitva.

8 The five samskaras that a paramaikdntin must pass through are as follows: tdpah paundras tathd ndma mantro ydgas ca pancamah ami te paiica samskdrdh paramaikdnti-hetavah. Ibid. p. 15.

* This is technically called sambandha-jndnitvam. The conception that everything exists for God is technically called sesa-bhutatvam. Ibid. p. 18.

This naturally implies that the devotee must work and feel himself a servant of God and of His chosen men. The service to humanity and to God then naturally follow from the philosophical conception of the dependence of the human souls, and of the universe, on God as a part of Him and to be controlled by Him in every way. This is again technically called sesa-vrtti-paratva. Ibid. pp. 19-20,

presence in its fullness must easily lead to the complete control of all our senses. Through the realization of God's presence in them, the devotees play the part of moral heroes, far above the influences of the temptation of the senses 1 . The normal religious duties, as prescribed in the Vedas and the smrtis, are only for the lower order of the people; those who are given entirely to God with the right spirit of devotion need not follow the ordinary code of duties which is generally binding for all. Such a person is released by the spontaneous grace of God, and without performing any of the scriptural duties enjoys the fruits of all 2 . He is always conscious of his own faults, but takes no notice of the faults of others, to which he behaves almost as a blind man; he is always infused with the consciousness that all his actions are under the complete sway of the Lord. He has no enjoyment for himself, for he always feels that it is the Lord who would enjoy Himself through all his senses 3 .

In the Astadasa-bheda-nirnaya it is said that according to the Arvars, since emancipation means the discovery of a lost soul to God or the unlimited servitude of God, emancipation is for the interest of God and not of the devotee. The service of the servant is for the servitude of God alone. It has therefore no personal interest for the devotee 4 . According to the Aragiyas, however, emancipation, though primarily for the interest of the Lord, is also

1 This is technically called the nitya-silratva.

2 jndna-nistho virakto vd mad-bhakto hy a-napeksakah sa lingdn dsramdn tyaktvd cared a-vidhi-gocarah

ity evam isana-traya-vinirmuktas san bhagavan-nir-hetuka-katdksa eva mokso-pdyah hi tisthati khalu so'dhikdrl sakala-dharmdndm avasyo bhavati. Astadasa-rahasydrtha-vivarana, p. 23

This spirit of following God, leaving all other scriptural duties, is technically called a-vidhi-gocaratva. In another section of this work Rarnanuja describes moksa or salvation as the conviction that the nature of God transcends, in bliss, power and knowledge, all other conceivable things of this or any other universe. A desire to cling to God as a true means of salvation is technically called mumnk-sutva. The doctrine of a-vidhi-gocaratva herein described seems to be in conflict with Ramanuja's view on the subject explained in the bhdsya as interpreted by his many followers. This may indicate that his views underwent some change, and these are probably his earlier views when he was under the influence of the Arvars.

s This is technically called pard-kdsatva (Ibid. pp. 23-24). The attitude of worshipping the image as the visible manifestation of God is technically called updya-svarupa-jndna. The cessation of attachment to all mundane things and the flowing superabundance of love towards God, and the feeling that God is the supreme abode of life, is technically called dtmd-rdmatva.

4 phalam moksa-rupam, tad bhagavata eva na svdrtham yathd pranasta-drsta-dravya-ldbho dravyavata eva na dravyasya; tathd moksa-phala?n ca svdmina eva

at the same time for the interest of the devotee, because of the intense delight he enjoys by being a servant of God. The illustration of lost objects discovered by the master does not hold good, because human beings are conscious entities who suffer immeasurable sorrow which is removed by realizing themselves as servants of God. Though the devotee abnegates all the fruits of his actions in a self-surrender, yet he enjoys his position in the servitude of God and also the bliss of the realization of Brahman. Thus, those who take the path of knowledge (updsaka) attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God, and those who take the path of self-surrender (prapatti) also attain Brahma knowledge and the servitude of God. In the state of salvation (mukti) there is no difference of realization corresponding to the variation of paths which the seekers after God may take 1 . Again, in the Arvar school of thought, besides the four ways of scriptural duties, philosophic wisdom, devotion to God and devotion to teachers, there was a fifth way, viz. that of intense self-surrender to God, i.e. prapatti. But the Aragiyas thought that apart from prapatti there was only one other way of approaching God, namely devotion, bhakti-yoga. Ramanuja and his followers maintain that karma-yoga and jiiana-yoga only help to purify the mind, as a preparation for bhakti-yoga. The devotion to the preceptor is regarded only as a form of prapatti; so there are only two ways of approach to God, viz. bhakti-yoga and prapatti 2 .

Further, Sri occupies an important position in Sri-vaisnavism. But as there are only three categories in the Sri-vaisnava system, a question may naturally arise regarding the position of Sri in the threefold categories of cit, acit and paramesvara. On this point the view of the older school, as described in Ramya-jamatr muni's Tattva-dipa, is that Sri is to be identified with human souls and is therefore to be regarded as atomic in nature 3 . Others, however, think that Sri is as all-pervasive as Visnu. Filial affection {vatsalya)

na muktasya; yad vd phalam kainkaryarn tat para-rtham eva na svd-rtham; para-tantra-dasd-krtam kainkaryarn sva-tantra-svdmy-artham eva. Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, p. 2.

1 Ibid. p. 3.

2 atah prapatti-vyatirikto bhakti-yoga eka eve' ti. Ibid. p. 4.

8 Ibid. In the next section it is urged that, according to some, Ndrdyana and not £ri is the only agent who removes our sins, but others hold that sins may be removed also by Sri in a remote manner, or, because Sri is identical with Ndrdyana ; as the fragrance is with the flower, she has also a hand in removing the sins. Ibid. p. 5.

laksinyd upayatvam bhagavata iva sdksdt abhyupagantavyam. Ibid.

The Arvdrs [ch.

for God is interpreted by the older schools as involving an attitude in which the faults of the beloved devotee are points of endearment to Him 1 . In the later view, however, filial affection is supposed to involve an indifference or a positive blindness towards the faults of the devotee. God's mercy is interpreted by the older school as meaning God's affliction or suffering in noticing that of others. Later schools, however, interpret it as an active sympathy on His part, as manifested in His desire to remove the sufferings of others on account of His inability to bear such miseries 2 .

Prapatti, otherwise called nydsa, is defined by the older school as a mere passivity on the part of the Lord in accepting those who seek Him or as a mental state on the part of the seeker in which he is conscious of himself only as a spirit; but such a consciousness is unassociated with any other complex feeling, of egoism and the like, which invests one with so-called individuality. It may also mean the mental state in which the seeker conceives himself as a subsidiary accessory to God as his ultimate end, to Whom he must cling unburdened by any idea of scriptural duties 3 ; or he may concentrate himself absolutely on the supreme interest and delight that he feels in the idea that God is the sole end of his being. Such a person naturally cannot be entitled without self-contradiction to any scriptural duty. Just as a guilty wife may return to her husband, and may passively lie in a state of surrender to him and resign herself, so the seeker may be conscious of his own true position with reference to God leading to a passive state of surrender 4 . Others think that it involves five elements: (i) that God is the only saviour;

1 yatha kamukah kdnnnyd malinyam bhogyatayd svlkaroti tathd bhagavdn dsrita-dosam svlkaroti itare tu vdtsalyam niima dosddarsitvam. Astddaia-bheda-nirnaya, p. 6.

It is further suggested that, if a devotee takes the path of prapatti, he has not to suffer for his faults as much as others would have to suffer.

2 The first alternative is defined as para-duhkha-dnhkhitvam day a. The second alternative is svdrtha-mrapeksa-para-duhkha-sahisnutd daya; sa ca tan nirakaraneccha. In the first alternative daya is a painful emotion; in.the second it is a state of desire, stirred up by a feeling of repugnance, which is midway between feeling and volition. Ibid. p. 6.

prapattir nam a a-niviirana-matram a-cid-vydvrtti-mdtram vd a-vidheyam sesatva-jndna-mdtram id para-sesatai-ka-rati-rupa-parisuddha-ydtlidtmya-jiidna-mdtrani vd. Ibid. p. 6.

According to some, any of these conditions would define prapatti " ato'prati-sedhddy-anyatamai' va iti hecit kathayanti." Ibid.

4 atyanta-para-tantrasya virodhatvena anusthdnd-nupapatteh, pratyuta anustatur dnarthakyamuktam Srlvacana-bhusana, ciram unya-parayd bhdryavd kadacid bhartrsakasam dgatayd mam angikuru iti vdkyavat celana-krta-prapattir iti. Ibid. p. 6.

(ii) that He is the only end to be attained; (iii) that He alone is the supreme object of our desires; (iv) that we absolutely surrender and resign ourselves to Him 1 ; and (v) supreme prayerfulness—all associated with absolute trustfulness in Him.

There are some who define the prapanna, or seeker of God, as one who has read the Arvar literature of prabandhas (adhita-prabandhah prapannah). Others, however, think that the mere study of the prabandhas cannot invest a man with the qualities of prapatti. They think that he alone is entitled to the path of prapatti who cannot afford to adopt the dilatory courses of karma-yoga, jnana-yoga and bhakti-yoga, and therefore does not think much of these courses. Again, the older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of prapatti should give up all scriptural duties and duties assigned to the different stages of life (dsrama); for it is well evidenced in the Gita text that one should give up all one's religious duties and surrender oneself to God. Others, again, think that the scriptural duties are to be performed even by those who have taken the path of prapatti. Further, the older school thinks that the path of knowledge is naturally against the path of prapatti ; for prapatti implies the negation of all knowledge, excepting one's self-surrendering association with God. The paths of duties and of knowledge assume an egoism which contradicts prapatti. Others, however, think that even active self-surrender to God implies an element of egoism, and it is therefore wrong to suppose that the paths of duties and of knowledge are reconcilable with prapatti on account of its association with an element of egoism. The so-called egoism is but a reference to our own nature as self, and not to ahankara, an evolute 2 . Again, some think that even a man who has

1 In the second alternative it is defined as follows:

an-anya-sddhye sva-bhlste mahd-visvdsa-purvakam tad-eko'-pdyatd ydcnd prapattis sarand-gatih. These are the five angas of prapatti, otherwise called niksepa, tyaga, nyasa or sarana-gati (Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, pp. 6, 7). The difference between the first and second alternative is that, according to the former, prapatti is a state of mind limited to the consciousness of its true nature in relation to God; on the part of God also it indicates merely a passive toleration of the seekers flocking unto Him (a-nivdrana-matram). In the second alternative, however, prapatti is defined as positive self-surrendering activity on the part of the seekers and unconditional protection to them all on the part of God. It is, therefore, that on the first alternative the consciousness of one's own true nature is defined in three ways, any one of which would be regarded on that alternative as a sufficient definition of prapatti. The first one is merely in the cognitive state, while the second involves an additional element of voluntary effort.

2 Ibid. pp. 8, 9.

The Arvdrs [ch.

adopted the path of prapatti may perform the current scriptural duties only with a view to not lending any support to a reference to their cases as pretexts for neglect of normal duties by the unenlightened and the ignorant, i.e. those that have adopted the path of prapatti should also perform their duties for the purpose of loka-samgraha. Others, however, think that the scriptural duties, being the commandments of God, should be performed for the satisfaction of God {bhagavat-prity-artham), even by those who have taken the path of prapatti. Otherwise they would have to suffer punishment for that.

The accessories of prapatti are counted as follows: (i) A positive mental attitude to keep oneself always in consonance with the Lord's will (dnukulyasya samkalpah); (ii) a negative mental attitude (prdtikulyasya varjanam), as opposing anything that may be conceived as against His will; (iii) a supreme trustfulness that the Lord will protect the devotee (raksisyatiti visvdsah); (iv) prayer to Him as a protector (goptrtva-varanam); (v) complete self-surrender {dtma-niksepah) ; (vi) a sense of complete poverty and helplessness (kdrpanyam). The older school thinks that the man who adopts the path of prapatti has no desires to fulfil, and thus he may adopt any of these accessories which may be possible for him according to the conditions and inclinations of his mind. Others, however, think that even those who follow the path of prapatti are not absolutely free from any desire, since they wish to feel themselves the eternal servants of God. Though they do not crave for the fulfilment of any other kind of need, it is obligatory upon them to perform all the six accessories of prapatti described above.

The older school thinks that God is the only cause of emancipation and that the adoption of the path of prapatti is not so; the later school, however, thinks that prapatti is also recognized as the cause of salvation in a secondary manner, since it is only through prapatti that God extends His grace to His devotees 1 . Again, the older schools think that there is no necessity for expiation (prdyascitta) for those who adopt the path of prapatti; for with them God's grace is sufficient to remove all sins. The later schools, however, think that, if the follower of the path of prapatti is physically fit to perform the courses of expiation, then it is obligatory on him. According to the older school a man possessing the eight kinds of devo-

1 Astadasa-bheda-nirnaya, p. 10.

tion (bhakti), even if he be a mleccha, is preferred to a Brahman and may be revered as such. According to the later schools, however, a devotee of a lower caste may be shown proper respect, but he cannot be revered as a Brahman. Again, on the subject of the possibility of pervasion of the atomic individual souls by God, the older schools are of opinion that God by His infinite power may enter into the atomic individuals; the later schools, however, think that such a pervasion must be of an external nature, i.e. from outside. It is not possible for God to penetrate into individual souls 1 . As regards Kaivalya the older schools say that it means only self-apperception. He who attains this state attains the highest stage of eternity or immortality. The later school, however, thinks that he who has merely this self-apperception cannot attain immortality through that means only; for this self-apperception may not necessarily mean a true revelation of his nature with reference to God. He can realize that only as he passes through higher spheres and ultimately reaches Vaikuntha—the abode of God, where he is accepted as the servant of the Lord. It is such a state that can be regarded as eternal 2 .

1 Aftddasa-bheda-nirnaya, p. 12. The view is supported by a reference to Varadacarya's Adhikarana-cintdmani.

2 The eighteen points of dispute as herein explained have been collected in the Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, according to the ancients in a verse quoted from them as follows:

bhedah svdmi-krpd-phald-nya-gatisu srl-vydpty-updyatvayos tad-vdtsalya-dayd-nirukti-vacasornydse ca tat kartari dharma-tydga-virodhayos sva-vihite nydsd-nga-hetutvayoh prdyascitta-vidhau tadlya-bhajane' nuvydpti-kaivalyayoh. Ibid. p. 1.

CHAPTER XVIII

AN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY SURVEY OF THE VlSlSTA-DVAITA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

The Aragiyas from Nathamuni to Ramanuja.

A. Govindacharyar has written a book, The Holy Lives of the Azhvdrs, based upon a number of old works 1 . The writings of the Arvars may be sub-divided generally into three rahasyas (or mystical accounts) called Tiru-mantra-churukku, Dvaya-churakku, Carama-sloka-churukku. These three rahasyas have also been dealt with in later times by very prominent persons, such as Venkatanatha, Raghavacarya and others. Some account of these, in the manner of these later writers, will be briefly given in the proper place, since the scope of this work does not permit us to go into the details of the lives of the Arvars. The hagiologists make a distinction between the Arvars and the Aragiyas in this, that, while the former were only inspired men, the latter had their inspirations modified by learning and scholarship. The list of Aragiyas begins with Nathamuni. There is some difficulty in fixing his age. The Guru-par am para, the Dhya-suri-carita and the Prapanndmrta, are of opinion that he was in direct contact with Namm'-arvar, otherwise called Sathakopa, or Karimaran, or rather with his disciple Madhura-kaviy-arvar. Thus, the Prapanndmrta says that Nathamuni was born in the village called Vlranarayana, near the Cola country. His father's name was Isvara Bhatta, and his son was Isvaramuni 2 . He went on a long pilgrimage, in the course of which he visited the northern countries, including Mathura, Yrndavana and Haridvara, and also Bengal and Purl. After returning to his own place he found that some of the

1 (i) Diryowsuri-carita (a.i earlier work than the Prapanndmrta, -which often alludes to it) by Garuda-vahana Pandita, contemporary and disciple of Ramanuja; (2) Prapanndmrta, by Ananta-suri, disciple of £aila-rarigesa curu; (3) Prabandha-sdra, by Venkatanatha; (4) Upadcsa-ratna-mdlui by Ramyajamatr-maha-muni, otherwise called Varavara-muni or Periya-jlyar or Manavala Mi-muni; (5) Guru-parampara-prabhavam by Pinb'-aragiya Peru-mal Jlyar; and (6) Pazhanadai-vilakkan.

2 It is said that he belonged to the lineage of ^arhakopa or £atha-marsana. His other name was £rl-rariga-natha. (See introduction to Catuh-slukl, Ananda Press, Madras, p. 3.)

Srlvaisnavas, who came from the Western countries to the temple of Rajagopala, recited there ten verses by Karimara. Nathamuni, who heard those hymns, realized that they were parts of a much bigger work and decided to collect them. He went to Kumbhakona, and under the inspiration of God proceeded to the city of Kuraka, on the banks of TamraparnI, and there met Madhura-kaviy-arvar, the disciple of Namm'-arvar, and asked him if the hymns of Namm'-arvar were available. Madhura-kaviy-arvar told him that after composing a big book of hymns in Tamil and instructing Madhura-kaviy-arvar the same, Namm'-arvar had attained salvation. The work could not, therefore, obtain currency among the people. The people of the locality had the misconception that the study of the work would be detrimental to the Vedic religion. So they threw it into the river TamraparnI. Only one page of the book, containing ten verses, was picked up by a man who appreciated the verses and recited them. Thus only these ten verses have been saved. Nathamuni recited twelve thousand times a verse composed by Madhura-kaviy-arvar in adoration of Namm'-arvar, and, as a result of that, Namm'-arvar revealed the purport of the whole work to him. But when Nathamuni wanted to know all the verses in detail he was advised to approach an artisan of the place who was inspired by Namm'-arvar to reveal all the verses to him. So Nathamuni received the entire work of Namm'-arvar from the artisan. He then gave it to his pupil Pundarikaksa, and Pundarlkaksa gave it to his disciple Rama Alisra, and Rama Misra gave it to Yamuna, and Yamuna gave it to Gosthlpurna, and Gosthlpurna gave it to his daughter DevakI Sri. Nathamuni brought the hymns together, and, through his two nephews, Melaiyagattarvar and Kilaiyagattarvar, set them to music in the Vedic manner; from that time forward these hymns were sung in the temples and were regarded as the Tamil Veda 1 . The oldest Guru-parampara and Divya-suri-carita, however, say that Nathamuni obtained the works of Namm'-arvar directly from him. The later Srlvaisnavas found that the above statements did not very well suit the traditional antiquity of the Arvars, and held that Madhura-kaviy-arvar was not the direct disciple of Namm'-arvar and that Nathamuni attained the high age of three hundred years. But, if, as we found before, Namm'-arvar's date be fixed in the ninth century, no such supposition

1 Prapanndmrta, Chs. 106 and 107.

becomes necessary. Goplnatha Rau refers also to a Sanskrit inscription in the middle of the tenth century, in which it is stated that the author of the verses was a disciple of Srinatha. If this Srinatha is the same as Nathamuni, then the computation of Nathamuni's date as falling in the tenth century is quite correct. He had eleven disciples, of whom Pundarikaksa, Karukanatha and Srikrsna Laksmlnatha were the most prominent. He wrote three works, Nydya-tattva, Purusa-ninnaya and Yoga-rahasya 1 . Nathamuni is also described as a great yogin who practised the yoga of eight accessories {astdnga-yoga) 2 . The Prapanndmrta says that he died by entering into yoga in the city of Agariga (probably Garigaikondasodapuram). Gopl-natha, however, thinks that he could not have died in that city, for it was not founded by Rajen-dracola, otherwise called Garigaikondasola, before 1024, which must be later than the date of Nathamuni. Nathamuni lived probably in the reign of Parantaka Cola I, and died before or in the reign of Parantaka Cola II, i.e. he lived eighty or ninety years in the middle of the tenth century. He had made an extensive tour in Northern India as far as Mathura and Badarl-natha and also to Dvaraka and Purl. Srikrsna Laksmlnatha, disciple of Nathamuni, wrote an extensive work on the doctrine of prapatti. He was born at a place called Krsnamarigala. He was well-versed in the Vedas, and was a specialist in Vedanta and also a great devotee, who constantly employed himself in chanting the name of Visnu (ndma-sankirtana-ratah). He used often to go about naked and live on food that was thrown to him. The hagiologists say that he entered into the image of the temple and became one with God. Punda-

1 The Nydya-tattva is referred to by Verikatanatha in his Nydya-parisuddhi (p. 13) as a work in which Gautama's Nyaya-sutras were criticized and refuted:

bhagavan-ndtha-munibhir nydya-tattva-samdhvayd avadhlryd' ksapddddln nyabandhi nydya-paddhatih

Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 13.

2 The practice of astdnga-yoga was not a new thing with Nathamuni. In giving an account of Tiru-marisai Piran, also called Bhaktisara, the Prapanndmrta says that he first became attached to the god £iva and wrote many Tamil works on Saiva doctrines; but later on the saint Maharya initiated him into Vaisnavism and taught him astdnga-yoga, through which he realized the great truths of Vaisnavism. He then wrote many works in Tamil on Vaisnavism. Bhakti-sara also wrote a scholarly work, refuting the views of other opponents, which is known as Tattvdrtha-sdra. Bhakti-sara also used to practise astdnga-yoga and was learned in all the branches of Indian philosophy. Bhakti-sara had a disciple named Kanikrsna, who wrote many extremely poetical verses or hymns in adoration of Visnu. Kula-sekhara Peru-mal is also said to have practised yoga.

rlkaksa Uyyakondar is supposed to have very much influenced the character of Kurukanatha, who in the end entered into yoga and died. Rama Misra was born in the city of Saugandhakulya, in a Brahmin family, and was a pupil of Pundarikaksa. The name of Pundarlkaksa's wife was Andal. Pundarikaksa asked Rama Misra (Manakkal-lambej) to teach Yamuna all that he was taught. Yamuna, however, was not born during the life of Pundarikaksa, and Pundarikaksa only prophesied his birth in accordance with the old prophecy of Nathamuni. Rama Misra had four disciples, excluding Yamuna, of whom LaksmI was the most prominent 1 . He used to stay in Srirarigam and expound the doctrines of the Vedanta.

Yamunacarya, otherwise called Alavandar, son of Isvaramuni and grandson of Nathamuni, was born probably in a.d. 918 and is said to have died in a.d. 1038. He learned the Vedas from Rama Misra, and was reputed to be a great debater 2 . Becoming a king, he was duly married and had two sons named Vararaiiga and Sottha-purna. He lived happily for a long time, enjoying his riches, and took no notice of Rama Misra. But Rama Misra with some difficulty obtained access to him and availed himself of the opportunity to teach him the Bhagavad-gitd, which aroused the spirit of detachment in him, and he followed Rama Misra to Sriraiigam and, renouncing everything, became a great devotee 3 . One of the last

1 (1) Taivattuk-k-arasu-Nambi; (2) Gomathattut-tiruvinnagar-appan; (3) Sirup-pullur-udaya-Pillai; (4) Vangi-puratt-acchi. (See The Life of Rdmdnuja, by Govindacharyar, p. 14.)

2 The Prapanndmrta relptes a story of Yamuna's debating power at the age of twelve. The king of the place had a priest of the name of Akkaialvan, who was a great debater. Yamuna challenged him and defeated him in an open debate held in the court of the king. He was given half the kingdom as a reward. He seems to have been very arrogant in his earlier days, if the wording of his challenge found in the Prapanndmrta can be believed. The words of challenge run as follows:

d saildd adri-kanyd-carana-kisalaya-nydsa-dhanyopakanthdd

a rakso-nita-sltd-mukha-kamala-samulldsa-hetos ca setoh

a ca prdcya-pratlcya-ksiti-dhara-yuga tadarkacandrdvatamsdn

mimdmsd-idstra-yugmo-srama-vimala-mand mrgyatdm mddrso'nyah

Ch". in.

3 A story is told in the Prapanndmrta that, when Yamuna became a king and inaccessible to him, Rama Misra was concerned how he could carry out the commands of his teachers and initiate Yamuna to the path of devotion. He got in touch with Yamuna's cook, and for six months presented some green vegetables (alarka-sdka) which Yamuna very much liked. When, after the six months, the king asked how the rare vegetables found their way into the kitchen, Rama Misra stayed away for four days praying to Raiiganatha, the deity, to tell him how he could approach Yamuna. In the meanwhile the king missed the green vegetables and asked his cook to present Rama Misra when next he should come to the kitchen. Rama Misra was thus presented to Yamuna.

instructions of Rama Misra was to direct him to go to Kurukanatha (Kurugai-kkaval-appan) and learn from him the astdnga-yoga, which had been left with him (Kurukd) by Nathamuni for Yamuna. Yamuna had many disciples, of whom twenty-one are regarded as prominent. Of these disciples, Mahapurna belonged to the Bharadvajagofra, and had a son named Pundarikaksaand a daughter named Attutayi. Another disciple, called SrisailapQrna, was known also by the name Tatacarya 1 . Another of his disciples, Gosthlpurna, was born in the Pandya country, where also, in the city of Srima-dhura, was born another of Yamuna's disciples, Maladhara. In the city of Maraner in the Pandya country was born another disciple, Maraner Nambi, a siidra by caste; a further disciple, Kanclpurna, who was also of the siidra caste, was born in the city of Punamalll. Yamuna used to invest all his disciples with the five Vaisnava samskdras, and he also converted the Cola king and queen to the same faith and made over the kingdom he had hitherto enjoyed to the service of the deity Rariganatha of Srirarigam. Srisailapurna, or Bhuri brisailapurna, or Mahapurna had two sons, two sisters and two daughters. The elder sister, KantimatI, was married to Kesava Yajvan, also called Asuri Kesava, Ramanuja's father, and the second sister, DyutimatI, was married to Kanalaksa Bhatta, and a son was born to them called Govinda. Kuresa, who was long in association with Ramanuja, was born of Ananta Bhatta and MahadevI, and this Kuresa was the father of Anantacarya, writer of the Prapanndmrta 2 . Da^arathi was born of Ananta Dlksita, of Vadhula^oJra, and Laksmi. Dasarathi had a son called Kandadanatha, who was also called Ramanujadasa. They are all associates of Ramanuja, who had seventy-four prominent disciples.

Yamuna was very fond of Namm'-arvar's works, the doctrines of which were often explained to the people. Yamuna wrote six works: (i) Stotra-ratnam, in adoration to the deity Yarada; (ii) Catuh-sloki; (iii) Agama-prdmdnya; (iv) Siddhi-traya; (v) Gitiirtha-satngraha; (vi) Maha-purusa-nirnaya 3 . Of these the Siddhi-traya is the most important, and the section on Yamuna in this volume has been based almost entirely on it. The Agama-prdmdnya is a work in which he tries to establish the high antiquity and undisputed

1 Prapanncmirta, Ch. 113, p. 440. Ibid. Ch. 150, p. 450. Anantacarya, called also Ananta Suri, was the pupil of Sailarahgesa-Kuru. He reveres also Ramyajamatr-maha-muni.

See Vehkatanatha's introduction to the Gltartha-saingraha-raksa.

authority of the Pancaratra literature, which is supposed to be the canon of the Srivaisnavas. The Stotra-ratnam, Catuh-sloki and Gitdrtha-samgraha were all commented upon by various persons, but the most important of the commentaries is that of Venkatanatha 1 . The Stotra-ratnam consists of sixty-five verses in which Yamuna describes the beauty of the Lord Krsna, as set forth in the Puranas, and confesses to Him the deep affliction of all his sins and guilt, frailties and vices, and asks for forgiveness of them. He also describes the greatness of the Lord as transcendent and surpassing the greatness of all other deities, as the supreme controller and upholder of the universe. He narrates his own complete surrender to Him and entire dependence on His mercy. If the mercy and grace of the Lord be so great, there is none so deserving of mercy in his wretchedness as a sinner. If the sinner is not saved, the mercy of the Lord becomes meaningless. The Lord requires the sinner in order to realize Himself as the all-merciful. Yamuna further describes how his mind, forsaking everything else, is deeply attracted to the Lord; and the sense of his supreme helplessness and absolute abnegation 2 . The devotee cannot bear any delay in his communion with God, and is extremely impatient to meet Him; it is galling to him that God should heap happiness after happiness on him and thus keep him away. The fundamental burden of the hymns is an expression of the doctrine of prapatti; this has been very clearly brought out in the commentary of Venkatanatha. It is said that it was after reading these hymns that Ramanuja became so deeply attracted to Yamuna. The Catuh-sloki consists of only four verses in praise of Sri or Lakpni z .

In the Gitdrtha-samgraha Yamuna says that the means to the

1 The commentary on the Catuh-sloki by Venkatanatha is called Rahasya-raksd, and the commentary on the Stotra-ratnam goes also by the same name. The commentary on the Gitdrtha-samgraha, by Venkatanatha, is called Gttartha-satngraha-raksd.

2 Two specimen verses may be quoted from the Stotra-ratnam :

na dharma-nistho'smi na cd" tma-vedl na bhaktimdms tvac-carand-ravinde

a-kincano nd'nya-gatis saranya tvat-pdda-mulam s'aranam prapadye.

, . ' " &• 22.

na ninditam karma tad asti loke

sahasraso yan na mayd vyadhdyi

so'ham vipdkd-vasare mukunda

kranddmi sampraty a-gatis tavdgre. S~l. 23.

3 Venkatanatha, in his commentary on the Catuh-sloki, discusses the position of LaksmI according to the Vaisnava tradition. LaksmI is regarded as a being

7-2

attainment of the ultimate goal of life is devotion, which is produced as a result of the performance of scriptural duties and the emergence of self-knowledge 1 . According to Yamuna, yoga in the Gitd means bhakti-yoga. So the ultimate object of the Gitd is the propounding of the supreme importance of bhakti (devotion) as the ultimate object, which requires as a precedent condition the performance of the scriptural duties and the dawning of the true spiritual nature of the self as entirely dependent on God.

It is related in the Prapanndmrta that Yamuna was anxious to meet Ramanuja, but died immediately before Ramanuja came to meet him. So Ramanuja could only render the last homage to his dead body.

Ramanuja 2 .

It has already been said that Mahapurna (Nambi), disciple of Yamuna, had two sisters, KantimatI and DyutimatI, of whom the former was married to Kesava Yajvan or Asuri Kesava of Bhutapuri and the latter to Kamalaksa Bhatta. Ramanuja (Haya Perumal), son of Kesava Yajvan, was born in a.d. 1017. He received his training, together with his mother's sister's son Govinda Bhatta, from Yadavaprakasa, a teacher of Vedanta of great reputation. The details of Yadavaprakasa's views are not known, but it is very probable that he was a monist 3 . Before going to study with

different from Narayana, but always associated with Him. He thus tries to refute all the views that suppose Laksmi to be a part of Narayana. Laksmi should also not be identified with may a. She is also conceived as existing in intimate association with Narayana and, like a mother, exerting helpful influence to bring the devotees into the sphere of the grace of the Lord. Thus Laksmi is conceived to have a separate personality of her own, though that personality is merged, as it were, in the personality of Narayana and all His efforts, and all her efforts are in consonance with the efforts of Narayana {paraspard-nukulatayd sarvatra sdma-rasyani). On the controversial point whether Laksmi is to be considered a jiva and therefore atomic in nature, the problem how she can then be all-pervasive, and the view that she is a part of Narayana, Venkatanatha says that Laksmi is neither Jiva nor Narayana, but a separate person having her being entirely dependent on God. Her relation to Narayana can be understood on the analogy of the relation of the rays to the sun or the fragrance to the flower. 1 sva-dharma-jndna-vairdgya-sddhya-bhakty-eka-gocarah

nardyanah param brahma gitd-sdstre samudituh

Gitdrtha-samgrahu, verse i.

Most of the details of Ramanuja's life are collected from the account given in the Prapanndmrta by Anantacarya, a junior contemporary of Ramanuja.

"\ adava held that Brahman, though by its nature possessing infinite qualities, yet transforms itself into all types of living beings and also into all kinds of inanimate things. Its true nature is understood when it is realized that it is one

Yadavaprakasa, Ramanuja was married at the age of sixteen, by his father, who died shortly afterwards. His teacher Yadavaprakasa lived in Kanci. So Ramanuja left Bhutapuri his native place with his family and went to Kanci. In the early days of his association with Yadavaprakasa, it is said that Yadavaprakasa became annoyed with him, because he had cured the daughter of a certain chief of the place from possession by a spirit, which his teacher Yadavaprakasa had failed to do. Shortly after this there was a difference of opinion between Yadava and Ramanuja on the interpretation of certain Upanisad texts, which Yadava interpreted in the monistic manner, but Ramanuja on the principle of modified dualism. Yadava became very much annoyed with Ramanuja and arranged a plot, according to which Ramanuja was to be thrown into the Ganges while on a pilgrimage to Allahabad. Govinda divulged the plot to Ramanuja, who was thus able to wander away from the company and retire to Kanci, after suffering much trouble on the way. While at Kanci he became associated with a devout person of the sildra caste, called Kanclpurna. Later Ramanuja was reconciled to his teacher and studied with him. When Yamuna once came to Kanci he saw Ramanuja at a distance among the students of Yadava marching in procession, but had no further contact with him, and from that time forward was greatly anxious to have Ramanuja as one of his pupils. Ramanuja again fell out with his teacher on the meaning of the text kapyasam pundarikam [Chdn-dogya, p. 167). As a result of this quarrel, Ramanuja was driven out by Yadava. Thenceforth he became attached to the worship of Narayana on Hastisaila in Kanci, w r here he first heard the chanting of the Stotra-ratnam of Yamuna by Mahapurna, his maternal uncle and pupil of Yamuna. From Mahapurna Ramanuja learnt much of Yamuna and started for Srirahgam with him. But before he could reach Srirangam Yamuna died. It is said that after his death three fingers of Yamuna were found to be twisted and Ramanuja thought that this signified three unfulfilled desires: (1) to convert the people to the prapatti doctrine of Yaisnavism, making them well versed in

in spite of its transformation into diverse forms of animate and inanimate entities — anye punar aikyavabodha-yathatmyam varnayantah svabhavika-niratisaya-porimitodara-guna-sagaram brahmaiva sura-nara-tiryak-sthavara-nuraki-svargy-apavargi-caitanyaikn-svabhavam sva-bhavato vilaksanam avilnksanam ca viyad-ddi-naiia-vidha-mala-rupa-parinama-spadam ceti pratyavatisthante. Ramanuja, Veddrtha-samgraha, p. 15, printed at the Medical Hall Press, 1894.

the works of the Arvars; (2) to write a commentary to the Brahma-sutra according to the Srivaisnava school; (3) to write many works on Srlvaisnavism. Ramanuja, therefore, agreed to execute all these three wishes 1 . He returned to KancI and became attached to Kanclpurna, the disciple of Yamuna, as his teacher. Later he set out for Srlraiigam and on the way was met by Mahapurna, who w r as going to KancI to bring him to Srlraiigam. He was then initiated by Mahapurna (the deary a), according to the fivefold Yaisnava rites {panca-samskdra). Ramanuja, being annoyed with his wife's discourteous treatment with MabapGrna's wife, and also with people who came to beg alms, sent her by a ruse to her father's house, and renounced domestic life when he was about 30 or 32 years of age. After establishing himself as a satiny dsin, his teaching in the Sastras began with Dasarathi, son of his sister 2 , and Kuranatha, son of Anantabhatta. Yadavaprakasa also became a disciple of Ramanuja 3 . Eventually Ramanuja left for Srirangam and dedicated himself to the worship of Raiigesa. He learnt certain esoteric doctrines and mantras from Gosthlpurna who had been initiated into them by his teacher. Later on Ramanuja defeated in discussion a Sarikarite named Yajnamurti, who later became his disciple and wrote two works in Tamil called Jndna-sdra and Prameya-sdra 4 . He now had a number of well reputed disciples such as Bhaktagrama-purna, Marudha-grama-purna, Anantarya, Yara-dacarya and Yajnesa. Ramanuja first wrote his Gadya-traya. He then proceeded to the Sarada-matha with Kuresa, otherwise called Srivatsaiika Misra or Kuruttalvan, procured the manuscript of the Bodhdyana-vrttt, and started towards Srlraiigam. The keepers of the temple, however, finding the book missing, ran after him and

1 Prapannattirta, ix, p. 26. The interpretation of this passage by Govinda-carya and Ghosa seems to me to be erroneous; for there is no reference to Sathakopa here. Kuresa, or ^rlvatsanka Misra, had two sons; one of them was baptized by Ramanuja as Parasara Bhattarya and the other as Ramadesika. Ramanuja's maternal cousin, Govinda, had a younger brother, called Bala Govinda, and his son was baptized as Parankusa-purnarya.

2 The name of Dasarathi's father is Anantadiksita.

s His baptismal name was Govindadasa. After his conversion he wrote a book entitled Yati-dharma-samuccaya. This Govindadasa must be distinguished from Govinda, son of the aunt of Ramanuja, who had been converted to Saivism t>y Yadavaprakasa and was reconverted to Srlvaisnavism by his maternal uncle Srisailapurna, pupil of Yamuna. Govinda had married, but became so attached to Ramanuja that he renounced the world. Srisailapurna wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-glti. Ramanuja had another disciple in Pundarikaksa, Mahapurna's son.

4 His baptismal names were Devaraf and Devamannatha.

took it away. Fortunately, however, Kuresa had read the book during the several nights on the way, had remembered its purport and so was able to repeat it. Ramanuja thus dictated his commentary of £ri-bhdsya, which was written down by Kuresa 1 . He also wrote Veddnta-dlpa, Veddnta-sdra and Veddrtha-samgraha. The $ri-bhdsya was written probably after Ramanuja had made extensive tours to Tirukkovalur, Tirupati, Tirupputkuli, Kumbha-konam, Alagarkoil, Tiruppullani, Arvar-Tirunagari, Tirukkurun-gudi, Tiruvanparisaram, Tiruvattar, Tiruvanandapuram, Tiru-vallikeni, Tirunirmalai, Madhurantakam and Tiruvaigundipuram 2 . Later on he made extensive tours in Northern India to Ajmir, Mathura, Brindavan, Ayodhya and Badari, defeating many heretics. He also went to Benares and Purl and at the latter place established a matha. He forcibly tried to introduce the Paficaratra rites into the temple of Jagannatha, but failed. According to the Rdmd-nujdrya-dtvya-charitai, the $ri-bhdsya was completed in 1077 saka or a.d. 1155, though two-thirds of the work were finished before the Cola persecution began. But this date must be a mistake; for Ramanuja died in 1059 saka or a.d. 1137 3 . The eyes of Mahapurna (Periyalnambi) and Kuresa were put out by the Cola king Kolutt-uhga I, probably in the year 1078-1079, and this must be the date when Ramanuja was forced to take refuge in the Hoysala country. It was in a.d. 1117, on the death of Koluttuhga I, that Ramanuja again returned to Srlrangam, where he met Kuresa and finished the $ri-bhdsya 4 . In a Madhva work called Chaldri-smrti it is said that in 1049 saka, that is a.d. 1127, it was already an established work 5 . It is therefore very probable that the $ri-bhdsya was completed between a.d. 1117 and 1127. Gopi-natha Rau thinks that it was completed in a.d. 1125.

Ramanuja fled in the garb of an ordinary householder from

1 Ramanuja had asked Kuresa to check him if he were not correctly representing the Bodhdyana-ijtti, and in one place at least there was a difference of opinion and Ramanuja was in the wrong.

2 See Gopi-natha Rau's Lectures, p. 34, footnote.

3 See Ibid.

4 Rdmdniijdrya-divya-charitai (a Tamil work), p. 243, quoted in Gopl-niitha Rau's Lectures.

5 kalau pravrtta-bauddha-di-matam ramanujam tathd sake hy eko-na-pancdsad-adhika-bde sahasrake nirdkartum mukhya-vdyuh san-tnata-sthdpandya ca ekd-dasa-sate sake vimsaty-asta-yuge gate avatlrnam madhva-gurum sadd vande mahd-gunam.

Chaldri-smrti, quoted in Gopi-natha Rau's Lectures, p. 35.

SrTrangam to Tonelanur, to escape from the persecution of Kolutt-uiiga I or Rajendracola, otherwise called Krmikantha, a Saiva king. He was successful in converting the Jain king Bittideva of the Hoysala country, who was renamed Visnuvardhanadeva after the Vaisnava fashion. Air Rau says that this conversion took place some time before a.d. 1099 1 . With the help of this king he constructed the temple Tirunarayanapperumal at Melukot (Yada-vadri), where Ramanuja lived for about twelve years 2 . According to the Rdmdnujdrya-divya-charitai Ramanuja lived for eleven years after his return to Srirangam (some time after the death of Kolutt-uiiga I in 1118) and died in a.d. 1137. He thus enjoyed an extraordinary long life of one hundred and twenty years, which was spread over the reigns of three Cola kings, Koluttuiiga I (a.d. 1070-1118), Vikrama Cola (a.d. 1118-1135), and Koluttuiiga II (a.d. 1123-1146) 3 . He had built many temples and mathas in his lifetime, and by converting the temple superintendent of Srirarigam got possession of the whole temple.

Ramanuja's successor was Parasara Bhattarya, son of Kuresa, who wrote a commentary on the Sahasra-giti. Ramanuja had succeeded in securing a number of devoted scholars as his disciples, and they carried on his philosophy and forms of worship through the centuries. His religion was catholic, and, though he followed the rituals regarding initiation and worship, he admitted Jains and Buddhists, Sudras and even untouchables into his fold. He himself was the pupil of a Sudra and used to spend a long time after his bath in the hut of an untouchable friend of his. It is said that he ruled over 74 episcopal thrones, and counted among his followers 700 ascetics, 12,000 monks and 300 nuns (Ketti ammais). Many kings and rich men were among his disciples. Kuresa, Dasarathi, Nadadur Arvan and the Bhattara were dedicated to scholarly discourses. Yajnamurti performed the function of the priest; one disciple was in charge of the kitchen; Vatapurnaor Andhrapurna and Gomatham Sitivarvan were in charge of various kinds of personal service; Dhanurdasa was trea-

1 Mr Rice, however, says in the Mysore Gazetteer, vol. i, that the conversion took place in 1039 saka or a.d. ii 17. But Rau points out that in the Epiqraphia Carnatica we have inscriptions of Bittideva as early as saka 1023 (No. 34 Arsiker), which call him Vimu-vardhana.

1 The general tradition is that Ramanuja kept away from ^rlrahgam for a total period of twelve years only; but Rau holds that this period must be about twenty years, of which twelve years were spent in Yadavadri.

8 Sri Ratnanujacarya, by S. K. Aiyangar, M.A. Natesan and Co., Madras.

surer; Ammahgi of boiled milk; Ukkal Arvan served meals; Ukkal-ammal fanned, and so on 1 . Ramanuja converted many Saivas to Vaisnavism, and in the conflict between the Saivas and the Vaisnavas in his time; though he suffered much at the hands of the Cola king Krmikantha who was a Saiva, yet Krmikantha's successor became a Vaisnava and his disciple, and this to a great extent helped the cause of the spread of Srlvaisnavism.

The sources from which the details of Ramanuja's life can be collected are as follows: (1) Divya-suri-charitai, written in Tamil by Garudavaha, a contemporary of Ramanuja; (2) Guru-parampard-prabhdvam, written in manipravdla in the early part of the fourteenth century by Pinb'-aragiya Peru-mal Jlyar; (3) Pillai Lokam-jlyar's Rdmdnujdrya-dhya-charitai, written in Tamil; (4) Anbillai Kandadaiyappan's brief handbook of Arvars and Aragiyas called Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaiva, written in Tamil; (5) Prappanndmrta, by Anantacarya, a descendant of AndhrapGrna, and pupil of Saila-rarigesa-guru; (6) the commentaries on the Tiru-vdy-mori which contain many personal reminiscences of the Aragiyas; (7) other epigraphical records.

The Precursors of the Vis'istadvaita Philosophy and the contemporaries and pupils of Ramanuja.

The bheddbheda interpretation of the Brahma-sutras is in all probability earlier than the monistic interpretation introduced by Sarkara. The Bhagavad-gltd, which is regarded as the essence of the Upanisads, the older Purdnas, and the Pancardtra, dealt with in this volume, are more or less on the lines of bheddbheda. In fact the origin of this theory may be traced to the Purusa-sukta. Apart from this, Dramidacarya, as Yamuna says in his Siddhi-traya, explained the Brahma-sutra, and that it was further commented upon by Srivatsarika Misra. Bodhayana, referred to by Ramanuja as Vrtti-kdra and by Saiikara as LJpavarsa, wrote on the Brahma-sutras a very elaborate and extensive vrtti, which formed the basis of Ramanuja's bhdsya 2 . Anandagiri also refers

1 The Life of Ramanuja, by GovindScharyar, p. 218.

2 Verikatanatha in his Tattva-tlka says " Vrtti-karasya Bodhayanasyai'va hi Upavarsa iti syan nama." In his Sesvara-mimamsa, however, he refutes the view of Upavarsa, for in the Vaijayanti lexicon Krtakoti and Halabhuti are said to be names of Upavarsa.

See also the second volume of the present work, p. 43 n.

to Drdvida-bhdsya as being a commentary on the Chdndogy Upanisad, written in a simple style (rju-vivarana) previous to Sankara's attempt. In the Samksepa-sdriraka (in. 217-27) a writer is referred. to as Atreya and Vdkya-kdra, and the commentator Ramatlrtha identifies him with Brahmanandin. Rama-nuja, in his Veddrtha-samgraha, quotes a passage from the Vdkya-kdra and also its commentary by Dramidacarya 1 . While the Vdkya-kdra and Dramidacarya, referred to by Ramanuja, held that Brahman was qualified, the Dramidacarya who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin's work was a monist and is probably the same person as the Dravidacarya referred to by Anandagiri in his commentary on Sarikara's bkdsyopodghdta on the Chdndogya Upanisad. But the point is not so easily settled. Sarvajnatma muni, in his Samksepa-sdriraka, refers to the Vdkya-kdra as a monist. It is apparent, however, from his remarks that this Vdkya-kdra devoted the greater part of his commentarv to upholding the parindma view (akin to that of Bhaskara), and introduced the well known example of the sea and its waves with reference to the relation of Brahman to the world, and that it was only in the commentary on the sixth prapdthaka of the Chdndogya that he expounded a purely monistic view to the effect that the world was neither existent nor non-existent. Curiously enough, the passage referred to Sarvajnatma muni as proving decidedly the monistic conclusion of Atreya Vdkya-kdra, and his commentator the Dramidacarya is referred to by Ramanuja in his Veddrtha-samgraha, as being favourable to his own view. Ramanuja, however, does not cite him as Brahmanandin, but as Vdkya-kdra. The commentator of the Vdkya-kdra is referred to by Ramanuja also as Dramidacarya. But though Sarvajnatma muni also cites him as Vdkya-kdra, his commentator, Ramatirtha, refers to him as Brahmanandin and the Vdkya-kdra's commentator as Dravidacarya, and interprets the term " Vdkya-kdra" merely as "author." Sarvajnatma muni, how-

1 Veddrtha-samgraha, p. 138. The Vdkya-kdra's passage is " yuktam tad-gunopdsandd" and Dramidacarya's commentary on it is " yady-api sac-citto na nirbhugna-daivatam guna-ganam manasd'nudhdret tathapy antar-gunam eva deva-tam bhajata iti tatra'pi sa-giuunva devote! prdpyato iti." The main idea of these passages is'that, even if God be adored as a pure qualityless being, when the final release comes it is by way of the realization of God as qualified.

MM.S. Kuppusvami £astrl, M.A., identifies DramidiicSTya with Tiru-marisai PirSn, who lived probably in the eighth century a.d. But the reasons adduced by him in support of his views are unconvincing. See Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 468-473.

ever, never refers to Brahmanandin by name. Since the passage quoted in the Samksepa-sdriraka by Sarvajnatma muni agrees with that quoted by Ramanuja in his Veddrtha-samgraha, it is certain that the Vdkya-kdra referred to by Sarvajnatma muni and Ramanuja, and the Dramidacarya referred to by Sarvajnatma, Ramanuja and Anandagiri are one and the same person. It seems, therefore, that the Vdkya-kdra's style of writing, as well as that of his commentator Dramidacarya, was such that, while the monists thought that it supported their view, the Srlvaisnavas also thought that it favoured them. From Sarvajnatma muni's statement we understand that the Vdkya-kdra was also called Atreya, and that he devoted a large part of his work in propounding the bheddhheda view. Upavarsa is also referred to by Sarikara as a reputed exponent of the Mlmamsa philosophy and the Brahma-sutra ; and as having been the author of one tantra on Mlmamsa and another on the Brahma-sutra 1 . Our conclusion, therefore, is that we have one Vdkya-kdra who wrote a commentary on the Chdndogya Upanisad, and that he had a commentator who wrote in a clear and simple style and who was known as Dramidacarya, though he wrote in Sanskrit and not in Tamil. If we believe in Ramatlrtha's identification, we may also believe that his name was Brahmanandin. But, whoever he may be, he was a very revered person in the old circle, as the epithet "bhaga-vdn " has been applied to him by Sarvajnatma muni. Regarding Upavarsa we may say that he also was a very revered person, since Sarikara applies the epithet" bhagavat " to him, and quotes him as an ancient authority in his support. He seems to have flourished sometime before Sabara Svamin, the great Mlmamsa commentator 2 . Anandagiri and Vehkatanatha, in the fourteenth century, identify Upavarsa with the Vrtti-kara, and Vehkatanatha further identifies

1 ata eva ca bhagavato' pavarsena prathame tantre dtmd-stitva-bhidhdna-prasaktau sdrlrake vyaksydtna ity uddharah krtah. ^arikara's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, in. 3. 53.

Govindananda, in his Ratna-prabha, identifies Upavarsa with the Vrtti-kara. Anandagiri also agrees with this identification. In the Brahma-stitra-bhasya, I. 1. 19 and 1. 2. 23, Sankara refutes views which are referred to as being those of the Vrtti-kara. What can be gathered of the Vrtti-kdra's views from the last two passages, which have been regarded by the commentator Govindananda as referring to the Vrtti-kara, is that the world is a transformation of God. But we can never be certain that these views refuted by Sankara were really held by the Vrtti-kara, as we have no other authority on the point except Govindananda, a man of the thirteenth or fourteenth century.

a Savara, in his bhdsya on the Mimamsa-sutra, i. i. 5, refers to Upavarsa with the epithet "bhagavdn" on the subject of sphota.

him in a conjectural manner with Bodhayana. Even if Upavarsa was the Vrtti-kara, it is doubtful whether he was Bodhayana. On this point we have only the conjectural statement of Veiikatanatha referred to above. Sarikara, in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, i. 3. 28, refers again to Upavarsa in support of his refutation of the sphota theory 1 . But this point is also indecisive, since neither Sarikara nor the Srivaisnavas admit the sphota theory. There seems, however, to be little evidence. We are therefore not in a position to say anything about Upavarsa, the Vrtti-kara and Bodhayana 2 . If the testimony of the Prapannamrta is to be trusted, Bodhayana's I Wtti on the Brahma-sutra must have been a very elaborate work, and Dramidacarya's work on the Brahma-sutra must have been a very brief one. This was the reason why Ramanuja attempted to write a commentary which should be neither too brief nor too elaborate.

Now we have in MS. a small work called Brahma-sutrdrha-samgraha by Sathakopa, and we do not know whether this is the Dramida commentary referred to in the Prapannamrta. Yamuna, in his Siddhi-traya, refers to a bhdsya-kdra and qualifies him as " parimita-gambhira-bhdsind? i which signifies that it was a brief treatise pregnant with deep sense. He further says that this bhdsya was elaborated by Srivatsaiika-Misra. The views of these two writers were probably consonant with the views of the Srlvaisna\ a school. But Yamuna mentions the name of Tarika, Bhartr-prapanca, Bhartrmitra, Bhartrhari, Brahmadatta, Sarikara and Bhaskara. An account of Bhartrprapanca's interpretation of the Brahma-sutra has been given in the second volume of the present work. An account of Bhaskara's view has been given in the present volume. Nothing is definitely known about the interpretations of Taiika, Bhartrmitra, Bhartrhari and Brahmadatta, except that they were against the views of the Srivaisnavas.

Ramanuja, in his bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, says that Bodhayana wrote a very elaborate work on the Brahma-sutra and that

1 rarnd eva hi sabddh iti bhagavdn upavarsah. Sarikara's commentary on the Brahma-sutra, I. 3. 28.

Deussen's remark that the entire discussion of sphota is derived from Lpavarsa is quite unfounded. According to Kathd-sarit-sdgara Upavarsa was the teacher of Panini.

2 Savara, also, in his commentary on the 5th sutra of the Mimdmsd-sutra, I. 1.5, refers to a Vrtti-kara, a Mimamsa writer prior to Savara. The fact that in the bhdsya on the same sutra Savara refers to bhagavan Upavarsa by name makes it very probable that the Vrtti-kara and Upavarsa were not the same person.

this was summarized very briefly by the older teachers. He says, further, that in making his bhdsya he has closely followed the interpretation of the Sutra, as made by Bodhayana 1 . Ramanuja also owes a great debt of gratitude to Yamuna's Siddhi-traya, though he does not distinctly mention it in his bhdsya. It is said that Yamuna had a large number of disciples. Of these, however, Mahapurna, Gosthipurna, Maladhara, Kanclpurna, Srisailapurna, also called Tatacarya (Ramanuja's maternal uncle), and Srlranganatha-gayaka were the most important. Srisailapurna's son Govinda, the cousin and fellow-student of Ramanuja with Yadavaprakasa, became later in life a disciple of Ramanuja 2 . Of the seventy-four prominent disciples of Ramanuja, Pranatartihara of Atreya gotra, Kuresa or Srivatsanka Misra, Dasarathi, Andhrapurna or Vata-purna, Varadavisnu, Yatisekhara-bharata, Yadava-prakasa or Govinda and Yajfiamurti are the most important 3 . Of these Dasarathi of Vadhula gotra and Varadavisnu or Varadavisnu Misra were the sister's sons of Ramanuja. Varadavisnu was better known as Vatsya Varadaguru. Kuresa or Srivatsanka Misra had a son by Andal, called Parasara Bhattarya, who defeated the Vedantin Madhavadasa and afterwards became the successor of Ramanuja 4 . Parasara Bhattarya had a son called Madhya Pratoli Bhattarya or Madhya-vlthi Bhattarya. Kuresa had another son named Pad-manetra; Padmanetra's son was called Kurukesvara 5 . Kurukes-vara's son was Pundarikaksa, and his son was Srinivasa. Srinivasa had a son Nrsimharya. They belonged to the Srisaila lineage, probably from the name of Bhuri Sri Sailapurna, Kuresa's father. Nrsimharya had a son called Ramanuja. Ramanuja had two sons,

1 Sudarsana Surl, in his commentary on the bhdsya called the Sruta-prakdsika, explains the word "piirvdcdrya" in Ramanuja's bhdsya as Dramida-bhdsya-kdrddayah. On the phrase bodhdyana-matd'nusdrena sutrd-ksdrdni vydkhydyante, he says "na tu svo-tpreksitamata-ntarena sutrd-ksardni sutra-paddndm prakrti-pratyaya-vibhdgd-nugunam vaddmoh na tu svot-preksitd-rthesu sutrdni yathd-kathafi cit dyotayitavydni."

2 It is interesting to note that Yamuna's son Vararahga later on gave instruction to Ramanuja and had his younger brother Sottanambi initiated as a disciple of Ramanuja. Vararahga had no son. He had set the Sahasra-glti to music. Prapamwmrta, 23. 45.

3 Raja Gopalacariyar also mentions the name of Tirukurugaipiran Pillai as a prominent disciple of Ramanuja. He wrote a commentary on Namm'arvar's Tiru-vdymori.

* Kuresa had another son named £rl Rama Pillai or Vyasa Bhaftar. 5 It is rather common in South India to give one's son the name of his grandfather.

no The Visista-dvaita School [ch.

Nrsimharya and Rangacarya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century. Ramanuja's disciple, Yajnamurti, was an exceedingly learned man. When Ramanuja accepted him as a disciple, he changed his name to Devarat or Devamannatha or Devaraja and had a separate matha established in Srlrangam for him. Yajnamurti had written two very learned works in Tamil, called Jnana-sdra and Prameya-sdra. Ramanuja had four of his disciples, Bhaktagrama-purna, Marudha-grama-piirna, Anantarya and Yajnesa, initiated into Yaisnavism by Yajnamurti 1 . Another pupil of Ramanuja, Tiruku-rugai-piran Pillai, wrote a commentary of Namm'arvar's Tiru-vdy-mori. Pranatartihara Pillan, another pupil of Ramanuja, of Atreya gotra, had a son Ramanuja, a disciple of Nadadur Ammal of the lineage of Vatsya Yarada 2 . This Ramanuja, alias Padmanabha, had a son called Sri Ramanuja Pillan, a disciple of Kidambi Ramanuja Pillan. This Padmanabha had a son called Ramanuja Pillan and a daughter Totaramba, who was married to Anantasuri, the father of Yenkatanatha. Ramanuja's other disciple and nephew, Das-arathi, of \ adhula goira, had a son called Ramanuja, who had a son called Todappa or Yaranadrlsa or Lokarya or Lokacarya. After Parasara Bhattarya the Vedanti Madhavadasa, called also Nanjiar, became his successor. Madhavadasa's successor was Nambilla or Namburi Yaradarya or Lokacarya. He had two wives Andal and Sriranganayaki and a son called Ramanuja 3 . Nambilla's other name was Kalijit or Kalivairi. Now Yaranadrlsa became a disciple of Nambilla or the senior Lokacarya. Yaranadrlsa was known as Pillai Lokacarya. Namburi Yarada had a pupil called Madhava. Yarada had a son called Padmanabha who had a disciple called Rama-nujadasa. Ramanujadasa had a son called Devaraja, who had a son called Srisailanatha, and Srisailanatha had a pupil called Saumya Jamatr muni or Ramyajamatr muni, also called Yaravara muni or Yatlndrapravana or Manavalamahamuni or Periya-jiyar. It is said that he was the grandson of Kattur-aragiya-vanavalapillai. All these people were influenced by the Sahasra-giti-vyakhya of Kuresa. Namburi Varadarya, otherwise called Kalijit, had two other pupils called Udak-pratoli-krsna, and Krsna-samahbhaya, also called Krsnapada. Krsnapada's son Lokacarya was a pupil of

1 See Prapannamrta, Ch. 26.

2 See Govindacharyar's Life of Ramanuja.

3 He wrote two works called Sura-rtha-samgraha and Rahasya-traya. Prapannamrta, 119/3.

Kalijit, and Krsnapada himself. Krsnapada's second son was Abhirama-Varadhlsa.

Ramanuja's brother-in-law Devaraja, of Vatsya £o£ra, had a son called Varadavisnu JMisra or Vatsya Varada, who was a pupil of Visnucitta, a pupil of Kuresa. This Vatsya Varada was a great writer on Vedantic subjects. Kuresa had a son called Sri Rama Pillai, or Vedavyasa Bhatta, who had a son called Vadivijaya, who wrote Ksamd-sodasi-stava. Vadivijaya had a son called Sudarsana Bhatta, who was a pupil of Vatsya Varada, a contemporary of Varadavisnu. Sudarsana Bhatta was the famous author of the Sruta-prakdsikd. The celebrated Annayacarya also was a pupil of Pillai Lokacarya, the pupil of Kalijit. Srisaila Srinivasa, or Srisailanatha, was the son of Annayacarya. Ramyajamatr muni had a number of disciples, such as Ramanuja, Paravastu Prativadibhayankara Annayacarya, Vana-mamalai-jiyar, Periya-jlyar, Koyilkandadaiannan, etc. 1 Of Ven-katanatha's pupils two are of most importance: his son Nainara-carya, otherwise called Kumara-Vedanta-desika, Varadanatha or Varadaguru, who wrote many Vedantic works, and Brahmatantra-jiyar. Parakaladasa and Srirangacarya were probably pupils of Krsnapada, or Krsnasuri, the pupil of Kalijit or Namburi Vara-darya. Abhirama Varadhlsa was a pupil of Ramanuja, son of Saumya Jarnatr muni. The pontifical position of Srivaisnavism was always occupied in succession by eminent men in different important mathas or temples, and there arose many great preachers and teachers of Vedanta, some of whom wrote important works while others satisfied themselves with oral teachings. The works of some of these have come down to us, but others have been lost. It seems, however, that the Visistd-dvaita philosophy was not a source of perennial inspiration for the development of ever newer shades of thought, and that the logical and dialectical thinkers of this school were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Sankara and the Madhva school. There is hardly any one in the whole history of the development of the school of Ramanuja whose logical acuteness can be compared with that of Sriharsa or Citsukha, or with that of Jayatlrtha or Vyasatlrtha. Venkatanatha, Meghanadari or Ramanujacarya, called also Vadihamsa, were some of the most prominent writers of this school; but even with them philosophic

1 The Tamil names of some of the disciples have been collected from the Life of Ramanujacarya by Govindacharyar.

criticism does not always reach the highest level. It was customary for the thinkers of the Sankara and the Madhva schools in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to accept the concepts of the new School of Logic of Mithila and Bengal and introduce keen dialectical analysis and criticism. But for some reason or other this method was not adopted to any large extent by the thinkers of the Srivaisnava school. Yet this was the principal way in which philosophical concepts developed in later times.

In dealing with the names of teachers of the Ramanuja school, one Guru-pararnpara mentions the name of Paravadibhayaiikara, who was a pupil of Ramyajamatr muni and belonged to the Yatsya gotra. Prativadibhayaiikara was the teacher of Sathakopa Yati. The treatise speaks also of another Ramyajamatr muni, son of Anantarya, grandson of Prativadibhayaiikara and pupil of Srivenkatesa. It also mentions Yedantaguru* of the Yatsya gotra, a pupil of Ramyajamatr muni and Yaradarya; Sundaradesika, of the Yatsyagctfra, son of Prativadibhayaiikara; Aparyatmamrtacarya, son of Srlveiikata-guru and grandson of Prativadibhayaiikara. This Yeiikatacarya had a son called Prativadibhayaiikara. Ramyajamatr muni had a son called Srlkrsna-desika. Purusottamarya, of the Yatsya gotra, was the son of Srlveiikatacarya. Srikrsna-desika had a son called Ramyajamatr muni, who had a son called Krsna Suri. Anantaguru had a son called Yeiikata-desika. Srlnivasaguru was pupil of Yehkatarya and Yatsya Srinivasa, who had a son called Anantarya. It is unnecessary to continue with the list, as it is not very useful from the point of view of the development of the Srlvaisnava school of philosophy or literature. The fact that the names of earlier teachers are reverently passed on to many of those who succeeded them makes it difficult to differentiate them one from the other. But the history of the school is unimportant after the sixteenth or the early part of the seventeenth century, as it lost much of its force as an intellectual movement. In the days of the Arvars the Srlvais-nava movement was primarily a religious movement of mvstic and intoxicating love of God and self-surrender to Him. In the davs of Ramanuja it became intellectualized for some time, but it slowly-relapsed into the religious position. As with Saiikara, and not as with Madhva, the emphasis of the school has always been on the interpretations of Yedic texts, and the intellectual appeal has always been subordinated to the appeal to the Upanisadic texts and their

interpretations. The chief opponents of the Ramanuja school were the Sankarites, and we may read many works in which copious references are made by writers of the Sankara school who attempted to refute the principal points of the bhdsya of Ramanuja, both from the point of view of logical argument and from that of interpretations of the Upanisadic texts. But unfortunately, except in the case of a few later works of little value, no work of scholarly refutation of the views of Ramanuja by a Sankarite is available. The followers of Ramanuja also offered slight refutation of some of the doctrines of Bhaskara, Jadava-prakasa, and Madhva and the Saivas. But their efforts were directed mainly against Sankara.

It has already been noted that Ramanuja wrote a bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, Veddrtha-samgraha, Veddnta-sdra and Veddnta-dipa, a commentary on the Srimad-bhagavad-gitd, Gadya-traya, and Bhagavad-drddhana-krama 1 . According to traditional accounts, Ramanuja was born in a.d. 1017 and died in 1137. The approximate dates of the chief events of his life have been worked out as follows: study with Yadavaprakasa, 1033; first entry into Srirarigam to see Yamuna, 1043; taking holy orders, 1049; flight to Mysore for fear of the Cola king's persecution, 1096; conversion of Bitti-deva, the Jain king of Mysore, the Hoysala country, 1098; installing the temple God at Melukot, 1100; stay in Melukot, up to 1116; return to Srirarigam, 1118; death, 1137 2 . His nephew and disciple Dasarathi and his disciple Kurcsa were about fifteen or sixteen years junior to him 3 . Ramanuja's bhdsya, called also $ri-bhdsya, was commented on by Sudarsana Suri. His work is called Sruta prakdsikd, and is regarded as the most important commentary on the Sri-bhdsya.

1 visnv'arca-kriam avanotsukojnanam srlgltd-vivarana-bhdsya-dipa-sdrdn tad gadya-trayam akrta prapanna-nityd-nusthdna-kramam apt yogi-rat

pravandhdn. Divya-suri-Caritai.

Reference to the Veddrtha-samgraha of Ramanuja is also found in the same v 'O r k. i7v uktvd nigama-sikhd'rtha-samgrahd-khyam

bhinnas tarn krtim urarlkriyd-rtham asya.

2 Govindacharyar's Life of Ramanuja. Yamuna, according to the above view, would thus have died in 1042, corresponding with the first visit of Ramanuja to £rirarigam; but Gopi-natha Rau thinks that this event took place in 1038. The date of the Cola persecution is also regarded by GopI-nathaRau as having occurred in 1078-79, which would correspond to Ramanuja's flight to Mysore; and his return to ^rlrarigam must have taken place after 1117, the death of the Cola king Koluttuiiga. Thus there is some divergence between Govindacarya and Gopl-natha Rau regarding the date of Ramanuja's first visit to Jsrlrarigam and the date of his flight to Mysore. Gopi-natha Rau's views seem to be more authentic.

3 Apart from the Sahasra-giti-bhdsya, Kuresa wrote a work called Kuresa-vijaya.

Ramanuja Literature.

As already noted, the principal commentary on Ramanuja's bhdsya, was the &ruta-prakdsikd by Sudarsana Suri. Even before this Sruta-prakdsikd was written, another commentary, called Srl-bhdsya-vivrti, was written by Rama-misra-desika, a disciple of Ramanuja, under his own direction. This work was written in six chapters and was not a commentary in the ordinary sense, but a study of the principal contents of Ramanuja's bhdsya. This Rama Misra was a different man from Rama Misra, the teacher of Yamuna. The Sruta-prakdsikd had a further study, entitled Bhdva-prakdsikd, by Vlraraghavadasa. Criticisms of this work were replied to in a work called Bhdsya-prakasikd-dusanoddhdra by Sathakopacarya, a writer of the sixteenth century. The Sruta-prakdsikd had another commentary, called Tillika, by Yadhula Srlnivasa, a writer who probably belonged to the fifteenth century. The contents of the &ruta-prakdsikd were summarized in a work called Sruta-prakdsikd-sdra-samgraha. The bhdsya of Ramanuja was further commented on in the Tattva-sdra, by Vatsya Yarada, a nephew of Ramanuja. The name of the commentator's father was Devaraja, and his mother was Kamala, a sister of Ramanuja. He was a pupil of Srlvisnucitta, a disciple of Kuresa. This Tattva-sdra provoked a further criticism, called Ratna-sdritri ', by Ylra-raghava-dasa, son of Yadhula Nara-simha-guru and pupil of Yadhula Yaradaguru, son of Yadhula Venkatacarya. He also himself wrote a commentary on the &ri-bhdsya, called Tdtparya-dlpikd. Ylra-raghava-dasa lived probably in the later half of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Ramanuja's views were also collected together in a scholarly manner in a work called Naya-mukha-mdlikd, by Apvaya-dlksita, who was born in the middle of the sixteenth century. Ramanuja's bhdsya is also dealt with by the famous Yenkatanatha, in his work Tattva-tlkd. The Sri-bhdsya had another commentary called Naya-prakasika, by Meghanadari, a contemporary of Yenkatanatha of the fourteenth century 1 . A further commentary is

1 Meghanadari's great work^ Xaya-dyu-mani, has been treated in detail in a later section. He was the son of Atreyanatha and his mother's name was Adhvara-nayika. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinatha or Varanadrlsa, Varadarat, and Rama Misra. This Varanadrisa should not be confused with Dasarathi's grandson, who was of Vadhula %otra. Meghanadari's other works are Bhava-prabodlia and MwnukfG-paya-samgraha.

called Mita-prakdsikd, by Parakala Yati, probably of the fifteenth century. Parakala Yati had a disciple called Rahga Ramanuja, who wrote a study of the $ri-bhdsya, called Mula-bhdva-prakdsikd. One Srinivasacarya also criticized the &ri-bhdsya in Brahma-vidyd-kaumudi. It is difficult to guess which Srinivasa was the author of the work, there being so many brinivasas among the teachers of the Ramanuja school. Campakesa, disciple of Verikatanatha, also dealt with the $ri-bhdsya. Suddhasattva Laksmanacarya also wrote on the Sri-bhdsya, a work entitled Gnru-bhdva-prakdsikd which was based upon the Guru-tattva-prakdsikd of Campakesa. This work was in reality a commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd. The author was the son of Suddhasattva Yoglndra. He descends from the line of Rama-nuja's mother's sister, in which there were born eighteen teachers of Vedanta; he was the pupil of Saumya Jamatr muni and flourished probably in the latter half of the sixteenth century. This Guru-bhdva-prakdsikd was commented on in the Gura-bhdva-prakdsikd-vyakhyd. Sudarsana Suri also seems to have written a commentary on the $ri-bhdsya, called Sruti-dipikd. Srinivasa, the son of Tata-yarya and Laksml-devi, of Srisaila lineage and pupil of Annayarya and Kondinna Srlnivasa-dlksita, wrote another digest on the &i-bhdsya y called Tattva-mdrtanda. He probably lived in the latter half of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. The name of his grandfather was Anna-guru. He wrote Natva-darpana, Bheda-darpana, Siddhdnta-cintdmani, Sdra-darpana, and Virodha-nirodha 1 . He is also known as Srisaila Srinivasa, and he wrote other books, e.g. Jijndsd-darpana, Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd, and Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha. The Naya-dyu-mani of Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd is not to be confused with the Naya-dyu-mani of Megha-nadari; for it is a summaiy in verse of Ramanuja's bhdsya with a commentary in prose. The Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha is a work in

1 In his Virodha-nirodha he makes reference to a Mukti-darpana (MS. p. 82), Jndna-ratna-darpana (MS. p. 87), and in his Bheda-darpana (MS. p. 96) lie refers to his Guna-darpana. In his Virodha-nirodha he makes further reference to his other works, Advaita-vana-kiithdra and Bheda-mani (MS. p. 37), to his Bheda-darpana (MS. p. 68), and to his Sdra-darpana (MS. p. 66) and Tattva-mdrtanda (MS. p. 87). His Sdra-darpana gives the principal contents of Ramanuja's philosophy. In his Virodha-nirodha (MS. p. 37) he refers to a Virodha-bhanjana, by his elder brother Annayarya and to his own Siddhdnta-cintdmani (MS. p. 12). In referring to his elder brother he says that his Virodha-nirodha is largely a rearrangement of the arguments adduced by him in his Virodha-bhanjana, some of which had been elaborated and others condensed and rearranged in his Virodha-nirodha. The Virodha-nirodha is thus admitted by the author to have been based materially on Virodha-bhanjana by Annayarya, his elder brother.

8-2

prose on the bhdsya of Ramanuja, and the first four sutras intended to refute the criticisms made by his opponents. The Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha is a much smaller work than the Naya-dyu-mani^ which is often referred to by the author for details. It makes constant reference to objections against Ramanuja without mentioning the name of the critic. In the Naya-dyu-mani the author has made detailed discussions which are summarized by him in this work 5 . Thus Srinivasa wrote three works Naya-dyu-mani, Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha, and Naya-dyu-mani-dtpika. In his Siddhdnta-cintdmani Srlnivasa tries mainly to uphold the theory that Brahman is the only cause of all creation, animate and inanimate. In this work he tries to refute at every point the theory of Brahma-causality, as held by Sarikara.

Again, Desikacarya wrote a commentary on the Srl-bhdsya, called Prayoga-ratna-mdld. Narayanamuni wrote his Bhava-pradlpikd, and Purusottama his Subodhini also as commentaries on the Sri-bhdsya. These writers probably lived some time about the seventeenth century. Ylra-raghava-dasaalso criticized the Sri-bhdsya in the Tdtparya-dlpikd. His name has already been mentioned in connection with his study, Ral.ia-sdrinl, on Yatsva Yarada's Tattva-sdra. Srinivasa Tatacarya wrote his Laghu-prakdsikd, Sri-vatsanka Srinivasahis Sri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha, and Sathakopa hia Brahma-sutrdrtha-samgraha as commentaries on the Sri-bhdsya. These writers seem to have flourished late in the sixteenth century. Srivatsaiika Srinivasa's work was further summarized by Raiiga-carya in his Srivatsa-siddhdnta-sdra. Appava-dlksita, of the middle of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutras, called Naya-mukha-mdlikd, closely following the ideas of Ramanuja 2 . Raiiga Ramanuja also wrote a commentary, called

1 bhasya-rnavam avatlrno vistirnom yad avadam Nayo-dyumonau

samksipya tat paroktlr viksipya karumi tofamim vidusam.

Xaya-dyu-mani-samgraha, MS.

The general method of treatment followed in the book is to indulge in long discussions in refutation of the views of opponents and to formulate, as conclusion, the positive contentions of the I'isista-dvaita theory on the special points of interest. Thus at the end of a long discussion on the lirahma-sutra, i. 1.2, he says: rdddhantas tu no jannuVdlndm viscsnnatve risesya-bheda-prasangiih, ovirud-dhavisesananum dsraya-bhedakutviit na caivam viiesanatva-' m acchcdena na vyiivar-takatva-bhangah tad-un-astaya-jlvadi-vyavartakatvenaiva tad-asiddheh. {Naya-dyu-mani, MS. p. 126.)

Laksmandrya-firdayd'misdrinl likhyate Naya-malika.

Saya-muiihu-mdlika, printed in Kumbakonam, igi5, p. 3.

Sdriraka-sdstrdrtha-dipikd, on the Brahma-sutra, following the interpretations of Ramanuja. His Mula-bhdva-prakdsikd, a commentary on the £ri-bhdsya, has already been referred to in this section. He wrote also a commentary on the Nydya-siddhdnjana of Veiikatanatha, called Nydya-siddhdnjana-vydkhyd. He was a pupil of Parakala Yati and probably lived in the sixteenth century. He wrote also three other works, called Visaya-vdkya-dipikd, Chdnda-gyopanisad-bhdsya, and Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-sdra. Ramanujadasa, called also Mahacarya, lived probably early in the fifteenth century, and was a pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa. This Vadhula Srlnivasa, author of the Adhikarana-sdrdrtha-dipikd, must be an earlier person than Srinivasadasa, author of the Yattndra-mata-diptkd, who was a pupil of Mahacarya. Mahacarya wrote a work called Pdrdsarya-vijaya, which is a thesis on the general position of the Ramanuja Vedanta. He wrote also another work on the Sri-bhdsya called Brahma-sutra-bhdsyopanydsa. Mahacarya's other works are Brahma-vidyd-vijaya, Veddnta-vijaya, Rahasya-traya-mimdmsd, Rdmdnuja-carita-culuka, Astddasa-rahasydrtha-nirnaya, and Carida-mdruta, a commentary on the Sata-diisani of Veiikatanatha. He should be distinguished from Ramanujacarya, called also Vadihamsambuvaha, uncle of Veiikatanatha.

There is a work called &ri-bhdsya-vdrttika, which, unlike most of those above, has already been printed; but the author does not mention his name in the book, which is composed in verse. Sena-natha, or Bhagavat Senapati Misra, who is an author of later date, wrote Sdriraka-nydya-kaldpa. Vijayindra Bhiksu was the author of Sdriraka-tmmdmsd-vrtti, and Raghunatharya of Sdriraka-sdstra-samgati-sdra. Sundararaja-desika, an author of the sixteenth century, wrote a simple commentary on the Sri-bhdsya called Brahma-siitra-bhdsya-vydkhyd. Veiikatacarya, probably an author of the sixteenth century, wrote Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-purva-paksa-samgraha-kdrikd in verse. This Veiikatacarya was also known as " Prativadibhakesari." He also composed Acdrya-pancdsat. Cam-pakesa, who has already been referred to, wrote a commentary on the &ri-bhdsya, called Sri-bhdsya-vydkhyd. Venkatanatharya wrote a work called Sri-bhdsya-sdra. Srlvatsaiika Srlnivasacarya was the author of Sri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha. Sriraiigacarya composed Srl-bhdsya-siddhdnta-sdra and Srlnivasacarya wrote a work called Sri-bhdsyopanydsa. There are two other commentaries, called

Brahma-sutra-bhtisya-satngraha-vivarana and Brahma-sutra-bhtisyti-rambha-prayoyana-samarthana; but the names of the authors are missing in the manuscripts. Venkatanatha, of the thirteenth century, wrote Adhikar ana-stir avail, and Marigacarya Srlnivasa, Adhikarana-sarartha-dipika. Varadarya or Varadanatha, son of Venkatanatha, wrote a commentary on the Adhikarana-stiravali called Adhikara-cintamani. There is another work on similar subjects called Adhikarana-yukti-vilasa; but, though the author offers an adoration to Srlnivasa, he does not mention his name and it is difficult to discover who this Srinivasa was. Jagannatha Vati wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Ramanuja's bhasya, and it was called Brahma-sutra-dipika. It will thus be seen that Ramanuja's bhasya inspired many scholars and thinkers and a great literature sprang up on its basis. But it must be noted with regret that this huge critical literature on Ramanuja's bhasya, is not in general of much philosophical importance. Ramanuja's Vedtirtha-samgraha was commented on by Sudarsana Suri of the fourteenth century, in Tatparya-dfpika. He was the son of Yagvijaya, or Yisvajaya, and pupil of Yatsya Yarada. In addition to his study of Ramanuja's bhasya already referred to, he wrote a Sandhya-vandana-bhasya. Ramanuja's Vedanta-dipa (a brief commentary on the Brahma-sutra) was dealt with by Ahobila Rariganatha Yati, of the sixteenth century. Ramanuja's Gadya-traya was criticized by Venkatanatha, and Sudarsanacarya also wrote a commentary, Krsnapada, a later author, also wrote another commentary. Ramanuja's commentary on the Gita also was commented on by Yenkatanatha. The Vedanta-sara was a brief commentary on the Brahma-sutra by Ramanuja himself, based on his Sri-bhdsya.

Ramanujacarya, called also Yadihamsambuvahacarya of Atreya gotra, son of Padmanabha and maternal uncle of Yenkatanatha, lived in the thirteenth or fourteenth century; he wrote an important work, called Xaya-kulisa or Nyaya-kulisa, which has been noticed before. He composed also Dhya-suri-prabhaza-dlpikd, Sarva-darsana-siromani, and Moksa-siddhi, to which he himself refers in his Nyaya-kulisa 1 . It might seem that the Nyaya-kulisa was one of the earliest logical or ontological treatises of the Visista-dvaita school; but we find that there were other treatises of this type

1 I have not been able to procure a MS. of the Moksa-siddhi, and, so far as I can guess, the book is probably lost.

written during this period and even earlier than Ramanuja. Thus Nathamuni wrote a Nydya-tattva, in which he refuted the logical views of Gautama and founded a new system of Logic. Visnucitta, a junior contemporary of Ramanuja, wrote two works, Prameya-samgraha and Samgati-mdld. Varadavisnu Misra, who flourished probably in the latter half of the twelfth century, or the beginning of the thirteenth century, wrote a Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya. Varada Narayana Bhattaraka, who flourished before Vehkatanatha, also wrote a Prajnd-paritrdna 1 . Parasara Bhattaraka, who also probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote a Tattva-ratndkara 2 . These works have been referred to by Vehkatanatha in his Nydya-parisuddhi; but the manuscripts were not available to the present writer. Vatsya Varada's works have been mentioned in a separate section.

Vehkatanatha, called also Vedanta-desika, Vedantacarya, and Kavitarkikasimha, was one of the most towering figures of the school of Visistddvaita. He was born at Tupple in Kanjivaram in a.d. 1268. His father was Ananta Suri, his grandfather's name was Pundarlkaksa, and he belonged to the Visvamitra gotra ; his mother was Totaramba, sister of Atreya Ramanuja, otherwise called Vadi-kalahamsambuvahacarya. He studied with his uncle Atreya Ramanuja, and it is said that he accompanied him to Vatsya Varadacarya's place, when he was five years old. The story goes that even at such an early age he showed so much precocity that it was predicted by Vatsya Varada that in time he would be a great pillar of strength for the Visistd-dvaita-vdda school and that he would repudiate all false systems of philosophy 3 . It appears that he also studied with Varadarya himself 4 . It is said that he used to live by uficha-vrtti, receiving alms in the streets, and spent all his life in

1 He is said to have written another work, called Nydya-sudarsana, mentioned in the introduction to the Tattva-mukta-kalapa (Mysore, 1933). 1 He also wrote another work, called Bhagavad-guna-darpana. 3 utpreksyate budha-janair upapatti-bhumnya

ghantd hareh samajanista jadatmanfti pratisthapita-vedantah pratiksipta-bahir-matah bhiiyds traividya-mdnyas tvam bhuri-kalydna-bhdjanam. It is said that he was blessed by Varadacarya in the aforesaid verse, in which he describes Veiikatanatha as an incarnation of the bell of God. Vaisnavite Reformers of India, by T. Rajagopalachariar.

1 srutvd rdmdnujdrydt sad-asad-api tatas tattva-muktd kaldpam

vydtdnid venkateso varada-guru-krpd-lambhito-dddma-bhumd.

Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, si. 2.

writing philosophical and religious works. In the samkalpa-suryodaya he says that at the time when he was writing that work he had finished the Sri-bhdsya for the thirtieth time. While he lived in Kane! and Srirahgam, he had to work in the midst of various rival sects, and Pillai Lokacarya, who was very much senior to him in age and was the supporter of the Tehgalai school, against which Vehkatanatha fought, wrote a verse praising him. Scholars are in general agreement mat Vehkatanatha died in 1369, though there is also a view that he died in 1371. He enjoyed a long life and spent much of his time in pilgrimage to various northern countries such as Vijayanagara, Mathura, Brindaban, Ayodhya, and Purl. The story of Vidyaranya's friendship with Vehkatanatha may be true or false; but we know that Vidyaranya was acouainted with the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, and he quotes from it in his account of the Visistd-dvaita view in Sarva-darsana-samgraha. When Vehkatanatha was middle-aged, Sudarsana Siiri, writer of the Sruta-prakdsikd, was already an old man, and it is said that he called Vehkatanatha to Srirahgam and handed over to him his commentary on the Sri-bhdsya, so that it might get a greater publicity. Vehkatanatha himself also wrote a commentary on the Sri-bhdsya, called the Tattra-tikd. Though an extremely kind man of exemplary and saintly character, he had many enemies who tried to harass and insult him in countless ways. A great difference in interpretation of the nature oiprapatti, or self-surrender to God, was manifested at this time in the writings of different Srlvaisnava scholars. Two distinct sects were formed, based mainly on the different interpretation of the nature of prapatti, though there were minor differences of a ritualistic nature, such as the marks on the forehead, etc. Of these two sects, the leader of the Vadakalai was Vehkatanatha, and that of the Tehgalai was Pillai Lokacarya. Later on Sauniva Jamatr muni became the accepted leader of the Tehgalai school. Though the leaders themselves were actuated by a spirit of sympathy with one another, yet their followers made much of these little differences in their views and constantly quarrelled with one another, and it is a well known fact that these sectarian quarrels exist even now.

It was during Vehkatanatha's life that Malik Kafur, a general of 'Ala-ud-dln, invaded the Deccan in 1310. He easily conquered the countries of Warangal and Dvarasamudra and pushed to the extreme south, spreading devastation and plundering everywhere.

In 1326 the Mahomedans invaded Srlrahgam and pillaged the city and the temple. About 1351 the Hindu Kingdom in Vijay-anagar was established by King Bukka I. When the Mahomedans pillaged the temple of Srlrahgam, the temple-keepers had fled away to Madura with the God Rahganatha, who was established in Tirupati and was worshipped there. Bukka's son Kampana began to make conquest in the south and eventually Gopana, a general of Kampana, succeeded in restoring Rahganatha to Srlrahgam. This affair has been immortalized by a verse composed by Vehkatanatha, which is still written on the walls of the temple of Srlrahgam, though certain authorities think that the verse was not by him, but is only attributed to him. This story is found in a Tamil work, called Kavilologu, and is also recorded in the Vadakalai Guru-parampara of the fifteenth century. During the general massacre at Srirahgam, Vehkatanatha hid himself among the dead bodies and fled ultimately to Mysore. After having spent some years there he went to Coimbatore, and there he wrote his Abhiti-stava, in which he makes references to the invasion of the Mahomedans and the tragic condition at Srlrahgam. When he heard that by Gopana's endeavours Rahganatha was restored to Srlrahgam he went there and wrote a verse applauding his efforts 1 .

Vehkatanatha was a prolific writer on various subjects and also a gifted poet. In the field of poetry his most important works are the Yadavabhyudaya, 'Hamsa-samdeia, Subhasita-riivi, and Sam-kalpa-suryodaya, an allegorical drama in ten acts. The Yadavabhyudaya was a work on the life of Krsna, which was commented upon by no less a person than Appaya-dlksita. The Subhasita-nivi, a didactic poem, was commented upon by Srlnivasa Suri of the

1 ar:iyanlla-srnga-dyuti-racita-jagad-ranjanad anjand'dres

ceficydm aradhya kan cit samayam atha nihatyod'dhanuskans tuluskan laksml-bhumydv'ubhdbhydtn salia nija-nagare sthdpayan rangandtham samyag-varydm saparydm punar akrta yaso-darpattam goppand-ryah. The verse appears in Epigraphica Indica, vol. VI, p. 330.

This fact has also been recorded in Doddyacarya's Vcddnta-deiika-vaibhava-prakdsikd and Yatlndra-pravana in the following verse: jitvd tuluskan bhuvi goppanendro rangd-dhipam sthdpitavdn sva-dese ity'evam dkarnya guruh kavlndro dhrstavad yas tarn aham prapadye. According to the commentary, the aforesaid Vaibhava-prakdsikd, Verikatanatha was born in 1269 and died in 1369. Goppanarya's reinstallation of ^riranganatha took place in 1371.

Srisaila lineage, son of Yerikatanatha. He lived in all probability in the fifteenth century. Yerikatanatha's other poem was Hamsa-sandesa. In his Samkalpa-suryodaya he dramatically describes, after the pattern of the Prahodha-candro-daya, the troubles and difficulties of the human soul in attaining its final perfection. He wrote about thirty-two adoration hymns such as the Haya-griva-stutra, and Dez a-navaka-pancasdt and Padukd-sahasra-ndnia. He also wrote many devotional and ritualistic pieces, such as the Y' ajnoparlta-pratisthd ', Arddhana-krama, Hari-dina-tilaka, I 'aisvadeva-kdrikd, Sri-paiica-rdtra-raksd, Sac-caritra-raksd and Xiksepa-raksd. I le also collected from various sources the verses regarding the doctrine of prapatti, and wrote the iXydsa-vimsati and a further work based on it, called the Nxdsa-tilaka, which was commented upon by his son Kumara-Yedanta-desika in a work called Xydsa-tilaka-tydkhyd. Due notice of his Pancardtra-raksd has been taken in the section on Pancardtra of the present volume. He wrote also a work called Silpdrtha-sdra, two works on medicine called Rasa-bhaumdmrta and Vrksa-bhaumdmrta, a Puranika geography called Bhu-gola-nirnaya, and a philosophical work called Tattva-muktd-kaldpa in verse with his own commentary on it called Sarvdrtha-siddhi, which have been noticed in some detail in the special section on Yeiikatanatha. This work has two commentaries, called Ananda-ddxini or Ananda-vallari (in some manuscripts) or Nrsimha-rdjixa and Hhdra-prakdsa, of which the latter is of an annotative character. The commentary called Ananda-ddyim was written bv Yatsya Nrsimhadeva, son of Narasimha-suri, and Totaramba and Devaraja Sfiri. Xrsimhadeva's maternal grandfather was Kausika-£rihhasya-SrInivasa, who was also his teacher. He had another teacher, named Appavacarya. This Devaraja Suri was probably the author of the Vimba-tattva-prakdsikd and Caramopdya-tdtparya. Xrsimhadeva's other works were Para-tattva-dipikd, Bheda-dhikkura-nyakkdru, Mam-sdra-dhikkdra, Siddhdnta-nirnaya, a commentary on Yenkataniitha's Niksepa-raksd, called Xrsimha-rdjiya, and a commentary on the Sata-dilsani. This Nrsimhadeva lived probably in the sixteenth century. The commentary called Bhdva-prakdsa was witten by Navyaraiigesa. He describes himself as a disciple of Kalijit; but this must have been a different Kalijit from the well-known Lokacarya; for the Rhdva-prakdsikd commentary, as it refers to the topics of the Ananda-ddxini, is a later one. It must have been

written late in the sixteenth or at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Veiikatanatha also wrote the Nydya-parisuddhi, a comprehensive logical work of the Visistd-dvaita school. It was criticized by Srlnivasadasa, son of Devarajacarya, who was a disciple of Veiikatanatha. He may have been an uncle and teacher of Nrsimha-deva, author of the Ananda-ddyini. His commentary was called Nydya-sdra. The Nydya-parisuddhi had two other commentaries, Aikdsa, by Sathakopa Yati, a disciple of Ahovila and Nydya-pari-suddhi-vydkhyd, written by Krsnatatacarya.

Veiikatanatha wrote a work supplementary to the Nydya-parisuddhi, called Nydya-siddhd-njana, the contents of which have been noted in the separate sections on Veiikatanatha. He also wrote another work called Para-mata-bhanga, and a polemical work called Sata-dusani. The name Sata-dusatii signifies that it-contains a hundred refutations; but actually, in the printed text available to me, I can trace only forty. The best-known commentary, by Rama-nujadasa, pupil of Vadhula Srlnivasa, is called Canda-mdruta. All important discussions contained in the Sata-dusani, which are directed mainly against the Saiikara school, have been duly noticed in a different section. It had another commentary, by Nrsimharaja, which is also called Canda-mdruta, and another, by Srinivasacarya, called Sahasra-kirani.

Veiikatanatha, in addition to his Tattva-tikd commentary on the Sri-bhdsya, wrote a summary of the general topics of the Sri-bhdsya discussion, called Adhikarana-sdrdvali, which was commented upon by his son Kumara Vedantacarya or Varadanatha, in a work called Adhikarana-sdrdvali-vydkhyd or Adhikarana-cintdmani. He also wrote two small pamphlets, called Cakdra-samarthana and Adhikarana-darpana\ a commentary on the Isopanisat; one on Yamuna's Gitdrtha-samgraha, called Gitdrtha-samgraha-raksd, and a commentary on Ramanuja's Gitd-bhdsya, called Tdtparya-candrikd. He also criticized Ramanuja's Gadya-traya, in a work called Tdtparya-dipikd, and wrote commentaries on Yamuna's Catuh-sloki and Stotra-ratndkara, which are called Rahasya-raksd. In addition he composed thirty-two works in the mani-pravdla style, some of which have been translated into Sanskrit. These works are Sampraddya-parisuddhi, Tattva-padavi, Rahasya-padazi, Tattva-navanltam, Rahasya-navanitam, Tattva-

rndtrkd, Rahasya-mdtrkd, Tattva-sandesa, Rahasya-sandesa, Raha-sya-sandesa-vivarana,Tattva-ratndvali y Tattva-ratndvali-samgraha, Rahasya-ratndvali,Rahasya-ratndvali-hrdaya,Tattva-traya-culuka, Rahasya-traya-culuka, Sdra-dlpa, Rahasya-traya-sdra, Sdra-sdra, Abhaya-praddna-sdra, Tattva-sikhd-mani, Rahasya-sikhd-mani ', Anjali-vaibhava, Pradhdnd-sataka, Upakdra-satngraha, Sdra-samgraha, Virodha-parihdra, Muni-vdhana-bhoga, Madhura-kazi-hrdaya, Parama-pdda-sopdna, Para-mata-bhanga, Hastigiri-mdhdt-mya, Dravidopanisat-sdra, Dravidopanisat-tdtparydvali and Xigama-parimala. The last three are works summarizing the instructions of the Arvars. He was the author of twenty-four poems in the Tamil language 1 .

Yenkatanatha also wrote a small pamphlet called Vddi-traya-khandana, in which he tried to refute the views of Sankara, Yadava-prakasa, and Bhaskara. Most of the arguments are directed against Sankara, whereas the views of Yadavaprakasa and Bhaskara were but slightly touched. He also wrote two works on Mlmamsa, called Mvndrnsd-pddukd and Sesvara-mimdmsd. In the last work Yeh-katanatha tries to interpret the Mimdmsd-sutra of Jaimini in a manner different from that of Sahara. His main intention was to interpret the Mimdmsd-sutra in such a manner that it might not be in conflict with the Brahma-sutra, but might be regarded as a complementary accessory to the teachings of the Brahma-sutra. Thus, in interpreting the first sutra of jaimini, he says that the injunction of reading the Vedas is satisfied with the mere study of the Yedas. The injunction does not include an enquiry into the meaning of the texts and a study of the Mlmamsa, which comes out of the natural desire for knowing the meanings of the texts and their applications. The study of the Mlmamsa may therefore be undertaken even after the final bath of the brahma-cdrin. Thus, a man may, after finishing his obligatory studies as a brahma-cdrin in the house of his teacher, still continue to live there for the study of Mlmamsa, but the latter is no part of his obligatory duty. Again, in defining the nature of dharma, Venkatanatha says that dharma is that which contributes to our good and is also in accordance with the injunctions 2 . Though

The list of these Tamil works, which were not accessible to the present writer, has been collected from the introduction to the Mysore edition of the Tattva-mukta-kaltipa.

CoJana-laksanatva-visesitam evarthe sadhauatvam dharma-laksanam. Iivara-mlmamsa, p. 18.

the word dharma may be otherwise used by some persons, yet its accepted meaning, as defined above, remains unaltered. The instructions of the Smrtis, Purdnas, Pancardtras, Brahma-sutras, etc., are to be regarded as dharma, as being based upon the Vedas, which are their source. The validity of the nature of dharma cannot be determined by a reference to any other pramdna than the scriptural texts. In all matters of doubt and dispute the Mimdmsd-sutra should be interpreted in such a manner that it does not come in conflict with the views of Badarayana, who was the teacher of Jaimini.

Vehkatanatha's son was also a great writer on Vedanta. He was called Kumara Vedantacarya, Varadarya or Varadfmatha or Varada Desikacarya or Varadaraja Suri or Varadanayaka Suri or Varada-guru. He wrote a Tattva-traya-culuka-samgraha, a work in Sanskrit prose, in which he summarizes the contents of the Tamil Tattva-traya-culuka of Vehkatanatha, describing the fundamental Srivaisnava doctrines regarding soul, matter and God 1 . His other works are Vyavahdraika-satyatva-khandana, Prapatti-kdrikd, Rahasya-traya-culuka, Carama-guru-nirnaya, Phala-bheda-khan-dana, Arddhana-sarngraha, Adhikarana-cintdmant, Nydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd, Rahasya-traya-sdrdrtha-samgraha. The last three works are commentaries on Vehkatanatha's Adhikarana-sdrdvali, Nydsa-tilaka, and Rahasya-traya-sdra. Varadarya lived till the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Meghanadari lived probably in the twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries. He was closely associated with his elder brother Rama Misra, a pupil of Ramanuja. He wrote a Naya-prakdsikd, a commentary on the Sri-bhdsya, Bhdva-prabodha, Mumuksu-pdya-samgraha, and Naya-dyu-mani. The last work is one of the most recondite works on the Visistd-dvaita school of thought, and its main contents have been noted in a separate section. He was the son of Atreyanatha and Adhvara-nayika. He had three brothers, Hastyadrinatha, Varadarat, and Rama Misra.

Ramanujadasa or Mahacarya wrote a Brahma-sutra-bhdsyopa-nydsa, a commentary on the $ri-bhdsya. He wrote also a Pdrdsarya, in which he tried to show that the commentaries of Sahkara, Madhva and others were not in consonance with the Sutras of

1 It is also called cid-acid-isvoro-tattva-nirupana, or Tattva-traya.

Badarayana. Some account of this will be found in the fourth volume of the present work. He also wrote a Rdmdnuja-carita-culuka, Rahasya-traya-mimdmsd-bhdsya, and Canda-maruta, a learned commentary on the Sata-dusani of Verikatanatha. Sudar-sanaguru wrote a commentary on his Vedanta-vijaya, called Mahgala-dipikd. He wrote a big treatise called Vedanta-vijaya, which was divided into several more or less independent, though inter-related parts. The first part is Qurupasatti-vijaya, in which the methods of approaching the teacher are discussed. The manuscript is fairly voluminous, containing 273 pages, and the modes of discussion are on the basis of Upanisadic texts. The second part is called Brahma-vidyd-vijaya (a MS. containing 221 pages), in which he tries to prove, on the basis of Upanisadic texts, that Brahman means Narayana and no other deity. The third part, called Sad-vidyd-vijaya, contains seven chapters and is philosophical and polemical in spirit. I have in a later section given an account of its principal contents. The last part is called Vijayolldsa (a A IS. of 158 pages), in which he seeks to prove that the Upanisads refer to Narayana alone. I have not been able to trace the fourth part. Sudarsanaguru wrote a commentary on this Vedanta-vijaya. This Sudarsana is different from Sudarsanacarya. He wrote also an Advaita-vidyd-vijaya, a work in three chapters, based principally on Upanisadic texts. The three chapters are Prapahca-mithydtva-bhanga, Jivesvaraikya-bhanga, and Akhanddrthatva-bhanga. He also composed another work, called Upanisad-mangala-dipikd, which was not accessible to the present writer. 1 Ie describes himself sometimes as a pupil of Vadhula Srlnivasa and sometimes as a pupil of his son Prajnanidhi. He lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vadhula Srlnivasa, who wrote the Tulikd commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd.

Rariga Ramanuja Muni lived probably in the fifteenth century. He was the disciple of Vatsya Anantarya, Tatayarya, and Parakala Yati or Kumbha-kona Tatayarya. He wrote a commentary on the Sribhdsya, called Mfda-blidva-prakdsikd, and one on the Xvdya-siddhdnjana, called Nydya-siddhdnjana-vydkhyd. He also wrote a Dramidupanisad-bhdsya, Visaya-vdkya-dipikd, Rdrndm/ja-sidd/idnta-sdra, a commentary on the Chdndogyo-panisad, called Chandogyo-panisad-prakdsikd, and one on the Brhad-dranyako-panisat-prakd-hkd. He wrote an independent commentary on the Brahma-siitra,

called Sdriraka-Sastrdrtha-dipikd. Aufrecht reports, in his Cata-logus Catalogorum, that he wrote also the following works (which, however, are not accessible to the present writer): Upanisad-vdkya-vivarana, Upanisat-prakdsikd, Upanisad-bhdsya, Dravidopanisat-sdra-ratndvali-vydkhyd y Kathavally-upanisat-prakdsikd, Kausita-kopanisat-prakdsikd, Taittiriyopanisat-prakdsikd, Prasnopanisat-prakdsikd, Mdndukyopanisat-prakdsikd, Mundakopanisat-prakdsikd, Svetdsvataropanisat-prakdsikd y ^ruta-bhdva-prakdsikd y Guru-bhdva-prakdsikd 1 .

Raiiga Ramanuja's teacher, Parakala Yati, otherwise called Kumbha-kona Tatayarya, wrote the following works: Dravida-sruti-tattvdrtha-prakdsikd, Tiruppaldndu-vydkhyana, Tiruppalavai-vydkhydna, Kanninnun-sirattdmbu-vydkhydna, Adhikdra-samgraha-vydkhyd. He wrote also a Vijayindra-pardjaya in refutation of the Para-tattva-prakdsikd of Vijaylndra.

Srinivasadasa, of the lineage of Madhava, son of Devarajacarya and a pupil of Venkatanatha, wrote a Nydya-sdra, a commentary on the Nydya-parisuddhi, and also a commentary called Sata-dusani-vydkhyd-sahasra-kirani. It is possible that the Srinivasadasa who wrote the Visistd-dvaita-siddhdnta, Kaivaly-sata-dusani, Durupadesa-dhikkdra, Nydsa-vidyd-vijaya, Mukti-sabda-vicdra, Siddhy-updya-sudarsana, Sdra-niskarsa-tippani and Vddddri-kulisa is the same as the author of the Nydya-sdra. He lived late in the fourteenth and in the fifteenth century. This Srinivasa must be distinguished from Srlsaila Srlnivasa, whose works have been treated in a separate section. Srlsaila Srlnivasa also lived probably in the fifteenth century.

We have another Srlnivasa, who wrote an Adhikarana-sdrdrtha-dipikd. On some interpretations of the colophon he may probably be styled as Vadhula Srlnivasa, in which case he would be the teacher of Mahacarya 2 .

There is another Srlnivasa, who was the pupil of Mahacarya, alias Ramanujadasa, and son of Govindarya. He wrote a commentary on the Sruta-prakdsikd and also the Yatindra-mata-dipikd, or Yati-pati-mata-dlpikd. The author says that in writing this elementary treatise on the fundamental principle and doctrines of Srivais-

1 See Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum, pp. 488-9.

2 On the other interpretation the adjective Vadhula-kula-tilaka applies to his teacher Samara-pungavdcdrya. This SVinivasa was known also as Mahgacarya Srlnivasa.

navism he collected his materials from a large number of ancient treatises. 1

The book Yatindra-mata-dipika contains ten chapters. The first chapter enumerates the different categories, gives the definition of perception and shows how other sources of knowledge, such as memory, recognition, and non-perception, can all be included within this definition. It then gives a refutation of the various theories and establishes the theory of sat-khydti. It denies the claim of verbal cognition to be regarded as a case of perception, refutes the definition of indeterminate cognition, and does not admit the possibility of any inference regarding God.

In the second chapter the writer defines "inference," classifies it and enumerates the rules regarding the validity of it and also gives a list of fallacies that may arise out of the violation of these rules. He includes analogy (upamiti) and proof by implication (arthdpatti) in the definition of inference and names the different modes of controversy.

In the third chapter we get the definition of " verbal testimony." The authority of the scriptures is established, and an attempt has been made to show that all words convey the sense of Narayana the Lord.

The fourth chapter is longer than all the others. The author here refutes the categories of the Nydya school of thought such as the universals, the relation of inherence, the causality of the atoms, and gives his own view about the genesis of the different categories, the mind-stuff, the body, the senses, the five primordial elements of earth, air, heat, water, sky, and so on.

The fifth chapter gives an account of time and establishes its all-pervasive and eternal nature. The sixth chapter enumerates the eternal, transcendental attributes of pure sattva, which belongs both to isvara and jiva.

The seventh chapter is more philosophical. It contains a de-

1 evatti Drdvida-bhdsya — Nydya-tattva — Siddhi-traya- Sri-bhdsya- Dipa-sara — Veddrthasamgraha — Bhasya-vivarana — Samglta-mdld- -Sud-artha-sam-ksepa, Sruta-prakusika — Tattva-ratndkara- Prajnd-paritrdna - Prameya-samgra-ha — Nydya-kulisa—Nydya-sudarsana — Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya—Sydya-sdra — Tattya-dlpana — Tattvu-nirnaya — Sarvdrtha-sidJhi — Nydya-parisuddhi — Xyd-ya-siddhdiijnna - Paramata-bhanga — Tattva-traya-culuka — Tattva-traya-niru-pana—Tattva-traya-pracanda-mdruta — Veddnta-vijaya- Pdrdsaryya-vijaya'di-purvd'carya-priibandhd-nusdrena jndtarydrthdn samgrhyo bdlabodhdrthom Viitui-dra-mata-cfrpiku-khya-sdriraka-paribhdsdydm te pratipdditdh. Yatlndra-mala-dtpUm, p. 101.

tailed discussion as to how knowledge may be both an attribute and a substance, so that it may be a quality of the self and also constitute its essence. Attempts are here made to show that all mental states, including that of feeling, can be reduced to that of knowledge. Devotion and the attitude of self-surrender are discussed and the three courses, knowledge, action, and devotion, are elaborated. The writer also brings out the futility of the means of salvation prescribed by other systems of thought.

In the eighth chapter the author enumerates the attributes common to both, jiva and isvara, and deals at great length with the true nature of the individual self, refuting the theory of the Buddhists on this point. He gives also a description of the devotees and their twofold classification, and enumerates the attributes of the emancipated jivas.

The ninth chapter is devoted to the definition of God, and establishes Him as the instrumental, material and the accessory cause of the world. It refutes the theory of mdyd of the monists (adraitins) and gives an account of the fivefold aspects of God such as vibhavas, avatdras, etc. The tenth chapter enumerates and defines ten categories other than substance, such as the sattva, rajas, tamaSy sabda, sparsa, and the relation of contact, etc.

There was another Srlnivasadasa, of the Andan lineage, who was author of a Katva-tattva-paritrdna. He tried to prove that the word Narayana is not an ordinary compound word, but a special word which stands by itself indicative of the name of the highest God. There was yet another Srinivasa, called Srinivasa Raghava-dasa and Canda-maruta, who wrote a Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha.

This Srinivasa again must be distinguished from another Srinivasa of the lineage of Sathamarsana, who wrote at least one work known to the present writer, Ananda-tdratamya-khandana. In this small treatise he tries to refute, by a reference to scriptural passages, the view that there are differences in the state of salvation.

A few other Srlnivasas and their works are also known to the present writer, and it is possible that they flourished in the fifteenth or the sixteenth century. These are Srivatsarika Misra, who wrote a small work called &ri-bhdsya-sdrdrtha-samgraha\ Srinivasa Tatarya, who wrote Laghu-bhdva-prakdsikd\ Srisaila Yogendra,

who wrote a work called Tydga-sabddrtha-tippani; Srlsaila Ragha-varya, grandson of Verikatanatha, who wrote a Veddnta-kaustubha ; Srisailadasa, son of Raiigadasa, who wrote Siddhdnta-samgraha; Sundararajadesika, author of Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-zydkhyd (an elementary commentary). These minor writers flourished probably in the sixteenth, seventeeth and eighteenth centuries.

Srlnivasa-diksita, son of Srlsaila Srlnivasa Tatayarya, grandson of Annayarva, and a pupil of Acarya-diksita, wrote a work called Virodha-varuthinl-pramdthinl. This must be distinguished from the Virodha-varuthini-pramdthim of Raiigacarya dealt with in a different section. Srlnivasa-sudhl also wrote Brahma-jndna-nirdsa, which records the controversy which the author had with Tryambaka Pandita, a follower of Saiikara. It generally follows a line of argument adapted in the Sata-dusarii in refuting the monistic Vedanta of Saiikara. It is difficult to say whether the works Naya-mani-kalikd, Laksmandrya-siddhdnta-saingraha, and llari-guna-manimald should be attributed to this author or to the Srlnivasa who wrote the Virodha-nirodha.

Sudarsana Suri, who lived in the thirteenth and fourteenth

centuries, of the lineage of Harita, son of Vagvijaya and pupil of

Vatsya Varada, has been already mentioned. He wrote a treatise on

the commentary of Ramanuja from whose works all succeeding

writers drew their inspiration. The title of his commentary is

Sruta-prakdsikd, which incorporates, often word for word, what he

heard from his teacher Vatsya Varada 1 . He also wrote a Sandhyd-

vandana-bhdsya, Veddnta-samgraha-tdtparya-dipikd, a commentary

on the Veddrtha-samgraha of Ramanuja, and another work, called

Sruta-pradipikd. He was often called Vedavyasa Bhattarya. This

Sudarsana must be distinguished from Sudarsanaguru who wrote

a commentary on the Veddnta-vijaya of Mahacarya. Sathakopa

muni, who was a pupil of Sathari Suri and often known as Satha-

kopa Yati, lived probably towards the end of the sixteenth century.

He wrote the following works: Brahma-laksana-vdkydrtha-

samgraha, Brahma-sabddrtha-vicdra, \ dkydrtha-samgraha, Brahma-

sutrdrtha-samgraha, Brahma-laksana-vdkydrtha, Divya-prabandha

and Bhdva-prakdsikd-dusanoddhdra. The last work is an attempt at

1 gurubhyo' rthah srutah sabdais tat-prayuktais ca yojitah

saukaryaya bubhutsunam sumkalayya prakasyate.

Introductory' verses to the Sruta-prakasikd.

refutation of the criticism of the Bhdva-prakdsikd, a commentary on Sruta-prakdsikd, by Varada Visnu Suri.

Ahobila Rariganatha Yati, who flourished at the beginning of the fifteenth century, wrote a Nydsa-vivrti, in which he deals with the topics of nydsa as expounded in Verikatanatha's Nydsa-tilaka. Adivaraha Vedantacarya wrote a Nydya-ratndvali. Krsnatatacarya, who flourished in the fifteenth century and belonged to the Srisaila lineage, wrote a commentary on the Nydya-parisuddhi, called Nydya-parisuddhi-vydkhyd and some small treatises called Durdrtha-durikarana, Brahma-sabddrtha-vicdra and Natva-candrikd. Krsna-pada-lokaguru, probably of the same century, wrote a Rahasya-traya-mlmdmsd-bhdsya, Divya-prabandha-vydkhyd, Catuh-slokl-vydkhyd, and a number of Tamil works. Campakesa, of the fifteenth century, wrote a Guru-tattva-prakdsikd, and a Veddnta-kantako-ddhdra. In the last work he tried to refute the criticisms of the Sri-bhasya 1 . He was a pupil of Verikatanatha. Another Tatacarya, who was grandfather of Verikatadhvari, the author of the Visva-gunddarsa, wrote a Tdtdcdrya-dina-caryd. He was the maternal uncle of Appaya-dlksita. Again, Desikacarya, who wrote the Prayoga-ratna-mdld as a commentary on the &ri-bhdsya, also wrote a book on the commentary on Venkatanatha's Panyikd on the Taittiriyopanisat, which was called the " Asti-brahmeti-sruty-artha-vicdra." Doddayacarya, who lived probably in the fifteenth century, wrote a Parikara-vijaya, often referred to in Mahacarya's works, and a life of Veiikatanatha, called Veddnta-desika-vaibhava-prakdsikd. Narayana muni wrote a Bhdva-pradipikd, Gltdrtha-samgraha, Gitd-sdra-raksd, Gitd-samgraha-vibhdga, Rahasya-traya-jlvdtu. He was the son of Srisaila Tatayarya, grandson of Anantarya and pupil of Ramanujacarya, probably Mahacarya. He lived perhaps late in the fifteenth century. Nrsimharaja, who wrote a commentary on the Sata-dusani, called Sdta-dusani-vydkhyd, was probably the same person who wrote an Ananda-ddyinl on the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa. Nrsimhasuri, a much later writer, wrote a &arira-bhdvddhiharana-vicdra and Tat-kratu-nydya-vicdra. Para-

1 ^uddhasattvalaksanarya wrote a work called Guru-bhdva-prakasikd as a commentary on the Sruta-prakasikd, which he based upon the Guru-tattva-prakasikaoi Campakesa. He was the disciple of ^uddhasattvacarya, son of Saumya Jamatr muni. In his commentary he constantly refers to the Tulikd commentary of Vadhula £rinivasa. He lived probably in the sixteenth century, and may have been a contemporary of Mahacarya.

9-2

vastu Yedantacarya, son of Adivarahacarya, composed a Veddnta-kaustubha. Purusottama wrote a commentary on the Sri-bhdsya called Subodhini, and Bhagavat Senapati Misra wrote a Sdriraka-nydya-kald.

Pela Puradesika wrote a work called Tattva-bhdskara. It is divided into two parts, in the first of which he tries to ascertain the meaning of mdyd and elucidates the nature of God on the basis of Dravidian and Sanskrit texts. The second part is of a ritualistic nature. Rarigaraja, who lived probably in the sixteenth century, was the author of Adzaita-zahiskdra. Ranganathacarya wrote an Astddasa-bheda-vicdra, Purusdrtha-ratndkara, I izdddrtha-sam-graha, Kdryddhikorana-zeda and Kdryddhikarana-tattva. The contents of the last two works have been dealt with in a different section. He lived perhaps in the sixteenth centurv, and was a pupil of Saumya Jamatr muni. A Ramanuja called Vedanta Ramanuja wrote a Dizya-suri-prabhdza-dlpikd and a Sarva-darsana-siromam. Ramanujadasabhiksu wrote Sauri-rdja-carandrurinda-saratid-gati-sdra, and Rama Subrahmanvasastrl lisnu-tattva-rahasya. These two writers flourished probably in the seventeenth or late in the sixteenth century.

Atreya Varada wrote a Rahasya-traya-sdru-zydkhyd, a commentary on Yerikatanatha's Rahasya-traya-sdra. Varadadasa wrote Nydsa-vidyd-bhusana and Yadi Kesarl Misra the following: Adhydtma-cintd, Tattza-dlpa-satngraha-kdrikd, Tattva-dlpa and Rahasya-traya-kdrikd. These small works are of little value. Only the Tattva-dlpa contains some philosophical materials inspired by the Sruta-prakdsikd of Sudarsana. Ylra-raghava-dasa, son of Vadhula Narasimha and pupil of Yadhula Yaradaguru, produced a commentary on the Sri-bhds\a, called Tutparxa-dlpikd, and one on Yatsya Yarada's Tattza-sdra, called Ratna-sdrini. Yehkata Sudhl wrote a voluminous work in four chapters, called Siddhdnta-ratndzali, in which he tried to prove that Xarayana and not Siva is the supreme Lord and the cause of the world, and dealt with many sectarian doctrines which are of no philosophical value. He was the pupil of Yehkatanatha and son of Tatacarva of Sathamarsana lineage. Some notice of the work will be taken in the section on Pancardtra. Yenkatadasa, called also Yucci Yehkatacarya, the third son of Annayarya, of Sathamarsana lineage, composed a work called Veddntakdrikdzali. Yehkatadhvari wrote a work called Yati-

prativandana-khandana, Ayyanna wrote Vydsa-tdtparya-nirnaya and Annavayyangacarya, Trtnsa-prasno-ttara, Kesara-bhusana and Sri-tattva-darpana. Gopalatata wrote Satakoti-dusana-parihdra, Govindacarya Pramdna-sdra and Jagannatha Yati Brahma-sutra-dlpikd. Devanatha wrote Tattva-nirnaya, Dharmakuresa Rdmdnuja-nava-ratna-mdlikdy Nllameghatatacarya Nydsa-vidydrtha-vicdra, Rangacarya Srivatsa-siddhdnta-sdra, Raghunathacarya Bdla-sarasvati and Sangati-sdra. Raghavacarya wrote Rahasya-traya-sdra-samgraha, Ramanatha Yogi Sadd-cdra-bodha, Ramanuja Gdyatri-sata-dusani and Tirumalacarya of Bharadvaja lineage Nattvopapatti-bhanga.

Annayarya, brother of Srisaila Srinivasa, wrote Saptati-ratva-tndlikd, Vyavahdrikatva-khandana-sdra, Mithydtva-khandana y Ac-drya-vimsati y Ananda-tdratamya-khandana. Appaya-dlksita of the sixteenth century commented on the Brahma-sutra in accordance with the views of Ramanuja, in a work called Naya-mukha-mdlikd. Anantarya of the nineteenth century wrote a number of works of which the following have been published: Nattva-tattva-•vibhusana, Satakoti-khandana, Nydya-bhdskara, Acdra-locana (a refutation of widow-remarriage), £dstrdrambha-samarthana, Satn-dsa-vdda, Visayatd-vdda, Brahma-sakti-vdda, Sdstraikya-vdda, Moksa-kdranatd-vdda, Nirvisesa-pramdna-vyuddsa, Samvin-ndn-dtva-samarthana, Jndna-ydthdrthya-vdda, Brahma-laksana-vdda, Iksaty-adhikarana-vicdra, Pratijnd-vdda, Akdsddhikarana-vicdra, Sribhdsya-bhdvdnkura, Laghu-sdmdnddhikaranya-vdda, Guru-sdm-dnddhikaranya-vdda, Sdrira-vdda, Siddhdnta-siddhdhjana, Vidhi-sudhdkara, Sudarsana-sura-druma, Bheda-vdda, Tat-kratu-nydya-zicdra, Drsyatvd-numdna-nirdsa. These treatises are mostly short papers, though a few are more elaborate. The Nydya-bhdskara is a refutation of the Gauda-brahmdnandi commentary on the Advaita-siddhi, in refutation of the Nydydmrta-tarangini. It consists of twelve topics, and the refutations are mostly of a scholastic nature following the style of the new school of logic in Bengal which found fault with the definitions of their opponents. Some of the most important works of this writer have been referred to in the relevant places of this work.

The Influence of the Arvars on the followers of Ramanuja.

We have already referred to the Divya-prabandhas, written by the Arvars in Tamil, which exerted a profound influence on all teachers of the Srlvaisnava school 1 . Kuresa (Tirukkurukaippiran Pillai) wrote a commentary of 6000 verses on a selection of Namm'-arvar's one thousand verses called the Sahasra-glti. Parasara Bhattarya wrote a commentary of 9000 verses. Under the directions of Kalijit (Lokacarya) Abhaya-prada-raja wrote a commentary of 24,000 verses. Krsnapada, pupil of Kalijit, wrote another commentary of 3600 verses. Saumya Jamatr muni wrote 12,000 verses interpreting the views of Namm'-arvar. The commentaries of Abhava-prada-raja on the Divya-prabandhas helped the later teachers to understand the esoteric doctrine of the later works. The commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas written by Saumyajamatr muni, the younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, had already become rare in the time of Abhirama Varacarya, the translator of the Upadesa-ratna-mdld and the grandson of Saumya Jamatr muni.

It is thus seen that Parasara Bhattarya, the successor of Ramanuja in the pontifical chair, and his successor VedantI Madhava, called also Nanjiyar, and his successor Namburi Varadaraja, called also Kalijit or Lokacarya I, and his successor Pillai Lokacarya, all wrote works dealing not so much with the interpretation of Rama-nuja's philosophy, as with the interpretation of devotion as dealt with in the Sahasra-giti and the Divya-prabandhas. Their writings are mostly in Tamil, only a few have been translated into Sanskrit,

1 These Dkyo-prabandhas are four thousand in number. Thus Poygaiv-arvar wrote Mudal-tiru-vantadi of ioo stanzas; Bhutatt'-arvar, Irandam-tiru-vantadi of 100 stanzas; Pey-arvar, Mutirum-tiru-vantddi of ioo stanzas; Tiru-marisai Piran, Ndn-mukom Tiru-vantadi and Tiru-chanda-rruttam of q6 and 120 stanzas respectively; Madhura-kaviy-arvar wrote Kanninun-siruttdmbu of 11 stanzas; Namm'-arvar wrote Tiru-vruttam of 100 stanzas, Tiru-vrisiriyam, Perixa-tiru-vantddi of 87 stanzas and Tiru-vay-mori of 1102 verses; Kula-sekhara Peru-mal wrote Perumal-tirumnli of 105 stanzas, Periy-drvdr-tiruppalandu and Periy-drvdr-tirumori of 12 and 461 stanzas, Andal, Tiruppdvai and A 'dcchiyar-tirumoli of 30 and 143 stanzas; Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, Tiru-palliy-eruchi and Tiru-malai of 10 and 45 stanzas respectively; Tiru-pan-arvar, Amalanddi-piran of 10 stanzas; Tiru-maiigaiy-ajrvar wrote Periya-tirumoli of 1084 verses, Tiru-kkurunddndokom of 20 stanzas, Tirunedundandakam of 30 stanzas, Tiruvehtkiir-tirukkai of 1 stanza, Siriya-timmadal of 77 stanzas and Periyo-tirumadal of 148 stanzas, thus making a total of 4000 verses in all. They are referred to in the Upadesd-ratna-mdld of Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) and in its introduction by M. T. Narasimhiengar.

and in the present work notice is taken only of the Sanskrit works of these writers (mostly in the manuscript form) which have been available to the present writer. Both Pillai Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Vadikesari, were sons of Krsnapada, but this Saumya Jamatr muni must be distinguished from a later Saumyajamatr muni, called also Yatindrapravanacarya, who was a much more distinguished man. Parasara Bhattarya was probably born before a.d. 1078 and he died in a.d. 1165. He was succeeded by Vedanti Madhava or Nanjiyar, who was succeeded by Namburi Varadaraja or Lokacarya I. He was succeeded by Pillai Lokacarya, a contemporary of Venkatanatha, and Sruta-prakasika-carya or Sudarsana Suri. It was in his time that the Mahomedans attacked Srirarigam. as has already been mentioned in connection with our account of Venkatanatha. The Mahomedans were expelled from Srirarigam by Goppanarya, and the image of Ranga-natha was re-installed in a.d. 1293. It was at this time that the famous Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) was born. The senior Saumya Jamatr muni, younger brother of Pillai Lokacarya, called also Vadikesari, wrote some commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas, a work called Dlpa-prakdsa, and Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya. He is referred to by the junior Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Vara-vara muni, in his Upadesa-ratna-mdld, Tattva-traya-bhdsya and Srivacana-bhusana-vydkhyd. We cannot be sure whether the Adhydtma-cintdmani, in which Vadhula Srinivasa is adored as his teacher, was written by Saumya Jamatr muni. Mahacarya also described himself as a pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa, and, if the senior Saumya Jamatr and Mahacarya were pupils of the same teacher, Mahacarya must have lived in the fourteenth century. If, however, the junior Saumya Jamatr wrote the Adhydtma-cintdmani, Mahacarya will have to be placed at a later date.

The present writer has been able to trace only three books in Sanskrit by Pillai Lokacarya: Tattva-traya, Tattva-sekhara, and Srivacana-bhusana 1 . The Tattva-traya is a very useful compendium of the Srivaisnava school of thought, in which the nature of the inanimate (acit), the souls, God and their mutual relations are dealt

1 Some of his other works are Mumuksu-ppadi, Prameya-sekhara, Nava-ratna-mala, Tani-pranava, Prapanna-paritrana, Yddrcchika-ppadi, Dvayam, Artha-pancaka, Sdra-samgraha, Parunda-padi, Samsara-samrajyam, Sriyah-pati-ppadi, Caramam, Arcir-ddi, Nava-vidha-sambandha. Vide footnote in Tattva-sekhara, p. 70.

with. There is an excellent commentary by Varavara muni. The Tattva-sekhara is a work in four chapters. The first chapter quotes scriptural evidences in support of the view that Narayana is the highest God and the ultimate cause; in the second chapter he describes the nature of self by reference to scriptural testimony. The same description of the nature of self is continued in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter he deals with the ultimate goal of all souls, self-surrender to God. He says that the ultimate summum bonum (purusdrtha) consists in the servitude (kainkarya) to God roused by love of Him (priti-kdrita), due to the knowledge of one's own nature and the nature of God in all His divine beauty, majesty, power and supreme excellence. Not all servitude is undesirable. We know in our ordinary experience that servitude through love is always pleasurable. In the ordinary idea of emancipation, a man emphasizes his own self and his own end. This is therefore inferior to the summum bonum in which he forgets his own self and regards the servitude of God as his ultimate end. Lokacarya then refutes the various other conceptions of the ultimate goal in other schools of philosophy. He also refutes the conception of the summum bonum as the realization of one's own nature with a sense of supreme subordination (para-tantratvena svd-nubhaza-mdtram na puru-sdrthah). This is also technically called kaivalya in the Srlvaisnava system. Our ultimate end is not cessation of pain, but enjoyment of bliss. Positive bliss is our final aim. It is held that in the emancipation as described above the individual realizes himself in close association with God and enjoys supreme bliss therebv; but he can never be equal to Him. Bondage (bandha) is true and the removal of bondage is also true. Prapatti, or self-surrender to God, is regarded as a means to cessation of bondage. This prapatti may be direct (a-vyazahita) and indirect (vyazahita). In the first case the self-surrender is complete and absolute and done once for all 1 . The in-

1 Prapatti is defined as follows:

bhagavad-ajfultivartana-nivrtti-bhagavad-armkulya-san-a-saktitva-nusand/uina-prabhrti-sahitah yactid-garbhn vijrmbhti-rupa-jmlna-visesah; Ultra jiieyakara livarasya nirapeksa-sadhanatvamjndtulkaro vyavasaya-tmakatvam ; etac ca sastra-rthatvdt sakrt kartavyam. Tattva-sekhara, p. 64.

Just as the bankarites hold that, once the knowledge regarding the unity of the individual with Brahman dawns through the realization of the meaning of such texts, there remains nothing to be done. So here also the complete selt-surrender to God is the dawning of the nature of one's relation to God, and, when this is once accomplished, there is nothing else to be done. The rest remains with God in His adoption of the devotee as His own.

direct propatti is the continual meditation on God through love of Him, along with the performance of the obligatory duties and the non-commission of prohibited actions. This is decidedly the lower stage; the more deserving ones naturally follow the first method.

The main contents of Pillai Lokacarya's $ri-vacana-bhusana follow in a separate section in connection with the account of the commentary on it and sub-commentary by Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) and Raghuttama. The Srivacana-bhusana consists of 484 small sentences longer than the £«£ra-phrases, but often shorter than ordinary philosophical sentences. Lokacarya followed this style in his other works also, such as his Tattva-traya and Tattva-sekhara.

Ramya-jamatr muni or Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Manavalama muni or Periya-jlyar, was the son of Tikalakkidandan-tirunavIrudaiyapiran-Tatar-annar, a disciple of Pillai Lokacarya and grandson of Kollikavaladasar, who was also a disciple of Pillai Lokacarya. He was born in the Tinnevelly district in a.d. 1370 and lived for seventy-three years, that is till A.D. 1443. He first obtained training from brlsailesa, called also Tiru-marai Arvar, in Tiru-vay-mori. One of the first works of his early youth was a poem called Yati-rdja-vimsati, in honour of Ramanuja, which is incorporated and published in Varavara muni's Dina-caryd. On account of his deep devotion for Ramanuja he was also known as Yatlndra-pravana, and wrote a commentary on a short life of Ramanuja called Prapanna-sdvitri or Raman uja-nurandddi of Tiruvarangatt-amndandr. After completing his studies under brlsailesa he remained at Srlrangam and studied the commentaries on the Divya-prabandhas, the Srivacana-bhusana and other Drdvida Veddnta works. In his study of the Divya-prabandhas and the Gltd-bhdsya he was helped by his father Tatar-annar. He also studied with Kidambi-Tirumalai-Nayinar, called also Krsnadesika, the Sri-bhdsya and Sruta-prakdsikd. He also studied the Acdrya-hrdaya with Annayacarya, called also Devarajaguru, of Yadavadri. He renounced the world, became a sannydsin, and attached himself to the Pallava-matha at Srirahgam, where he built a zydkhydna-mandapa, in which he used to deliver his religious lectures. He was very proficient in the Dravida Veddnta, produced many works in the mani-pravdla style (mixture of Sanskrit and Tamil), and had hundreds of followers. He had a son, called Ramanujarya, and a grandson, called Visnucitta. Of his pupils eight were very famous: Bhatta-

natha, Srinivasa-yati, Devarajaguru, VadhQla Varada Narayana-guru, Prativadibhayarikara, Ramanujaguru, Sutakhya, and Sri-vanacala Yoglndra. These eight disciples were great teachers of Veddnta 1 . He taught the Bhdsya to Rarigaraja. There were many ruling chiefs in South India who were his disciples. Among his works the following are noteworthy, Yati-rdja-vimsati, Gitd-tdtparya-dipa, a Sanskrit commentary on the Gita, &rl-bhasyd-ratha, Taittiriyo-panisad-bhdsya, Para-tattva-nirnaya. He wrote also commentaries on the Rahasya-traya, Tattza-traya and on-vacana-bhusana of Pillai Lokacarya and the Acdrya-hrdaya of the senior Saumya Jamatr muni, called also Yadikesar!, brother of Pillai Lokacarya; commentaries on Priydlzar-tiru-nwri, Jfulna-sdra and Prameya-sdra of Devaraja, and the Sapta-gdthd of Yiramsolai-ppillai; glosses on the authorities quoted in the Tattza-traya, Srizacana-bhusana, and commentaries on the Dirya-prabandha called the Idu ; many Tamil verses, such as Tiruzdymori-nuriwdddi, Artti-prabandha, Tiruzdrddhana-krama, and many Sanskrit verses. He occupied a position like that of Ramanuja, and his images are worshipped in most Yaisnava temples in South India. Many works were written about him, e.g. Varaz-ara-muni-dina-caryd, Varazmra-nuini-sataka, Varavara-muni-kdvya, Varavara-muni-campu, Yatindra-prazana-prabhdva, Yatlndra-pravana-bhudra-campu, etc. I lis I padesa-ratna-mdld is recited by Srivaisnavas after the recital of the Dizya-prabandha. In his L~padesa-ratna-mdld he gives an account of the early Arvars and the Aragiyas. It was translated into Sanskrit verse by his grandson Abhirama-varacarya, whose Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya has already been noted in the present work. He also wrote another book called Naksatra-mdlikd in praise of Sathakopa 2 .

Though Mr Narasimhiengar says that a commentary on the ISrizacana-bhusana was written by Saumya Jamatr muni (junior) in the maniprazdla style, yet the manuscript of the commentary, with a sub-commentary on it by Raghuttama, which was available to the present writer, was a stupendous volume of about 750 pages, all written in Sanskrit. The main contents of this work will appear in a separate section.

1 See Prapannamrta, Ch. 122.

2 The present writer is indebted for some of his information regarding the works of Saumya Jamatr muni to M. T. Narasimhiengar's Introduction to the English translation of the Upadesa-ratna-malii.

CHAPTER XIX THE PHILOSOPHY OF YAMUNACARYA

Though in later days Bodhayana is regarded as the founder of the Vaisnava systems, yet, as his commentary on the Brahma-sutras is not now available, we may look upon Yamuna as being the earliest of the latter-day Vaisnava philosophers. We hear that many other people, such as Tarika, Dramida and Bharuchi, wrote in accordance with the teachings contained in the commentary of Bodhayana, endeavouring to refute the views of other systems of thought. Dramida wrote a Bhdsya which was elaborated by Srivatsanka Misra and is frequently referred to by Yamuna. The sage Vakula-bharana, called Sathakopacarya, also wrote an elaborate treatise in the Tamil language on the bhakti creed, but this also is hardly available now. Thus the history of modern Vaisnavism should, for all practical purposes, begin with Yamunacarya, who flourished during the latter part of the tenth and the earlier part of the eleventh century. Yamunacarya was said to be the preceptor of Mahapurna from whom the great Ramanuja had his initiation. So far as I am aware, Yamuna wrote four books, namely, Siddhi-traya, Agama-pramanya, Purusa-ntnnaya, and Kdsmirdgama. Of these only the first two have been printed.

Yamuna's doctrine of Soul contrasted with those of others.

We have seen that from the Carvakas to the Vedantists there had been many schools of philosophy and each of them had its own theory of soul. We made but a scanty reference to Carvakism in the first volume, and we have generally omitted the discussions against Carvakism in which other systems usually indulged. The most important of the doctrines held by the Carvakas is that there is no self other than the body; some of them, however, regarded the senses as the self, and others as Manas. They held that there were only four elements and that out of them life and consciousness sprang forth. Our notion of self also referred to the body, and there was no separate soul, apart from the body. The Carvaka literature

has, however, vanished from India, and we can know only from references in other works that their original writings were also in the form of sutras 1 .

Yamuna's philosophy was directly opposed to the doctrine of the Carvakas. It is best therefore that we should deal here with Yamuna's theory of soul in connection with the pretensions of the Carvakas. Yamuna takes his stand on the notion of self-consciousness. He says that our preception " I know" distinctly points to the self as the subject, as distinguished from the perception of the body as "this is my body," which is closely akin to other objective perceptions such as "this is a jug," "this is a piece of cloth." When I restrain my senses from external objects and concentrate myself on myself, I have still the notion of my self as " I," which arises in me without the least association of my hands or feet or any other parts of the body. The body as a whole cannot be said to be indicated by my perception, when none of the parts of the body shine forth in it. Even when I say "I am fat," "I am lean," the notion of "I" does not refer to the external fat or lean body, but to some mysterious entity within me with which the body is wrongly associated. We should not forget that we also say "this is my body" as we should say "this is my house," where the body is spoken of as being different from the self as any external object. But it may be objected that we also say "my self" (mamatmd); but this is only a linguistic usage which expresses that difference, whereas the entity perceived is just the same and identical. The confusion which is felt in the fact that the notion of " I" refers to the body is due to this, that the self has no perceivable shape or form as have ordinary external objects (such as jug, cloth, etc.), bv virtue of which they are distinguished from one another. Those who are not sufficiently discriminating cannot rest content with the formless self, and consequently confuse the soul with the body, more particularly because they find that corresponding to any and every desire of the soul there is a corresponding change of the body. They think that, since, corresponding to any mental change, such as new feeling, thought, or desire, there is a corresponding physical or physiological change of the body, there is no other soul different from the body. But, if

1 The first siitra of Brhaspati is atho tattvam vyakhyasyamah ; the second is prithivy-ap-tejo-vayur iti tattvani and the third is tebhyas caitanyum kinvddi-bhyo mada-saktivat.

we try to find out by a deeper self-introspection what we mean by "I," we find that it is an entity, as the subject, as the " I," as distinct from the objects which are not self and which are indicated as this or that. Had the notion "I know" referred to the body, the bodily parts would surely have been manifested in the notion, as external objects shine forth in all external perception as this or that. But it is not so; on the contrary, by introspection I find that the self is an entity which is independent in itself, and all other things of the world are for the sake of my self; I am the enjoyer^ whereas everything else is the object of my enjoyment; I am not for the sake of any body; I am an end in myself and never a means for anything else {a-pardrthd). All combinations and collocations are for the sake of another, whom they serve; the self is neither the result of any collocation nor does it exist for the sake of serving another.

Moreover, consciousness cannot be regarded as being a product of the body. Consciousness cannot be thought to be like an intoxicating property, the product of the four elements; for the combination of the four elements cannot produce any and every sort of power. There is a limit to the effects that a certain cause can produce ; in the production of the intoxicating property it is the atoms which happen to possess that property; intoxication is not to be compared with consciousness; nor has it any similarity to any physical effect; nor can it be thought that there are atoms in which the property of consciousness is generated. Had consciousness been the result of any chemical change, such as we find in the production of the red colour by the combination of lime with catechu, there would have been particles of consciousness (caitanya) produced, and our consciousness would then have been the sum total of those particles of consciousness, as in the case of any material chemical product; the red colour produced by the combination of lime with catechu belongs to an object every particle of which is red; so, if consciousness had been a chemical product of the material of this body, there would have been generated some particles of consciousness, and thus there would have been perceptions of many selves in accordance with each particle of consciousness, and there would be no identity of consciousness and experience. Thus it must be admitted that consciousness belongs to an entity, the soul, which is different from the body.

Nor can consciousness belong to the senses; for, if it belonged

to each of the senses, then that which was perceived by one sense (e.g. the eye) could not be perceived by another sense (e.g. the touch), and there would not rise the consciousness "I touch that which I had seen before." If all the senses together produced consciousness, then we could not perceive anything with one sense (e.g. the eye), nor could we have any consciousness, or the memory of the object of any particular sense after that sense was lost; when a man was blinded, he would lose all consciousness, or would never remember the objects which he had seen before with his eyes.

Nor can the manas be regarded as atman ; for it is only an organ accepted as accounting for the fact that knowledge is produced in succession and not in simultaneity. If it is said that the manas may be regarded as being a separate organ by which it can know in succession, then practically the self, or atman, is admitted; the only difference being this, that the Carvakas call manas what we (Yamuna and his followers) call atman.

The Vijnanavadin Buddhists held that knowledge, while self-manifesting, also manifested the objects and so knowledge should be regarded as the self (atman). Against these Buddhists Yamuna held that, if any permanent seat of knowledge was not admitted, then the phenomenon of personal identity and recognition could not be explained by the transitory states of self-manifesting knowledge; if each knowledge came and passed, how could one identify one's present experiences with the past, if there were only flowing states of knowledge and no persons? Since there was no permanence, it could not be held that any knowledge persisted as an abiding factor on the basis of which the phenomenon of self-identity or recognition could be explained. Each knowledge being absent while others came, there was no chance of even an illusion of sameness on grounds of similarity.

The doctrine of the Sarikara school, that there is one qualityless permanent pure consciousness, is regarded by Yamuna as being against all experience. Thus, consciousness is always felt as belonging to a person and as generated, sustained for a time, and then lost. At the time of deep sleep we all cease to possess knowledge, and this is demonstrated by our impression on waking that we have slept for so long, without consciousness. If the antahkarana, which the Advaitins regard as the substratum of the notion of "I," had been submerged during the sleep, then there could not have been

on waking the notion that "I slept so long." Nobody has ever experienced any pure knowledge. Knowledge as such must belong to somebody. The Sankarites say that the rise of knowledge means the identity of the knowledge with the objects at the time. But this is not so; for the truth of the knowledge of an object is always with reference to its limitations of time and space and not to the intrinsic quality of the thing or the knowledge. The assertion also that knowledge is permanent is without any foundation; for whenever any knowledge arises it always does so in time and under the limitations of time. Nobody has ever experienced any knowledge divested of all forms. Knowledge must come to us either as perception or as inference, etc.; but there cannot be any knowledge which is absolutely devoid of any forms or modifications and absolutely qualityless. The Sankarites regard the self as pure consciousness or anubhuti, but it is apparent that the self is the agent of anubhuti, or the knower, and not knowledge or pure consciousness. Again, as in Buddhism, so in Sankarism, the question of recognition remains unsolved; for recognition or personal continuity of experience means that the knower existed in the past and is existing even now —as when we say, "I have experienced this"—but, if the self is pure consciousness only, then there cannot be any perceiver persisting in the past as well as in the present, and the notion "I have experienced this" is not explained, but only discarded as being illusory. The consciousness of things, however, is never generated in us as "I am consciousness," but as "I have the consciousness of this"; if all forms were impure impositions on pure consciousness, then the changes would have taken place in the consciousness, and instead of the form "I have consciousness" the proper form of knowledge ought to have been "I am consciousness." The &an-karites also hold that the notion of the knower is an illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. If that be so, the consciousness itself may be regarded as an illusory imposition; if it is said that the pure consciousness is not an imposition, since it lasts till the end— the stage of emancipation—then, since the result of right knowledge {tattva-jndna) is this, that the self ceases to be a knower, false knowledge should be welcomed rather than such a right knowledge. The notion "I know" proves the self to be a knower and apart from a knower so manifested no pure consciousness can be experienced. The notion "I" at once distinguishes the knower from the body,

the senses, the manas, or even the knowledge. Such a self is also called a sdksi (perceiver), as all objects are directly perceived by it. The Sdmkhya view is that it is the ahankdra or buddhi which may be regarded as the knower; for these are but products ofprakrti, and thus non-intelligent in themselves. The light of pure consciousness cannot be regarded as falling on them and thereby making them knowers by the reflection of its light; for reflection can only happen with reference to visible objects. Sometimes it is held by the Sarikarites that true consciousness is permanent and unchangeable, that the ego (ahankdra) derives its manifestation from that and yet reveals that in association with itself, just as a mirror or the surface of water reflects the sun; and, when these limitations of ahankdra, etc., are merged during deep sleep, the self shines forth in its own natural light and bliss. This also is unintelligible; for if the ahankdra, etc., had all been manifested by the pure consciousness, how can they again in their turn manifest the consciousness itself? Actually it cannot be imagined what is the nature of that manifestation which pure consciousness is made to have by the ahankdra, since all ordinary analogies fail. Ordinarily things are said to be manifested when obstructions which veil them are removed, or when a lamp destroys darkness, or when a mirror reflects an object; but none of these analogies is of any use in understanding how consciousness could be manifested by ahankdra. If, again, consciousness requires something else to manifest it, then it ceases to be self-manifesting and becomes the same as other objects. It is said that the process of knowledge runs on by successive removals of ajfidna from the consciousness. Ajfidna (na-jndna —not knowledge) may be understood as absence of knowledge or as the moment when some knowledge is going to rise, but such an ajfidna cannot obstruct consciousness; the Sarikarites hold, therefore, that there is an indefinable positive ajfidna which forms the stuff of the world. But all this is sheer nonsense. That which manifests anything cannot make that thing appear as a part of itself, or as its own manifestation. The ego, or ahankdra, cannot also manifest another consciousness (which is different from it) in such a way that that consciousness shall appear as its own manifestation. So it has to be admitted that the self is not pure consciousness, but the self-conscious ego which appears in all our experience. The state of deep sleep (susupti) is often put forward as an example of pure

consciousness being found unassociated with other limitations of ego, etc. But this is not possible, as we have already seen. Moreover, when the later experience of the waking moment testifies that "I did not know anything," it can well be urged that there was ho pure consciousness during deep sleep; but that the ego existed is proved by the fact that at the waking moment the perception which identifies the ego (ahankara) as the self, also testifies that the ego as the self had persisted during deep sleep. The self which shines forth in us as the ego therefore remains the same during deep sleep; but it has no knowledge at that time. After rising from deep sleep we feel "I did not know anything, I did not know even myself." The Sarikarites assert the experience that during deep sleep there is no knowledge even of the ego. This, however, is hardly true; for the perception "I did not know even myself" means that during deep sleep all the personal associations (e.g. as belonging to a particular family, as occupying a particular position, etc.) were absent, and not that the ego itself was absent. When the self is conscious of itself, there is the notion of the "I," as in "I am conscious of myself." During deep sleep also, when no other objects are manifested, there is the self which is conscious of itself as the ego or the "I." If during emancipation there was no consciousness as the self, the ego, the "I," then it is the same almost as the absolute nihilism of the Buddhists. The sense of " I," the ego, is not a mere quality extraneously imposed on the self, but the very nature of the self. Even knowledge shines forth as a quality of this ego or "I," as when we say " I know it." It is the " I" who possesses the knowledge. Knowledge thus appears to be a quality of the " I." But no experience of ours ever demonstrates that "I" is a quality of pure knowledge. We say " I have this knowledge" and not that the knowledge has the "I." If there is no "I," no one who experiences, no subject who is existent during emancipation, who would strive to attain emancipation? If even the "I" is annihilated after emancipation, who would care to take all the trouble, or suffer the religious restraints, etc., for such an undesirable state? If even "I" should cease to exist, why should I care for such a nihilistic state ? What am I to do with pure consciousness, when " I" ceases to exist ? To say that "I" is such an object as "you" or "he" or "this" or "that," and that this "I" is illuminated by pure consciousness, is preposterously against all experience. The "I" manifests of itself

without the help of any other manifesting agency, now as well as during emancipation; for the manifestation of the self has always the sole form of "I"; and, if during emancipation the self manifests, it must do so as " I." From the sacred texts also we find that the emancipated sages, Vamadeva and Manu, thought of their own selves as the "I." Even God is not devoid of this notion of His personality as " I," as is attested by the Upanisad sayings, in which He declares: "I have created this world." The notion of "I" is false when it is identified with the body and other extraneous associations of birth, social rank, etc., and when it gives rise to pride and boastfulness. It is this kind of ahankara which has been regarded as false in the scriptures. The notion "I," when it refers to the self, is, indeed, the most accurate notion that we can have.

All our perceptions of pleasure and pain also are manifested as qualities of the " I," the self. The " I " manifests itself to itself and hence must be regarded as being of non-material stuff {ajada). The argument, that since the notion of "I" is taken along with knowledge (sahopalambha), knowledge alone exists, and that" I " is not different from it, may well be repudiated by turning the table and with the same argument declaring that " I" alone exists and that there is no knowledge. All persons experience that knowledge is felt to be as distinct from the "I," the knower, as the known object. To say that self is self-manifesting by nature is not the same thing as to say that the self is knowledge by nature; for the self is independent of knowledge; knowledge is produced as a result of the perceptual process involving sense-contact, etc.; the self is the knower, the "I," which knows things and thereby possesses knowledge.

The "I," the knower, the self, manifests itself directly by self-consciousness; and hence those who have attempted to demonstrate the self by inference have failed to do so. Thus, the Naiyayikas think that the self is proved as that in which qualities such as knowledge, desire, pleasure, pain, etc., inhere. But, even though by such an inference we may know that there is something in which the qualities inhere, it cannot be inferred therefrom that this thing is the self in us. Since nothing else is found in which knowledge, willing, etc., might inhere, it may as well be argued that knowledge, etc., are not qualities at all, or that there is no law that qualities must necessarily inhere in a thing. They are regarded asgunas (qualities) only by their technical definition; and the Naiyayikas can accept these

asgunas, and on that ground infer that there must be some other entity, self (which is not testified by any other proof), as the basis in which the aforesaid gunas may inhere. It is hardly justifiable to accept a new substance, soul (which cannot be obtained by any other proof), simply on the ground that there must be some basis in which gunas must inhere; it is the maxim of the opponents that gunas must exist in some substance and that there are knowledge, willing, etc., which they are pleased to call gunas ; one cannot take further advantage in holding thereby that, since there is no other substance in which these so-called gunas (knowledge, willing, etc.) might inhere, the existence of some other substance as the self must be inferred.

The Samkhyists also make the same mistake, when they hold that all the movements of this non-intelligent prakrti must be for the sake of the purusa, for whom the prakrti is working. The objection to such a view is this, that even though such entities for which the prakrti is working may be inferred, yet that cannot prove that those entities are not themselves also combinations of many things and objects requiring further superintendents for themselves; or that the purusas should be the same pure intelligence as they are required to be. Moreover, that alone can be the end of a certain combination of events or things, which can be in some way benefited, moved or affected by those combinations. But the purusas, as the passive pure intelligence, cannot in any way be affected by the prakrti. How then can they be regarded as the end for which the prakrti works ? The mere illusion, the mere semblance on the part of the purusa of being affected or benefited cannot be regarded as a reality, so that by it the purposes of the movements of the prakrti might be realized. Moreover, these so-called affections, or illusions of affection, themselves belong to prakrti and not to the purusas; for the purusas, as pure intelligences, are without the slightest touch of modifications of the gunas. All mental modifications are, according to the Sdmkhya, but modifications of the buddhi, which, being unintelligent, cannot be subject to illusion, error, 01 mistake. Moreover, no explanation can be found in the supposition that the reflection of the purusas falls upon the buddhi; for, as the purusa is not a visible object, it cannot be reflected in the buddhi. If it is said that there is no real reflection, but the buddhi becomes like the pure intelligence, the purusa, then that also is not possible; for, if the buddhi is to become as qualityless as the purusas, then all

mental states have to be abrogated. If it is said that the buddhi does not become like pure intelligence, but as if it was as intelligent as the purusa, then that also is not possible; for purusa is according to the Sdmkhya pure intelligence, not intelligent. There is no intelligent knower in the Sdmkhya, and that is its trouble. If it is said that what is meant by the belief that purusa is the end of all guna-movements is simply this, that, though it is absolutely incapable of any change or transformation, yet by its very presence it sets the gunas in motion and is thus the end for which all the guna modifications take place, just as if the purusa were a king for whom the whole dominion works and fights. But since the purusa, unaffected by them, is only the seer of them all, this also is not possible; for the analogy does not hold, since the king is really benefited by the movements of the people of his dominions but the purusa, which merely implies seeing, cannot be regarded as a seer.

The nature of the self, as we have described it, is also attested by the verdict of the I panisads. This self is directly revealed in its own notion as "I," and pleasure, pain, attachment, antipathy are but its states, which are also revealed along with the revelation of its own self as the "I." This self is not, however, perceived by any of the senses or even by the organ manas, as Kumarila supposed. For the question arises as to when, if the self is believed to be perceived by the manas, that takes place? It cannot take place precisely at the moment when the knowledge of an object arises; for then the notions of the self and the objects, as they occur at the same moment, could not so appear that one (the self) was the cognizer or determiner, and the others (the objects) were the cognized or the determined. If the knowledge of the objects and the self arose at two different moments as separate acts, it would be difficult to conceive how they could be related as cognizer and cognized. So it cannot be held that the self, though it always manifests itself to us in self-consciousness, could yet be perceived by any of the senses or the manas. Again, Kumarila held that knowledge was a new product, and that when, as a result of certain sense activities, knowledge or the jndna movement was generated in us, there was also produced an illumination (jndtatd or prakatya) in objects in association with the self, and that from such an illumination the jndna-kriyd or knowledge movement could be inferred, and the self, as being the possessor of this knowledge, could be perceived by the manas. But such

a theory that the self is conscious not by itself, but by an extraneous introduction of knowledge, is hardly acceptable; for no one imagines that there exists in him such a difference when he perceives a thing which he had not before that perception. Moreover, since the act of knowledge did not directly reveal the self, there might also be doubts as to whether the self knew things or not, and the self would not shine forth directly in all conscious experience, as it is found to do.

Again, some hold that the self is known from the objective consciousness and not directly by itself. It is easy to see that this can hardly be accepted as true; for how can objective consciousness, which refers to the objects, in any way produce the consciousness of the self? According to this view it is difficult to prove even the existence of knowledge; for this, since it is not self-manifested, requires something else to manifest it; if it is thought that it is self-manifesting, then we should expect it to be manifested to all persons and at all times. It may be said that, though knowledge is self-manifesting, yet it can be manifested only in connection with the person in whom it inheres, and not in connection with all persons. If that be so, it really comes to this, that knowledge can become manifested only through its connection with a someone who knows. If, in answer to this, it is said that knowledge does not require its connection with a person for its own existence, but only for its specific illumination as occurring with reference to a certain subject and object, then that cannot be proved. We could have accepted it if we had known any case in which pure consciousness or knowledge had been found apart from its specific references of subject and object. If it is still asserted that consciousness cannot be separated from its self-manifesting capacities, then it may also be pointed out that consciousness is never found separated from the person, the subject, or the knower who possesses it. Instead of conceding the self-manifesting power to the infinite number of states of consciousness, is it not better to say that the self-manifestation of consciousness proceeds from the self-conscious agent, the subject and determiner of all conscious experiences ? Even if the states of consciousness had been admitted as self-manifesting, that would not explain how the self could be self-manifesting on that account. If, however, the self, the knower of all experiences, be admitted as self-manifesting, then the manifestation of the con-

scious experiences becomes easily explained; for the self is the per-ceiver of all experiences. All things require for their manifestation another category which does not belong to their class; but since also there is nothing on which the self can depend for its consciousness, it has to be admitted that the self is a self-manifesting intelligent entity. Thus the jug does not require for its manifestation another jug, but a light, which belongs to an altogether different class. The light also does not require for its manifestation another light, or the jug which it manifests, but the senses; the senses again depend on consciousness for the manifestation of their powers. Consciousness, in its turn, depends upon the self; without inhering in the self it cannot get itself manifested. The self, however, has nothing else to depend upon; its self-manifestation, therefore, does not depend on anything else.

The states of consciousness have thus to be regarded as being states of the self, which by its connection with different objects manifests them as this or that consciousness. Knowledge of this or that object is thus but different states of consciousness, which itself again is a characteristic of the self.

If consciousness had not been an inseparable qualitv or essential characteristic of the self, then there might have been a time when the self could have been experienced as being devoid of consciousness; a thing which is so related with another thing that it never exists without it must necessarily be an essential and inseparable characteristic thereof. It cannot be said that this generalization does not hold, since we are conscious of our self in connection with the body, which is not an essential characteristic of the self; for the consciousness of the self as "I," or as "I know," is not necessarily connected with a reference to, or association with, the body. Again, it cannot be said that, if consciousness were an essential and inseparable characteristic of the self, then the states of unconsciousness in deep sleep and swoon could not be explained; for there is nothing to prove that there is no consciousness of the knowing self during those so-called stages of unconsciousness. We feel on waking that we had no consciousness at the time because we cease to have any memory of it. The reason therefore why states of unconsciousness are felt in the waking stage to be so is this, that we have no memory of those states. Memory is only possible when certain objects are apprehended and the impression of these oh-

jects of consciousness is left in the mind, so that through them the object of memory may be remembered. During deep sleep no objects are perceived, and no impressions are left, and, as a result, we cease to have any memory of those states. The self then remains with its characteristic self-consciousness, but without the consciousness of anything else. The self-conscious self does not leave any impression on the organs of the psychosis, the manas, etc., as they all then cease to act. It is easy to understand that no impression can be made upon the self; for, if it could and if impressions had been continually heaped on the self, then such a self could never manage to get rid of them and could never attain emancipation. Moreover, it is the characteristic of the phenomenon of memory that, when a perception has once been perceived, but is not being perceived continually, it can be remembered now, when those past impressions are revived by association of similar perceptions. * But the self-conscious self has always been the same and hence there cannot be any memory of it. The fact that on waking from deep sleep one feels that one has slept happily does not prove that there was actually any consciousness of happiness during deep sleep; it is only a happy organic feeling of the body resulting from sound sleep which is interpreted or rather spoken of as being the enjoyment of happiness during deep sleep. We say, " I am the same as I was yesterday," but it is not the self that is remembered, but the particular time association that forms the content of memory. Perception of objects is generated in us when consciousness comes in contact with the physical objects in association with this or that sense of perception. It is on that account that, though the self is always possessed of its self-consciousness, yet it is only when the consciousness of the self is in touch with an external object in association with a sense-organ that we get that particular sense-perception. This self is not all-pervading, but of an atomic size; when it comes in association with any particular sense, we acquire that particular sense-perception. This explains the fact that no two perceptions can be acquired simultaneously: where there is an appearance of simultaneity, there is only a succession of acquirement so rapid that changes cannot be noticed. Had the soul been all-pervading, we should have had the knowledge of all things at once, since the soul was in touch with all things. Thus it is proved that the self has consciousness as its essential characteristic; knowledge

or consciousness is never produced in it, but when the obstructions are removed and the self comes into touch with the objects, the consciousness of these objects shines forth.

God and the World.

As we have already noted, the Mlmamsists do not admit the existence of Isvara. Their antitheistic arguments, which we have not considered, can be dealt with here in contrast to Yamuna's doctrine of Isvara. They say that an omniscient Isvara cannot be admitted, since such an assumption cannot be proved, and there are, indeed, many objections to the hypothesis. For how can such a perception of omniscience be acquired? Surely it cannot be acquired by the ordinary means of perception; for ordinary perception cannot give one the knowledge of all things present and past, before and far beyond the limits of one's senses. Also the perception of Isvara generally ascribed to the Yogins cannot be admitted; for it is impossible that the Yogin should perceive past things and things beyond the limits of his senses, by means of his sense-organs. If mind (antahkarana) be such that it can perceive all sense-objects without the aid of the senses, then what is the use at all of the senses? Of course it is true that by great concentration one can perceive things more clearly and distinctly; but no amount of concentration or any other process can enable a man to hear by the eye or to perceive things without the help of the senses. Omniscience is therefore not possible, and we have not by our senses seen any such omniscient person as Isvara. His existence cannot be proved by inference; for, since He is beyond all perceptible things, there cannot be any reason {hetu) which we could perceive as being associated with Him and by reason of which we could make I lim the subject of inference. It is urged by the Xaiyayikas that this world, formed by collocation of parts, must be an effect in itself, and it is argued that, like all other effects, this also must have taken place under the superintendence of an intelligent person who had a direct experience of world materials. But this is not necessary; for it may very well be conceived that the atoms, etc., have all been collocated in their present form by the destinies of men (adrsta) — according to the karma, of all the men in the world. The karmas of merit and demerit exist in us all, and they are moulding the world-

process, though these cannot be perceived by us. The world may thus be regarded as a product of the karmas of men and not of Isvara, whom no one has ever perceived. Moreover, why should Isvara, who has no desire to satisfy, create this world ? This world, with all the mountains, rivers and oceans, etc., cannot be regarded as an effect produced by any one.

Yamuna follows the method of the Nydya and tries to prove that the world is an effect, and, as such, must have been produced by an intelligent person who had a direct knowledge of the materials. He also has a direct knowledge of the dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) of men, in accordance with which He creates the whole world and establishes an order by which every man may have only such experiences as he deserves. He, by His mere desire, sets all the world in motion. He has no body, but still He carries on the functioning of His desire by His manas. He has to be admitted as a person of infinite knowledge and power; for otherwise how could He create this world and establish its order?

The Sahkarites had held that, when the Upanisads say that nothing exists but one Brahman, it means that Brahman alone exists and the world is false; but that is not the sense. It means simply that there is no other Isvara but Isvara, and that there is none else like Him. When the Upanisads declare that Brahman is all that we see and that He is the sole material of the world, it does not mean that everything else does not exist and that the qualityless Brahman is the only reality. If I say there is one sun, it does not mean that He has no rays; if I say there are the seven oceans, it does not mean that the oceans have no ripples, etc. The only meaning that such passages can have is that the world has come out of Him, like sparks from fire, and that in Him the world finds its ultimate rest and support; from Him all things of the world—the fire, the wind, the earth—have drawn their powers and capacities, and without His power they would have been impotent to do anything. If, on the contrary, it is held that the whole world is false, then the whole experience has to be sacrificed, and, as the knowledge of Brahman also forms a part of this experience, that also has to be sacrificed as false. All the Vedanta dialectic employed to prove that the perception of difference is false is of very little use to us; for our experience shows that we perceive differences as well as relations. We perceive the blue colour, the lotus, and also that the lotus has

the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be conceived in accordance with the teaching of the Upanisads as being inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legitimate than the conception which would abolish all the world manifestation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure intelligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Sankarites assert; for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly manifested, e.g. our feelings of individual pleasures and pains. If there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to be both Being (sat), intelligence («"/), and bliss (dnanda). If this tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic doctrine which the Sankarites try to protect so zealously. If, however, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, but all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also is not possible; for how can bliss be the same as intelligence? Pleasure and intelligence are experienced by all of us to be entirely different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Saiikarite doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to be admitted that our notions about the external world are correct and give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory appearance, but true, as attested by our sense-experience.

Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yamuna's philosophy demonstrates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and, on the other, the omniscient and all powerful Isvara and the manifold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in some places that the world may be regarded as being like sparks coming out of Isvara; but he does not elaborate this thought, and it is contradicted by other passages, in which Isvara is spoken of as the fashioner of the world system, in accordance with the Nyaya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the Nyaya position with regard to the relation of Isvara and the world, both in the Siddhi-traya and in the Agama-pramdnva, it is almost certain that his own attitude did not differ much from the Nviiya attitude, which left the duality of the world and Isvara absolutely unre-

solved. It appears, therefore, that (so far as we can judge from his Siddhi-traya) Yamuna's main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul. The reality of the external world and the existence of Isvara had been accepted in previous systems also. Yamuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about Isvara and His relation to the souls and the world. He does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world, and rests content with proving that the world-appearance is not false, as the Sahkarites supposed. He says in one place that he does not believe in the existence of the partless atoms of the Naiyayikas. The smallest particle of matter is the trasarenu, the specks of dust that are found to move in the air when the sun's rays come in through a chink or hole. But he does not say anything more than this about the ultimate nature of the reality of the manifold world or how it has come to be what it is. He is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation, and the nature and characteristics of that state.

Yamuna, in his Agama-pramanya, tried to establish that the Panca-ratra-samhita had the same validity as the Vedas, since it was uttered by Isvara himself. Visnu, or Vasudeva, has been praised in the Purnsa-siikta and in other places of the Vedas as the supreme Lord. The Pasupata-tantra of the Saivas is never supported by the Vedas, and thus the validity of the Pasupata-tantra cannot be compared with that of the Pancaratra-satnhita.

God according to Ramanuja, Venkatanatha and Lokacarya.

Bhaskara had said that, though Isvara is possessed of all good qualities and is in Himself beyond all impurities, yet by His Sakti (power) He transformed Himself into this world, and, as all conditions and limitations, all matter and phenomena are but His power, it is He who by His power appears as an ordinary soul and at last obtains emancipation as well. Ramanuja holds that on this view there is no essential form of Brahman which transcends the limits of all bonds, the power (Sakti) which manifests itself as all phenomena. Brahman, being always associated with the power which exists as the world-phenomena, becomes necessarily subject to all the defects of the phenomenal world. Moreover, when a Saktiy or power of Brahman, is admitted, how can Brahman be said

to suffer any transformation ? Even if the Sakti (power) be regarded as its transformation, even then it cannot be accepted that it (Brahman) should combine with its Sakti to undergo a worldly transformation.

Another Vedantist (probably Yadavaprakasa, the Preceptor of Ramanuja in his early days) held that Brahman, in its own essence, transformed itself into the world; this theory also is open to the objection that the Brahman, being transformed into the world, becomes subject to all the impurities and defects of the world. Even if it is held that in one part it is transcendent and possesses innumerable good qualities and in another suffers from the impurities associated with its transformation into the world, then also that which is so impure in one part cannot have its impurity so counterbalanced by the purity of its other half that it can be called Isvara.

Ramanuja, therefore, holds that all the changes and transformations take place in the body of the Isvara and not in His essence. So Isvara, in His pure essence, is ever free from all impurities, and the possessor of all the best qualities, untouched by the phenomenal disturbances with which His body alone is associated. The matter which forms the stuff of the external world is not what the Samkhya calls the guna substances, but simply the prakrti or the primeval causal entity, possessing diverse qualities which may be classified under three different types—the sattva, the rajas and the tamas. This prakrti, however, in its fine essence, forms the body of Isvara and is moved into all its transformations by Isvara Himself. When I le withholds prakrti from all its transformations and annuls all its movement, we have the state of pralaya, in which Isvara exists in the karana or causal state, holding within Him the. prakrti in its subtle state as His body. Prakrti is a body as well as a mode (prakdra) of Isvara, and, when it is in a manifested condition, we have the state of creation. Prakrti undergoes its transformations into tan-matra, ahahkdra, etc.; but these are yet the subtle substance forming parts of Isvara's body. The transformations through which prakrti passes in the origination of tan-matra, ahahkdra, etc., are not the results of the collocation of the guna reals, as we saw in the case of the Samkhya, but may be regarded as the passing of prakrti through different stages, each stage being marked out by the special character of the prakrti while passing through that stage. The word guna here has then its ordinary meaning of quality; and it is supposed that the prakrti, as it is moved by Isvara, continues to ac-

quire new qualities. The present state of the world also represents prakrti in a particular state wherein it has acquired the qualities which we note in the phenomenal world of ours.

We have seen before that the existence of Isvara was inferred by Yamuna on Nyaya lines. But Ramanuja thinks that there is as much to be said in favour of the existence as against it. Thus he says that, even supposing that the hills, etc., are effects, it cannot be said that they were all created by one person; for even all jugs are not made by the same person; Isvara may also be denied, after the Samkhya mode, and it may be imagined that in accordance with the Karma of men the world arose out of a combination of the original gunas. There is thus as much to be said against the existence of Isvara as in favour of it. Ramanuja holds that Isvara cannot be proved by inference, but is to be admitted on the authority of the sacred texts 1 . The Nyaya and Yoga, moreover, conceived Isvara to be only the nimitta-karana, or instrumental cause; but according to Ramanuja Isvara is all-pervading in all space and in all time. This all-pervasiveness of God does not mean that His reality is the only reality everywhere, or that He is identical with the world-reality, and all else is false. It means, as Sudar-sanacarya has said in his Sruta-prakasikd on the Ramanuja-bhasya, 2nd sutra, that there is no measure with which He may be limited by any spatial relation. Varada and Narayana, however, and Venkatanatha, agree in interpreting all-pervasiveness as the absence of any limit to His good qualities {iyad-gunaka iti pariccheda-rahitah)". There is nothing else than Isvara'& body, so by His body also he may be conceived as pervading the whole world. Thus, Isvara is not only nimitta-karana but also upddana-karana, or material cause as well. Verikata establishes in some detail that the highest Isvara is called Narayana and His power, as presiding over matter and souls, is called Laksmi. Isvara has His manas, and His eternal senses do not require any body or organs for their manifestation. Vehkata also mentions three modified forms of manifestation of Lord Vasudeva, namely Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. This vyuha doctrine of the Pancaratra has been briefly discussed in Varavara's bhasya on the Tattva-traya of Lokacarya. These three, Samkarsana, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha,

1 See Ramanuja's Bhasya, 3rd sutra.

2 See Nyaya-siddhanjana of Venkatanatha.

are said to be the three different forms of Vasudeva, by which He controls the individual souls (jtva), the manas and the external world. That form of activity by which the jtvas were separated from the prakrti at the beginning of the creation is associated with a form of Isvara called Samkarsana. When this separating activity passes and dominates over men as their manas and ultimately brings them to the path of virtue and good, it is said to be associated with a form of Isvara called Pradyumna. Aniruddha is that form of Isvara by which the external world is generated and kept in order, and in which our experiences and attempts to attain right knowledge are fulfilled. These forms are not different Isvara, but are imagined according to the diversity of His function. Isvara's full existence is everywhere; He and His forms are identical. These forms are but manifestations of the power of Vasudeva and are therefore called Vibhava. Such manifestations of His power are also to be found in great religious heroes such as Vyasa, Arjuna, etc. Lokacarya, in describing Him further, says that in His real essence Isvara is not only omniscient, but this omniscience is also associated with complete and eternal joy. His knowledge and powers do not suffer any variation or comparison, as they are always the very highest and the most inconceivable by any one else. He moves us all to action and fulfils our desires according to our karmas. He gives knowledge to those who are ignorant, power to those who are weak, pardon to those who are guilty, mercy to the sufferers, paternal affection and overlooking of guilt to those who are guilty, goodness to those who are wicked, sincerity to the crooked, and goodness of heart to those who are wicked at heart. He cannot bear to remain separated from those who do not want to be separated from Him, and puts Himself within easy reach of those who want to see Him. When he sees people afflicted, He has mercy on them and helps them. Thus all His qualities are for the sake of others and not for Himself. His affection for us is of a maternal nature, and out of this affection He neglects our defects and tries to help us towards the ideal of good. He has created this world in Himself, not in order to satisfy any wants but in a playful manner, as it were through mere spontaneity (lild). As in creation, so in keeping the created world in order, and in dissolution, His playful spontaneity upholds everything and brings about everything. Dissolution is as much of His play as creation. All this is created in Himself and out of Himself.

Visista-dvaita doctrine of Soul according to Ramanuja and Venkatanatha.

The existence of souls as separate self-conscious entities, in contradistinction to the doctrines of other systems, had been established by Yamuna, as we have shown in some detail in our section on his doctrine of soul. The soul is atomic in its size, as we have already found stated by Yamuna. Barada, Visnu Misra and Venkatanatha held that in the ordinary phenomenal state its knowledge expands and contracts. At the time of emancipation it has its highest expansion in which it pervades the whole world. The cause of its contraction and expansion is its karma, which is also called avidya. Ramanuja, in his Vedanta-dipa, indulged in the simile of the ray of a lamp in explaining the rise of knowledge in different parts of the body, despite the atomic soul being located in only one part. The soul exists in one part of the body and spreads out its knowledge over all other parts of the body, like the rays of a lamp. Ramanuja says that Isvara allows the individual self-conscious souls to perform whichever action they have a desire to attempt. Movement is possible only through the approval by Isvara of the desires of individual souls. The self-conscious souls desire things according to their own free will, and in this they are not hampered by Isvara; Isvara always allows the individual souls to act, i.e. to move their limbs according to their desires. This is a sort of occasionalism, which holds that, in every action which I am performing, I am dependent on Isvara's will. I can move my limbs because He wishes it. Apart from this general law that Isvara is a supporter of all actions, there are some exceptions of particular favour and disfavour. To those who are particularly attached to Him He is more favourably disposed, and by His grace generates in them such desires that they adopt actions by which they may easily win Him. Into those who are particularly opposed to Him He imports such desires that they are led farther away from Him 1 . Isvara exists in us all as the inner controller. This inner controller is represented by our individual soul. This individual soul is free in all its desires, knowledge, and attempts 2 . This freedom of will, knowledge, etc., is given to us all by Isvara, and He also arranges that the movements in the material world may take place in ac-

1 See Varavara's commentary on the Tattva-traya.

2 See Ramanuja's Bhdsya, n. 3. 40, 41.

cordance with our desires. Thus He not only gives us freedom of will, but also helps the realization of that will in the external world, and ultimately grants good and evil fruits according to our good and evil deeds 1 . Thus Isvara's control over us does not rob us of our freedom of will. Even His favour and disfavour consist in the fulfilment of a devotee's eager desire to be associated with Him, and His disfavour consists in fulfilling the desire of a confirmed sinner, leading him away into worldly pleasures farther from Him. The self is often called jndna, or consciousness, because of the fact that it is as self-revealing as consciousness 2 . It reveals all objects, when it comes in touch with them through its senses. The souls are, however, all held in Isvara. Ramanuja had spoken of the souls only as being the body of Isvara; but Lokacarya and Varavara further hold that, as the external material objects exist for the sake of the souls, so the souls exist for the Isvara; as Man is the end for which the external objects of enjoyment exist, so Isvara is the end (sesa) for which Man exists as the object of His control and support (sesi).

The self, though pure in itself, becomes associated with ignorance and worldly desires through coming into touch with matter (acit). Avidya, or ignorance, here means want of knowledge, misapplication of characteristics, false knowledge, etc. This ignorance, or avidya, which is the cause of many worldly desires and impure instincts, is generated by the association of the souls with matter; when this association is cut away, the self becomes divested of the avidya and emancipated 3 .

Ramanuja says in his Vedartha-samgraha that Isvara grants emancipation from worldly bonds to a person, when he, after acquiring true knowledge from the sastras according to the instruction of good teachers, engages himself every day in self-control, penance, purity; practises forgivingness, sincerity, charity, noninjury; performs all the obligatory and ceremonial duties; refrains from prohibited actions, and afterwards surrenders himself completely to the Lord; praises Him, continually thinks of Him, adores Him, counts His names, hears of His greatness and goodness, speaks of it, worships Him, and has all the darkness of his soul removed

1 See Ramanuja's Bhasya, xi. 3. 40, 41.

2 See Ramanuja's Bhasya, 11. m. 29, 30.

J See Varavara's commentary on the Tattva-traya, Cit-prakarana.

by His grace. The ordinary obligatory and ceremonial duties have to be performed; all the highest ethical virtues have to be practised and a true knowledge attained from the sdstras. It is only when a man has thus qualified himself that he can ultimately attain emancipation from all worldly bonds by supreme self-surrender and bhakti to the Lord. Bhakti, or devotion, with Ramanuja means continual thinking of Him. Without it pure knowledge cannot give us emancipation. The special feature of bhakti is this, that by it a man loses all interest in everything else than that which is done for the sake of the dearest. Finally bhakti is not with Ramanuja feeling, but a special kind of knowledge (jndna-visesa) which seeks to ignore everything that is not done for the sake of Isvara, the dearest to us all 1 .

Venkatanatha says that the performance of karnias makes a man fit to inquire into true knowledge, and the acquirement of true knowledge makes a man fit to attain devotion, or bhakti. When a man is fit to inquire after true knowledge, he may give up the karnias. Bhakti is, according to Venkatanatha, the feeling of joy (priti) in the adorable, and not mere knowledge. Emancipation as sdyujya (sameness of quality) with Isvara is the result of such bhakti. In this state of sdyujya, the human soul participates in the qualities of omniscience, bliss, etc., of Isvara. The human soul cannot, of course, wholly participate with Isvara, and such of His qualities as the power of creating and controlling the world, or of granting emancipation to human souls, remain ever with Isvara alone. Human souls can participate only in His knowledge and bliss and can be as omniscient and as blissful as He. In this state of emancipation Man remains in an eternal and infinite blissful servitude to Isvara. This servitude to Isvara is not painful in the least, like other services. When a man forgoes all his personal vanity and merges all his independence in His service, and considers himself as His servant whose only work is to serve Him, this is indeed the state of bright joy. Venkatanatha, however, further differentiates this Vaisnava emancipation, as the thinking of the Isvara as the most supreme, and thereby deriving infinite joy, from the other type of kaivalya, in which Man thinks of himself the Brahman and attains kaivalya. There also the association with avidyd and the world is indeed destroyed, and the man is reduced to oneness; but

1 See Vedartha-samgraha, p. 146.

this is hardly a desirable state, since there is not here the infinite joy which the Vaisnava emancipation can bring. Ramanuja has written of mukti as a state which a man can acquire when he is divested of all avidya, and has the natural intuition of the Supreme Soul and his relations with Him. He had distinguished this state from that mukti in which a man is divested of all karmas and realizes himself in himself, as obstructing the qualities of Isvara from him. This kaivalya, or realization of one's own self as the highest, is thus distinctly a lower emancipation. It is not out of place to say that Venkatanatha had pushed bhakti and the human goal of mukti distinctly further on to the side of feeling, by defining bhakti as a feeling of joy and mukti as servitude to Isvara.

Acit or Primeval Matter: the Prakrti and its modifications.

Proceeding to describe the nature of matter, Vehkatanatha tries to disprove the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of atoms. The smallest particle of matter is that which is visible in the sun's rays coming in through a chink or hole. The imagination of still finer particles, which may be called dyads or atoms, is not attested by experience; for these cannot be perceived. They cannot be compared to the small invisible pollen of flowers which makes the air carrying it fragrant; for these small particles possess the quality of smell, whereas atoms are subtle particles which do not possess any perceivable characteristic. Even inference cannot establish these atoms; for, if we suppose that particles when divided could be further divided until we could arrive at the limit of division, beyond which no division was possible, and that these subtlest particles could be called atoms, this would be impossible, for the atoms of Nyaya and Vaisesika are not only the smallest particles but they are considered to have a special kind of measure (parimandalya) as their characteristic, and this we have no data for inferring. If only the smallness is the criterion, we may better stop at the trasa-renu (the dust particles in the air). There are also other objections against the atomic theory, such as have been propounded by Sankaracarya, that the partless atoms cannot come into touch with other atoms or form together into one whole, or that the pdriman-dalya measure of the paramanu should not generate a different kind of measure in the dyad {dvy-anuka), or that the dyad ought not to

generate quite another kind of measure in the trasa-renu. The world cannot thus be accepted as due to the conglomeration of atoms or trasa-renus. Prakrti containing the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas has thus to be admitted as the primal matter. The state of it just preceding ahankdra and just following its state as prakrti (the state in which, all its three qualities being the same, there is no manifestation of any particular quality) is called mahat. The next state, which follows mahat and precedes the senses, is called ahankdra. The mahat and ahankdra are not subjective states of buddhi or ego, as some Samkhyists would think, but are two successive cosmic stages of the prakrti, the primeval cosmic matter. The ahankdra is of three kinds, sdttvika, rdjasa and tdmasa. The senses are not products of elements, as the Vaisesika supposed, but represent the functional cognitional powers in association with the eye, nose, skin, etc. It is manas whose states are variously called imagination, determination, etc. Lokacarya describes prakrti as being of three kinds, namely (1) that which contains the purest sattva characters and forms the material of the abode of Isvara; (2) that which contains the threefold characters of sattva, rajas and tamas and forms the ordinary world for us. This is the field of Isvara's play. It is called prakrti because it produces all transformations, avidyd because it is opposed to all true knowledge, and mdyd because it is the cause of all diverse creations. As we have mentioned before, the gunas of prakrti are its qualities, and not the Sdmkhya reals. Creation is produced by the rise of opposite qualities in the prakrti. The tan-mdtras are those states of matter in which the specific elemental qualities are not manifested. The order of the genesis of the tan-mdtras is described by some as follows: first the bhutddi, from it sabda-tan-matra, and from that the dkdsa ; again, from dkdsa comes sparsa-tan-mdtra (vibration-potential), followed by vdyu; from vdyu comes the rupa-tan-mdtra (light-potential) and from that tejas (light and heat); from tejas comes rasa-tan-mdtra (taste-potential), and thence water; from water comes gandha-tan-mdtra (smell-potential), and from that earth. Other theories of the genesis of the bhutas are also described, but we omit them here, as they are not of much value. Varavara says that time is regarded as the prakrti without its sattva quality, but Venkata-natha speaks of time as existing in the nature of Isvara as a special form of His manifestation. Space (dik) is not an entity different

from akasa, which offers room for the movement of things. Akasa is not a mere vacuity or non-occupiedness, but a positive entity.

Thus it is seen that the indeterminate matter of prakrti, with its three qualities, passes through many stages and at last exhibits the phenomenal world, which produces happiness and misery in accordance with a man's destiny {adrsta) and good or bad deeds. The force of adrsta is not a separate entity, but the favour and disfavour of Isvara, which works in accordance with the good or bad deeds of men.

CHAPTER XX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE RAMANUJA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Sankara and Ramanuja on the nature of Reality as qualified or unqualified.

Sankara says that Brahman, as pure intelligence (cin-matrarn) entirely divested of any kind of forms, is the ultimate reality (paramdrtha), and that all differences of the knower, the known, and the diverse forms of cognition are all imposed on it and are false. Falsehood with him is an appearance which ceases to exist as soon as the reality is known, and this is caused by the defect (dosa), which hides the true nature of reality and manifests various forms. The defect which produces the false world appearance is ignorance or nescience (avidyd or mdyd), which can neither be said to be existent nor non-existent {sad-asad-anirvacaniyd) y and this ceases {nivrtta) when the Brahman is known. It is, indeed, true that in our ordinary experience we perceive difference and multiplicity; but this must be considered as faulty, because the faultless scriptures speak of the one truth as Brahman, and, though there are the other parts of the Vedas which impose on us the performance of the Vedic duties and therefore imply the existence of plurality, yet those texts which refer to the nature of Brahman as one must be considered to have greater validity; for they refer to the ultimate, whereas the Vedic injunctions are valid only with reference to the world of appearance or only so long as the ultimate reality is not known. Again, the scriptures describe the Brahman as the reality, the pure consciousness, the infinite (satyam jndnam anantam brahmd) ; these are not qualities which belong to Brahman, but they are all identical in meaning, referring to the same difference-less identical entity, absolutely qualityless—the Brahman.

Ramanuja, in refuting the above position, takes up first the view of Sarikara that the Brahman as the ultimate reality is absolutely unqualified (nirvisesa). He says that those who assert that reality can be unqualified have really no means of proving it; for all proofs are based on the assumption of some qualified character. This un-qualifiedness could not be directly experienced, as they believe;

166 Philosophy of the Ramanaja School of Thought [ch.

for there can be no experience without the assumption of some qualified character, since an experience, being my own unique experience, is necessarily qualified. Even if you tried to prove that one's own experience, which is really qualified in nature, is unqualified, you would have to pick up some special trait in it, in virtue of which you would maintain it was unqualified; and by that very fact your attempt is defeated, for that special trait would make it qualified. Intelligence is itself self-revealing, and by it the knower knows all objects. It may also be shown that even during sleep, or swoon, the experience is not characterless. Even when the Brahman is said to be real, pure consciousness, and infinite, it means that these are the characters of Brahman and it is meaningless to say that they do not indicate some character. The scriptures cannot testify to the existence of any characterless reality; for they are a collection of words arranged in order and relation, and each word is a whole, comprising a stem and a suffix, and the scriptures therefore are by nature unable to yield any meaning which signifies anything that is characterless. As regards perception, it is well established that all determinate perception (sa-vikalpa-pratyaksa) manifests an entity with its characters; but even indeterminate perception (nirzikalpa-pratyaksa) manifests some character for its in-determinateness means only the exclusion of some particular character; and there can be no perception which is absolutely negative regarding the manifestation of characters. All experiences are embodied in a proposition—"This is so"—and thus involve the manifestation of some characters. When a thing is perceived for the first time, some specific characters are discerned; but, when it is perceived again, the characters discerned before are revived in the mind, and by comparison the specific characters are properly assimilated. This is what we call determinate perception, involving the manifestation of common characters or class characters as distinguished from the perception of the first moment which is called indeterminate perception. But it does not mean that indeterminate perception is not the perception of some specific characters. Inference is based on perception and as such must necessarily reveal a thing with certain characteristics; and so not one of the three sources of our knowledge, perception, scriptures and inference, can reveal to us any entity devoid of characteristics.

It is urged by Sarikara and his followers that perception refers

to pure being and pure being alone (san-mdtra-grdhi) ; but this can never be true, since perception refers to class-characters and thus necessarily involves the notion of difference; even at that one particular moment of perception it grasps all the essential characteristic differences of a thing which distinguish it from all other objects. If perception had reference only to pure being, then why should it manifest to us that "here is a jug," "here is a piece of cloth"; and, if the characteristic differences of a thing are not grasped by perception, why are we not contented with a buffalo when we need a horse ? As pure being they are all the same, and it is being only which, it is urged, is revealed by perception. Memory would not then distinguish one from the other, and the cognition of one thing would suffice for the cognition of everything else. If any distinctive differences between one cognition and another is admitted, then that itself would baffle the contention of the characterlessness of perception. Moreover, the senses can grasp only their characteristic special feature, e.g. the eye, colour, the ear, sound, and so on, and not differencelessness. Again, Brahman is said to be of the nature of pure being, and, if the same pure being could be experienced by all the senses, then that would mean that Brahman itself is experienced by the senses. If this were so, the Brahman would be as changeable and destructible as any other objects experienced by the senses, and this no one would be willing to admit. So it has to be granted that perception reveals difference and not pure characterlessness.

Again, it has been argued that, since the experience of a jug, etc., varies differently with different space and time, i.e. we perceive here a jug, there a piece of cloth, and then again at another moment here a toy and there a horse, and we have not the one continuous experience of one entity in all space and time, these objects are false. But why should it be so? There is no contradiction in the fact that two objects remain at the same place at two different points of time, or that two objects remain at two different places at one and the same point of time. Thus there is nothing to prove that the objects we perceive are all false, and the objects are by nature pure being only.

Again, it has been urged that experience or intuition (e.g. as involved in perception) is self-revealing (svayam-prakdsa)\ but this is true only with reference to a perceiver at the particular time of

168 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

his perception. No intuition is absolutely self-revealing. The experience of another man does not reveal anything to me, nor does a past experience of mine reveal anything to me now; for with reference to a past experience of mine I only say "I knew it so before," not "I know it now." It is also not true that no experience can be further experienced; for I can remember my own past experience or can be aware of it, as I can be aware of the awareness of other persons; and, if the fact that one awareness can be the object of another would make it cease from being an experience or intuition (samvid or anubhiiti), then there would be no anubhiiti or experience at all. If a man could not be aware of the experiences of others, he could use no speech to express himself or understand the speech of other people, and all speech and language would be useless. That jug, etc., are not regarded as intuition or experience is simply because their nature is altogether different therefrom and not because they can be objects of cognition or experience; for that would be no criterion at all.

It is again urged that this intuition or experience [anubhiiti or samvid) is never produced, since we do not know any stage when it was not in existence (prag-abhavddy-abhdvdd utpattir nirasyate). It is also urged that any experience or awareness cannot reveal any state in which it did not exist; for how can a thing reveal its own absence, since it cannot exist at the time of its absence ? Ramanuja, in reply to such a contention on Sankara's side, debates why it should be considered necessary that an experience should reveal only that which existed at the same time with it; for, had it been so, there would be no communication of the past and the future. It is only sense-knowledge which reveals the objects which are existing at the time when the senses are operating and the sense-knowledge is existing; but this is not true with regard to all knowledge. Memory, inference, scriptures, and intuitive mystic cognition (yogi-pratyaksa) of sages can always communicate events which happened in the past or will happen in the future. Arguing in the same way, one could say that even in the case of the experience of ordinary objects such as jug, etc., it can be said that the perception which reveals their presence at any particular time does not reveal their existence at all times. That they are not so revealed means that the revelation of knowledge {samvid or anubhiiti) is limited by time. If revelation of knowledge were not itself limited in time, then the objects re-

vealed by it would also not be limited in time, which would be the same thing as to say that these objects, such as jug, etc., are all eternal in nature; but they are not. This sort of argument may also be applied to the revelation of knowledge in inference; and it may well be argued that, since the objects must be of the same type as the knowledge which reveals them, then, if the knowledge is not limited in time and is eternal, the objects also will be eternal. For there can be no knowledge without an object. It cannot be said that at the time of sleep, drunkenness, or swoon, the pure experience is experienced as such without there being an object. If the pure experience were at that time experienced as such, one would remember this on waking; for except in the case of experiences at the time of universal destruction (pralaya), and in the period when one's body is not in existence, all that is experienced is remembered. No one, however, remembers having experienced an experience at the time of sleep or swoon, so that no such pure revelation of knowledge exists at that time. What Ramanuja maintains here, as will be shown later on, is that during sleep or swoon we have a direct experience of the self and not the pure formless experience of the revelation of pure consciousness. Thus there cannot be any state in which knowledge is pure revelation without an object. Hence it cannot be argued that, because knowledge does not reveal the state in which it did not exist, it must always be in existence and never be produced; for as each cognition is inseparably associated with its object, and as all objects are in time, knowledge must also be in time.

Again, the argument that, since knowledge is unproduced, it cannot suffer any further modification or change, is false. Granting for the sake of argument that knowledge is unproduced, why should it on that account be necessarily changeless? The negation preceding a particular production (prdga-bhdva) is beginningless, but it is destroyed. So is the avidyd of the Sarikarites, which is supposed to be beginningless and yet to be suffering all kinds of changes and modifications, as evidenced by its false creations of the world-appearance. Even the self, which is beginningless and destruction-less, is supposed to be associated with a body and the senses, from which it is different. This apprehension of a difference of the self from avidyd means a specific character or a modification, and if this difference is not acknowledged, the self would have to be considered

170 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

identical with azidya. Again, it is meaningless to say that pure intelligence, consciousness, experience or intuition {anubhuti or samvid), is pure self-revelation; for, were it so, why should it be called even self-revelation, or eternal, or one? These are different characters, and they imply a qualified character of the entity to which they belong. It is meaningless to say that pure consciousness is characterless; for at least it has negative characters, since it is distinguished from all kinds of material, non-spiritual or dependent objects which are considered to be different from this pure consciousness. Again, if this pure consciousness is admitted to be proved as existing, that must itself be a character. But to whom is it proved? It must be to the self who knows, and in that case its specific character is felt by the self who is aware of it. If it is argued that the very nature of the self-revelation of consciousness is the self, then that would be impossible; for knowledge implies a knower who is different from the knowledge which reveals certain objects. The knower must be permanent in all his acts of knowledge, and that alone can explain the fact of memory and recognition. The consciousness of pleasure, pain and of this or that object comes and goes, whereas the knower remains the same in all his experiences. How then can the experience be identified with the person who experiences? "I know it," "just now I have forgotten it"—it is in this way that we all experience that our knowledge comes and goes and that the phases are different from ourselves. How can knowledge or consciousness be the same as the knower or the self?

It is held that the self and ego or the entity referred to by "I" are different. The entity referred to by "I" contains two parts, a self-revealing independent part as pure consciousness, and an objective, dependent non-self-revealed part as "myself," and it is the former part alone that is the self, whereas the latter part, though it is associated with the former, is entirely different from it and is only expressed, felt, or manifested by virtue of its association with the former. But this can hardly be admitted. It is the entity referred to by "I" which is the subjective and individual self and it is this which differentiates my experience from those of others. Even in liberation I am interested in emancipating this my individual self, for which I try and work and not in a so-called subject-object-less consciousness. If " I" is lost, then who is interested in a mere consciousness, whether that is liberated or not? If there is

no relation with this ego, the self, the " I," no knowledge is possible. We all say "I know," "I am the knower"; and, if this individual and subjective element were unsubstantial and false, what significance would any experience have ? It is this ego, the " I," which is self-luminous and does not stand in need of being revealed by anything else. It is like the light, which reveals itself and in so doing reveals others as well. It is one whole and its intelligent nature is its self-revealing character. So the self-luminous self is the knower and not a mere revelation. Revelation, cognition or knowledge means that something is revealed to someone, and so it would be meaningless to say that the self and the knowledge are identical. Again, it has been maintained that self is pure consciousness; for this pure consciousness alone is what is non-material (ajada) and therefore the spirit. But what does this non-materiality mean ? It means with the Sarikarites an entity whose nature is such that its very existence is its revelation, so that it does not depend on anything else for its revelation. Therefore, pleasures, pain, etc., are also self-revealing. There cannot be a toothache which is present and yet is not known; but it is held that pleasures and pains cannot be revealed, unless there is a knower who knows them. Well the same would be true for knowledge even. Can consciousness reveal itself to itself? Certainly not; consciousness is revealed always to a knower, the ego or the self. As we say " I am happy," so we say " I know." If non-materiality {ajadatvd) is defined as revealing-to-itself in the above sense, such non-materiality does not belong to consciousness even. It is the ego, the "I," that is always self-revealed to itself by its very existence, and it must therefore be the self, and not the pure consciousness, which stands as much in need of self-revelation as do the pains and pleasures. Again, it is said that, though pure consciousness (anubhuti) is in itself without any object, yet by mistake it appears as the knower, just as the conch-shell appears by illusion as silver. But Ramanuja contends that this cannot be so; for, had there been such an illusion, people would have felt "I am consciousness" as "this is silver." No one makes such a mistake; for we never feel that the knowledge is the knower; but, as a matter of fact, we always distinguish the two and feel ourselves different from the knowledge—as "I know" (aham ana-bhavdmi).

It is argued that the self as changeless by nature cannot be the

172 Philosophy of the Ramamija School of Thought [en.

agent of the act of cognition and be a knower, and therefore it is only the changeful modifications of prakrti, the category of ahankdra, to which can he ascribed the capacity of being a knower. This ahankdra is the inner organ {antahkarana) or mind, and this alone can be called a knower; for the agency of an act of cognition is an objective and dependent characteristic, and, as such, cannot belong to the self. If the agency and the possibility of being characterized by the notion of ego could be ascribed to the self, such a self would have only a dependent existence and be non-spiritual, like the body, since it would be non-self-revealing. Ramanuja, in answer to such an objection, says that, if the word ahankdra is used in the sense of antahkarana, or the mind, as an inner organ, then it has all the non-spiritual characteristics of the body and it can never be considered as the knower. The capacity of being a knower (jndtrtza) is not a changeful characteristic (vikriydtmaka), since it simply means the possession of the quality of consciousness (jnana-giindsraya), and knowledge, being the natural quality of the eternal self, is also eternal. Though the self is itself of the nature of consciousness (jndna-szanipa), yet, just as one entity ot light exists both as the light and as the rays emanating from it, so can it be regarded both as consciousness and as the possessor of consciousness {mani-prabhrtlndm prabhdsrayatvam iza jnandsrayatzam api az'iruddham). Consciousness, though unlimited of itself {svayam aparicchinnam evajnanam), can contract as well as expand {sankoca-vikdsdrham). In an embodied self it is in a contracted state (san-kucita-svarupam) through the influence of actions (karmand), and is possessed of varying degrees of expansion. To the individual it is spoken of as having more or less knowledge 1 , according as it is determined by the sense-organs. Thus one can speak of the rise of knowledge or its cessation. When there is the rise of know ledge, one can certainly designate it as the knower. So it is admitted that this capacity as knower is not natural to the self, but due to karma, and therefore, though the self is knower in itself, it is changeless in its aspect as consciousness. But it can never be admitted that the non-spiritual ahankdra could be the knower by virtue of its being in contact with consciousness (cit) ; for consciousness as such can never be regarded as a knower. The ahankdra also is not the knower, and therefore the notion of the knower could not be explained on such a

view. It is meaningless to say that the light of consciousness falls on the non-spiritual ahankara through contiguity; for how can the invisible consciousness transmit its light to the non-spiritual ahankara ?

Even in sleep one feels the self as " I"; for on waking one feels " I have slept happily." This also shows that during sleep it is the " I" that both knew and felt happy. It has to be admitted tha.t there is a continuity between the " I" before its sleep, the " I" during its sleep, and the "I" after its sleep; for after waking the "I" remembers all that it had experienced before its sleep. The fact that one also feels "I did not know anything all this time" does not mean that the "I" had no knowledge at all; it means only that the "I" had no knowledge of objects and things which it knows on waking. There can be no doubt that the " I" knew during the sleep, since even a Sarikarite would say that during dreamless sleep the self (atmari) has the direct intuitive perception (saksi) of ignorance (ajfidna), and no one can have any direct intuitive perception without also being a knower. Thus, when after sleep a man says " I did not know even myself, I slept so well," what he means is that he did not know himself with all the particulars of his name, caste, parentage, etc., as he knows when he is awake. It does not mean that he had absolutely no knowledge at all. Even on liberation the entity denoted by " I" (aham-artha) remains; for it is the self that is denoted. If there is no one to feel or to know in the state of liberation, who is it that is liberated, and who is to strive for such a liberation? To be revealed to itself is self-consciousness and implies necessarily the knower as the "I" that knows, and therefore the notion of " I" denotes the self in its own nature as that which knows and feels. But the entity denoted by the notion of "I" {aham-artha) should be distinguished from the non-spiritual category of mind or the antahkarana, which is but a modification of prakrti or the false feeling of conceit, which is always regarded as bad and is the cause of the implication of insult towards superior persons and this is clearly due to ignorance (avidyd).

The next point of discussion raised by Ramanuja in this connection, to prove his point that there is no reality which can be regarded as characterless and unqualified in any absolute sense, is in the attempt that he makes to refute Sarikara's contention that the scriptures give us sufficient ground for acknowledging such a

174 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [en.

reality, and their authority is to be considered as the highest and as absolutely irrefutable. Sarikara had urged that the testimony of the scriptures was superior to that of perception. But the scriptures are based on the assumption of plurality, without which no language is possible. These are for that reason false. For the superiority that is ascribed to the scriptures was due to their teaching of the doctrine that all plurality and difference are false, and that the reality is absolutely differenceless; but yet since the meaning and the expressions of the scriptures are themselves based on the assumption of difference, how can the teaching of the scriptures be anything but false? Again, since they are as faulty as perception on account of their assumption of plurality, why should they be regarded as having an authority superior to perception? When the scriptures are based on error, what is communicated by them must likewise be erroneous, though it may not be directly contradicted by experience. If a man who is absolutely out of touch with all men has an eye-disease which makes him see things at a great distance double, then his vision of two moons in the sky, though it may not be contradicted by his or any one else's experience, is yet false. So, when there is defect, the knowledge produced by it must be false, whether it is contradicted or not. Hence, avidya being false, the Brahman communicated by it through its manifested forms, the scriptures, must also be false. And one may well argue, that, since Brahman is the object of knowledge produced by means tainted by avidya, it is false, just as the world is false {Brahma mithytl avidyddy-iitpanna-jfhlna-visayatviit prapancarat). In anticipation of such objections Sarikara urges that even false dreams can portend real good or bad happenings, or an illusory sight of a snake may cause real death. Ramanuja's answer to this is that what is meant by saying that dreams are false is that there is some knowledge, corresponding to which there are no objects; so there is knowledge in illusion and real fear due to such knowledge, but the corresponding external object does not exist. So in these cases also the communication of truth, or a real thing, or a real fact, is not by falsehood, but real knowledge; for no one doubts that he had knowledge in his dream or in his illusion. So far as the fact that there was knowledge in dream is concerned, dreams are true, so that it is useless to say that in dreams falsehood portends real fact.

Thus, from whatever point of view it may be argued, it is im-

possible to prove that the reality is characterless and differenceless, whether such a reality be pure being, or a unity of being, intelligence and bliss, or pure intuitional experience, and such a contention will so much cripple the strength of the scriptures that nothing can be proved on their authority and their right to supersede the authority of perception can hardly be established. But the scriptures also do not speak of any characterless and unqualified reality. For the texts referring to Brahman as pure being (Ch., vi. 2. 1), or as transcendent (Mund., 1. 1. 5), or where the Brahman is apparently identified with truth and knowledge (Tait., 11. 1. 1), can actually be proved to refer to Brahman not as qualityless, but as possessing diverse excellent qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness, eternality and the like. The denial of qualities is but a denial of undesirable qualities {heya-gunan pratisidhyd). When Brahman is referred to in the scriptures as one, that only means that there is no second cause of the world to rival him; but that does not mean that His unity is so absolute that He has no qualities at all. Even where Brahman is referred to as being of the essence of knowledge, that does not mean that such an essence of knowledge is qualityless and characterless; for even the knower is of the essence of knowledge, and, being of the essence of knowledge, may as well be considered as the possessor of knowledge, just as a lamp, which is of the nature of light, may well be regarded as possessing rays of light x .

Refutation of Sankara's avidya.

It is urged by Sankara that the self-luminous differenceless one reality appears as the manifold world through the influence of defect (dosa). This defect, called avidya, hides its own nature and produces various appearances and can neither be described as being nor as non-being: for it cannot be being, since then the illusion and the realization of its being an error would be inexplicable, and it cannot be non-being since then the world -appearance, as well as its realization as being wrong, would be inexplicable.

1 jndna-svarupasyaiva tasya jndnd-srayatvam mani-dyumani-pradlpd-divad ity uktam eva. Srl-bhdsya, p. 61.

The above is based on the discussions in the Srl-bhdsya known as mahd-purva-paksa and mahd-siddhdnta. l§fi-bhdsya, p. 10 et seq.

176 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

Ramanuja, in refuting avidyd, says that this avidyd is impossible since it must lean on some other thing for its support (dsraya), and it is clear that individual souls cannot be its support, since they themselves are regarded as being the products of avidyd. The Brahman also cannot be its support; for it is self-luminous consciousness and is hence opposed to avidyd, which is regarded as being liable to be recognized as illusory as soon as the true knowledge dawns. It cannot be argued that it is only the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge, and not pure knowledge forming the essence of Brahman, that destroys avidyd; for there is no difference between these two, between knowledge as the essence of Brahman and knowledge as removing avidyd. The nature of Brahman that is revealed by the knowledge that Brahman is of the nature of pure knowledge is already present in His pure self-luminous nature, which must necessarily on that account destroy avidyd 1 . Moreover, in accordance with Sarikara's view, Brahman, being of the nature of pure intuition, cannot further be the object of any other knowledge, and hence the nature of Brahman should not be further the object of any other concept. So, if knowledge is to be opposed to ignorance or avidyd, it must be in its own essence as it is, in itself, and so Brahman, as pure knowledge, ought to be opposed to avidyd. Moreover, to say that Brahman, which is of the nature of pure self-illumination, is hidden by avidyd is to say that the very nature of Brahman is destroyed (svarupa-ndsa) ; for, since pure self-illumination is never produced, its concealment can only mean that it is destroyed, since it has no other nature than pure self-illumination. Again, if the contentless pure self-luminous intuition is said to assume diverse forms on account of the defect of avidyd, which is supported by it, then the question may be asked, whether this defect is real or unreal. If it is real, then the monism falls, and, if it is unreal, then the question arises, how is this unreal defect brought about? If it is brought about by some other defect, then, that also being unreal, the same question will again arise, and hence there will be a vicious infinite (anavasthd). If it is held that even without any real basis one unreal defect may be the cause of another unreal defect and so on in a beginningless series, then we

1 Sudarsana Suri says here that, if there is such a difference between Brahman as essence and Brahman as destroying avidyd, that would mean that one form of Brahman is different from its other form, or, in other words, that it is qualified. Sruta-prakasika, Pandit edition, Benares, vol. ix, p. 658.

virtually have nihilism {Mddhyamika-paksa or Sunya-vdda) 1 . If, to escape these criticisms, it is held that the defect is the very essence of intuition (anubhuti) or Brahman, then, Brahman being eternal, the defect also will be eternal, and emancipation, or the cessation of the world-appearance, will never take place. Again, this avidyd is said to be indefinable, being different from both the existent and the non-existent (sad-asad-vilaksana). But how can this be? A thing must be either existing or not existing; how can there be anything'which is neither existing nor not-existing?

Referring to the arguments of the Sarikarites in favour of the existence of ajndna (nescience) as a positive entity and as directly perceived in such perceptions as "I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or any others," Ramanuja says that such perceptions refer only to the non-existence of the knowledge of an object prior to its apprehension (prdga-bhdva). Ramanuja argues that the ignorance perceived cannot refer to its specific and determinate object; for, if it did, then the object would be known and there would be no ignorance at all; and if the ajndna does not refer to any specific object, how can the ajndna or ignorance, standing by itself, be perceived or realized? If it is urged that ajndna refers to indistinct (a-visada-svardpa) knowledge, then also it may be said that this

1 Sudarsana Suri here points out that the Sarikarites try to evade the vicious infinite in three ways: firstly, those who think that ignorance (avidyd) is associated \\iih jiva(ilva-jnana-radl)cxy\am it by affirming it so as to involve an infinite series like the sced-and-the-shoot (vijdnkura), but not a vicious infinite; since on their view jiva is produced by avidyd and avidyd is again produced by jiva (avidydydm jiiah jtvdda vidyd). Those again who think that avidyd belongs to Brahman (Brahmd-jndna-vddl) hold that avidyd is by nature beginningless and the irrationality or unreasonableness of its nature is nothing surprising. As regards the beginninglessness of avidyd in an infinite series (pravdhd-ndditva) of jiva and avidyd and avidyd and jiva as propounded in the first view of the jJvd-jiidna-vddins, the refutation of it by those who hold that the ajndna belongs to Brahman is enough. For they have pointed out that such a view goes against the universally accepted doctrine of the eternity of souls, since it held that the souls came out through avidyd and avidyd through souls. The other view, that the illusory series is by itself beginningless, is no better; for, if one illusion were the basis of another illusion in a beginningless series, this would be practically identical with the nihilistic philosophy. Moreover, even if the illusion is admitted to be beginningless in nature, then also that must await some other root primary cause (miila-dosdpeksa) from which this successive series of illusions springs, and from that another, and so there will arise the vicious infinite. If no such root cause is awaited, the world-appearance may itself be regarded as avidyd, and there will be no need to suppose the existence of any root cause as avidyd. Again, if avidyd is held to be irrational in nature, why should it not affect the emancipated souls and also Brahman? If it is answered that it does not do so because the emancipated souls and Brahman are pure, then that means that this avidyd is rational and wise and not irrational. Sruta-prakdsikd, in Pandit, vol. IX, pp. 636—665.

178 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

may be regarded as the absence of the rise of distinct knowledge. Thus, even if a positive ignorance is admitted, it must somehow be related to something else to which it refers. In whatever way one may attempt to explain ajndna (ignorance), either as want of knowledge, or as other than knowledge, or as opposed to knowledge, it can be made possible only by a knowledge of the very fact of which it will be the opposite. Even darkness has to be conceived as being opposed to light; and hence one must have knowledge of light in order to understand darkness, as being opposed to it. But the ajndna (ignorance) of the Sahkarites cannot stand by itself, and so must show its content by a reference to the object or entity of which there is ignorance. Therefore, in the aforesaid experiences, " I am ignorant," " I do not know myself or any one else," it should be admitted that what is felt is this want of rise of knowledge and not any positive ignorance, as the latter is equally found to be relative to the object and the subject and has no advantage over the former. Moreover, the Brahman, which is ever free and ever the same pure self-luminous intelligence, cannot at any time feel this ignorance or avidyd. It cannot hide Brahman; for Brahman is pure intelligence, and that alone. If it is hidden, that amounts to the destruction of Brahman. Again, if Brahman can perceive ajndna, it can as well perceive the world appearance; if by hiding Brahman the ajndna makes itself perceived by Brahman, then such ajndna cannot be removed by true knowledge, since it has the power of concealing knowledge and of making itself felt by it. Further, it cannot be said that avidyd hides the Brahman only partially; for Brahman has no part. So the above experience of " I did not know anything," as remembered in the awakened state and referring to experiences of deep sleep, is not the memory of ajndna or ignorance directly experienced in deep sleep (susupti), but an inference during the awakened state of not having any knowledge during deep sleep on account of there being no memory 1 . Inference also is unavailing for proving the existence of any ajndna; for not only would such premises of inference involve a faulty reason, but no proper example could be found which could satisfy the claim of reason by a reference to any known case where a similar thing happens. More-

1 ato na kincid avedisam iti jnanam na smaranam kintu asmarana-lingakam jnana-bhava-visayam anumiti-rupam. Sruta-prakasika, p. 178. (Nirnayasagar ed. (9i6).)

over, it is quite easy to formulate other series of inferences to disprove the possibility of such ajndna as is accepted by the Sari-karites 1 .

Ramanuja's theory of Illusion—All knowledge is Real.

Ramanuja says that all illusion may briefly be described as perception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (anyasya anyathdvabhdsah). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is something wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (atyantd-paridrstd-kdranaka-vastu-kalpand-yogdt). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (anirvacaniya) ; but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correction. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conch-shell-silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another. Speaking against the Sarikarites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible {anirvacaniya) silver produced ? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs; for such defects are subjective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conch-shell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms.

Ramanuja seems to have himself favoured the anyathd-khyati theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge,

1 Sruta-prakdsikd, pp. 178-180.

180 Philosophy of the Rdmaniija School of Thought [ch.

unless error is ultimately explained as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another. He also says that all the other theories of illusion (except possibly the yathdrtha-khydti view, as suggested in the Sruta-prakasikd commentary— yathdrtha-khydti-vyatirikta-paksesu anyathd-khydti-paksah prabalah) would ultimately have to accept the analysis of error as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another (khydty-antardndm tu suduram api gatvd anyathdva-bhdsah dsrayaniyah — Rdmdnujabhdsya). Ramanuja further points out that even the akhydti theory of illusion (i.e. illusion considered as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the presentation of the "this" of the conch-shell and the memory of silver) is a form of anyathd-khydti; for ultimately here also one has to accept the false identification of two characters or two ideas. Vehkatanatha, commenting on this point in his Nydya-parisuddhi, says that the appearance of one thing as another is the indispensable condition of all errors, but the non-apprehension of difference must always be granted as an indispensable condition which must exist in all cases of false identification and has therefore the advantage of a superior simplicity (laghava); yet the anyathd-khydti theory gives the proper and true representation of the nature of illusion, and no theory of illusion can do away with the need of admitting it as a correct representation of the phenomenon of illusion. So Vehkatanatha says that Ramanuja, while he agrees with the anyathd-khydti view as a theory of illusion, yet appreciates the superior simplicity of the akhydti view as giving us the indispensable condition of all forms of illusion.

But, though Ramanuja himself prefers the anyathd-khydti view of illusion, he could not very well pass over the yathdrtha-khydti view, as advocated by the senior adherents and founders of the school of thought which he interpreted, viz. Bodhayana, Natha-muni and Varada Visnu Misra. Ramanuja is thus faced with two different theories, one that he himself advocated and the other that was advocated by his seniors. Fortunately for him, while his own theory of anyathd-khydti was psychological in character, the other theory of yathdrtha-khydti was of an ontological character, so that it was possible for one to hold the one view psychologically and the other view ontologically. Ramanuja, therefore, offers the yathdrtha-khydti view as an alternative. Vehkatanatha says that this yathdrtha-khydti view can only be put forward as a theory based on scriptural

xx] Ramanuja! s theory of Illusion

181

evidence, but cannot be supported as a philosophical theory which can be experienced and therefore as a scientific theory of illusion. We have to make up our minds between the two plausible alternative theories of anyathd-khydti and akhydti.

Ramanuja, to distinguish the ydthdrtha-khydti theory of his seniors, whom he refers to by the term "Vedic school" (veda-viddm matam), develops this view in a number of verses and says that he understands on the strength of the scriptural texts that the material world was created by the intermingling of the three elements, fire, water and earth, so that in each object there are all the three elements. When a particular element predominates in any material object, it is found tc possess more qualities of that element and is designated by its character, though it still holds the qualities of other elements in it. Thus it may in some sense be said that all things are in all things. A conch-shell possesses also the qualities of tcjas, or silver, and it is on that account that it may be said to resemble silver in some sense. What happens in the case of illusion is that through defects of organs, etc., the qualities or characters in a conch-shell representing other elements are not noticed and hence the perception can only grasp the qualities or characters of silver existing in the conch-shell, and the conch-shell is perceived as silver. So the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell is neither false, nor unreal, but is real, and refers to a real object, the silver element existing in the conch-shell 1 . In this view of illusion all knowledge is regarded as referring to a real object (yathdrtha-khydti) 2 . The difference between this view and that of Prabhakara is this, that, while Prabhakara was content with the negative condition of non-apprehension of the difference between the present perception of a glittering conch-shell and the memory of silver in the shop as the cause of the illusion, and urges that knowledge is real either as perception or as the memory, and that illusion has been the result of non-apprehension of the distinction of the two, Ramanuja is more radical, since he points out that the perception of silver in a

1 See Sruta-prakdsikd, pp. 183-6.

2 According to Sudarsana Suri this view is the traditional view (sdmpra ddyika) accepted by Bodhayana, Nathamuni, Rama Misra and others, which Ramanuja, as a faithful follower of that school, had himself followed. Thus, Ramanuja says:

yatha-rtham sarva-vijfidnam iti veda-vidam matam sruti-smrtibhyah sarvasya sarvd-tmatva-pratltitah.

Bhdsya and Sruta-prakasika, p. 183.

182 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

conch-shell is due to the real perception of the element of silver in a conch-shell and the non-apprehension owing to defects (dosa) of the other elements present in it which would have shown its difference from silver. So what is called the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell has a real objective basis to which it refers.

Dreams are explained by Ramanuja as being creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes is explained by him as due to the fact that yellow colour emanates from the bile of his eyes, and is carried to the conch-shell through the rays of the eyes which turn the white shell yellow. The appearance of the conch-shell as yellow is therefore a real transformation of the conch-shell, noticed by the eye of a jaundiced person, though this transformation can be noticed only by him and not by other persons, the yellow being very near his eyes 1 .

The akhydti and the yathdrtha-khyati views agree in holding that the imposed idea has a real basis as its object. But, while the former holds that this real basis is a past presentation, the latter holds that it is given as a presentation along with the object, i.e. the silver element, being mixed up with the conch-shell element, is also presented to the senses, but owing to some defects of circumstances, organs of sight, etc., the conch-shell, which ought to be the main part, is not perceived. Thus, it is only the silver part that forms the presentation, and hence the error. So non-perception of the conch-shell part is common to both the views; but, while the akhydti view holds that the silver part is only a reproduced image of past experience, the yathdrtha-khyati view grounds itself on the trivrt-karana texts of the Upanisads and holds that the silver part is perceived at the time. But Sudarsana Suri refers to the views of other teachers {kecid dcdrydh) and says that the trivrt-karana view may well explain the misapprehension of one element (bhuta) for another; but in the cases of misapprehension due to similarity trivrt-karana is not of much use, for trivrt-karana and panci-karana

1 Other types of errors or illusions are similarly explained by Ramanuja as having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of other elements which are objectively existent and associated with the entity which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not perceived. See ibid. pp. 187, 188.

can explain the intermixture of bhutas, but not of the bhautikas, or the later modifications of the five elements into the varied substances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually misapprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has, therefore, to be maintained that in these £/zwta-modifications also the trivrt-karana principle applies to a certain extent; for here also the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large parts of some Mwta-modification and smaller parts of one or more of other £/zwta-modifications. The conch-shell molecules are thus made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one element to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one element in the other, and is called the pratinidhi-nydya, or the maxim of determining similarity by real representation. So in all cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right apprehension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element {sukty-amsd) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver, despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell and not silver (nedam rajatam), the "not silver" has no other meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated in its negative aspect as "not silver" and in its positive aspect as conch-shell.

Ramanujacarya, alias Vadihamsambuvahacarya, the maternal uncle of Verikatanatha, seems to support the Ramanuja method of sat-khyati by showing that all the other three rival theories of illusion, such as that of anyathd-khydti, akhydti, and the anitva-caniya-khydti, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But he takes great pains to show that the sat-khydti theory may be supported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the

184 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

anyathd-khydti and the akhydti types of realism. He starts the discussion by taking for granted the akhydti type of realism and its logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to anyathd-khydti, and that therefore (excepting the sat-khydti), of all the khydtis, anyathd-khydti is perhaps the best. He says in his Nydya-kulisa that, since the way of knowledge requires that the sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not convey any knowledge about an object with which they were not in contact 1 . The defect (dosa) cannot account for the production of new knowledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being perceived or known. Defects only obstruct the course of the natural sequence of cause and effect 2 , just as fire would destroy the natural shooting powers of seeds 1 . Moreover, taking the old example of the conch-shell-silver, it may be asked how, if there was no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness cannot refer to non-existing entities, all forms of awareness must guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. What happens in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver is that there is memory of silver previously experienced and the "this," which is experienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the defects (dosa) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of past experience, while it is only the "this" in front of us that is experienced at the time (dosdt pramusita-tadavamarsah) 3 .

Vadihamsambuvaha, weighing the various arguments of the rival theories of anyathd-khydti and akhydti, deals with the arguments of the anvathd-khydti view which holds that it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. As against the objections raised by such a view in opposition to the akhydti view, viz., if each thing is different from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the "this" perceived directly in experience? Arguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not

1 indriydndm prdpyti-kdritvcna aprdptd-rtha-prakdsana mtpapatteh. Syuya-kulisa, Madras (Jovt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

2 dosdndm kdrya-viiihdta-mdtra-hetutvena kdryd-ntaro-pajanakatvd-ynQdt, na hy a%ni-$amsprstasya kalamu-vijasya ankuro-tpddane sdnmrthyam asti. Ihid.

8 idam iti pura-rastum anubhavah rtijatum iti ai purvd-nubhuta-rajata-visayd smrtih. Ibid.

apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misapprehended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of the conch-shell as silver {samsarga-virodhi-vaidharmya-visesa-rupa-bhedd-grahah pravrtti-hetuh) 1 . But the real objections to holding this akhydti view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic operation (samsarga-vydpdra) consisting of a thing being regarded as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. This forces us to accept the anyathd-khydti view as an unavoidable and ultimate explanation 2 . Vadihamsambuvaha urges that, since the silver is felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential part of anyathd-khydti). Just as in the real perception of a piece of silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch-shell-silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver,

1 Madras Govt. MS. No. 4910.

2 Like the seniors referred to by Ramanuja, Prabhakara also considers all knowledge to be valid {yathartham sarvam eve ha vijiidnam iti, Prokarano-pancika, p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psychological and experiential grounds. Salikanatha, representing Prabhakara's view, says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the time of the conch-shell-silver illusion, what is known is " this is silver," but there is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the conch-shell as silver, but of the " this " as silver; for, when there is the knowledge of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory perception is that through defects the differentiating characteristics of the conch-shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general character as an object. Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in the mental process {mano-dosat) the silver is not remembered with its original association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply remembered as an image of silver (tad-ity-amsa-paramarsa-vivarjitam). Though there is no such definite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of silver has to be admitted to be due to memory; for it cannot be due either to perception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the elimination of all other sources of knowledge, silver has to be admitted to be due to memory (ananya-gatitah smrtir atrazagomyate). On account of the absence of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be distinguished from a percept; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present percept from a reproduced image; and so we fail to differentiate between this memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two different kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and immediate perception of silver w hich is not there at the time, and even tempt us to

186 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that "this is not silver"; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if negations could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives [bddhyasya vidhi-riipatve vidhi-nisedha-vyatydsam ca nisedhe bddha iti tulydrthatzdt) 1 . The akhydti view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of association (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, asamsargdgraha) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association ? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible. Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we perceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that "this is silver," there is the perception of a false association (bddhaka-samsarga-grahanam) ; but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (bheddgraha) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch-shell-silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-anguliyakddi-hetutaydbhimatasya vyavahdrasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra visesah). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anya-hetu-vyavahdro ''nya-hetutaydvagatah). This will be anyathd-khydti; for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then

stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See Prakarana-paiicikd, Ch. iv, Naya-vithi.)

Sudarsana Suri, commenting on the akhydti view in his Sruta-prakdsikd in connection with his commentary on the yathdrtha-khydti view of Ramanuja's seniors, says that the akhydti view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made.

1 Nydya-kulisa of Vadiharnsambuvaha Ramanujacarya, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is not explained 1 . In all such cases the final appeal must be made to experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appearance of one thing as another 2 .

But though Vadihamsambuvahacarya thus tries to support the anyathd-khydti view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the akhydti view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For, if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver. So, even in anyathd-khydti, there is one element of akhydti involved ; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch-shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what one sees before one and what one remembers. But, 'though the negative fact of akhydti, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact of association (samsarga) or synthesis has to be admitted as an indispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting a concrete perception. The root-cause of all our behaviour and action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by itself be made a real cause of our actions (na ca miila-bhute samsarga-jndne pravrtti-kdrane siddhe tad-upajivino nirantara-jndnasya pravrttihetutvam iti yaktam vaktum) 1 . Although Vadihamsam-buvaha spends all his discussions on the relative strength of akhydti and anyathd-khydti as probable theories of illusion, yet he refers to the view of illusion mentioned by Ramanuja that all things are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory. He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But, if this were so, all his discussions on the akhydti and anyathd-khydti theories of illusion would be futile. Vadihamsambuvaha does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted, the other theories of akhydti or anyathd-khydti could be sup-

1 yadi cd'trapi bhedd-grahah saranam sydt tato'bhimdna-visesa-krta-bddha-vyavasthd na sidhyet. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

8 katham ayam loka-vyavahdro vrtta iti, na hi kancid upddhim andlambya loke iabda-prayogo'vakalpyate, tasmddbddhya-bddhaka-bhdvd-nyathd-nupapattydany-athd-khydti-siddhih. Ibid.

8 Ibid.

188 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

ported 1 . He further criticizes the anirvacanlya-khydti (illusion as the indescribable creation of, say, the appearance of silver in the conch-shell-silver illusion), a view of illusion as held by the San-karites, in the stereotyped form with which we are already familiar. Anantacarya, a writer of the nineteenth century, laid stress on the view of illusion which held that all things were contained in all things, and hence the perception of conch-shell as silver was neither false knowledge nor non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered; for the perception "this is silver" is a complex of two perceptions, "this" and "silver." Had not this been a case of actual perception, we should not have felt as if we perceived the "this" before us as "silver." The function of dosa (defect) was only to hide the conch-shell part (mixed up with the silver part) from perception. To say that all perceptions have objective entities corresponding to them (yath-drtha) does not mean that things are as they are perceived, but it means that it is not true that what is perceived has not an objective basis corresponding to it 2 . That sort of /e/«s-substance which forms the material cause of silver certainly exists in the elemental tejas, and, the earth-particles forming the material cause of conch-shells being present in the elemental earth-substances, these substances get mixed in the primitive stage of compounding by trivrt-karana, and this explains the presence of the objective substratum of silver in the illusory perception of silver 3 . It is evident, argues Anantacarya, that conch-shell cannot appear as silver; for, since conch-shell is not silver, how can it appear as silver? In order properly to account for the perceptual experience " this is silver," it is necessary to assume that the two constituents, "this" and "silver," of the complex "this is silver" are both perceptually determined; for it is only in this way that one can justify the perception " I perceive this silver."

1 yady api bhutdndm pancikarana-labdha-paraspara-vydptyd suktikdydm api sddrsyut rajatai-kadeso vidyata era iti siddhdntah tathdpi na vidyata iti krtvd cintyatevady-uddharana-prasiddhy-anurodhdya. Govt. Oriental A1SS. No. 4910.

2 tad-visayaka-jiidtia-sdrndnyam visesydvrtti-dharma-prakdrakatvd-bhdvavad iti yathdrtharn sarza-vijndnatn. Jiidna-ydthdrthya-vdda, MSS. No. 4884.

3 yddrsa-dharmd-vacchinndt tejo'msdd rajatd-rambhah tddrsa-dharmd-vacchinndndtn apy amsdndtn mahd-bhutdtmake tejasi sattvena sukty-drambhakatd-vacchedaka-dharmd-vacchinndndm pdrthiva-bhdgdndm api mahd-prthivydtn sattvena tayoh mahd-bhuta-trhrt-karana-dasdydm eva meland-sambhavdcchukty-ddau rajatd-sad-bhdvo-papatteh. Ibid.

This is an answer to the already noted objection raised by the Sruta-prakdsikd.

Failure of theistic proofs.

The existence of God can be known by the testimony of the scriptures (sdstra-pramdnaka), and by that alone. All other proofs which seem to demonstrate the existence of God ultimately fail to do so, since suitable counter-arguments may always be successfully arrayed to destroy the efficacy of such arguments.

God cannot be perceived either by any of the sense-organs or by the mind; for the former can make known only those objects with which they have come in contact, and the latter (excepting in the direct communication of feelings like pleasure, pain, etc.) cannot make external objects known to us without depending on the sense-organs. Further, God cannot be perceived by the special perception of saints (yogi-pratyaksa) ; for these are of the nature of memory, and do not convey any facts previously unknown through the senses. The saints can perceive only what has been already perceived, though these may not be present to the senses at the time. Objects too small for the senses cannot be perceived; for there cannot be any sense-contact with them. No reason can be perceived by means of which a necessary inference could be drawn regarding the existence of a supreme person who has a direct acquaintance with all things and the power of making them all. The ordinary argument that is offered is from effect to cause— since the world is "effect" (kdrya), it must have a cause, a maker, who has direct acquaintance with all its materials and their utility and enjoys them. The world is "effect" because, like all effects, it is made up of parts (sdvayava) ; like a healthy human body, therefore, it is under the guidance and superintendence of one person and one alone. But the point is that the two cases are not analogous. The human body is neither produced nor maintained in existence by its superintendent, the soul. The production of the body of a person is due to the adrsta (unseen effects of deeds) not only of that person, but also of beings who are benefited or in some way connected with it. Its existence as connected parts is due to the union of its parts, and does not depend for that on the living person who superintends it. Its existence as living is wholly unique and cannot be found in the case of the world as a whole. The superintendence of one person need not be considered as the invariable cause of all movements; for it is well known that many persons unite their

190 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

efforts to move some heavy object which could not otherwise be moved.

Moreover, if such a maker of the universe is to be admitted, could not the making of the world be better ascribed to one or more individual souls ? They have a direct acquaintance with the materials of the world. It is not necessary that the maker should be acquainted with the inner efficiencies or power of things; for it is enough if the objects containing those powers are directly known. We see also that in all examples of making, such as the making of a jug, a cloth, or the like, the maker is an ordinary human being. Since the inference of the existence of a cause of the world is inspired by these examples, it will be only fair to assume that the maker of the universe belongs to the same class of beings as the makers of the ordinary mundane effects, such as a jug or a cloth. Thus, inbtead of assuming a supreme being to be the maker of the universe, we might as well assume an individual soul to be the maker of the universe. Hence it is difficult to prove the existence of God by inference. Ordinarily inferences are applied for the knowing of an object which may also be known in other ways, and in all such cases the validity of any inference is tested by these. But in the case of the application of inference for the knowing of God this is not possible; for God cannot be known by anv other direct or indirect method. So the application of inference is not of any use here, since there is nothing which can test the validity of the inference or can determine that inference in a particular way and in that way alone. Therefore, since all sorts of inferences can be made from diverse propositions, it is not possible to determine that any particular kind of inference would be more acceptable than any other.

There are some who would still want to support the cosmo-logical argument on the ground that no less than a supreme person, entirely different from the individual persons, could be regarded as the maker of this vast universe; for the individuals cannot have the power of perceiving subtle things, or things which are obstructed from our view, or things which are far away. Thus it is necessary to hold that the maker of the universe must be a being of unlimited powers. From the effect we infer its cause; and again from the nature of the effect we infer the nature of the cause. So, if the cause of the universe is to be inferred, then only such a cause

can be inferred as really has the unlimited powers required for producing such an effect. It is irrelevant to infer such a cause as cannot produce it. Also the unessential conditions of ordinary causes need not be imported by suggesting that, just as in the case of ordinary human beings there must be a body and also instruments by which they can operate and produce the effect, so also in the case of the supreme cause it might be expected that He should have a body and should have instruments by which He could operate. This cannot be; for we know that many effects are wrought by sheer force of will and desire {sankalpd) and neither will nor desire needs a body for its existence, since these are generated not by body, but by mind {manas). The existence of manas also is independent of the existence of body; for the mind continues to exist even when it is dissociated from body. Since limited beings, who are under the sway of virtue and vice, are unable to produce this manifold universe of such wonderful and diverse construction, it has to be ad-mitted that there exists a supreme person who has done it. Moreover, since the material cause is seen in all known examples to be entirely different from the cause as agent or doer, there cannot be a Brahman which is both the material cause (updddna-kdrana) and the cause as agent (nimitta-kdrana) of this universe.

To this, however, it may be replied that it is admitted that the world is effect and that it is vast, but it is not known that all parts of this vast world originated at one time and from one person. Not all jugs are made at one time and by one person. How can any room be made for an unknown supreme person and the possibility be ruled out that different individual souls, by virtue of special merit and special powers, should at different times create the different parts of the world, which now appear as one unified whole created by one person at one time? It is quite possible that the different parts of the world were created at different times and will similarly be destroyed at different times. To imagine the existence of one such supreme person who could create all this manifold may well be regarded as almost chimerical. From the fact that the world is effect all that can be argued is that it must have been produced by an intelligent being, but there is nothing to infer that it is necessarily the creation of one intelligent being. This infinite universe could not have sprung into being at any one moment, and there is no proof that it did so. And, if it came into being gradually, it may

192 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

well be supposed that there were many intelligent beings who brought it into being gradually. Moreover, God, being absolutely complete in Himself, could not be conceived as having any need to effect such a creation, and He has neither body nor hands with which He could create. It is true that mind does not die with the body, but it is not found in any active state when it is not associated with the body. If it is admitted that God has a body, then He cannot be eternal. If His body could be eternal, though having parts, then on the same grounds the world too might be regarded as eternal. If the world is admitted to have come into being by His mere wish, that would be so strange as to be entirely dissimilar to all known cases of cause and effect. So, if one has to argue the existence of God as cause of the world on the basis of the analogy of known causes and effects as experienced by us, and if such a God is endowed with all the attributes with which He is generally associated, and with strange ways of creating this world, He must be such a cause as could never be inferred on the basis of the similarity of known causes and their modes of creating the effect. Thus, God can never be proved bv inference. His existence has to be admitted on the testimony of scriptural texts and of that alone.

Bhaskara and Ramanuja.

Kvery careful reader of Bhaskara and Ramanuja must have noticed that Ramanuja was largely indebted for his philosophical opinions and views to Bhaskara, and on most topics their doctrines are more or less the same. It is possible that Ramanuja was indebted for his views to Bodhayana or other Yaisnava writers, but, however that may be, his indebtedness to Bhaskara also was very great, as a comparative study of the two systems would show. However, the two systems are not identical, and there is an important point on which thev disagree. Bhaskara believed that there is Brahman as pure being and intelligence, absolutely formless, and the causal principle, and Brahman as the manifested effect, the world. According to Bhaskara there is no contradiction or difficulty in such a conception, since all things have such a dual form as the one and the many or as unity and difference. "Unity in difference" is the nature of all things. Ramanuja, however, holds that difference and unity cannot both be affirmed of the same thing. Thus, when we affirm "this is like this," it is not true that the same

entity is both the subject and the predicate. For example, when "this" in the above proposition stands for a cow, the predicate "like this" stands for its particular and unique description of bodily appearance. The latter is only the attribute of the former and determines its nature and character. There is no meaning in asserting the identity of the subject and the predicate or in asserting that it is the same entity that in one form as unity is "subject" and in another form as difference is the predicate. Bhaskara argues that the conditions and the conditioned {avasthd-taadvasthas cd) are not wholly different; nor are the substance and its attributes, the cloth and the whiteness, entirely different. There are no qualities without substance and no substance without qualities. All difference is also unity as well. The powers or attributes of a thing are not different from it; the fire is the same as its power of burning and illuminating. So everything is both unity and difference, and neither of them may be said to be wholly reducible to the other. But Rama-nuja maintains that all propositions are such that the predicate is an attribute of the subject. The same attributive view is applicable to all cases of genus and species, cause and effect, and universals and individuals. The "difference" and the "unity" are not two independent forms of things which are both real; but the "difference" modifies or qualifies the nature and character of the "unity," and this is certified by all our experience of complex or compound existence 1 . According to Ramanuja the affirmation of both unity and difference of the same entity is self-contradictory. The truth of "difference" standing by itself is not attested by experience; for the difference of quality, quantity, etc., always modifies the nature and character of the subject as " unity," and it is this alone that is experienced by us.

Bhaskara urges that, though there is the twofold Brahman as the manifested many and as the unmanifested formless identity of pure being and intelligence, it is only the latter that is the object of our highest knowledge and worship. Ramanuja, however, denies this formless and differenceless Brahman and believes in the qualified complex Brahman as the transcendent and immanent God holding within Him as His body the individual souls and the world of matter. Regarding the relation of Brahman and the individual souls (Jiva) Bhaskara says that a jiva is nothing but Brahman

1 Vadi-traya-khandana. d in 13

194 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

narrowed by the limitations of the mind substance {antahkarano-padhy-avacchinna). When it is said that jiva is a part (amsa) of Brahman, it is neither in the sense of part or of cause that the word "amsa" is used, but in the technical sense of being limited by the limitation of mind. This limitation is not false or unreal, and it is on account of it that the individual souls are atomic. According to Ramanuja "difference" is felt as a result of ignorance and the difference is therefore unreal. With Ramanuja the identity of Brahman with the individual souls is the last word. The apparent difference of imperfection, finiteness, etc., between the individual souls and the perfection and infiniteness of Brahman is due to ignorance (avidyd), and is found to be false as soon as the souls realize themselves to be forming the body of Brahman itself. "Difference" as such has no reality according to Ramanuja, but only modifies and determines the character of the identical subject to which it refers. The subject and its character are identical. Bhaskara considers identity and difference as two modes, both of which are alike independently true, though they are correlated to each other. In criticism of Bhaskara it is said that, if the limitations of Brahman were also true, then they would wholly limit Brahman, since it has no parts, and thus it would be polluted in its entirety. This objection to Bhaskara's view in some of its subtle aspects is made with dialectical skill by Ramanuja 1 . But it does not appear that it has much force against Bhaskara, if we admit his logical claim that unity and plurality, cause and effect, are two modes of existence of the same reality and that both these forms are equally real. It does not seem that the logical position of Bhaskara has been sufficiently refuted.

Ramanuja also speaks of Brahman as being identical with individual souls or the material world and yet different therefrom, but only in the sense in which a character or a part may be said to be at once identical with and different from the substance possessing the character or the whole to which the part is said to belong. The individual souls and the inanimate creation cannot stand by themselves independently, but only as parts of Brahman. So from the fact that they are parts of Brahman their identity (abheda) with Brahman becomes as primary as their difference (bheda), inasmuch

1 Ramanuja's Bhasya, pp. 265, 266, with the Sruta-prakasika, Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay, 1916.

as the substance may be considered to be different from its attributes 1 . The main difference that remains on this point between Bhaskara and Ramanuja is this, that Bhaskara does not think it necessary to introduce the conception of body and parts, or substance and attributes. According to his doctrine Brahman is immanent and transcendent at the same time, identity and difference can be affirmed of a thing at one and the same time; and this can be illustrated from the cases of cause and effect, or substance and attributes, etc.

Ontological position of Ramanuja's Philosophy.

The entire universe of wondrous construction, regulated throughout by wonderful order and method, has sprung into being from Brahman, is maintained by Him in existence, and will also ultimately return to Him. Brahman is that to the greatness of which there is no limitation. Though the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world signify three different traits, yet they do not refer to different substances, but to one substance in which they inhere. His real nature is, however, His changeless being and His eternal omniscience and His unlimitedness in time, space and character. Referring to Sarikara's interpretation of this sutra (1. 1. 2), Ramanuja says that those who believe in Brahman as characterless (nirvisesa) cannot do justice to the interpretation of this attribute of Brahman as affirmed in Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 2; for instead of stating that the creation, maintenance and absorption of the world are from Brahman, the passage ought rather to say that the illusion of creation, maintenance, and absorption is from Brahman. But even that would not establish a characterless Brahman; for the illusion would be due to ajiidna, and Brahman would be the mani-fester of all ajnana. This it can do by virtue of the fact that it is of the nature of pure illumination, which is different from the concept of materiality, and, if there is this difference, it is neither characterless nor without any difference 2 .

This raises an important question as regards the real meaning

1 jlvavat-prthak-siddhy-anarha-visesanatvena acid-vastuno brahma-msatvam; visista-vastv-eka-desatvena abheda-vyavahdro mukhyah, visesana-viiesyayoh svarupa-svablidva-bhedena bheda-vyavahdro'pi mukhyah. §rl-bhdsya, in. 2. 28.

2 jagaj-janmddi-bhramo yatas tad brahme' ti svot-preksa-pakse'pi na rrirvisesa-lastu-siddhih, etc. Ibid. I. 1.2.

196 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

of Saiikara's interpretation of the above sutra. Did he really mean, as he is apparently stated by Ramanuja to have said, that that from which there is the illusion of creation, etc., of the world is Brahman ? Or did he really mean Brahman and Brahman by itself alone is the cause of a real creation, etc., of the world? Sahkara, as is well known, was a commentator on the Brahma-sutras and the Upanisads, and it can hardly be denied that there are many passages in these which would directly yield a theistic sense and the sense of a real creation of a real world by a real God. Saiikara had to explain these passages, and he did not always use strictly absolutist phrases; for, as he admitted three kinds of existence, he could talk in all kinds of phraseology, but one needed to be warned of the phraseology that Saiikara had in view at the time, and this was not always done. The result has been that there are at least some passages which appear by themselves to be realistically theistic, others which are ambiguous and may be interpreted in both ways, and others again which are professedly absolutist. But, if the testimony of the great commentators and independent writers of the Sankara school be taken, Sahkara's doctrine should be explained in the purely monistic sense, and in that alone. Brahman is indeed the unchangeable infinite and absolute ground of the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of all world-appearance and the ultimate truth underlying it. But there are two elements in the appearance of the world-phenomena—the ultimate ground, the Brahman, the only being and truth in them, and the element of change and diversity, the mdyd —by the evolution or transformation of which the appearance of "the many" is possible. But from passages like those found in Sahkara's bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, 1. 1.2, it might appear as if the world-phenomena are no mere appearance, but are real, inasmuch as they are not merely grounded in the real, but are emanations from the real: the Brahman. But, strictly speaking, Brahman is not alone the updddna or the material cause of the world, but with avidyd is the material cause of the world, and such a world is grounded in Brahman and is absorbed in Him. Vacaspati, in his Bhdmati on Saiikara's bhdsya on the same sutra [Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 2), makes the same remark 1 . Prakasatman, in his Panca-pddikd-vivarana, says that the creative functions here spoken of do

1 avidyd-sahita-brahmdpaddnam jagat brahmany evdsti tatraiyva ca tlyate. Bhdmati, 1. 1.2.

not essentially appertain to Brahman and an inquiry into the nature of Brahman does not mean that he is to be known as being associated with these qualities 1 . Bhaskara had asserted that Brahman had transformed Himself into the world-order, and that this was a real transformation— parindma —a transformation of His energies into the manifold universe. But Prakasatman, in rejecting the view of parindma, says that, even though the world-appearance be of the stuff of tndyd, since this may a is associated with Brahman, the world-appearance as such is never found to be contradicted or negated or to be non-existing—it is only found that it is not ultimately real 2 . Maya is supported in Brahman; and the world-appearance, being transformations of mdyd, is real only as such transformations. It is grounded also in Brahman, but its ultimate reality is only so far as this ground or Brahman is concerned. So far as the world-appearances are concerned, they are only relatively real as mdyd transformations. The conception of the joint causality of Brahman and mdyd may be made in three ways; that mdyd and Brahman are like two threads twisted together into one thread; or that Brahman, with mdyd as its power or sakti, is the cause of the world; or that Brahman, being the support of mdyd, is indirectly the cause of the world 3 . On the latter two views mdyd being dependent on Brahman, the work of mdyd —the world—is also dependent on Brahman; and on these two views, by an interpretation like this, pure Brahman (suddha-brahma) is the cause of the world. Sarvajnatma muni, who also thinks that pure Brahman is the material cause, conceives the function of mdyd not as being joint material cause with Brahman, but as the instrument or the means through which the causality of pure Brahman appears as the manifold and diversity of the universe. But even on this view the stuff of the diversity is the mdyd, though such a manifestation of mdyd would have been impossible if the ground-cause, the Brahman, had been absent 4 . In discerning the nature of the causality of Brahman, Prakasatman says that the monistic doctrine of Vedanta is upheld by the fact that apart from

1 na hi ndnd-vidha-kdrya-kriydvesdtmakatvam tat-prasava-sakty-dtmakatvam vd jijndsya-visuddha-brahmdntargatam bhavitum arhati. Panca-pddikd-znvarana, p. 205.

2 srstes ca svopadhau abhava-vydvrttatvdt sarve ca sopddhika-dharmdh svd-srayopddhau abddhyatayd satyd bhavanti srftir api svarupena na bddhyate kintu paramd-rthd-satyatvd-tnsena. Ibid. p. 206. 8 Ibid. p. 212.

* Sankfepa-sdrTraka, I. 332, 334, and the commentary Anvaydrtha-prakdsikd by Ramatirtha.

198 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

the cause there is nothing in the effect which can be expressed or described {updddna-vyatirekena kdryasya aniriipandd advitiyatd) 1 . Thus, in all these various ways in which Saiikara's philosophy has been interpreted, it has been universally held by almost all the followers of Sahkara that, though Brahman was at bottom the ground-cause yet the stuff of the world was not of real Brahman material, but of mdyd; and, though all the diversity of the world has a relative existence, it has no reality in the true sense of the term in which Brahman is real 2 . Sankara himself says that the omniscience of Brahman consists in its eternal power of universal illumination or manifestation (yasya hi sarva-visaydvabhdsana-ksamam jndnam nityam asti). Though there is no action or agency involved in this universal consciousness, it is spoken of as being a knowing agent, just as the sun is spoken of as burning and illuminating, though the sun itself is nothing but an identity of heat and light {pratatausnya-prakdsepi savitari dahati prakdsayatiti svdtantrya-vyapadesa-darsandt... evam asaty apt jndna-karmani Brahmanas tad aiksata iti kartrtva-vyapadesa-darsandt). Before the creation of the world what becomes the object of this universal consciousness is the indefinable name and form which cannot be ascertained as "this" or "that" 3 . The omniscience of Brahman is therefore this universal manifestation, by which all the creations of mdyd become the know-able contents of thought. But this manifestation is not an act of knowledge, but a permanent steady light of consciousness by which the unreal appearance of mdyd flash into being and are made known. Ramanuja's view is altogether different. He discards the view of Sankara, that the cause alone is true and that all effects are false.

1 Panca-padika-vivarana, p. 221.

2 Prakasatman refers to several ways in which the relation of Brahman and mdyd has been conceived, e.g. Brahman has mdyd as His power, and the individual souls are all associated with avidyd; Brahman as reflected in mdyd and avidyd is the cause of the world (mdyd-vidyd-pratibimbitam brahma jagat-kdranam) ; pure Brahman is immortal, and individual souls are associated with avidyd; individual souls have their own illusions of the world, and these through similarity appear to be one permanent world; Brahman undergoes an apparent transformation through His own avidyd. But in none of these views is the world regarded as a real emanation from Brahman. Panca-padika-vivarana, p. 232.

Regarding the question as to how Brahman could be the cause of beginning-less Vedas, Prakasatman explains it by supposing that Brahman was the underlying reality by which all the Vedas imposed on it were manifested. Ibid. pp. 203, 231.

s kim punas tat-karma? yat prdg-utpatter livara-jndnasya visayo bhavatlti. tattvdnyatvdbhydm anirvacanlye ndma-rupe avyakrte vydcikirsite iti brumah. Sankara-bhdsya, 1. 1. 5.

One of the reasons adduced for the falsity of the world of effects is that the effects do not last. This does not prove their falsehood, but only their destructible or non-eternal nature (anityatva). When a thing apparently existing in a particular time and space is found to be non-existing at that time or in that space, then it is said to be false; but, if it is found to be non-existing at a different place and at a different time, it cannot be called false, it is only destructible or non-eternal. It is wrong to suppose that a cause cannot suffer transformation; for the associations of time, space, etc., are new elements which bring in new factors which would naturally cause such transformation. The effect-thing is neither non-existent nor an illusion; for it is perceived as existing in a definite time and place after its production from the cause until it is destroyed. There is nothing to show that such a perception of ours is wrong. All the scriptural texts that speak of the world's being identical with Brahman are true in the sense that Brahman alone is the cause of the world and that the effect is not ultimately different from the cause. When it is said that a jug is nothing but clay, what is meant is that it is the clay that, in a specific and particular form or shape, is called a jug and performs the work of carrying water or the like; but, though it does so, it is not a different substance from clay. The jug is thus a state of clay itself, and, when this particular state is changed, we say that the effect-jug has been destroyed, though the cause, the clay, remains the same. Production (utpatti) means the destruction of a previous state and the formation of a new state. The substance remains constant through all its states, and it is for this reason that the causal doctrine, that the effect exists even before the operation of causal instruments, can be said to be true. Of course, states or forms which were non-existent come into being; but, as the states have no existence independently from the substance in which they appear, their new appearance does not affect the causal doctrine that the effects are already in existence in the cause. So the one Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, and the many souls, being particular states of Him, are at once one with Him and yet have a real existence as His parts or states.

The whole or the Absolute here is Brahman, and it is He who has for His body the individual souls and the material world. When Brahman exists with its body, the individual souls and the material world in a subtler and finer form, it is called the "cause" or Brah-

200 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuj.a School of Thought [ch.

man in the causal state (kdrandvasthd). When it exists with its body, the world and souls in the ordinary manifested form, it is called Brahman in the effect state (kdrydvasthd) 1 . Those who think that the effect is false cannot say that the effect is identical with the cause; for with them the world which is false cannot be identical with Brahman which is real 2 . Ramanuja emphatically denies the suggestion that there is something like pure being (san-mdtra), more ultimately real than God the controller with His body as the material world and individual souls in a subtler or finer state as cause, as he also denies that God could be regarded as pure being (san-mdtra); for God is always possessed of His infinite good qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. Ramanuja thus sticks to his doctrine of the twofold division of matter and the individual souls as forming parts of God, the constant inner controller (antar-ydmiri) of them both. He is no doubt a sat-kdrya-vddin, but his sat-kdrya-vdda is more on the Samkhya line than on that of the Vedanta as interpreted by Saiikara. The effect is only a changed state of the cause, and so the manifested world of matter and souls forming the body of God is regarded as effect only because previous to such a manifestation of these as effect they existed in a subtler and finer form. But the differentiation of the parts of God as matter and soul always existed, and there is no part of Him which is truer or more ultimate than this. Here Ramanuja completely parts company with Bhaskara. For according to Bhaskara, though God as effect existed as the manifested world of matter and souls, there was also God as cause, Who was absolutely unmanifested and undifferentiated as pure being (san-mdtra). God, therefore, always existed in this His tripartite form as matter, soul and their controller, and the primitive or causal state and the state of dissolution meant only the existence of matter and souls in a subtler or finer state than their present manifest form. But Ramanuja maintains that, as there is difference between the soul and the body of a person, and as the defects or deficiencies of the body do not affect the soul, so there is a marked difference between God, the Absolute controller, and His body, the individual souls and the world of matter, and the defects

1 Srl-bhasya, pp. 444, 454, Bombay ed., 1914.

2 This objection of Ramanuja, however, is not valid; for according to it the underlying reality in the effect is identical with the cause. But there is thus truth in the criticism, that the doctrine of the " identity of cause and effect" has to be given a special and twisted meaning for Jaarikara's view.

of the latter cannot therefore affect the nature of Brahman. Thus, though Brahman has a body, He is partless (niravay ava) and absolutely devoid of any karma; for in all His determining efforts He has no purpose to serve. He is, therefore, wholly unaffected by all faults and remains pure and perfect in Himself, possessing endless beneficent qualities.

In his Veddrtha-samgraha and Veddnta-dipa, Ramanuja tried to show how, avoiding Sankara's absolute monism, he had also to keep clear of the systems of Bhaskara and of his own former teacher Yadavaprakasa. He could not side with Bhaskara, because Bhaskara held that the Brahman was associated with various conditions or limitations by which it suffered bondage and with the removal of which it was liberated. He could also not agree with Yadavaprakasa, who held that Brahman was on the one hand pure and on the other hand had actually transformed itself into the manifold world. Both these views would be irreconcilable with the Upani-sadic texts.

Verikatanatha's treatment of pramana.

As the nihilistic Buddhists {sunya-vadl or madhyamika) are supposed to deny the valid existence of any fact or proposition, so the Sankarites also may be supposed to suspend their judgment on all such questions. In the preliminary portions of his Khandana-khanda-khddya, in answer to the question whether all discussions (kathd) must presuppose the previous admission of validity and invalidity as really referring to facts and propositions, Sriharsa says that no such admission is indispensable; for a discussion can be conducted by the mutual agreement of the contending persons to respect certain principles of reality or unreality as decided by the referee (madhyastha) of the debate, without entering into the question of their ultimate validity. Even if validity or invalidity of certain principles, facts, or propositions, were admitted, then also the mutual agreement of the contending persons to these or other principles, as ruled by the referee, would be an indispensable preliminary to all discussions 1 . As against these views Venkatanatha,

1 na ca pramdnddlndm sattd'pi ittham eva tdbhydm angikartum ucitd; tddria-vyavahdra-niyama-mdtrenaiva kathd-pravrtty-upapatteh. pramdnddi-sattam ab-hyupetya'pi tathd-vyavahdra-niyama-vyatireke kathd-pravrttim vind tattva-nirnayasya jayasya vd abhilasitasya kathakayor aparyavasdndt, etc. Khandana-khanda-hhddya, p. 35.

202 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

the best-reputed philosopher of the Ramanuja school, seeks to determine the necessity of the admission of validity (prdmdnya) or invalidity (a-prdmdnyd) as naturally belonging to certain proportions or facts, as a preliminary to our quest of truth or objective and knowable facts. If the distinction of valid and invalid propositions is not admitted, then neither can any thesis be established, nor can practical affairs run on. But, though in this way the distinction between valid and invalid propositions has to be admitted on the basis of its general acceptance by people at large, yet their real nature has still to be examined. Those who deny such a distinction can have four alternative views, viz. that all propositions are valid, that all propositions are invalid, that all propositions mutually contradict one another, or that all propositions are doubtful. If all propositions are valid, then the negation of such a proposition is also valid, which is self-contradictory; if they are all invalid, then even such a proposition is invalid and hence no invalidity can be asserted. As to the third alternative, it may be pointed out that invalid propositions can never contradict the valid ones. If one valid proposition restricts the sphere of another valid proposition, this does not mean contradiction. A valid proposition has not to depend on other propositions for making its validity realized; for a valid proposition guarantees its own validity. Lastly, if you doubt everything, at least you do not doubt that you doubt; so then you are not consistent in saying that you doubt everything; for at least in one point you are certain, viz. that you doubt everything 1 . Thus it has to be admitted that there are two classes of propositions, valid and invalid. But, though the general distinction between valid and invalid propositions be admitted, yet proper inquiry, investigation, or examination, is justified in attempting to determine whether any particular proposition is valid or invalid. That only is called a pramdna which leads to valid knowledge. 2 In the case of perception, for example, those which would lead to valid knowledge would be defectless eyes, mind-contact as attention, proper proximity of the object, etc., and these would jointly constitute pramdna. But in the

1 This remark naturally reminds one of Descartes— sarvam sandigdham iti te nipunasyasti niscayah, samsayas ca na sandigdhah sandigdhadvaita-vadinah. Nyaya-parisuddhi. p. 34. Chowkhamba s.s.

2 A distinction is here made between karana-pramanya and asraya-pramanya (pramdsrayasya isvarasya pramanyam anglkrtarri). Nydya-sdra commentary on Nyaya-parisuddhi by Srlnivasa, p. 35.

case of testimony it is the faultlessness of the speaker that constitutes the validity of the knowledge. The scriptures are valid because they have been uttered by God, Who has the right knowledge of things. The validity of the Vedas is not guaranteed by absence of defect in our instruments of knowledge. Whatever that may be, the ultimate determination of pramdna is through pramd, or right knowledge. That by which one can have right knowledge is pramdna. Vedas are valid, because they are uttered by God, Who has right knowledge. So it is the Tightness of knowledge that ultimately determines the validity of pramdna 1 .

Vatsya Srinivasa, a successor of Venkatanatha of the Ramanuja school, defines pramdna as the most efficient instrument amongst a collocation of causes forming the immediate, invariable and unconditional antecedents of any right knowledge (pramd). Thus, in the case of perception, for example, the visual organ is a pramdna which leads to right visual knowledge, through its intermediary active operation (avdntara-vydpdra) —the sense-contact of the eye with its objects 2 . Jayanta, the celebrated Nyaya writer, had, however, expressed a different view on the point in his Nydya-manjart. He held that no member in a collocation of causes producing the effect could be considered to be more efficient or important than the other members. The efficiency (atisaya) of the causal instruments means their power of producing the effect, and that power belongs to all the members jointly in the collocation of causes; so it is the entire collocation of causes producing right knowledge that is to be admitted as its instrument or pramdna 3 . Even subject and object cannot be regarded as more important; for they manifest themselves only through the collocating causes producing the desired relation between the subject and the object 4 . With Nyaya this

1 karana-prdmdnyasya dsraya-prdmdnyasya ca jfidna-prdmanyd-dhlna-jndna-tvdt tad ubhaya-prdmdnya-siddhy-artham api jndna-prdmdnyam eva vicdranlyam. Nydya-sdra, p. 35.

* pramd-karanam pramdnam ity uktam dcdryaih siddhdnta-sdre pramo-tpddaka-sdmogrl-madhye yad atisayena pramd-gunakam tat tasydh kdranam; atisayas ca vydpdrah, yad dhi yad janayitvaiva yadjanayet tat tatra tasydvdntara-vydpdrah. sdksdtkdri-pramdyd indriyam kdranam indriyd-rtha-samyogo 'vdntara-vydpdrah. Ramanuja, Siddhdnta-samgraha. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4988.

8 sa ca sdmagry-antar-gatasya na kasyacid ekasya kdrakasya kathayitum pdrycte, sdmagryds tu so'tisayah suvacah sannihitd cet sdmagfl sampannam eva phalam iti. Nydya-mafijarl, p. 13.

4 sdkalya-prasdda-labdha-pramiti-sambandha-nibandhanah pramdtr-pramey-ayor mukhya-svarupa-ldbhah. Ibid. p. 14.

204 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

collocation of causes consists of ideational and non-ideational {bodhdbodha-svabhdva) factors*.

If the view of the Veddnta-paribhdsa is to be accepted, then the Sarikarite view also is very much like the Ramanuja view on this point; for both Dharmarajadhvarlndra and Ramakrsna agree in defining pramdna as the instrument of right knowledge. In the case of visual perception or the like the visual or the other sense organs are regarded as, pramana; and the sense-contact is regarded as the operation of this instrument.

The difference between the Nyaya view and the Ramanuja view consists in this, that, while the Nyaya gives equal importance to all members of the collocation, the Ramanuja view distinguishes that only as the instrumental cause which is directly associated with the active operation (zydpdra). Even the Sarikarites agree with such a productive view of knowledge; for, though they believe consciousness to be eternal and unproduced, yet they also believe the states of consciousness {vrtti-jnand) to be capable of being produced. Both the Ramanuja and the Sarikara beliefs accept the productive view of knowledge in common with the Nyaya view, because with both of them there is the objective world standing outside the subject, and perceptual knowledge is produced by the sense-organs when they are in operative contact with the external objects. A distinction, however, is made in the Ramanuja school between karana (cause) and karana (important instrument), and that cause which is directly and intimately associated with certain operations leading to the production of the effect is called a karana-. It is for this reason that, though the Ramanuja view may agree regarding the samagri, or collocation as causes, in some sense it regards only the sense-organ as the chief instrument; the others are accessories or otherwise helpful to production.

There are Buddhists also who believe that it is the joint collocation of mental and extra-mental factors of the preceding moment which produce knowledge and external events of the later moment; but they consider the mental factors to be directly producing knowledge, whereas the extra-mental or external objects are mere accessories or exciting agents. Knowledge on this view is determined

1 bodhd-bodha-svabhavd samagri pramdnam. Nydya-manjari, p. 15.

2 tat-kdranandm madhye yad atisayena kdryotpddakam tat karanam. Rdmd-nuja-siddhdnta-samgraha. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4988.

a priori from within, though the influence of the external objects is not denied. With reference to the operation of causality in the external world, they believe that, though the mental elements of the present moment influence them as accessories, immediate causal operation is to be sought among the external objects themselves. The mental and extra-mental elements of the preceding moment jointly determine every phenomenon of the later moment in the world, whether mental or physical; but in the determination of the occurrence of knowledge, the mental factors predominate, and the external factors are accessories. In the determination of external phenomena mental elements are accessories and the external causes are immediate instruments. Thus, in the production of knowledge, though the specific external objects may be regarded as accessory causes, their direct and immediate determinants are mental elements *.

The idealistic Buddhists, the vijndna-vddins, who do not distinguish between ideas and their objects, consider that it is the formless ideas that assume different forms as "blue," "red," etc.; for they do not believe in any external objects other than these ideas, and so it is these ideas in diverse forms and not the sense-organs or other collocations which are called pramdnas. No distinction is here made between pramdna and pramdna-phala or the result of the process of pramdna 2 . They, however, fail to explain the difference that exists between the awareness and its object.

The Mimdmsaka school of Kumarila thinks that, following the soul-sense-mind-object contact, there is a process or an act (jndna-vydpdra) which, though not directly perceived, has to be accepted as an operation which immediately leads to the manifestation of objects of knowledge [artha-drstatd or visaya-prakdsatd). It is this unperceived, but logically inferred, act of knowledge or jndna-

1 jndna-janmani jndnam updddna-kdranam arthafr sahakdri-kdranam artha-janmam ca artha updddna-kdranam jndnam sahakdri-kdranam. Nydya-manjarl,

P- IS-

The objection against this view as raised by Jayanta is this, that, if both mental and physical entities and events are determined by the joint operation of mental-physical entities of the preceding moments, we ask what determines the fact that one is mental and the other physical, that one is perceiver and the other perceived.

1 nirdkdrasya bodha-rupasya nlla-pitddy-aneka-visaya-sddhdranatvdd jana-katvasya ca cakfur-dddv api bhdvend'tiprasangdt tad-dkdratva-krtam eva jndna-karma-niyamam avagacchantah sdkdra-vijndnam pramdnam. .. arthas tu sdkdra-jndna-vddino na samasty eva. Ibid. p. 16.

206 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

vydpdra that is called pramdna 1 . Jayanta, of course, would not tolerate such an unperceived operation or act of knowledge; for, according to Nyaya, the only kind of action that is accepted is the molecular motion or vibration {parispanda or calana) produced by a collocation of causes (kdraka-cakra) 2 .

The Jains, however, repudiate the idea of the combined causality of the collocation, or of any particular individual cause such as any sense-organ, or any kind of sense-contact with reference to sense-knowledge, or of any other kind of knowledge. Thus Prabhacandra contends in his Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda that none of the so-called individual causes or collocations of causes can lead to the production of knowledge. For knowledge is wholly independent and self-determined in leading us to our desired objects or keeping us away from undesirable objects, and in no sense can we attribute it to the causal operation of the sense-organs or collocations of sense-organs and other entities. Thus knowledge (jndna) should itself be regarded as pramana, leading us to our desired objects 3 .

The whole point in these divergent views regarding pramdnas consists in the determination of the nature of the relation of the sense-organs, the objects and other accessory circumstances to the rise of knowledge. As we have seen, knowledge is in the Ramanuja view regarded as the product of the operation of diverse causal entities, among which in the case of sense-perception the sense-organs play the most important, direct and immediate part. Both the Jains and the idealistic Buddhists (though they have important and most radical differences among themselves) agree in holding the view of self-determination of knowledge independent of the sense-organs or the operation of objective entities which become the objects of knowledge and are revealed by it.

1 ndnyathd hy artha-sadbhdvo drstah sann upapadyate jnanam cennetyatah pascdt pramanam upajdyate.

Sloka-vdrttika, Sunya-rdda, 178. Jayanta also says phaldnumeyo jndna-vydpdro jndnddi-sabda-vdcyah pramanam. Nydya-mafijarl, p. 17.

2 tasmdt kdraka-cakrena calatd janyate phalam,

na punas calandd anyo vydpdra upalabhyate. Ibid. p. 20.

3 tato'nya-nirapeksatayd svdrtha-paricchinnam sddhakatamatvdt jnanam era pramanam. Prameya-kamala-martanda, p. 5.

Venkatanatha's treatment of Doubt.

Venkatanatha defines doubt as the appearance of two or more alternatives (which are in themselves incompatible) owing to the non-perception of their specific contradictory qualities and the perception of some general characteristics common to them both; e.g. when a tall thing only is seen* which may be either a man or a stump, both of which it could not be, they being entirely different from one another. So the two alternatives are not to be entirely different, and from what is seen of the object it cannot be known that it must be the one and not the other, and this causes the doubt. Venkatanatha tries to justify this analysis of doubt by referring to other earlier authorities who regarded doubt as an oscillating apprehension in which the mind goes from one alternative to another {dold-vegavad atra sphurana-kramah), since it would be contradictory that the same object should be two different things at the same time. The author of the Atma-siddhi has therefore described it as the loose contact of the mind with two or more things in quick succession (bahubhir-yugapad a-drdha-samyogah). Doubt may arise either from the apprehension of common characteristics—such as from tallness, whether the object perceived be a tree-stump or a man—or from not having been able to decide between the relative strength of the various opposite and different possibilities suggested by what is perceived or otherwise known (a-grhyamdna-bala-tdratamya-viruddhd-neka-jndpako-pasthdpanam iha-vipratipattih). So, whenever there are two or more possibilities, none of which can be ruled out without further verification, there is doubt 1 .

1 The Nyaya analysis of doubt, as found in Vdtsydy ana's bhasya, I. 11. 23, is as follows: When the common characteristics of two possible things are noticed, but not the specific quality which would decide for the one or the other, the anguish of the mind in determining or deciding in favour of the one or the other is called doubt. Doubt may also arise from conflicting opinions {vipratipatteh), e.g., some say that there is a soul, while others hold that there is no soul. Doubt may also arise from the perception of determining qualities (production through division, vibhdgajatva) which a thing (e.g. sound) has in common with other things (e.g. substance, attributes, and actions). Doubt may arise from perception of things which may be illusorily perceived even when non-existent (e.g. water in mirage), out of a desire for certainty and also from a non-perception of things (which may yet be there, though non-evident), out of a desire to discover some traits by which one could be certain whether the thing was there or not. The special contribution of Venkatanatha consists in giving a general analysis of doubt as a state of the mind instead of the specification of the five specific forms of doubt. Venkatanatha points out that doubt need not be of five kinds only but

208 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

Thus, doubt arises between a true and a false perception as when I perceive a face in the mirror, but do not know whether it is a real face or not until it is decided by an attempt to feel it by touch. So, between valid and invalid inference, when I judge from smoke that the hill is on fire, and yet through not perceiving any light doubt that it is on fire; between opposition of scriptural texts, "jiva has been said to be different from Brahman and to be one with it," whether then the jiva is different from Brahman or one with it; between conflicting authorities (e.g. the Vaisesika philosophers and the Upanisadic doctrines) such as "are the senses material or are they the products of the ego ?" Between perception and inference (e.g. in the case of the illusory perception of yellow conch-shell, the perceiving of it as yellow and the inferring that it could not be yellow because it is a conch-shell and hence the doubt, whether the conch-shell is white or yellow, and so forth).

In referring to the view of Varadanarayana in his Prajna-paritrana, Verikatanatha says that the threefold division of doubt that he made, due to perception of common characteristics, apprehension of different alternatives, and the opposition of scholars and authorities, is in imitation of the Nyaya ways of looking at doubt 1 , for the last two forms were essentially the same. Verikatanatha further refutes the Nyaya view of doubt in which Vatsyayana, in explaining Nydya-sutra, I. n. 23, says that there can be doubt even from special distinguishing qualities. Thus, earth has smell as a distinctive characteristic which is not possessed either by eternal substances, such as self, or by non-eternal substances, such as water, etc.; and there can naturally be a doubt whether earth, being different from eternal substances, is non-eternal, or whether, being different from non-eternal substances, it is eternal. Verikatanatha points out that here doubt does not take place owing to the fact that earth possesses this distinguishing quality. It is simply because the possession of smell is quite irrelevant to the determination of eternity or non-eternity, as it is shared by both eternal and non-can be of many kinds which, however, all agree in this, that in all states of doubt there is an oscillation of the mind from one alternative to another, due to the in-determination of the relative strength of the different possible alternatives on account of the perception of merely certain common characteristics without their specific determining and decisive features.

1 sddhdrand-krter drstyd'nekd-kdra-grahdt tathd

vipascitdm vivadac ca tridhd samsaya isyate.

Prajnd-paritrdna, quoted in Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 62.

eternal substances. Doubt would continue until a distinguishing characteristic, such as is possessed by eternal or non-eternal substances alone, is found in earth (vyatireki-nirupana-vilambdt), on the strength of which it could be determined whether it is eternal or not. Vehkatanatha, in various illustrations, shows that doubt consists essentially of an oscillation of the mind, due to indecision between two possible alternatives. He would admit even such inquiries as "What may be the name of this tree?" as doubt, and not mere indecision or want of knowledge {an-adhyavasdya). Such inquiries can rightly be admitted as doubts; for they involve doubt regarding two or more alternative names, which are vaguely wavering in the mind and which are followed by a desire to settle or decide in favour of one or the other. So here also there is a want of settlement between two alternatives, due to a failure to find the determining factor (avacchedakd-darsandt an-avacchinna-koti-visesah). Such a state of oscillation might naturally end in a mental reckoning in favour of or against the possible or probable alternatives, which is called uha (but which must be distinguished from uha as tarka in connection with inference), which leads to the resolution of doubt into probability 1 . However, Anantarya, a later writer of the Ramanuja school, further described doubt as being a state of mind in which one perceived only that something lay before him, but did not notice any of its specific features, qualities or characters (puro-vrtti-mdtram a-grhita-visesanam anubhuyate). Only the two alternatives (e.g. "a tree stump or a man"— sthdnu-purusau) are remembered. According to the Sarvdrtha-siddhi, the imperfect observation of something before us rouses its corresponding subconscious impression (samskdra), which, in its turn, rouses the subconscious impressions leading to the simultaneous revival in one sweep of memory of the two possible alternatives of which neither could be decided upon 2 . The point disputed in this connection is between a minority party of interpreters, who think that the perception of something in front of us rouses an impression which in its turn rouses two different subconscious impressions leading to

1 uhas tu prdyah purusend'nena bhavitavyam ity-ddi-rupa eka-koti-saha-carita-bhuyo-dhartna-darsanad anudbhutd-nya-kotikah sa eva.

Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 68. Chowkhamha.

2 puro-vrtty-anubhava-janita-samskdretia koti-dvayo-pasthiti-hetu-sarnskdrd-bhydm ca yugapad-eka-smaranam samsaya-sthale svlkriyata iti sarvd-rtha-siddhau uktam. Anantarya's jfndna-ydthdrthya-vdda. Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4884.

210 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [en.

one memory joining up the two alternative entities (e.g. tree-stump and man), and a majority party, who think that the perception of something in front of us leads directly to the memory of two different alternatives, which is interpreted as doubt. The former view, by linking up the two memories in one act of knowledge, supposes the oscillating movement to be one act of judgment and so holds the opinion that in doubt also there is the false substitution of one judgment for another, which is in accordance with the anyatha-khyati (illegitimate substitution of judgments) theory of illusion. The latter view, which holds that there are two separate memories of the two possible alternatives, interprets Ramanuja as an upholder of realism of knowledge (jnana-yatharthya-vada), or the view that whatever is known or perceived has an objective and a real basis.

Error and Doubt according to Vehkatanatha.

Error is defined by Vehkatanatha as occurring when one or more incompatible characters are predicted of an entity without any notion of their incompatibility or contradictions. It is generally due to a wrong psychological tendency in association with other vicious perceptual data, as in the case of the perception of the conch-shell as yellow, the perception of one big moon as small and two, the relativistic (anekanta) assertion of contradictory predicates with reference to one thing or the predication of both reality and unreality in regard to world-appearance by the Sarikarites 1 . Doubt, on the other hand, occurs when a perceived characteristic is not incompatible in predication with regard to two or more entities which are felt to be exclusive and opposed to one another, and which therefore cannot both at the same time be affirmed. This state is therefore described by some as an oscillator)' movement of the mind from one pole to another. Decision results from a unipolar and firm direction of mind to one object; doubt results from a multipolar oscillation, as has been set forth in the Atma-siddhi. Absence of firmness of the direction of the mind is due to the natural constitution of mind, which has necessarily to reject a particular alternative before it can settle down in its opposite. Bhattarakaguru repeats the same idea in his Tattva-ratndkara, when he defines

doubt as the association of two contrary or contradictory qualities with any particular entity. Doubt, according to Venkatanatha, is of two kinds: from samdna-dharma and from vipratipatti, i.e. when different indications point to two or more conclusions and the relative strength of these indications cannot be conclusively decided. The condition of doubt in the first case is the uncertainty caused by the fact that two contrary possibilities, the relative strength of which cannot be determined on account of certain similar traits (samdna-dharma-vipratipattibhydm), claim affirmation. Thus, when we see something tall before us, two possibilities may arise—the tall object may be a man or a post, since both these are tall. When the relative strength of the different sources of knowledge, e.g. perception, illusion, inference, testimony, etc., leading to different conclusions {a-grhyamdna-bala-tdratamya) cannot be determined, both claim affirmation with regard to the same object or conclusion, and doubt arises as to which is to be accepted. Thus, when one sees in the mirror the image of one's face, which is not corroborated by touch, there arises the doubt as to the reality of the reflection. Again, there may be a doubt arising from two possible inferences regarding the existence of fire in the hill from smoke, and its possible non-existence from the existence of light. Again, as there are texts in the Upanisads some of which are monistic and others dualistic, a doubt may arise as to which is the right view of the Upanisads, and so forth. Doubt may also arise from two opposing contentions, such as those of the atomists and the Upanisadists regarding the question as to whether the senses have sprung from matter or from the ego. It may also arise regarding the opposing assertions of two ordinary individuals; between perception (e.g. illusory perception of conch-shell as yellow) and inference which indicates that the conch-shell cannot be yellow; between perception of the self as an embodied being and the scriptural testimony concerning the self as atomic.

Doubt may also arise between inferential knowledge of the world as atomic and the scriptural knowledge of the world as having Brahman as its substance. The Naiyayikas, however, think that doubt can also arise regarding the two different contentions of opposing parties 1 . Venkatanatha points out that both the Nydya-

1 samdna-neka-dharmo-papatter vipratipatter upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-avy-avasthatas ca visesd-pekso vimarsah samsayah. Nyaya-sutra, I. i. 23. The in-

14-2

212 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

sutra and the Prajnd-paritrdna are wrong in giving the perception of similar traits (samdna-dharma) and of special characteristics (aneka-dharma) as two independent reasons for the origin of doubt 1 . The explanation given with regard to the doubt arising from a special characteristic such as odorousness is that, as this characteristic is not possessed by non-eternal substances, one may be led to think of including earth under eternal substances; and, again, as this characteristic is not to be found in any of the eternal substances, one may be led to include earth under non-eternal substances. But the doubt here is due not to the perception of a special characteristic, but to the delay of the mind in determining the ultimate differentia (vyatireki-nirupana-vilambdt) which may justify one in including it under either of them. Odorousness as such is not an indispensable condition of either eternality, or non-eternality; so naturally an inquiry arises regarding such common features in eternal or non-eternal substances as may be possessed by the odorous earth and may lead to a classification. The doubt here is due not to the fact that odorousness is a special characteristic of earth, but to the fact that earth possesses such characteristics as are possessed by eternal things on the one hand and by non-eternal things on the other. Even when it is urged that the odorous character distinguishes earth from eternal and non-eternal

terpretation given by Uddyotakara is that in all cases of doubt there are three factors, viz. knowledge of the (i) common or (2) special features, (3) opposite assertions and contending persons associated with a non-determinate state of mind due to the want of definite realization of any of the contrary possibilities, and a hankering to know the differentia. Uddyotakara thinks that doubt can arise not only from a conflict of knowledge, but also from a conflict of opinions of contending persons, vipratipattih being interpreted by him as vddi-vipratipattih. This view is also held by the Prajnd-paritrdna by Varadavisnu Misra, as is evident from the following sloka :

sddhdrand-krter drstyd-nekd-kdra-grahdt tathd,

vipascitdm vivdddc ca tridhd samsaya isyate.

Prajnd-paritrdna, quoted in the Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 61. This view is criticized by Verikatanatha as a blind acceptance of the Nydya view. 1 As an example of doubt arising from perception of similar traits, Vatsyayana gives the example of man and post, in which the common traits (viz. height, etc.) are visible, but the differentia remains unnoticed. The example given by him of doubt arising from perception of special characteristics is that odorousness, the special character of earth, is not characteristic of dravya (substance), karma (action), and guna (quality), and this may rouse a legitimate doubt as to whether earth is to be classed as substance, quality, or action. Similarly, from the special characteristic of odorousness of earth a doubt may arise as to whether earth is eternal or non-eternal, since no other eternal or non-eternal thing has this characteristic.

substances and that this is the cause of doubt, it may be pointed out that doubt is due not to this distinguishing characteristic, but to the fact that earth possesses qualities common to both eternal and non-eternal substances. There are some who think that doubt through vipratipatti (i.e. through uncertainty arising from reasoned assertions of contending persons) may also be regarded as a case of doubt from samdna-dharma (i.e. perception of similar traits), because the opposed assertions have this similarity amongst themselves that they are all held as true by the respective contending persons. Verikatanatha, however, does not agree with this. He holds that doubt here does not arise merely on the strength of the fact that the opposed assertions are held as true by the contending persons, but because of our remembering the diverse reasons in support of such assertions when the relative strength of such reasons or possibilities of validity cannot be definitely ascertained. Thus, vipratipatti has to be accepted as an independent source of doubt. Doubt arises generally between two possible alternatives; but there may be cases in which two doubts merge together and appear as one complex doubt. Thus, when it is known that one or other of two persons is a thief, but not which of them, there may be a doubt— "this man or that man is a thief". In such a case there are two doubts: "this man may or may not be a thief" and "that man may or may not be a thief," and these merge together to form the complex doubt (samsaya-dvaya-satnahara). The need of admitting a complex doubt may, however, vanish, if it is interpreted as a case where the quality of being a thief is doubted between two individuals. Doubt, however, involves in it also an assertory aspect, in so far as it implies that, if one of the alternatives is ruled out, the other must be affirmed. But, since it cannot be ascertained which of them is ruled out, there arises the doubt. There is, however, no opposition between doubt and the assertory attitude; for all doubts imply that the doubtful property must belong to one or other of the alternatives 1 .

But there may be cases in which the two alternatives may be such that the doubtful property is not in reality affirmable of either of them, and this is different from those cases in which the alternatives are such that, if the doubtful property is negated of the one,

1 sarvasminn apt samsaye dharmy-amsddau mrnayasya dustyajatvdt. Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 66.

214 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

it is in reality affirmable of the other. From these two points of view we have further twofold divisions of doubt. Thus, when a volume of smoke arising from a heap of grass on fire is subject of doubt as being either an elephant or a hill, in this case negation of one alternative does not imply the actual affirmation of the other. Uncertainty (an-adhyavasdya, e.g. "what may be the name of this tree?") cannot be regarded as an independent state of mind; for this also may be regarded as a case of doubt in which there is uncertainty between a number of possible alternative names with which the tree may be associated. It seems, however, that Venkatanatha has not been able to repudiate satisfactorily the view of those who regard uncertainty or inquiry as a separate state of mind. tJha (in the sense of probability such as "that must be a man") does not involve any oscillation of the mind between two poles, but sets forth an attitude of mind in which the possibility of one side, being far stronger, renders that alternative an object of the most probable affirmation and so cannot be classed as doubt. Where such a probable affirmation is brought about through perception, it is included under perception, and when through inference it is included under inference.

Venkatanatha, following Ramanuja, admits only three pramdnas, viz. perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. Ramanuja, however, in his commentary on the Gitd 1 , includes intuitive yogic knowledge as a separate source of knowledge; but Venkatanatha holds that intuitive yogic knowledge should be included under perception, and its separate inclusion is due to the fact that the yogic perception reveals a special aspect of perception 2 . Correct memory is to be regarded as a valid pramdna. It should not be classed as an independent source of knowledge, but is to be included within the pramdna which is responsible for memory (e.g. perception) 3 .

Meghanadari, in discussing the claim of memory to be regarded as pramdna, says that memory satisfies the indispensable condition of pramdna that it must not depend upon anything else for its self-manifestation; for memory, being spontaneous, does not depend

1 jndnam indriya-lingd-gama-yogajo vastu-niscayah. Gttd-bhdsya, 15. 15.

2 Visnucitta also, in his Prameya-samgraha, holds that Ramanuja admitted only three pramdnas.

3 This view has been supported by Bhaftarakaguru in his Tattva-ratnukara. Varadavisnu Misra, in his Prajnd-paritrdna, includes dirya (i.e. intuitive knowledge through the grace of God) and svayam-siddha (natural omniscience) as separate sources of knowledge, but they are also but modes of perception.

upon anything else for its manifestation. It is true, no doubt, that the revelation of objects in memory depends upon the fact of their having been perceived before, but the functioning of memory is undoubtedly spontaneous 1 . But it may be argued that, since the objects revealed in memory can never be manifested if they were not perceived before, memory, though partly valid in so far as its own functioning is concerned, is also invalid so far as the revelation of the object is concerned, since this depends on previous perception and cannot, therefore, be regarded as spontaneous manifestation, which is the indispensable condition of a pramdna. To this Meghanadari's reply is that the criticism is not sound; for the spontaneous manifestation is also at the same time revelation of the object remembered, and hence the revelation of the remembered object does not depend on any other condition. Memory, therefore, is valid both in its own manifestation and in the revelation of its object. It may be pointed out in this connection that the revelation of knowledge necessarily implies the revelation of the object also. The revelation of the object should not, therefore, be regarded as depending on any other condition, it being spontaneously given with the revelations of knowledge 2 .

In many other systems of philosophy the definition of a pramdna involves the condition that the object apprehended should be such that it was not known before (an-adhigatd-rtha-gantr), since in these systems memory is excluded from the status of pramdna. Megha-nadari objects to this. He says that the condition imposed does not state clearly whether the apprehension of the object which is intended to be ruled out should be of the perceiver or of other persons. In the case of permanent objects such as the self or the sky these have all been perceived by many persons, and yet the validity of the perception or inference of the present knower is not denied 3 . It also cannot be said that the object of valid perception or inference should be such that it has not been perceived before by the present perceiver; for when a person seeks to find out an object which he knew before and perceives it, such a perception would be invalid; and similarly, when an object perceived by the eye is re-perceived

1 sva-sphurane pramava-ntara-sa-peksatva-bhavat visaya-sphurana eva hi-smrteh purvo-nubhuta-bhdva-peksa. Meghanadari's Naya-dyu-mani.

2 jnana-sphiirtivad visayasyapi sphurtih. Ibid.

3 sthayitvena-bhimata-kaia-deh purvair avagatatva-sambhavat tad-vifaya-numanoder apramanya-prasanga*. Ibid.

2i6 Philosophy of the Ramdnaja School of Thought [ch.

by touch, the tactile perception will be invalid 1 . The reply is often given (e.g. Dharmarajadhvarlndra in his Veddnta-pari-bhdsd) that, when an object known before is again perceived, it has a new temporal character, and so the object may be regarded as new and thus its later perception may be regarded as valid. Meghanadari's criticism against this is that, if the new temporal character can constitute the newness of the object, then all objects will be new, including memory. Hence there will be nothing which would be ruled out by the condition that the object must be new (an-adhigatdrtha-gantr).

There are others who hold that the validity of a pramdna of any particular sense-knowledge, or of inference, is conditioned by the fact of its being attested by the evidence of other senses, as in the case where a visual perception is corroborated by the tactile. These philosophers regard corroboration (a-visamvdditra) as an indispensable condition of the validity of pramdna. Meghanadari criticizes this by pointing out that on such a view the validity of each pramdna would have to depend upon others, and thus there would be a vicious circle 2 . Moreover, the determinate knowledge of the Buddhists, which is corroborative, would, under the supposition, have to be regarded as a pramdna.

Unlike Yeiikatanatha, Meghanadari holds that Ramanuja admitted five pramdnas, viz. perception, inference, analogy, scripture and implication.

Perception is defined by Vehkatanatha as direct intuitive knowledge (sdksdtkdri-pramd). This may be regarded either as a special class of cognition (jdti-rupa) or knowledge under special conditions (upddhi-rupa). It is indefinable in its own nature, which can onlv be felt by special self-consciousness as perception (jiidna-svabhdra-visesah svdtma-sdksikah). It may be negatively defined as knowledge which is not generated by other cognitions, as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge ana memory 3 . Varadavisnu also, in his Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya, has defined perception as clear and

1 sva-vidilosycVrthosyo sattra-twefane pratyaksd-der a-priimanya-prasangac caksusa drsta-risaye dravye sparsanasya'pramcinya-prasangdt. Meghanadari's Naya-dyu-ma m.

*pramana-ntarasya-pyavisamvada-rthampramuna-ntara-7ive$anena-nm'asthd. Ibid.

3 jiiana-karanaja-jnana-smrti-rahita matir aparoksam. Verikajanatha's Xydya-parisuddhi, pp. 70-71. This view has also been supported in the Prameya-samgraha and Tattva-ratnakara.

vivid impression (pramdyd dparoksyam noma visadd-vabhdsatvam). Clearness and vividness with him mean the illumination of the special and unique features of the object, as different from the appearance of generic features as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge.

Meghanadari also defines perception as direct knowledge of objects {artha-paricchedaka-sdksdj-jndnam). The directness (sdks-dttva) consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other pramdnas. It is, no doubt, true that sense-perception depends upon the functioning of the senses, but this is no objection; for the senses are common causes, which are operative as means in the perception of the hetu, even in inference 1 . The directness of perceptual knowledge, as distinguished from inference, is evident from the fact that the latter is produced through the mediacy of other cognitions 2 . Meghanadari criticizes the definition of perception as vivid impression (visadd-vabhdsa), as given by Varadavisnu Misra, on the ground that vividness is a relative term, and even in inference there are different stages of vividness. Clearness of awareness, " dhi-sphutatd," also cannot be regarded as defining perception; for all awarenesses are clear so far as they are known. The definition of perception as sense-knowledge is also open to criticism; for in that case it would only apply to indeterminate (nirvikalpa) knowledge, in which certain specific characters of the object are imprinted through the functioning of the senses, but which it did not carry further for the production of determinate knowledge (savikalpa).

Both Venkatanatha and Meghanadari hold that the pure objective substance without any character or universals is never apprehended by sense-perception. Following Ramanuja, they hold that objects are always apprehended with certain characters at the very first instance when they are grasped by the visual sense; otherwise it is difficult to explain how in the later instance they are apprehended in diverse characters. If they were not apprehended in the first instance, they could not have been known in the later

1 indriydndm sattd-kdranatvena karanatvd-bhdvdt. Naya-dyu-mani.

a The word sdkfdttva is explained by some as svarupa-dhi (its own awareness). But such an explanation is exposed to criticism; for even inferential knowledge reveals some features of the object. If svarupa is taken to mean " nothing but the nature of the object," then the definition would not be applicable even to perception ; for perception reveals not merely the object, but also its relation to other objects, and thereby transcends the limit of the object merely as it is.

218 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

instance in their fullness in a related manner. So it has to be admitted that they were all grasped in the first instance, but could not manifest themselves in their fullness in the short span of the first moment. In the Vedartha-samgraha of Ramanuja the determinate-ness of all perceptions has been illustrated bv the case of their apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception. This has led some interpreters to think that the apprehension of determinate characters in the first moment of perception applies only to the universals on account of the fact that it involves the assimilation of many individuals in one sweep which must be started at the very first moment in order that it may be manifested in its full form in the second moment. But Meghanadari holds that the apprehension of other characters also, such as colours, etc., has specific differences when the object is near or at a distance. This involves the grasping of diverse shades of colour in one colour-perception, and thus they also are apprehended at the first moment of perception, on the same grounds which led to the affirmation of the apprehension of universals at the first moment of perception.

It is objected that the concept of determinateness or relatedness (z'isistatva) of all knowledge is incomprehensible and indefinable. What exist are the two relata and the relation. The relatedness cannot be identical with them or different; for we do not know "relatedness" as an entitv different from the two relata and the relation. Also relatedness cannot be defined either as the manifestation of two entities in one cognition or the appearance of two cognitions without any break or interval; for in a concrete specific illustration, as in such awareness as "jug-and-pot," though two different cognitions have appeared without anv break, they have not lost their unique separateness, as mav well be judged by the duality implied in such awareness. Thus, there is no wav in which the concept of determinateness, as distinguished from that of the relata and the relation, can be arrived at.

To this Meghanadari's reply is that, in such a sentence as " bring a white cow," the verb refers to a qualified being, the "white cow," and not to the separate elements, "the whiteness" and "the cow." Both the relation and the relata are involved in the determinate conception, the "white cow." In contactual perception, such as "a man with a stick," the contactual relation is directly perceived. The conception of a determinate being is not thus dif-

ferent from the relation and the relata, but implies them. The relations and the relata thus jointly yield the conception of a determinate being 1 . The unifying trait that constitutes determinate-ness is not an extraneous entity, but is involved in the fact that all entities in this world await one another for their self-manifestation through relations, and it is this mutual awaitedness that constitutes their bond of unity, through which they appear connectedly in a determinate conception 2 . It is this mutual awaitedness of entities that contributes to their apprehension, as connected in experience, which is simultaneous with it, there being no mediation or arresting of thought of any kind between the two 3 . The fact that all our perceptions, thoughts and ideas always appear as related and connected is realized in universal experience. All linguistic expressions always manifest the purport of the speech in a connected and related form. Had it not been so, communication of ideas through our speech would have been impossible.

Nirvikalpa knowledge is a cognition in which only some fundamental characters of the object are noted, while the details of many other characters remain unelaborated 4 . Savikalpa knowledge, on the other hand, is a cognition of a number of qualities and characters of the object, together with those of its distinctive features by which its differentiation from other objects is clearly affirmed 5 .

On the analogy of visual perception, the perception of other senses may be explained. The relation of samavdya admitted by the Naiyayikas is discarded by the Ramanuja view on account of the difficulty of defining it or admitting it as a separate category. Various relations, such as container and contained, contact and the like, are revealed in experience in accordance with the different directions in which things await one another to be related; and

1 na ca pratyekam visistatd-pdtah militdndm eva visistatvdt. Naya-dyu-mani.

2 eka-buddhi-visayatd-rhdndm padd-rthdndm anyo-nya-sdpeksa-svarupatvam militatvam. Ibid.

3 visistatva-dhl-visayatve ca tesdm sdpeksatvam ca yaugapadydt tatra virdmd-pratlteh sdpeksatd siddhd ca. Ibid.

4 nirvikalpakamcaghatd-deranullekhitd-nuvrtti-dharma-ghatatvd-di-katipaya-visesana-visistatayd-rthd-vacchedakam jndnam. Ibid.

5 ullekhitd-nuvrtty-ddi-dharmakd-neka-insesana-visistatayd sdksdd-vastu-vya-vacchedakam jndnam savikalpakam. Ibid.

Venkatanatha however defines savikalpa and nirvikalpa knowledge as " sa pratyavamarsa-pratyaksam savikalpakam" and " tad-rahitam pratyaksam nirvikalpakam." Nydya-paris'uddhi, p. 77.

220 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

these determine the nature of various relations which are perceived in sense-experience 1 . Verikatanatha also points out that the very same collocations (sdmagri) that manifest the awareness of substance and attribute also manifest the awareness of relations; for, if the relations were not grasped at the first moment of perception, they could not originate out of nothing at the later moment. The relatedness being a character of entities, the awareness of entities necessarily means the awareness of relations.

Perception in the light of elucidation by the later members of the Ramanuja School.

Ramanuja and his followers admitted only three kinds of pramdnas: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Knowledge, directly and immediately experienced, is perception (sdksdt-kdrini pramd pratyaksam). The special distinguishing feature of perception is that it is not knowledge mediated by other knowledge (jndnd-karanaka-jndnatvam). Perception is of three kinds: God's perception, perception of yogins, and perception of ordinary persons. This perception of yogins includes intuitive perception of the mind (mdnasa-pratyaksa) or perception of sages (drsa-pratyaksa), and the yogi-pratyaksa is due to the special enlightenment of yoga practice. Ordinary perception is said to be of two kinds, sarikalpa, or determinate, and nirvikalpa, or indeterminate. Saznkalpa pratyaksa is the determinate perception which involves a spatial and temporal reference to past time and different places where the object was experienced before. Thus, when we see a jug, we think of it as having been seen at other times and in other places, and it is this reference of the jug to other times and other places, and the

1 atas tat-smbandhdd vastuta upddhito vadhdra-dheya-bhdva-vastv-antaram era. evam ca kalpand-ldghuvam. sa ca gund-di-bheddd anekah na ca tat-sambtindha-smbahdhinos sanibandhd-ntara-kalpandydm anavasthd. anyo-nya-sdpeksa-svarupotva-rupo-pddhi-vyatirekend'rthd-ntard-bhdi'dt. Naya-dyu-mani MS.

The nirvikalpaka is the knowledge involving the notion of certain positive features and rousing the subconscious memory resulting in the first moment of perception through the direct operation of the sense. Savikalpaka knowledge involves the noting of differences consequent upon the operation of memory. They are thus defined by Visnuacitta:

samskdro-dbodha-sahakrte-ndriya-janyam jniinam savikalpakam iti eka-jdtlyesu prathama-pimla-grahanam dvitlyd-di-pinda-grahanesii pratluimd-ksa-san-nipdtajam jndnam nirvikalpakam iti. And in the Tattvu-ratndkara:

visesandndtn svd-yoga-vydvrttir avikalpake savikalpe'nya-yogasya vydvrttih samjnJnd tuthd.

Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 82.

associations connected with it as involved in such reference, that constitutes the determinate character of such perceptions, by virtue of which they are called savikalpa 1 . A perception, however, which reveals the specific character of its object, say a jug as a jug, without involving any direct references to its past associations, is called indeterminate perception or nirvikalpa jndna 2 . This definition of nirvikalpa perception distinguishes the Ramanuja conception of nirvikalpa knowledge from the types formulated by many other systems of Indian philosophy.

It is now obvious that according to Ramanuja philosophy both the savikalpa and the nirvikalpa knowledges are differentiated and qualified in their nature, referring to objects which are qualified in their nature {ubhaya-vidham api etad visista-visayam eva) 3 . Verikata says that there is no evidence whatsoever of the existence of indeterminate and unqualified knowledge, at even its first stage of appearance, as is held by the Naiyayikas; for our experience is entirely against them, and even the knowledge of infants, dumb persons, and the lower animals, though it is devoid of concepts and names, is somehow determinate since the objects stand as signs of things liked or disliked, things which they desire, or of which they are afraid 4 . For if these so-called indeterminate perceptions of these animals, etc., were really absolutely devoid of qualitative colouring, how could they indicate the suitable attractive or repulsive behaviour? The Naiyayikas urge that all attribute-substance-complex or determinate knowledge (visista-jndna) must first be preceded by the knowledge of the simpler element of the attribute; but this is true only to a limited extent, as in the case of acquired perception. I see a piece of sandal to be fragrant; fragrance cannot be seen, but the sight of the colour, etc., of a piece of sandal and its recognition as such suggest and rouse the nasal impressions of fragrance, which is then directly associated with

1 tatra nuvrtti-visayakam jiidnam savikalpakam anuvrttis ca samsthdna-rupa-jdty-dder aneka-vyakti-vrttitd, sd ca kdlato desatas ca bhavati. Ramanuja-siddhdnta-samgraha, MS. No. 4988.

2 ekasydm vyaktau ghatatva-prakdrakam ay am ghata iti yajjiidnam janyate tan nirvikalpakam. Ibid.

* Nyaya-parisuddhi, p. 77.

4 bdla-muka - tiryag - ddi -jndndndm anna - kantaka-vahni - vydghrd-di - sabda-vaisistyd - navagdhitve'pi ista - dvaisyatd-vacchedakd - nnatvd- hitva - kantakatvd-di-prakdrd-vagdhitvam asti. Nydya-sdra commentary on Nydya-parisuddhi by 5§rlnivasa, p. 78.

222 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

vision. Here there must first be the perception of the attributes of the sandal as perceived by the visual organ, as rousing sub-conscious impressions of fragrance associated with the nasal organ and giving rise to its memory, and finally associating it with the attributes perceived by the visual organ. But in the perception of attribute and substance there is no necessity of assuming such a succession of the elements constituting a complex; for the data which give rise to the perception of the attribute and those which give rise to the perception of substance are presented to the senses simultaneously and are identically the same (eka-sdmagri-vedya-visesanesu tan-nirapeksatvdt) 1 . The main point of this discussion consists in our consideration of the question whether relations are directly perceived or not. If relations are regarded as being the very nature of the things and attributes that are perceived (svarupa-sambandha), then, of course, the relations must necessarily be perceived with the perceived things and attributes at the first moment of sight. If the relation of attributes to things be called an inherent inseparable relation {samavaya), then this, being an entity, may be admitted to be capable of being grasped by the eye; and, since it constitutes the essence of the linking of the attributes and the thing, the fact that it is grasped by the eye along with the thing and the attribute ought to convince us that the relatedness of attribute and thing is also grasped by the eye. For, if it is admitted that samavaya is grasped, then that itself makes it unexceptionable that the attribute and things are grasped, as the former qualifying the latter. Like the attribute and the thing, their relation as constituting their relatedness is also grasped by the senses (dharmavad dharmivac ca tat-sambandhasya py aindriyakatzd-visesena grahana-sambhavat)' 1 . For, if the relation could not be grasped by the senses at the time of the perception of the thing and the object, it could not be grasped by any other way at any other time.

In the savikalpa perception, the internal impressions are roused in association with the visual and other senses, and they co-operate with the data supplied by the sense-organs in producing the inner act of analysis and synthesis, assimilation and differentiation, and

1 Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 78: surabhi-candanam sv'yam ghata ity-ddi-jiidnesu saurabhata-mse caksusah sva-vijdiiya-samshara-janydydh smrter visesana-praty-dsattitayd apeksanepi cakfitr-mdtra-janye ghuta-jndne tad-apeksdyd abhdvdt. Nydyu-sdra, p. 78.

mutual comparison of similar concepts, as involved in the process of savikalpa perception. What distinguishes it from memory is the fact that memory is produced only by the rousing of the subconscious impressions of the mind, whereas savikalpa perception is produced by the subconscious impressions (samskdra) working in association with the sense-organs 1 . Though the roused subconscious impressions co-operate with sense-impressions in savikalpa perception, yet the savikalpa can properly be described as genuine sense-perception.

It may be pointed out in this connection that difference is considered in this system not as a separate and independent category, but as apprehended only through the mutual reference to the two things between which difference is realized. It is such a mutual reference, in which the affirmation of one makes the affirmation of the other impossible, that constitutes the essence of "difference" {bhedaf.

Verikatanatha strongly controverts the Sarikarite view of nirvi-kalpa pratyaksa in the case where a perception, the materials of which are already there, is made on the strength of auditory sensation in the way of scriptural instructions. Thus, when each of ten persons was counting upon leaving himself out of consideration, and counting nine persons instead of ten, another observer from outside pointed out to the counting person that he himself was the tenth. The Sarikarites urge that the statement or affirmation " thou art the tenth" is a case of direct nirvikalpa perception. But Venkatanatha points out that, though the entity indicated by "thou" is directly perceived, the proposition itself cannot be directly perceived, but can only be cogitated as being heard; for, if whatever is heard can be perceived, then one can also perceive or be directly acquainted with the import of such propositions as "thou art virtuous"— dharmavams tvam. So the mental realization of the import of any proposition does not mean direct acquaintance by perception. It is easy to see how this view controverts the Sari-karite position, which holds that the realization of the import of the proposition "thou art that"— tat tvam asi —constitutes direct ac-

1 smrtdv iva savikalpake samskdrasya na svdtantryena karanatvam yena praty-aksatvam nasydtkintu indriya-sahakdritayd tathd ce'ndriya-janyatvena pratyaksam eva savikalpakam. Nydya-sdra p. 80.

2 yad-graho yatra yad-dropa-virodhl sa hi tasya tasmdd bhedah. Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 86.

224 Philosophy of the Rdmdmija School of Thought [ch.

quaintance with the identity of self and Brahman by perception (pratyaksa) x .

It has already been pointed out that nirvikalpa perception means a determinate knowledge which does not involve a reference to past associations of similar things (anuvrtty-avisayaka-jnana), and savi-kalpa perception means a determinate knowledge which involves a reference to past association (anuvrtti-visayaka). This anuvrtti, or reference to past association, does not mean a mere determinate-ness (e.g. the perception of a jug as endowed with the specific characteristics of a jug— ghatatva-prakdrakam ayam ghatah), but a conscious reference to other similar objects (e.g. jugs) experienced before. In savikalpa knowledge there is a direct perception by the visual organ of the determinate characters constituting a complex of the related qualities, the thing and the relatedness; but that does not mean the comprehension or realization of any universals or class concepts involving a reference to other similar concepts or things. Thus, the visual organs are operative equally in savikalpa and nirvikalpa, but in the former there is a conscious reference to other similar entities experienced before.

The universals or class concepts are not, however, to be regarded as a separate independent category, which is comprehended in savikalpa perception, but a reference or assimilation of similar characteristics. Thus, when we refer to two or more cows as possessing common characteristics, it is these common characteristics existing in all individual cows that justify us in calling all these animals cows. So, apart from these common characteristics which persist in all these individual animals, there is no other separate entity which may be called jdti or universal. The commonness {anuvrtti) consists in similarity {susadrsatvam eva gotva-dinam anuvrttih) 2 . Similarity is again defined as the special cause (asddhdrana-kdrana) which justifies our regarding two things as similar which exist separately in these things and are determined by each other. The application of a common name is but a short way of signifying the fact that two things are regarded as similar. This similarity is of two kinds: similarity of attributes (dharma-sddrsya) as in substances, and similarity of essence (svarilpa-sddrsya)

1 ata eva tat tvam-asy-ddi-sabdah sva-visaya-gocara-pratyaksa-jfidna-janakah .. .ity-ddy-anumundni nirastdni. Xydya-pci isuddhi, p. 89.

2 ayam sdsnddimdn ayam api sdsnddimdn iti sdsnddir eva anuvrtta-vyavahara-visayc drsyatc. Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha, MS. No. 4988.

as in all other categories of qualities which are not substance (a-dravya) 1 .

In perception two kinds of sense-contact are admitted: sense-contact with the object (samyoga) and sense-contact with the qualities associated with the object {samyukta-sraya). Thus, the perception of a jug is by the former kind of contact, and the perception of its qualities is by the latter 2 .

Venkatanatha's treatment of Inference.

Inference according to the Ramanuja school is very much the same as inference according to the Naiyayikas. Inference is the direct result of pardmarsa, or knowledge of the existence of reason (associated with the knowledge of its unblemished and full concomitance with the probandum) in the object denoted by the minor term 3 . Inference is a process by which, from a universal proposition which includes within it all the particular cases, we can make an affirmation regarding a particular case. 4 Inference must therefore be always limited to those cases in which the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of experience derived from sensible objects and not to the affirmation of ultra-sensual objects—a reason which precludes Ramanuja and his followers from inferring the existence of Isvara (God), who is admitted to be ultra-sensual (atindriya) {ata eva ca vayam atyantd-tindriya-vastv-anumdnatn necchdmahy.

As formulated by the traditional view of the school, the principle of concomitance (vydpti) holds that what in the range of time or space is either equal or less than another is called the "pervaded " (vydpya) or the hetu, while that which in the range of time or space is either equal or greater than it, is called vydpaka or the probandum 8 . But this view does not cover all cases of valid con-

1 MSS. No. 4988.

2 The sense-contact with remote objects can take place in the case of the visual and the auditory organs by means of a mysterious process called vrtti. It is supposed that these senses are lengthened as it were (dpydyamdna) by means of their objects. Ibid.

3 pardmarsa-janyd pramitir anumitih. Ibid.

* pardmarsa means vydpti-visista-paksa-dharmatd-jfidnam sarva-visesa-sam-grdhi-sdmdnya-vydpti-dhlr api visesd-numiti-hetuh. Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 97. 6 Ibid. 6 desatah kdlato vd'pi samo nyuno'pi vd bhavet

sva-vydpyo vydpakastasya samo vd'py adhiko'pi vd.

Ibid. p. 100.

d in 15

226 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

comitance. The example given for spatial and temporal co-existence is that between date-juice (rasa) and sweetness (guda), or between the shadow thrown by our bodies and the specific position of the Sun. But such spatio-temporal co-existences do not exhaust all cases, as, for example, the sunset and the surging of the sea. This led the later Ramanujas to adopt a stricter definition of concomitance as unconditional and invariable association (nirupd-dhikatayd niyatah sambandho vydptih) 1 .

Regarding the formation of this inductive generalization or concomitance, we find in Tattva-ratndkara, an older authority, that a single observation of concomitance leading to a belief is sufficient to establish a general proposition 2 . But Vehkatanatha urges that this cannot be so and that a wide experience of concomitance is indispensable for the affirmation of a general proposition of concomitance.

One of the important points in which Ramanuja logic differs from the Nyaya logic is the refusal on the part of the former to accept kevala-vyatireki (impossible-positive) forms of inference, which are admitted by the latter. Thus, in the kevala-vyatireki forms of inference (e.g. earth is different from other elements on account of its possession of smell) it is argued by the Nyaya logic that this difference of earth with other elements, by virtue of its possession of the specific property of smell not possessed by any other element, cannot be proved by a reference to any proposition which embodies the principle of agreement in presence anvaya. This view apparently seems to have got the support of the earlier Ramanuja logicians such as Varadavisnu Misra and Bhattarakaguru (in his Tattva-ratndkara); but both Vehkatanatha (in his Nydya-parisuddhi) and the author of the Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha point

1 Nydya-parisuddhi.

2 sambandho'yarn sakrd grdhyah pratiti-sva-rasdt tathd prafitayo hi sva-rasdd dharma-dharmy-avadhin viduh.

Tattva-ratndkara MS. The author of the Tattva-ratndkara urges that, since the class-concept (e.g. of dhuma-dhumatvd) is associated with any particular instance (e.g. of smoke), the experience of any concomitance of smoke and fire would mean the comprehension of the concomitance of the class-concept of smoke with the class-concept of fire. So through the experience of any individual and its class-concept as associated with it we are in touch with other individuals included within that class-concept — sannihita-dhumddi-vyakti-samyuktasya indriyasya tad-dsrita-dhumatt'ddih samyuktd-sritah, tad-dsrayatvena vyakty-antardni samyuktdni, etc. Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 105. (Chowkhamba.)

out that, since Yamuna rejects the kevala-vyatireki form of argument in his lecture on Atma-siddhi, it is better to suppose that, when the previous authors referred to spoke of kevala-vyatireki as a form of inference, it was not admission of their acceptance of it, but only that they counted it as being accepted by the Nyaya logicians 1 . The author of the Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha points out that it may very well be brought under anvaya-vyatireki. Thus we may argue "body is earthly by virtue of its possession of smell; for whatever possesses smell is earthly and whatever does not possess smell is not earthly." So in this form it may be put forward as a anvaya-vyatireki form of argument. The possession of smell (gandhavattva) may very well be put forth as "reason" or hetu, the presence of which determines earthiness and the absence of which determines non-earthiness or difference from non-earthiness.

Ramanuja logic admits the necessity of "tarka" (cogitation regarding the relative possibilities of the alternative conclusions by a dialectic of contradictions) as an indispensable means of inferential conclusions. Regarding the number of propositions, Veiikatanatha says that there is no necessity of admitting the indispensable character of five propositions. Thus it must depend on the way in which the inference is made as to how many propositions {avayavd) are to be admitted. It may be that two, three, four or five propositions are deemed necessary at the time of making an inference. We find it said in the Tattva-ratndkara also that, though five propositions would make a complete statement, yet there is no hard and fast rule (aniyama) regarding the number of propositions necessary for inference 1 .

Veiikatanatha urges that inference is always limited to perceptible objects. Things which entirely transcend the senses cannot be known by inference. Inference, though irrefragably connected with perception, cannot, on that account, be regarded as a mode of perception; for the knowledge derived from perception is always indirect (a-paroksa). Inference cannot also be regarded as due to memory; for it always reveals new knowledge. Further, it cannot be said to be a form of mental intuition, on account of the fact that inference works by rousing the subconscious impressions of the mind; for such impressions are also found to be active in percep-

1 Nydya-parisuddhi and Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha.

2 Ibid.

15-2

228 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

tion, and on that analogy even perception may be called mental intuition.

Vydpti (concomitance) may be defined as that in which the area of the probandum (sddhya) is not spatially or temporally less than {a-nyuna-desa-kdla-vrtti) that of the reason, hetu —and reason is defined as that, the area of which is never wider than that of the probandum (a-nadhik-desa-kdla-niyatam vydpyam). As an illustration of spatial and temporal co-existence {yaugapadyd) Yeri-katanatha gives the instance of sugar and sweetness. As an illustration of temporal co-existence {yaugapadyd) he gives the example of the measure of the shadow and the position of the sun. As a case of purely spatial co-existence he gives the instance of heat and its effects. Sometimes, however, there is concomitance between entities which are separate in space and time, as in the case of tides and their relation to the sun and the moon 1 .

Such a concomitance, however, between the probandum and the reason can be grasped only by the observation of numerous instances (bhilyo-darsana-gamya), and not by a single instance, as in the case of Sarikara Vedanta as expounded by Dharmaraja-dhvarindra. Bhattarakaguru, in his Tattva-ratndkara, in explaining the process by which the notion of concomitance is arrived at, says that, when in numerous instances the concomitance between the probandum and the reason is observed, the result of such observation accumulates as subconscious impressions in favour of the universal concomitance between all cases of probandum and all cases of the reason, and then in the last instance the perception of the concomitance rouses in the mind the notion of the concomitance of all probandum and all reason through the help of the roused subconscious impressions previously formed. Verikatanatha admits concomitance through joint method of Agreement and Difference (anvyaya-vyatireki) and by pure Agreement [kevald-nvayi), where negative instances are not available. Ordinarily the method of difference contributes to the notion of concomitance by demonstrating that each and every instance in which the probandum does not occur is also an instance in which the reason does not occur. But in the case of kevald-nvayi concomitance, in which negative instances

1 vydpti is thus defined by Vehkatanatha— aire dam tattvam yddrg-rupasya yad-desa-kdla-vartino yasyayadrg-rupena yad-desa-kdla-vartind yend'vina-bhdvah tad idam avind-bhutam vydpyum. tat-pratisambandhi-vydpakam iti. Nydya-parisuddhi, pp. 101-102.

are not available, the non-existence of the reason in the negative instance cannot be shown. But in such cases the very non-existence of negative instances is itself sufficient to contribute to the notion of kevald-nvayi concomitance. The validity of kevald-nvayi concomitance is made patent by the fact that, if the reason remains unchanged, the assumption of a contrary probandum is self-contradictory (vydhata-sddhya-viparyaydf), and this distinguishes it from the forms of kevald-nvayi arguments employed by Kularka in formulating his Mahd-vidyd doctrines.

Ramanuja's own intention regarding the types of inference that may be admitted seems to be uncertain, as he has never definitely given any opinion on the subject. His intention, therefore, is diversely interpreted by the thinkers of his school. Thus, Meg-hanadari gives a threefold classification of inference: (1) of the cause from the effect (kdrand-numdna); (2) of the effect from the cause (kdryd-nwndna); and (3) inference by mental association (anu-bhavd-numdna —as the inference of the rise of the constellation of Rohini from the Krttika constellation). As an alternative classification he gives (1) the joint method of agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireki); (2) inference through universal agreement in which no negative instances are found (kevald-nvayi); and (3) inference through exclusion, in which no positive instances are found (kevala-vyatireki). Bhattarakaguru and Varadavisnu Misra, who preceded Veiikatanatha in working out a consistent system of Ramanuja logic, seem also to admit the three kinds of inference, viz. anvyayi, kevald-nvayi, and kevala-vyatireki, as is evident from the quotation of their works Tattva-ratndkara and Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya. Veiikatanatha, however, tries to explain them away and takes great pains to refute the kevala-vyatireki form of argument 1 . His contention is that there can be no inference through mere negative concomitance, which can never legitimately lead to the affirmation of any positive character when there is no positive proposition purporting the affirmation of any character. If any such positive proposition be regarded as implied in the negative proposition, then also the contention that there can be inference from purely negative proposition fails. One of the conditions of validity

1 Veiikatanatha points out that Yamunacarya, also the accredited teacher of Ramanuja, did not admit the kevala-vyatireki form of inference in his Siddhi-traya.

230 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

of inference is that the hetu or reason must exist in the sa-paksa (that is, in all such instances where there is the sddhya), but in the ryatireki form of inference, where there are no positive instances of the existence of the hetu and the sddhya excepting the point at issue, the above condition necessarily fails 1 . The opponent might say that on the same analogy the keiald-nvayi form of argument may also be denied; for there negative instances are found (e.g. idam vdcyam pramcvatvdt). The reply would be that the validity of a kezald-nravi form of argument is attested by the fact that the assumption of a contrary conclusion would be self-contradictory. If the contention of the opponent is that the universal concomitance of the negation of the hetu with the negation of the sddhya implies the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sddhya, then the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sddhya would imply the absolute coincidence of the opposites of them both. This would imply that from the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sddhya in a kevald-nvaxi form of inference the absolute coincidence of their opposites would be demonstrable. This is absurd 2 . Thus, the Naivaikas, who admit the kevald-nvayi inference, cannot indulge in such ways of support in establishing the validity of the kevala-vyatireki form of argument. Again, following the same method, one might as well argue that a jug is self-revealing (sva-prakdsa) because it is a jug (ghatat-vdt)\ for the negation of self-revealing character (a-sva-prakdsatra) is found in the negation of jug, viz. the cloth, which is impossible (van naivam tan naivam yathd patah). Thus, merely from the concomitance of two negations it is not possible to affirm the concomitance of their opposites. Again, in the above instance— anubhutir ananubhdvyd anubhiititvdt (immediate intuition cannot be an object of awareness, because it is immediate intuition)—even the existence of an-anubhdzyatva (not being an object of awareness) is doubtful; for it is not known to exist anywhere else than in the instance under discussion, and therefore, from the mere case of

1 The typical forms of ryatireki inference are as follows: anubhutir an-anubhdvyd anubhutitvdt, ran naivam tan naivam yathd ghat ah. prthivl itarebhyo bhidyate gandhavattvdt yan naivam tan naivam yathd jalam. In the above instance an-anubhdvyatva (non-cognizability) belongs only to immediate intuition. There is thus no sa-paksa of anubhuti 'where an-anubhdvyatva was found before.

2 idam vdcyam prameyatvdt (this is definable, because it is know able) would, under the supposition, imply that the concomitance of the negation of rdcyatt'a and prameyatva, viz. avdcyati'a (indefinable) and aprameyatva (unknowable), would be demonstrable; which is absurd, since no such cases are known.

concomitance of the negation of an-anubhavyatva with the negation of anubhuti the affirmation of an-anubhavyatva would be inadmissible. Moreover, when one says that that which is an object of awareness (anubhdvya) is not immediate intuition, the mere affirmation of the negative relation makes anubhuti an object of awareness in a negative relation, which contradicts the conclusion that anubhuti is not an object of awareness. If, again, the character that is intended to be inferred by the vyatireki anumana is already known to exist in the paksa, then there is no need of inference. If it is known to exist elsewhere, then, since there is a sa-paksa 1 , there is no kevala-vyalireki inference. Even if, through the concomitance of the negation of the hetu and the sddhya, the sddhya is known to exist elsewhere outside the negation of the hetu, its presence in the case under consideration would not be demonstrated. Again, in the instance under discussion, if, from the concomitance of the negation of not being an object of awareness and the negation of immediate intuition, it is argued that the character as not being an object of awareness (a-vedyatva) must be present somewhere, then such conclusion would be self-contradictory; for, if it is known that there is an entity which is not an object of awareness, then by that very fact it becomes an object of awareness. If an existent entity is ruled out from all possible spheres excepting one, it necessarily belongs to that residual sphere. So it may be said that "willing, being an existent quality, is known to be absent from all spheres excepting the self; it, therefore, necessarily belongs thereto." On such an interpretation also there is no necessity of vyatireki anumana; for it is really a case of agreement (anvaya); and it is possible for us to enunciate it in a general formula of agreement such as "an existent entity, which is absent from all other spheres excepting one must necessarily belong to that residual sphere." Again, in such an instance as " all-knowingness (sarva-vittva), being absent in all known spheres, must be present somewhere, as we have a notion of it, and therefore there must be an entity to which it belongs, and such an entity is God," we have the well known ontological argument which is of vyatireki type. Against such an inference it may well be contended with justice that the notion of

1 sa-paksa are all instances (outside the instance of the inference under discussion) where the hetu or reason is known to co-exist with the sddhya or probandum.

232 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

a hare's horn, which is absent in all known spheres, must necessarily belong to an unperceived entity which is obviously false.

It may be contended that, if the vyatireki inference is not admitted, then that amounts to a denial of all defining characters; for a defining character is that which is absent everywhere except in the object under definition, and thus definition is the very nature of vyatireki inference. The obvious reply to this is that definition proceeds from the perception of special characteristics which are enunciated as the defining characteristics of a particular object, and it has therefore nothing to do with vyatireki inference 1 . It may also be urged that defining characteristics may also be gathered by joint method of agreement and difference, and not by a vyatireki inference as suggested by the opponents. In such an instance as where knowability is defined as that which is capable of being known, no negative instances are known but it still remains a definition. The definition of definition is that the special characteristic is existent only in the object under definition and nowhere else (a-sadharana-vyapako dharmo laksanam) 2 . In the case where a class of objects is defined the defining class-character would be that which should exist in all individuals of that class, and should be absent in all other individuals of other classes. But when an individual which stands alone (such as God) is defined, then we have no class-character, but only unique character which belongs to that individual only and not to a class. Even in such cases, such a defining character differentiates that entity from other entities (Brahma, £iva, etc.) with which, through partial similarity, He might be confused. Thus, the definition is a case of agreement of a character in an entity, and not a negation, as contended by those who confuse it with vyatireki inference. Therefore, the kevala-vyatireki form of inference cannot be supported by any argument.

On the subject of propositions (avayava) Yerikatanatha holds that there is no reason why there should be five propositions for all inference. The dispute, therefore, among various logicians regarding the number of propositions that can be admitted in an inference is meaningless; for just so many propositions need be admitted for an inference as are sufficient to make the inference appeal to the

1 artha-sadharana-kara-pratipatti-tiibandhanam sajatlya-vijatlya-vyavacchedena laksanam.

Tattva-ratnakara, quoted in Nyaya-parisuddhi, p. 143.

person for whom it may be intended. Thus, there may be three, four, or five propositions, according to the context in which the inference appears.

In addition to inference Venkatanatha also admits sabda, or scriptural testimony. No elaboration need be made here regarding the sabda-pramdna f as the treatment of the subject is more or less the same as is found in other systems of philosophy. It may be remembered that on the subject of the interpretation of words and sentences the Naiyaikas held that each single element of a sentence, such as simple words or roots, had its own separate or specific sense. These senses suffer a modification through a process of addition of meaning through the suffixes of another case-relation. Viewed from this light, the simple constituents of sentences are atomic, and gradually go through a process of aggregation through their association with suffixes until they grow into a total meaning of the sentence. This is called the abhihita-nvaya-vdda. The opposite view is that of anvitd-bhidhdna-vdda, such as that of Mimamsaka, which held that no sentence could be analysed into purely simple entities of meaning, unassociated with one another, which could go gradually by a process of aggregation or association. Into however simple a stage each sentence might be capable of being analysed, the very simplest part of it would always imply a general association with some kind of a verb or full meaning. The function of the suffixes and case-relations, consists only in applying restrictions and limitations to this general connectedness of meaning which every word carries with itself. Venkatanatha holds this anvitd-bhidhdna-vdda against the abhihita-nvaya-vdda on the ground that the latter involves the unnecessary assumption of separate specific powers for associating the meaning of the simplest word-elements with their suffixes, or between the suffixed words among themselves and their mutual connectedness for conveying the meaning of a sentence 1 . The acceptance of anvitd-bhidhdna was conducive to the philosophy of Ramanuja, as it established the all-connectedness of meaning (visistd-rtha).

Ramanuja himself did not write any work propounding his views of logic consistent with his system of philosophy. But Nathamuni had written a work called Nydya-tattva, in which he criticized

1 abhihitd-nvyaye hi paddndm padd-rthe padd-rthdnam vdkyd-rthe paddndm ca tatra iti sakti-traya-kalpand-gauravam sydt. Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 369.

234 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

the views of Gotama's logic and revised it in accordance with the Visistd-dvaita tradition. Visnucitta wrote his Sangati-mdld and Prameya-samgraha, following the same lines, Bhattarakaguru wrote his Tattva-ratndkara, and Varadavisnu Misra also wrote his Prajnd-paritrdna and Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya, working out the views of Visistd-dvaita logic. Veiikatanatha based his Nydya-parisuddhi on these works, sometimes elucidating their views and sometimes differing from them in certain details. But, on the whole, he drew his views on the Visistd-dvaita logic from the above writers. His originality, therefore, in this field is very limited. Meghanadari, however, seems to differ very largely from Veiikatanatha in admitting Upamdfta and arthdpatti as separate pramdnas. He has also made some very illuminating contributions in his treatment of perception, and in his treatment of inference he has wholly differed from Veiikatanatha in admitting vyatireki anumdna.

Meghanadari admits upamdna as a separate pramdna. With him upamdna is the pramdna through which it is possible to have the knowledge of similarity of a perceived object with an unperceived one, when there was previously a knowledge of the similarity of the latter with the former. Thus, when a man has the knowledge that the cow which he perceives is similar to a bison, and when later on, roaming in the forest, he observes a bison, he at once notes that the cow which he does not perceive now is similar to a bison which he perceives. This knowledge, Meghanadari contends, cannot be due to perception, because the cow is not before the perceiver; it also cannot be due to memory, since the knowledge of similarity dawns before the reproduction of the cow in the mind. Meghanadari holds that no separate pramdna need be admitted for the notion of difference; for the knowledge of difference is but a negation of similarity. This interpretation of upamdnais, however, different from that given in Nyaya, where it is interpreted to mean the association of a word with its object on the basis of similarity, e.g. that animal is called a bison which is similar to a cow. Here, on the basis of similarity, the word " bison " is associated with that animal. Meghanadari tries to explain this by the function of recognition, and repudiates its claim to be regarded as a separate pramdna 1 . He also admits arthdpatti as a separate pramdna. Arthdpatti is generally translated as "implication," where a certain hypothesis, without the

assumption of which an obscured fact of experience becomes inexplicable, is urged before the mind by the demand for an explanation of the observed fact of experience. Thus, when one knows from an independent source that Devadatta is living, though not found at his house, a natural hypothesis is urged before the mind that he must be staying outside the house; for otherwise either the present observation of his non-existence at his house is false or the previous knowledge that he is living is false. That he is living and that he is nonexistent at his house can only be explained by the supposition that he is existing somewhere outside the house. This cannot be regarded as a case of inference of the form that "since somewhere-existing Devadatta is non-existent at his house, he must be existent somewhere else; for all somewhere-existing entities which are nonexistent at a place must be existent elsewhere like myself." Such an inference is meaningless; for the non-existence of an existing entity in one place is but the other name of its existing elsewhere. Therefore, the non-existence of an existing entity in one place should not be made a reason for arriving at a conclusion (its existence elsewhere) which is not different from itself. Arthdpatti is thus to be admitted as a separate pramdna.

Epistemology of the Ramanuja School according to Meghanadari and others.

Veiikatanatha, in his Nyaya-parisuddhi, tries to construct the principles of Logic {Nydya or Niti) on which Ramanuja's system of philosophy is based. He was not a pioneer in the field, but he followed and elaborated the doctrines of Visista-dvaita logic as enunciated by Nathamuni, the teacher of Yamuna, in his work called Nyaya-tattva, and the works of Parasara Bhattaon the subject. Regarding the system of Nyaya propounded by Gotama, Venkata's main contention is that though Gotama's doctrines have been rejected by Badarayana as unacceptable to right-minded scholars, they may yet be so explained that they may be made to harmonize with the true Vedantic doctrines of Visista-dvaita. But the interpretations of Gotama's Nyaya by Vatsyayana take them far away from the right course and have therefore to be refuted. At any rate Veiikata, like Visnucitta, is not unwilling to accept such doctrines of Gotama as are not in conflict with the Vedanta view. Thus, there may be a divergence of opinion regarding the sixteenfold classi-

236 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

fication of logical categories. There can be no two opinions regarding the admission of the fact that there are at least certain entities which are logically valid; for if logical validity is denied, logic itself becomes unfounded. All our experiences assume the existence of certain objective factors on which they are based. A general denial of such objective factors takes away the very root of experience. It is only when such objective factors are admitted to be in existence in a general manner that there may be anv inquiry regarding their specific nature. If everything were invalid, then the opponent's contention would also be invalid. If everything were doubted, then also it would remain uncontradictory. The doubt itself cannot be doubted and the existence of doubt would have to be admitted as a decisive conclusion. So, even by leading a full course of thoroughgoing doubt, the admission of the possibilitv of definite conclusion becomes irresistible 1 . Therefore, the contention of the Buddhists that there is nothing valid and that there is nothing the certainty of which can be accepted, is inadmissible. If, therefore, there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible, there arises a natural inquiry about the means or instruments by which such valid knowledge is possible. The word pramana is used in two senses. Firstly, it means valid knowledge; secondly, it means instruments by which valid knowledge is produced, pramana as valid knowledge is defined by Verikata as the knowledge which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are {yatha-vasthita-vyavahara-nu-giwam) 2 . The definition includes behaviour as an indispensable condition of pramana such that, even though in a particular case a behaviour may not actually be induced, it may yet be pramana if the knowledge be such that it has the capacity of producing a behaviour which would tally with things as they are 3 . The definition

1 rywahdro hijagato bhavaty dlmbane kiacit na tat sdmdnyato ndsti kathantd tu parlksyate sdmdnya-niscitd-rthena visese tu bubhutsitam pariksa hy ucitd sre-sta-pramdno-tpddand-tmikd. . .

sari-am sandigdham iti te nipuriasyd'sti mscayah sams'ayas ca na sandigdhah sandigdhd-dvaita-zddinah.

Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 31 (Chowkhamba edition).

2 Nydya-parisuddhi, by Venkatanatha, p. 36.

3 anuguna-padam lyavahdra-janana-svarupa-yogya-param tend'janita-vyava-hdre yathd-rtha-jiidna-visese nd'vydptih. S§rinivasa's Nydya-sdra on Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 36.

ofpramana as knowledge leading to a behaviour tallying with facts naturally means the inclusion of valid memory within it. An uncontradicted memory is thus regarded as valid means of knowledge according to the Ramanuja system 1 . Venkata urges that it is wrong to suppose the illicit introduction of memory as the invariable condition of illusion, for in such illusory perception as that of yellow conch-shell, there is manifestly no experience of the production of memory. The conch-shell directly appears as yellow. So in all cases of illusions the condition that is invariably fulfilled is that one thing appears as another, which is technically called anyatha-khyati. But it may as well be urged that in such an illusion as that of the conch-shell-silver, the reason why the conch-shell appears as the silver is the non-apprehension of the distinction between the subconscious image of the silver seen in shops and the perception of a shining piece before the eyes, technically called akhyati. Thus, in all cases of illusion, when one thing appears as another there is this condition of the non-apprehension of the distinction between a memory image and a percept. If illusions are considered from this point of view, then they may be said to be primarily and directly due to the aforesaid psychological fact known as akhyati. Thus, both these theories of illusion have been accepted by Ramanuja from two points of view. The theory of anyatha-khyati appeals directly to experience, whereas the akhyati view is the result of analysis and reasoning regarding the psychological origin of illusions 2 . The other theory of illusion (yathartha-khyati), which regards illusions also as being real knowledge, on the ground that in accordance with the panci-karana theory all things are the result of a primordial admixture of the elements of all things, is neither psychological nor analytical but is only metaphysical, and as such does not explain the nature of illusions. The illusion in such a view consists in the fact or apprehension of the presence of such silver in the conch-shell as can be utilized for domestic or ornamental purposes, whereas the metaphysical explanation only justifies the perception of certain primordial elements of silver in the universal admixture of the elements of all things in all things.

1 smrti-mdtrd-pramdnatvam na yuktam iti vakfyate abddhita-smriter loke pramdnatva-parigrahdt.

Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 38.

2 idam rajatam anubhavdmV ty ekatvenai'va pratlyamdndydh pratlter grahana-smarand-tmakatvam anekatvam ca yuktitah sddhyamdnam na pratlti-patham drohati. Nydya-sdra, p. 40.

238 Philosophy of the Ramannja School of Thought [ch.

In refuting the atma-khyati theory of illusion of the Buddhists, Venkata says that if the idealistic Buddhist can admit the validity of the different awarenesses as imposed on the one fundamental consciousness, then on the same analogy the validity of the perceived objects may also be admitted. If the different subjective and objective awarenesses are not admitted, then all experiences would be reduced to one undifferentiated consciousness, and that would be clearly against the Buddhistic theory of knowledge. The Buddhist view that entities which are simultaneously apprehended arc one, and that therefore knowledge and its objects which are apprehended simultaneously are one, is wrong. Knowledge and its objects are directly apprehended as different, and therefore the affirmation of their identity is contradicted in experience. The Madhyamika Buddhists further hold that, just as in spite of the falsehood of the defects (dosa), illusions happen, so in spite of the falsehood of any substratum or any abiding entity, illusions may appear as mere appearances without any reality behind them. Against such a view, Venkata savs that whatever is understood by people as existent or non-existent has always a reference to a reality, and mere phenomena without any basis or ground on reality are incomprehensible in all our experience. Hence the pure phenomenalism of the Madhyamika is wholly against all experience l . When people speak of non-existence of any entity, they always do it with some kind of spatial or temporal qualification. Thus, when they say that the book does not exist, they always qualify this non-existencewith a "here" and a "there" orwith a "now" or a "then." But pure unqualified non-existence is unknown to ordinary experience 2 . Again all positive experience of things is spatiallv limited (e.g. there is a jug "here"); if this spatial qualification as "here" is admitted, then it cannot be held that appearances occur on mere nothing (nir-adhisthana-bhrama-nupapattih). If, however, the limitation of a "here" or "there" is denied, then no experience is possible (pratiter apahnava eva syat).

Criticizing the a-nirvacanlya theory of illusion of the Vedantists Verikatanatha says that when the Sankarites described all things as

1 loke bhdrd-bhdva-sabdayos tat-pratltyos ca z'idyamanasyaVva vastunah ar'asthd-visesa-gocaratvasya pratipdditatvdt. prakdrd-ntarasya ca loka-siddha-pramand-visayatvdd ity-arthah. Xydya-sdra, p. 46.

2 sarvo'pi nisedhah sa-pratiyogiko niyata-desa-kdlaica pratlyate. Nlrupa-dhirniyata-desa-kdla-pratiyogi-visesana-rahito nisedho napratlyate iti. Ibid. p. 46.

indefinable (a-nirvacaniya), the word "indefinable" must mean either some definite trait, in which case it would cease to be indefinable, or it might mean failure to define in a particular manner, in which case the Sankarites might as well accept the Ramanuja account of the nature of the universe. Again when the Sankarites are prepared to accept such a self-contradictory category as that which is different both from being and non-being (sad-asad-vyatirekah), why cannot they rather accept things as both existent and non-existent as they are felt in experience? The self-contradiction would be the same in either case. If, however, their description of the world-appearance as something different from being and non-being is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the world-appearance is different both from chimerical entities (tuccha) and from Brahman, then Ramanujists should have no dispute with them. Further, the falsity of the world does not of itself appeal to experience; if an attempt is made to establish such a falsity through unfounded dialectic, then by an extension of such a dialectic even Brahman could be proved to be self-contradictory. Again the assertion that the world-appearance is non-existent because it is destructible is unfounded; for the Upanisads speak of Brahman, the individual souls and the prakrti as being eternal. The Sankarites also confuse destruction and contradiction (nacai'kyamnasa-bddhayoh) 1 .

The followers of Patanjali speak of an illusory comprehension through linguistic usage in which we are supposed to apprehend entities which have no existence. This is called nirvisaya-khyati. Thus, when we speak of the head of Rahu, we conceive Rahu as having an existence apart from his head, and this apprehension is due to linguistic usage following the genitive case-ending in Rahu, but Venkata urges that it is unnecessary to accept a separate theory of illusion for explaining such experience, since it may well be done by the akhyati or anyatha-khyati theory of illusion, and he contends that he has already demonstrated the impossibility of other theories of illusion.

Meghanadari, however, defines pramana as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge such as memory 2 .

1 Nydya-parisuddhi, pp. 48-5*•

* " tatrd'nya-pramdnd-napekfam artha-paricchedakam jnanam pramdnam, artha-paricchede'nya-pramdna-sdpekfa-smrtdv ativydpti-parihdre'nya-pramdnd-napek$am iti." Naya-dyu-mani, Madras Govt. Oriental MS.

240 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

Though knowledge is self-revealing {sva-murtav apt svayam eva hetuh), and though there is a continuity of consciousness in sleep, or in a state of swoon, yet the consciousness in these stages cannot reveal objects of cognition. This is only possible when knowledge is produced through the processes known as pramdria. When we speak of the self-validity of knowledge, we may speak of the cognition as being determined by the objects that it grasps (artha-paricchinnam pramanam). But when we speak of it from the perceptual point of view or from the point of view of its determining the objects of knowledge, we have to speak of knowledge as determining the nature o{oh)ccts(artha-paricchedaka) and not as being determined by them. Knowledge may thus lie looked at from a subjective point of view in self-validity of cognition (sratah-pramariya). Then the self-validity refers to its content which is determined by the objects of comprehension. It has also to be looked at from the objective point of view in all cases of acquirement of knowledge and in our behaviour in the world of objects, and then the knowledge appears as the means by which we determine the nature of the objects and measure our behaviour accordingly. The definition of knowledge as that which measures the nature of objects {artlui-pariccheda-Uari jniinam pramanam), as given by Meghanadari is thus somewhat different from that given by Yehkata, who defines it as that which corresponds to or produces a behaviour leading to an experience of things as they are (yatha-vasthita vyavahara-nugunam). In the case of Yenkata, knowledge is looked at as a means to behaviour and it is the behaviour which is supposed to determine the nature of correspondence. In Mcgha-nadari's definition the whole question of behaviour and of correspondence is lost sight of, or at least put in the background. The emphasis is put on the function of knowledge as determining the objects. The supposition probably is that in case of error or illusion also the real object is perceived, and the illusion is caused through the omission of other details, a correct perception of which would have rendered the illusion impossible. We know already that according to the yathartha-khyati theory of Ramanuja there are elements of all things in all things, according to the Upanisadic theory of " trivrt-karana" and its elaboration in the panci-karana doctrine. What happens therefore in illusion (e.g. the conch-shell -silver) is that the visual organ is in contact with the element of

silver that forms one of the constituents of the conch-shell. This element of silver no doubt is infinitesimally small as compared with the overwhelmingly preponderating parts—the conch-shell. But on account of the temporary defect of the visual organ or other distracting circumstances, these preponderating parts of the conch-shell are lost sight of. The result is that knowledge is produced only of the silver elements with which the sense-organ was in contact; and since the conch-shell element had entirely dropped out of comprehension, the silver element was regarded as being the only one that was perceived and thus the illusion was produced. But even in such an illusion the perception of silver is no error. The error consists in the non-perception of the preponderating part— the conch-shell. Thus, even in illusory perception, it is undoubtedly a real object that is perceived. The theory of anyathd-khydti is that illusion consists in attributing a quality or character to a thing which it does not possess. In an indirect manner this theory is also implied in the yathartha-khydti theory in so far that here also the characters attributed (e.g. the silver) to the object of perception (purovarti vastu) do not belong to it, though the essence of illusion does not consist in that, and there is no real illusion of perception. Meghanadari thus holds that all knowledge is true in the sense that it has always an object corresponding to it, or what has been more precisely described by Anantacarya that all cognitive characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as objects of knowledge 1 . We have seen that Venkata had admitted three theories of illusion, namely, anyatha-khyati, akhyati and yathartha-khydti, from three different points of view. This does not seem to find any support in Meghanadari's work, as he spares no effort to prove that the yathartha-khydti theory is the only theory of illusion and to refute the other rival theories. The main drift of Meghanadari's criticism of anyathd-khydti consists in the view that since knowledge must always refer to an object that is perceived, it is not possible that an object should produce a knowledge giving an entirely different content, for then such a content would refer to no object and thus would be chimerical (tuccha). If it is argued that the object is present elsewhere, then it might be contended that since the presence of the object can be determined

1 " Tat-tad-dharma-prakaraka-jiidnatz'a-ryapakam tat-tad-dharmavad-vises-yakatvam iti yathartham sarva-vijiianam iti" Anantacarya, Jnana-yatharthya-vada (MS.)-

dim 16

242 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

only by the content of knowledge, and since such an object is denied in the case of illusory perception where we have such a knowledge, what is the guarantee that the object should be present in other cases ? In those cases also it is the knowledge that alone should determine the presence of the object. That is to say, that if knowledge alone is to be the guarantor of the corresponding object, it is not right to say in two instances where such knowledge occurs that the object exists in one case and not in the other 1 .

In refuting the anirvacanlya-khyati Meghanadari says that if it is supposed that in illusions an indefinable silver is produced which is mistaken for real silver, then that is almost the same as the anyatha-khyati view, for here also one thing is taken as another. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how the perception of such an indefinable silver would produce the real desire for picking it up which is possible only in the case of the perception of real silver. A desire which can be produced by a real object can never be produced by a mere illusory notion. Nor can there be any similarity between a mere illusory notion and the real shining entity, viz. silver 2 . The so-called indefinable silver is regarded either as being of the nature of being and non-being, or as different from being and non-being, both of which are impossible according to the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that such an extra-logical entity is possible, it would be difficult to conceive how it could have any similarity with such a positive entity as ordinary silver. It cannot be admitted that this complex of being and non-being is of the nature of pure vacuity, for then also it would be impossible to conceive any similarity between a vacuum entity and real silver 3 .

1 na ca tadbajjiidne'stziti vdcyam. tad-dkdrasya satyatve bhrantitra-nu-papattih asattve tu na tasya jiidnd-kdratd. tucchosya vasH'-dkdratd-nupapatteh. tad-dkdratve ca khydtir eva tuccheti suktikddau na rajatd-rthi-pravrttih. Meghanadari, Naya-dyu-mani (MS.).

The general drift of Meghanadari's theme may be summed up in the words of Anantacarya in his jfiidna-ydthdrthya-vada (MS.) as follows: " tathdca rajatatzam sukti-nistha-iisayatd-vacchedakatzd-bhdiavat sukty-azrttitzdt yo yad-azrttih sa tan-nistha-dharma-nirupitd-vacchedakatvd-bhdvavdn iti sdmdnya-vydptau danda-nistha-kdranatd-vacchedakatva-bhdvavad danda-zrtti ghatatrddikam drstdntah."

2 "tasyd'nirvdcya-rajatatayd grahandd z-iparita-khydti-paksa-pdtah. . .sam-yag-rajata-dhir hi prarrtti-hetuh. . . tasya pratlty-dtmaka-vastz-dtrruikayor bhds-z'aratvd-di-sadrsya-bhdvdt." Ibid.

3 ekasya yugapat sad-asada-tmaka-viruddha-dharmavattvd-nupapatteh. tad-upapattdv apt sddrsyd-nupapattesca...sunya-vastuni pramdnd-bhdvdt. tut-sad-bhdve'pi tasya rajata-sddrs'yd-bhdvdccu tato na pravrttih. Ibid.

Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable {anirvacanlya) because it is different from pure being such as the self which is never contradicted in experience {attnano bddha-yogat) and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare's horn which can never be objects of knowledge (khyaty-ayogat). But in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of knowledge it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being because of its association with the class concept of being, for the self is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class concept 1 . Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a condition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his association with variable objects and variable relations, and would therefore be false. Again being (sattd) is not as universal as it is supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view that holds negation to be a positive category 2 . If the self is regarded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous. 3

Again the akhyati view is liable to two different interpretations, in both of which it may be styled in some sense as yathartha-khyati. In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining character of something before the eyes, and this shining character, being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to dis-

1 tasya drsyatvd-nabhyupagame sasa-visdnd-di-sdmyam. dtmanah prameyatd ca ne'ste'ti, na tatas tat-sattd-siddhih. tad-abhyupagatau ca pfapancavanmithydt-vam.. . dtma-vyakter ekatvd-bhimdndt tad-vyatirikta-paddrthasyd'sattvd-bhimdn-dcca sattd-samavdyitvd-nupapatteh. Meghanadari, Naya-dyu-mani.

2 atha ghata-patd-di-bheddndm vydvartamdnatvend'pdramdrthyam. .. dtma-no'pi ghata-patddi-sarva-paddrthebhyo vydvartamdnatvdn mithydtvd-pattih. . . ab-hivyanjakd-pdramdrthyebhivyangyd-pdramdrthyam...na ca sattvasyai'va sam-asta-padarthesv anuvartamdnam pdramdrthyam. ghatddayo'pi tad-apeksayd vydvartante. . .abhdvasya paddrthd-ntarbhdve'pi tatra sattd-nabhyupagamdt sarva-paddrthd-nuvrtty-abhdvdl. Ibid.

3 na ca tasya svayam-prakdsatvdn na pramdnd-pekse'ti svayam-prakdsatvasyd' '-pi pramdnd-dhlnatvdt pramdnd-ntara-siddhd-tmanah svayam-prakdsatvasya sdd-hyatvdcca. na hi dharmy-aprasidhau dharma-sddhyatd. Ibid.

16-2

244 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

tinguish whether this shining character belongs to silver or to something else, and since the object in front is associated with such an undiscriminated shining character, the shining character cannot be treated as a mere self-ejected idea, but has to be taken as having its true seat in that something before the eye; thus, the notion of silver is a result of a true perception. It would have been a false perception if the conch-shell had been perceived as silver, but in such a perception it is not the conch-shell, but "this" in front, that is perceived as silver. The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experienced in such a behaviour {yad-artha-vyavahara-nuguna ya dhih sd tad-artha). This maxim has its application here inasmuch as the "this" in front can be experienced in practical behaviour as such, and the silvery character has also a true reference to real silver. So the notion "this silver" is to be regarded as a complex of two notions, the "this" and the "silver." Thus, the perception involved in the above interpretation is a true perception according to the akhyati view. In the above explanation it is contended that just as the two different notions of substance and quality may both appear in the same concept, so there cannot be any difficulty in conceiving of a legitimate unity of two different notions in one illusory perception as "this silver." Such a fusion is possible on account of the fact that here two notions occur in the same moment and there is no gap between them. This is different from the anyatha-khyati view, in which one thing is supposed to appear as another. The objections against this view are: firstly, that a defect cannot possibly transmute one thing into another; secondly, if illusions be regarded as the appearance of one thing as another, then there is scope for such a fear, even in those cases which are regarded as correct perception; for all knowledge would be exposed to doubt, and this would land us in scepticism. If, therefore, it is suggested that illusion is due to a non-comprehension of the difference between the presence of a conch-shell and the memory-image of silver, that also would be impossible. For if "difference" means only the different entities (bhedo rastu-sruru-pam-eva), then non-comprehension of difference (which is regarded as the root-cause of illusion in the present view) would mean the comprehension of the identity of the memory-image and the percept, and that would not account for the qualified concept where

one notion (e.g. the silver) appears as qualifying the other notion (the "this" before the eye). Moreover, if two independent notions which are not related as substance and quality be miscomprehended as one concept, then any notion could be so united with any other notion, because the memory-images which are stored in our past experiences are limitless. Again the silver that was experienced in the past was experienced in association with the space in which it existed, and the reproduction of the silver and memory would also be associated with that special spatial quality. This would render its mis-association with the percept before the perceiver impossible on account of the spatial difference of the two. If it is contended that through the influence of defects the spatial quality of the memory-image is changed, then that would be the anyatha-khyati theory, which would be inadmissible in the akhyati view. Again since all sensible qualities must be associated with some kind of spatial relation, even if the original spatial quality be transmuted or changed, that would be no reason why such a spatial image should be felt as being in front of the perceiver. It must also be said that the distinctive differences between the memory-image and the percept are bound to be noted; for if such a distinctive difference were not noted, the memory-image could not be distinguished as "silver-image." It cannot also be said that though the percept can be distinguished from the memory-image the latter cannot be distinguished from the former, for the discriminative character is a constituent of both, and it is nothing but the white shining attribute. If it is urged that the spatial and other distinctive qualities are not noted in the memory-image and it appears merely as an image, then it may well be objected that any and every memory-image may be confused with the present percept, and even a stone may appear as silver.

Since both the a-nirvacaniya-khyati and the akhyati are in some sense yathartha-khyati, Meghanadari refuted these two theories of illusion and attempted to show that the yathartha-khyati would be untenable in these views. Now he tries to show that all other possible interpretations of yathartha-khyati are invalid. The fundamental assumption of yathartha-khyati is that all knowledge must correspond to a real object like all right knowledge 1 . Thus, in other

1 vipratipannah pratyayo yatha-rthah pratyatvdt, sampratipanna-pratyaya-vaditi. Naya-dyu-mani, p. 140 (MS.).

246 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

interpretations, the yathartha-khyati or the correspondence theory, might mean that cognition is produced by a real object or by the objective percept or that it means uncontradicted experience. The first alternative is untenable because even in the illusion of the conch-shell-silver the notion of silver has been produced by a real object, the conch-shell; the second view is untenable, for the object corresponding to the illusory percept of silver is not actually present in the conch-shell according to other theories; and so far as the operation of the memory impression of the silver as experienced in the past is concerned (purva-nubhuta-rajata-mmskara-dvdra) its instrumentality is undeniable both in right and in illusory cognitions. The third alternative is untenable because contradiction refers to knowledge or judgment and not to things themselves. If it is said that the cognition refers to the illusory appearance and hence it is the illusory entity existing outside that is the object of perception, the obvious objection would be that perception refers to a non-illusory something in front of the perceiver, and this cannot be obviated. If non-illusory something is a constituent in the cognition, then it would be futile to say that the mere illusory perceptual form is all that can be the object of perception.

It cannot also be said that the illusory perception has no object (nirvisaya-khyati) and that it is called cognition, because, though it may not itself be amenable to behaviour as right cognitions are, it is similar to them by producing an impression that it also is amenable to behaviour, just a& autumn clouds, which cannot shower, are also called clouds. The illusory cognition has for its content not only the illusory appearance but also the non-illusory "this" to which it objectively and adjectively refers. The truth, however, is that it is not indispensable for constituting the objectivity of a cognition that all the characters of the object should appear in the cognition; if any of its characters are manifested, that alone is sufficient to constitute the objectivity of an entity with regard to its cognition. The position, therefore, is that all cognitions refer and correspond to certain real entities in the objective world, and this cannot be explained on any other theory than on the supposition of a metaphysico-cosmological theory akin to the theory of homoiomeriae.

Anantacarya, in his Jnana-yatharthya-vada, more or less repeats the arguments of Meghanadari when he says that no cognition can

xx] The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge 247

be possible without its being based on a relation of correspondence to an objective entity. The content of knowledge must therefore have a direct correspondence with the objective entity to which it refers. Thus, since there is a perception of silver (in the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver), it must refer to an objective substratum corresponding to it 1 . The Mimamsa supposition that errors are produced through non-discrimination of memory-image and perception is also wrong, because in that case we should have the experience of remembering silver and not of perceiving it as an objective entity before us 2 . Both Meghanadari and Anantacarya take infinite pains to prove that their definition of error applies to all cases of illusions of diverse sorts, including dreams, into the details of which it is unnecessary for our present purposes to enter 3 .

The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge.

Pramdna, or valid knowledge, is defined as the cognition of objects as they are {tatha-bhuta-rtha-jnanam hi pramanam ucyate), and apramdna, or invalid knowledge, is described as cognition representing a wrong notion of an object {a-tathd-bhutd-rtha-jndnam hi a-pramdnam). Such a validity, it is urged by Meghanadari, is manifested by the knowledge itself (tathdtvd-vadhdrand-tmakam pram-any am dtmanai'va nisctyate). This does not expose it to the criticism that knowledge, being passive, cannot at the same moment be also regarded as active, determining its own nature as valid (na ca karma-kartrtd-virodhah)\ for since it is of the nature of a faithful representation of the object, the manifestation of its own nature as such is an affirmation of its validity. If knowledge had no power by itself of affirming its own validity, there would be no way by which such a validity could be affirmed, for the affirmation of its validity by any other mediate process, or through any other instrumentality, will always raise the same question as to how the testimony of those processes or instruments can be accepted. For on such a supposition, knowledge not being self-valid, each such testimony has to be

1 tatha ca rajatatvam sukti-nistha-visayatd-vacchedakatvd-bhdvavat sukty-avrttitvdt yo yad-avrttih sa tan-nistha-dharma-nirupitd-vacchedakatvd-bhdvavd-niti. Jndna-ydthdrthya-vdda (MS.).

2 rajata-smarane idam-paddrtha-grahana-rupa-jfidna-dvaya-kalpane rajatam smardmVti tatrd'nubhava-prasangah, na tu rajatam pasydmlti, sdksdt-kdratva-vyanjaka-visayatdydh smarane'bhdvdt. Ibid.

248 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

corroborated by another testimony, and that by another, and this will lead us to infinite regress.

In repudiating other views Meghanadari points out that if validity is admitted as belonging to the collocative causes of knowledge (involving the self, the senses, and the object), then even the object would have to be regarded as a pramana, and there would be no prameya or object left. Again, if affirmation is regarded as being of the nature of awareness, then even memory-knowledge has to be regarded as valid, since it is of the nature of awareness. Further, if affirmation of validity be of the nature of power, then such power, being non-sensible, has to be manifested by some other means of knowledge. If, again, validity is supposed to be produced by the causes of knowledge, then the dictum of the self-manifestation of validity would have to be given up. Uncontradicted behaviour also cannot be regarded as a definition of validity, for in that case even memory has to be regarded as valid by itself. It cannot also be defined as merely knowledge as such, for knowledge, not being able to turn back on itself to apprehend its own validity, would have to depend on something else, and that would imply the affirmation of validity through extraneous reference (paratah-pramanya). Again in those cases where the cause of error is known, the cognition, though known as erroneous, irresistibly manifests itself to us (e.g. the movement of the sun). The assumption that all knowledge is associated with its validity is inapplicable to such cases. If, again, it is held that, whenever a later cognition rejects the former, we have a clear case as to how the invalidity of the previous cognition is demolished by the valid knowledge of a later moment; it may be urged that, when the generic knowledge of an object is replaced by a cognition of details, we have a case when one cognition replaces another, though it does not involve any criticism of the former knowledge.

In the Bhatta view, where it is supposed that when the object attains its specific cognized character its knowledge as an internal operation is inferred, both validity and invalidity ought to depend upon the objects. If, however, it is urged that the notion of validity shows itself in the faultless character of the instruments and condition of cognition, that would also imply the notion of validity as of extraneous origin. In the Prabhakara view, where knowledge is supposed to reveal the knower, the object and knowledge in one

sweep, we have a much better case in so far that here knowledge has not to depend on anything extraneous. In this case self-invalidity may apply only to memory which has to depend on previous perception. To this the Nyaya objection is that since memory is also knowledge, and since all knowledge is self-revealing, the Prab-hakaras ought consistently to admit the self-validity of memory.

Meghanadari holds that all these objections against the self-validity of knowledge are invalid; for if the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend on other pramanas, then there is an infinite regress. If, however, an attempt is made to avoid the regress by admitting the self-validity of any later pramdna, then it virtually amounts to the admission of self-validity {anavastha-pariharaya kasyacit svatastvd-ngikdre ca na paratah-pramanyam). It may be urged that we are not necessarily prompted to action by a consciousness of validity, but through the probability of the same which is sought to be tested (ajndtatayd jnatatayai'va) by our efforts in the direction of the object. But in such a supposition there is no meaning in the attempt of our opponents in favour of the doctrine of the validity of cognition through extraneous means (paratah-prdmdnya), for such a supposition is based on the view that our efforts are produced without a previous determination of the validity of cognition. When we see that a person, having perceived an object, makes an effort towards it, our natural conclusion is that he has, as the basis of the effort, a knowledge of the validity of his perception, for without it there can be no effort. It is hopeless to contend that there is validity of cognition in such cases without the knowledge of validity, for validity of knowledge always means the consciousness of such validity. The fact is that what constitutes a pramdna constitutes also its validity. It is wrong to think that validity appertains to anything else outside the cognition in question. When we see fire, its validity as a burning object is grasped with the very notion of fire and does not wait for the comprehension of any supersensible power or burning capacity of fire. The comprehension of fire as a burning object involves the knowledge of its association with its burning capacity. The knowledge of the burning capacity by itself cannot induce any action on our part, for we are always led to act by the comprehension of objects and not by their capacities. It is, therefore, wrong to separate the capacity from the object and speak of it as the cause of our effort. So the cognition of a pramdna

250 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

involves with it its validity. Thus validity cannot be dissociated from the cognition of the object 1 . Further, validity cannot be defined as uncontradictedness, for if that test is to be applied to every knowledge it would lead to infinite regress. If, however, the knowledge of the validity of any cognition has to depend upon the knowledge of the defectlessness or correctness of the means and conditions of cognition, then, since validity of such knowledge has to depend upon another knowledge for the correctness of the means and condition, and that upon another, there is obviously an infinite regress. Since knowledge normally corresponds to the object, ordinarily there should not be any fear of any error arising from the defects of the causes and conditions of such knowledge; it is only in specific cases that such doubts may arise leading to special inquiries about the correctness or incorrectness of the means and conditions of knowledge. If there is an inquiry as to the validity of every knowledge, we should be landed in scepticism. Thus, validity means the manifestation of any form of content not awaiting the confirmation by other means of knowledge (pramdna-ntara-napeksayaWtha-vacchinnattvam), and such a conviction of validity is manifested along with the cognition itself. Memory, however, depends upon a prior cognition, and as such the conviction of its validity depends upon the validity of a prior knowledge, and hence it cannot be regarded as self-valid.

Ramanujacarya, the teacher and maternal uncle of Verikatanatha, anticipates the objection that if self-validity of cognition is to be

1 Ramanujacarya, the maternal uncle of Veiikatanatha, anticipates an objection that perceptual cognition reveals only the content (instil). The revelation of such a content does not also involve the knowing relation which must necessarily be of a very varied nature, for a knowledge may refer to a content in infinitely diverse relation. The revelation of the mere content, therefore, without the specific knowing relation, does not involve the judgmental form, though the truth of this content may be ascertained at a later moment when it is reduced to a judgmental form as " I know it." There is no possibility of the affirmation of any validity at the moment of the revelation of the content. In reply to this, Ramanujacarya says that the revelation of a content necessarily implies all its knowing relations in a general manner; and therefore, by the mode of its revelation at any particular moment, the mode of its specific knowing relation at any particular moment is grasped along with the content. Thus, since the revelation of the content implies the specific knowing relation, all cognitions may be regarded as implicitly judgmental, and there cannot be any objection to the self-validity of such knowledge.

If the content and knowledge were regarded as entirely distinct, as they must be, and if the knowing relation w ere not given implicitly along with the content, then all knowledge would be contentless, and as such any future attempt to relate them would be impossible. Nydya-kulisa (MS.).

admitted, then no doubt could arise with reference to any cognition 1 . The reply of Ramanujacarya is that all cognitions are associated with a general conviction of their self-validity, but that does not prevent the rise of doubt in a certain specific direction. Self-validity in this view means that all cognitions produce by themselves a general conviction regarding their validity, though it does not rule out misapprehension in a specific direction 2 .

The Ontological categories of the Ramanuja School according to Venkatanatha.

(a) Substance. Venkatanatha in his Nyaya-siddhanjana and Tattva-mukta-kalapa y tries to give a succinct account of the different categories, admitted or presumed, in the philosophy of Ramanuja which the latter did not bring prominently to the view of his readers. The main division is that of the substance {dravya) and that which is non-substance (adravyd). Substance is defined as that which has states (dasavaf) or which suffers change and modification. In admitting substance he tries to refute the Buddhist view that there is no substance, and all things are but a momentary conglomeration of separate entities which come into being and are destroyed the next moment. The Vaibhasika Buddhists say that there are four ultimate sense-data, viz. colour, taste, touch, and smell, which are themselves qualities and are not themselves qualities of anything. These can be grasped by our specific senses 3 . The Vatslputriya school includes sound as a separate sense-data which can be perceived by the ear. Against this Veiikata urges that in all perception we have a notion that we touch what we see; such a perception cannot be false, for such a feeling is both invariable and uncontradicted in experience (svarasika-badhd-drster ananyatha-siddhesca). Such a perception implies recognition (pratyabhvjna) involving the notion that it is a permanent entity in the objective field which is perceived by a constant and unchangeable perceiver, and that the two sense-qualities refer to one and the same object. This recognition does not refer merely to the colour sensation, for the colour

1 samanyasya svato-grahena'bhydsa-daso-tpanna-jndne tat-samsayo na sydt. Tattva-cinta-mani (A.S. B), p. 184.

2 Nydya-kulisa, p. 27 (MS.).

3 evam dhur vaibhasikah mrddhdrd nirdharmakasca rupddayas catvdrah paddrthdh. Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 8.

252 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

sensation does not involve the tactile; nor does it refer merely to the tactile, as that does not involve colour. Perception, therefore, refers to an entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong. Such a perception of recognition also repudiates the Buddhist view of the conglomeration of entities. For such a view naturally raises the question as to whether the conglomeration is different from or the same as the entities that conglomerate. In the latter case there cannot be any recognition of the object as one entity to which both the colour and the tactile quality belong. In the former case, when conglomeration is regarded as extraneous to the conglomerated entities, such a conglomeration must either be positive or negative. In the first alternative it amounts virtually to an admission of substances, for the assumption of the existence of merely the complex characters is inadmissible, since there cannot be anything like that which is neither a substance, nor quality, nor a qualifying relation. In the second alternative, if the conglomeration (samghatd) is nonexistent, then it cannot produce the recognition. If conglomeration be defined as absence of interval between the perceived qualities, then also, since each sense quality has an appeal only to its own specific sense-organ, it is impossible that the perception of two different sense-qualities by two different organs should point to a common entity. Conglomeration cannot also be defined as spatial identity, for it must also involve temporal identity in order to give the notion of conglomeration. It cannot also be said that time and space are identical, for such a view which is true of momentariness, will be shown to be false by the refutation of momentariness. Space cannot also be of the nature of akasa, which in the Buddhist view means unobstructedness and is not a positive concept. Space cannot also be regarded as material identitv with the sense-qualities, for the different sense-qualities are regarded as the unique nature of different moments 1 . If it means that the different sensible qualities have but one material behind them, that amounts to the admission of substance 2 . If the sensible qualities be regarded as a conglomeration on account of their existence in the same material object, then the material object would have to be described as a conglomeration by virtue of the existence of its elemental entities

1 na co' padana-rupah sparsa-rupadmdm bhinna-svalaksano-paddnatva-bhy-upagamat. Tattva-muktd-kalcipa, Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 9.

in some other entity and that again in some other entity, and thus we have a vicious infinite. It cannot also be urged that the tactile sensation is inferred from the colour sensation, for such an inference would involve as its pre-condition the knowledge of the concomitance of the colour datum and the tactile, which is not possible unless they are known to belong to the same object. Neither can it be urged that the tactile and the colour-data are mutually associated; this gives rise to the notion that what is seen is touched, for the two sensations are known to be different in nature and originate through different sense-organs. It cannot also be said that our apperception that we touch what we see, being due to the operation of our instinctive root-desire (vasana), is false, for proceeding on the same analogy and following the Yogacara view, one may as well deny all external data. If it is said that the sense-data are never contradicted in experience and thus that the idealistic view is wrong, then it may as well be pointed out that our notion that we experience an object to which colour and the tactile sensations belong is also never contradicted in experience. If it is urged that such an experience cannot be proved to be logically valid, then it may be proved with equal force that the existence of external sense-data cannot be logically proved. Therefore, our ordinary experience that the object as a substance is the repository of various sense-qualities cannot be invalidated. The view that all the other four elements, excepting air (vayu), are themselves of diverse nature and are hence perceived as coloured, as touchable, etc., and that they are capable of being grasped by different senses is also false, as it does not necessarily involve the supposition that they are the repository of different sense-qualities; for experience shows that we intuit the fact that the objects are endowed with qualities. No one perceives a jug as being merely the colour-datum, but as an object having colour. It is also impossible that one neutral datum should have two different natures; for one entity cannot have two different natures. If it is said that two different qualities can abide in the same object, then that amounts to the admission of a substance in which different qualities inhere. It is also wrong to suppose that since the colour-datum and the tactile are grasped together they are identical in nature, for in the case of one error where a white conch-shell appears as yellow, the conch-shell is grasped without its white character, just as the yellow colour is grasped without its

254 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

corresponding object. And it cannot be said that a separate yellow conch-shell is produced there; for such a view is directly contradicted in experience when we perceive the yellow colour and assert its identity with the conch-shell by touch. So, by the simultaneity of perception, coherence of qualities in an object is proved and not identity.

Moreover, even the Buddhists cannot prove that the tactile and the colour sensations occur simultaneously. If this were so, the testimony of the two different senses naturally points to the existence of two different characters. When an object is near we have a distinct perception of it, and when it is at a distance perception is indistinct. This distinctness or indistinctness cannot refer merely to the sense-character, for then their difference as objects would not be perceived. It cannot also refer to the size (parimana), for the notion of size is admitted to be false by the Buddhists. Under the circumstances, it is to be admitted that such perceptions should refer to the objects.

The Buddhists are supposed to urge that if qualities are admitted to be separate from the substance, then it may be asked whether these qualities (dharma) have further qualities themselves or are without quality. In the latter alternative, being qualitiless, they are incapable of being defined or used in speech. In the former alternative, if qualities have further qualities, then the second grade qualities would have to be known by further qualities adhering to it, and that again by another, and thus we have a vicious infinite. Again, qualitiness (dharmatva) would itself be a quality. And it cannot be said that qualitiness is the very nature of quality, for a thing cannot be explained by having reference to itself. If qualitiness is something different from the quality, then such a concept would lead us in infinite regress. To this Verikata's reply is that all qualities are not qualitiless. In some cases quality appears as itself qualified, as testified by experience. In those cases where a quality is not demonstrable with particularizing specification, such as "this quality is so and so" (ittham-bhava), it does not depend for its comprehension on any other quality. Such qualities may be illustrated in the case of all abstract qualities and universals, and the opposite may be illustrated in the case of adjectival qualities such as the word "white" in the case of "white horse." There may be further specification regarding the nature of whiteness in the

white horse, whereas when the word "whiteness" stands by itself any inquiry regarding its further specification becomes inadmissible. Logically, however, there may be a demand of further specification in both the cases and the fear of an infinite regress, but it is not felt in experience 1 . Moreover, one might imagine a vicious infinite in the necessity of having an awareness of an awareness, and then another and so on, but still this is only hyper-logical; for the awareness, in manifesting itself, manifests all that needs be known about it, and there is actually nothing gained by continuing the series. Thus a quality may be supposed to have further qualities, but whatever could be manifested by these may be regarded as revealed by the quality itself 2 . Again the assertion that if qualities are themselves without quality then they are unspeakable would involve the Buddhists themselves in a great difficulty when they described the nature of all things as unique; for obviously such a uniqueness (svalaksanya) is without quality, and if that which has no quality cannot be described, then its specification as unique or svalaksana is impossible 3 .

It may be urged that a quality may belong to that which has no quality or to that which has it. The former alternative would imply the existence of an entity in its negation which is impossible; for then everything could exist everywhere, and even the chimerical entities, which are not regarded as existing anywhere, would be regarded as existing. In the other alternative a quality would exist in a quality, which is an absurd conception, being only a circular reasoning (atmdsraya). The reply of Venkata to this is that he does not hold that the quality belongs to the locus of its negation or to that which has it already, but he holds that a qualified entity possesses the quality not as a qualified entity but as taken apart from it 4 . It cannot be urged that this virtually implies the old objection of the existence of a quality in the locus of its negation. To this Venkata's reply is that the special feature of a qualified entity does

1 uddhrtefu niyatd-niyata-niskarsaka-sabdesu jdti-gunddeh pradhdnatayd nirdese'pi santi kecit yathd-pramdnam ittham-bhdvdh tvayd'pi hetu-sddhyd-di-dharmdndm paksa-dharmatvd-di-dharmdh sznkdryd anavasthd ca kathancid upaiamanlyd. Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 16.

a svtkrtanca samvedana-samvedane sabda-sabdddau sva-para-nirvdhakatvam. Ibid.

3 kinca sva-laksand-dindm jdtyd-dlndfica samvrti-siddhdndm nirdharmakatve'pi kathancid abhildpdrhatvam tvaydpi grdhyam. Ibid.

* vastutas' tad-visiste visesye tad visista-vrty-abhdve tac-chunye vrtti syddeva. Ibid. p. 17.

256 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch

not belong to any of its constituents, and qualities of any of the constituents may not belong to the constituted entity 1 . If by the hyper-logical method the manner of the subsistence of a quality in a qualified entity is criticized, then it might lead to the view that the conception of qualified entity is without any sufficient ground, or self-contradictory, or that such a conception is itself inadmissible. All such views are meaningless, for the wildest criticism of opponents would involve the very notion of qualified entity in the use of their logical apparatus. So it has to be admitted that qualities adhere in qualified entities and that such an adherence does not involve infinite regress.

(b) Criticism of the Samkhya Inference for Establishing the Existence of Prakrti. Verikatanatha admits the doctrine of prakrti as the theory of materiality, but he thinks that such a doctrine can be accepted only on the testimony of scriptures and not on inference. I Ie therefore criticizes the Samkhya inference as follows. Neither prakrti nor any of its evolutes such as mahat, ahamkara, tanmatras, etc., can be known through perception. Neither prakrti nor anv of its evolutes can also be known by inference. The Samkhyists hold that the effect has the same qualities as the cause. The world of effects, as we find it, is pleasurable, painful or dulling (mohatmaka); so its cause also must have, as its nature, pleasure, pain and a feeling of dullness. To this the question naturally arises regarding the relation of the causal qualities with the effects. They cannot be identical -the whiteness of the cloth is not identical with the thread of which it is made; the effect as a substance is not identical with causal qualities, for the white and the cloth are not identical. Further it cannot be said that the identity of the cause and the effect means merely that the effect is subordinate to the cause, as when one says that the effect, cloth, exists only in the samava\a relation in the cause and in no other form (adrster eva tantu-samavetatvat patasya tantu-gunatvoktili), for the obvious reply is that the Samkhya itself does not admit the samavaya relation or anv ultimate distinction between the whole and the part. If it is said that all that is intended is that the effect exists in the cause, then it may be pointed out that merely by such an affirmation nothing is gained; for that would not explain

1 na ca ghatavati bhutale vartamdnandm gunudindm ghate'pi rrtter adrsteh. Tattva-mukta-kalapa, Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 18.

why the causal matter (prakrti) should have the nature or qualities as the effect substance {na karana-vasthasya sukha-duhkha-dya-tma-katva-siddhih). If it is held that the effect shares the qualities of the cause, then also it is against the normal supposition that the effect qualities are generated by the cause qualities; and, moreover, such a supposition would imply that the effect should have no other quality than those of the cause. It cannot also be said that the effect is of the same nature as the cause (sajatiya-gunavattvam), for the Samkhyists admit the tnahat to be a different category existent in the prakrti as its cause (vilaksana-mahatva-dy-adhikaranatvad). I f it is held that the effect must have only qualities similar to the cause, then they may be admitted with impunity; if the effect has all its qualities the same as those of the cause, then there will be no difference between the effect and the cause. If, again, it is held that only certain specific traits which are not inappropriate in the cause can be supposed to migrate to the effect, and that the relation of the transmission of qualities from cause to the effect can thus be limited by a specific observation of the nature of the essential trait of the cause, then such cases in which living flies are produced from inanimate cow-dung would be inexplicable as cases of cause and effect 1 . The Samkhyists are supposed to argue that if pure intelligence were supposed naturally to tend to worldly objects, then there would be no chance of its attaining liberation. Its association, therefore, must needs be supposed through the intermediary of some other category. This cannot be the senses, for even without them the mind alone may continue to imagine worldly objects. Even when the mind is inactive in sleep, one may dream of various objects. And this may lead to the assumption of the category of ego or ahamkara; and in dreamless sleep, when the operation of this category of ahamkara may be regarded as suspended, there is still the functioning of breathing, which leads to the assumption of another category, viz. manas. But as this has a limited operation, it presupposes some other cause; if that cause is also regarded as limited, then there would be an infinite regress. The Samkhyists, therefore, rest with the assumption that the cause of mahat is unlimited, and this is prakrti or avyakta. The reply of Venkata

1 mrt-suvarnd-divat-kdrya-visesa-iyavasthdpaka-kdrana-svabhdva-sdjdtya-vivaksdydm gomaya-maksikd-dy-drabdha-vrscikd-disu vyabhicdrdt. Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 22.

Din 17

258 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

to this is that the association of pure intelligence with worldly objects is through the instrumentality of karma. It is also not possible to infer the existence of Manas as a separate category through the possibility of the thinking operation, for this may well be explained by the functioning of the subconscious root-impressions; for even the assumption of mind would not explain the thinking operation, since manas, by itself, cannot be regarded as capable of producing thought. Manas, being merely an instrument, cannot be regarded as playing the role of a substance of which thought may be regarded as a modification. In the state of dream also it is not necessary to assume the existence of a separate category of ahamkara to explain dream experiences, for this may well be done by mind working in association with subconscious root-impression. The breathing operation in deep, dreamless sleep may also be explained by ordinary bio-motor functions, and for this there is no necessity for the assumption of mahat.

It is also wrong to suppose that the cause must be of a more unlimited extent than the effect, for it is not testified in ordinary experience, in which a big jug is often found to be made out of a lump of clay of a smaller size. It is also wrong to suppose that whatever is found to abide in an effect must also be found in its cause (na hi yad yena 1 nugatam tat tasya karanam iti niyamah), for the various qualities that are found in a cow are never regarded as its cause. Following the same assumption, one would expect to find a separate cause of which the common characteristics of the prakrti and its evolutes are the effects, and this would involve the admission of another cause of the prakrti itself {vyakta-vyakta-sadharana-dharmanam tad-ubhaya-karana-prasangat tatha ca tattva-dhikya-prasangah). Thus, the argument that an effect must have as its cause qualitative entities that inhere in it is false. The earthiness (mrttva) which inheres in the jug is not its cause, and the earthy substance (mrd-dravya) which shows itself in its unmodified form or its modified form as jug cannot be said to be inherent in the jug. Again the argument that things which are related as cause and effect have the same form is also false; for if this sameness means identity, then no distinction can be made between cause and effect. If this sameness means the existence of some similar qualities, then there may be such similarity with other things (which are not cause and effect) as well. Again applying the same analogy to the Samkhya doctrine

of purusas (which are admitted to have the common characteristic of intelligence), the Samkhyists may well be asked to hold a new category as the cause of the purusas. Further, two jugs which are similar in their character are not for that reason produced from the same lump of clay; and, on the other hand, we have the illustration of production of effects from an entirely different cause, as in the case of production of insects from cow-dung. Thus, from our experiences of pleasure, pain, and dullness it does not follow that there is a common cause of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, for these experiences can in each specific instance be explained by a specific cause, and there is no necessity to admit a separate common cause of the nature of three gunas. If for the explanation of the ordinary pleasurable and painful experiences a separate pleasure-and-pain complex be admitted as the cause, then there may be further inquiry regarding this pleasure-and-pain complex and this will lead to infinite regress. Again if the three gunas are regarded as the cause of the world, then that would not lead to the affirmation that the world is produced out of one cause; for though the three gunas may be in a state of equilibrium, they may still be regarded as having their special contribution in generating the varied types of effects. Thus, the triguna or the prakrti of the Samkhya can never be proved by inference. The only mode of approach to the doctrine of prakrti is through the scriptures. The three gunas rest in the prakrti, and in accordance with the gradual prominence of sattva, rajas, and tamas, three kinds of mahat are produced. From these three types of mahat three kinds of aham-karas are produced. Out of the first type (i.e. sdttvika ahamkara) the eleven senses are produced. Out of the last type (viz. the tamasa ahamkara) the tanmatras (also called the bhutadi) are produced. The second type of ahamkara (called rajasa ahamkara) behaves as an accessory for the production of both the eleven senses and the bhutadi. There are some who say that the conative senses are produced by rajasa ahamkara. This cannot be accepted, as it is against the scriptural testimony. The tanmatras represent the subtle stage of evolution between the tamasa ahamkara and the gross elemental stage of the bhutas 1 . The sabda-tan-matra (sound-

1 bhutanam avyavahita-suksmd-vasthd-visistam dravyam tanmdtram dadhi-rupena parinamamanasya payaso madhyamd-vasthdvad bhuta-rupena parinama-manasya dravyasya tatahpurvd kdcidavasthd tanmdtrd. Nydya-siddhdnjana, p. 25.

17-2

260 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

potential) is produced from bhutddi, and from it the gross elemental sound is produced. Again the rupa-tanmatra (light-heat-potential) is produced from the bhutddi or the tdmasa ahamkdra, and from the rupa-tanmatra (light-heat-potential) gross light-heat is produced, and so on. Lokacarya, however, says that there is another view of the genesis of the tanmatra and the bhuta which has also the support of the scriptures and cannot therefore be ignored. This is as follows : sabda-tanmatra is produced from the bhutddi and the dkdsa is produced from the sabda-tanmatra (sound-potential); the dkdsa again produces the sparsa-tanmdtra (the touch-potential) and air is produced from the touch-potential. Again from air heat-light-potential {rupa-tanmatra) is produced and from heat-light-potential tejas (heat-light) is produced; from tejas, rasa-tanmdtra (taste-potential) is produced, and from it water. From water again the gandha-tan-matra (smell-potential) is produced, and from it the earth 1 .

The view is explained by Varavara on the supposition that just as a seed can produce shoots only when it is covered by husks, so the tanmdtras can be supposed to be able to produce further evolutes only when they can operate from within the envelope of the bhutddi 2 .

The process of evolution according to the said interpretation is as follows. Sabda-tanmatra is produced from bhutddi which then envelops it, and then in such an enveloped state dkdsa is produced. Then from such a sabda-tanmatra, sparsa-tan-mdtra is produced which

1 This view seems to be held in the Visnu-purdna, I. 3. 66, etc. where it is distinctly said that the element of dkdsa produces sparsa-tanmdtra (touch-potential). Varavara, however, in his commentary on the Tattvatraya of Lokacarya, wishes to point out that according to Parasara's commentary this has been explained as being the production of tanmdtras from tanmdtras, though it clearly contradicts the manifest expressions of the Visnu-purana when it states that tanmdtras are produced from the bhutddi. He further points out that in the Mahabharata (£dntiparva Moksadharma, Ch. xxx) the vikdras or pure modifications are described as sixteen and the causes {prakrti) as eight. But in this counting the sixteen vikdras (eleven senses and the five categories— sabda, etc.), the distinction between the five tanmdtras and the five elements has not been observed on account of there not being any essential difference, the grosser stages being only modified states of the subtler ones (tanmdtrdndm bhutebhyah svarupa-bhedd-bhdrdt avasthd-bheda-mdtrattvdi). According to this interpretation the eight Prakrtis mean the prakrti, the mahat, the ahamkdra and five categories of dkdsa, etc., in their gross forms. The five categories included under the sixteen vikdras are the tanmdtras which are regarded as modifications of the elemental states of the bhutas.

2 yathd tvak-sunya-vijasyd'mkura-saktir ndsti, tathd'varana-sunyasyo'ttara-kdrya-saktir ndstiti bhdndt kdrana-gunam vino'ttaro-ttara-guna-visesesu.. ..

sva-visesasyo'kta-gu nd- tisayd- nupapatteh.

envelops the sabda-tanmatra. The sparsa-tanmatra, as enveloped by the sabda-tanmatra, produces the vayu through the accessory help of akasa. Then from this sparsa-tanmatra the rupa-tanmatra is produced. The rupa-tanmatra in its turn envelops the sparsa-tanmatra and then from the rupa-tanmatra, as enveloped by the sparsa-tanmatra, tejas is produced through the accessory help of vayu. Again the rasa-tanmatra is produced from the rupa-tanmatra, which again envelops the rasa-tanmatra. From the rasa-tanmatra enveloped by the rupa-tanmatra water is produced through the accessory help of tejas. From the rasa-tanmatra the gandha-tanmatra is produced which again, enveloped by rasa-tanmatra, produces earth through the accessory help of water 1 .

Varavara points out that in the Tattva-nirupana another genesis of creation is given which is as follows. Sabda-tan-matra is produced from bhutadi and as a gross state of it akasa is produced. The bhutadi envelops the sabda-tanmatra and the akasa. From the transforming sabda-tan-matra, through the accessory of the gross akasa as enveloped by bhutadi, the sparsa-tanmatra is produced and from such a sparsa-tanmatra vayu is produced. The sabda-tan-matra then envelops both the sparsa-tanmatra and the vayu, and from the transforming sparsa-tanmatra, through the accessory of vayu as enveloped by sabda-tanmatra. the rupa-tanmatra is produced. From the rupa-tanmatra, similarly, tejas is produced, and so on. In this view, in the production of the sparsa and other tanmatras the accessory help of the previous bhutas is found necessary.

As Venkatanatha accepts the view that the gross bhuta of akasa acts as accessory to the production of the later bhutas, he criticizes the Samkhya view that the gross bhutas are produced from the synthesis of tanmatras 2 . The Samkhyists, again, think that the evolution of the different categories from prakrti is due to an inherent teleology and not to the operation of any separate agent. Verikata, however, as a true follower of Ramanuja, repudiates it and asserts that the evolving operation of the prakrti can only proceed through the dynamic operation of God Himself.

1 Varavara's bhdsya on Tattvatraya, p. 59.

2 sdmkhydstu panchapi tanmatrani sdksdt-tdmasd-hamkdro-tpanndni tatra sabda-tanmdtram dkdid-rambhakam itardni tu tanmatrani purva-purva-tanmdtra-sahakrtdny uttaro-ttara-bhutd-rambhakdnl'ty dhuh tad asat. dkdsdd vdyur ity-ddy-ananyathd-siddho-pdddnakrama-visesd-bhidhdna-darsandt. Nydya-siddhdnjana, pp. 25-26.

262 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

(c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nydya in relation to Whole and Part.

In refuting the Nydya view that the parts attach themselves to each other and thereby produce the whole, and ultimately the part-less atoms combine together to form a molecule, Venkata introduces the following arguments. So far as the association of the wholes through their parts (beginning from the molecules) through the association of the parts are concerned, Vehkata has nothing to object. His objection is against the possibility of an atomic contract for the formation of molecules. If the atoms combine together through their parts, then these parts may be conceived to have further parts, and thus there would be infinite regress. If these parts are regarded as not different from the whole, then the different atoms could well be regarded as occupying the same atomic space, and thus they would not produce a conglomeration bigger in size than the constituent atoms. Further, it is not possible to imagine that there should be wholes without the parts also being present. Proceeding in this way, if the atomic combination cannot account for the origin of bigger measures, the possibility of objects of different magnitude through conglomeration (e.g. a hill or a mustard seed) would be inexplicable. If it is said that parts refer to the different sides of an atom, then also it might be urged that a partless atom cannot have sides.

It is held that knowledge, though one, can refer to many, though it is partless. It may also be urged in this connection that if it refers to all objects in their entirety, then the constituent entities would not be referred to separately, and it cannot also refer to the objects separately in parts, for theji intelligence itself would not be partless. The Naiyayika may also, on this analogy, urge that any solution that the idealist may find to his difficulty also applies to the atomic theory. To this the obvious answer of the idealist is that in the case of intelligence, experience testifies that though one and partless it can refer to many, and the Naiyayikas have no such advantage to show in their favour, for the Naiyayikas do not admit that in any case wholes may combine except through their parts. The objection cannot be laid against the Buddhist theory of conglomeration (sanghdta), for there such conglomeration is not due to contact. The Naiyayikas may be supposed to raise an objection regarding the association of all-pervasive entities (vibhu) with finite

objects; such an association has to be admitted, for otherwise the association of the self or the akasa with objects cannot be explained; it is not also possible to hold that all pervasive entities have parts. So ultimately it has to be admitted that the partless all-pervasive entities have contact with finite objects, and if their procedure is accepted, then the same might explain the contact of partless atoms. To this Venkata's reply is that the illustration of the contact of all-pervasive entities with finite objects might well be thrown in our face, if we had attempted to refute the view that wholes had no specific qualities; but our main object is to show the inconsistency to which the Naiyayikas are exposed when they apply their theory that all combinations of wholes must be through parts to the combination of the supposed partless atoms. As a matter of fact, the error lies in the assumption that the atoms are partless. If it is supposed that division of particles must ultimately take us to partless atoms, the obvious reply is that from the division of parts we could not go to the partless, the better way being the acceptance of the smallest visible particles called the trasarenu. If it is urged that if trasarenu is the atom, then it must be invisible, the obvious reply is that there is no such general concomitance between atomic nature and invisibility. The better course, therefore, is to accept the trasarenu as ultimate particles of matter. There is, therefore, no necessity to admit dvyanuka also.

Venkatanatha further objects to the Nyaya doctrine of the formation of wholes (avayavi) from parts (avayava) and points out that if this is to be admitted, then the weight of an object must be due to the weight of the atoms; but the Naiyayikas hold that the atoms have no weight. The proper view therefore is that the effect, or the so-called whole, is to be regarded as being only a modified condition of the parts. The causal operation in such a view is justified in producing the change in the condition of the causal object and not in producing a new object in the effect or the whole as is supposed by the Naiyayikas. Again in the consideration of the production of the wholes from parts, when the thread is regarded as the cause of the production of the whole, the cloth, it may be observed that in the process of the production we find various accretions through the gradual addition of one thread after another. In each such addition we have separate wholes, since the process may easily be stopped anywhere; and in such a view we have the

264 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

addition of a part to a whole for the production of another whole. This is obviously against the Nyaya view, which would not lend any support to the doctrine that the addition of parts to wholes would produce other wholes. The Naiyayikas urge that if a whole as a different entity from the parts be not admitted, and if a whole be regarded as nothing more than a collection of atoms, then, the atoms being invisible, the wholes would be invisible. The production of gross wholes not being admitted, the supposed explanation that there is an illusion of grossness in the atoms would also be inadmissible 1 . The question now is what is meant by grossness. If it means a new measure, then it is quite admissible in the Ramanuja view in which the production of separate wholes is not admitted; for just as the atomists would think of the production of the new wholes from atoms, so the Ramanujist may also agree to the production of a new measure (parimdna). If the Naiyayikas object to this and urge that the production of a new measure from the atomic is inadmissible, then they may as well be asked how they would also account for the notion of plurality in a collection of separate entities, each of which may be regarded as one in itself. If it is said that the conception of number as plurality proceeds from a mental oscillation incorporating the diversity, then it may also be argued that from the absence of any such oscillation there may be a failure in noting the separateness which may give rise to a notion of gross measure. Moreover, there is nothing incongruous in the fact that if individuals are not visible the collection may be visible. If the grossness is supposed to mean the occupation of more spatial units than the individual entities, then also it is not inadmissible; for in a collection of small particles they are cognized as occupying different spatial units. If it is urged that since no separate wholes are admitted to be produced the gross dimension cannot be perceptible, the obvious reply is that the perception of grossness has no connection with the perception of wholes. Even before the dyad is produced the combining atoms have to be admitted as occupying' more space in their totality than in their individual capacity; for otherwise they in their totality could not produce a bigger dimension. Thus, there is no reason for admitting the production of wholes separate from the parts. Under the same specific

1 sthula-dravyd-bhdve cd'nu-samhatau sthulatvd-dhydso na siddhyet. Sarvdr-tha-siddhi, p. 46.

kind of combination of threads in which the Naiyayikas think that a cloth could be produced, the Ramanujists think that the threads under the selfsame condition are the cloth and there is no separate production of cloth 1 . But it should not be thought that any slight change in the condition of an object would mean that thereby there is a new object so long as the object remains sufficiently unchanged to be recognized as the same for all practical purposes. The causal operation, according to the Ramanujists, only brings about new changes of conditions and states in the already existent causal substance. This is thus different from the Samkhya theory of sat-karya-vada, according to which the effect is already existent in the cause even before the causal operation is set in motion. Venkata, therefore, criticizes the Samkhya theory of sat-karya-vada.

(d) Criticism of the Samkhya Theory of Sat-karya-vada.

The Samkhya is wrong in supposing that the effect (e.g. the jug) was pre-existent in its cause (e.g. earth), for had it been so the causal operation would have been fruitless. The Samkhya may, however, say that the causal operation serves to manifest what was potentially existing in the cause; the function of causal operation is thus manifestation and not production. This, however, is wrong, for manifestation (vyanga) and production (karya) are two different words having two different concepts. Manifestation can occur only in the operation of a manifesting agent with the help of its accessories in making an object manifested with regard to a particular sense-organ in a particular place where the manifesting agent exists 2 . It would first be proved that the pre-existent effect is manifested and not produced; only then would it have been worth while to inquire into the conditions of the causal operation to see whether it satisfied the necessary conditions of a manifesting agent. But the Samkhya can hardly succeed in showing that it is so. The Samkhyist says that the effect is pre-existent before the causal

1 yadi sarnsrstds tantava eva patas tatas tantu-rdsimdtre'pi pata-dhlh sydd ity aha samsargdder iti. na hi tvaycipi tantu-sarnsarga-matram patasyd'samavdyi-kdranam isyate tathd sati kuvindd-di-vydpdra-nairapeksya-prasangdt ato yddrsdt samsarga-visesdd avayavl tavo'tpadyate tddrsa-samsarga-visistds tantavah papa iti kvd'tiprasahgah. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 48.

* kdrya-vyangya-sabdau ca vyavasthita-visayau loke drstau kdraka-vyanjaka-bhedas ca kdrakam samagram apy ekam utpddayati vyanjakantu sahakdri-sam-pannam samdne-ndriya-grdhydni samdna-desa-sthdni tddrsdrri sarvdnyapi vyan-akti. Ibid. pp. 55-56.

266 Philosophy of the Rdma?iuja School of Thought [ch.

operation; but the causal operation is itself an effect, and if their previous assertion is correct then it was non-existent when the effect was non-manifested. If the causal operation was also existent at the time of the existence of the cause, then the effect would also have been present in the cause in a manifested state. The Samkhya says that what is non-existent cannot be produced, and this implies that a thing is existent because it can be produced, which is, on the face of it, self-contradictory. The theory that the effect is pre-existing in the cause could have been admitted as a last resort if there were no other theory available, but the ordinary notion of causality as invariable and immediate antecedent is quite sufficient to explain the phenomenon of production. Therefore, there is no necessity for such a chimerical theory. Again instead of holding that the effect is nothing more than the potential power in the cause, it is much better to say that the cause has such power by which it can produce the effect under certain conditions 1 . Again it may be thought about the instrumental and other accessory agents that if they lead to the generation of effort, as indeed they do, they should also be accepted as subtle potential states of the effect. But this is not admitted by the Samkhyist, for according to him it is only the material cause which is regarded as the potential effect. Otherwise even the purusa, which, teleologically, is to be regarded as the instrumental cause of the world phenomenon, has to be regarded as a part of prakrti. Again consider the destructive agents. Are the destructible effects already present in the destructible agent? It cannot be so, for they are entirely opposed to each other. If it were not so, it could not destroy it 2 . If it were not so and yet if it would be destroyed by the destructive agent, then everything could be destroyed by everything.

Turning to the function of the material cause, it may be pointed out that it cannot be defined as that from which an effect is produced {tajjanyatvd) ; for then even an instrumental cause would be included in the material cause. Nor can it be regarded as a modification (iadvikaratva), for then the effect would be only the quality of the cause, and there would be no difference between the cause

1 yatha sarvesu dravyesu tild era taila-garbhah sra-karana-saktya srjyante tathd tat-tat-karya-niyata-purra-bhavitaya tat-lad-utpadaka-svabhazas te te bhavas tathai've'ti svlkaryam. Sarziartha-siddhi, p. 59.

a nasakesu ca ndsya-vrttir asti na va. asti cet bahnau tulavaa virodhah na cet katham tadeva tasya ndsakam. Ibid. p. 60.

and the effect. But we see that the cloth is different from threads 1 . If the effect is regarded as identical with the cause on the ground that though there cannot be any contact between the effect and the cause yet the former is never outside the latter, the obvious reply is that in the view that the effect is not a substance there need not be any contact, and if it is a property of the cause it is never beside it 2 . On the view that the effect is a manifestation, it may be asked whether such a manifestation is eternal or itself an effect. In the former case no causal operation is necessary for the manifestation. In the latter case, if the manifestation be regarded as a separate effect, then it virtually amounts to a partial sacrifice oisat-karya-vada. If for the manifestation of a manifestation causal operation is necessary, then that will lead to a vicious infinite. Moreover, if manifestation is itself regarded as an effect, then since it did not exist before, its coming into being would involve the sacrifice of sat-kdrya-vdda.

It may be urged that the production of an effect is not of the nature of the effect itself, for one always speaks of an effect as being produced. Thus the effect is different from production. If this is admitted, then what is the difficulty in accepting the view that the effect may be manifested ? If the word production be considered more logical, then with regard to it also there may be the same question, whether a production is produced or manifested, and in the former case there would be infinite regress, and in the latter no necessity for the causal operation. With regard to the manifestation also there would be the same difficulty as to whether it is produced or manifested, and in both cases there would be vicious infinite. The reply to this is that production means the operation of the causal agents, and if this operation be again admitted to be produced by the operation of its own causal constituent, and that by another, there is no doubt an infinite regress, but it is not vicious and is admitted by all. When there is a movement of a specific nature in the thread, we say a cloth is produced, or rather at the very first moment of such a movement involving the cloth-state of the thread

1 tad-dharmatva-hetu-kta-dosdd eva ubhayatra pata-vastha tantvd-tmd na bhavati tantubhyo bhinnatvdt ghatavad iti prati-prayogasya sakyatvdeca. Sar-vdrtha-siddhi, p. 60.

a tdddtmya-virafie'pi anyatarasyd'dravyatvdt samyogd-bhdvah tad-dharma-svabhdvatvdd eva aprdpti-parihdrdt iti anyathd-siddhasya asddhakatvdt. Ibid. p. 61.

268 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

we say that a cloth is produced 1 . It is for this reason that we can speak of an effect as being produced. Such a production has no further production.

(e) Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness.

The Buddhists hold that the theory of causal efficiency proves that whatever is existent must be momentary; for the same efficiency cannot be produced again and again. So, in accordance with each efficiency or the production of effects, a separate entity has to be admitted. Since the efficiency at two different moments cannot be identical, the entities producing them also cannot be identical. Since the different characters that are supposed to belong to the same object represent different efficiencies, their attribution to the same object is also erroneous. Therefore, there are as many different entities as there are different character points in a particular moment (yo yo viruddha-dharma-dhyasavan sa sa nana). To this Verikatanatha's reply is that things are not associated with diverse opposite characters, and that though in certain cases, e.g. the flowing river or the flame of a lamp, changing entities may show the appearance of an unchanging whole, there are undeniable cases of true recognition in all such cases where we perceive that it is the same thing which we both see and touch. The fact that in such cases subconscious impressions may also be working should not be exaggerated to such an extent as to lead us to believe that recognition is a mere affair of memory. Recognition is a case where perception predominates, or at the worst it may be said to be a joint complex of memory and perception. The objection that the presence of memory falsifies recognition is wrong, for not all memory is false. It is also wrong to think that memory is only subjective and as such cannot lead us to an objective determination; for memory is not only subjective but has also an objective reference involving the time character of the objects as past. Again the Buddhists say that the association of many characters to an object is wrong, for each character-point represents the efficiency of a momentary unit, and that, therefore, the association of many characters in recognition is false. To this Verikata's reply is that if each momentary unit

1 yada hi tantvd-dayah vydpriyante tada pata utpadyate iti vyavaharanti ddya-ksand-vacchinna-patatvd-vasthai-va va pato'tpattir ucyate sai'va tadava-sthasyo'tpattir iti bhd$yam apt tad-abhiprdyam eva. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 62.

is by itself capable of producing any effect, it ought to do it by its own nature, and it ought not to wait for the assistance of other accessories. Following the same analogy, even the unique nature of any momentary unit would not be the same with any other unique nature of any other moment, and thus the idea of identity would be impossible and would land us in nihilism. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that there is a separate entity corresponding to each and every character unit 1 . The Buddhists are supposed to urge further that the experience of recognition identifies a past moment with a present, which is impossible. The reply of Venkata is that though it would be absurd to connect a past moment with the present, there is no incongruity in associating them with an entity which has lived through the past and is also persisting in the present moment 2 . It is true that the affirmation of a past time in the present is contradictory, but the real mystery of the situation is that one time appears as many under diverse conditions {upadhi). In such cases the contradiction arises in associating the different conditions in each other's conditioned time unit, but this does not imply that the reference to the different conditions and time is inadmissible; for had it been so, even the concept of a successive series of moments would be inadmissible, since the notion of successive moments implies a reference of before and after, and hence in some way or other it brings together the past, the present and the future. If this be not admitted, the very concept of momentari-ness would have to be sacrificed 3 . If it is urged that momentariness {ksana-sambandhitva) means the unique self-identity of any entity, then that leads us to no new knowledge. Thus, the mere association of the past with the present leads us to no temporal self-contradiction.

Again the Buddhists are supposed to urge that perception refers

1 viruddhdndm desa-kdld-dya-samdhita-virodhatvena sva-laksanasyd'pi virud-dha-sata-ksunnatayd ndndtve tat-ksoddndm ca tathd tathd ksode kincid apy ekatn na siddhyet tad-abhdve ca kuto nai'kam iti mddhyamika-matd-pdtah. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 66.

2 kdla-dvayasyd'nyonyasminn-abhdve'pi tad-ubhaya-sambandhini vastuny a-bhdvd-bhdvdt yas tu tasmin vastuny asambaddha kdlah tasya tatra sadbhdvam na brumah. Ibid. p. 68.

3 purvd-para-kdla-yogo hi viruddhah sveno'pddhind'vacchinnasyai'kasya kdla-syd'vdntaro-pddhibhir ndndtve'pi tat-tad-upddhlndm eva tat-tad-avdntarakd-ladvaydnvaya-virodhah anyd-peksayd purvd-para-kdlayor anyasya viruddhatve ksana-kdlasyd'py anyd-peksayd paurvdparydt tat-kala-vartitvam api vastuno viruddhyeta. Ibid.

270 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

only to the present moment. It can never lead us to the comprehension of the past. Our notion, therefore, that things existent in the past are persistent in the present is an illusion due to the operation of the subconscious root-impressions which ignore difference between the past and the present, and impose the former on the latter, as silver is imposed on conch-shell. The reply of Verikata to this is that perception demonstrates only the presence of an object in the present moment as against its absence; but it does not on that account deny its existence in the past. Just as "this" indicates the presence of an object in the present moment, the perceptual experience "that is this" demonstrates the persistence of the object in the past and in the present 1 . If it is urged that perception reveals its object as a present entity, then the Buddhist theory of perception as indeterminate (nirvikalpa), which cannot reveal the object as qualified by the temporal character as present, falls to the ground. If it is urged that perception reveals the existence of the object at the moment of the perceptual revelation, then also it is impossible in the Buddhist view, for the momentary object with which the sense-organ was in touch has ceased to exist by the time knowledge was produced. So, in whichever way the Buddhist may take it, he cannot prove that perception reveals an object only as present; whereas in the Ramanuja view, since the sense-contact, the object as associated with it, and the temporal element associated with them, are continuous, the mental state is also continuous and as such the perception reveals the object as that with which the sense was in contact. Even after the cessation of the sense-contact, the mental state, indicating the perception of the object with which the sense was in contact, is comprehended 2 .

Again if it is argued that whatever is invariably produced from anything must also be produced unconditionally without awaiting any causal operation, then it must be said that when leaves and flowers grow from a plant they do so unconditionally, which is absurd. Moreover, when in a series of momentary entities one entity follows another, it must do so without awaiting any cause; then, on the one hand, since each of the preceding entities has no

1 yatha idam iti tat-kdla-sattd grhyate tathd tad idam iti kdla-dvaya-sattvam apt pratyaksenai'va grhitam. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 69.

2 asman-mate tv indriya-samprayogasya tad-visista-vastunas tad-upahita-kdld-msasya ca sthdyitvena dhl-ksandnuvrttau tad-visayatayd pratyak$o-daydt sam-prayogd-nantara-k$ane dhlr apt nirvartyate. Ibid. p. 70.

special function to fulfil, it is without any causal efficiency and as such is non-existent; and, on the other hand, since each succeeding entity rises into being without waiting for any cause, it may rise into being in the preceding moment as well, and if this is so there would be no series at all. Again it is argued that since whatever is produced must necessarily be destroyed, destruction as such is unconditioned and takes place without awaiting any cause. Negation can be unconditioned only when it is an implication of position which as such is never produced but is always associated with any and every position (e.g. cow implies the negation of a horse). But negations which are produced always depend on certain causes which can produce them just as much as any positive entity, as in the case of the destruction of a jug by the stroke of a stick. If it is argued that the stroke of a stick does not produce any destruction but only starts a new series of existence in the form of the particles of the jug, then also there are many other illustrations (e.g. the blowing out of a flame) in which the explanation of the starting of a new series is not available. If it is argued that negation is mere nothing and as such does not depend on a cause like chimerical entities, e.g. the lotus of the sky, such an explanation would be meaningless; for negations or destructions are conditioned in time just as are any positive entities, and as such are different from chimerical entities {jpratiyogivad eva niyata-kalataya pramitasya atyanta-tucchata-yogai). If negations be regarded as similar to chimerical entities, then the former would be as beginningless as the latter, and, if this were so, then there would be no positive entities, all being beginningless negations. If negation were chimerical, then even at the time of negation there could be the positive entities, for negation being chimerical could not condition anything and this would amount to the persistence of all entities and cannot be acceptable to momentarists like the Buddhists. If negations were devoid only of certain specific characters, then they would be 1 ike the unique-charactered entities (svalaksana) which are also devoid of certain specific characters. If they were devoid of all characters (sarva-svabhava-viraha), then they could have no place in a proposition which must affirm some predicate of them. If it is said that negation has a character as such, then that being its character i t would not be devoid of any character. If such negations were not pre-existent, then their coming into being must depend on some

272 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

causal operation. If they were pre-existent, then there would not be any positive entities (prak-sattve tu bhavd-pahnavah).

If it is urged that the effect-moment as destruction is simultaneous with the cause-moment, then the positive entity and its destruction would occur at the same moment; and if this were so, there is no reason why the destruction should not precede the positive entity. If destruction is admitted to appear at a moment succeeding that of the production of the positive moment, then the destruction would not be unconditioned. If the sequence of the positive entity and its destruction be with reference to the positive entity itself and not to its production, then the positive entity would be the cause of the destruction. It cannot be said that destruction is conditioned only by the position, for its dependence on other accessory agents cannot be repudiated. It cannot be argued that the production of a moment is also its destruction, for that would be self-contradictory. It is sometimes maintained that difference does not constitute destruction, and hence the rise of a different-charactered moment does not imply the destruction of the previous moment. The destruction of a moment has thus to be regarded as a separate fact, and as such it is involved and inherent in the very production of a moment 1 . To this the reply is that a different-charactered entity must also be regarded as the destruction of the previous entity, for otherwise it would be impossible to assign any cause to the rise of such a different-charactered entity. If, again, the destruction be the very essence of an entity, then such an essence might as well manifest itself at the time of the rise of the present entity, and thus reduce it to the negation which would mean the universal negation of all things. If it is urged that an entity produces its own destruction by itself, then it would be meaningless to hold that destruction is unconditional; and if it is thus conditioned by itself, it would be idle to suppose that it does not depend on any other condition, for there is no means of knowing it. If it is admitted that an entity produces its own destruction with the help of other accessories, then the doctrine of momentariness fails. It has also been shown before that the affirmation of momentariness is distinctly contradicted by the phenomenon of recognition

1 yad yato bhidyate na tat tasya dhvamsah yatha rupasya rasah. dhvmnsas tu kasyacid eva bhavati iti tad-dtmakah. atah svo-tpattdv eva svdtmani dhvamse sannihite katham ksand-ntaram prdpnuydt. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 72.

as elaborated above. Again when the momentarist says that all things are momentary, how does he explain the fact that the effect-moment is caused by the cause-moment? If causation means nothing more than immediate succession, then the universe at a particular moment is caused by the universe at the preceding moment. The problem is whether such immediacy of succession is by itself competent to produce the effect-moment or needs the accessories of space and time. If such accessories are not necessary, then spatial co-existence or concomitance (as in the case of smoke and fire) ought not to lead to any inference. If such accessories are awaited, then it would mean that whatever is produced at any unit of space has also its cause in that unit of space and that unit of time. On such a view the effect-moment would be in the space and time of the cause, and thus the cause-space or cause-time would be co-extensive in two moments. If this were admitted, then the momentarist might as well admit that the cause persists in two moments. So, the momentarist who does not admit persisting time and space cannot also admit that any sequence should be conditioned by them. If it is said that a cause-moment starts its effect in the very space or time in which it exists, then there would be no unity of the series between the cause and the effect; and, by supposition, they are regarded as having different sets of moments for themselves. There might be superimposition but no unity of the series. If the unity of the series be not admitted, then the expectation that just as when a cotton-seed is dyed there is redness in the cotton, so in the moral sphere whenever there is the vasana or root-inclination there is also its fruit, fails. The co-existence of the causal-moment and the effect-moment does not imply the unity that is expected in a normal cause and effect relation, and it would therefore be difficult to say that such an effect has such a cause, for the momentaristic theory cannot establish the bond between cause and effect.

Let us now analyse the concept of momentariness. It may mean the fact that (1) an entity is associated with a moment {ksana-sambandhavattva), or (2) association with a momentary unit of time (ksana-kala-sambandhatvam), or (3) existence for only one moment (ksana-matra-vartitva), or (4) absence of relation with two moments (ksana-dvaya-sambandha-sunyatvd), or (5) identity with the moment of time {ksana-kalatvam), or (6) being determinant of the moment-Din 18

274 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

character (ksana-padhitvam). The first alternative is inadmissible, for even those who believe in persistent entities admit that such entities, since they persist in- time, are associated with a moment. The second alternative is inadmissible because the Buddhists do not believe in any separate category of time apart from the ksana 1 . On such an admission, again, an entity as time which is beyond a ksana has to be virtually accepted, which contradicts the doctrine of momentariness. The third alternative is directly contradicted in the experience of recognition which testifies to the fact that we touch what we see. The fourth view is also for the same reason contradicted in experience; and if any supposed entity which is not itself a ksana is not associated with two time-moments, then it can have only a chimerical existence, and, curiously enough, the Buddhists often compare all existent entities with chimerical objects 2 . The fifth alternative is also inadmissible, for just as an entity exists in a unit of space and cannot be identical with it, so also it cannot be identical with the time in which it exists, and it is directly contradicted in experience. The sixth alternative is also inadmissible for the reason that if objects were in their own nature determinants of moments, then there would be nothing to explain our notion of temporal succession 3 ; and all our experiences depending on such a succession would be contradicted. If things did not persist in time and were absolutely destroyed without leaving any trace (niranvaya-vinasah), then the ordinary experience of the world in which things are done for the purpose of reaping their benefits could not be explained. The man who had done some work would not wait a moment for his reward. In the Ramanuja view persistence of the self is well explained in self-consciousness. The theory that such a self-consciousness refers only to the succeeding terms produced in the series of the alaya-vijnana is only a theory which has no verification, and such a theory is directly contradicted by the well attested maxim that the experience, of one individual cannot be remembered by another (na'nya-drstam smaraty any ah). There is also no way in which the

1 kalam evd'nicchatas te ko'sau ksana-kdlah kas ca tasya sambandhah. Sarvdr-tha-siddhi, p. 74.

2 yasminnanityata ndsti kdryatapi na vidyate tasmin yathd kha-pwpdddviti sakyam hi bhdsitum. Ibid. p. 75.

8 yadd hi ghatd-dayah svarupena ksano-pddhayah syuh kdla-tdratamya-dhlh kutrd'pi na bhavet. Ibid.

terms of the alaya-vijnana series may be associated with volitional notions.

If the momentariness of entities means that they are modified or conditioned by moments, then also the question arises if they are not themselves momentary, how can they be conditioned by moments? If the conditioning by moments means that causal collocations represent only the previous moment of the effect (karya-praga-bhava-samanvitd), then it maybe urged by the opponent that it would be difficult to refute such momentariness. On the side of the opponent it may be further said that the criticism that the conglomeration of the causes is something different from, or identical with the conglomerating entities, cannot be made; for, in either case, since such an entity would, according to the Rama-nujists, be a persisting one, it would not condition a moment. The reply is that conglomeration can neither mean relation nor the related entities; for the word "conglomeration" cannot apply specifically to each of the entities, and as such it is to be admitted that the causal entities, collected together by some condition, represent the conglomeration. If such entities are regarded as determining the moment, then they must necessarily be persistent. If it is held that the combining condition is the condition of the ksana, then the reply is that the production must be due to the joint operations of the combining conditions and the specific collocating entities. Of these the combining condition is not momentary, and since the collocating entities would stay till they were combined, they are also not momentary. The condition of the ksana seems, therefore, to be the last accessory agent or operation which associates with it the previous entities or operations and thereby behaves as the condition of the moment immediately antecedent to the effect. There is thus nothing momentary in it. Time being unlimited in its nature cannot be parcelled out in moments. The supposed moments can be attributed to an operation or an existing entity only for specifying particular states or conditions for practical purposes; but an entity that exists, exists in time, and thus outgrows the limits of a previous or later moment. So, though a specific unit of time may be regarded as momentary, the entity that exists, therefore, is not momentary in the nature of its own existence. Since the Buddhists do not admit time, they are not justified in speaking of momentary time in which things are sup-

276 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

posed to exist. Nor are they justified in holding that nature in itself suffers change in every moment, for that virtually amounts to the existence of a persisting entity which suffers modification 1 .

The Buddhist assumption that things are destroyed entirely, and there are no elements in them that persist (niranvaya-vindsa), on the analogy that flames are destroyed without leaving any trace of their existence, is false. For, from various other instances, e.g. the case of jugs, cloth, etc., we find that their destruction means only a change of state and not entire annihilation; and from this analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the elements of the flame that are destroyed are not completely annihilated but persist in invisible forms. Even when a flame is destroyed, the tip of the wick is felt to be slightly warm, and this is certainly to be interpreted as a remnant of the heat possessed by the flame. If the last stage in the destruction of an entity be regarded as lapsing into entire annihilation, it would have no causal efficiency and as such would be nonexistent. If the last stage is non-existent, then its previous stage also would have no causal efficiency and would be non-existent, and so on. This would lead to universal non-existence.

(/) Refutation of the Carvaka criticism against the Doctrine of Causality.

The problem of causality naturally brings in the question of time relation between the cause and the effect, i.e. whether the effect precedes the cause, or whether the cause precedes the effect, or whether they are simultaneous. If the effect precedes the cause, then it would not depend upon causal operation for its existence and it would then be an eternally existent entity like space. If it is not existent, then it cannot be brought into existence by anv means, for a non-existent entity cannot be produced. If the effect were produced before the cause, then the so-called "cause" could not be its cause. If the cause and effect were simultaneous, then it would be difficult to determine which is the cause and which the effect. If the cause precedes the effect, then, again, it may be asked whether the effect was already existent or beside it. If it is already existent, there is no need of causal operation, and that which is to happen

1 sarva-kfanikatvam sadhayitum upakramya sthira-dravya-zrtti-ksatiika-vikaravad iti katham drstantayema tesu ca na tvad-abfnmatam ksanikatvam pradlpa-di vaddsutara-vinasitva-matrena ksanikato-kteh. Sarzdrtha-siddhi, p. 77.

later cannot be considered to be co-existent with that which was at a prior moment. If the effect was not co-existent with the cause, then what would be the bond which would determine why a particular cause should produce a particular effect and not others? Since production cannot be synonymous with what is produced, it must be different from it. Being a different entity, it may be demanded- that production should have a further production, and that another, and this will lead to infinite regress.

To these objections Verikatanatha's reply is that the opposition of negation with position can hold good only with reference to the same unit of time and space. Therefore, the non-existence of the effect at a prior moment has no opposition to its existence at a later moment. That there is a relation between the cause of a prior moment and the effect of a later moment can be directly experienced. Such a relation is, of course, not contact, but one of dependence, of one another, as prior and later, as is perceived in experience. The dialectical criticism that production, being a separate entity, demands a further production and so forth cannot be applied to the Ramanuja view; for here the effect is regarded as only a modified condition or state of the cause. The effect depends upon the cause in the sense that it is identical with it as being its state 1 . Identity here, of course, does not mean oneness but identity in difference. The objection that no bond can be established in difference is found contradicted in our experience of cause and effect, and in many other cases, e.g. in the instance where a speaker tries to produce a conviction in his hearers who are different from him. The objection that a cause can be called a cause only by virtue of its doing some operation (kincit-kara) and that its causality towards that operation must again involve the effectuation of some other operation, and thus there is an infinite regress, is invalid; for the existence of a number of operations (as given in experience) in producing an effect cannot lead to a yicious infinite, for only those operations which are revealed in experience can be accepted as having happened. In the case of spontaneous production {dvard-n-tara-nirapeksa), there is no necessity to admit any series of operations as the causality as invariable antecedent is directly given in

1 na hi vayam abhivyaktim va kdrana-samavdyd-dikam vd janme'ti brumah. kintu padana-vastha-visesam tasya kdryd-vasthd-sdmdnddhikaranya-vyapadesah tdddtmyena tad-dsraya-vrtteh. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 80.

278 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

experience. The objection that a cause is a cause because it produces the effect involves the previous existence of the effect, and hence the futility of the causal operation is invalid; for causality means the happening of an operation suitable to the becoming of the effect 1 . This does not involve the prior existence of the effect, since the happening of the operation leading to the effect refers to the effect not as an existing fact but as anticipated in the mind of the observer {kurvattva-nirupanam tu bhavincfpi kdryena buddhyd-rohind siddheh). The objection that if effect was a nature of the cause then it would be already there, and if it was not it could not come into being at any time, is also invalid on the supposition that there is an invariable uniformity of relationship (niyata-pratisambandhika-svabhavata eva). The effect entity is numerically and characteristically different from the cause entity, but yet the former and the latter are related to one another as mutually determining each other (anyo-nya-nirupyataya). The objection, that since the separate entities in a causal conglomeration cannot produce the effect, the conglomeration as a whole could not produce the effect, is invalid; for the capacity of the individual entities is defined in terms of their capacity in joint production {samuditdnam kdrya-karatvam eva hi pratyekam api hi saktih). The further objection that since the cause is destroyed on its way to produce the effect, it (cause) itself being destroyed, ought not to be able to produce the effect, is not valid; for the production of the effect requires only the existence of the cause at a prior moment {purva-ksana-sattvam eva hi karanasya karyo-payogi).

Again it is urged that the concept of invariable priority which determines causation is itself indeterminable, for time as duration has no quality in itself. Priority and posteriority therefore have to be determined by other imposed conditions (upadhi), and the causal phenomena could be regarded as such an imposed condition. If this is so, priority and posteriority, which are in this view supposed to originate from causal conditions, cannot be regarded as determining causality. Again if conditions are supposed to split up time as pure duration into succession, then, since time is not regarded as discrete, the supposed conditions would have to refer to the whole of time, in which case there w r ould be no succession.

1 bhavi-karya-nuguna-vyaparavattvam eva karanasya kurzattvam. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 81.

Moreover, if the conditions were to refer to certain parts, discrete time has first to be accepted 1 . The reply to the above objection is that if by the force of the above argument time as succession is not admitted, then if things are in time they are eternal, and if they are not, they are chimerical; which is absurd. The objector is again supposed to urge that, all universals being eternally existing, priority and posteriority can never be referred mutually among them, or between them and individuals. Where the rise of the constellation Rohini is inferred from the rise of the constellation Krttika, priority and posteriority are not between the two. The reply is to be found in the experience that such a qualified entity is produced from such other qualified entity where the universal and the individual merge together in a complex whole—a qualified entity 2 . Definite causal relations with definite effects are known from large experience of invariable antecedence between them, and this repudiates the idea of any denial of the uniformity of causal relation relating specific cause to specific effect. The notion of the plurality of causes is also therefore repudiated for the same reason. Where the same effect seems to be produced by different causes it is due to mal-observation and non-observation. A closer observation by experts reveals that though certain effects may be apparently similar yet they have specificity in their individual nature. By virtue of such specificity, each one of them can be referred to its own determinate cause. The negation-antecedent-to-being (praga-bhava) cannot by itself be regarded as determining the effect, for such negations in themselves, being beginningless, could not explain the occasion of an effect's coming into being. Moreover, such negations involve in some form or other the effect to which it would give rise as its constituent; for, otherwise it could not be referred to or defined as a negation-antecedent-to-being of the effect. If an effect, being existent, be without any cause, it would be eternal; and if it be non-existent without any cause, then it would be chimerical. If the effect could happen by fits and starts, then its uniform dependence upon the immediate and invariable ante-

1 kale ca purvattvam upddhi-krtam sa ca upddhir yady ayam eva tadd tad-adhlnam kalasya purvattvam kdld-dfilnanco'pddher ity anyonyd-srayah. anya-peksdydm cakrakam anavastha'pi kalasya kramavad upddhi-sambandha-bheddd bhedasca krtsnai-ka-desa-vikalpa-duhstha iti. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 82.

2 etad-dharmakdd etad-dharmakam upajdtam itijdty-upddhi-krodt-krta-rupena vyaktisu niyama-siddheh. Ibid. p. 83.

280 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

cedents could not be explained. Thus the doctrine of causality stands unimpeached by any of the objections brought forward by the Carvakas.

(g) The Nature of the Senses according to Venkatanatha.

The Naiyayikas think that the visual organ has for its material cause the eight elements, for though it cannot perceive any other sense-data it can grasp colours like a lamp; and, following a similar course of argument, they hold that the tactile organ is made up of air, the gustatory organ, of water, the smell-organ, of earth, and the auditory organ, of space-element (akasa). Venkatanatha's main objection is directed against viewing the senses as the specific and most important instruments of the corresponding perceptions on the ground that in the act of perception many accessories, such as the subject, object, light, sense-organ, sense-contact, absence of obstruction, and other accessories participate in such a manner that it is impossible to single out the sense-organ as being the most important instrument (karana). Even if the sense-faculties be regarded as different from the sense-organs, they may be considered as the special ways of the ego-hood (ahamkara), and this is testified by scriptural texts. Merely on the ground that the visual sense-faculty can perceive colours, it would be wrong to argue that this sense-faculty is made up of the same element as colour; for the visual sense-faculty is not by itself responsible for the colour-perception. The special predominance of the visional organ over other accessories in colour-perception, by which its affinity with the colour element may be shown, cannot be established.

Venkata urges that the same reasons that lead to the acceptance of the five cognitive senses lead also to the admission of the five conative senses and manas (mind). The function of the cognitive senses is believed to be of a special kind by which the senses can operate only in a special manner and under special conditions, and the same applies also to the conative senses. These are as much associated with the subtle body as the cognitive senses, and the view of Yadavaprakasa that the conative senses came into being with this body and were destroyed with its destruction is regarded as false 1 . Manas, being a part of the evolution of prakrti, cannot be regarded as all-pervasive. The ordinary argument that that which,

being eternal, is not the material constituent of any other thing is all-pervasive, is faulty, for this is directly contradicted by the testimony of the scriptures, and according to the Ramanuja view atoms are not the ultimate constituent of things. Again the argument that that which is devoid of specific qualities, like time, is all-pervasive is also untenable, for according to the Ramanuja view there is nothing which is devoid of specific quality. The argument that since mind can remember very distant experiences it is all-pervasive is also faulty, for such remembrances are due to the contact of mind with specific subconscious root-impressions.

The senses are to be regarded as subtle (silksma) or atomic, and yet by their functioning or in association with other things they may behave as being spread out 1 . It is for this reason that in the bodies of animals of different dimensions the same senses may spread over smaller or larger areas through such functions without which they have to be admitted as becoming larger or smaller according to the dimensions of the bodies in which they may operate. If manas is all-pervasive, or if it occupies the span of the body, then the cognition by all the five senses may arise at one moment. The senses are regarded by Verikata as abiding in the heart, whence they move through respective nerves to the particular sense-organs.

The sense operates by its function called vrtti, which moves almost with the speed of light and grasps its object. There is thus a gradual operation of the sense-function passing from one place to another which, on account of its high speed, seems to be operative with regard to the object near at hand and also at a distance. This produces the appearance of simultaneous perception. The same process also holds good in the case of auditory perception. Since, according to the Ramanuja school, senses are immaterial, their functions also are to be described as immaterial 2 .

1 siddhe'pi hy atyutve vikdsatayd vrtti-visesa-dvdrd'pydyaka-pracaydd va prthutvam anglkdryam. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 98.

2 According to the Samkhya view, where also the senses are regarded as immaterial, the vrtti is regarded as their transformation in the form of the object and not contact. The Yoga view, however, as explained by Bhiksu, is that the citta passes through the senses and comes in contact with the object and is transformed into its form in association with the senses. The transformation, therefore, is not of the citta alone but of the citta together with the senses.

282 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

(h) The Nature of akasa according to Venkatanatha.

Venkata tries to establish in some detail the supposed fact that the akasa is perceived by the visual organ, as in our well attested experience in perceiving the blue sky or the scarlet sky in the evening and also the movement of the birds through the sky. He denies the position that the existence of akasa can only be inferred through movements, for the akasa exists even in thick walls where no movement is possible. Akasa is not its pure vacuity; its existence is manifested by its non-obstruction to the movements of animals. Some of the Buddhists and the Carvakas argue that there are only four elements and that akasa is only the negation {avarana-bhava). We do not perceive any akasa in a wall, but when it is split up we say that we perceive akasa. Such an akasa cannot be anything but a negation of obstruction; for if this is not admitted, then there is no negation of obstruction anywhere, all such cases being explainable on the supposition of akasa. It is this negation of obstruction, pure vacuity, which produces the illusion of some positive entity like a mirage. Such experiences may well be illustrated in those instances where the negation of pain is experienced as pleasure and negation of light as blue darkness. We are all familiar with the fact that mere linguistic usage sometimes produces an idea without there being an entity behind it, when someone says "the sharp horn of a hare."

To this Venkata's reply is that the existence of categories can only be justified by an appeal to experience, and we all have a positive experience of akasa. What we call negation is also a positive entity. The very negative concept can well be regarded as a positive notion. It is useless to argue that the negative concept differs from all positivity, for each specific category has its own special notion, and it is futile to argue why a particular entity should have its own peculiar concept 1 . A negation is always defined as the absence of the positive entity of which the negation is affirmed. The positivity of akasa is established by its positive experience. The view that there is nG akasa in occupied space is wrong, for when the occupying object is cut asunder we perceive the akasa and we affirm of it the negation of occupation. Thus the negation of occupation (avar-

1 nd'bhdvasya nihsvabhavata abhdva-svabhdvatayaVva tat-siddheh svdnya-svabhdvatayd siddhis tu na kasyd'pi. na ca siiena svabhdvena siddhasya para-svabhdva-virahdd asattvam atiprasangdt. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 113.

ana-bhava) is the predicate which is affirmed of the positive entity akasa, for in our experience of akasa we perceive that there is no occupation (avarna) in the akasa (iha'varanam nasti). If this is not admitted, then such perceptions as "Here is an object" would be inexplicable, for the word "here" would have no meaning if it were mere absence of negation. If, again, akasa was absent in an occupying object, it would be unreasonable to define akasa as the absence of such an object; since nothing exists in itself, everything would on the above analogy become its own negation 1 . The fact that akasa sometimes seems to show the false appearance of a surface is due also to the fact that it is an entity on which certain qualities are illusorily imposed. If it were mere nothing, there could have been no predication of false qualities to it. When it is said that the negation of pain is falsely conceived as pleasure, the fact is that the so-called negation is only another kind of positivity 2 . In the case of chimerical entities such as the sharp hare's horn there is an affirmation of horn in the hare, and when the horn is known there is a deliberation in our mind whether our notion of sharpness is true or false. The affirmation of sharpness, therefore, is not on mere negation. The falsity of chimerical predication also consists of affirming a predicate to a subject which in the course of nature it does not possess, and there is nothing like pure falsity or non-existence in such notions. When one says that there is no occupation here he must show the locus where the occupation is denied or negated; for a negation implies a locus. The locus of the negation of occupation would be pure space (akasa). If the negation of occupation meant absolute non-existence, then that would land us in nihilism. If the occupation (avarana) did exist anywhere or did not exist anywhere, then in either case the production or destruction of such occupation would be undemonstrable; for an existent thing is never produced nor destroyed and a non-existent thing is neither produced nor destroyed. Thus, for these and other considerations, akasa, which is neither eternal nor all-pervasive, has to be regarded as a separate positive entity and not as mere negation of occupation. Dik or the quarter of the sky, north, south, etc., should

1 na tv dkdsa-mdtram dvaranesv avidyamdnataya tad-abhdva akasa iti cd'yuktam sarvesdm svasminn avidyamdnataya svd-bhdvatva-prasangdt. Sar-vdrtha-siddhi, p. 114.

2 duhkhd-bhdve sukhd-ropdt abhdvasya bhdvd-nyatva-mdtram eva hy asatvam siddham tena ca svarupa-sann evd'sau. Ibid.

284 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

not be regarded as separate entities, but it is the sky, or akasa, which appears as different kinds of dik on account of its association with different conditions of the perceiver and the perceived space-relations.

(i) Nature of Time according to Venkatanatha.

Time is eternal and beginningless, for any conception in which it might be held that time were produced would involve the view that time was non-existent before its production. This, as it is easy to see, involves a notion of before and after, and as such it may be presumed that without the assumption of time even the production of time cannot be perceived. Time is directly perceived as a quality of all perceived entities. If time is regarded as being only inferable, then since it is intimately associated with all perceptible things the non-apprehension of time by direct perception would mean that the perceived objects also are not directly apprehended but known by inference. Even those who deny the separate existence of time explain it as an unreal notion of things in relation with the movement of the sun. Thus, the category of time, whether it is admitted as real or unreal, is taken as a quality or mode of perceived things and is apprehended along with them. There is no other time than what is conceived as before and after, as modes of our experience. It may be argued that with the exception of recognition all our experiences relate to the present and as such in the apprehension of objects by perception there is no notion of before and after which constitutes time, so there is no direct perception of time. To this the suggested discussion is whether, when objects are apprehended, they are apprehended as present or not, or whether only the notion of "the present" is apprehended without any association of any other object. Such views are directly contradicted in such experience as "I see this," where the object is demonstrated as being perceived at the present time. Perception thus refers both to the object and to its temporal character as present. It cannot be said that the temporal character is only illusorily imposed upon the perceived object; for in that case it must be shown that the temporal character was at least somewhere perceived or known independently by itself. It is argued that the sense-characters are perceived as "present," and this notion of the "present" is illusorily imposed upon time. To this it may be replied that in the passing series of the momentary

sense-characters it is impossible to point out anything as " present," since these are only perceived as "before" and "after"; by the time anything could be designated as "present" it is already past. Thus the point of time as present is undemonstrable. If the time as present may be affirmed of any sense-character, it may be affirmed of time itself. Again if time were non-existent, what is the use of assuming its imposition? If it is held that there is only the imposition of time-conception without any entity of which it is affirmed, then it would become the blind phenomenalism of the nihilists. In the Ramanuja view of things it is possible somehow to affirm the notion as "present" of time just as it is affirmed of the sense-characters. It cannot be said that time is merely a character of the sensibles, and that there is no other entity as time apart from these sensibles; for the temporal character of the sensibles as "present" is only possible on the assumption that there is such a thing as "present" time. Again if the "present" is denied, then that would mean universal negation, for the past and future are never perceived by us. Moreover, the present cannot be conceived as something different or unrelated and independent of the past and the future. If the past and the future were regarded as constituting the present, then our experience would only be related to the past and the future and there would be no possibility for any of our present afflictions. " Present" thus may be regarded as that series of operations which has begun but has not as yet ended in fruition.

Though time is one and eternal it can appear as limited and many, like all other objects which, though they may remain as one, may yet be supposed to be many and different in respect of the states through which they may seem to pass by virtue of the various conditional qualities (upddhi-sambandha) with which they may be associated. Though this view may be regarded as sufficient in explaining the notion of limited time, yet there are others who think that unless time itself is supposed to be constituted of moments through which time as changeable may be apprehended, the association of conditions to explain the notion of limitation will be impossible; for such an association presupposes the fact of limitation in time to which alone the conditions could be referred. Thus, Yadavaprakasa holds that time is beginningless and endless, and continually transforms itself through moments by which the divisions of time as hours, days and nights can be spanned; through

286 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [en.

which again the transformation of all changeable objects can be measured 1 . In this view the conditions are relative from the point of view of each person, who collects the passing time-units and forms his own conceptions of minutes, hours and days from his own point of calculation according to his own needs. A valid objection, however, mav be raised against such a view when it is pointed out that the criticism that was made against the association of conditional qualities to partless time may also be raised against the present view in which time is regarded as constituted of parts as moments, For it may well be said that the parts would require further parts for associating the conditional qualities; and if it does, there would be a vicious infinite and if it does not, then it will be admitted that the whole of a moment would not require a specification of parts for the association of conditional qualities. If the whole of a moment does not stand in need of any specification of parts for such association, why should time as a whole require it? The explanation that the association of a conditional quality with a part means its association with the whole on the analogy of the association of qualities in a substance is equally applicable to part-less time. Verikata points out that though the moments are adventitiously conceived on account of the variety of conditional qualities, time in itself is eternal. "Internal" means that it is never destroyed. Time is thus co-existent with God. It is a material cause with reference to its own modifications and is the efficient cause with reference to everything else. The scriptural pronouncements that God is all-pervading can be harmonized with the all-pervading character of time by conceiving it to be co-existent with God.

(j) The Nature of Soul according to Vehkatanatha.

Yerikatanatha first tries to establish the existence of the soul as different from the body, and in this connection tries to refute the well-known Carvaka arguments which do not admit the existence of a soul as different from the body to which the former mav be supposed to belong. The main emphasis of Yenkata's arguments lies in the appeal to the testimony of our experience which manifests the body as a whole and its parts as belonging to an " 1," as

1 yadavaprakasair apy abhyupagato' yampaksah kdlo' nady-ananto'jasra-ksana-parinami muhurta-haratra-di-rihhaga-yuk sarvesam parinarna-spanda-hetuh. Sar-vartha-siddhi, pp. 148-149.

when we say " my body," " my head," etc. He says that though we have various parts of one body and though some of these may be destroyed, yet in spite of such variations they are all supposed to belong to one unchangeable unity, the self, which seems to persist through all changes of time. If the experiences belonged to the different parts of the body, then on the removal of any of the limbs the experiences which are associated with that limb could not be remembered; for it cannot be admitted that there is a transmission of experiences from one limb to another. Even a mother's experience cannot be shared by the foetus. It cannot also be supposed that the experiences of the different limbs are somehow collected as impressions in the heart or brain; for it can neither be directly perceived, nor is there a datum which can lead to such an inference. Moreover, if there is a continual accumulation of impressions in the heart or brain, such a matter of conglomeration would be different at each moment through dissipation and aggregation of its constituent impressions, and as such it would be impossible to explain the fact of memory through such a changing entity 1 .

The unified behaviour of an individual cannot also be regarded as being due to the co-operation of a number of individual units of consciousness; for, in that case there must be individual purposes in each of them, leading to a conflict, and if they have no such purposes, there is no reason why they should co-operate together. If it is assumed that these individual constituent conscious-entities are naturally such that they are engaged in serving one another without any conflict, then the more normal possibility would be that, having no natural attachment or antipathy, they would cease to act, and this would result in a cessation of all activities on the part of the constituted individual as a whole. Again whenever an animal is born it is perceived as endowed with certain instinctive tendencies towards certain action, such as sucking the mother's breast, which demonstrates its attachment in that direction and necessarily presupposes an experience of that kind in a previous birth. This shows that there is a self which is different and distinct from the body and its parts. The experiences and their root-impressions

1 sarva-bodhaii ca hrt-kose samskdrd-dhdnam ityapi

na drstam na ca tat-klptau lihgam kirn apt drsyate na ca samskdra-kosas te sanghdtd-tmd prati-ksanam pracayd-pacaydbhydm sydd bhinnah smartd'tra ko bhavet.

Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 153.

288 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

also explain the diversity of intellectual powers, tendencies and inclinations 1 .

It cannot also be held that the units of consciousness of the different parts of the body are in themselves too subtle and potential to manifest themselves in their individual capacity, but they may yet co-operate together jointly to manifest the consciousness of the individual as a whole; for even the smallest molecular animals are found to be endowed with behaviouristic action. Moreover, if the units of consciousness emanating from the different parts of the body are admitted to be only potentially conscious, then it is absurd to suppose that they will be able to produce actual consciousness by mere conglomeration.

Again consciousness is a quality and as such it must await a substratum to which it would belong, but in the view in which consciousness is supposed to be material, the fundamental distinction between a quality and a substance is not observed 2 . It cannot also be held that consciousness is but a special modification of certain of the bodily elements, for this would only be a theory, which cannot be attested by any experience. Again to such of the Carvakas as admit the validity of inference, it may be urged that the body is a matter-complex; and, being but a conglomeration and sensible, is material like any other material object, whereas consciousness, being something entirely different from the body by virtue of its being consciousness, is also entirely distinct from it. The ordinary illusory notion which confuses the self with the body can be explained in diverse ways. The objector may say that if from such notions as " my body," " my hand," etc., it is argued that the self is something different from the body, then from such expressions as "my self" one may as well argue that the self has a further self. To this Yenkata's reply is that such expressions as "my hand" and "my body" are like such other expressions as "my house" and " my stick," where the distinction between the two things is directly apprehended. In such an expression as "my self" we have a linguistic usage in which the possessive case can be explained only in the sense of ideality, having only such an imaginary distinction between the two terms as may be in the mind of the observer at the

1 evam manusyd-di-sarira-prdpti-dasdydm adrsta-z'isesdt purva-janma- nubhava-samskdra-bhedair evam abhiruci-bhedai cayujyante. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, pp. 153-154.

2 nanu caitanyam iti na kaicid gunah, yasyd'dhdro'peksyah kintu yd'sau yus-mdkam caitanya-sdmagrl sai'za cailanya-paddrthah sydt. Ibid. p. 154.

moment and due to his emphasizing a difference from a conditional point of view. Venkata holds that further arguments may also be brought forward by the Carvakas 1 , to which effective replies may be given. But instead of going into a big chain of arguments and counter arguments the most effective way is to appeal to the testimony of scripture which in its self-validity affirms both positively and by implication the existence of the permanent self as distinct from the body. The testimony of the scriptures cannot be rebutted or refuted by mere speculative arguments.

There is a view that consciousness belongs to the senses and that cognitions through the different senses are integrated together in the same body, and it is by that means that an object perceived by the eye is also identified as the same entity as that grasped by the tactile apprehension. Another view is that the pleasurable, painful feelings associated with sense-cognitions can themselves attract or repulse an individual to behave as a separate entity who is being attracted or repelled by a sense-object. Venkata objects to such a doctrine as being incapable of explaining our psychological experience in which we feel that we have touched the very thing that we have seen. This implies that there is an entity that persists over and above the two different cognitions of the two senses; for the

1 The additional arguments of the Carvakas are as follows: When one says " I, a fat person, know," it is difficult to say that the fatness belongs to the body and the knowledge to some other entity. If the expression "my body" seems to imply that the body is different, the expression " I am fat" demonstrates the identity of the body and the self. What is definitely perceived cannot be refuted by inference, for in that case even fire could be inferred as cold. Perception is even stronger than scriptures and so there is no cause of doubt in our experience; therefore there is no reason to have recourse to any inference for testing the perceptual experience. The Samkhya argument, that those which are the results of aggregation must imply some other entity for which the aggregation has been named (just as a bedstead implies someone who is to lie on the bed), is ineffective; for the second-grade entity for which the first-grade conglomeration is supposed to be intended may itself await a third grade entity, and that another, and this may lead to a vicious infinite. To stop this vicious infinite the Samkhya thinks that the self does not await for any further entity. But instead of arbitrarily thinking the self to be ultimate, it is as good to stop at the body and to think that the body is its own end. The argument that a living body must have a soul because it has life is false, for the supposed self as distinct from the body is not known to us by other means. One might as well say that a living body must have a sky-lotus because it has life. The Carvaka ultimately winds up the argument and says that the body is like an automatic machine which works by itself without awaiting the help of any other distinct entity presiding over it, and is the result of a specific modification of matter {ananya-dhisthita-svayam-vahaka-yantra-nydydd vicitra-bhuta-parinati-visesa-sambhavo'yam deha-yantrah). Sarvd-rtha-siddhi, p. 157.

Din 19

290 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

visual and the tactile sense-organs are limited to the apprehension of their own peculiar sense-data or sensibles, and none of them is competent to affirm the identity of the object through two different sense-appearances or sense-characteristics. Venkata further says that the view that the impressions of the various senses accumulate in the heart, and that it is through such an integration of experiences in the heart that there is an appearance of one concrete individual, is wrong; for no such centre of integration of impressions inside our bodies is known to us, and if such a centre in the body is to be admitted there is no harm in admitting a separate soul in which these impressions inhere 1 .

Consciousness also cannot be regarded as the self, for consciousness is an experience and as such must belong to some individual separate and distinct from it. In the passing conscious states there is nothing that abides and persists which can integrate the past and present states in itself and develop the notion of the person, the perceiver. Therefore, it has to be admitted that there is a conscious ego to which all cognitions and experiences belong. Such an ego is self-luminous in the sense that it is always manifest by itself to itself and not merely the locus of self-knowledge. Such a self-revealing ego is present even in our dreamless sleep, and this is attested by later recollections in which one feels " I slept happily"; and it is not contradicted by any experience. Even when one is referred to by another as "you" or "this," the ego in the latter is all the time self-manifested as "I." Such an ego refers to the soul which is a real agent and experiencer of pleasure and pain and a cognizer of all cognitions and as such is a real moral agent and is therefore distinguished from other kindred souls by its specific efforts leading to specific kinds of deeds and their fruits. The efforts, however, of the individual agents are themselves pre-determined by the resulting fruits of actions in previous births, and those by other actions of other previous births. Those who say that efforts lead to no efforts contradict themselves in all the practical behaviour which presupposes a belief in the efficacy of efforts. Only such of the efforts as are directed towards the attainment of the impossible or towards objects which require no effort are found

1 tvad-ista-samskara-kose mdnd-bhdvdt, anekesdm aham-arthdndm eka-sarlra-yoge ca tatas ca varam yatho-palambham ekasminn aham-arthe sarvais samskdrd-dhdnam. Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 160.

to be ineffective, whereas all other efforts are attended with fruition.

Venkata urges that the theory which holds that there is but one Brahman which appears as many by its association with different minds is false; for we know that the same individual is associated with different bodies in the series of his transmigrations, and such an association with different bodies cannot produce any difference in the individual. And if this is so, that is, if association with different bodies cannot induce a difference in the individual, there is no reason why one Brahman should become many by its association with different minds. Again the view that holds that the individuals, though really different from one another, are so far identical that they are all but parts of pure Being—the Brahman—is equally false; for if the Brahman is thus one with the individual, it should also be exposed to all its sufferings and imperfections, which is absurd.

Brahmadatta held that Brahman alone is eternal and unborn and the individual souls are born out of it. Venkata criticizes this view and propounds the theory that the souls are all uncreated and unborn. They are to be regarded as permanent and eternal; for if they are believed to be changing during the continuance of their body, then the continuity of purposive activity will be inexplicable. If they are destroyed with the death of the body, then the karma theory and all theories of moral responsibility have to be given up.

The soul, however, is not all-pervasive; for the Upanisads speak of it as going out of the body. The argument for all-pervasiveness of the soul as given by the Naiyayikas is as follows. Virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul and may produce such changes in the material world, even in distant places, as would conduce to the enjoyment or suffering of that particular individual; and since virtue and vice are associated with a particular soul, they could not produce their effects on a distant place unless the soul, their locus, is co-extensive with those places. This, however, does not apply to the Ramanujists, for according to them virtue and vice are only terms which mean that God has either been pleased or displeased owing to the particular kinds of deeds of an individual, and God's pleasure or displeasure has no limitations of operation 1 .

1 iha hi dharma-dharma-sabdah karma-mmitte-ivara-pflti-kopa-rupa-buddhi-dyotakah. asti hi subhe tv asau tufyati dufkrte tu na tufyate' sou paramah sarlrf iti. Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 179.

19-2

292 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

From the opponent's point of view, even if the self is regarded as all-pervasive, that would not explain the happening of favourable or unfavourable effects; for though the self may be co-extensive with those distant places, yet its adrsta or unseen merit occurs not throughout the entire pervasive self, but only in a part of it, and as such, since it is not in touch with the place where the effect will happen, it cannot very well explain it.

(k) The Nature of Emancipation according to Venkatanatha.

Venkatanatha says that an objection has been raised by some that if individuals had been in the state of bondage from beginning-less time, there is no reason why they should attain emancipation at some future date. To this the reply is that it is admitted by all that there is every hope that at some time or other there will be such a favourable collocation of accessories that our karma will so fructify that it will lead us out of bondage, through the production of sight of discrimination and disinclination, to enjoyment of all kinds that it may give God an opportunity to exercise His mercy. Thus, though all are in a state of bondage from beginningless time, they all gradually find a suitable opportunity for attaining their emancipation. Thus, God extends His grace for emancipation only to those who deserve it by reason of their deeds, and it is theoretically possible that there should be a time when all people would receive their salvation and the world process would cease to exist. Such a cessation of the world-process will be due to His own free will, and thus there is not the slightest reason for fear that in such a state there will have been any obstruction to God's free and spontaneous activity from extraneous sources. Man is led to the way of emancipation by his experience of suffering, which nullifies the pleasure of our mundane life. He feels that worldly pleasures are limited (alpa) and impermanent (asthira) and associated with pain. He thus aspires to attain a stage in which he can get unlimited pleasure unmixed with suffering. Such an emancipation can be brought about only through the love of God (bhakti). Bhakti, however, is used here in the sense of meditation or thinking with affection 1 . Such a bhakti also produces knowledge, and such a

1 mahanlya-visaye pritir bhaktih prlty-ddayas ca jnana-viiesa iti vaksyate sneha-purvam anudhydnam bhaktih. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 190.

knowledge is also included in bhakti 1 . Bhakti is defined here as unceasing meditation (dhruva-nusmrti), and this therefore has to be continually practised. The Sankarite view that emancipation can be attained by mere knowledge is false. In the Upanisads knowledge means unceasing meditation, and this has to be continued and only then can it be regarded as upasana, which is the same as bhakti 2 .

The performance of the prescribed duties is helpful to the production of knowledge in the sense of bhakti by counteracting the wrong influence of such karmas as are antagonistic to the rise of true knowledge. Thus the prescribed duties are not to be performed along with the practice of bhakti, and they are not both to be regarded as joint causes of emancipation; but the performance of duties is to be interpreted as helping the rise of bhakti only by removing the obstructive influences of other opposing karmas 3 . The performance of scriptural duties including sacrifices is not incompatible with devotional exercises, for the gods referred to in the Vedic sacrifices may also be regarded as referring to Brahman, the only god of the Vaisnavas. The absolutely (nitya) and the conditionally (naimittika) obligatory duties should not be given up by the devotee, for mere cessation from one's duties has no meaning; the real significance of the cessation from duties is that these should be performed without any motive of gain or advantage. It is wrong to suppose that emancipation can be attained only by those who renounce the world and become ascetics, for a man of any caste (varna) and at any stage of life {asrama) may attain it provided he follows his normal caste duties and is filled with unceasing bhakti towards God.

It is well to point out in this connection that duties are regarded as threefold. Those that are absolutely obligatory are called nitya. No special good or advantage comes out of their performance, but their non-performance is associated with evil effects. Those that are obligatory under certain circumstances are called naimittika. If these duties are not performed under those special circumstances, sin will accrue, but no special beneficial effects are produced by

1 bhakti-sddhyam prdpaka-jndnam api bhakti-laksano-petam. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 191.

2 ekasminn eva visaye vedano-pdsana-sabdayoh vyatikareno'pakramo-pasam-hdra-darsandc ca vedanam eva updsanatayd visesyate. . .sd mukti-sddhanatayo'ktd hi vittih bhakti-rupatva-paryanta-visesana-visistd. Ibid. pp. 191—192.

3 Ibid. pp. 194-195.

294 Philosophy of the Rdtndnuja School of Thought [ch.

their performance. Those duties which are to be performed only if the person is desirous of attaining special kinds of pleasurable ends such as residence in Heaven, the birth of a son, and the like, are called kamya. Now a man who wishes to attain emancipation should give up all the kamya duties and refrain from all actions prohibited in the scriptures, but he should perform the nitya and the naimittika duties. Though the performance of the nitya and the naimittika duties is associated with some kind of beneficial results, inasmuch as such performance keeps away the evil and the sinful effects which would have resulted from their non-performance, yet these, being fruits of a negative nature, are not precluded for a person who intends to attain emancipation. For such a person only the performance of such actions as bring positive pleasures is prohibited. When it is said that actions of a devotee should have no motive, this does not mean that it includes also actions which are performed with the motive of pleasing God; for actions with motive are only such actions as are performed with motives of one's own pleasure, and these are always associated with harmful effects 1 .

It has already been said that the naimittika duties should be performed; but of these there are some which are of an expiatory nature, called prayasa'tta, by which the sinful effects of our deeds are expiated. A true devotee should not perform this latter kind of expiatory duties, for the meditation of God with love is by itself sufficient to purge us of all our sins and indeed of all our virtues also; for these latter, as they produce heavenly pleasures as their effects, obstruct the path of emancipation as much as do our sins. All that narrows our mind by associating it with narrow ends is to be regarded as sinful. Judged from this point of view even the so-called meritorious actions (punya) are to be regarded as harmful to a devotee who intends to attain emancipation 2 . Virtue (dharma) can be regarded as such only relatively, so that actions which are regarded as virtuous for ordinary persons may be regarded as sinful for a person inspired with the higher ambition of attaining emancipation 3 . For a true devotee who has attained the knowledge

1 anarthd-vind-bhuta-sukha-kdmandto nhrttam karma niskdmam. Sarz'drtha-siddhi, p. 202.

2 tad evam dhi-satikocaka-karma-dhvamse dhl-zikdsa era brahmd-nubhutih. Ibid. p. 220.

* sa era dharmah so'dharmas tarn tarn prati naram bhavet

of Brahman and is pursuing the meditation of God, sinful or virtuous actions are both inefficacious, the older ones being destroyed by the meditation itself and the new ones incapable of being associated with him—the wise man.

The eschatological conception of the Ramanuja school as explained by Venkata is that the soul of the true devotee escapes by a special nerve in the head {murdhanya-nddi) and is gradually lifted from one stage to another by the presiding deities of fire, day, white fortnight, the vernal equinox, year, wind, the sun, the moon, lightning, Varuna, Indra and Prajapati, who are appointed by God for the conducting of the departed devotee 1 .

The state of final emancipation is regarded as the rise of the ultimate expansion of the intellect. But though this is a state which is produced as a result of devotional exercises, yet there is no chance that there would ever be a cessation of such a state, for it is the result of the ultimate dissociation of all causes, such as sins or virtues, which can produce a contraction of the mind. Therefore, there can never be a falling off from this state.

An emancipated person can assume bodies at his own will. His body is not a source of bondage to him, for only those whose bodies are conditioned by their karma may be supposed to suffer bondage through them. The state of emancipation is a state of perfect bliss through a continual realization of Brahman, to whom he is attached as a servant. This servitude, however, cannot beget misery, for servitude can beget misery only when it is associated with sins. The emancipated person is omnipotent ir the sense that God is never pleased to frustrate the fulfilment of his wishes.

The emancipated person regards all things as being held in Brahman as its parts and as such no mundane affair can pain him, though he may have the knowledge that in the past many things in the world caused him misery.

Venkata denied the possibility of attaining emancipation in this life, for the very definition of emancipation is dissociation from life, sense-organs and the body generated by karma. So when we hear of jivanmukta or those emancipated in their lifetime, it is to be interpreted to mean a state similar to the state of emancipation. The contention of the Advaitins that the principal avidyd vanishes with knowledge, yet that its partial states may still continue binding

1 Sarvartha-siddhi, pp. 226-227.

296 Philosophy of the Rdmamija School of Thought [ch.

the emancipated person with a body, is false. For if the principal avidya has vanished, its states cannot still continue. Moreover, if they do continue in spite of the knowledge, it is impossible to imagine how they will cease at the death of the emancipated person.

God in the Ramanuja School.

We have seen that according to Ramanuja the nature and existence of God can be known only through the testimony of the scriptures and not through inference. Verikata points out that the Samkhya theory that the world-creation is due to the movement of prakrti, set in operation through its contiguity with the parusas, is inadequate; for the Upanisads definitely assert that just as the spider weaves its net, so does God create the world. The scriptures further assert that God entered into both the prakrti and thepurusas, and produced the creative movement in them at the time of creation 1 . The Yoga view of God—that He is only an emancipated being who enters into the body of Hiranyagarbha or adopts some such other pure body—is also against all scriptural testimony. It is also idle to think that the world-creation is the result of the cooperative activity of the emancipated spirits, for it is much against the scriptural testimony as also against the normal possibility, since there cannot be such an agreement of wish among the infinite number of emancipated beings that would explain the creation of the world by unobstructed co-operation. Thus, on the strength of the scriptural testimony it has to be admitted that God has engaged Himself in world-creation, either for the good of the created beings or through His own playful pleasurable activity. The enjoyment of playful activity is not to be explained as anything negative, as avoidance of ennui or langour, but as a movement which produces pleasure of itself 2 . When we hear of God's anger, this is not to be regarded as indicating any disappointment on God's part, for He is ever complete in Himself and has nothing to attain or to lose. So God's anger is to be interpreted simply as meaning His desire to punish those who deserve punishment.

1 prakrtim purnsam cai'va pravisyd'tme-cchayd harih. kfobhayamdsa samprdpte sarga-kdle vyayd-vyoyau.

Sarzdrtha-siddhi, p. 252.

2 krldd-yogdd arati-yogah tad-abhdvdd vd tad-abhdvah sydt, mai'varn kridd hi prlti-visesa-prabhaz'ah svayam-priyo vydpdrah. Ibid. p. 255.

According to the Ramanuja system the individual souls and the material world form the body of God (sarira). Anantarya of the Sesarya family, following Venkata's treatment of this doctrine in the Nyaya-siddha-iijana, elaborates upon the same and enters into a critical analysis of the conception and significance of the notion of the body of God, which is not unworthy of our notice. He refuses to accept the view that the notion of body {sarira) involves a class-concept (jati) ; for though the notion of a body is found applicable in each specific instance of a body, the existence of such a notion is always associated with one or other of those specific instances and as such it does not justify the assumption of the existence of a separate category as a self-existent universal bodiness. All that one can say is that there is a universal notion of bodiness associated with the individual bodies 1 . All notions of class-concepts may therefore be explained in the same manner as notions which are associated with particular kinds of groupings in their aggregate characters, and in this way they may be regarded as somewhat similar to collective notions such as an army or assembly 2 . Vatsya Srinivasa, however, in his Ramanuja-siddhanta-samgraha, explains the notion of class-concepts as being based upon the notion of close similarity of collocative groupings. He says that when two col-locative groupings are both called cow, nothing more is seen than those individual collocative groupings. That they are both called cow is due to the fact of close similarity (sausadrsya) subsisting between those groupings 3 . Thus there is no other entity apart from

1 na ce'dam iarlram idam iarlram ity anugata-pratltir eva tat-sddhika, anugatd-pratiteh bddhaka-virahe jdti-sddhakatvdd iti vdcyarn, siddhdnte anugata-pratlteh satnsthdna-visayakatvena tad-atirikta-idti-sddhakatvd-sambhavdt. Anantarya, Sarira-vdda (MS.).

2 eka-jdttyam iti vyar<ahdrasya tat-tad-upddhi viseseno-papatteh, rdsi-sainya-parisad-aranyd-disv aikya-vyavahdrddivat, upddhis cd'yam anekesdm eka-smrti-samdrohah. Nydya-siddhd-njana, p. 180.

8 ayam sdsnd-dimdn ayam api sdsnd-dimdn iti sdsnd-dir eva anuvrtta-vyai'ahdra-visayo drsyate, anwrtta-dhi-vyavahdra-visayas tad-atirikto na kas cid api drsyate. tasmdd ubhaya-sampratipanna-samsthdnenai 'va susadrso-pddhi-vasdd anugata-dhl-vyavahdro-papattdv atirikta-kalpane mdnd-bhdvdt, susadriatvam eva gotvd-dlndm anuvrttih. Rdmdnuja-siddhdnta-samgraha (MS.).

Vatsya brlnivasa defines close similarity as the special character which may be regarded as the cause of the apprehension of generality amidst differences (pratiyogi-niriipya- prativyakti- vilaksana-visaya- nistha- sadrsa-vyavahdra- sddhd-rana-kdrana-dharma-visesah sausddrsyam). This similarity leads to the application of names to similar objects. When it subsists between two substances, we call it similarity of character (dharma-sadrsya). When it subsists between entities other than substances (a-dravya) we call it similarity of essence (sva-rupa-sddrsya).

298 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

our notion of universality arising from specific similarity of similar groupings (tdvad-visayaka-jnana-rupa-jdti-visayakatvd-ngikdrena).

Anantarya refers to the definition of sarira in the Rdmdnuja-bhdsya as that which is liable to be held or controlled in its entirety for the purpose of spirit, and is thus merely a means to its end (cetanasya yad dravyam sarvd-tmand svdrthe niyantutn dhdrayitum sakyam tac cestai-ka-svarupanca tat tasya svarupam). Sudar-sanacarya, the author of the Sruta-prakdsikd, interprets this definition as meaning that when the movement of anything is wholly determined by the desire or will of any spirit and is thus controlled by it, the former is said to be the body of the latter (krti-prayukta-sviya-cestd-sdmanyakatva-rupa-niydmyatvam sarira-pada-pravrtti-nimittatn) 1 . When it is said that this body belongs to this soul, the sense of possession (ddheyatva) is limited to the fact that the movements in general of that body are due to the will of that spirit or soul 2 . A servant cannot be called the body of his master on the same analogy, for only some of the movements of the servant are controlled by the will of the master. The assumption that underlies the above definition is that the movement in the animal and vegetable bodies presided over by individual souls and in the inanimate objects presided over by God is due to the subtle will-movements in these specific souls, though they may not always be apprehended by us 3 .

But anticipating the objection that there is no perceptual evidence that the physico-biological movements of bodies are due to subtle volitions of their presiding souls, a second definition of sarira has been suggested in the bhdsya of Ramanuja. According to this definition a body is said to be that which may as a whole be held fast and prevented from falling by the volitional efforts of a spirit 4 . But an objection may still be raised against such a definition, as it cannot explain the usage which regards the souls as being the

1 SarTra-vdda (MS.).

2 etaj-jwasye'dam sariram ity-ddau ddheyatvam tasya ca sarlrd-paddrthai-kadese krtau anvyaydd vd taj-jlva-nistha-krti-prayukta-sz'lya-cestd-sdmdnyakam idam iti bodhah. Ibid.

8 jlva-sarlre zjksddau isvara-sartre parvatddau ca suksmasya tat-tat-krti-prayukta-cestd-visesasya anglkdrdn na sarlra-z'yaz'ahdra-visayatva-nupapattih. Ibid.

* yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvd-tmand dhdrayitum sakyam tat tasya sariramitikrti-prayukta-sva-pratiyogika-patana-pratibandhaka-samyoga-sdmdnya-vattvam sarlra-pada-pravrtti-nimittam. Ibid.

bodies of God (yasyd'tma sariram). The souls have no weight and as such it is absurd to suppose that God prevents them from falling down, and in that way they are related to Him as bodies. The definition may therefore be modified to the extent that a body is that which is wholly held together in a contactual relation with a particular spirit through its own volition 1 . But a further objection may also be raised against this modification, for the definition, even so modified, fails to include time and other entities which are all-pervasive. Now the contactual relation subsisting between two all-pervasive entities is held to be eternal and uncaused. So the contactual relation of God with time and the like cannot be held to be caused by the volition of God, and if this be held to be the connotation of the body, time, etc., cannot be regarded as the body of God. So a different definition has been given which states that a body is a substance which is wholly dependent upon and subservient to a spirit. Dependence and subserviency are to be understood in the sense of productivity of a special excellence. Now, in the present context the special excellence which is produced in the spirit is its determination either as a cause or as an effect. When Brahman is regarded as cause, such causality can be understood only in relation to its association with the subtle constituents of matter and individual souls, and its evolution into the effect-stage as the manifold world is intelligible only through the transformation of the subtle matter-constituents in gross material forms and the spirits as endeavouring towards perfection through their deeds and rebirths. Brahman as such, without its relation to matter and souls, can be regarded neither as cause nor as effect. That it can be viewed as cause and effect is only because it is looked at in association with the causal or the effectuated states of matter and souls. The latter, therefore, are regarded as His body because they by their own states serve His purpose in reflecting Him as cause and effect.

The definition, however, needs a further modification in so far as the determining relation of the body is such that there is never a time when such a relation did not subsist. The relation conceived in this way {aprthak-siddhd) is not something extraneous, but is a defining constituent of both the body and the soul, i.e. so long as either of them exists they must have that relation of the

1 Patana-pratibandhakatvam parityajya krti-prayukta-sva-pratiyogika-sam-yoga-samdnyasya sartra-pada-pravrtti-nimittatva-svtkdre'pi kfati-virahdt. Sarlra-vdda.

300 Philosophy in the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

determiner and the determined (yavat sattvam asambandhand-rthayor eva'prthak sambandhd-bhyupagamdty. Thus, even the emancipated souls are associated with bodies, and it is held that with death the body associated with the living soul is destroyed; the so-called dead body is not the body with which the living soul was in association 2 . But it may again be objected that the soul also determines the actions and efforts of the body and being inseparably connected with it, the soul may also be called the body of the body according to the definition. To meet this objection the definition is further modified, and it is held that only such inseparable relation as determines the causality or elTectness in association with the production of knowledge can be regarded as constituting the condition of a body. The whole idea is that a body, while inseparably-connected with the soul, conditions its cognitive experiences, and this should be regarded as the defining characteristic of a body 3 . This definition of Sarira is, of course, very different from the Nyaya definition of "body" (sarira) as the support (asraya) of effort (cesta), senses (indriya), and enjoyment (bhoga)*. For in such a definition, since there may be movement in the furthest extremities of the body which is not a direct support of the original volition of the soul, the definition of the notion of support has to be so far extended as to include these parts which are in association with that which was directly moved by the soul. Extending this principle of indirect associations, one might as well include the movement of objects held in the hand, and in that case the extraneous objects might also be regarded as body, which is impossible. The defence of the Naviyayikas would, of course, be by the

1 Sarira-vdda, p. 8 (MS.).

2 mrta-sarirasya jiva-sambandha-rahitataya'pi ai asthdna-darsanena yavat -sattvam asambandha-narhatva-virahdd iti cet na purva-sariratayd'vastliitasya dravyasya cetana-viyogii-nantara-ksane eva nasa-bhyupagamena anupapatti-vira/ult. Ibid.

3 tac-cliesatvam hi tan-nisthd-tisayd-dhdyakatvam, prakrte ca tan-nisthd-tis'ayah kdryatva-kdranatvd-nyatara-upn jndnd-vacchinnd-nuvogitdkd-prthak-siddhi-sambaiidlid-vacchinna-kdryatva-kdranatvd-nyatard-vacchedakatvam sarira pada-pravrtti-nimittam ityarthah. Ibid.

Brahman as associated with subtle matter and spirits is the cause, and as associated with cross matter and the souls passing through diverse gross states may he regarded as effect. The subtle and the gross states of matter and spirits may thus be regarded as determining the causal and effect states of the Brahman. — suksma-cid-acid-visista-brahmanah kdranatvdt sthiila-cid-acid-? isistasxa ca tasva kdryatvdt brahma-nistha-kdryatva-kdranatvd-nyatard-vacchedakatvasya pra-panca-samdnye sattvdt. Ibid.

introduction of the relation of inseparable coherence (samavdya) in which the parts of a body are connected together in a way different from any other object. But it has already been pointed out that the samavdya relation is not admitted by the Ramanujists.

Brahman may be regarded as the material cause of the world through its body as prakrti and the souls. Though a material cause, it is also the instrumental cause just as the individual souls are the efficient causes of their own experiences of pleasure and pain (through their own deeds), of which, since the latter inhere in the former, they may be regarded as their material causes. On the other hand, God in Himself, when looked at as apart from His body, may be regarded as unchangeable. Thus, from these two points of view God may be regarded as the material and efficient cause and may also be regarded as the unchanging cause.

Bhaskara and his followers hold that Brahman has two parts, a spirit part (cidamsa) and a material part (acidamsa), and that it transforms itself through its material part and undergoes the cycles of karma through the conditions of such material changes. Bhaskara thinks that the conditions are a part of Brahman and that even in the time of dissolution they remain in subtle form and that it is only in the emancipated stage that the conditions (upddhi), which could account for the limited appearance of Brahman as individual souls, are lost in Brahman. Verikata thinks that the explanation through the conception of upddhi is misleading. If the upddhi constitutes jivas by mere conjunction, then since they are all conjoined with God, God Himself becomes limited. If the conception of upddhi be made on the analogy of space within a jug or a cup, where space remains continuous and it is by the movement of the conditioning jugs or cups that the space appears to be limited by them, then no question of bondage or emancipation can arise. The conception of upddhi cannot be also on the analogy of the container and the contained, as water in the jug, since Brahman being continuous and indivisible such a conception would be absurd. The upddhis themselves cannot be regarded as constitutive of individual souls, for they are material in their nature. Yadavaprakasa holds that Brahman is of the nature of pure universal being (sarvd-tmakam sad-rupam brahma) endowed with three distinct powers as consciousness, matter and God, and through these powers it passes through the various phenomenal changes which are held up in it

302 Philosophy in the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

and at the same time are one with it, just as one ocean appears in diverse forms as foam, billows and waves. Vehkata says that instead of explaining the world-creation from these makeshift points of view, it is better to follow the scriptures and regard Brahman as being associated with these changes through its body. It is wrong also to regard God, world and spirit as being phenomenal modifications of one pure being as Katyayana does 1 . For the scriptures definitely assert that God and the changeless Brahman are one and identical. If the transformation is regarded as taking place through the transformation of the powers of Brahman, then the latter cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world, nor can these transformations be regarded as creations of Brahman. If it is said that Brahman is both identical and different from its powers, then such a view would be like the relative pluralism of the Jains. There is a further view that Brahman in His pure nature exists as the world, the souls and God, though these are different and though in them His pure nature as such is not properly and equally evident. Vehkata holds that such a view is contradicted by our experience and by scriptural texts. There is again another view according to which Brahman is like an ocean of consciousness and bliss, and out of the joy of self-realization undergoes various transformations, a small portion of which he transforms into matter and infuses the spiritual parts into its modifications. Thus, Brahman transforms itself into a number of limited souls which undergo the various experiences of pleasure and pain, and the whole show and procedure becomes a source of joy to Him. It is not a rare phenomenon that there are beings who derive pleasure from performing actions painful to themselves. The case of incarnations (avatara) again corroborates this view, otherwise there would be no meaning in the course of misery and pain which they suffer of their own free will. Vehkata observes that this view is absolutely hollow. There may be fools who mistake painful actions for sources of pleasure. But it is unthinkable that Brahman, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, should engage in an undertaking which involves for Him even the slightest misery and pain. The misery of.even a single individual is sufficient evil and the total miseries of the whole

1 liva.ra-vyakrta-prana.ir virat-sindhur ivo'rmibhih

yat pranrtya diva bhati tasmai sad-brahmane namah.

Katyayana-karika, quoted in Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 298.

world of individual selves are intolerable in the extreme. Therefore, how can Brahman elect to shoulder all this misery of His own free choice without stultifying Himself? The case of incarnations is to be understood as that of actors on the stage. Further, this view contradicts the testimony of all scriptures. Venkata thinks that the view of his school is free from all these objections, as the relation of the Brahman and individuals is neither one of absolute identity nor one of identity and difference but one of substance and adjuncts. The defects in the adjuncts cannot affect the substance nor can the association between them be a source of pollution to Brahman, the substance, because association becomes so only when it is determined by karma 1 .

On the theological side Venkata accepts all the principal religious dogmas elaborated in the Pancaratrq works. God is, of course, omniscient, omnipotent and all-complete. His all-completeness, however, does not mean that He has no desires. It only means that His desires or wishes are never frustrated and His wishes are under His own control 2 . What we call our virtue and sins also proceed through His pleasure and displeasure. His displeasure does not bring any suffering or discomfort. But the term "displeasure" simply indicates that God has a particular attitude in which He may punish us or may not extend His favour.

The scriptural injunctions are but the 'commands of God. There is no separate instrumental as apurva or adrsta which stands between the performance of deeds and their fruition and which, while it persists when the deeds are over, brings about the effects of these actions. But God alone abides and He is either pleased or displeased by our actions and He arranges such fruits of actions as He thinks fit 3 . The scriptures only show which kinds of actions will be pleasing to God and which are against His commands. The object of the scriptural sacrifices is the worship of God, and all the different deities that are worshipped in these sacrifices are but the different names of God Himself. All morality and religion are thus

1 asman-mate tu visesana-gatd dosd na visesyam sprsanti, aikya-bheda-bhedd-nangikdrdt, akarma-vasya-samsargaja-dosandm asambhavdcca. Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, p. 302.

a dpta-kdma-sabdas tdvad isitur estavyd-bhdvam icchd-rdhityam vd na brute . . . istam sarvam asya prdptam eva bhavatlti tdtparyam grdhyam. . . sarva-kdrya-visaya-pratihatd-nanyd-dhlne-chdvdn Isvarah, flvas tu na tathd. Ibid.

P- 386 ' "

• tat-tat-karma-carana-parinate-svara-buddhi-visesa eva adrstam. Ibid. p. 665.

304 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

reduced in this system to obedience to God's commands and the worship of Him. It is by God's grace that one can attain emancipation when there is an ultimate expansion of one's intellect, and by continual realization of the infinite nature of God one remains plunged as it were in an ocean of bliss compared with which the so-called worldly pleasures are but sufferings 1 . It is not ultimately given to man to be virtuous or vicious by his own efforts, but God makes a man virtuous or vicious at His own pleasure or displeasure, and rewards or punishes accordingly; and, as has already been said, virtue and vice are not subjective characters of the person but only different attitudes of God as He is pleased or displeased. Whomsoever He wishes to raise up He makes perform good actions, and whomsoever He wishes to throw down He makes commit sinful actions. The final choice and adjudgment rests with Him, and man is only a tool in His hands. Man's actions in themselves cannot guarantee anything to him merely as the fruits of those actions, but good or bad fruits are reaped in accordance with the pleasure or displeasure of God 2 .

Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School.

The readers who have followed the present work so far must have noticed that the chief philosophical opponents of the Sri Vaisnava school of thought were Sankara and his followers. In South India there were other religious opponents of the Sri Vaisnavas, Saivas and the Jainas. Mutual persecution among the Sri Vaisnavas, Saivas and the Jainas is a matter of common historical knowledge. Conversion from one faith to another also took place under the influence of this or that local king or this or that religious teacher. Many volumes were written for the purpose of proving the superiority of Naravana, Visnu or Krsna to Siva and vice versa. Madhva and his followers were also opponents of the Sri Vaisnavas, but there were some who regarded the philosophy of the Madhvas as more or less akin to the Sri Vaisnava thought.

1 Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, pp. 663, 664.

2 sa evainam bhutim gamayati, sa enam pritah prlnati esa era sddhu karma kdrayati tarn ksipamy ajasram asabhd-nityd-di-bhih pramdna-sataih isvara-prlti-kopdbhydm dharmd-dharma-phala-prdptir avagamyate. Ibid. p. 670.

There were others, however, who strongly criticized the views of Madhva, and Mahacarya's Pdrdsarya-vijaya and Parakala Yati's Vijayindra-pardjaya may be cited as examples of polemical discussions against the Madhvas. The Sri Vaisnavas also criticized the views of Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa, and as examples of this the Vedartha-samgraha of Ramanuja, or the Vdditraya-khandana of Venkata may be cited. But the chief opponents of the Sri Vaisnava school were Sankara and his followers. The Sata-dusani is a polemical work of that class in which Venkatanatha tried his best to criticize the views of Sankara and his followers. The work is supposed to have consisted of one hundred polemical points of discussion as the name Sata-dusani (century of refutations) itself shows. But the text, printed at the Sri Sudarsana Press, Cori-jeeveram, has only sixty-six refutations, as far as the manuscripts available to the present writer showed. This printed text contains a commentary on it by Mahacarya alias Ramanujadasa, pupil of Vadhula Srinivasa. But the work ends with the sixty-fourth refutation, and the other two commentaries appear to be missing. The printed text has two further refutations—the sixty-fifth and sixty-sixth—which are published without commentary, and the editor, P. B. Anantacarya, says that the work was completed with the sixty-sixth refutation (samaptd ca Sata-dusanT). If the editor's remark is to be believed, it has to be supposed that the word Sata in Sata-dusani is intended to mean "many" and not "hundred." It is, however, difficult to guess whether the remaining thirty-four refutations were actually written by Venkata and lost or whether he wrote only the sixty-six refutations now available. Many of these do not contain any new material and most of them are only of doctrinal and sectarian interest, with little philosophical or religious value, and so have been omitted in the present section, which closes with the sixty-first refutation. The sixty-second refutation deals with the inappropriateness of the Sankara Veddnta in barring the Sudras from Brahma-knowledge. In the sixty-third, Venkata deals with the qualifications of persons entitled to study Veddnta (adhikdri-viveka), in the sixty-fourth with the inappropriateness of the external garb and marks of the ascetics of the Sankara school, in the sixty-fifth with the prohibition of association with certain classes of ascetics, and in the sixty-sixth with the fact that Sahkara's philosophy cannot be reconciled with the Brahma-sutra.

306 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

First Objection. The view that Brahman is qualityless cannot give any satisfactory account of how the word Brahman can rightly denote this qualityless entity. For if it is qualityless it cannot be denoted by the term Brahman either in its primary sense or in any secondary sense of implication (laksana) ; for if the former is not possible, the second is also impossible, since an implicative extension of meaning can take place only when in any particular content the primary meaning becomes impossible. We know also from the scriptural testimony that the word Brahman is often used in its primary meaning to denote the Great Being who is endowed with an infinite number of excellent qualities. The fact that there are many texts in which an aspect of qualitylessness is also referred to cannot be pushed forward as an objection, for these can all be otherwise explained, and even if any doubt arises the opponent cannot take advantage of it and assert that Brahman is qualityless. It is also not possible to say that the word Brahman denotes the true Brahman only by implication, for the scriptures declare the realization of the meaning of the word Brahman as being one of direct perception. So in the opponent's view of Brahman, the word Brahman would be rendered meaningless.

Second Objection. There cannot be any inquiry regarding Brahman according to Sarikara's interpretation of the term as a qualityless something. Sarikara says that Brahman is known in a general manner as the self in us all; the inquiry concerning Brahman is for knowing it in its specific nature, i.e. whether it is the body endowed with consciousness, the overlord, pure self, or some other entity regarding which there are many divergences of opinion. Verikata urges that if the self-revelation of Brahman is beginningless it cannot depend on our making any inquiry about it. All that depends on causes and conditions must be regarded as an effect and in that sense Brahma-revelation would be an effect which is decidedly against Sarikara's intention. Thus, therefore, an inquiry regarding the general and specific nature of Brahman cannot deal with its own real pure nature. If, therefore, it is urged by the Sarikarites that this inquiry does not concern the real nature of Brahman, but only a false appearance of Brahman {upahita-svariipa), then the knowledge derived from this inquiry would also be of this false appearance and nothing would be gained by this false knowledge. Again, when Brahman is partless and self-re-

vealing, there cannot be any meaning in knowing it in a general manner or in a specific manner, for no such distinction can be made in it. It must be known in its entirety or not known at all; there cannot be any distinction of parts such that there may be scope for different grades of knowledge in it. All inquiry (jijnasa) however must imply that its object is known generally but that greater detail is sought; since Sarikara's unqualified homogeneous Brahman cannot be the object of such an inquiry, no such Brahman can be sought. Therefore, an inquiry can only be regarding a qualified object about which general or special knowledge is possible. The Sarikarites cannot legitimately urge that a distinction of general and specific knowledge is possible in their view; for it may be maintained that, though the Brahman may be known in a general manner, there is room for knowing it in its character as different from the illusory appearances, since if Brahman has no specific nature it is not possible to know it in a general manner (nirvisese sdmanya-ni-sedhah). If it is urged that the knowledge of the world-appearance as false is the knowledge of Brahman, then there would be no difference between Vedanta and the nihilism of Nagarjuna.

Third Objection. Verikata here introduces the oft-repeated arguments in favour of the doctrine of the theory of Jnana-karma-samuccaya as against the view of Sarikara that a wise man has no duties.

Fourth Objection. Verikata here says that all errors and illusions do not vanish merely by the knowledge that all world-appearance is false. The performance of the scriptural duties is absolutely necessary even when the highest knowledge is attained. This is well illustrated in the ordinary experience of a jaundiced person where the illusion of yellow is not removed merely by the knowledge of its falsity but by taking medicines which overcome the jaundice. Ultimate salvation can be obtained only by worshipping and adoring God the supreme Lord and not by a mere revelation of any philosophical wisdom. It is impossible to attain the final emancipation merely by listening to the unity texts, for had it been so then Sarikara himself must have attained it. If he did so, he would have been merged in Brahman and would not have been in a position to explain his view to his pupils. The view that the grasping of the meaning of the unity texts is an immediate perception is also untenable, for our ordinary experience shows that scriptural know-

308 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

ledge is verbal knowledge and as such cannot be regarded as immediate and direct perception.

Fifth Objection. Sarikara's reply to the above objection is that though the final knowledge of the identity of all things with self be attained yet the illusion of world-appearance may still continue until the present body be destroyed. To this Venkata asks that if avidya be destroyed through right knowledge, how can the world-appearance still continue? If it is urged that though the avidya be destroyed the root-impressions (vasana) may still persist, then it may be replied that if the vasana be regarded as possessing true existence then the theory of monism fails. If vasana is regarded as forming part of Brahman, then the Brahman itself would be contaminated by association with it. If vasana is, however, regarded as a product of avidya, then it should be destroyed with the destruction of avidya. Again, if the vasana persists even after the destruction of avidya, how is it to be destroyed at all? If it can be destroyed of itself, then the avidya may as well be destroyed of itself. Thus there is no reason why the vasana and its product, the world-appearance, should persist after the destruction of avidya and the realization of Brahma-knowledge.

Seventh Objection. Sankara and his followers say that the utterance of the unity text produces a direct and immediate perception of the highest truth in the mind of a man chastened by the acquirement of the proper qualifications for listening to the Vedantic instructions. That the hearing of the unity texts produces the immediate and direct perception of the nature of self as Brahman has to be admitted, since there is no other way by which this could be explained. To this \ eiikata replies that if this special case of realization of the purport of the unity texts be admitted as a case of direct perception through the instrumentality of verbal audition only because there is no other means through which the pure knowledge of Brahman could be realized, then inference and the auditory knowledge of other words may equally well be regarded as leading to direct perception, for they also must be regarded as the only causes of the manifestation of pure knowledge. Moreover, if the causes of verbal knowledge be there, how is that knowledge to be prevented, and how is the direct and immediate perception to be produced from a collocation of causes which can never produce it? Any knowledge gained at a particular time cannot be regarded

as the revelation of one individuated consciousness which is identical with all knowledge of all times or of all persons, and therefore the words which may lead to any such knowledge cannot be regarded as producing any such immediate realization {aparoksyd). If it is held that there is no other cause leading to the realization of pure consciousness apart from what leads to the apprehension of the specific forms of such consciousness, then the same is true of all means of knowledge, and as such it would be true of inference and of verbal expressions other than the unity texts. It is not possible therefore to adduce for the unity texts claims which may not be possessed by other ordinary verbal expressions and inferential knowledge. In the case of such phrases as "You are the tenth," if the person addressed had already perceived that he was the tenth, then the understanding of the meaning of such a phrase would only mean a mere repetition of all that was understood by such a perception; if, however, such a person did not perceive the fact of his being the tenth person, then the communication of this fact was done by the verbal expression and this so far cannot be regarded as direct, immediate or perceptual. It may be noted in this connection that though the object of knowledge may remain the same, yet the knowledge attained may be different on account of the ways of its communication. Thus, the same object may be realized perceptually in some part and non-perceptually in another part. Again, though Brahman is admittedly realized in direct perception, yet at the time of its first apprehension from such verbal phrases as "Thou art he" it is a verbal cognition, and at the second moment a realization is ushered in which is immediate and direct. But if the first cognition be not regarded as direct and immediate, why should the second be so? Again, the position taken by Sankara is that since disappearance of the falsity of world-appearance cannot be explained otherwise, the communication imparted by the understanding of the unity texts must be regarded as being immediate; for falsehood is removed by the direct and immediate realization of the real. But the world is not false; if it is regarded as false because it is knowable, then Brahman, being knowable, would also be false. Again, if the world-appearance be regarded as false, there is no meaning in saying that such an appearance is destroyed by right knowledge; for that which never exists cannot be destroyed. If it is held that the world-appearance is not destroyed but only its knowledge

310 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

ceases, then it may be pointed out that a false knowledge may cease naturally with the change of one's mental state, just as the illusion of false silver may cease in deep dreamless sleep, or it may be removed by inferential and other kinds of cognition. There is no necessary implication that false knowledge must be removed only by direct and immediate knowledge. Again, if it is held that the cessation of the world-appearance means the destruction of its cause, then the reply is that no direct realization of reality is possible unless the cause itself is removed by some other means. So long as there is a pressure on the retina from the fingers there will be the appearance of two moons. Thus it is meaningless to suppose that it is only by direct and immediate perception that the falsity of the world-appearance would cease. If the removal of the falsity of world-appearance simply means that the rise of a knowledge is contradictory to it, then that can be done even by indirect knowledge, just as the false perception of two moons may be removed by the testimony of other persons that there is only one moon. But not only is the world not false and therefore cannot be removed, but verbal knowledge cannot be regarded as leading to immediate perception; even if it did, there must be other accessory conditions working along with it, just as in the case of visual perception, attention, mental alertness, and other physical conditions are regarded as accessory factors. Thus, mere verbal knowledge by itself cannot bring about immediate realization. Nor is it correct to suppose that perceptual knowledge cannot be contradicted by non-perceptual knowledge, for it is well known that the notion of one continuous flame of a lamp is negated by the consideration that there cannot be a continuous flame and that what so appears is in reality but a series of different flames coming in succession. Thus, even if the realization of the purport of unity texts be regarded as a case of direct perception, there is no guarantee that it could not be further contradicted by other forms of knowledge.

Tenth Objection. In refuting the reality of pure contentless consciousness, Venkata urges that even if such a thing existed it could not manifest by itself its own nature as reality, for if it did it could no longer be regarded as formless; since if it demonstrated the falsity of all content, such content would be a constituent part of it. If its reality were demonstrated by other cognitions, then it was obviously not self-luminous. Then, again, it may be asked, to

whom does this pure consciousness manifest itself? The reply of the Sankarites is that it does not reveal itself to this or that person but its very existence is its realization. But such a reply would be far from what is normally understood by the term manifestation, for a manifestation must be for some person. The chief objection against the existence of a contentless consciousness is that no such thing can be experienced by us and therefore its priority and superiority or its power of illuminating the content imposed upon it cannot also be admitted. The illustration of bliss in the deep dreamless sleep is of no use; for if in that state the pure contentless consciousness was experienced as bliss, that could not be in the form of a subjective experience of bliss, as it could not be called contentless. A later experience after rising from sleep could not communicate to the perceiver that he was experiencing contentless consciousness for a long period, as there is no recognition of it and the fact of recognition would be irreconcilable to its so-called contentless character.

Eleventh Objection. In attempting to refute the existence of indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa) Venkata says that the so-called indeterminate knowledge refers to a determinate object {nirvikal-pakam api savisesa-visayakameva). Even at the very first moment of sense-contact it is the object as a whole with its manifold qualities that is grasped by the senses and it is such an object that is elaborated later on in conceptual forms. The special feature of the nirvikalpa stage is that in this stage of cognition no special emphasis is given to any of the aspects or qualities of the object. If, however, the determinate characters did not in reality form the object of the cognition, such characters could never be revealed in any of the later stages of cognition and the nirvikalpa could never develop into the savikalpa state. The characters are perceived in the first stage, but these characters assume the determinate form when in the later moments other similar characters are remembered. Thus a pure indeterminate entity can never be the object of perception.

Twelfth Objection. The contention of the Sankarite is that perception is directly concerned with pure being, and it is through nescience that the diverse forms are later on associated with it, and through such association they also seemingly appear as being directly perceived. Venkata says that both being and its characters are simultaneously perceived by our senses, for they form part of

312 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

the same object that determines our knowledge. Even universals can be the objects of our direct knowledge: it is only when these universals are distinguished from one another at a later moment that a separate mental operation involving its diverse functions becomes necessary. Again, if perception only referred to indeterminate being, how then can the experience of the diverse objects and their relative differentiation be explained?

Thirteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Sarikara school that the apprehension of "difference" either as a category or as a character is false, Verikata says that the experience of "difference " is universal and as such cannot be denied. Even the much-argued "absence of difference" is itself different from "difference" and thus proves the existence of difference. Any attempt to refute "difference" would end in refuting identity as well; for these two are relative, and if there is no difference, there is no identity. Verikata urges that a thing is identical with itself and different from others, and in this way both identity and difference have to be admitted.

Fourteenth Objection. The Sarikarites say that the world-appearance, being cognizable, is false like the conch-shell-silver. But what is meant by the assertion that the world is false? It cannot be chimerical like the hare's horn, for that would be contrary to our experience and the Sarikarite would not himself admit it. It cannot mean that the world is something which is different from both being and non-being, for no such entity is admitted by us. It cannot also mean that the world-appearance can be negated even where it seems to be real (pratipanno-padhau nisedha-pratiyogitvatn), for if this negation cannot further be negated, then it must be either of the nature of Brahman and therefore false as world-appearance or different from it. The first alternative is admitted by us in the sense that the world is a part of Brahman. If the world-appearance can be negated and it is at the same time admitted to be identical with Brahman, then the negation would apply to Brahman itself. If the second alternative is taken, then since its existence is implied as a condition or explication of the negation, it itself cannot be denied. It cannot also be said that falsity means the appearance of the world in an entity where it does not exist {sva-tyanta-bhava-samana-dhikaranataya pratiyamanatvam), for such a falsity of the world as not existing where it appears cannot be understood by

perception, and if there is no perception for its ground no inference is also possible. If all perception is to be regarded as false, all inference would be impossible. It is said that world-appearance is false because it is different from the ultimate reality, the Brahman. Verikata, in answer to this, says that he admits the world to be different from the Brahman though it has no existence independent and separable from it. Still, if it is argued that the world is false because it is different from reality, the reply is that there may be different realities. If it is held that since Brahman alone is real, its negation would necessarily be false, then the reply is that if Brahman is real its negation is also real. The being or reality that is attributed by Verikata to the world is that it is amenable to proof (pramanika). Truth is defined by Ramanuja as that which is capable of being dealt with pragmatically (vyavahara-yogyata sattvam), and the falsity of the assertion that the world is false is understood by the actual perception of the reality of the world. Again, the falsity of the world cannot be attempted to be proved by logical proof, for these fall within the world and would therefore be themselves false. Again, it may be said that Brahman is also in some sense knowable and so also is the world; it may be admitted for argument's sake that Brahman is not knowable in an ultimate sense (para?narthika), so the world also is not knowable in an ultimate sense; for, if it were, the Sarikai ite could not call it false. If that is so, how could the Sarikarite argue that the world is false because it is knowable, for in that case Brahman would also be false?

Sixteenth Objection. Again, it may be argued that the objects of the world are false because, though being remains the same, its content always varies. Thus we may say a jug exists, a cloth exists, but though these so-called existents change, "being" alone remains unchanged. Therefore the changeable entities are false and the unchangeable alone is real. Now it may be asked: what is the meaning of this change? It cannot mean any difference of identity, for in that case Brahman being different from other entities could be regarded as false. If, however, Brahman be regarded as identical with the false world, Brahman itself would be false, or the world-appearance would be real being identical with the real Brahman. Spatial or temporal change can have nothing to do with determining falsehood; the conch-shell-silver is not false because it does not exist elsewhere. Brahman itself is changeable in the sense tha t

3 H Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

it does not exist as unreal or as an entity which is neither being nor non-being. Change cannot here legitimately be used in the sense of destruction, for, even when the illusion of conch-shell-silver is discovered, no one says that the conch-shell-silver is destroyed (badha-rinasayor riviktatayaVva ryutpatteh). Destruction (rinasa) is the dissolution of an entity, whereas zadha or contradiction is the negation of what was perceived. In such phrases as "a jug exists" or "a cloth exists," the existence qualifies jug and cloth, but jug and cloth do not qualify existence. Again, though Brahman abides everywhere, it does not cause in us the cognition "jug exists" or "cloth exists." Again, temporal variation in existence depends upon the cause of such existence, but it cannot render the existence of anything false. If non-illumination at any particular time be regarded as the criterion of falsehood, then Brahman also is false for it does not reveal itself before the dawn of emancipation. If it is held that Brahman is always self-revealing, but its revelation remains somehow hidden until emancipation is attained, then it may be said with the same force that the jug and the cloth also remain revealed in a hidden manner in the same way. Again, the eternity of illumination, or its uncontradicted nature, cannot be regarded as a criterion of reality, for it is faultlessness that is the cause of the eternity of self-illumination, and this has nothing to do with determining the nature of existence. Since the ordinary things, such as a jug or a cloth, appear as existent at some time, they are manifestations of the self-illumination and therefore real.

An opposite argument mav also be adduced here. Thus, it may be said that that which is not false does not break its continuity or does not change. Brahman is false, for it is without any continuity with anything else, and is different from everything else.

Seventeenth Objection. The Saiikarites hold that since it is impossible to explain the existence of any relation (whatever may be its nature) between the perceiver and the perceived, the perceived entity or the content of knowledge has to be admitted as false. In reply to this Veiikata says that the falsity of the world cannot be adduced as a necessary implication (arthapatti), for the establishment of a relation between the perceiver and the perceived is possible not by denying the latter but by affirming it. If, however, it is said that since the relation between the perceiver and the perceived can be logically proved chimerical, the necessary deduction

is that the perceived entity is false. To this the reply is that the falsity of the relation does not prove the falsity of the relata; the relation between a hare and a horn may be non-existent, but that will not indicate that both the hare and the horn are themselves non-existent. Following that argument, the perceiver might just as well be declared as false. If, however, it is contended that the perceiver, being self-luminous, is self-evident and cannot therefore be supposed to be false, the reply is, that even if, in the absence of the act of perceiving, the perceiver may be regarded as self-revealing, what harm is there in admitting the perceived to have the same status even when the perceiver is denied? If, however, it is said that the cognition of objects cannot be admitted to be self-established in the same way as the objects themselves, it may be asked if consciousness is ever perceived to be self-revealed. If it is said that the self-revealing character of consciousness can be established by inference, then by a counter-contention it may be held that the self-revealing character of the universe can also be proved by a suitable inference. It may again be questioned whether, if the Sarikarite wishes to establish the self-revealing nature of Brahman by inference, its objectivity can be denied, and thus the original thesis that Brahman cannot be the object of any process of cognition must necessarily fail.

The Sarikarite may indeed contend that the followers of Rama-nuja also admit that the objects are revealed by the cognition of the self and hence they are dependent on the perceiver. The reply to such a contention is that the followers of Ramanuja admit the existence of self-consciousness by which the perceiver himself is regarded as cognized. If this self-consciousness is regarded as false, then the self-luminous self would also be false; and if this self-consciousness be admitted as real, then the relation between them is real. If the self-revealing consciousness be regarded as impossible of perception and yet real, then on the same analogy the world may as well be regarded as real though unperceived.

The objection that the known is regarded as false, since it is difficult logically to conceive the nature of the relation subsisting between the knower and the known, is untenable, for merely on account of the difficulty of conceiving the logical nature of the relation one cannot deny the realit)' of the related entity which is incontestably given in experience. Therefore the relation has some-

316 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

how to be admitted. If relation is admitted to be real because it is experienced, then the world is also real because it is also experienced. If the world is false because it is inexplicable, then falsity itself would be false because it is inexplicable.

The objection that there can be no relation between the past and the future is groundless, for the very fact that two things exist in the present time would not mean that they are necessarily related, e.g. the hare and the horn. If, however, it is said that it may be true that things which exist in the present time are not necessarily related, yet there are certain entities at present which are related, so also there are certain things in the present which are related with certain other things in the past and the future. It is no doubt true that the relation of contact is not possible between things of the present and the future, but that does not affect our case, for certain relations exist between entities at present, and certain other relations exist between entities in the present and the future. What relations exist in the present, past and future have to be learnt by experience. If spatial contiguity be a special feature of entities at present, temporal contiguity would hold between entities in present, past and future. However, relation does not necessarily mean contiguity; proximity and remoteness may both condition the relation. Relations are to be admitted just as they are given by experience, and are indefinable and unique in their specific nature. Any attempt to explain them through mediation would end in a conflict with experience. If an attempt is made to refute all relations as such on the ground that relations would imply further relations and thus involve a vicious infinite, the reply is that the attempt to refute a relation itself involves relation and therefore according to the opponent's own supposition stands cancelled. A relation stands by itself and does not depend on other relations for its existence.

Eighteenth Objection. In refuting the view of the Sarikarites that self-luminous Brahman cannot have as an object of illumination anything that is external to it, Verikata argues that if nescience be itself inherent in Brahman from beginningless time, then there would be no way for Brahman to extricate itself from its clutches and emancipation would be impossible. Then the question may be asked, whether the avidya is different from Brahman or not. If it be different, then the monism of the Saiikara philosophy breaks

down; if it be non-different, then also on the one hand Brahman could not free itself from it and on the other hand there could be no evolution of the avidya which has merged itself in the nature of the Brahman, into the various forms of egoism, passions, etc. If this avidya be regarded as false and therefore incapable of binding the free nature of Brahman, the objection may still be urged that, if this falsehood covers the nature of Brahman, how can it regain its self-luminosity; and if it cannot do so, that would mean its destruction, for self-luminosity is the very nature of Brahman. If the avidya stands as an independent entity and covers the nature of Brahman, then it would be difficult to conceive how the existence of a real entity can be destroyed by mere knowledge. According to Ramanuja's view, however, knowledge is a quality or a characteristic of Brahman by which other things are known by it; experience also shows that a knower reveals the objects by his knowledge, and thus knowledge is a characteristic quality of the knower by which the objects are known.

Nineteenth Objection. In refuting the view of Sankara that ignorance or avidya rests in Brahman, Venkata tries to clarify the concept of ajnana. He says that ajnana here cannot mean the absolute negation of the capacity of being the knower; for this capacity, being the essence of Brahman, cannot be absent. It {ajnana) cannot also mean the ignorance that precedes the rise of any cognition, for the Sankarites do not admit knowledge as a quality or a characteristic of Brahman; nor can it mean the negation of any particular knowledge, for the Brahman-consciousness is the only consciousness admitted by the Sankarites. This ajnana cannot also be regarded as the absence of knowledge, since it is admitted to be a positive entity. The ajnana which can be removed by knowledge must belong to the same knower who has the knowledge and must refer to the specific object regarding which there was absence of knowledge. Now since Brahman is not admitted by the Sankarites to be knower, it is impossible that any ajnana could be associated with it. The view that is held by the members of the Ramanuja school is that the individual knowers possess ignorance in so far as they are ignorant of their real nature as self-luminous entities, and in so far as they associate themselves with their bodies, their senses, their passions, and other prejudices and ideas. When they happen to discover their

318 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

folly, their ignorance is removed. It is only in this way that it can be said to be removed by knowledge. But all this would be impossible in the case of Brahman conceived as pure consciousness. According to the view of Ramanuja's school, individual knowers are all in their essential natures omniscient; it is the false prejudice and passions that cover up this omniscience whereby they appear as ordinary knowers who can know things only under specific conditions.

Twentieth Objection. Vehkata, in refuting the definition of immediate intuition (anubhiiti) as that which may be called immediate perception without being further capable of being an object of awareness (avedyatve sati aparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatvam), as given by Citsukhacarya in his Tattva-pradipika, raises certain objections against it as follows. It is urged by the Sahkarites that if the immediate intuition be itself an object of further cognitive action, then it loses its status as immediate intuition and may be treated as an object like other objects, e.g. a jug. If by the words "immediate intuition" it is meant that at the time of its operation it is self-expressed and does not stand in need of being revealed by another cognition, then this is also admitted by Ramanuja. Furthermore, this intuition at the time of its self-revelation involves with it the revelation of the self of the knower as well. Therefore, so far as this meaning of intuition is concerned, the denial of self-revelation is out of place.

The words "immediate intuition" {anubhiiti) are supposed to have another meaning, viz. that the intuition is not individuated in separate individual cognitions as limited by time, space or individual laws. But such an intuition is never experienced, for not only do we infer certain cognitions as having taken place in certain persons or being absent in them, but we also speak of our own cognitions as present in past and future, such as "I know it," "I knew it" and the like, which prove that cognitions are temporally limited. It may be asked whether this immediate intuition reveals Brahman or anything else; if it reveals Brahman, then it certainly has an object. If it is supposed that in doing so it simply reveals that which has already been self-ex pressed, even then it will be expressive of something though that something stood already expressed. This would involve a contradiction between the two terms of the thesis avedyatve sati aparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatvam,

for, following the arguments given above, though the Brahman may be regarded as immediate, yet it has been shown to be capable of being made an object of intuition. If on the other alternative this intuition expresses something else than Brahman, that would bring the opponent to a conclusion not intended by him and contradictory as well.

Just as one may say that one knows a jug or a cloth or an orange, so one may say that one knows another man's awareness or one's own. In this way an awareness can be the object of another awareness just as another object. Again, if one cannot be aware of another man's awareness, the use of language for mental understanding should cease.

If the immediate intuition itself cannot be made an object of awareness, that would mean that it is not known at all and consequently its existence would be chimerical. It cannot be urged that chimerical entities are not perceivable because they are chimerical, but entities do not become chimerical because they cannot be perceived, for the concomitance in the former proposition is not conditional. The Sankarites would not hold that all entities other than immediate intuition are chimerical. It may also be held that chimerical entities are not immediate intuition because they are chimerical ; but in that case it may also be held that these objects (e.g. a jug) are not immediate intuition because of their specific characters as jug, etc. The whole point that has to be emphasized here is that the ordinary objects are other than immediate intuition, not because they can be known but because of their specific characters. The reason that an entity cannot be called immediate intuition if it can be known is entirely faulty 1 .

If, again, Brahman is manifest as only immediate intuition, then neither the scriptures nor philosophy can in any way help us regarding the nature of Brahman.

Twenty-first Objection. The Sankarites deny the production of individual cognitions. In their view all the various forms of so-called cognitions arise through the association of various modes of avidya with the self-luminous pure consciousness. In refuting this view Venkata urges that the fact that various cognitions arise in time is testified by universal experience. If the pure consciousness be always present and if individual cognitions are denied, then all

1 Sata-da^anl, 11. 78.

320 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

objects ought to be manifested simultaneously. If, however, it is ascertained that though the pure consciousness is always present yet the rise of various cognitions is conditioned by other collocating causal circumstances, the reply is that such an infinite number of causal conditions conditioning the pure consciousness would be against the dictum of the Saiikarites themselves, for this would be in conflict with their uncompromising monism. Now if, again, it is held that the cognitive forms do really modify the nature of pure consciousness, then the pure consciousness becomes changeable, which is against the thesis of Sarikara. If it is held that the forms are imposed on pure consciousness as it is and by such impositions the specific objects are in their turn illuminated by consciousness, then the position is that in order that an object may be illuminated such illumination must be mediated by a false imposition on the nature of pure consciousness. If the direct illumination of objects is impossible, then another imposition might be necessary to mediate the other false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, and that might require another, and this would result in a vicious infinite. If the imposition is not false, then the consciousness becomes changeable and the old objection would recur. If, however, it is urged that the objects are illuminated independent of any collocating circumstances and independent of any specific contribution from the nature of the pure consciousness, then all objects (since they are all related to pure consciousness) might simultaneously be revealing. If, again, all cognitions are but false impositions on the nature of pure consciousness, then at the time of an illusory imposition of a particular cognition, say, a jug, nothing else would exist, and this would bring about nihilism. It may also be asked, if the Saiikarite is prepared to deny the world on account of the impossibility of any relation subsisting between it and the perceiver, how can he launch himself into an attempt to explain the relation of such a world with Brahman?

On the other hand, the experience of us all testifies to the fact that we are aware of cognitions coming into being, staying, passing away, and having passed and gone from us; except in the case of perceptual experience, there is no difficulty in being aware of past and future events; so the objection that the present awareness cannot be related to past and future events is invalid. The objection that there cannot be awareness of past or future entities because

they are not existing now is invalid, for past and future entities also exist in their own specific temporal relations. Validity of awareness consists in the absence of contradiction and not in the fact of its relating to an entity of the present moment, for otherwise an illusory perception of the present moment would have to be considered as valid. Thus, since it is possible to be aware of an awareness that was not there but which comes into being both by direct and immediate acquaintance and by inference, the view of the Sankarites denying the origination of individual awareness is invalid. In the view of Ramanuja, knowledge is no doubt admitted to be eternal; yet this knowledge is also admitted to have specific temporal characters and also specific states. Therefore, so far as these characters or states are concerned, origination and cessation would be possible under the influence of specific collocative circumstances. Again, the objection that since pure consciousness is beginningless it cannot suffer changes is invalid, for the Sarikarites admit avidya also as beginningless and yet changeable. It may also be pointed out in this connection that the so-called contentless consciousness is never given in experience. Even the consciousness in dreamless sleep or in a swoon is related to the perceiver and therefore not absolutely contentless.

Twenty-second Objection. It is urged by the Sarikarites that the pure consciousness is unchanging because it is not produced. If, however, the word unchanging means that it never ceases to exist, it may be pointed out that the Sankarites admit ajnana to be un-produced and yet liable to destruction. Thus there is no reason why a thing should not be liable to destruction because it is not produced. If it is urged that the destruction of avidya is itself false, then it may be pointed out with the same force that the destruction of all things is false. Moreover, since the Sankarites do not admit any change to be real, the syllogism adduced by them that an entity which is unproduced is not changeable falls to the ground. The difference between Sarikara's conception of Brahman and that of Ramanuja is that according to the former Brahman is absolutely unchangeable and characterless, and according to the latter the Brahman is the absolute, containing within it the world and the individual beings and all the changes involved in them. It is unchangeable only in so far as all the dynamical change rises from within and there is nothing else outside it which can affect it. That

322 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

is, the absolute, though changeable within it, is absolutely self-contained and self-sustained, and is entirely unaffected by anything outside it.

Twenty-third Objection. The Sarikarites urge that since consciousness is unproduced it cannot be many, for whatever is many is produced, e.g. the jug. If it is a pure consciousness which appears as many through the conditioning factors of avidva, it may be asked in this connection whether, if the pure consciousness cannot be differentiated from anything else, it may as well be one with the body also, which is contrary to Sarikara's thesis. If, however, it is replied that the so-called difference between the body and the pure consciousness is only a false difference, then it would have to be admitted and that would militate against the changeless character of Brahman as held by the Sarikarites. Again, if the real difference between the body and the pure consciousness be denied, then it may be urged that the proposition following from it is that things which in reality differ are produced (e.g. the jug); but according to the Saiikarites jug, etc., are also not different from Brahman, and thus a proposition like the above cannot be quoted in support. Moreover, since the avidya is unproduced, it follows that according to the maxim of the Saiikarites it would not be different from Brahman which, however, the Saiikarites would undoubtedly be slow to accept. It cannot also be held that an awareness does not differ from another awareness on the supposition that different awarenesses are but seeming forms imposed upon the same consciousness, for so long as we speak of difference we speak only of apparent difference and of apparent divergent forms; and if the apparent divergent forms are admitted, it cannot be said that thev are not different. Again, ir is urged that the same moon appears as many through wavy water, so it is the same awareness that appears as many, though these are identically one. To this the reply is that the analogy is false. The image-moon is not identical with the moon, so the appearances are not identical with awareness. If it is said that all image-moons are false, then on the same analogy all awarenesses may be false and then if only one consciousness be true as a ground of all awarenesses then all awarenesses may be said to be equally true or equally false. Again, as to the view that the principle of consciousness as such does not differ from individual cognitions, such a position is untenable, because the Ramanujists

do not admit the existence of an abstract principle of consciousness; with them all cognitions are specific and individual. It may be pointed out in this connection that according to the Ramanujists consciousness exists in the individuals as eternal qualities, i.e. it may suffer modification according to conditions and circumstances.

Twenty-fourth Objection. In objecting to the unqualified character of pure consciousness Venkata says that to be unqualified is also a qualification. It differs from other qualities only in being negative. Negative qualifications ought to be deemed as objectionable as the positive ones. Again, Brahman is admitted by the Sankarites to be absolute and unchangeable, and these are qualifications. If it is replied that these qualifications are also false, then their opposite qualifications would hold good, viz. Brahman would be admitted as changeable. Again, it may be asked how this unqualified character of Brahman is established. If it is not established by reason, the assumption is invalid; if it is established by reason, then that reason must exist in Brahman and it will be qualified by it (the reason).

Twenty-fifth Objection. Venkata denies the assumption of the Sankarites that consciousness is the self because it reveals it to itself on the ground that if whatever reveals it to itself or whatever stands self-revealed is to be called the self, then pleasure and pain also should be identical with the self, for these are self-revealed. Venkata further urges that the revelation of knowledge is not absolutely unconditional because revelation is made to the perceiver's self and not to anything and everything, a fact which shows that it is conditioned by the self. It may also be pointed out that the revelation of knowledge is not made to itself but to the self on one hand and to the objects on the other in the sense that they form constituents of knowledge. Again, it is testified by universal experience that consciousness is different from the self. It may also be asked whether, if consciousness be identical with the self, this consciousness is unchangeable or changeable. Would later recognition be impossible? In the former alternative it may further be asked whether this unchanging consciousness has any support or not; if not, how can it stand unsupported? If it has a support, then that support may well be taken as the knower, as is done by the Ramanujists. It may also be pointed out h6re that knowledge being

324 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

a character or a quality cannot be identified with that (viz. the self) which possesses that character.

Twenty-sixth Objection. The Saiikarites assert that the self is pure consciousness. Therefore the perception of self as "I" is false, and therefore this notion of " I" is obsolete both in dreamless sleep and emancipation. To this Veiikata's reply is that if the notion of "I" is obsolete in dreamless sleep, then the continuity of self-consciousness is impossible. It is no doubt true that in dreamless sleep the notion of the self as "I" is not then manifestly experienced, but it is not on that account non-existent at the time, for the continuity of the self as "I" is necessarily implied in the fact that it is experienced both before the dreamless sleep and after it. Since it is manifestly experienced both before and after the dreamless sleep, it must be abiding even at the time of the sleep. And this self-consciousness itself refers to the past and the present as a continuity. If this ego-notion was annihilated during the dreamless sleep, then the continuity of experience could not be explained {rnadhye ca'hama-rtha-bhave samskara-dhara-bhavat, pratisandhana-bhava-prasangas ca). It is a patent fact that in the absence of the knower neither ignorance nor knowledge can exist. It cannot also be said that the continuity of experience is transmitted to pure consciousness or avidya during the dreamless sleep; for the pure consciousness cannot be a repository of experiences, and if avidya. is the repository it would be the knower, which is impossible; and the fact of recognition would be unexplainable, for the experience associated with avidya cannot be remembered by the entity to which the ego-notion refers. Moreover, the experience of a man rising from sleep who feels "I slept happily so long" indicates that the entity referred to by the ego-notion was also experienced during the sleep. Even the experience referring to the state in dreamless sleep as "I slept so soundly that I even did not know myself" also indicates that the self was experienced at that time as being ignorant of its specific bodily and other spatial and temporal relations. It cannot be contended that the entity denoted by the ego-notion cannot abide even in emancipation, for if there was no entity in emancipation no one would attempt to attain to this stage. The existence of pure qualityless consciousness at the time of emancipation would mean the annihilation of the self, and no one would ever be interested in his own self-destruction. Moreover, if the entity

denoted by the ego-notion is not a real entity, then the view (often put forward by the Sankarites) that the entity denoted by the ego-notion is often falsely identified with the body or the senses would be meaningless. If the illusion be due to a false imposition of false appearances, such as the body or the senses, on the pure consciousness, then that cannot be called the delusion of the ego-entity as the body and the senses. It cannot also be said that in the experience of the self as "I" there are two parts, the pure consciousness which is eternal and real and the egohood which is a mere false appearance. For if it is so in the ego-experience it might also be so in other experiences as objectivity as this or that. Moreover, if this is so, what is there to distinguish the specific experience as subjectivity from the experience as objectivity? What is it that constitutes the special feature of subjectivity? Thus it may be confidently stated that the ego-entity is the real nature of the self.

Twenty-seventh Objection. It is urged by the Sankarites that the notion of the self as the knower is false because the ultimate reality, being the self-luminous Brahman, is absolutely unchangeable. The attribution of the characteristic of being a knower would be incompatible with this nature. To this it may be replied that if the fact of being a knower is regarded as a changeable character, then being or self-luminosity would also be a character, and chey also would be incompatible with this nature. The change of the states of knowledge does not in any way affect the unchangeable nature of the self, for the self is not changed along with the change of the cognitions.

Twenty-eighth Objection. It is well known that the Sankarites conceive of pure consciousness which is regarded as the witness (saksin), as it were, of all appearances and forms that are presented to it, and it is through its function as such a witness that these are revealed. It is through this sa/e : «-consciousness that the continuity of consciousness is maintained, and during dreamless sleep the blissfulness that is experienced is also made apparent to this saksi-consciousness. The Ramanujists deny this sa/e«-consciousness because it is unnecessary for them; its purpose is served by the functions of a knower whose consciousness is regarded as continuous in the waking state, in dreams, and also in dreamless sleep. Venkata urges that the manifestation of blissfulness which is one with pure consciousness is implied by the very nature of pure consciousness as self-revealed. It may also be pointed out that the sensuous

326 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

pleasures cannot be manifested during dreamless sleep; if this is so, why should a ^^/-consciousness be admitted for explaining the experience of blissfulness during dreamless sleep? Since Brahman is not admitted to be a real knower, the conception of saksin is not the same as that of a knower. It cannot also be a mere revelation; for if it be a revelation of itself as Brahman, then the mediation of the function of ^^'-consciousness is unnecessary, and if it be of avidya, then through its association Brahman would be false. It cannot be that the functioning of the safoZ-consciousness is one with the nature of Brahman, and yet that partakes of the nature of avidya; for it cannot both be identical with Brahman and the avidya. If the functioning of the ^^/-consciousness be false, a number of other saksins is to be admitted, leading to a vicious infinite. Thus in whatsoever way one may try to conceive of the ^^/-consciousness, one fails to reconcile it either with reason or with experience.

Twenty-ninth and thirtieth Objections. Venkata urges that the Sankarites are wrong in asserting that scriptural testimony is superior in validity to perceptual experience. As a matter of fact, scriptural knowledge is not possible without perceptual experience. Therefore scriptures are to be interpreted in such a way that they do not come into conflict with the testimony of perceptual knowledge. Therefore, since the perception proves to us the reality of the many around us, the scriptural interpretation that would try to convince us of their falsity is certainly invalid. The Sankarites further urge and adduce many false illustrations to prove the possibility of attaining right knowledge through false means (e.g. the fear that arises from the perception of false snakes, representations of things that are made by letters, and the combinations of letters which are combinations of lines). But Venkata's reply to it is that in all those cases where falsehood is supposed to lead us to truth it is not through falsehood that we come to truth but from one right knowledge to another. It is because the lines stand as true symbols for certain things that they are represented by them, and it is not possible to adduce any illustration in which falsehood may be supposed to lead us to truth. If, therefore, scriptures are false (in the ultimate sense) as Saiikarites would say, it would be impossible for them to lead us to the true Brahma-knowledge.

Thirty-first Objection. The view of the Sankarites that the emancipation may be attained by right knowledge even in this life

before death, called by them Jivanmukti or emancipation in life, is denied by the Ramanujists, who hold that emancipation cannot be attained by right knowledge but by right actions and right feelings associated with right knowledge, and consequently emancipation is the result. Real separation of the association of the worldly things from the self can only come about after the body ceases to exist. Verikata points out that, so long as the body remains, perception of the ultimate truth as one is impossible, for such a person is bound to be aware of the existence of the body and its manifold relations. If it be said that though the body persists yet it may be regarded as absolutely false or non-existent, then that would amount to one's being without any body and the distinction of emancipation in life and emancipation in death would be impossible.

Thirty-second Objection. The Sarikarites assert that ajnana or ignorance, though opposed to knowledge, is a positive entity as it is revealed as such by perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Verikata, in refusing this, says that if ajnana be regarded as opposed to knowledge, it can only be so if it negates knowledge, i.e. if it be of the nature of negation. Such a negation must then obviously refer to a content of knowledge; and if this be admitted then the content of knowledge must have been known, for otherwise the negation cannot refer to it. To this the Sarikarites are supposed to say that the negation of knowledge and the content to which it refers are two independent entities such that the experience of the negation of knowledge does not necessarily imply that the content should be known. Therefore it is wrong to say that the negation of knowledge is a contradiction in terms. To this the obvious reply is that as in the case of a negation, where the presence of the object of negation contradicts a negation, so when there is a negation of all contents of knowledge the presence of any content necessarily contradicts it. So the experience that "I do not know anything" would be contradicted by any knowledge whatsoever. If it is urged that a negation of knowledge and its experience may be at two different moments so that the experience and the negation may not be contradictory, the reply is that perceptual experience always grasps things which are existent at the present time. Though in the case of the supposed perception of ajnana during dreamless sleep the experience of ajnana may be supposed to be

328 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

known by inference, and in cases of such perception as " I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or anything else," there is obviously perceptual experience of ajiiana. It is, therefore, impossible that "I" should perceive and be at the same time ignorant. Perception of ignorance would thus be absurd. Again, the experience of a negation necessarily must refer to a locus, and this implies that there is a knowledge of the locus and that this would contradict the experience of a universal negation which is devoid of all knowledge. It may, however, be urged that the perception of ignorance is not the experience of a negation, but that of a positive entity, and so the objections brought forward in the above controversy would not apply to it.

To this the reply is that the admission of a positive category called ajiiana which is directly experienced in perception may imply that it is of an entity which is opposed to knowledge; for the negative particle "a" in "ajriana" is used either in the sense of absence or negation. If it does so, it may well be urged that experience of opposition implies two terms, that which opposes and that to which there is an opposition. Thus, the experience of ajiiana would involve the experience of knowledge also, and, therefore, when the opposite of ajiiana shines forth, how can ajiiana be perceived? It is clear, therefore, that no advantage is gained by regarding ajiiana as a positive entity instead of a mere negation. The conception of a positive ajiiana cannot serve any new purpose which is not equally attainable by the conception of it as negation of knowledge. If a positive entity is regarded as able to circumscribe or limit the scope of manifestation of Brahman, a negation also may do the same. The Saiikarites themselves admit that knowledge shines by driving away the ignorance which constituted the negation-precedent-to the production of (praga-bhava) knowledge, and thus in a way they admit that ajiiana is of the nature of negation. The supposed experience of dullness {tmigdhu smi) involves in it the notion of an opposition. The mere fact that the word "dull" {rnugdha) has no negative particle in it does not mean that it has no negative sense. Thus, a positive ignorance cannot be testified by perception.

It has been suggested that the existence of ajiiana may be proved by inference on the supposition that if light manifests itself by driving away darkness, so knowledge must shine by driving away

positive ignorance. Now inference is a mode of knowledge and as such it must drive away some ignorance which was hiding its operation. Since this ajfiana could not manifest itself, It must imply some other ajfiana which was hiding it, and without driving which it could not manifest itself, and there would thus be infinite regress. If the ajfiana be regarded as hiding, then the inference may as well be regarded as destroying the ignorance directly. Whenever a knowledge illuminates some contents, it may be regarded as dispelling the ignorance regarding it. The scriptural texts also do not support the conception of a positive ajfiana. Thus, the concept of a positive ajnana is wholly illegitimate.

Fortieth Objection. The supposition that the ajfiana rests in the individual jlvas and not Brahman is also false. If the ajnana is supposed to rest in the individual in its own real essence (i.e. as Brahman), then the ajnana would virtually rest in Brahman. If it is supposed that ajfiana rests in the individual jlvas, not in their natural state but in their ordinarily supposed nature as suffering rebirth, etc., then this amounts to saying that the ajnana is associated with the material stuff and as such can never be removed; for the material limitations of an individual can never have a desire to remove the ajfiana, nor has it the power to destroy it. Again, it may be asked whether the ajfiana that constitutes the difference of individual jlvas is one or many in different cases. In the former case in the emancipation of one, ajnana would be removed and all would be emancipated. In the second case it is difficult to determine whether avidya comes first or the difference between individual jlvas, and there would thus be anyonya-sraya, for the Sankarites do not admit the reality of difference between jlvas. In the theory that ajfiana is associated with Brahman, the difference between jlvas being false, there is no necessity to admit the diversity of ajfiana according to the diversity of jlvas. In any case, whether real or fictitious, avidya cannot explain the diversity of the jlvas. Again, if the ajfianas which are supposed to produce the diversity of the jlvas be supposed to exist in the Brahman, then Brahman cannot be known. In the view that these ajfianas exist in the jlvas, the old difficulty comes in as to whether the difference of avidyas is primary or whether that of the jlvas is primary. If the difficulty is intended to be solved by suggesting that the regression is not vicious as in the case of the seed and the shoot, then it may be pointed out that

33° Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

in the supposition that the ajnanas which produce difference in jivas have these as their support then there is no scope for such a regression. The seed that produces the shoot does not produce itself. If it is suggested that the avidya of the previous^ftYW produces the later jivas, then the jivas would be destructible. Thus, from whichever way we may try to support the view that the avidya rests in individual jivas we meet with unmitigated failure.

Forty-first Objection. It is said that the defect of avidya belongs to Brahman. If this defect of avidya is something different from Brahman, then that virtually amounts to the admission of dualism; if it is not different from Brahman, then Brahman itself becomes responsible for all errors and illusions which are supposed to be due to avidya, and Brahman being eternal all errors and illusions are bound to be eternal. If it is said that the errors and illusions are produced when Brahman is associated with some other accessory cause, then about this also the old question may be raised as to whether the accessory cause or causes are different or not different from Brahman and whether real or not. Again, such an accessory cause cannot be of the nature of a negation-precedent-to the production of the true knowledge of the identity of the self and the Brahman; for then the doctrine of a positive ignorance propounded by the Sarikarites would be wholly unnecessary and uncalled for. Further, such a negation cannot be identical with Brahman, for then with true knowledge and with the destruction of ignorance Brahman itself would cease. Again, since everything else outside Brahman is false, if there is any such entity that obstructs the light of Brahman or distorts it (if the distortion is in any sense real), then that entity would also be Brahman; and Brahman being eternal that distortion would also be eternal. If the defect which acts as an obstructive agent be regarded as unreal and beginningless, then also it must depend on some cause and this will lead to an infinite regress ; if it does not depend upon any cause, then it would be like Brahman which shines forth by itself without depending on any defect, which is absurd. If it is supposed that this defect constructs itself as well as others, then the world-creation would manifest itself witriout depending upon any other defect. If it is said that there is no impropriety in admitting the defect as constructing itself, just as an illusion is the same as the construction, i.e. is made by it, then the Sarikarites would be contradicting their own views;

for they certainly do admit the beginningless world-creation to be due to the operation of defects. If the avidya is not itself an illusory imposition, then it will be either true or chimerical. If it is regarded as both an illusory construction and a product, then it would not be beginningless. If it has a beginning, then it cannot be distinguished from the world-appearance. If illusion and its construction be regarded as identical, then also the old difficulty of the avidya generating itself through its own construction would remain the same. Again, if the avidya appears to Brahman without the aid of any accessory defect, then it will do so eternally. If it is urged that, when the avidya ceases, its manifestation would also cease, then also there is a difficulty which is suggested by the theory of the Sarikarites themselves; for we know that in their theory there is no difference between the illumination and that which is illuminated and that there is no causal operation between them. That which is being illuminated cannot be separated from the principle of illumination.

If it is urged that the avidya is manifested so long as there is no dawning of true knowledge, then may it not be said that the negation-precedent-to the rise of true knowledge is the cause of world-appearance and that the admission of avidya is unnecessary? If it is said that the negation cannot be regarded as the cause of the very varied production of woi ld-appearances, then it can be urged with as much force that the position may also be regarded as capable of producing the manifold world-appearance. If it is held that positive defects in the eye often produce many illusory appearances, then it may also be urged on the other side that the non-observation of distinctions and differences is also often capable of producing many illusory appearances. If it is urged that negation is not limited by time and is therefore incapable of producing the diverse kinds of world-appearances under different conditions of time, and that it is for that reason that it is better to admit positive ignorance, then also it may be asked with as much force how such a beginningless ignorance unconditioned by any temporal character can continue to produce the diverse world-appearance conditioned in time till the dawning of true knowledge. If in answer to this it is said that such is the nature and character of avidya, then it may well be asked what is the harm in admitting such a nature or character of "negation." This, at least, saves us from admitting a strange and

332 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

uncalled for hypothesis of positive ignorance. It may be urged that negation is homogeneous and formless and as such it cannot under^ go transformations of character, while avidya, being a positive stuff, can pass through a series of transformations of character (vivarta-parampara). In this connection it may be urged that the nature of avidya is nothing but this succession of transformations of character; if it is so, then since it is the nature of avidya to have a succession of diverse kinds of transformations, there may be all kinds of illusions at all times. It cannot also be regarded as an effect of transformation of character, for the avidya is supposed to produce such effects. If it is urged that avidya is a distinct entity by itself, different from the appearance of its character that is perceived, then also the old question would recur regarding the reality or unreality of it. The former supposition would be an admission of dualism; the latter supposition, that is, if it is false, the succession of it as various appearances conditioned by diverse kinds of time and space would presuppose such other previous presuppositions ad infinitum. If it is held that there is no logical defect in supposing that the previous sets of transformations determine the later sets in an unending series, it is still not necessary to admit avidya in order to explain such a situation. For it may well be supposed that the different transformations arise in Brahman without depending upon any extraneous cause. The objection that such a supposition that Brahman is continually undergoing such diverse transformations of character (real or unreal) would inevitably lead to the conclusion that there is no Brahman beyond such transformations is invalid; for our perceptual experience shows that the transfor-matory change of a lump of clay does not invalidate its being. In such a view Brahman may be regarded as the ground of all illusory appearances. On the other hand, it is only on the assumption of false avidya that one cannot legitimately affirm the existence of a basis, for the basis of falsehood would itself be false. Therefore, if Brahman be regarded as its basis, then it would itself be false and would land.us in nihilism.

Again, it may well be asked whether avidya shines by itself or not. If it does not, it becomes chimerical; if it does, then it may again be asked whether this shining is of the nature of avidya or not. If it is, then it would be as self-shining as Brahman and there would be no difference between them. Again, if the shining cha-

racter of avidya belongs to Brahman, the Brahman being eternal, there would never be a time when avidya would not shine. The shiningness cannot also be regarded as a character of either Brahman or the avidya, for none of them is regarded as being a knower of it. If it is urged that the character as the knower is the result of an illusory imposition, then the objection is that the meaning of such an imposition is unintelligible unless the conception of avidya is clarified. The character as knower is possible only on the supposition of an illusory imposition, and on the above supposition the illusory imposition becomes possible on the supposition of the knower. If it is due to Brahman, then Brahman, being eternal, the illusory impositions would also be eternal. If it be without any reason, then the entire world-illusion would be without any cause. Again, any conception regarding the support of avidya is unintelligible. If it has no support, it must be either independent like Brahman or be like chimerical entities. If it has a support and if that support be of the nature of Brahman, then it is difficult to conceive how the eternally pure Brahman can be the support of the impure avidya which is naturally opposed to it. If the solution is to be found in the supposition that the impure avidya is false, then it may well be urged that if it is false there is no meaning in the effort to make it cease. If it is said in reply that though it is nonexistent yet there is an appearance of it, and the effort is made to make that appearance cease, then also the reply is that the appearance is also as false as itself. If it is admitted that though false it can yet injure one's interest, then its falsehood would be only in name, for its effects are virtually admitted to be real. If Brahman in its limited or conditioned aspect be regarded as the support of avidya, then since such a limitation must be through some other avidya this would merely bring us into confusion. If it is held that avidya has for its support an entity quite different from Brahman conditioned or unconditioned, then the view that Brahman is the support of avidya has to be given up, and there would be other difficulties regarding the discovery of another support of this support. If it be said that like Brahman avidya is its own support but Brahman is not its own support, then the support of avidya would have no other support. If it is said that the support can be explained on the basis of conditions, then also it would be difficult to imagine how a condition of the nature of a receptacle (adhara-kdro-padhi) can itself

334 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

be without any support. If further supports are conceived, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, if it is held that what is false does not require any support, then it may be urged that according to the Saiikarites the support is regarded as the basis on which the illusion occurs, and even the jug is regarded as an illusion on the ground. Moreover, this false experience of avidya is not any of the illusory or limited perceptions, such as ego-experience or the experience of other mental states; for these are regarded as the effects of avidya. If they are not so, then they must be due to some other defects, and these to other ones, and so there would be a vicious infinite. If it is held that avidya is nothing different from its experience, then since all experience is of the nature of Brahman, Brahman itself would be false. Again, if the avidya manifests itself as Brahman by hiding its (Brahman) nature, then all pure revelation being hidden and lost, avidya itself, which is manifested by it, would also be naturally lost. If it be manifested as Brahman and its own nature be hidden, then Brahman alone being manifested there would be no question of bondage. It is obvious that it cannot manifest itself both as avidya and as Brahman, for that would be self-contradictory, since knowledge always dispels ignorance. If it is held that just as a mirror reflects an image in which the character of the mirror and the real face is hidden, so avidya may manifest itself and hide both itself and the Brahman. To this the reply is that in all cases of illusions of identity (tadatmya-dhyasa) the non-observation of the difference is the cause of the error. The cause of the illusion of the face and the mirror is the non-observation of the fact that the face is away from the mirror. But Brahman and avidya are neither located in a proximate space so that it is possible to compare their illusion of identity by the illustration of other illusions which depend upon such proximity. If it is said of avidya, not being a substance, that all criticism that applies to real and existent entities would be inapplicable to it, then such a doctrine would be almost like nihilism, for all criticisms against nihilism are accepted by nihilists as not invalidating their doctrine.

Forty-second Objection. It is held by the Sarikarites that avidya and may a are two distinct conceptions. Maya is supposed to be that by which others are deluded, and avidya is supposed to be that which deludes one's self. The word may a is used in various senses but none of these seems to satisfy the usage of the word in Saiikarite

manner. If it is supposed that the word maya, of which Brahman is supposed to be the support, has this peculiarity that it manifests its various forms to others as well as deludes them, then it is hard to distinguish it from the conception of avidya. If it is held that the word avidya is restricted to mean the agent that causes false perceptions as in the case of conch-shell-silver, then maya may also be called avidya, for it also causes the false world-appearance to be perceived. There is no reason why the cause of the false perception of the conch-shell-silver should be called avidya and not those relatively true cognitions which contradict such illusory perceptions. Isvara also may be said to be suffering from avidya, for since He is omniscient He has the knowledge of all individual selves of which falsehood is a constituent. If God has no knowledge of illusions, He would not be omniscient. It is wrong also to suppose that maya is that which manifests everything else except Brahman in its nature as false; for if the Brahman knows the world-appearance as false without being under an illusion, it would still be hard to repudiate the ignorance of Brahman. If Brahman knows all things as the illusions of others, then He must know the others and as such their constituent illusions, and this would mean that Brahman is itself subject to avidya. It is difficult also to conceive how one can have any cognition of falsehood without being under illusion, for falsehood is not mere non-existence but the appearance of an entity where it does not exist. If Brahman sees other people only under illusions, that does not mean that Brahman deludes others by His maya. There may be a magician who would try to show his magic by mere false tricks. If the Brahman tried to show His magic by mere false reflections, He would indeed be mad. It may be supposed that the difference between avidya and maya is that avidya, by producing illusory experiences, hurts the real interests of the perceiving selves, yet the Brahman Who perceives these illusory selves and their experiences does so through the agency of maya which does not injure His interest. To this the reply is that if maya does not injure anybody's interest, it cannot be called a defect. It may be objected that defects have no connection with harmful or beneficial effects but they have a relation only to truth and error. Such a view cannot be accepted, for truth and error have a pragmatic value and all that is erroneous hurts one's interests ; if it were not so, nobody would be anxious to remove them.

336 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

If it is argued that maya is not a defect of Brahman but a quality, then it may be said that if it were so then no one would be anxious to remove it. If, again, maya were a quality of Brahman and served the purpose of such a mighty person, how could the poor individual selves dare it? And if they could, they would be able to injure the practical interests of an Omnipotent Being, for maya being a quality would certainly be of great use to Him. Maya cannot be destroyed by itself without any cause, for that would land us in the doctrine of momentariness. If the maya were eternal and real, that would be an admission of dualism. If maya be regarded as being included in Brahman, then Brahman, being only self-manifesting, and maya being included within it would not have the power of producing the world-delusions which it is supposed to produce. Again, maya being eternal cannot also be false. Again, if the manifestation of maya from Brahman be regarded as real, then the ignorance of Brahman becomes also real; if it is a false manifestation from Brahman, then it would be meaningless to suppose that Brahman should be using the maya as an instrument of play. It is absurd to suppose that Brahman would be playing with false reflected images, like a child. Again, if the jivas and Brahman be identical, then it is unreasonable to suppose that the ignorance of the jivas would not imply the ignorance of Brahman. If, again, the jivas and the Brahman be really different, then how can there be any emancipation by the knowledge of their identity? So the conception of a maya and an avidya different from it is wholly incomprehensible.

Forty-third Objection. It is held by the Sankarites that a knowledge of monistic identity produces emancipation. Now such a knowledge cannot be different from the Brahma-knowledge; for if it is a contentless entity, then it would be no knowledge, since the Sankarites hold that knowledge can only be a mental state associated with a content (vrtti-riipam hi jiianam savisayam eva iti bhavatam api siddhantah). It cannot also be identical with Brahma-knowledge, for if such a knowledge can produce emancipation the pure Brahma-knowledge would have done the same. It may be held that in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver, when there is a true shining regarding the nature of the "this" in its own character, then that is equivalent to the contradiction of the illusory appearance of silver, and the manifestation of identity showing the

real nature of Brahman may be regarded as contradictory to world-illusion. To this the reply is that there is no identity between the existence of the "this" as conch-shell and its appearance as silver. Thus, one knowledge may contradict the other, but in the case under review there is no new element in the notion of the identity which was not already present in the Brahma-knowledge itself. If the notion of identity be regarded as a contentful knowledge, then it would be different from the Brahma-knowledge, and being itself false it could not remove the error. The case where a thing known is again recognized is also not a proper instance for supporting the Sarikarite position, for here also the knowledge of recognition is not the same as the knowledge of original acquaintance, whereas the notion of identity is supposed to be the same as the Brahma-knowledge. Again, if it is supposed that a mental state of a particular content removes the illusions and produces Brahma-knowledge, then the illusions would be real entities since they were capable of being destroyed like other entities.

If it is held that the notion of identity has a reference to Brahman as limited by avidyd, then that will be like the manifestation of the illusory world-creations through the ^/^-consciousness, and such a manifestation would not remove errors.

Again, it may be asked whether the knowledge that produces the notion that all else excepting Brahman is false can itself be regarded as constituting falsehood, for that would be self-contradictory. If the notion of the falsehood of the world-appearance be itself regarded as false, then the world would have to be regarded as real. If it is urged that as in the supposition of the death of a barren woman's son both the barren woman's son and his death are false, so here also both the world and its falsehood may be equally false. But it may be replied that in the instance put forward the falsehood of the barren woman's son and that of his death are not both false. Again, if the falsehood of the world-appearance were real, then that would imply dualism.

Again, if inferences led to the contradiction of world-appearance, then there would be no reason to suppose that the contradiction of the world-appearance would be possible only through listening to the Vedantic texts of identity. If the contradiction of world-appearance is produced by Brahman itself, then Brahman being eternal there would be no world-illusion. Again, Brahman

338 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

has been regarded as helping the process of world-illusion in its own pure nature for otherwise there would have been no illusion at all. It is a curious doctrine that though Brahman in its pure nature helps illusion, yet, in its impure nature, as the scriptural texts or the knowledge arising out of them, it would remove it. So in whichever way we may think of the possibility of a removal of ajnana we are brought into confusion.

Forty-fourth Objection. The conception of the cessation of the avidya. is also illegitimate. For the question that arises in this connection is whether the cessation of avidya is itself real or unreal. If it is unreal, then the hope that the avidya is rooted out with such a cessation is baffled, for the cessation itself is a manifestation of avidya. It cannot be said that the cessation of avidya has as its ground a real entity, the atman, for then the atman will have to be admitted as suffering change. And if in any way the cessation of avidya is to be regarded as having a true cause as its support, then the cessation being real there would be dualism. If it is regarded as an illusion, and there is no defect behind it, then the assumption of avidya as a defect for explaining the world-illusion would be unnecessary. If it is without any further ground like avidya and Brahman, then there is no meaning in associating avidya with it. There is also no reason why, even after the cessation of avidya, it may not rise up again into appearance. If it is suggested that the function of the cessation of avidya is to show that everything else except Brahman is false and as soon as this function is fulfilled the cessation of avidya also ceases to exist, then also another difficulty has to be faced. For if the cessation of avidya itself ceases to exist, then that would mean that there is a cessation of cessation which means that avidya is again rehabilitated. It may be urged that when a jug is produced it means the destruction of the negation-precedent-to-production (prdga-bhava), and when this jug is again destroyed it does not mean that the negation-precedent again rises into being; so it may be in this case also. To this the reply is that the two cases are different, for in the above case the negation of one negation is through a positive entity, whereas there is nothing to negate the cessation of avidya; so in this case the negation would be a logical negation leading to a position of the entity negated, the avidya. If it is said that there is the Brahman which negates the cessation of avidya, then the difficulty would be that Brahman, the

negation of both avidya and its cessation, being eternal, there ought to be no illusory world-creation at any time.

If the cessation of avidya is not itself of illusory nature and if it is regarded as included in the being of Brahman, then Brahman being beginningless the avidya should be regarded as having always remained arrested. It cannot be said that the existence of Brahman is itself the cessation of ajnana, for then it would be impossible to connect the cessation of avidya with the realization of the nature of Brahman as cause and effect.

If it is suggested that a mental state reflecting the nature of Brahman represents the cessation of ajnana of Brahman and that this mental state may be removed by other causes, then the reply is that this would mean that such a mental state is illusory; and this implies that the cessation of avidya is illusory. The criticism of such a view is given above. The cessation of avidya is not real, being outside Brahman; neither real, something different from real, and unreal, for that could not lead to a real cessation. So ultimately it must be neither unreal nor something different from any of the above entities, for the cessation of positive and negative entities only are of the nature of real and unreal. Ajnana is something different from real and unreal; its cessation is valid, being amenable to proofs. So the cessation has to be admitted as being something unique and different from all existent and non-existent entities. In reply it may be said that if the ajnana is admitted to be like-anon-existent entity (asativa), then in both the two meanings of negation, that is, in the view that negation is but the other name of position and that negation is a separate category in itself, the admission of avidya would involve dualism. If it is regarded as something chimerical, it could never show itself, and such a chimerical entity would have no opposition to the world-cycle. So the cessation of avidya cannot lead to emancipation. Again, if the cessation of avidya is non-existent, that would imply the existence of avidya. The cessation of avidya is not like the destruction of a jug which has a real existence, so that though it may appear like a non-being, yet the jug may be regarded as a positive entity. The destruction of avidya is not of that nature, for it has no definite form. If it is held that the cessation of avidya is of the fifth type, that is, different from existent, non-existent, existent-and-non-existent and different-from-existent-and-non-existent, then this is virtually the admission

34° Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

of the madhyamika doctrine of indescribability of all phenomena, for it also describes the world-phenomena as being of the fifth type. There is also really no way in which such an absolutely unique and indefinable category can be related to anything else.

Forty-fifth Objection. It is argued by the Sahkarites that the scriptural texts cannot signify Brahman, which is devoid of all and every specific quality. To this Vehkata replies that Brahman is endowed with all specific qualities and, therefore, it is quite legitimate that texts should signify it. It is wrong also to suppose that Brahman, being self-luminous, cannot be manifested by words, for it has been shown by the Ramanuja school that even the self-luminous can be the object of further awareness. Brahman is also sometimes described by the Sarikarites as the state of being quality-less, but is itself a quality since it is used adjectively to Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman could not be signified by the scriptural texts, the texts themselves would be meaningless. It is wrong also to suppose that the scriptural words refer to Brahman only in a secondary manner, just as one may point to a tree-top in order to show that the moon is visible {sakha-candra-darsana) ; for whatever be the method, Brahman is indicated by the texts. Even a state of non-conceptual meditation {asamprajtiata-samadhi) is not absolutely unpredicable. In that state one cannot apply the concepts or words. If Brahman is absolutely without any character, it cannot be admitted that it should be implied or signified in a remote manner (laksya) by the scriptures. The passages which say that Brahman is beyond word (yato vaco nivartante) indicate only that the qualities of Brahman are infinite. Thus, it is wholly unjustifiable on the part of the Sahkarites to say that Brahman is not indicated by the texts.

Forty-seventh Objection. It is maintained by the bahkarites that all determinate knowledge is false because it is determinate in its nature like the conch-shell-silver. If all that is determinate is false, then since all distinctions must involve determinateness they would all be false and thus ultimately we have monism. The futility of such a position is shown by Vehkata, who points out that such an inference involves determinate concepts in all its limbs, and would thus be absolutely unwarrantable according to the thesis itself. Moreover, if the determinate knowledge is false, the indeterminate would also be false for want of corroboration. It is wrong also to suppose that determinate perceptions are false for want of cor-

roborative evidence from other awarenesses; for an illusion may be further corroborated by other illusions and may yet be false, and the last corroborative knowledge would be false for want of further corroborations, which would lead to the falsehood of the whole set of corroborations which is dependent on it. It is also wrong to suppose that determinate conceptions do not stand the test of causal efficiency, for all our practical experiences depend on determinate notions. It cannot also be held that the conceptual cognitions involving universals are false, for they are neither contradicted nor found to be doubtful in any way. Thus, if all determinate cognitions are regarded as false, then that would lead us to nihilism and not to monism. Moreover, if the indeterminate nature of Brahman is to be inferred from the indeterminate nature of our perception of external things, then on the analogy of the falsehood of the former the latter may also be false.

Fifty-fifth Objection. The Sankarites hold that all effects are false, for they seem to contradict themselves if an attempt is made to conceive the logical situation. Is the effect produced out of the cause related with it or unrelated? In the first alternative the cause and the effect, being but two relata connected together by relation, there is no reason why the effect should be produced by the cause and not the cause by the effect. If the cause produces the effect without being related to it, then anything might produce anything. Again, if the effect be different from the cause, things which are different from one another would be productive of one another. If they are identical, then one could not produce the other. If it is said that cause is that which invariably precedes and effect is that which invariably succeeds, then a thing ought to be existent before the negation-precedent-to-production. Again, if the effect be regarded as having been produced from a material cause which has undergone transformation, then it may further be asked whether these transformations are produced from other transformations, and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If the effect be regarded as produced from a cause which has not undergone any transformation, then it would abide the whole time in which the material cause remains. Moreover, an effect is like the illusory silver which is nonexistent in the beginning and in the end. The production of an entity cannot be either from a positive entity or a negative entity; for an effect, say, the jug, cannot be produced from its cause, the

342 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

earth-matter, without producing some change in it, that is, without negating it in some way or the other. On the other hand, if the production is regarded as being from a negation, then it will itself be a negation. So in whichever way a causal relation may be viewed, it becomes fraught with contradictions.

The reply of Verikata to this is that the objection as to whether the effect is related to the cause in its production or unrelated to it is overcome by the view that the effect is unrelated to the cause; but that need not imply that all that is unrelated to the cause should be the effect, for mere unrelatedness does not induce the production of the effect such that the very unrelatedness will connect anything with any other thing as effect. The special powers associated with causal entity are responsible for the production of the special effects, and these can be known by the ordinary methods of agreement and. difference. The relations of the causal elements among themselves are transferred to the effect. It is well known that causes produce effects of an entirely different nature, just as when a jug is produced by a stick and the potter's wheel. Even the material cause is very different from the material cause as the effect. It is indeed admitted that the effect is produced from a modified {vikrta) cause, for any change in the cause, even the proximity of an accessory condition, would be a modification. But if modification or vikara cannot be affirmed of the cause in the sense in which the effect is regarded as a modification, it may be said in that sense that the effect is produced from an unmodified cause. It would be wrong to suggest that any and every effect might spring from any and every unmodified cause, for an effect is produced from an unmodified cause under proper temporal conditions and the association of collocative agents. It is also wrong to suggest that in the supposition that an effect is analysable as a course of changes, the cause as the immediate antecedent would be undiscoverable; and the cause being undiscoverable the effect would also be inexplicable; for it is the effect which is recognized as perceived and this implies the existence of the cause without which it could not come into being. If it is urged that the effect is not perceived, or that it is contradicted, then the obvious reply is that both non-perception and contradiction are effects, and in denying effects through them the criticism becomes self-contradictory.

When a material cause is changed into an effect, there are cer-

tain parts of it which remain unchanged, even when that effect is changed into other objects called effects, and there are some characters which are formed only in certain effects. Thus, when gold is changed into a bangle and the bangle into a necklace, the persisting qualities of gold continue the same both in the bangle and in the necklace; but the special form of the bangle does not pass into that of the necklace. Again, the objection that if the effects were already existent in the cause, then there is no necessity of the causal operation as has elsewhere been repudiated, and it has also been pointed out that the assertion that all effects are false like conch-shell-silver is false, for these effects are not found to be contradicted like these illusory appearances. It is wrong also to suggest that because an effect does not exist in the beginning or in the end it also does not exist in the middle, for its existence in the middle is directly experienced. It may also be suggested on the other hand that because an effect exists in the middle it must also exist in the beginning and in the end.

It is suggested by the Sarikarites that all notions of difference as effects are illusorily imposed upon one permanent entity which permeates through all so-called different entities, and that it is this permeating entity which is real. Against such a supposition the Sarikarites may be asked to discover any entity that permeates both through Brahman and avidya. It would be wrong to suggest that Brahman is both in itself and in the avidya; for Brahman cannot have any dual entity, and also cannot be illusorily imposed upon itself.

The suggestion that since the unity of a flame is perceived to be false all perception is false is obviously wrong, for in the former case the illusion is due to the rapid coalescing of similar flames, but this does not apply to all perception.

In the sense of substance {dravya) an effect exists in the cause, but in the sense of an effect-state the effect does not exist in the cause. The objections of the Samkhyists that if the effect-state did not exist in the cause it could not be produced and that similarly anything could be produced from anything are futile, for the effects are produced by specific powers which manifest themselves as effects in definite spatial and temporal conditions.

A question is asked whether the effects are produced from a positive or a negative entity, that is, whether when the effects are

344 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

produced they are produced as states of a substance which persists through them or not. Verikata's reply is that the substance persists; only states and conditions change when the effect is produced. For in the production of an effect there is change only in the causal state and not in the causal substance. There is thus an agreement-between the cause and the effect only so far as the substance is concerned and not with reference to their states; for it is by the negation of the causal state that the effect-state arises. It is sometimes suggested that since an effect is neither permanently existing nor permanently non-existing it must be false. But this suggestion is obviously wrong, for the fact that an entity may be destroyed at a later moment does not mean that it was non-existent at the moment when it was perceived. Destruction means that an entity which was existent at a particular moment was non-existent at another. Contradiction means that a thing is non-existent even when it is perceived. Mere non-existence is not destruction, for the negation-precedent-to-production might also be called destruction since it is also non-existent. Non-existence at a later point of time also does not mean destruction, for then even chimerical entities might also be called destruction. The case of conch-shell-silver is not a case of destruction, for clearly that is a case of contradiction in experience. Thus, if the concepts of production, destruction and non-existence be analysed, then it will be found that the concept of effect can never be regarded as illusory.

Fifty-seventh Objection. It is said that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss (ananda) ; but it may well be said that in whichever sense the word ananda may be used it will not be possible to affirm that Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss. For if ananda means an entity the awareness of which induces an agreeable experience, then Brahman will be knowable. If it means merely an agreeable experience, then Brahman would not be pure indeterminate consciousness. If it means a mere agreeable attitude, then duality will be implied. If it means negation of pain, then Brahman would not be positive and it is well admitted on all hands that Brahman is neutral. Moreover, according to the Sarikarites themselves the state of intuition of Brahman is regarded as a positive state like the state of dreamless sleep. Thus, in whichever way one may look at the problem the assertion that the indeterminate Brahman is of the nature of pure bliss becomes wholly unwarrantable.

Fifty-eighth Objection. The eternity of Brahman cannot be maintained, if it is regarded as indeterminate. If eternity means existence in all times, then avidya also would be eternal; for it is also associated with all time, and time is itself regarded as its product. If it is urged that association with all time does not mean existence in all time, then it is wrong to regard existence in all times as a definition of eternity, for it will be enough to say that existence itself is eternal. The "inclusion of all time" as distinguished from mere existence shows the difference between existence and eternity. Eternity would thus mean existence in all time, which can be affirmed of avidya also. Eternity cannot also be defined as that which does not cease in time since such a definition would apply to time also which does not cease in time. It cannot also be said that eternity means that which is not contradicted in the beginning or in the end, for then the world-appearance also would be eternal. Again, it is difficult to understand how consciousness is regarded as eternal by the Sarikarites, for if it is affirmed of ordinary consciousness, then that is directly against perceptual experience; and if it is affirmed of transcendental consciousness, then that is directly against experience. Further, eternity cannot be regarded as the essence, for then it would be identical with self-luminosity, and its predication, such as Brahman is eternal, would be unnecessary. If it is regarded as a knowable quality, then if such a quality existed in consciousness, consciousness would become knowable. If it did not exist in consciousness, then its knowledge would not imply the eternity of consciousness. It cannot also be said that whatever is not produced is eternal, for then negation-precedent-to-production would be eternal. If it is said that any positive entity which is not produced is eternal, then avidya would also be eternal. Thus, in whichever way one may try to prove the eternity of the indeterminable pure consciousness one fails.

Sixty-first Objection. It is often asserted by the Sankarites that there is a unity of the self. If by self here they mean the "ego," then clearly all the egos cannot be regarded as identical, for it is well known that the experiences of other people are never identified by us as ours. Nor can it be said that there is unity of consciousness of us all, for then each of us would know the minds of others. It is not maintainable that our underlying being is the same, for that would not mean the identity of our selves. One may think of

346 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

universal existence, but that would not mean the identity of the existents. Again, the identity of the selves cannot be regarded as real since the selves (jivas) themselves are regarded as unreal. If the identity of the selves be regarded as false, then there is no reason why such a doctrine should be propounded. In any case, when one has to deal with our experiential life, one has to admit the diversity of selves and there is no other proof by which their identity may be established. Thus it would be wrong to think, as the Sankarites do, that there is one self.

Meghanadari.

Meghanadari, son of Atreyanatha suri, seems to be one of the earliest members of the Ramanuja school. He wrote at least two books, Naya-prakasika and Naya-dyu-mani ', both of which are still in manuscript and only the latter has been available to the present writer. Most of the important contributions of Meghanadari on the subject of the Ramanuja theory of the pramanas have already been discussed in some detail in connection with the treatment of that subject under Verikatanatha. Only a few of his views on other topics of Ramanuja philosophy will therefore be giveti here.

Svatah-pramanya-vada. Yerikata, in his Tattva-tmikta-kaldpa and Sarvartha-siddhi, says that all knowledge manifests the objects as they are. Even errors are true at least so far as they point to the object of the error. The erroneousness or error is due to the existence of certain vitiating conditions 1 . When there is knowledge that there is a jug, the existence of the object is the validity (pram-anya) of it and this is made known by the very knowledge that the jug exists 2 . Even where there is the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell, there is the knowledge of the existence of the objective silver implied in that very knowledge, and thus even in erroneous knowledge there is the self-validity so far as it carries with it the existence of the object of perception 3 .

Meghanadari however, who in all probability preceded Venkata, gives a somewhat different account of the doctrine of svatah-

1 jiidndndm yathd-vasthitd-rtha-prakdsakatvam sdmdnyam era bhrdntasyd'pi jndnasya dharminy abhrdntatvdt ato vahnyd-der ddhakatvavaj jiidndndm prdm-dnyam svdbhdvikam era upddher mani-mantravad doso-pddhi-iasdd apramdnatvam bhr amortise. Sarrdrtha-siddhi, p. 554.

2 ghato'stl' ti jndnam utpadyate tatra visayd-stitvam eva prdmdnyam tat tit tenaiva jndnena pratlyate atah svatah-prdmdnyam. Ibid.

pramanya. He says that validity {pramanya) proceeds from the ap-prehensionofcogmtion(pramanyamjnana-satta-pratiti-karanadeva) y for the validity must have a cause and no other cause is traceable 1 .

The Naiyayikas, arguing against the svatah-pramanya doctrine of the Mimamsakas, are supposed to say that the self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced in every case of knowledge, for the Mimamsakas hold that the Vedas are eternal and thus their self-validity cannot be regarded as being produced. Self-validity cannot be regarded as produced in some cases only, for if that were the case the thesis that all cognitions are self-valid cannot stand. Therefore the proper view is that only that knowledge is self-valid which is uncontradicted in experience (abadhita-vyavahara-hetutvam eva jnanasya pramanyam) 2 . Self-validity cannot be regarded as a special potency, for such a potency is non-sensible and has therefore to be known by inference or some other means; neither can it be regarded as being one (svarupa) with the sense-organs by which knowledge is acquired, for the existence of such sense-organs is itself inferred from mere knowledge and not from what is only true knowledge.

Arguing against the Saftkarites, the Naiyayikas are supposed to say that in their view knowledge being self-luminous, there would be no way of determining validity either from uncontradicted experience or by any other means; and since, according to them, everything is false, the distinction of validity and invalidity also ought to have no place in their system, for if such distinctions are admitted it would land them in dualism. To this Meghanadari says that if self-validity is not admitted, then the whole idea of validity has to be given up; for if validity is said to be produced from a knowledge of the proper conditions of knowledge or the absence of defects, such a knowledge has to be regarded as self-valid, for it would have to depend on some other knowledge and that again on some other knowledge, which would mean a vicious infinite. So knowledge is to be regarded as self-valid by nature and its invalidity occurs only when the defects and vitiating contributions of the causes of knowledge are known by some other means. But the method of establishing self-validity according to the followers of Kumarila is liable to criticism, for according to that system the existence of knowledge is only inferred from the fact of the revelation of the objects, and that implication cannot also further

1 Naya-dyu-mani, p. 21 (MS.). f Ibid. p. 22.

348 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

lead to the self-validity of knowledge. The theory of self-validity that it is caused by the same constituents which produce the knowledge is also inadmissible, for the senses have also to be regarded as the cause of knowledge and these may be defective. Again, it is held that knowledge which corresponds with the object (tathd-bhuta) is valid and that which does not correspond with the object is invalid and that such validity and invalidity are therefore directly manifested by the knowledge itself. Meghanadari replies that if such correspondence be a quality of the object, then that does not establish the validity of knowledge; if it is a quality of knowledge, then memory has also to be regarded as self-valid, for there is correspondence in it also. Again, the question arises whether the self-validity is merely produced or also known. In the former case the self-manifestation of self-validity has to be given up, and in the latter case the Kumarila view is indefensible for by it knowledge being itself an implication from the revelation of objects its self-validity cannot obviously be self-manifested.

Meghanadari, therefore, contends that an intuition {anubhuti) carries with it its own validity; in revealing the knowledge it also carries with it the conviction of its own validity. The invalidity, on the other hand, is suggested by other sources. This intuition is in itself different from memory 1 . The whole emphasis of this contention is on his view that each cognition of an object carries with it its cognizability as true, and since this is manifested along with the cognition, all cognitions are self-valid in this sense. Such a self-validity is therefore not produced since it is practically identical with the knowledge itself. Meghanadari points out that this view is in apparent contradiction with Ramanuja's own definition of svatah-pramanya as that which is produced by the cause of knowledge; but Ramanuja's statement in this connection has to be interpreted differently, for the knowledge of God and the emancipated beings being eternal and unproduced any view which defines self-validity as a production from the same source from which knowledge is produced would be inapplicable to them 2 .

Time. Time according to Meghanadari is not to be regarded as a separate entity. He takes great pains to show that Ramanuja has

1 anubhutitvam vd prdmdnyam astu; tac ca jridnd-vdntara-jdtih; sd ca smrti-jndna-jdtitah prthaktaya lokatah eva siddhd; anubhuteh svasattayd eva sphurteh. Naya-dyu-?nani, p. 31.

himself discarded the view that time is a separate entity in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, the Vedanta-dlpa and the Vedanta-sara. The notion of time originates from the relative position of the sun in the zodiac with reference to earth. It is the varying earth-space that appears as time, being conditioned by the relative positions of the Sun 1 . This view is entirely different from that of Venkata which will be described later on.

Karma and its fruits. According to Meghanadari deeds produce their fruits through the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. Though ordinarily deeds are regarded as virtuous or vicious, yet strictly speaking virtue and vice should be regarded as the fruits of actions and these fruits are nothing but the satisfaction and dissatisfaction of God. The performance of good deeds in the past determines the performance of similar deeds in the future by producing helpful tendencies, capacities and circumstances in his favour, and the performance of bad deeds forces a man to take a vicious line of action in the future. At the time of dissolution also there is no separate dharma and adharma, but God's satisfaction and dissatisfaction produced by the individual's deeds determine the nature and extent of his sufferings and enjoyment as well as his tendencies towards virtue or vice at the time of the next creation. The fruits of actions are experienced in the Heaven and Hell and also in the mundane life, but not while the individual is passing from Heaven or Hell to earth, for at that time there is no experience of pleasure or pain, it being merely a state of transition. Again, except in the case of those sacrifices which are performed for injuring or molesting other fellow beings, there is no sin in the killing of animals in sacrifices which are performed for the attainment of Heaven or such other pleasurable purposes 2 .

Vatsya Varada.

Regarding the doctrine of Vedic injunction that one should study the Vedas, Vatsya Varada in his Prameya-mala holds the view, in contradistinction to the Sahara Bhasya, that Vedic injunction is satisfied only in the actual reading of the Vedic texts and that the Vedic injunction does not imply an inquiry into the mean-

1 suryd-di-sambandha-viseso-pddhitah prthivyd-didesdndm eva kdla-sarnjnd. Naya-dyu-mani, p. 168. 8 Ibid. pp. 243-246.

35© Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

ing of those texts. Such an inquiry proceeds from the normal inquisitive spirit and the desire to know the various applications in the practical performances of sacrifices. These do not form a part of the Vedic injunction (vidhi).

Vatsya Varada holds that the study of the Vedic injunction and the inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scripture, i.e. the latter follows or is a continuation of the former; and he mentions Bodhayana in his support.

Sarikara had thought that the study of the Mimamsa was intended for a class of people but not necessarily for those who would inquire into the nature of Brahman. The Purva-mimamsa and the Uttara-mimamsa were intended for different purposes and were written by different authors. These should not therefore be regarded as integrally related as two parts of a unified work. To this Vatsya Varada, following Bodhayana, takes exception, for he thinks that though the Purva-mimamsa and Uttara-mimamsa are written by different authors yet the two together uphold one common view and the two may be regarded as two chapters of one whole book.

Vatsya Varada also, in referring to Sarikara's view that the Purva-mimamsa assumes the existence of a real world, whereas the purport of the Brahma-sutra is to deny it and therefore the two cannot be regarded as having the same end in view, challenges it by affirming the reality of the world. Sarikara's argument, that all which is cognizable is false, would imply that even the self is false; for many Upanisads speak of the perceptibility of the self. His declaration of the falsity of the world would also imply that the falsehood itself is felse, for it is a part of the world. Such an argument ought to be acceptable to Sarikara, for he himself utilized it in refuting the nihilists.

Regarding the denial of the category of difference by the Sarikarites Vatsya Varada says that the opponent cannot by any means deny that difference is perceived, for all his arguments are based on the assumption of the existence of difference. If there were no difference, there would be no party and no view to be refuted. If it is admitted that the category of difference is perceived, then the opponent has also to admit that such a perception must have its own peculiar and proper cause. The real point in the conception of difference is that it constitutes its other as a part of itself. An object in its own nature has twofold characteristics, the

characteristic of its universal similarity with other things of its class and the characteristic in which it differs from others. In its second characteristic it holds its others in itself. When it is said that a thing is different it does not mean that the difference is identical with the thing or but another name for the thing, but what is meant is that a thing known as different has an outside reference to other entities. This outside reference to other entities, when conceived along with the object, produces the perception of difference.

The conception of difference involves the conception of negation as involved in the notion of otherness. If this negation is different in nature from the object which is conceived as "different" or as the "other" of other objects, then since this negation cannot be directly known by perception " difference " also cannot be known directly by perception. The Visista-dvaita theory admits that "difference" can be directly perceived. In order to prove this point Vatsya Varada gives a special interpretation of "negation" (abhava). He holds that the notion of negation of an entity in another entity is due to the latter's being endowed with a special character as involving a reference to the former. The notion of negation thus proceeds from a special modified character of an object in which the negation is affirmed. There are many Sankarites who regard negation as positive, but in their case it is held to be a special category by itself which is perceived in the locus of the negation by the special pramana of non-perception. Though positive its notion is not produced according to them by the special modified nature of the object perceived in which the negation is affirmed. But Vatsya Varada holds that the notion of negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed 1 . The negation revealed to us in one object as the otherness of another object means that the latter is included in a special character of the former which makes the reference as the otherness possible.

Vatsya Varada also emphasizes the view that the tests referring to Brahman as satya, jnana> ananta, etc., indicate the fact of the possession of these qualities by God and that the monistic interpretation that these together refer to one identical being, the Brahman, is false. He also describes the infinite and unlimited nature of

1 pratiyogi-buddhau vastu-visesa-dhlr evo'peta ndstl' ti vyavahara-hetuh. Varada, Prameya-mala, p. 35 (MS.).

352 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

Brahman and explains the exact sense in which the world and the individuals may be regarded as the body of God and that the individuals exist for God who is their final end. He also deals in this work with certain topics regarding the external rituals, such as shaving of the head, wearing the holy thread, etc., by ascetics.

Varada, in his Tattva-sara, collects some of the specially interesting points of the Bhasya of Ramanuja and interprets them in prose and verse. Some of these points are as follows: (i) The view that the existence of God cannot be logically proved, but can be accepted only from scriptural testimony, (ii) The special interpretation of some of the important Upanisadic texts such as the Kapydsa text, (iii) The results of the discussions of the important adhikaranas of Vedanta according to Ramanuja. (iv) The doctrine that negation is only a kind of position, (v) The interpretation of the apparent dualistic and monistic texts, (vi) The discussion regarding the reality of the world, etc.

This Tattva-sara provoked a further commentary on it called Ratna-sarini by Vlra-raghava-dasa, a son of Badhula Narasimha Guru, disciple of Badhula Varada Guru, son of Badhula Veiika-tacarya. Some of Vatsya Varada's other works are: Sara-rtha-catustaya, Aradhana-samgraha, Tattva-nirnaya, Prapanna-pdrijdta, Yati-linga-samarthana and Purusa-ninnaya 1 .

Ramanujacarya II alias Vadi-Hamsa-Navamvuda.

Ramanujacarya II, the son of Padmanabharya, belonged to the Atri lineage. He was the maternal uncle of Veiikatanatha, the famous writer of the Ramanuja school. He wrote the Nydya-kulisa which has often been referred to in Veiikata's Sarvdrtha-siddhi. He also wrote another work called Moksa-siddhi. Some of his interpretations of Ramanuja's ideas have already been referred to in dealing with the Ramanuja theory of knowledge as explained by Verikata. Other contributions by him are mentioned in brief below.

Negation. Negation as a separate category is denied by Ramanujacarya II. He thinks that negation of an entity means only another entity different from it. The negation of a jug thus means the

1 In his Tattva-nirnaya he tries tp prove that all the important Sruti texts prove that Narayana is the highest God. He refers in this work to his Purusa-nirnaya where, he says, he has discussed the subject in more detail.

existence of some other entity different from it. The real notion of negation is thus only "difference." A negation is described as that which is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is thus no way in which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a positive entity. But a positive entity never stands in need of its specification through a reference to negation 1 . It is also well known that the negation of a negation is nothing else than the existence of positive entity. The existence of negation cannot be known either by perception, inference, or by implication. Venkata, in further explaining this idea, says that the idea of absence in negation is derived from the association of the object of negation with a different kind of temporal or spatial character 2 . Thus, when it is said that there is no jug here, it merely means that the jug exists in another place. It is argued that negation cannot be regarded as the existence of positive entity, and it may be asked if negation cannot be regarded as negation, how can negation of negation be regarded as the existence of positive entity. Just as those who admit negation regard negation and existence of positive entity as mutually denying each other, so the Ramanujas also regard the existence of positive entities and negations as denying each other in their different spatial and temporal characters. Thus it is not necessary to admit negation as a separate category. When an existing entity is said to be destroyed, what happens is that there is a change of state. Negation-precedent-to-production (praga-bhava) and the negation of destruction do not mean anything more than two positive states succeeding each other, and there may be an infinite series of such states. If this view is not admitted, and if the negation of destruction (pradhvamsa-bhava) and the negation-precedent-to-production (prag-abhava) be regarded as separate categories of negation, then the destruction of negation-precedent-to-production and negation-precedent-to-production of destruction will depend upon an infinite series of negations which would lead to a vicious infinite. It is the succession of a new state that is regarded as the destruction of the old state, the former being a different state from the latter. It is sometimes held that negation is mere vacuity and has no reference to the existence of positive entity. If that were so, then on the one hand

1 athd'bhdvasya tad-rupam yad-bhdva-pratipaksatd nai'vam adya'py asau yasmdd bhdvo-ttlrnena sddhitah. Nydya-kulisa. MS.

2 tat-tat-pratiyogi-bhava-sphurana-sahakrto desa-kdld-di-bheda eva svabhdvdt nan-prayogam apt sahate. Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 714.

diii 23

354 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

negation would be causeless and on the other it could not be the cause of anything; and so negations would thus be both beginning-less and eternal. In that case the whole world would be within the grasp of negation and everything in the world would be non-existing. Thus it is unnecessary to admit negation as a separate category. The difference of one positive entity from another is regarded as negation.

Another problem that arises in this connection is that if negation is not admitted as a separate category how can negative causes be admitted. It is well known that when certain collocations of causes can produce an effect they can do so only when there are no negative causes to counteract their productive capacity. This capacity (sakti) is admitted in the Ramanuja school as the collocation of accessories which helps a cause to produce the effect (karanasya karyo-payogi sahakari-kalapah saktir ity ucyate) 1 . To this Ramanujacarya's reply is that the absence of counteracting agents is not regarded as a separate cause, but the presence of the counteracting agents along with the other accessory collocations is regarded as making those accessory collocations unfit for producing the effect. Thus there are two sets of collocations where the effect is or is not produced, and it is the difference of two collocations that accounts for the production of the effect in one case and its non-production in another; but this does not imply that absence or negation of the obstructive factors should be regarded as contributing to the causation. In one case there was the capacity for production and in another case there was no such capacity 2 . Capacity (sakti) is not regarded by Ramanujacarya as a separate non-sensible (atlndriya) entity, but as an abstract specification of that which produces any effect (sakti-gata-jaty-anabhyupagame tad-abhavat saktasydiva jatih karya-niyamika na tu sakti-jatir iti) 3 .

Jati (universal). Ramanujacarya does not admit anyjati or universal in the sense of any abstract generality of individuals. Accord-

1 Sarvdrtha-siddhi, p. 685.

2 siddha-vastn-virodhi ghdtakah sddhya-vastu-virodhi pratibandhakah, kat-ham yadi kdrye tad-viruddhatvam iti cen na; ittham karyam kdratia-pauskalye bhavati, tad-apauskalye na bhavati, apauskalyam ca kvacit kdrandndm anyatama-vaikalyat kvacit sakti-raikalyat iti bhidyate, yadyapi saktir na karanam tatha'pi saktasyai'va kdranatvdt zisesand-bhdve'pi vis'istd-bhdva-nydyena kdrand-bhdvah. tad-ubhaya-kdranena prdg-abhdva-sthitl-karandt kdrya-virodhi ti pratibandhako bhavati; tatra yathd kdrana-vaikalya-drsta-rupena kurvato'bhdvah karanam na sydt; tathd sakti-vighnitah yo hi ndma pratibandhakah karanam kificid vinds'ya karyam pratibadhndti na tasyd'bhdvah karanam iti siddham. Nydya-kulis'a. MS.

ing to him any unified assemblage of parts similar to such other assemblages of parts (susadrsa-samsthana) is called a universal 1 .

Venkata, a follower of Ramanujacarya, defines jati as mere similarity (sausadrsya). Criticizing the Naiyayika theory of jati he says that if that which manifests universals is itself manifested through universals, then these universals should have to be manifested by others which have to be manifested by further universals and this would lead to a vicious infinite. If to avoid such a vicious infinite it is held that the second grade parts that manifest a jati (universal) do not require a further jati for their manifestation, then it is better to say that it is the similar individuals that represent the notion of jati and that it is not necessary to admit any separate category as jati. It is clear that the notion of universals proceeds from qualities or characters in which certain individuals agree, and if that is so it should be enough to explain the notion of universals. It is these characters, the similarity of which with the similar characters of other individuals is remembered, that produce the notion of universals 2 . When some parts or qualities are perceived in some things they of themselves naturally remind us of other similar parts in other things and it is this fact, that the two mutually stand, one beside the other, in the mind, which is called similarity 3 . It is inexplicable why certain qualities or characters remind us of others and it can only be said that they do so naturally; and it is this fact that they stand beside each other in the mind which constitutes their similarity as well as their universal. There is no other separate category which may either be called similarity (sadrsya) or universal. There is not, however, much difference between Rama-nujacarya's definition of universals and Veiikata's definition of it, for though the former defines it as any assemblages that are similar and the latter as similarity, yet the very conception of similarity of Venkata involves within it the assemblage of parts as its constituent; for the notion of similarity according to Venkata is not

1 Nyaya-kulisa. MS.

2 kecid dhl-samsthana-bhedah kvacana khalu mithas sadrsyarupa bhanti yair bhavadlyam samanyam abhivyajyate ta eva sausadrsya-vyavahara-visaya-bhutah samanya-vyavaharam nirvahantu; tasmat tesam sarvesam anyonya-sapeksai-ka-smrti-visayataya tat-tad-ekdvamarsas tat-tajjatlyatva-vamarsah. Sarvartha-siddhi,

P- 7°4-

3 yady apy ekaikastham sasna-di-dharma-svarupam tatha'pi tan-nirupadhi-niyataih svabhdvato niyataih tats tais sasna-dibhir anya-nisthais sa-pratidvand-vikam sydt; idam eva anvonya-sa-pratidvandvika-rupam sadrsya-sabda-vacyam abhidhlyate. Ibid.

23-2

356 Philosophy of the Rdmdmija School of Thought [ch

anything abstract, but it means the concrete assemblages of parts that stand beside one another in memory. Venkata, however, points out that the notion of "universal" does not necessarily mean that it can be with regard to assemblages of parts only, for in case of those partless entities, such as qualities, there cannot be any assemblage of parts, yet the notion of universals is still quite applicable. It is for this reason that Venkata makes "similarity" only as the condition of "universals" and does not include assemblages of parts {samsthdnd) as is done by Ramanujacarya.

Svatah-prdmanya {self-validity). It is sometimes argued that as in all things so in the determination of validity and invalidity the application of the methods of agreement and difference is to be regarded as the decisive test. The presence of qualities that contribute to validity and the absence of defects that make any perception invalid is to be regarded as deciding the validity or invalidity of any perception. To this Ramanujacarya says that the ascertainment of qualities that contribute to validity cannot be determined without an assurance that there are no defects, and the absence of defects cannot also be known without the knowledge of the presence of qualities that contribute towards validity: and so, since they mutually depend upon each other, their independent determination is impossible. Thus the suggestion is that there is neither the determination of validity nor invalidity, but there is doubt. To this the reply is that unless something is known there cannot be any doubt. So there is a middle stage before the determination of validity or invalidity. Before it is known that the knowledge corresponds with the object or does not do so, there must be the manifestation of the object {artha-prakdsa) which, so far as it itself is concerned, is self-valid and does not depend for its validity upon the application of any other method; for it is the basis of all future determinations of its nature as true or false. So this part of knowledge—the basic part—the manifestation of objects—is self-valid. It is wrong to say that this knowledge is in itself characterless (nihsvabhava), for it is of the nature of the manifestation of an objective entity like the determination of tree-ness before its specific nature as a mango or a pine tree 1 . The knowledge of the contri-

1 yatha-rtha-paricchedah pramanyom oyothu-rtha-paricchedah apramanyarn kalham tad-ubhaya-parityage artha-pariccheda-siddliih ili cen na, aparilydjyatva-bhynpagamot. tayoh sadharanam era hy ortha-paricchedam britmah simsapa-paldsa-disu iva vrksatvam. Nydya-kulisa. MS.

butory qualities is not the cause of validity, but when validity is determined they may be regarded as having contributed to the validity. The self-validity is of the knowledge (jnana) and not of its correspondence (tathatva). If the correspondence were also directly revealed, then there can never be any doubt regarding such correspondence. When the followers of Kumarila say that knowledge is self-valid, they cannot mean that knowledge itself imparts the fact that there has been a true correspondence, for they do not admit that knowledge is self-revealing. They have therefore admitted that there are some other means by which the notion of such validity is imparted. The validity of those will again have to depend upon the validity of other imparting agents, and there will thus be a vicious infinite. For the determination of validity one is bound to depend on the ascertainment by corroboration and causal efficiency. If validity thus depends upon the ascertainment of contributory qualities, then there is no self-validity. The Vedas also cannot be self-valid in this view. If there are no defects in them because they have not proceeded from any erring mortals, then they have no contributory qualities also because they have not proceeded (according to the Mimamsa view) from any trustworthy person. So there may legitimately be a doubt regarding their validity. The truth of any correspondence depends upon something other than the knowledge itself, e.g. the falsehood of any mis-correspondence. If it depended merely on the cause of the knowledge, then even a false knowledge would be right. For establishing the validity of the Vedas, therefore, it has to be admitted that they have been uttered by an absolutely trustworthy person. Knowledge does not manifest merely objectivity but a particular thing or entity and it is valid so far as that particular thing has been manifested in knowledge 1 . The validity of knowledge thus refers to the thing in its general character as the manifestation of a particular thing and not regarding its specific details in character 2 . Such a validity, however, refers only to the form of the knowledge itself and not to objective corroboration 3 . Whatever may be doubtful in it is to be ascertained by contributory qualities, corroboration and the like, and when the

1 yad dhijndne vidyate tad eva tasya laksanam ucitam vastu-prakdsatvam eva inane vidyate na tu vifaya-prakdsatvam yato vijndne samutpanne vi$ayo' yam iti nd' bhdti kintu ghato' yam iti. Nydya-kulisa. MS.

2 jndndndm sdmdnya-rupani eva prdmdnyam na vaisesikam rupam. Ibid.

3 tasmdd bodhd'tmakatvena prdptd buddheh pramdnatd. Ibid.

358 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

chances of error are eliminated by other sources the original validity stands uncontradicted.

Saprakasatva (self-luminosity). Ramanujacarya first states the Naiyayika objection against self-luminosity. The Naiyayikas are supposed to argue that things are existent but they become know-able only under certain conditions and this shows that existence (satta) is different from cognition or its self-illumination (prakasa). Arguing from the same position it may be said that knowledge as an existent entity is different from its illumination as such 1 . If knowledge itself were self-revealing, then it would not depend upon any conditioning of it by its contiguity or relationing with objects and as such any individual cognition would mean universal cognition. If, on the other hand, knowledge requires a further conditioning through its relationing with objects, then knowledge would not be self-revealing. Further, knowledge being partless, there cannot be any such conception that one part of it reveals the other. In the case of partless entities it is not possible to conceive that knowledge should be self-revealing, for it cannot be both an agent and an object at the same time. Again, if knowledge were self-revealing, then the difference between consciousness and its re-perception through introspection cannot be accounted for. Further, it must be remembered that the difference between one cognition and another depends upon the difference of its objective content. Apart from this there is no difference between one cognition and another. If the objective content was not a constituent of knowledge, then there would be no difference between the illumination of knowledge as such and the illumination of an object. If knowledge were by itself self-illuminating, then there would be no place for objects outside it and this would bring us to absolute idealism. So the solution may be either on the Mimamsa lines that knowledge produces such a character in the objective entity that by that cognized character of objects cognition may be inferred, or it may be on Nyaya lines that knowledge manifests the objects. Thus it has to be admitted that there must be some kind of cognitive relation between the object and its knowledge, and it would be the specific nature of these relations that would determine the cognitive character in each case. Now it may again be asked whether this cognitive relation is only object-pointing or

1 sarvasya hi svatah st-a-gocara-jnona-dhlnah prakasah samvidam apt tathai'va abhyupagantum ucitah. Nyaya-kulisa. MS.

whether it is object-knowledge-pointing. In the former case the object alone would be manifested and in the latter case knowledge would be its own object, which is again absurd. If knowledge manifested the object without any specific relation, then any knowledge might manifest any object or all objects. Knowledge implies a cognitive operation and if such an operation is not admitted knowledge cannot be manifested, for the very objectivity of knowledge implies such an operation. Hence the conclusion is that as knowledge manifests other objects so it is also manifested by a further cognition of re-perception. When one says " I perceive it," it is not a case of mere knowledge-manifestation but a re-perception of having perceived that particular object. So knowledge is manifested by a further re-perception and not by itself. To this Rama-nujacarya raises an objection: it may be asked whether this re-perception of knowledge takes place in spite of the absence of any desire to re-perceive on the part of the knower or as the result of any such desire. In the former case, since the re-perception takes place automatically, there will be an infinite series of such automatic re-perceptions. In the latter case, i.e. when the re-perception takes place in consequence of a desire to do so, then such a desire must be produced out of previous knowledge and that would again presuppose another desire, and that another knowledge, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. To this the Naiyayika reply is that the general re-perception takes place without any desire, but the specific re-perception occurs as a result of a desire to that effect. This ordinary re-perception of a general nature follows as a natural course, for all mundane people have always some knowledge or other throughout the course of their experience. It is only when there is a desire to know some specific details that there is a specific mental intuition (mdnasa-pratyaksa) to that effect.

To this Ramanujacarya's reply is that in the case of an ordinary existent thing there is a difference between its existence as such and its manifestation of knowledge, for it always depends upon specific relations between itself and knowledge; but in the case of a self-luminous entity where no such relations are needed there is no difference between its existence and its manifestation. The fire illuminates other objects but it does not need any other assistance to manifest itself. It is this that is meant by self-luminosity. Just as no entity depends upon any other entity of its own class for its

360 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

manifestation, so knowledge also does not need assistance from knowledge for its manifestation. The relations that are needed for the manifestation of other objects are not needed for the manifestation of knowledge itself 1 . Knowledge thus being self-luminous helps our behaviour directly but does not depend upon anything else for lending such assistance. It is against all experience that knowledge for its manifestation requires some other knowledge, and if it has no support in our experience there is no justification for making such an extraordinary theory that any knowledge for its manifestation should require the operation of another knowledge. That only can be called an object of knowledge which though existent remains unmanifested. But it cannot be said that there was knowledge which was not known, for a cognition would not last like other objective entities awaiting the time when it might be manifested. In the case of a past knowledge which is merely inferred now, there is no notion of that knowledge, so one can always draw a distinction between the known and the unknown. If only the object were illuminated and not the knowledge of it, no one would fail for a moment to perceive that. If knowledge were merely inferred from its effect, everyone would have so experienced it, but no one has a moment's hesitation in discriminating between what is known and unknown. It is again wrong to say that knowledge arises only after inquiry, for in the present knowledge whatever is sought to be known is known directly, and in the past knowledge also there is no such inference that there was knowledge because it is remembered, but the past knowledge directly appears as memory; for if that is called an inference, then even re-perception may be regarded as an inference from memory.

Again, a thing that exists without being an object of knowledge at the same time is liable to erroneous manifestation on account of the presence of defects in the collocation conditioning the knowledge, but knowledge itself is never liable to error, and consequently it has no existence apart from being known. Just as there cannot be any doubt whether a pleasure or a pain is experienced, so there cannot be any doubt about knowledge, and this shows that whenever there is knowledge it is self-manifested. When one knows an object one is also sure about one's knowledge of it. Again, it is

1 jfidnam ananya-dhlna-prakascnn artha-prakdsakatvdt dlpavat. Nydya-kulisa. MS.

wrong to suppose that if knowledge is self-manifested then there would be no difference between itself and its objective content, for the difference is obvious; knowledge in itself is formless, while the object supplies the content. Two entities which appear in the same manifestation, such as quality and substance, things and their number, are not on that account identical. It cannot also be said that knowledge and its object are identical because they are simultaneously manifested, for the very fact that they are simultaneously manifested shows that they are two different things. Knowledge and the object shine forth in the same manifestation and it is impossible to determine which of them shines before or after.

The self also is to be regarded as being of the nature of knowledge from the testimony of the scriptures. Self being of the nature of knowledge is also self-luminous, and it is not therefore to be supposed that it is cognized by mental intuition {manasa-pratyaksa).

Ramanujadasa alias Mahacarya.

Ramanujadasa, called also Mahacarya, was the pupil of Badhiila Srinivasacarya. He is not, however, to be confused with Ramanujacarya II, the son of Padmanabharya and the maternal uncle of Vedanta-desika—who was also known as Vadi-hamsa-navambuda. He wrote at least three books: Sad-vidyd-mjaya, Advaita-vijaya, and Parikara-vijaya.

In his Sad-vidyd-vijaya, in refuting the Sankarite doctrine that the existence of positive nescience {bhdva-rupd-jndna) can be known by the different pramdnas of perception, inference and implication, he says that intuitive experience of ignorance, such as "I am ignorant," cannot be regarded as an experience of nescience as such in its entirety {krtsnd-jndna-pr otitis tdvad asiddha), for it can never refer to all objects as negativing all knowledge. A perceptual mental state of the antahkarana is not admitted by the Sankarites to refer to entities past and gone. Even when a man intuits that he is ignorant, there is at that stage an illumination of his own ego and the fact of his being ignorant, and it cannot be said that in such an experience the nescience in its entirety has been illuminated, for the ego is also illuminated at the time. If nescience in its entirety

362 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

is not illuminated, then the nescience is only illuminated with reference to particular objects, and if that is so the assumption of a positive nescience is useless. Again, if nescience or want of knowledge refers to a particular object, then there is a knowledge of that object implied in it; and therefore nescience as such is not experienced and a supposition of a positive nescience is no better than the ordinarily accepted view that in such cases there is only a negation of the knowledge of an object except in deep dreamless sleep. In all other stages all experiences of ignorance refer to the negation of knowledge of particular objects. All cases of ignorance mean that their objects are known only in a general manner, but not in their specific details. Again, it cannot be said that nescience is regarded as positive merely to denote that it is of the nature of a stuff that is opposed to knowledge in gener3.\(jfiana-samanya-virodhi) \ for in such experiences as "I am ignorant" there is the knowledge of the subject to which the ignorance belongs and also some general content regarding which there is the ignorance. Further, since the nescience has the pure consciousness as its support and since the mind (antahkarana) is not regarded as its support, how can the experience "I am ignorant" be said to refer to the experience of this stuff? If it be held that since the mind is an illusory construction on the pure consciousness which is the support of the nescience {ajndna), the latter may appear as a mental function, for both the ego and the nescience, being illusory impositions on the pure consciousness, may shine forth from the same identical basis of consciousness. The reply is that such an explanation is obviously wrong, for if both the ego-consciousness and the ajndna shone forth from the same basic consciousness, the latter could not appear as the predicate of the former. If the one pure consciousness manifests both the ego and the ajndna, they would not appear as different and arranged in a definite subject-predicate order. Again, if it is held that the ajndna shines only as a predicative to the ego because they are based on pure consciousness, then how can such an ajndna refer to the objective things (which are independent impositions on pure consciousness) in such experiences as " I do not know a jug?" If it is said that since there is the one identical consciousness on which the objective entities, the ajndna and the ego-entity, are all imposed, and the ajndna is always in relation with the objective entities, then it may be said that even when a jug is known, the ajndna, being in

relation with other entities (such as cloth) and through them with the pure consciousness underlying them, is also in relation with the pure consciousness on which the jug is a construction. As such it would also be in relation with the jug, with the result that there would be the experience that the jug is not known. It may be argued that the very fact of the positive perception of the jug may be an obstacle to the association of ajnana with it. To this the reply is that just as when one says "I do not know this tree" there is knowledge regarding the "this" and ignorance regarding the nature of the tree, so here also there may be a partial knowledge and ignorance in different aspects of the same jug. In cases of doubt one has to admit knowledge and ignorance subsisting in the same entity, and this is true in all cases of inquiry where a thing may be known in a general way and yet remain unknown so far as its specific details are concerned.

Again, it is wrongly contended by the Sankarites that during deep dreamless sleep there is a direct intuition of ajnana; for if ajnana were then known in its own nature as such, a man could not wake up and remember that he knew nothing. He should then have remembered that he had a direct intuition of ajnana. If during deep dreamless sleep the pure consciousness illuminated ajnana, it must have also illuminated all known and unknown things in the world, which is absurd, for then these would have been remembered during the waking period. It cannot be said that during deep dreamless sleep only ajnana is manifested and nothing else, for according to the testimony of waking consciousness time is also perceived during dreamless sleep which accounts for the memory of the waking stage "so long I did not know anything." Further, if it is held that whatever is illuminated by pure safoz-consciousness (i.e. without passing through the vrtti stage) then the ajnana also would not be remembered. If it is held that the objects of ajnana only are not illuminated by the sa/tfz-consciousness but only the ajnana, then that could not account for the memory in the waking stage "I did not know anything," where "anything" definitely refers to some object of ajnana. Moreover, if the above supposition were correct, then the pure bliss could not be illuminated during dreamless sleep and remembered later in the waking stage. If in reply to this it were contended that certain specific characters were remembered during the waking period in addition to the ajnana

364 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [ch.

because they were represented through the modes of avidyd, the reply is that instead of assuming that there were specific modes of avidyd one might as well admit them to be due to mental modes or states, and the experience of ajndna might well be accounted for as being the experience of absence of knowledge. Since absence of knowledge is acceptable to all, there is no justification for admitting a new entity such as a positive ajndna.

Again, in the case of loss of memory of a perceived object, a person might say that he did not know the object, but that does not prove that while he knew the object he had an intuition of the ajndna of that object. After an illusory perception of conch-shell-silver one says "I did not know silver so long"; and how is this to be explained? Moreover, when one sees an object at the present moment, one may say "I did not know this object so long." How is this to be explained? The obvious reply is that in all such cases we infer only that there was an absence of knowledge of those entities. In the instance under discussion also we may hold the same view and say that we infer that during dreamless sleep we had no knowledge. But we cannot say that we then intuited directly a positive ajndna. The Saiikarites say that the existence of ajtlana as a positive stuff can be proved by inference also, for according to them just as light manifests things by removing the positive stuff of darkness, so knowledge also manifests things by removing the ajndna stuff that was hiding them. In refuting this, Mahacarya enters into a long discourse of formal and scholastic criticism of the Saiikarite mode of syllogism which cannot appropriately be treated here. The main point that is worthy of our notice here and which has a philosophical significance is the view of the Ramanuja school that the illumination of things by knowledge does not presuppose that some positive stuff of ajndna must have been removed. The Saiikarites object that unless ajtlana is admitted as a separate stuff, hiding the pure bliss of the self, it is difficult to explain emancipation. To this Mahacarya's reply is that emancipation can well be explained as cessation of bondage. People are as anxious to gain positive pleasure as to remove negative pain. It is wrong to suppose that unless the bondage were false it could not be removed, for it is well known that the effects of poison can be removed by the meditation of the mythical bird Garuda. So worldly bondage can also be removed by the meditation of God, though it be real. Meditation

as knowledge can remove not only ignorance but also the real fact of bondage. Emancipation may thus be regarded as the eternal manifestation of bliss and it is not indispensably necessary that all manifestation of bliss or happiness must be associated with a body like other ordinary bodily pleasure 1 .

The Sankarites say that since the unchangeable self cannot be the material cause of the world phenomena nor anything else, it comes by implication that there must be an ajndna stuff which is the material cause of the world, for it is only such a material cause that can explain the ajndna characteristics of the world-phenomena. Brahman has often been designated as the material cause of the world, and this is true only so far as it is the basic cause (adhisthdna-kdrana), the pure being that underlies all phenomena. The ajndna is the changing material cause (parindmi-kdrana), and as such the world participates in the nature of ajndna in its characters.

To this Mahacarya's reply is that even though the world-creation may be supposed to be false, that does not necessarily imply the assumption of a positive ajndna. Thus the illusory silver is produced without any cause, or the self may be regarded as the material cause of the world-creation, which though partless may appear as the world through error. It cannot be said that a false effect must have a false entity as its cause, for no such generalization can be made. The presence of the common characteristic of falsehood cannot determine the supposition that a false entity must necessarily be the cause of a false effect, for there must be other common characteristics in other respects too and there is certainly no absolute similarity of characteristics between the cause and the effect 2 . Moreover, an effect does not necessarily possess the same identity of existence as its changing material cause; it is therefore not impossible for the Brahman to be the material cause of the world, though its purity may not be found in the world. If the Brahman is regarded as the parindmi-kdrana of the world, it cannot of course have the same identical existence as the world, but if an entity can show itself in another form we may call it a parindmi-kdrana, and it is not necessary for it to have the same existence as that effect. Thus, destruction and the cessation of avidyd are both regarded as

1 Sad-zidyd-vijaya, pp. 39-75 (MSS.).

2 nanu updddno-pddeyayoh sdlaksanya-niyama-darsandd eva tat-siddhir iti cet sarvathd sdlaksanyasya mrd-ghatayoh. apy adarsandt yat kincit sdrupyasya sukti-rajatd-ddv api paddrthatvd-dind satvdt. Ibid. p. 77.

366 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

effects and yet they have not the same existence as their causes 1 . It cannot therefore be argued that if Brahman be regarded as the parindmi-karana of the world, the world would thereby be as real as Brahman. Again, the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world may well be explained as being due to the influence of karma. Even for explaining the non-appearance of the Brahma-character of the world the assumption of an ajnana is not necessary. It is also not necessary to define emancipation as the cessation of ajnana, for that stage, being itself a state of bliss, can thereby be regarded as an object of our efforts, and the supposition of avidya and its cessation is wholly groundless.

Mahacarya also made a vigorous effort to show by textual contents that the existence of avidya as a positive ignorance is not admitted in the Vedic scriptures.

In the second chapter Mahacarya attempts to 6ho\v that there is no necessity to admit an ajnana as an independent hiding stuff. The Sarikarites argue that though the self is experienced in the notion of our ego, yet the self is not expressed in our ego-experience as identical with Brahman as the fullness of bliss, and for this it is necessary to admit that there is an ajnana stuff which hides the pure character of Brahman. To this Mahacarya's reply is that since ajnana is regarded as beginningless its hiding capacity will also be eternal and no emancipation is possible; and if Brahman could be hidden, it will cease to have its own nature as self-luminous and will be ignorant. Moreover, the experience is of the form " I am ignorant" and as such the ajnana seems to have reference only to the ego. If it is held that the existence of the veil is admitted only to explain the limited appearance of Brahman through mind {antahkarana), then it may well be pointed out that the limited appearance of Brahman as ego may well be explained through the limitation of the antahkarana through which it manifests itself, and for that it is not necessary to admit a separate veil of ajnana.

Again it may be asked whether the veiling is identical with ajnana or different from it. In the former case it would ever remain

1 yad uktam brahmanah parindmitayd updddnatve parindmasya parindtni-samdna-stittdkatva-niyamena kdryasyd'pi satyatza-prasatiga iti. tatra kirn pari-ndma-iabdena kdrya-mdtram vivaksitam, uta rupd-ntard-pattih ; dhvamsasya avidyd-nivrttesca parindmi-samdna-sattdkatvd-bhdxdt na hi tad-rupena parindtni kincid asti. na dvitiyam rupd-ntard-patteh parindmi-mdtra-sdpeksatvdt gauravena sva-samdna-sattdka-partndmy-apeksd-bhdvdt. Sad-vidyd-vijaya, p. 77.

unmanifested, and the manifestation of the world-appearance would be impossible. If the veiling is something different from ajnana, then since that something is not in any way related with pure consciousness its operation would not explain the world-illusion. If this veiling is supposed to render the ajnana indefinable, then it may be asked if this veiling is something different from ajnana or identical with it; in the latter case it would not depend on it and in the former case it is meaningless to regard ajnana as antagonistic to Brahman. Thus, since the limitations through which the Brahman manifests itself are sufficient to explain the limited appearance of Brahman as world-objects, it is unnecessary to admit a separate ajnana.

Again, if ajnana can veil the pure sfifo/-consciousness, then the whole world would be blind and there would be no knowledge at all. If the Sflfoz-consciousness cannot be veiled, then the Brahman also cannot be veiled. Further, if Brahman is always self-luminous, then it can never be hidden by ajnana. If it is said that the self-luminosity of Brahman means that it cannot be the object of cognition (a-vedyatva) or of immediacy (aparoksa), then it is unnecessary to indulge in the conception of veiling, for the non-cognizability is neither of the two. Again, the Sankarites hold that the ajnana hides the bliss part of Brahman but not the part of its consciousness. This is obviously impossible, for they hold that bliss and pure consciousness are identical; and if that were so, how can the bliss part be covered without covering also the part of consciousness, and how can one identical partless being, the Brahman, be divided into two parts of which one is covered while the other is not? Again, if the self is admitted to be of the nature of pure bliss, and if our love of pleasure is explained as being due to the illusory construction of the ego on this self, then since all things of the world are but illusory impositions on the self, all things in the world would be dear to us and even pain would be pleasurable.

In the third chapter Mahacarya refutes the Sankarite theory of the support of ajnana. It is held by some exponents of the Sankara school that the o/wawa-constituents of the objects are supported in the pure consciousness underlying these objects. Though there are the modifications of these ajnana entities, yet they may have relation with our ego-consciousness, for both the ego and the objects are but the states of a ground-ajnana. To this Mahacarya says that

368 Philosophy of the Rdmannja School of Thought [en.

if all objects of the world have separate and different ajiiana materials as their causes, then it is wrong to suppose that the illusory silver is produced by the ajiiana of the conch-shell. It would be much better to say that the ajiiana of the subject (pramata) as it comes out with the antahkarana has produced the illusory silver. Again, if the ajiiana of the conch-shell is regarded as beginningless, it is meaningless to regard it as being a modification of a ground-ajnana, and if it is not regarded as a mode its perception cannot be explained.

There are again others who hold that the ajiiana constituting an external object in some sense subsists in the subject as well and thus there may be a connection between the subject and the object. To this Mahacarya says that such a view is impossible, for the consciousness underlying the object is different from that underlying the subject; and if it is held that pure consciousness is ultimatelv one, then all objects ought to be illuminated just as much as any particular object is illuminated at the time of any particular cognition. Again, if the consciousness underlying the objects and the subject is without any distinction, why should a man know himself to be ignorant when he says "I am ignorant"? There is no reason why this feeling of ignorance should be felt in the subject and not in the object when the consciousness underlying them are one and the same. Moreover, in that case where one person knows an object, there would be a knowledge of that object with all persons.

There are again others who say that the ajiiana constituent of the conch-shell has the consciousness underlying the ego-experience as its support and the consciousness underlying the conch-shell as its object. To this Mahacarya says that the ajiiana supported by the consciousness underlying the ego-experience cannot undergo transformation, and, if this is so, it cannot explain the diverse objects.

There are others again who think that when a man says that he does not know the conch-shell his ignorance refers to the root-ajnana; for though the ajiiana refers to the pure consciousness, that being identical with the pure consciousness underlying the conch-shell, the ajiiana also refers to the conch-shell and mav be so apprehended. One has also to admit that the illusory silver is also made up of the stuff of ajiiana, for since the illusory silver appears in perception, it must have some stuff as its material cause.

To this Mahacarya's reply is that if the apperception of self-

ignorance has a reference to the root-ajnana, there is no justification for admitting separate ajnanas constituting the stuff of the objects. It cannot be suggested that the existence of such ajnana may be proved by the fact that each perception implies the cessation of a particular ajnana, for the disappearance of such an ajnana is only a matter of inference, and it may as well be assumed that it does not mean anything more than that a particular cognition follows only the absence of that particular knowledge. A negation-precedent-to-a-production is always destroyed by the production of a particular entity. When one says " I did not know the jug long, but I know it now," the cessation of the absence of knowledge or the ajnana has a direct and immediate reference to the subject, the knower. But the removal of the ajnana hiding the objects is only a matter of inference from the fact of cognition, and it can never be immediate or intuitive. Again, if the root-ajnana is supposed to veil the pure consciousness as underlying the objects, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of separate ajnanas hiding the objects. If it is supposed that the pure consciousness underlying the objects, being identical with Brahman, which is referred to by the root-ajnana, may appear in consciousness as being limited under the object-appearance, it may be asked how on account of the association of the root-ajnana the object may appear to be unknown even when it is known. Again, the root-ignorance implied in such an experience as "I do not know" cannot belong to the mind (antahkarana), for it is a material object and it cannot belong to the self-shining pure consciousness. Being what it is, it cannot be ignorant about itself.

Further, it may well be said that though the self is manifested in self-consciousness yet it often appears as associated with the body, and though objects may generally be known as "knowable" yet their specific nature may not be known and it is this that often leads to doubt; all these are inexplicable except on the assumption of ignorance. They may all be admitted, but even then the assumption that ajnana acts as a veiling agent is wholly unwarrantable. Uncertainty (anavadharana) and veiling {avarana) are not one and the same thing. In the appearance of water in a mirage there may be doubt due to uncertainty, and it cannot be denied that there is all the appearance of water which could not have been if the so-called ajnana had veiled it. Nor can it be said that the uncertainty

D III 24

37° Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

is due to the veiling, for it may well be urged that since veiling cannot manifest itself either as being or as self-luminous, it is itself a mere consequence or result of the factor of uncertainty. If it is urged that the factor of indefiniteness or uncertainty itself constitutes the nature of veiling (anavadharanatvam eza avaranam), then it may be said that the fact that the individual ego is not felt to be identical is regarded as being due to the veiling operation; but that does not mean that there is any uncertainty in our experience as the limited individual. If there were any such uncertainty, then ego-experience would not have stood as an indubitable fact. Again, if ajnana be itself of the nature of uncertainty, then there is no meaning in ascribing a separate veiling character to it. If it is held that ajnana is supported only by pure consciousness, then there would be no reason why the individual selves should pass through the cycles of birth and rebirth, for such ajnana would have no association with the individual selves. If it is urged that the same consciousness manifests itself through the individual self, then it may also be urged that since the consciousness underlies both the individuals and God, God may equally well be supposed to undergo the cycle of birth and rebirth 1 .

It is sometimes said that it is the mind (antahkarana) which experiences pleasure and pain and it is this that constitutes bondage. The mind itself being an illusory construction on the pure consciousness, the characters of the mind are felt to belong to the consciousness. To this Mahacarya's reply is that if the bondage belonged to the mind, then the pure consciousness cannot be supposed to suffer bondage. For if the suffering of bondage is due to the false notion of the identification of the pure consciousness with the mind, the bondage is not due to mind but to that false notion. In a similar manner Mahacarya enters into a criticism of many alternative interpretations that are offered by various writers of the Sarikara school in support of the existence of ajnana and such of its relations as may explain the world creation, and finally tries to establish his view that in whichever way the relation of ajnana may be conceived it is fraught with diverse kinds of contradictions which baffle explanation.

Again, in the fourth chapter Mahacarya contends that the

1 ajiianasya caitanya-matra-srayatve jive saynsara-hetutd na syat vaiyadhi-karanydc caitanyasyai'va jive-sa-vibhagdt samanadhikaranye isvarasyapisamsdra-prasangah. Sad-vidya-vijaya, p. 107 (MS.).

avidya cannot be regarded as ultimately real (paramarthiki) for then there would be no monism. It cannot be regarded as the stuff of all that is cognized in practical experience (vyavahariki), for then it could not be called the stuff of illusory experiences. It is sometimes urged that even from false things, such as a false fear, there may be real illness or even death, and so even from ignorance there can be real knowledge. Mahacarya points out that this analogy is false, for even in the above instances it is knowledge that produces the said results. If avidya is false, then all its material transformations must also be false, for the effect is always identical with the cause. It is urged that since the world-objects are false their knowledge must also be false; then the Brahman, which is the knowledge which is itself a product of avidya, is also false.

Further, if ajnana be regarded as one, then with the knowledge of conch-shell all ajnana should cease; for without the cessation of ajnana the conch-shell could not have been known. It cannot be said that with the knowledge of the conch-shell only the veil hiding it has been removed and that the ajnana did not cease, for experience testifies to the disappearance of ajnana and not that of the veil. Thus one is forced to admit the existence of many ajndnas. For if it is held that knowledge removes only the veil, then even the last emancipating knowledge would also remove only a particular veil and that would not result in the destruction of the ultimate ajnana. Again, ajnana is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge (jnana). If that is so, it is obviously wrong to define knowledge as being itself a product of ajnana. The effect cannot destroy the causal entity. Again, if at the time of emancipation of a man the ajnana is supposed to be destroyed, such an ajnana if it is one only would be wholly destroyed and there would be no other ajnana left which could bind the other unemancipated individuals. It is supposed that ajnana must be false, for it is destroyed by knowledge, but at the same time it is admitted that the ajnana is destroyed by the true scriptures (sruti), and when a thing is destroyed by another real and true entity the former cannot be regarded as false.

Again, avidya is sometimes defined as something the cessation of which can be produced by knowledge (Jnanajanya). Now Brahman is itself the cessation of avidya, but it is not produced by knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as a means to the cessation of knowledge (jnanasadhyatvat), then it does not necessarily mean that

24-2

372 Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

it has produced the cessation (na ca sva-janyatvam eva sva-sa-dhyatvam). If the two concepts are regarded as identical, then the relationing of avidyd to which avidya may be regarded as a means would also have to be admitted as being produced by avidya, which is reasoning in a circle 1 . Arguing on the same analogy, one might as well say that the cessation of the relationing with avidya. depends on the cessation of avidya, but in that case since the cessation of avidya itself means a relationing with avidya it becomes a tautology only.

Again, in order to differentiate any ordinary erroneous view, which is removed by right knowledge from avidya, it has been defined as being beginningless yet destructible by knowledge. Now, it may be asked, what is the nature of this knowledge which destroys avidya} Does it mean pure consciousness or only mental states? If it is pure consciousness, then it cannot destroy the root-impressions {samskara); for it is only the mental states (vrtti) which can destroy the mental root-impressions, and if avidya is a beginningless samskara it cannot be removed by knowledge as pure consciousness and thus the assumption of its being beginningless serves no useful purpose. The second supposition, that knowledge which destroys avidya is only a mental state, cannot also be correct, for it is held that knowledge as mental state can remove only the veil of ajfiana but not the ajfiana itself. If it is said that the mental state removes both the veil and the ajfiana, then the definition of ajfiana as that which can be removed by knowledge becomes too wide, as it would also signify the veil (avarana) which is not intended to be covered within the definition of ajfiana. Again, if ajnanas are regarded as many, then such cognitive states can remove onlv the ajfianas veiling the ordinary objects, and cannot therefore be applied to one undifferentiated ajfiana-\\ho\e which can be removed only by the intuition of the partless real, for this knowledge would not be a mental state which is always limited 2 . Here also the ajfiana must be supposed to be hiding the nature of Brahman, and the cessation of the ajfiana is directly consequent upon the cessation of the veil. So, firstly, the direct cause of the cessation of the ajfiana is not knowledge but the removal of the veil; secondly, it is the removal of the veil that is caused by the knowledge, and so it is this that ought to be called ajfiana according to the definition, for the veil is both beginningless and destructible by knowledge.

Mahacarya enters into a series of further criticisms of the definition of avidya which are more or less of a scholastic nature and may therefore be omitted here.

In the fifth chapter Mahacarya disputes the possibility that the avidya is illuminated or manifested. If avidya was self-manifesting, then it would be real and spiritual like the Brahman. If the manifestation of Brahman were the manifestation of the manifestation of the avidya, then the former being eternal the manifestation of the avidya would also be eternal; yet avidya is always regarded as existing only so long as it shines, and therefore as false (mithya-rthasyapratibhasa-samana-kalinatva-niyamat). If the manifestation (prakasa) of avidya be regarded as its non-distinguishingness (abheda) with the manifestation of Brahman, then so long as the manifestation of Brahman remains, the avidya would also remain and hence avidya itself would be eternal. Again, if it is urged that, when the avidya ceases, its non-distinguishingness with the Brahma-manifestation would also cease, and hence Brahman would be eternal and avidya would be destructible, a further difficulty may be pointed out to this contention, namely, that if the avidya be indistinguishable from the Brahma-manifestation, then either the latter would be false or the former real. It would be absurd to suggest in reply that, though different, they have an identical being (bhinnatve saty abhinnas-attakatvam). The criticisms suggested herein will apply to the doctrine if the illumination of avidya be explained as the manifestation of Brahman, as limited by avidya (avidya-vacchinnam brahma-svarupam avidya-prakasah) or as conditioned by it or reflected through it.

In the next chapter Mahacarya tries to show the incompatibility of the conception that avidya may be brought to an end. He says that pure consciousness cannot be supposed to destroy avidya. Then avidya can never exist, for the pure consciousness is eternally existing and as such by itself destroys avidya and no other effort is necessary. If pure consciousness cannot destroy avidya, it cannot do so when reflected through a mental state (vrtti-prativimbitam), for it is not more than the unlimited consciousness (caitanyad adhika-visayatva-bhave tadvad eva nivarttakatva-sambhavat). If the pure consciousness reflected through a vrtti cannot remove avidya, then it cannot do so when limited by a vrtti or conditioned by it. The vrtti itself also cannot remove it, for it is itself material. If it

374 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

is held that the knowledge which contradicts the illusory notion brought about by the ajndna destroys it and not the intuition of the reality, then if that contradiction is something identical with pure consciousness, it is the pure consciousness which is to be supposed as destroying the ajndna; the objections against such a view have already been dealt w T ith. If knowledge and ajndna are different, then it is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys ajndna ; for knowledge is the contradiction that is supposed to destroy avidyd and by-supposition avidyd is not knowledge. Moreover, since that illumination which destroys ajndna cannot be supposed to have a further veil which is removed by it, it cannot rightly be called knowledge; for knowledge according to the supposition of the Sarikarites operates by removing a veil. Further, this knowledge is supposed to be opposed to all things in the world, and if that is so how can it be said that by this knowledge only the ajndna is destroyed? Again, if it is supposed that illusion consists in identifying everything with Brahman and knowledge is supposed to remove this false identification, then since knowledge is supposed to operate by removing a veil, it has to be supposed that ajfidna was veiling the false identification, and if that were so there could have been no knowledge in our world-experience.

Again, the cessation of avidyd is also incomprehensible in itself, for it cannot be different from the nature of Brahman; if it were there would be duality and emancipation would be impossible. If it were one with the Brahman, then being so it would exist always and there would be no scope for making any effort about it. It cannot also be said that avidyd and Brahman mutually negate each other; for avidyd has Brahman for its support and as such is not antagonistic to it.

Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Srivacana-bhusana of Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr Muni's Commentary on it.

According to the Srivacana-bhiisana the mercy of God remains always as submerged in His justice, but yet it always exists and its apprehension by us is obstructed by certain conditions. It is not produced by our efforts, for then God would not always be merciful (anudbhiita-dayd-dy-udbhdvaka-purusa-kdra-sdpeksakatvenityo-dbhu-ta-dayd-di-mattvam vydhatam sydt 35. B.).

The mercy of God is dependent on Him and on no one else; yet there exists in Narayana the deity LaksmI who is like the essence of Him or the body of Him, and who has voluntarily reconciled her will absolutely with that of Narayana. Though in such a conception the LaksmI is dependent on Narayana, yet for the devotees Narayana and LaksmI go together, and for him the mercy of God is to be attributed to both LaksmI and Narayana taken as a whole.

The conception of LaksmI is such that she is the greatest object of love for Narayana, who has conceived her as a part of Himself, and LaksmI has also so identified herself with Him that there is no separate existence for her. As such LaksmI has not to make any special effort for bringing Narayana in consonance with her will; for there is practically no existence of duality, and for this reason there is no necessity for devotees to cling separately to LaksmI. The nature of LaksmI is the pure essence of the mercy of God 1 .

When the devotee is in a state of separation from God through the wrong conception of his own independence and separate individuality, he has to make an effort in the negative direction in forsaking his own sense of freedom and adopting God as his ultimate end. But once he has forsaken his false egoism and surrendered himself entirely to God, there is no need of further effort on his part. At such a stage through the influence of LaksmI all the sins of the devotee are destroyed and through her influence God extends His mercy to him 2 . LaksmI also rouses in the human mind through internal moral persuasion the belief in the necessity of seeking His friendship. She performs the dual function, first that of turning the minds of the people, who are under the sway of beginningless avidya by which they are always being attracted by mundane interest to God; and, secondly, she also melts the heart of God Who is bent upon giving fruits in accordance with the deserts of the people, and persuades Him to extend His bliss to all people by overruling the bondage of karma.

'The prapatti, as seeking the protection of God, is not restricted

1 devyd kdrunya-rupaye'ti tad-guna-sdratvena kdrunyam svayam eve'ti. Srivacana-bhusana. MS.

2 prapatter desa-niyamah kdla-niyamah prakdra-niyamah adhikdri-niyamah phala-niyamas ca ndsti. Srlvacana-bhusana-vydkhyd. MS.

The above idea is supported in the commentary by a quotation from Bhdradvdja-samhitd which runs as follows:

brahma-ksatra-visah sudrdh striyas cantor a-jdtayah sarva eva prapadyeran sarva-dhdtdram acyutam. Ibid.

376 Philosophy of the Rdmdniija School of Thought [ch.

by any limiting conditions of holy or unholy places, or of any special time, or of any special mode, or of any caste restriction, or that it can produce only this or that result. When God accepts any person through prapatti He forgives all his faults of commission and omission. The only fault that He does not forgive is insincerity or cruelty (kraurya). People take to prapatti either because they feel helpless and know no other means of saving themselves, or because they are very wise and definitely know that this is the best means, or because they are naturally attached to God, like the Arvars 1 . In the first case true knowledge and devotion are at the minimum; in the second case there is not so much ignorance but devotion also is of the normal extent. In the third case ignorance is least and attachment is at its highest and as such even true knowledge of the nature of God is engulfed as it were by an excess of attachment. In the first case the consciousness of one's own ignorance is strongest; in the second case the consciousness of one's humbleness and ignorance is equally balanced with the true knowledge of the essence of God and the relation of one's nature with Him.

The devotee who has in great love surrendered himself to God has occasional communion and detachment with Him. In the first case he is filled with ecstatic joy by coming in direct contact with God as associated with noble qualities. But at the moment of detachment the memory of that communion and ecstasy of joy is a source of dire pain. It has been related above that God's mercy is continuous and ever-flowing; but in spite of this, on account of obstructive tendencies which by investing us with a false belief in our own independence lead to the assertion of our false individuality, the course of God's mercy is obstructed. The adoption of prapatti removes the obstructive attitude and renders it possible for God to extend I lis mercy to us. In such a conception prapatti is to be regarded only as a negative means. The positive means (iipaya) is God Who extends His mercy. Prapatti therefore should not be regarded as the cause of our deliverance. It only removes our obstructive tendencies, and cannot therefore be regarded as an element of the cause that secures our deliverance—that cause being God

1 As an illustration of the last type a few lines from Srlvacana-bhusana-vydkhyd may be quoted: bhakti-pcravasyena prapanna bhagavat-prema-paus-kalyena padau stabdhau manah sithilam bhavati caksur bhyamati padau hastau ca niscestau ity ukta-prakarena sithila-karanatvena sddhand-nusthdna-yogyata-bhazad ananya-gatikds santas tasmin bhara-samarpanam krtam. MS.

and God alone. God is thus both the means and end of attainment, and the only absolute means for the devotee to attain Him. The prapatti view here propounded flatly denies the necessity of any other means. The essence of prapatti consists in the passivity involved in the mental attitude of the devotee surrendering himself to God and thus giving occasion for God's affecting powers to affect him favourably. When the devotee ceases to concern himself with any anxiety as to how he may be saved, then God exerts His will to save him 1 . This view of God's relationship with the devotee involves within it the philosophical doctrine that the individual souls exist for God and have no end to realize for themselves. It is only through ignorance that the individual seems to possess an independent end for himself. The denial of this position through excessive love of God renders the philosophical reality of their mutual relationship realizable as a spiritual fact.

The definition of soul as consciousness and bliss and as atomic is only an external description (tatastha). The internal situation (antaranga) of the relation of the individual soul with God may best be described as his servitude to Him.

The nature of emotional attachment which is associated with prapatti is such that the devotee by his tender love for God induces the same in Him so that the emotion of love may be regarded on the one hand as a consciousness of bliss and on the other hand as a relation in which the lover and the beloved are the constituents. The first inferior stage of prapatti is not always actuated by deep natural attachment, but by a sense of one's own insignificance and helplessness 2 . In the second stage called the upeya the devotee is so much actuated by his deep love for God that he loses all considerations for himself, and the intoxication of love may grow so deep that it may lead to the annihilation of his body. But the prospect of such an annihilation does not deter him from moving forward in the path of intoxication, for at that stage he loses all interest in the consequences of such an attachment. He is simply lost in God through intoxicating emotion. This is technically called raga-prapta-prapatti.

The relation between the devotee and God is interpreted on the analogy of the wedding of the mistress with her lover, of the

1 asya icchd nivrttd cet tasye'cchd asya kdryakarl bhavati. Srtvacana-bhusana-vydkhya. MS.

2 This is regarded as the updya stage where the devotee seeks God as the means to his highest attainment.

378 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

Gopika with Krsna, and it is held that the deep emotion is like the erotic emotion that leads to the wedding of the bridegroom with the bride. Bhakti or devotion is described as a special kind of consciousness dissociated from ignorance which reveals itself in the form of a deep emotion. The devotee is supposed to pass through all the stages which a love-stricken woman would do. All the emotions of the devotee, the lover, are for rousing the pleasure of God. Just as a woman's behaviour under the influence of love is intended to bring a smile or twinkle into the eyes of her lover, so the emotion of the devotee is intended solely to please God 1 . This is regarded as siddha-prema or natural love. Devotees intoxicated by such a love are not necessarily subjected to any kind of code of duty. It is only those whose intoxication bv love is so great that they cannot wait and pass through any such discipline as is prescribed in the vaidhi or the tipdya stage of prapatti who are driven to embrace God as it were with their melting hearts. The ordinary rules of prapatti are utterly unbinding on these people. In the adoption of prapatti of all the three types mentioned above the personal effort (purusakara) necessary is limited to the extent that the individual should hold himself in absolute self-surrender so that God may be inclined to accept even his faults and defects as they are and remove them by His divine grace. In the case of those who are advanced in the stage of prapatti —the paramartas —God removes even all the prarabdha-karmas and grants them immediate emancipation 2 .

The person who adopts the path of prapatti is not anxious to attain even emancipation. He has also no specific preference as to the nature of the spiritual emancipation that may be granted to him. To desire emancipation and to attach any preference to any possible state of existence involves an egoistic desire. But the person who has sincerely adopted the path of prapatti must annihilate altogether even the last traces of egoism. On the one side egoism means ignorance, for it is only by false knowledge that a man asserts

1 tijiidna-nivrtti-purvaka-bhakti-rupd-pannam jiidnam prasddhitam. mahad-rhdha-janaka-kdmam samudra-tulyatayd varddhayan megha-sadrsa-vigraho* smat-krsna ity evam-bhuta-pravrtti-hetor bhakter utpddako varddhakas ca. sd era hi tasya bhakti-pdravasya-nivandhand pravrttir updya-phalam ity ucyate.. . . prdpya-tvarayd strl-vratayd netra-bhramanena etasya smnbhramd sarie tnad-visayd'sdm krtrd ezam avasthd labdhd iti tan-mukha-vikdsd-rtham kriyamdna-kainkaryazad upeyd-ntarbhutd. Srwacana-bhusana-vydkhyd. MS.

2 evam-bhutasya surira-sthiti-hetuh prdrabdha-karme'ti na vaktum sakyate sarva-pdpebhyah moksayisydmi ity atiena virodhdt. Ibid. MS.

himself as having an independent being. On the other side egoism means insincerity (krauryd). It has been said above that God may forgive all our sins excepting insincerity. The fundamental requirement of prapatti therefore consists in the annihilation of egoism. It is only through the annihilation of egoism that the perfect self-surrender required by prapatti is possible 1 .

The four stages precedent to the attainment of the summum bonum through prapatti are as follows: (i) jnana-dasa, i.e. the state in which through the instructions of the teacher the devotee attains self-knowledge in relation to God. (ii) varana-dasd, the state in which the devotee adopts God in a spirit of helpless surrender as the only protector, (iii) prapti-dasa, the state in which he realizes God. (iv) prapya-nubhava-dasa, i.e. the state in which, having realized God, he attains the summum bonum 2 .

The doctrine of prapatti is, indeed, very old. It is found in the Ahirbudhnya-samhita, Laksmi Tantra, Bharadvaja-samhita and other Panca-ratra works. The Srivaisnava writers trace its origin to much older literature such as the Taittiriyopanisad, Katho-panisad and the Svetdsvatara, the Mahdbhdrata and the Rdmdyana. The nature of prapatti in the Ahirbudhnya-samhita has already been discussed. In the Bharadvaja-Samhita the prapatti is described as self-surrender to God, and the descriptions that it gives are more or less the same as those found in the Ahirbudhnya. The devotee who adopts the path of prapatti is not exempted from the ordinary duties of a Vaisnava or from the regular caste duties. The Bharadvaja-samhita describes in some detail the courses of action which are favourable or unfavourable to the adoption of such a path. Ramanuja, in his £arand-gati-gadya, advocates the path of prapatti in which the devotee seeks protection not only of Ndrdyana but also of Laksmi. But it does not appear either in the £arand-gati-gadya or in his commentary of the Gitd that a person who has adopted the path of prapatti is exempted from the normal caste and other duties, nor is the function of Laksmi in awarding the fruits of prapatti explained by him. In his explanation of the Bhagavad-gltd text (sarva-dharman parityajya, etc., 18. 66), he says that the devotee should perform all his normal duties without any motive of

1 Srlvacana-bhusana-vydkhyd. MS.

2 etad-anubhava-janita-pfiti-karita-kainkaryam eva parama-purusa-rthah. Ibid.

380 Philosophy of the Ramdmija School of Thought [ch.

attaining fruits thereby 1 . As regards the destruction of the prd-rabdha-karma also, Ramanuja and Vehkatanatha hold that though most of it is destroyed by the grace of God, yet a trace of it is left 2 . Vatsya Varada, in his Prapanna-pdrijdta, follows the same idea. Vehkatanatha also repeats the same view in his Nydsa-vimsati and Nydsa-tilaka, and Annayarya, a disciple of Vedanti Ramanuja, follows the idea in his Prapatti-prayoga. Varadanatha, the son of Vehkatanatha, also repeats the idea in his Nydsa-tilaka-vdkhyd and Nydsa-kdrikd. The view of Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr muni, the leaders of the Tengalai school, differs from it to the extent that while the above-mentioned prapatti doctrine may be true of the inferior devotees, the superior devotees who are absolutely intoxicated with God's love are through the very nature of their psychological intoxication unable to follow any of the normal duties and are entirely exempted from them. Their prdraddha-karma may also be entirely destroyed by God's grace. The distinction

1 Vehkatanatha in his Tdtparya-dipikd on Rdmdnuja-bhdsya on the Gltd (verse 18. 66) says: etac-chlokd-pdta-pratityd kuta-yuktibliisca yathd varnd-srama-dharma-siarupa-tydgd-di-pakso no'deti tat fid upapdditam.

2 " sddhya-bhaktistn so hantrl prdrarddhasyd'pi bhuyasl. {Rahasya-raksd commentary of Vehkatanatha on Sarana-gati-gadya, p. 50. Vanlvilasa Press, 1910).

In the Nyasa-vimsati and the Nydsa-tilaka as commented in the Nydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd by Vehkatanatha's son Varadanatha prapatti is denned in the same manner as that by Lokacarya. Prapatti is an old doctrine in Southern Vaisnavism and its fundamental characters are more or less final. In the Sydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd great emphasis is laid on the fact that prapatti as a path of approach to God is different from the path of bhakti and superior to it. In the Srivacana-bhusana there is a tendency to treat bhakti as an intermediary way to prapatti. In the Nydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd it is said that the chief difference between bhakti and prapatti is firstly that the former is of the nature of unbroken meditation, while the latter has to be done once for all; secondly, the prdrardha-karma cannot be destroyed by the former, whereas in the latter it can be so done by the grace of God; thirdly, the former needs various accessory methods of worship— continual effort and continual action—whereas in the latter we have excessive faith; fourthly, the former produces fruit after a long time whereas the latter applies only to those who want immediate fruit; fifthly, the former may have different objectives and may yield different fruits accordingly, whereas the latter being of the nature of absolutely helpless surrender produces all fruits immediately. High faith is the foundation of prapatti. In and through many obstacles this faith and attachment to God leads the devotee to his goal. For these reasons the path of bhakti is inferior to the path of prapatti. Prapatti to the teacher is regarded as a part of prapatti to God. The difference between the conception of prapatti in the Srli-acana-bhusana and the Nydsa-tilaka is that the latter holds that even those who adopt the path of prapatti should perform the obligatory duties imposed by the scriptures and refrain from committing the acts prohibited by them; for the scriptures are the commands of God. The former however thinks that a man who adopts the path of prapatti by the very nature of the psychological state produced by it is unable to adhere to any programme of duties outlined by the scriptures. He therefore transcends it.

between the Varagalai and Tengalai schools depends largely on the emphasis given by the latter to the superior type of prapatti.

Kasturi Rangacarya.

Kasturi Rangacarya, otherwise called §ri Rangasuri, was a disciple of Saumya Jamatr muni and probably lived late in the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. Ramanuja's views do not seem to have undergone great changes of interpretation, and we do not find the emergence of different schools of interpretation as in the case of the philosophy of Sankara. The followers of Ramanuja throughout the succeeding centuries directed their efforts mostly to elucidating Ramanuja's views and adducing new arguments for his doctrines or refuting the arguments of his opponents and finding fault with the theories of other schools. A sectarian difference, however, arose with Verikatanatha's efforts to explain the nature of devotion and the ultimate nature of emancipation and various other problems associated with it. Some external ritualistic differences can also be traced from his time. One sect 1 (Vadkalai or Uttara-kalarya) was led by Venkatanatha and the other school (called Tengalai or Daksina-kalarya) by Lokacarya and Saumya Jamatr muni.

Kasturi Rangacarya wrote two works called Karya-dhikarana-vada and the Karya-dhikarana-tattva, in which he discussed some of the most important differences of these two schools and lent his support to the Tengalai or the Daksina-kalarya school. The discussion began on the occasion of the interpretation of Ramanuja of a topic in the Brahma-sutra (4.3.6-15) called the Karya-dhikarana-vada, in which some Upanisad texts raised certain difficulties regarding the attainment of absolute immortality as conditioned by wisdom or worship (upasana). Vadari says that the worship of Hiranya-garbha, the highest of the created beings, leads to absolute immortality; Jaimini says that only the worship of the highest Brahman can produce immortality. Badarayana, however, rejects their views and holds that only those who regard their souls as naturally dissociated from Prakrti and as parts of Brahman attain absolute immortality.

1 sarvasu vipratipattisu purvd kaksyd vedanta-carya-tad-anuvandhinam uttara-kaldrya-samjndndm uttard tu lukdcdrya-tad-anubandhindm daksina-kaldrya-samjfidndm iti viveko budhyah. Kdrya-kurand-dhikarana-vdda, 8. 2.

382 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [en.

Those who cannot realize their essential difference from the material qualities with which they are seemingly associated cannot attain the highest immortality and have ultimately to follow the cycles of births and rebirths. Those alone who worship Brahman with a proper apprehension of their own nature in relation to it can attain the highest immortality. The nature of this worship has been described by Raiigacarya in accordance with the Glta which enjoins the worship of Brahman with sraddha {sraddha-purvakam brahmo-pasanam). The word sraddha ordinarily means faith. This faith undergoes a special characterization at the hands of Raiigacarya and other thinkers of the Tengalai school. Thus it is said that the first stage is the full apprehension of the great and noble qualities of God; the second stage is the attachment produced by such apprehension; the third stage is to regard Him as the ultimate end and fulfilment of our nature; the fourth stage is to think of Him as the only dear object of our life; the fifth stage is the incapacity to bear separation from God through intense love for Him; the sixth stage is absolute faith in God as the only means of self-fulfilment; the seventh and last stage is the enkindling of the spirit in its forward movement to hold fast to Him. It is this last stage as associated with all the previous stages and as integrated with them which is called sraddha. The worship of God with such faith {sraddha) is also called devotion or bhakti. The worship of God again means intense joy in Him (priti-rupo-pasantatra-laksanam). The mere realization of one's self as dissociated from the material elements is not sufficient. Those who follow the process of Pancagni-zidya rest only with self-discriminative wisdom and do not take to God as the final end of self-fulfilment.

The first point of dispute between the followersof Uttara-kalarya and Daksina-kalarya concerns the nature of emancipation called kaivalya which consists in self-realization as the ultimate end {attna - nubhava - laksana - kaivalya - khya -purusd - rthah). Veiikata-natha, the leader of the I ttara-kalarya, thinks that those who attain such emancipation have again to come back, i.e. such an emancipation is destructible. The Daksina-kalarya school, however, thinks that such an emancipation is eternal. Thus Veiikata, in his Nxaya-siddha-rljana, says that mere realization of self as distinguished from all material elements is not sufficient, for it should also be supplemented by the knowledge that that self is a part of God and is

entirely subordinate to Him, and that this view is held in the Sri-bhasya 1 . He draws a distinction between the realization of one's own nature as bliss and the realization of the blissful nature of God. The former may happen without the latter. It has to be admitted that in the state of kaivalya there is an association of materiality (acit-samsarga), since the karma in its entirety is not destroyed in this case; for to know one's proper essence is to know oneself as a part of God and so long as this state is not attained one is under the influence of may a. In the case of such a person the may a obstructs his vision of God. Venkata, however, cannot say anything definitely as to the ultimate destiny of those who attain kaivalya. He asserts only that they cannot attain the eternal Brahmahood. He is also uncertain as to whether they are associated with bodies or not. He is also aware that his interpretation of the nature of kaivalya is not in harmony with all the scriptural texts, but he feels that since some of the texts definitely support his views other texts also should be taken in that light.

Kasturl Rangacarya, however, asserts that, according to the testimony of the old Dravida texts and also of the Glta and such other texts, those who attain emancipation through self-knowledge attain the state of absolute immortality. The difference between liberation through self-knowledge and the liberation through one's self-knowledge in association with God is only a difference in the richness and greatness of experience, the latter being higher than the former in this respect 2 . Other points of difference between the Uttara-kalaryas and the Daksina-kalaryas are closely connected with the point discussed above. They have been enumerated in the second chapter of Karya-dhikarana-vada and are as follows. The Uttara-kalaryas think that those who attain the emancipation of a self-realization as kaivalya pass to a higher world through other

1 parama-purusa-vibhuti-bhutasya prdptur dtmanah svarupa-ydthdtmya-veda-nant apavarga-sddhana-bhuta-parama-purusa-vedano-payogitayd dvasyakam. na svata eva updyatvena ity uktatn. Nydya-siddhdnjana, p. 82.

Venkata also refers to Varada Visnumisra in support of his views. " nihsesa-karma-ksayd-bhdvdt kaivalya-prdptau na muktih."

He refers to Sangati-mdld, where £ri Visnucitta says that a person wishing to attain Brahman may commit such errors of conception that instead of attaining the true Brahmahood he may attain only the lower state of kaivalya just as a man performing sacrifices to attain Heaven may commit errors for which he may become a brahma-rdksasa instead of attaining Heaven. Ibid. p. 84.

2 Kdryd-dhi karana-vdda, 3. 79. Kasturi Rangacarya goes through a long course of references to scriptural texts, Dravidian and Sanskritic, in support of his views.

384 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

channels than those adopted by persons who attain ultimate emancipation. This is denied by the Daksina-kalaryas. Secondly, the former hold that the absolute dissociation of all trace of the elements of prakrti is the same as emancipation, but the latter deny it. Thirdly, the former hold that those who attain the kaivalya are associated with subtle material impurities and may still be regarded as attaining immortality in a remote sense; this is desired by the latter. Fourthly, the former hold that those who attain kaivalya remain in a place within the sphere of the material world and their state is therefore not unchangeable, but the latter deny it. Fifthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices (pancagni-vidya) are different from those that attain kaivalya, but the latter hold that they may or may not be so. Sixthly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through the five sacrifices may remain \v ithin the sphere of the material world when they attain only self-knowledge, but when they realize the nature of their relation with Brahman they pass away beyond the sphere of the material world {prakrti); the latter, however, deny this. Seventhly, the former hold that those who attain wisdom through pancagni-vidya, those who realize the nature of their relation to God, have the same characteristics, but the latter deny it. Eighthly, the former hold that outside the sphere of the material world (prakrti) there cannot be any difference in the nature of one's highest experience, but this also is denied by the latter 1 .

In his Kdryd-dhikarana-tattva, Raiigacarya only repeats the same arguments and the topic of discussion is also the same as that in Karya-dhikarana-vada.

&aila Srinivasa.

Saila Srinivasa was the disciple of Kaundinya Srinivasa Diksita, the son of Srinivasa Tatacarya, and the brother of Anvayarya Diksita. He was very much influenced by the writings of his elder brother Anvayarya and some of his works are but elaborations of the works of his elder brother who wrote many books, e.g. Virodha-bhanjani, etc. Saila Srinivasa wrote at least six books: Virodha-nirodha, Bheda-darpana, Advaita-vana-kuthdra, Sdra-darpana, Mukti-darpana, Jndna-ratna-darpana, Guna-darpana, and Bheda-mani.

In his Virodha-nirodha, probably the last of his works, he tries mainly to explain away the criticisms that are made on the different Ramanuja doctrines by the Sarikarites, and also by the writers of other Vedantic schools—viz. that the Ramanuja views are not strictly faithful to the scriptural texts—by showing that the scriptural texts favour the Ramanuja interpretations and not the views of the other Vedantic writers.

In the first chapter of the Virodha-nirodha Saila Srinivasa first takes up the view that the Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the world—which he thinks is possible only in the conception that Brahman has the individual souls and the matter-stuff associated with Him (brahmani cid-acid-visista-rupatam antarena na ghatate). The Brahman remains unchanged in itself but suffers transformations through its two parts, the soul and the matter-stuff. Brahman as cause is associated with souls and the matter-stuff in their subtle forms, and when it undergoes transformation the souls expand and broaden as it were through the various intellectual states as a result of their karma, and the matter-stuff passes through its grosser stages as the visible material world; the portion of God as the inner controller of these two suffers transformation only so far as it is possible through its association with these two transforming entities 1 . When the scriptural texts deny the changing character of the Brahman, all that is meant by them is that it does not undergo the changes through which matter and individual souls pass through their karma, but that does not deny the fact that Brahman is the material cause 2 . Brahman has two parts, a substantive and a qualifying part, and it is the substantive part that through its subtle material parts becomes the transforming cause of the grosser qualifying material part. This material part being inseparable from Brahman may be regarded as subsisting in it. So also the Brahman has a spiritual part which undergoes a sort of expansion through thought-experiences and behaves as individual souls. Thus Brahman suffers modification through its physical and spiritual parts, and from this point of view God is

1 acid-amsasya kdrand-vasthdydm sabdd-di-vihlnasya bhogyatvaya sabdd-di-mattvayd svarupd-nyathd-bhdva-rupa-vikdro bhavati ubhaya-prakdra-visiste niyantr-amse tad-avastha-tad-ubhaya-visistatd-rupa-vikdro bhavati. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

2 cid-acid-gata-karmd-dy-adhlna-vikdratvam nirvikdratva-srutir nisedhati ity etddrsam jagad-updddnatvam na sd srutir bddhate. Ibid.

d in 25

386 Philosophy of the Rdmanuja School of Thought [en.

subject to development through its two parts and through their association independently as their inner controller. Unlike Veii-kata, Saila Srinivasa holds that this causal transformation is like the Samkhyist causal transformation 1 ; vikdra or change here means change of states. Brahman thus suffers change directly in the spiritual and the intellectual part and indirectly as their inner controller, though in itself it suffers no change. To the objection that if matter and spirit are regarded as suffering transformation there is no meaning in attributing causality to Brahman as qualified by them, the reply is that the causality of Brahman is admitted on the strength of scriptural testimony. So far as Brahman remains as the inner controller and does not suffer any change in itself, it is regarded as the efficient cause 2 .

In the second chapter Saila Srinivasa replies to the criticisms against the Ramanuja doctrine of soul, and says that the contraction and expansion of soul due to ignorance and increase of knowledge does not imply that it is non-eternal, for non-eternality or de-structibility can be affirmed only of those who undergo accretion or decrease of parts (avayavo-pacaya-pacayayor eva anityatva-vya-pyataya). Knowledge is partless and so there is no contraction or expansion of it in any real sense. What are called contraction and expansion consist in reality of its absence of relationship with objects due to the effects of karma or the natural extension of relations with objects like the ray of a lamp; karma is thus regarded as the upddhi (limiting condition) which limits the natural flow of knowledge to its objects and is figuratively described as contraction. It is on account of this nature of knowledge that unless obstructed by karma it can grasp all sensations of pain and pleasure spreading over all parts of the body, though it belongs to soul which is an atomic entity. So knowledge is all-pervading (vibhu) 3 . Knowledge also is eternal in its own nature though changeful so far as its states are concerned.

In the third chapter Srinivasa deals with the question as to

1 visistam brahma kdranam ity uktam tena kdryam api visistam eva tatra ca brahmana updddnatvam visesand-msam visesyd-msam prati tatra ca'cid-amsam prati yad-updddnatvam tat suksmd-vasthd-cid-amsa-dvdrakam tatra tatra dvdra-bhutd-cid-amsa-gata-svarupd nyathd-bhdva-rupa eve vikdrah sa ca aprthak-siddha-vastu-gatatvdt brahma-gato'pt. . . evam ca sdmkhyd-bhimato-pdddnatdydh siddhdntepy anapdydt na ko'pi virodhah. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

2 tena tad eva advdrakam nimittam-sad-zdrakam updddnam. Ibid.

whether the souls are produced or eternal, and his conclusion is that in their own nature they are unproduced, but they are produced so far as their own specific data of knowledge are concerned 1 . The production of eternal knowledge is possible only so far as its contraction and expansion are concerned, which is due to the action of the body and other accessories. It is only in this sense that knowledge though eternal in itself can be said to be suffering production through its various kinds of manifestation (abhivyakti).

In the fourth chapter Srinivasa discusses the same question in which the Upanisads urge that by the knowledge of one everything is known. He criticizes the Madhva and the Sarikarite views and holds that the knowledge of one means the knowledge of Brahman which, being always associated with the individual souls and matter, involves the knowledge of these two entities. His exposition in this subject is based throughout on the interpretations of scriptural texts.

In the fifth chapter Srinivasa explains the same question in which the individual souls can be called agents (karta). Agency (kartrtva) consists in an effort that may lead to the production of any action (karya-nukula krtimattvam). In the Ramanuja view effort means a particular intellectual state and as such it may well belong to the soul, and so the effort that may lead to any action also belongs to the soul which, though eternal in itself, is changeful so far as its states are concerned 2 . The agency of the individual souls, however, is controlled by God, though the fruits of the action are enjoyed by the former, for the direction of God which determines the efforts of the individuals is in accordance with their actions. This virtually means an admixture of determinism and occasionalism.

In the seventh chapter Srinivasa contends that though knowledge is universal it only manifests itself in accordance with the deeds of any particular person in association with his body, and so there is no possibility that it should have all kinds of sufferings and enjoyments and should not be limited to his own series of experiences. In the eighth and ninth chapters he tries to establish

1 tatra nisedhah viyad-adivat jiva-svarupo-tpattim pratisedhanti utpatti-vidhayaas tu svd-sddhdrana-dharma-bhuta-jndna-visista-vesena utpattim vadanti. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

2 prayatnd-der buddhi-visesa-rupatayd kdryd-nukula-krtimattvasy'dpi kartr-tvasya jfidna-visesa-rupatayd tasya svdbhd vikatayd tad-dtmand jivasya jndnasya nityatvepi tat-parindma-visesasya anityatvdt. Ibid.

25-2

388 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School 0/ Thought [ch.

the view that during emancipation the individuals are cleanly purged of all their deeds, virtues and sins, but at this stage God may be pleased to endow them with extraordinary bodies for the enjoyment of various kinds of pleasures. In the remaining nineteen chapters Saila Srinivasa introduces some of the relatively unimportant theological doctrines of the Ramanuja system and discusses them on the basis of scriptural texts which may very well be dropped for their insignificance as philosophical contribution.

In the Bheda-darpana also Saila Srinivasa takes some of the important doctrines where the Ramanujists and the Sankarites part company, and tries to show by textual criticism that the Ramanuja interpretation of the scriptural texts is the only correct interpretation 1 . The work, therefore, is absolutely worthless from a philosophical point of view. In most of his other works mentioned above, Saila Srinivasa prefers to discuss the doctrines of Ramanuja philosophy in the same style of scriptural criticism, and any account of these is therefore of very little value to students of philosophy.

Sri Saila Srinivasa, in his Siddhanta-cintamani, discusses the nature of Brahma-causality. Brahman is both the instrumental (nimitta) and the material (upadana) cause of the world. Such a Brahman is the object of our meditation (dhyana). An object of meditation must have knowledge and will. A mere qualityless entity cannot be the object of meditation. In order that Brahman may be properly meditated upon it is necessary that the nature of His causality should be properly ascertained. It is no use to attribute false qualities for the sake of meditation. If the world is an illusion, then the causality of Brahman is also illusory, and that would give us an insight into His real nature. If God is the real cause of the world, the world must also be real. It is sometimes said that the same entity cannot be both a material and instrumental cause (samavaya-samavayi-bhinnam karanam nimitta-karanamiti). The material cause of the jar is earth, while the instrumental cause is the potter, the wheel, etc. To this the reply is that such an objection is groundless; for it is difficult to assert that that which is an instrumental cause cannot be a material cause, since the wheel of the potter, though an instrumental cause in itself, is also the material

1 bhedd-bheda-sruti-vrdta-jdta-sandeha-santatdh

bheda-darpanam dddya niscinvantu vipascitah.

Bheda-darpana. MS.

cause of its own form, colour, etc. There is thus nothing which can lead us to suppose that the material cause and the instrumental cause cannot exist together in the same entity. It may further be contended that the same entity cannot behave as the material and instrumental cause with regard to the production of another entity. To this the reply is that the internal structure of rod is both the material cause for its form as well as the instrumental cause for its destruction in association with other entities. Or it may be contended that time (kdla) is the cause for both the production and destruction of entities (kala-ghata-samyoga-dikam prati kalasya nimittatvad updddnatvdcca). To this the obvious reply would be that the behaviour of the same entity as the material and the instrumental cause is limited by separate specific conditions in each case. The association of separate specific conditions renders a difference in the nature of the cause; and therefore it would be inexact to say that the same entity is both the material and the instrumental cause. This objection, however, produces more difficulty in the conception of the causality of Brahman according to the Visistddvaita theory, for in our view Brahman in His own nature may be regarded as the instrumental cause and in His nature as matter (acit) and souls (cit). He may be regarded as the material cause 1 . It is sometimes objected that if Brahman as described in the texts is changeless, how can He be associated with changes as required by the conception of Him as the material and instrumental cause, which involves the view of associating Him with a body? Moreover, the association of body (sarira) with God is neither an analogy nor an imagery. The general conception of body involves the idea that an entity is called the body where it is only controlled by some spiritual substance 2 . To this the reply is that Brahman may Himself remain unchangeable and may yet be the cause of changes in His twofold body-substance. The objection is that the material world is so different from the bodies of animals that the conception of body cannot be directly applied to it. The reply is that even among animal bodies there is a large amount of diversity,

1 evarn hi brahmany'api no'pdddnatva-nimittatvayor virodhah; tasya cid-acid-visista-vesena upddanatvat svarupena nimittatvdc ca. tat-tad-avacchedaka-bheda-prayukta-tad-bhedasya tasya tatrd'pi nispratyuhavtdt. Siddha.nta-dnta.mani. MS.

2 yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvd-trnand svdrthe niydmyam tat tasya sarlram. Ibid. This subject has been dealt with elaborately in Sri £aila SVinivasa's Sdra-darpana.

39° Philosophy of the Ramdnuja School of Thought [ch.

e.g. the body of a man and the body of a microscopic insect. Under the circumstances we are to fall upon a general definition which would cover the concept of all bodies and ignore the individual differences. The definition given above suits the concept of bodies of all living beings and applies also to the concept of the world as the body of Brahman. This is also supported by the Sruti texts of the Antarydmi-brdhmana, where the world has been spoken of as the body of God. If there is an apparent difference in our conception of body as indicated in the definition as testified by the Vedic texts, with our ordinary perception of the world which does not reveal its nature as body, the testimony of the Vedic texts should prevail; for while our perception can be explained away as erroneous, a scientific definition and the testimony of texts cannot be dismissed. Our ordinary perception is not always reliable. We perceive the moon like a small dish in size, whereas the scriptural testimony reveals its nature to us as much bigger. When there is a conflict between two sources of evidence, the decision is to be made in favour of one or the other by the canon of unconditionality (ananyathd-siddhatva). An evidence which is unconditional in its nature has to be relied upon, whereas that which is conditional has to be subordinated to it. It is in accordance with this that sometimes the Vedic texts have to be interpreted in such a manner that they may not contradict perceptual experience, whereas in other cases the evidence of perceptual experience has to be dismissed on the strength of scriptural testimony. It cannot also be said that the evidence of a later pramdna will have greater force, for there may be a series of errors, in which case there is no certitude in any of the later pramdnas. Again, there is no force also in mere cumulation of evidence, for in the case of a blind man leading other blind men mere cumulation is no guarantee of certitude 1 . In the case of the conflict of pramdnas, the dissolution of doubt and the attainment of certitude are achieved on the principle of unconditionality. That which is realized in an unconditional manner should be given precedence over what is realized only in a conditional manner 2 . Our powers of perception are limited by their own limitations and can-

1 na ca parati'dd uttarena purva-badhah iti yuktam dhdrd-vdhika-bhrama-sthale vyabhicdrdt ata eia na bhuyastvam opi nirndyakam satd'ndha-nydyena aprayojakatvdc ca. Siddhdnta-cintamani. MS.

2 ananyathd-siddhatvam eva virodhy-aprdmdnya-vyavasthd pakatd-vacche-dakam isyate. Ibid.

not therefore discern whether the world may after all be the body of the transcendent Brahman, and therefore it cannot successfully contradict the testimony of the Vedic texts which declare the world to be the body of God. The Vedic texts of pure monism are intended only to deny the duality of Brahman, but it can well be interpreted on the supposition of one Brahman as associated with his body, the world. The denial of dualism only means the denial of any other being like Brahman. Thus Brahman as cit and acit forms the material cause of the world, and Brahman as idea and will as affecting these is the instrumental cause of the world. The twofold causality of Brahman thus refers to twofold conditions as stated above which exist together in Brahman 1 .

In the Vedantic texts we have expressions in the ablative case indicating the fact that the world has proceeded out of Brahman as the material cause {upadand). The ablative case always signifies the materiality of the cause and not its instrumentality 2 . But it also denotes that the effect comes out of the cause and it may be objected that the world, being always in Brahman and not outside Him, the ablative expressions of the Vedantic texts cannot be justified. To this the reply is that the conception of material cause or the signification of the ablative cause does not necessarily mean that the effect should come out and be spatially or temporally differentiated from the cause. Even if this were its meaning, it may well be conceived that there are subtle parts in Brahman corresponding to cit and acit in their manifested forms, and it is from these that the world has evolved in its manifested form. Such an evolution does not mean that the effect should stand entirely outside the cause, for when the entire causal substance is transformed, the effect cannot be spatially outside the cause 3 . It is true that all

1 sarva-sarira-bhutd-vibhakta-ndma-rupd-vasthd panna-cid-acid-visista-vesena brahmanah updddnatvam ;tad-upayukta-samkalpd-di-insista-svarupena nimittatvam ca nispratyuham iti nimittatvo-pdddnatvayor ihd' py avacchedaka-hheda-prayukta-bhedasya durapahnavatvd ttayor ekdsraya-vrttitvasya prdg upapddita-tvdt na brahmano abhinna-nimitto-pdddnatve kas cid virodhah. Siddhdnta-cintdmani. MS.

2 Such as yato vd imdni bhutdni jdyante.

s updddnatva-sthale'pi na sarvatra loke'pi vislesah krtsna-parindme tad a-sambhavdt kintv ekadesa-parindma ez'e'ti tad-abhiprdyakam pratydkhydnam vdcyam. tac ce'kd' pi sambhavati. visistai-kadesa-parindmd-nglkdrdt. ato na tad-virodpah; kinca suksma-cid-acid-visistam updddnatvam iti vaksyate tasmdc ca sthuld-vasthasya vislefo yujyate visleso hi na sarvd-tmand kdrana-deia-paritydgah. Ibid. MS.

392 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [ch.

material causes suffer a transformation; but in the Visistadvaita view there is no difficulty, for it is held here that Brahman suffers this modification and controls it only so far as it has reference to his body, the cit and acit. God's instrumentality is through His will, and will is but a form of knowledge.

In the Bheda-darpana Srlnivasa tries to support all the principal contentions of the Visistadvaita theory by a reference to Upanisadic and other scriptural texts. In his other works mentioned above the subjects that he takes up for discussion are almost the same as those treated in Virodha-nirodha, but the method of treatment is somewhat different; what is treated briefly in one book is elaborately discussed in another, just as the problem of causality is the main topic of discussion in Siddhdnta-cintdmani, though it has been only slightly touched upon in Virodha-nirodha. His Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha is a brief summary in verse and prose of the contents of what the author wrote in his Naya-dyu-mani, a much bigger work to which constant references are made in the Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha. Sri Saila Srlnivasa wrote also another work called Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd which is bigger than Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha. It is probably smaller than Naya-dyu-mani , which is referred to as a big work 1 . There is nothing particular to be noted which is of any philosophical importance in Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd or Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha. He generally clarifies the ideas which are already contained in the Sruta-prakasika of Sudarsana Suri. He also wrote Omkdra-vdddrtha, Anandatdra-tamya-khandana, Arund-dhikarana-sarani-vivarani and Jijndsd-darpana. He lived probably in the fifteenth century.

Srlnivasa wrote first his Sdra-darpana which was followed by Siddhanta-cintamani, and Virodha-nirodha. In fact Virodha-nirodha was one of his last works, if not the last. In the first chapter of this work he deals with the same subject as he did in the Siddhanta-cintamani, and tries to explain the nature of Brahman as the material and instrumental cause of the world. In the second chapter he tries to refute the objections against the view that the souls as associated with knowledge or rather as having their character interpreted as knowledge should be regarded as the means for God's manifestation as the world. The objector says that thought is always moving, either expanding or contracting, and as such it can-

not be the nature of self which is regarded as eternal. In the case of the Jains the soul is regarded as contracting and expanding in accordance with the body that it occupies, and it may rightly be objected that in such a conception the soul has to be regarded as non-eternal. But in the Visistadvaita conception it is only thought that is regarded as expanding or contracting. The expansion or contraction of thought means that it conceives greater or lesser things, and this is different from the idea of an entity that grows larger or smaller by the accretion or dissociation of parts. The expansion or contraction of thought is due to one's karma and as such it cannot be regarded as non-eternal. Knowledge in its own nature is without parts and all-pervading; its contraction is due to the effect of one's bad deeds which is often called may a or avidyd 1 . The Visistadvaitins do not regard knowledge as produced through the collocations of conditions as the Naiyayikas think, but they regard it as eternal and yet behaving as occasional (agantuka-dharmav-attvam) or as being produced. Earth in its own nature is eternal, and remaining eternal in its own nature suffers transformation as a jug, etc. In this way the conception of the eternity of the soul is different from the conception of knowledge as eternal, for in the case of knowledge, while remaining all-pervasive in itself, it seems to suffer transformation by virtue of the hindrances that obstruct its nature in relation to objects 2 . Universal relationship is the essential nature of knowledge, but this nature may be obstructed by hindrances, in which case the sphere of relationship is narrowed, and it is this narrowing and expansive action of knowledge which is spoken of as transformation of knowledge or as the rise or cessation of knowledge. A distinction has thus to be made between knowledge as process and knowledge as essence. In its nature as essence it is the eternal self; in its nature as process, as memory, perception, thinking, etc., it is changing. The Jaina objection on this point is that in the above view it is unnecessary to admit a special quality of ajnana as the cause for this expansion or contraction of thought, for it may well be admitted that the soul itself undergoes such a

1 jndnasya svdbhdvikam prasaranam aupadhikas tu samkocah; upadhis tu pracinam karma eva. Virodha-nirodha, pp. 39, 40 (MS.).

2 na hi yddrsam dtmano nityatvam tddrg jnanasya'pi nityatvam abhyapugac-chdmah karana-vydpdra-vaiyarthy ■ prasangdt. kintu tdrkikd'dy abhimatam jnanasya dgantuka-dharmatvam ni dkartum drier iva svarupato nityatvam dgantukd'-vasthd'-srayatvam ca; tena rupena nityatvam tu ghatatva'-dy-avasthd-visista-vesena mrddderiva istam eva. Ibid. p. 44.

394 Philosophy of the Rdmannja School of Thought [ch.

transformation through the instrumentality of its deeds. To this the reply is that the Vedic texts always declare that the soul is in itself unchangeable, and if that is so the change has to be explained through the instrumentality of another factor, the ajnana. Knowledge is thus to be regarded as the pure essence or nature of the soul and not as its dharma or character, and it is this character that is in itself universal and yet is observed to undergo change on account of obstructions. Thus, the soul in itself is eternal, though when looked at in association with its character as knowledge which is continually expanding or contracting it may seemingly appear to be non-eternal 1 . Thought in itself has no parts and therefore cannot itself be regarded as non-eternal. It is nothing but relationship, and as such the analogy of change which, in other objects, determines their non-eternity cannot apply to it.

Now there are different kinds of Upanisadic texts, from some of which it may appear that the soul is eternal, whereas from others it may appear that the soul is created. How can this difficulty be avoided? On this point Srinivasa says that the eternity and uncreated nature of the self is a correct assertion, for the soul as such is eternal and has never been created. In its own nature also the soul has thought associated with it as it were in a potential form. Such an unmanifested thought is non-existent. But knowledge in its growing richness of relations is an after-production, and it is from this point of view that the soul may be regarded as having been created. Even that which is eternal may be regarded as created with reference to any of its special characteristics or characters 2 . The whole idea, therefore, is that before the creative action of God the souls are only potentially conscious; their real conscious activity is only a result of later development in consequence of God's creative action.

Again, the Upanisads assert that by the knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. Now according to the Saiikarite explanation the whole world is but a magical creation on Brahman which alone has real being. Under the circumstances it is impossible that

1 nityd-tiitya-vibhd^a-svariipa-dvdrakatva-svabhdva-dvdrukatz'dbhydm vya-vasthita iti na kas cid dosah. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

2 svd-sddhdrana-dharma-bhuta-jndna-visista-i-esena utpattim vcidanti sid-dhasyd'pi hi vastunah dharmd-ntara-visista-vesena sddhyatd vrlhyd-dau drstd. Ibid.

prdk srster jivdndm niskriyatvo-ktyd ca idam eva darsitarn. Ibid.

by the knowledge of Brahman, the real, there would be the knowledge of all illusory and unreal creation, for these two, the reality and the appearance, are entirely different and therefore by the knowledge of one there cannot be the knowledge of the other. In the Visistddvaita view it may be said that when God as associated with his subtle body, the subtle causal nature of the souls and the material world, is known the knowledge of God as associated with the grosser development of His body as souls and the world is also by that means realized 1 .

In performing the actions it need not be supposed that the eternal soul undergoes any transformation, for the individual soul may remain identically unchanged in itself and yet undergo transformation 3,0 far as the process of its knowledge is concerned. In the Visistddvaita view, will and desire are regarded as but modes of knowledge and as such the psychological transformations of the mind involved in the performance of actions have reference only to knowledge 2 . It has already been shown that possibly knowledge in its essential form is unchangeable and yet unchangeable so far as its nature as process is concerned. Such an activity and performance of actions belongs naturally to the individual souls.

The Virodha-nirodha is written in twenty-seven chapters, but most of these are devoted to the refutation of objections raised by opponents on questions of theological dogma which have no philosophical interest. These have therefore been left out in this book.

Rangacarya 3 .

A follower of Sankara named Uma-Mahesvara wrote a work named Virodha-varuthini in which he proposed to show one hundred contradictions in Ramanuja's bhdsya and other cognate

1 suksma-cid-acic-charlrake brahmani jiidte sthula-cid-acic-charlrakasya tasya jndnam atrd' hhimatam. Virodha-nirodha. MS.

2 iha prayatnader buddhi-visesa-rupatayd kdryd-nukula-krtimattvasyd'pi kartrtvasya jndna-visesa-rupatayd tasya svdbhdvikatayd tad-dtmand jivasya jndnasya nityatve'pi tat-parindma-visesasya anityatvdc ca. Ibid.

3 " sri-rdmdnuja-yogi-pdda-kamala-sthdnd-bhisekam gato jiydt so'yam

ananta-purusa-guru-simhdsand-dhlhiarah srl-rar.ga-surih srisaile tasya simhdsane sthitah Ku-drsti-dhvdnta-mdrtandam prakdsayati samprati." He was thus a disciple of Anantarya of the middle of the nineteenth century. At the end of his San-mdrga-dlpa he says that it was written in refutation of Rama Misra's work on thesubject. RamaMisra lived late in the nineteenth century and wrote Sneha-purti.

396 Philosophy of the Rdmdnuja School of Thought [ch.

literature of the school, such as Satadusani, etc., but through illness he lost his tongue and could offer criticisms on only twenty-seven points 1 . As a refutation of that work Raiigacarya wrote his Ku-drsti-dhvdnta-mdrtanda. It also appears that Annayarya's grandson and Srinivasa-tayarya's son, SrTnivasa-dlksita, also wrote a work called Virodha-varuthirii-pramathini as a refutation of Virodha-varuthini. The first chapter of Ku-drsti-dhvdnta-mdrtanda is also called Virodha-varuthirii-pramdthinl.

Uma-Mahesvara says that according to the view of Ramanuja the manifold world and the individual souls {acit and cit) exist in an undivided and subtle state in Brahman, the original cause. In the state of actualized transformation, as the manifested manifold worlds and the experiencing selves, we have thus a change of state, and as Brahman holds within Himself as qualifying Him this gross transformation of the world He is associated with them. He must, therefore, be supposed to have Himself undergone change. But again Ramanuja refers to many scriptural texts in which Brahman is regarded as unchanging.

To this the reply is that the mode in which the cit and the acit undergo transformation is different from the mode in which the all-controlling Brahman produces those changes in them. For this reason the causality of Brahman remains unaffected by the changes through which the cit and the acit pass. It is this unaffectedness of Brahma-causality that has often been described as the changeless-ness of Brahman. In the Sarikara view, the manifested world being the transformation of mdyd, Brahman cannot on any account be regarded as a material cause of it. The Brahman of Sarikara being only pure consciousness, no instrumental agencies (nitnitta-kdranatd) can be attributed to it. If Brahman cannot undergo any change in any manner and if it always remains absolutely changeless it can never be regarded as cause. Causality implies power of producing change or undergoing change. If both these are impossible in Brahman it cannot consistently be regarded as the cause. According to the Ramanuja view, however, Brahman is not absolutely changeless; for, as producer of change it also itself undergoes a change homogeneous (brahma-samasattaka-vikdrd-ngikdrdt) with

1 Uma-Mahesvara is said to have written other works also, i.e. Tattva-candrikd, Advaita-kamadhenu, Tapta-mudrd-vidravana, Prasanga-ratniikara, and Rdmdyana-tlkd.

it. As the change is of a homogeneous nature, it may also be regarded as unchanged. The Brahman is the ultimate upholder of the world; though the worldly things have their intermediate causes, in which they may be regarded as subsisting, yet since Brahman is the ultimate and absolute locus of subsistence all things are said to be upheld in it.

Causation may be defined as unconditional, invariable antecedence (ananyatha-siddha-niyata-purva-vartita). Brahman is certainly the ultimate antecedent entity of all things, and its unconditional character is testified by all scriptural texts. The fact that it determines the changes in cit and acit and is therefore to be regarded as the instrumental agent does not divest it of its right to be regarded as the material cause; for it alone is the ultimate antecedent substance. Brahman originally holds within itself the cit and the acit in their subtle nature as undivided in itself, and later on undergoes within itself such changes by its own will as to allow the transformation of cit and acit in their gross manifested forms. It leaves its pristine homogeneous character and adopts an altered state at least with reference to its true parts, the cit and the acit, which in their subtle state remained undivided in themselves. It is this change of Brahman's nature that is regarded as the parinama of Brahman. Since Brahman is thus admitted to be undergoing change of state (parinama), it can consistently be regarded as the material cause of the world. The illustration of the ocean and the waves is also consistent with such an explanation. Just as mud transforms itself into earthen jugs or earthen pots, and yet in spite of all its changes into jugs or pots really remains nothing but mud, so Brahman also undergoes changes in the form of the manifested world with which it can always be regarded as one 1 . As the jug and the pot are not false, so the world also is not false. But the true conception of the world will be to consider it as one with Brahman. The upper and the lower parts of a jug may appear to be different when they are not regarded as parts of the jug, and

1 vahu sydm prajdyeye'tyd-di-srutibhih srsteh pran ndma-rupa-vibhdgd-bhavena ekatvd-vasthdpannasya suksma-cid-acid-visista-brahmanah pascdn-ndma-rupa-vibhdgetmekatvd-vasthd-prahdna-purvakajnsthula-cid-acid-vaisistya-laksana-vahutvd-pattir-hi prasphutam pratipadyate; sai'va hi brahmanah parinamo nama; prdg-avasthd-prahdnend' vasthd-ntara-prdpter eva parindma-sabdd-rthatvdt.. . . yathd sarvam mrd-dravya-vikrti-bhutam ghatd-di-kdrya-jdtam kdrana-bhuta-mrd-dravyd-bhinname va na tu dravyd-ntaram tathd brahmd'pi jagatah abhinnam eva. Ku-drsti-dhvdnta-mdrtanda, p. 66.

in that condition to consider them as two would be false; for they attain their meaning only when they are taken as the parts of one whole jug. When the Upanisads say that plurality is false, the import of the text is that plurality attains its full meaning only in its unified conception as parts of God, the Absolute.

The Sarikarites do not admit the theory of illusion as one thing appearing as another (anyatha-khyati). According to them illusion consists in the production of an indefinable illusory object. Such an object appears to a person only at a particular moment when he commits an error of perception. It cannot be proved that the illusory object was not present at the time of the commission of illusory perception. Under the circumstances the absence of that object at other times cannot prove its falsity; for an object present at one time and not present at another cannot indicate its false nature. Falsity has then to be defined as relative to the perceiver at the time of perception. When the perceiver has knowledge of the true object, and knows also that one object is being perceived as another object, he is aware of the falsity of his perception. But if at the time of perception he has only one kind of knowledge and he is not aware of any contradiction, his perception at any time cannot be regarded as false. But since the dream experiences are not known to be self-contradictory in the same stage, the experience of conch-shell-silver is not known to be illusory at the time of the illusion; and as the world experience is uncontradicted at the time of our waking consciousness, it cannot be regarded as false in the respective stages of experience. The falsehood of the dream experiences therefore is only relative to the experience of another stage at another time. In such a view of the Sarikarites everything becomes relative, and there is no positive certainty regarding the experience of any stage. According to the Buddhists and their scriptures, the notion of Brahman is also false; and thus, if we consider their experience, the notion of Brahman is also relatively true. In such a view we are necessarily landed in a state of uncertainty from which there is no escape 1 .

1 Rarigacarya wrote at least one other work called San-mdrga-dipa which, being of a ritualistic nature, does not warrant any treatment in this work.

CHAPTER XXI THE NIMBARKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Teachers and Pupils of the Nimbarka School.

Nimbarka, Nimbaditya or Niyamananda is said to have been a Telugu Brahmin who probably lived in Nimba or Nimbapura in the Bellary district. It is said in Harivyasadeva's commentary on Dasa-sloki that his father's name was Jagannatha and his mother's name was Sarasvati. But it is difficult to fix his exact date. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, in his Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, thinks that he lived shortly after Ramanuja. The argument that he adduces is as follows: Ilarivyasadeva is counted in the Guru-parampara list as the thirty-second teacher in succession from Nimbarka, and Bhandarkar discovered a manuscript containing this list which was written in Sam vat 1806 or a.d. 1750 when Damodara Gosvami was living. Allowing fifteen years for the life of Damodara Gosvami we have a.d. 1765. Now the thirty-third successor from Madhva died in a.d. 1876 and Madhva died in a.d. 1276. Thus thirty-three successive teachers, on the Madhva line, occupied 600 years. Applying the same test and deducting 600 years from a.d. 1765, the date of the thirty-third successor, we have 1165 as the date of Nimbarka. This, therefore, ought to be regarded as the date of Nimbarka's death and it means that he died sometime after Ramanuja and might have been his junior contemporary. Bhandarkar would thus put roughly eighteen years as the pontifical period for each teacher. But Pandit Kisoradasa says that in the lives of teachers written by Pandit Anantaram Deva-carya the twelfth teacher from Nimbarka was born in Samvat 1112 or a.d. 1056, and applying the same test of eighteen years for each teacher we have a.d. 868 as the date of Nimbarka, in which case he is to be credited with having lived long before Ramanuja. But from the internal examination of the writings of Nimbarka and Srinivasa this would appear to be hardly credible. Again, in the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the North Western Provinces, Part 1, Benares, 1874 ( or N.W.P. Catalogue, MS. No. 274), Madhva-mukha-mardana, deposited in the

Madan Mohan Library, Benares, is attributed to Nimbarka. This manuscript is not procurable on loan and has not been available to the present writer. But if the account of the authors of the Catalogue is to be believed, Nimbarka is to be placed after Madhva. One argument in support of this later date is to be found in the fact that Madhava who lived in the fourteenth century did not make any reference in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha, to Nimbarka's system, though he referred to all important systems of thought known at the time. If Nimbarka had lived before the fourteenth century there would have been at least some reference to him in the Sarva-darsana-satngraha, or by some of the writers of that time. Dr Rajendra Lai Mitra, however, thinks that since Nimbarka refers to the schools (sampradayd) of Sri, Brahma and Sanaka, he lived later than Ramanuja, Madhva and even Vallabha. While there is no positive, definite evidence that Nimbarka lived after Vallabha, yet from the long list of teachers of his school it probably would not be correct to attribute a very recent date to him. Again, on the assumption that the Madhva-mukha-mardana was really written by him as testified in the N. W.P. Catalogue, one would be inclined to place him towards the latter quarter of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century. Considering the fact that there have been up till now about forty-three teachers from the time of Nimbarka, this would mean that the pontifical period of each teacher was on the average about ten to twelve years, which is not improbable. An internal analysis of Nimbarka's philosophy shows its great indebtedness to Ramanuja's system and even the style of Nimbarka's bhasya in many places shows that it was modelled upon the style of approach adopted by Ramanuja in his bhasya. This is an additional corroboration of the fact that Nimbarka must have lived after Ramanuja.

The works attributed to him are as follows: (i) Vedanta-pdrijdta-saurabha. (2) Dasa-sloki. (3) Krsna-stava-rdja. (4) Guru-parampard. (5) Madhva-mukha-mardana. (6) Veddnta-tattva-bodha. (7) Veddnta-siddhanta-pradipa. (8) Sva-dharmd-dhva-bodha. (9) Sri-krsna-stava. But excepting the first three works all the rest exist in MS. most of which are not procurable 1 . Of these the present writer

1 Vedanta-tattva-bodha exists in the Oudh Catalogue, 1877, 42 and vm. 24, compiled by Pandit Deviprasad.

Veddnta-siddhanta-pradipa and Sva-dharma-dhva-bodha occur in the Notices

could secure only the Sva-dharmd-dhva-bodha t which is deposited with the Bengal Asiatic Society. It is difficult to say whether this work was actually written by Nimbarka. In any case it must have been considerably manipulated by some later followers of the Nimbarka school, since it contains several verses interspersed, in which Nimbarka is regarded as an avatara and salutations are offered to him. He is also spoken of in the third person, and views are expressed as being Nimbdrka-matam which could not have come from the pen of Nimbarka. The book contains reference to the Kevala-bheda-vadi which must be a reference to the Madhva school. It is a curious piece of work, containing various topics, partly related and partly unrelated, in a very unmethodical style. It contains references to the various schools of asceticism and religion.

In the Guru-parampara list found in the Har-iguru-stava-mdld noted in Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Report of the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts 1882-1883, we find that Hamsa, the unity of Radha and Krsna, is regarded as the first teacher of the Nimbarka school. His pupil was Kumara of the form of four vyuhas. Kumara's pupil was Narada, the teacher of prema-bhakti in the Treta-yuga. Nimbarka was the pupil of Narada and the incarnation of the power {sudarsana) of Narayana. He is supposed to have introduced the worship of Krsna in Dvapara-yuga. His pupil was Srinivasa, who is supposed to be the incarnation of the conch-shell of Narayana. Srinivasa's pupil was Visvacarya, whose pupil was Purusottama, who in turn had as his pupil Svarupacarya. These are all described as devotees. Svariipacarya's pupil was Madhavacarya, who had a pupil Balabhadracarya, and his pupil was Padmacarya who is said to have been a great controversialist, who travelled over different parts of India defeating people in discussion. Padma-carya's pupil was Syamacarya, and his pupil was Gopalacarya, who is described as a great scholar of the Vedas and the Vedanta. He had as pupil Krpacarya, who taught Devacarya, who is described as a great controversialist. Devacarya's pupil was Sundara Bhatta, and Sundara Bhatta's pupil was Padmana Bhacarya. His pupil was Upendra Bhatta; the succession of pupils is in the following order:

of Sanskrit Manuscripts, by R. L. Mitra, Nos. 2826 and 1216, and the Gvru-parampara in the Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the N.W.P., Parts l-x, Allahabad, 1877-86.

Ramacandra Bhatta, Krsna Bhatta, Padmakara Bhatta, Sravana Bhatta, Bhuri Bhatta, Madhva Bhatta, Syama Bhatta, Gopala Bhatta, Valabhadra Bhatta, Goplnatha Bhatta (who is described as a great controversialist), Kesava, Gahgala Bhatta, Kesava Kasmiri, Sri Bhatta and Harivyasadeva. Up to Harivyasadeva apparently all available lists of teachers agree with one another; but after him it seems that the school split into two and we have two different lists of teachers. Bhandarkar has fixed the date for Harivyasadeva as the thirty-second teacher after Nimbarka. The date of Harivyasadeva and his successor in one branch line, Damodara Gosvami, has been fixed as 1750-1755. After Harivyasadeva we have, according to some lists, Parasuramadeva, Harivamsadeva, Narayanadeva, Vrndavanadeva and Govindadeva. According to another list we have Svabhuramadeva after Harivyasadeva, and after him Karmaharadeva, Mathuradeva, Syamadeva, Sevadeva, Naraharideva, Dayaramadeva, Purnadeva, Manisldeva, Radha-krsnasaranadeva, Harideva and Vrajabhusanasaranadeva who was living in 1924 and Santadasa Vavajl who died in 1935. A study of the list of teachers gives fairly convincing proof that on the average the pontifical period of each teacher was about fourteen years. If Harivyasadeva lived in 1750 and Santadasa Vavajl who was the thirteenth teacher from Harivyasadeva died in 1935, the thirteen teachers occupied a period of 185 years. This would make the average pontifical period for each teacher about fourteen years. By backward calculation from Harivyasadeva, putting a period of fourteen years for each teacher, we have for Nimbarka a date which would be roughly about the middle of the fourteenth century.

Nimbarka's commentary of the Brahma-sutras is called the Vedanta-parijata-saurabha as has been already stated. A commentary on it, called the Vedanta-kaustubha, was written by his direct disciple Srlnivasa. Kesava-kasmlri Bhatta, the disciple of Mukunda, wrote a commentary on the Vedanta-kaustubha, called the Vedanta-kaustubha-prabha. He also is said to have written a commentary on the Bhagavad-gita, called the Tattva-prakasika, a commentary on the tenth skanda of Bhagavata-purana called the Tattva-prakasika-veda-stuti-tika, and a commentary on the Taittrlya Upanisad called the Taittriya-prakasika. He also wrote a work called Krama-dipika, which was commented upon by Govinda

Bhattacarya 1 . The Krama-dipika is a work of eight chapters dealing mainly with the ritualistic parts of the Nimbarka school of religion. This work deals very largely with various kinds of Mantras and meditations on them. Srinivasa also wrote a work called Laghu-stava-raja-stotra in which he praises his own teacher Nimbarka. It has been commented upon by Purusottama Prasada, and the commentary is called Guru-bhakti-mandakini. The work Vedanta-siddhanta-pradipa attributed to Nimbarka seems to be a spurious work so far as can be judged from the colophon of the work and from the summary of the contents given in R. L. Mitra's Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts (MS. No. 2826). It appears that the book is devoted to the elucidation of the doctrine of monistic Vedanta of the school of Sankara. Nimbarka's Dasa-sloki, called also Siddhanta-ratna, had at least three commentaries: Vedanta-ratna-manjusa, by Purusottama Prasada; Laghu-manjusa, the author of which is unknown; and a commentary by Harivyasa muni. Purusottama Prasada wrote a work called Vedanta-ratna-manjusa as a commentary on the Dasa-sloki of Nimbarka, and also Guru-bhakti-mandakini commentary as already mentioned. He wrote also a commentary on the &ri-krma-stava of Nimbarka in twenty chapters called &ruty-anta-sura-druma, and also Stotra-trayi 2 . The discussions contained in the commentary are more or less of the same nature as those found in Para-paksa-giri-vajra, which has been already described in a separate section. The polemic therein is mainly directed against Sankara vedanta. Purusottama also strongly criticizes Ramanuja's view in which the impure cit and acit are regarded as parts of Brahman possessed of the highest and noblest qualities, and suggests the impossibility of this. According to the Nimbarka school the individual selves are different from Brahman. Their identity is only in the remote sense inasmuch as the individual selves cannot have any separate existence apart from God. Purusottama also criticizes the dualists, the Madhvas. The dualistic texts have as much force as the identity texts, and therefore on the strength of the identity texts we have to admit that the world exists in Brahman, and on the strength of the duality texts we have to

1 This Kesava Kasmlrl Bhatta seems to be a very different person from the Kesava Kasmlrl who is said to have had a discussion with Caitanya as described in the Caitanya-caritamrta.

1 The Srl-krsna-stava had another commentary on it called Sruti-siddhanta-manjafX, the writer of which is unknown.

26-2

admit that the world is different from Brahman. The real meaning of the view that God is the material cause of the world is that though everything springs from Him, yet the nature of God remains the same in spite of all His productions. The energy of God exists in God and though He produces everything by the diverse kinds of manifestations of His energies, He remains unchanged in His Self 1 .

Purusottama makes reference to Devacarya's Siddhanta-jahnavi, and therefore lived after him. According to Pandit Kisoradasa's introduction to Sruty-anta-sura-druma, he was born in 1623 and was the son of Narayana Sarma. The present writer is unable to substantiate this view. According to Pandit Kisoradasa he was a pupil of Dharmadevacarya. 2 Devacarya wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutras called the Siddhanta-jdhnavt, on which Sundara Bhatta wrote a commentary called the Siddhanta-setukd.

A General Idea of Nimbarka's Philosophy.

According to Nimbarka, the inquiry into the nature of Brahman can take place only after one has studied the literature that deals with the Vedic duties leading to various kinds of beneficial results and discovered that they are all vitiated by enjoyment and cannot bring about a state of eternal bliss. After such a discovery, and after the seeker has learnt in a general manner from the various religious texts that the realization of Brahman leads to the unchangeable, eternal and ever-constant state of bliss, he becomes anxious to attain it through the grace of God and approaches his teacher with affection and reverence for instruction regarding the

1 yatha ca bhumes tathd-bhuta-sakti-matyd osadhindm janma-mdtram tathd sarva-kdryo-tpddand-rha-laksand-cintydnnanta-sarva-sakter aksara-paddrthdd brahmano visvam sambhavati'ti; yadd sva-svd-bhdvikd-lpd-dhika-sdtisaya-sakWna-dbhyo' cetanebhyas tat-tac-chaktya-nusdrena sva-sva-kdrya-bhdi^d-pattavapi apra-cyuta-sva-rupatvam pratyaksa-pramdna-siddham, tarhy acintya-sarvd-cintya-viszdkhya-kdryo-tpddand-rha-saktimato bhagavata ukta-rltyd jagad-bhdvd-pattavapya-pracyuta-sva-rupatvarn kim asakyam iti.. . . sakti-viksepa-sam-haranasya parindma-sabda-vdcyatvd-bhiprdyena kvacit parindmo-ktih. sva-riipa-parindmd-bhdvas ca pdrvam eva nirupitah; sakteh sakti-mato' prthak-siddhatvdt. (&ruty-anta-sura-druma, pp. 73—74.)

8 Pandit Kisoradasa contradicts himself in his introduction to Veddnta-manjusd and it seems that the dates he gives are of a more or less fanciful character. Pandit Kisoradasa further says that Devacarya lived in a.d. 1055. This would place Nimbarka prior even to Ramanuja, which seems very improbable.

nature of Brahman. The Brahman is Sri Krsna, who is omniscient, omnipotent, the ultimate cause, and the all-pervading Being. Such a Being can be realized only through a constant effort to permeate oneself with His nature by means of thought and devotion. The import of the first aphorism of the Brahma-sutra consists in the imposition of such a duty on the devotee, namely, the constant effort at realizing the nature of Brahman 1 . The pupil listens to the instruction of his teacher who has a direct realization of the nature of Brahman and whose words are therefore pregnant with his concrete experience. He tries to understand the import and meaning of the instruction of his teacher which is technically called sravana. This is indeed different from the ordinary accepted meaning of the sravana in the Sankara literature where it is used in the sense of listening to the Upanisadic texts. The next step is called manana — the process of organizing one's thought so as to facilitate a favourable mental approach towards the truths communicated by the teacher in order to rouse a growing faith in it. The third step is called nididhyasana —the process of marshalling one's inner psychical processes by constant meditation leading ultimately to a permanent conviction and experiences of the truths inspired and communicated by the teacher. It is the fruitful culmination of the last process that brings about the realization of the nature of Brahman. The study of the nature of the Vedic duties, technically called dharma, and their inefficacy, rouses a desire for the knowledge of the nature of Brahman leading to eternal bliss. As a means to that end the pupil approaches the teacher who has a direct experience of the nature of Brahman. The revelation of the nature of the Brahman in the pupil is possible through a process of spiritual communication of which sravana, manana and nididhyasana are the three moments.

According to Nimbarka's philosophy which is a type of Bhedd-bheda-vdda, that is, the theory of the Absolute as Unity-indifference, Brahman or the Absolute has transformed itself into the world of matter and spirits. Just as the life-force or prana manifests itself into the various conative and cognitive sense-functions, yet keeps its own independence, integrity and difference from them,

1 As the nature of this duty is revealed through the text of the Brahma-sutra, namely, that the Brahma-hood can be attained only by such a process of nididhyasana, it is called the apurva-vidhi.

so the Brahman also manifests itself through the numberless spirits and matter without losing itself in them. Just as the spider spins out of its own self its web and yet remains independent of it, so the Brahman also has split itself up into the numberless spirits and matter but remains in its fullness and purity. The very existence and movement of the spirits and indeed all their operations are said to depend upon Brahman {tad-ay atta-sthiti-purvika) in the sense that the Brahman is both the material and the determining cause of them all 1 . In the scriptures we hear of dualistic and monistic texts, and the only way in which the claims of both these types of texts can be reconciled is by coming to a position of compromise that the Brahman is at once different from and identical with the world of spirits and matter. The nature of Brahman is regarded as such that it is at once one with and different from the world of spirits and matter, not by any imposition or supposition, but as the specific peculiarity of its spiritual nature. It is on this account that this Bheda-bheda doctrine is called the svabhavika bheda-bheda-vada. In the pure dualistic interpretation of the Vedanta the Brahman is to be regarded only as the determining cause and as such the claims of all texts that speak of the Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits with the Brahman are to be disregarded. The monistic view of the Vedanta is also untenable, for a pure differenceless qualityless consciousness as the ultimate reality is not amenable to perception, since it is super-sensible, nor to inference, since it is devoid of any distinctive marks, nor also to scriptural testimony, as no words can signify it. The supposition that, just as one's attention to the moon may be drawn in an indirect manner by perceiving the branch of a tree with which the moon may be in a line, so the nature of Brahman also may be expressed by demonstrating other concepts which are more or less contiguous or associated with it, is untenable; for in the above illustration the moon and the branch of the tree are both sensible objects, whereas Brahman is absolutely super-sensible. Again, if it is supposed that Brahman is amenable to logical proofs, then also this supposition would be false; for all that is amenable to proofs or subject to any demonstration is false. Further, if it is not amenable to any proof, the Brahman would be chimerical as the

1 Srinivasa's commentary on Nimbarka's Vedanta-pdrijata-saurabha on Brahma-sutra, I. i. 1-3.

hare's horn. If it is held that, Brahman being self-luminous, no proofs are required for its demonstration, then all the scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman would be superfluous. Moreover, the pure qualityless Brahman being absolutely un-associated with any kind of impurity has to be regarded as being eternally free from any bondage, and thus all scriptural texts giving instruction in the methods for the attainment of salvation would be meaningless. The reply of the Sankarites, that all duality though false has yet an appearance and serves practical purposes, is untenable ; for when the scriptures speak of the destruction of bondage they mean that it was a real bondage and its dissolution is also a real one. Again, an illusion is possible in a locus only when it has some specific as well as some general characters, and the illusion takes place only when the object is known in a general manner without any of its specific attributes. But if the Brahman is absolutely qualityless, it is impossible that it should be the locus of any illusion. Again, since it is difficult to explain how the ajnana should have any support or object (asraya or visaya), the illusion itself becomes inexplicable. The Brahman being of the nature of pure knowledge can hardly be supposed to be the support or object of ajnana. The jlva also being itself a product of ajnana cannot be regarded as its support. Moreover, since Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination and ajnana is darkness, the former cannot legitimately be regarded as the support of the latter, just as the sun cannot be regarded as the supporter of darkness.

The operation that results in the formation of illusion cannot be regarded as being due to the agency of ajnana, for ajnana is devoid of consciousness and cannot, therefore, be regarded as an agent. The agency cannot also be attributed to Brahman because it is pure and static. Again, the false appearance of Brahman as diverse undesirable phenomena such as a sinner, an animal, and the like, is inexplicable; for if the Brahman is always conscious and independent it cannot be admitted to allow itself to suffer through the undesirable states which one has to experience in various animal lives through rebirth. If the Brahman has no knowledge of such experiences, then it is to be regarded as ignorant and its claim to self-luminosity fails. Again, if ajnana is regarded as an existent entity, there is the change to dualism, and if it is regarded as nonexistent then it cannot hide the nature of Brahman. Further, if

Brahman is self-luminous, how can it be hidden and how can there be any illusion about it? If the conch-shell shines forth in its own nature, there cannot be any misperception of its nature as a piece of silver. Again, if the nature of Brahman is admitted to be hidden by ajnana, the question that naturally arises is whether the ajnana veils the nature of the Brahman as a whole or in part. The former supposition is impossible, for then the world would be absolutely blind and dark(jagad-andhya-prasangat), and the latter is impossible, for the Brahman is a homogeneous entity and has no characters or parts. It is admitted by the monists to be absolutely qualityless and partless. If it is held that ordinarily only the "bliss" part of the Brahman is hidden by ajnana whereas the "being" part remains unveiled, then that would mean that Brahman is divisible in parts and the falsity of the Brahman would be demonstrable by such inferences as: Brahman is false, because it has parts like the jug (brahtna mithya samsatvat, ghatadivat).

In reply to the above objections it may be argued that the objections against ajnana are inadmissible, for the ajnana is absolutely false knowledge. Just as an owl perceives utter darkness, even in bright sunlight, so the intuitive perception "I am ignorant" is manifest to all. Anantarama, a follower of the Nimbarka school, raises further objections against such a supposition in his Vedanta-tattva-bodha. He says that this intuitively felt "I" in "I am ignorant" cannot be pure knowledge, for pure knowledge cannot be felt as ignorant. It cannot be mere egoism, for then the experience would be "the egoism is ignorant." If by "ego" one means the pure self, then such a self cannot be experienced before emancipation. The ego-entity cannot be something different from both pure consciousness and ajnana, for such an entity must doubtless be an effect of ajnana which cannot exist before the association of the ajnana with Brahman. The reply of the Sarikarites that ajnana, being merely false imagination, cannot affect the nature of the Brahman, the abiding substratum (adhisthana), is also inadmissible; for if the ajnana be regarded as false imagination there must be someone who imagines it. But such an imagination cannot be attributed to either of the two possible entities, Brahman or the ajnana; for the former is pure qualityless which cannot therefore imagine and the latter is inert and unconscious and therefore devoid of all imagination. It is also wrong to suppose that Brahman

as pure consciousness has no intrinsic opposition to ajnana, for there can be no knowledge which is not opposed to ignorance. Therefore the Sarikarites are not in a position to demonstrate any entity which they mean by the intuition "I" in "I am ignorant."

The final conclusion from the Nimbarka point of view therefore is that it is inadmissible to accept any ajnana as a world-principle producing the world-appearance by working in co-operation with the Brahman. The ajnana or ignorance is a quality of individual beings or selves who are by nature different from Brahman but are under its complete domination. They are eternal parts of it, atomic in nature, and are of limited powers. Being associated with be-ginningless chains of karma they are naturally largely blinded in their outlook on knowledge 1 .

The Sankarites affirm that, through habitual failure in distinguishing between the real nature of the self and the not-self, mis-perceptions, misapprehensions and illusions occur. The objection of Anantarama against such an explanation is that such a failure cannot be attributed either to Brahman or to ajnana. And since all other entities are but later products of illusion, they cannot be responsible for producing the illusion 2 .

In his commentary Sarikara had said that the pure consciousness was not absolutely undemonstrable, since it was constantly being referred to by our ego-intuitions. To this the objection that naturallv arises is that the entity referred to by our ego-intuitions cannot be pure consciousness; for then the pure consciousness would have the characteristic of an ego—a view which is favourable to the Nimbarka but absolutely unacceptable to the Sankarites. If it is held to be illusory, then it has to be admitted that the ego-intuition appears when there is an illusion. But by supposition the illusion can only occur when there is an ego-intuition 3 . Here is then a reasoning in a circle. The defence that reasoning in a circle can be avoided on the supposition that the illusory imposition is beginningless is also unavailing. For the supposition that illusions as such are beginningless is false, as it is well known that illusions

1 paramd-tma-bhinno'lpa-saktis tad-adhlnah sanatanas tad-amsa-bhuto' nddi-karma-tmikd-Tidyd-vrta-dharma-bhutd-jnano jtva-ksetrajnd-di-sabdd-bht-dheyas tat-pratyayd-sraya iti. Veddnta-tattva-bodha, p. 12.

2 Ibid. p. 13.

3 adhyastattz'e tu adhydse sati bhdsamdnatvam, tasmin sati sa ity anyonyd-sraya-dosah. Ibid. p. 14.

are possible only through the operation of the subconscious impressions of previous valid cognitions 1 . Again, the reflection of the pure consciousness in the ajnana is impossible, for reflections can take place only between two entities which have the same order of existence. From other considerations also the illusion has to be regarded as illegitimate. Illusions take place as the result of certain physical conditions such as contact, defect of the organs of perception, the operation of the subconscious impressions, etc. These conditions are all absent in the supposed case of the illusion involved in the ego-intuition.

The Saiikarites described may a as indefinable. By " indefinable'' they mean something that appears in perception but is ultimately contradicted. The Saiikarites define falsehood or non-existence as that which is liable to contradiction. The phenomena of maya appear in experience and are therefore regarded as existent. They are liable to contradiction and are therefore regarded as nonexistent. It is this unity of existence and non-existence in maya that constitutes its indefinability. To this Anantarama's objection is that contradiction does not imply non-existence. As a particular object, say a jug, may be destroyed by the stroke of a club, so one knowledge can destroy another. The destruction of the jug by the stroke of the club does not involve the supposition that the jug was nonexistent. So the contradiction of the prior knowledge by a later one does not involve the non-existence or falsity of the former. All cognitions are true in themselves, though some of them may destroy another. This is what the Nimbarkists mean by the sat-khyati of knowledge. The theory of sat-khyati with them means that all knowledge {khyati) is produced by some existent objects, which are to be regarded as its cause (sad-dhetuka khyati, sat-khyati). According to such a view, therefore, the illusory knowledge must have its basic cause in some existent object. It is wrong also to suppose that false or non-existent objects can produce effects on the analogy that the illusory cobra may produce fear and even death. For here it is not the illusory cobra that produces fear but the memory of a true snake. It is wrong therefore to suppose that the illusory world-appearance may be the cause of our bondage.

Since illusions are not possible, it is idle to suppose that all our

1 adhydso nd'nddih, purva-pramd-hita-samskdra-janyatrdt. Veddnta-tattva-bodha, p. 14.

perceptual, inferential, and other kinds of cognitions are produced as associated with an ego through sheer illusion. Right knowledge is to be regarded as a characteristic quality of the self and the production of knowledge does not need the intervention of a vrtti. The ajnana which prevents the flashing in of knowledge is our karma which is in accumulation from beginningless time. Through the operation of the sense-organs our selves expand outside us and are filled with the cognition of the sense-objects. It is for this reason that when the sense-organs are not in operation the sense-objects do not appear in cognition, as in the state of sleep. The self is thus a real knower (jiiata) and a real agent (karta), and its experiences as a knower and as an agent should on no account be regarded as the result of a process of illusion 1 .

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness, but it should yet be regarded as the real knower. The objection that what is knowledge cannot behave in a different aspect as a knower, just as water cannot be mixed with water and yet remain distinct from it, is regarded by the Nimbarkists as invalid. As an illustration vindicating the Nimbarka position, Purusottama, in his Vedanta-ratna-manjusdi refers to the case of the sun which is both light and that from which light emanates. Even when a drop of water is mixed with another drop the distinction of the drops, both quantitative and qualitative, remains, though it may not be so apprehended. The mere non-apprehension of difference is no proof that the two drops have merged into identity. On the other hand, since the second drop has its parts distinct from the first one it must be regarded as having a separate existence, even when the two drops are mixed. The character as knower must be attributed to the self; for the other scheme proposed by the Sarikarites, that the character as knower is due to the reflection of the pure consciousness in the vrtti, is inefficacious. The sun that is reflected in water as an image cannot be regarded as a glowing orb by itself. Moreover, reflection can only take place between two visible objects; neither pure consciousness nor the antahkarana-vrtti can be regarded as visible objects justifying the assumption of reflection.

The ego-intuition refers directly to the self and there is no illusion about it. The ego-intuition thus appears to be a continuous revelation of the nature of the self. After deep dreamless sleep one

1 Vedanta-tattva-bodha, p. 20. •

says "I slept so well that I did not know even myself." But this should not be interpreted as the absence of the ego-intuition or the revelation of the self. The experience "I did not know myself" refers to the absence of the intuition of the body and the mental psychosis, but it does not indicate that the self-conscious self had ever ceased to shine by itself. The negation involved in the denial of the perception of one's self during dreamless sleep refers to the negation of certain associations (say, of the body, etc.) with which the ego ordinarily links itself. Similar experience of negation can also be illustrated in such expressions as " I was not so long in the room," "I did not live at that time," etc., where negations refer to the associations of the ego and not to the ego. The self is not only to be regarded as expressed in the ego-intuition, but it is also to be regarded as distinct from the knowledge it has. The perception of the self continues not only in the state of dreamless sleep but also in the state of emancipation, and even God in His absolute freedom is conscious of Himself in His super-ego intuition. He is also all-Merciful, the supreme Instructor, and the presiding deity of all our understanding. Like individual selves God is also the agent, the creator of the universe. If the Brahman were not an agent by nature, then He could not have been the creator of the universe, even with the association of the may a conditions. Unlike Brahman the activity of the individual souls has to depend upon the operation of the conative organs for its manifestation. The self also really experiences the feelings of pleasure and pain. The existence and agency of the human souls, however, ultimately depend on the will of God. Yet there is no reason to suppose that God is partial or cruel because He makes some suffer and others enjoy; for I Ie is like the grand master and Lord who directs different men differently and awards suffering and enjoyment according to their individual deserts. The whole idea is that though God awards suffering and enjoyment to individuals and directs their actions according to their deserts, He is not ultimately bound by the law of karma, and may by His grace at any time free them from their bondage. The law of karma is a mechanical law and God as the superintendent decides each individual case. He is thus the dispenser of the laws of karma but is not bound by it 1 . The human souls are a part of the

1 na vayam brahma-niyantrtvasya karma-sdpekmttvam briimah, kintu punya-di-karma-karayitrtve tat-phala-ddtrtve ca. Vedanta-ratna-manjusa, p. 14.

nature of God and as such are dependent on Him for their essence, existence, and activities {tad-dyatta-svarupa-sthiti-piirvikah). God being the ultimate truth, both the human souls and inanimate nature attain their essence and existence by virtue of the fact that they are parts of Him and participate in His nature. They are therefore entirely dependent on Him for their existence and all their operations.

The individual souls are infinite in number and atomic in size. But though atomic in size they can at the same time cognize the various sensations in various parts of the body through all-pervading knowledge which exists in them as their attribute. Though atomic and partless in their nature, they are completely pervaded by God through His all-pervading nature. The atomic souls are associated with the beginningless girdle of karma which is the cause of the body, and are yet through the grace of God finally emancipated when their doubts are dissolved by listening to the instructions of the sastras from the teachers, and by entering into a deep meditation regarding the true essence of God by which they are ultimately merged in Him. God is absolutely free in extending His mercy and grace. But it so happens that He actually extends them to those who deserve them by their good deeds and devotion. God in His transcendence is beyond His three natures as souls, the world and even as God. In this His pure and transcendent nature He is absolutely unaffected by any changes, and He is the unity of pure being, bliss and consciousness. In His nature as God He realizes His own infinite joy through the infinite souls which are but constituent parts of Him. The experiences of individuals are therefore contained in Him as constituents of Him because it is by His own iksana or self-perceiving activity that the experiences of the individual selves can be accounted for. The existence and the process of all human experience are therefore contained and controlled by Him. The individual selves are thus in one sense different from Him and in another sense but constituent parts of Him. In Bhas-kara's philosophy the emphasis was on the aspect of unity, since the differences were due to conditions (upadhi). But though Nimbarka's system is to be counted as a type of Bheda-bheda or Dvaita-dvaita theory, the emphasis here is not merely on the part of the unity but on the difference as well. As a part cannot be different from the whole, so the individual souls can never be dif-

ferent from God. But, in the state of bondage the individuals are apt to forget their aspects of unity with God and feel themselves independent in all their actions and experiences. When by absolute self-abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to be absolutely controlled and regulated by God and realizes himself to be a constituent of Him, he loses all his interests in his actions and is not affected by them. The ultimate ideal, therefore, is to realize the relation with God, to abnegate all actions, desires and motives, and to feel oneself as a constituent of Him. Such a being never again comes within the grasp of mundane bondage and lives in eternal bliss in his devotional contemplation of God. The devotee in the state of his emancipation feels himself to be one with God and abides in Him as a part of His energy {tat-tadatmya-nubha-va-purvakam visvarupe bhagavati tac-chaktya-tmana avasthdnam) 1 . Thus, even in the state of emancipation, there is a difference between the emancipated beings and God, though in this state they are filled with the utmost bliss. With the true realization of the nature of God and one's relation with Him, all the three kinds of karma (sancita, kriyamana and arabdhd) are destroyed 2 . Avidyd in this system means ignorance of one's true nature and relationship with God which is the cause of his karma and his association with the body, senses and the subtle matter 3 . The prdrabdha karma, or the karma which is in a state of fructification, may persist through the present life or through other lives if necessary, for until their fruits are reaped the bodiless emancipation cannot be attained 4 . Sainthood consists in the devotional state consisting of a continual and unflinching meditation on the nature of God {dhyana-paripakena dhruva-smrti-para-bhakty-akhya-jnand-dhigame). Such a saint becomes free from the tainting influence of all deeds committed and collected before and all good or bad actions that may be performed later on (tatra uttara-bhavinah kriyamanasya papasya dslesah tat-prag-bhutasya sancitasya tasya nasah . Vcdanta-kaustubha-prabha, w. i. 13). The regular caste duties and the duties of the various stages of life help the rise of wisdom and ought therefore always to be performed, even when the wisdom has arisen; for the flame of

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 591.

2 Ibid. p. 598. 3 Ibid.

* viduso vidyd-mdhdtmydt sancita-kriyamdnayor dslesa-vindsau, prdrabdhasya tu karmano bhogena vindsah, tatra prdrabdhasya etac charlrena itara-sarlrair vd bhuktvd vindsdn-moksa iti samksepah. Ibid. p. 583.

this light has always to be kept burning {tastnat vidyo-dayaya sva-sratna-karma-gnihotra-di-rupatn grhasthena, tapo-japa-dlni karmani urdhva-retobhir anustheyani iti siddham). But the conglomeration of deeds which has started fructifying must fructify and the results of such deeds have to be reaped by the saint either in one life or in many lives as the case may be. The realization of Brahman consists in the unflinching meditation on the nature of God and the participation in Him as His constituent which is the same thing as the establishment of a continuous devotional relationship with Him. This is independent of the ontological fusion and return in Him which may happen as a result of the complete destruction of the fructifying deeds (prarabdha karma) through their experiences in the life of the saint {vidya-yoni-sarira) or in other lives that may follow. A saint, after the exhaustion of his fructifying deeds, leaves his gross body through the susumna nerve in his subtle body, and going beyond the material regions {prakrta-mandala) reaches the border region— the river viraja —between the material regions and the universe of Visnu 1 . Here he leaves aside his subtle body in the supreme being and enters into the transcendent essence of God {Vedanta-kaustubha-prabha, iv. 2. 15). The emancipated beings thus exist in God as His distinct energies and may again be employed by Him for His own purposes. Such emancipated beings, however, are never sent down by God for carrying on an earthly existence. Though the emancipated beings become one with God, they have no control over the affairs of the world, which are managed entirely by God Himself 2 .

Though it is through the will of God that we enjoy the dream experiences and though He remains the controller and abides in us through all stages of our experiences, yet He is never tainted by the imperfections of our experiental existence {Vedanta-kaustubha and its commentary Prabha, HI. 2. 11). The objects of our experiences are not in themselves pleasurable or painful, but God makes them so to us in accordance with the reward and punishment due to us according to our good or bad deeds. In themselves the objects are

1 para-loka-gamane dehad utsarpana-samaye eva vidusah punya-pdpe nira-vasesam kslyate,. . . vidya hi sva-sdmarthydd eva sva-phala-bhuta-brahma-prdpti-pratipddandya. . .enarn deva-ydnena pathd gamayitum suksma-sarlram sthdpayati. Vedanta-kaustubha-prabhd, III. 3. 27.

2 tnuktasya tu para-brahma-sddharmye'pi nikhila-cetand-cetana-patitva-tan-niyantrtva-tiid-vidhdrakatva-sarva-gatatvd-dy-asa.mbha.vdt jagad-vydpdra-varjam aisvaryam. Ibid. iv. 4. 20.

but indifferent entities and are neither pleasurable nor painful (Vedanta-kaustubha-prabha, in. 2. 12). The relation of God and the world is like that of a snake and its coiled existence. The coiled (kundala) condition of a snake is neither different from it nor absolutely identical with it. So God's relation with the individuals also is like that of a lamp and its light (prabha-tadvator iva) or like the sun and the illumination (prakasd). God remains unchanged in Himself and only undergoes transformation through His energies as conscious (cic-chakti) and unconscious (acic-chakti) 1 . As the individuals cannot have any existence apart from Brahman, so the material world also cannot have any existence apart from him. It is in this sense that the material world is a part or constituent of God and is regarded as being one with God. But as the nature of the material world is different from the nature of God, it is regarded as different from Him 2 .

The Vedic duties of caste and stages of life are to be performed for the production of the desire of wisdom (vividisa), but once the true wisdom is produced there is no further need of the performance of the duties (Ibid. in. 4. 9). The wise man is never affected by the deeds that he performs. But though ordinarily the performance of the duties is helpful to the attainment of wisdom, this is not indispensable, and there are many who achieve wisdom without going through the customary path of caste duties and the duties attached to stages of life.

Controversy with the Monists by Madhava Mukunda.

(a) The Main Thesis and the Ultimate End in Advaita Veddnta are Untenable.

Madhava Mukunda, supposed to be a native of the village of ArunaghatI, Bengal, wrote a work called Para-paksa-giri-vajra or Harda-sancaya, in which he tried to show from various points of

1 ananta-guna-saktimato brahmanah parindmi-svabhdvd-cic-chakteh sthula-vasthdydm satydm tad-antard-tmatvena tatrd'vasthdne' pi parinamasya sakti-gatatrdt svarupe parindmd-bhdvdt kundala-drstdnto na dosd-rahah aprthak-siddhatvena abhede'pi bheda-jiidpand-rthah. Veddnta-kaustubha-prabhd, in. 2. 29.

2 fivavat prthak-sthity-anarha-viscsanatvena acid-vastuno brahmd-miatvam visista-vastv-eka-desatvena abheda-vyavohdro mukhyah visesana-visesyayoh sva-rupa-svabhdva-bhedena ca bheda-vyarahdro mukhyah. Ibid. 111. 2. 30.

view the futility of the monistic interpretation of Vedanta by Saiikara and his followers.

He says that the Saiikarites are interested in demonstrating the identity of the individuals with Brahman(jiva-brahmai-kya) and this forms the principal subject-matter of all their discussions. This identity may be illusory or not. In the former case duality or plurality would be real, and in the latter case, i.e. if identity be real, then the duality presupposed in the identification must also be real 1 . It is not the case of the single point of an identity that Saiikarites are interested in, but in the demonstration of an identification of the individuals with Brahman. The demonstration of identity necessarily implies the reality of the negation of the duality. If such a negation is false, the identification must also be false, for it is on the reality of the negation that the reality of the identification depends. If the negation of duality be real, then the duality must also be real in some sense and the identification can imply the reality of the negation only in some particular aspect.

The objections levelled by the Sankarites against the admission of "duality" or "difference" as a category are, firstly, that the category of difference (bheda) being by nature a relation involves two poles and hence it cannot be identical in nature with its locus in which it is supposed to subsist {bhedasya na adhikarana-svaru-patvam). Secondly, that if "difference" is different in nature from its locus, then a second grade of "difference" has to be introduced and this would imply another grade of difference and so on ad infinitum. Thus we have a vicious infinite. To the first objection, the reply is that "difference" is not relational'in nature with this or that individual locus, but with the concept of the locus as such (bhutalatvd-dind nirapeksatve'pi adhikarandtmakatvena sdpeksatve ksaterabhdvdt) 2 . The charge of vicious infinite by the introduction of differences of differences is invalid, for all differences are identical in nature with their locus. So in the case of a series of differences the nature of each difference becomes well defined and the viciousness of the infinite series vanishes. In the instance " there is a jug on the ground" the nature of the difference of the jug is jugness, whereas in the case of the difference of the difference, the second order of

1 dvitiye aikya-pratiyogika-bhedasya pdramdrthikatva-prasangat. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 12.

2 Ibid. p. 14.

diii 27

difference has a separate specification as a special order of dif-ferenceness. Moreover, since difference reveals only the particular modes of the objects, these difficulties cannot arise. In perceiving difference we do not perceive difference as an entity different from the two objects between which it is supposed to subsist 1 . One might equally well find such a fault of mutual dependence on the identification of Brahman with jiva, since it depends upon the identification of the jiva with the Brahman.

A further discussion of the subject shows that there cannot be any objections against "differences" on the score of their being produced, for they merely subsist and are not produced; or on the possibility of their being known, for if differences were never perceived the Sankarites w r ould not have been so anxious to remove the so-called illusions or mis-perception of differences, or to misspend their energies in trying to demonstrate that Brahman was different from all that was false, material and the like; and the saint also would not be able to distinguish between what was eternal and transitory. Again, it is held that there is a knowledge which contradicts the notion of difference. But if this knowledge itself involves difference it cannot contradict it. Whatever may signify anything must do so by restricting its signification to it, and all such restriction involves difference. Even the comprehension that demonstrates the illusoriness of "difference" (e.g. this is not difference, or there is no difference here, etc.) proves the existence of "difference." Moreover, a question may be raised as to whether the notion that contradicts difference is itself comprehended as different from difference or not. In the former case the validity of the notion leaves "difference" unmolested and in the second case, i.e. if it is not comprehended as different from "difference," it becomes identical with it and cannot contradict it.

If it is contended that in the above procedure an attempt has been made to establish the category of difference only in indirect manner and that nothing has been directly said in explanation of the concept of difference, the reply is that those who have sought to explain the concept of unity have fared no better. If it is urged that if ultimately the absolute unity or identity is not accepted then

1 nd'py anyonya-srayah bheda-pratyakse pratiyogita-vacchedaka-stambhatvd-dt-prakdraka-jridnasyai'va hetutrdt na tdvad bheda-pratyakse bhedd-sraydd bhinnatvena pratiyogi-jfianam hetuh. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, pp. 14, 15.

that would lead us to nihilism, then it may also be urged with the same force that, differences being but modes of the objects themselves, a denial of difference would mean the denial of the objects, and this would also land us in nihilism. It must, however, be noted that though difference is but a mode of the objects which differ, yet the terms of reference by which difference becomes intelligible (the table is different from the chair: here the difference of the table is but its mode, though it becomes intelligible by its difference from the chair) are by no means constituents of the objects in which the difference exists as their mode. The Sankarites believe in the refutation of dualism, as by such a refutation the unity is established. The thesis of unity is thus though, on the one hand dependent upon such refutation and yet on the other hand identical with it because all such refutations are believed to be imaginary. In the same manner it may be urged that the demonstration of difference involves with it a reference to other terms, but is yet identical in nature with the object of which it is a mode; the reference to the terms is necessary only for purposes of comprehension.

It must, however, be noted that since difference is but a mode of the object the comprehension of the latter necessarily means the comprehension of all differences existing in it. An object may be known in a particular manner, yet it may remain unknown in its differential aspects, just as the monists hold that pure consciousness is always flashing forth but yet its aspect as the unity of all things may remain unknown. In comprehending a difference between any two objects, no logical priority which could have led to a vicious circle is demanded. But the two are together taken in consciousness and the apprehension of the one is felt as its distinction from the other. The same sort of distinction has to be adduced by the monists also in explaining the comprehension of the identity of the individual souls with the Brahman, otherwise in their case too there would have been the charge of a vicious circle. For when one says "these two are not different," their duality and difference depend upon a comprehension of their difference which, while present, prevents their identity from being established. If it is held that the duality is imaginary whereas the identity is real, then the two being of a different order of existence the contradiction of the one cannot lead to the affirmation of the other. The apology that in comprehending identity no two-term reference is needed is futile, for an

identity is comprehended only as the negation of the two-term duality.

Thus, from the above considerations, the main thesis of the Sankarites, that all things are identical with Brahman, falls to the ground.

According to Nimbarka the ideal of emancipation is participation in God's nature {tad-bhava-patti). This is the ultimate end and summum bonum of life (prayojana). According to the Sarikarites emancipation consists in the ultimate oneness or identity existing between individual souls and Brahman. The Brahman in reality is one with the individual souls, and the apparent difference noticed in our ordinary practical life is due to misconception and ignorance, which impose upon us a false notion of duality. Madhava Mukunda urges that in such a view, since the individual souls are already one with Brahman, they have nothing to strive for. There is thus really no actual end (proyojana) as the goal of our strivings. Madhava Mukunda, in attempting to emphasize the futility of the Sarikarite position, says that, if the ultimate consciousness be regarded as one, then it would be speckled with the various experiences of individuals. It cannot be held to be appearing as different in accordance with the variety of conditions through which it appears, for in our experiences we find that though through our various cognitive organs we have various experiences they are also emphasized as belonging to one being. Variability of conditions does not necessarily imply a variety of the units of experience of individual beings, as is maintained by the Sahkarites. The pure and ubiquitous dif-ferenceless consciousness (nirvisesa-caitanya) cannot also be regarded as capable of being identified as one with the plurality of minds (antahkarana). Again, it is admitted by the Sankarites that in dreamless sleep the mind is dissolved. If that were so and if pure consciousness is regarded as being capable of manifesting itself through false identification with minds, there would be no explanation of the continuity of consciousness from day to day in the form of memory. It cannot be urged that such a continuity is maintained by the fact that minds exist in a state of potency (samskara-tmana' vasihitasyd) in the deep dreamless sleep; for the mind in a potent state cannot be regarded as carrying impressions and memories, since in that case there would be memories even in dreamless sleep.

Further, if the experiences are supposed to belong to the states of ignorance, then emancipation, which refers only to pure consciousness, would refer to an entity different from that which was suffering from bondage. On the other hand, if the experiences belong to pure consciousness, then emancipation will be associated with diverse contradictory experiences at the same time according to the diversity of experiences.

The Sankarites may urge that the conditions which bring about the experiences are associated with pure consciousness and hence in an indirect manner there is a continuity of the being that experiences and attains salvation. To this the reply is that the experiencing of sorrow is a sufficient description of the conditions. That being so, where the experiencing of sorrow does not exist, the conditions, of which it is a sufficient description, also do not exist. Thus, the discontinuity of the entities which suffer bondage and attain emancipation remains the same.

Again, since it is held that the conditions subsist in the pure consciousness, it may well be asked whether emancipation means the dissolution of one condition or many conditions. In the former case we should have emancipation always, for one or other of the conditions is being dissolved every moment, and in the latter case we might not have any emancipation at all, for all the conditions determining the experiences of infinite individuals can never be dissolved.

It may also be asked whether the conditions are associated with the pure consciousness in part or in whole. In the first alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second the differentiation of the pure consciousness in various units would be inadmissible.

Moreover, it may be asked whether conditions are associated with pure consciousness conditionally or unconditionally. In the former alternative there would be a vicious infinite and in the second case there would be no chance of emancipation. The theory of reflection cannot also explain the situation, for reflection is admitted only when the reflected image has the same order of existence as the object. The avidya. has a different order of existence from Brahman, and thus reflection of Brahman in avidya cannot be justified. Again, in reflection that which is reflected and that in which the reflection takes place must be in two different places,

whereas in the case of avidya and Brahman the former is supposed to have Brahman as its support. The conditions (iipadhi) cannot occupy a part of Brahman, for Brahman has no parts; nor can they occupy the whole of it, for in that case there will be no reflection. In the Nimbarka system both the monistic and the dualistic texts have their full scope, the dualistic texts in demonstrating the difference that exists between souls and God, and the monistic texts showing the final goal in which the individuals realize themselves as constituents of Him and as such one with Him. But in the Saiikara system, where no duality is admitted, everything is self-realized, there is nothing to be attained and even the process of instruction of the disciple by the preceptor is unavailable, as they are all but adumbrations of ignorance.

(b) Refutation of the Sankara Theory of Illusion in its various Aspects.

The Sarikarite doctrine of illusion involves a supposition that the basis of illusion (adhisthana) is imperfectly or partly known. The illusion consists in the imposition of certain appearances upon the unknown part. The stump of a tree is perceived in part as an elongated thing but not in the other part as the stump of a tree, and it is in reference to this part that the mis-attribution of an illusory appearance, e.g. a man, is possible by virtue of which the elongated part is perceived as man. But Brahman is partless and no division of its part is conceivable. It must therefore be wholly known or wholly unknown, and hence there can be no illusion regarding it. Again, illusion implies that an illusory appearance has to be imposed upon an object. But the avidya, which is beginningless, cannot itself be supposed to be an illusory appearance. Following the analogy of beginninglessness Brahman may be regarded as illusory. The reply that Brahman being the basis cannot be illusory is meaningless; for though the basis is regarded as the ground of the imposition, there is no necessary implication that the basis must also be true. The objection that the basis has an independent reality because it is the basis associated with ignorance which can become the datum of illusion is futile; because the hasis may also be an unreal one in a serial process where at each stage it is associated with ignorance. In such a view it is not the pure Brahman which becomes the basis but the illusory Brahman which is associated with

ignorance. Moreover, if the avidya and its modifications were absolutely non-existent they could not be the subject of imposition. What really exists somewhere may be imposed elsewhere, but not that which does not exist at all. The pure chimericals like the hare's horn can never be the subjects of imposition, for that which is absolutely non-existent cannot appear at all.

Again, illusions are supposed to happen through the operation of impressions (samskara), but in the beginningless cosmic illusion the impressions must also be beginningless and co-existent with the basis (adhisthana) and therefore real. The impressions must exist prior to the illusion and as such they cannot themselves be illusory, and if they are not illusory they must be real. Again, the impressions cannot belong to Brahman, for then it could not be qualityless and pure; they cannot belong to individual souls, for these are produced as a result of illusory impositions which are again the products of the operation of impressions. Further, similarity plays an important part in all illusions, but Brahman as the ground or basis which is absolutely pure and qualityless has no similarity with anything. There cannot also be any imaginary similarity imposed upon the qualityless Brahman, for such an imaginary imposition presupposes a prior illusion. Again, all illusions are seen to have a beginning, whereas entities that are not illusory, such as the individual souls, are found to be beginningless. It is also erroneous to hold that the ego-substratum behaves as the basis of the illusion, for it is itself a product of the illusion.

Furthermore, the supposition that the world-appearance is a cosmic illusion which is related to pure consciousness in an illusory relation (adhydsika-sambandha) is unwarrantable. But the Sari-karites admit that the relation between the external world and the knower is brought about by the operation of the mind in modification, called vrtti. Moreover, if the pure consciousness be admitted to be right knowledge or prama, then its object or that which shines with it must also be right knowledge and as such it cannot be the basis of false knowledge. If the pure consciousness be false knowledge, it cannot obviously be the basis of false knowledge. The mere fact that some of the known relations, such as contact, inseparable inherence, do not hold between the object of knowledge and knowledge does not prove that their relation must be an illusory one, for other kinds of relations may subsist between them Knowledge-and-

the-known may itself be regarded as a unique kind of relation. It is also wrong to suppose that all relations are false because they are constituents of the false universe, for the universe is supposed to be false because the relations are false, and hence there would be a vicious infinite. Again, the objection that, if relations are admitted to establish connection between two relata, then further relations may be necessary to relate the relation to relata and that this would lead to a vicious infinite, and also that, if relations are identical in essence with the relata, then relations become useless, is futile. The same objections would be admissible in the case of illusory relations. If it is held that, since all relations are illusory, the above strictures do not apply, then it may be pointed out that if the order of the relations be subversed, then, instead of conceiving the jug to be a product of maya, maya may be taken as a product of the jug. Thus, not only the Sankarites but even the Buddhists have to admit the orderly character of relations. In the Nimbarka view all relations are regarded as true, being the different modes of the manifestation of the energy of God. Even if the relations be denied, then the nature of Brahman cannot be described as this or that.

(c) Refutation of the Sankarite View of Ajnana. Ajnana is defined as a beginningless positive entity which is destructibleby knowledge (anadi-bhavatve satijiiana-nivartyatvam). The definition is unavailing as it does not apply to ignorance that hides an ordinary object before it is perceived. Nor does ajnana apply to the ignorance regarding the negation of an object, since it is of a positive nature. Again, in the case of the ignorance that abides in the saint who has attained the knowledge of Brahman, the ajnana is seen to persist even though knowledge has been attained ; hence the definition of ajnana as that which is destructible by knowledge fails. In the case of the perception of red colour in the crystal through reflection, the ignorant perception of the white crystal as red persists even though it is known to be false and due to reflection. Here also the ignorance is not removed by knowledge. It is also wrong to suppose that ajnana, which is but the product of defect, should be regarded as beginningless. Moreover, it may be pointed out that all things (excluding negation) that are beginningless are also eternal like the souls and it is a curious assumption that

there should be an entity called ajnana which is beginningless and yet destructible. Again, ajnana is often described as being different both from being and non-being, but has yet been defined as a positive entity. It is also difficult to imagine how, since negative entities are regarded as products of ajnana, ajnana may itself be regarded as a positive entity. Moreover, the error or illusion that takes place through absence of knowledge has to be admitted as a negative entity; but being an illusion it has to be regarded as a product of ajnana.

There is no proof of the existence of ajnana in the so-called perception " I am ignorant." It cannot be the pure Brahman, for then that would have to be styled impure. It cannot be a positive knowledge by itself, for that is the very point which has to be proved. Further, if in establishing ajnana (ignorance) one has to fall back upon jnana or knowledge, and if in establishing the latter one has to fall back upon the former, then that would involve a vicious circle. It cannot be the ego-substratum (aham-artha), for that is itself a product of ajnana and cannot be in existence as the datum of the perception of ajnana. The ego itself cannot be perceived as ignorant, for it is itself a product of ignorance. The ego is never regarded as synonymous with ignorance, and thus there is no means of proving the supposition that ignorance is perceived as a positive entity either as a quality or as a substance. Ignorance is thus nothing but" absence of knowledge" (jnana-bhava) and ought to be recognized by the Sarikarites, since they have to admit the validity of the experience " I do not know what you say" which is evidently nothing but a reference to the absence of knowledge which is admitted by the Sarikarites in other cases. There is no proof that the cases in point are in any way different from such cases of absence of knowledge. Again, if the ajnana is regarded as hiding an object, then in the case of mediate knowledge (paroksa-vrtti —where according to the Sarikarites the vrtti or the mental state does not remove the veil of ajnana) one ought to feel that one is ignorant of the object of one's mediate knowledge, for the veil of ajnana remains here intact 1 . Moreover, all cases of the supposed perception of ignorance can be explained as the comprehension of the absence of knowledge. In the above manner Mukunda criti-

1 paroksa-vrtter I'isaya-varakd-jiiana-nivartakatvena paroksato jndte'pi na jdndmVty anubhavd-pdtdc ca. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 76.

cizes the theories of ajnana and of the illusion in their various aspects. But as the method of the dialectic followed in these logical refutations is substantially the same as that attempted by Verikata-natha and Vyasatlrtha which have been examined in detail it is not necessary to give a detailed study of Mukunda's treatment.

The Pramanas according to Madhava Mukunda.

The followers of Nimbarki admit only three (perception, inference and testimony) out of the following eight pramanas, viz. perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), similarity (upamana), scriptural testimony (sabda), implication (arthdpatti), non-perception (anupalabdhi), inclusion of the lower within the higher as of ten within a hundred (sambhava), and tradition (aitihya). Perception is of two kinds, external and internal. The external perception is of five kinds according to the five cognitive senses. The mental perception called also the internal perception is of two kinds, ordinary (laukika) and transcendent (alaukika). The perception of pleasure and pain is a case of ordinary internal perception, whereas the perception of the nature of self, God and their qualities is a case of transcendent internal perception. This transcendent internal perception is again of two kinds, that which flashes forth through the meditation of an entity and that which comes out of meditation on the essence of a scriptural text. The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher or by the formation of right tendencies it cannot have a glimpse of the transcendent realities. Knowledge is a beginningless, eternal and all-pervasive characteristic of individual selves. But in our state of bondage this knowledge is like the rays of a lamp in a closed place, in a state of contraction. Just as the rays of a lamp enclosed within a jug may go out through the hole into the room and straight through the door of the room and flood with light some object outside, so the knowledge in each individual may by the modification of the mind reach the senses and again through their modification reach the object and, having flood-lit it, may illuminate both the object and the knowledge. The ajnana (ignorance) that ceases with the knowledge of an object is the partial cessation of a state of contraction

leading to the flashing of knowledge. What is meant by the phrase "knowledge has an object" is that knowledge takes a particular form and illuminates it. The objects remain as they are, but they are manifested through their association with knowledge and remain unmanifested without it. In the case of internal perception the operation of the senses is not required, and so pleasure and pain are directly perceived by the mind. In self-consciousness or the perception of the self, the self being itself self-luminous, the mental directions to the self remove the state of contraction and reveal the nature of the self. So God can be realized through His grace and the removal of obstruction through the meditative condition of the mind 1 .

In inference the knowledge of the existence of the hetu (reason) in the minor (paksa) having a concomitance (vyapti) with the pro-bandum (sadhya), otherwise called paramarsa (vahni-vyapya-dhumavan ayam evam-rupah), is regarded as the inferential process (anumana) and from it comes the inference (e.g. "the hill is fiery"). Two kinds of inference, i.e. for the conviction of one's own self (svarthanumana) and for convincing others (pararthanumana), are admitted here; and in the latter case only three propositions (the thesis, pratijria, the reason, hetu, and the instance, udaharana) are regarded as necessary. Three kinds of inference are admitted, namely kevala-nvayi (argument from only positive instances, where negative instances are not available), kevala-vyatireki (argument from purely negative instances, where positive instances are not available), and anvaya-vyatireki (argument from both sets of positive and negative instances). In addition to the well-known concomitance (vyapti) arising from the above three ways, scriptural assertions are also regarded as cases of concomitance. Thus there is a scriptural passage to the following effect: The self is indestructible and it is never divested of its essential qualities (avinasi va are atma an-ucchitti-dharma), and this is regarded as a vyapti or concomitance, from which one may infer the indestructibility of the soul like the Brahman. 2 There are no other specially interesting features in the Nimbarka doctrine of inference.

Knowledge of similarity is regarded as being due to a separate pramana called upamana. Such a comprehension of similarity (sadrsya) may be due to perception or through a scriptural assertion

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, pp. 203-206. 2 Ibid. p. 210.

of similarity. Thus a man may perceive the similarity of the face to the moon or he may learn from the scriptures that the self and God are similar in nature and thus comprehend such similarity. This may be included within the proposition of instance or illustration in an inference (upamanasya drstanta-matra-ika-vigraha-tvena'numana-vayave udaharane antarbhavah. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 254).

That from which there is a communication of the negation or non-existence of anything is regarded as the pramana or anupala-bdhi. It is of four kinds: firstly, the negation that precedes a production, called prag-abhava; secondly, the negation of one entity in another, i.e. the negation as "otherness," called anyonya-bhava; thirdly, the negation as the destruction of an entity, called dhvam-sa-bhava; fourthly, the negation of an entity in all times (kdlatrayc'pi nastiti pratiti-visayah atyanta-bhavah). But it is unnecessary to admit abhava or anupalabdhi as a separate pramana, for according to the Nimbarkas negation is not admitted as a separate category. The perception of negation is nothing but the perception of the locus of the object of negation as unassociated with it. The negation-precedent {prag-abhava) of a jug is nothing but the lump of clay; the negation of destruction of a jug is nothing but the broken fragments of a jug; the negation of otherness {anyonya-bhava) is the entity that is perceived as the other of an another, and the negation existent in all times is nothing but the locus of a negation. Thus the pramana of negation may best be included with perception. The pramana of implication may well be taken as a species of inference. The pramana of sambhava may well be regarded as a deductive piece of reasoning.

The Nimbarkas admit the self-validity of the pramanas {svatah-pramanya) in the manner of the Sankarites. Self-validity {svatastva) is defined as the fact that in the absence of any defect an assemblage forming the data of cognition produces a cognition that represents its nature as it is {dosa-bhavatve ydvat-svd-sraya-bhuta-prama-grahaka-sdmagri-matra-grahyatvam) 1 . Just as the eye when it perceives a coloured object perceives also the colours and forms associated with it, so it takes with the cognition of an object also the validity of such a cognition.

The nature of God can, however, be expressed only by the

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 253.

scriptural texts, as the signifying powers of these texts directly originate from God. Indeed, all the powers of individual minds also are derived from God, but they cannot signify Him as they are tainted by the imperfections of the human mind. The Mlm-amsists are wrong to think that the import of all parts of the Vedas consists in enjoining the performance of the Vedic duties, for the results of all deeds ultimately produce a desire for knowing Brahman and through it produce the fitness for the attainment of emancipation. Thus considered from this point of view the goal of the performance of all duties is the attainment of emancipation 1 . There cannot be any scope for the performance of duties for one who has realized the Brahman, for that is the ultimate fruit of all actions and the wise man has nothing else to attain by the performance of actions. Just as though different kinds of seeds may be sown, yet if there is no rain these different kinds of seeds cannot produce the different kinds of trees, so the actions by themselves cannot produce the fruits independently. It is through God's grace that actions can produce their specific fruits. So though the obligatory duties are helpful in purifying the mind and in producing a desire for true knowledge, they cannot by themselves be regarded as the ultimate end, which consists in the production of a desire for true knowledge and the ultimate union with God.

Criticism of the views of Ramanuja and Bhaskara.

The view of Ramanuja and his followers is that the souls and the inanimate world are associated with God as His qualities. The function of qualities (visesana) is that by their presence they distinguish an object from other similar objects. Thus, when one says " Ramathesonof Dasaratha," the adjective "sonof Dasaratha" distinguishes this Rama from the other two Ramas, Balarama and Parasurama. But no such purpose is served by styling the individual souls and the inanimate nature as being qualities of Brahman, for they do not distinguish Him from any other similar persons; for the Ramanujists also do not admit any other category than the conscious souls, the unconscious world and God the controller of them both. Since there is nothing to differentiate, the concept of the souls and matter as quality or differentia also fails. Another

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, pp. 279-280.

function of qualities is that they help the substance to which they belong to become better known. The knowledge of souls and matter as qualities of God does not help us to know or comprehend Him better.

Again, if God be associated with matter and souls, He is found to be associated with their defects also. It may be argued whether the Brahman in which the souls and matter are held to abide is itself unqualified or qualified. In the former alternative the Rama-nujas like the Sarikarites have to admit the existence of an unqualified entity and a part in Brahman has to be admitted which exists in itself as an unqualified entity. If the Brahman be in part qualityless and in part associated with qualities, then it would in part be omniscient only in certain parts of itself. Again, if the pure unassociated Brahman be regarded as omniscient, then there would be one Brahman associated with omniscience and other qualities and another Brahman associated with matter and soul, and the doctrine of qualified monism would thus break down. The pure Brahman being outside the souls and matter, these two would be without a controller inside them and would thus be independent of God. Moreover, God in this view would be in certain parts associated with the highest and purest qualities and in other parts with the defiled characters of the material world and the imperfect souls. In the other alternative, i.e. if Brahman as associated with matter and souls be the ultimate substance which is qualified with matter and souls, then there would be two composite entities and not one, and God will as before be associated with two opposite sets of pure and impure qualities. Again, if God be admitted to be a composite unity and if matter and souls which are regarded as mutually distinct and different are admitted to be constituents of Him though He is different in nature from them, it is difficult to imagine how under the circumstances those constituents can be at once one with God and yet different from Him 1 .

In the Nimbarka view Sri Ivrsna is the Lord, the ultimate Brahman and He is the support of the universe consisting of the souls and matter which are derivative parts of Him and are absolutely under His control and thus have a dependent existence only (para-tantra-sattva). Entities that have dependent existence are of two kinds, the souls which, though they pass through apparent

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 342.

birth and death, are yet eternal in their nature and the substance of the corporeal structure that supports them, the matter. The scriptural texts that speak of duality refer to this duality that subsists between the ultimate substance, the Brahman, which alone has the independent existence, and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence. The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate entity which has independent existence which forms the common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts that try to refer to Brahman by negations (ne'ti, ne'ti) signify how Brahman is different from all other things, or, in other words, how Brahman is different from matter and the souls which are limited by material conditions 1 . Brahman is thus the absolute Being, the abode of all good and noble qualities, which is different from all entities having only dependent existence. The monistic texts refer to the fact, as has already been noted, that the world of matter and the infinite number of souls having but dependent existence cannot exist independent of God (tad-aprthak-siddha) and are, in that sense, one with Him. They also have the essence of their being in Brahman (brahma-tmatvd), are pervaded through and through by it (tad-vyapyatva), are supported in it and held in it and are always being completely controlled and dominated by it 2 . Just as all individual objects, a jug, a stone, etc., may be said to have substantiality (dravyatvd) permeating through them by virtue of their being substances, so the souls and the matter may be called God by virtue of the fact that God permeates through them as their inner essence. But just as none of these individual objects can be regarded as substance per se, so the souls and matter cannot also be identified with God as being one with Him 3 .

The Bhaskarites are wrong in asserting that the individuals are false inasmuch as they have only a false appearance through the

1 vastutas tu ne'ti ne'tVti nanbhydm prakrta-sthula-suksmatvdm-di-dha.rm.avat jada - 7mstu - tad - avacchinna -jlva - vastti - vilaksanam brahmc' ti pratipddyate. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 347.

2 tayos ca brahmd-tmakatva-tan-niyamyatva-tad-vydpyatva-tad-adhlna-sattva-lad-ddheyatva-di-yogena tad-aprthak-siddhatvdt abhedo'pi svdbhdvikah. Ibid. p. 355.

3 yathd ghato dravyani, prthivi-dravyam ity-ddau dravyatva-vacchinnena saha ghatatvd-vacchimui-prthirltvd-vacchinnayoh sdmdnddhikaranyam mukhyam eva visesasya sdmdnyd-bhinnatva-niyamdt evarn prakrte'pi sdrvajnyd-dy-anantd-chmtyd-parunita-visesd-vacchinmnd'paricchinna-sakti-vibhntikena tat-pctddrthena para-bhrahmand svd-tmaka-cctana-cetanatvd-vacchinyayos tad-dtma-rupayos tvam-ddi-paddrthayoh sdmdnddhikaranyam mukhyam eva. Ibid. pp. 355-356.

limitations (upadhi) imposed upon the pure Brahman. The nature of the imposition of Brahman by the so-called conditions is unintelligible. It may mean that the atomic individual is the iesult of the imposition of the conditions on Brahman by which the Brahman as a whole appears as the individual soul or by which the Brahman is split asunder, and being thus split appears as the individual self or the Brahman as qualified by the conditions or that the conditions themselves appear as the individuals. The Brahman being homogeneous and unchangeable cannot be split asunder. Even if it can be split asunder, the individual selves being the products of such a splitting would have a beginning in time and would not thus be eternal; and it has to be admitted that on such a view Brahman has to be split up into as many infinite parts as there are selves. If it is held that the parts of Brahman as limited by the conditions appear as individual souls, then Brahman would be subject to all the defects of the conditions which could so modify it as to resolve it into parts for the production of the individual selves. Moreover, owing to the shifting nature of the conditions the nature of the selves would vary and they might have in this way spontaneous bondage and salvation 1 . If with the shifting of the conditions Brahman also shifts, then Brahman would not be partless and all-pervasive. If it is held that Brahman in its entirety becomes envisaged by the conditions, then, on the one hand, there will be no transcendent pure Brahman and, on the other, there will be one self in all the different bodies. Again, if the individuals are regarded as entirely different from Brahman, then the assertion that they are but the product of the conditioning of Brahman has to be given up. If it is held that the conditions themselves are the individuals, then it becomes a materialistic view like that of the Carvakas. Again, it cannot be held that the conditions only cover up the natural qualities of Brahman such as omniscience, etc., for these being natural qualities of Brahman cannot be removed. Further questions may arise as to whether these natural qualities of Brahman are different from Brahman or not, or whether this is a case of difference-in-identity. They cannot be absolutely different, for that would be an admission of duality. They cannot be identical with Brahman, for then they

1 kiii ca upddhau gacchati sati upddhind szui-z-acchinna-brahma-pradesd-karsand-yogdt anuksanam iipddlri-samyukta-pradesa-bheddt ksane ksane bundha-tnoksau sydtdm. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 357.

could not be regarded as qualities of Brahman. If it be its own essence, then it cannot be covered up, for in that case Brahman would lose all its omniscience. If it is held that it is a case of dif-ference-in-identity, then it comes to an acceptance of the Nimbarka creed.

Again, if it is held that the so-called natural qualities of omniscience, etc., are also due to conditions, it may be asked whether such conditions are different from or identical with Brahman. In the latter alternative they would have no capacity to produce any plurality in Brahman. In the former alternative, it may be asked whether they are moved by themselves into operation or by some other entity or by Brahman. The first view would be open to the criticism of self-dynamism, the second to that of a vicious infinite, and the third to a vicious circle. Moreover, in this view, Brahman being eternal, its dynamism would also be eternal; at no time would the conditions cease to operate, and thus there would be no emancipation. The conditions cannot be regarded as false, unreal or non-existent, for then that would be an acceptance of the Nimbarka creed 1 .

It may further be asked whether the conditions are imposed by certain causes or whether they are without any cause. In the former alternative we have a vicious infinite and in the latter even emancipated beings may have further bondage. Again, it may be asked whether the qualities, e.g. omniscience, that belong to Brahman pervade the whole of Brahman or whether they belong only to particular parts of Brahman. In the former view, if there is entire veiling of the qualities of Brahman there cannot be any emancipation and the whole field of consciousness being veiled by ignorance there is absolute blindness or darkness (jagad-andhya-prasanga). In the second view the omniscience of Brahman being only a quality or a part of it the importance of Brahman as a whole fails.

Following the Bhaskara line it may be asked whether the emancipated beings have separate existence or not. If the former alternative be admitted, and if after destruction of the conditions the individuals still retain their separate existence then the view that differences are created by the conditions has to be given up (aupadhika-bheda-vado datta-jalanjalih syat). If the distinctness of the souls is not preserved in their emancipation, then their very

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 358. d in 28

essence is destroyed, and this would almost be the same as the maya doctrine of the Sarikarites, who hold that the essential nature of both God and souls is destructible.

It is wrong to suppose that individuals are but parts of which a structural Brahman is constituted, for in that case, being made up of parts, the Brahman would be itself destructible. When the scriptures speak of the universe and the souls as being but a part of Brahman, the main emphasis is on the fact that Brahman is infinite and the universe is but too small in comparison with it. It is also difficult to imagine how the minds or the antahkaranas can operate as conditions for limiting the nature of the Brahman. How should Brahman allow these so-called conditions to mutilate its nature? It could not have created these conditions for the production of individual souls, for these souls were not in existence before the conditions were in existence. Thus the Bhaskara doctrine that the concept of distinction and unity of Brahman is due to the operation of conditions (aupadhika-bhedabheda-vada) is entirely false.

According to the Nimbarka view, therefore, the unity and difference that exist between the individuals and Brahman is natural (svabhavika) and not due to conditions {aupadhikd) as in the case of Bhaskara. The coiling posture (kundala) of a snake is different from the long snake as it is in itself and is yet identical with it in the sense that the coiling posture is an effect; it is dependent and under the absolute control of the snake as it is and it has no separate existence from the nature of the snake as it is. The coiled state of the snake exists in the elongated state but only in an undifferentiated, unperceivable way; and is nothing but the snake by which it is pervaded through and through and supported in its entirety. So this universe of matter and souls is also in one aspect absolutely identical with God, being supported entirely by Him, pervaded through and through by Him and entirely dependent on Him, and yet in another aspect different from Him in all its visible manifestations and operations 1 . The other analogy through which the Nim-barkists try to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which are at once one with it and are also perceived as different from it.

1 yathd kundala-vasthd-pannasya ahch kundalam vyakttl-pannati'at pratyaksa-pramaria-gocaram tad-bhedasya svdbhdiikatvdt lambdyamdnd-iasthdydm tu sarpd-yatd-zacchinna-srarupena kundalasya tatra sattve'pi aryakta-ndma-riipata-pattya pratydksd-gocaratvam sarva-tmahatva-1ad-ddheyatz , a-tad-vyiipy(itvii-dind tad-aprthak-siddhatvdd abhedasyd'pi svdbhdvikatvam. Para-paksn-^iri-injra, p. 361.

The difference of this view from that of the Ramanujists is that while the latter consider that the souls and the matter qualify the nature of Brahman and are in that sense one with it, the former repudiate the concept of a permanent modification of the nature of Brahman by the souls and matter.

The Reality of the World.

The Sankarites hold that if the world which is of the nature of effect were real it would not be liable to contradiction at the time of Brahma-knowledge; if it were chimerical it would not appear to our sense. The world, however, appears to our senses and is ultimately liable to contradiction; it has therefore an indefinable (anirvacaniya) nature which is the same thing as saying that the world is false 1 . But what is the meaning of this indefinability? It cannot mean the absolutely non-existent, like the chimerical entities of the hare's horn; it cannot mean that which is absolutely non-existent, for then it would be the souls. But all things must be either existent or non-existent, for there is no third category which is different from the existent and the non-existent. It cannot also be that of which no definition can be given, for it has already been defined as indefinability (na'pi nirvacana-narhattvam anenaVva nirucyamanataya asambhavat). It cannot be said to be that which is not the locus of non-existence, for even the chi-mericals are not so, and even Brahman, which is regarded as existent and which is absolutely qualityless, is not the locus of any real existence; for Brahman is only existent in its own nature and is not the locus of any other existence. If it is said that Brahman is the locus of the existence of false appearances, then that may be said to be true as well of the so-called indefinable. Brahman is not the locus of any existence that has the same status as itself. It cannot be defined as that which is not the locus of either the existent or the non-existent, for there is nothing which is the locus of absolute non-existence, since even the chimerical is not the locus of its own non-existence. Moreover, since Brahman and the chimerical have the quality of being qualityless, they may themselves be regarded as the locus of that which is both existent and

1 asac cen na pratlyate sac cen na vddhyate, pratlyate vadhyate ca atah sad-asad-vilaksanam hy anirvacariiyam eva abhyupagantavyam. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, P- 384-

28-2

non-existent, and as such may themselves be regarded as indefinable.

It cannot also be said that indefinability is that of which no sufficient description can be given that "this is such" or that "this is not such," for no such sufficient description can be given of Brahman itself. There would thus be little difference between Brahman and the indefinable. If it is held that "the indefinable" is that regarding the existence of which no evidence can be put forward, then the same may be said about Brahman, because the Brahman being the conceptless pure essence, it is not possible to prove its existence by any proof.

Again, when it is said that the indefinable is that which is neither existent nor non-existent, the meaning of the two terms "existence " and "non-existence" becomes somewhat unintelligible. For "existence" cannot mean only "being" as a class concept, for such a concept does not exist either in Brahman or in the world-appearance. Existence cannot be defined as causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva), nor as that which is never contradicted; nor non-existence as that which is contradicted, for the world-appearance which is liable to contradiction is not supposed to be non-existent; it is said to be that which is neither existent nor non-existent. Existence and non-existence cannot also be defined as that which can or cannot be proved, for Brahman is an entity which is neither proved nor unproved. Moreover, the world-appearance cannot be said to be that which is different from all that which can be called "existent" or "non-existent," for it is admitted to have a practical existence (vyavaharika-satta). Again, it cannot be urged that if the nature of anything cannot be properly defined as existent or non-existent that it signifies that such an entity must be wholly unreal (avastava). If a thing is not properly describable as existent or non-existent, that does not imply that it is unreal. The nature of the final dissolution of avidya cannot be described as existent or not, but that does not imply that such a dissolution is itself unreal and indefinable (nanirvacyasca tat-ksayah).

Again, from the simple assertion that the world is liable to dissolution through knowledge, its falsity does not necessarily follow. It is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys only false ignorance, for knowledge destroys its own negation which has a content similar to that of itself; the knowledge of one thing, say

that of a jug, is removed by the knowledge of another, the subconscious impression is removed by recognition, attachment is removed by the knowledge of the defects of all worldly things and so also virtuous actions destroy sins. In the case under discussion also it may well be supposed that it is not merely the knowledge of Brahman but meditation of its nature that removes all false notions about the world. Thus, even if the bondage is real, there cannot be any objection that it cannot be cut asunder through the meditation of the nature of Brahman if the scriptures so direct. It does not follow from any legitimate assumption that what can be cut asunder or removed must necessarily be false. Again, it is well known in experience that what demolishes and what is demolished have the same status of existence; if the knowledge of Brahman can destroy our outlook of the world, that outlook must also be a real and true one. As the knowledge and the object of knowledge have the same status, the defects, as also the locus wherein the defects are imposed, have the same status; the Brahman and the ajfiana also have the same status and both are equally real.

Further, if what is called ajfiana is merely false knowledge, then even when it is removed by the realization, there is no reason why it should still persist in the stage of jivanmukti or sainthood. The mere fact, therefore, that anything is removable by knowledge does not prove its falsity but only its antagonism to knowledge. So the world is real and the bondage also is real. The bondage is removed not by any kind of knowledge but by the grace of God 1 . The function of true knowledge is to awaken God to exert His grace to cut asunder the knots of bondage.

Again, all the scriptures agree in holding that the world we see around us is being protected and maintained by God. If the world were but a mere false appearance, there would be no meaning in saying that it is being maintained by God. For knowing the world-appearance to be false, He would not be tempted to make any effort for the protection and maintenance of that which is false and unreal. If God Himself is admitted to be under the influence of ignorance, He cannot be entitled to be called God at all.

Pursuing the old dialectical type of reasoning, Madhava Mukunda urges that the sort of falsehood that is asserted of the

1 vastutas tu bhagavat-prasdddd eva bandha-nivrttir na prakdra ntarena. Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 388.

world can never be proved or demonstrated. One of the reasons that is adduced in favour of the falsity of the world is that it is knowable or the object of an intellectual state (drsya). But if the Vedantic texts refer to the nature of Brahman, the due comprehension and realization of the meaning of such texts must involve the concept of the nature of Brahman as its object, and thus Brahman itself would be the object of an intellectual state and therefore false. If it is urged that the Brahman can be the object of an intellectual state only in a conditioned form and that the conditioned Brahman is admitted to be false, then the reply is that since the Brahman in its pure form can never manifest itself its purity cannot be proved. If the Brahman does not express itself in its purity through an ideational state corresponding to scriptural texts describing the nature of Brahman, then it is not self-luminous; if it is expressed through such a state, then being expressible through a mental state it is false. It cannot also be said that since all that is impure is known to be non-self-luminous it follows that all that is pure is self-luminous, for the pure being absolutely unrelationed cannot be referred to or known by way of a negative concomitance. Thus the impure is known only in itself as a positive entity and not as the opposite of the pure, for such a knowledge would imply the knowledge of purity. If, therefore, the predicate of self-luminosity is not denied of impurity as an opposite of "purity," the predicate of self-luminosity cannot also be affirmed of "purity." Moreover, if the pure Brahman is never intelligibly realizable, then there would be no emancipation, or there would be an emancipation only with the conditioned Brahman.

Moreover, if all objects are regarded as illusory impositions on pure Brahman, then in the comprehension of these objects the pure Brahman must also be comprehended. The scriptures also say: "Brahman is to be perceived with the mind and with the keen intellect" {nianasaiva nudrasttwyam. . .drsyate tvagraya buddhya). There are also scriptural passages which say that it is the pure Brahman which is the object of meditation {tarn pasyati niskalam dhydyamanam).

Again, if perceivability or intelligibility determining falsehood is defined as relationing with consciousness, then since pure consciousness is supposed to have a relationing through illusion it also is liable to the charge of being perceivable. In this connection it is

difficult to conceive how Brahman, which has no opposition to ajiiana, can have an opposing influence against it when it is in conjunction with a mental state or vrtti. Instead of such an assumption it might as well be assumed that the object itself acquires an opposing influence to its own ignorance when it is in association with a mental state having the same content as itself. On such a supposition perceivability does not consist in relation with consciousness as conditioned by mental state, for the conditioning has a bearing on the object and not on the consciousness. Thus it may well be assumed that an object becomes perceivable by being conditioned by a mental state of its own content. The assumption that the vrtti or the mental state must be reflected on pure consciousness is unnecessary, for it may well be assumed that the ignorance is removed by the mental state itself. An object comes into awareness when it is represented by a mental state, and in order to be aware of anything it is not necessary that the mental state, idea or representation should be reflected in consciousness. Again, if Brahman cannot be its own object, it cannot also be termed self-luminous. For self-luminous means that it is manifest to itself independently, and this involves the implication that the Brahman is an object to itself. If that which is not an object to itself can be called self-luminous, then even material objects can be called self-luminous. Moreover, in the differenceless Brahman there cannot be any immediacy or self-luminousness apart from its nature (nirvisese brahmani svarupa-bhinna-paroksasya abhavena).

In the monistic view the self is regarded as pure knowledge which has neither a subject nor an object. But that which is subject-less and object-less can hardly be called knowledge, for knowledge is that which manifests objects. If that which does not manifest objects can be called knowledge, even a jug can be called knowledge. Again, the question naturally arises whether, if knowledge be regarded as identical with the self, such knowledge is valid or invalid; if it be valid, then the ajnana which shines through it should also be valid, and if it be invalid, then that must be due to some defects and there are no such defects in the self. If it is neither false nor right knowledge, it would not be knowledge at all. Again, if the world-appearance is an illusion, then it must be an imposition on the Brahman. If Brahman be the basis (adhisthana) of the illusory imposition, then it must be an entity that is known in a general

manner but not in its details. But Brahman is not an entity of which we can have either any general or specific knowledge. Brahman cannot therefore be regarded as the basis of the imposition of any illusion. In this connection it has further to be borne in mind that if the world were non-existent then it could not have appeared in consciousness; the chimerical entities are never perceived by anyone. The argument that even the illusory snake can produce real fear is invalid, for it is not the illusory snake that produces fear but the real knowledge of snakes that produces it. The child is not afraid of handling even a real snake, for it has no knowledge of snakes and their injurious character. Even dreams are to be regarded as real creation by God and not illusory impositions. The argument that they are false since they can only be perceived by the dreamer and not by others who are near him is invalid, for even the feelings and ideas felt or known by a person cannot be perceived by others who are near him 1 .

The world is thus not an illusory imposition on the pure Brahman, but a real transformation of the varied powers of God. The difference of this view from that of Samkhya is that while the Samkhya believes in the transformation of certain primary entities in their entirety, the Nimbarkists believe in the transformation of the various powers of God. God Himself remains unchanged and unmodified, and it is only His powers that suffer modification and thereby produce the visible world 2 .

The explanation that the world is produced through the reflection of Brahman in mayo, or by its limitation through it is invalid, for since the maya is an entity of an entirely different order, there cannot be any reflection of Brahman in it or a limitation by it. It is not possible to bind down a thief with a dream-rope.

Vanama.ll Misra.

Vanamali Misra, a native of Triyaga, a village within two miles of Brindavan, of Bharadvaja lineage, in his Vedanta-siddhanta-samgraha, called also Sruti-siddhanta-samgraha, gives some of the important tenets of the Nimbarka school. The work is written in the form of Karikas and a commentary on it and is based on the commentary on the Brahma-sutra by Nimbarka and other commentaries on it.

1 Para-paksa-giri-vajra, p. 420. 2 Ibid. p. 429.

He regards sorrow as being due to attachment to things that are outside one's own self, and the opposite of it as happiness 1 . All actions performed with a view to securing any selfish end, all performance of actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions and nonperformance of duties rendered obligatory by Vedas produce sins. The opposite of this and all such actions as may please God are regarded as producing virtue. It is the power of God which is at the root of all virtue and vice which operates by veiling the qualities of God to us. This nescience {avidya) is real and positive and different in different individuals. It produces the error or illusion which consists in regarding a thing as what it is not; and it is this false knowledge that is the cause of rebirth 2 . This avidya is different with different individuals. It is through this avidya that one gets attached to one's possession as "mine" and has also the false experience of individual freedom. In reality all one's actions are due to God, and when a person realizes this he ceases to have any attachment to anything and does not look forward for the fruits of his deeds. The avidya produces the mind and its experiences of sorrows and pleasures; it also produces the false attachment by which the self regards the experiences as its own and ceases to realize its own nature as pure knowledge and bliss. Only the videhi-muktas enjoy this state; those in the state of jivanmukti or sainthood enjoy it only to a partial extent. It is on account of attachments produced by ignorance that man is stirred to be led by the will of God. But as the ignorance is a true ignorance, so the experience of sorrow is also a true experience. All our rebirths are due to our actions performed against the mandates of the Vedas or for the fulfilment of our desires 3 . The purity of the soul is attained by the realization of the idea that all our actions are induced by God and that the performer has no independence in anything. When a person feels that it is through false association with other things, and by considering oneself as the real independent agent that one gets into trouble, one naturally loses all interest in one's actions and experience of

1 Sruti-siddhiinta-samgraha, I. 9, 10, 11.

2 prati-jlvatn libhinna syat satyd ca bhdva-riipinl \ a-tasmims tad-dhiyo hetur niddnam jiva-samsrtau. \\ Ibid. 1. 15.

3 atah kamyam nisiddham ca duhkh-avljam tyajed budhah. Sruti-siddhdnta-samgraha, 1. 63. According to Vanamall Misra at death a person goes to Heaven or to Hell according to his deeds and then after enjoying the fruits of his actions or suffering therefrom he is born as plants and then as lower animals, then as

Yavanas or mlecchas and then in lower castes and finally as Brahmins.

pleasure and pain, and regards all objects as being invested with harmful defects. It is this disinclination or detachment that pleases God. The process of attaining devotion is also described in the scriptures as listening to the Upanisads (sravana), realizing their meaning with logical persuasion (manana), and continual meditation on the nature of God as an unceasing flow (nididhydsana) 1 . The last can come only as a result of the first two; for meditation involves a direct realization which is not possible without the performance of sravana and manana. It is only through the purification of the mind by the above processes that God is pleased and makes Himself directly intuited (aparoksa) by the devotee, just as one can intuit the musical melodies and tunes through musical discipline. This direct intuition is of the vers' nature of one's own self. For at this stage one has no functioning of the mind. The destruction of experiential knowledge is identical with the intuition of God. This stage therefore implies the annihilation of avidya or the mind 2 . It is in this wav that the nature of God as bliss is realized by man in his state of supreme emancipation; but even then it is not possible for him to know all the qualities of God, for even God Himself does not know all His qualities. Such an emancipation can be realized onlv through the grace of God. In the state of emancipation, man exists in God just as the fish swims about in the ocean. God creates because of the spontaneity of I lis grace and not in order to increase His grace; so also emancipated souls dally in God out of the spontaneity of their essence as bliss and not in order to increase their bliss 3 . The nature of God is always within us, and it is only when it is directly intuited that we can attain salvation. Some people attain emancipation in this world while others attain it in the upper worlds through which they pass as a result of their deeds. But emancipation of all kinds may be defined as the existence of man in his own nature as a result of the destruction of nescience 4 . The jlvanmuktas or saints are those whose avidya has

1 anyd-rtha-visayah puro brahmd-kdra-dhiydm sndd nididhydsana-sabdd-rtfw jdyate sudhiydm hi safi.

Sruti-siddhdnta-samgraha, n. 13.

2 brahma-gocarasya veddnta-vdsita-manasi utpannasya d-paroksyasya yah prdga-bhavah tasya abhdz'u dhiamsn jiidna-tad-dhvamsd-riyatara-rupo jndna-brahmanah sambandhah, samsdra-dasdydm ndsti. Ibid. 11. iq.

3 dnando-drekato visrmryathd srstyd-di-cestanam.

tat ha mukta-citdm kridd na tv dnanda-vivrddhaye. Ibid. 11. 37.

4 sva-rupena sthitir muktir ajndna-dhramsa-purvakam (Ibid. 11. 58). This mukti can be of four kinds: sdrupya, i.e. the same external form as Krsna;

been destroyed, but who have still to suffer the effects of their prdrabdha karma. The realization of God can destroy the sancita and kriyamdna karma, i.e. previously collected karma and those that are performed in the present life, but not the prdrabdha karma, i.e. the karma that is already in a state of fruition.

It is wrong to suppose that the attainment of a state of bliss can be desired by any person; the state desired can only be one in which a person enjoys unobstructed bliss 1 . In a state of deep dreamless sleep one can enjoy a little bliss, but not the full bliss, as the mdydvddins hold. There is but little difference between the mdydvddins and the Buddhists; the difference is only in the mode of expression 2 .

The self is regarded as atomic, but its existence is definitely proved by the notion of the ego (aham-pratyayavedya) who enjoys all his experiences. Even though he may be dependent upon God, yet he is a real and active agent who works through the influence of avidyd. The existence of the self is also proved by the continuity of experiences through all stages of life. The self-love manifested in all beings for selfish ends also shows that each person feels a self or soul within himself and that this self is also different in different individuals. The difference between jiva and isvara is that the former is of little power and little knowledge and always dependent, and the latter is omniscient, omnipotent and independent; He makes xhejivas work or assert their supposed independence by His avidyd-power. The jivas are thus different from God, but as they exist in Him at the time of emancipation and as all their actions are guided by the avidyd-power of God, they are regarded also as being

sdlokya, i.e. existence in the same sphere as God; sayujya, as being merged in God; samlpya, as existence in proximity to God as associated with a particular form of Him. The merging in God called sayujya should not be regarded as being unified with God. This merging is like the animals roaming in the forest. The emancipated beings are different from God, but exist in Him (evam muktva harer bhinna ramante tatra modatah {Ibid. n. 61). They can thus come out of God also, and we hear of them as entering in succession the bodies of Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Samkarsana and Vasudeva. Such emancipated beings are not associated with the creation and destruction of the worlds, but remain the same in spite of all cosmic changes. They are like the being of Svetadvlpa referred to in the Narayanlya section of the Mahdbharata. But they are still always under the control of God and do not suffer any sorrow on account of such control.

1 purusd-rtham sukhitvam hi na tv dnanda-svarupatd. Sruti-siddhdnta-samgraha, n. 96.

2 meyato na viseso'-sti mayi-saugatayor mate bhangl-matra-bhida tu sydt ekasminn api darsane. Ibid. n. 136.

one with Him. The mind of the individual being a creation of God's avidya, all I lis world experience is also due to God's activity. In His own nature as self the jivas, the individuals, have the revelation of God's nature which is pure bliss. The existence of individuals in their own essential nature is therefore regarded as a state of salvation. The individuals in their essential nature are therefore of the nature of sat, at and ananda, and though atomic they can enjoy the experiences all over the body through their internal functioning just as a lamp illuminates the whole room bv rays. The experience of sorrow also is possible through the expansion or dilatation of the mind (antah-karana) through the various parts of the body and by means of the help of avidya by which the jlva wrongly identifies himself with other objects. As the relation of the self with other objects takes place through the antah-karana of each person the sphere of experience of each of the jivas is limited by the functioning of his own antah-karana. The antah-karana is different in different persons.

The Upanisads speak of God as the all (sarvam khalvidam Brahma), and this is due to the fact that I Ie pervades all things and controls all things. It means that the souls are dependent on Him or maintained in Him (tad-adhdratva), but it does not mean their identity with Him. God is Himself able to create all things by Himself; but for His pleasure, for His mere sportive dalliance, He takes the help of prakrti and the destiny born out of the deeds of human beings as His accessories. Though God makes all persons act in the manner in which they do act, yet I lis directive control is regulated in accordance with the adrsta or the destiny of the human beings which is beginningless. The theory of karma doctrine herein suggested is different from that propounded by Patanjali. According to Patanjali and his commentators, the fruits of the deeds, i.e. pleasure or pain, are enjoyed by the persons while thev are free to act by themselves. I lere, however, the freedom of the individuals is controlled and limited by God in accordance with the previous good or bad deeds of the individual, which are beginningless. Thus in our ordinary life not only our pleasures and pains but also our power to do good or bad actions are determined by previous deeds and the consequent control of God.

CHAPTER XXII THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIjftANA BHIKSU

A General Idea of Vijflana Bhiksu's Philosophy.

The ultimate goal is not the cessation of sorrow, but the cessation of the experience of sorrow; for when in the state of emancipation one ceases to experience sorrow, the sorrow as such is not emancipated since it remains in the world and others suffer from it. It is only the emancipated individual who ceases to experience sorrow. The ultimate state of emancipation cannot be a state of bliss, for since there are no mental organs and no mind in this state there cannot be any experience of bliss. The self cannot itself be of the nature of bliss and be at the same time the experiencer of it. When it is said that self is of the nature of bliss (ananda), the word bliss is there used in a technical sense of negation of sorrow.

Bhiksu admits a gradation of realities. He holds that one is stabler and more real than the other. Since paramatma is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, he is more real than the prakrti or purusa or the evolutes of prakrti. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Puranas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the paramdtman. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as prakrti and purusa which are changing forms; prakrti, so far as it exists as a potential power in God, is regarded as non-existent but so far as it manifests itself through evolutionary changes it is regarded as existent. The state of emancipation is brought about by the dissociation of the subtle body consisting of the five tammatras and the eleven senses. Consequent upon such a dissociation the self as pure consciousness is merged in Brahman as the rivers mingle with the ocean, a state not one of identity but identity-indifference. According to the Samkhya, emancipation cannot be attained until the fruits of the karmas which have ripened for giving experiences of pleasure and pain are actually exhausted through experiencing them, i.e. even when ignorance or avidya is destroyed the attainment of the emancipation is delayed until the prarabdha

karma is finished. The Yogin, however, can enter into an objectless state of meditation (asamprajnata yoga) and this wards off the possibility of experiencing the prarabdha karma. From the state of asamprajnata samadhi he can at will pass into a state of emancipation. The state of emancipation is reached not merely by realizing the purport of the text of the Upanisads but by philosophic wisdom attained through a reasoned process of thought and by the successive stages of Yoga meditation.

The world does not emanate directly from Brahman as pure consciousness, nor are the kala, prakrti and purusa derived from Brahman through transformatory changes (parinama). Had the world come into being directly from Brahman, evil and sins would have been regarded as coming into being from it. With the association of sattva through the beginningless will of God at the beginning of the previous cycles the Brahman behaves as Isvara and brings into actual being the prakrti and the purusa which are already potentially existent in God, and connects the prakrti with the purusa. The moment of God's activity in bringing out the prakrti and purusa may be regarded as kala. In this sense kala is often regarded as the dynamic agency of God. Though purusas in themselves are absolutely static, yet they have a seeming movement as they are always associated with prakrti, which is ever in a state of movement, kala as the dynamic agency of God is naturally associated with the movement of prakrti, for both the prakrti and the purusa are in themselves passive and are rendered active by the dynamic agency of God. This dynamic agency is otherwise called kala, and as such it is an eternal power existing in Brahman, like the prakrti and purusa. In all other forms of actual existence kala is determinate and conditioned, and as such non-eternal and to some extent imaginary. It is only as the eternal power that subsists in and through all the operations of dynamic activity that kala maybe called eternal. The kala that produces the connection of the prakrti and the purusa and also produces the mahat is non-eternal and therefore does not exist at the time of pralaya when no such connection exists. The reason for this is that the kala that produces the connection between prakrti and punisa is a determinate kala which is conditioned, on the one hand by the will of God, and, on the other, by the effects it produces. It is this determinate kala that can be designated as present, past and future. But the terms pre-

sent, past and future imply an evolutionary change and such a change implies activity; it is this activity as dissociated from the manifest forms of kala as present, past and future that can be regarded as eternal 1 .

The reference to the Atharva-Veda, as noted below in the footnote, will show how the conception of time in very ancient eras reveals "time" as a separate entity or energy which has brought everything into being, maintains it, and destroys everything. The God, paramesthin Brahman or prajapati is said to be derived from it. In the Maitri Upanisad we also hear of the conception of kala or time as akala or timeless. The timeless time is the primordial time which is only the pure energy unmeasured and immeasurable. It appears in a measurable form when, after the production of the sun from it, it is measured in terms of the movement of the sun. The entire course of natural phenomena is thus seen to be an emanation or manifestation of the energy of time undirected by any other superintendent. Such a conception of time seems to be of an atheistic character, for even the highest gods, the paramesthin and the prajapati, are said to be produced from it.

In the first chapter of the anukasana parvan of the Mahabharata there is a dialogue between GautamI, whose son was bitten by a serpent, the hunter who was pressing for killing the serpent, the serpent, the mrtyu or death and kala. It appears from the dialogue that time is not only the propeller of all events by itself but all states of sattva, rajas and tamas, all that is moving and the unmoved in the heaven and in the earth, all our movements and cessation of movements, the sun, the moon, the waters, the fire, the sky, the earth, the rivers, the oceans and all that is being or not being are of the

1 Atharva-Veda, xix. 54. In the Atharva-Veda time is regarded as a generator of the sky and the earth and all beings exist through time. Tapas and Brahman exist in time and time is the god of all. Time produced all creatures. The universe has been set in motion by time, has been produced by it and is supported in it. Time becoming Brahman supports paramesthin. In the &vetdsvatara Upanisad time is regarded as being held by the sun as the ultimate cause. In the Maitri Upanisad, vi. 14, it is said that from time all creatures spring, grow and decay. Time is a formless form (kdldt sravanti bhutdni, kdldt vrddhim praydnti ca. | kale cd'stam niyacchanti kdlo murtir amurtimdn).

It is again stated in the same work that there are two forms of Brahman, Time and no-Time.

2 That which is before the sun is no-Time and is devoid of parts, and that which is after the sun is Time with parts.

nature of time and brought into being by time and dissolved in time. Time is thus the original cause. Time, however, operates in accordance with the laws of karma; there is thus the beginningless relation between time and karma which determines the courses of all events. Karma in itself is also a product of time and as such determines the future modes of the operation of time. Here we have an instance of the second stage, the conception of time as the transcendental and immanent cause of all things. Here time is guided by karma. In the third stage of the conception of time, which is found in the puranas and also adopted by Bhiksu, it is regarded as the eternal dynamic power inherent in Brahman and brought into operation by the will of God 1 .

The word purusa is often used in the scriptural text in the singular number, but that signifies only that it is used in a generic sense, cf. Satnkhya-sutra, I. 154 (nadvaita-sruti-virodho jati-paratvat) 2 . The difference between the superior purusa or God and the ordinary purusas is that while the latter are subject to experiences of pleasure and pain as a result of the actions or karma, the former has an eternal and continual experience of bliss through its reflection from its sattvamaya body to itself. The ordinary purusas, however, have not the experience of pleasure and pain as of constitutive definition, for in the stage of saintliness (jivanmukti) they have no such expeiienccs. God can, however, have an experience of the experiences of pleasure and pain of other purusas without having been affected by them. The ultimate principle or the Brahman is a principle of pure consciousness which underlies

1 In tlic Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, the work of the Paficardtra school, niyati (destiny) and kula (time) are the two manifestations of the power of transcendent kala as arising from aniruddha. From this kala first arises the sattia-guna and from that the rajo-guna and thence the tamo-guna.

It is further said that it is time which connects and separates. The kala of course in its own turn derives its power from the self-perceiving activity (sudar-sana) of Visnu. That the prakrti transforms itself into its evolutes is also due to the dynamic function of kala.

The Mat liar a vrtti on the Sdmkhya-kdrikd, however, refers to the doctrine of kala as the cause of the world (kdlah srjati bhutani, kdlah sarnharate prajdh | kdlah suptesu jdgarti tasmat kdlas tu kdranam) and refutes it by sa\ ing that there is no separate entity as kala (kdlo noma na kas cit paddrtho'sti), there are only three categories, ryakta, aiyakta and purusa, and kdla falls within them {vyaktam aiyaktam purusa iti trayah era paddrthdh tatra kdlo antarbhutah).

2 The Ahirbudhnya-satnhitd, however, explains the singular number by the concept of a conglomeration of purusa or a colony of cells, as the honey-comb, which behaves as a totality and also in a multiple capacity as separate cells. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, VI. 33.

the reality of both the purusas, prakrti and its evolutes; and it is because they are emergent forms which have their essence in the Brahman that they can appear as connected together. The movement of the prakrti is also ultimately due to the spontaneous movement of the pure consciousness, the basic reality.

The viveka and the aviveka, the distinction and the non-distinction, are all inherent in buddhi, and this explains why the purusas fail to distinguish themselves from the buddhi with which they are associated. The association of the purusas with the buddhi implies that it has in it both the characters of distinction and non-distinction. The difficulty is that the "revelation of the distinction" is so opposed by the force of non-distinction that the former cannot find scope for its manifestation. It is the purpose of yoga to weaken the force of the tendency towards non-distinction and ultimately uproot it so that revelation of distinction may manifest itself. Now it may be asked what is the nature of this obstruction. It may be replied that it is merely a negative condition consisting in the non-production of the cognition of the distinction through association with the products of prakrti, such as attachment and antipathy, through which we are continually passing. The Samkhya, however, says that the non-production of the distinction is due to the extreme subtleness of the nature of buddhi and purusa which so much resemble each other that it is difficult to distinguish their nature. But this view of the Samkhya should not be interpreted as meaning that it is only the subtleness of the natures of these two entities that arrests our discriminating knowledge regarding them. For had it been so, then the process of yoga would be inefficacious in attaining such a knowledge. The real reason is that our association with attachment and antipathy with regard to gross objects obstructs our discriminating vision regarding these subtle entities. Our attachment to gross objects is also due to our long association with sense-objects. A philosopher, therefore, should try to dissociate himself from attachment with gross objects. The whole purpose of creation consists in furnishing materials for the experiences of purusa which seems to undergo all experiential changes of enjoyment and suffering, of pleasure and pain, in and through the medium of buddhi. With the dissociation of buddhi, therefore, all experience ceases. The God is essentially pure consciousness, and though the knowledge of Him as such

Dili 29

brings about liberation, yet epithets of omnipotence, all-pervasiveness and other personal characteristics are attributed to Him because it is through an approach to God as a super-personal Being that devotion is possible, and it is through devotion and personal attachment that true knowledge can arise. It is said in the scriptures that God cannot be realized by tapas, gifts or sacrifices, but only by bhakti 1 . The highest devotion is of the nature of love {attyuttama bhaktih prema-laksana).

God remains within all as the inner controller and everything is revealed to^ His super-consciousness without the mediation of sense-consciousness. God is called all-pervasive because He is the cause of all and also because He is the inner controller.

Bhakti consists in the whole process of listening to God's name, describing His virtues, adoration to Him, and meditation ultimately leading to true knowledge. These are all to be designated as the service of God. These processes of operations constituting bhakti are all to be performed with love. Bhiksu quotes Garuda purana to prove that the root "bhaj" is used in the sense of service. He also refers to the Bhagavata to show that the true bhakti is associated with an emotion which brings tears to the eyes, melts the heart and raises the hairs of the body. Through the emotion of bhakti one dissolves oneself as it were and merges into God's existence, just as the river Ganges does into the ocean.

It will be seen from the above that Bhiksu urges on the doctrine of bhakti as love, as a way to the highest realization. The metaphysical views that he propounded give but small scope for the indulgence of such an attitude towards divinity. For, if the Ultimate Reality be of the nature of pure consciousness, we cannot have any personal relations with such a Being. The ultimate state of realization is also the entrance into a state of non-difference with this Ultimate Being, who is not Himself a person, and therefore no personal relations ought to be possible with Him. In the Vijnand-mrta-bhasya, iv. i. 3, Bhiksu says that at the time of dissolution or emancipation the individuals are not associated with any content of knowledge, and are therefore devoid of any consciousness, and being of the nature of unconscious entities like wood or stone they

1 aharn prakrstah bhaktito'anyaih sadhanaih drastum na

sakyah, bhaktir eva kevala mad-darsane sadhanam. Iivara-glta-tlka (MS. borrowed from N. N. Goplnatha Kaviraja, late

Principal, Queen's College, Benares).

enter into the all-illuminating great Soul just as rivers enter into the ocean. Again, it is this great Soul that out of its own will sends them forth like sparks of fire and distinguishes them from one another and goads them to action 1 . This great Soul or paramatman is the inner-controller and mover of our selves. But it may be remembered that this great Soul is not also the Ultimate Principle, the pure consciousness, but is the manifestation of the pure consciousness in association with the sattvamaya body. Under the circumstances the metaphysical position does not allow of any personal relation between the human beings and the Ultimate Entity. But yet the personal relation with the divinity as the ultimate consciousness not being philosophically possible, that relation is ushered in more out of a theistic tendency of Bhiksu than as a necessary natural conclusion. The theistic relation is also conceived in a mystical fashion in the indulgence of the emotions of love rising to a state of intoxication. Such a conception of Divine love is found in the Bhagavata-purdna; and later on in the school of Vaisnavism preached by Caitanya. It is different from the conception of devotion or bhakti as found in the system of Ramanuja, where bhakti is conceived as incessant continual meditation. He seems to have been, therefore, one of the earliest, if not the earliest, exponent of emotionalism in theism, if we do not take into account the Puranic emotionalism of the Bhdgavata-purdna. There are instances in the writings of modern European philosophers also, where the difficult position does not justify an emotionalism that is preached merely out of the theistic experiences of a personal nature, and as an illustration one may refer to the idea of God of Pringle Pattison. In the conception oijlva or individuals also there seems to be an apparent contradiction. For while the purusas are sometimes described as pure consciousness, they are at other times described as inert and wholly under the domination of paramatman The contradiction is to be solved by the supposition that the inertness is only relative, i.e. the purusas are to be regarded as themselves inactive, being goaded to action by the inlying controller,

1 tasmdt pralaya-moksd-dau visaya-sambandhd-bhdvdt kdstha-lostra-divat jaddh sdnto jlvd madhyandmd-dityavat sadd sarvd-vabhdsake paramd-tmani viliyante samudre nada-nadya iva punasca sa eva paramd-tmd sve-cchayd gni-vissphul ihgavat td-nupdyi-sambandhena svato vibhajyd'ntarydml sa na prerayati tathd coktam caksusmata" ndhd iva nlyamdnd iti atah sa eva mukhya dtmd-ntarydmy amrtah. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, iv. i. 3.

29-2

paramatman. They are called "jada," resembling stone or wood only in the sense that they are inactive in themselves. But this inactivity should not be associated with want of consciousness. Being sparks of the eternal consciousness they are always of the nature of consciousness. Their activity, however, is derived from the paramatman, so that, drawn by Him, they come out of the Eternal consciousness and play the role of a mundane individual and ultimately return to Brahman like rivers into the ocean at the time of emancipation. This activity of God is an eternal activity, an eternal creative impulse which is absolutely without any extraneous purpose (carama-karanasya krteh nityatvat) 1 . It proceeds from the spontaneous joy of God in a spontaneous manner like the process of breathing, and has no reference to the fulfilment of any purpose. In the Vyasa-bhasya it is said that the creation of God is for the benefit of living beings. But Bhiksu does not support any purpose at all. This activity is sometimes compared with the purposeless playful activity. But Bhiksu says that even if there is any slight purpose in play that also is absent in the activity of God. The action also proceeds spontaneously with the creative desire of God, for which no body or senses are necessary. I le is identical with the whole universe and as such I lis action has no objective outside of I Iimself, as in the case of ordinary actions. It is He who, depending upon the beginningless karma of human beings, makes them act for good or for evil. The karma itself, also being a part of His energy and a manifestation of I lis impulse, cannot be regarded as limiting His freedom 2 . The analogy of the doctrine of grace where the king bestows his grace or withholds it in accordance with the good or bad services of his servants is also regarded as helpful to conceive of the freedom of God in harmony with the deeds of the individual. If it is argued now, if the creative activity of God is eternal, it can depend on the karma, Bhiksu's reply is that the karmas act as accessory causes determining the eternal creative impulse of God as producing pleasurable and painful experiences. Following the trend of the Puranic method Bhiksu further suggests that it is the Hiranyagarbha created by God who appears as the law-giver of the law of karma, as manifested in the spontaneous activity of God. It is He, therefore, who is responsible for the suffering of humanity

1 See Vijndnd-mrta-bhasya, n. i. 32.

2 Ibid. 11. 1. 33.

in accordance with their karmas. God helps the process only by letting it go on in an unobstructed manner 1 . In another passage he says that God perceives within Himself as parts of Him the jivas and their conditioning factors (upddhi) as associated with merit and demerit (dharma and adharma)\ associating these conditions with the jivas He brings them out of Himself. He is thus the maker of souls, just as the potter is the maker of pots 2 .

The self is regarded as being itself untouchable and devoid of any kind of association (a-sanga). The association between prakrti and purusa, therefore, is not to be interpreted in the sense of a direct contact in the ordinary sense of the term, but the association is to be understood only as transcendental reflection through the conditioning factors which make the pure soul behave as a phenomenal self or jiva. The self has no knowledge as its quality or character, and is in itself pure consciousness, and there is at no time a cessation of this consciousness, which exists even during dreamless sleep. But in dreamless sleep there is no actual knowledge, as there is no content present at the time; and it is for that reason that the consciousness though present in the very nature of the self cannot be apperceived. The vasanas or desires existing in the antah-karana cannot affect the pure soul, for at that time the antahkarana remains in a dissolved condition. Knowledge of contents or objects is possible only through reflections from the states of the buddhi. The pure consciousness being identical with the self, there cannot also be the self-consciousness involving the notion of a duality as subject and object during dreamless sleep. The pure consciousness remains the same and it is only in accordance with changes of mental state that knowledge of objects arises and passes away 3 . The jivas are thus not to be regarded as themselves the products of the reflection of paramatman as the Sankarites suppose; for in that case the jivas would be absolutely unreal, and bondage and emancipation would also be unreal.

1 Vijnand-mrta-bhasya, II. i. 33.

2 Isvaro hi svd-msa-sva-sarird-msa-tulyau jlva-tad-upddhl svd-ntar-gatau dharmd-di-sahitau sdksdd eva paiyann a-para-tantrah sva-tllayd samyoga-visesam brahmd-dlndm api dur-vibhdvyam kurvat kumbhakdra iva ghatam. Ibid. II. 1. 13.

3 Ibid. 11. 3. 5.

The Brahman and the World according to Vijnana-mrta-bhasya.

The production, existence, maintenance, modification, decay and destruction of the world are from Brahman as God. He holds within Himself all the energies constituting the prakrti and purusas, and manifests Himself in other diverse forms; Brahman as pure consciousness is associated with the conditioning factor of His own being, the maya as pure sattva quality in all this creative activity, so from that great Being who is devoid of all afflictions, karmas and their fruits are also produced. The fact that the Brahma-sutra, 11. 2, says that Brahman is that from which the world has come into being and is being maintained implies that the world as it is in its own reality is an eternal fact in the very being of the ultimately real and the unmanifested. The production, the transformation and the destruction of the world are only its phenomenal aspect 1 . Brahman is here regarded as the adhisthana-karana. This means that Brahman is the basis, the ground, the adhara (container) as it were of the universe in which it exists as undivided and as indistinguishable from it and which also holds the universe together. Brahman is the cause which holds together the material cause of the universe so that it may transform itself into it 2 . Brahman is the principle of ultimate cause which renders all other kinds of causality possible. In the original Brahman, the prakrti and the purusas exist in the eternal consciousness and as such are held together as being one with it. The Brahman is neither changeable nor identifiable with prakrti and purusa. It is because of this that, though Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness and unchangeable, yet it is regarded as being one with the universe and as the material cause. The material cause or upadana-karana is the name which is given to changing material cause (the vikari-karana) and to the ground cause or the adhisthana-karana. The underlying principle of both the ground cause (adhisthana-karana) and the material cause (upadana-karana) is that the effect is held in it as merged in it or

1 atra cai'tad yata ity'anuktvd janmd-dyasya yata iti vacandd avyakta-rupena jagan nityam cva ity dcdryyd-s'ayah. Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, I. 1.2.

2 kim punar adhisthdna-kdranatvam ucyate tad evd' dhisthdna-kdranom yatra' vibhaktam yeno' pastabdham ca sad updddnd-kdranam kdryd-kdrena pdrinamate. Ibid.

indistinguishable from it 1 . The idea involved in avibhaga or oneness with the cause is not regarded as an ordinary relation of identity but as a sort of non-relational relation or a situation of uniqueness which cannot be decomposed into its constituents so that a relational bond may be affirmed of them. The upshot of the whole position is that the nature of the universe is so founded in Brahman which forms its ground that it cannot be regarded as a mere illusory appearance of it or as a modification or a product of it; but while these two possible ways of relation between the cause and the effect fail, the universe as such has no existence, significance or meaning without the ground in which it is sustained and which helps its evolutionary process. The ordinary relation of the sus-tainer and the sustained is inadequate here, for it implies a duality of independent existence; in the present case, however, where Brahman is regarded as the ground cause there is no such duality and the universe cannot be conceived as apart from Brahman which forms its ground and essence while remaining unchanged in its transcendent reality. Thus, though it may have to be acknowledged that there is a relation between the two, the relation has to be conceived as the transcendental one, of which no analogy is found elsewhere. The seeming pictorial analogy which falls far short of the situation is to be found in the case where water is mixed with milk 2 . Here the existence of the water is dependent upon the existence of the milk so long as the two exist in a mixed condition; and neither of them can be conceived without the other. The nature of the prakrti and the purusa is also manifested from the essence of God's nature as pure consciousness. The causality of substance, qualities and actions is also due to the underlying essence of God which permeates all things. The difference between the relation of samavaya and this unique relation of indistinguishableness in the ground is that while the former applies to the case of the intimate relation of the effects in and through themselves, the latter refers only to the special fact of the indistinguishable character of the effect in the cause, and has no reference to the relation of the effect-parts among themselves with reference to the whole as an inseparable concatenation of effects. The ordinary organic relation such

1 Kdryd-vibMgd-dhdratvasyaV vo' pdddna-sdmunya-lak$anritvdt. Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, I. i. 2.

2 avibhagai cd' dhdratdvat svarupa-sambandha-viseso' tyanta-sammisrona-rupo dugdha-jalddy-ekatd-pratyaya-niyamakah. Ibid.

as that which subsists between the parts of a living body is thus different from that which is referred to here as the indistinguishable character of the effects in the ground. The parts of the universe as comprising the living and the non-living may be regarded as inseparably united with one another in the whole, but such a relation is an intimate relation between the effects, and the whole is nothing but an assemblage of these. This is what may be called the special feature of samavaya relation. But in the unique relation of in-distinguishableness in the ground the effect subsists in the ground in such a manner that the effect has no separate reality from the cause 1 . Brahman in this view is the basis or the substratum—the ground which supports the totality of the unity of prakrti and the purusas to evolve itself into the universe with its varied forms 2 . It does not, therefore, in itself participate in the changing evolution and transformation of world-forms, but it always exists as one with it, and being in it and supported by it, it develops into the world. Vijnana Bhiksu says that the Vaisesikas believe that God is the dynamic or the instrumental agent, whereas he thinks that the causality of God cannot be regarded as being either of the samavdyi, asamavayi or nimitta types, but is a fourth kind of conception— cause as ground or container 3 . He also describes this type of causation as being adhisthana, a term with which we are familiar in Sankara Vedanta. But the difference between the two kinds of conception of adhisthana karana is indeed very great, for while Bhiksu considers this to be the unchangeable ground which sustains the movements of the principle of change in it in an undivided unity, Sankara regards adhisthana as the basis of all changes which are unreal in themselves. According to Bhiksu, however, the changing phenomena are not unreal, but they are only changes which are the modifications of a principle of change which subsists in an undivided unity with the ground cause. When they say that the world is both being and non-being (sad-asadriipa), and is hence unreal and illusory, the Sankarites suffer from a grave misconception. The

1 tatra samavdya-sambandhena yatrd' vibhdgas lad rikdri-kdranam ; yatra ca karyasya karanavibhagena avibhdgas tad adhisthana-karanam. Ibid.

2 yadi hi paramd-tmd dehavat sarvam kdranam nadhitistheta tarhi dravya-guna-karmd-di-sddhdrand-khila-karye ittham mula-kdranam na sydt. Isvara-gltd-bhasya. MS.

8 asmdbhis tu samavay-asamavdyibhydm uddslnam nimitta-kdratiebhyas ca vilaksanataya caturtham ddhdra-kdratiatvam. Ibid.

world is called sat and asat (being and non-being), because it represents the principle of becoming or change. It is affirmed as "this" and yet because it changes it is again not affirmed as "this." The future forms of the changing process are also non-existent as it were in the present form and the present form is also nonexistent as it were in the future forms that are to be. Thus, any of its forms may be regarded as not existing and hence false when compared with an entity that always exists and in the same form 1 . All objects of the world so far as they are past and future are contradicted by their present states and are therefore regarded as false, but so far as they are perceived in their present state they are regarded as real 2 . The universe has, however, an eternal and immutable form as pure consciousness in the very nature of Brahman from which it is separated out as the world of matter and souls. The pure consciousness in itself is the only ultimate reality which is ever the same and is not subject to any change or process of becoming. Both the individual souls and the world of matter are ultimately dissolved and merged in Brahman, the pure and ultimate consciousness. These, therefore, are regarded as being names and forms when compared with the ultimate changeless Reality, Brahman 3 . But this does not mean that the universe of matter and souls is absolutely unreal and mere maya or illusion. If all that appears were absolutely false, then all moral values would disappear and all notions of bondage and emancipation would become meaningless. If the falsity of all things except the pure consciousness can be proved by any means, that itself would prove that such proofs have validity and that therefore there are other things over and above pure consciousness which may be valid. If such proofs are invalid but can establish the validity of pure consciousness as against the validity of all other things, then such proofs may also prove the reality of all other things in the world. It may be held that what ordinary people consider as true can be proved to be invalid by what is regarded by them as valid means of proof; but on the Sarikarite view nothing is regarded as valid and therefore there are

1 eka-dharmena sattva-dasdydm parindmi-vastundm atltd-ndgata-dharmena asattvdt. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, i. i. 3.

2 ghatd-dayo hi andgatd-dy-avasthdsu vyaktd-dy-avasthdbhir bddhyante iti. ghatd-dayo mithyd-iabdena ucyante vidyamdna-dharmais ca taddrilm na bddhyante iti satyd ity api ucyante. Ibid.

8 jndna-svarupah parama-tma sa eva satyah jlvds cd'msatayd amsiny eklbhutdh athavd' vayavattvena paramc-tma-peksayd te' py asantah. Ibid.

no proofs by which the validity of the world-process can be maintained. But the reply that naturally comes to such a view is that though the validity of the world may not be proved, yet that does not lead to the conclusion that the world-process is unreal; for even if its validity is not proved, its validity or reality may at least be doubtful. There is, therefore, nothing by which we may come to any conclusion about its invalidity and unreality. The reality of the universe is of a different order from that of Brahman, which is of the nature of pure consciousness, as the former consists of practical efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva). But even though in the state of a changing process the reality of the world is only its reality as becoming and as causal efficiency, yet it has also an ultimate reality in itself, since it has come into being from the ultimate reality, Brahman. The world of matter and souls exists in God as pure consciousness and therefore as one with Him. When from out of its state as pure consciousness it is manifested as the world of matter and souls, we mark it as the stage of creation. When again they retire back into God as being one with His consciousness, that is marked as the state of dissolution 1 . The universe of matter and souls is also ultimately to be regarded as being of the nature of consciousness, and is as such a constituent of the ultimate pure consciousness in which it remains as it were merged and lost. The world of visible forms and changes is also thus of the nature of thought, and only the ignorant regard them as mere objects 2 . When the scriptural texts speak of the identity of the world and Brahman they refer to this ultimate state in which the world exists in the pure consciousness—Brahman as one with it. But it is not only in the state of dissolution that the world exists in Brahman in undivided unity, but in the state of creation also the world exists in Brahman as one with it, for all the so-called mechanical and other kinds of forces that are to be found in matter and which constitute its reality are but the energy of God. And as the energy is always conceived as being one with that which possesses it, it is believed that the world with all its changes exists in God 3 . In the state of

1 pralayehi pum-prakrtyd-dikam jndna-rupenai'va rupyate na tv artha-riipena arthato vyanjaka-vydpdrd-bhdvdt. Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, 1. 1.4.

2 jiiana-svarupam akhilam jagad etad abuddhayah 1. artha-svarupam pasyanto bhramyante moha-samplave. Ibid.

s saktimat-kdrya-kdrand-bhedenai'va brahmd-dvaitam bodhayanti. . ayam ca fdrva-kdlo brahmani prapar.cd-bhedah. Ibid.

pralaya the world-energies exist in God as some form of consciousness or conscious energy which is later on manifested by Him as material energy or matter. The unity of the world-energies in God is such that though these retain some kind of independence yet it is so held up and mixed up as it were in the reality of God that it cannot be separated from Him. Their independence consists in the fact that they are of the nature of energy, but as God possesses them they can have no existence and they cannot be conceived as apart from Him. As thus described the world of matter has no permanent reality, and the consciousness of this fact may be called the bddha or contradiction {paramarthika-sattva-bhava-niscaya eva badhah) 1 . But in spite of this badha the universe has a relative or vyavaharika existence (tadrsa-badhe'pi ca sati jnana-sadhana-dinam vyavaharika-sattvat).

The causality of prakrti and parusa is limited to their specific capacities which determine the nature of modifications. But God is the universal all-cause behind them which not only shows itself through these specific limitations but which regulates the inner harmony and order subsisting in them and in their mutual relations. Thus the visual organ is limited in its function to the operation of vision, and the tactile organ is limited in its function to the operation of touch, but the functions and activities of all these are organized by the individual self which operates and manifests itself through them. Thus Brahman in this sense may be regarded as being both the instrumental and the material cause 2 . According to Samkhya and Yoga the prakrti is supposed to be associated with the purusas through the inner and inherent teleology, but according to the Vedantic view as interpreted by Bhiksu their mutual association is due to the operation of God 3 .

1 Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, i. i. 4.

* brahmanas tu sarva-saktikatvdt tat-tad-upddhibhih sarva-kdranatvam yathd caksurd-dlndm dariand-di-kdranatvam yat praty-ekam asti tat sarvam sarvd-dhyaksasya jivasya bhavati, etena jagato' bhinna-nimitto-pdddnattvam vydkhyd-tam. Ibid. 1. 1. 2.

* sdmkhya-yogibhyam purusd-rtha-prayuktd pravrttih svayam eva purusena ddya-jlvena samyuyyate. . . asmdbhis tu prakrti-purusa-samyoga Isvarena kriyate. Ibid.

The Individual.

In his commentary on the Isvara-gita, Bhiksu says that the more universal has a wider sphere than the less universal and therefore it is called Brahman in relation to it. The cause of an effect is wider and more universal than the effect and is therefore called Brahman in comparison with it. Thus there is a hierarchy of Brahmans. But that which is at the apex of the hierarchy is the highest universal and the ultimate cause, and is therefore called the highest Brahman. Brahman is thus the highest and the ultimate reality. The determinations that make the universe of matter exist in Brahman as merged in its nature as thought. Creation means that these determinations which exist there in a potential form and without any operation are manifested and made operative as the world of nature. God in His nature as pure consciousness has a full and complete acquaintance of all the possible developments and modifications of the pre-matter as evolving into the actual universe. The starting point in the evolution of the pre-matter or prakrti is the moment of its association with the spirits. The scriptural text says that the Lord entered into the prakrti and the purusas, disturbed the equilibrium and associated them with one another. The purusas are, however, like sparks of consciousness and it is not possible to produce any disturbance in them. The disturbance is thus produced in the prakrti and the effect of such disturbance in the prakrti on the purusas is interpreted as seeming disturbances in the purusas as well. The purusas are to be conceived as being parts of God and there cannot be a real identity between the purusas and the Brahman. The so-called identity between the purusas and the Brahman refers merely to the fact of the purusas being the constituent entities in the being of God such as that which exists between the parts and the whole. The assertion of the Sarikarites that the individual soul is the same as Brahman and that the difference is due to external limitations of nescience or on account of reflections through it is wrong. The kind of unity that exists between the individual souls and the Brahman lies in the fact that they are indistinguishable in character from it (avibhaga). If the reality of individual souls is denied, that would amount to a denial of religious and moral values and of bondage and emancipation.

In this connection it is also urged that the individual souls are derived from God just as sparks come out of fire or the son comes out of the father. The individual souls resemble God so far as they are of the nature of pure consciousness. But though they have come out of Him, yet they retain their individuality and thus preserves for them the sphere of their moral career. The individual souls are free and emancipated in their own nature, they are all-pervasive and they also hold the universe within them in their consciousness. In all these they share the nature of Brahman. But in association with the limiting conditions {upadhi) they appear as finite and limited. When the entire career of the individual souls is known as existing in Brahman as part of it, as being manifested out of it as separate entities, as leading a career of their own in association with the limiting conditions and ultimately dissociating themselves from them and realizing their own natures as one with Brahman and in a sense different from it, this is the true philosophic knowledge and realization of their own nature. When the individuals start their career and destiny in life they are different from Brahman; but there was a time when they remained in one undivided unity with Brahman. But in spite of this unity the Brahman is always felt as different and as the other of the individuals, and this difference is never sublated 1 . But the difference of this view from the Samkhya is that the Samkhya is satisfied only with considering the individuality and separateness of the purusas, but the Vedantic view as interpreted herein cannot ignore the fact that in spite of their separateness they are one in essence with Brahman and have sprung out of it, and after the fulfilment of their career of individuality and destiny will again be merged in it, and even during their mundane career have an aspect of undividedness with Brahman inasmuch as they are the powers or energies of it 2 . The difference that exists between the individuals and Brahman is most apparent during the mundane career on account of the fact that the world of nature has a separate existence in the consciousness of the individual centres and each one of them is limited to his own experiences. But at the time of dissolution, when the world of nature merges in the Brahman as a potential level of its energies, the individuals are

1 bhedd-bhedau vibhdgd-vibhdga-rupau kdla-bhedena aviruddhau anyonya-bhavas ca jiva-brahmanor dtyantika eva. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, i. i. 2.

2 ata idam brahmd-tma-jndnam vivikta-jlva-jndndt sdmkhyo-ktdd apt sre-ftham. Ibid. I. 1. 2.

also merged in it and have no separate spheres of experience for themselves and thus cease to have any descriptive definition of themselves.

The nature of the relation of part and whole that exists between the individuals and Brahman is regarded as that subsisting between the son and the father. The father is reborn in the son. Before birth the son lies in a state of undivided unity in the vital energy of the father and yet when he separates out of him it is the same vital energy of the father that repeats itself in its new career and has a sphere of activity which is definitely its own. Again, when it is said that the individuals are parts of Brahman, it should not be interpreted to mean that they have any share in the existence of Brahman as God or world-creator. God is not homogeneous in His nature, but the element of individuation and differentiation always exists in Him. Had He been a homogeneous being His parts would have no specific differentiation and they would be like the parts of space which are always indistinguishable from one another. But the fact that God has within Him the principle of differentiation explains the fact that the individuals resemble Brahman only in the aspect of their consciousness but have no share in I lis creative functions or omnipotence. The Sarnkhyists hold that salvation is attained through dissociation of attachment as "mine" to one's experiences, mental faculties, senses, understanding and body, owing to one's knowledge of the fact that the self is the self-shining entity to which all experiences appear and within which they are held together as one with it though they are all different from it. But the Yedanta as herein interpreted holds that the attachment as "mine" vanishes with the knowledge of self as pure consciousness, with the knowledge of God as the being from which they come into being, by which they are maintained and into which they ultimately return, and with the knowledge that they all exist in the consciousness of God as parts of it; and that the self is not the real enjoyer of the experiences but is only the consciousness in which the universe and its experiences shine forth. Thus, though both in the Samkhya and in the Vedanta as herein interpreted salvation is attained through the dissolution of the false attachment as "mine-ness," the dissolution of "mine-ness" is here due to an entirely different philosophic conception 1 .

1 Vijndna-mrta-bhdsya, p. 56.

Consciousness is not a quality but it is the very substance of the self. Just as light is a substance which illuminates other things, so consciousness is also a substance which illuminates other things. When one says " I know it," knowledge appears to be a quality of "I" which is neither self nor a homogeneous entity. The "I" is a complex of sense-faculties, understanding, etc., to which a quality can be attributed; the self is not a complex entity, but a homogeneous simple substance—the consciousness. The complex entity, the "I," expresses all things by a manifestation of consciousness. Bliss or happiness, however, cannot be regarded as a self-revealing substance, but it is an independent substance like sorrow which is revealed by consciousness. Neither the Brahman nor the self can therefore be regarded as being of the nature of bliss or happiness as this is a modification of prakrti and has therefore to be regarded as expressible (drsya) and not as expressing (darsana). The consciousness requires the intermediary of intellectual functions for the illumination of objects, but consciousness in itself does not require the intermediary of any other functions, as such a view would lead only to an infinite regressus without solving the point at issue. It is also wrong to suppose that the principle of consciousness exercises any operation in order to reveal itself, for an entity cannot operate on itself {karma-kartr-virodhai). If for the above reasons the self cannot be regarded as being of the nature of bliss, then at the time of salvation also there cannot be any bliss in the self. There is only a cessation of sorrow at that time, or rather a cessation of both happiness and sorrow which is technically called a state of happiness or sukha (sukham duhkha-sukha-tyayah) 1 . At the time of emancipation all conditioning factors such as the intellectual functions and the like are dissolved and as a consequence thereof all experiences of pleasure and pain also vanish, for these are substances belonging to objects which were presented to the self through these conditions. When the Upanisads say that the self is dearest to us, it need not necessarily be supposed that it is the pleasure that is dearest to us, for the self may be regarded as being valued for its own sake; it may also be supposed that pleasure here means the cessation of pain 2 . The desire for immortality or con-

1 Vijndnd-mrtd-bhdsya, I. i. 2.

2 dtmatvasya pi prema-prayojakatvat duhkha-nivrtti-rupattvdd vd bodhyam. Ibid.

tinued existence of the self illustrates the feeling of fondness that we all have for ourselves. The other view, that the ultimate object of realization is extermination of all sorrow is also not open to any objection on the ground that pleasure and pain never belonged to the selves; for the association of pleasure and pain is only with reference to their enjoyment and suffering and not directly as a bond of attachment to the self. The term "bhoga," which may be translated only semi-accurately as "experience," has a twofold application as referring to buddhi or psychosis and to purusa. The prakrti is composed of sukha, duhkha and nioha substances, and buddhi is an evolute of the prakrti; therefore, when the buddhi is in association with sukha or duhkha, such an association supplies the buddhi with the stuff of which it is made and thus sustains and maintains its nature and constitution. But when the word bhoga has a reference to purusa, it means that the pleasure or sorrow held in the buddhi is reflected on it and is thereby intuited. It is this intuition of pleasure and pain through their reflection in the purusa that is regarded as their bhoga or experience by purusa. The buddhi cannot have any bhoga or experience, even in a remote sense of the term, for the simple reason that it is unconscious. But it may well be argued that since the purusa is not in reality the ego, it cannot have any experience in any real sense of the term; and since it cannot in reality have any experience of sorrow, it cannot in reality regard its cessation as being of the utmost value to it. The reply to such an objection is that the realization of the fact that the cessation of sorrow is of ultimate value to the experiencer, the purusa, leads the suddhi on its onward path of progress. Had it not been so there would be no movement of the buddhi on lines of utility. So though pleasure and pain do not belong to purusa, they may yet be experienced by it and the buddhi may be guided by such experiences.

When the Upanisad says "that art thou," the idea at the back of it is that the self is not to be identified with any of the elements of the psychosis—the buddhi —or with any of the evolutes of the prakrti. The self is part of the pure consciousness—the Brahman. When a man learns from the Upanisad text or one's teacher that he is a part of Brahman he tries to realize it through a process of meditation. The difference of the Yedantic view from that of Samkhya is that the latter rests with the individual selves as the ultimate entities whereas the former emphasizes the Brahman as

the ultimate reality, and also the fact that the reality of all other things, the selves and the matter, depends ultimately on their participation in it.

Brahma-Experience and Experience.

Cause may be defined as the productivity due to direct and immediate perception of the material cause. The buddhi is regarded as an effect because, like jugs and other things, it is produced through some direct and immediate intuition of its causal material. This naturally implies that the buddhi has a causal material which is directly perceived by some Being and to which His creative activity is directed and this Being is God. It is said in the Brahma-siltras that Brahman can be known by the testimony of the scriptures. But this cannot be true, for the Upanisads say that the Brahman cannot be expressed by words or known by intellect. The reply to this is that the denial contemplated in such passages refers only to the fact that Brahman cannot be known in entirety or in its uniqueness by the scriptural texts, but these passages do not mean that it is not possible to have a generic knowledge of the nature of Brahman. It is only when we have such a generic knowledge from the scriptures that we enter the sphere from which we may proceed further and further through the processes of Yoga and have ultimately a direct intuitive apperception of it. The specific nature of God as devoid of any quality or character only means that His nature is different from the nature of all other things, and though such a nature may not be realized by ordinary perception, inference or other sources of knowledge, there cannot be any objection to its being apprehended by the intuition of Yoga meditation. There are some Vedantists who think that the Brahman cannot be felt or apprehended intuitively, but there is a mental state or function {vrtti) which has the Brahman as its object. Such a mental state destroys the nescience and as a result of this the Brahman shines forth. But Bhiksu objects to this and says that the vrtti or mental function is admitted for relating the consciousness or the self with the objects, but once this connection is effected the objects are directly apprehended; so, in order to bring Brahman within the sphere of knowledge, the intuitive apperception is in itself sufficient for the purpose. It cannot be held that, since Brahman is itself of

D III 30

the nature of pure illumination, no special intuitive apprehension is necessary and that the existence of the mental function or vrtti was admitted for explaining the dissolution of ajnana; for Brahman, being of the nature of consciousness, can be realized only through intuitive apprehension which is itself of the nature of knowledge. Since all apprehension is direct and immediate, self-knowledge must also be of the same kind. There is also no necessity to assume a principle of obstruction which has to be overcome as a condition of the rise of knowledge. In the state of deep dreamless sleep a principle of obstruction in the shape of the function of tamas has to be admitted in order to explain the absence of knowledge which leads to the absence of all cognitive or practical behaviour. To the opponent's idea that since Brahman is self-luminous it cannot have any relation with anything else, and that since Brahman and the self are identical there cannot be any self-knowledge of Brahman, for the Brahman cannot be both the knower and the known, Bhiksu's reply is that self-luminousness does not mean unrelated-ness; and the absolute identity of the self and the Brahman cannot also be admitted, and even if it be admitted we can explain the method of Brahma-knowledge by the same manner in which our experiential knowledge or self-consciousness can be explained.

Bhiksu thinks that since we do not find in the Brahma-sutras any account of the origin and growth of knowledge, the Samkhya-Yoga account of knowledge may well be accepted on account of the general affinity of the Samkhya-Yoga ideas with the Yedanta. According to the Samkhya-Yoga there is first a contact of the senses with their respective objects and as a result the tamas aspect of the buddhi is subordinated at the time; and the buddhi as pure sattva assumes the form of the object. This state of buddhi is called an objective state of the buddhi or a sensory idea or state {so. buddhya-vastha visaya-kara buddhi-vrttir ity ucyate). During dreams and contemplative states images of external objects arise in the mind and are directly perceived and therefore valid. The connection of the purusa with the external objects is thus effected through the intermediary of the buddhi. So long as the buddhi remains impure the purusa cannot get itself related to objects through it. It is for this reason that during deep sleep when the buddhi is dominated by tamas the /wrastf-consciousness cannot manifest itself or make itself related with other objects. As soon as the buddhi is

modified into a sensory or image-state it is reflected in the purusa, which then reveals it as a flash of conscious state. It is in this manner that the pure infinite consciousness can manifest itself into finite forms of objects. As the buddhi is constantly transforming itself into various forms and reflecting them on the purusa from beginningless time there is a continuous flow of conscious states only occasionally punctuated by dreamless sleep. The purusa in its turn is also reflected in the buddhi and thereby gives rise to the notion of ego. In this connection Bhiksu criticizes the view of Vacaspati that the reflection of the purusa in the buddhi is sufficient to explain the cognitive situation, and says that a reflection of consciousness cannot itself be conscious and hence cannot explain why the states of buddhi should appear as conscious. But the assumption that the states of buddhi are reflected in the consciousness explains their real connection with consciousness. It may be said that since it is only the reflections that are associated with consciousness, the things as they exist are not known. The reply to such an objection is that the buddhi-states are but copies of the external objects; and if the copies are intelligized, we have in the validity of such direct acquaintance of the copies the guarantee of their application to objects. It may be said again that when the reflections of the buddhi-states in the consciousness appear as one with it and therefore produce the phenomenon of knowledge we have in such phenomena an illusory unity of the consciousness with the states; our knowledge then becomes illusory. The reply to such an objection is that even if there is an element of illusion in knowledge, that does not touch the reality and validity of the objects to which such knowledge refers. Valid knowledge (prama) thus consists of this reflection of the buddhi-states in the purusa. The fruit of the cognitive process (pramana-phala) belongs to the pure consciousness or the purusa who thus behaves as the knower, though he is absolutely unattached to all experiences. The Vaisesikas lay stress on the appearance of knowledge as produced and destroyed and therefore regard knowledge as being produced or destroyed by the collocation of causes. The reflection of the mental states to purusa is explained by them as if the knowledge belonged to the self. The Vedantic epistemological process in which the purusa appears to be the knower and the enjoyer is explained by them as being due to a separate cognitive process called anu-vyavasaya.

30-2

The transcendental experience of God has also to be explained on the basis of the origin of ordinary experiential knowledge. Through the understanding of the meaning of the scriptural texts and by the processes of Yoga there arises in the buddhi a modification of the form " I am Brahman." This valid form of modification, being reflected in the purusa, is revealed as an intuitive apperception of the fact as true self-knowledge belonging to purusa. The difference between ordinary experiential knowledge and this knowledge is that it destroys egoism (abhimana). In such a conception of self-knowledge the objection that the self cannot be both the knower and the known does not hold good; for the self that is known, being a mental state, is different in character from the transcendent self which knows it. The transcendent self as such is the knower, while its reflection in the buddhi as coming back to it is the self that is known 1 . The objection that the admission of the possibility of self-knowledge stands against the doctrine of the self-luminosity of the self is not valid. The self-luminosity of the self simply means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of any conditions to manifest itself.

Self-Luminosity and Ignorance.

Citsukha has defined self-luminosity as that which not being knowable may yet be treated or felt as immediate (avedyatve sati aparoksa-vyavahara-yogyatvam). Bhiksu argues that such a definition of self-luminosity {svaprakasatva) is quite inadmissible. It is nowhere so defined in the Upanisads and it does not follow from the etymology of the word svaprakasatva. The etymology only indicates the meaning "known by itself." Again, if a thing is not known or cognized, it cannot for that simple reason have any relation to us; and such a meaning would be directly against the scriptural testimony which affirms that the ultimate truth can be apprehended or intuited. It may be suggested that though the Brahma-state of the mind cannot be directly known yet it will have the effect of removing the avidya in the purusa. But this is open to various objections. Firstly, the self-luminous is a valid means of knowledge—a pramana ; but the mere removal of the avidya from

1 dtma'pi bimba-rupena jndta bhavati svagata-sva-pratibimba-rupena ca jneyah. Vijnand-mrta-bhdsya, 1. 1. 3.

the purusa cannot be regarded as valid knowledge or apramana. In this connection it is also relevant to ask the meaning of the term "avidya." If it means an illusory mental state, it must be a state of the buddhi, and its destruction must also belong to the buddhi and not to the purusa. If it means the psychical instincts or root-inclinations which are the cause of errors, then also since such root-instincts belong to the gunas of the prakrti the destruction of such root-instincts must also qualify the prakrti. If it is regarded as a tamas —substance which covers the self, the supposition would be inadmissible, for if the tamas inherent in the buddhi is not removed there cannot be any modification of the buddhi copying the object in it, and if the tamas in the buddhi is once so removed then there cannot be any reflection of it in the purusa. Thus the view that knowledge leads to the dissolution of the veil of ignorance cannot be supported. The veil is only related to the instruments of knowledge, such as the eye, and cannot therefore be regarded as having anything to do with the pure consciousness. The explanation of the rise of knowledge as being due to the removal of the veil in the pure consciousness cannot therefore be justified. There cannot be any veil in the self. If the self be of the nature of pure consciousness, there cannot be any veil of ignorance inherent in it as the two suppositions are self-contradictory. Again, if it is supposed that the world-appearance is due to the operation of the principle of ignorance or avidya in the mind and if it is supposed that true knowledge dispels such ignorance, then we are led to the absolutely unwarrantable conclusion that the world may be destroyed by knowledge, or that when one self attains true knowledge the world-appearance as such ceases, or that when emancipation is attained during the lifetime of a saint he will have no experience of the world around him. If it is held that the emancipated saint has still an element of ignorance in him, then the theory that knowledge destroys ignorance has to be given up. Moreover, if the self be regarded as being absolutely unattached to anything (a-sanga), it is wrong to suppose that it would be associated with avidya or ignorance. The veil can have reference only to the mental states, but it cannot have any relation to pure and unchangeable consciousness ; for we have no analogy for such a thing. Again, if it is held that there is natural association of ignorance with pure consciousness, such an association can never be broken off. If such an

association be regarded as the consequence of some causal condition, it may well be said that such causality may be found in the mental states themselves. At least this would be a much simpler supposition than the primary assumption of a relationship of avidya with pure consciousness and then to assume the operation of the mental states to dissolve it. The association of a veil with the mental states has to be admitted at least in the case of deep sleep, swoon or senility. Thus, if the veil has to be associated with the mental states, as the instrument of knowledge, it is quite unnecessary to assume it with reference to the self or pure consciousness. Patanjali, in his Yoga-siltra, has defined avidya as a mental state which apprehends the non-eternal as the eternal, the impure as the pure, the pleasure as sorrow. It is not, therefore, to be regarded as a separate substance inseparably associated with pure consciousness. In the same way it is wrong to define knowledge as the cessation of avidya, which belongs to the purusa in this capacity. The proper way of representing it would be to say that knowledge arises in the purusa with the cessation of avidya in the mental states. With the rise of the final knowledge as "I am Brahman" towards which the whole teleological movement of the prakrti for the purusa was tending, the ultimate purpose of the prakrti for the sake of the purusa is realized, and that being so the teleological bond which was uniting or associating the buddhi with the purusa is torn asunder and the mind or the buddhi ceases to have any function to discharge for the sake of the purusa. With the destruction of false knowledge all virtue and vice also cease and thus there is the final emancipation with the destruction of the integrity of the buddhi. Avidya (false knowledge), asmitd (egoism), raga (attachment), dvesa (antipathy), abhinivesa (self-love) may all be regarded as avidya or false knowledge which is their cause, and avidya may also be regarded as tamas which is its cause. This tamas obstructs the manifestation of sattva and it is for this reason that there is false knowledge. When the tamas is dominated by the sattva, the sattva manifests through its instrumentality the ultimate self. The words "knowledge" (jnana) and "ignorance" (ajiiana) are used in the scriptures to denote sattva and tamas. The word tamas is used to denote ajnana and there is no such ajiiana as indescribable or indefinite entity as is supposed by the Sarikarites. In ordinary experiential knowledge this tamas is only temporarily removed, but

in the case of the rise of true and ultimate knowledge the power of the gunas to undergo modification for the sake of the relevant purusa is destroyed. Before the sattva can show itself in its own vrtti or state, it must dominate the tamas which would have resisted the sattva state. Thus the ontological opposition of the sattva and the tamas must settle their differences before a psychological state can make its appearance.

Relation of Samkhya and Vedanta according to Bhiksu.

Bhiksu thinks that the Samkhya and Yoga philosophies are intimately connected with the Vedanta and are referred to in the Upanisads. For this reason when certain topics, as for example the problem of experiential knowledge, are not described in the Vedanta, these are to be supplemented from the Samkhya and Yoga. If there is any seeming antagonism between the two, these also have to be so explained that the opposition may be reconciled. Bhiksu takes this attitude not only towards Samkhya-yoga but also towards Nyaya-Vaisesika, and the Pancaratra. According to him all these systems have their basis in the Vedas and the Upanisads and have therefore an internal affinity which is not to be found in the Buddhists. The Buddhists are therefore the only real opponents. Thus he attempts to reconcile all the astika systems of philosophy as more or less supplementary to one another or at least presenting differences which can be reconciled if they are looked at from the proper angles of vision. Bhiksu collects his materials from the Upanisads, the Puranas and the smrtis and tries to build his system of interpretation on that basis. It may, therefore, be regarded on the whole as a faithful interpretation of the theistic Vedanta which is the dominant view of the Puranas in general and which represents the general Hindu view of life and religion. Compared with this general current of Hindu thought, which flows through the Puranas and the smrtis and has been the main source from which the Hindu life has drawn its inspiration, the extreme Samkhya, the extreme Vedanta of Sankara, the extreme Nyaya, and the extreme dualism of Madhva may be regarded as metaphysical formalisms of conventional philosophy. Bhiksu's philosophy is a type of bheda-bheda which has shown itself in various forms in Bhartr-prapanca,

Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Nimbarka and others. The general viewpoint of this bheda-bheda philosophy is that it believes in the reality of the universe as well as in its spirituality, the distinctness of the individual souls as well as in their being centres of the manifestation of God, moral freedom and responsibility as well as a spiritual determinism, a personal God as well as an impersonal reality, the ultimate spirit in which matter and pre-matter are dissoved into spirituality, an immanent teleology pervading through matter and souls both in their origin and mutual intercourse as well as in the holiness of the divine will, omnipotence and omniscience, in the superior value of knowledge as well as of love, in the compulsoriness of moral and social duties as well as in their abnegation.

The ordinary classical Samkhya is well known to be atheistic and the problem arises as to how this may be reconciled with theism and the doctrine of incarnations. In interpreting sutra I. i. 5, of the Brahma-sutra, Bhiksu says that since the scriptures say that "it perceived or desired," Brahman must be a Person, for desire or perception cannot be attributed to the inanimate pre-matter (prakrti). Sankara, in interpreting this sutra, asserts that the purport of the sutra is that prakrti is not the cause of the world because the idea of a prakrti or pradhana is unvedic. Bhiksu quotes a number of passages from the Upanisads to show that the idea of a prakrti is not unvedic. Prakrti is spoken of in the Upanisads as the cause of the world and as the energy of God. Prakrti is also spoken of as maya in the Svetasvatara, and God is spoken of as mayavi or the magician who holds within Himself the magic power. The magician may withhold his magic, but the magic power lies all the same in him (may ay a vydpdra-nivrttir evavagamyate na nasah) 1 . The ordinary prakrti is always undergoing change and transformation and it is only the special sattva-stufi associated with God that is always regarded as unchanging.

A question that may naturally arise in this connection is, if God is Himself unchangeable and if the sattva-body with which He is always associated is also always unchangeable, how is it that God can have a desire to produce the world at any particular time? The only explanation of this is that the attribution of will to God at a particular creative moment is only a loose usage of language. It

1 Vijndnd-mrta-bhdfya, I. i. 5.

means only that when the proper collocation of the causal conditions is ready for emergence into creative production at any particular point of time, it is designated as the manifestation of the creative will of God. God's knowledge and will cannot have a beginning in time 1 . But if God's creative will be regarded as the cause of the movement of the prakrti, then the Samkhya view that the movement of the prakrti is solely due to its inherent teleology to be of service to the purusas becomes indefensible. The sattva, rajas and tatnas in the mahat are indeed regarded in Samkhya as the triad of three persons, Brahma, Visnu and Mahesvara—the three created gods as it were (janye-svara). But the Samkhya does not believe in any eternal God (nitye-svara). According to Yoga the sattva part of mahat associated with eternal powers and existing eternally in the emancipated state is the person called Isvara. His sattva body is, however, of the nature of an effect as it is derived from the sattva part of mahat and His knowledge is also not timeless.

In justification of Samkhya, Bhiksu maintains that the denial of God by the Samkhya may be interpreted to mean that there is no necessity of admitting God for salvation. Salvation may be achieved by self-knowledge also. If this process is to be adopted, then it becomes quite unnecessary to prove the existence of God. It may, however, be remarked in this connection that this explanation of Bhiksu can hardly be regarded as correct, for the Samkhya-sutra is not merely silent about God, but it makes a positive effort to prove the non-existence of God, and there is not one redeeming statement that can be interpreted to mean that Samkhya was not antagonistic to theism. Bhiksu, however, further reiterates that Samkhya was not atheistic and refers to the statement in the Svetasvatara (vi. 16) that salvation can be obtained by knowing the ultimate cause as declared in the Samkhya-yoga and to the statement of the Gita where atheism is regarded as a demonic view.

In referring to Yoga, Bhiksu says that it is curious that though the Yoga admitted the existence of God yet it did not make any effort to repudiate the idea that He might be partial or cruel; and instead of giving God His true cosmological place accepted a naturalistic view that prakrti of itself passes through the trans-formatory changes, being determined by its own inherent teleology in relation to the purusas. Isvara, in Patanjali's Yoga-sutra, is an

1 Vijndnd-mrta-bhasya, I. i. 5.

object of Yoga meditation and He shows His mercy to his devotees and other beings. Bhiksu, however, thinks that unless God is made to serve a cosmological purpose the association of prakrti with the purusas cannot be explained.

The Isvara is not conditioned in His activities by any entities which are associated with rajas or tamas which are of a fluctuating nature but with an entity which is always the same and which is always associated with eternal knowledge, will and bliss 1 . The natural implication of this is that the will of God behaves like an eternal and unchangeable law. This law, however, is not a constituent of God but a constituent of prakrti itself. It is through this part, an eternal unchangeable law which behaves as the eternal will and knowledge of God, that the phenomenal or the changeable part of prakrti is determined.

In the Glta Sri Krsna says that He is tht highest purusa and that there is nothing higher than Him. Bhiksu gives two explanations of such statements which seem to be in opposition to the concept of God explained above. One explanation is that the reference of Krsna as God to Himself is only a relative statement, made in a popular manner which has no reference to the nature of absolute God who is unrelationable to ordinary experience. The other explanation is that Krsna calls Himself God by feeling Himself as identified with God. There is thus a distinction between para-brahma and karya-brahma; and Sri Krsna, being the karya-brahman, popularly describes Himself as the karana-hrahma. When other beings identify themselves with brahma, such identification is true only with reference to kdrya-brahma, Sri Krsna or Xarayana. They therefore have no right to speak of themselves as the absolute (Jod. Beginningless absolute Brahman is unknown and unknowable, even bv the gods and the sages. It is only the Xarayana who can know Him in His absolute nature. Xarayana is therefore to be regarded as the wisest of all beings 2 . Those beings who in the previous creation became one with God bv sayujva-mukti exist in the \asudeva-Tyuha. In the Vasudera-ryfiha Vasudeva alone is the

1 rajas-tamah-sambhinnatayd malinam kdrya-tattvam ptirame-svarasya no' pddhih kintu kevahmi nitya-jiidne-cchd-nandd-dimat-sadai-ka-rupam kdrana-sattvam era tasyo' pddhih. Israra-gltd. MS.

2 anddyam tarn paratn brahma na derd

narsayo viduh ekas tad veda bhagaidn dhdtd ndrdyanah

prabhuh. Vijiidnd-mrta-bhdsya, i. 1.5.

eternal God; the other beings are but His parts. The other vyuhas, such as the Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, are but the manifestations of Vasudeva (vibhuti) and they are to be regarded as partial creation of God or as Brahma, Visnu and Rudra. The power of the lesser gods, Visnu or Siva, is limited, since they cannot produce any change in the regulation of the cosmic affairs. When they speak of themselves as the Supreme God they do so only by a process of self-identification with the absolute God. The mahattatva, with its threefold aspect as sattva y rajas and tamas, forms the subtle body of Brahma, Visnu and Siva or Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. These three gods, therefore, are supposed to have the one body, the "mahat," which forms the basic foundation and substratum of all cosmic evolution. It is for this reason that they are said to have the cosmos or the universe as their body. These three deities are regarded as mutually interdependent in their operations, like vata, pitta and kapha. It is for this reason that they are said to be both different from one another and yet identical 1 . These three deities are identical with "mahat" which again is the unity of purusa and prakrti. It is for this reason that Brahma, Visnu and Mahesvara are to be regarded as the partial manifestations {amsavatam) of Gods and not direct incarnations 2 .

The penetration of Isvara into pradhana and purusa is through His knowledge, will and effort by which He rouses the gunas and helps the production of the mahat. Bhiksu takes great pains to show that Bhagavan or absolute God is different from Narayana or Visnu who are direct manifestations of Him just as sons are of the father. Bhiksu here differs from the opinion of the Pancaratra school and of other thinkers such as Madhva, Vallabha and Gaudiya Vaisnavas who regard Narayana, Visnu and Krsna as identical with God. The other avataras, such as the Matsya, Kurma, etc., are regarded by Bhiksu as the lila-vatara of Visnu and the avesa-vatara of God as bhagavan or parame-svara.

1 Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, I. i. 5.

2 In this connection Bhiksu quotes the famous verse of the Bhagavata, ete ca msa-kalah pumsah krsnas tu bhagavan sty am. I. 1. 5. He, however, paraphrases Krsna as Visnu and explains svayam bhagavan as being the part of God just as the son is the part of the father: atra krsno visnuh svayam parame-svaras tasya putravat saksad ams'a ity arthah. Ibid. This, however, goes directly against the interpretation of the verse by the Gaudiya school of Vaisnavas who regard Krsna as being the absolute God.

Maya and Pradhana.

Sankara, in his commentary on the Vedanta-sutra, 1. 1.4, discusses the meaning of the term avyakta and holds that it has no technical meaning but is merely a negation of vyakta or manifested form. He says that the word avyakta is compounded of the negative particle na and vyakta. He points out that since the term avyakta has thus a mere etymological meaning and signifies merely the unmanifested, it cannot be regarded as having a technical application to the Pradhana of Samkhya. The avyakta according to Sankara thus means the subtle cause, but he does not think that there is an independent subtle cause of the world corresponding to the Pradhana of the Samkhya 1 . He holds that this primal state of the existence of the universe is dependent upon God and is not an independent reality. Without the acceptance of such a subtle power abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. For without power God cannot move Himself towards creation; it is the seed power called avidya which is denoted by the term avyakta. It is the great sleep of maya {indydmayi maha-supti) depending upon God. In it all the jivas lie without any self-awakening. The potency of the seed power is destroyed by knowledge in the case of emancipated beings and for that reason they are not born again 2 . Vacaspati, in commenting on it in his Bhdmatl, says that there are different avidyds with reference to different selves. Whenever an individual attempts to gain wisdom, the avidya associated with him is destroyed, though the avidya associated with other individuals remains the same. Thus, even though one avidya is destroyed, the other avidyds may remain in an operative condition and may produce the world. In the case of the Samkhyists, however, who admit one pradhana, its destruction would mean the destruction of all. Vacaspati says further that if it is held that though the pradhana remains the same yet the avidya as non-distinction between purusa and the buddhi is responsible for bondage, then there is no necessity of admitting the prakrti at all. The existence and the non-existence of avidya would explain the problem of bondage and emancipation.

1 yadi vayam sva-tantram kancit prag-avastham jagatah karanatvena' bhyupagacchema prasanjayema tada pradhana-karana-vadam. Vedanta-sutra, I. 4- 3-

2 muktanam ca punar an utpattih; kutah vidyaya tasyd vlja-sakter ddhdt. Ibid.

xxi i] Maya and Pradhana tfj

The objection that the distinction of selves depends upon avidya and the distinction of avidya upon the distinction of the selves is invalid, for the process is beginningless. The term avyakta refers to avidya in a generic sense as including all avidyas. The avidya rests in the individual but is yet dependent upon God as its agent and object. The avidya cannot come into operation without having the Brahman as its support, though the real nature of the selves is Brahman; yet, so long as they are surrounded by avidya, they cannot know their real nature.

In reply Bhiksu says that since without power God alone is unable to create the manifold universe it has to be admitted that God does so by a power distinct from Him, and this power is the prakrti and the purusa. If it is said that this power is avidya, then also since it is a dual factor separate from Brahman that may as much nullify the monistic doctrine as the admission of prakrti and purusa. It cannot also be said that in the time oipralaya the avidya is non-existent, for in that case there being only Brahman the world would have to be admitted as coming into being from Brahman alone, and the selves that lie identified with Brahman and one with Him would, even though emancipated, undergo the world-process (sarnsara). If it is held that bondage and emancipation are all imaginary, then there is no reason why people should undergo so much trouble in order to attain an imaginary emancipation. If it is held that avidya may be said to have a secondary or vyavaharika existence at the time oipralaya, and if it is argued that under the circumstances bondage and emancipation may also be regarded as having a merely secondary existence, the view of monism would be unexceptional. But if such an avidya be admitted which has mere vyavaharika or secondary existence, the same may be supposed with regard to pradhana. If we inquire into the meaning and significance of the term vyavaharika, we find that its connotation is limited to the power of effectuation and service towards the fulfilment of the purpose. If that is so, then prakrti may also be admitted to have a similar kind of existence 1 . It is true no doubt that the pradhana is regarded as eternal, but this eternality is an eternality of ceaseless change. Avidya is regarded by the Vedantists as apdramarthikd, that is, avidya is not true

1 pradhane 1 pidam tulyam pradhane artha-kriyd-kdritva-rupa-vyavahdrika-sattvasyaVvd'smdkam istattvdt. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, i. 4. 3.

absolutely. This negation of absolute truth may mean that it is not immediate and self-apparent or that it cannot manifest itself as being or that it has no existence in all times. Hut such limitations are true also of pradhana. The pradhana is eternal as changeful, but it is non-eternal in all its products. All the products of prakrti are destructible; being unintelligent by nature they can never be self-apparent. Again, though pradhana may be said to be existent in any particular form at any particular time, yet even at that time it is non-existent in all its past and future forms. Thus, since vyarahdrikatva cannot mean absolute non-existence (like the hare's horn) and since it cannot also mean absolute existence it can only mean changefulness (parinamittva); and such an existence is true of the pradhana. Thus Sarikarites do not gain anything in criticizing the doctrine of pradhana, as a substitute of the aridya is supposed by them to be endowed with the same characteristics as those of the prakrti.

It is thus evident that Sarikara's criticism against prakrti may well apply to the prakrti of Isvara Krsna, but it has hardly any application to the doctrine of prakrti as conceived in the Puranas as interpreted by Bhiksu, where prakrti is regarded as a power of Brahman. If avidxa is also so regarded, it becomes similar to prakrti. As it is believed to be existent in a potential form in God, even in the pralaya, most of the connotations of azidya that distinguish it from the absolute reality in the Brahman are also the connotations of prakrti.

According to the view propounded by Bhiksu pradhana is not regarded as having a separate and independent existence but onlv as a power of (Jod 1 .

In explaining Brahma-sutra I. 4. 23, Bhiksu points out that Isvara has no other upadhi than prakrti. All the qualities of Isvara such as bliss, etc., proceed from prakrti as is shown in I'atanjali-sutra. Prakrti is to be regarded as the characteristic nature of Brahman, which is not directly the material cause of the world, but is only the abiding or the ground cause (adlnsthana-karana), and prakrti, as it were, is its own character or part (srivo bharuli padartha upadhir ity arthah). The relation between this upadhi and prakrti is one of the controller and the controlled or the possessor

1 Pmkr tasya tad-upapattaye pradhanam karanaha-suriraiac ihahtiJ'iiJhnyai'-i-o'cyalr na si<itaniryenc'ty a t adharyata tty arthah I'ijiiami-mtta-hhasya . 1.4.4.

and the possessed. The fact that God can think or will also testifies to the fact that God must have as His instrument the prakrti which can make such thinking possible for Him. For God is in Himself only pure consciousness. Prakrti, however, behaves as the upadhi of God with its purer parts of the eternally pure sattva. Kala and adrsta also form part of the prakrti and as such are not regarded as the separate powers of God.

Bhiksu's criticism of the Samkhya and Yoga.

In commenting on the Brahma-sfitra, 11. 1. 1,2, 3, Bhiksu says that Manu speaks of the original cause as being the prakrti, and so also does the Samkhya, and both of them are regarded as authoritative 1 . But since the Samkhya doctrine of atheism is contradicted by the opinions of Patanjali and Parasara, the view of the Brahma-siltras cannot be interpreted merely on the atheistic suggestion of Samkhya. It has also to be admitted that the atheistic portion of Samkhya has no authoritative support either in the Vedas or in the Puranas and has therefore to be regarded as invalid 2 .

It is wrong, however, to suppose that Kapila really intended to preach atheism. He quoted atheistic arguments from others and showed that even if God were not accepted emancipation could be obtained by differentiation of prakrti from purnsa. The Samkhya also emphasizes the fact that emancipation can be obtained merely by knowledge. This, however, should not be interpreted as being in conllict with the Upanisadic texts which declare that emancipation can be obtained only by the true knowledge of God. For these signify only that there are two ways of obtaining emancipation, the inferior one being through knowledge of the distinction of prakrti and purusa, and the superior one through the true knowledge of God. The Yoga also shows two ways of emancipation, the inferior one being through the ordinary Yoga processes, and the superior one through the renunciation to God of all actions and through devotion to Him. It is also wrong to suppose that the Samkhya is traditionally atheistic, for in the Mahabharata {Santi-parvan 318. 73) and Matsya Pur ana (4. 28) we hear of a twenty-sixth category,

1 samkhyam yogam panca-rdtram veddh pdsupatam tathd I. paras-pardny angdny etuni hetubkir na virodhayet. Vijnana-mrta-bhasya, n. i. i.

2 itas ce'svara-pratisedhd-mse kapila-smrteh muldndm anupalabdheh a-pratya-ksatvdt durvalatvam ity aha. Ibid.

the God. So the difference between the theistic and the atheistic Samkhya is due to the difference of representation as the true Samkhya doctrine and the Samkhya doctrine which proposes to ensure emancipation even for those who are not willing to believe in God. In this connection Bhiksu admits the probability of two different schools of Samkhya, one admitting Isvara and the other not admitting it, and it is only the latter which he thinks to be invalid 1 . He also refers to the Kurma Pur ana in which the Sam-khyists and the Yogins are said to be atheistic. The chief defect of the Sarikara school is that instead of pointing out the invalidity of theistic Samkhya, Sarikara denies all theistic speculations as non-vedic and misinterprets the Brahma-sutras accordingly. Bhiksu refers to Prasna, 4. 8, where the twenty-three categories of Samkhva are mentioned and only prakrti has been omitted. The mahat-tattva is not mentioned directly, but only as buddhi and citta. The fourfold division of the buddhi-tattva as manas, buddhi ahamkara and citta is also admitted there. In the Garbha Upanisad eight prakrtis and sixteen vikaras are mentioned. In the Maitreyo-panisad we hear of the three gunas and their disturbance by which creation takes place. We hear also that the purusas are pure consciousness. In Maitri Upanisad, v. 2, it is said that the tamas, being disturbed by the supreme being, gives rise to rajas and that to sattva 2 . In the Cidika Upanisad the categories of the Samkhya doctrine are also mentioned in consonance with the monistic doctrine of the Vedanta. It also says that there are various schools of the Samkhya, that there are some who admit twenty-six categories, others twenty-seven, and again others who admit only twenty-four categories. There is also said to be a monistic and also a dualistic Samkhya and that they find expression in three or five different ways. Thus Vijfiana Bhiksu says that the Samkhya doctrine is definitely supported by the Upanisadic texts.

Concerning the Yoga also it can be said that only that part of it may be regarded as opposed by the Upanisads which holds a separate and independent existence of prakrti as apart from Isvara. In the Sutras of Patarijali it is said that God helps the movement of the prakrti only by removing the obstacles, just as a ploughman enables

1 athavd kapilai-ka-desasya prdmdnyam astu. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya. n. i. 2.

2 tamo vd idm ekatnagre dslt vat rajasas tat pare sydt tat parene'ritam visamatvam prayaty etad riipam tad rajah khalv l-ritam risamatram praydty etad vai sattvasya riipam tat sattiam ei'a. Maitri Upanisad, v. 2.

water to pass from one field to another. But the Upanisads definitely say that God is the generator of the movement and the disturbance of the prakrti. The sattva body of God is thus there held to be a product of prakrti as it comes into being from the prakrti through desire in a previous creative cycle. The sattva body of God is thus derived from the prakrti, through the will of God serving as the vehicle of the will of God for the removal of the obstructions in the course of the evolutionary process of the prakrti. Prakrti in itself therefore is not regarded by Patanjali as the upadhi of Isvara 1 . Bhiksu seeks to explain this part of the Yoga doctrine also in the same manner as he did with the Samkhya by accepting the so-called abhyupagama-vada. He maintains that the Yoga holds that even if it is considered that the prakrti is independent and runs into evolutionary activity by herself, undetermined by the eternal knowledge and will of God, and even if it be admitted that the eternal God has no eternal knowledge and will and that the movement of prakrti is due to an inner teleology in accordance with karma, and that in the beginning of the creation prakrti is transformed into the sattvo'pddhi of God, even then by self-abnegation to God kaivalya can be attained. Thus, in the Yoga view the upadhi of Isvara is a product and not the material or the instrumental cause of the world, whereas in the Vedanta view as propounded by Bhiksu the upadhi of Isvara is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, and this upadhi which forms the material stuff of the world is prakrti herself and not her product. In the Yoga view God is eternal, but His thought and will are not eternal. This thought and will are associated with the sattva part of prakrti which lies embedded in it at the time of pralaya which only shows itself at the beginning of a new creative cycle through the potency left in it by the will of God in the previous creative cycle. God, in the view of Yoga, is thus not both the material and the instrumental cause of the world as the Vedanta holds. According to the Vedanta as explained by Bhiksu, the prakrti plays her dual part; in one part she remains as the eternal vehicle of the eternal knowledge and will of God, and through the other part she runs through an evolutionary process by producing disturbances of sattva, rajas and

1 yoga hl'svarasya jagan-nimittatvam prakrtitvena'bhyupagacchanti Isvaro-pddheh sattva-vise$asya purva-sargiya-tat-samkalpa-vasdt sargd-dau sva-tantra-prakrtita utpaty-anglkdrdt. Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, II. i. 2.

tamas. This also explains the Puranic view of the gradual derivation of sattva, rajas and tamas as stages in the evolution of prakrti through which at a later stage the cosmic evolution takes place. Thus the prakrti which remains associated with God as the vehicle of His knowledge and will is unchangeable and eternal 1 .

Isvara-gita, its Philosophy as expounded by Vijnana Bhiksu.

In the second part (uttara-vibhdga) of the Kurma Purana the first eleven chapters are called Isvara-gita. In the first chapter of this section Suta asks Vyasa about the true knowledge leading to emancipation as originally instructed by Narayana in his incarnation as a tortoise. It is reported by Vyasa that in Vadarikasrama in an assembly of the sages Sanat-kumara, Sanandana, Sanaka, Arigira, Bhrgu, Kanada, Kapila, Garga, Valadeva, Sukra, and Vasistha Rsi Narayana appeared and later on Siva also came there. Siva then at the request of the sages gave a discourse regarding the ultimate nature of reality, the world and God. The real discourse begins with the second chapter. Vijnana Bhiksu wrote a commentary on the Isvara-gita; he thought that since the Isvara-gita contains the main purport of the Bhagavad-gita it was unnecessary for him to write any commentary on the latter. Apart from the Samkhya and Yoga works, Vijnana Bhiksu wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sutra, a commentary on the Upanisads, and a commentary on the Isvara-gitii of the Kurma Purana. In his commentary on the Brahma-sutra he quotes a passage from (itsukhacarya of the thirteenth century. lie himself probably flourished some time in the fourteenth century. Bhiksu's other works are Samkhya-pravacana-bhdsva, Yoga-vartika, Yoga-sutra, Samkhya-sdra, and the I'padesa-ratnamala. In his interpretation of the Brahma-sutra and of the Isvara-gita he has followed the line of interpretation of Vedanta as adopted in the Puranas, where the Samkhya-yoga and Vedanta appear to be wielded together into one indivisible harmonious system. The philosophy of the Isvara-gita as dealt with here is based upon Bhiksu's commentary, called the Isvara-gitd-bhasya which was available to the present writer as a manuscript by courtesy of M. M. Goplnatha Kaviraja, of the Benares Sanskrit College.

' Vijridna-mrta-bhdsya, pp. 271, 272.

The main questions that were asked by the sages which led to the discourse of Siva are the following: (1) What is the cause of all? (2) Who suffers rebirth? (3) What is the soul? (4) What is emancipation? (5) What is the cause of rebirth? (6) What is the nature of rebirth? (7) Who can realize all? (8) What is the ultimate reality, the Brahman ? The answers to these questions are not given serially, but the most important topics as they appeared to the instructor, Siva, were handled by him in his own order of discourse. Thus the eighth question was taken up for answer before all other questions. This answer begins with a description of the nature of Atman not as the individual soul, but as the highest self.

Vijnana Bhiksu seems to acknowledge the doctrine of absolute absorption or assimilation of the individual soul within the universal and infinite soul. And even during his existence in this world, the soul is said to be merely a witness.

He explains that in the answer to the eighth question in the Kurma Purdna, 11. 1. 7, p. 453 1 , the word alma refers to the Godhead, though in ordinary usage it stands only for the finite souls, and suggests the self-sameness of the finite and infinite souls. The reference here is thus to the prakrta-tma and not to the jivd-tma 2 . God is called sarvd-ntara as He has already entered the hearts (antah) of the diverse living beings and exists there in the capacity of being only a witness {sarvesam sva-bhinnanam antah-saksitvena' tiugatah) 3 . A sdksl (witness) is he who illuminates {sva-prati-vimbita-vastu-bhdsakah), without any efforts on his part (vydpdram vinaV vd). I le is called antaryami on account of his association with finite intelligences and through this association even the individual soul shares the greatness of the highest self.

Vijnana Bhiksu says that the line "asmad vijdyate visvam atraV va praviliyate" occurs here by way of giving a reason for the sakti-saktimad-a-bhedatva doctrine so ably put forth by calling the ultimate Reality or paramd-tman, antarydmin and then explaining the doctrine a little by giving him a few adjectives more to bring out the significance of the esoteric doctrine or suggestion of sakti-saktimad-abhedatva. Now it is said that as it is from Him that the inverse-effects are created, in Him they exist and in Him they are

1 Bibliotheca Indica edition, 1890.

2 See Isvara-glta-bhdsya, MS.

3 evam antarydmi-sattva-sambandhdt cin mdtro'pi paramd-ntarydml bhavati sarvd-ntaratvena sarva-saktisv' avibhdga-lakfand-bheddt. Ibid.

31-2

annihilated. He is non-different (or better, inseparable) from purusa and prakrti, because of His being the support and the ground of the whole universe beginning from purusa and prakrti; i.e. of the effects right down from purusa and praktri and inclusive of them. If like the body He had not superintended all the causal agencies, then the cause, like the draiya, guna, karma, etc., could not have effected any causal function (yadi hi paramd-tmd dehazat sarvam karanam nadhitistheta tarhi drarya-guna-karmd-di-sadha-rana-khila-kriya-rtha-mula-karanam na sydd itiy. If it is said that the sentence speaks of effectedness (or causality) as common to all tangible manifestations, then the idea of the previous sentence maintaining the identity between Brahman and the world would not be admissible 2 .

Brahman is the updddna-karana of the universe, but this universe is a parmami-rupa of Brahman. His is not therefore the parinumi-rilpa, because that will contradict the statements made by the scriptures declaring the Brahman to be unchangeable (kiitastha). Then Vijnana Bhiksu defines that God being the ultimate substratum of all, the functioning of all tvpes of causes is helped in its operation by Him and it is this that is called the adhisthdna-kdranatd of God.

Then he maintains his doctrine of jivatma-parama-tmanor amsdmsy-abheda by the line " sa mayi may ay a baddhah karoti vivid/ids tanuh" and says further that Ydjnavalkya-smrti and Veddnta-sutra also preach the same doctrine. Srimad-bhagavad-gltd says the same thing. Then comes the elaboration of the same idea. A reference to Sarikara by way of criticizing him is made 3 . Mdyd-vdda is called a sort of covert Buddhism and for support a passage from Padma-purdna has also been quoted.

Adhisthdna-kdranatva, or the underlying causality, is defined as that in which, essence remaining the same, new differences emerge just as a spark from the fire. This is also called the amsdmsi-bhdra, for, though the niravayava Brahman cannot be regarded as having parts, yet it is on account of the emergence of different characters from a common basis that the characterized units are called the parts of the common basis. It should be noted that Vijnana Bhiksu is against the view that the Brahman undergoes any transformatory

1 Isvara-gitd-bhdsya. MS. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

change. Though the Brahman does not undergo any transformatory change, yet new differences emerge out of it. In the sentence "Sa mayl may ay a baddhah " the idea is that the may a itself is an integral part of the Divine entity and not different from it. The maya is like an amsa which is identical with the amsin.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual with the Brahman that ultimate emancipation can be attained 1 .

The self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is not in any way bound by its experiences. The assertion of Sankara that atma is of the nature of joy or bliss is also wrong; for no one can always be attached to himself, and the fact that everyone seeks to further his own interest in all his actions does not imply that the soul is of the nature of bliss. Moreover, if the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot at the same time be of the nature of pure bliss; at the time of acquiring knowledge we do not always feel pleasure. 2

Egoism (abhimana) also does not belong to the soul but like sukha and duhkha belongs to prakrti, which are wrongly attributed to the self. 3 The soul is, however, regarded as an enjoyer of its experiences of pleasure and pain, a reflection of them on it through the vrtti, and such a reflection of pleasure and pain, etc., through the vrtti is regarded as the realization (saksatkara) of the experiences. Such an enjoyment of experiences, therefore, is to be regarded as anaupadhika (or unconditional). This is also borne out by the testimony of the Bhagavad-gita and Samkhya. Such an enjoyment of the experiences does not belong to the prakrti (saksatkara-rupa-dharmasya drsya-dharmatva-sambhavat)*. The passages which say that the experiences do not belong to the purusa refer to the modifications of vrtti in connection with the experiences. The assertion of Sankara, therefore, that the atman is as incapable of experiences (bhoga) as of the power of acting (kartrtva) is therefore false.

Ajnana, according to Vijnana Bhiksu, means anyathd-jnana. Pradhana is so called because it performs all the actions for the sake of the purusa ; and it is through the fault of his association with pradhana that the purusa is associated with false knowledge.

1 Isvara-glta-bhdsya. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

The atman remains unchanged in itself and the differences are due to the emergence of the association of buddhi and other faculties which give rise to experience. At the time of emancipation jivas remain undifferentiated with Brahman. Prakrti, purnsa, and kola are ultimately supported in Brahman and yet are different from it.

There are indeed two kinds of scriptural texts, one emphasizing the monistic side, the other the dualistic. A right interpretation should, however, emphasize the duality-texts, for if everything were false then even such a falsity would be undemonstrable and self-contradictory. If it is argued that one may accept the validity of the scriptural texts until the Brahman is realized and when that is done it matters little if the scriptural texts are found invalid, the reply to such an objection is that, whenever a person discovers that the means through which he attained the conclusion was invalid, he naturally suspects the veiy conclusion arrived at. Thus the knowledge of Brahman would itself appear doubtful to a person who discovers that the instruments of such knowledge were themselves defective.

The individual soul exists in the parama-tman in an undifferentiated state in the sense that the parama-tman is the essence or ground-cause of the jivas ; and the texts which emphasize the monistic side indicate this nature of parama-tman as the ground-cause. This does not imply that the individual souls are identical with Brahman.

Pleasure and pain do not belong to the self; they really belong to the antahkarana and they are ascribed to the self only through the association of the antahkarana with the self. In the state of emancipation the self is pure consciousness without any association of pleasure and pain. The ultimate end is the cessation of the suffering of sorrow (duhkha-bhoga-nivrtti) and not the cessation of sorrow (na duhkha-nivrttih); for when one has ceased to suffer sorrow, sorrow may still be there and the avoidance of it would be the end of other persons. The assertion of Saiikara that there is bliss in the stage of emancipation is wrong. For during that stage there is no mental organ by which happiness could be enjoyed. If the self be regarded as of the nature of bliss, then also the self would be both the agent and the object of the enjoyment of bliss, which is impossible. The ascription of ananda in the state of emancipation only refers to it in a technical sense, i.e., ananda means the absence of pleasure and pain.

Bhiksu admits a gradation of realities. He holds further that when one entity is stabler than another, the former is more real than the latter. Since parama-tman is always the same and does not undergo any change or transformation or dissolution, He is more real than the prakrti or purusa or the evolutes of prakrti. This idea has also been expressed in the view of the Puranas that the ultimate essence of the world is of the nature of knowledge which is the form of the parama-tman. It is in this essential form that the world is regarded as ultimately real and not as prakrti and purusa which are changing forms.

The prakrti or maya has often been described as that which can be called neither existent nor non-existent. This has been interpreted by the Sarikarites as implying the falsity of maya. But according to Vijfiana Bhiksu it means that the original cause may be regarded as partly real and partly unreal in the sense that while it is unproductive it is regarded as unreal, and when it passes through the course of evolutionary changes it is regarded as real {kincit sad-rupd kincit asad-rupa ca bhavati).

Now coming to sadhana he says that by agama, anumana and dhyana one should attain self-knowledge. This self-realization leads to the asamprajnata-yoga which uproots all the vasanas. It is attained not only by the cessation of ajnana but also by the destruction of the karmas. He also maintains that the emphasis of Sankara on the understanding of the Upanisadic texts as a means to the attainment of self-realization is also wrong.

In the state of mukti, self having dissociated itself from the linga-sarira becomes one with Brahman, just as the river becomes one with the sea. This is not a case of identity, but one of non-difference (linga-sarira-tmaka-sodasa-kala-siinyena ekatam avi-bhaga-laksana-bhedam atyantam vrajet). Here in the state of mukti the identity and difference oijiva and Brahman have been indicated on the analogy of the river and the sea.

Bhiksu says that there is a difference between the Samkhya and Yoga regarding the attainment of emancipation. The followers of the Samkhya can attain emancipation only by the cessation of their prdrabdha karmas. Since avidyd has been destroyed, the realization of emancipation has only to wait till the prarabdhas exhaust themselves. The followers of Yoga, however, who enter into a state of asamprajnata-samadhi have not to suffer the fruits of the prarabdha,

because being in a state of asamprajnata meditation the prarabdha can no longer touch them. They can, therefore, immediately enter into a state of emancipation at their own sweet will.

According to Bhiksu, though Isvara transcends the gunas, yet through his body as pure sattva he carries on the creative work and the work of superintending and controlling the affairs of the universe. Though his agency is manifested through his body as pure sattva as a directive activity, yet it is without any association of passions, antipathies, etc.

In the third chapter of the Kurma Pur ana it is said that pra-dhana, purusa and kala emerge from avyakta, and from them the whole world came into being. Bhiksu says that the world did not emanate directly from Brahman but from pradhana, purusa and kala. There cannot be any direct emanation from Brahman; for that would mean that Brahman undergoes a change. A direct emanation would imply that evil and hell also sprang from Brahman. The emanation of prakrti, purusa and kala from Brahman is explained on the supposition that Brahman is a kind of ground-cause of prakrti, purusa, and kala {abhivyakti-karana or adhara-karand). But this emanation of prakrti, purusa and kala is not through modificatory processes in the manner in which curd is produced from milk. In the time of dissolution prakrti and purusa are unproductive of any effects and may therefore be regarded as it were as nonexistent. It is through the will of God that the prakrti and purusa are draw r n out and connected together, and the point of motivation is started for the processes of modification of the prakrti. This point of motivation is called kala. It is by such a course that all these three may be regarded as producing an effect and therefore as existent. It is in this sense that prakrti, purusa and kala are regarded as brought into being by God 1 .

Avyakta as God is so called because it transcends human knowledge. It is also so called because it is a state of non-duality, where there is no difference between energy and its possessor, and where everything exists in an undifferentiated manner. Avyakta used in

1 na tu sdksdd eva brahmanah. . .atra kala-di-trayasya brahma-kdryatvam abhivyakti-rupam eva vivaksitam.. . .prakrti-purusayus ca mahad-adi-kdryo-nmukhatan ca parame-svara-krtdd anyonya-samyogad eva bhavati, evam kdlasya prakrti-purusa-samyogd-kJiya-kdryo-nmukhatvam parame-svare-cch ayui'va bhavati. Isvara-gltd-bhdfya. MS.

the sense of prakrti is the basis of change, or change as such; and purusa denotes the knower.

The parama-tman is spoken of as the soul of all beings. This should not, however, be taken to mean that there is only the paramatman which exists and that all things are but false impositions on his nature. The parama-tman or Parame-svara is both different and identical with kala, pradhana and the purusa. The existence of the prakrti and the purusa has to be regarded as less ultimate than the existence of God, because the existence of the former is relative as compared with the existence of God {vikdrd-peksayd sthiratvena apeksakam etayos tattvam, p. 44). Time is regarded as an instrumental cause of the connection of prakrti and purusa. Time is a superior instrumental agent to deeds, for the deeds are also produced by time (karmd-dinam api kdla-janyatvat). Though the time is beginningless, yet it has to be admitted that it has a special function with reference to each specific effect it produces. It is for that reason that at the point of dissolution time does not produce the evolutes of mahat, etc. Mahat-tatva is in itself a combination of the conscious centres and the material element.

When the word purusa is used in the singular number, such a use should not be interpreted to mean a denial of the individual purusas. It only means that in such instances of scriptural texts the word purusa has been used in a generic sense. Purusas are also of two kinds—the apara and the para. Both are in themselves devoid of any qualities and of the nature of pure consciousness. But there is this difference between the para purusa and the apara purusa, that while the former never has any kind of association with any experience of pleasure and pain, the latter may sometimes be associated with pleasure and pain which he at that time feels to be his own (anye guna-bhimdndt sagund iva bhavanti paramdtmd tu gund-bhimdna-sunyah, p. 46). It must be understood, however, that the experiencing of pleasure and pain is not an indispensable part of the definition of purusa, for at the stage of jlvan-mukti the purusas do not identify themselves with the experiences of pleasure and pain, but they are still purusas all the same. God, however, who is called the superior purusa, does not associate Himself with the experiences that proceed as a fruit of karma and which are enjoyed in a spatial-temporal manner. But God continues to enjoy eternal bliss in association with His own special upddhi or conditions

(svo-padhistha-nitya-nanda-bhoktrtvam tu parama tmano pi asti). When the scriptural texts deny the enjoyment of the experiences of pleasure and pain with regard to the Supreme purusa, the idea is that though the Supreme purusa underlies the ordinary purusas as their ground yet he is not in any way affected by their experiences {ekasminn era buddhdv avasthanena jlva-bhogatah prasaktasyaparama-tma-bhogasyairapratisedhah). So the Supreme purusa has in common with ordinary purusas certain experiences of his own. These experiences of pure eternal bliss are due to the direct and immediate reflection of the bliss in the purusa himself, by which this bliss is directly and immediately experienced by him. By such an experience the purusas cannot be admitted to suffer any change. lie can, however, be aware of the mental states of ordinary persons as well as their experiences of pleasure and pain in a cognitive manner (such as that by which we know external objects) without being himself affected by those experiences. This enjoyment of experience is of course due to the action of God's mind through the process of reflection.

The monism of such a view becomes intelligible when we consider that the purusa, the mahat, the ahamkara and all its products exist in an undifferentiated condition in the very essence of God. The ultimate purusa as the supreme cognitive principle underlies the very being of purusas and the faculties such as the buddhi and the ahamkara, and also all in later material products. For this reason, by the underlying activity of this principle all our cognitions become possible, for it is the activity of this principle that operates as the faculties of the origins of knowledge. In the case of the experience of pleasure and pain also, though these cannot subsist outside the mind and may not apparently be regarded as requiring any separate organ for their illumination, yet in their case also it is the mind, the buddhi, that behaves as the internal organ. So though pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as having an unknown existence, yet their experiences are also interpreted as being due to their reflection in the mind.

When the mahat becomes associated with the purusa and no distinction is felt between it, the purusas and the original ground-cause, it is then that the cycle of world-existence appears. It is the super-consciousness of God that holds together the objective and the subjective principles. The objective principle, the prakrti, and

the subjective centres, the purusas, are held together in a state of non-distinction. It is this that gives rise to all experiences of sorrow and bondage with reference to the conscious centres. It may be asked how it is that the buddhi and the purusa are held in non-distinction instead of being distinguished from one another. The reply is that distinction and non-distinction are both possible elements in the buddhi, and the function of Yoga is to destroy the obstruction in the way of the realization of such a mutual distinction (yogd-dind tu pratibandha-mdtram apdkriyate).

Love of God proceeds in two stages: first, from the notion of God as satisfying our highest needs; and, secondly, in the notion of Him as being one with the self of the devotee. These highest needs find their expression firstly in our notion of value as pleasure and satisfaction in our experiences; secondly, in our notion of value in our emancipation; thirdly, in our notion of value in the satisfaction that we achieve in our realization of the sublimity in experiencing the greatness of God (Prema ca anurdga-visesah paramd--tmani ista-sddhanatd-jiidndt dtmatva-jndndc ca bhavati. istam api dvi-vidham bhogd-pavargau tan-mahimd-darsano-ttha-sukham ca iti tadevam mdhdtmya-pratipddanasya phalam prema-laksand bhaktih).

Maya, as identified with prakrti, should be regarded as substantive entity. The prakrti has two elements in it, sattva and tamas. Through sattva, wisdom or true knowledge is produced; through tamas is produced delusion or false knowledge. It is this aspect of prakrti as producing false knowledge that is called mdyd. Maya is described as being trigund-tmikd prakrti or the prakrti with three gunas. But though the mdyd is identified with prakrti, yet this identification is due to the fact that the tamas side of prakrti cannot be taken as apart from the prakrti as a whole. When it is said in the scriptures that God destroys the mdyd of Yogins, it does not mean that the trigund-tmikd prakrti as a whole is destroyed, but only that the operation of the tamas side is suspended or destroyed or ceases only with reference to the Yogin. Maya is also described as that which cannot produce an illusion in Him on whom it has to depend for its existence, i.e. God, but that it can produce illusion or false knowledge in others (sva-sraya-vydmohakatve sati para-vydmohakatvam).

It is further said that God creates the world by his mdyd-sakti as composed of the three gunas. The significance of the designation

maya in this connection implies that it is by the false identification of the prakrti and the purusa that the latter evolutionary process of the formation of the world and world-experience becomes possible. The term maya is generally restricted to prakrti in its relation to God, whereas it is called avidya as a delusive agent with reference to individuals.

True knowledge does not consist in a mere identification with Brahman as pure consciousness, but it means the knowledge of Brahman, his relationship with pradhana, purusa, and kala, and the manner in which the whole cosmic evolution comes into being, is maintained, and is ultimately dissolved in Brahman; and also in the personal relationship that he has with the individuals, and the manner in which he controls them and the ultimate ways of attaining the final realization. Kala is, again, here referred to as the conditional upadhi through which God moves the prakrti and purusa towards the evolution of the cosmic process.

The great difficulty is to explain how God who is regarded in essence of the nature of pure consciousness and therefore absolutely devoid of desire or will can be the cause of the great union of prakrti with the purusas. The answer proposed by Bhiksu is that in God's nature itself there is such a dynamization that through it He can continue the actualizing process and the combining activities of the prakrti and purusa lying dormant in Him. Though prakrti and purusa may also be regarded as the causes of the world, yet since the combination happens in time, time may be regarded primarily as a dynamic agent; the condition existing in God through which He renders the union is made possible {mama sviyo bhaiah pada-rthah sva-bhdva upddhih tatas tasya preranat bhagavdn a-pratihato maha-yogasya prakrti-purusa-di-samyogasya isvaras tatra samarthah . . .prakrti-prati-ksana-parhidmanam era kdlo-pddhitrat). Since God moves both the prakrti and the purusa through His own dynamic conditions, the whole universe of matter and spirits may be regarded as His body in the sense that they are the passive objects of the activity of God. God is thus conceived as dancing in his activity among his own energies as prakrti and purusas. It may be argued that purusa being itself absolutely static, how can these be moved into activity consists of the fact that they are turned to the specific operations or that they are united with the prakrti. Sometimes it is also suggested that the prakrti is the condition of

the purusas and that the movement of the prakrti in association with the purusas is interpreted as being the movement of the purusas.

In the seventh chapter of Isvara-gitd Brahman is defined as the Universal. Thus any cause may be regarded as Brahman in relation to its effect. So there may be a hierarchy of Brahmans as we proceed from a lesser universal to a higher universal. The definition of Brahman is: "yad yasya karanam tat tasya brahma tad-apeksaya vyapakatvat." As God contains within Himself all the universals, He is called brahma-maya. God is always associated with the purusas. But yet His dynamic activity in association with the purusas consists in bringing about such an association with prakrti that the objects of the world may be manifested to them in the form of knowledge.

The jiva or individual is regarded as being a part of God, the relation being similar to that of a son and father. When the jivas dedicate all their actions to God with the conviction that if it is God who works through them, then virtues and vices lose their force and become inefficacious to cause any bondage to them. As all jivas are the parts of God, there is a great similarity between them in spite of their diversity. God exists in the jivas just as the whole exists in the parts.

Vijiiana Bhiksu conceives of the adhisthana-karana as the ground cause, as one which in itself remains the same and yet new differences emerge out of it. This is also his doctrine of the part and the whole. The parts are thus supposed to be emergents from the whole which does not itself participate in any change. The relation is thus not organic in the sense that the dissolution of the parts would mean the dissolution of the whole. In the pralaya the parts are dissolved, yet pure Brahman remains just as it was in the stage of creation. So, again, when the parts are affected pleasures and pains are experienced, but the affection of the parts does not involve in the least the affection of the whole. But the whole is not affected by the sufferings that exist in the emergents. It is further stated that it is through the function of the ground-cause that the emergents, e.g. substance, quality and action, can express themselves or operate in their specific forms. The underlying whole, the ground-cause, has really no parts in itself. Yet from this common basis various emergents of appearances as characterized units show themselves, and since they are seen to emerge from it they are in

this specific technical sense called the parts of the underlying ground cause.

It will thus be seen that the Brahman, the ground-cause, always remains unchangeable in itself, but it is said that the Brahman is associated with may a and is united by it (sa mayimayaya baddhah). The idea is that the maya is an integral part of the divine entity and not different from it. Maya is like a part which is identical with the whole.

Though in the scriptures both the distinction and the identity of the individual with the Brahman have often been mentioned, yet it is by the realization of the difference of the individual from the Brahman that the ultimate emancipation can be attained 1 .

In the Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad, n. 4. 5, it is stated that all other things are desired because we desire the self. Sarikara infers from it that we are primarily attached to the self, and since all attachments imply attachment to pleasure, it follows that the self is of the nature of pleasure or bliss. Other things are desired only when they are falsely regarded as ourselves or parts of ourselves. Bhiksu denies this proposition. He says that firstly it is not true that we are always attached to our own selves; nor, therefore, is it true that seeking of happiness from other sources is always the seeking of the selves. It is, therefore, wrong to suppose that self is of the nature of bliss. If the soul is of the nature of pure consciousness, it cannot be the nature of pure bliss. If bliss and consciousness were the same, all knowledge would imply pleasure, but our knowledge is as much associated with pleasure as with pain. Pleasure and pain, as also egoism (abhimana), belong to prakrti or its product buddhi and are transferred through its function (vrtti) to the self, which is the real enjoyer and sufferer of pleasure and pain. The self is thus the real experiencer and the experiences therefore do not belong to the prakrti but to the self 2 . Through the operation of the sense-contact with the object and light the mental states are generated. These mental states are called vrtti and belong to buddhi and therefore to prakrti, but corresponding to each such mental state there is an intuition of them on the part of the purusa (vrtti-saksatkara)

1 yady api bhedd-bhedd-vubhdv eva sriiti-smrtyoruktau tathapi yathokta-bheda-jndna-rupa-vivekad eva sarvd-bhimdna-nivrtyd sdksdt jnoksah. Isvara-gUd. MS.

2 sdksdt-kdra-rupa-dharmasya drsya-dharmatva-sambhavdt. Bhiksu's commentary on Isvara-gltd. MS.

and it is this intuition that constitutes the real experience of the purusa. The word bhoga has an ambiguity in meaning. It sometimes refers to the mental states and at other times to their intuition and it is as the former state that the bhoga is denied of the purusa. The ajnana (ignorance) in this system means false knowledge. When the purusa intuits the vrttis of the buddhi and thereby falsely regards those vrttis as belonging to itself there is false knowledge which is the cause of the bondage. The intuition in itself is real, but the associations of the intuitive characters with the self are erroneous. When the self knows its own nature as different from the vrttis and as a part of Brahman in which it has an undifferentiated reality, we have what is called emancipation. The existence of the self as undifferentiated with Brahman simply means that the Brahman is the ground-cause, and as such an unchangeable ground-cause Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is in its nature as pure consciousness that the whole world may be regarded as existing in the Brahman of which the prakrti and the purusa, the one changing by real modifications and the other through the false ascription of the events of prakrti to itself, may be regarded as emergents. The world is ultimately of the nature of pure consciousness, but matter and its changes, and the experience itself are only material and temporary forms bubbling out of it. But since these emergent forms are real emanations from Brahman an over-emphasis on monism would be wrong. The reality consists of both the ground-cause and the emergent forms. Sarikara had asserted that the duality was true only so long as the one reality was not reached. But Bhiksu objecting to it says that since the monistic truth can be attained only by assuming the validity of the processes that imply duality, ultimate invalidation of the dualistic processes will also nullify the monistic conclusion.

CHAPTER XXIII

PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATIONS OF SOME OF THE SELECTED PURANAS

The readers who have followed the philosophy of the Vedanta as interpreted by Vijnana Bhiksu in his commentary on the Brahma-siitra and the Isvara-gita section of the Kiirma Purana must have noticed that, according to him, the Vedanta was associated with the Samkhya and Yoga, and in support of his view he referred to many of the Puranas, some of which are much earlier than Sarikara. Vijnana Bhiksu, therefore, quotes profusely from the Puranas and in the writings of Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Jiva GoswamI and Baladeva we find profuse references to the Puranas in support of their views of the philosophy of the Vedanta.

It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra was preserved in the Puranic tradition. Sarikara's interpretation of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra seems to have diverged very greatly from the semi-realistic interpretation of them as found in the Puranas. It was, probably, for this reason that Sarikara seldom refers to the Puranas; but since Sarikara's line of interpretation is practically absent in the earlier Puranas, and since the extreme monism of some passages of the Upanisads is modified and softened by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedanta, as found in the Puranas and the Bhagavad-glta, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra.

It seems, therefore, desirable that the treatment of the philosophy of Ramanuja and Vijnana Bhiksu should be supplemented by a short survey of the philosophy as found in some of the principal Puranas. All the Puranas are required to have a special section devoted to the treatment of creation and dissolution, and it is in this section that the philosophical speculations are largely found 1 . In the present section I shall make an effort to trace the philosophical speculations as contained in the sarga-pratisarga portions

1 sargas ca pratisargas ca z-amso manv-antarani ca \ vamsd-nucaritah caiva purdnam paiica-laksanam. \\ Kiirma Purdna, i. 12.

of some of the selected Puranas so as to enable readers to compare this Puranic philosophy with the philosophy of Bhaskara Ramanuja, Vijnana Bhiksu, and Nimbarka.

The first manifestation of Brahman according to the Visnu Purana is purusa; then come the other manifestations as vyakta-vyakta and kala. The original cause of pradhana, purusa, vyakta and kala is regarded as the ultimate state of Visnu. Here then we find Brahma-Visnu 1 .

In Visnu Purana, 1. 2. 11, it is said that the Ultimate Reality is only pure existence, which can be described only as a position of an eternal existence. It exists everywhere, and it is all (this is Pantheism), and everything is in it (this is Panentheism) and therefore it is called Vasudeva 2 . It is pure because there is no extraneous entity to be thrown away 3 . It exists in four forms: vyakta, avyakta, purusa and kala. Out of His playful activity these four forms have come out 4 . Prakrti is described here as sadasad-atmaka 5 and as triguna 6 . In the beginning there are these four categories: Brahman, pradhana, purusa and kala 1 , all these being different from the unconditional (Trikalika) Visnu. The function of kala is to hold together the purusa and the pradhana during the creational period, and to hold them apart at the time of dissolution. As such it (kala) is the cause of sensibles. Thus there is a reference to the ontological synthetic activity and the ontological analytical activity of kala 8 . ("Ontological" in the sense that kala appears here not as instrumental of the epistemological aspect of experience, but as something "being" or "existing," i.e. ontological.) As all manifested things had returned to the prakrti at the time of the last dissolution, the prakrti is called pratisancara 9 . Kala or time is beginningless

1 Brahman is also regarded as srastd, Hari as pdtd (Protector), and Mahesvara as samhartd.

dpo ndrd iti proktd, dpo vai nara-sunavah

ayanam tasya tdh purvam tena ndrdyanah smrtah. Manu. i. 10.

2 sarvatrd'sau samastam ca vasaty atre'ti vai yatah.

tatah sa vdsudeveti vidvadbhih paripathyute. Visnu Purana, i. 2. 12.

3 Heyd-bhdzclc-ca nirmalam. Ibid. 1. 2. 13.

4 vyaktam zisnus tathd'vyaktam purusah kala eva ca 1. krldato bdlakasye'va cestdm tasya nisdmaya. Ibid. 1. 2. 18.

5 Ibid. 1. 2. 19. e Ibid. 1. 2. 21.

7 Vimu Purana, I. 2. 23.

8 Visnoh svarupat parato hi tenye rupe pradhdnam purusasca vipra tasyai'va tenyena dlirte viyukte rupa-di yat tad dvija kala-samjfidm.

Ibid. 1. 2. 24.

9 Ibid. 1. 2. 25.

diii 32

498 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Pur anas Ten.

and so exists even at the time of dissolution, synthesizing prakrti or purusa together and also holding them out as different at the time of creation. At that time God enters by His will into prakrti and purusa and produces a disturbance leading to creation 1 . When God enters into prakrti and purusa His proximity alone is sufficient to produce the disturbance leading to creation; just as an odorous substance produces sensation of odour by its proximity without actually modifying the mind 2 . He (God) is both the disturber (ksobha) or disturbed (ksobhya), and that is why, through contradiction and dilation, creation is produced 3 . Here is once again the Pantheistic view of God, its first occurrence being manifested ultimately in four main categories, all of which are, so to speak, participating in the nature of God, all of which are His first manifestations, and also in which it is said that all is God, and so on. Arm means jiva-tman*. Visnu or Isvara exists as the vikara, i.e. the manifested forms, the purusa and also as Brahman 4 . This is clear Pantheism.

The commentator says that the word "ksetrajna" in " ksetrajnd-dhisthdnat" means purusa. But apparently neither the context nor the classical Samkhya justifies it. The context distinctly shows that ksetrajna means Isvara; and the manner of his adhisth-atrtva by entering into prakrti and by proximity has already been described 5 . From the pradhana the mahat-tattva emerges and it is then covered by the pradhana, and being so covered it differentiates itself as the sdttvika, rdjasa and tamasa mahat. The pradhana covers the mahat just as a seed is covered by the skin 6 . Being so covered there spring from the threefold mahat the threefold ahamkara called vaikarika, taijasa and bhutd-di or tamasa. From this bhutd-di or tamasa ahamkara which is covered by the mahat (as the mahat itself was covered by pradhana) there springs through its spontaneous self-modification the sabda-tanmatra, and by the same process there springs from that sabda-tanmatra the akasa —the gross element. Again, the bhutd-di covers up the sabda-tanmatra and the akdsa differentiated from it as the gross element. The dkdsa, being thus conditioned, produces spontaneously by self-modification the

1 Visnu Purdna, 1. 2. 29. 2 Ibid. 1. 2. 30.

3 Ibid. I. 2. 31. 4 Ibid. 1. 2. 32.

6 guna-sdmydt tatas tasmdt ksetrajiid-dhisthitan miine

guna-vyanjana-sambhiitih sarga-kdle dvijo-ttama. Ibid. 1. 2. 33. 6 pradhdna-tattvena samam tvacd bijam izd'vrtam. Ibid. 1. 2. 34.

sparsa-tanmatra, which produces immediately and directly the gross vayu. The bhutadi again covers up the dkasa, sabda-tanmdtra, sparsa-tanmatra and the differentiated vayu which later then produces the rupa-tanmdtra which immediately produces the gross light-heat (jyoti) 1 . The sparsa-tanmatra and the vayu cover up the riipa-tanmatra. Being thus conditioned, the differentiated gross jyoti produces the rasa-tanmatra from which again the gross water is produced. In a similar manner the rasa-tanmatra and the riipa-tanmatra, being covered up, the differentiated gross water produces the gandha-tanmdtra, from which again the gross earth is produced. The tanmatras are the potential conditions of qualities and hence the qualities are not manifested there. They are, therefore, traditionally called avisesa. They do not manifest the threefold qualities of the gunas as sdnta, ghora and miidha. It is for this reason also that they are called avisesa 21 .

From the taijasa-ahamkdra the five conative and cognitive senses are produced. From the vaikarika-ahamkdra is produced the manas*. These elements acting together in harmony and unity, together with the tanmatras, ahamkara and mahat, form the unity of the universe under the supreme control of God. As the universe grows up, they form into an egg which gradually expands from within like a water-bubble; and this is called the materialistic body of Visnu as Brahman. This universe is encircled on the outer side by water, fire, air, the dkasa and the bhutd-di and then by the mahat and the avyakta, each of which is ten times as large as the earth. There are thus seven coverings. The universe is like a cocoanut fruit with various shell-coverings. In proper time, again by causing a preponderance of tamas, God eats up the universe in His form as Rudra, and again creates it in His form as Brahma. He maintains the world in His form as Visnu. Ultimately, however, as God holds the universe within Him, He is both the creator and the created, the protector and the destroyer.

Though the Brahman is qualityless, unknowable and pure, yet

1 The commentator notes that when the dkasa is said to produce sparsa-tanmatra, it is not the dkasa that does so but the bhutd-di manifesting itself as dkasa, i.e. it is through some accretion from bhutd-di that the dkasa can produce the sparsa-tanmatra. Akdsah dkdsamayo bhutd-dih sparsa-tanmdtram sasarja.

2 See the commentary to sloka. Visnu Purana, i. 2. 44.

3 The commentator notes that the word manas here means antahkarana, including its four functions as manas, buddhi, citta and ahamkara.

32-2

500 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Pur anas [en.

it can behave as a creative agent by virtue of its specific powers which are incomprehensible to us. As a matter of fact the relation between the powers or energies and the substance is unthinkable. We can never explain how or why fire is hot 1 . The earth, in adoring Hari, described Ilim as follows: "Whatever is perceived as having visible and tangible forms in this world is but your manifestation. The ordinary people only make a mistake in thinking this to be a naturalistic universe. The whole world is of the nature of knowledge, and the error of errors is to regard it as an object. Those who are wise know that this world is of the nature of thought and a manifestation of God, who is pure knowledge. Error consists in regarding the world as a mere naturalistic object and not as a manifestation of the structure of knowledge." 2

In the Visnu Purana, I. 4. 50-52, it is said that God is only the dynamic agent [nimitta-matram), the material cause being the energies of the objects of the universe which are to be created. These energies require only a dynamic agent to actualize them in the form of the universe. God is here represented to be only a formative agent, whereas the actual material cause of the world is to be found in the energies which constitute the objects of the world, through the influence and presence of God. The commentator notes that the formative agency of God consists merely in his presence {sannidhya-matreinai\af.

In the Visnu Purana, 1. 4, we find another account of creation. It is said that God in the beginning thought of creation, and an unintelligent creation appeared in the form of tamas, moha, maha-moha,tamisra and andha-tamisra. These were the five kinds of avidya which sprang from the Lord. From these there came a creation of the five kinds of plants as zrksa, gulma, lata, zirilt and

1 Visnu Purana, I. 3. 1-2.

2 yad etad drsyate murtam, etad jfidnd-tmanas tava. bhrdnti-jfidnena pasyanti jagad-rupam ayoginah. Ibid. I. 4. 39. j ndna-svat upam akhilam jagad etad abuddliayah artha-svarupatn pasyanto bhrdmyante moha-samplaie.

Ibid. 1. 4. 40.

3 nimitta-matram ezd'sit srjydndm sarga-karmani pradhdna-kdram-bhutd yato zai srjya-saktayah. Ibid. I. 4. 51. nimitta-mdtratn muktiaVkam nanyat kiiicid areksyate

nlyate tapatdtn srestha sva-saktyd rastu vastutdm. Ibid. 1. 4. 52. sisrksuh sakti-yukto'sau srjya-sakti-pracoditah. Ibid. 1. 5. 65.

In this passage it is hinted that the will of God and His power to create is helped by the energies of the objects to be created.

trna (to which are to be added the mountains and the hills) which have no inner or outer consciousness and may be described as having, as it were, closed souls (samvrta-tman). Not being satisfied with this He created the animals and birds, etc., called tiryak-srota. The animals, etc., are called tiryag, because their circulation is not upwards but runs circularly in all directions. They are full of tarhas, and are described as avedinah. The commentator notes that what is meant by the term avedin is that the animals have only appetitive knowledge, but no synthetic knowledge, i.e. cannot synthesise the experience of the past, the present and the future and cannot express what they know, and they have no knowledge about their destinies in this world and in the other, and are devoid of all moral and religious sense. They have no discrimination regarding cleanliness and eating; they are satisfied with their ignorance as true knowledge, i.e. they do not seek the acquirement of certain knowledge. They are associated with the twenty-eight kinds of vadha 1 . They are aware internally of pleasure and pain but they cannot communicate with one another 2 . Then, being dissatisfied with the animal creation, God created "the gods" who are always happy and can know both their inner feelings and ideas, and also the external objects, and communicate with one another. Being dissatisfied with that creation also He created "men," which creation is called arvak-srotas as distinguished from the creation of gods which is called urddhva-srotas. These men have an abundance of tamas and rajas, and they have therefore a preponderance of

1 In the Sdmkhya-kdrikd, 49, we hear of twenty-eight vddhds. The reference to vddlids here is clearly a reference to the technical vddhds of the Sarnkhya philosophy, where it also seems certain that at the time of Visnu Purdna the technical name of the Sarnkhya vddlids must have been a very familiar thing. It also shows that the Visnu Purdna was closely associated with the Sarnkhya circles of thought, so that the mere allusion to the term vddhd was sufficient to refer to the Sarnkhya vddlids. The Visnu Purdna was probably a work of the third century A.D.; and the Kdrikd of Isvara Krsna was composed more or less at "the same time. In the Mdrkandeya Purdna (Yerikatesvara edition, ch. 44, v. 20) we have the reading Astdvimsad-vidhdtmikd. In the B. 1. edition of Mdrkandeya by K. M. Banerji we have also in ch. 47, v. 20, the same reading. The reading vddhdnvitd occurs neither in the Mdrkandeya nor in the Padma Purdna 13, 65. The supposition, therefore, is that the twenty-eight kinds in Mdrkandeya were changed into twenty-eight kinds of vddhd through the Sarnkhya influence in the third century. The Mdrkandeya is supposed to have been written in the first half of the second century B.C. It is not easy to guess what twenty-eight kinds of animal creation were intended by Markandeya. But the identification of them with the twenty-eight kinds ot Sarnkhya vddhd seems to be quite inappropriate.

2 antah prakdsds te sarva dvrtds tu paras-param. Visnu Purdna, 1. 5. 10.

502 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Pur anas [ch.

suffering. There are thus nine creations. The first three, called the unintelligent creation (avuddhi-pilrvaka), is the naturalistic creation of (i) mahat, (ii) the tanmatras, and (iii) the bhutas, the physiological senses. The fourth creation, called also the primary creation (mukhya-varga), is the creation of plants; fifth is the creation of the tiryag-srotas; sixth the urdha-srotas; seventh the arvak-srotas or men. The eighth creation seems to be the creation of a new kind. It probably means the distinctive characteristic of destiny of each of the four creations, plants, animals, gods and men. The plants have, for their destiny, ignorance; the animals have mere bodily energy; the gods have pure contentment; and the men have the realization of ends. This is called the anugraha-sarga 1 . Then comes the ninth sarga, called the kaumdra-sarga, which probably refers to the creation of the mental children of God such as Sanatkumdra, etc.

There are four kinds of pralayas: they are called the naimittika or brdhma, the prdkrtika, the dtyantika and the nitya. The naimittika-pralaya takes place when Brahma sleeps; the prakrtika occurs when the universe merges in prakrti; the atyantika-pralaya is the result of the knowledge of God, i.e. to say, when Yogins lose themselves in paramd-tman, then occurs the atyantika-pralaya; and the fourth, viz. the nitya-pralaya, is the continual destruction that takes place daily.

In the Vayu Purana we hear of an ultimate principle which is associated with the first causal movement of God. This is regarded as the transcendental cause (karanam aprameyam) and is said to be known by various names, such as Brahman, pradhdna, prakrti, prasuti (prakrti-prasiiti), dtman, guha, yoni, caksus, ksetra, amrta,

1 The Vdyu Purana, vi. 68, describes it as follows:

sthdvaresu ziparydsas tiryag-yonisu saktitd siddhd-tmdno manusyds tu tustir dezesu krtsnasah. The sixth sarga is there described as being of the ghosts.

bhiitd-dikdndm sattvdndm sasthah sargah sa ucyate.

Ibid. vi. 58-59. te parigrahinah sarve samribhdga-ratdh punah. khddands cd'py asilds ca jtieyd bliutd-dikds ca te. Ibid. vi. 30. In the Mdrkandeya Pur ana, anugraha-sarga is described as the fifth sarga. In the Kurma Purana, 7. 11, these bhutas are regarded as being the fifth sarga. The Kurma Purana describes the first creation as the mahat-sarga, the second as bhuta-sarga, the third as Vaikdrike'-ndriya-sarga, the fourth as the mukhya-sarga, and the fifth as tiryak-sarga. There is thus a contradiction, as the fifth sarga was described in the eleventh verse in the same chapter as the creation of ghosts. This implies the fact that probably two hands were at work at different times, at least in the seventh chapter of the Kurma Purana.

aksara, sukra, tapas, satyam, atiprakasa. It is said to cover round the second purusa. This second purusa is probably the loka-pita-maha. Through the association of time and preponderance of rajas eight different stages of modification are produced which are associated with ksetrajna 1 . In this connection the Vayu Purana speaks also of the prakrtika, the naimittika and the atyantika-pralaya 2 . It also says that the categories of evolution have been discovered both by the guidance of the sastras and by rational argument 3 , and that prakrti is devoid of all sensible qualities. She is associated with three gunas, and is timeless and unknowable in herself. In the original state, in the equilibrium of gunas, everything was pervaded by her as tamas. At the time of creation, being associated with ksetrajna, mahat emerges from her. This mahat is due to a preponderance of sattva and manifests only pure existence. This mahat is called by various names, such as manas, mahat, mati, brahma, pur, buddhi, khyati, Isvara, citi, prajna, smrti, samvit, vipura*. This mahat-prajna, being stirred by desire to create, begins the work of creation and produces dharma, adharma and other entities 5 . Since the cause of the gross efforts of all beings exists always as conceived in a subtle state in the mahat, it is called "manas." It is the first of all categories, and of infinite extent and is thus called mahan. Since it holds within itself all that is finite and measurable and since it conceives all differentiations from out of itself and appears as intelligent purusa, by its association with experience it is called mati. It is called brahman since it causes all growth. Further, as all the later categories derive their material from it, it is called pur. Since the purusa understands all things as beneficial and desirable and since it is also the stuff through which all understanding is possible, it is called buddhi. All experience and integration of experience and all suffering and enjoyment depending upon knowledge proceed from it; therefore it is called khyati. Since it directly knows everything as the great Soul it is called Isvara. Since all sense-perceptions are produced from it, it is called prajna. Since all states of knowledge and all kinds of

1 Vayu Purana, 3. 11, and compare the Pancaratra doctrine as elaborated in Ahirbudhnya.

2 Vayu Purana, 3. 23.

3 tac-chastra-yuktya sva-mati-prayatnat samastam aviskrta-dhl-dhrtibhyah. Ibid. 3. 24.

It speaks of five pramanas. Ibid. 4. 16.

4 Ibid. 4. 25. 6 Ibid. 4. 24.

504 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Puranas [ch.

karman and their fruits are collected in it for determining experience, it is called citi. Since it remembers the past, it is called smrti. Since it is the storehouse of all knowledge, it is called mahd-tman. Since it is the knowledge of all knowledge, and since it exists everywhere and everything exists in it, it is samvit. Since it is of the nature of knowledge, it is called jndna. Since it is the cause of all desideratum of conflicting entities, it is called vipura. Since it is the Lord of all beings in the world, it is called Isvara. Since it is the knower in both the ksetra and the ksetrajfia, and is one, it is called ka. Since it stays in the subtle body (puryain sete) it is called purusa. It is called svayambhu, because it is uncaused and the beginning of creation. Mahan being stirred up by the creative desire manifests itself in creation through two of its movements, conception (samkalpa) and determination (adhyavasdya). It consists of three gunas, sattva, rajas, and tatnas. With the preponderance of rajas, ahamkara emerged from mahat. With the preponderance of tamas there also emerges from mahat, bhutd-di, from which the bhutas and tanmdtras are produced. From this comes the dkdsa as vacuity which is associated with sound. From the modification of the bhutd-di the sound-potential (sabda-tanmdtra) has been produced. When the bhutddi covers up the sound-potential, then the touch-potential was produced. When the dkdsa covers up the sound-potential and the touch-potential, the vdyu is produced. Similarly the other bhutas and qualities are produced. The tanmdtras are also called avisesas. From the vaikdrika or sdttvika-ahamkdra are produced the five cognitive and the five conative senses and the tnanas 1 .

These gunas work in mutual co-operation, and thereby produce the cosmic egg like a water-bubble. From this cosmic egg, the ksetrajfia called Brahma —also called Hiranyagarbha (the four-faced God)—is produced. This god loses His body at the time of each pralaya and gains a new body at the time of a new creation 2 . The cosmic egg is covered by water, light, heat, air, dkdsa, bhutddi, mahat, and avyakta. The eight prakrtis are also spoken of, and probably the cosmic egg is the eighth cover 3 .

1 This is different from other accounts. No function is ascribed to the rdjasa ahamkara, from which the conative senses are generally derived.

2 Vdyu Pur ana, 4. 68.

3 The passage is obscure, as it is difficult to find out exactly what these eight prakrtis are. Ibid. 4. 77-78.

In Chapter vin it is said that rajas remains as the dynamic principle inherent in sattva and tamas, just as oil remains in seas amum. It is further said that Mahesvara entered the pradhana and purusa, and with the help of the dynamic principle of rajas produced a disturbance in the equilibrium of the prakrti 1 . By the disturbance of the gunas three gods are produced, from rajas Brahma, from tamas Agni, and from sattva Visnu. The Agni is also identified with kola or Time.

The Vayu Purana also describes the nature of mahesvara-yoga 2 . This is said to be constituted of five elements or dharmas, such as pranayama, dhyana, pratyahara, dharand, and smarana. Pranayama is of three kinds, manda, madhyama, and uttama. Manda is of twelve matrds, madhyama of twenty-four, and uttama of thirty-six. When the vayu is once controlled by gradual practice, then all sins are burnt and all bodily imperfections are removed. By dhyana one should contemplate the qualities of God. Then pranayama is said to bring about four kinds of results: (i) santi, (ii) prasanti, (iii) dipti, and (iv) prasada. Santi means the washing away of sins derived from impurities from parents and from the association of one's relations. Prasanti means the destruction of personal sins, as greed, egotism, etc. Dlpti means the rise of a mystical vision by which one can see past, present and future and come in contact with the wise sages of the past and become like Buddha. Prasada means the contentment and pacification of the senses, sense-objects, mind, and the five vayus.

The process of pranayama beginning with asana is also described. Pratyahara is regarded as the control of one's desires and dharma is regarded as the fixing of the mind on the tip of the nose, or the middle of the eyebrows, or at a point slightly higher than that. Through pratyahara the influence of external objects is negated. By dhyana one perceives oneself like the sun or the moon, i.e. there is an unobstructed illumination. The various miraculous powers that the yogi attains are called the upasargas and it is urged that one should always try to keep oneself free from the callings of these miraculous powers. The various objects of dhyana

1 It has been noted before that the creation of the material world proceeded from the tdmasa ahamkara, and that of the cognitive and conative senses from the sattvika ahamkara. The rajasa ahamkara was not regarded as producing anything, but merely as a moment leading to disturbance of equilibrium. See also Vayu Purana, 5. 9. 2 Ibid. chap. 11-15.

506 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Pur anas [ch.

are regarded as being the elements originating from the earth, manas and buddhi. The Yogin has to take these objects one by one, and then to leave them off, so that he may not be attached to any one of them. When he does so and becomes unattached to any one of these seven and concentrates on Mahesvara associated with omniscience, contentment, beginningless knowledge, absolute freedom (svatantrya), unobstructed power, and infinite power, he attains Brahman. So the ultimate object of Yoga realization is 1 the attainment of Brahmahood as Mahesvara which is also called apavarga 2 .

In the Markandeya Purana, yoga is described as a cessation of ajnana through knowledge, which is, on the one hand, emancipation and unity with Brahman, and, on the other, dissociation from the gunas of prakrti 3 . All sorrows are due to attachment. With the cessation of attachment there is also the cessation of the feeling of identifying all things with oneself (mamatva); and this leads to happiness. True knowledge is that which leads to emancipation, all else is ajnana. By experiencing the fruits of virtues and vices through the performance of duties and other actions, through the accumulation of fruits of past karman (apiirva), and through the exhaustion of certain others, there is the bondage of karma. The emancipation from karma, therefore, can only result from an opposite procedure. The pranayama is supposed to destroy sins 4 . In the ultimate stage the yogi becomes one with Brahman, just as water thrown in water becomes one with it 5 . There is no reference here to chitta-vrtti-nirodha as yoga.

Vasudeva is described here as the ultimate Brahman, who by His creative desire has created everything through the power of time. Through this power He separated the two entities of pra-

1 There is no reference in the chapters on yoga of the Vayu Purana to vrtti-nirodha and kaivalya.

2 There is a chapter both in the Vayu Purana and in the Markandeya Purana on arista, similar to what is found in the Jayakhya-samhita where signs are described by which the yogin is to know the time of his death, though the description of his death is entirely different from that given in the other two works.

3 jndna-piirvo viyogo yo'jiidnena saha yoginah | sd muktir brahmand cai'kyam anaikyam prdkrtair gunaih. \\ Markandeya Purana, 39. 1.

4 The method of pranayama and other processes of yoga is more or less the same as that found in the Vayu Purana.

5 Markandeya Purana, 40. 41.

The Markandeya Purana, in this connection, says that the yogin should know the approach of his death by the signs described in ch. 40, so that he may anticipate it and may not get dispirited.

dhdna and purusa from within Himself and connected them both. The first entity that emerged from prakrti in this creative process was mahat, from which emerged ahamkdra, and from which again emerged sattva, rajas and tamas. From tamas came the five tan-matras and the five bhiitas; from rajas came the ten senses and the buddhi. From sattva came the presiding gods of the senses and the manas 1 . It is further said that Vasudeva exists in the prakrti and the purusas and all the effects, both as pervading through them and also separate from them, that is, He is both immanent and transcendent. Even when He exists as pervading through them, He is not in any way touched by their limitations and impurities. True knowledge is that which takes account of the nature of all those which have emanated from Vasudeva in their specific forms as prakrti, purusa, etc., and also of Vasudeva in His pure and transcendent form 2 .

It should be noted that in the Padma Purana there is a mention of brahma-bhakti, which is either kayika, vacika and mdnasika or laukiki, vaidiki and adhyatmiki. This adhyatmiki-bhakti is further subdivided into the samkhya-bhakti and yoga-bhakti 3 . The knowledge of twenty-four principles and of their distinction from the ultimate principle called purusa, as also of the relation among purusa and prakrti and the individual soul, is known as samkhya-bhakti*. Practice of pranayama and meditation upon the Lord Brahma constitute the yoga-bhakti 5 . The term bhakti is here used in a very special sense.

In Naradiya Purana Narayana is said to be the Ultimate Reality, that is, if seen in theological perspective it may be said to create from itself Brahma the creator, Visnu the protector and preserver, and Rudra the destroyer 6 . This Ultimate Reality has also been called Maha-visnu 1 . It is through his characteristic power that the universe is created. This sakti or power is said to be both of the type of existence and non-existence, both vidyd and avidya 8 . When the universe is seen as dissociated from Maha-visnu, the vision is clearly due to avidya ingrained in us; when, on the other hand, the consciousness of the distinction between the knovver and the known disappears and only the consciousness of

1 Skanda Purana, 11. 9. 24, verses 1-10. 2 Ibid, verses 65-74.

3 Padma Purana, 1. 15, verses 164-177. 4 Ibid, verses 177-186.

5 Ibid, verses 187-190. 6 Naradiya Purana, I. 3. 4.

7 Ibid, verse 9. 8 Ibid, verse 7.

508 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Puranas [ch.

unity pervades, it is due to vidya (it is vidya itself) 1 . And just as Hari permeates or pervades through the universe, so also does His sakti 2 . Just as the quality of heat exists by pervading, i.e. as in and through Agni its support, even so the sakti of Hari can never be dissociated from Him 3 . This sakti exists in the form of vyakta-vyakta, pervading the whole universe, prakrti, purusa and kala are her first manifestations 4 . As this sakti is not separate from Maha-visnu, it is said that at the time of first or original creation Maha-visnu, being desirous of creating the universe, becomes, i.e. takes the forms of prakrti, purusa and kala. From prakrti, disturbed by the presence of the purusa, comes out mahat, and from mahat comes into existence buddhi, and from buddhi, ahatnkara 5 .

This Ultimate Principle has also been called Vasudeva, who is said to be the ultimate knowledge and the ultimate goal 6 .

Sorrow or misery of three kinds is necessarily experienced by all beings born in the universe—and the only remedy that sets them free from misery is the final obtaining of the Lord (or God) 7 . The ways to find God are two, the way of knowledge (jiiana) and that of action (karma). This jnana springs up either from the learning of scriptural texts or from viveka (discriminative knowledge) 8 .

1 Ndradiya Purana, i. 3, verses 7-9.

2 Ibid, verse 12.

It should be distinctly noted here that the creation of the universe has been attributed to Hari through the upddhi avidyii, which is His own sakti. The whole account sounds the note of the Vedanta philosophy. The following line should be particularly noted:

avidyo-pddhi-yogena tat he'dam akhilam jagat. Ibid. 3. 12. And this line should be read with the previous verse—

visnu-sakti-samudbhutam etat sarvam cara-caram yasmad bhinnam idam sarvam yacce'gam yacca tengati upddhibhir yathd'kds'o bfiinnatvena pratiyate.

Ibid, verses 10-11.

3 Ibid, verse 13. 4 Ibid, verse 17. 5 Ibid, verses 28, 31. 6 Ibid, verse 80.

7 For the concept of antarydmin see verse 26 of Adhyaya 3 and also verse 48 of Adhyaya 33.

8 Ndradiya Purana, verses 4, 5. •

utpattim pralayam cai'va bhiltdndm agatim gatim vetti vidyam azidydm ca sa vacyo bhagavdn iti jiidna-sakti-balai-svarya-zirya-tejdmsy asesatah bhagavac-sabda-vdcyo'yam vind heyair gund-dibhih sarvam hi tatra bhutdni vasanti paramu-tmani bhutesu vasate sdntar vdsudevas tat ah smrtah. bhutesu vasate sdntar vasanty atta ca tdni yat dhdtd vidhdtd jagatdm vdsudevas tatas smrtah.

Ibid. 1. 46, verses 21-24.. The attributes of Vasudeva are described in following four verses. It should also be noted that Bhagavan means Vasudeva. (Ibid, verse 19.)

yoga is also defined in the next chapter. It is described as Brahma-laya. The manas is the cause of bondage and emancipation. Bondage means association with sense-objects, and emancipation means dissociation from them. When, like a magnet, the self draws the mind inside and directs its activities in an inward direction and ultimately unites with Brahman, that is called yoga 1 .

Visnu is described as having three kinds of sakti (power): para or ultimate, the apara (which is identical with individual efforts), and a third power which is called vidya and karma 2 . All energies belong to Visnu, and it is through His energies that all living beings are moved into activity 3 .

The word bhakti has also been used in another chapter in the sense of sraddha, and is held to be essential for all the various actions of life 4 .

According to the Kurma Purana it seems that God exists firstly as the unmanifested, infinite, unknowable and ultimate director. But He is also called the unmanifested, eternal, cosmic cause which is both being and non-being and is identified with prakrti. In this aspect He is regarded as para-brahman, the equilibrium of the three gunas. In this state the purusa exists within Himself as it were, and this is also called the state of prakrta-pralaya. From this state of unmanifestedness God begins to assert Himself as God and enters into prakrti and purusa by His own inner intimate contact. This existence of God may be compared with the sex-impulse in man or woman which exists within them and manifests itself only as a creative impulse although remaining one and the same with them all the while. It is for this reason that God is regarded as both passive (ksobhya) and dynamic (ksobhaka). It is therefore said that God behaves as prakrti by self-contraction and dilatation. From the disturbed prakrti and the purusa sprang up the seed of mahat, which is of the nature of both pradhana and purusa {pradhana

1 dtma-prayatna-sdpeksd visistd yd mano-gatih tasyd brahmani samyogo yoga ity abhidhlyate.

Ndradlya Purana, 47. 7. There is also a description of prdndydma, yama, and niyanta, etc., from v. 8 to v. 20.

2 Ibid. 1. 47, verses 36-38. 3 Ibid, verses 47-49. * Ibid. I, verse 4. 5 Kurma Purana contains the following verse:

maheivarah paro'vyaktas catur-vyuhah sandtanah anantas caprameyas ca niyanta sarvato-mukhah. (4. 5.)

Two points should be noted here. Firstly, that the Ultimate Reality has been called Mahesvara and not Visnu. Secondly, catur-vyuha is one of the adjectives mentioned in this verse to explain the nature of that Ultimate Reality.

510 Philosophical Speculations of Selected Puranas [ch.

purusdt-makam). From this came into existence mahat, also called dtman, matt, brahmd, prabuddhi, khydti, Isvara, prajna, dhrti, smrti, samvit. From this rnahat came out the threefold ahamkdra-vaikdrika, taijasa and bhutddi (also called tamasa ahamkdra). This ahamkdra is also called abhimdna, kartd, mantd, and dtman, for all our efforts spring from this.

It is said that there is a sort of cosmic mind called manas which springs directly from the avyakta and is regarded as the first product which superintends the evolution of the tamasa ahamkdra into its products 1 . This manas is to be distinguished from the manas or the sense which is the product of both the taijasa and vaikdrika ahamkdra.

Two kinds of views regarding the evolution, the tanmdtras and the bhutas, are given here in succession, which shows that the Kurma Purdna must have been revised; and the second view, which is not compatible with the first, was incorporated at a later stage. These two views are as follows:

(i) Bhiitddi has, in its development, created the sabda-mdtra, from which sprang into existence the dkdsa, which has sound as its quality. The sparsa-mdtra was created from the dkdsa, developing itself; and from the sparsa-tanmdtra came out vdyu, which, consequently has sparsa as its quality. Vdyu, in the state of development, created the rupa-mdtra from which came into existence jyoti (light-heat), which has colour (rupa) as its quality. From this jyoti, in the condition of development, sprang up rasa-mdtra (taste-potential), which created water, which has taste for its quality. The water, in the state of development, created the smell-potential (gandha-mdtra), from which came into existence the conglomeration, which has smell as its quality.

(2) Akdsa as the sound-potential covered up the touch-potential, and from this sprang up vdyu, which has therefore two qualities—the sound and touch. Both the qualities, sabda and sparsa, entered the colour-potential, whence sprang up the vahni (fire), with three qualities—the sabda, the sparsa, and the rupa. These qualities, viz. sabda, sparsa and rupa, entered the taste-potential, whence came into existence water having four qualities

1 manas tv avyakta-jam pro'ktum vikarah prathamah smrtah

yenasau jayate kartd bhiitd-duns cd'nupasyati.

— sabda, sparsa, rupa and rasa. These four qualities entered smell-potential, from which sprang into existence gross bhumi (the earth), which has all the five qualities of sabda, sparsa, rupa, rasa, and gandha.

Mahal, ahamkara and the five tanmatras are in themselves unable to produce the orderly universe, which is effected through the superintendence of the purusa {purusa-dhisthitatvac ca) and by the help of avyakta (avyakta-nugrahend). The universe thus created has seven coverings. The production of the universe, and its maintenance and ultimate dissolution, are all effected through the playful activity (sva-lilaya) of God for the benefit of his devotees 1 .

1 The God is called Narayana, because He is the ultimate support of all human beings:

nardndm ayanam yasmat tena narayanas smrtah.

Kurma Purana, iv. 62.

APPENDIX TO VOLUME I

THE LOKAYATA, NASTIKA AND CARVAKA

The materialistic philosophy known as the Lokdyata, the Cdrvdka or the Bdrhaspatya is probably a very old school of thought. In the Svetdsvatara Upanisad a number of heretical views are referred to and among these we find the doctrine which regarded matter or the elements (bhutdni) as the ultimate principle. The name Lokdyata is also fairly old. It is found in Kautilya's Artha-sdstra, where it is counted with Samkhya and Yoga as a logical science (dnviksikl) 1 . Rhys Davids has collected a number of Pali passages in which the word Lokdyata occurs and these have been utilized in the discussion below 2 . Buddhaghoso speaks of Lokdyata as a vitandd-vdda-sattham 3 . Vitandd means tricky disputation and it is defined in the Nydya-siitra, I. 2. 3, as that kind of tricky logical discussion {jalpa) which is intended only to criticize the opponent's thesis without establishing any other counter-thesis (sd pratipaksa-sthdpand-hind vitandd), and it is thus to be distinguished from vdda which means a logical discussion undertaken in all fairness for upholding a particular thesis. Vitandd, however, has no thesis to uphold, but is a kind of jalpa or tricky argument which seeks to impose a defeat on the opponent by wilfully giving a wrong interpretation of his words and arguments (chala), by adopting false and puzzling analogies (jdti), and thus to silence or drive him to self-contradiction and undesirable conclusions {nigraha-sthdna) by creating an atmosphere of confusion. But vitandd cannot then be a vdda, for vdda is a logical discussion for the ascertainment of truth, and thus the word vitandd-vdda would be self-contradictory. Jayanta, however, points out that the Buddhists did not make any distinction

1 Kautilya, Artha-sdstra, i. i.

2 Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. I, p. 166. In recent times two Italian scholars, Dr Piszzagalli and Prof. Tucci, have written two works called Nastika, Cdrvdka Lokdyatika and Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano respectively in which theyattempt to discover themeaningof the terms nastika, cdrvdka and lokdyata and also the doctrines of the sects. Most of the Pali passages which they consider are those already collected by Rhys Davids.

3 Abhidhdna-ppadlpikd, v. 112, repeats Buddhaghoso's words "vitandd-sattham vinneyam yam tarn lokdyatam."

between a pure logical argument and a tricky disputation and used the same word vada to denote both these forms of argument 1 . This explains why Lokdyata, though consisting merely of vitanda, could also be designated as vada in Buddhist literature. A few examples of this vitanda are given by Buddhaghoso in the same commentary in explaining the term " loka-khdyikd" (lit. "popular story," but "popular philosophy" according to P.T.S. Pali Dictionary) —the crows are white because their bones are white, the geese are red because their blood is red 2 . Such arguments are there designated as being vitandd-salldpa-kathd, where sallapa and kathd together mean conversational talk, sallapa being derived from sam and lap. According to the definitions of the Nydya-sutra, 2. 18, these would not be regarded as instances of vitanda but of jdti, i.e. inference from false analogies where there is no proper concomitance, and not vitanda as just explained. Rhys Davids quotes another passage from the Sadda-niti of the Aggavamsa (early twelfth century) which, in his translation, runs as follows: "Loka means 'the common world' (bala-loka). Lokdyata means 'dyatanti, ussdhanti vdyamanti vddassadendtV '; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps it means ' the world does not make any effort iyatati) by it,' that it does not depend on it, move on by it (na yatati na ihati vd). For living beings (sattd) do not stir up their hearts (cittam na uppddenti) by reason of that book {tarn higandham nissdya) 3 ." Now the Lokdyata is the book of the unbelievers (titthia-sattham yam loke vitandd-sattham uccati), full of such useless disputations as the following: "All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this reason or for that"— the book which is known in the world as the vitandd-sattha, of which the Bodhisattva, the incomparable leader, Vidhura the Pundit, said: "Follow not the Lokdyata, that works not for the

1 ity uddhrtam idam kathd-trayam yat paraspara-vivikta-lakfanam sthulam apy anavalokya kathyate vada eka iti sdkya-iisyakaih.

Nydya-manjarl, p. 596.

2 Sumangala-vildsinl, 1. 90, 91.

3 This translation is inexact. There is no reference to any book in the Pali passage; in the previous sentence there was a word vddassddana which was translated as " through the pleasure they take in discussion," whereas the literal translation would be "by the taste (assdda) of the disputation," and here it means "pursuing that smell" people do not turn their minds to virtuous deeds.

d 111 33

progress in merit 1 ." Thus, from the above and from many other passages from the Pali texts it is certain that the Lokayata means a kind of tricky disputation, sophistry or casuistry practised by the non-Buddhists which not only did not lead to any useful results but did not increase true wisdom and led us away from the path of Heaven and of release. The common people were fond of such tricky discourses and there was a systematic science (sastra or sattha) dealing with this subject, despised by the Buddhists and called the zitanda-sattha 2 . Lokayata is counted as a science along with other sciences in Dlghanikaya, in. i. 3, and also in Anguttara, 1. 163, and in the Divyavadana it is regarded as a special branch of study which had a bhasya and a pravacana (commentaries and annotations on it) 3 .

There seems to be a good deal of uncertainty regarding the meaning of the word Lokayata. It consists of two words, loka and ay ata or ayata; ay at a may be derived as a+yam + kta or from a+yat (to make effort) + a either in the accusative sense or in the sense of the verb itself, and ayata is formed with the negative particle a and yat (to make effort). On the passage in the Agga-vamsa which has already been referred to, it is derived firstly as a+yatanti (makes great effort) and the synonyms given are ussahanti vayamanti, and secondly as a+yatanti, i.e. by which people cease to make efforts (tena loko na yatati na ihati va ioka-yatam). But Prof. Tucci quotes a passage from Buddhaghoso's Sarattha-pakasini where the word ayata is taken in the sense of

1 See Dialogues of the Buddha, i. 168. The translation is inexact. The phrase "All is impure; all is not impure" seems to be absent in the Pali text. The last passage quoted from Vidhura-pandita-jdtaka (Fausboll, vi, p. 286) which is one of the most ancient of the jdtakas runs as follows: " na seve lokdyatikam na' etam pannaya vaddhanam." The unknown commentator describes the lokdyatika as " lokaydtikan ti anattha-nissitam sagga-maggdndm addyakam aniyydnikam vitanda-salldpam lokdyatika-vddam na sereyya." The Lokayata leads to mischievous things and cannot lead to the path of Heaven or that of release and is only a tricky disputation which does not increase true wisdom.

2 Rhys Davids seems to make a mistake in supposing that the word Vidaddha in Vidaddharddi is only the same word as vitandd wrongly spelt {Dialogues of the Buddha, 1. 167) in the Atthasdlinl, pp. 3, 90, 92, 241. The word vidaddha is not vitandd but vidagdha which is entirely different from vitandd.

3 lokdyatam bhdsya-pravacanam, Divydvaddna, p. 630; also chandasi va vydkarane va lokdyate vd pramdna-mimdmsdydm va na cai-sdm uhd-pohah pra-j tidy ate. Ibid. p. 633.

It is true, however, that lokayata is not always used in the sense of a technical logical science, but sometimes in its etymological sense (i.e. what is prevalent among the people, lokesu dyato lokd-yatah) as in Divydvaddna, p. 619, where we find the phrase " lokdyata-yajna-mantresu nisndtah."

ayatana (basis), and lokayata according to this interpretation means "the basis of the foolish and profane world 1 ." The other meaning of lokayata would be lokesu ayata, i.e. that which is prevalent among the common people, and this meaning has been accepted by Cowell in his translation of Sarva-darsana-samgraha and here the derivation would be from a+yam + kta (spreading over) 2 . The Amara-kosa only mentions the word and says that it is to be in the neuter gender as lokayatam. It seems that there are two lokayata words. One as adjective meaning "prevalent in the world or among the common people" and another as a technical word meaning "the science of disputation, sophistry and casuistry" (vitandd-vada-sattham) ; but there seems to be no evidence that the word was used to mean "nature-lore," as suggested by Rhys Davids and Franke, or "polity or political science" as suggested by other scholars. The Sukra-niti gives a long enumeration of the science and arts that were studied and in this it counts the nastika-sastra as that which is very strong in logical arguments and regards all things as proceeding out of their own nature and considers that there are no Vedas and no god 3 . Medhatithi, in commenting upon Manu> vii. 43, also refers to the tarka-mdya. of the Carvakas, and all the older references that have been discussed show that there was a technical science of logic and sophistry called the Lokayata. Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the Lokayata-sastra with its commentary existed as early as the time of Katyayana, i.e. about 300 B.C. There is a Vartika rule associated with vii. 3. 45 " varnaka-tantave upasamkhyanam," that the word varnaka becomes varnaka in the feminine to mean a blanket or a wrapper (pravarana), and Patanjali (about 150 B.C.), in interpreting this vartika sutra, says that the object of restricting the formation of the word varnaka only to the sense of a cotton or woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine form would

1 Linee di una storia del Materialismo Indiano, p. 17. Sdrattha-pakdsinl (Bangkok), 11. 96.

2 Rhys Davids describes lokayata as a branch of Brahmanic learning, probably Nature-lore, wise sayings, riddles, rhymes and theories, handed down by tradition, as to the cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants {Dialogues of the Buddha, 1. 171). Franke translates it as " logische beweisende Naturerklarung," Digha, 19.

3 yuktir vatiyasl yatra sarvam svdbhavikam matam-kasyapi ne's'varah kartd na vedo ndstikam hi tat. Sukra-nlti-sdra, IV. 3. 55.

33-2

be varnikd or varttikd (e.g. meaning a commentary) as in the case of the Bhdguri commentary on the Lokdyata — varnika bhdguri-lokdyatasya, vartikd bhdguri lokdyatasya 1 . Thus it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the Lokdyata on which there was at least one commentary earlier than 150 B.C. or even earlier than 300 B.C., the probable date of Katyayana, the author of the vdrttika-sutra. Probably this was the old logical work on disputation and sophistry, for no earlier text is known to us in which the Lokdyata is associated with materialistic doctrines as may be found in later literature, where Cdrvdka and Lokdyata are identified 2 . Several sutras are found quoted in the commentaries of Kamalasila, Jayanta, Prabhacandra, Gunaratna, etc. from the seventh to the fourteenth century and these are attributed by some to Cdrvdka by others to Lokdyata and by Gunaratna (fourteenth century) to Brhaspati 3 . Kamalasila speaks of two different commentaries on these sutras on two slightly divergent lines which correspond to the division of dhurta Carvaka and susiksita Carvaka in the Nydya-manjarl. Thus it seems fairly certain that there was at least one commentary on the Lokdyata which was probably anterior to Patanjali and Katyayana; and by the seventh century the lokdyata or the Carvdka-sutras had at least two commentaries representing two divergent schools of interpretation. In addition to this there was a work in verse attributed to Brhaspati, quotations from which have been utilized for the exposition of the Carvaka system in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha. It is difficult, however, to say how and when this older science of sophistical logic or of the art of disputation became associated with materialistic theories and revolutionary doctrines of morality, and came to be hated by Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism alike. Formerly it was hated only by the Buddhists, whereas the Brahmins are said to have learnt this science as one of the various auxiliary branches of study 4 .

It is well known that the cultivation of the art of disputation is very old in India. The earliest systematic treatise of this is to be found in the Caraka-samhitd (first century a.d.) which is only a

1 Patanjali's Mahd-bhdsya on Pdnini, vn. 3. 45, and Kaiyata's commentary on it.

2 tan-ndmdni cdrvdka-lokdyate-ty-ddini. Gunaratna's commentary on Sad-darsana-samuccaya, p. 300. Lokdyata according to Gunaratna means those who behave like the common undiscerning people— lokd nirvicdfdh sdmdnyd lokds tadvdd dcaranti sma iti lokdyata lokdyatikd ity apt.

3 Ibid. p. 307, Tattva-samgraha, p. 520. * Anguttara, 1. 163.

revision of an earlier text (Agnivesa-samhita), which suggests the existence of such a discussion in the first or the second century B.C. if not earlier. The treatment of this art of disputation and sophistry in the Nyaya-sutras is well known. Both in the Ayur-veda and in the Nyaya people made it a point to learn the sophistical modes of disputation to protect themselves from the attacks of their opponents. In the Kathd-vatthu also we find the practical use of this art of disputation. We hear it also spoken of as hetu-vdda and copious reference to it can be found in the Mahabharata 1 . In the Asva-medha-parvan of the Mahabharata we hear of hetu-vadins (sophists or logicians) who were trying to defeat one another in logical disputes 2 . Perhaps the word vakovakya in the Chandogya Upanisad, vii. 1. 2, vii. 2. 1, vii. 7. 1, also meant some art of disputation. Thus it seems almost certain that the practice of the art of disputation is very old. One other point suggested in this connection is that it is possible that the doctrine of the orthodox Hindu philosophy, that the ultimate truth can be ascertained only by an appeal to the scriptural texts, since no finality can be reached by arguments or inferences, because what may be proved by one logician may be controverted by another logician and that disproved by yet another logician, can be traced to the negative influence of the sophists or logicians who succeeded in proving theses which were disproved by others, whose findings were further contradicted by more expert logicians 3 . There were people who tried to refute by arguments the Vedic doctrines of the immortality of souls, the existence of a future world either as rebirth or as the pitr-yana or the deva-yana, the efficacy of the Vedic sacrifices and the like, and these logicians or sophists (haituka) who reviled the Vedas were called nastikas. Thus, Manu says that the Brahmin who through a greater confidence in the science of logic (hetu-sdstra) disregards the authority of the Vedas and the smrti are but nastikas who should be driven out by good

1 Mahabharata, III. 13034, v. 1983; xm. 789, etc.

2 Ibid. xiv. 85. 27.

3 Compare Brahma-sutra " tarkd-pratisthdndd apy anyatha-numdnam iti ced evam api avimoksa-prasangah." II. 1. 11.

fsankara also says: yasmdn niragamah purufo-prekfd-mdtra-nibandhandh tarkdh a pratisthitd bhavanti utprekfdydh nirankuiatvdt kair apy utpreksitdh santah tato'nyair dbhdsyante iti na pratisthitatvam tarkdnam sakyam asrayitum.

Vacaspati, commenting on the commentary of fsarikara, quotes from Vdkya-padiya: yatnend' numito' py arthah kuialair anumdtrbhih abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathai'vo'papddyate.

men 1 . The Bhagavata-purana again says that one should neither follow the Vedic cult, nor be a heretic (pasandl, by which the Buddhists and Jains were meant), nor a logician (haituka) and take the cause of one or the other party in dry logical disputations 2 . Again, in Manu, iv. 30, it is said that one should not even speak with the heretics (pasandino), transgressors of caste disciplines (vikarmasthan), hypocrites (zaiddla-rratika), double-dealers and sophists (haituka) 3 . These haitukas, sophists or logicians thus indulged in all kinds of free discussions and controverted the Vedic doctrines. They could not be the Naiyayikas or the Mimamsists who were also sometimes called haituka and tarki because they employed their logical reasonings in accordance with the Vedic doctrines 4 . Thus we reach another stage in our discussion in which we discover that the haitukas used sophistical reasonings not only in their discussions, but also for repudiating the Vedic, and probably also the Buddhistic doctrines, for which they were hated both by the Vedic people and the Buddhists; and thus the sophistical or logical science of disputation and criticism of Vedic or Buddhistic doctrines grew among the Brahmanic people and was cultivated by the Brahmins. This is testified by Manu, II. 11, where Brahmins are said to take this hetu-sastra, and this also agrees with Anguttara, 1. 163, and other Buddhistic texts.

But who were these nastikas and were they identical with the haitukas} The word is irregularly formed according to Panini's rule, iv. 460 (asti-nasti-distatn matih). Patanjali, in his commentary, explains the word astika as meaning one who thinks " it exists" and nastika as one who thinks "it does not exist." Jayaditya, in his Kasika commentary on the above sutra, explains astika as one who believes in the existence of the other world (para-loka), nastika as one who does not believe in its existence, and distika as one who believes only what can be logically demonstrated 5 . But we have the

1 yo'vamanyeta te mule hetu-sdstrd-sraydd dvijah \ sa sadhubhir vahis-kdryo nastiko veda-nindakah. Manu, u. 11.

2 xeda-vdda-rato na sydn na pdsand ina haitukah \ suska-rada-vivade na kan cit paksam samdsrayet. Bhdgavata, xi. 18. 30.

3 Medhatithi here describes the haitukas as nastikas, or those who do not believe in the future world (para-loka) or in the sacrificial creed. Thus he says, haituka nastika ndsti paraloko, nasti dattam, nelsti hutam ity exam sthita-prajnah.

4 Manu, xii. 111.

8 paralokah astiti yasya matir asti sa dstikah, tadviparlto ndstikah; prama-nd-nupatiril yasya matih sa distikah. Kasika on Panini, iv. 4. 60. Jayaditya lived in the first half of the seventh centurv.

definition of ndstika in Manu's own words as one who controverts the Vedic doctrines (veda-nindaka 1 ). Thus the word ndstika means, firstly, those who do not believe in the existence of the other world or life after death, and, secondly, those who repudiate the Vedic doctrines. These two views, however, seem to be related to each other, for a refusal to believe in the Vedic doctrines is equivalent to the denial of an after-life for the soul and also of the efficacy of the sacrifice. The ndstika view that there is no other life after the present one and that all consciousness ceases with death seems to be fairly well established in the Upanisadic period; and this view the Upanisads sought to refute. Thus, in the Katha Upanisad Naciketa says that there are grave doubts among the people whether one does or does not exist after death, and he was extremely anxious to have a final and conclusive answer from Yama, the lord of death 2 . Further on Yama says that those who are blinded with greed think only of this life and do not believe in the other life and thus continually fall victims to death 3 . Again, in the Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad (11. 4. 12, iv. 5. 13) a view is referred to by Yajnavalkya that consciousness arises from the elements of matter and vanishes along with them and that there is no consciousness after death 4 . Jayanta says in his Nydya-manjari that the Lokdyata system was based on views expressed in passages like the above which represent only the opponent's (piirva-paksa) view 5 . Jayanta further states in the same passage that no duties are prescribed in the lokdyata; it is only a work of tricky disputation (vaitandika-kathai'va'sau) and not an agama 6 .

References to the ndstikas are found also in the Buddhist litera-

1 Manu, 11. 11. Medhatithi in explaining ndstika'-krdntam (Manu, vm. 22) identifies ndstikas with lokdyatas who do not believe in the other world. Thus he says, yathd ndstikaih para-lokd-pavddibhir lokdyatikd-dyair dkrdntam. But in Manu, iv. 163, ndstikya is explained by him as meaning the view that the Vedic doctrines are false: veda-pramdnakdndm arthdndm mithydtvd-dhyavasdyasya ndstikya-sabdena pratipddanam.

z ye'yam prete vicikitsd manusye astl'ty eke nd'yam astl'ti cai'ke, etad-vidydm anusistas tvayd'ham vardndm esa varas trtlyah. Katha, 1. 20.

3 na sdmpardyah pratibhdti bdlam pramddy-antam vitta-mohena mudham ; ay am loko ndsti para iti mdnl punah punar vasam dpadyate me. Ibid. 11. 6.

4 vijhdna-ghana era etebhyah bhutebhyo samutthdya tdny evd'nuvinasyati, na pretya samjnd'sti ity are bravimi. Brhad-dranyaka, II. 4. 12.

6 tad evam purva-paksa-vacana-mulatvdt lokayata-sdstram api na svatantram. Nydya-manjarl, p. 271, V.S. Series, 1895.

6 nahi lokdyate kin cit kartavyam upadisyate vaitandika-kathaVvd'san na punah kas cid dgamah. Ibid. p. 270.

ture. The P.T.S. Pali Dictionary explains the meaning of the word natthika as one who professes the motto of "natthi" a sceptic, nihilist, and natthika-ditthi as scepticism or nihilistic view. It may, however, seem desirable here to give brief accounts of some of the heretics referred to in Buddhistic literature who could in some sense or other be regarded as sceptics or nihilists. Let us first take up the case of Purana Kassapa described in Dlgha Nikaya, n. 16, 17. Buddhaghoso, in commenting on the Dlgha Nikaya,\ 1. 2, in his Sumangala-vilasini, says that, in a family which had ninety-nine servants, Kassapa was the hundredth servant and he having thus completed {purana) the hundredth number was called by his master purana (the completer), and Kassapa was his family name. He fled away from the family and on the way thieves robbed him of his cloth and he somehow covered himself with grass and entered a village. But the villagers finding him naked thought him to be a great ascetic and began to treat him with respect. From that time he became an ascetic and five hundred people turned ascetics and followed him. King Ajatasatru once went to this Purana Kassapa and asked him what was the visible reward that could be had in this life by becoming a recluse, and Purana Kassapa replied as follows: "To him who acts, O king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trembles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor increase of merit. Thus, Lord, did Purana Kassapa, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound his theory of non-action {akiriyam) 1 ." This theory definitely repudiates the doctrine of karma and holds

1 Dialogues of the Buddha, 1. 69-70.

that there is neither virtue nor vice and thus no action can lead to any fruit 1 . This is what is here called the doctrine of akiriya and it is in a way an answer to the question what may be the visible reward in this life of being a recluse. Since there is neither virtue nor vice, no action can produce any meritorious or evil effect—this is one kind of ndtthikavdda. But it is wrong to confuse this akiriya 2 doctrine with the doctrine of inactivity (akaraka-vada) attributed to Samkhya by Silanka in his commentary on Sutra-krtanga-sutra, 1. 1. 13. That akdraka doctrine refers to the Samkhya view that the souls do not participate in any kind of good or bad deeds 3 .

Let us now turn to another nihilistic teacher, viz. Ajita Ke£a-kamball. His doctrines are briefly described in Dlgha, 11. 22-24, where Ajita says: "There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next (n'atthi ayarn loko na paro loko). There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly and who, having understood and realized, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four elements; when he dies the earth in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, his wind to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, with the bier as the fifth, take the dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter eulogies, but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated and after death they are not." 4 Ajita Kesakamball was so called because he used to wear a garment made of human hair which was hot in summer and cold in winter and was thus a source of suffering. 4 It is easy to see that Ajita Kesakamball's views were very similar to

1 Buddhaghoso, in commenting on it says, sabbathdpi pdpapunndnam kiriyam eva patikkhipati. Sumangala-vildsinl, I. 160.

2 This has been interpreted by Dr Barua as representing the doctrine of Purana Kassapa, which is evidently a blunder. Prebuddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1921, p. 279.

3 bale ca pandite kdyassa bhedd ucchijjanti vinassanti, na honti param marana ti. LHgha, II. 23. Dialogues of the Buddha, pp. 73-74-

4 Sumangala-vildsinl, 1. 144.

the views of the Carvakas as known to us from the fragments preserved as quotations and from accounts of them given by other people. Thus, Ajita did not believe in the other world, in virtue or vice, and denied that karmas produced any fruits. He, however, believed in the view that the body was made up of four elements, that there was no soul separate from the body, that with the destruction of the body everything of this life was finished, and that there was no good in the Vedic sacrifices.

Let us now turn to the doctrine of Makkhali Gosala or Mankhali-putta Gosala or Makkhali Gosala who was a contemporary of the Buddha and Mahavfra. Buddhaghoso says that he was born in a cow-shed (gosala). As he grew up he was employed as a servant; while going in the mud to bring oil he was cautioned by his master to take care not to let his feet slip (makhali) in the mud; but in spite of the caution he slipped and ran away from his master, who, following him in a rage, pulled the ends of his dhoti, which was left in his hands, and Makkhali ran away naked. Thus left naked he afterwards became an ascetic like Purana Kassapa 1 . According to the Bhagavati-sutra, xv. i, however, he was the son of Makkhali who was a mankha (a mendicant who makes his living by showing pictures from house to house) and his mother's name was Bhadda. He was born in a cow-shed and himself adopted the profession of a mankha in his youth. At his thirtieth year he met Mahavlra and after two years he became his disciple and lived with him for six years practising penances. Then they fell out, and Makkhali Gosala, after practising penances for two years, obtained his Jina-hood while Mahavlra became a Jina two years after the attainment of Jina-hood by Gosala. After this Gosala continued to be a Jina for sixteen years and Mahavlra met him at the end of that period in Savatthi where there was a quarrel between the two and Gosala died through fever by the curse of Mahavlra Hoernle shows in his edition of the text and translation of Uvasagadasao, pp. iio-m, that Mahavlra died in 450-451 B.C. at the age of 56. Makkhali was the founder of the Ajlvaka sect. Ajlvakas are mentioned in the rock-hewn cave (which was given to them) on Barabar hills near Gaya, in the seventh Pillar Edict of Asoka in 236 B.C. and in the rock-hewn caves on Nagarjuni hill in 227 B.C. in the reign of Asoka's successor Dasaratha. They are also mentioned in the

1 Sumafigala-vildsinl, I. 143, 144.

Brhaj-jataka (xv. 1) of Varaha Mihira in the middle of the sixth century a.d. Silanka (ninth century) also refers to them in his commentary on the Sutra-krtdnga-sutra (1. 1. 3. 12 and I. 3. 3. 11), in which the Ajivakas are mentioned along with Trai-rasikas as being followers of Makkhali Gosala 1 . Halayudha also mentions the djivas as being the same as the Jains in general; but does not distinguish the nirgranthas from the Digambaras or identify the latter with the Ajivakas as Hoernle says in his article on the Ajivakas. Hoernle further points out in the same article that in the thirteenth-century inscriptions on the walls of the Perumal Temple at Poygai near Virinchipuram reference is made to the taxes imposed on the Ajivakas by the Chola king Rajaraja in the years a.d. 1238, 1239, 1243 and 1259. Thus it is clear that the Ajivaka school of Makkhali which was started by Makkhali in the fifth century B.C. continued to exist and spread not only in North India but also in South India, and other schools also have developed out of it such as the Trai-rasikas. Panini's grammar has a rule (iv. 1.154), maskara-maskarinau veniiparivrajakayoh, which signifies that maskara means a bamboo and maskarin a travelling ascetic. Patanjali, however, in commenting on it, says that maskarins were those who advised the nonperformance of actions and held that cessation (santi) was much better (maskrta karmdni sdntir vah sreyasiitydha ato maskariparivrd-jakah). The word, therefore, does not necessarily mean ekadandins or those who bore one bamboo staff. The identification of Makkhali with maskarins is therefore doubtful 1 . It is also very doubtful whether the Ajivakas can be regarded as the same as Digambara Jains, as Hoernle supposes, for neither Varaha nor Bhottolpala identifies the Ajivakas with the Jains, and Silanka treats them as different and not as identical 2 . Halayudha also does not speak of the Digambaras

1 The Trai-rasikas are those who think that the self by good deeds becomes pure and free from karma and thus attains moksa, but seeing the success of its favourite doctrines it becomes joyous and seeing them neglected it becomes angry, and then being born again attains purity and freedom from karma by the performance of good deeds and is again born through joy and antipathy as before. Their canonical work is one containing twenty-one sutras. In commenting on I. 3. 3. 11 Silanka mentions also the Digambaras along with the Ajivakas, but it does not seem that he identifies them in the way Hoernle states in his scholarly article on the Ajivakas in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. The exact phrase of Silanka is ajlvaka-dlndm para-tirthikdnam digamvaranam ca asad-acaranair upaneya.

2 Hoernle, in his article on the Ajivakas in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, says: "From this fact that Gosala is called Makkhaliputta or Mankhali (Maskarin), i.e. the man of the bamboo staff, it is clear that originally he belonged

as Ajivakas 1 . It is, therefore, very doubtful whether the Ajivakas could be identified with the Digambara Jains unless by a confusion in later times, probably on account of the fact that both the Digam-baras and the Ajivakas went about naked 2 .

The fundamental tenet of Gosala appears in more or less the same form in Uvasagadasao, 1. 97, 115, 11. in, 132, Samyutta Nikaya, m. 210, Anguttara Nikaya, 1. 286 and the Digha Nikaya, 11. 20. In the last-mentioned work Gosala is reported to say to king Ajatasatru: "There is no cause for the sufferings of beings; they therefore all suffer without any cause; there is no cause for the purity (visuddhi) of beings; they all become pure without any cause; there is no efficiency in one's own deeds or in the deeds of others (n'atthi atta-kare natthi parakare) or in one's free efforts (purisa-kare); there is no power, no energy, no human strength or heroic endeavours (parakkamdf. All vertebrates (sabbe satta), all animals with one or more senses (sabbe pand), all lives emanating from eggs or ovaries (sabbe bhutd), all vegetable lives, are without any power or efficiency. They become transformed in various forms by their inherent destiny, by their manifestation in various life-forms, and by their different natures (niyati-sangati-bhava-parinati), and it is in accordance with their six kinds of life-states that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasures." Again, in the Sutra-krtanga sutra, 11. 6. 7, Gosala is reported to say that there is no sin for ascetics in having intercourse with women 4 . These doctrines of Gosala

to the class of eka-dandins (or dandiri) ascetics; and, though he afterwards joined Mahavlra and adopted his system, he held some distinguishing tenets of his own, and also retained his old distinguishing mark, the bamboo staff." This is all very doubtful, for firstly mankha and maskarin cannot be identified; secondly, mankha means a beggar who carried pictures in his hands— mankhas citra-phalaka-vyagra-karo bhiksuka-visesah (Abhayadeva Suri's comment on the Bhagavati-siltra, p. 662. Nirnaya Sagara ed.). Gosala's father was a mankha and his name was Mankhali from which Gosala was called Makkhaliputta. Both Jacobi (Jaina Sutras, 11. 267 footnote) and Hoernle' {Ajivaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 266) are here wrong, for the passage referred to is Sllarika's commentary on Sutra-krtdnga-sutra, in. 3. 11 (djlvakd-dindrn para-tirthikdndm digamvarandm cd), and the " ca " in the passage which is to be translated as " and " and not as "or" distinguishes the Ajivakas from the Digamvaras.

1 nagna to dig-vdsdh ksapanah sramanas ca jlvako jainah, ajivo mala-dharl nirgranthah kathyate sadbhih. II. 190.

2 Divyavadana, p. 427, refers to an episode where a Buddha image was dishonoured by a nirgrantha and in consequence of that 8000 Ajivakas were killed in the city of Pundravardhana. Dr Barua also refers to this passage in his small work, The Ajivakas.

3 As Buddhaghoso says, these are all merely specifications of purisa-kdra {sarvaiva purisa-kdra-viv'ecanam eva). Sumangala-vilasini, II. 20.

4 There is another passage in the Sutra-krtanga-sutra, in. 4. 9 (evamege u asatthapannavanti andriyd; itthivdsam gaya bald jinasdsana-pardmmuhd), where

interest us only so far as they may be considered similar to the other nastika teachings. But unlike other nastikas, Gosala believed not only in rebirths but also introduced a special doctrine of re-animation 1 . Several other doctrines which are not of philosophical, ethical or eschatological interest but which refer only to Ajivaka dogmatics are related both in the Digha Nikaya, 11. 20, and in the Bhagavati-sutra, xv, and have been elaborately dealt with by Hoernle in his article on the Ajivaka and his translation of the Uvasagadasao. The two important points that we need take note of here are that the Ajivakas who were an important sect did not believe in the efficiency of our will or our karma and regarded sex-indulgence as unobjectionable to recluses. Other heretics are also alluded to in the Sutra-krtanga sutra, 1.111. 4. 9-14, where they also are alluded to as having similar tendencies 2 . Thus it is said: " Some unworthy heretics, slaves of women, ignorant men who are averse to the Law of the Jainas, speak thus: ' As the squeezing of a blister or boil causes relief for some time, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How could there be any sin in it? As a ram

it is said that some wrongdoers and others who belong to the Jaina circle have turned their faces from the laws imposed upon them by Jina and are slaves of women. Hoernle" says {Ajivaka, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 261) that this passage refers to the followers of Gosala. But there is no evidence that it is so, if at least we believe in Jsllarika's commentary. ^Ilanka explains "ege" or "eke" as bauddha-visesd mla-patddayah ndtha-vddika-mandala-pravistd va saiva-visesdh and pasattha as sad-anusthdndt pdrsve tisthanti iti parsvasthdh sva-yuthyd va pdrsvasthd-vasanna-kusa-ld-dayah stri-parisaha-pardjitdh. Thus, according to him, it refers to some Buddhists wearing blue garments, the ndtha-vddins, the Saivas, or some Jains with bad characters, or bad people in general.

1 Gosala thought that it was possible that one person's soul could reanimate other dead bodies. Thus, when he was challenged by Mahavlra, who forbade his disciples to hold any intercourse with him, he is reported to have said that the Makkhaliputta Gosala who was the disciple of Mahavlra was long dead and born in the abode of the gods while he was in reality Udayl-kundiyayanlya, who in the seventh and the last change of body through reanimation had entered Gosala's body. According to Gosala, a soul must finish eighty-four thousand mahd-kalpas during which it must be born seven times in the abode of the gods and seven times as men, undergoing seven reanimations, exhausting all kinds of karmas. See Bhagavati-sutra, xv. 673, Nirnaya Sagaraed. See also Hoernle^s two Appendices to his translation of Uvasagadasao and the article on Ajlvika, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 262. A mahd-kalpa is equal to 300,000 saras and one sara is the time required to exhaust the sands of the seven Ganges (each Ganges being 500 yojanas or 2250 miles in length, z\ miles in breadth, and 50 dhanus or 100 yards in depth), at the rate of putting 100 years for the removal of one grain of sand. See ibid.; also Rockhill's Appendix 1 to his Life of the Buddha.

2 According to Jsllarika they were a sect of Buddhists wearing blue garments, £aivas, the Nathas, and some degraded Jains also.

drinks the quiet water, so it is with (the enjoyment of) charming women. How can there be any sin in it?' So say some unworthy heretics who entertain false doctrines and who long for pleasures as the ewe for her kid. Those who do not think of the future but only enjoy the present will repent of it afterwards when their life or their youth is gone 1 ."

Again, some heretics (identified by Sllarika with the Lokdyata) are reported in the Sutra-krtdnga-sutra, 11. 1. 9-10, as instructing others as follows: Upwards from the sole of the feet up to the bottom of the tips of hair and in all transverse directions the soul is up to the skin; so long as there is the body there is the soul and there is no soul apart from this body, so the soul is identical with the body; when the body is dead there is no soul. When the body is burnt rfo soul is seen and all that is seen is but the white bones. When one draws a sword from a scabbard, one can say that the former lies within the latter, but one cannot say similarly of the soul that it exists in the body; there is in reality no way of distinguishing the soul from the body such that one may say that the former exists in the latter. One can draw the pith from a grass stalk, or bones from flesh or butter from curd, oil from sesamum and so forth, but it is not possible to find any such relation between the soul and the body. There is no separate soul which suffers pains and enjoys pleasures and migrates to the other world after the death of the body, for even if the body is cut into pieces no soul can be perceived, just as no soul can be perceived in a jug even when it is broken to pieces, whereas in the case of a sword it is found to be different from the scabbard within which it is put. The Lokdyatas thus think that there is no fault in killing living beings, since striking a living body with a weapon is like striking the ground. These Lokdyatas, therefore, cannot make any distinction between good and bad deeds as they do not know of any principle on which such a distinction can be made, and there is thus no morality according to them. Some slight distinction is made between the ordinary nihilists and the haughty nihilists [pragalbha ndstika) who say that if the soul was different from the body then it would have some specific kind of colour, taste or the like, but no such separate entity is discoverable, and therefore it cannot be believed that there is a separate soul. The Sutra-krtdnga-sutra, 11. 1.9 (p. 277), speaks

1 See Jacobi's translation of Sutra-krtdnga-sutra. Jaina Sutras, n. 270.

of these Pragalbha Nastikas as renouncing (niskramya) the world and instructing other people to accept their doctrines. But Sllanka says that the Lokayata system has no form of initiation and thus there cannot be any ascetics of that school; it is the ascetics of other schools such as the Buddhists who sometimes in their ascetic stage read the Lokdyata, became converted to lokayata views, and preached them to others 1 .

After the treatment of the views of the lokayata nastikas the Sutra-krtanga-sutra treats of the Samkhyas. In this connection Sllanka says that there is but little difference between the lokayata and the Samkhya, for though the Samkhyas admit souls, these are absolutely incapable of doing any work, and all the work is done by prakrti which is potentially the same as the gross elements. The body and the so-called mind is therefore nothing but the combination of the gross elements, and the admission of separate purusas is only nominal. Since such a soul cannot do anything and is of no use (akimcitkara), the Lokayatas flatly deny them. Sllanka further says that the Samkhyists, like the Lokdyatikas, do not find anything wrong in injuring animal lives, for after all the living entities are but all material products, the so-called soul being absolutely incapable of taking interest or part in all kinds of activities 2 . Neither the nastikas nor the Samkhyists can, therefore, think of the distinction between good and bad deeds or between Heaven and Hell, and they therefore give themselves up to all kinds of enjoyments. Speaking of the lokayata nastikas, the Sutra-krtariga-sutras say as follows: "Thus some shameless men becoming monks propagate a law of their own. And others believe it, put their faith in it, adopt it (saying):' Well you speak the truth, O Brahmana (or) O Sramana, we shall present you with food, drink, spices and sweetmeats, with a robe, a bowl, or a broom.' Some have been induced to honour them, some have made (their proselytes) to honour them. Before (entering an order) they were determined to become Sramanas,

1 yady api lokdyatikdndm nasti diksddikam tathd'pi aparena sdkyd-dind pravrajyd-vidhdnena pravrajyd pascdt lokdyatikam adhiydnasya tathdvidha-parinateh tad evd'bhirucitam. ^ilahka's commentary on the Sutra-krtdnga-sutra, p. 280 a (Nirnaya Sagaraed).

In pp. 280-281 ^ilahka points out that the Bhdgavatas and other ascetics at the time of their renouncement of the world take the vow of all kinds of self-restraint, but as soon as they become converted to the lokayata views they begin to live an unrestrained life. They then wear blue garments (mla-pata).

2 Ibid. pp. 281, 283.

houseless, poor monks, who would have neither sons nor cattle, to eat only what should be given them by others, and to commit no sins. After having entered their Order they do not cease (from sins), they themselves commit sins and they assent to another's committing sins. Then they are given to pleasures, amusements and sensual lust; they are greedy, fettered, passionate, covetous, the slaves of love and hate 1 ."

But we find references to the lokayata doctrines not only in the Sutra-krtanga-sutra but also in the Brhad-aranyaka, the Kapha as described above and in the Chandogya Upanisad, vm. 7, 8, where Virocana, the representative of the demons who came to Prajapati for instruction regarding the nature of self, went away satisfied with the view that the self was identical with the body. Prajapati asked both Indra and Virocana to stand before a cup of water and they saw their reflections, and Prajapati told them that it was that well dressed and well adorned body that was the self and both Indra and Virocana were satisfied; but Indra was later on dissatisfied and returned for further instructions, whereas Virocana did not again come back. The Chandogya Upanisad relates this as an old story and says that it is for this reason that those, who at the present time believe only in worldly pleasures and who have no faith (in the efficiency of deeds or in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul) and who do not perform sacrifices, are called demons (asura); and it is therefore their custom to adorn the dead body with fine clothes, good ornaments and provide food for it with which they probably thought that the dead would conquer the other world.

This passage of the Chandogya seems to be of special importance. It shows that there was a race different from the Aryans, designated here as asuras, who dressed their dead bodies with fine clothes, adorned them with ornaments, provided them with food, so that when there was a resurrection of these dead bodies they might with that food, clothes and ornaments prosper in the other world and it is these people who believed that the body was the only self. The later Lokayatas or Carvakas also believed that this body was the self, but the difference between them and these dehatmavadins referred to in the Chandogya is that they admitted "another world" where the bodies rose from the dead and prospered in the fine clothes, ornaments and food that were given to

1 See Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, 11. 341-342.

the dead body. This custom is said to be an asura custom. It seems possible, therefore, that probably the lokdyata doctrines had their beginnings in the preceding Sumerian civilization in the then prevailing customs of adorning the dead and the doctrine of bodily survival after death. This later on became so far changed that it was argued that since the self and the body were identical and since the body was burnt after death, there could not be any survival after death and hence there could not be another world after death. Already in the Katha and the Brhad-dranyaka we had proof of the existence of people who did not believe in the existence of any consciousness after death and thought that everything ended with death; and in the Chdndogya we find that Virocana believed in the doctrine that the body was the dtman and this doctrine is traced here to the custom of adorning the dead body among the asuras.

The tenets and doctrines of these asuras are described in the Gita y xvi. 7-18, as follows: The asuras cannot distinguish between right and wrong conduct; they do not have any purity, truthfulness and proper behaviour. They do not think that the world is based on any truth and reality; they do not believe in God and consider all beings to have come out from the desires of the sexes and from nothing more than from mutual sex-relations. These foolish people with such views do harm to the world, engage themselves in ferocious deeds and destroy their own selves (as they have no faith in the other world or in the means thereto) 1 . Full of insatiable desire, egoism, vanity and pride, they take the wrong course through ignorance and live an impure life. They think that existence ends finally at death and that there is nothing beyond this world and its enjoyments, and they therefore give themselves up to earthly enjoyments. Bound with innumerable desires, anger, attachment, etc., they busy themselves in collecting materials of earthly enjoyments through wrong means. They always think of their riches, which they earn daily, and which they accumulate, with which they fulfil their desires in the present or wish to fulfil in the future; of the enemies whom they have destroyed, or whom they wish to destroy; of their powers, their success, their joys, their strength, and so forth.

A doctrine similar to that of the Lokdyatikas is preached by Jabali in Ramayana, 11. 108, where he says that it is a pity that there

1 isridhara says that these refer to the Lokdyatikas. Glta, xvi. 9. am 34

should be some people who prefer virtue in the other world to earthly goods of this world; the performance of the different sacrifices for the satisfaction of the dead is but w r aste of food, for being dead no one can eat. If food eaten by people here should be of use to other bodies, then it is better to perform sraddhas for people who make a sojourn to distant countries than to arrange for their meals. Though intelligent men wrote books praising the merit of gifts, sacrifices, initiation and asceticism, in reality there is nothing more than what is directly perceived by the senses.

In the Visnu Purdna (i, 6. 29-31) certain people are alluded to who did not believe in the efficacy of the performance of sacrifices and spoke against the Vedas and the sacrifices; and in the Mahd-bhdrata, xn. 186, it has been urged by Bharadvaja that life-functions can be explained by purely physical and physiological reasons and that the assumption of a soul is quite unnecessary. In the Mahdbhdrata references are made also to haitukas who did not believe in the other world; they were people with strong old convictions (drdha-purve) who could hardly change their views; they were learned in the Vedas (vahusruta), were well read in older sdstras, made gifts, performed sacrifices, hated falsehood, were great orators in assemblies, and went among the people explaining their views. This passage reveals a curious fact that even in the Vedic circles there were people who performed sacrifices, made gifts and were well read in the Vedas and in older literature, who despised falsehood, were great logicians and speakers and yet did not believe in anything except what exists in this world (naitad astVti-i'ddinah). We know from the Buddhistic sources that the Brahmins were well versed in the lokayato learning; we know also that in the Upanisadic circles the views of those who did not believe in life after death are referred to and reproached, and the Chdndogya refers to people among whom the doctrine that the self and the body were identical was current as a corollary underlying their custom of adorning the dead. In the Rdmdyana we find that Javali taught the doctrine that there was no life after death and that the ritualistic offerings for the satisfaction of the dead were unnecessary. In the Git a we find also the holders of such views referred to, and they are there reported as performing sacrifices only in name, as thev did not adhere to the proper ritualistic course 1 . But in the

1 yajante nama-jajiiais te damhhenavidhi-purvakam. Gltd, xvi. 17.

Mahdbharata certain people are referred to who were well read in the Vedas and other older literature and yet did not believe in the other world and in the immortality of the soul. This shows that this heterodox view (that there was no life after death) was gradually spreading amongst certain sections of the Vedic people, and that though some of them were worthless people who utilized the doctrine only to indulge in sense-gratifications and to live in a lower plane of life, there were others who performed the Vedic practices, were well read in Vedic and other literature and yet did not believe in the doctrine of immortality or in a world beyond the present. Thus, even in those early times., on the one hand there were in the Vedic circle many moral and learned people who believed in these heretical views, whereas there were also immoral and bad people who lived a vicious life and held such heretical views either tacitly or openly 1 .

We thus know that the lokdyata views were very old, probably as early as the Vedas, or still earlier, being current among the Sumerian people of pre-Aryan times. We know further that a commentary on the Lokayata-sdstra by Bhaguri was very well known in 200 or 300 B.C., but it is exceedingly difficult to say anything regarding the author of the Lokayata-sdstra. It is attributed to Brhaspati or to Carvaka 2 . But it is difficult to say who this Brhas-pati may have been. One Brhaspati-sutra, a work on polity, has been edited with translation by Dr F. W. Thomas and published from Lahore. In this work the lokdyatas have been mentioned in 11. 5, 8, 12, 16, 29, and in. 15. Here they are very severely abused as thieves who regard religion as a mere means of advantage and who are destined to go to Hell. It is therefore absolutely certain

1 The Maitrayana Upanisad, vn. 8, 9, says that there are many others who by adopting useless arguments, illustrations, false analogies and illusory demonstrations wish to oppose the Vedic ways of conduct; they do not believe in the self and are like thieves who would never go to Heaven and with whom no one should associate. One sometimes forgets that the doctrine of these people is nothing new but is only a different kind of Vedic science {veda-vidyd'ntaran tu tat). Brhaspati became !§ukra and taught the Asuras this doctrine so that they might be inclined to despise the Vedic duties and consider bad to be good and good to be bad.

2 The Maitrdyanlya attributes these doctrines to Brhaspati and isukra; the Prabodha-candro-daya of Krsna Misra says that these were first formulated by Brhaspati and then handed over to Carvaka who spread them among people through his pupils.

See also Mr D. £astri's Cdrvdka-sasti, pp. 11-13, where he refers to a number of authorities who attribute this to Brhaspati.

34-2

that the Brhaspati who was the author of these sutras on polity could not have been the author of the lokayata science. Nor could it have been the legal writer Brhaspati. In Kautilya's Artha-sastra a Brhaspati is referred to as a writer on polity, but this must be a different one from the Barhaspatya-sutra published by Dr Thomas 1 . The Brhaspati of Kautilya's Artha-sastra is reported there as admitting agriculture, trade and commerce {varta), law and statecraft (danda-niti), as the only sciences; in the next passage of the same chapter (Vidya-samuddesa) danda-niti is regarded as the one subject of study by Usanas. In the Prabodha-candro-daya Krsna Misra makes Carvaka hold the view that law and statecraft are the only sciences and that the science of varta (i.e. agriculture, commerce, trade, dairy, poultry, etc.) falls within them. According to this report the Carvakas took only danda-niti and -varta into account, and thus their views agreed with those of Brhaspati and Usanas, and more particularly with those of the latter. But we cannot from this assume that either Brhaspati or Usanas mentioned by Kautilya could be regarded as the author of the original lokayata. Brhaspati, the author of the Lokayata-sastra, is thus a mythical figure, and we have practically no information regarding the originator of the lokayata system. It is probable that the original lokayata work was written in the form of sutras which had at least two commentaries, the earliest of which was probably as early as 300 or 400 B.C. There was at least one metrical version of the main contents of this system from which extracts are found quoted in Madhava's Sarva-dar-sana-samgraha and in other places.

It is difficult to say whether Carvaka was the name of a real person or not. The earliest mention of the name is probably to be found in the Mahabharata, xn. 38 and 39, where Carvaka is described as a Raksasa in the garb of an ascetic Brahmin with three staffs (tridandi), but nothing is said there about the doctrine that he professed. In most of the early texts the lokayata doctrines are either mentioned as the lokayata view or attributed to Brhaspati. Thus, in the Padma Purana in the Srst-khanda, xn. 318-340, some of the lokayata doctrines are described as being the instructions of Brhaspati. Kamalaslla, of the eighth century, refers to the Carvakas as being the adherents of the lokayata doctrine; the Prabodha-candro-daya speaks of Carvaka as being the great teacher who

1 Kautilya's Artha-sastra, pp. 6, 29, 63, 177, 192, Mysore ed. 1924.

propagated through a succession of pupils and pupils of pupils the Lokayata-sastra written by Vacaspati and handed over to him. Madhava, in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha, describes him as one who follows the views of Brhaspati and the chief of the nihilists {brhaspati-matd-nusarina nastika-siromanina). Gunaratna, however, in his commentary on the Sad-darsana-samuccaya, speaks of the Carvakas as being a nihilistic sect who only eat but do not regard the existence of virtue and vice and do not trust anything else but what can be directly perceived. They drank wines and ate meat and were given to unrestricted sex-indulgence. Each year they gathered together on a particular day and had unrestricted intercourse with women. They behaved like common people and for this reason they were called lokayata and because they held views originally framed by Brhaspati they were also called Barhaspatya. Thus it is difficult to say whether the word Carvaka was the name of a real personage or a mere allusive term applied to the adherents of the lokayata view.

Both Haribhadra and Madhava have counted the Lokayata or Carvaka philosophy as a darsana or system of philosophy. It had a new logic, a destructive criticism of most of the cherished views of other systems of Indian philosophy, a materialistic philosophy, and it denied morality, moral responsibility and religion of every kind.

Let us, therefore, first take up the Carvaka logic. The Carvakas admitted the validity only of perception. There is nothing else but what can be perceived by the five senses. No inference can be regarded as a valid means of knowledge, for inference is possible only when the universal concomitance of the reason (hetus) with the probandum is known, and such a reason is known to be existing in the object of the minor term {vyapti-paksa-dharmata-sali hi lingam gamakam). Such a concomitance is possible when it is known not only to be unconditional but when there is no doubt in the mind that it could be conditional. Such a concomitance must first be known before an inference is possible; but how can it be known? Not by perception, for concomitance is not an objective entity with which the senses can come in contact. Moreover, the concomitance of one entity with another means that the entities are associated with each other in the past, present and future (sarvo-pasamharayatri vyaptih), and the sense-organs can have no

scope with regard to future associations or even with regard to all past time. If it is urged that the concomitance is between the class-character (samanya-gocaram) of the probandum (e.g. fire) and the class-character of the reason (e.g. smoke), then it is not necessary that the concomitance of the reason with the probandum should have actually to be perceived at all times by the sense-organs. But if the concomitance is between the class-character of smoke and fire, why should any individual fire be associated with every case of smoke? If the concomitance cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, it cannot be perceived by the mind either, for the mind cannot associate itself with the external objects except through the sense-organs. The concomitance cannot be known through inference, for all inference presupposes it. Thus, there being no way of perceiving concomitance, inference becomes impossible. Again, a concomitance which can lead to a valid inference must be devoid of all conditions; but the absence of such conditions in the past or in the future cannot be perceived at the time of making the inference. Moreover, a condition (upadhi) is defined as that which, having an unfailing concomitance with the probandum, has not the same concomitance with the reason (sadhana-vyapakatve sati sadhya-sama-vyaptih) 1 .

Again it is said that an inference is possible only when the reason (e.g. smoke) is perceived to be associated with the object denoted by the minor term (paksa, e.g. hill), but in reality there is no association of the smoke with the hill nor can it be a character of it, for it is a quality of fire. There is no universal agreement between smoke and hill so that one can say that wherever there is a hill there is smoke. Nor can it be said that wherever there is smoke there is both the hill and the fire. When the smoke is first seen it is not perceived as the quality of fire associated with a hill; therefore it is not enough to say that the reason (e.g. smoke) belongs to the minor term (paksa, e.g. hill) as its character (paksa-dharmd), but that the reason belongs to the minor term associated with the probandum. The assertion that in an inference the reason must be known as a quality of the minor term (paksa) has therefore to be interpreted as being a quality of a part of the minor term as associated with the probandum.

A valid inference can be made when the two following con-

1 Sarva-darsana-samgraha, I.

ditions are satisfied: (1) An invariable and unconditional concomitance is known between the reason and the probandum such that in every case when the reason is present the probandum must also be present in all places and in all times, without the association of any determining condition. (2) That a reason having such a concomitance with the probandum must be known to exist in the minor term (paksa) in which the probandum is asserted. Now the Carvaka contention is that none of these conditions can be fulfilled and that therefore valid inference is impossible. Firstly, concomitance is ascertained through an experience of a very large number of cases (bhuyo-darsana) of agreement between the reason {hetii) and the probandum (sadhya). But according to the difference of circumstances, time and place, things differ in their power or capacity and thus since the nature and qualities of things are not constant it is not possible that any two entities should be found to agree with each other under all circumstances in all times and in all places 1 . Again, an experience of a large number of cases cannot eliminate the possibility of a future failure of agreement. It is not possible to witness all cases of fire and smoke and thus root out all chances of a failure of their agreement, and if that were possible there would be no need of any inference 2 . The Carvakas do not admit "universals," and therefore they do not admit that the concomitance is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness {dhumatva) and fire-ness {vahnitvdf. Again, it is impossible to assure oneself that there are no conditions (upadhi) which would vitiate the concomitance between the hetu and the sadhya, for though they may not now be perceivable they may still exist imperceivably 4 . Without a knowledge of agreement in absence (i.e. in a case where there is no fire there is no smoke), there cannot be any assurance of concomitance. It is impossible to exhaust in

1 desa-kdla-dasd-bheda-vicitrd-tmasu vastusu avind-bhdva-niyamo na sakyo vastum aha ca.

Nydya-manjari, p. 119.

2 na pratyaksl-krta ydvad dhumd-gni-vyaktayo'khildh tdvat sydd api dhumo' sau yd" nagner iti sankyate ye tu pratyaksato visvam pasyanti hi bhavddriah

kim divya-caksusdrr esdm anumdna-prayojanam Ibid.

3 sdmdnya-dvdrako' py asti nd'vindbhdva-niscayah vdstavam hi na sdmdnyam ndma kincana vidyate. Ibid.

* Compare Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 693:

vydghdto yadi sanka'sti na cec chankd tatastardm vydghdtd-vadhir dsankd tarkah sankd-vadhih kutah.

experience all cases of absence of fire as being also the cases of the absence of smoke. Thus since without such a joint method of agreement in presence and absence the universal invariable concomitance cannot be determined, and since it is not possible to assure oneself of the universal agreement in presence or in absence, the concomitance itself cannot be determined 1 .

Purandara, however, a follower of Carvaka (probably of the seventh century), admits the usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma regarding the transcendental world, or life after death or the laws of Karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual experience 2 . The main reason for upholding such a distinction between the validity of inference in our practical life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an inductive generalization is made by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence together with agreement in absence, and no cases of agreement in presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by the senses. Thus, since in the supposed supra-sensuous transcendent world no case of a hetu agreeing with the presence of its sadhya can be observed, no inductive generalization or law of concomitance can be made relating to this sphere 3 . In reply to this contention Vadideva says that such a change may be valid against the Mim-amsists who depend upon the joint method of agreement and difference for making any inductive generalization, but this cannot

1 niyamas cd'numdnd-ngam grhitah pratipadyate grahanam cd'sya na'nyatra ndstitd-niscayam vina darsana-darsandbhyam hi niyama-grahanam yadi tad apy asad anagnan hi dhumasye'stam adarsanam anagnis ca kiyan sarvam jagaj-jvalana-varjitam tatra dhumasya ndstitvam naiva pasyanty ayoginah.

Nydya-mafijarl, p. 120.

2 He is mentioned in Kamalasila's Patijikd, p. 431, Purandaras tv aha loka-prasiddham anumanam carvakair apl'syate eva, yat tu kais cit laukikam mdrgam atikramya amimdnam ncyate tan nisidhyate. Vadideva Suri also quotes a sutra of Purandara in his commentary Syddvdda-ratndkdra on his Pramdna-naya-tattra-lokd-lankara, 11. 131: pramdnasya gaunatvdd anumdndd artha-niscaya-durlabhdt.

3 avyabhicdrd-vagamo hi laiikika-hetundm anutneyd'vagame nimittam sa ndsti tantra-siddhesu iti na tebhyah paroksd-rthd'vagamo nydyyo'ta idam nktam anumdndd artha-niscayo durlabhah.

apply against the Jaina view of inference which is based on the principle of necessary implication (anyathd-nupapattdv eva tat-svaru-patvena svikdrdt).

Other objections also made against the possibility of a valid inference are as follows: (1) impressions made by inferential knowledge are dim and not so vivid (aspastatvdt) as those produced by perception; (2) inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object (svdrtha-niscaye para-peksatvaf); (3) inference has to depend on perception (pratyaksa-piirvakatvat); (4) inferential cognitions are not directly produced by the objects (arthdd anupajdyamdnatvdt); (5) inference is not concrete (avastu-visayatvdt); (6) it is often found contradicted (bddhyamdnatvdt); (7) there is no proof which may establish the law that every case of the presence of the hetu should also be a case of the presence of the sadhya {sddhya-sddhanayoh pratibandha-sddhaka-pramdnd-bhdvdd vd) 1 . None of these can be regarded as a reason why inference should be regarded as invalid from the Jaina point of view. For in reply to the first objection it may be pointed out that vividness has never been accepted as a definition of pramdna, and therefore its absence cannot take away the validity of an inference; illusory perceptions of two moons are vivid, but are not on that account regarded as valid. Again, an inference does not always depend on perception, and even if it did, it utilized its materials only for its own use and nothing more. Perception also is produced from certain materials, but is not on that account regarded as invalid. The inference is also produced from objects and is as concrete as perception since like it it involves universals and particulars. Again, false inferences are indeed contradicted, but that is no charge against right inferences. The invariable relationship between a hetu and a sadhya can be established through mental reasoning (tarka) 2 .

Jayanta points out in this connection that a law of universal agreement of the sadhya with the hetu has to be admitted. For an inference cannot be due to any mere instinctive flash of intelligence (pratibhd). If a knowledge of invariable and unconditional agreement was not regarded as indispensable for an inference, and if it was due to a mere instinctive flash, then the people of the Cocoanut

1 Vadideva Suri's Syddvdda-ratndkdra, pp. 131, 132. Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1914. 2 Ibid.

island who do not know how to make fire would have been able to infer fire from smoke. Some say that the invariable association of the hetu with the sadhya is perceived by mental perception (manasa-pratyaksa). They hold that in perceiving the association of smoke with fire and the absence of the former when the latter is absent, the mind understands the invariable association of smoke with fire. It is not necessary in order to come to such a generalization that one should perceive the agreement of smoke and fire in all the infinite number of cases in which they exist together, for the agreement observed in the mind is not between smoke and fire but between smoke-ness and fire-ness (jzalanatza-di-samanya-purahsarataya zyapti-grahanai). The objection against this view would be the denial of class-concepts as held by the Carvakas, Buddhists, and others. There are others, again, who say that even if universals are admitted, it is impossible that there should be universals of all cases of absence of fire as associated with the absence of smoke, and under the circumstances unless all positive and negative instances could be perceived the inductive generalization would be impossible. They, therefore, hold that there is some kind of mystic intuition like that of a yogin (yogi-pratyaksa-kalpatn) by which the invariable relation (pratibandha) is realized. Others hold that an experience of a large number of positive instances unaccompanied by any experience of any case of failure produces the notion of concomitance. But the Nyaya insists on the necessity of an experience of a large number of instances of agreement in presence and absence for arriving at any inductive generalization of concomitance 1 . The Carvakas, of course, say to this that in determining the unconditional invariable agreement of every case of a hetu with its sadhya the absence of visible conditions may be realized by perception; but the possibility of the existence of invisible conditions cannot be eliminated even by the widest experience of agreement in presence, and thus there would always be the fear that the invariable concomitance of the hetu with the sadhya may be conditional, and thus all inference has the value of more or less probability but not of certainty, and it is only through perceptual corroboration that the inferences come to be regarded as valid 2 . The reply of Nyaya to this is that the assertion that in-

1 Nydya-manjari, p. 122.

2 athd-mimdnam napramdnamyogyo-padhlnam yogya-nupalabdhyabhma-nis-caye' py' ayogyo-pddhi-sankayd vyahhicdra-sainsaydt satasah sahacaritayor apt vyabhicdro-palabdhes ca loke dhumd-di-darsand-ntaram vahnyd'di-vyazahdras ca

ference is not valid is itself an inference based on the similarity of inferential processes with other invalid mental processes. But this does not properly refute the Carvaka position that inductive generalizations are only probable, and that therefore (as Purandara says) they acquire some amount of validity by being corroborated by experience and that they have no force in spheres where they cannot be corroborated by perceptual experience.

Since the Carvakas do not attribute any more validity to inference than probability, other forms of pramanas, such as the testimony of trusty persons or the scriptures, analogy or implication, also were not regarded as valid. According to Udayana's statement, the Carvakas denied the existence of anything that was not perceived, and Udayana points out that if this doctrine is consistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be seriously disturbed and upset 1 . The school of dhurta Carvakas, in their Sutra work, not only denied the validity of inference but criticized the Nyaya categories as enunciated in the Nydya-sutra, 1. 1. 1, and tried to establish the view that no such enumeration of categories was possible 2 . It is no doubt true that the Carvakas admitted perception as the only valid pramana, but since illusions occurred in perception also, ultimately all pramanas were regarded as indeterminable by them.

The Carvakas had to contend on the one hand with those who admitted a permanent soul, such as the Jains, the Naiyayikas, the Samkhya-yoga and the Mlmamsa, and on the other hand with the idealistic Buddhists who believed in a permanent series of conscious states; for the Carvakas denied all kinds of existence after death. Thus they say that since there is no permanent entity that abides after death, there is no existence after death. As the body, understanding and sense-functions, are continually changing, there cannot be any existence after death, and hence no separate soul can be admitted. According to some, Carvakas consciousness is pro-

sambhdz'ana-mdtrdt samvddena ca prdmdnyd-bhimdnad. Tattva-cintdmani Annumiti. For a similar view see Russel, "On the notion of Cause" in his Mysticism and Logic.

1 Udayana's Nydya-kusumdiijali, in. 5, 6.

2 cdrvdka-dhurtas tu athatas tattvam vydkhydsydma iti pratijndya pramdna-prameya-samkhyd-laksana-niyamd-sakya-karanlyatvam eva tattvam vydkhyd-tavdn; pramdna-samkhyd-niyam-dsakya-karanlyatva-siddhaye ca pramiti-bhedan pratyaksd-di-pramdndn upajanydn idrsdn upddarsayat. Nydya-manjarl, p. 64.

duced (utpadyate) from the four elements, and according to others it is manifested (abhivyajyate) from them like fermenting intoxication (sura) or acids. It is on account of diverse kinds of arrangements and rearrangements of the atoms of air, water, fire and earth that consciousness is either produced or manifested and the bodies and senses are formed or produced. There is nothing else but these atomic arrangements, and there is also no further separate category 1 .

The school of Susiksita Carvakas holds that, so long as the body remains, there is an entity which remains as the constant perceiver and enjoyer of all experiences. But no such thing exists after the destruction of the body. If there was anything like a permanent self that migrated from one body to another, then it would have remembered the incidents of the past life just as a man remembers the experiences of his childhood or youth 2 . Arguing against the Buddhist view that the series of conscious states in any life cannot be due to the last conscious state before death in a previous life, or that no state of consciousness in any life can be the cause of the series of conscious states in another future life, the Carvakas say that no consciousness that belongs to a different body and a different series can be regarded as the cause of a different series of conscious states belonging to a different body. Like cognitions belonging to a different series, no cognition can be caused by the ultimate state of consciousness of a past body 3 . Again, since the last mental state of a saint cannot produce other mental states in a separate birth, it is wrong to suppose that the last mental state of a dying man should be able to produce any series of mental states in a new birth. For this reason the Carvaka teacher Kambalasvatara says that consciousness is produced from the body through the operation of the vital functions ofprana, apana and other bio-motor faculties. It is also wrong to suppose that there is any dormant consciousness in the early stages of the foetal life, for consciousness means the cognition of objects, and there cannot be any consciousness in the foetal state when no sense-organs are properly developed; so also there is no consciousness in a state of swoon, and

1 tat-samudaye visaye-ndriya-samjna. Carvaka-sutra quoted in.Kamalaslla's Panjika, p. 520.

2 Nydya-maiijarl, p. 467.

3 yadi jndnam na tad vivaksita-tlta-deha-varti-caram ajnana-janyam. jndnatvdt yathd'nya-santdna-varti-jndnam. Kamalaslla's Panjika, p. 521.

it is wrong to suppose that even in these stages consciousness exists as a potential power, for power presupposes something in which it exists and there is no other support for consciousness excepting the body, and, therefore, when the body is destroyed, all consciousness ceases with it. It cannot also be admitted that at death consciousness is transferred to another intermediary body, for no such body is ever perceived and cannot therefore be accepted. There cannot also be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies; thus the mental states of an elephant cannot be in the body of a horse.

The Buddhist reply to this objection of the Carvakas is that if by discarding after-life the Carvakas wish to repudiate the existence of any permanent entity that is born and reborn, then that is no objection to the Buddhists, for they also do not admit any such permanent soul. The Buddhist view is that there is a beginningless and endless series of states of conscious states which, taken as a period of seventy, eighty or a hundred years, is called the present, past or future life. It is wrong on the part of the Carvakas to deny the character of this series as beginningless and endless; for if it is so admitted, then a state of consciousness at birth has to be regarded as the first and that would mean that it had no cause and it would thus be eternal, for since it existed without any cause there is no reason why it should ever cease to exist. It could not also have been produced by some eternal consciousness or god, for no such eternal entities are admitted; it cannot be admitted as being eternal by itself; it cannot be produced by eternal atoms of earth, water, etc., for it may be shown that no eternal entities can produce anything. Thus, the last alternative is that it must have been produced by the previous states of consciousness. Even if the atoms are regarded as momentary it would be difficult to prove that consciousness was produced by them. The principle which determines causation is, firstly, that something is the cause which, being present, that which was worthy of being seen but was not seen before becomes seen 1 . Secondly, when two instances are such that though all the other conditions are present in them both, yet with the introduction of one element there happens a new phenomenon in the one which does not happen in the other, then that element is the cause of that

1 yesdm upalambhe sati upalabdhi-laksana-praptam pUrvam anupalabdham sad upalabhyate ity evam asrayanlyam. Kamalaslla, Panjika, p. 525.

phenomenon 1 . The two instances, which differ from each other only in this that there is the effect in the one and not in the other, agree with each other in all other respects excepting that that in which there is the effect has also a new element which is not present in the other, and it is only in such a case that that element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Otherwise, if the cause is defined as that which being absent the effect is also absent, then there is the alternative possibility of the presence of another element which was also absent, and it might be that it was on account of the absence of this element that the effect was absent. Thus, the two instances where an effect occurs and where it does not occur must be such that they are absolutely the same in every respect, except the fact that there is one element in the case where there is the effect which was absent in the other instance. The causal relation between body and mind cannot be established by such a rigorous application of the joint method of agreement and difference. It is not possible to employ the method of agreement to determine the nature of relation between one's own body and mind, for it is not possible to observe the body in the early foetal stage before the rise of mind, for without mind there cannot be any observation. In other bodies also the mind cannot be directly observed and so it is not possible to say that the body is prior to mind. The method of difference also cannot be employed, for no one can perceive whether with the cessation of the body his mind also ceases or not; and since the minds of other people cannot be directly perceived, such a negative observation cannot be made with reference to other people, and no assertion can therefore be made as to whether with the cessation of other people's bodies their minds also ceased or not. No inference can be drawn from the immobility of the body at death that it must be due to the destruction of mind, for it may still exist and yet remain inoperative in moving the body. Moreover, the fact that a particular body is not moved by it, is due to the fact that the desires and false notions which were operative with reference to that body were then absent.

Again, there are other reasons why the body cannot be regarded as the cause of mind: for if the body as a whole was the cause of

1 satsu tad-anyesu samarthesu ta-dhetusu yasyaVkasyabhiire na bhaiatt'ty evam asrayamyam anyatha hi kevalam tad-abhave na bhavatfty upadaisane sandigdham atra tasya sdmarthyam syat anyasyapi tat-samarthasyabliiivat. Kamalasila, Paiijika, p. 526.

mind, then slight deformities of the body would have changed the character of the mind, or minds associated with big bodies like those of elephants would be greater than those of men. If with the change of one there is no change in the other, the two cannot be said to be related as cause and effect. Nor can it be said that the body with the complete set of senses is the cause of mind, for in that case with the loss of any sense the nature and character of the mind would also be changed. But we know that this is not so, and when by paralysis all the motor organs are rendered inoperative, the mind may still continue to work with unabated vigour 1 . Again, though the body may remain the same, yet the mental temperament, character or tone might considerably change, or sudden emotions might easily unhinge the mind though the body might remain the same. Even if instances are found which prove that the conditions of the body affect the conditions of the mind, yet that is no reason why the mind or soul should cease to exist with the destruction of the body. If on account of co-existence {saha-sthiti-niyamd) of body and mind they may be said to be connected with each other in bonds of causation, then since body is as much co-existent with mind as mind with body, the mind may as well be said to be the cause of body. Co-existence does not prove causation, for coexistence of two things may be due to a third cause. Heated copper melts, so through heat the foetal elements may be supposed to produce on the one hand the body and on the other hand to manifest mind or consciousness. So the co-existence of body and mind does not necessarily mean that the former is the material cause of the latter.

It is said that though the later mental states are perceived to be produced by the previous ones, yet the first manifested consciousness has a beginning and it is produced by the body, and thus the theory of the Buddhists that the series of conscious states is without beginning is false. But if the mental states are in the first instance produced by the body, then these could not in later cases be produced in other ways through the visual or other sense organs. If it is urged that the body is the cause of the first origin of knowledge, but not of the later mental states, then the later mental states ought to be able to raise themselves without being in any way dependent

1 prasuptikd-di-rogd-dind kdrye-ndriyd-dlndm upaghdte'pi mano-dhlr avi-krtaikd-vikaldm sva-sattdm anubhavati. Kamalasila, Panjikd, p. 527.

on the body. If it is held that a mental state can produce a series of other mental states only with the help of the body, then each of them would produce an infinite series of such mental states, but such an infinite number of infinite series is never experienced. It cannot also be said that the body generates consciousness only at the first stage and that in all later stages the body remains only as an accessory cause, for that which once behaves as a generating cause cannot behave as an accessory cause. Thus, even if the physical elements be admitted to be impermanent, they cannot be regarded as the cause. If the mental states be regarded as having a beginning, it may be asked whether by mental states the sense-knowledge or the mental ideas are meant. It cannot be the former, for during sleep, swoon or inattentive conditions there is no sense-knowledge, even though the sense-organs are present, and it has therefore to be admitted that attention is the necessary pre-condition of knowledge, and the sense-organs or the sense-faculties cannot be regarded as the sole cause of sense-knowledge. The mind cannot also be regarded as the sole cause, for unless the sense-data or the sense-objects are perceived by the senses, the mind cannot work on them. If the mind could by itself know objects, then there would have been no blind or deaf people. Admitting for argument's sake that mind produces the cognitions, it may be asked whether this cognition is savikalpa or nirvikalpa; but there cannot be any savikalpa unless the association of names and objects (satiketa) is previously learnt. It cannot be also nirvikalpa knowledge, for nirvikalpa represents the objects as they are in their unique character, which cannot be grasped by the mind alone without the help of the sense-organs. If it is held that even the sense-data are produced by the mind, then that would be the admission of extreme idealism and the giving up of the Carvaka position. Thus, the conscious states are to be regarded as beginning-less and without any origin. Their specific characters are determined by experiences of past lives, and it is as a reminiscence of these experiences that the instincts of sucking or fear show themselves even with the newly-born baby 1 . It has therefore to be admitted that the conscious states are produced neither by the body nor by the mind, but that they are beginningless and are generated by the previous

1 tasmdt purvd-bhydsa-krta evd'yam bdldndm ista-nisto-paddna-paritydga-laksano vyavahdra iti siddhd buddher andditd. Kamalasila, Panjikd, p. 532.

states, and these by other previous states, and so on. The parental consciousness cannot be regarded as being the cause of the consciousness of the offspring, for the latter are not similar in nature, and there are many beings which are not of parental origin. It has, therefore, to be admitted that the conscious states of this life must be produced by the states of another life previous to it. Thus, the existence of a past life is proved. And since the mental states of this life are determined by the mental states of other lives, the mental states of this life also are bound to determine other mental states, and this establishes the existence of future lives; provided, however, that these mental states are associated with the emotions of attachment, anger, antipathy, etc. For the mental states can produce other mental states only when they are affected by the emotions of attachment, anger, etc., and these are inherited by the new-born baby from the mental states of his previous life which determined the series of experiences of his present life. Though the past experiences are transferred to the present life, yet owing to a severe shock due to the intervention of the foetal period these experiences do not at once show themselves in infancy, but reveal themselves gradually with age. One does not always remember what one experienced before; thus, in dreams and deliriums, though the elements of the past experience are present, yet they are reconstructed in a distorted form and do not present themselves in the form of memory. So the past experiences cannot ordinarily be remembered by the infant, though there are some gifted beings who can remember their past lives. It is wrong to suppose that the mind is supported by the body or inheres in it, for the mind is formless. Again, if the mind inhered in the body and was of the same stuff as the body, then the mental states should be as perceptible by the visual organ as the body itself. The mental states can be perceived only by the mind in which they occur, but the body can be perceived both by that mind as well as by others; therefore, these two are of entirely different character and are hence entirely different. The body is continually changing, and it is the unitary series of conscious states that produces the impression of the identity of the body. For though the individual consciousnesses are being destroyed every moment, yet the series remains one in its continuity in the past lives, the present life and the future. When the series is different, as in that of a cow and a horse or between two different

D III 35

persons, the states of the one series cannot affect those in the other. One conscious state is thus admitted to be determining another conscious state, and that another, and so on, within the series. Thus it has to be admitted that consciousness exists, even in the unconscious state; for had it not been so, then there would be a lapse of consciousness at that time and this would mean the breaking up of the series. States of consciousness are independent of the sense-organs and the sense-objects, as they are determined by the previous states; in dreams, when the sense-organs are not operating and when there is no sense-object contact, the conscious states continue to be produced; and in the case of the knowledge of past or future events, or the knowledge of chimerical things like the hare's horn, the independence of conscious states is clearly demonstrated. Thus it is proved that consciousness is neither produced by the body nor is in any way determined or conditioned by it, and it is determined only by its past states and itself determines the future states. Thus also the existence of the past and the future lives is proved.

The arguments of the Jains and of the Naiyayikas against the Carvakas are somewhat of a different nature from those of the idealistic Buddhists just described, as the former admitted permanent souls which the latter denied. Thus Yidyanandi, in his Tattvartha-sloka-vartika, says that the chief reason why the soul cannot be regarded as a product of matter is the fact of undisputed, unintermittent and universal self-consciousness unlimited by time or space. Such perceptions as "this is blue" or " I am white" depend upon external objects or the sense-organs, and cannot therefore be regarded as typical cases of self-consciousness. But such perceptions as "I am happy" which directly refer to the self-perception of the ego do not depend on the operation of any external instruments such as the sense-organs or the like. If this self-consciousness were not admitted to be established by itself, no other doctrine, not even the Carvaka doctrine which seeks to demolish all attested convictions, could be asserted, for all assertions are made by virtue of this self-consciousness. If any consciousness required another consciousness to have itself attested, then that would involve a vicious infinite and the first consciousness would have to be admitted as unconscious. Thus, since the self manifests itself in self-consciousness (sva-samvedana), and since the body is perceived

through the operation of the senses like all other physical things, the former is entirely different from the latter and cannot be produced by the latter, and because it is eternal it cannot also be manifested by the latter. Again, since consciousness exists even without the senses, and since it may not exist even when there is the body and the senses (as in a dead body), the consciousness cannot be regarded as depending on the body. Thus, the self is directly known as different from the body by the testimony of self-consciousness. The other arguments of Vidyanandi are directed against the idealistic Buddhists who do not believe in a permanent self but believe in the beginningless series of conscious states, and this discussion had better be omitted here 1 .

Jayanta argues in the Nyaya-manjari that the body is continually changing from infancy to old age, and therefore the experiences of one body cannot belong to the new body that has been formed through growth or decay, and therefore the identity of the ego and recognition which form the essential constitutive elements of knowledge cannot belong to the body 2 . It is true no doubt that good diet and medicine which are helpful to the body are also helpful to the proper functioning of the intellect. It is also true that curds and vegetable products and damp places soon begin to germinate into insects. But this is no proof that matter is the cause of consciousness. The selves are all-pervading, and when there is appropriate modifications of physical elements they manifest themselves through them according to the conditions of their own karmas. Again, consciousness cannot also be admitted to belong to the senses, for apart from the diverse sense-cognitions there is the apperception of the ego or the self which co-ordinates these diverse sense-cognitions. Thus I feel that whatever I perceive by the eyes I touch by the hand, which shows distinctly that apart from the sense-cognitions there is the individual perceiver or the ego who co-ordinates these sensations, and without such a co-ordinator the unity of the different sensations could not be attained. The Susiksita Carvakas, however, hold that there is one perceiver so long as the body exists, but that this perceiver (pramatr-tattva) does not transmigrate, but is destroyed with the destruction of the body; the soul is thus not immortal, and there is no after-world after the destruction of this body 3 . To this Jayanta's reply is that if

1 Tattvartha-sloka-vdrtika, pp. 26-52. 2 Nydya-manjarl, pp. 439-441.

3 Ibid. pp. 467, 468.

35-2

a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of this body, then since this self is different from the body, and since it is partless and non-physical by nature, there cannot be anything which can destroy it. No one has ever perceived the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Thus, since it has never been found to be destroyed, and since it is not possible to infer any cause which can destroy it, it is to be regarded as immortal. Since the self is eternal, and since it has a present and past association with a body, it is not difficult to prove that it will have also a future association with a body. Thus, self does not reside either in any part of the body or throughout the body, but is all-pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of karma. Para-loka or after-life is defined by Jayanta as rebirth or the association of the soul with other bodies after death. The proofs that are adduced in favour of such rebirths are, firstly, from the instinctive behaviour of infants in sucking the mother's breast or from their unaccountable joys and miseries which are supposed to be due to the memory of their past experiences in another birth; and, secondly, from the inequalities of powers, intelligence, temper, character and habits, inequalities in the reaping of fruits from the same kind of efforts. These can be explained only on the supposition of the effects of karma performed in other births 1 .

Sankara, in interpreting the Brahma-sutra, in. 3. 53, 54, tries to refute the lokayatika doctrine of soullessness. The main points in the lokayatika argument here described are that since consciousness exists only when there is a body, and does not exist when there is no body, this consciousness must be a product of the body. Life-movements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body, since they are experienced only in the body and not outside of it 2 . To this Sankara's reply is that life-movements, memory, etc., do not sometimes exist even when the body exists (at death), therefore they cannot be the products of the body. The qualities of the body, such as colour, form, etc., can be

1 Nydya-manjarl, pp. 470-473.

2 yad dhi yasmin sati bhavaty asati ca na bhavati tat tad-dharmatvena ad-hyavaslyate yathd'gni-dharmdv ausnya-prakdsau; prdna-cestd-caitanya-smrtyd-dayas cd'tma-dharmatvend'bhimatd dtma-vd-dindm te' py antar eva deha upala-bhyamdnd bahis cd'nupalabhyamand asiddhe deha-vyat irikte dharmini deha-dharmd eva bhavitum arhanti; tastndd avyatireko dehdd dtmdna iti. £arikara-bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, in. 3. 53.

perceived by everyone, but there are some who cannot perceive consciousness, memory, etc. Again, though these are perceived so long as the living body exists, yet there is no proof that it does not exist when this body is destroyed. Further, if consciousness is a product of the body, it could not grasp the body; no fire can burn itself and no dancer can mount his own shoulders. Consciousness is always one and unchangeable and is therefore to be regarded as the immortal self. Though ordinarily the self is found to manifest itself in association with a body, that only shows that the body is its instrument, but it does not prove that the self is the product of the body, as is contended by the Carvakas. The Carvakas criticized the entire social, moral and religious programme of orthodox Hindus. Thus Sriharsa, in representing their views in his Naisadh-acarita, says as follows: "The scriptural view that the performance of sacrifices produces wonderful results is directly contradicted by experience, and is as false as the Puranic story of the floating of stones. It is only those who are devoid of wisdom and capacity for work who earn a livelihood by the Vedic sacrifices, or the carrying of three sticks (tridanda), or the besmearing of the forehead with ashes. There is no certainty of the purity of castes, for, considering the irrepressible sex-emotions of men and women, it is impossible to say that any particular lineage has been kept pure throughout its history in the many families on its maternal and paternal sides. Men are not particular in keeping themselves pure, and the reason why they are so keen to keep the women in the harem is nothing but jealousy; it is unjustifiable to think that unbridled sex-indulgence brings any sin or that sins bring suffering and virtues happiness in another birth; for who knows what will happen in the other birth when in this life we often see that sinful men prosper and virtuous people suffer?" The Vedic and the smrti texts are continually coming into conflict with one another, and are reconciled only by the trickery of the commentators; if that is so, why not accept a view in which one may act as one pleases? It is held that the sense of ego is associated with the body, but when this body is burnt, what remains there of virtue or vice, and even if there is anything that will be experienced by another ego and in another body and as such that cannot hurt me. It is ridiculous to suppose that any one should remember anything after death, or that after death the fruits of karma will be reaped, or that by feeding Brahmins after death the so-called departed soul will have any

satisfaction. The image-worship, or the worship of stones with flowers, or of bathing in the Ganges as a religious practice is absolutely ridiculous. The practice of performing sraddha ceremonies for the satisfaction of the departed is useless, for if the offering of food could satisfy the dead then the hunger of travellers could also be removed by their relations offering them food at home. In reality with death and destruction of the body everything ends, for nothing returns when the body is reduced to ashes. Since there is no soul, no rebirth, no god and no after-life, and since all the scriptures are but the instructions of priests interested in cheating the people, and the Puranas are but false mythical accounts and fanciful stories, the one ideal of our conduct is nothing but sense-pleasures. Sins and virtues have no meaning, they are only the words with which people are scared to behave in a particular manner advantageous to the priests. In the field of metaphysics the Carvakas are materialists and believe in nothing beyond the purely sensible elements of the atoms of earth, water, air and fire and their combinations; in the field of logic they believe in nothing but what can be directly perceived; they deny karma, fruits of karma, rebirth or souls. The only thing that the Carvakas cared for was the momentary sense-pleasures, unrestrained enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future, they did not aim at increasing the total happiness and well-being of the whole life as we find in the ethical scheme of Caraka; with them a pigeon/to-day was better than a peacock to-morrow, better to have a sure copper coin to-day than a doubtful gold coin in the future 1 . Thus, immediate sense-pleasures were all that they wanted and any display of prudence, restraint, or other considerations which might lead to the sacrifice of present pleasures was regarded by them as foolish and unwise. It does not seem that there was any element of pessimism in their doctrine. Their whole ethical position followed from their general metaphysical and logical doctrine that sense-objects or sense-pleasures were all that existed, that there was no supra-sensible or transcendent reality, and thus there was no gradation or qualitative difference between the pleasures and no reason why any restraint should be put upon our normal tendency to indulge in sense-pleasures.

1 varam adya kapotah svo mayurdt

varam samsayikan niskdd asamsayikah

kdrfdpana iti lokdyatikdh. Kdma-sutra, I. 2. 29, 30.

Abhayadeva Suri, 524 n.

Abhaya-prada-raja, 134

Abhaya-praddna-sdra, 124

abhdva, 351, 428

abheda, 6, 194, 373

Abhidhdna-padlpikd, 512 n.

abhihitd-nvaya-vdda, 233

abhimdna, 48, 468, 485, 494, 510

abhimantd, 48

abhinivesa, 470

abhinna, 32

Abhirama Varacarya, 69, 134, 138

Abhirama Varadhlsa, 111

Abhlti-stava, 121

abhivyakti, 387

Ablative case, 391

Ablutions, 22

Abnegation, 99

Abode, 52

Absence, 203; of cruelty, 29; of greed, 61; of obstruction, 280

Absolute, 41, 52, 398, 405, 474. 475; coincidence, 230; idealism, 358; immortality, 383; trustfulness, 91

Absolute surrender, 91

Absorption, 195

Abstract, 356

Absurd, 230 n.

Acceptance, 54

Accessory, 24, 37, 90, 124, 205, 259, 261, 273, 292, 310, 330, 331, 387, 444, 452; agent, 272, 275; cause, 544; collocations, 354; methods, 380 n.

Accordance, 54

acic-chakti, 416

acidamsa, 301

acit, 89, 160, 391, 396, 397; Venkata's view of, 162 et seq.

acit-samsarga, 383

Acquaintance, 321, 460

Act, 205, 520

Actions, 7, 11, 16, 28, 31, 32, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55. 129, 186, 187, 198, 212 m., 290, 294, 295, 300, 303, 304, 318, 349, 414, 441, 45i» 452, 455. 485, 493. 506, 508, 521, 523

Active, 48; operation, 203; sense, 49; sympathy, 90

Activity, 27, 36, 42, 44, 47, 50, 51, 413, 446, 447, 448 m., 452, 462, 465, 481,

492, 493. 497, 509 Actual perception, 185 n. t 313 Actual state, 37 Acyuta, 27, 20 adharma, 153, 349, 453, 503 adhigatdrtha-gantr, 216 adhikarana, 352

Adhikarana-cintdmani, 93 n., 123, 125 Adhikarana-darpana, 123 Adhikarana-sdrdrtha-dipikd, 117, 118 Adhikarana-sdrdvali, 118, 123, 125 Adhikarana-sdrdvali-vydkhyd, 123 Adhikarana-yukti-vildsa, 118 Adhikdra-cintdmani, 118 Adhikdra-samgraha-vydkhyd, 127 adhisthdna, 408, 422, 423, 439, 456 adhisthdna-kdrana, 47, 365, 454, 456,

478, 493 adhisthana-karanatd, 484 adhisthdtrtva, 498 adhita-prabandhah prapannah, 91 Adhvarandyikd, 114W., 125 adhyavasdya, 504 Adhydtma-cintd, 132 Adhydtma-cintdmani, 135 Ad infinitum, 332, 417 Adjectival qualities, 254 Adjuncts, 303 Admission, 339 Admixture, 38

Adoration, 53, 54, 55, 70, 450 a-dravya, 225, 251 adrfta, 152, 164, 189, 292, 303, 444,

479", Venkata's view of, 303-4 advaita, 4, 416 Advaita-kdmadhenu, 396 n. Advaita-siddhi, 133 Advaita-vahifkdra, 132 Advaita-vana-kuthdra, 115 n., 384 Advaita-vidyd-vijaya, 126 Advaita-vijaya, 361 Advaitic, 65

Advaitins, 129, 142, 295 Affection, 70, 292 Affinity, 466, 471 Affirmation, 193, 211, 419 Afflictions, 28, 44, 454

1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.

Index

After-life, 541, 548

Agastya-samhitd, 23

Agency, 35, 172, ig8, 412, 484, 488

Agent, 8, 11, 27, 31, 204, 290, 407, 412, 477, 486, 500

Aggavamsa, 513, 514

Agglutinative, 45

Aggregation, 287

Agni, 505, 508

Agni-purana, 20

Agnivesa-samhitd, 517

Agreement, 296, 344, 372, 535, 536

aham-artha, 173, 425

aham anubhavdmi, 171

ahamkara, 7, 25, 43, 47, 48, 49, 56, 91, 144, 145, 146, 156, 163, 172, 173, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260 n., 280, 490, 499. 504. 507, 508, 510, 511; its nature, 171—3; Nimbarka's conception of, 411 et seq.

ahamkara-vaikdrika, 510

aham-pratyaya-vedya, 443

ahimsa, 61

Ahirbudhnya, 24, 34, 50, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 379, 503 n.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, 21, 24, 34, 36 n., 37 n., 39, 40 n., 41, 42, 43 n., 44 n., 46 n., 47 n., 48 n., 49 n., 50 n., 51 w., 52 n., 53 n., 54, 55 n., 56 n., 57 n., 58 M., 59//., 60 n., 62 n., 379, 448 n.; accessories of Yoga in, 61; adoration in, 54; anatomy in, 59; antaryamiti doctrine of, 41; avatar as in, 38—9; dsana in, 60; Brahman, nature of, in, 35; Brahman, followers of, in, 35; developments of ahamkara in, 48; dharma and jiiana, classification of, in, 62; emancipation in, 62; faith in, 54; God's grace in, 52; God, how to approach Him, in, 53; God's llld in, 51; God, power of, different views of, in, 57; God, qualities of, in, 56; God, relation with jlva, in 50; gunas, mutual partial similarity of, in, 46 n.; impure creations in, 42 et seq. ; intermediate creation in, 42; jlva as tatastha-sakti, 50 and 50 n. ; jlva's emancipation in, 52; jlva's nature of, in, 51; jlva's, relation of God with, in, 51; kala and niyati in, 45; Laksmi as mdyd in, 52; Laksmi as sakti in, 52; Laksmi, nature of, in, 52; mahat, development in, 47; mahat in, 47; man, fall of, in, 50; manus and manavasm, 49; mukti, states of, in 56; nature of souls, in 61; nyasa and sarandgati in, 55; objects of pra-

manas in, 62; pramd and pramdna, definition of, in, 62; prapatti in, 54; purusa in, 43; purusa and avidya in, 44; Samkarsana, Pradyumna and Anirudha in, 56; sattva, rajas and tamas in, 45; senses and personality, evolution of, in, 49; service of God in, 54; Sudarsana power, nature of, in, 53; Sudarsana power of, in, 57; sabda-brahman, evolution of, in, 58; sabda-energy and the cakras in, 58; sakti and creation in, 36-7; sakti, nature of, in, 36; sakti of God in, 44; time in, 46; time in relation with categories, in, 46; trinity of prakrti, purusa and kala, in, 46-7; ultimate reality in, 34; ultimate reality, realization of, in, 34; upaya-jiiana in, 55; vasand, karma affecting the jlvas, in, 51; Visnu-sakti as bhdvaka and bhdvya in, 50; vyuhas in, 38; vyuha doctrine in, 39; yamas and niyamas, enumeration of, in, 61; yoga in, 60

Ahobila, 123

Ahobila Raftganatha Yati, 118, 131

Air, 60, 128, 499, 504, 540, 550

aisvarya, 30, 35, 37, 47, 56

aitihya, 426

Aiyangar, Mr S. K., 64 n., 66, 67 n., 68, 81 n., 104 n.

ajada, 146, 171

ajadatva, 171

Ajatasatru, 520, 524

Ajita, 521, 522

Ajita Kesakambali, 521; his doctrines, 521

Ajmir, 103

Ajnana, 144, 177, 178, 179, 195, 315, 317, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 338, 339. 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 393, 394, 407, 408, 409, 41-0, 411, 424, 426, 437, 439. 466, 470, 485, 487, 495. 5°6; characteristics, 365; constituents, 367; diverse supposition of it refuted by Ramanuja, 177 et seq. ; its assumption leads to vicious infinity, 177 n.\ its criticism by Veftkata, 327 et seq.; Nimbarka's conception of, 407 et seq. ; refuted by Ramanuja, 177; stuff, 366; Saft-kara's view of it criticized by Mahacarya, 361 et seq.; Jsaftkarite view criticized by Madhava Mukunda, 424 et seq.; unspeakable, 367; whole ; 372

553

ajndtatayd jndtatayaVva, 249 akala, 44.J akdraka-vdda, 521 Akhanddrthatva-bhanga, 126 akhydti, 47, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184,

185, 186, 187, 237, 239, 241, 243,

245; view, 186 n., 244, 245 akimcitkara, 527 akiriya, 521 akiriyam, 520 Akkaialvan, 97 n. aksara, 46, 503 alambusa, 59 alarka-saka, 97 n. alaukika, 426 'Ala-ud-din, 120 Allahabad, 101, 401 n. All-complete, 303 All-iiluminating, 451 All-merciful, 85, 99, 412 All-perceiving, 27 All-pervading, 393, 405, 413 All-pervasive, 23, 24, 262, 291, 292,

299, 426, 432; entities, 263 All-pervasiveness, 157, 450 Allegorical drama, 121 Alms, 102, 119 alpa, 292 Alternative, 180, 207, 209, 210, 312,

43o Alagarkoil, 103 Amalan-ddipirdn, 69, 134 n. Amara-kosa, 515 Ambrosial sweetness, 84 Ammaftgi, 105 Amorous, 73; longings, 83 amrta, 502 amumtila, 505 amsa, 194, 485 amsd-msibhdva, 484 amsdvatdra, 475 an-adhigatd-rtha-gantr, 215 an-adhyavasdya, 214 Analogy, 5, 128, 144, 192, 216, 219,

230, 269, 276, 298, 301, 315, 322,

341, 371, 4io, 434, 452, 455, 469,

512, 513. 53i M -» 539 Analysis, 52, 180, 207, 297 Analytic, 31 Analytical, 497 Ananda Press, 94 n. Ananta, 39 n., 351 Ananta Bhatta, 98, 102 Ananta Diksita, 98, 162 n. Anantaguru, 112 Anantarama, 408,409,41 o; his criticism

of the mdyd of Jsankara, 410 et seq.

Ananta-suri, 94 n., 98 w., no, 119

Anantacarya, 98, 105, 188, 241, 242 n., 246, 247, 305; supports correspondence theory, 246-7; theory of illusion, 188

Anantarya, 102, no, 112, 131, 133, 209, 297, 298, 395; his notion of class-concepts, 297; his view of relations of souls with God, 297

an-anubhdvyatva, 230, 231

an-anyathd-siddhatva, 390

an-anyathd-siddha-niyata-purva-vartitd,

397 Anatomy, 515 n. anaupddhika, 485 anavadhdrana, 369

anavadhdranatvam eva dvaranam, 370 anavasthd, 9, 176 anavasthd-parihdrdya, 249 anddy-ananta, 61 a-ndmaka, 25 andhatdmisra, 500 Andhrapurna, 104, 105, 109 aneka-dharma, 212 anekdnta, 210 Anger, 32, 48, 61, 545 Animals, 221, 441 n. Animate, 116 Aniruddha, 13, 37, 3 8 » 39. 42, 43, 44,

52,56,57, 157,158,443 m., 448 m., 475 Aniruddha-samhita-mahopanisad, 2 3 anirvacaniya, 179, 238, 239, 243, 435 anirvacanlya-khydtiy 183, 188, 242, 245 anityatva, 199 amyama, 227

Annihilation, 276, 324, 377 Antagonism, 437 Antagonistic, 374 antah, 483 antahkarana, 142, 152, 172, 173, 361,

364, 366, 368, 369, 370, 420, 434,

444. 453, 486, 499 n. antahkarana-vrtti, 411 antaranga, 377 antarydmi, 483 antarydmy-avatdra, 39 n. Antarydmi-brahmana, 390 antarydmin, 40, 41, 200 Antecedent, 203, 342 Antipathy, 29, 30, 51, 87, 148, 449,

470, 488 Antiquity, 99 anubhava, 8, 9 anubhavd-numana, 229 anubhdvya, 231 anubhuti, 143, 168, 170, 171, 177,

230 n., 231, 318, 348

Index

anugraha, 51, 52

anugrahasarga, 502

anumdna, 426, 427, 487

anumiti, 178 n.

anupalabdhi, 426, 428

anuidsana parva, 447

anuzjtti, 224

anuvrtti-visayaka, 224

anuzrtty-avisasayaka-jndna, 224

anu-zyavasaya, 467

anvaya, 231

anvaya-vyatireki, 227, 228, 229, 427

Anvaydrtha-prakdsikd, 197 w.

Anvayarya, 384

Anva\arya Dlksita, 384

anz'itd-bhidhdna, 233; Verikata, its upholder, 233

anvitd-bhidhdna-vada, 233

anyathd-jfidna, 485

anyathd-khydti, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 210, 237, 239, 241, 242, 244, 245. 398

anyathavabhdsuh, 179

anvyayi, 229

anyonya-bhdva, 428

anyonyd-sraya, 329

avyundnatirikta, 46

Afigird, 482

Anguttara Nikdya, 516 w, 518, 524

Aiijali-vaibhava, 127

Anna-guru, 115

Annavayyarigacarya, 133

Annayacarya, m, 137

Annayarya, 115, 130, 132, 133, 396

arm, 498

a/>, 49 w.

apara, 489

apard, 509

aparigraha, 61 n.

aparoksa, 227, 367, 442

Aparydtmdmrtdcarya, 112

Apathy, 73

apavarga, 506

a/>awa, 59, 540

apdna vayu, 59

apdramdrthikd, 477

Aperture, 59

Apostolic, 66

Appayacarya, 122

Apyaya-diksita, 114, 116, 121, 131,

133

Appeal, 56

Appearance, 52, 179, 180, 182, 187, 188, 193, 196, 199, 207, 218, 268, 290, 306, 325, 332, 333, 336, 337, 366, 367, 369, 407, 422, 471

Apperception, 80, 368, 465

Apprehension, 177, 183, 186, 215, 219,

239 apramdna, 247 aprameyatva, 230 n. apravrttimat, 46 aprdkrta-vapuh, 73 a-prdmdnya, 202 aprthak-siddha, 209 a-prthak-sthita, 35 apurva, 303, 506 apurvavidhi, 405 n. arcdvatdra, 39 n., 41 Arcir-ddi, 135 n. Argument, 124, 184, 190, 289, 291,

3"3, 314, 503. 512, 513, 517, 546,

547; in a circle, 17 arista, 506 n. Arjuna, 39. 158 artha, 62

artha-kriya-karitva, 436, 458 Artha-paficaka, 135 n. artha-paricchedaka, 240 artha-pariccheda-kdri, 240 arthapatti, 128, 234, 235, 314, 426;

upheld by Meghanadari, 234-5 artha-prakdsd, 356 Artha-sdstra, 512, 532 Articles of worship, 70 Arunaghafl, 416

Arunddhikarana-sarana-vivarani, 392 arvaksrotas, 501, 502 Aragiyas, 68, 85, 88, 89, 94, 105. 138 asamavdyi, 456 asamprajndta, 488 asamprajndta-samadhi, 446, 487 asamprajndta yoga, 446 asamsargdgraha, 186 asanga, 453, 469 asaf, 457 asatlva, 339

asddhdrana-kdrana, 224 Ascetic, 293, 305, 520, 523, 524, 527 Ash, 186 asmita, 470 Asoka, 522 aspastatvdt, 537 Aspects, 311, 414, 419, 454 assdda, 513 Assembly, 482

Assertion, 313, 343, 344, 431, 432 Association, 26, 185 n., 186, 187, 199,

224, 233, 284, 299, 300, 303, 308,

326, 327, 345, 389, 408, 412, 441,

469. 470, 474. 489, 493. 503, 509,

534. 535; of body, 389 Assumptions, 186 n., 297, 298, 323,

338, 350, 424, 437. 439

555

asteya, 61 asthira, 292

Asti-brahmeti-sruty-artha-vicdra, 131 Astronomy, 515 n. asura, 528, 529, 531 n. Astddasa-bheda-nirnaya, 85, 86, 88,

89 m., 90 n., 91, 92 n., 93 n., 132,

138; its contents, 88 ef seg. Astddasa-rahasydrtha-nirnaya, 117 Astddaia-rahasydrtha-vivarana, 85,86,

'87 M. astdnga yoga, 24, 96, 98 Astdvimsad-vidhdtmikd, 501 w. Asvamedha-parvan, 517 a-tathd-bhiitd-rtha-jndnam, 247 Atharva-Veda, 447 Atheism, 473, 479 Atheistic, 472, 480 atiprakdsa, 503 atisaya, 203 atlndriya, 225, 354 Atomic, 7, 51, 89, 100 m., 194, 281,

413, 432, 443, 444; individuals, 93;

individual souis, 93; theory, 262 Atomists, 211, 264 Atoms, 128, 152, 155, 163, 183, 262,

264, 540, 541, 550 Attachment, 10, 29, 32, 34, 51, 71, 148,

287, 437, 441, 449, 450, 462, 464,

470, 506, 545 Attainment, 32, 60, 62, 70, 290, 429,

443. 445 Attention, 31, 310 Atthasdlinl, 514 n. Attitude, 344 Attribute, 80, 192, 193, 195, 222, 407,

413

Attribution, 325, 472

Attutayi, 98

Auditory, 308; knowledge, 5; perception, 281

Aufrecht, 127

aupddhika, 434

Author, 130

Authoritativeness, 20

Authority, 175, 517

Auto-intoxication, 82

avatdra, 38, 39, 40 n., 129, 302, 401,

475 avayava, 227, 232, 263 avayavl, 263

avayavo-pacayd-pacayayor, 386 avdcyatva, 230 n. avdntara-vydpdra, 203 avdstava, 436 avedinah, 501 a-vedyatva, 231, 367

avibhdga, 455, 460

a-vidhi-gocaratva, 88 n.

avidyd, 4, 5, 29, 44, 46, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 194, 196, 198 n., 295, 296, 308, 316, 317, 319, 321, 322, 324, 326, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 337, 338, 339, 343, 345, 3^4, 3 6 5, 366, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 393, 414, 421, 422, 423, 436, 441, 443, 444, 445, 468, 469, 470, 476, 477, 478, 487, 402, 500, 507, 508 n.\ Brahman cannot assume diverse forms on account of, 176; Brahman cannot be dsraya of it, 176; conception of its cessation criticized, 338 et seq.; in relation to self-luminosity, as treated by Vijnana-Bhiksu, 468 et seq.; it cannot veil Brahman, 176; its criticism by Venkata, 330 et seq.; its opposition to vidyd, 176; Nim-barka's idea of, 411; £aftkara's conception refuted, 175 et seq.; the view of its difference from mdyd criticized, 334 et seq.

avidydyam jlvah flvdda vidyd, 177 n.

a-visamvdditva, 216

a-visada-svarupa, 177

avisesa, 499, 504

aviveka, 449

avuddhipurvaka, 502

avyakta, 34, 36, 45, 257, 476, 477, 488,

497, 504, 5io, 5". Avyakta-nrsimhopanisad, 13 avyakti, 52 Avyaktopanisad, 13 a-vyavahita, 136 Awakened state, 178 Awareness, 184, 185 n., 205, 217, 220,

248, 255, 319, 320, 321, 322, 340,

341, 344,439 Ayodhya, 103, 120 ayoni, 46 Ayyanna, 133 Ayyar, Sir Subrahmanya, Lectures,

64 m., 65 n. Acdra-locana, 133 deary a, 102 Acdrya-dlksita, 130 Acdrya-hrdaya, 137, 138 Acdrya-pancdsat, 117 Acdrya-vimsati, 133 ddhdra, 454 ddhdrd-kdro-pddhi, 333 ddheyatva, 298 ddhydsika-sambandha, 423 ddhydtmikl, 507

Index

Aditya, 20

Adivarahacarya, 132

Adivaraha Vedantacarya, 131

dgama, 14, 487, 519

Agama-prdmdnya, 14, 17, 98, 154, 155

agantuka-dharmavattvam, 393

Agariga, 96

dgneya-mandala, 59

Ajlvaka sect, 522

djlvakas, 523, 524, 525

Ajlvakas, their views, 522

djwas, 523

dkdsa, 6, 48, 49 n., 163, 164, 252, 260, 261, 263, 280, 282, 283, 284, 498, _499, 504. 5io

Akasadhikatana-vicara, 133

Alaya-vijndna, 274, 275

Alavandar, 67 n., 97

Alvartirunagari, 68

dnanda, 35, 154, 344, 444. 445. _ 4 86

Ananda-ddyinl, 122, 123, 131

Anandagiri, 105, 106, 107

Ananda-tdratamya-khandana, 129,133,

_ 392

Ananda-vallari, 122

dnukfdyasya samkalpa, 92

anvlksikl, 512

Angirasa, 21

Anbillai, 105

Anbillai-Kandadai-yappan, 64

Andal, 63, 64, 65, 66 w., 67, 69, 77, 97, 109, 110, 134 n.

Andan lineage, 129

dparoksya, 309

Arddhana-krama, 122

Aradhand-samgraha, 125, 352

drjava, 61

Artti-prabandha, 138

Arvar and Ramanuja, difference of outlook, 112

Arvar Kula-sekhara, 80 n.

Arvar literature, 91

Arvars, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88 n., 89, 102, 105, 112, 124, 134, 138, 376; Andal's filial love, 77; Andal's love for God as GopI, 77; the Aragiyas generally followed Arvars, though there were differences in religious dogmas, 85; as Avataras of, 64; castes of, 64; cessation of inclinations leads to God, 72; chronology of, 64-8; conception of bridegroom and bride, 79; difference of their devotion with that of the £aivas, 83; difference between Arvars and

Aragiyas on religious dogmas, 85-6; distinguished from the Aragiyas, 68; episode of the King Kula-sekhara, feeling oneself as wife of God, 73; fifth centum, 72-3; fourth centum, 72; God constantly wooing the devotee, 78; God fettered by His mercy, 78; God's grace, only means of salvation, 78; influence of the Puranic religion on the Arvars, 81; lamentation for God, 73; lamentation illustrated, 74, 75, 76; love of God, ever growing, 79; meaning of, 68; Namm'-arvar's conception of soul, 79-80; Namm'-arvar's third centum, 71; ninth centum, 73; pangs for God, 71; pathological symptoms of love similar to those of the Vaisnavas of the Gaudiya school, 83; Periy-arvar's conception of himself as Yosoda, 77; philosophy of, 69 c/ seq. ; Radha (Nappinai) referred to as the consort of Krsna, 81; reference to in Bhagavata, 63; sources of, 64; stages of God's love, 79; summary of Jsathakopa's works, 70 et seq. ; their auto-intoxication, 82; their controversy with the Vaisnavas regarding religious dogmas, 84; their distinction from the Aragiyas, 94; their love ecstatic but not philosophic, 79; their love of God does not sh6w signs of gross criticism, 83; their relation with the love of the Gaudiya school, 81—2; their works divided into three rahasyas, 92; the Tehgalai and Vadagalai schools represent the difference between the Arvars and the Aragiyas, 86; they identify themselves as legendary personages associated with the life of Krsna unlike Bhagavata, 81; they reveal a knowledge of Puranic religion of Krsna, 80; they reveal in the devotion all the principal types of emotion, 83; they visualized God everywhere through intoxication of love, 83; Tiru-maftgaiy's filial love, 77; Tiru-mahgaiy and Namm'a.rvar, difference of their love, 79; vision of God, 72; works of, 68-9

Arvar-Tirunagari, 103

Arvaric Tehgalai school, 86

dsana, 30, 60, 61, 505

dstika, 471, 518

astikya, 62

Asuri Kesava, 98, 100

557

dsaya, 44

dsrama, 2, 11, 91, 293

dsraya, 176, 407

Asvaldyana-smrn, 20

dtma-caitanya, 8

dtma-khydti, 238

dtma-niksepah, 92

dtma-samarpana, 60

Atma-siddhi, 207, 227

Atman, 30, 34, 142, 173, 338, 483, 486,

502, 510, 529 dimdf, 8o, 483, 485 dtmd-nubhava-laksana-kaivalyd-khya-

purusdrthah, 382 dtmdsraya, 255 atma 1x2 are drastavyah, 8 Atreya, 39, 106, 107, 119 Atreya gotra, 109, no, 118 Atreyanatha, 114 n., 125 Atreyanatha suri, 346 Atreya Ramanuja, 119 Atreya varada, 132 Atri, 21; lineage, 352 dtyantika, 502. 503 dvarana, 283, 369, 372 dvara.nd-bha.va, 282 dvesdvatdra, 38, 39, 475 dyata, 514 dyatana, 515 Ayur-veda, 517

Bad, 80, 452, 521; actions, 414; deeds,

4i5, 444. 527 Badari, 103 Badarl-natha, 96 bala, 37, 56 Balabhadracarya, 401 Baladeva, 496 Balarama, 392, 429 bandha, 136 Bangkok, 515 n. Baptism, 19 Barabar hills, 522 Barua, Dr, 521 n., 524 n. Basic, 475; cause, 365; consciousness,

362; reality, 449 Basis, 46, 182, 192, 332, 334, 422, 423,

439, 440, 454. 456, 468, 471, 4 8 9,

494. 515 Bath, 104 Badarayana, 15, 17, 125, 235, 381; his

so-called refutation of Paficaratra is

not correct, 17; refutes the Paft-

caratras, 15 bddha, 459

badhaka-samsarga-grahdnam, 186 Badhula £rlnivasacarya, 361

bdla-loka, 513

Bdla-sarasvatl, 133

Bdrhaspatya, 512, 533

Bdrhaspatya-sutra, 532

Beauty, 71, 98

Becoming, 457

Before and after, 284

Beginning, 343, 544

Beginningless, 5, 6, 26, 27, 34, 43, 51, 54, 177, 198 n., 279, 284, 285, 330, 33i, 339, 354, 367, 372, 373, 4°9, 413, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 444, 446, 448, 452, 467, 474, 477, 489, 497, 506, 544, 547; time, 316

Behaviour, 5, 179, 185, 187, 236, 240, 244, 246, 287

Behaviouristic action, 288

Beings, 30, 34, 42, 49, 54. I54> 190, 195, 239, 243, 312, 313, 314, 325, 339, 413, 421, 431, 436, 443 "•, 447, 448, 450, 452, 454, 456. 457, 465, 474, 477, 4 8 °, 4 8 3, 4 88 > 4 8 9, 509, 524

Belief, 55, 187, 204, 290

Bell, 119 n.

Bellary, 399

Benares, 103

Benediction, 42

Beneficent, 52

Beneficial, 51, 62; effects, 335

Bengal, 94, 112

Bengal Asiatic Society, 401

Besnagar Column, 19

Bhadantabhaskara, 3 n.

Bhadda, 522

bhadra, 30, 60

Bhagavad-drddhana-krama, 113

Bhagavad-gttd, 97, 105, 379, 402, 482,

485

Bhagavad-guna-darpana, 119 n.

Bhagavad-vishayam, 78 n., 79, 79 n.

bhagavanmaya, 51

Bhagavat, 107

bhagavat-prlty-artham, 92

Bhagavat Senapati Misra, 117, 132

Bhagavatl-sutra, 522, 524 n., 525

bhagavdn, 34, 107 n., 475, 508 n.

Bhaktagramapurna, no

Bhaktaiighrirenu, 63

bhakti, 17, 19, 32, 33, 63, 63 n., 93, 100, I39 ; 161, 292, 293, 378, 380, 382, 450, 451, 507, 509; as conjugal love, 70; as ddsya, 70; cult, 63; in Vijftana Bhiksu, 450 et seq.; Veh-kafa's views, 292 et seq.

bhakti-exuhation, 78

Bhakti-sara, 63, 96 n.

Index

bhakti-yoga, 89, 91, 100

Bhandarkar, Sir R. G., 64 m., 66, 67,

80 n., 399, 4.02; Report of the Search

for Sanskrit Manuscripts 1882-

1883, 401 bhantikas, 182 Bharadvaja, 530 Bharadvaja gotra, 98 Bharadvaja lineage, 133, 440 Bharadvaja Samhitd, 379 Bhartrhari, 108 Bhartrmitra, 108 Bhartr-prapanca, 108, 471 Bharuchi, 139 Bhatta Bhaskara, 1,2,311. Bhattanatha, 137, 138 Bhattarakaguru, 210, 214 n., 226, 229,

234; his view of doubt, 210 Bhattarya, 134 Bhaftojl Diksita, 1, 19B.; speaking of

Bhaskara, 1 Bhagavata cult, 19 Bhagavata school, 3 n. Bhagavata-mahatmyay 63 Bhdgavata-purdna, 40 «., 63, 63 n., 66,

67, 80 n., 81, 402, 451, 518 Bhdgavata-yoga, 24, 32 Bhagavatas, 2, 15, 17, 19, 20, 71, 450,

475 n -i 5 J 8 w., 527 n.; not low castes,

17

Bhdguri, 516, 531

Bhdmatl, 4, 196, 196 n., 476

Bhaskara, 1, 2, 3, 3 w., 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 106, 108, 113, 124, 155, 192, i93> 194, 195, 197, 200, 201, 301, 305, 413, 429, 433, 434. 472, 497; a tri-dandin,, 1; bhakti, nature of, 10; Brahman as transcendent, 10; Brahman not exhausted in transformation, 10; deeds, relation of, with knowledge, 7; difference between his view and that of Jaahkara, 2; episternology distinguished from Sahkara, 9; his bhedabheda concept, 6; his causality view of, 4-5; his date, 3; his difference with Rumania, 8; his sea and wave illustration, 6; his view, God and soul relation of, 6; his view of Brahman, 301; his view of God, 155; his views contrasted with those of Ramanuja, 192 et seq. ; his views criticized from the Nimbarka point of view, 431 et seq.; flvan-mukti, denial of, 10-11; jiidna-samuccita-karma, his view of, 8; knowledge, his view of, 8; liberation, nature of, 9; liberation of

duties, 9; mukti, way to, 10; relation of Brahma-sutra with Mlmamsa-sutra, his concept of, 7; relation to Pancaratras, p. 2; sat cit and ananta, identity of, 10; soul nature of, 7; soul relation with God, 7; substance and qualities, view of, 10; Sahkara, refutation of, 4-5; transcendent Brahman, nature of, 10; world as spiritual, 10

Bhaskara Bhatfa, 3

Bhdskara-bhdsya, 2 m., 4, 6 m., 7, 8 m.

Bhaskaradeva, 3 n.

Bhaskaradiksita, 3 n.

Bhaskaramisra, 3 n.

Bhaskaranrsimha, 3 n.

Bhaskarasena, 3 n.

Bhaskarasastrl, 3 n.

Bhaskaracarya, 3

Bhaskaracarya, Pandita, 3 n.

Bhaskaranandanatha, 3 n.

Bhaskararanya, 3 n.

Bhaskarites, 431

bhdsya. 88 n., 107 n., 108, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 138, 139, 181 M., 196, 298, 352, 395, 400, 514

bhasya-kara, 108

Bhdsya-prakdsikd-dusanoddhdra, 114

Bhdsya-vivarana, 128

bhdsyopodghdta, 106

Bhatta, 248

Bhaudajl, Dr 3

bhdva, 52

bhdva-jd, 29

bhdvaka, 50, 51, 53

Bhdva-prabodha, 114M., 125

Bhdva-pradlpikd, 116, 131

Bhdva-prakdsa, 122

Bhdva-prakdsikd, 114, 122, 131

Bhdva-prakdsikd-dusanoddhdra, 130

bhava-rupd'-jiidna, 361

bhdvya, 50, 51, 53

bheda, 6, 194, 223, 417

Bheda-darpana, 115, 384, 388, 392

Bheda-mani, 115 m., 384

Bheda-vdda, 133

bheda-vddl, 401

bhedabheda, i t 28, 105, 107, 406, 413,

471_. 472 Bheda-bheda-vada, 405 Bheda-dhikkdra-nyakkdra, 122 bheddgraha, 186 Bhiksu, 281 m., 448, 450, 451, 452,

456, 460, 465, 466, 467, 468, 47i,

472, 473, 474. 477, 47», 479, 4^7, 488

559

bhinnatve satyabhinna-sattdkatvam, 373

bhoga, 300, 464, 485, 495

bhogya-sakti, 6

bhoktr, 6

BhrSnta-yoglndra, 63 n.

Bhrgu, 482

Bhutan, 68 n.

Bhii-gola-nirnaya, 122

Bhumi, 41, 57, 511

Bhuri Bhatta, 402

Bhuri Ssrlsailapurna, 98, 109

6/iwta-modifications, 183

Bhutapurl, 100, 101

bhutas, 163, 182, 260 n., 261, 502, 504,

507, 5io bhuta-sarga, 502 n. Bhutan'-arvSr, 63, 64, 65, 68, 66 n.,

68 n., 134 n. Bhutayoglndra, 63 n. bhuta-yoni, 25 bhutddi, 48, 163, 259, 260, 261, 498,

499. 504, 5io bhutdni, 512 bhutdtmd, 25 bhuti, 44 bhuti-bheddh, 44 bhuti-sakti, 42 bhuty-amsah, 44 bhuyo-darsana-gamya, 228 Bibliotheca Indica, 483 n. Bile, 182 bindu, 58

Bio-motor, 59, 258; faculties, 540 Birth, 33, 5i, 287, 290, 294, 370, 382,

43i, 462, 549 Bison, 234 Bittideva, 104, 113 bljdfikura, 177 Black Rati, 38 Blind, 367; man, 390 Bliss, 16, 34, 35, 41, 50, 51, 52, 71,

144, 154. 175, 295, 302, 304, 311,

365, 366, 404, 408, 413, 414, 441,

442, 443, 445, 448, 463, 474, 485,

486, 489, 494 Blissful, 62; emotion, 71; nature,

383 Blissfulness, 325 Blue colour, 153 Boar, 38 boddhd, 48 bodha-laksana, 10 BodhSyana, 105, 108, 109, 139, 180,

181 n., 192, 350 Bodhdyana-vrtti, 102, 103 n. Bodhisattva. 513 Bodily charms, 83

Body, 7, 31, 33, 41, 55, 58, 59, 60, 80, 139, 191, 192, 194, 195, 199, 201, 288, 289, 291, 295, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302, 308, 325, 327, 352, 365, 369, 39i, 412, 414, 444, 448, 450, 451, 456, 462, 475, 504, 522, 526, 528, 529, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 546, 548, 549, 550; of God, 71

Bombay, 200 n.

Bond 26; of sympathy, 71

Bondage, 5, 7, 24, 27, 44, 51, 57, 136, 201, 292, 295, 334, 364, 365, 370, 407, 410, 412, 414, 421, 432, 433, 437, 453, 457, 460, 476, 477, 491, 495, 506, 509

BrahmS, 306, 473, 474

brahma-bhakti 507

brahma-carya, 61

Brahma-causality, 116, 388, 396

brahma-cdrin, 124

Brahma-character, 366

Brahmadatta, 108, 291; his view of Brahman, 291

Brahma-experience, 465; treatment by VijnSna Bhiksu, 465

Brahmahood, 17, 405 11., 506

Brahma-jndna-nirdsa, 1 30

Brahma-knowledge, 2, 4, 89, 305, 308, 326, 336, 337, 435, 466

Brahma-laksana-vada, 133

Brahma-laksana-vdkydrlha, 130

Brahma-lakfana-vdkydrtha-samgraha, 130

brahma-laya, 569

Brahma-manifestation, 373

Brahman, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 20, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 68, 89, 93, 106, 116, 126, 136 n., 153, 154, 155, 156, 165, 166, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 208, 211, 224, 239, 291, 295, 299, 300 n., 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 312, 3i3, 3i4, 3i5, 316, 317, 319, 320, 322, 323, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 33i, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 34°, 343, 345, 35°, 351, 352, 365, 366, 367, 369 37i, 372, 373, 374,' 381, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 39i, 392, 394. 395, 396, 397, 398, 404, 405. 406, 407, 408, 409, 412, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 429, 430, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 44°, 445, 446, 447, 448, 452, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 460, 461, 462, 464, 465, 466, 477, 483, 484,

Index

Brahman (cont.)

485, 486, 487, 492, 4Q3, 494, 495, 497, 506, 509; material and efficient cause, 301

Brahmanandin, 106, 107

Brahman-consciousness, 317

Brahmanhood, 383 n.

Brahmanic, 515 n.

Brahman of Sarikara, 396

Brahman's nature, 397

Brahmana, 527

brahma-randhra, 31, 59

Brahma-rdtra, 23

brahma-samasattdka-vikdrd - ngikdrdt,

39° Brahma-samhitd, 40 n.; avatdras in,

40 n. Brahma-sarga, 25 Brahma-state, 468 Brahma-sutra, 1, 3, 4, 7 n., 15, 17, 102,

105, 107, 108, 113, 116, 117, 118,

124, 125, 126, 133, 139, 195, 196,

305, 349, 35°. 381, 402, 404, 405 "-.

406 n., 440, 454, 465, 466, 472, 478,

479, 48o L 482, 496, 5*7_*-, 54« Brahma - sutra - bhdsya-purva-paksa-

samgraha-kdrikd, 117 Brahma - siitra - bhdsyd - rambha -prayo -

yana-samarthana, 118 Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-samgraha-viva-

rana, 118 Brahma - sutra - bhdsya - vydkhyd, 117,

130 Brahma-sutra-bhdsyopa-nyasa, 117,

125 Brahma-sutra-dlpikd, 118, 133 Brahma-sutrdrtha-samgraha, 108, 116,

130 Brahma-sabddrtha-vicdra, 130, 131 Brahma-sakti-vdda, 133 Brahmatantra-jiyar, 111 Brahma-vidyd-kaumudi, 115 Brahma-vidyd-vijaya, 117, 126 Brahma-visnu, 497 Brahma, 12, 13, 25, 38, 40 «., 43, 45,

52, 232, 475, 499, 503, 504, 505, 507,

510 Brahmd-jndna-vddl, ill n. brahmdnda, 38 Brahmdnda-purdna, 20 brahmdtmatva, 431 Brahminic, 2, 19 Brahmins, 14, 17, 1 n., 97, 441 w., 516,

517, 518, 521, 549 brahmi, 47 brahmopdsanam, 382 brdhma, 502

Breath, 60

Breath-control, 23

Brhad-dranyaka Upanisad, 494, 519,

519 n., 528, 529 Brhad-dranyako-panisat-prakdsikd, 126 Brhaj-jdtaka, 523 Brhaspati, 12, 140 n., 516, 531, 532,

533 Brhaspati-sutra, 531 Bridegroom, 79, 378 Brindaban, 63, 120, 440 Buddha, 39, 505, 522 Buddhaghoso, 512, 513, 520, 521 n.,

522, 524 n. buddhi, 7, 43, 47, 49, 56, 80, 144, 147,

148, 163, 449, 453, 464, 465, 466,

467, 468, 469, 470, 476, 480, 486,

490, 491, 494, 495, 499 "-, 5°3, 5°6, 507, 508; in relation to sukha-duhkha in Vijnana Bhiksu, 464

Buddhism, 143, 516

buddhi-states, 467

Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, refutation by Verikata, 268 et seq.

Buddhist theory, 262

Buddhist view, 251-2, 541

Buddhistic doctrines, 518

Buddhistic literature, 520

Buddhistic texts, 518

Buddhists, 1, 129, 205, 216, 236, 238, 254, 255, 268, 269, 270, 271, 275, 276, 282, 398, 424, 443, 471, 512, 513, 518, 519, 525, 527, 538, 539, 540, 541, 543, 546; view of invalidity inadmissible, 236

buddhi-tattva, 25

Bukka I, King, 121

Bukka's son Kampana, 121

Burning capacity, 249

Burning object, 249

Caitanya, 403 caitanya, 8, 81, 141, 451 Caitanya-caritdmrta, 403 n. Cakdra-samarthana, 123 cakra, 58, 60, 64 caksus, 502 Calmness, 52 Campakesa, 115, 117, 131 Canda-mdruta, 117, 123, 126, 129 Capacity, 149, 349, 354; of fire, 249 Caraka-samhitd, 516 carama, 135 n. Carama-guru-nirnaya, 1 25 Carama-sloka-churukku, 94 Caramopdya-tdtparya, 122 Cardinal faith, 86

561

Cardinal points, 85, 86

Carnatica, 104 n.

Carnatik, 63

Case, 288

Case-ending, 239

Case-relation, 233

Caste, 17, 42, 43, 49, 293, 416, 441 n., 5*8, 549

Caste-distinction, 44

Caste-duties, 33, 414

Casuistry, 514, 515

Catalogue, 400

Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the Northwestern Provinces, 379, 400 n., 401 n.

Catalogus Catalogorum, 127

Category, 2, 30, 36, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 80, 89, 98, 128, 129, 150, 223, 224, 239, 257, 258, 297, 328, 339, 34°, 35°, 3Si, 353, 354, 355, 417, 428, 429, 435, 480, 503, 540; of difference, 417; of time, 284

Catholic, 104

Catuh-sloki, 94 n., 98, 99, 123

Catuh-slokl-vyakhyd, 131

Catur-vyuha, 509 n

Causal, 46, 265, 341, 344, 470, 473, 484; agents, 267; constituent, 267; doctrine, 199; efficiency, 268, 271, 276, 436, 458; entity, 371; instruments, 203; material, 465; moment, 273; movement, 502; nature, 395; operation, 205, 263, 265, 266, 267, 270, 272, 276, 343; principle, 192; qualities, 256; relations, 279, 342; state, 42, 200, 344; substance, 344,

39i

Causality, 53, 128, 205, 206, 276, 278, 299, 300, 389, 396, 455, 456, 459, 470

Causation, 354, 397, 456, 541, 543

Cause, 4, 8, 9, 24, 42, 46, 58, 174, 179, 181, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197. 198, 199, 204, 206, 232, 256, 257, 260 n., 266, 267, 270, 271, 276, 277, 278, 279, 293, 295. 299, 306, 310, 330, 333, 339, 34i, 342, 343, 350, 354, 365, 366, 385, 388, 389, 396, 406, 410, 413, 433, 441, 447 "•, 448, 452, 454, 455, 456, 460, 465, 469, 470, 472, 473, 479, 483, 493, 495, 5°3, 5°9, 520, 524, 539 n., 541, 542, 543, 545, 547; and effect, 258; qualities, 257

Causeless, 46, 354

Cause-moment, 273

Cause-space, 273

Cause-time, 273

Carvaka, 139, 140, 276, 280, 282, 286, 288, 289, 432, 512, 515, 516, 522, 528, 531, 533, 536, 538, 539, 541, 544, 546, 549, 550; contention, 535; criticisms against by Jains and Naiyayikas, 546; criticisms of the Buddhists, against, 541 et seq.; doctrine, 546; his logic, 533 et seq.; his logic criticized by Jayanta, Udayana, etc., 537 et seq.; logic, 533; other criticisms against, 548 et seq.; reference to, 531 et seq.; their arguments for denying soul, 289 n.; types of, 539

Cdrvdrka-sasti, 531 n.

Cdrvdkism, 139

Cease, 310

Central question, 50

Centum, 72

Ceremonial duties, 160

Ceremonials, 41

Cessation, 27, 28, 52, 61, 136, 177, 287, 292, 293, 295, 310, 321, 338, 339, 365, 366, 369, 371, 372, 374. 393, 445, 453, 463, 47o, 486, 506, 523, 572; of bondage, 364; of rebirth, 70

cestd, 300

chala, 512

Chaldri-smrti, 103

Change, 196, 313, 314, 321, 325, 338, 344. 443 «-, 445, 447, 456, 457, 458, 485, 488, 489, 490, 493, 495

Changeable, 313, 323

Changeless, 34, 61, 195, 389, 396, 457

Character, 46, 180, 181, 193, 194, 195, 209, 210, 297, 311, 312, 315, 319,

323, 324, 33 1 , 332, 333, 334, 336,

351, 407, 408, 411, 430, 465, 534,

548 Characteristic, 185, 207, 209, 212, 300,

3»7, 325. 35°, 426, 450; quality, 317 Characterless, 166, 195, 356 Charity, 86, 87 Charm of God, 83 Chdndoagyopanisad-bhdsya, 117 Chdndogya, 101, 106, 528, 529, 530 Chdndogya Upanisad, 3, 106, 107, 126,

517, 528; heretics referred to, in, 528 Chdndogyo-panisad-prakds'ikd, 126 Chemical change, 141 Chimerical, 179, 191, 241, 271, 312,

3i4. 3i9, 33i, 339, 406, 435;

entities, 239, 243, 271, 333, 344,

440; objects, 274; theory, 266

36

Index

Choice, 304

Chowkhamba, 202 n., 209 n.

Chronological, 68

cic-chakti, 32, 416

cidamsa, 301

cin-mdtram, 165

cintandtmakam indriyam, 48

Circular, 255

Circulation, 59

Circumstances, 182, 320, 323, 349,

43° "t, 154, 391, 396, 397, 444 citi, 503, 504 Cit-prakarana, 160 n. Citsukha, 111, 468 citsukhacarya, 318, 482 citta, 281 n., 480, 499 n. citta-vrtti-nirodha, 62, 506 Class-characters, 167, 232, 534 Class-concept, 224, 226 n., 297, 436 Class-notions, 61 Classification, 30, 129, 212 Clay, 3, 4/1., 199; materials, 3 Clearness, 217 Clinging to God, 87 Closed souls, 501 Cloth, 190, 193, 256, 265 Clouds, 50 Code of duties, 88 Coeval, 183 Co-existence, 273, 543 Co-existent, 286, 423 Co-extensive, 291, 292 Cognate, 43

Cognition, 8, 9, 217, 218, 248, 289, 310, 311, 315, 318, 320, 323, 325, 335. 347. 36o, 368, 410, 411, 428 Cognitive, 31, 49, 61, 318, 466; experiences, 300; characters, 241; operation, 359; process, 467; relation, 358; sense, 25, 48, 280; situation, 467 Coherence, 300; of qualities, 254 Coimbatore, 121 Cola, 65, 67, 94, 98, 103, 113, 523;

kings, 104 Collocating entities, 275 Collocation, 141, 152, 204, 206, 264, 2 9 2 , 354. 360, 473; of accessories, 354; of causes, 203 Collocative agents, 342 Collocative causes, 248 Colony, 42, 43 Colophon of Mitra, 403 Colour, 61, 141, 167, 182, 251, 389;

perception, 280 Colour-data, 253

Colour-datum, 253 Combinations, 326 Commands, 303

Commentary, 1 w., 3, 99, 102 «., 106, 107, 108, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 134, 138, 214, 260 n., 305, 349, 402, 403, 440, 460, 476, 482, 516, 517/1., 518, 523, 532; literature, 86

Commentator, 107 n., 196, 444

Commission, 398

Common, 207

Communication, 309, 428

Communion, 70, 99, 376

Companions, 83

Compendium, 135

Complete, 36, 296

Complex, 188, 193; feeling, 90

Comprehension, 419

Computation, 96

Conative, 49; organs, 412; senses, 31, 61, 280, 504

Conceit, 173

Concentration, 30

Concept, 42, 53, 185, 186, 195, 254, 264, 297, 340, 344, 390, 406, 434,

435 Conception, 45, 192, 195, 295, 297, 301, 321, 328, 333, 335, 341, 351,

389, 397, 398, 447. 448, 45i. 456, 462, 468, 504

Conceptual cognitions, 341

Conceptual forms, 311

Conch-shell, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 208, 210, 211, 241, 244, 247, 253, 254, 270, 337. 34 6 . 368, 371, 408; silver, 179, 184, 237, 246, 312, 314, 335, 336, 340, 343. 344, 398; silver illusion, 185 n., 186, 188

Conciliatory, 20

Conclusions, 211, 319, 409, 451, 458, 469, 486, 495

Concomitance, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 263, 273, 319, 427, 438, 513, 533, 534, 535, 536, 538

Concrete, 49, 187

Condition, 51, 180, 181, 193, 211, 301, 306, 310, 312, 318, 323, 333, 344, 346, 412, 413, 416, 420, 421, 422, 428, 432, 433, 434, 461, 463, 468, 473, 476, 489, 492, 493, 534, 5351 of reality, 243

Conditional, 289, 390, 533, 538; qualities, 285, 286

Conditioned, 193, 446, 474

Conduct, 16, 550

563

Conflict of knowledge, 212 n.

Confusion, 25, 140

Conglomeration, 37, 163, 252, 262, 275, 278, 288

Conjeevaram, 68

Connection, 43 n.

Connotation, 299

Conscious, 27, 31, 41, 290, 416, 467, 491; energy, 459; entities, 89; principle, 29; state, 540, 543, 546

Consciousness, 368, 369, 373, 377, 406, 407, 413, 420, 429, 438, 439, 44°, 452, 454, 459. 460, 462, 463, 467, 469, 479, 486, 507, 519, 529,

54°, 54i, 543, 545, 546, 547, 548,

549; its character, 141, 142 Considerations, 420 Consonance, 44, 58 Consort, 70, 81 Constancy, 29

Constituent conscious-entities, 287 Constituents, 188, 256, 310, 323, 335,

4i4, 415, 419, 424, 43°, 455, 458 Constituted entity, 256 Construction, 191, 195 Contact, 263, 270, 281 n., 316, 453,

466 Container, 456 Contemplation, 68 Contemporary, 131 n., 135 Content, 250 n., 310, 329, 336, 439;

of awareness, 185 w.; of knowledge,

242, 247, 314 Contentions, 211, 311, 315, 348 Contentless, 250, 310, 311 Contentment, 61, 506 Contents of thoughts, 198 Contiguity, 46, 296, 316, 324, 325,421;

of consciousness, 240, 420 Contraction, 393 Contradiction, 9, 186, 192, 210, 239,

269, 314, 3i8, 321, 327, 336, 337,

342, 374, 386, 398, 435, 436, 451,

459, 47°, 498, 502 n.; of knowledge,

179 Contradictory, 17, 207, 211, 269, 310,

319, 337, 42i Contrary, 322; conclusion, 230 Contributions, 346 Control, 30, 32, 58, 303, 430, 443 n.,

444, 499; of mind, 29 Controller, 99, 200, 386, 415, 429, 430,

45i, 478 ' Controversialist, 406 Controversy, 68, 128, 130, 328, 416 Conviction, 54, 55 Co-operation, 409

Corporeal structure, 431

Correct, 180

Correction, 179

Correspondence, 247, 348, 357; theory,

246 Corroboration, 340, 341, 357 Cosmic, 443 n., 475, 482, 492, 509,

510; affairs, 475; egg, 504; matter,

163 Cosmogony, 515 n. Cosmological, 474 Cotton-seed, 273 Counterpart, 58 Couples, 38

Course, 31, 34, 51, 52, 56, 57 Cow, 234 Cowell, 515 Creation, 25, 27, 36, 38, 42, 45, 50, 51,

52, 56, 58, 116, 158, 182, 188, 192,

195, 196, 302, 443 n., 444, 449, 452,

458, 460, 476, 498, 500, 501, 502,

504, 508 Creative, 50, 465, 473; activity, 452,

454; desire, 48; moment, 472 Creator, 16, 412, 476, 507 Creatures, 447 n. Creed, 433 Criterion, 314 Criticism, 76, 112, 116, 179, 215, 217,

304, 339, 342, 429, 433, 478, 479,

518, 533 Crooked, 158 Cults, 81 Currency, 95 Customs, 2 Culikopanisad, 480 Cycle, 41, 51, 446, 481, 490 Cymbals, 80

daksina, 381 n.

Daksina-kalarya, 381, 382, 383,

384 Dancer, 85 Dantivarman, 67 danda-nlti, 532 dandin, 524 n. Darkness, 178 darsana, 463, 533 Dasaratha, 429, 522 Dasa-slokl, 399, 400, 403 dasdvat, 251 Data, 210, 428 Dattatreya, 40 n. Dattdtreyopanisad, 13 Date-juice, 226 Datum, 287 Davids, 515

36-2

Index

daya, 57, 61

Dayaramadeva, 402

Damodara, 39

Damodara GosvamI, 399

ddna, 33, 61

Dasarathi, 98, 102, 104, 109, no, 113

Dasarya, 63 n.

ddsya, 70

Dead, 550

Death, 69,291,431,447, 519, 530, 531, 536, 539, 548, 55°

Death-coma, 79

Decay, 447 «., 454, 547

Decision, 210

Deduction, 314

Deeds, 7, 15, 33, 54, 61, 290, 292, 299, 3°i, 303, 349, 388, 415, 429, 444, 452, 489, 513 n., 521, 524, 528

Deep concentration, 22

Deep emotion, 378

Deep sleep, 142, 151, 178

Defect, 175, 177, 179, 182, 184, 185 n., 203, 230, 238, 331, 332, 334, 336, 338, 356, 43°, 437, 439, 442

Defectlessness, 250

Defects of organs, 181

Defence, 300

Definable, 230

Definite effects, 279

Definition, 128, 217 n., 221, 232, 295, 298, 299, 300, 318, 345, 348, 373, 390, 424, 448, 462, 519, 537; of error, 247; of validity, 248

dehatmavadins, 528

Deity, 31,38,39,41,58; 60,126,295,303

Delirious, 79

Deliverance, 376

Delusion, 325 JL.

Delusive, 45

Demerit, 15, 153, 453

Demons, 25

Demonstrable, 230

Denial, 186

Dependence, 55, 272, 299

Descartes, 202 n.

Description, 52, 436

Desires, 7, 33, 34, 44, 45, 48, 61, 92, 146, 160, 191, 296, 298, 303, 350, 416, 429, 441, 463, 472, 503, 504, 505, 506, 529

Destiny, 43, 45, 444, 461, 501, 502

Destroyer, 499, 507

Destructible, 199, 373, 425

Destruction, 26, 33, 38, 51. 52, 58, 178, 239, 271, 272, 308, 314, 344, 353, 365, 407, 4io, 428, 442, 443 n., 454. 469, 476, 55°

Destructive agents, 266 Desikacarya, 116, 131 Detachment, 442 Determinate, 166, 220, 311, 466;

knowledge, 216, 217, 221, 224, 340;

object, 177 Determinateness, 218 Determination of validity, 357 Determinations, 42, 113, 504 Deussen, 108 n. devadatta, 59, 60 Devaki Sri, 95 Devamannatha, 102 n., no Devanatha, 133 Deva-ndyaka-pancdsat, 122 Devaraja, no, in, 114, 138 Devarajaguru, 137, 138 Devaraja Suri, 122 Devarajacarya, 123, 127 Devarat, 102 n., no deva-ydna, 517 Devacarya, 401, 404 Devacarya, Pandita Anantarama, 399 DevadevJ, 69 Development, 42, 49 Deviprasad Pandita, 400 n. Devi, 57 Devotee, 28, 38,39 n., 55, 70, 82, 89,90,

99, 129, 337, 378, 379, 405, 442, 49i Devotion, 10, 13, 32, 61, 70, 78, 82,

84, 88, 89, 100, 129, 134, 161, 442,

450, 451; to God, 89 Devotional, 69, 293; development, 81;

faiths, 81; Devotional songs, 83 dhananjaya, 59 Dhanurdasa, 104 Dhanvantari, 40 n. Dharma, 40 n., 47, 62, 124, 125, 153,

254,294,349, 394, 405, 453,5°3,5°5 Dharmadevacarya, 404 Dharmakuresa, 133 Dharmarajadhvarindra, 9, 204, 216 dharma-sddrsya, 224 Dharma-sdstras, 21 dharmatva, 254 Dharmaraja, 228 dharana, 61 dhdrana, 30, 505 Dhenu, 52 dhl-sphutatd, 217 dhoti, 522 Dhruva, 39 n. dhruvd-nusmrti, 293 dhrti, 57, 61, 510 dhuma-dhumatva, 226 n. dhumatva, 535 dhurta cdrvaka, 516, 539

565

dhvamsd-bhdva, 428

dhyana, 10, 30, 61, 388, 487, 505

dhydnddind paricaryd. 10

Dialectic, 239, 426

Dialectical, 111,194,304,437; analysis, 112; criticism, 277

Dialogues of the Buddha, 512 n., 514 n., 515 n., 520 n., 521 n.

Dictum, 320

Didactic poem, 121

Difference, 6, 28, 30, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204, 220 n., 228, 266, 303, 312, 322, 330, 331, 342, 343, 350,

35i» 353, 354, 355, 35^, 359, 383,

405, 411, 413, 417, 418, 419, 422, 433, 434, 435, 436, 443, 448, 455, 456, 471, 480, 485, 486, 489, 536, 542, 550; conception of the Nim-barkas school of, 417 et seq.

Difference-in-identity, 432, 433 DifferenceJess, 406, 420 Differencelessness, 167 Different, 42, 302, 330, 336, 339, 397,

406, 413, 416, 441; order, 419 Different-from-existent-and-non-ex-

istent, 339

Differentia, 212, 429

Differentiating characteristic, 185 n.

Differentiation, 200, 462, 479

Difficulty, 192

Diganwara Jains, 523, 524

Digamvaras, 523

dik, 163, 283, 284

Dilation, 444

Dina-carya, 137

Direct, 309, 465; intuition, 363; knowledge, 217, 312; perception, 308

Disappearance, 309

Disciple, 98, 102, no, 114, 122, 123, 126, 138, 522

Discipline, 28, 29, 33, 442

Disciplined, 32

Discrimination, 292

Discriminative, 49; knowledge, 52

Discussions, 123, 352, 418

Disfavour, 51, 52, 159, 160, 164

Disinclination, 33, 47, 52, 292, 442; of mind, 29

Displeasure, 291, 303, 304

Disposition, 54

Disputation, 515, 517, 518, 519

Dissipation, 287

Dissociation, 393

Dissolution, 36, 45, 49, 50, 158, 196, 301, 314, 450, 458, 461, 466, 469, 493, 498, 521; of doubt, 390

Distant perception, 254

Distinct perception, 254

Distinction, 47, 181, 185 n., 186 n., 288, 307, 331, 411, 419, 434, 449, 485, 491, 494

Distinctive differences, 167

Distinctness, 254

distika, 518

Diverse forms, 36

Diversity, 196

Divine, 41, 472; beauty, 136; entity, 485; functions, 38; grace, 84, 378; love, 451

Divine Wisdom, 80 n.

Divine Wisdom of the Drdvida Saints, 78, 79 n.

Divinity, 450

Division, 208

divya, 214 n.

Divya-prabandha, 64, 130, 134, 135, 137, 138

Divya-prabandha-vydkhyd, 131

Divya-suri-carita, 64, 94, 95, 105, 113 n.

Divya-suri-prabhdva-dlpikd, 118, 133

Divydvaddna, 514, 524 n.

Dlgha, 515 n., 521

Dlgha Nikdya, 514, 520, 524, 525

Dlksita, 19 n.

Dlpa-prakdsa, 135

Dlpa-sdra, 128 n.

dlpti, 505

Docility, 54

Doctrinal, 305

Doctrine, 28, 43, 50, 55, 86, 192, 195, 196, 297, 33°, 334. 338, 34°, 34<>, 349, 406, 422, 427, 430, 434, 472, 483, 484, 512 n., 516, 517, 518, 519, 521, 522, 523, 525, 5^6, 527, 528, 529, 53°, 539, 546, 548, 55°; of bhakti, 450; of causality, 276; of kdla, 448 n.; of prakrti, 478

Doddyacarya, 121 n.

Dogmas, 303

Domestic life, 62

Dormant, 56

dosa, 165, 175, 184, 188, 238

Doubt, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 336, 241, 251; its analysis, 211; its classification, 213; itself indubitable, 236; Nyaya view of it, 207 n.; Vehka^a's conclusive remarks on, 208 et seq.; Venkafa's criticism of Nyaya view, 207-8; Verkata's special treatment of it, 207 et seq.; Verikafa's treatment similar to that of Descartes. 202

Index

Doubtful property, 213 Dramatic action, 82 Dramida, 108, 139 Dramidacarya, 105, 106, 107, 108 Dramidopanisad-bhdsya, 126 Dramidopanisat-tdtparya, 69, 70 n.,

71 n.,.72 n., 73 n. Dravida - sruti - tativartha - prakdsikd,

127 Dravidian, 132, 383 n. Dravidopanisat-sdra, 124 Dravidoponisat - sdra - ratndvall - vyd -

khyd, 127 Dravidopanisat-tdtparydvall, 124 dravya, 2.12. n., 251, 343, 484 dravyatva, 431 Dravida, 63 Drdvida-bhdsya, 106 Dravida texts, 383 Drdvida-veddnta, 137 Dravidacarya, 106 Dream, 4, 5, 182, 258, 325, 415, 440;

experiences, 5 Dreamless sleep, 258, 310, 311, 321,

324, 325, 326, 327, 344, 362, 363,

364, 411, 412, 420, 443. 453. 467 Drunkenness, 169 drdha-purve, 530 drsya, 438, 463 Drsyatvd-numdna-nirdsa, 133 Dualism, 330, 332, 337, 338, 339, 347,

407 Dualistic, 352, 406, 486; texts, 422 Duality, 4, 37, 154, 218, 344, 375,

4i7, 419, 420, 422, 43i» 432, 455.

495 Duality-texts, 486 Dubrenil, Professor, 65 duhkha, 464, 485 duhkha-nivrttih, 486 Dulling, 256 Dullness, 328 Durupadesa-dhikkdra, 127 Duties, 8, 11, 19, 293, 294, 307, 379,

44i. 519 Durdrtha-durikarana, 131 Dvaitd-dvaita, 413 Dvaya-churukku, 94 Dvayam, 135 n. dvesa, 470 Dvivedin Pandita Vindhyesvarl Pra-

sada, 1 n. dvyanuka, 263 Dvapara-yuga, 401 Dvaraka, 96

dvdrdntara-nirapeksa, 277 Dvarasamudra, 120

Dynamic, 29, 44, 456, 500; agency, 446; function, 448 n.; operation, 261; power, 448

Dynasty, 67

DyutirnatI, 98, 100

Ear, 167

Earliest devotees, 82

Early History of Vaisnavism in South India, 64 n., 67 n., 81 n.

Earth, 41, 46, 128, 181, 208, 212, 349, 393. 447, 500. 506, 521, 540, 541, 550

Earth-matter, 342

Earth-particles, 188

Earth-substances, 188

Earthiness, 258

Ecstasy, 63 n. ; of joy, 376

Ecstatic delight, 83

Ecstatic experiences, 79

Ecstatic joy, 376

Eddies, 83

Effect, 4, 15, 35, 49, 56, 153, 184, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195. x 99, 229, 256, 257, 265, 266, 267, 276, 277, 291, 293, 294, 299, 303, 306, 332, 339. 34i. 342, 343. 344. 359, 365, 434. 435, 443. 446, 455, 456, 460, 465, 488, 489, 493, 521, 542, 543; moment, 272, 273; state, 200,

344 Effectness, 300 Effect-stage, 299 Effect-thing, 199 Effectuation, 54 Efficacious, 28, 29

Efficiency, 203, 268, 341, 458, 524, 528 Efficient, 203; causes, 301, 386 Efforts, 56, 58, 190, 249, 290, 298, 300,

304, 333, 374, 475, 5°3 Ego, 13, 42, 56, 144, 208, 2ii, 257,

290, 345, 366, 367, 408, 409, 411,

412, 443, 547. 549 Ego-consciousness, 362, 367 Ego-entity, 325, 362, 408 Ego-experience, 334, 366, 368, 370 Ego-intuition, 409, 410, 411, 412 Ego-notion, 324, 325 Ego-substratum, 425 Egohood, 325 Egoism, 31, 51, 90. 9i, 317. 375, 3/8,

379, 408, 468, 470, 485, 494, 505, 529 Egoistic desire, 378 ekadandins, 523, 524 n. Ekasrhgatanu, 40 n. ekdntins, 21, 87 ekdntitva, 87 Ekarnavasayin, 40 n.

567

ekatma-rupa, 40 n.

Ekayana, 21

Ekdyana veda, 21

Element, 25, 30, 42, 45, 46, 49, 181, 182, 196, 205, 337, 462, 467, 505, 506, 512, 515 n., 519, 521, 522, 527, S4i, 542, 544, 545, 547, 550

Elementary, 127

Emanated, 37

Emanation, 37, 198 n., 447, 488, 495

Emancipated, 296. 300, 476; souls, 177 n. ; stage, 301

Emancipation, 29, 32, 50, 52, 57, 61, 62, 71, 88, 136, 143, 145, 146, 159, 161, 177, 292, 293, 294, 295, 304, 3U, 316, 324, 326, 327, 336, 364, 365, 366, 371, 374, 382, 383, 384, 388, 408, 412, 414, 420, 421, 429,

433. 442, 445. 446, 45°, 453, 457,

460, 463, 476, 477, 479, 483, 485,

486, 487, 488, 491, 494, 495, 506,

509; attainable by God's grace, 304;

view of the Nimbarka school of,

420 et seq. Embrace, 72, 73 Emergence, 45, 48, 196 Emergents, 45, 494, 495 Emerges, 47 Emotion, 29, 82, 83, 377, 450, 451;

of love, 79 Emotional analysis, 82 Emotional stage, 82 Emotional transformation, 82 Emphasis, 311, 348, 413, 434 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,

523 w., 524 n ., 525 End, 41, 42, 51, 54, 298, 343, 352, 420,

441, 443, 486, 502 Endearment, 90 Enemy, 70 Energy, 30, 31, 37, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49,

53. 56, 57, 79, 4i4, 416, 418, 424,

447, 454, 458, 489, 500, 502, 524;

of God, 404 Enjoyable, 6 Enjoyed, 37 Enjoyer, 6, 32, 37 Enjoyment, 291, 292, 412, 464, 485,

486, 490, 503, 529 Enlightened, 80 Enlightenment, 53 Enquiry, 197 Entirely, 194 Entirety, 432, 434

Entity, 5, 8, 9, 26, 27, 41, 42, 44, 163, 178, 179, 186, 193, 206, 210, 211, 235, 243, 253, 274, 275, 289, 299,

306, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 3i7, 319, 32i, 324, 325, 327, 328, 33°, 332, 333, 335, 337, 339, 34i, 342, 343, 344, 345, 351, 352, 353, 389, 408, 410, 416, 421, 423, 425, 430, 436, 439, 440, 448, 451, 457, 463, 464, 474, 487, 497, 503, 504, 506, 507, 539, 541

Environments, 30

Epigraphia Carnatica, 104 n.

Epigraphica Indica, 121 n.

Epigraphical, 64, 105

Epigraphists, 67

Epistemological, 9, 80, 467

Epithets, 450

Epitome, 53

Equilibrium, 29, 36, 46, 259, 460, 503,

505, 509 Equinox, 295

Erroneous, 335; manifestation, 360 Error, 179, 180, 182, 185, 186, 187, 210, 240, 241, 253, 307, 330, 334, 337, 346, 383 n. t 441, 469, 500; of conception, 398 Eschatological, 295, 525 Esoteric, 57, 583; doctrine, 134 Essence, 28, 31, 35, 329, 345, 393, 4*3. 4i5, 424, 426, 431, 433, 434, 436, 442, 445, 449, 455. 461, 49°; of intuition, 177 Essential characteristic, 151 Essential qualities, 70 Eternal, 5, 9, 34, 35, 36, 52, 128, 161, 169, 172, 177, 192, 195, 204, 208, 209, 212, 213, 267, 279, 284, 285, 286, 291, 299, 321, 325, 330, 336,

337, 339, 345, 347, 354, 3°5, 373, 386, 387, 393, 394, 404, 409, 426, 433, 447, 448, 452, 454, 457, 47°, 473, 481, 482, 489, 497; bliss, 404; power, 198; world, 80

Eternity, 314, 345, 393; of souls, 177 n.

Ethical, 525; position, 550

Elorembavay, 77

Events, 448

Evidence, 181, 390

Evil, 5, 26, 34, 293, 294, 302, 446, 52i

Evolutes, 26, 487

Evolution, 25, 26, 30, 31, 36, 49, 58, 196, 280, 299, 317, 456, 475, 482, 492, 503, 5io

Evolutionary, 37, 45, 46, 445, 447, 455, 481; cause, 47; changes, 24

Excitement, 61

Excommunicated, 20

Exercises, 293

Index

Existence, 31, 33, 41, 42, 50, 51, 182ft., 184, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 199, 297, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319. 323. 327, 332, 339> 345. 346, 347, 35°, 352, 353, 358, 359, 406, 410, 412, 413, 415, 416, 419, 427, 43°, 431, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 442, 443, 445, 454, 455, 459, 464, 476, 477, 489, 497, 507, 5°9, 5i8, 533

Existent, 47, 182 n., 313, 339, 343, 445, 486; entity, 358

Existent-and-non-existence, 339

Expansion, 393, 444

Experience, 8, 9, 29, 34, 41, 45, 79, 83, 87, 142, 152, 166, 170, 178, 182, 185 n., 186, 187, 188, 235, 236, 238, 243, 251, 253, 254, 255, 258, 262, 269, 274, 277, 287, 288, 290, 292, 301, 302, 307, 312, 315, 316, 317, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 334, 344, 347, 360, 363, 364, 370, 383, 398, 413, 414, 415, 420, 421, 437, 44i, 443, 444, 445, 448, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 468, 469, 474, 485, 486, 490, 495, 497, 503, 535, 538, 539, 54°, 544, 545J treatment of by Vijfiana Bhiksu, 466 et seq.

Experienced, 37

Experience!-, 37

Experiency, 168

Experiential, 185 n. ; knowledge, 468,

47°, 47i Expiation, 22, 23 Explanation, 212, 235, 301 Exposition, 387 Expressions, 3, 4, 34, 53, 443 Extension, 85 External, 44, 53, 341, 426; data, 253;

objects, 189, 204, 205; perception,

426; world, 154, 423 Extra-mental, 204, 205 Eye, 167, 182

Fact, 189, 195, 201, 309 Factor, 204, 205, 209, 322,

463, 477

Faculty, 28, 462

Failure, 535

Faith, 54, 98, 304, 380 m.

Fallacies, 128

False, 4, 153, 155, 157, 173, 181, 188, 194, 198, 208, 252, 254, 291, 293, 296, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 326, 327, 329, 332, 333, 341, 343, 35°, 351, 364,

453, 454,

174, 180, 210, 235, 306, 307, 324, 325, 337, 34°, 37i, 397,

406, 407, 408, 418, 424, 433, 437, 438, 440, 457, 470, 485, 486, 543, 549; appearance, 283, 325, 431, 435, 437; association, 186; azidya, 332; effect, 365; imposition, 320, 325; individuality, 376; knowledge, 5, 310, 378, 408, 423, 441, 485, 49i, 495; means, 326; notion, 370, 420, 437; perception, 244, 310; things, 371

Falsehood, 5, 165, 174, 186, 199, 314, 317, 326, 332, 337, 341, 357, 398, 4io, 530

Falsity, 186, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315. 3i6, 326, 350, 398, 410, 437, 436, 438, 457, 486; of the world,

199, 239 Fasting, 33 Fathomless, 79 Fault, 70

Faultless character, 248 Faulty reason, 178 Fausboll, 514 n. Favour, 51, 159, 160, 164, 303 Favourable, 292 Fear, 5, 56 Features, 46 n., 209 Feeling, 52, 289, 464; of dullness, 256 Female lover, 83 Females, 42

Filial affection, 83, 89, 90 Finger-ring, 186

Finite, 44, 263, 461, 483; forms, 467 Finiteness, 194 Fire, 6, 42, 181, 184, 186, 193, 208,

211, 226 n., 295, 447, 451, 461, 484,

499, 500, 534, 536, 538, 540, 549, 550 Fish, 38 Fitness, 429 Five elements, 183 Flames, 276 Flow, 442 Foetus, 44, 287 Food, 80 Force, 50, 59 Forehead, 120 Forgiveness, 29 Form, 5, 34, 41, 49, 52, 56, 193, 299,

310, 322, 339, 343, 389, 445, 447 "-.

454, 456, 457, 458, 459, 466, 468,

476, 477. 486, 493, 495, 499, 500;

of activity, 158 Formal, 364 Formless, 10, 193, 197, 310, 332,

447 n. Foundation, 475 ; of prapatti, 380 n.;

stone, 12 Fragrance, 27, 221, 222

569

Franke, 515

Free, 317, 461, 523 n.

Freedom, 78, 441, 452, 506; of will,

160 Free-will, 45, 292 Friendliness, 70 Friends, 83 Friendship, 87, 375 Fructification, 414 Fructify, 415

Fruition, 32, 33, 265, 291, 303, 443 Fruits, 26, 28, 33, 55, 290, 294, 349,

441 n., 444, 445, 454, 488, 489, 504,

506, 521, 522, 548, 550 Fulfilment, 29 Fullness, 406 Function, 36, 37, 38, 49, 56 n., 60, 188,

196, 312, 326, 459, 463, 465, 484,

489, 499 n., 50471., 530, 548; of

Laksml, 379 Fundamental, 47, 524; tenets, 21 Funeral sacrifices, 23 Future, 446, 447, 457, 533; lives, 545

Gadd, 64

Gadya-trayam, 86 n., 102, 113, 118, 123

Gaekwad, 26 n.

gandha, 49 n., 511

Gandhamadana, 25

gandha-mdtra, 510

gandha-tanmdtra, 163, 260, 499

gandhavattva, 227

Ganges, 520, 525, 550

Garigaikondasodapuram, 96

Garigaikondasola, 96

Gahgala Bhafta, 402

Garbhopanisad, 480

Garga, 482

Garuda, 364

Garudavaha, 105

Garuda-vahana, 64, 94

Garuda purdna, 450

Garudopanisad, 13

Gauda-brahmdnandl, 133

Gaudiya, 13, 50 n.

Gaudiya school, 51, 81, 82, 83; pathological symptoms of love similar to that of the A.rvars, 83

Gaudiya vaisnavas, 82, 475; their analysis of love follows the analysis of the rhetorical school, 82; their relation with the Arvars, 82

gauh, 47

Gaurl, 52

Gautama, 96 n., 119

Gautaml, 447

Gaya, 522

Gdndhdrl, 59

Garuda, 20

Gdyatrl-sata-dufanl, 133

General character, 185 n.

General idea, 445

General opposition, 226

Generalization, 536, 538

Generator, 481

Generosity, 520

Genesis, 128, 163

Genus, 193

Germs, 44

ghatatva-prakdrakam, 224

ghatatvdt, 230

ghora, 499

Ghosa, 102 n.

Gifts, 33, 54, 55, 450

Gitd, 20, 33, 40, 51, 91, 100, 118, 138, 214, 379, 380, 383, 473, 474, 529, 530; heretics referred to, in, 529

Gltd-bhdfya, 123, 137, 214/1.

Gttdrtha-samgraha, 98, 99, 100, 123,

131

Gitartha-samgraha-raksd, 98 n., 99 n., 123

Gltd-samgraha-vibhdga, 131

Gltd-sdra-rakfd, 131

Gltd-tdtparya-dlpa, 138

Glittering, 181

Goal, 50, 445, 508

God, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 5°, 5i, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86 n., 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 100, 106, 112, 11971., 125, 128, 129, 132, 135, 136, 182, 189, 190, 192, 196, 200, 203, 225, 232, 261, 286, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 301, 302, 303, 307, 335, 349, 35i, 352, 364, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 387, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 398, 404, 412, 413, 414, 4i5, 416, 420, 422, 424, 426, 428, 429, 430, 431, 434, 437, 440, 44i, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 450, 45i, 452, 453, 454, 455, 45^, 458, 459, 460, 462, 465, 468, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 488, 489, 491, 492, 493, 498, 499, 500, 502, 505, 508, 509,51 in., 515; Bhaskara's view, 155; His nature in Vijfiana Bhiksu, 474 et seq.; in Ramanuja's school, 296 et seq. ; in Vdyu Purdna, 502 et seq. ; in

Index

God (cont.)

Visnu Purdna, 498 et seq.; Isvaragita, 490 et seq.; proof of His existence available only from scriptural testimony, 189; Ramanuja's view, 155 et seq. ; refutation of Sarikara's view of, 153, 154; refutation of the Nyaya and Yoga view of, 157; theistic proofs, failure of, 189 et seq.; Vehkata's view of, 157 et seq.; Yadavapraksa's view of, 156; Yamuna's view of it, 152 et seq.; Yamuna's ultimate conclusion about,

154, 155 God Krsna, 73

God, Nimbarka's idea of, 472 et seq. God Rarigahatha, 121 God's grace, 380 God's manifestation, 392 God's mercy, 376 God's relation with man, 70 Godhood, 50 Gods, 27, 58, 293, 474, 501, 502, 505,

525; dispute regarding the relative

superiority of, 304 Goda, 63 Gold, 343

Gomatham Sitiyarvan, 104 Gomathattut-tiruvinnagar-appan, 97 n. gomukha, 60 Good, 5, 26, 29, 34, 62, 80, 158, 293,

304, 414, 415, 444, 452, 521, 527;

deeds, 523 n. Gopalacariyar, 109 n. Gopana, 121 Gopala Bhatta, 402 Gopalasuri, 18 Gopdlatdpanl Upanisad, 13 Gopalatata, 133 Gopalacarya, 401 Gopdlottaratdpanl Upanisad, 13 Gopika, 378 Gopi, 69, 74, 77, 81, 82 Gopi-natha, 96 Goppanarya, 121 n., 135 goptrtva-varanam, 92 Gosthipurna, 95, 98, 102, 109 Gosala, 522, 523, 524, 525 Gotama, 235; logic, 234 gotra, 3 Government Oriental Manuscripts,

203 Government Oriental Manuscript

Library', 69 n. Govinda, 39, 101, 102 n., 109 Govinda Bhatta, 100 Govinda Bhattacarya, 402

Govindadasa, 102 n.

Govindacarya, 102 n., inn., 113 n.,

133 Govindacarya's Life of Rdmdnuja,

110 n. Govindananda, 107 Govindarya, 127 Govindesa, 109

GSvindacharyar, 78, 94, 97 n., 105 n. Grace, 28, 32, 52, 55, 68, 70, 72, 86,

99, 161, 413, 442, 452; of God, 70,

214 n., 380 Gradation, 486 Grandson, 130, 131 Grantha, 81 n. Gratitude, 109 Grama-purna, 102 Greatness, 99, 195 Greed, 48, 87, 505 Greeks, 19 Grief, 71 Gross, 24, 31, 46, 47, 48; dimension,

264; elements, 25, 43, 498; objects,

449 Grossness, 264 Ground, 190, 192, 196, 334, 338,

420, 423, 431, 454, 456, 464, 490;

cause, 197, 456, 486, 488, 493, 494,

495 Ground-ajndna, 367 Groundless, 366 Grow, 447 n. Growth, 547 guda, 226 guha, 502 Guhadeva, 1 n. gulma, 500 guna, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 36, 37,

42, 43, 45. 46, 56, 147, 148, 156, 157,

212 n., 259, 469, 471, 475, 480, 484,

488, 491, 491, 499, 504, 505, 506,

509 Guna-darpana, 115 w., 384 guna-guhya, 25 gwwa-potential, 45 Gunaratna, 516, 533 guna reals, 156 guna-sdmya, 46 guna-yoni, 46 gundvatdras, 40 n. Guru, 28, 45

Guru-bhakti-manddkinl, 403 Guru - bhdva - prakdsikd, 115, 127,

131 n. Guru-bhdva-prakdsikd-vydkhyd, 115 Guru - par ampard, 64, 65, 66, 94, 95,

112, 121, 399, 400, 401

571

Guru-parampara-prabhavam, 64, g4.fi.,

105 Guru-samanddhikaranya-vdda, 133

Guru-tattva-prakdsikd, 115, 131

Gurupasatti-vijaya, 126

Guzerat, 63

Habit, 29, 32, 548

Hagiologists, 94, 96

haituka, 517, 518 n., 530

haitukdn, 518

Halabhuti, 105 w.

Halayudha, 523

Hall, 69

Hamsa, 40 «., 401

Hamsa-samdesa, 121, 122

Happiness, 9, 16, 164, 365, 441, 463,

494, 5°6, 549, 550 Hare's horn, 5, 312, 407, 435, 478 Hari, 40 n., 497 «., 500, 508 Haribhadra, 533 Haribhaskara, 3 n. Harideva, 402 Hari-dina-tilaka, 122 Haridvara, 94 Hari-guna-manimdld, 130 Hari-guru-stava-mdld, 401 Harivamsa, 20, 81 Harivyasadeva, 399, 402 Harivyasa muni, 403 Harmful, 294, 335; results, 51, 52 Harmony, 452, 459 Hastigiri-mdhdtmya, 124 Hasti-jihvd, 59 Hastisaila, 101 Hastyadrinatha, 11472., 125 Hatred, 87

Haya-grlva-stotra, 122 Hayaslrsa, 39/1.

Hayaslrsa-samhitd, 22; its contents, 22 Hdrda-sancaya, 416 Harita, 20, 130 He, 498 Head, 239, 295 Heart, 7, 58, 59, 71, 158 Heat, 128, 198 Heaven, 13, 24, 40, 43 n., 294, 349,

441 n., 447, 514 «., 527 Hell, 40, 349, 441 n., 527, 531 Helpless surrender, 379, 380 Helplessness, 99 Hemadri, 20

Heretics, 103, 518, 520, 526 Heretical views, 531 Heterodox view, 531 hetu, 152, 217, 225, 227, 228, 230, 231,

427, 533, 535, 536, 537, 538

hetu-sdstra, 517

hetu-vdda, 517

heya-gundn pratisidhya, 175

High faith, 380 n.

Higher form, 37

Highest soul, 61

Hill, 208, 211, 534

Hindu life, 471; thought, 471; view, 471

Hinduism, 516

Hindus, 549

Hiranyagarbha, 296, 381, 452, 504

Hiranya-garbha-samhitd, 24

hita, 62

Hoernte, 522, 523, 524 «., 525

Holiness, 22

Holy Lives of the Azhvdrs, 78, 94

Homogeneous, 307, 332, 396, 397, 432,

462, 463 Homoiomeriae, theory of, 246 Honeycomb, 43 Hooper, 68 «., 77 «., 78 n. Horse, 167 Householder, 103 Hoysala, 103, 104, 113 hrd-ydga, 60 hri, 62 Hrslkesa, 39 Human, 444; beings, 191; body, 189;

lover, 73; soul, 87, 89, 122, 413 Humanity, 70, 71 Humbleness, 376 Husband, 90 Hymns, 69, 99 Hymns of the Afaars, by J. S. M.

Hooper, 74 n. Hyper-logical, 255 Hypocrites, 518 Hypothesis, 332

iccha, 41, 57

icchd-sakti, 42 n.

idam vdcyam, 230

idam vdcyam prameyatvdt, 230/1.

Idea, 34, 42, 51, 54, 180, 182, 185 «.,

205, 206, 210, 300, 317, 352, 353,

412. 439, 44°, 44i, 45i, 455, 466,

472, 473, 49°, 494, 496, 544 Ideal, 53, 420, 550 Idealistic, 205, 253, 546; Buddhist,

238 Ideality, 288 Ideational, 438 Identical, 28, 302, 309, 313, 336, 341,

345, 35i, 4°6, 416, 418, 419, 420,

432, 433, 434, 466 Identification, 53, 66, 180, 374, 417,

420

Index

Identity, 6, 37, 58, 193, 194, 195, 198, 256, 269, 290, 303, 308, 312, 330, 336, 337, 345. 346, 4°6, 411, 417, 418, 419, 420, 444, 445, 455, 458, 460, 466, 485, 495; of consciousness, 141; texts, 403

Identity-in-difference, 445

Idol, 31

Ida, 59, 60

Idu, 138

Ignorance, 4, 6, 7, 44, 46, 51, 160, 173, 177, 178, 194, 3i7. 3i8 ; 324, 327, 328, 331, 334, 361, 362, 363, 365, 368, 369, 371, 376, 377, 378, 386, 409, 414, 420, 421, 422, 425, 436, 437. 439. 44i. 445. 4^8, 469, 47°, 495. 502, 529

Ignorant, 51

Ilaya Perumal, 100

Illness, 396

Illumination, 149, 217, 316, 320, 331, 373. 374. 4i6, 463, 466

Illusion, 30, 142, 147, 171, 175, 177 n., 179, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 195, 196, 210, 211, 237, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 264, 270, 307, 308, 310, 314, 325, 330, 331, 334. 335. 336, 338, 341, 374. 388, 398, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 418, 422, 423, 425, 426, 438, 439, 440, 441, 457, 467, 491, 539; akhyati and yathdrtha-khydti contrasted, 182; Anantacarya's treatment of it, 188; as akhyati, 237; as akhyati refuted by Meghanadari, 243-4; as a-nirva-canlya-khydti, 238—9; as a-nirva-canlya-khyati refuted by Meghanadari, 242-3; as anyatha-khyati, 237; as anyatha-khyati and akhyati compared, 244-5 J as anyatha-khyati and yathdrtha-khydti, 241; as anyatha-khyati refuted by Meghanadari, 241-2; as dreams, 182; as nirvisaya-khydti refuted, 239; as yathdrtha-khydti, 237; as yathdrtha-khydti and trivrt-karana, 182—3; as yathdrtha-khydti supported, 245—6; Buddhist theory of dtma-khydti refuted, 238; condition of, 237; different interpretation— khydtis, 237; its relation with maxim of pratinidhi-nydya, 183; its relation with trivrt-karana, 240-1; Prabhakara's view, 185/1.; Ramanuja's sat-khydti supported by Vadihamsambuvaha, 183; Sudar-sana's comment on the akhyati view, 186 n.\ Sarikarite view criti-

cized by Madhavamukunda, 422 et seq. ; theory of akhyati refuted, 180; theory of anyatha-khyati, 179; theory of anyatha-khyati favoured by Ramanuja and Verikata, 180; theory of yathdrtha-khydti, 180; theory of yathdrtha-khydti advocated by Bodhayana, etc., 180; theory of yathdrtha-khydti also accepted by Ramanuja, 180-1; treatment by Vadihamsambuvaha, 184 et seq. ; Vadihamsambuvaha's criticism of anirvacanlya-khydti, 188; Vadihamsambuvaha's wavering between akhyati and anyatha-khyati, 187

Illusoriness, 418

Illusory, 176, 182, 184, 187, 208, 211, 239, 344. 365, 367, 374, 388, 395, 410, 422, 423, 424, 439, 456, 467, 469, 531 n., 537; appearance, 154, 246, 33i. 343, 422, 455; Brahman, 422; cognition, 246; construction, 33 T » 37°; entity, 246; experiences, 371; imposition, 320, 331, 333, 423, 438, 440; knowledge, 185; notion, 242; object, 398; percept, 246; perception, 237, 242, 244, 246, 321; relations, 424; series, 177/1.; silver, 185/1., 341, 368; world-creation,

339

Illustration, 209, 311, 326, 334

Image, 18, 28, 39 n., 41, 182, 185/1., 186 n., 211, 234, 336

Image-building, 17

Image-incarnations, 41

Image-worship, 17, 19, 22, 23, 550; its antiquity, 19

Imaginary, 419, 423, 446, 477; identification, 81; imposition, 423

Imagination, 49, 163

Immanent, 195, 448, 472, 507

Immaterial, 281

Immediacy, 367, 439; of succession of,

273 Immediate, 203, 266, 308, 309, 319, 369; emancipation, 378; intuition, 230, 231, 318, 319; perception, 185/1., 308. 318, 465; realization, 309; reference, 369; succession,

273 Immortal, 198, 547, 548, 549 Immortality, 381, 382, 384, 463, 517,

528, 531 Immutable, 457 Imparting agents, 357 Imperfect souls, 430 Imperfection, 194, 415

573

Impermanent, 292

Implication, 128, 183, 216, 234, 310, 314. 347, 353, 365, 366, 426, 474, 537, 539

Imposed, 182

Imposition, 185, 186, 333, 406, 422, 423, 432, 439, 44°

Impressions, 8, 209, 227, 287, 290, 410, 423, 437, 537

Improbable, 404 n.

Impulse, 44, 452

Impulsion, 40

Impure, 42, 44, 50, 56, 438, 470; nature, 338

Impurity, 46, 51, 54, 80, 156, 505

Inactivity, 451

Inanimate, 57, 429; creation, 194

Incantations, 23

Incarnation, 39, 64, 69, 70, 119 n., 302, 472, 475, 482

Inclination, 32, 61

Incompatible, 325

Incomprehensible, 218, 238

Incongruity, 269

Indefinability, 410, 435, 436

Indefinable, 177, 218, 230 n., 239, 243. 316, 340, 410, 436; silver, 242

Indefinite, 2

Indefiniteness, 370

Independence, 51, 54, 55, 455

Independent, 443

Indescribability, 340

Indescribable, 179

Indeterminate, 270; cognition, 128; knowledge, 311; matter, 164; perception, 166

India, 401

Indian Antiquary, 66 n.

Indian philosophy, 96 n.

Indians, 19

Indispensable, 180, 201; condition, 180

Indistinctness, 254

Individual, 30, 190, 193, 206, 211, 232, 287, 289, 291, 303, 323, 370, 377, 403, 413, 414, 416, 417, 429, 431, 433, 434, 441, 443, 444, 451. 452, 459, 462, 485, 492, 493, 494", capacity, 288; cognition, 318, 319, 358; experiences, 82; limitations, 82; self, 79, 170; selves, 335, 370, 413, 426, 464; souls, 2, 6, 7, 26, 38, 56, 158, 159, 176, 190, 191, 194, 198 n., 199, 200, 297, 298, 299, 3 or . 377, 385. 387, 395, 396, 413, 420, 423, 429, 432, 434, 460, 461, 472, 483; units, 287

Individuality, 90, 461

Individuation, 462

Indra, 295, 528

Indra-rdtra, 23

indriya, 300

Indubitable, 370

Inductive generalization, 536

Inert, 408

Inexpressible, 179

Infatuation, 76

Inference, 14, 16, 128, 146, 152, 168, 169, 179, 185 n., 190, 192, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 256, 296, 3°9, 313, 315, 327, 328, 329, 340, 353, 360, 361, 364, 406, 426, 427, 428, 465, 517, 534, 535, 536, 537, 539; Vehkafa's treatment of it, 225 et seq.

Inferential, 62, 310, 411; process, 427

Inferior, 53, 54

Inferred, 341

Infinite, 10, 27, 34, 51, 149, 161, 165, 176, 196, 200, 255, 296, 306, 320,

34°, 351, 353, 4i3, 43i, 467, 5°3.

506, 509, 544; individuals, 421; joy,

161; knowledge, 153; nature, 304;

regress, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256, 259,

262, 267, 277, 329, 330, 463; series,

177 n.; universe, 191 Infiniteness, 194 Infinitude, 51, 71 Influence, 47, 56, 61, 205, 293, 304,

366, 437, 500; of love, 378 Influx, 38

Inherence, 128, 308, 423 Inherent, 261

Initiation, 19, 22, 23, 87, 104, 139 Injunctions, 14, 123, 124 Injury, 61 Inner Controller, 27, 39 n., 40, 41, 159,

200, 450, 451 Inner dynamic, 47 Inner microcosm, 29 Inner organ, 172 Inquiry, 28, 209, 212, 306, 307 Inscriptions, 64, 523 Inseparable, 423; characteristic, 150;

quality, 150; relation, 222 Insignia, 2 Insignificance, 54 Insincerity, 379 Inspiration, 80, in, 130, 471 Inspired persons, 39 Installation, 2a, 23 Instinctive, 287; root-desire, 253 Instructions, 25, 38, 413, 550

Index

Instrumental, 266, 303, 388, 389, 459; agencies, 396; agent, 397, 456; cause, 2, 204, 266, 301, 388, 389, 391, 481, 489

Instrumentality, 247, 308, 391

Instruments, 191, 204, 205, 336, 470, 479; of knowledge, 203

Insult, 173

Integrity, 405

Intellect, 295, 304, 465, 547

Intellectual, 32, 45, 548; operation, 8. 9; powers, 288; state, 387, 438

Intelligence, 10, 26, 154, 166, 175, 178, 192, 193, 483, 537, 548

Intelligent, 26, 29; being, 191, 192

Intelligibility, 438

Intelligible, 419

Intelligizing, 47

Intense self-surrender, 89

Intention, 124

Interest, 89, 441

Intermediary, 203, 257

Intermediate causes, 397

Intermingling, 181

Intermixture, 182

Internal, 426; action, 8; situation, 377; structure, 389

Interpretation, 40, 108, 195, 196, 306, 351, 471, 475 n., 486, 496, 512, 515, 516

Intimate knowledge, 80

Intoxicated, 79

Intoxicating, 141; emotion, 377

Intoxication, 63 n.; 377; by love, 378

Introspection, 141

Intuited, 442

Intuition, 27, 34, 62, 167, 168, 170, 176, 227, 318, 319, 348, 364, 372, 409, 412, 442, 464, 465, 538

Intuitional experience, 175

Intuitive, 168, 369, 466; experience, 361; knowledge, 68, 214/1., 216; wisdom, 61

Invalid, 236, 278, 326, 411, 417, 440, 477i 479> 537 J inference, 208; knowledge, 247; propositions, 202

Invalidity, 201, 202, 248, 347, 348, 356, 458

Invariable, 203, 251, 266, 278, 535, 536, 539; antecedence, 279; antecedent, 277; association, 226, 538; concomitance, 538; priority, 278

Inverse, 37

Involution, 37

Irandam-tiru-vantadi, 134 n.

Irrational, 177 n.

Irrationality, 177 n.

Itihdsasamuccaya, 20

ittham-bhdva, 254

iyad-gunaka, 157

iksana, 413

Ikfaty-adhikarana-vicdra, 133

Isopanisat, 123

Isvara, 47, 128, 129, 152, 153, 154, 155. 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 163, 225, 335, 443, 446, 473, 474, 475, 480, 481, 488, 498, 503, 504, 510

Isvara Bhatta, 94

Isvara's body, 157

Isvara-gltd, 460, 47471., 482, 494 n., 496; its philosophy, 460 et seq.,

482 et seq. Isvara-gltd-bhdsya, 285/1., 456/1., 482,

483 n., 484 n. lsvara-gltd-tikd, 450 n. Isvara-krsna, 30, 478, 501 n. Isvara-mlmdmsd, 124 n. Isvaramuni, 94, 97 Isvara-pranidhdna, 62 n. Is'vara-pvjana, 61

Isvara-samhitd, 21, 22; its contents, 22 Isvara's will, 159

Jacobi, 524 n., 526 n., 528 n.

jada, 452

Jagannatha, 103, 399

Jagannatha Yati, 118, 133

Jaimini, 124, 125, 381

Jain king, 104

Jaina, 304, 525, 537; objection, 393;

view, 537 Jaina sutras, 524 n., 526 n. Jainism, 516 Jains, 104, 206, 302, 393, 518, 523,

525 "•, 539, 546

jalpa, 512

janye-svara, 473

japa, 13, 62

Jaundiced, 182

Jayanta, 203, 206, 512, 516, 519, 537, 547, 548

Jayatlrtha, 111

Jayaditya, 518

Jaydkhya, 21, 22

Jaydkhya-sainhitd, 24, 25, 26 n., 27 «., 28, 29, 30, 31 n., 506 n.\ consciousness how possible, 26; creation as Samkhya evolution, 25; emanations of Vasudeva in, 29; God-function of, 29; God, nature of, 27; gutia and azidyd, 29; knowledge as static and dynamic, 29; liberation only possible through knowledge of ultimate reality, 24; prakrti appears as in-

575

Jaydkhya-samhitd (cont.)

telligent, how, 26; Samddhi, nature, of, 29; Sdmkhya, difference with, 30; soul, progress of, 28; soul, ultimate realization of, 28; inddha-sarga in, 27; theory of vdsand, 26; two kinds of creation in, 25; ultimate reality can be known only through teacher, 25; ultimate reality is beyond the gunas, 25; yama and niyama in, 29; yoga, different ways of, 30; yoga leading to final emancipation, 31

Jabali, 529

jdtakas, 514/1.

jdti, 297, 354, 355, 512

jdti-rupa, 216

Jati-Vadihamsa's conception of it, 354

Jati-Verikafa's conception of it, 355

Javali, 530

Jealousy, 87

Jewish Christian, 50 n.

jijndsd, 307

Jijndsd-darpana, 115, 392

Jina-hood, 522

jlva, 26, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52, 128, 129, 158, 177 n., 187, 193, 194, 208, 301, 329, 33°, 336, 346, 4°7, 4i8, 443, 444, 45i» 453. 476, 486, 493

Jlva GoswamI, 496

jlva-brahmai-kya, 417

jlvanmukta, 295, 442

jlvan-mukti, io, 327, 437, 441, 448

jlvd-jndna-vddt, 177 n.

jlvdtman, 498

jlvdtmd, 483

jivesvaraikya-bhanga, 126

jndna, 8, 37, 41, 47, 56, 62, 63, 80, 160, 206, 351, 357, 37i, 47°, 5°4, 5°8

jndna-dasd, 379

jndna-gundsraya, 172

jndna-janya, 371

jndna-karma-samuccaya, 307

jndna-kriyd, 148

jnanam, 178/1.

Jndna-ratna-darpana, 115 n., 384

jndna-rupa, 61

jiiana-samuccita-karma, 8

j ndnasddhyatvdt, 371

jiidna-sdmdnya-virodhi, 3^2

Jndna-sdra, 102, no, 138

jndna-svabhdva, 216

jndna-svariipa, 172

jndna-vydpdra, 205

jndna-visesa, 161

Jndna-ydthdrthya-vdda, 133, 209/1., 210, 241 n., 246 n., 247 n.

jnana-yoga, 22, 33, 34, 89, 91; its meaning, 22

jndnd-bhdva, 178 n., 425

jndnd-karanaka-jfidnatvam, 220

jndtatd, 148

jndtd, 411

jndtrtva, 172

jiieya, 28

Joint causality, 197

Joint method of agreement, 536

Joint method of agreement and difference, 542

Joy, 485, 55°

Judgment, 210

Judgmental form, 250 n.

Jug, 168, 190, 199, 220, 221, 224, 230,

243, 258, 362, 363, 397 Just will, 78 Justice, 195, 374 Jydyan, 53 jyoti, 499, 510

Kadanmallai, 64

kainkarya, 136

Kaifabha, 25

Kaivalya, 93, 136, 161, 382, 383, 384,

506 n. Kaivalya-sata-dUfanl, 127 Kaiyata, 516/1. kalana, 45 kalana-kdrana, 47 Kali, 65

Kalijit, no, in, 122, 134 Kali-santaranopanisad, 13 Kalivairl, no Kalki, 39 n. Kalkin, 40 n. kamala, 30 Kamalaslla, 516, 532 Kamalasila's Panjikd, 536 n., 540 n. f

541 n., 542 n., 543 n. Kamala, 114 Kamalaksa Bhafta, 100 Kamathesvara, 40 n. Kambalasvatara, 540 Kampana, 121 Kanikrsna, 96 n. Kanjivaram, 119 Kannada, 81 n. Kanada, 482 Kandadanatha, 98 Kandadaiyappan, 105 Kannan, 74 n.

Kanninnu-sirattdmbu-vydkhydna, 127 Kanninun-siruttdmbu, 134/1. kapha, 475 Kapila, 21, 40/1., 479, 482

Index

Kapydsa text, 352

Kapydsam pundarlkam, 101

karana, 280

Karimara, 95

Karimaran, 94

karma, 8, 11, 26, 49, 51, 52, 61, 152, *53> I 57» ^59. 161, 172, 201, 212 n., 258, 291, 292, 293, 295, 301, 349, 366, 375, 383, 385, 386, 393, 409, 411, 412, 413, 443, 444, 445, 446,

448, 452, 453, 454, 481, 484, 487, 489, 508, 509, 520, 522, 523 n., 525, 536, 547, 548, 549, 55°; Vijnana Bhiksu, 452; Nimbarka's conception of, 411 et seq. ; Nimbarka's idea of, 414 et seq.

Karmaharadeva, 402

Kartnan, 303, 504

Karma-yoga, 22, 33, 34, 89, 91; its meaning, 22

karta, 387, 411, 510

kartrtva, 35, 485

Karukanatha, 96

Kasturl Rarigacarya, 381, 383; his general view, 381 et seq.; his treatment of the sectarian differences of Badgolai and Tehgalai, 381 et seq.

Katha, 519 «., 528, 529

Kapha Upanisad, 519

Kathavally-upanisat-pakdsikd, 127

katha, 201, 513

Kathd-sarit-sdgara, 108 n.

Kathd-vatthu, 517

Kathopanisad, 379

Kattur-argiya-vanavalapillai, 110

kaumara-sarga, 502

Kaundinya Srinivasa Dlksita, 384

Kausika-^rlbhasya-^rlnivasa, 122

Kausitakopanisat-prakdsikd, 127

Kautilya, 512, 532

Kautilya, Artha-sdstra, 512 n.

Kavicakravarti Trivikrama, 3

Kavilologu, 121

Kaviraja Gopinatha, 482

Kavitarkikasimha, 119

Kdla, 36, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 52, 389, 446, 447, 448, 479, 486, 488, 489, 492, 497, 505, 508; different conceptions of, 447; in relation to Karma, 448; in Vijnana Bhiksu, 446

kdla-ghata-samyogd-dikam, 389

Kalamukhas, 16

Kalanemighna, 40 n.

kdla-sakti, 45

kdlatraye'pi, 428

Kama, 40 n., 62

kdma, as nitya and naimittika, 293-4

Kdma-sutra, 550 n.

kdmya, 294

Kantatman, 40 n.

kdnti, 57

KantimatI, 98, 100

Kanci, 63 n., 65, 66, 78, 101, 102,

120 Kanclpurna, 98, 101, 102, 109 kdnda, 59 Kapalika, 3 n., 16 kdraka-cakra, 206 karana, 156, 204 kdrana-brahma, 474 kdranam aprameyam, 502 kdrandnumdna, 229 karandvasthd, 200 Kdrikd, 440, 501 n. Kari, 65 Karimaran, 65 kdrpanya, 54, 92 kdrya, 4, 189, 265 kdrya-brahma, 474 kdrya-kdratid-dhikarana-vdda, 381 n. kdrya-prdga-bhdva-samanvita, 275 kdryddhikarana-tattva, 132, 381, 384 kdryddhikarana-vdda, 132, 381, 383,

384

karya-numana, 229

kdrydvasthd, 200

Kasarayogin, 63 n.

kdsikd, 518, 518W.

Kdsmirdgama-prdmdnya, 17

Kdsyapa, 20

Kdsyapa-samhitd, 23

Katyayana, 302, 515, 516; his view of God, 302

Kafhaka-siddhantin, 3 n.

Kaveri, 63

kdyika, 507

Kerala, 67

Kernel, 2

Kesara-bhusana, 133

Kesava, 39, 402

Kesava Kasmirl, 402

Kesava Kasmirl Bhatta, 402, 403 n.

Kesava Yajvan, 98, 100

Ketti ammais, 104

kevald-nvayi, 228, 229, 230, 427; inference, 230

kevala-vyatireki, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 427

Khandana-khanda-khddya, 201, 535/1.

khyatis, 184, 410, 503, 510

khydty-ayogdt, 243

Kidambi Ramanuja Pillan, no

Kidambi-Tirumalai-Nayinar, 137

Kilaiyagatfarvar, 95

577

kincit-kara, 277

Kisoradasa Pandit, 399, 404

kirti, 57

klesa, 44

Knots, 437

Knower, 172, 315, 325, 326, 333, 411,

423, 466, 467, 468, 489, 507 Knowing relation, 250 n. Knowledge, 4, 7, 8, 9, 28, 29, 32, 33,

34. 35. 37. 4i> 47. 49, 5*. 54, 91, 129, 146, 176, 178, 179, 181, 184, 185 M., 187, 188, 193, 204, 205, 206, 210, 238, 250 n., 292, 293, 295, 300, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 317, 318, 321, 323, 324, 325, 327. 328, 329, 335, 336, 34°, 346, 347, 348, 352, 357, 361, 369, 37i, 386, 409, 410, 411, 412, 418, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 43°, 436, 437, 44°, 443, 445, 449, 453, 461, 462, 465, 466, 467, 469, 47°, 47i, 472, 473, 474. 475, 479, 481, 482, 485, 486, 488, 490, 491,

492, 493, 5°o, 5°i. 5°2, 5°3, 5°4,

506, 507, 508, 533, 537, 547; and the

known, 423; its self-validity, 247 et

seq. Known, 466 Kolli, 67

Kollikavaladasar, 137 Koluttuhga I, 103, 104 Koluttuhga II, 104 Kondinna, 115 Kohgu, 67

Koyilkandadaiannan, 111 Krama-dlpikd, 403 Kratu, 21 kraurya, 376, 379 kriyamdna karma, 443 kriyd, 36, 37, 41, 51, 57 kriydkhya, 29, 44 kriydkhya-jndna, 29 kriyd-sakti, 42 Krodatman, 40 n. krkara, 59

Krmikantha, 104, 105 Krpdcdrya, 401 Krsna, 38, 39 n., 40 «., 69, 70, 71, 72,

74 n., 77, 8o, 81, 82, 83, 121, 304;

378, 401, 405, 442 n., 474, 475; his

life, 83 Krsna Bhafta, 401 Krsnadesika, 18, 137 Krsnamahgala, 96 Krsna Mis>a, 531 «., 532 Krsnapada, no, in, 118, 134, 135 Krsnapada-lokaguru, 131 Krsna-samahbhaya, no

Krfna-stava-rdja, 400

Krsnasuri, in, 112

Krsnatatacarya, 123, 131

Krsnopanisad, 13

Krtakofi, 105 n.

Krtamala, 63

krtsnd-jndna-pratltis tdvad asiddhd, 361

Krttika, 279; constellation, 229

ksamd, 57, 61

Ksamd-sodasi-stava, in

ksana, 274

ksana-dvaya-sambandha-sunyatva, 273

kfana-kdla-sambandhatvam, 273

ksana-kdlatvam, 273

ksana-mdtra-vartitva, 273

ksana-sambandhitva, 269

kfana-pddhitvam, 274

Ksattriya, 64

Kfetra, 31, 32, 502, 504

Ksetrajna, 31, 498, 503

Ksetrajna-sakti, 51

ksobha, 498

ksobhaka, 509

ksobhya, 498, 509

Ku-drsti-dhvdnta-mdrtanda, 396, 397 n.

kuhu, 59

kukkuta, 60

Kula-sekhara, 64, 66 n., 67, 68, 69, 76,

82, 134 Kula-sekhara Peru-mal, 63, 65, 66,

96 n. Kula-sekharanka, 66, 67 Kularka, 229 Kumara, 401

Kumara-Vedanta-desika, in, 122 Kumara Vedantacarya, son of Veft-

kafa, 123, 126; his works, 125 Kumarila, 8, 148, 205, 347, 348, 357 Kumbakonam, 68, 73, 95, 103, 116 n. Kumbha-kona Tatayarya, 126, 127 kundala, 67, 416, 434 Kundalinl, 36 Kundall, 58 Kwvdall-sakti, 58 Kuraka, 95 Kuranatha, 102 Kuresa, 98, 102, 103, 104, 109, no,

in, 113, 114, 134; his contribution

in writing Srlbhdsya, 103; his eyes

put out, 103 Kuresa-vijaya, 113 n. Kurugai-kkaval-appan, 98 Kurukd, 98 Kurukanatha, 98 Kurukesvara, 109 Kurukur, 68 Kuruttalvan, 66, 102

37

Index

Kuruttama, 66

Kuvera, 39

Kuyil, 77

Kurma, 39 n., 40 n., 59, 60, 475

Kurmapurdna, 19, 20, 480, 482, 483, 488, 496, 502 w., 509, 510, 511 n.\ philosophical elements in, 509 et seq.

kutastha, 49, 484

kutastha purusa, 50

Laghu-bhdgavatdmrta, 40 n.; avataras

in, 40 n. Laghu-bhdva-prakdsikd, 129 Laghu-mdnjusd, 403 Laghu-prakdsikd, 116 Laghu-sdmdnddhikaranya-vdda, 133 Laghustava-rdja-stotra, 403 laksand, 306

Laksmandrya-siddhdnta-samgraha, 130 Laksml, 36, 41, 45, 52, 53, 56, 57, 70,

99, 100 «., 157, 375, 379 Laksml Dasarathi, 98 Laksmi-devi, 115 Laksminatha, 96

Laksmi-tantra, 39 n., 56 n., 57, 379 Laksmitantra, avataras in, 39-40 n. laksya, 340 Lamentation, 72, 73 Lamp, 25, 444 Lanka, 82 lata, 500

Laugaksibhaskara, 3 n. laukika, 426 laukiki, 507 Law, 412, 448, 474; of Excluded

Middle, 242; of Contradiction, 242 laghava, 180 Legendary account, 83 Legendary life, 81, 83 Legendary lovers, 81 Legendary personages, 81, 82 Lesser gods, 475 Letters, 4 Liberation, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 24, 39, 170,

173, 257, 450; during lifetime, 10 Life, 41, 293, 327, 420, 443, 461, 471,

5°9» 519, 52i» 522, 526, 530, 531,

536, 545 Life-force, 59 Life-functions, 7 Life-history, 82 Life-movements, 548 Life of Rdmdnuja, 113 n. Light, 46, 178, 198, 280; and heat,

163 Light-heat-potential, 48, 260 Light-potential, 163

Limitation, 194, 195, 432

Limited, 292; sense, 43; time, 285

Lineage, 3, 129, 132

Linee di una storia del Materialismo

Indiana, 512 n. Linguistic, 218; usage, 239, 282 Linga, 16, 22 Linga-purdna, 20 linga-sarlra, 487 Literary, 69

Literature, 43, 56, 58, 112, 531 Living, 456 tild, 51, 158 llld-vatdra, 40 n., 475 Location, 41 Locus, 58, 283, 290, 328, 351, 417, 435,

437; its negation, 255; of subsistence, 397; of the negation, 283 Logic, 119, 235, 236, 533; depends on

admission of objective realities, 236;

in Bengal, 133 Logical, 80, in, 183, 194, 442, 513;

apparatus, 256; argument, 113;

categories, 236; criticism, 154;

doctrine, 550; implications, 184;

proof, 313; situation, 341 Logically valid, 236, 253 Logicians, 517, 518 Loka, 513, 514 Lokabhaskara, 3 n. loka-khdyikd, 513 Lokanatha, 40 n. loka-pitamaha, 503 loka-samgraha, 92 Lokacarya, no, 122, 134, 136, 137,

155, 157. i^o, 163, 260, 374, 380,

381; his views, 136 lokdcdrya-tad-anubandhindm, 381 n. Lokacarya I, 134, 135 Lokayata, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 519,

526, 530, 532, 533; its significance,

512 et seq. lokayata doctrines, 528, 529, 532 lokayata view, 532 Lokayata-sdstra, 515, 531, 533 Lokdyatika, 512 n., 527, 529, 548 lokesu dyata, 515 Loneliness, 79 Longings, 70 Lord, 22, 27, 31, 33, 41, 42, 44, 50, 51,

53. 54, 56, 83, 87, 88, 307, 412, 430,

508 Lord (Bhagaran), 21 Lord Krsna, 99 Lost objects, 89 Lost soul, 88 Lotus, 58, 153, 271

579

Love, 136, 294, 376, 377, 414, 450,

451, 472, 491; stricken, 378 Love-sickness, 83 Lover, 70, 83, 84, 377 Loving embraces, 73 Lower caste, 93 Lower form, 37 Lower order, 88 Lowliness, 54 Lucidity, 79

Lump of clay, 46, 259, 332; of salt, 10 Lunar, 295

Madan Mohan Library, Benares, 399 Madhu, 25, 47 Madhura-kavihrdaya, 124 Madhura-kavi, 69 Madhura-kaviy-arvar, 63, 64, 65, 66n.,

67. 94. 95. 134 n.

Madhurantakam, 103

Madhusudana, 39, 40 n.

Madhva, in, 112, 113, 125, 304, 305, 387, 399. 400, 401, 403, 475, 496

Madhva-mukha-mardana, 399, 400

madhya, 58

madhyama, 505

Madhya Pratoli Bhaftarya, 109

madhyastha, 201

Madhya-vlthi Bhattarya, 109

Madras, 69 n., 94 n., 104 n. f 106 n.

Madras Govt. Oriental MS., 239 n.

Madras Presidency, 64

Madura, 65, 67, 120

Magical creation, 394

Magician, 335

Mahadyogin, 63

mahat, 46, 47, 63 n., 163, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260 n., 446, 473, 475. 489, 490, 499, 502, 504, 507, 509, 510, 511

mahdtman, 504

mahat prajfid, 503

mahattattva, 475, 480, 489, 498

Mahdbhdrata, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 40 n., 260 n., 379, 443 n., 447, 479, 517, 53°. 53i> S3 2 ; Nara and Narayana in, 12; reference to heretics in, 530

Mahacarya, 117, 125, 127, 130, 131, 135. 305. 361, 364, 365. 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 373; his works, 125, 126

Mahadevi, 98

mahd-kalpas, 525

Mahalaksmi, 41, 67 n.

mahdmoha, 500

mahdn, 503, 504

Mahanada, 63

Mahanadi, 63

Mahapurna, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103,

109, 139 Mahd-purusa-nirnaya, 98, 99 n. mahd-purva-paksa, 175 n. Maharastra, 63 Maharya, 63 n., 96 Mahd-sanatkumdra-samhitd, 23, 37 mahd-siddhdnta, 175 n. Mahd-vidyd doctrines, 229 mahd-visvdsa, 54 Maha-visnu, 56, 507, 508 Mahavira, 522, 524 n., 525 n. Mahayana, 1 n. Mahesvara, 39 n., 473, 497 n., 506,

509 n. Mahomedans, 121, 135 Maintenance, 38, 51, 52, 56, 195, 196,

454

Maitrdyaniya Upanisad, 531 n.

Maitreyo-panisad, 480

Maitrl Upanisad, 447

Majesty, 35, 136

Makkhali, 522

Makkhali Gosala, 522; his views, 522

Makkhaliputta Gosala, 525 n.

Males, 42

Malik Kafur, 120

Mallipura, 63 n.

Mal-observation, 279

Mamallai, 65

mamatva, 506

mamdtmd, 140

Manakkal, 67 n.

Manakkal-lambej, 97

manana, 405, 422

manas, 8, 9, 13, 25, 38, 48, 49, 56, 57, 80, 139, 142, 144, 148, i5i> 153. 158, 163. 191, 257, 258, 280, 281, 499, 503, 504, 506, 507, 509, 5x0

Manavalamahamuni, no

manda, 505

Mandangudi, 69

Mandates, 441

Manhood, 70

Manifest, 36

Manifestation, 4, 17, 26, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 n., 40 n., 42, 44, 45, 47, 51, 53. 57. 150, 163, 198, 215, 218, 247, 250, 265, 267, 311, 336, 338, 355, 356, 359, 360, 361, 365, 367, 373, 387, 4x2, 447, 449, 451, 473, 487, 497. 498, 500. 508, 524

Manifested condition, 156

Manifesting, 39; power, 41

Manifold, 32, 197

Mani-sdra-dhikkdra, 122

Manlsideva, 402

37-2

Index

mankha, 522, 524 n.

Mankhali, 523

Mankhaliputta GosSla, 522

Man-lion, 38

Manner, 60

mano-dosdt, 185 n.

manomaya, 57

mantd, 510

mantras, 13, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 57, 58, 60, 69, 102, 403

Manu, 1 n., 14, 17, 21, 146, 479, 515, 518, 519; denies the Pancardtrlns, 14

manus, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 57

Manu-samhita, 16

Manuscripts, 119, 126, 135, 138, 305, 346, 399

Manu Vaivasvata, 40 n.

Matigala-dipikd, 126

Marigacarya, 127 n.

Marigacarya ^rinivasa, 118

Manavala, 94 n.

Manavala Ma-muni, 64, 65, 137

mant-pravdla, 64, 105, 123, 137, 138

Maraner, 98

Maraner Nambi, 98

Marici, 21

Mark 17, 20, 524 w.

Marriage, 69

Marudha-grama-purna, 102, no

Maskarin, 523, 524 n.

Masters, 83

Material, 10, 25, 26, 29, 49, 181, 189, 190, 208, 288, 388, 389, 418, 449, 481, 495; cause, 2, 37, 46, 55, 188, 196, 197, 266, 286, 301, 302, 341, 342, 365, 385, 388, 389, 397, 404, 454. 459. 465. 500. 543; changes, 301; element, 489; energy, 459; forms, 37; identity, 252; impurities, 384; part, 301; products, 527; stuff,

329 Material world, 181, 194, 199, 200,

291, 297. 384. 385, 416 Materialistic, 512 Materialists, 550 Materiality, 195, 256, 383 Maternal grandfather, 122 Maternal uncle, 109, 183 Mathuradeva, 402 Mathura, 94, 96, 103, 120 mati, 47, 57, 61, 503, 510 Matsya, 39 n., 40 n., 475 Alatsya Purdna, 16, 479 Matter, 26, 49, 125, 157, 193, 200, 211,

299, 406, 430, 431, 434, 435, 457,

458, 459. 465. 492, 495. 501. 519;

Venkata's view of it, 162 et seq.

Matter-stuff, 385

matha, 103, 104, in

Maxim of determining similarity by

real representation, 183 maydra, 60 Mayilai, 64 Madhava, 39, 103, no, 127, 400, 532,

533, 632 Madhavadasa, 109, no Madhava Mukunda, 416, 420, 426,

437; controversy with the monist,

416 et seq.; his criticism of jlva-brahmai-kya, 417; his criticism of Ramanuja and Bhaskara, 429 et seq.; his criticism of ^arikarite ajndna, 424 et seq.; his criticism of ^arikarite emancipation, 420 et seq.; his criticism of the category of " difference ",

417 et seq.; his criticism of the theory of illusion of £arikara, 422 et seq.; his refutation of the falsity of the world, 435 et seq.; his treatment of pramdnas, 426 et seq.

Madhavacarya, 2

mddhyamika, 201, 238, 340

Madhyamika Buddhists, 238

Mddhyamika-paksa, 177

Mahesvara, 3 n., 505

mdhehara yoga, 505

mdkhali, 522

Maladhara, 98, 109

mdnasa-pratyaksa, 220, 359, 361, 538

mdnasika, 507

mdnavas, 49

Mana-yathdtmya-nirnaya, 119, 128 n., 216, 229, 234

Mdndukyopanisat-prakdsika, 127

Manikka-vachakar, 84

Maratha, 3

Mdrkandeya Purdna, 501 n., 502 n. 506; philosophical treatment in, 506

Mdrkandeya-samhita, 24

Mara, 65

Marankari, 65

Maran-jadaiyan, 65

Mdthara vrtti, 448

mdyd, 1, 2, 4, 5, 26, 29, 42, 52, 100 n., 129, 132, 165, 196, 197, 198, 334, 335. 336, 383, 393, 396, 410, 412, 424. 434, 440, 454, 457, 472, 476, 485, 486, 491, 492, 494; in Isvara-gltd, 497; in relation to pradhdna as treated by Vijnana Bhiksu, 476 et seq.

Aldyd-kosa, 38

Mdydvdda, 484

mdydvddin, 4, 443

581

ma.ya.vl, 472

Meals, 105

Meaning, 195, 233

Meaningless, 99

Means, 55, 298, 310

Measure, 264

medhd, 57

Medhatithi, 515, 518 n., sign.

Mediate knowledge, 425

Mediate process, 247

Meditation, 10, 11, 22, 23, 30, 31, 32, 39, 40 n., 41, 42, 58, 60, 69, 80, 137, 219, 292, 293, 295, 364, 388, 405, 414. 415, 437. 442, 446, 45°, 451, 465, 474

Medium, 449

Meghanadari, m, 114, 115, 125, 214, 215, 216, 217, 229, 234, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243; adopts only yath-drtha-khydti, 241, 245, 246, 247 n., 248, 249, 346, 348, 349; arguments in favour of validity of knowledge, 247; his admission of five pramdrias, 216; his admission of upamdna, 234; his arguments in favour of yathdrtha-khydti, 245-6; his conception of various categories connected with conception, 218 et seq. ; his definition of perception, 217; his refutation of akhydti, 243; his refutation of anirvacanlya-khydti, 242-3; his refutation of anyathd-khydti, 241-2; his refutation of nirvisaya-khydti, 246; his refutation of objections against self-validity, 248-50; his refutation of the Nyaya view of paratah prdmdnya, 347; his treatment of memory, 214 et seq.; his treatment of nature validity, 215-16; his treatment of object, 217; his treatment of perception in relation to validity, 215—16; his view of karma and fruits, 349; his view of perception contrasted with that of Ramanuja, 218; his view of svatah-prdmdnya-vdda, 346; his view that intuition is self-valid, 348; his view of time, 348; his works, 125; pramdna and artha-pariccheda-katva, 240; supports arthd-patti, 234-5 Melody, 80 Melukot, 104, 113 Melaiyagaftarvar, 95 Memory, 5, 8, 128, 150, 151, 167, 168, 178, 180, 181, 184, 185 n., 186 «.,

209, 2IO, 214, 215, 2l6, 220 W., 223, 234, 239, 245, 249, 25O, 268, 287,

348, 360, 363, 364, 376, 4IO, 42O,

545» 548, 549; its treatment by Venkafa and Meghanadari, 214-15; its validity, 237

Memory-image, 244, 245, 247

Memory-knowledge, 248

Mental, 204, 205; intuition, 359, 361; modes, 364; organs, 445; perception, 426, 538; powers, 47; process, 185 n., 539; state, 310, 334, 339, 372, 373, 439, 465, 469, 470, 495, 54©, 54i, 543, 544, 545; temperament, 543

Merciful, 54, 374

Mercy, 78, 85, 99, 292, 375, 413, 474; of God, 374, 375

Merit, 15, 153, 191, 453, 520

Meritorious, 521; actions, 294

Messengers, 83

Metals, 41

Metaphysical, 237; position, 451; views, 450

Metaphysico-cosmological theory, 246

Metaphysics, 550

Method, 55, 183, 195; of agreement, 228, 356

Microcosm, 26

Microscopic, 390

Mind, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48, 54, 60, 152, 172, 182, 189, 191, 192, 207, 209, 291, 294, 295, 308, 420, 423, 427, 434, 440, 442, 444, 490, 498, 505, 527, 542, 543; contact, 202; substance, 194 Minimum assumption, 186 n. Minor, 427; gods, 22; term, 533, 534,

535 Minor Religions, 81 n. Minor Religious Systems, 64 n., 399 Minority sect, 20 Miraculous, 505; power, 30, 60 Mirage, 282, 369 Mirror, 27, 144, 208, 211, 334 Misapprehension, 182, 183, 185, 251 Mis-association, 245 Misconception, 456 Mis-correspondence. 357 Mis-perception, 418 Misery, 28, 87, 164, 295, 302, 303, 308 Mistake, 5 Mistress, 75, 377 Misra, 139 misra-varga, 57

misra-varga-srstim ca karoti, 38 Mita-prakdsikd, 115 mitdhdra, 61 Mithila, 112

Index

Mithydtva-khandana, 133

Mitra, Dr Rajendra Lai, 400

Mimarpsa, 107, 108 n., 124, 247, 357, 350, 358, 539

Mimamsakas, 15, 347

Mimdmsaka school, 205

Mimdmsd-pddukd, 124

Mimarpsa theory of error as nondiscriminating memory-image and perception refuted, 247

Mimdmsd-siitra, 7 n., 107 n., 108 n., 124, 125

Mimarpsists, 152, 429, 518, 536

mleccha, 93, 441 n.

Mode, 42, 53, 194, 419; of syllogism,

364 Modification, 2, 3, 4, 6, 80, 183, 260 n.,

299, 323, 367, 423. 435. 454. 455,

459. 463, 468, 471, 495. 503 moha, 464, 500 mohana, 46 mohdtmaka, 256 moksa, 62, 71, 523 n. Moksa-dharma, 260 n. Moksa-kdranatd-vdda, 133 Moksa-siddhi, 118, 352 Molecular, 206 Molecule, 183, 262 Moment, 47, 273, 277, 285, 286 Momentariness, 252, 268, 269, 272,

274 Momentarists, 271 Momentary, 268, 270, 275, 284;

entities, 270; unit, 268, 269 Monetarist, 273 Monetary, 273 Monism, 4, 176, 308, 316, 320, 340,

371, 39i. 477, 49°. 495 Monist, 100, 106, 129, 416, 419 Monistic, 101, 196, 422, 486, 495; doctrine, 197, 477, 480; identity, 336; interpretation, 351, 417; texts, 5. 352, 406, 431; view, 406 Monotheistic, 13; God, 43 n. Moon, 42, 59, 210, 228, 295, 310, 340,

447, 537 Moral, 29, 32, 33, 472, 501, 549;

apprehension, 32; freedom, 472;

heroes, 88; responsibility, 291, 533;

sphere, 273; values, 457, 460 Morality, 303, 516, 533 Mother's breast, 77 Motion, 206 Motivation, 44 Motive, 54, 293, 294 Motor organs, 543 Mouth, 59

Movement, 44, 45, 53, 56, 189, 210,

446, 449, 481, 493, 504 mrd-dravya, 258 mrttva, 258 mrtyu, 447 Much, 494 Mud, 397

Mudal-arvars, 68 n. Mudal-tiru-vantddi, 134 n. mugdha, 328 mukta, 60

mukti, 11, 50, 51, 89, 487 Mukti-darpana, 115 n., 384 Mukti-sakda-vicdra, 127 Mukunda, 425, 426 Mukunda-mdld, 66, 67, 80 n. Mumuksu-ppadi, 135 n. Mumuksu-pdya-samgraha, 114*2., 125 Mundane, 16, 34, 41, 295, 452;

bondage, 414; forms, 40; gods, 38;

life, 43 n., 292 Muni-vdhana-bhoga, 124 Munrdm-tiru-vantddi, 134 n. Mundakopanisat-prakdsikd, 127 Muttering, 23; of mantras, 62 Mutual agreement, 201 mudha, 499 mitla, 46

Mula-bfuwa-prakdsikd, 115, 117 .126 mtila-dosdpeksd. ijj n. miild-dhdra, 58 murdhariya-nddi, 295 Mysore, 113, 121, 124*2. Mysore Gazetteer, 10421. Mystic, 53; cognition, 168 Mysticism and Logic, 539 n. Mythical, 364, 550 Mythological, 25

na, 476

na caVkyam ndsa-bddhayoh, 239

Nacchiydr, 69

Naciketa, 519

Nadadur Ammal, no

Nadadur Arvan, 104

naimittika, 293, 294, 502, 503

naimittika pralaya, 502

Nainaracarya, 111

Naisadhacarita, 549

Naiyayikas, 146, 152, 155, 211, 219, 221, 225, 230, 233, 262, 263, 264, 265, 280, 291, 300, 347, 355, 358, 359, 393, 5^539, 546

Naksatra-mdlika, 138

namah, 53

Nambi, 67 n., 100

Nambilla, no

S83

Namburi Varada, no

Namburi Varadarya, no, m

Namburi Varadaraja, 134, 135

Names, 3, 4, 34, 47, 48, 209, 457, 544

Namm'-arvar, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 74, 78, 79, 83, 94, 9s, 98, no, 134

Nandagopal, 77

Nandivarman, 67

Nanjiar, no, 134, 135

Nan-mukham Tiru-vantddi, 68

Nappinnai, 77, 81

Nara, 12, 40 n.

Naraharideva, 402

Narasimha, 40 n.

Narasimha-suri, 122

Narasimhavarman I, 65, 67

Narasimhiengar, MrM.T., 134 n., 138

Narcotic, 79

Nasik, 3

Natesan and Co., 104 n.

natthi, 520

natthika, 520

natthika-ditthi, 520

ndtthikavdda, 521

Natural, 51; omniscience, 21471.

Nature, 35, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 53, 54. 56> 57i i°° w -> I2 8, 146, 166, 180, 193, 195. 197. 206, 253, 256, 306, 310, 315, 317, 325, 331, 334, 344, 35o. 389, 407, 408, 411, 413, 4i4» 415, 420, 428, 431, 439, 442, 448, 499. 45o» 461, 466, 483, 485, 545; of Laksmi, 375; of soul, 79

Navaratna-mdld, 135 n.

Nava-vidha-sambandha, 135 n.

Navel, 58

Navel-wheel, 59

Navyaraiigesa, 122

Naya-dyu-mani, 114M., 115, 116, 125, 215 n., 216 n., 217 n. y 219 n.-, 220 n., 234 n., 239 n., 242 n., 243 «., 245 n., 247 n., 346, 347 n., 348 n., 349 n., 392

Naya-dyu-mani-dipika, 115, 116, 392

Naya-dyu-mani of Naya-dyu-mani-dipikd, 115

Naya-dyu-mani-samgraha, 115, 116, 392

Naya-kulisa, 118

Naya-mdlikd, 116 n.

Naya-mani-kalikd, 1 30

Naya-mukha-mdlikd, 114, 116, 133

Naya-prakdsikd, 114, 346

Naya-vlthi, 186 n.

nabhi-cakra, 59

Nacchiyar-tirumoli, 1 34 w.

ndda, 58

nddls, 59, 60 na&a, 59

Nagarjuna, 307, 522 naga-vayu, 60 Ndl-dyira-divya-prabandham, 64, 66,

69, 77

Ndl-dyira-prabandham, 69

ndmadheya, 4

ndma-dheyam, 3

ndma-sankirtana-ratah, 96

Ndm-mukam, 134 k.

Narada, 13, 25, 40 n., 401; his journey to ^veta-dvipa, 13

Ndradlya, 20

Ndradiya-purana, 507, 508 n.; philosophical elements in, 507

Narayana, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 39, 40 w., 42 n., 68 h., 86, 89 n., 100 n., 101, 126, 128, 129, 132, 136, 157, 304, 352 n., 375, 379, 401, 474, 475, 482, 507, sn n.; alone, 126; as highest God, 12; associated with Pancaratra, 12; his worship in the ^vetadvipa, 13

Narayanadeva, 402

Narayana muni, 116, 131

Narayana Sarma, 404

Narayaniya, 40 n., 443 n.

Ndrdyanopanisad, 13

Nastika, 512, 517, 518, 519, 525, 527; its significance, 517 et seq.

Nastika cdrvdka, 512 n.

ndstikasastra, 515

Nathamuni, 66, 67 n., 85, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 119, 180, 181 n., 233, 235; he practised astdnga yoga, 96 n. ; his life, 94 et seq.

Nathas, 525 n.

ndtha-vddins, 525

Negation, 5, 169, 186, 202, 214, 230, 232, 243, 255, 271, 272, 283, 312, 3U, 327. 330, 33i» 332, 339, 342, 344, 35i, 352, 353, 354, 4»2, 420, 424, 428, 431, 445, 467, 476; antecedent to being, 279; of occupation, 282; of vdcyatva, 230 n.

Negation-precedent-to, 328, 330, 351; production, 338, 341, 344, 345, 353.

369

Negative, 181, 183, 186, 187, 252, 343; causes, 354; characters, 170; concept, 282; concomitance, 229; entity, 341; instance, 228, 229; means, 376; pain, 364; qualifications, 323; relation, 231

Nerve, 59, 295

Nervous system, 58

Index

Nescience, 177, 311, 316, 361, 362, 441, 442, 460, 465

neti, 431

Neutral datum, 253

New knowledge, 184

New measure, 264

nididhydsana, 405, 442

nidrd, 57

Nigamaparimala, 124

nigraha, 51

nigrahasthdna, 512

Nihilism, 177, 269, 307, 320, 332, 334, 419

Nihilist, 350, 520, 533

Nihilistic, 520, 521; Buddhists, 201; philosophy, 177 n.; sect, 533

nihsambandhah, 1.1

nihsvabhdva, 356

Nikdsa, 123

Nikdya, 524

Kiksepa-raksd, 122

Nimba, 399

Nimbapura, 399

Nimbaditya, 399, 400, 401

Nimbarka, 399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 409, 420, 422, 424, 426, 427, 428, 433, 434, 44°, 472, 497, 506; his bhdsya, 400; his conception of ahartkdra, 411 et seq. ; his conception of ajndna, 404 et seq.; his conception of karma, 411; his criticism of !aan-kara, 409 et seq.; his idea of avidyd, 414; his idea of God, 412 et seq.; his idea of karma, 414 et seq.; his philosophy, 400, 404 et seq.; his works, 400—2; Nature of self, 411 et seq.; school, 401, 408, 440; system, 413; teachers and pupils of the school, 379 et seq.; view, 430

Nimbdrka-matam, 401

Nimbarkists, 410, 411, 434, 440

nimitta, 2, 388, 456

nimitta-kdrana, 157, 191, 398

nimitta-kdranatd, 396

nimittamdtram, 500

Nineteenth century, 188

Ninru kumirume, 78

nir - adhisthdna - bhramd-nupapattih, 238

niranvaya-vindsa, 274, 276

nirapeksataydnanda, 36

niravayava, 201

nirbharatva, 86

nirgranthas, 523 nirguna, 25 nirhetuka, 85

Nirvana, 28

nirvikalpa, 217, 219, 220, 221, 224, 270, 311, 544; knowledge, 544

nirz-ikalpa jtidna, 221

nirzikalpa-pratyaksa, 166, 223

nirvisesa, 165, 195

nirvisesa caitanya, 420

Nirvis'esa-pramdna-vyuddsa, 133

nir-visaya-khydti, 239, 246

niskala, 31

niskramya, 527

nisprapanca brahman, 10

nitya, 36, 293, 294, 502

nitya-rangitva, 87 n.

nitya-suratva, 88 n.

nivartaka, 61

nizrtta, 165

niyama, 29, 33, 61, 62 n., 509 n.

Niyamananda, 399, 403

niyati, 42, 43, 45, 57, 448 n.

Nllameghatatacarya, 133

nil a-pat a, 527 n.

Nila, 41, 42, 57

riirupa, 238 n.

Ntti, 235

Noble qualities, 70, 71

Non-appearance, 365

Non-apprehension, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 237, 284

Non-being, 239, 312, 314, 456, 457,

509 Non-Buddhists, 514 Non-dependence, 37 Non-difference, 487 Non-different, 484 Non-discrimination, 247 Non-distinction, 449, 491 Non-duality, 488 Non-earthiness, 227 Non-eternal, 199, 208, 209, 212, 213,

386, 446, 470, 478 Non-eternality, 386 Non-eternity, 394 Non-existence, 27, 177, 211, 229, 235,

344, 410, 428, 435, 436, 473, 476,

4','S, 507 Non-existent, 5, 47, 177, 266, 284, 327,

339, 344, 407, 423, 433, 43^, 44°,

445, 457, 477, 486 Non-existing, 184 Non-illumination, 314 Non-illusory, 246 Non-living, 456 Non-material, 146, 171 Non-materiality, 171 Non-mundane, 39 Non-observation, 279, 334 Non-occupiedness, 164

585

Non-perception, 128, 182, 207, 241,

342, 35i, 426 Non-performance, 523 Non-physical, 548 Non-production, 449 Non-relational, 455 Non-sensible, 354 Non-sentient, 54 Non-spiritual characteristics, 172 Non-substance, 251 Non-vedic, 15, 16, 17, 19 Normal caste, 379 Normal duties, 92, 380 North India, 63, 523 Northern India, 103 Nothingness, 36

Notices, 400 n.; of Sanskrit Manuscripts, 403 Notion, 297, 298, 300, 310, 324, 337, 34i. 343, 349. 3Si, 353, 418, 443, 538, 542; of validity, 248 Not-self, 409 Not-silver, 183 Nrsimha, 39 n., 40 n. Nrsirnhadeva, 122, 123 Nrsimharaja, 123, 131 Nrsimha-rujlya, 122 Nrsimhasuri, 131 Nrsimha-tapini Upanisad, 13 Nrsimharya, 109, no Nrsimhottara-tdpinl Upanisad, 13 Nuns, 104 nukhya varga, 502 N.W. Provinces Catalogue, 400 Nyagrodhasayin, 40 n. nyasa, 55, 90, 131 Nydsa-kdrikd, 380 Nydsa-tilaka, nz, 125, 131, 380 Nydsa-tilaka-vydkhyd, 122, 125, 380 Nyasa-vidya-bhusana, 132 Nydsa-vidydrtha-vicdra, 133 Nydsa-vidyd-vijaya, 127 Nydsa-vimsati, 122, 380 Nydsarivrti, 131

Nyaya, 9, 128, 131, 153, 154, 157, 203, 204, 206, 207 n., 208, 212 n., 234, 235, 262, 263, 300, 358, 471, 517, 538; categories, 539; logic, 226; objection, 249; refutation of the doctrine of whole and parts by Venkafa, 263 et seq.; Venkafa's refutation of atomic theory, 262 et seq. Nydya-bhdskara, 133 Nydya-kulisa, 118, 128 n., 184, 186 n., 250 n., 251 n., 352, 353 «-, 354 «•, 355 n., 356 n., 357 n., 358 «., 360 n. Nydya-kusumdnjali, 1, 539 n.

Nydya-manjarl, 203, 204 n., 205 n., 206 n., 513 n., 516, 519, 535 n., 536 n., 538 n., 539, 540 «., 547, 548

Nyaya-parisuddhi, 96 n., 119, 123, 125, 127, 128 n., 131, 180, 202 n., 208 n., 209 n., 210, 213 n., 216 n., 219 n., 220 n., 222 n., 223 n., 225 n., 226, 227 n., 228 n., 232 n., 233 n., 234 n., 235, 236 n., 237 n., 239 ?/.

Nyaya-porisuddhi'-vydkhyd, 131

Nydya-ratndvall, 131

Nydya-sdra, 123, 127, 128 n., 202 «., 203 n., 222 n., 223 n., 237 n., 238 w.

Nyr.ya-siddhdnjana, 117, 123, 126, 128 n., 157 n., 251, 25yn., 261 n., 280 n., 297, 382, 383 n.

Nydya-siddhdiijana-vydkhyd, 117, 126

Nydya-sudarsana, 119 n., 128 «.

Nydya-siitra, 76 w., 208, 211-12, 300 n., 512, 513, 517, 539

Nydya-tattva, 96, 119, 128 n., 233, 235

Nyaya-Vaisesika, 162, 471

Nydydmrta-taranginl, 1 38

Nattva-tattva-vibhusana, 1 33

Nattvopapatti-bhanga, 133

Natva-candrikd, 131

Natva-darpana, 115

Natva-tattva-paritrdna, 129

Object(s), 30, 33, 41, 47, 49, 50, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185 n., 189, 190, 205, 206, 210, 244, 280, 289, 297 n., 298, 307, 309, 3", 312, 315, 316, 3i7, 318, 319, 320, 343, 347, 348, 35i, 4i5, 4i9, 423, 426, 427, 439, 442, 444, 457, 458, 466, 467, 474, 477, 500, 506, 544; its matter according to Veftkafa and Meg-hanadari, 217; of awareness, 231, 318, 319; of knowledge, 241, 243; of perception, 246, 346

Objection, 298, 299, 303, 308, 315, 3i6, 317, 320, 321, 333, 343, 392, 408, 409, 417, 418, 422, 437, 477, 537

Objective, 53, 58, 179, 182, 490; awarenesses, 238; cognition, 9; entities, 188, 247, 360, 362; factors, 236; world, 246

Objectively, 182 n.

Objectivity, 315, 325

Obligatory, 441; duty, 124, 137, 293

Observation, 209, 257

Obstacles, 33

Obstruction, 183, 282, 449, 466, 481

Obstructive attitude, 376

Occasion, 47, 60

Occasionalism, 159

Index

Occupation, 282 Occurrence, 205 Ocean, 52, 301, 302, 304, 445, 447,

450, 45i, 452 Odorousness, 212 w. Odour-potential, 48 Offering, 23, 550 Older school, 91, 92 Omnipotence, 24, 51, 200, 450, 462,

472 Omnipotent, 10, 11, 15, 34, 303, 443;

being, 336 Omniscience, 24, 50, 51, 158, 195, 198,

200, 432, 433, 472, 506 Omniscient, 9, 11, 27, 44, 152, 303,

318. 335, 405, 430, 443 Omkara-vadartha, 392 Ontological, 118, 180, 185 n., 195,497;

argument, 231 Ontologically, 180 Openings, 59

Operation, 45, 46, 56, 185, 204, 205, 206, 267, 297, 312, 318, 329, 331, 411, 412, 413, 423, 427, 433, 446, 448, 459, 460, 470, 475, 547 Opinion, 93, 210 Opponent, 116 ?/., 230, 249 Opportunity, 292 Opposites, 230 Opposition, 208 Order, 49, 58, 195

Ordinary, 43; methods, 58; personality, 82 Organ, 48, 490 Organic, 151, 455 Organs of sight, 182 Origin, 212, 466, 468, 490; of Bhakti in Bhdgarata-mdhdtya, 63; of knowledge, 543 Original, 42, 58; course, 396 Origination, 321 Oscillation, 264 Otherness, 351 Oudh Catalogue, 400 n.

Padma, 20, 60 Padmalocana Bhatta, 98 Padmanabha, 39, no, 118 Padmanahhacarya, 401 Padmanabharya, 352, 361 Padma Purana, 484, 507, 532 Padmapurana, reference to Bhakti in,

507 Padma Samhitd, 23 Padma-tantra, 39 n., 42 n. ; avatdras in,

39 n. Padmacarya, 401

Padmakara Bhatta, 401

Pain, 146, 148, 171, 189, 256, 259, 290, 301, 302, 344, 349, 412, 427, 442, 449, 463, 464, 485, 486, 489, 490,

493, 494

Painful, 256, 289, 415, 416, 452

Pairs, 42

paksa, 231, 427, 534, 535

paksadharma, 534

Palar, 63

Pallava king, 67

Pallavamalla, 65

Pallava-matha, 137

Pallavas, 65, 67

Pamphlet, 123, 124

Panar, 64, 69

Panen theism, 497

Pangs, of love, 72; of separation, 73; of sorrow, 70

Pantheism, 497, 498

Pantheistic, 498

pancama, 15, 17.

Panca-pddikd-vivarana, 196, 197 n., 198 n.

Pancaratra(s), 2, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 38 n., 40 n., 42 71., 50, 56, 57, 58, 62, 103, 105, 122, 125, 132, 157. 303, 379, 448 «., 47i, 4755 antiquity of, 12; conflict between Brahminic authorities about, 19; contents of, 18—19; doctrine, 503; instructed by God, 14; its antiquity, 19; its ideal different from the Vedas, 17; its relation with the Vedas, 18; its validity attested in Purusa-nirnaya of Yamuna, 16; not polytheistic, 17; originated how, 21; Purdnas that are favourable and unfavourable to it, 20; purusa-sukta, associated with, 12; regarded as tantra, i8n.; relation with the Vedas, 12; religion, 20; rituals not non-Vedic, 17; sacrifice, 12; texts, 13; valid as the injunction of God, 14; worship, 19 Paficaratra literature, 18, 21, 24; its validity attested by Yamuna, 10; works enumerated, 2.1 et seq. Pancardtra-raksd, 18, 122 Pancardtra-raksd-samgraha, 1 8 Pancaratra-samhitd, 12 n., 155 Pancardtra-sdstra, 21 Paiicardtrins, 14, 19, 20; denounced in smrti and Purana, 19-20; identical with Bhdgavatas and Sutvatas, 15; possess a lower stage, 15 panca-samskdra, 102

587

Pancadhyayi-£astra, 3 n.

Pancdgni-vidyd, 382, 384

Pancl-karana, 182, 237, 240

Panjikd, 131

Pandita, 94, 130, 177 n.

para, 41, 42, 489

para-brahma, 474, 509

Parakala, 63

Parakaladasa, 111

Parakala Yati, 115, 117, 126, 127, 305

para-loka, 518, 548

Parama, 32

Parama-pdda-sopdna, 1 24

Parama-samhitd, 22, 24,32, 33; Bhakti, rise of, in, 33-4; its contents, 22; karma and jndna-yoga in, 33; karma-yoga and jndna-yoga in, 22; vairdgya, nature of, in, 33; yoga in, 32

Para-mata-bhanga, 123, 124, 128 n.

Parama-tattva-nirnaya, 23

paramdrtha, 165, 378

paramdtman, 7, 34, 445, 451, 452, 453, 487, 489, 502

paramesvara, 89, 475, 489

Paramesvara-samhitd, 23

Paramesvarvarman II, 65

paramesthin, 447

Paranda-padi, 135 n.

Para-paksa-giri-vajra, 403, 414 n., 416, 417 n., 418 n., 425 n., 428 n., 429 n., 430 n., 431 n., 432 w., 433 w., 434 n., 435 «•. 437 «•, 440 n

Parasurama, 38, 40 n., 429

Parasuramadeva, 402

paratah pramdna, 9

paratah-pratndnya, 248, 249

para-tantra-sattvd, 430

Para-tattva, 24

Para-tattva-dipikd, 122

Para-tattva-nirnaya, 138

Para-tattva-prakdsa, 23

Para-tattva-prakdsikd, 127

Paravastu Prativadibhayankara Anna-yacarya, m

Paravadibhayahkara, 112

para, 509

pard-kdsatva, 88 w.

pardmarsa, 225, 427

Parahkusa, 65, 78

Parahkusa-purharya, 102 w.

Parantaka, 67

Parantaka Cola I, 96

Parantaka, King, 65

Parantaka Pandya, 65

pardrthdnumdna, 427

Parasara, 134, 260 n., 479

Parasara Bhafta, 235

Parasara Bhattaraka, 119

Parasara Bhattarya, 102 n., 104, 109, no, 134, 135

Parasara pur ana, 19

Parasara samhitd, 22; its contents, 22-3

pardtman, 486

Parents, 70

Parikara-vijaya, 131, 361

parimdna, 254, 264, 397

parimita-gambhira-bhdsird, 108

parindma, 6, 106, 197

parindma kdrana, 365

parindmi kdrana, 365, 366

parindmi-rtipa, 484

paritrdna, 40

paroksa, 62

paroksa-vrtti, 425

Part, 30, 49, 178, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 262, 286, 291, 295, 300, 301, 307, 308, 312, 408, 409, 411, 422, 430, 432, 433, 434, 444, 447 «•, 453, 456, 462, 464, 475, 493, 494

Particles, 263, 264; of consciousness, 141

Particular, 193, 299, 537; proposition, 202

Partless, 201, 263, 306, 358, 365, 422, 432, 548; atoms, 263; real, 372

Paryamka, 30

Passionate lover, 82

Passionate yearning, 83

Passions, 32, 51, 54, 317, 318, 488

Past, 182, 446, 447, 457, 533; experience, 184, 185 n.

pasyanti, 58

Patanjali, 61 n., 62, 239, 444, 470, 473, 479, 480, 515, 516, 518, 523; his Mahd-bhasya, 516 n.

Patanjali-sutra, 478

Paternal affection, 158

Path, of bhakti, 380 n. ; of knowledge, 89; of right, 61; of virtue, 158

Pathological symptoms, 83

Paths of duties, 91

Pattars, 104

pauranic, 482

Pauranic emotionalism, 451

paurusa, 30

Pauskara, 21, 22

Pauskara-samhitd, 23, 24

Payasvinl, 59, 63

Pazhanadai-vilakkan, 94 n.

Pddukd-sahasra-ndma, 122

Pali, 512, 513 n. ; texts, 514

Pali Dictionary, 520

Index

Pali-English Dictionary, 513

Paficaratrikas, 3 n.

Pandya, 65, 67, 98

Panini, 108 n., 516 n., 518, 523

pdramarthika, 313

paramarthikl, 371

pdratantrya, 87

Pdrdsara, 20

Pdrdsarya, 125

Pdrasarya-vijaya, 117, 305

Pdrdsaryya-vijayd'di-purvd'cdrya-pra-

bandhd-nusdretia, 128 n. Parijatahara, 40 n. Pdrijdta-saurabha, 406 n. pdsandl, 518 pdsandino, 518 Pasupata, 3 w., 16 Pdsupata-tantra, 155 Patalasayana, 40 w. Pavaka, 39 Pela Puradesika, 132 Penance, 13, 24, 29, 34, 160 People, 43 n. Perceivability, 438, 439 Perceived qualities, 252 Perceiver, 284, 315, 321, 398, 547 Percept, 185 n.

Perception, 14, 80, 128, 141, 151, 152, 166, 168, 174, 177, 179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 199, 202, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 237, 241, 242, 252, 254, 268, 269, 270, 280, 284, 306, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 324, 326, 327, 328, 334, 343, 35i, 353. 356, 368, 390, 398, 406, 412, 426, 427, 465, 472, 533, 537; its definition, 216—17; savikalpa and nirviknlpa, 220-4; treatment by Veiikatanatha and Meghanadari, 216 et seq. ; view on, by later members of the Ramanuja school, 220 et seq. Perceptual, 79. 309, 411; cognition, 250 «.; evidence, 298; experience, 320, 326, 327, 328, 300, 536; knowledge, 212, 326; form, 246 Perfect, 295; knowledge, 50 Perfection, 31, 122, 194 Performance, 33, 293, 530 Periya-jiyar, 94 n., 110, 111, 137 Periyalnambi, 103 Periya Nambi, 67 n. Periyar, 63

Periya-tiru-madal, 69, 134 n. Periya-tirumoli, 134 n. Periya-tiru-mori, 69 Periya-tiru-mudiy-adaivu, 64, 105

Periya tiru-vantddi, 69, 134 n. Periy-arvar, 63, 64, 65, 66 n., 68, 69, 77 Periy-drvdr-tirumori, 134 n. Periy-drvdr-tiruppaldndu, 134 n. Permanent, 144, 198, 291, 343, 541,

546; world, 198 n. Permadi, 66 per se, 431

Person, 49, 189, 191, 401, 472 Personal continuity, 143 Personal effort, 378 Personal God, 472 Personal identity, 142 Personal service, 104 Personality, 49, 100 n. Peru-mal, 64, 134 n. Peru-mal Jiyar, 64 Perumal Temple, 523 Perumdl-tirumoli, 134 n. Peru-mdl-tiru-mori, 69 Pervasive entities, 263 Pessimism, 550 Pey, 68 Pey-a.rvar, 63, 64, 65, 66 n., 68 n ,

i34w-

Phala-bheda-khandana, 125

Phenomena, 205, 238, 340, 365, 407, 456

Phenomenal, 454; world, 155, 164

Phenomenalism, 238, 285

Phenomenon, 142, 180, 266, 272, 302, 467, 542

Philosopher, 202, 449

Philosophical, 120, 126, 181, 305, 307, 364, 395, 525; doctrines, 22; elements, 24; importance, 21; reality, 377; speculation, 79; topics, 23; wisdom, 89

Philosophy, 34, 107, 112, 119, 195,

235. 305. 319. 413. 445. 471. 472,

482, 496, 508 »., 512, 513 Phraseology, 196 Phrases, 309 Physical, 205, 310, 530; elements, 547;

practices, 60 Physico-biological, 298 Physics, 5 15 n.

Physiological, 530; change, 140 Pictorial, 455 Piece of iron. A, 26 Pilgrimage, 55, 120 Pillai Lokacarya, no, in, 120, 134,

135. 137. 138 Pij)ai Lokamjlyar, 105 Pillai Lokacaryar, 64 Pillar edict, 522 Pillan, 66

S»9

Pinb'-aragiya, 64

Pinb'-aragiya Peru-mal Jlyar, 94«.,

105 _ Pingala, 59, 60

Pioneers, 84

Piran, 63

Piszzagalli, Dr, 512 n.

pitr-ydna, 517

pitta, 475

Pity, 52

Piyaruli-ceyalare-rahasya, 135

Plyusaharana, 40 «.

Place, 185 n.

Playful, 51

Pleasurable, 46, 256, 289, 415, 416, 452; ends, 294

Pleasure, 71, 146, 148, 154, 171, 189, 256, 259, 282, 290, 291, 292, 301, 302, 303, 304, 326, 349, 365, 412, 427, 442, 444, 449, 463, 464, 470, 485, 486, 489, 490, 493, 494, 513, 528, 550

Plurality, 165, 174, 194, 264, 398

Poetry, 68, 121

Point, 192, 195, 209, 4*6

Poison, 364

Polemic, 403

Polemical discussions, 305

Polemical work, 123

Political science, 515

Polity, 515, 532

Pollution, 303

Pontifical, 111; chair, 134

Pope, 84 n.

Position, 194, 195, 331, 339, 349, 352

Positive, 178, 183, 186, 187, 252, 323, 343. 35i. 362, 441; ajnana, 364, 365; bliss, 136; category, 243; defects, 331; entity, 164, 177, 271, 272, 282,

3i7, 327, 339, 34i, 345, 353, 354, 424; experience, 238, 282; [ignorance, 330, 332, 336; inference, 329; instances, 230; means, 376; moment, 272; nescience, 361, 362; perception, 363; pleasure, 294; proposition, 229; state, 344; stuff, 332,

364 Positivity, 282 Possibilities, 207 Posture, 30, 60 Potency, 347 Potential, 35, 37, 266, 445, 461; effect,

266; form, 50, 56; power, 541 Pots, 453 Potter, 453 Potter's wheel, 342

Power, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 60, 136, 153, 155, 184, 190, 193, 197, 301, 441, 445, 471, 473, 475, 477, 5°o, 5°5, 5°6, 5°9, 524, 540, 548

Poygaiy, 64, 68, 523

Poygaiy-arvar, 63, 65, 66«., 68«.,

i34«-

Prabandham, 67

prabandhas, 91

Prabandha-sdra, 94 n.

Prabandha-sdram, 66

Prabhacandra, 206, 516

Prabhakara, 181, 185/1.; his view, 185 n.

prabha-tadvatoriva 416

Prabodha-candro-daya, 122, 531«., 532

prabuddhi, 510

Practical, 265, 458; behaviour, 4, 466; conduct, 5; experiences, 341, 371; philosophy, 22

Practice, 29, 30, 31, 33, 293

Pradhdna, 25, 34, 472, 475, 476, 477, 478, 485, 489, 492, 497, 498, 502, 505, 506, 509

Pradhdna-sataka, 124

pradhvamsd-bhdva, 353

Pradyumna, 13, 37, 39, 42, 43, 52, 56, 57, 157, 158, 443 "•, 475J stage, 57

pragalbha nastika, 526, 527

Pragmatic value, 335

prajdpati, 48, 295, 447, 528

prajnd, 47, 503, 510

Prajfianidhi, 126

Prajnd-paritrdna, 119, 128«., 208, 212, 214 «., 234

Prakarana-pancikd, 185 «., 186 n.

prakdra, 156

prakdsa, 358, 373, 416

Prakdsa-samhitd, 23

Prakasatman, 196, 197, 198/1.; criticized by Ramanuja, 197; his view of relation between mdyd and Brahman, 198 n.

Prakdsdtmd, 25

prakrti, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 56, 57, 61, 144, 147, 156, 158, 163, 164, 172, 173, 239, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260 «., 261, 266, 280, 296, 301, 381, 384, 444, 445, 446, 449, 453, 454, 455, 456, 459, 460, 463, 464, 469, 472, 473, 474, 476, 477, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 487, 489, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 498, 502, 503, 504, 505,506, 507, 508, 509

prakrti-prasuti, 502

Index

pralaya, 13, 36.. 56, 156, 169, 446, 459, 477, 481, 493, 502, 503

pramd, 62, 203, 467

pramdna, 62, 125. 201, 202, 203, 204, 205. 206, 214, 215, 216, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 247, 248, 249, 346, 351, 361, 390, 423, 426, 427, 428, 468, 469, 503 n., 537, 539; as artha-paricchedakatva, 240; Buddhist view of it, 205; difference between Rama-nuja Nyaya and Sankara, 204; difference of view regarding it between Verikata and Meghanadari, 240; Jaina view, 205; Jayanta's view, 203; Rumania's view, 205; Megh-anadari's definition of, 239; refutation of it by Sriharsa, 201; Vatsya-Srinivasa's treatment of it, 203; Vehkata's definition, 236; Vehkata's treatment of it, 201 et seq.

pramdna-phala, 205, 467

Pramdna-samgraha, 20

Pramdna-sdra, 133, 138

Pramanas, treatment by Madhava Mukunda, 426 et seq.

pramdndrtha, 62

pramdtd, 368

pramdtr-tattva, 547

prameya, 248

Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda, 206

Prameya-mdld, 349, 351 n.

Prameya-samgraha, 128 n., 214 n., 216 n., 234

Prameya-sdra, no

Prameya-sekhara, 135 n.

prameyatva, 230 n.

prameyatvdt, 230

Pranatartihara, 109

Pranatartihara Pillan, no

Prapanna, meanings of, 91

Prapanna-paritrdna, 135 n.

Prapanna-pdrijdta, 352, 380

Prapanna-sdvitrl, 137

Prapannd-mrta, 63 n., 94, 97 n., 98, 100, 102 n., 105, 108, 10971., non., 138 n.

Prapanndmrta relates, 97 n.

Prapanca-mithydtva-bhanga, 126

prapatti, 54, 55, 68, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 101, 120, 122, 136, 137, 375, 376, 377. 378, 379. 380; according to Saumyajamatr Muni, 374 et seq. ; its accessories, 92; its angas, 91 n. ; its history, 379; its meaning, 90; its schools, 92 et seq.; its stages, 379

Prapatti-kdrikd, 125

Prapatti-naisthikam, 86 n.

Prapatti-prayoga, 380

prapdthaka, 106

Prasanga-ratndkara, 396 n.

prasdda, 505

prasdnti, 505

Prasna, 480

Prasnopanisat-prakdsikd, 127

prasiiti, 502

pratibandha, 538

pratibhd, 537

pratijnd, 427

Pratijnd-vdda, 133

pratinidhi-nydya, 183

pratisancara, 497

Pratisthd-kdnda, zz

Prativadibhakesan, 117

Prativadibhayahkara, 112, 138

pratlter apahnava eva sydt, 238

pratyaksa, 220, 224, 426

Pratyahara, 30. 61, 505

pravacana, 514

pravartaka, 61

pravdhd-ndditva, 177 n.

Prayoga-ratna-mdld, 116, 131

prayojana, 420

Prabhakara view, 248

prdga-bhdva, 169, 177, 279, 328, 338,

353. 428 Prajdpatya-smrti, 20 prdkatya, 148 prdkrta, 30 prdkrta-mandala, 415 prdkrta-pralaya, 509 prdkrtd-tmd, 483 prdkrtika, 502, 503 prdmdnika, 313 prdmdnya, 202, 346, 347 prdpa, 7, 47, 49, 59, 80, 405, 540 prana vdyu, 59 prdndydma, zz, 23, 30, 32, 60, 61, 505,

506, 509 n. Prdpti-dasd, 379 Prdpyd-nubhava-dasd, 379 prdrabdha, 445, 487, 488 prdrabdha karma, 378, 389, 414, 443,

487 pratikulyasya varjanam, 92 prdvarana, 515 prdyascitta, 92, 294; Vehkata's view,

294 Pre-Aryan, 531

Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, 521 n. Preceptor, 28, 87, 89, 139, 156 Pre-condition, 253 Predicate, 80, 193, 271, 283, 438 Prediction, 345 Pre-existent effect, 265

59i

Preferences, 34

Prejudices, 317

prema-bhakti, 401

Prema-sdra, 102

Premises, 178

Prerogative grace, 85

Presence, 54

Present, 181, 284, 285, 446, 533

Presentation, 180, 182

Pride, 529

Priest, 104, 550

Primary, 41; cause, 179 n.\ entities,

440; forms, 39; sense, 306 Primeval, 42 n. Primordial, 44, 45, 447; elements,

128 Principle, 31, 32, 47, 57, 201, 502, 505,

507, 508, 512; of agreement, 226;

of consciousness, 322, 463 Pringle Pattison, 451 priori, 205 Priority, 419 Prior moment, 278 Priyalvar-tiru-mori, 138 prlti, 161 Prlti-karita, 136

prlti-rupo-pasantatva-laksanam, 382 Probability, 214 Probandum, 225, 228, 229, 231 n.,

427, 534. 535 Proceedings and Transactions of the

Third Oriental Conference, 106 n. Process, 30, 32, 42, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55,

56, 205, 292, 442, 453, 455, 458,

475, 495 Procession, 69 Product, 26, 29, 34, 36, 208, 331, 409,

423. 448, 449, 455, 477, 5i°> 548

Production, 184, 199, 204, 206, 265, 267, 268, 277, 278, 284. 292, 300, 328, 330, 331, 341, 342, 344, 411, 416, 428, 447, 454, 473, 481

Productive capacity, 354

Productivity, 465

Progress, 464, 514

Progressive, 37

Prohibited actions, 62

Proofs, 189, 406, 407, 457, 458

Proportion, 46, 54

Propositions, 190, 193, 201, 202, 223, 225, 227, 319

Protection, 54

Protector, 499, 507

Proximity, 316, 498

Prudence, 550

prthivl, 49 n.

Psychical, 469; elements, 29

Psychological, 180, 185 n., 210, 237; state, 380 n. ; transformations, 395

Psychologically, 180

Psychosis, 29, 30, 151, 412, 464

Publicity, 120

Pulaha, 21

Pulastya, 21

Pum-sakti, 51

Punamali, 98

Punishment, 51, 92, 415

Pundarlkaksa, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102 n., 109, 118

Pundravardhana, 524 n.

punya, 294

Pupil, 117, 127, 130, 131

pur, 503

Purandara, 536, 539

Purana, 16, 19, 20, 71, 72, 99, 105, 125, 445, 448, 47i, 479, 486, 496. 497, 520, 550

Purana Kassapa, 520, 522; his views, 520

Puranic, 452, 497, 549; legends, 80

Puranika, 122

Pure, 32, 34, 42, 44, 50, 311, 413, 420, 423, 430, 454, 467, 469, 470, 479, 490, 499, 500; action, 56; being, 10, *67, 175, 192, 193, 200, 291, 302, 311; bliss, 27, 344, 444, 494; brahman, 333, 432, 440; consciousness, 24, 26, 28, 29, 35, 5i. 57, 143. 145, 166, 170, 171, 309, 311, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 325, 345, 362, 363, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 373, 374, 408, 409, 419, 421, 423, 445. 446, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453, 455, 457, 458, 460, 461, 462, 485, 492, 494; creation, 27; energy, 447; existence, 497; experience, 169; form, 438; illumination, 195, 407; impure-creation, 57; indeterminate, 344; intelligence, 26, 147, 148, 154; knowledge, 176, 408, 439, 441; nature, 302, 306, 338; revelation, 169; self, 408; soul, 453; space, 283

Purest qualities, 430

Purification, 60, 442

Purificatory rites, 22

Purity, 6, 29, 160, 406, 438, 441, 524

Purl, 94, 96, 103, 120

purovarti vastu, 241

Purpose, 452, 474

Purusa, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 57, H7. 148, 259, 266, 296, 445, 446, 448,

449, 45i, 453, 454, 455, 456, 459, 460, 461, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469,

Index

Purusa {cont.)

47°, 471. 473. 474. 475. 477. 479, 480, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495, 497, 498, 503, 5°4, 5°5, 5°7. 508, 509, 511, 527; conception of in Vijnana Bhiksu, 448; consciousness of, 464

purusakdra. 378

Purusa-ninriaya, 16, 96, 139, 352

purusa-sukta, 12, 44, 105, 155

purusdrtha, 136

Purusdrtha-ratndkara, 132

pur us avatar a, 40 n.

" puruso ha ndrayariah" , 12

Purusottama, 38, 70, 116, 132, 403

Purusottama prasada, 403

Purusottamanya, 112, 411

puryam sete, 504

purna, 36

pusti, 57

Purnadeva, 402

Purva-mimamsa, 350

purva-paksa, 519

purvd-nubhuta-rajata-samskdra-dvdrd,

246 Pusd, 58 Putayogin, 63

Qualifications, 28, 305, 308, 323

Qualified, 165, 193, 430; concept, 244; entity, 255, 279; monism, 430

Qualifying relation, 252

Qualitative, 550

Quality, 10, 25, 30, 34, 35, 36, 48, 53, 54. 56, 61, 156, 181, 197, 207, 208, 209, 212 n., 254, 255, 256, 284, 288, 306, 311, 317, 324, 336, 340, 343, 34^, 35i. 356, 357, 361, 4 11 , 426, 429, 430, 433, 435, 441, 442, 455, 463, 465, 489, 493, 503, 505, 508, 5io, 548

Qualityless, 31, 306, 406, 407, 408,

423, 43°, 435, 499 Queen, 98 Question, 195

Raghunathacarya, 133 Raghunatharya, 117 Raghuttama, 137, 138 Rahasya-mdtrkd, 124 Rahasya-navanitam, 123 Rahasya-padavi, 123 Rahasya-raksa, 99 n., 123, 380 n. Rahasya-ratndvali, 126 Rahasya-ratndvali-hrdaya, 124 rahasyas, 94 Rahasya-sandesa, 124

Rahasya-sandesa-vivarana, 124 Rahasya-sikhd-mani, 124 Rahasya-traya, won., 138 Rahasya-traya-culuka, 124, 125 Rahasya-traya-jlvdtu, 131 Rahasya-traya-kdrikd, 132 Rahasya-traya-mlmamsd, 117 Rahasya-traya-mimdmsd-bhdsy a, 126,

131 Rahasya-traya-sdra, 18, 63 n., 124,

125 132 Rahasya-traya-sdra-samgraha, 133 Rahasya-traya-sdra-zydkhyd, 132 Rahasya-traya-sdrdrtha-samgraha, 125 rajas, 25, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 129,

156, 163, 259, 447, 473, 474, 475,

480, 481,482,501,503,504,505,507 Rajendracola, 96, 104 rajoguna, 448 raksisyatiti visvdsah, 92 Rallying, 79

Ram> ajamatr-maha-muni, 94 «., 98 n. Ramya-jdmdtr muni, 89, no, in, 112,

137; his works and relation to

Ramanuja, 137, 138 Rahgadasa. 130 Raftganatha, 69, 98, 121, 135 Raftganathacarya, 132 Rahgaraja, 132, 138 Rahga Ramanuja, 115, 116, 127; his

works, 126, 127 Rahga Ramanuja Muni, 126 Rahgacarya, no, 116, 130, 133, 382,

384, 395, 396, 398 n. Rahgesa, 102

Rapturous, 73, 79; passions, 83 rasa, 49 n., 226, 510, 511 Rasa-bhawndmrta, 122 rasa-mdtra, 510

rasa-tan-mdtra, 163, 260, 261, 499 rati, 57

Rational, 177 n. Ratna-prabhd, 107 n. Ratna-sdrinl, 114, 116, 132, 352 Raurava hell, 20 Ravishing joy, 83 Ravishing love, 79 Ravishment of soul, 79 Ray of lamp, 384 Rays, 182, 444 Radha, 81, 82, 401 Radha-krsnasaranadeva, 402 rdga, 10, 470 rdga-prapta-prapatti, 377 Raghavacarya, 94, 133 Rdhoh sirah, 4 Rahu, 4, 239

593

Rahujit, 40 n.

Rajagopala, 95

Rajaraja, 523

rdjasa, 31, 163, 498

rajasa ahamkdra, 31, 259, 504/1.

Rdjasa-sdstra, 21, 22

Raksasa, 532

Rama, 38, 39, 40 n., 82, 429

Ramacandra Bhatta, 401

Ramadesika, 102 n.

Ramakrsna, 204

Rama Misra, 95,97,98, 1 14,125,181 n., 395"-

Rama-misra-desika, 114

Ramanatha Yogi, 133

Rdma-rahasya Upanisad, 13

Rama Subrahmanyasastrl, 132

Rdmatdpinl Upanisad, 13

Ramatlrtha, 106, 107, 197 n.

Ramanuja, 1«., 3, 24, 64, 66, 67, 80, 85, 86, 88 «., 89, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, no, in, 112, 113, 114, 115 n., 116, 117, 119, 123, 125, 130, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 155, 156, 157. 159, 161. 165, 168, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177. 179. 180, 181, 182, 185 n., 186 «., 187, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 203, 204, 206, 210, 214, 218, 219, 220, 225, 226, 227, 229 n., 233, 237, 239, 240, 251, 261, 264, 274, 277, 281, 285, 295, 290, 297, 298, 305, 313, 315, 317.321,348, 352, 354, 379, 380, 381,385,386,387, 388, 395, 396, 399, 400,404,429,430, 451, 472,496, 497; avidyd of bahkara refuted, 175 et seq. ; criticism of bah-kara's ontological views, 196; his conception of individual volitions, 298—9; his controversy with bahkara on the nature of reality, 165 et seq.; his criticism of mayd, 197; his criticism of Prakasatman, 197; his criticism of theisticproofs, lSgetseq. ; hislife, 100 et seq.; his ontological views, 195 et seq.; his principal disciples, 109 et seq.; his refutation of bahkara's theory of illusion, 179; his sat-karya-vdda, 199—200; his theory of illusion, 179 et seq.; his view criticized from the Nimbarka point of view, 429 et seq.; his view of God, 155 et seq.; his view of God in relation to self, 159 et seq.; his view that all knowledge is real, 179 et seq.; his view of perception contrasted with that of Meghanadari, 218; his views

of pramdna contrasted with those of bahkara and Nyaya, 204; his view of relation of cause and effect, 198-9; his views contrasted with those of Bhaskara, 192 et seq.; literature of the school, 114; logic, 226, 229; philosophy, 346; principal episodes of his life, 113; theory, 346; view, 270; view of self-validity of knowledge, 247 et seq.

Ramanuja, Life of, 97 «., 105 n.

Ramanuja school, 202, 209, 281, 317, 318, 340, 346, 352, 364; refutation by the faaiikarites, 113

Rdmdnuja-bhdsya, 157, 180, 298, 380 m.

Rdmanuja-carita-culuka, 117, 126

Ramanujadasa, 98, no, 117, 123, 125, 305, 361; his works, 125, 126

Ramanujadasa (Mahacarya), his refutation of ajndfia being BhavarOpa, 361 et seq.

Ramanujadasabhiksu, 132

Ramanujaguru, 138

Ramdnuja-murandddi, 66 «., 137

Ramdnuja-nava-ratna-malikd, 133

Rdmanuja-siddhanta-samgraha, 129, 204 n., 224 «., 226, 227, 297

Rdmanuja-siddhanta-sara, 117, 126

Ramanujacarya, in, 117, 131, 183, 250, 251, 354, 355, 356, 358; his refutation of the objections against self-validity, 250 «., 251

Ramanujacarya II, 352, 361

Ramanujarya, 137

Rdmdnujdrya-divya-charitai, 103, 104, 105

Ramanujists, 86, 239, 265, 291, 301, 322, 325, 327, 388, 435

Ramayana, 82. 379, 396«., 530; reference to heretics in, 530

Ramayana, 529

Ramottarottara-tapinl Upanisad, 13

rdsis, 39

Rau, Mr T. A. Gopi-natha, 65, 66, 68, 96, 103, 104; Lectures, 103

Ravana, 82

Real, 4, 166, 179, 181, 182, 183, 193, 194, 195, 196, 208, 306, 309, 313, 314, 315, 3i6, 325, 330, 332, 333, 337. 338, 339, 343, 353, 364, 373, 388, 417, 41Q, 423, 435, 437, 441, 454, 457, 486, 495; agent, 411; basis, 182, 210; fact, 365; knower, 411; knowledge, 237, 371; nature, 337; object, 181, 240; silver, 244; world, 3.SO

Realism, 184, 210

38

Index

Reality, 10, 16, 27, 28, 34, 42, 60, 173, 179, 194, 198, 201, 210, 211, 300, 310, 313, 322, 325, 326, 332, 386, 4i7, 435, 445, 449, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 4^o, 465, 472, 476, 482, 483, 487, 525 n., 526, 529, 550; as qualified or unqualified—Sahkara and Ramanuja's controversy on, 115 et seq.

Realization, 70, 106,295, 3°4> 3°6, 308, 310,311,339,382,383,414,415,437, 441, 442, 443, 464, 485, 492, 502

Reason, 53, 178, 189, 212, 231 n., 264, 326, 427, 438, 533, 534, 535

Reasoning, 255, 437; in a circle, 409

Rebirths, 7, 28, 51, 299, 329, 370, 382,

407, 44i, 483, 5i7, 525, 548, 550 Receptacle, 333 Reception, 359 Receptive, 48 Recluse, 520, 521 Recognition, 128, 142, 143, 221, 269,

437 Recollection, 79, 290 Red goddess, 37 Reference, 30, 344, 351, 447, 454, 489,

519, 523 Reflections, 29, 31, 147, 211, 411, 421,

422, 440, 448, 453, 460, 464, 467,

485, 400, 528 Refutation of the Buddhist view of

soul, 142 Refutation of the Sahkara view of

soul, 142 et seq. Refutations, 133. 177 n., 252, 305, 422,

424 Regression, 330 Relata, 218, 315, 424 Relation, 50, 53, 54, 193, 206, 218, 299,

301, 314, 315, 3i6, 335, 416, 423,

424, 426, 444, 448, 45i. 455, 456,

459, 460, 462, 471, 500, 539, 542; of

contact, 129; of inherence, 55 Relationless, 11 Relative existence, 198 Relative pluralism, 302 Relative positions, 349 Relatively real, 197 Relativistic, 210 Release, 514

Religion, 81, 86, 303, 471, 531, 533 Religious, 120, 501, 549; duties, 91;

faith, 86; festivities, 23; marks, 19;

performances, 38; practices, 19;

stages, 2; value, 305 Reminiscence, 79, 105 Remoteness, 316

Representation, 180, 480

Repression, 62

Reproduction, 245

Researches, 64

Resolve, 54

Respiration, 59

Responsibility, 472

Restraint, 550

Resultant, 37

Results, 294, 442

Retention, 60

Revelation, 171, 215, 250 n., 270, 307, 309, 323, 326, 347, 411, 412, 449; of knowledge, 169

Reverence, 404

Reward, 51, 415

Rhetorical school, 82; their analysis of art communication as influenced in the Gaudiya Vaisnavas, 82

Rhys Davids, 512, 513, 514 n., 515 n.

Rice, Mr, 104 n.

Right actions, 327

Right apprehension, 183

Right conditions, 246

Right feelings, 327

Right knowledge, 5, 203, 204, 245, 309, 326, 327, 411, 423

Rites, 16, 19, 39 n., 103

Ritual, 2, 18, 19, 22, 23, 70; ceremonies, 17

Ritualistic, 8, 16, 24, 120, 132; differences, 381; worship, 22, 23

Rival sects, 120

Rohini, 229, 279

Root, 34, 46, 59

Root-ajnana, 369

Root-cause, 187, 244

Root-elements, 45

Root-ignorance, 369

Root-impressions, 43, 44, 54, 258, 281, 287, 308, 372

Root-instincts, 29, 30, 33, 34, 51, 469

Rudra, 16, 475, 507

Rules, 128

Russel, 539 n.

Rupa, 40 n., 49 «., 510, 511

Rupa Gosvami, 82

rupa-mdtra, 510

rupa-tan-mdtra, 163, 260, 261, 499

Rg-veda, 12

rju-vivarana, 106

Rsi Narayana, 482

Rsi-rdtra, 23

rsis, 21

sabbe bhutd, 524 sabbe puna, 524

595

sabbe satta, 524

Sac-caritra-raksd, 1 22

Sacrifice, 23, 29, 55, 293, 350, 384,

45o, 519, 520, 530; of Narayana, in

Sata-patha, 12 Sad-artha-samksepa, 128 n. sad-asad-anirvacanlyd, 165 sad-asad-dtmaka, 497 sad-asadrupa, 456 sad-asad-vilaksana, 177 sad-asad-vyatirekah, 239 «. Sadd-cdrabodha, 133 Sadda-ritti, 513 Sad-vidyd-vijaya, 126, 361, 365 «.,

366/1., 370/1., 372 /!. sad-darsana-samuccaya, 516 «., 533 Sages, 13, 2i, 25, 45, 220, 474, 483 Sahasra-glti, 102/1., 104, 109 «., 134 Sahasra-glti-bhdsya, 113/2. SaJiasra-glti-vydkhyd, no Sahasra-kirani, 123 saketuka, 85 sahopalambha, 146 Saint, 13, 40, 71, 189 Sainthood, 414, 441 Saintliness, 448 sajdtlya-gunavattvam, 257 sakala, 30, 31 sal-laksana, 10 salldpa, 513 salldpa-kathd, 513 Salvation, 24, 32, 44, 55, 56, 78, 89,

129, 292, 307, 421, 432, 444, 463,

473 Samara-pungavacarya, 127 n. samavaya, 219, 222, 256, 301, 455,

456; relation, 256 samavdya-samavdyi-bhinnam, 388 samavdyi, 456 samddhi, 22, 29, 33, 60, 61 samdna, 59, 60

samdna-dharma, 211, 212, 213 samdrddhana, 10 Samdsa-vdda, 133 sarribandha-jndnitvam, 87 «. sambhava, 426, 428 Sameness, 142; of quality, 161 sampraddya, 400 Sampraddya-parisuddhi, 1 23 samuccaya, 8 samghdta, 252, 262 Satngita-mdld, 128 «. Samgraha, 119 Samhitds, 21, 24, 39 samkalpa, 34, 36, 45, 191, 504 samkalpa-suryodaya, 120, 121, 122 samkalpamayl murti, 42

Samkarsana, 13, 21, 22, 34, 37, 39, 52,

56, 57, 157, 158, 443 "•, 475 Samksepa-sdrtraka, 106, 107, 197 «. samsarga, 187 samsarga-vydpdra, 185 samsdra, 43 «., 477 Samsdra-sdmrdjyam, 135 «. samskdra, 8, 63 «., 98, 209, 223, 372,

423 samsthdna, 356 samsaya-dvaya-samdhdra, 213 Samvat in2, 399 Samvat 1806, 399 samvin-ndndtva-samarthana, 133 satnvit, 168, 170, 503, 504, 510 samvrtd-tman, 501 samyoga, 225 samyuktdsraya, 225 Samyutta, 524 Sana, 21

Sanaka, 21, 40 «., 400, 482 Sanandana, 21, 482 Sanatkumara, 21, 482, 502 Sanatsujati, 21 Sanatana, 21 Sandal, 221; paste, 7 Sandhyd-vandana-bhdsya, 118, 130 San-mdrga-dlpa, 395 «., 398 w. san-mdtra, 200 san-mdtra-grdht, 167 sannydsin, 102, 137 Sanskrit, 1 «., 9, 64, 107, 123, 125, 134,

'35. 137, !38; literature, 3 «.; texts,

132 Sanskrit Manuscripts, 401 «. Sanskritic, 383 «. santosa, 61, 62 «. Sahgati-mala, 119, 234, 383 w. Sangati-sara, 133 saftketa, 544 sankucita-svarupam, 172 sancita, 443

sankocavikdsarham, 172 sa-paksa, 230, 231 saprakdsatva, 358 Sapta-gdthd, 138 Saptati-ratna-mdlikd, 133 SarasvatI, 52, 57, 59, 399 sarga, 502

sarga-pratisarga, 496 Saroyogin, 63 sarvabhrt, 61 Sarva-darsana-samgraha, 120, 400,

515. 5i6. 532, 533, 534 w. Sarva-darsana-siromani, 118, 132 sarva-dharma-vahiskrta, 20 sarva-ga, 61

38-2

Index

Sarvajnatma muni, 106, 107, 197

sarva-svabhdva-ziraha, 271

sarva-vittza, 231

sarvd-ntara, 483

Sarvartha-siddhi, 122, 128 n., 209, 251 n., 252 n., 255 n., 256 n., 257 n„ 264 w., 265 n., zbb n., 267 n., 268 rc., 269 w., 270 n., zyz n., 274 n., 276 w., 277 w., 278 n., 279 n., 281 n., 282 w., 283 w., 286 n., 288 w., 289 n., 290 w., 291 w., 292 n., 293 w., 294 n., 295 w., 296 w., 302 n., 346, 352, 353 n., 354 «•, 355".

*«'. 154. 444> 457

satatam kurvato jagat, 36

Satisfaction, 92

sat-karya-vdda, 43, 200, 265, 267; other views contrasted with those of Ramanuja, 200

sat-kdrya-vddin, 200

sat-khyati, 128, 183, 184, 410

sattd, 243

sattdkhya, 29

sattdkhya-jiidna, 29

sa/f/za, 513, 514

sattva, 25, 30, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 57, 128, 129, 156, 163, 259, 446, 447. 47o, 47i. 473. 475. 479, 480, 481, 482, 488, 491, 504, 505, 507; part, 473; quality, 454; bodv, 472, 481

sattva-guna, 45, 448

sattvamaya, 448, 451

sattva-stuff, 472

sattzo-pddhi, 481

sattvd, 358, 513

Satya, 27, 29, 61, 351

sat yam, 503

satyam jndnam anantam brahma,

165

Saugandhakulya, 97

Saumya Jamatr muni, 24, no, in, 115, 120, 131 n., 132, 134, 135, 137, x 38, 374, 380, 381; his conception of Laksmi, 375; his conception of prapatti, bhakti and prema, 377; his doctrine of prapatti, 376 et seq.

Saura-kanda, zz

Sauri-raja-carandra-vinda-saranagati-sara, 132

sausddrsya, 297, 355

sa-zigraha, 31

savikalpa, 217, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 311, 544; knowledge, 219

sa-vikalpa-pratyaksa, 166

Saviour, 86 n.

sddhana, 62

sddhand, 487

sddhya, 62, 228, 230, 231, 427, 535, 536. 537. 538

sadrsya, 355, 427; Vadihamsa's conception of it as samsthdna, 356; Vehka^a's conception of it, 355

sdksdd-avatara, 38, 39

sdksdtkdra, 62, 485

sdksdtkari-pramd, 216

sdksdt-sakti, 41, 42 n., 57

sdksattva, 217

sa/js/'-consciousness, 325, 326, 337,

363, 367

saksin, 325, 326

sdksi, 144, 173. 483

sdlokya, 443 n.

sdlokya-mukti, 50

samagrl, 204, 220

sdmdnya-gocaram, 534

samlpya, 443 n.

sdmpra ddyika. 181 n.

Sdmkhya, 18, 23, 30, 43, 52, 62, 144, 148, 156, 200, 256, 258, 259, 261, 265, 266, 296, 440, 445, 449, 459, 461, 462, 464, 471, 472, 473, 476, 479, 480, 481, 482, 485, 496, 498, 512, 521, 527; categories, 25; doctrine, 479, 480; inference, 256; in relation to Vedanta according to Vijnana Bhiksu, 471 et seq.; mode, x 57; philosophy, 501 n.; theory, 265; theory of sat-kdrya-vdda, refutation by Yehkata, 365 et seq.; view, 281 n.

Sdmkhya-karikd, 448, 501 n.

Samkhya-Patanjala, 45

Sdmkhya-prazacana-bhdsya, 482

Sdmkhya-sdra, 48Z

Sdmkhya-sutra, 448, 473

Sarnkhya-yoga, 466, 539; Vijnana Bhiksu's criticism of, 479 et seq.

Samkhyist, 46, 147, 163, 256, 257, 259, 261, 265, 266, 343, 386, 462, 476,

527 Sara-darpana, 115, 384, 389 n., 392 Sdra-dipa, 124 Sdra-niskarsa-tlppanl, 127 Sara-samgraha, 124, 135 n. Sara-sara, 124

Sdrattha-pakasini, 514, 515 n. Sara-rtha-catustaya, 352 Sdrd-rtha-samgraha, now. sdrupya, 442 n. sdttzika, 31, 163, 498 sdttvika ahamkdra, 259, 504 Sattvika purdnas, 20 sdtzata, 12, 15, 17, 19, 22

597

Sdtvata-samhitd, 12 «., 21, 40 «., 42 «., 57

satvata-sdsana, 62

Sdtvika-sdstra, 21

Savatthi, 522

sdyujya, 161, 443 «.

sdyujya-mukti, 474

Scepticism, 244, 520

Sceptics, 520

Scholars, 86, 104

Scholarship, 94

Scholastic, 133, 373; criticism, 364

School, m; of logic, 112

Schrader, 37, 38, 40«., 41, 42«., 50

Science, 34, 512, 514, 516, 518

Scientific, 181

Scope, 328, 422

Scriptural, 33, 180, 223; criticism, 388; duties, 61, 89, 90, 91, 92, 100, 293. 3°7; injunctions, 303; interpretation, 326; knowledge, 307, 326; testimony, 136, 211, 214, 296, 306, 326, 327, 352, 406, 426, 468; texts, 5, 15, 16, 17, 181, 192, 199, 208, 280,

302, 329, 338, 340, 383, 385, 387, 388, 392, 396, 397, 407, 426, 429, 43i. 438, 448, 458, 465, 468, 486, 490, 508, 517; view, 549

Scriptures, 4, 7, 8, 9, 25, 50, 52, 54, 146, 166, 168, 174, 189, 203, 216, 256, 259, 281, 289, 294, 296, 302,

303, 306, 319, 326, 340, 350, 361, 371, 380 «., 406, 407, 428, 437, 442,

452. 465, 472. 494, 539

Sea, 6, 487

Secondary, 38, 41; sense, 306

Sectarian, 305; authors, 18; difference, 381; quarrels, 120

Section, 305

Sect of Brahmins, 2

Sects, 512 n.

Seed, 184, 330, 429, 509

Self, 12, 26, 129, 140, 143, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 172, 208, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292, 306, 308, 315, 3 2 3, 324, 327, 330, 345. 346, 361, 365, 369, 408, 409, 411, 412, 426, 428, 439. 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 453, 459, 463, 464, 469, 470, 483, 485, 486, 487, 494, 495, 509, 523 «., 528, 529, 547, 548, 549; how its knowledge rises according to Ramanuja, 159; in relation to God according to Ramanuja, 159 et seq.; Nimbarka's conception of, 411 et seq.; Verikata's view of self in relation to God, 161

et seq.; according to Yamuna, its nature, 140 et seq.; and the problem of consciousness, 149 et seq. ; refutation of Rumania's view, 148; refutation of the Samkhya view, 147

Self-abnegation, 55, 60, 62, 414

Self-apperception, 93

Self-conscious, 27, 412; entities, 159

Self-consciousness, 9, 140, 146, 151, 154, 155, 173, 216, 274, 315, 324, 369, 466, 546, 547

Self-contradiction, 90, 239, 269

Self-contradictory, 193, 202, 230, 231,

239, 256, 266, 272, 334, 342, 398, 469, 486, 512

Self-control, 22, 33, 160

Self-criticism, 32

Self-dependent, 36

Self-destruction, 324

Self-discriminative, 382

Self-dynamism, 433

Self-ejected idea, 244

Self-evident, 315

Self-existent, 297

Self-fulfilment, 382

Self-identification, 475

Self-identity, 269

Self-illuminating, 35, 358

Self-illumination, 176, 358

Self-introspection, 141

Self-invalidity, 249

Self-knowledge, 290, 383, 384, 466, 467, 468, 487

Self-love, 443, 470

Self-luminosity, 317, 325, 345, 358, 359, 367, 407, 438, 468; its treatment by Vijfiana Bhiksu, 468 et seq.

Self-luminous, 61, 171, 176, 178, 243, 290, 310, 315, 316, 319, 325, 340, 347, 360, 361, 370, 407, 408, 438, 439, 466, 468

Self-luminousness, 439

Self-manifestation, 214, 248

Self-manifesting, 142, 149, 150

Self-mastery, 520

Self-offering, 60, 62

Self-perceiving, 413

Self-realized, 24

Self-realization, 28, 29, 302, 382, 383, 487

Self-revealed, 315

Self-revealing, 160, 166, 168, 171, 230,

240, 249, 306, 315, 358 Self-revelation, 170, 306, 318 Self-shining, 332

Index

Self-sufficiency, 35

Self-surrender, 86, 87, 89, 112, 120,

136, 379

Self-surrendering, 78; association, 91

Self-valid, 9, 247, 250, 348, 357

Self-validity, 240, 249, 250 n., 251, 289, 347, 348, 356, 357, 428; of cognition, 240; of knowledge, Bhatta and Prabhakara view, 249

Selves, 44, 345, 346, 411, 451, 465, 476, 477; as inseparable from God, 298-300

Semi-conscious, 83

Senai Nathan, 67 n.

Senanatha, 117

Senda, 66

Seniors, 185 n., 186 n.

Sensations, 253, 386

Sense, 7, 8, 9, 27, 30, 32, 33. 43, 47, 48, 49, 80, 181, 182, 189, 196, 280, 281 n., 289, 300, 306, 311, 317, 325, 414, 427, 435, 462, 466, 502, 505,

540, 543, 545. 547 Sense-appearances, 290 Sense-character, 254, 284, 285 Sense-cognitions, 289, 547 Sense-consciousness, 450 Sense-contact, 189, 203, 204, 206, 270,

280, 311 Sense-data, 251, 291, 544 Sense-faculty, 280, 463 Sense-function, 281, 539 Sense-gratifications, 531 Sense-impressions, 223 Sense-inclinations, 22 Sense-knowledge, 206, 217, 544 Sense-objects, 32, 152, 411, 449, 546,

550 Sense-organ, 8, 9, 13, 28, 172, 179,

184, 185 n., 189, 204, 205, 206, 222,

223, 270, 280, 290, 295, 347, 411,

533, 534, 540, 543, 544, 54° Sense-perception, 31, 151, 217, 223,

503 Sense-pleasures, 550 Sense-qualities, 251, 252, 253 Sense of possession, 71 Sensible, 288, 290; qualities, 27, 31 Sensory, 467 Sensual joys, 550 Sensuous, 325 Sentient, 54 Separate ajndnas, 369 Separate wholes, 263, 264 Separateness, 264 Separation, 71, 72, 327 Sequence, 184, 273

Series, 310, 353, 540, 543, 544, 545,

54<>, 547 Servants, 83, 84, 87; of God, 89 Service, 54, 88 Servitude, 136, 161, 377; of God,

89 Sesvara-mltnamsd, i8n, 124 Sevadeva, 402 Sex-emotions, 549 Sex-indulgence, 549 Shapes, 5 Shining, 336; character, 232, 243, 244;

entity, 242 Shop, 181 siddha-prema, 378 siddha-zastu-virodhl, 354 n. Siddhdnta-cintdmani, 115, 116, 388,

389 n., 390 m., 391 n., 392 Siddhdnta-jdhnavi, 404 Siddhdnta-nirnaya, 122 Siddhdnta-ralna, 403 Siddhdnta-ratndzali, 12, 18, 132 Siddhdnta-samgraha, 130, 203 n. Siddhdnta-setukd, 404 Siddhdnta-siddhdiijana, 133 Siddhanta-siromani, 3 Siddhdnta-srazana, 61 Siddhdnta-vaijayanti, 18 Siddhi-traya, 98, 105, 108, 109, 128^.,

154, 155, 229 n. Siddhy-updya-sudarsana, 127 Significance, 53, 293, 297 Silver, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184,

185, 186, 187, 188, 241, 242, 244,

245, 3io, 336, 337, 346, 408; elements, 241; image, 245 Similar, 298 Similarity, 142, 179, 182, 183, 234,

297, 298, 351, 355, 423, 426, 427, 428 Simplicity, 180, 186 n. Simultaneity, 142, 254 Simultaneous, 276; perception, 281 simha, 60 Sin, 34, 295, 303, 388, 441, 446, 505,

524, 526, 528, 550 Sincerity, 158 Sinful, 294, 304, 549 Sinner, 99

Sirup-pullur-udaya-Pillai, 97 n. Situation, 332, 434, 455 Six qualities, 37 Sltd-upanisad, 41, 42 n., 57 skanda, 402

Skanda-purdna, 19 n., 507 n. Skill, 194 Sky, 128. 447 Sleep, 169, 240, 257

599

smarana, 505

smaranam, 178 n.

Smell, 251

Smell-potential, 163, 510

Smoke, 211, 22671., 534, 536, 538

smrti, 14, 15, 16, 20, 57, 125, 471, 503, 504, 510, 517, 549; literature, 19

Sneha-purti, 395 n.

Social, 472, 549

Sophistry, 514, 515, 516, 517

Sophists, 518

Sorrow, 52, 441, 443 «., 444, 445, 463, 464, 470, 486, 491, 506, 508

Sorrowful, 46

Sottanambi, 109 n.

Souls, 6, 7, 10, 35, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 80, 83, 125, 139, 140, 147, 151, 154, 155. 157, 177 «•» 189, 194, 200, 286, 291, 295, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 381, 385, 393, 395, 412, 413, 422, 430, 43i, 434, 435, 44i, 443, 444, 45i, 453, 457, 458, 483, 485, 489, 503, 517, 5i9, 525, 526, 527, 530, 53i, 539, 543, 546, 547, 549, 55°

Sound, 5, 33, 48, 58, 167

Sound-potential, 504, 510

Source, 292, 295, 303, 348, 494, 521, 530; of knowledge, 185 «., 465

South, 18

South India, 19, 80, 138, 523

South Indian, 81 n.

Southern India, 63

Space, 6, 27, 34, 48, 82, 163, 195, 199, 228, 252, 264, 273, 277, 282, 301, 521; relations, 284

Spaceless, 72

Sparks, 6

sparsa, 49 «., 261, 510, 511

sparsa-tan-matra, 163, 260, 261, 499, 5io

Spatial, 313, 324, 343, 353; character, 353; contiguity, 316; difference, 245; qualification, 238; quality, 245; units, 264

Spatial-temporal, 489

Spatio-temporal, 226

Special, 43, 208; powers, 38; quality,

393 Species, 173 Specific cause, 279 Specific characters, 46 n. Specific effect, 279 Specific modes, 364 Specific nature, 356 Specific qualities, 263 Spectator, 82 Speculations, 496

Speech, 3, 4, 34, 48, 53, 168

sphota, 107 n., 108 n.

Spider, 59, 406

Spirit, 32, 55, 298, 299, 302, 350, 406,

460, 472, 492; part, 301, 302; of

service, 70 Spiritual, 10, 28, 35, 41, 44, 47, 48, 60,

373, 385, 386; emancipation, 378;

energy, 51; entities, 36; fact, 377;

form, 37, 38; love, 81; nature, 406;

transformation, 10; zeal, 72 Spirituality, 472 Spontaneity, 56, 85, 442 Spontaneous, 27, 34, 35, 36, 85, 214,

215, 292, 452; agency, 37; grace, 88;

production, 277 Sportive, 444 Srsti-khanda, 532 Staffs, 532 Stage, 44, 46 «., 47, 48, 50, 56, 58, 60,

79, 292, 311, 422, 458, 486, 491, 503,

541, 544; of life, 11, 416; of love,

82 Stars, 515 n. State, 35, 41, 50, 52, 56, 290, 295, 339,

344, 414, 438, 439, 44i, 443, 444,

445, 446, 457, 458, 469, 471, 476,

486, 488, 494, 495, 503, 545, 546 Static, 29, 446, 492; entities, 36 Statical, 46 Status, 437

Stick, 1 «., 2, 342, 549 Stone, 41

Stotra-ratnam, 98, 99, 101 Stotra-ratnakara, 123 Stotra-trayl, 403 Strength, 35, 404 Structural Brahman, 434 Structural cause, 47 Structure, 500 Study of the Vedas, 29 Sub-commentary, 137, 138 Sub-conscious image, 237; impressions, 228, 268 Sub-consciousness, 8, 222, 227, 258,

270, 281, 437 Subhdsita-nlvi, 121 Subject, 178, 193, 194, 204, 280, 283,

297 «■, 368 Subjective, 170, 179, 238, 268,

490 Subjectivity, 325 Submission, 54 Subodhint, 116, 132 Subserviency, 299 Subsidiary, 27, 39, 58, 90 Subsistence, 256

Index

Substance, 10, 34, 35, 80, 129, 147, '83, 193, 195, 199, 208, 209, 211, 212, 222, 224, 245, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 258, 288, 299, 303, 334, 343. 344. 361, 425. 430, 43'. 455.

463. 4 r H. 493. 500 Substantiality, 431 Substantive, 385 Substitution, 210

Substratum, 142, 188, 238, 408, 456,

475. 484 Subtle, 35, 42, 45, 58, 61, 298, 415,

445, 475, 504; aspects, 194; body,

24; cause, 476; constituents, 299;

essence, 80; form, 29, 301; matter,

414; state, 396, 397 Succession, 142, 207, 310, 353 Sudarsana, 34, 35, 41. 51, 53, 57, 126,

130, 132, 401, 448 n. Sudarsana Hhafta, 111 Sudarsanaguru, 126, 130 Sudarsana-samhitd, 23 Sudarsana-sura-druma, 133 Sudarsana Suri, iou n., 113, 114, 115,

118, 120, 130, 135, 176 n., 177 n.,

181 m., 182, 186 n. ; his refutation of

ajiidna, 177 n.\ his works, 130 Sudarsana sakti, 50 Sudarsanacarya, 118, 126, 298; his

view of relation of souls to God, 297 Suffering, 52, 291, 292, 303, 304, 412,

464, 521, 524 Suffix, 166, 233 Suggestion. 343. 344 sukha, 463, 464, 485 Sumafiiiala-vildsim, 513 w., 520, 521 n.,

522 ;/., 524 n. Sumerian, 531 ; civilization, 529 summum bnnum, 136, 379, 420 Sun, 6, 42, 59, 153, 228, 295, 349, 447 Sundara Bha;ta, 404 Sundaradesika, 112 Sundararaja-desika, 117, 130 Super-consciousness, 450, 490 Superintendence, 31, 152, 189 Superintendent, 56, 58, 104 Superintending, 38 Superior, 53, 54; devotees, 380 Superiority, 53 Supplementary, 123 Support, 34, 56, 300, 330, 333, 334,

338. 350. 422, 477 Supposition, 322, 330, 332, 406, 408,

410, 423, 439 Supra-sensible, 550 Supreme, 28, 33, 42, 49, 54, 55. 475;

bliss, 130; cause, 191; energy, 45;

excellence, 136; intoxication, 83;

person, 189, 190, 191; power, 36,

52; resignation, 86 surd, 540

susadrsa-samsthdna, 355 susadrsatvam, 224 Sustained, 455 Sustainer, 455

susiksita cdrzdka, 516, 540, 547 susutnnd, 59, 415 susumnd nddi, 58 susupti, 144, 178 Suta, 482 Sutakhya, 138 siiksma, 61, 281 suksma-kdla-gund-rasthd, 42 Siita-samhitd, 19 sutra, 1, 108 w., 109, 116, 125, 140,

195, 196, 472, 480, 516, 518, 523 n.,

532, 539; of Jaimini, 124 Siitra-krtdnga, 524, 527, 528 Sutra-krtdnija-sutra, 521, 523, 524, 525,

526, 527; heretics referred to, in,

526 svabhdra, 46 Svabhii, 402

Sza-dharmd-dhia-bodha, 400 n., 401 si ajanyatvam, 372 svalaksana, 255, 271 sva-lilayd, 5 11

sza-murtdv apt svayam era hetuh, 240 sva-prakasa, 230 svaprakdsati a, 468 svarupa, 217 n., 347 svarupa-dhi, 217 srarupa-sddrsya, 224 Svarupacarya, 401 svarupareia, 38 srasttku, 30, 60 svatah-pramdna, 9; upheld by the

Ramanuja school, 247 el seq. svatah-prdtudnya, 240, 347, 348, 356,

428 svatah-prdmdnya-i dda, 346; Meghan-

adari's view, 346 sratastva, 428 sva-vildsa, 40 n. sravildsa-aiatdra , 40 n. svayambhu, 504 Svayambhuva, 21 siayam-prakdsa, 167 svayam-rupa, 40 n. srayam-siddha, 214 n. svdbhdvika, 434

srdbhdrika bheda-bheda-vdda, 406 svddhydya, 62 n. svdlaksanya, 255

601

svdmi-krpd, 85

svdml, 86

svdmsa, 40 n.

svdmsa-avatdra, 40 n.

svdrasika-bddhd-drster ananyathd-sid-dhesca, 251

svdrthd-mimdna, 427

svdtantrya, 506

svdtantrya-mula icchdtmd, 45

Sweetness, 226

Swoon, 169, 240

syddvdda-ratndkdra, 536 w., 537 w.

Syllogism, 321

Symbol, 53, 326

Sympathy, 73, 120

Synonymous, 277

Synthesis, 187

Synthetic, 31, 47, 185, 501; association, 187

System, 32, 192, 297, 304, 347, 422, 451, 471, 482, 495. 516/1., 524/1., 527; of philosophy, 533

Systematic doctrine, 68

Sahara, 124

Sahara Bhdsya, 349

Sahara Svamin, 107

sabda, 31, 49 n., 129, 233, 260 n., 426, 510, 511

Sabda-brahman, 58

s'abda-mdtra, 510

sabda-pramdrta, 233

sabda-tan-mdtra, 48,163,259, 260, 26:,

499. 504

£aila-rangesa, 94

£aila-rangesa-guru, 98 n.

S~aila Srinivasa, 384, 385, 386, 388; his conception of causality, 385 et seq.; his criticism of Uma-Mahesvara, 396 et seq.; his refutation of San-karite attacks on Ramanuja doctrine, 385 et seq.; his refutation of the objections to Ramanuja's doctrine by various opponents, 392 et seq.

Saiva, 3 n., 18, 19, 105, 113. 155. 3°4, 525; hymns, 84; king, 104

S"aivism, 18, 64, 81 n., 102 n., 399: its love of God distinguished from Arvars, 84; Manikka-vachakar's love of God, 84; of South India, 84

s'akti, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43. 44- 45- 5 1 , 52. 53, 56, 57, 155, 156, 197, 354, 507, 508, 509

^aktyatman, 40 n.

s'akty-diesa, 38

Salikanatha, 185 n.

sauca, 61, 62 «.

Jaarikara, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 65, 105, 107, 108, in, 112, 124, 125, 130, 165, 166, 173, 174, 195, 196, 198, 200, 204, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 317, 320, 322, 350, 381, 395, 417, 456, 471, 472, 476, 480, 484, 486, 487, 494, 496, 548; a crypto-Buddhist, 1; his avidyd refuted, 175 et seq.; his controversy with Ramanuja on the nature of reality, 165 et seq.; his interpretation of causality, 3; his theory of illusion refuted, 179; literature, 405; philosophy 198, 316; school, 123, 142, 304, 312; system, 422; Theory, 422; view, 396

Sankara-bhdsya, 198 n., 548 n.

£ankara Vedanta, 228, 403, 456

Sankara-vijaya, 2

^ankarism, 143

Sankarite epistemology, 9

Sankarite view, 293, 387, 424

^ankarites, 102, 113, 143, 144, 145, 153. 154, 155, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 188, 201, 204, 210, 223, 238, 239, 3", 313, 3^5. 3i8, 3i9, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 334, 336, 337, 340, 34i, 343, 345, 346, 347, 35°, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 374, 385, 388, 394, 398, 409, 4i7, 418, 419, 420, 421, 428, 430, 434, 435, 456, 470, 478, 486

Sankhinl, 59

Sarana-gati, 55

Sarand-gati-gadya, 379, 380 n.

Sarand-gati-gadyam, 86 n.

s'arlra, 297, 298, 300, 389; its definition, 297 et seq.

Sarlra-bhdvddhikarana-vicdra, 131

Jsantadasa Vavaji, 402

Sdrlraka-mlmdrnsd-vrtti, 117

Sdrlraka-nyaya-kaldpa, 117, 132

Sdrlraka-sastrdrtha-dlpikd, 117, 127

Sdrlraka-sastra-samgati-sdra, 117

Sdrlra-vdda, 133, 297/1., 298/1., 299 n., 300 n.

sastta, 21, 25, 56, 102, 161, 413, 503,

, 514, 530

Sastraikya-vada, 133 sdstra-sampraddya-pravartaka, 7 n. Sdstrdrambha-samarthana, 133 Sastri, Mr D., 531 n. Sastri, M. M. S. KuppasvamI, 106 n. Sata-dusani, 117, 122, 123, 126, 130,

131, 305, 3i9"-, 396 Sata-dusGrii-vydkhyd, 131

Index

Sata - dusam - vyakhyd - sahasra - kiram,

127 sataka, 70

Satakoti-dusana-parihdra, 133 Satakoti-khandana, 133 Sata-patha Brdhmana, 12 Sathakopa, 63, 65, 67 n., 69, 70, 71,

78,94, 102 n., 108, 116, 138 Sathakopa muni, 130 Sathakopa Yati, 112, 123, 130 Sathakopacarya, 114, 139 Safha-marsana, 94 n., 129, 132 Sathari Suri, 130 Havana, 107, ro8 n. sdkhd-candra-darsana, 340 Saktas, 19 Samba-pur ana, 19 sunt a, 499

Santatman, 40 n.

Santi, 37, 505, 523

Santi-parvan, 12, 260 n., 479

Sandilya, 3, 17, 21, 25

Sandilyabhaskara, 3 n.

handily a-smrti, 20

Sarada-matha, 102

Satatapa, 20

sesa-sesita, 53

iesa-vrtti-paratva, 87 n.

Sesarya, 297

sesl, 160

Silpdrtha-sdra, 122

Siriya-tiru-madal, 69, 134 72.

S~iva, 12, 16, 37, 38, 39, 40/2., 52, 84, 132, 232, 304, 475, 482, 483

Siva-rdtra, 23

S~ilarika, 521, 523, 525, 526, 527

Sloka-vdrttika, 206 n.

Sottha-pQrna, 97

iraddhd, 57, 382, 509, 550

Sramana, 527

sravana, 405, 442

Sravana Bhatta, 402

srdddhas, 530, 550

Srantabhaskara, 3 n.

Srimadhura, 98

Sriyah-pati-ppadi, 135/2.

Sri, 37, 41, 57. 89, 99; its meaning, 89

$rl-bhdsya, 103, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 123, 125, 126, 128/2.,

131, 132, 137, 175 72., 195 72., 20C 72.,

383

Sri-bhdsya-bhdvafikura, 133 $ri-bhdsyopanydsa, 117 $rl-bhasyd-ratha, 138 £ri-bhdsya-sdra, 117 S~rl - bhdsya-sdrdrtha - samgraha, 116, 117, 129

^rl-bhdsya-siddhdnta-sdra, 117 $rl-bhdsya-idrttika, 117 &rl-bhdsya-vivrti, 114 Srl-bhasya-vydkhya, 117 SribittiputtQr, 69 Sri Brahma, 400 Sridhara, 39, 529 n. Sriharsa, 111, 201, 549 Srikrsna, 96, 430, 474 Srikrsna-desika, 112 Sri-krsnastava, 403 £rimad-bhaf;arad-gitd, 113 SrI-natha, 96

Srinivasa, 109, 115, 116, 118, 127, 129,

130, 236 «., 297, 386, 387, 392, 393.

399, 401, 402, 403, 406 72.; pupil of

Mahacarya, his works, 127, 128

Srinivasadasa, 123, 127, 129; his

works, 127 Srlnivasa-diksita, 115, 130, 396 Srinivasa Riighavadasa, 129

Srinivasa Suri, 121

Srinivasa Tatacarya, 116, 384

Si'Inivasa-tayarya, 396

Srinivasa-yati, 138

Srlnivasacarya, 114, 117, 123

$rl-pafica-ratra-raksd, 122

Sripati, 40 72.

Srirarigam, 69, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, no, 113, 120, 121, 135, 137

Sri-rariga-natha, 9472., 121 72.

Srirariganatha-gayaka, 109

Srlrariganayakl, 110

Sri RarigasQri, 381

Srlrarigacarya, in, 117

Srirama, 39 n.

Sri Rama Pillai, 10972., in

Sri Ramanuja Pillan, no

Srt-ramdnuja-yogi-pada, 395 72.

Sri Rdmdnujdcdrya, 104 n.

Srlsailaddsa, 130

Srlsaila lineage, 109, 115, 122, 131

Srisailanatha, no, m

SrlsailapQrna. 98, 102 72., 109

Srlsaila Raghavarya, 130

Srlsaila Srinivasa, 18, in, 115, 127, 133. 388, 389 72., 392

Srlsaila Tatayarya, 18, 130, 131

Srlsaila Yogcndra, 129

Srisailesa, 137

Srisudarsana Press, 305

Sri-tattva-darpana, 133

Srlvacana - bhusana - vyakhya, 135, 375 "•. 376 72., 377 72., 378 71., 379 n.

Srlvacana-bhusana, 9071., 135, 137, 138, 374. 375 "•> 38072.

Srivaisnava, 18, 19, 24, 95, 99. I02 »

603

£rlvaisnava (cont.)

107, 108, 112, 120, 125, 135, 138, 304, 305, 379; many works written in defence against the £aivas, 18; philosophy, 22; school, 134; system, 136; their quarrel with the Jsaivas, 18

SrI-vaisnavism, 89, 102 n., 105, 127

^rlvallabhadeva, 65

Srlvatsa, 57

Srlvatsa-siddhdnta-sdra, 113, 116

Srlvatsanka, 139

Srlvatsanka Misra, 102, 105, 108, 109, 129

Srlvatsanka Srinivasa, 116

Srlvatsanka Srlnivasacarya, 117

Srlvanacala Yoglndra, 138

Jsrlvasaguru, 112

^rlvenkataguru, 112

^rivenkatacarya, 112

Srlvehkatesa, 112

Srlvisnucitta, 114

Sruta-bhdva-prakdsikd, 127

Sruta-pradlpika, 130

Sruta-prakdsikd, 109/1.. in, 113, 114, 115, 120, 126, 127, 1287;., 130, 131, x 36, 137, 157, 176/1., 177 n., 179 n., 180, 181 n., 186/1., 188, 298

S\uta-prakasikacarya, 135

Sruta-prakdsikd of Sudarsana Suri,

392 Sruta-prakasikd-sdra-samgraha, 114 Sruti, 352 n., 371; texts, 390 Sruti-dlpikd, 115 Sruti-siddhdnta-manjarl, 403 n. Sruti-siddhdnta-samgraha, 240, 441 n.,

442 n., 443 n. Sruty-anta-sura-druma, 403, 404 iuddha-brahma, 197 suddha-sarga, 27

Suddhasattva Laksmanacarya, 115 Suddhasattvalaksanarya, 131 n. Suddhasattva Yoglndra, 115 Suddhasattvacarya, 131/1-iuddhetard-srsti, 42 • suddhi, 464

iuddhy-asuddhimaya, 44 S"ukra, 482, 503, 531 n. Sukranlti, 515 Sukra-nltl-sdra, 515 n. Suktyamsa, 183 Sudra, 20, 64, 68, 98, 104 sunyatvarupinl, 36 Sunya-vdda, 177, 206 n. sunya-vddl, 201 £veta-dvlpa, 13, 19, 443 n -Svetdsvatara, 379, 472, 473, 512 Svetdsvatara Upanisad, 447 n.

Svetdsvataropanisat-prakdsikd, 127 £yama Bhatja, 402 Jsyamadeva, 402 Jsyamacarya, 401 sad-anga-yoga, 24 sad-guna, 37

Tactile, 253, 254; organ, 459; sensation, 253

tad-dyatta-sthiti-purvikd, 406

tad-bhdvd-patti, 420

tadvikdratva, 266

tad-vydpyatva, 431

taijasa, 25, 48, 498, 510

Taittirlya-prakdsika, 402

Taittirlya Upanisad, 402

Taittirlyo-panisat, 131, 379

Taittirlyo-panisat-bhdsya, 138

Taittirlyo-panisat-prakdsika, 127

Taivattuk-k-arasu-Nambi, 97 w.

tajjanyatva, 266

tamas, 25, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 129, 163, 259. 447, 466, 469, 471, 473, 474. 475, 480, 482, 491, 500, 501, 513,

504, 505, 507 tamasa mahat, 498 Tamil, 63 n., 64, 66, 95, 96, 102, 105,

107, no, in n., 121, 124, 125, 131,

134. 137 Tamil Veda, 95 tamoguno, 448 n. tamomaya, 46 Tangible, 5, 500 Tani-pranava, 135 n. Tanjore, 67 tanmdtra, 25, 43, 156, 163, 256, 259,

260 n., 445, 499, 502, 504, 507, 510,

5" tantra, 107

tantu-samavetatvdt, 256 tapah, 62 n. tapas, 55, 45°, 5°3_ Tapta-mudra-vidravana, 396 n. tarka, 227, 537 tarkavidyd, 515 tarkl, 518 Taste, 251

Taste-potential, 48, 163, 510 Tatar-annar, 137 tathd-bhuta, 348 tathdtva, 357

Tat-kratu-nydya-vicdra, 131, 133 Tattva-bhdskara, 132 Tattva-candrikd, 396 n. Tattva-dlpa, 89, 132 Tattva-dlpana, 128 w. Tattva-dlpa-samgraha-kdrikd, 132

Index

tattva-jfidna, 143 Tattva-kanstubha, 19 n., 20

Tattva-mdrtanda, 11 5

Tattva-mdtrkd, 123, 124 Tattva-muktd-kalapa, 119, 120, 122, 124, 131, 251, 256 n., 257 n., 303 r;., 304 w., 346

Tattva-naranltam, 1 23

Tattva-nirnaya, 128 w., 133, 352, 352 n.

Tattva-nirupana, 261

Tattva-padavl, 123

Tattza-pradlpikd, 318

Tattva-prakdsikd, 402

Tattza-prakdsikd-veda-stuti-tlkd, 402

Tattva-ratndkara, 119, 128 n., 210, 214 w., 216 r;., 226, 227, 228, 229, 232 r;., 234

Tattva-rattidvall, 124

Tattva-ratnarall-samgraha, 124

Tattva-samgraha, 5167;., 544 w.

Tattza-smnkhydna, 23

Tattra-sandesa, 124

Tattza-sdra, 114, 116, 132, 352

Tattva-sekhara, 135, 136, 137

Tattra-sikha-mani, 124

Tattva-tikd, 105 w., 114, 120, 123

Tattra-traya, 39, 40 w., 41, 43 w., 56, 57, 125 w., 135, 137, 138, 157, 159"-, 160 w., 260 w., 261 w.; vyuha doctrine in, 39 w.

Tattva-traya-bhdsya, 135

Tattva-traya-culuka, 124, 125, 1287;.

Tattva-traya-culuko-satngraha, 125

Tattza-traya-nirupana, 128 m.

Tattva-traya-pracanda-mdruta, 128 n.

Tattva-viz'eka-tlkd-iiz'firana, 1

Tattvdrtha-sdra, 96 w.

Tattvdrtha-sloka-vdrtika, 546, 547 w.

tatastha, 51, 377

tdddtmyd-dhydsa, 334

tdmasa, 31, 163, 510

tdmasa ahamkdra, 259, 260

tdmasa sdstra, 22

tdmisra, 500

Tamraparni, 63, 95

Tantric system, 57

Tantric works, 58

Tdrdsdropatiisad, 1 3

Tatacarya, 98, 109, 131, 132

Tdtdcdrya-dina-caryd, 131

Tatarya, 129

Tatayarya, 115, 126

Tdt parya-candrikd, 1 23

Tdtparya-dlpikd, 114, 116, 118, 123, 132, 380 71.

Tautology, 372

Teacher, 62, 102, 122, 124, 182, 235, 400, 405

te/Yij, 35, 37, 40 w., 49 n.. 56, 163, 181, 260, 261; substance, 188

TeleoloKical, 470

Teleology, 30, 261, 459, 472, 473

Telugu Brahmin, 399

Temper, 548

Temple, 17, 18, 58, 69, 96, 104, m, 121

Temple-building, 17

Temple-gods, 18

Temple-keepers, 121

Temporal, 42, 313, 314, 324, 353; character, 284, 285, 331, 353; conditions, 343; contiguity, 316; identity, 252; relations, 321; succession, -274

Temporary, 495

Tendency, 30, 34, 45, 51, 210, 288, 349, 449. 550

Tender equality, 84

Tenets, 524 m.

Tehgalai, 120, 380, 381, 382; school, 120; their difference with the Vada-galai is based on the greater or less emphasis on prapatti, 86-7

Terms of reference, 419

Test, 341

Testimony, 192, 196, 203, 211, 24.7, 289, 296, 303, 310, 326, 390, 426,

( 465, 485, 547 ti " Tettarumtiral," 67 Text, 340, 350, 398, 438, 446 Textual criticism. 388 Theism, 451, 472 Theistic, 189, 196, 480; tendency,

45i

Theological, 303; dogma, 395

Theory, 28, 30, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 187, 210, 291, 296, 308, 331, 348, 35'. 352. 413. 421, 426, 515 «., 516, 520, 543; illusion, 237, 238, 239, 241; ot knowledge, 238

Thesis, 315, 322, 416, 419, 420, 427, 512

Thief, 213

Thing itself, 1S6

Things, 34, 45 n., 48, 190, 192, 193,

195 "This," 180, 184, 185 n. Thomas, Dr F. \\\, 531, 532 Thought, 32, 46, 47, 53, 61, 304,

460 Thought-activity, 44, 50, 51, 53 Thought-experiences, 385 Thought-movement, 44

605

Threads, 197

Tides, 228

Tikalakkidandan-tirunavlrudaiyapiran-

Tatar-annar, 137 tilakdlaka, 56 Time, 27, 34, 35, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47,

51, 56, 82, 185 71., 195, 199, 228, 252, 273, 277, 278, 279, 284, 285, 286, 287, 309, 348, 349, 389, 447,

448, 472, 473, 489, 504, 515 Time-conception, 285 Time-energy, 45 Timeless, 72, 447, 473 Time-moments, 274 Time-units, 286 Tinnevelly, 68, 137 Tiru-chanda-vruttam, 68, 134/1. Tirukkovalur, 103 Tirukkurgur, 65 Tirukkurukaippiran Pillai, 134 Tirukkurun-ddndakam, 69, 134 n. Tirukkurungudi, 103 Tirukurugaipiran Pillai, 109 n., no Tirumalacarya, 133 Tirumal-Tiru-mori, 76 Tiru-mantra-churukku, 94 Tiru-mangaiy, 66, 69, 77 Tiru-maiigaiy-arvar, 63, 64, 65, 66 n.,

67, 68, 79, 83, 134/1., 137 Tiru-marisai, 63

Tiru-marisai Piran, 63, 64, 65, 66 n.,

68, 96 «., 106 n., 134 n. Tiru-mdlai, 69, 134 n. Tiru-mori, 69

Tirunarayanapperumal, 104 Tiru-nedum-ddndokam, 69, i34 n -Tirunirmalai, 103 Tiru-paU'-dndu, 69 Tiru-palliy-eruchi, 69, 134 n. Tirupati, 103

Tiru-pan-arvar, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69,

134 n-Tiru-pdvai, 69, 77 Tiruppalavai-vydkhydna, 127 Tiruppavai, 134 n. Tiruppullani, 103 Tirupputkuli, 103 Tiruvaigundipuram, 103 Tiruvallikeni, 103 Tiruvanandapuram, 103 Tiru-vantddi, 68, 134 n. Tiruvanparisaram, 103 Tiruvarangattamudandr, 137 Tiruvattar, 103 Tiru-vdcha kam, 84 Tiruvdrddhana-krama, 138 Tiru-vdsinyam, 69, 134

Tiruvdymori-nurundddi, 138 Tiru-vdy-mori, 66, 69, 79, 80 n., 105,

109/1., no, 134/1., 137 Tiruvelukur-tirukkai, 134/1. Tiru-verugutt-irukkai, 69 Tiru-vruttam, 69, 74, 134 n. tiryag, 501

tiryak-srotas, 501, 502 Todappa, no Tondar-adi-podiy-arvar, 63, 64, 65,

66 n., 68, 69, 134 n. Tondanur, 104 Totality, 264 Totaramba, no, 119, 122 Touch, 251

Touch-potential, 48, 260, 504 Toy, 167

Tradition, 57, 63, 104/1., 496, 515 n. Traditional, 64, 65 traigunya, 46 Trai-rdsikas, 523 Traits, 195, 212 Trance, 30, 79 Transcendent, 39, 41, 44, 47, 99, 156,

175, 195, 197, 391, 426, 455, 507,

536; beauty, 83; Brahman, 10;

nature, 413; reality, 550; self, 468;

world, 536 Transcendental, 24, 30, 38, 448, 453,

468; cause, 502; form, 73 Transformation, 2, 6, 10, 36, 37, 47,

156, 182, 196, 197, 199, 281, 286,

298, 302, 332, 341, 368, 371, 385,

386, 393, 395, 396, 397, 4i6, 440,

454, 456, 487 Transformer, 45 n. Transforming entities, 385 Transition, 349 Transitoriness, 28 Transmigrations, 291 Transmission, 287 Transparent, 46 trasarenu, 155, 163, 263 Travancore, 66, 67 Treaties, 86

Treatment, 207, 297, 426 Tricky, 513

tridanda, 1, 549; its meaning, 1 n. Tridandl Brahmins, their views, 2 tridandi, 2, 532 triguna, 259, 497 trigund-tmikd prakrti, 491 Trikdlika, 497 Trikandamandana, 3 n. Trinity, 46, 47 Tripartite, 29, 47 200; union,

46

Index

Tripdd-vibhuti-mahdndrdyana Upani-

sad, 13 Triplicane, 68 Trivikrama, 39, 40 n. trivrt-karana, 182, 183, 188, 240 Triyaga, 440 True, 194, 208, 316, 331, 424, 437,

457, 471, 482, 507; adoration, 54;

cause, 338; knowledge, 160, 178,

330, 331. 347, 429. 45°. 491, 492,

506; wisdom, 416 Trustworthy, 357 Truth, 5, 8, 202, 308, 313, 326, 335,

413, 478, 517, 529 Truthfulness, 29 Tryambaka, 130 Trmsa-prasno-ttara, 133 trna, 501 trsd, 48

tuccha, 239, 241 Tucci, Dr G., 512 n. Tuppu, 118 tusli, 57 Tuvalil, 78

Tidikcl, 126, 114, 131 n. Twinkle, 378

Tyaga-sabddrtha-tippanl, 130 Types, 51; of soul, 61 Tanka, 1 n., 108, 139

Udak-pratoji-krsna, 110

Udayana, 1, 2, 539

uddharana, 427

udana, 59, 60

Udayi-kundiyayaniya, 525 n.

Uddyotakara, 212 n.

Ujjvala, 52

Ujjvala-mla-mani, 82

Ukkalammal, 105

Ukkal Arvan, 105

Ultimate, 42, 52, 509; antecedent, 397; attainment, 38; consciousness, 420, 457; destiny, 383 ; emancipation, 38; end, 136, 416; goal, 100, 136; ideal, 414; object, 464; principle, 451; state, 445; truth, 196, 327, 426, 468; union, 429

Ultimate reality, 24, 25, 27, 31, 37, 165, 197, 406, 450, 457, 460, 497, 507, 509 n.; as nirvisesa and sarisesa, 165 et seq.; as unqualified, refuted,

173-5

Ultimately real, 197, 200, 371

Ultra-sensual, 225

Uma-Mahesvara, 395, 396; his criticism of Ramanuja, 396

Unaffectedness, 37

Unassociated Brahman, 430 Unborn, 291 Uncaused, 299 Uncertainty, 370, 398 Unchangeable, 34, 46, 196, 301, 323,

469, 549; unity, 287 Unconditional, 203, 226, 272, 390,

485, 497, 533, 535

Unconditioned, 272

Unconscious, 26, 27, 29, 41, 79, 408, 416, 546; power, 43; world, 429

Unconsciousness, 150

Uncontradicted, 251, 314, 358; experience, 246

Uncontradictory, 236

Understanding, 462, 463, 539

Undifferentiated, 35, 200, 372, 495; consciousness, 238

Unfavourable effects, 292

Uniformity, 278

Unintelligent, 25, 26

Unintelligible, 144

Union, 33, 38, 53

Unique, 189, 193, 316, 424, 454

Uniqueness, 255, 455

Unit of time, 273

Unitary, 545

Units, 420

Unity, 25, 26, 31, 42, 46, 53, 192, 193, 194, 4i3, 4i4, 418, 419, 434, 456, 459, 460, 461, 462, 506, 508; of a flame, 343; of being, 175; of consciousness, 345; texts, 307, 308, 309, 3io

Unity-in-difTerence, 28, 30, 405

Universal, 45, 86, 193, 217, 218, 224, 243, 254, 279, 312, 323, 34i, 355, 356, 387, 460, 493, 535, 536, 537. 538; agreement, 229; cognition, 358; concomitance, 228, 230, 533; consciousness, 198; destruction, i6y; existence, 345; experience, 219, 319; illumination, 198; negation, 272, 328; proposition, 225

Universality, 298

Universe, 32, 35, 41, 45 r., 53, 56, 87, 190, 191, 195, 197, 239, 315, 412. 434, 454, 455, 45^, 457, 459, 460, 472, 475, 484, 492, 499, 500, 507, 508, 511

Unknowable, 230 n., 499

Unlimited, 10; servitude, 88

Unproduced, 204

Unprohibited food, 61

Unqualified, 165, 430

Unreal, 2, 179, 181, 194, 314, 330, 332, 338, 339, 346, 433, 436, 456, 458, 487

607

Unreality, 5, 201, 210, 332, 458

Unreasonableness, 177 n.

Unrelatedness, 466

Unseen merit, 292

Unspeakable, 35

Untouchables, 104

Unvedic, 472

uncha-vrtti, 119

Upadesa-ratna-mdlai, 64, 94 n.

Upadesa-ratna-mdld, 134,135, 138, 482

upahitasvarupa, 306

Upakdra-samgraha, 124

upamdna, 234, 426, 427; upheld by Meghanadari, 234

upamiti, 128

Upanisad(s), 5, 12, 13, 16, 101, 105, 126, 146, 148, 153, 154, 182, 196, 211, 291, 293, 296, 387, 394, 398, 442, 446, 447, 463, 464, 465, 468, 471, 480, 481, 496, 512, 519

Upanisad-bhdsya, 127

Upanisad-brahmayogin, 13

Upanisadic, 112, 113, 126, 208, 240, 392, 519; texts, 201, 394, 405, 479, 480, 487

Upanisadists, 211

Upanisad-mangala-dlpikd, 126

Upanisad texts, 381, 464

Upanisad-vakya-vivarana, 127

Upanisat-prakdsikd, 127

upasargas, 505

Upavarsa, 7 n., 105, 107, 108

Upavarsdcdrya, 7 n.

upavdsa, 33

updddna, 2, 191, 196, 388, 391

updddna-kdrnana, 157, 454, 484

upddhi, 269, 278, 301, 386, 413, 422, 432, 453, 478, 479. 481, 4 8 9, 492, 508 w., 534, 535, 561

upddhi-rupa, 216

updsaka, 89

updsand, 293, 381

updya, 376

updya-jfidna, 55

updya stage, 377 «., 378

updya-svarupa-jfidna, 88 n.

updya-sunyatd, 87

Upendra Bhatta, 401

upeya, 377

Upper India, 19

Uraipur, 67

Usage, 334

Usanas, 532

utpatti, 199

uttama, 505

Uttara-kaldrya, 381, 382, 383

uttara-mantrin, 65

Uttara-mlmamsa, 350 Uttara-ndrdyana, 57 uttara-vibhdga, 482 Uvdsagadasdo, 522, 524 Uyyakkondar, 67 n., 97 uha, 214 urddhva-srotas, 501

Vacuity, 36, 353

Vadari, 77

Vadarikasrama, 482

vadhii, 47

Vadagalai, their difference with the Tehgalai is based on the greater or less emphasis on prapatti, 86-7

Vadakalai, 67, 120, 121, 381

Vadavavaktra, 40 n.

vahni, 510

vahnitva, 535

vahusruta, 530

Vaibhava-prakdsikd, 121 n.

Vaibhasika Buddhists, 251

vaidhl, 378

vaidikl, 507

vaiddla-vratika, 518

Vaigai, 63

Vaijayantl, 105 n.

vaikdrika, 48, 498, 499, 504, 510

vaikdrika-indriya-sarga, 502 n.

Vaikhdnasa, 22, 57

Vaikunfha, 50, 93

Vairamegha, 67

Vairamegha Pallava, 66

vairdgya, 33, 47, 63

Vaisesika, 208, 456, 467; supposed, 163

Vaisvadeva-kdrikd, 122

Vaisnava, 12, 39 n., 63, 65, 83, 87, 98,

104, 105, 293, 379; commentators, 1 n.\ literature, 10; marks, 22; rites, 102; systems, 139; temple, 65, 138; tradition, 99 n. ; writers, 192

Vaisnava Upanisads, 13; division of, 13 Vaisnavism, 13, 63 n., 64, 81 n., 96 n.,

105, 110, 139, 399, 45i Vaisnavite Reformers of India, 119 n. Vakula-bharana, 139

Valadeva, 482

Valid, 185 n., 202, 203, 208, 468, 533, 537, 5395 inference, 537; knowledge, 236, 248, 467, 469; memory, 237; perception, 215

Validity, 16, 190, 201, 202, 203, 213, 216, 229, 230, 238, 247, 248, 250, 321, 326, 346, 347, 348, 356, 357, 428, 457, 458, 495, 534, 536, 537, 539; its nature as treated by Me-ghanadari, 215-16; of cognition, 249

Index

Vallabha, 400, 475, 496

Value, 464, 472

Vanamanialai-jiyar, 111

Vanamall Misra, 440, 441 n. ; his interpretation of Nimbarka philosophy, 440 et seq.

Vangi-puratt-acchi, 97 n.

Vanity, 529

Vanjikulam, 67

Varada, 98, 157, 159, 352

Varadadasa, 132

Varada Desikacarya, 125

Varadaguru, 111, 125

Varadakrsna, his definition of perception, 216

Varadanarayana, 208; his view of doubt, 208

Varada Narayana Rhattaraka, 119

Varadanatha, 111, 118, 123, 125, 380

Varadanayaka Suri, 125

Varadaraja, 78

Varadaraja Suri, 125

Varadarat, 114/1., I2 5

Varadavisnu, 109, 111, 216

Varadavisnu Misra, 109, 111, 119, 180, 212/1., 214 71., 217, 226, 229, 234,

Varada Visnu Suri, 131 Varadacarya, 93 //., 102, 119 Varadarya, 112, 118, 119, 125 Varagalai, 381 varanadasd, 379

Varavara, 39, 41, 941., 157, 159 «., 160, 163, 2O0, 261 ; his view of time,

r i6 3 Varavara muni, 110, 135, 136, 137

Varavat a-muni-campu, 138

Varavara-muni-dinacarya, 138

Varavara-muni-kd-t ya, 138

Varavara-mtim-sdtaka, 138

Vardha, 16, 20, 39 «., 40 «., 523

Varaha Mihira, 523

Vararariga, 97, 109 n.

Variable, 243

Variability, 243

varna, 293

varnaka, 515

varnikd, 516

zarttika, 516

Varuna, 59, 295

vastu, 250 n.

Vasistha, 21, 23, 482

Vasistha-samhitd, 19

Vatsabhaskara, 3 n.

Vatapurna, 104, 109

Yacaspati, 3, 196, 467, 476, 517 n., 533

z'dcdrambhanam, 3

vacika, 507

vada^ 381, 512, 513

I'ddadri-kulisa, 127

vddassddana, 5 13 n.

vddha, 314, 501

Vadhula, 109

Vadhula f^otra, 98, no, 114/1.

Yadhula-kula-tilaka, 127/7.

Vadhula Narasinigha-guru, 114

Vadhula Narasimha, 132

Vadhula hrinivasa, 114, 117, 123, 126,

131 //., 135, 305 Vadhula Yaradaguru, 114 Vadhula varada Narayanaguru, 138 Vadhula Vehkatacarya, 114 Vadideva, 536

Vadideva Suri, 536 //., 537 n. Vadihamsa, 111 ; his conception of

jdti, 354; his view of S7atah-

priimiinya-vdda, 356 et seq.; his view

of svaprakdsaU a, 358 et seq. Vadi-hamsa-navamvuda, 352, 361 ;

his notion of negation, 352 VadihamsJinbuvaha, 117, 184, 185,

187; his treatment of illusion, 184 et

seq. Vadihanisanibuvaha RamanujacSryr.,

1 S(> n. Vadihamsambuvahacarva, 118, 119,

183, 187 Vadikesarl, 135, 138 Vadikesari Mii : ra, 132 \'ddi-lraya-l<himdanu, 124, 193 //., 305 Yadivijaya, 111 vddi-ripratipattih, 212 n. Vagisvara, 40 n. Vagvijaya, 118, 130 vdkordkya, 5 17 vdkya-kdra, 106, 107 \dltya-padiya, 517/1. I 'dkydrtha-satn^raha, 130 Vamana, 39, 40 n. Yiimanadeva, 40 //., 146 Yanivilasa Press 1910, 380//. Yaranadrisa, 110, 114 n. vdrtd, 532 rdrttika, 5 1 5 vdrttiUasutra, 515, 516 vds.md. 26, 27, 33, 34, 43, 51, 54, 253,

273, 308, 453, 487 Vasudeva, 2, 13, ift, 17. 21, 27, 29, 31,

34. 37. 3**. 39, 42//., 57, 155. '57,

•58, 443 "•> 474. 475- 4->7, 5°°. 508 Vdsudera-vyuha, 474 Vasudevendra, 13 I 'dmdevopatusad, 13 Vasistha, 20

609

vdta, 475

vatsalya, 89

Vfttslputriya, 251

Vatsya, 119, 297

Vatsya Anantarya, 126

Vatsya gotra, 111, 112

Vatsya Nrsimhadeva, 122

Vatsya Srlnivasa, 112, 203; his notion of class-concepts, 297; his treatment of pramdna, 203

VatsyaVarada, no, in, 114, 116, 118, 119, 130, 132, 349, 350, 351, 380; his analysis of the concept of difference, 351; his notion of God, 351; his refutation of brlharsa's view of the falsity of the world, 350; his refutation of the denial of the category of difference, 350; his view of bidhi,

349-50

Vatsya Varadaguru, 109

Vatsyayana, 208, 212 n., 235

Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, 207 n.

vdyu, 7, 48, 49 n., 59, 60, 163, 253, 261, 499, 504, 505, 510

Vdyu purdna, 20, 502, 503, 505, 506n.; its philosophy, 502 et seq.

Veda, 2, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 25, 62, 88, 124, 165, 198 n., 203, 347, 349, 357. 401, 429. 441. 47i, 5i5» 517. 53°, 53i

veda-nindaka, 519

Vedas instructed by God, 15

Vedavid, 40 n.

veda-viddm matam, 181

Vedavyasa Bhafta, 111. 130

Vedanta, 1, 8, 96, 97, ioo, 115, 117, 125, 130, 138, 197, 200, 305, 307, 352, 401, 403, 406, 416, 462, 466, 471, 480, 481, 482, 496, 508 n.; in relation to Samkhya according to Vijftana Bhiksu, 471 et seq.; its bheddbheda interpretation, 105 et seq.; dialectic, 153; view, 235

Vedanta-desika, 119, 361

Vedanta - desika - vaibhava - prakdsikd, 121 n., 131

Veddnta-hpa, 103, 113, 118, 159, 201,

349 Vedantaguru, 112 Veddnta-kantako-ddhdra, 131 Veddnta-kaustubha, 130, 132, 402 Veddnta-kaustubha-prabhd, 402, 415 n.,

416 Veddntakdrikavali, 132 Veddntamanjusfi , 404 n. Veddnta-paribhdsd, 9, 204, 216 Veddnta-pdrijdta-sauraleha, 400, 402

Veddnta-ratna-manjusdy 403, 411, 412 Vedanta Ramanuja, 18, 132, 380 Veddnta-samgraha, 113 Veddnta-samgraha-tdtparya-dJpikd,

130 Veddnta-sdra, 103, 113, 118, 349 Veddnta-siddhdnta-pradlpa, 400, 403 Veddnta-siddhdnta-smngraha, 440 Veddnta-sutra , 2, 56 n., 476, 484 Veddnta-tattva-vodha, 400, 408, 409 n.,

410 n., 411 n. Veddnta-vijaya, 117, 126, 128 n., 130 Vedantacarya, 119, 132 Vedantic, in, 438, 461, 467; instructions, 308; schools, 385; texts, 61, 337; view, 464; writers, 385 Vedantin, 109

Vedantists, 139, 156, 465, 477 Vedanti Madhava, 134, 135 Vedanti Madhavadasa, nor. Veddrtha-samgraha, 101, 103, 106, 107,118, I28n.,i30,160,201,218,305 Vedic, 16, 17, 18, 43 n., 57, 293, 518, 549; circles, 530; cult, 518; doctrines, 517, 519; duties, 15, 165, 404, 416, 429; injunctions, 165, 349, 350, 441; people, 19, 20, 531; religion, 40, 95; rites, 14, 20; sacrifices. 517, 522, 549; school, 181; science, 531 n.; scriptures, 366; sects. 20; texts, 17, 112, 390, 391,

394

Vegetables, 97 n.

Veil. 366, 371, 372, 374

Veiling, 369; agent, 369

Vehkata, 18, 63 n., 66 n., 67, 94, 96n., o8«., 99, 105 n., 107, 110, in, 114, 115, 117. 118, 119, 120, 121 n., 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132. '35. 155. !57, 159, 161, 163, 183, 201, 203, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212 n., 213, 214, 216, 217, 219 n., 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236 n., 238, 240, 241, 250 «., 251, 254, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262, 263, 265, 268 n., 269, 270, 277, 280, 281, 282, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295. 296, 297. 3°». 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 311, 313. 3i4. 3i6, 317. 318, 319, 323, 324. 325. 326, 327, 340, 342, 344, 346, 352, 353. 355, 356, 380, 381, 382, 383, 426; analysis of momentariness, 273 et seq.; an upholder of anvita-bhidhdna-vdda, 233; a constructor of Ramanuja logic, 235; conclusive remarks on

19

Index

Venka{a (cont.)

doubt, 208 et seq., decision, nature of, 210; definition of pramana, 236; doubt and uha, 214; error, definition of, 210; error and doubt, relation, 208 et seq.; his agreement with the Pancardtra view of God, 303; his admission of three pramdnas, 214; his admission of three types of illusion from three points of view, 241; his analysis of douht, 211; his classification of doubt, 212-13; his conception of jdti, 355; his conception of sddriya, 355; his criticism of Bhaskara, 301; his criticism of Brahmadatta, 291; his criticism of Nydya-siitra and Prajnd-paritrdna regarding doubt, 211; his criticism of Nyaya theory of doubt. 207; his criticism of Samkhya argument in favour of prakrti, 256 et seq.; his criticism of the avidyd, 330 et seq. ; his criticism of the Samkhya view of God, 296; his criticism of the Sahkara conception of the unity of self, 345; his criticism of the view that ajndna is a positive entity, 327 et seq. ; his criticism of the view that ajndna rests in the individual jwas, 329; his criticism of the view that all effects are false owing to their contradiction, 341 et seq.; his criticism of the view that avidyd and mdyd are different, 334 et seq.; his criticism of the view that Brahman is pure bliss, 344; his criticism of the view that consciousness cannot be produced, 321; his criticism of the view that consciousness is identical with self, 323 et seq.; his criticism of the view that consciousness is one, 322; his criticism of the view that emancipation is attained by right knowledge, 326; his criticism of the view that indeterminate Brahman could be eternal, 345; his criticism of the view that pure consciousness is sdksin, 325; his criticism of the view that pure consciousness is unqualified, 323; his criticism of the view that realization of monistic identity produces emancipation, 336 et seq.; his criticism of the view that scriptural testimony is superior to perception, 326; his criticism of the view that the notion of the self as knower is false, 325;

his criticism of the Yoga view of God, 296; his criticism of Yadava Prakasa, 302; his definition of perception, 216; his doctrine of emancipation, 292; his eschatological conception, 295; his life and literature, 119-25; his Nyaya theory, refutation of, 262 et seq.; his relation of the view that consciousness is identical witn self, 290; his refutation of Buddhist and Carvaka theory of dkdsa, 282; his refutation of Buddhist doctrines of momentari-ness, 268 et seq.; his refutation of Carvaka causality, 276; his refutation of contentless consciousness, 310-11; his refutation of different views of God, 302; his refutation of Katyay ana's views of God, 302; his refutation of Samkhya-satkarya-vada, 265 et seq.; his refutation of nirrikalpajiidna, 311; his refutation of Sahkara, 304 et seq.; his refutation of Sankara's theory of anubhuti, 318-19; his refutation of £rlharsa's refutation of pramana, 202; his refutation of the denial of production of individual cognitions, 319 et seq.; his refutation of the Buddhist denial of substance, 251 et seq.; his refutation of the denial of the category of difference, 312; his refutation of the doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of souls, 291; his refutation of the falsity of the world on the ground of validity, 313-14; his refutation of the falsity of the world on the ground of absence of relation between the perceiver and the perceived, 314 et seq.; his refutation of the Nyaya doctrine of the formation of whole from parts, 263 et seq.; his refutation of the possibility of jijndsd according to £arikara's interpretation, 306; his refutation of the view of the reflection of Brahman under avidyd, 291; his refutation of the view that avidyd rests in Brahman, 317—18; his refutation of the view that perception refers to pure Being, 311; his refutation of the view that Brahman is qualityless, 306; his refutation of the view that the self-luminosity of Brahman is contentless, 316—17; his refutation of the view that the utterance of unity texts can lead to immediate perception, 308-10; his re-

611

futation of the view that the world is illusory, 312-13; his special treatment of doubt, 207 et seq.; his support to the theory of jndna-karma-samiiccaya, 307; his support of the Vedic testimony, 203; his theory of consciousness, a quality of self, 288; his treatment of avayava, 232; his treatment of doubt, 202; his treatment of doubt compared with that of Varada Narayana, 208; his treatment of inference, 225 et seq.; his treatment of kevala-vyati-rekin, 226-7; his treatment of memory as pramdna, 214; his treatment of object, 217; his treatment of pardmarsa, 229; his treatment of pramdna, 201 et seq.; his treatment of sabda-pramdna, 233; his treatment of substance, 251 et seq. ; his treatment of tarka, 227; his treatment of types of inference, 229 et seq.; his treatment of vydptigraha, 228; his treatment of vydpti, 225-6; his view of apurva or adrsta, 303; his view of bhakti, 292 et seq.; his views of emancipation attainable by God's grace, 304; his view of God, 157 et seq.; his view of incarnation, 302—3; his view of karma and mukti, 295; his view of karma and prdyas-citta, 293-4; his view of matter, 162 et seq.; his view of prakrti, mahai, tanmdtra, etc., 163 et seq.; his view of self in relation to God, 161 et seq. ; his view of the relation of the souls with God, 297; his view of validity of memory, 237; his view of virtue and vice, 291; his view that errors cannot vanish by Brahma-knowledge, 307; his view that world appearance continues even after the destruction of avidyd, 308; nature of dkdsa, 282; nature of the senses, 280 et seq.; nature of time, 284; nature of soul, 286 et seq.; offered a critic of Gotama's logic, 235; refutation of Carvaka theory of soul, 286 el seq.; refutation of the view that consciousness belongs to the senses, 289; refutation of the view that scriptural texts cannot signify Brahman, 340; £arikara's conception of cessation of avidyd criticized, 338 et seq.

Verikatadasa, 132

Verikata-desika, 112

Verikatanathaiya, 117

Verikata Sudhl, 12, 18, 132

Verikatacarya, 112, 117

Verikatadhvarl, 131, 132

Verikatarya, 112

Verbal knowledge, 216, 217, 308, 310

Verbal testimony, 128

Vernal, 295

Verse, 117, 181

vibhava, 39, 42, 129, 158

ribhava-avatdras, 40 n.

vibhava-devatd, 21

vibhavdvatdra, 41

vibhu, 262, 386

vibhuti, 475

Vibration, 206; potential, 163

Vice, 291, 304, 349, 441, 493, 506, 521, 522, 533

Vicious, 255, 267, 304, 349; circle, 419, 433; infinite, 9, 253, 267, 277, 286, 316, 320, 334, 341, 353, 355, 359, 417, 421, 424, 433; infinitude, 177M.

Victor, 78

Vidaddha, 514 n.

Vidaddhavddi, 514 ;/.

vidugdha, 514 n.

videhl muktas, 441

vidhi, 8, 350

Vidhisudhdkara, 133

Vidhura, 513

Vidhura-pandita-jdtaka, 514 n.

vidyd, 47, 49, 507, 508, 509

Vidyadhideva, 40 n.

Vidyanandi, 546, 547

Vidyapati, 3

Vidyapati Bhaskara Bhatta, 3

Vidyaranya, 120

vidyd-yoni-sarlra, 415

View, 50, 56, 181, 182, 184, 185, 1X7, 192, 196,204,206,289,291, 297, 302, 303. 305. 3C7, 318, 330, 335, 349, 350, 409, 410, 429, 433, 435, 456, 458,461,469,473,477,496,498,51c. 512,519,520, 521, 522, 532, 533, 53S

Vihagendra samhita, 23, 24, 41, 57

Vihangama, 40 n.

Vijayanagara, 120, 121

vijayd, 57

Vijaylndra, 127

Vijaylndra Bhiksu, 117

Vijaylndra-pardjaya, 127, 305

Vijayolldsa, 126

Vijnana Bhiksu, 445, 456, 480, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 493, 496, 497; his conception of the individual, 460 et seq.; his conception of the relation of the world with God, 454 et seq.;

Index

Vijnana Bhiksu (cont.)

his criticism of Sarnkhya and Yoga, 479 et seq.; his notion of God, 461; his philosophy, 445 et seq. ; his treatment of avidyd, 468 et seq. ; his treatment of bhakti, 450 et seq. ; his treatment of Brahma experience, 465 et seq. ; his treatment of experience, 467; his treatment of karma, 452 et seq. ; his treatment of the nature of God, 474 et seq. ; his treatment of the relation of Sarnkhya to Vedanta, 471 et seq. ; his view of gradation of realities, 445 ; his view of karma, 445 ; kdla in, 446; may a and pradhdna in, 476 et seq. ; relation of self and dnanda in, 445; world and Brahman in, 446 et seq.

vijndnam, 185 n.

vijfidna-vddin, 142, 205

Vijndnd-mrta-bhdsya, 450, 451 n.,

453 "-. 454 »., 455 "■> 457 "■. 458 «..

459 ri., 461, 462 «., 463 n., 468 n.,

472 «., 473 n., 477 n., 478 n., 480 n.,

481 71., 482 n. Vikalpa, 4

vikdra, 3, 260 n., 386, 480 Vikdra-veda, 21 vikdri kdrana, 454 zikdrin, 61 rikarmasthdn, 518 Vikrama Cola, 104 rikriydtrnaka, 172 vikrta, 342 rikrty-dtmd, 25 vilaksana-mahatvd-dy-adhikaranatrdd,

257 Vimba-tattza-prakasika, 122 vindsa, 314 Vindhyesvari l'rasada, referring to

Vaisnava commentators, 1 tj. Vindhyesvari Prasada Pandita, 1 n., 2,

3 n. Violation, 128 vipratipattih, 212 «., 213 vipura, 503, 504 Virinchipuram, 523 Virocana, 528 V r irodha-bhaitjanl, 384 Virodha-nirodha, 115, 130, 384, 385,

386 n., 387, 392, 393 «., 394 71., 395 V irodha-parihara, 124 Virodha-varuthirii, 395, 396 Virodha-varuthinl-pramdthinl, 130, 396 Virtues, 29, 33, 34, 47, 291. 294, 295,

303. 304. 349. 388, 44i. 450. 493. 506, 521, 522, 530, 533, 549, 550

Virtuous, 51, 295, 304. 349. 437. 549

viruddha-dharmd-dhyasavan, 268

vlrut, 500

Viramsolaippillai, 138

Visible, 5, 500

Vision, 71, 459, 471, 505

Visual, 543; organ, 222, 240, 241, 243, 459. 545; perception, 219, 310; sense, 217

visadd-vabhdsa, 217

visesana, 429

tisista-jndna, 221

Visistd-dvaita, m, n 6 n., 118, 119, 120, 123, 125, 159, 234, 235, 351, 389, 392, 393. 395

Visista-dvaita logic, 234

Visistd-dvaita-siddhdnta, 127

Visistd-dvaitavdda, 119

Visistd-dvaitins, 393

visistdrtha, 233

visistatva, 218

visuddhi, 524

Visva-gunddarsa, 1 31

Visvajaya, 118

Visvarupa, 40 n.

VisVacftrya, 401

Viivdmitra, 23

VisVftmitra gotra, 119

Visvodard, 59

Visayatd-vdda, 133

Visaya-vdkya-dipikd, 117, 126

Visnu, 12, 19, 20, 24, 25, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40 7/., 44, 45, 50, 52, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67 n., 68, 69, 87. 89, 96, 155, 304, 415. 448 n., 473, 475, 498, 499, 505. 507. 509

Visnucitta, 69, m, 119, 137, 21471., 22071., 234, 235, 383 71.; a predecessor of Vehkata in the construction of Ramanuja logic, 235

Visnucittan, 63

Vtsnudharmottara, 20

Visnu Misra, 159

Visnu Purdna, 20, 81, 26071., 497, 498 n., 499 n., 500, 501 71., 530; its philosophy. 497 et seq.

Visnu-samhitd, 23, 24, 31, 32; aham-kdra in, 31; Bhugavata-yoga in, 32; bhakti and yoga, 32; God, nature of, 31; philosophy of, 23-4; prakrti, theory of, 31; Sarnkhya in, 23-4; sdd-anga-yoga in, 24; view of all-pervasive soul different from the Srlvaisnavas, 24

Visnu-sakti, 36

Visnu-tattza-rahasya, 132

613

Vtptu-tattva-samhiid, 22; its contents,

22 Visnu-vardhana, 104 n. Visvaksena, 63 «., 64, 67 n. Visvaksena-samhitd, 24, 30, 41 n., 43,

.56, 57; vyuha doctrine in, 39 n. Vital energy, 462 Vital functions, 540 Vital spirit, 80 vitandd, 512, 513, 514*1. vitandd-sattha, 514 vitandd-vdda-sattham, 512 viiarta-parampard, 332 Vivdddrtha-samgraha, 13 2 viveka, 449, 508 Vivid impression, 217 Vividness, 217 t;Jra, 60

Vlranarayana, 94

Vira-raghava-dasa, 114, 116, 132, 352 vlry a, 35, 37, 56 Void, 56

Volition, 298, 299 Volitional activity, 47 Vrajabhusanasaranadeva, 402 vrata, 33, 62 Vrddha-manu, 20 vrddhi, 47

Vrhan-ndradlya-purdna, 20 vrksa, 500

Vrksa-bhaumdmrta, 122 Vrndavana, 94 Vrndavanadeva, 402 17M1", 105, 281, 372, 373, 374, 411, 423.

439. 4 6 5. 466, 471, 485, 494, 49s vrtti-jiidna, 204 vrtti-kdta, 105, 107, 108 vrtti-kdrasya, 105 n. vrtti-nirodha, 506 n. vrtti-prativimbitam, 373 t>/7£t stage, 363 Vucci Verikatacarya, 132 vyakta, 476, 497 vyaktd-vyakta, 497, 508 vyakti, 52 i'}'awga, 265 vydpya, 225 vyatireki, 230; inference, 230 n., 232;

type, 231 vyatireki anumdna, 231, 234 Vyavahdraika-satyatva-khandana, 125 vyavahdrika, 459, 477 vyavahdrikatva, 478 Vyavahdrikatva-khandana-sdra, 133 vyavahdriki, 371 vyavahita, 136 vydhata-sddhya-viparyaydt, 229

vydkhydna-mandapa, 137

tryana, 59, 60

vydpaka, zz$

zydpdra, 204

vydpti, ZZ5, zzS, 427

Vyasa, 18 «., 20, 39, 482

Vyasa Bhattar, 109 n.

Vydsa-bhdsya, 452

Vyasadeva, 402

Vyasa- tdtparya- nirnaya, 133

Vyasatlrtha, 111, 426

ayoma, 31

rywfca, 17, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 56, 157,

475; doctrine, 19; manifestations,

22

Waking consciousness, 363

Warangal, 120

Water, 42, 46, 128, 181, 369, 540, 541, 550

Waves, 6, 106, 302

Way of knowledge, 184

Ways, 60

Wedding, 377, 378

Western, 95

Wheel, 58, 60

Whirlpool, 83

White, 182, 256; goddess, 37

Whiteness, 193, 254

Whole, 189, 262, 263, 264, 298, 408, 413, 432. 433. 455. 456, 493. 494. 542

Will, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 191, 295, 298, 375. 412, 415, 441, 446, 448, 451, 472, 473. 474. 475. 481, 482, 488, 498, 500 "-. 525

Will-activity, 45

Wisdom, 33, 38, 54, 307, 384, 414, 416, 446, 476, 491, 514, 521

Wise, 53

Wish, 54, 192, 295

Women, 20

Wonderful entity, 79

Words, 5, 29, 53, 61, 194, 309, 318

Work, 42, 46, 53, 56, 60, 303, 350

World, 6, 27, 34, 35, 41, 42, 53. 54, 55. 56, 57, 153. 174, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 198 n., 200, 205, 293, 299, 301, 302, 312, 313, 314, 320, 321, 35°, 365, 366, 388, 390, 391, 397, 413, 415, 4i6, 435, 438, 440, 442, 443 «-, 445, 446, 456, 457. 45**, 472, 476, 482, 488, 515, 517, 518, 531; of effects, 256; of matter, 200; view of its falsity refuted from the Nimbarka point of view, 435 et seq.

Index

World-appearance, 155, 175, 177, 178, 196, 197, 210, 239, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 331, 335, 337, 345. 367. 409, 423, 43<J, 439

World-creation, 296, 302, 330, 331, 3^5, 37o

World-creator, 462

World-energy, 58, 459

World-existence, 490

World-experience, 374

World-force, 24

World-forms, 37, 456

World-illusion, 333, 337, 338

Worldly bonds, 22

Worldly objects, 258

World-materials, 152

World-objects, 367, 371

World-order, 197

World-phenomena, 155, 196, 340

World-process, 292, 458, 477

World-reality, 157

Worship, 10, 22, 32, 39, 40 n., 58, 61, 104, 193; of God, 382

Wretchedness, 99

Writers, 111, 196

Wrongful, 180

yad-artha-vyavahdrd-nugund, 244 Yajnamurti, 102, 104, 109, no Yajna Varaha, 40 n. Yajnesa, 102, 110

Yajnopavlta-pratisthd, 122 yama, 29, 33, 61, 509 n., 519

Yama samhitds, 20

Yamunacarya, his life and works, 97 et seq.

Yasasvinl, 59 Yasoda, 77, 81 n. yathdrtha, 180, 188 yathdrtha-khydti, 180, 181, 182, i86n.,

237, 240, 243, 245, 246 n. yathdrtham, 185 n. yathdrthd-vadhdranam. 62 yathd - vasthita - vyavahdrd - nugunam, 236, 240

Yati-dharma-samuccaya, 102 n.

Yati-litiga-samarthana, 352

Yati-pati-mala-dipikd, 127

Yati-pratirandana-khandana, 133

Yati-rdja-vimsati, 137, 138 Yatisekhara-bharata, 109

Yatindra-mata-dipikd, 117, 127, 128; analysis of, 128, 129

Yatlndrapravana, no, 121 »., 137 Yatlndra-pravana-bhadra-campu, 138 Yatindra-pravana-prabhdva, 138 Yatindra-prarana-prabhdvam, 64 Yatindrapravanacarya, 135 yaugapadya, 228 Yavanas, 441 n. yavani, 47 Yadava, 100 n., 101 Yadava hill, 22

Yadavaprakasa, 100, 101, 102, 109, 113, 124, 156, 201, 280, 285, 301, 305; his view of Brahman, 301; his view of God, 15b; his view of time,

Yadavdbhyudaya, 120, 121

Yadavadri, 104, 137

Yddrcchika-ppadi, 135 n.

Yajnavalkya, 519

Ydjiiavalkya-smrti, 484

Yamuna, 14, 16, 17, 18, 79, 85, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 108, loy, 113, 114, 123, 139, 140, 142, 152, 153, 154. 155, 157. 159. 227, 235; Carvaka's criticism of soul, 139; his disciples, 109; his general position, 139; his theory of self, 140; his view of God, p. 152 et seq.

Yamuna's philosophy, 140

Y'amunacarya, 97, 139, 229 n.

Yellow, 182, 254

Yoga, 18, 22, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 52, 60, 61, 62, 80, 96, 97, 100, 157, 220, 281 n., 446, 449, 459, 46$, 468, 471, 473. 474. 479. 480, 481, 482, 487, 491, 496, 506, 509, 512

yoga-bhakti, 507

Yoga processes, 479

Yoga-rahasya, 96

Yoga-sutra, 61 n., 62 n., 470, 473,

482 Yoga-vdrttiku, 482

Yoga-view, 296

yogdnusdsana, 62

Yogic knowledge, 214

Yogic practice, 28

Yogin, 27, 30, 31, 42, 58, 60, 62, y6, 152, 446, 491, 506, 538

yogi-pratyaksa, 168, 189

Yogivaha, 63

yogi, 505

yoni, 46, 502

A HISTORY

OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

VOLUME IV INDIAN PLURALISM

CAMBRIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bcntley House, 200 Euston Road, London, N.W. 1 American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York 22, N.V.

hirst Edition 1949

Reprinted 1955

1961

/•'irst printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

Reprinted by qffset-litho by

Percy Lund Humphries & Co. Ltd., Bradford

TO THE SACRED AND BLESSED MEMORY OF THE LATE MAHATMA

MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND GANDHI,

THE POET

RABINDRANATH TAGORE,

and those martyrs and patriots who have

died or worked

for the liberation and elevation of

India

THIS HUMBLE WORK, WHICH SEEKS TO DISCOVER

INDIA AT ITS BEST AND HIGHEST, IS

DEDICATED WITH SINCEREST

REVERENCE AND

HUMILITY

PREFACE

The third volume of the present series was published in 1940. The manuscript of the fourth volume was largely ready at that time and it would have been possible to send it for publication at least by 1942. But the second wo rid-war commenced in 1939 and although the Cambridge University Press was prepared to accept the manuscript even during war-time, the despatch of the manuscript from Calcutta to Cambridge and the transmission of proofs to and fro between England and India appeared to me to be too risky. In 1945, after retiring from the Chair of Philosophy in the Calcutta University, I came to England. But shortly after my arrival here I fell ill, and it was during this period of illness that I revised the manuscript and offered it to the University Press. This explains the unexpected delay between the publication of the third volume and the present one. The promises held out in the preface to the third volume, regarding the subjects to be treated in the present volume, have been faithfully carried out. But I am not equally confident now about the prospects of bringing out the fifth volume. I am growing in age and have been in failing health for long years. The physical and mental strain of preparing a work of this nature and of seeing it through the Press is considerable, and I do not know if I shall be able to stand such a strain in future. But I am still collecting the materials for the fifth volume and hope that I may be able to see it published in my life-time.

The present volume deals with the philosophy of the Bhdgavata-purdna, the philosophy of Madhva and his followers, the philosophy of Vallabha and the philosophy of the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism. So far as I know, nothing important has yet been published on the philosophy of the Bhdgavata-purdna and that of Vallabha. Two important works by Mr Nagaraja Sarma of Madras and by Professor Helmuth von Glasenapp on the philosophy of Madhva have been published in English and German respectively. But so far nothing has appeared about the philosophy of the great teachers of the Madhva school such as Jaya-tlrtha and Vyasa-tlrtha. Very little is known about the great controversy between the eminent followers of the Madhva school of thought and of the followers of the

Sarikara school of Vedanta. In my opinion Jaya-tlrtha and Vyasa-tlrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief amongst many that monism of Sarikara presents the final phase of Indian thought. The realistic and dualistic thought of the Samkhya and the yoga had undergone a compromise with monism both in the Puranas and in the hands of the later writers. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jaya-tirtha and particularly of Vyasa-tlrtha will realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyasa-tlrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole field of Indian thought. Much more could have been written on the system of Madhva logic as explained in the Tarka-tdndava of Vyasa-tirtha. In this great work Vyasa-tlrtha has challenged almost every logical definition that appears in the Tattva-cintdmani of Gangesa, which forms the bed-rock of the new school of Nyaya logic. But this could have been properly done only in a separate work on the Madhva logic. Of the controversy between the monists of the Sarikara school and the dualists of the Madhva school, most people are ignorant of the Madhva side of the case, though there are many who may be familiar with the monistic point of view. It is hoped that the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers undertaken in the present volume will give new light to students of Indian thought and will present many new aspects of dialectical logic hitherto undiscovered in Indian or European thought.

The treatment of the philosophy of Vallabha which is called visuddhddvaita or pure monism, presents a new aspect of monism and also gives us a philosophical analysis of the emotion of devotion. Though readers of Indian philosophy may be familiar with the name of Vallabha, there are but few who are acquainted with the important contributions of the members of his school.

I have not devoted much space to the philosophy of the Bhdgavata-purana. Much of its philosophical views had already been anticipated in the treatment of the Samkhya, yoga and the Vedanta. As regards the position of God and His relation to the world the outlook of the Bhdgavata-purana is rather ambiguous. The Bhdgavata-purana has therefore been referred to for support by the Madhvas, Vallabhas and thinkers of the Gaudiya school.

The Gaudlya school seems to make the Bhagavata-purana the fundamental source of its inspiration.

The chief exponent of the Gaudlya school of thought is Caitanya. He, however, was a religious devotee and very little is known of his teachings. He did not produce any literary or philosophical work. But there were some excellent men of letters and philosophers among his disciples and their disciples. The treatment of the Gaudlya school of Vaisnavism thus gives a brief exposition of the views of Rupa GosvamI, Jlva Gosvami and Baladeva Vidyabhusana. Dr S. K. De has contributed a numoer of important articles on the position of Jlva GosvamI, though it does not seem that he cared to put an emphasis on the philosophical perspective.

In writing the present volume I have been able to use the huge amount of published materials in Sanskrit as well as a number of rare manuscripts which I collected from South India on my journeys there on various occasions.

My best thanks are due to my old friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, who, in spite of his advanced age and many important preoccupations, took the trouble to revise some portions of the manuscript and of revising and correcting the proofs, with so much care and industry. But for his help the imperfections of the present work would have been much greater. I also have to thank Dr E. J. Thomas for the many occasional helps that I received from him from the time of the first inception of the present series. My best thanks are also due to my wife, Mrs Surama Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal. et Cantab), Sastri, for the constant help that I received from her in the writing of the book and also in many other works connected with its publication. I am also grateful to Dr Satindra Kumar Mukherjee, M.A., Ph.D., my former pupil, for the help that I received from him when I was preparing the manuscript some years ago. I wish also to thank the Syndics of the University Press for undertaking the publication of this volume at a time when the Press was handicapped by heavy pressure of work, and by great difficulties of production.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

Trinity College, Cambridge August, 1948

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIV THE BHAGAVATA PURANA

PAGE

i The Bhdgavata-purGna ......... i

2 Dharma ........... 2

3 Brahman, Paramatman, Bhagavat and Paramesvara . . . 11

4 Kapila's philosophy in the Bhdgavata-purana .... 24

5 Eschatology 49

CHAPTER XXV

MADHVA AND HIS SCHOOL

1 Madhva *s life 51

2 Madhva Gurus .......... 56

3 Important Madhva works . . . . . . . . 57

4 Teachers and writers of the Madhva School ..... 90

5 Ramanuja and Madhva 94

CHAPTER XXVI MADHVA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS

1 Interpretation of Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 1 . . . . . 102

2 Interpretation of Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 2 . . . . . .121

3 Interpretation of Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 3-4 . . . . .127

4 A general review of the other important topics of the Brahma-sutras 129

CHAPTER XXVII A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

1 Ontology . . .150

2 Pramanas (ways of valid knowledge) . . . . . .160

3 Svatah-pramdnya (self-validity of knowledge) . . . .168

4 Illusion and Doubt ......... 173

CHAPTER XXVIII MADHVA LOGIC

PAGE

i Perception . . . . . . . . . . .181

2 Inference (Anumdna) . . . . . . . . .184

3 Tarka (Ratiocination) . . . . . . . . .188

4 Concomitance (Vydpti) . . . . . . . . .197

5 Epistemological process in Inference ...... 200

6 Various considerations regarding Inference ..... 200

7 Testimony ......... 202

CHAPTER XXIX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS

1 Vyasa-tlrtha, Madhusudana and Ramacarya on the Falsity of the World ........ ... 204

2 Nature of Knowledge . . . .... 230

3 The World as Illusion ......... 246

CHAPTER XXX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS (cont.)

1 A refutation of the definition of Avidyd (nescience) . 259

264 276

279 294 301

305 308

315

2 Perception of Ajfidna (ignorance) .....

3 Inference of Ajfidna .....

4 The theory of Avidyd refuted . . . .

5 Ajfidna and Ego-hood (ahamkdra) .

6 Indefinability of World-appearance

7 Nature of Brahman .......

8 Refutation of Brahman as material and instrumental cause

9 Liberation (moksa) ......

' CHAPTER XXXI THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

1 Vallabha's interpretation of the Brahma-sutra .... 320

2 The nature of Brahman . . ...... 3 2 7

3 The Categories ........ 33 2

4 The Pramdnas .... ..... 336

5 Concept of bhakti .......... 346

PAGB

6 Topics of Vallabha Vedanta as explained by Vallabha's followers 358

7 Vifthala's interpretation of Vallabha's ideas ... . 363

8 Life of Vallabha (1481-1533) 37*

9 Works of Vallabha and his disciples ...... 373

10 Visnusvamin ........... 382

CHAPTER XXXII CAITANYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

1 Caitanya's biographers ......... 384

2 Life of Caitanya .......... 385

3 Emotionalism of Caitanya ........ 389

4 Gleanings from Caitanya-Caritamrta on the subject of Caitanya's philosophical views ......... 390

5 Some companions of Caitanya ....... 393

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF jIVA GOSVAMl AND BALADEVA VIDYABHOSANA, FOLLOWERS OF CAITANYA

1 Ontology ........... 396

2 Status of the World ......... 405

3 God and His Powers ......... 409

4 God's relation to His devotees . . . . . . .410

5 Nature of bhakti . . . . . . . . . .415

6 Ultimate Realization ......... 428

7 The joy of bhakti .......... 430

8 The philosophy of Baladeva VidySbhusana ..... 438

INDEX : 449

CHAPTER XXIV

THE BHAGAVATA-PURANA

The Bhagavata-purana.

The Bhagavata-purana shares with the Bhagavad-gitd a unique position in the devotional literature of India. It cannot however claim the same antiquity: before the tenth century a.d. no references to it have been discovered by the present writer. Even Ramanuja (born in a.d. 1017) had not mentioned its name or made any quotations from it. But by the time of Madhva the work had become famous: one of the principal works of Madhva (thirteenth century a.d.) is called the Bhdgavata-tdtparya, in which he deals with the principal ideas of the Bhagavata-purana, and lays emphasis on them so far as they support his views. The thoughts of the Bhagavata-purana are loftily poetic, but the style is more difficult. The present writer is of opinion that it must have been composed by a Southerner, as it makes references to the Alvars, who have probably never been referred to by any writer in Northern or Upper India. The Bhagavata-purana, however, was so much appreciated that immediately commentaries were written upon it. Some of these commentaries are:

Amrta-ranginl, Atmapriyd, Krsna-padi, Caitanya-candrikd, Jaya-mangald, Tattva-pradipikd, Tatparya-candrika, Tdtparya-dipikd, Bhagavallild-cintdmani, Rasa-manjari, Sukapaksiyd Prabodhini, a tikd by Janardana Bhatta, a tikd by Narahari, Prakdsa by Srinivasa, Tattva-dipikd by Kalyana Raya, a tikd by Krsna Bhatta, a tikd by Kaura Sadhu, a tikd by Gopala CakravartI, Anvaya-bodhirii by Cudamani CakravartI, Bhdva-prakdsikd by Narasimhacarya, a tikd by Yadupati, Subodhini by Vallabhacarya, Pada-ratndvali by Vijayadhvaja-tlrtha, a tikd by Vitthala Dlksita, Sdrdrtha-darsini by Visvanatha CakravartI, a tikd by Visnusvamin, Bhdgavata-candrikd by Vlraraghava, Bhdvdrtha-dipikd by Sivarama, Bhdvdrtha-djpikd by Sridhara-svaml, Sneha-piirani by Kesavadasa, a tikd by Srivasa-carya, a tikd by Satyabhinava-tlrtha, a tikd by Sudarsana Suri, a tikd by Braja-bhusana, Bhdgavata-purdndrka-prabhd by Hari-bhanu, Bhdgavata-purdna-prathama-sloka-tikd by Jayarama and

Madhusudana SarasvatI, Pancama-skandha-tlkd by Vallabhacarya, Subodhini by Balakrsna Yati, Vaisnava-tosini by Sanatana GosvamI, Budharanjinl by Vasudeva, Nibandha-prakdsa by Vitthala Dlksita, Anukramanikd by Vallabhacarya, Ekddasa-skandha-tdtparya-cand-rikd by Brahmananda, Anukramanikd by Vopadeva. Many other works also have been written on the diverse subjects of the Bhdgavata-purdna and some have also summarized it. Some of these works are by Ramananda-tlrtha, Priyadasa, Visvesvara, Purusottama, Srinatha, Vrndavana GosvamI, Visnu Purl and Sanatana.

Dharma.

The word dharma, ordinarily translated as "religion" or "virtue," is used in very different senses in the different schools and religious traditions of Indian thought. It will be useful to deal with some of the more important of these notions before the reader is introduced to the notion of dharma as explained in the Bhdgavata-purdna. The Mimdmsd-sutra begins with an enquiry regarding the nature of dharma, and defines it as that good which is determinable only by the Vedic commands. 1 According to Sahara's and Kumarila's interpretation, the good that is called dharma means the Vedic sacrifices that lead to good results—the attainment of Heaven and the like. The fact that the Vedic sacrifices may bring about desirable results of various kinds can neither be perceived by the senses no'r inferred from other known data: it tan be known only from the testimony of the Vedic commands and directions. Dharma, therefore, means both the good results attainable by the Vedic sacrifices and the sacrifices themselves, and, as such, it is determinable only by the Vedic injunctions. Desirable results which are attained by rational and prudent actions are not dharma: for by definition dharma means only those desirable results which are attainable by operations which are performed strictly in accordance with Vedic injunctions. But in the Vedas are described various kinds of sacrifices by the performance of which one may take revenge on his enemies by destroying them or causing grievous injuries of various kinds to them, but action causing injury to any fellow-being is undesirable, and such action cannot be dharma.

1 athdto dharma-jijndsa. Mlmdmsd-sutra, I. i. i. codand-laksano'rtho dharmah. Ibid. I. 1.2.

Dharma in this sense has nothing to do with God, or with ordinary or customary morality, or any kind of mystical or religious fervour as we understand it now. It simply means Vedic rituals and the good results that are supposed to follow from their performances; it has but little religious or moral application; and such a dharma can only be known through scriptural injunctions 1 . It contains however just a little germ of the idea of non-injury, inasmuch as the performance of rituals for injuring others is not included within its content. Dharma also definitely rules out all kinds of emotion, mystic feeling, and exercise of intellect or thought of any description, and merely presupposes a strict loyalty to external scriptural commands; there is not the slightest trace here of any internal spiritual law, or rational will, or loyalty to God's will. The scriptural command however is categorically imperative in some cases, whereas in others it is only conditionally imperative, i.e. conditioned by one's desire for certain good things. Kumarila, in interpreting this idea, says that any substance (dravya), action (kriya) or quality (guna) which may be utilized to produce happiness, by a particular kind of manipulation of them in accordance with Vedic commands, is called dharma 2 . Though these substances, qualities etc. may be perceived by the senses yet the fact that their manipulation in a particular ritualistic manner will produce happiness for the per-

1 ya eva sreyas-karah, sa eva dharma-sabdena ucyate; katham avagamyatdm; yo hi ydgam anutisthati, tarn dhdrmika iti samdcaksate; yasca yasya kartd sa tena vyapadisyate; yathd pdvakah, Idvaka iti. tena yah purusam nihsreyasena sarnyu-nakti, sa dharma-sabdena ucyate... ko'rthah — yo nihsreyasdya jyotistomddih. ko'narthah — yah pratyavdyayah. Sabara-bhdsya on Mlmdmsd-sutra, I. i. 2.

Prabhakara however gives a different interpretation of this rule, and suggests that it means that every mandate of the Vedas is always binding, and is called dharma even when by following it we may be led to actions which are injurious to other people:

tatah sarvasya veddrthasya kcryatvam arthatvam ca vidhlyata iti syenddi-niyogdndm api arthatvam sydt.

Sdstra-dipikd, p. 17, Nirnaya-sagara Press, Bombay, 1915. Kumarila, further interpreting it, says that an action (performed according to the Vedic commands) which produces happiness and does not immediately or remotely produce unhappiness is called dharma.

8 phalam tdvad adharmo'sya syenddeh sampradhdryate

yadd yenesta-siddhih sydd anusthdndnubandhint tasya dharmatvam ucyeta tatah syenddi-varjanam yadd tu codand-gamyah kdrydkdrydnapeksayd dharmah priti-nimittam sydt tadd syene'pi dharmatd yadd tvaprlti-hetur yah sdksdd vyavahitdpi vd so'dharmas codandtah sydt tadd syene'py adharmatd.

Sloka-varttika, on sutra 2, sloka 270-273.

former can be known only by Vedic injunctions; and it is only with regard to this knowledge that the dharma is dependent on the Vetlas 1 . Doing an injury to one's enemy may immediately give one happiness, but by its nature it is bound to produce unhappiness in the future, since it is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. [But injury to the life of animals in the performance of sacrifices does not produce any sin, and must be regarded as being included within dharma.]

On the other hand, there are actions performed with the motive of injuring one's enemies, which are not commanded by the Vedas, but the methods of whose performance are described in the Vedas only in the case of those who are actuated by such bad motives: these actions alone are called adharma. Thus not all injury to life is regarded as sinful, but only such as is prohibited by the Vedas: whereas those injuries that are recommended by the Vedas are not to be regarded as sin (adharma) but as virtue (dharma). By nature there are certain powers abiding in certain substances, actions or qualities which make them sinful or virtuous, but which are sinful and which can only be known by the dictates of the scriptures 2 . Dharma and adharma are thus objective characters of things, actions, etc., the nature of which is only revealed by the scriptures. It has already been noted above that Prabhakara gave an entirely different meaning of dharma. With him dharma means the transcendental product (apurva) of the performance of Vedic rituals which remains in existence long after the action is completed and produces the proper good and bad effects at the proper time 3 .

The smrti literature is supposed to have the Vedas as its sources, and therefore it is to be regarded as authoritative; even when its contents cannot be traced in the Vedas it is inferred that such Vedic

drarya-kriyd-gnnddituhn dharmatram sthdpayisyate tesdm aindriyakatre'pi na tddrupyena dharmatd sreyah-sddhanatd hy esdm nit yam veddt pratlyate tddrupyena ca dharmatram tasmdn nendriya-gocarah.

Sloka-rdrttika, sutra 2. 13, 14. dliarmddharmdrtliibhir nifyam mrgyau ndhi-nisedhakau kracid asyd nisiddhatrdi cliaktih sdstrcna bodhitd... ridyamdnd hi kalhyante saktayo drarya-karmandm tad era cedam kurmcti idstram evdnudhdvatd. s Ibid. 240, 231.

na In lyotiMriHiddi-ydgasyapi dharmatram asti. apnrvasya dharmatrd-hhyupagamdt. Sa\tta-dipil.a, p. 33, Hombav, 1915.

texts must have existed 1 . It is only when the smrti is directly contradicted by the Vedas in any particular injunction or statement of fact that the former is to be regarded as invalid. The smrti works are therefore generally regarded as a continuation of the Vedas, though as a matter of fact the smrti works, written at different times at a later age, introduce many new concepts and many new ideals; in some of the smrtis, however, the teachings of the Purdnas and Smrtis are regarded as possessing a lower status than those of the Vedas 2 . On the relation of the Smrtis and the Vedas there are at least two different views. The first view is that, if the Smrtis come into conflict with the Vedas, then the smrti texts should be so interpreted as to agree with the purport of the Vedic texts; and, if that is not possible, then the smrti texts should be regarded as invalid. Others hold that the conflicting smrti text should be regarded as invalid. Mitra Misra, commenting on the above two views of the Savara and Bhatta schools, says that, on the first view, it may be suspected that the author of the conflicting smrti texts is not free from errors, and as such even those non-conflicting smrti texts which cannot be traced in the Vedas may be doubted as erroneous. On the second view, however, smrti is regarded as valid, since no one can guarantee that the non-conflicting texts which are not traceable to the Vedas are really non-existent in the Vedas. Even in the case of irreconcilably conflicting texts, the smrti directions, though in conflict with the Vedic ones, may be regarded as optionally valid 3 . The Vedic idea of dharma excludes from its concept all that can be known to be beneficial, to the performer or to others, through experience or observation; it restricts itself wholly to those ritualistic actions, the good effects of which cannot be known by experience, but can only be known through Vedic commands 4 . Thus the digging of wells, etc., is directly known by experience to be of public good (paropakdraya) and therefore is not dharma. Thus nothing that is drstdrtha, i.e. no action, the

1 virodhe tvanapeksyam sydd asati hyanumdnam. Mlmdmsd-sutra, i. 3. 3.

2 atah sa paramo dharmo yo veddd avagamyate avarah sa tu vijneyo yah purdnddisu smrtah

tatha ca vaidiko dharmo mukhya utkrstatvdt, smdrtah anukalpah apakrstatvdt. Vydsa-smrti as quoted in Viramitrodaya-paribhdsdprakdsa, p. 29.

3 See Viramitrodaya, Vol. I, pp. 28, 29.

4 tatha pratyupasthita-niyamdndm dcdrdndm drstdrthatvdd eva prdmdnyam. .. prapds taddgdni ca paropakdraya na dharmdya ity evd'vagamyate.

Sabara-bhdsya on Mimdmsd-sutra, 1. 3. 2.

beneficial effects of which may be known through experience, can be called dharma. The Ahgirah smrti echoes this idea when it says that, excepting efforts for attaining self-knowledge, whatever one does out of his own personal desire or wish is like child's play and unnecessary 1 .

Many of the important Smrtis however seem to extend the limits of the concept of dharma much further than the pure Vedic commands. As Mami's work is based entirely on the purport of the Vedas, he is regarded as the greatest of all smrti writers; whatever smrti is in conflict with Manu's writings is invalid 2 . Manu defines dharma as that which is always followed by the learned who are devoid of attachment and antipathy, and that to which the heart assents 3 . In another place Manu says that dharma is of four kinds; the observance of the Vedic injunctions, of the injunctions of smrti, the following of the customary practices of good people, and the performance of such actions as may produce mental satisfaction (dtmanas tustih) to the performer 4 . But the commentators are very unwilling to admit any such extension of the content and meaning of dharma. Thus Medhatithi (9th century), one of the oldest commentators, remarks that dharma as following the Vedic injunctions is beginningless; only the Vedic scholars can be said to know dharma, and it is impossible that there should be other sources from which the nature of dharma could be known. Other customs and habits and disciplines of life which pass as religious practices are introduced by ignorant persons of bad character (murkha-duhsila-purusa-pravarttitah): they remain in fashion for a time and then die out. Such religious practices are often adopted out of greed {lobhan mantra-tantradisu pravarttate) 5 . The wise and the good are

1 svdbhiprdya-krtam karma yatkimcij jndna-varjitam krldd-karmeva bdldndm tat-sarvam nis-prayojanam.

Vlramitrodaya-paribhdsdprakdia, p. n.

2 veddrthopambandhrtvdt prddhdnyam hi manoh smrtam manvartha-viparitd tu yd smrtih sd na prasasyate.

Brhaspati quoted in Vlramitrodaya, ibid. p. 27.

3 vidvadbhih sevitah sadbhir nityam advesa-rdgibhih hrdayendbhyanujndto yo dharmas tarn nibodhata.

Manu-samhitd, 11. 1. * vedo'khilo dharma-mulam smrti-slle ca tadviddm

dcdras caiva sddhundm dtmanas tustir eva ca. Ibid. 11. 6.

6 Medhatithi says that such practices as those of besmearing the body with ashes, carrying human skulls, going about naked or wearing yellow robes, are adopted by worthless people as a means of living. Ibid. 11. 1.

only those who know the injunctions of the Vedas, who carry them into practice out of reverence for the law, and who are not led astray into following non-Vedic practices out of greed or antipathy to others. And, though a man might be tempted in his mind to perform many actions for his sense-gratification, real contentment of the heart can come only through the performance of Vedic deeds 1 . Consistently with his own mode of interpretation Medhatithi discards not only the Buddhists and the Jains as being outside the true Vedic dharma, but also the followers of Paficaratra (i.e. the Bhagavatas) and the Pasupatas as well, who believed in the authority of the authors of these systems and in the greatness of particular gods of their own choice. He held that their teachings are directly contrary to the mandates of the Vedas: and as an illustration he points out that the Bhagavatas considered all kinds of injury to living beings to be sinful, which directly contradicts the Vedic injunction to sacrifice animals at particular sacrifices. Injury to living beings is not in itself sinful: only such injury is sinful as is prohibited by the Vedic injunctions. So the customs and practices of all systems of religion which are not based on the teachings of the Vedas are to be discarded as not conforming to dharma. In interpreting the phrase smrti-Hle ca tad-viddm, Medhatithi says that the word sila (which is ordinarily translated as "character") is to be taken here to mean that concentration which enables the mind to remember the right purports of the Vedic injunctions 2 . By customary duties (dcdra) Medhatithi means only such duties as are currently practised by those who strictly follow the Vedic duties, but regarding which no Vedic or smrti texts are available. He supposes that minor auspices and other rituals which are ordinarily

1 In interpreting the meaning of the word hrdaya (heart) in the phrase hrdayena abhyamtjndta Medhatithi says that the word hrdaya may mean " mind " (manas, antar-hrdaya-varttim' buddhyddi-tattvam); on this supposition he would hold that contentment of mind could only come through following the Vedic courses of duties. But, dissatisfied apparently with this meaning, he thinks that hrdaya might also mean the memorized content of the Vedas (hrdayam vedah, sa hy adhlto bhdvana-rupena hrdaya-sthito hrdayam). This seems to mean that a Vedic scholar is instinctively, as it were, led to actions which are virtuous, because in choosing his course of conduct he is unconsciously guided by his Vedic studies. A man may be prompted to action by his own inclination, by the example of great men, or by the commands of the Vedas; but in whichever way he may be so prompted, if his actions are to conform to dharma, they must ultimately conform to Vedic courses of duties.

2 samadhih silam ucyate...yac cetaso'nya-visaya-vydksepa-pariharena sdstrd-rtha-mrupana-pravanata tac chilam ucyate. Medhatithi's commentary, 11. 6.

performed by the people of the Vedic circle have also ultimately originated from the Vedic injunctions. Similarly it is only the feeling of self-contentment of those persons who are habituated to work in accordance with the Vedas that can be regarded as indicating the path of dhartna. It simply means that the instinctive inclination of the true adherents of the Vedas may be relied on as indicating that those actions to which their minds are inclined must be consistent with the Vedic injunctions, and must therefore conform to dharma. Other commentators however take a more liberal view of the meaning of the words sila, dtmanas tusti and hrdayena abhyanujndta. Thus Govindaraja explains the last phrase as meaning "absence of doubt" (antah-karana-cikitsd-sunya), and Narayana goes so far as to say that, unless the heart approves of the action, it cannot be right: Ramananda says that, when there is any doubt regarding two conflicting texts, one should act in a way that satisfies his own mind. The word sila has been interpreted as "character" (vrtta or caritra) by Ramananda in his Manvartha-candrikd and as dissociation of attachment and antipathy by Govindaraja: Kulluka takes it according to Harita's definition of sila as involving the qualities of non-injury to others, absence of jealousy, mildness, friendliness, gratefulness, mercy, peace, etc. Self-satisfaction can in practice discern the nature of dharma, but only when there are no specified texts to determine it. Thus, though the other later commentators are slightly more liberal than Med-hatithi, they all seem to interpret the slight concession that Manu had seemed to make to right character and self-contentment or conscience as constituent elements of dharma, more or less on Medhatithi's line, as meaning nothing more than loyalty to scriptural injunctions.

It has been pointed out that Medhatithi definitely ruled out the Pancaratra and the Pasupata systems as heretical and therefore invalid for inculcating the nature of dharma. But in later times these too came to be regarded as Vedic schools and therefore their instructions also were regarded as so authoritative that they could not be challenged on rational grounds 1 .

1 Thus Yogi-ydjnavalkya says: Sdmkhyam yogah panca-ra.tram veddh pdsupatam tathd ati-pramdndnyetdni hetubhir na virodhayet, quoted in Vlra-mitrodaya, p. 20, but not found in the printed text, Bombay. This Yogi-ydjnavalkya is a work on yoga and the other a work on smrti, and it is the former text

It is however a relief to find that in some of the later Smrtis the notion of dharma was extended to morality in general and to some of the cardinal virtues. Thus Brhaspati counts kindness (dayd, meaning a feeling of duty to save a friend or foe from troubles), patience (ksamd, meaning fortitude in all kinds of difficulty), the qualities of appreciating others' virtues and absence of elation at others' faults (anasuyd), purity (sauca, meaning avoidance of vices, association with the good and strict adherence to one's caste duties), avoidance of vigorous asceticism (sannydsa), performance of approved actions and avoidance of disapproved ones (mangold), regular charity even from small resources (akdrpanya), contentment with what little one may have and want of jealousy at others' prosperity (asprhd), as constituting the universal dharma for all 1 . Visnu counts patience (ksamd), truthfulness for the good of all beings (satya), mind-control (dama), purity (sauca as defined above), making of gifts (ddna), sense-control (indriya-samyama), noninjury (ahirnsd), proper attendance to teachers (guru-susrusa), pilgrimage, kindness (dayd), straightforwardness (drjava), want of covetousness, adoration of gods and Brahmins, as constituting universal dharma. Devala considers purity (sauca), gifts (ddna), asceticism of the body (tapas), faith (sraddhd), attendance to teachers (guru-sevd), patience (ksamd), mercifulness in the sense of pity for others' sufferings, showing friendliness as if these were one's own (dayd), acquirement of knowledge, Vedic or non-Vedic (vijndna), mind-control and body-control (vinaya), truthfulness (satya), as constituting the totality of all dharmas (dharma-samuccaya). Yajnavalkya speaks of ahirnsd, satya, asteya (avoidance of stealing), sauca, indriya-nigraha (sense-control), ddna, dama, dayd, and ksdnti as constituting universal dharma for all. The Mahdbhdrata counts truthfulness (satya), steadiness in one's caste duties (tapas as sva-dharma-vartitva), purity (sauca), con-that has been printed. The present writer has no knowledge whether the latter text has been published anywhere.

Visnudharmottara also speaks of Paficaratra and Pasupata as means of enquiry into Brahman:

sdmkhyam yogah pancaratram veddh pasupatam

tathd krtanta-pancakam viddhi brahmanah parimdrgane. Ibid. p. 22.

But Mitra Misra on the same page distinguishes between Pasupata as a Vedic agama and as a non-Vedic agama. Similarly there was a Vedic and non-Vedic Paficaratra too. Ibid. p. 23.

1 Ibid. pp. 32-4-

tentment, meaning sex-restriction to one's own wife and also cessation from sense-attractions (visaya-tydga), shame at the commission of evil deeds (hri), patience as capacity in bearing hardships (ksamd), evenness of mind (drjava), philosophic knowledge of reality (jndna), peace of mind (soma as citta-pras'dntatd), desire to do good to others (dayd), meditation, meaning withdrawal of the mind from all sense objects (dhydna as nirvisaya), as universal dharmas. Yajfiavalkya says that the highest of all dharmas is self-knowledge through yoga.

These universal dharmas are to be distinguished from the special dharmas of the different castes, of the different stages of life (dsrama), or under different conditions. We have thus three stages in the development of the concept of dharma, i.e. dharma as the duty of following the Vedic injunctions, dharma as moral virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, self-control etc., dharma as self-knowledge through yoga.

But the Bhdgavata presents a new aspect of the notion of dharma. Dharma according to the Bhdgavata consists in the worship of God without any ulterior motive—a worship performed with a perfect sincerity of heart by men who are kindly disposed towards all, and who have freed themselves from all feelings of jealousy. This worship involves the knowledge of the absolute, as a natural consequence of the realization of the worshipfulness of the spirit, and naturally leads to supreme bliss 1 . The passage under discussion does not directly refer to the worship of God as a characteristic of the definition of dharma as interpreted by Sridhara 2 . The dharma consists of absolute sincerity—absolute cessation of the spirit from all motives, pretensions and extraneous associations of every description: and it is assumed that, when the spirit is freed from all such extraneous impurities, the natural condition of the spirit is its natural dharma. This dharma is therefore not a thing that is to be attained or achieved as an external acquirement, but it is man's own nature, which manifests itself as soon as the impurities are removed. The fundamental condition of dharma is not therefore something positive but negative, consisting of the dissociation (projjhita) of extraneous elements (kitava). For, as soon as the extraneous elements are wiped out, the spirit shows itself in its own

1 Bhdgavata-purana, I. 1.2, interpreted according to £rldhara's exposition. * komalam Isvardrddhana-lakfano dharmo nirupyate. £rldhara's comment on the above passage.

true nature, and then its relation to absolute truth and absolute good is self-evident: the normal realization of this relationship is what is called dharma or worship of God, or what Sridhara calls the tender worshipfulness towards God. The primary qualifications needed for a person to make a start towards a true realization of the nature of dharma in himself are, that he should have no jealousy towards others, and that he should have a natural feeling of friendliness towards all beings. The implications of this concept of dharma in the Bhagavata, which breaks new ground in the history of the development of the notion of dharma in Indian Philosophy, are many, and an attempt will be made in the subsequent sections to elucidate them. That this dissociation from all extraneous elements ultimately means motiveless and natural flow of devotion to God by which the spirit attains supreme contentment, and that it is supreme dharma, is very definitely stated in I. 2. 6: If anything which does not produce devotion to God can be called dharma, such a dharma is mere fruitless labour 1 . For the fruits of dharma as defined by the Vedic injunctions may lead only to pleasurable consequences which are transitory. The real dharma is that which through devotion to God leads ultimately to self-knowledge, and as such dharma cannot be identified with mere gain or fulfilment of desires. Thus dharma as supreme devotion to God is superior to the Vedic definition of dharma, which can produce only sense-gratification of various kinds.

Brahman, Paramatman, Bhagavat and Paramesvara.

The opening verse of the Bhagavata is an adoration of the ultimate (param) truth (satya). The word para however is explained by Sridhara as meaning God (paramesvara). The essential (sva-rupd) definitive nature of God is said to be truth (satya). Truth is used here in the sense of reality; and it is held that by virtue of this supreme reality even the false creation appears as real, and that on account of this abiding reality the entire world of appearance attains its character of reality. Just as illusory appearances (e.g. silver) appear as real through partaking of the real character of the real object (e.g. the conch-shell) or the substratum of the illusion, so in this world-appearance all appears as real on account of the underlying reality of God. The fact that the world is produced from

1 Ibid. 1. 2. 7.

God, is sustained in Him and is ultimately dissolved in Him, is but an inessential description of an accidental phenomenon which does not reveal the real nature of God.

God is called by different names, e.g. Brahman, Paramatman and Bhagavat, but, by whatever name He may be called, His pure essence consists of pure formless consciousness (arupasya ciddt-manah) 1 . He creates the world by His maya-power, consisting of the three gunas. Underlying the varied creations of mdyd, He exists as the one abiding principle of reality which bestows upon them their semblance of reality. The mdyd represents only His external power, through which He creates the world with Himself as its underlying substratum. But in His own true nature the mdyd is subdued, and as such He is in His pure loneliness as pure consciousness. Sridhara in his commentary points out that God has two powers called vidyd-sakti and avidyd-sakti. By His vidyd-sakti God controls His own mdyd-sakti in His own true nature as eternal pure bliss, as omniscient and omnipotent. The jiva or the individual soul can attain salvation only through right knowledge obtained through devotion. On this point Sridhara tries to corroborate his views by quotations from Visnusvamin, who holds that Isvara a being, intelligence, and bliss (saccid-dnanda isvara) is pervaded with blissful intelligence (hlddini samvit), and that the mdyd is under his control and that his difference from individual souls consists in the fact of their being under the control of mdyd. The individual souls are wrapped up in their own ignorance and are therefore always suffering from afflictions (klesa) 2 . God in His own nature as pure consciousness transcends the limits of mdyd and prakrti and exists in and for Himself in absolute loneliness; and it is this same God that dispenses all the good and bad fruits of virtue and vice in men under the influence of mdyd 3 . That God in His own true

1 Bhdgavata-purdna, l. 3. 30.

2 Ibid. 1. 7. 6 (^ridhara's comment):

tad uktam visnu-svdmind

hlddinyd samviddslistah sac-cid-dnanda isvarah

svdvidyd-samvrto jivah samklesa-nikardkarah

tathd sa lio yad-vase mdyd sa jlvo yas taydrditah, etc.

Jiva quotes the same passage and locates it in Sarvajna-sukti Sat-sandarbha,

p. 191.

3 tvam ddyah purusah sdksdd Isvarah prakrteh parah mdydm vyudasya cic-chaktyd kaivalye sthita dttnani sa eva jiva-lokasya mdyd-mohita-cetaso

vidhatse svena vlryena sreyo dharmddi-laksanam. Ibid. 1. 7. 23, 24.

nature is pure consciousness and absolutely devoid of all duality and all distinctions is emphasized again and again in numerous passages in the Bhagavata. In this He is ultimate and transcendent from all: the individual souls also lie dormant, and in this stage all the guna reals exist only in their potential forms; and it is by His own power that He rouses the prakrti which is His may a by which the individual souls are being always led into the experience of diverse names and forms. God in His own nature is therefore to be regarded as absolutely formless pure consciousness; by His power of consciousness (cic-chakti) He holds the individual souls within Him and by His power of materiality He spreads out the illusion of the material world and connects it with the former for their diverse experiences 1 .

It is thus seen that God is admitted to have three distinct powers, the inner power as forming His essence (antaranga-svarupa-sakti), the external power (bahiranga-sakti) as maya and the power by which the individual souls are manifested. This conception however may seem to contradict the view already explained that Brahman is one undifferentiated consciousness. But the interpreters reconcile the two views by the supposition that from the ultimate point of view there is no distinction or difference between "power" and "possessor of power" (sakti and saktiman). There is only one reality, which manifests itself both as power and possessor of power 2 . When this one ultimate reality is looked at as the possessor of power, it is called God; when, however, emphasis is laid on the power, it is called the great power which is mytho-logically represented as Maha laksml 3 . Thus the terms Brahman, Bhagavat and Paramatman are used for the same identical reality according as the emphasis is laid on the unity or differencelessness, the possessor of power, or the transcendent person. The antar-anga, or the essential power, contains within it the threefold powers of bliss {hlddini), being (sandhini) and consciousness (samvit), of which the two latter are regarded as an elaboration or evolution or

1 anantavyakta-rupena yenedam akhilam tatam cid-acic-chakti-yuktaya tastnai bhagavate namah.

Bhagavata, vn. 3. 34.

2 atha ekam eva svarupam saktitvena saktimattvena ca virajati.

Sat-sandarbha, p. 188 (byamalal Gosvaml's edition).

3 yasya sakteh svarupa-bhutatvam nirupitam tac-chaktimattva-prddhanyena virajamanam bhagavat-samjnam apnoti tac ca vyakhyatam; tad eva ca saktitva-pradhanyena virajamanam laksmi-samjndm apnoti. Ibid.

manifestation of the former (the klddini power, or bliss). This threefold power is also called cic-chakti or dtma-mdyd (essential mdyd), and, as such, is to be distinguished from God's external power of mdyd (bahiranga-mdyd), by which He creates the world. His other power, by which He holds the individual souls (which are but parts of Himself) within Himself and yet within the grasp and influence of His external power of mdyd, is technically called tatastha-sakti. The individual souls are thus to be regarded as the parts of God as well as manifestations of one of His special powers (tatastha-sakti). Though the individual souls are thus contained in God as His power, they are in no way identical with Him, but are held distinct from Him as being the manifestations of one of His powers. The unity or oneness (advaya-tattva) consists in the facts that the ultimate reality is self-sufficient, wholly independent, and standing by itself; and that there is no other entity, whether similar (e.g. the individual souls) or dissimilar to it (e.g. the matrix of the world, the prakrti), which is like it; for both the prakrti and the jivas depend upon God for their existence, as they are but manifestations of His power. God exists alone with His powers, and without Him the world and the souls would be impossible 1 . The nature of His reality consists in the fact that it is of the nature of ultimate bliss (parama-sukha-rupatva), the ultimate object of all desires (parama-purusdrthatd) and eternal (nitya). It is this ultimate eternal reality which has formed the content of all Vedanta teachings. Thus the Bhdgavata-purdna points out that it is this reality which is the cause of the production, maintenance and destruction of all; it is this that continues the same in deep sleep, dreams and in conscious life; it is this that enlivens the body, senses, life and mind, yet in itself it is without any cause. It is neither born, nor grows, nor decays, nor dies, yet it presides over all changes as the one constant factor—as pure consciousness; and even in deep sleep, when all the senses have ceased to operate, its own self-same experience continues to be just the same 2 .

Now this reality is called Brahman by some, Bhagavat by some and Paramatman by others. When this reality, which is of the nature

1 advayatvam ca asya svayam-siddha-tddrsdtddrsa-tattvdntardbhdvdt sva-saktyeka-sahdyatvdt, paramdsrayam tarn vind tdsdm asiddhatvdc ca.

Tattva-sandarbha, p. 37.

2 Bhdgavata-purdna, xi. 3. 35-39.

of pure bliss, is experienced by sages as being identical with their own selves, and when their minds are unable to grasp its nature as possessing diverse powers, and when no distinction between itself and its powers is realized, it is called Brahman. In such experiences this reality is only grasped in a general featureless way in its abstractness 1 . But when this reality is realized by the devotees in its true nature as being possessed of diverse powers in their distinction from the former, He is called by the name Bhagavat. In this it is the pure bliss which is the substance or the possessor, and all the other powers are but its qualities. So, when the reality is conceived in its fulness in all its proper relations, it is called Bhagavat: whereas, when it is conceived without its specific relations and in its abstract character, it is called Brahman 2 . So far as this distinction between the concepts of Brahman and Bhagavat is concerned it is all right. But in this system philosophy is superseded at this point by mythology. Mythologically Krsna or the lord Bhagavan is described in the Puranas as occupying His throne in the transcendent Heaven (Vaikuntha) in His resplendent robes, surrounded by His associates. This transcendent Heaven (Vaikuntha) is non-spatial and non-temporal; it is the manifestation of the essential powers (svarupa-sakti) of God, and as such it is not constituted of the gunas which form the substance of our spatio-temporal world. Since it is non-spatial and non-temporal, it is just as true to say that God exists in Vaikuntha as to say that He Himself is Vaikuntha. Those who believed in this school of religion were so much obsessed with the importance of mythological stories and representations that they regarded God Himself as having particular forms, dress, ornaments, associates etc. They failed to think that these representations could be interpreted mythically, alle-gorically or otherwise. They regarded all these intensely anthropomorphic descriptions as being literally true. But such admissions would involve the irrefutable criticism that a God with hands, feet,

1 tad ekam eva akhanddnanda-rupam tattvam.. .parama-hamsdndm sadhana-vasdt tdddtmyam anupapamyam satydm api tadlya-svarupa-sakti-vaicitrydm tad-grahana-sdmarthye cetasi yathd sdmdnyato laksitam tathaiva sphurad vd tad-vad eva avivikta-sakti-saktimattdbhedatayd pratipddyamdnam vd brakmeti sabdyate.

Sat-sandarbha, pp. 49-50.

1 evam ca dnanda-mdtram visesyam samastdh saktayah visesandni visisto bhagavan itydydtam. tathd caivam vaisistye prdpte purndvirbhdvatvena akhanda-tattva-rupo'sau bhagavan brahma tu sphutam aprakatita-vaiiistydkdratvena tasyaiva asam.yag-dvirbha.vah. Ibid. p. 50.

and drc ^ would be destructible. To avoid this criticism they held that God's forms, abode, etc., were constituted of non-spatial and non-temporal elements of His non-material essential power. But forms involve spatial notions, and non-spatial forms would mean non-spatial space. They had practically no reply to such criticism, and the only way in which they sought to avoid it was by asserting that the essential nature of God's powers were unthinkable {acintya) by us, and that the nature of God's forms which were the manifestations of this essential power could not therefore be criticized by us on logical grounds, but must be accepted as true on the authoritative evidence of the Puranas.

This notion of the supra-logical, incomprehensible or unthinkable (acintya) is freely used in this school to explain all difficult situations in its creeds, dogmas, and doctrines. Acintya is that which is to be unavoidably accepted for explaining facts, but which cannot stand the scrutiny of logic (tarkdsaham yaj-jndnam kdrydnyathdnupapatti-pramdnakam), and which can account for all happenings that may be deemed incomprehensible or impossible (durghata-ghatakatvam). How the formless Brahman may be associated with the three powers by which it can stay unchanged in itself and yet create the world by its external power of mdyd or uphold the individual souls by its other power is a problem which it is attempted to explain by this concept of incomprehensibility (acintya) 1 . The mdyd which is the manifestation of the external power of God is defined in the Bhdgavata as that which cannot manifest itself except through the ultimate reality, and which yet does not appear in it, i.e. mdyd is that which has no existence without Brahman and which, nevertheless, has no existence in Brahman 2 . This mdyd has two functions, viz. that with which it blinds the individual souls, called jiva-mdyd, and the other by which the world transformations take place, called the guna-mdyd.

Jlva Gosvami argues in his Sarva-samvddini, which is a sort of a running commentary on Tattva-sandarbha, that the followers of Sarikara consider ultimate reality to be pure consciousness, one and

1 In the Visnu-purdna these three powers are called para, avidya-karma-samjnd and ksetrajnakhya. This para mdyd or the szarupa-sakti is also sometimes called yoga-mdyd.

2 rte'rtham yat pratiyeta na pratiyeta cdlmani

tad vidyud dtmano may dm yatlidbhdso yathd tamah.

Bhdgavata, u. 9. 33.

undifferentiated. There exists no other entity similar or dissimilar to it, and it is this fact that constitutes its infinitude and its reality. According to them such a reality cannot have any separate power or even any power which may be regarded as its essence {svarupa-bhuta-sakti). For, if such a power were different from reality, it could not be its identical essence; and if it were not different from reality, it could not be regarded as being its power. If such an essential power, as distinct from reality, be admitted, such a power must be of the same nature as reality (i.e. of the nature of pure consciousness); and this would make it impossible to conceive of this power as contributing God's diverse manifestations, His transcendent forms, abode and the like, which are admitted to be the principal creed of the Vaisnavas. But against the views of the followers of Sankara it may be urged that even they have to admit that the Brahman has some power by which the world-appearance is manifested; if the world is wholly a creation of may a and Brahman has nothing to do in it, there is no good in admitting its existence, and the maya would be all in all. This power cannot be different in nature from the reality that possesses it, and, since the nescience or avidya cannot exist without Brahman, it is an additional proof that the avidya is also one of his powers. The power of any entity always exists in it as its own self even when it is not manifested. If it is argued that the Brahman is self-shining and that it does not require any power, it may be replied that the very reason by virtue of which it is self-shining may be regarded as its power. In this way Jlva follows some of the fundamental points in Ramanuja's argument in favour of the doctrine that ultimate reality, the Brahman, is not formless and qualityless, but a qualified being, having its powers and qualities. In attempting to prove this view Jlva follows briefly the central argument of Ramanuja. But Jlva introduces the notion that the relation of the qualities and powers of ultimate reality is supra-logical, inexplain-able on logical grounds, and that therefore in a mysterious manner the powers are different from reality and yet one with it; so that in spite of the manifestation of ultimate reality as concrete God with human forms, dress etc., He is, at the same time, unchanged in His own changeless existence as Brahman. The introduction of the mystic formula of incomprehensibility seems to discharge the Vaisnavas of this school from all responsibility of logically explaining

their dogmas and creeds, and, thus uncontrolled, they descend from the domain of reason to the domain of the puranic faith of a mythological character.

In describing the special excellences of God, Jiva follows Ramanuja in holding that He has none of the evil qualities that are found in the world, but possesses all the excellent characters that we can conceive of. In the light of the concept of incomprehensibility (acintya) all these excellent characters are regarded as somehow manifestations of His essential power and therefore identical with Him. The introduction of the supra-logical concept of acintya enables Jiva and other interpreters of the Bhdgavata of his school to indulge in eclecticism more freely than could otherwise have been possible; and thus it is that, though Jiva follows Ramanuja in admitting ultimate reality to be qualified, he can in the same breath assert that ultimate reality is formless and characterless. Thus he says that, though the followers of Ramanuja do not accept the view of Brahman as characterless, yet admission of characters naturally presupposes the admission of the characterless also 1 . The idea of introducing the concept of the supra-logical in order to reconcile the different scriptural texts which describe reality as characterless (nirvisesa), qualified (viiista) and many, can be traced to the introduction of the concept of visesa in the philosophy of Madhva, already described in a previous chapter, by which Madhva tried to reconcile the concept of monism with that of plurality. The Bengal school of Vaisnavism, introduced by Caitanya, is based principally on the Bhagavata-purdna, and of the many writers of this school only two are prominent as authors of philosophical treatises, Baladeva Vidyabhusana and Jiva Gosvami. Of these Baladeva has again and again referred to the indebtedness of this school to the philosophy of Madhva, and to the initiation of Caitanya as an ascetic by a follower of the Madhva school of Vaisnavism. Though he was a junior contemporary of Jiva Gosvami and a commentator of the latter's Tattva-sandarbha y yet he often reverts to Madhva's doctrine of vtiesa in reconciling the monistic position with the positions of qualified monism and pluralism. Had he adhered to Jiva's concept of the supra-logical, the

1 yadyapi hi-Ramdnujlyair trirviie$am brahma na manyate tathdpi saviiefarji manyamdnair viie$atiriktam mantavyam eva.

Jiva's Sarva-samvddirH, p. 74 (Nityasvarupa Brahmacarl's edition).

concept of visesa would have been entirely unnecessary. Baladeva, however, uses not only the concept of visesa, but also the concept of the supra-logical (acintya), and he characterizes the concept of visesa as being itself the concept of the supra-logical. Thus in his Siddhdnta-ratna he says that the qualities of consciousness, bliss, etc., do not differ/rom the nature of Brahman, and yet Brahman is consistently described as possessing these different qualities because of the supra-logical functions of visesa {acintya-visesa-mahimna). This assertion does not involve the doctrine that reality is from a particular point of view different from its qualities and from another point of view identical with them (na caivam bhedabhedau syatam), and the only solution of the difficulty is to assume the doctrine of the supra-logical (tasmad avicintyataiva saranam). In this connection Baladeva further says that the doctrine of visesa must be accepted as something which even in the absence of difference can explain the phenomena of difference 1 . This concept of visesa, however, is to be applied only in reconciling the simultaneous plurality and unity of ultimate reality. But so far as the relation between reality and individual souls is concerned, their difference is well known, and therefore the application of the principle of visesa would be unjustifiable. The principle of visesa is, however, applied not only in reconciling the unity of Brahman with the plurality of his qualities and powers, but also with his divine body, divine dress, his divine abode and the like, so that though these appear to be different from him they are at the same time identical with him 2 .

Speaking on the same topic, Jlva holds that God Visnu's power of consciousness (cic-chakti) is identical with His own essence. When this essence is on the way to produce effects, it is called power {sva-rupatn eva kdryyonmukham sakti-sabdena uktam). Now this special state of reality cannot be regarded as different from it, and can have no separate existence from it, since it can never be regarded (cintayitum akakyatvdd) as different from the essence of reality; since moreover difference itself cannot be regarded as being in any way different, the difference between the power and its possessor is unthinkable, incomprehensible and supra-logical. This view is not that of Ramanuja and his followers, who regard the

1 Siddhdnta-ratna, pp. 17-22 (Benares, 1924)'

* tatha ca vigrahddeh sva-rupanatirehe , pi viiefdd eva bheda-vyavaharah. Ibid. p. 26.

power as different from its possessor; yet, since they also believe that God's powers are essentially contained in Him, there is a good deal of similarity between the Ramanuja school and the Bengal school of Vaisnavism 1 . Arguing against the followers of Sankara, Jlva says that even in the Upanisad passage on pure consciousness, bliss, the Brahman (vijndnam anandatn Brahma), the consciousness and the bliss cannot be identical, for then the two words would be mere repetition; they cannot be different, for then Brahman would have two conflicting qualities within himself. If the two words vijndna and dnanda mean the negation of ignorance and of sorrow, then these two negations, being two different entities, are coexistent in Brahman. If the two negations mean one entity, how can one entity be the negation of two different things? If it is said that only agreeable consciousness is called bliss, then again the quality of agreeableness stands out as a separate quality. Even if these words stood merely as negations of ignorance or sorrow, then these also would be specific characters; if it is urged that these are not specific characters, but represent only special potencies (yogyatd) by virtue of which ignorance and sorrow are negated, then nonetheless those special potencies would be special characters. Thus the theory that ultimate reality is characterless is false. The characters of Brahman are identically the same as his powers, and these are all identical with his own self.

On the subject of the nature of self, Jlva says that individual selves are not pure consciousness, but entities which are characterized by self-consciousness as "ego" or "I." Individual souls are on no account to be regarded as being identical with God or Paramatman, and each individual self is different from every other 2 . These individual souls are of atomic size and therefore partless. The atomic self resides in the heart, whence it pervades the whole body by its quality of consciousness, just as sandal paste pervades the whole neighbourhood by its sweet smell. Just so, individual selves are atomic, but they pervade the bodies in which they are located by their power of consciousness. Consciousness is called a quality of the self because it is always dependent on that and serves its purpose {nitya-tad-dsrayatva-tac-chesatva-nibandhanah) z . Again,

1 Sarva-samvddinl, pp. 29, 30.

2 tasmdt prati-ksetram bhinna eva jlvah. Ibid. p. 87.

3 Ibid. p. 94.

consciousness, being thus dependent on the self, expands and contracts in order to pervade the different bodies in which it may be operating at the time. Being thus different from God, individual selves, even in emancipation, remain separate and distinct. They are thus produced from the highest self (Paramatman or God), and they are always under His absolute control and pervaded by Him. It is on this account that God is called Paramatman as distinguished from individual souls (dtman). They are like rays emanating from Him and are therefore always entirely dependent on Him and cannot exist without Him 1 . They are also regarded as God's disengaged power (tatastha-sakti), because, though they are God's power, yet they are in a way disengaged and separately situated from Him, and therefore they are under the delusion of God's other power, may a, which has no influence on God Himself; and therefore, though individual selves are suffering under the blinding operation of ignorance (avidyd), the highest self (paramatman) is absolutely untouched by them. As individual souls are the powers of God, they are sometimes spoken of as identical with Him and sometimes as different from Him. Of these individual selves some are always naturally devoted to God, and others are dominated by ignorance and are turned away from Him; it is the latter that are the denizens of this world and suffer rebirth.

Maya, the external power {bahiranga-sakti) has two functions, creative (nimitta) and passive (updddna)\ of these, time (kdla), destiny (daiva), and actions (karma) represent the former, and the three gunas the latter. Individual selves contain within them as integral parts elements of both these functions of tndyd. The creative function of mdyd has again two modes, which operate either for the bondage or for the liberation of man. This creative mdyd also typifies the cosmic knowledge of God, His will and His creative operation 3 . Knowledge of God is also regarded as twofold —that which is His own self-knowledge and which forms a part of His essential power (svarupa-sakti), and that which is turned

1 tadiya-rasmi-sthdmyatve'pi nitya-tad-dsrayitvdt, tadvyatirekena vyatirekdt.

Sat-sandarbha, p. 233.

2 tad evatn saktitve'pi anyatvam asya tatasthatvdt, tatasthatvam ca tndyd-sakty-atltatvdt, asya avidyd-parabhavddi-rupena dosena paramdtmano lopd-bhdvdc ca. Ibid. p. 234.

3 nitnittdtnsa-rupayd mdydkhyayaiva prasiddhd saktis tridhd drsyate jiidne-cchd-kriyd-rupatvena. Ibid. p. 244.

towards cosmical operation for the good of the individual selves. It is this cosmic knowledge of God that falls within the creative function of His power of maya. This cosmic knowledge is again twofold—that which abides in God as His omniscience, His desire of creation, and his effort of creation (otherwise called time (kdla)); and that which He passes over to individual selves as their desire for enjoyment or liberation from their works (karma), etc.; these in their turn are regarded as their ignorance (avtdyd) and wisdom (vtdyd) 1 . Maya according to this view does not mean ignorance, but power of manifold creation (miyate vicitram nirmiyata anaya iti vicitrdrtha-kara-sakti-vacitvam eva), and therefore the world is to be regarded as a transformation of Paramatman (paramdtma-parindma eva) 2 . By the supra-logical power of God, He remains unchanged in Himself and is yet transformed into the manifold creations of the world. According to Jlva, parindma does not mean the transformation of reality (na tattvasya parindma), but a real transformation {tattvato parindmahf. The manifestation of God in Himself in His own essential power (svarupa-sakti) remains however always untouched by His transformations through His supra-logical maya power unto the world. This does not mean that God has two distinct forms, but merely that what appears contradictory to our ordinary reason may yet be a transcendental fact; and in the transcendental order of things there is no contradiction in supposing God as unchanged and as at the same time changeable by the operation of His two distinct powers. Maya in this system is not something unreal or illusory, but represents the creative power of God, including His omniscience and omnipotence, the entire material substance of the world in the form of the collocation and combination of the gunas, and also the totality of human experience for good and for evil in all its diverse individual centres of expression. But in spite of all these transformations and manifestations of Himself through His supra-logical power of maya, He remains entirely complete and unchanged in the manifestations of His supra-logical essential power. On the one side we have God as the creator and upholder of the universe, and on the other we have the God of religion, the object of the mystic raptures of His

1 Sat-sandarbha, p. 244. 2 Ibid. p. 247.

8 tattvato'nyathd-bhdvah parindma ityeva laksanam na tu tattvasya.

Sarva-samvddinl, p. 121.

devotees. The world is produced by the mdyd power of God and is therefore not identical with Him. The gross and the impure selves and the world, all that is conscious and unconscious, the cause and the subtle pure element of the self—none of them are different from God, because the subtler ones are of the nature of His power, and the grosser ones are the modification or effects of His power; and though the world is one with Him, yet the defects and impurities of the world do not affect Him in the least, for in spite of these transformations He is untouched by them; such is the supra-logical character of His power 1 .

Jiva then proceeds to show that the ultimate substance of the gross physical world, of the five elements and their modifications, is none other than the highest self, Paramatman or God. There is nothing in gross physical objects which can explain their appearance of unity as concrete wholes. For these wholes cannot be wholes in the same sense as forests made up of trees; these latter, indeed, cannot properly be called wholes, for, if one pulls a tree, the forest is not pulled; whereas in the case of a concrete object, when one pulls at one end, the object itself is pulled. If it is argued that there is a whole distinct from the parts, then its relation to the latter would be incomprehensible, for it is never experienced as entirely different from the parts; if the whole is supposed to be connected with each of the parts, then even a finger may be felt as a whole body; if it is supposed that a whole exists in parts only, in parts, then the same difficulty will again arise, and there will be a vicious infinite. So no concrete whole as distinct from the parts can be admitted to exist, and for the same reason the separate concrete existence of the elements may be denied. If the existence of wholes is denied in this way, then the existence of parts must also be denied; for, if there are no wholes, then there cannot be any parts, since it is only the wholes that are directly experienced, and parts are only admitted to account for the experience of the wholes. So the only assumption that remains is that God is the ultimate substance. Jiva refers to the Bhdgavata-purdna, in. 6.1-3, which seems to hold that the discrete elements of God's own powers form the twenty-three Samkhya categories, which are combined and united into wholes through the element of time, which is but another name for His transcendent effort. The curious doctrine here put forth is

1 Ibid. p. 251.

rather very new in the history of Indian philosophy, though it is unfortunate that it has not been further developed here. It seems to maintain that the discrete elements of the substantial part (updddndmsa) of mdyd derive their appearance of reality from God, and that through God's elan or activity as time these elements are held together and produce the notion of wholes, since there is no other whole than God. How time is responsible for the combination of atoms into molecules and of molecules into wholes is not explained.

Kapila's philosophy in the Bhagavata-purana.

The Bhdgavata-purdna gives an account of Samkhya which is somewhat different from the account that can be got from the classical Samkhya works. There is one beginningless qualityless purusa, which shines forth as all the individual souls, self-shining, which transcends the sphere of the prakrti 1 . It is this purusa that playfully (lilayd) accepts the prakrti that approaches it of its own accord; it is this purusa that is probably regarded as Isvara or God 2 . He however, having perceived the prakrti as producing diverse kinds of creation out of its own stuff, was Himself blinded (vimudha) by the veiling power of ignorance (jndna-guhaya) of this prakrti 3 . By a false imposition the purusa conceives itself to be the agent in the changes that take place by the natural movement of the gunas of prakrti; and hence it exposes itself to births and rebirths and becomes bound by the laws of karma. In reality the prakrti itself is the cause and agent of all its own self-abiding effects, and purusa is only the passive enjoyer of all pleasures and pains. In describing the evolution of the categories we have the five gross elements or mahdbhutas, the five tanmdtras, the ten senses and the microcosm (antarattnaka) —consisting of manas, buddhi, ahamkdra and citta.

1 anddir dtmd puruso nirgunah prakrteh parah pratyag-dhdmd svayam-jyotir visvam yena samanvitam.

Bhdgavata-purdna, hi. 26. 3.

2 ayam isvara ity ucyate. Subodhim commentary on ibid.

3 Subodhinl points out here that in this state, in which the purusa blinds himself, he is called jlva. Vijaya-dhvaji, however, takes it in the sense that the transcendent purusa or isvara which had accepted the prakrti as its own thus blinds the individual souls through it. Jsridhara says that there are two kinds of purusa, isvara and jiva; and, further, that according to its blinding power (dvarana-sakti) and creative power (viksepa-sakti) prakrti is twofold; and that purusa also is twofold, according as it behaves as individual souls or as God.

In addition to these there is the twenty-fifth category, called time (kdla), which some regard as a separate category, not as an evolute or prakrti, but as the transcendental effort of purusa (used in the sense of God) 1 . It is said that God manifests Himself in man internally, as his inner self, as the controller of all his experiences, and externally, as time in the manifold objects of experience. Thus there are twenty-five categories if time, individual soul, and God are taken as one; if time is taken separately and God and purusa are taken as one, there are twenty-six categories; and if all the three are taken separately, there are twenty-seven categories 2 . It is the purusa which is to be taken as being under the influence of prakrti and as free of it in its transcendent capacity as God (in an implicit manner). It is by the influence of time (kdla) that the equilibrium of the gunas in the prakrti is disturbed and that their natural transformations take place; and through the direction of laws of karma superintended by God the category of mahat is evolved 2 . It is curious that, though mahat is mentioned as a stage of prakrti, it is only regarded as a creative state (vrtti) or prakrti, and not as a separate category. In another passage in the Bhdgavata it is said that in the beginning God was alone in Himself with His own dormant powers, and not finding anything through which He could reflect Himself and realize Himself, He disturbed the equilibrium of His mdyd power through the functioning of time and through His own self (purusa), impregnating it with consciousness; and thus the process of creation started through the transformations of the prakrti 3 . In another passage the question is raised how, if God is free in Himself, can He put Himself in bondage to mdyd; and the reply given is that in reality there is no bondage of God, but, just as in dreams a man may perceive his own head to be struck off his body, or may perceive his own reflection shaking in water on account of its ripples, so it is but the reflection of God that appears as individual souls suffering bondage to world-experiences. It follows therefore, according to this view, that individual souls are illusory creations, and that both they and their world-experience must consequently be false 4 . In another passage which immediately

1 prabhavam paurusam prdhuh kalam eke yato' bhayam. Ibid. in. 26. 16.

2 Prakrti is not included in this enumeration; if it were, there would be twenty-eight categories.

3 Ibid. 11. 5. 22, 23. 4 Ibid. in. 5. 22-27.

follows the previous one it is definitely stated that the world only appears in consciousness, but that in reality it does not exist 1 . It is clear that these passages of the Bhdgavata distinctly contradict the interpretation of its philosophy given by Jlva in the previous section, as they deny the reality of individual souls and the reality of world-appearance. 2 But this is just what we may expect if we remember that the Bhdgavata is a collection of accretions from different hands at different times and not a systematic whole. If the Samkhya theory described in II. 5, hi. 5, in. 7 and ill. 26 be interpreted consistently, then the result is that there are two fundamental categories, God and His own maya, the prakrti; that God, in His desire to realize Himself, reflects Himself in the prakrti, which is but His own power, and it is through this impregnation of Himself in His own power that He appears as individual souls suffering the bondage of prakrti', it is again through this impregnation of Himself that prakrti is enlivened by consciousness; and then, through His creative effort, which is designated as time, the equilibrium of the gunas of prakrti is disturbed, the transformatory movement is set up in the prakrti, and the categories are evolved.

In a passage in the fifth chapter (v. 12. 6-9) the existence of wholes is definitely described as illusory. There are no entities but the partless atoms, and even these atoms are imaginary constructions without which it would not be possible to conceive of wholes. All our conceptions of the external world start with atoms, and all that we see or feel gradually grows through a series of accretions. This growth in accretion is not a real growth, but is only an application of the time-sense. Time is therefore co-pervasive with the universe. The conception of an atom is but the conception of the smallest moment, and the entire conception of wholes of atoms as developing into dyad molecules, grosser specks and so on is nothing but advancing temporal construction and the growing combination of time-moments. The ultimate reality underlying all these changes is one all-pervasive unchanging whole, which through the activity of time appears as moments and their accretions (corresponding to atoms and their combinations) 3 . Time is

1 Bhagavata-purdna, in. 7. 9-12.

2 arthabhavaiji vimscitya pratltasydpi ndtmanah. Ibid. ill. 7. 18. andtmanah prapancasya pratltasydpi arthdbhdvam artho'tra ndsti kintu

prattti-mdtram. (Sridhara's comment on Bhdgavata, in. 7. 18). * Ibid. HI. ii. 1-5.

thus not a product oiprakrti but the transcendent activity of God, through which the unmanifested prakrti is transformed into the gross world and by which all the discrete entities appear as wholes 1 . In God this time exists as His inherent power of activity. It has been pointed out in the last section how Jlva considered time to be the active element of the mdyd and the gunas the passive element.

The first category evolved from the prakrti is mahat, which contains the germs of the entire universe; it is pure translucent sattva (also called citta and Vdsudeva according to the terminology of the Bhagavata cult). From the category of mahat the threefold ahatnkdra, viz. vaikdrika, taijasa and tdmasa, was produced. In the terminology this ahatnkdra is called Samkarsana. All activity, instrumentality and transformatory character as effect is to be attributed to this ahatnkdra. The category of manas is produced from the vaikdrika ahamkdra, and it is called Aniruddha in the terminology of the Bhagavata cult. The Bhagavata cult here described believed in three vyuhas of Vdtnadeva, Samkarsana and Aniruddha, and therefore there is no mention here of the production of the Pradyumna-vyuha. Pradyumna in this view stands for desire; desires are but functions of the category of manas and not a separate category 2 . From the taijasa-ahamkdra the category of buddhi is evolved. It is by the functions of this category that the functioning of the senses, the cognition of objects, doubts, errors, determinateness, memory and sleep are to be explained 3 . Both the conative and cognitive senses are produced from the taijasa-ahamkdra. From the tdmasa-ahamkdra the sound-potential (sabda-tanmdtra) is produced, and from it the element of dkdsa is produced. From the element of dkdsa the heat-light-potential (rupa-tantnatra) is produced, and from that the element of light, and so on.

The purusa is immersed in the prakrti, but nevertheless, being unchangeable, qualityless and absolutely passive, it is not in any way touched by the qualities oiprakrti. It has already been pointed

1 This view of time is different from the yoga view of time as moments (as explained by Vijnana-bhiksu in his Yoga-vdrttika, in. 51). There a moment is described as the movement of a guna particle through a space of its own dimension, and the eternity of time is definitely denied. Time in that view can only be the discrete moments.

2 Ibid. in. 26. 27. yasya manasah, sankalpa-vikalpabhyam kama-sambhavo varttata iti kama-rupa vrttilaksanatvena ukta na tu pradyumna-vyuhotpattih tasya sankalpadi-karyatvabhavat. (Jsridhara's comment on the above.)

8 Those who believe in four vyuhas call this the pradyumna-vyuha.

out that the influence of the prakrti is limited to the image of purusa in the prakrti, and that, being reflected in the prakrti, the one purusa throws a shadow of infinite selves. These selves are deluded by egoism and consider themselves to be active agents, and, though there are no real births and rebirths, yet they continue to suffer the bondage of the samsdra cycle like a man who suffers from bad dreams.

Those who wish to be emancipated should therefore steadily practise disinclination from worldly joys and keen devotion. They should take to the path of self-control, make their minds free of enmity to all beings, practise equality, sex-control and silence, should remain contented with anything that comes in their way, and should have a firm devotion to God. When they leave their false self-love and egoism and can realize the truth about prakrti and purusa, viz. that the latter is the unconditioned and underlying reality of all, as the one Sun which creates illusions like its reflections in the water; when they understand that the real self, the ultimate reality, is always experienced as the underlying being which manifests our biological, sensory and psychical personality or egohood, and that this reality is realized in deep dreamless sleep (when this egohood temporarily ceases to exist), they attain their real emancipation 1 . The well-known yoga accessories mentioned by Patanjali, such as non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, contentment with the bare necessities of life, purity, study, patience, control of the senses, are also regarded as a necessary preparation for self-advancement. The practice of postures (dsana), breath-control (prdndydma), and that of holding the mind steadily on particular objects of concentration, are also advised as methods of purifying the mind. When the mind is thus purified and concentration practised, one should think of God and His great qualities 2 . Devotion to God is regarded as the second means of attaining right knowledge and wisdom about the oneness of the ultimate and the relation between the prakrti and the illusory individual selves. Thus it is said that, when one meditates upon the beautiful transcendent and resplendent form of Hari and is intoxicated with love for Him, one's heart melts through devotion, through excess of emotion one's hair stands on end, and one floats in tears of excessive delight through yearning after God; it is thus that the hook of the

1 Bhdgavata-purana, m. 27. 2 Ibid. HI. 28.

mind is dislodged from the sense-objects to which it was attached 1 . When through such excess of emotion one's mind becomes disinclined to all other objects, and thus there is no object of meditation, the mind is destroyed like a flame extinguished, and the self, returning from the conditions imposed upon it by the transformations of the gunas, finds itself to be one with the transcendent and the highest self 2 . Devotion is said to be of four kinds, sdttvika, rdjasa, tatnasa and nirguna. Those who want God's grace and are devoted to Him in order to satisfy their personal jealousy, pride or enmity are called tdmasa, those who seek Him for the attainment of power, fame, etc. are called rdjasa, and those who are devoted to Him or who renounce all their karrnas and their fruits to Him through a sense of religious duty or for the washing away of their sins are called sdttvika. But those who are naturally inclined towards Him without any reason save deep attachment, and who would not desire anything but the bliss of serving Him as His servants, it is they who may be said to possess the nirguna devotion (bhakti). But this nirguna devotion must manifest itself in realizing God as pervading all beings: devotees of this type would consider all beings as their friends, and with them there is no difference between a friend and a foe. No one can claim to possess this high devotion merely by external adorations of God; he must also serve all humanity as a friend and brother 3 . Thus either by yoga methods of self-purification and concentration of the mind on God and His super-excellent qualities, or by a natural love for Him, one may attain the ultimate wisdom, that the one reality is God and that individual selves and their experiences are but mere reflections in prakrti and its transformations.

It may however be pointed out that even the first method of yoga

1 evam harau bhagavati prati-labdha-bhdvo

bhaktyd dravad-hrdaya utpulakah pramoddt

autkanthya-vdspa-kalayd muhur ardyamdnas

tac cdpi citta-badisam ianakair viyunkte. Ibid. in. 28. 34.

8 muktasrayam yan nirvisayam viraktam

mrvdnam rcchati manah sahasd yathd'rcih dtmdnam atra puruso'vyavadhdnam ekam anviksa*e prati-nivrtta-guna-pravdhah. Ibid. III. 28. 35.

3 yo mam sarvesu bhutesu sdntam dtmdnam Isvaram

hitvd'rcdm bhajate maudhydd bhasmany era juhoti sah aham uccdvacair dravyaih kriyayotpannayd'naghe naiva tusye'rcito'rcdydm bhuta-grdmdvamdmnah.

Ibid. III. 29. 22, 24.

is associated with some kind of bhakti or devotion, as it involves meditation upon God and the blissful feeling associated with it. The word yoga is not used in this connection in Patanjali's technical sense (from the root yuj samddhau), but in the more general sense of yoga (yoga as " connection," from the root yujir yoge). Though this system involves most of the accessories of yoga for the purification of mind and as preparation for concentration, yet the ultimate aim is the realization of unity of the phenomenal self with God, which is entirely different from the yoga of Patanjali. So, as this yoga essentially aims at a unification with God through meditation upon Him, it may also be called a sort of bhakti-yoga, though it in its turn is different from the other bhakti-yoga, in which all the purposes of yoga discipline are served by an excess of emotion for God 1 .

Kapila has been described as an incarnation of God, and the philosophy that is attributed to him in the Bhagavata forms the dominant philosophy contained therein. All through the Bhagavata the philosophy of theistic Samkhya as described by Kapila is again and again repeated in different passages in different contents. Its difference from the classical Samkhya as expounded by IsVara-krsna or by Patanjali and Vyasa is too patent to need explanation at any length. In the Bhagavata, xi. 22 a reference is made to different schools of Samkhya which count their ultimate categories as three, four, five, six, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, twenty-five and twenty-six, and it is asked how these differences of view can be reconciled. The reply is that these differences do not involve a real difference of Samkhya thought; it is held that the difference is due to the inclusion of some of the categories within others (paraspardnupravesdt tattvdndm); for instance, some of the effect categories are included within the cause categories, or some categories are identified from particular considerations. Thus, when one thinks that the purusa, being always under the influence of beginningless ignorance (anddyavidyd-yuktasya), cannot by itself attain the knowledge of ultimate reality, it becomes necessary to conceive the existence of a super-person, different from it, who could grant such knowledge; according to

1 yatah sandhdryamdnaydm yogino bhakti-lakfanah

ahi sampadyate yoga atrayam bhadram tkfatah.

Bhagavata-purdna, n. i. 21.

this view there would be twenty-six categories. But, when one thinks that there is not the slightest difference between the purusa (or the individual soul) and God, the conception of the latter as separate from the former becomes quite unnecessary; on this view there would be only twenty-five categories. Again, those who reckon nine categories do so by counting purusa, prakrti, mahat, ahamkdra and the five tanmdtras. In this view knowledge (jndna) is regarded as a transformation of the gunas, and (prakrti being nothing more than the equilibrium of the gunas) knowledge may also be regarded as identical -with prakrti; similarly actions are to be regarded as being only transformations of rajas and ignorance as transformation of tamas. Time (kdla) is not regarded here as a separate category, but as the cause of the co-operative movement of the gunas, and nature (svabhdva) is identified with the mahat-tattva. The cognitive senses are here included within the cognitive substance of sattva, the conative senses within the rajas, and the cognitions of touch, taste, etc. are regarded as the fields of the manifestations of the senses and not as separate categories. Those who reckon eleven categories take the cognitive and conative senses as two additional categories and, considering the sensations of touch, taste, etc. as being manifestations of the senses, naturally ignore their claim to be considered as categories. In another view prakrti, which is moved into activity by the influence of purusa, is regarded as different from it, and thus there are the two categories of purusa and prakrti, then are the five tanmdtras, the transcendental seer and the phenomenal self; thus there are nine categories in all. Upon the view that there are six categories, only the five elements and the transcendent self are admitted. Those who hold that there are only four categories admit only the three categories of light-heat (tejas), water and earth, and accept the transcendent self as the fourth. Those who hold that there are seventeen categories admit the five tanmdtras, five elements and five senses, manas and the self. Those who hold that there are sixteen categories identify manas with the self. Those who hold that there are thirteen categories admit the five elements (which are identified with the tanmdtras), the five senses, manas, and the transcendent and the phenomenal selves. Those who admit only eleven categories accept only the five elements, five senses and the self. There are others, again, who admit eight prakrtis and the purusa, and thus reduce the

number to nine. The eclectic spirit of the Bhagavata tried to reconcile the conflicting accounts of the Samkhya categories by explaining away the differences; but to an impartial observer these differences are sometimes fundamental, and at least it is evident that, though these different lines of thought may all be called in some sense Samkhya, they signify the existence of a good deal of independent thinking, the exact value of which, however, cannot be determined for want of detailed and accurate information regarding the development of these schools 1 .

The fundamental difference of the Bhagavata school of Samkhya from that of the classical Samkhya is that it admits one purusa as the real all-pervading soul, which is the real seer of all our experiences and the basic universal being that underlies all things of this universe. The individual phenomenal selves appear as real entities only by the delusive confusion of the universal purusa with the transformations of the prakrti and by the consequent false attribution of the movements and phenomena of the prakrti to this universal purusa. The false individual selves arise out of such false attribution and there is thus produced the phenomenon of birth and rebirth, though there is no association of the prakrti with the universal purusa. All our world-experiences are mere illusions, like dreams, and are due to mental misconceptions. The emphasis on the illusory character of the world is very much stronger in the passages that are found in the Bhagavata, xi. 22 than in the passages that deal with Kapila's philosophy of Samkhya just described; and though the two treatments may not be interpreted as radically different, yet the monistic tendency which regards all worldly experiences as illusory is so remarkably stressed that it very nearly destroys the realistic note which is a special feature of the Samkhya schools of thought 2 .

1 In Asvaghosa's Buddha-carita there is an account of Samkhya which counts prakrti and vikara. Of these prakrti consists of eight categories—the five elements, egoism {ahamkdrd), buddhi and avyakta, and the vikara consists of seventeen categories—the five cognitive and the five conative senses, manas, buddhi and the five kinds of sense-knowledge. In addition to these there is a category of ksetrajna or self or dtman.

a yatha mano-ratha-dhiyo visayanubhavo mrsd

svapna-drstas ca ddsarha tatha samsara atmanah arthe hy avidyamdne'pi samsrtir na nivartate dhydyato visayan asya svapne'narthdgamo yatha.

Bhagavata, xi. 22. 55, 56.

In xi. 13 this monistic interpretation or rather this monistic transformation of Samkhya reaches its culmination; it is held that ultimate reality is one, and that all differences are but mere differences of name and form. Whatever may be perceived by the senses, spoken by words or conceived in thought is but the one reality, the Brahman. The gunas are the product of mind and the mind of the gunas, and it is these two illusory entities that form the person; but one should learn that both of them are unreal and that the only reality, on which both of them are imposed, is Brahman. Waking experiences, dreams, and dreamless sleep are all functions of the mind; the true self is the pure seer (sdksin), which is entirely different from them. So long as the notion of the "many" is not removed by philosophical reasonings, the ignorant person is simply dreaming in all his waking states, just as one feels oneself awake in one's dreams. Since there is nothing else but the self, and since all else is mere illusion like dreams, all worldly laws, purposes, aims and works are necessarily equally false. One should observe that we have the notion of the identity of our selves, in our wakeful and dream experiences and in our experiences of dreamless deep sleep, and one should agree that all these experiences in all these three stages of life do not really exist, they are all but the manifestations of maya on the ultimate reality, the Brahman; and thus by such inferences and considerations one should remove all one's attachments and cut asunder all one's fetters by the sword of knowledge. One should regard the entire world and its experiences as nothing more than the imagination of the mind—a mere appearance which is manifested and lost; all experiences are but maya and the only underlying reality is pure consciousness. Thus it is through right knowledge that true emancipation comes, though the body may hold on so long as the fruits of karma are not exhausted through pleasurable and painful experiences. And this is said to be the secret truth of Samkhya and Yoga. It may generally appear rather surprising to find such an extreme idealistic monism in the Bhdgavata, but there are numerous passages which show that an extreme form of idealism recurs now and then as one of the principal lines of thought in the Bhdgavata 1 .

The first adoration verse is probably the most important passage in the Bhdgavata. And even in this passage it is said (in one of its

1 Ibid. xi. 13.

prominent and direct interpretations) that the creation through gunas is false and that yet, on account of the all-pervading reality that underlies it, it appears as real; that the production, maintenance and destruction of the universe all proceed from the ultimate reality, Brahman, and that it is through the light of this reality that all darkness vanishes 1 . In another passage, in vi. 4. 29-32, it is said that Brahman is beyond the gunas, and that whatever may be produced in the world, or as the world, has Brahman for its ground and cause, and that He alone is true; and that both the atheistic Samkhya and the theistic Yoga agree in admitting Him as the ultimate reality.

It was pointed out in a previous section that according to Jlva the mdyd had two parts, formative and constitutive, and it was the latter that was identified with prakrti or the three gunas. But this mdyd was regarded as an external power of God as distinguished from His essential power. The Visnu-purdna, however, does not seem to make any such distinction; it says that the great Lord manifests Himself through His playful activity as prakrti, purusa, the manifold world and time, but yet it considers the prakrti and the purusa to be different from the essential nature of the Lord, and time as that which holds these two together and impels them for the creational forms 2 . Thus, since time is the cause which connects the prakrti and the purusa, it exists even when all creational modes have shrunk back into the prakrti in the great dissolution. When the gunas are in equilibrium, the prakrti and the purusa remain disconnected, and it is then that the element of time proceeds out of the Lord and connects the two together 3 . But the prakrti in both its unmanifested and manifested forms or its contraction and dilation (samkoca-vikdsdbhydm) is a part of God's nature; so in disturbing the equilibrium of prakrti it is God who disturbs His

1 janmddyasya yato'nvaydd itaratas cdrthesv abhijnah svardt tene brahma hrdd ya ddikavaye muhyanti yat surayah. tejo-vdri-mrddm yathd vinimayo yatra trisargo'mrfd dhdmnd svena sadd nirasta-kuhakam satyam param dhlmaki.

Bhdgavata, i. i. i.

2 vyaktam vifttus tathdvyaktam purusah kdla eva ca. kfldato bdlakasyeva cestdm tasya nisdmaya.

visnoh svarupdt parato hi te'nye rupe pradhdnam purusas ca viprds tasyaiva tenyena dhrte viyukte rupddi yat tad dvija kdla-samjOam.

Visnu-purdna, i. 2. 18, 24.

3 guna-sdmye tatas tasmin prthak pumsi vyavasthite kdla-svarupa-rupam tad visitor maitreya vartate. Ibid. 27.

own nature (sa eva ksobhako brahman ksobhyai ca purusottamah), and this He does through the instrumentality of time. Through His will He penetrates into the prakrti and the purusa, and sets off the creative operation of the prakrti, though this operation of the will does not involve any notion of ordinary physical activity 1 . Time is thus regarded as the spiritual influence of God, by which the prakrti is moved though He remains unmoved Himself. From prakrti there is the threefold evolution of mahat (sdttvika, rajasa and tdmasa) by a process of differentiation and development of heterogeneity 2 . By the same process the differentiation of mahat into vaikdrika, taijasa and bhutadi takes place as integrated within the mahat as integrated within the prakrti 3 . Being similarly integrated in the mahat, the bhutadi is further differentiated into the tanmatric stage and produces first the sound-potential {sabda-tanmatra). From the sabda-tanmatra the element of akdsa was produced from the relevant matter of bhutadi; this sabda-tanmatra and akdsa was further integrated in bhutadi and in this integrated state the element of akdsa transformed itself into the touch-potential (sparsa-tanmdtra); then from this touch-potential air was produced by its transformation (through accretion from bhutadi). Then in association of the integration of the element of akdsa and sabda-tanmatra with the touch-potential {sparsa-tanmdtra) the element of air produced the heat-light-potential (rupa-tanmdtra) in the medium of the bhutadi, and from that the element of heat-light was produced by an accretion from bhutadi. Again in association of the integration of touch-potential, the element of air and the heat-light-potential, the element of heat-light transformed itself into the taste-potential in the medium of the bhutadi, and in a similar way water was produced by an accretion from the bhutadi. Again, from the integration of taste-potential, heat-light potential and water, the smell-potential was produced by a transformation of the element of water in the medium of the bhutadi, and out of this smell-potential in integration with the above the element of earth was produced by an accretion from bhutadi. Out of the

1 pradhdnam purusam capi pravisydtmecchayd harih

kfobhaydmdsa samprdpte sarga-kdlevyaydvyayau Ibid. 29.

8 This view of the evolution of three different kinds of mahat is peculiar to the Vifnu-purdna, which is different from the classical SSmkhya.

8 This second stage is in agreement with the doctrine of Samkhya as explained in the Vydsa-bhdsya on the Yoga-sutra, 11. 19 of Patanjali.

3-2

taijasa-ahamkdra the ten conative and cognitive senses were produced, and manas was produced out of the vaikdrika-ahamkdra. The five tanmdtras are called the unspecialized modifications \avisesa), and the senses and the gross elements are regarded as fully specialized modifications (visesa) *.

It will appear from the above and also from what has already been said in the chapter fin the Kapila and Patanjala school of Samkhya in the first volume of the present work that the system of Samkhya had undergone many changes in the hands of various writers at different times. But it is difficult to guess which of these can be genuinely attributed to Kapila. In the absence of any proof to the contrary it may be assumed that the account of Samkhya attributed to Kapila in the Bhagavata may generally be believed to be true. But IsVarakrsna also gives us an account of what can be called the classical Samkhya in his Sdmkhya-kdrikd, which he says was first taught by Kapila to Asuri and by him to Pancasikha, and that his account of Samkhya was a summary of what was contained in the Sasti-tantra with the exception of the polemical portions and fables; also that he himself was instructed in the traditional school of Samkhya as carried down from Asuri through generations of teachers and pupils. But the Bhagavata account of Kapila's Samkhya materially differs from the Samkhya of the Sdmkhya-kdrikd, for, while the former is definitely theistic, the latter is at least tacitly atheistic, for it is absolutely silent about God; apparently God has no place in this system. But the theistic Samkhya as described in the Bhagavata, which is of course quite different and distinct from the theistic Samkhya of Patanjali and Vydsa-bhdsya, is not an isolated instance which can easily be ignored; for most of the Purdnas which have a Vaisnava tradition behind them generally agree in all essential features with the theistic element of the Kapila Samkhya of the Bhagavata, and some of the important Pancaratra dgamas also in some ways support it. Thus the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd describes the Samkhya system as that which believes the prakrti to be the cause of the manifold world and that this prakrti is moved into creative transformations through the

1 Visnu-purdna, 1. 2. See also Dr Sir B. N. Seal's interpretation of this passage in P. C. Ray's Hindu Chemistry, Vol. 11, pp. 90-5.

The same verses occur in the Padma-purdna (Svarga-khanda) regarding the evolution of the Samkhya categories.

influence of time by the will of Lord Visnu. There is but one purusa, who is the sum-total of all purusas and who is absolutely changeless (kutastha) ; there is the prakrti, constituted of the three gunas in equilibrium; and there is also the element of time (kala), through which by the will of the Lord (visnu-samkalpa-coditat) the purusa and the prakrti are connected and the creative movement of the prakrti set up. The purusa, prakrti and kala are in their turn but special manifestations of Lord Visnu 1 . The evolution of the gross elements is also described here as being directly from their respective tanmatras. It also believes that the powers of the Lord are supra-logical (acintya), and therefore cannot be contested on purely formal grounds of reason or logical principles of self-contradiction. It holds however the rather unique view that from time the sattva-guna springs into being and from sattva rajas and from rajas tamos, and it also gives a different interpretation of the vyuha doctrine—but these have already been discussed in the chapter on the Pancaratra philosophy. The Ahirbudhnya, however, ascribes this Samkhya philosophy to Kapila (the incarnation of Visnu) who wrote the Sasti-tantra, and it also enumerates the names of the chapters or tantras of this work 2 . The work is divided into two books; in the first book there is one chapter (tantra) on Brahman, one on purusa, three on power (sakti), destiny (niyati) and time (kala), three on the gunas, one on the changeless (aksara), one on prdna and one on the agent (kartr), one on the Lord, five on cognition, five on actions, five on tanmatras and five on the five gross elements; thus altogether there are thirty-two chapters in the first book. In the second book there are twenty-eight chapters— five on duties, one on experience, one on character, five on afflictions, three on the pramanas, one on illusions, one on dharma, one on disinclination, one on miraculous powers, one on guna, one on linga or signs, one on perception, one on Vedic performances, one on sorrow, one on final achievement, one on removal of passions, one on customs and one on emancipation 3 . Thus we have a theistic

1 purusas caiva kolas ca gunas ceti tridhocyate

bhutih suddhetara visnoh.... Ahirbudhnya-samhita, w. 8.

* sdmkhya-rupena samkalpo vaxsnavah kapildd rseh

udito yddrs'ah purvam tddrsam srnu me'khilam sasti-bhedam smrtam tantram sdrnkhyam noma mahamune prdkrtam vaxkrtam ceti mandate dve samasatah. Ibid. xii. 19.

8 Ibid. xii. 20-30.

and an atheistic account of Samkhya, both alleged to be based on the Sasfi-tantra Sdstra, both described as the philosophy of Kapila and both derived from authoritative ancient texts. Not only does the Bhagavata refer to Kapila as an incarnation of God, but many of the Pancaratra texts also allude to him as an incarnation of God Visnu; the Mahdbhdrata describes him as Bhagavan Hari and Visnu (hi. 47. 18), with Vasudeva (hi. 107. 31) and with Krsna, and also describes him as a great rsi who reduced the sons of Sagara into ashes by his wrath. In the Bhagavad-gitd also Krsna says that of the seers he is the sage Kapila (x. 26), but in the Mahdbhdrata (hi. 220. 21) Kapila is identified with the Fourth Fire. A sage Kapila is also mentioned in the Svetdsvatara Upanisad (v. 2), and Sankara says in the commentary on the Brahma-sutra that this Kapila must be different from the Kapila (who reduced the sons of Sagara to ashes) and the Kapila who wrote the Samkhya philosophy cannot be ascertained. Thus we have at least three Kapilas, the Kapila who reduced the sons of Sagara into ashes, and who is regarded by the Mahdbhdrata as an incarnation or manifestation of Visnu, Hari or Krsna, a Kapila who is regarded as an incarnation of Fire, and the Upanisadic sage Kapila, who is regarded there as mature in wisdom. The first two are definitely reputed to be authors of Samkhya philosophy, and Nilakantha, the commentator on the Mahdbhdrata, says that it is Kapila ( = the incarnation of Fire) who was the author of the atheistic Samkhya 1 . In the Mahdbhdrata (xh. 350. 5) it is said that the sage Kapila based his Samkhya philosophy on the doctrine that it is the one purusa, the great Narayana, who in himself is absolutely qualityless and untouched by all worldly conditions and is yet the superintendent of all phenomenal selves associated with their subtle and gross bodies, and is the ultimate ground of all the cognitional and sense-experiences enjoyed by them, the absolute and ultimate reality which appears as the subjective and the objective world and yet behaves as the cosmic creator and ruler in his four-fold personality as Vasudeva, Samkarsana, Aniruddhaand Pradyumna 2 . Before examining other accounts of Samkhya as found in the Mahdbhdrata we may point out that Pancasikha himself was not only called Kapileya from his sucking the breasts of a woman called

1 Nilakantha's commentary on the Mahdbhdrata, in. 220. 21.

2 See the Mahdbhdrata, xn. 351. See also the commentary of Nilakantha on it.

Kapila while an infant, but was also called Paramarsi Kapila 1 . It seems practically certain that there had been a number of pantheistic, theistic and atheistic varieties of Samkhya. Since the Ahirbudhnya-samhita gives the names of the chapters of the Sasft-tantra, it is almost certain that the author had seen this work, and that his account of Samkhya is in the main in agreement with it. The table of subjects enumerated shows that the work contained a chapter on Brahman, purusa, sakti (power), niyati (destiny), and kdla (time), and it is these elements that occur in the Ahirbudhnya account of Samkhya. It therefore seems very probable that the Ahirbudhnya account of Samkhya is largely faithful to the Sasfi-tantra. We know that the Samkhya philosophy of Kapila had begun to change its form in some of its most important features, and it is quite probable that it had changed considerably by the time it was traditionally carried to Isvarakrsna. It might still have been regarded as containing the essential instructions of the Sasti-tantra and yet be very different from it; there is no proof that Isvarakrsna had a chance of reading this original Sasti-tantra, and it is reasonable to suppose that he had access only to a Jater version of it or to a revised compendium supposed to be based on it; it may be that the Sasti-tantra, being an ancient work, was probably so loosely worded that it was possible to get different interpretations from it —like the Drahma-sutra of Badarayana—or even that there were two Sasti-tantras 2 .

1 yam dhuh Kapilam sdrnkhyam paramarsim prajdpatim. Ibid. xn. 218. 9. This Pancasikha is also described as panca-rdtra-visdrada, well-versed in the

panca-rdtra rites.

2 In the Mdthara-vrtti of Matharacarya on the Sdmkhya-kdrikd of Isvarakrsna it is said that Sasti-tantra means a tantra or work dealing with sixty subjects and not a work containing sixty chapters (tantryante vyutpddyante paddrthd iti tantram). These sixty subjects are: five viparyayas or errors, twenty-eight defects (asakti), nine false satisfactions (tusti), and eight miraculous achievements {siddhi)— altogether fifty items {kdrikd 47)—the other ten subjects being the existence of prakrti as proved by five reasons (called the category of astitva), its oneness (ekatva), its teleological relation to purusas (arthavattva and pdrdrthya), the plurality of the purusas (bahutva), the maintenance of the body even after flvan-mukti (sthiti), association and dissociation of prakrti with purusa (yoga and viyoga), difference of prakrti and purusa (anyatva), and final cessation of prakrti (nivrtti). Ma^hara quotes a Kdrikd enumerating the latter ten subjects: astitvam, ekatvam, arthavattvam, pdrdrthyam, anyatvam, arthanivrttih. yogo viyogo, bahavah pumdmsah, sthitih, sarlrasya visesa-vrttih. Mdthara-vrtti, 72.

This enumeration, however, seems to be entirely arbitrary, and apparently there is nothing to show that the Sasti-tantra was so called because it treated of these sixty subjects.

According to the interpretation of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd God or Isvara is above all, and then there is the category of the unchangeable, the Brahman (consisting of the sum-total of the purusas), the prakrti as the equilibrium of the gunas, and time (kdla), as has already been explained 1 . Time is regarded as the element that combines the prakrti with the purusas. It is said that the prakrti, the purusas and time are the materials which are led to their respective works in producing the manifold universe by the development of the categories through the will-movement of God (Sudarsana). 2 It is thus one unchangeable purusa that appears as the many individuals or parts of the Lord Visnu or Isvara 3 . The will of Isvara, otherwise called Sudarsana or samkalpa, which is regarded as a vibratory (parispanda) thought movement (jndna-mula-kriydtma), is the dynamic cause of the differentiation of prakrti into the categories (mahat and the rest). Time is not identified here with this power, but is regarded as a separate entity, an instrument through which the power acts. Yet this "time" has to be regarded as of a transcendental nature, co-existent with purusa and prakrti, and distinguished from "time" as moments or their aggregates, which is regarded as the tamas aspect of the category of mahat. The sattva aspect of the mahat manifests itself as definite understanding (buddhir adhyavasdyini), and the rajas aspect as life-activity (prdna). The sattva aspect of mahat as buddhi also manifests itself as virtue, wisdom, miraculous powers and as disinclination from worldly joys (vairdgya), and the tamas aspect as vice (adharma), ignorance, attachment and weakness. In the category of mahat the general sense-power is generated, by which objects are discerned as cognitional modes; the ego (ahamkdra) is also generated in the mahat, involving the notion of integrating all experience which

1 anyundnatiriktam yad guna-sdmyam tamomayam

tat sdmkhyair jagato mulam prakrtis ceti kathyate. kramavatlrno yas tatra catur-manu-yugah pumdn samastih purufo yonih sa kutastha itiryate yat tat kdlamayam tattvam jagatah samprakdlanam sa tayoh kdryam dsthdya samyojaka-vibhdjakah.

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, vii. 1-3.

* mrt-pindl-bhutam etat tu kdlddi-tritayam mune

visnoh sudarsanenaiva sva-sva-kdrya-pracoditam mahadddi-prthivyanta-tattva-vargopapddakam. Ibid. 4.

8 kutastho yah purd proktah pumdn vyomnah pardd adhah

mdnavo devatddydi ca tad-vyastaya itlritdh. flva-bhedd mune sarve visnu-bhuty-dmsa-kalpitdh. Ibid. 58.

belongs to a person (abhimdna) as a cognizer and enjoyer of all experiences. The implication seems to be that the category of mahat manifests itself as the sense-faculties and the person who behaves as the cognizer, because these are the modes through which thought must interpret itself in order to realize its own nature as thought. The sdttvika aspect of the ahamkdra is called vaikdrika, the rdjasa character taijasa and the tdmasa aspect bhutddi. It is well to point out here that this account greatly differs from the classical Samkhya in this respect, that the sense-power is here generated prior to ahamkdra and not from ahamkdra, and that, while the evolution of ahamkdra is regarded as the evolution of a separate category by the thought-movement of God, the sense-power is regarded only as modes or aspects of buddhi or mahat and not as separate categories. The only sense-faculty that is evolved through the thought-activity of God out of ahamkdra is manas, the reflective sense (cintandtmakam ahamkdrikam indriyam). From the tamas aspect of ahamkdra as bhutddi the infra-atomic sound-potential (sabda-tanmdtra) is produced and from this the element of dkdsa. Akdsa here is supposed to be of two kinds, as the maintainer of sound and as manifesting vacuity, unoccupation or porosity (avakdsa-praddyi). From the vaikdrika ahamkdra the organs of hearing and speech are produced as categories through the thought-activity of God. In a similar manner the infra-atomic touch-potential (sparsa-tanmdtra) is produced from the bhutddi, and from this again air, as that which dries up, propels, moves and conglomerates, is produced; again, through the thought-activity of God the organ of touch and the active organ of grasping are produced, and in a similar manner the infra-atomic heat-light-potential {rupa-tanmdtrd) is produced from bhutddi and from that the element of heat-light; from the vaikdrika also the visual organ and the conative organs of the two feet are produced, from the bhutddi the infra-atomic taste-potential (rasa-mdtra) is produced and from it water, and from the vaikdrika ahamkdra the organ of taste and the genitals are produced; from the bhutddi true infra-atomic smell-potential (gandha-mdtra) is produced, and from it earth; from the vaikdrika-ahamkdra the organs of smell and of excretion are produced. Will, energy, and the five kinds of bio-motor activities (prdna) are produced jointly from manas, ahamkdra and buddhi. The power (sakti) of Hari or Visnu or Isvara is one,

but it is not a physical power, a power that involves mechanical movement, but it is in a sense homogeneous with God, and is of the nature of pure self-determined thought (svacchanda-cinmaya) ; it is not however thought in the ordinary sense of thought—with particular contents and object—but it is thought in potentiality, thought that is to realize itself in subject-object forms, manifesting itself as a spiritual thought movement (jndna-mula-kriydtma). It is this spiritual movement of that which by self-diremption splits itself up (dvidhd-bhdvam rcchati) as the thought of God (samkalpd), the determiner (bhdvaka) and the passive objectivity (bhdvya) called the prakrti, and it is through the former that the latter developed and differentiated itself into the categories mentioned above. What is meant by the vibratory movement of the thought of God is simply its unobstructed character, its character of all potentiality for actuality without any obstruction. It is the pure unobstructed flow of God's thought-power that is regarded as His will, idea or thought (sudarsanatd) 1 . The prakrti is thus as much spiritual as God's thought; it represents merely objectivity and the content of the thought of God, and it only has an opportunity of behaving as an independent category of materiality when by the self-diremption of God's power the thought-energy requires an objective through which it can realize itself.

In another chapter of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd it is said that the power in its original state may be conceived to be pure stillness (staimitya-rupa) or pure vacuity (sunyatva-rupini), and it is out of its own indescribable spontaneity that it begins to set itself in motion 2 . It is this spontaneity, which springs out of itself and is its own, that is described as the thought of God or its self-dirempting activity, its desire for being many. All creation proceeds out of this spontaneity; creation is not to be described as an event which happened at a particular time, but it is the eternal spontaneity of this power of God that reveals itself as eternal creation, as eternal and continuous self-manifestation 3 . Whatever is described as movement (kriyd), energy (virya), self-completeness (tejas) or strength (bald) or God are but different aspects of this power. The strength

1 avydghatas tu yas tasya sd sudarsanatd mime jndna-mula-kriydtmdsau svacchah svacchanda-cinmayah.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, vu. 67.

2 svdtantrydd eva kasmdccit kvacit sonrnesam rcchati. Ibid. v. 4. 8 satatam kurvato jagat. Ibid. 11. 59.

{bald) of God consists in the fact that He is never tired or fatigued in spite of His eternal and continuous operation of creation; His energy (virya) consists in this, that, though His own power is split up as the material on which His power acts, He does not suffer any change on that account 1 . His lustre of self-completeness (tejas) consists in this, that He does not await the help of any instrument of any kind for His creative operations 2 : and it is the self-spontaneity of this power that is described as His agency (kartrtva) as the creator of the world. God is described as being both of the nature of pure consciousness and of the nature of power. It is the all-pervasive consciousness of Himself that constitutes the omniscience of God, and, when this stillness of omniscience and self-complete steady consciousness as pure differenceless vacuity dirempts itself and pulsates into the creative operation, it is called His power. It is on this account that the power (saktt) of God is described as thought-movement (jnana-mula-kriydtmaka). This power or consciousness may be regarded both as a part of God, and therefore one with Him, and also as His specific character or quality; it is this power which dirempts itself as consciousness and its object (cetya-cetana), as time and all that is measured by time (kalya-kdla), as manifest and unmanifest (vyaktdvyakta), as the enjoyer and that which is enjoyed (bhoktr-bhogya), as the body and that which is embodied (deha-dehiri) z . The conception oipurusa seems to indicate the view of a conglomeration of the individual selves into a colony or association of individual selves, like the honeycomb of the bees 4 . They are regarded as unchangeable in themselves (kutastha), but yet they are covered over with the dusty impurities of beginningless root-desires (vdsand), and thus, though pure in themselves, they may be also regarded as impure 5 . In themselves they are absolutely unaffected by any kind of affliction, and, being parts of God's nature, are omniscient and eternally emancipated beings. These purusas are, however, through the will of God or rather of necessity through the creative operation of His power, differently affected by ignorance

1 tasyopdddna-bhdve'pi vikara-viraho hi yah

vtryam noma gunah so'yam acyutatvdpardhvayam. Ibid. n. 60.

2 sahakdry-anapeksd yd tat tejah samudahrtam. Ibid. 11. 61.

3 Ibid. V. 6-12.

* sarvdtmandm samastir yd koso madhu-kftdm iva. Ibid. vi. 33.

5 hiddhyasuddhimayo bhdvo bhuteh sa purusah smrtah

anddi-vdsand-renu-kunthitair dtmabhis citah. Ibid. vi. 34.

(avidyd), which makes them subject to various kinds of affliction, and, as a result thereof, their own natures are hidden from themselves and they appear to be undergoing all kinds of virtuous and sinful experiences of pleasures and pains; and, being thus affected, they are first associated with the creative power (sakti) of God, and then, as this power first evolves itself into its first category of time as the all-determining necessity (niyati), they become associated with it; and then, as the third movement posits itself as all-grasping time, they become associated with that category, and then, as the sattva-gunas gradually evolve from kala, the rdjasa gunas from sattva and the tdmasa gunas from rajas, the colony of purusas is associated first with sattva, then with rajas and then with tamas. When all the gunas. are evolved, though the three gunas are then all disturbed for further creative operation, they are not disturbed in all their parts; there are some parts of the guna conglomeration which are in equilibrium with one another; and it is this state of equilibrium of the gunas that is called prakrti 1 . The account of the evolution of the various categories from the creative will of God up to the prakrti does not occur in the seventh chapter of the Ahirbudhnya, which is definitely described as the Sarnkhya philosophy of Kapila; it is only a Paiicaratra account given to supplement that of the Sarnkhya, which starts from the evolution of the categories from the prakrti —the equilibrium of the gunas. According to the Paiicaratra account of the Ahirbudhnya-samhita the colony or the honeycomb of the purusas thus forms a primal element, which is associated with the self-evolving energy of God from the first moment of its movement, continues to be so associated with each of the evolving stadiums of categories up to the evolution of the prakrti, and later on with all the other categories that are evolved from the prakrti. In the account of Kapila Sarnkhya as found in the Ahirbudhnya-samhita this conglomeration of the purusas is admitted to be the changeless category that is associated with the evolution of the categories and descends gradually through the successive stages of their evolution until we come to the complete human stage with the evolution of the different senses and the gross elements. Unlike the account of purusa that is found in the classical Sarnkhya

1 codyamdne'pi srstyartham purnam guna-yugam tada

amiatah sdmyam dydti visnu-samkalpa-coditam.

Ahirbudhnya-samhita, vi. 62.

treatises, which regards the purusas as being absolutely untouched by the instinctive root-desires {vasana) and the afflictions, it considers (like the Jains) that the purusas are coated with the impurities of vasanas and klesas, though in themselves they are essentially pure; again, the classical Samkhya considers that the vasanas are produced in a beginningless way, through karma, through an endless series of births and rebirths, whereas the Paficaratra holds that different purusas are originally associated with different vasanas according to the will of God. Unlike the account of the classical Samkhya, where the vasanas are regarded as a part oiprakrti as buddhi or cttta, in this it is an original extraneous impurity of the purusas. It is probable, however, that this account of vasanas and their original association with the purusas through the will of God did not form any part of the philosophy of Kapila's Sasti-tantra, but was a supplementary doctrine introduced by the author of the Ahirbudhnya, as it is not mentioned in the seventh chapter of the work, which is definitely devoted to the account of Samkhya.

The Samkhya thought described in the Gita has been explained in the second volume of the present work, and it will be seen that, though the Gita account is unsystematic and nebulous, with significant details missing, it is essentially theistic and intimately associated with this Ahirbudhnya account of Kapila Samkhya; and as such is fundamentally different from the classical Samkhya of the Samkhya-karika.

In Chapter 22 of the nth book of the Bhdgavata a reference is made to various schools of Samkhya admitting different categories of being or evolutes 1 . Thus some Samkhyists admitted nine categories, some eleven, some five, some twenty-six, some twenty-five, some seven, some six, some four, some seventeen, some sixteen and some thirteen. Uddhava requested Lord Krsna to reconcile these diverse opposing views. In reply Lord Krsna said that the different enumeration of the categories is due to the varying kinds of sub-sumption of the lower categories into the higher or by the omission of the higher ones, i.e. by ignoring some of the effect entities (as

1 kali tattvdni visvesa samkhydtdny rsibhih prabho

nava-ekddasa-pafica-tri^y atha tvam iha susruma kecit fadvimsatim prdhur apare pancavirnsatim saptaike nava-sat kecic catvdry ekddasdpare kecit saptadasa prdhuh fodasaike trayodasa. Slokas i, 2.

being already contained in the cause) or by ignoring some of the successive causal entities (as being present in the effect) 1 . Thus, there may be systems of Samkhya schools where the tanmdtras are not counted or where the gross elements are not counted as categories. The explanation in all such cases is to be found in the principle that some thinkers did not wish to count the tanmdtras, as they are already contained in the gross elements {ghate mrdvat) ; whereas others did not count the gross elements, as these were but evolutes in the tanmdtras (mrdi ghatavat). But there are differences of opinion not only as regards the evolutionary categories of prakrti, but also as regards the souls or the purusas and God. Thus there are twenty-four evolutionary categories (including prakrti) ; purusa is counted as the twenty-fifth category, and according to the theistic Samkhya God or Isvara is counted as the twenty-sixth. It may be objected that the above principle of reconciliation of the diverse counting of categories by subsuming the effect under the cause, or by ignoring the former, cannot apply here. The theistic Samkhya admits Isvara on the ground that there must be some being who should communicate self-knowledge to individual souls, as they cannot, by themselves, attain it. If on such a view the theistic school of twenty-six categories is regarded as valid, the other school of twenty-five categories becomes irreconcilable. To this the reply is that there is no intrinsic difference in the nature of purusa and Isvara, as they are both of the nature of pure consciousness. The objection that even on the above supposition the self-knowledge communicated by Isvara has to be counted as a separate category is invalid, for self-knowledge, being knowledge, is only the heightening of the sattva quality of the prakrti and as such falls within prakrti itself. Knowledge is not a quality of the purusa, but of the prakrti. The state of equilibrium in which the gunas are not specifically manifested is called prakrti. An upsetting of the equilibrium leads to the manifestation of the gunas, which have, therefore, to be regarded as attributes of the prakrti. The purusa, not being an agent, cannot possess knowledge as an attribute of its own. So, all activity being due to rajas and all ignorance being due to tamos, activity and ignorance are also to be regarded as con-

1 amipravesam darsayati ekastninnaplti purvatmin kdranabhute tattve sukftna-rupena pravistdni mrdi ghatavat. aparasmin kdrya-tattve kdrarta-tattvdni arrugatatvena pravistdni ghate mrdvat. 5§rldhara's commentary on sloka 8.

stituents of prakrti. Time (kdla) also is to be identified as God, because it is by the agency of God that the gunas combine, that He is regarded as the cause of the combination of the gunas. The view which regards kdla as the cause of the combination of the gunas is grounded on this fact, and it is for that reason that in the scriptures kdla has been regarded as the name of Isvara. As everything proceeds from the category of mahat, that itself is called svabhava or nature. Thus the two apparently conflicting views that kdla and svabhava are to be regarded as the ultimate causes of the world may well be reconciled with the Samkhya according to the above interpretation.

The school of Samkhya which reckons nine categories counts merely purusa, prakrti, mahat, ahatnkdra and the five elements. Those who reckon eleven count the five cognitive and conative senses and the manas only. Those who reckon five categories count the five sense objects only. Those who reckon seven count the five sense-objects, the soul and God. Those who reckon six include within them the five sense-objects and the purusa. There are others, however, who regard earth, water, fire and the soul as four categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the eleven sense-organs and the purusa as categories. By excluding manas some hold that there are only sixteen categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the five cognitive senses, manas, soul and God, and thus arrive at the thirteen categories. Others take the five sense-objects, the five cognitive senses and the sense as the eleven categories. Others count prakrti, mahat, ahatnkdra, the five tanmdtras and the purusa as the nine categories.

It is regrettable that apart from a reference to the above schools of Samkhya and the attempts at their reconciliation found in the Bhagavata, it is not possible to trace these doctrines to the original works, which must have long preceded the period of the composition of the Bhagavata. The Bhagavata is interested in the theistic Samkhya doctrine, as has already been shown, and attempts to reconcile the conflicting schools of Samkhya as being substantially one school of thought. It further holds that the prakrti and its manifestations are produced through the operation of the diverse power of the mdyd of Isvara. At the time of dissolution {pralaya) God remains in absolute identity with Himself, and the gunas, which are the various manifestations of His mdyd power, remain in

equilibrium—a state in which all His energies are sleeping as it were. By His own inherent energy He breaks the equilibrium of His sleeping energy and sets Himself to the work of the creation— the prakrti with its evolutes—and thereby associates them with jivas, which are merely His parts, and which thus are deluding the dualistic experience of the world, which they enjoy and for which they suffer; and He also shows them the right way by instructing them through the Vedas 1 . The self in its transcendent nature is pure experience and as such is devoid of and is absolutely un-associated with any kind of objective form. The association of objectivity and of content is as illusory as creations in dreams, and must be regarded as products of mdyd 2 .

Purusa as pure experience (anubhava-svarupd) is to be differentiated and comprehended as different from passing mental states, as the content of the waking, dream and dreamless stages by the method of agreement and difference (anvaya-vyatireka). For, through the contents of experience in the various constituents involved in the mental states, that which remains constant, like a thread in a garland of pearls, is the pure experiencer, the self. Self is therefore to be regarded as different from the contents of the mental states which it illuminates 3 .

1 sa vai kilayam purusah purdtano ya eka dsld aviiesa dtmani ogre gunebhyo jagad-dtmanlsvare nimllitdtman nisi supta-saktisu sa eva bhuyo nijavirya-choditam sva-jtva-mdydm prakrtim sisrksatlm andma-rupdtmani rupa-ndmanl vidhitsamdno'nusasdra sdstrakrt.

Bhdgavata, 1. 10. 21, 22.

2 dtma-mdydm rte rdjan parasydnubhavdtmanah

na ghatetdrthasambandhah svapnadrastur ivdnjasd.

Ibid. II. 9. 1. Illusion or mdyd is defined as that which manifests non-existent objects but is not manifested itself.

rte'rtham yat pratlyeta na pratiyeta cdtmani

tad vidydd atmano mdydm yathdbhdso tathd tamah.

Ibid. 11. 9. 33.

3 anvaya-vyatirekena vivekena satatmand sarga-sthdna-samdmndyair vimrsadbhir asatvaraih budher jdgaranam svapnah susuptir iti vrttayah td yenaivdnubhuyante so'dhyaksah purusah par ah.

Ibid. vii. 7. 24, 25.

Eschatology.

In the Bhdgavata-purdna, m. 32, it is held that those who perform sacrifices and make offerings to gods and forefathers pass after death to the lunar world, from which they return to earth again. Those, however, who follow their own duties and surrender all their actions to gods, pure in mind and heart and unattached to worldly things, pass after death to the solar sphere and thence to the Universal Being Who is the cause of the world. Those, however, who are obsessed with the notion of duality pass into the nature of qualified Brahman, and are then born again in the world in accordance with their past deeds. Those again who lead an ordinary life of desires and make offerings to their forefathers have first to go by the southern way of smoky path to the land of the forefathers, and are again born in the line of their own progenies. In xi. 22. 37, however, we find a more rational view. It is said there that the manas of men is permeated by their deeds and their causes, and it is this manas that passes from one body to another. The dtman, the soul, follows this manas. Sridhara, the well-known commentator on the Bhdgavata-purdna, regards manas here as the linga-sarira, and holds that the self follows the manas infested by egoism. The Bhdgavata-purdna further holds that through the destiny of karma the manas meditates over the things seen and heard and gradually loses its memory with regard to them. This manas entering into another body thus ceases to remember all the experiences of the previous bodies and thus death may be defined as absolute forgetfulness (mrtyuratyanta-vismrtih, xi. 22. 39). Birth is regarded as the acceptance of new experiences. Sridhara points out that this takes place with the cessation of the functioning of egoism with reference to the experiences of past bodies and the extension of the function of egoism with reference to the experiences of the new body. Just as one does not remember one's dreams, so one ceases to remember one's past experiences, and this is conditioned by death. At birth the self that was always existent appears to be born anew. By identifying the self with the body one divides one's experiences as internal and external. As a matter of fact the body is being continually destroyed and generated, but such changes, being of a subtle nature, are overlooked. Just as

there cannot be the same flame in two moments, or one flowing river in two different moments, so the body also is different in two different moments, though on account of our ignorance we suppose that the same body is passing through various stages and conditions. But in reality no one is born and no one dies through the agency of karma. It is all a panorama of illusions, just as the fire, as heat, exists eternally and yet appears to be burning in association with logs of wood. All the phenomena of birth, infancy, youth, old age and death as different stages of the body are but mere fancies. They are but stages of primal matter, the prakrti, which are regarded through illusion as different stages of our life. One notices the death of one's father and the birth of a son and so may speak of the destruction and generation of bodies, but no one experiences that the experiencer himself undergoes birth and death. The self thus is entirely different from the body. It is only through inability to distinguish properly between the two that one becomes attached to sense-objects and seems to pass through the cycle of birth and death. Just as a man seeing another man dance or sing imitates his action, so does the purusa, which has no movement of itself, seetn to imitate the qualities of buddhi in the operation of these movements. Again, just as when one looks at the images of trees in flowing water, the trees themselves seem to be many, so does the self regard itself as implicated in the movement of the prakrti. This gives us the world-experience and the experience of the cycles of birth and death, though none of them really exists. Thus we see that the Bhdgavata-purdna agrees with the general Samkhya and the Vedanta view regarding birth and death. It no doubt accepts the ordinary view of the Upanisads that a man, like a caterpillar, does not leave one body without accepting another at the same time {Bhdgavata-purdna, x. i. 38-44); but at the same time it holds that such birth and re-birth are due to one's own illusion or mdyd.

CHAPTER XXV

MADHVA AND HIS SCHOOL

Madhva's Life.

Bhandarkar in Vaisnavism, Saivaism and Minor Religious Systems says that in the Mahabharata-tatparya-nirnaya, Madhva has given the date of his birth as Kali 4300. The Kali age, according to Bhaskaracarya, begins with the year 3101 B.C. The date of Madhva's birth would thus be a.d. i 199 or 1121 saka. Bhandarkar says that, as some use the current year of an era and some the past, the saka era 1121 may be regarded as equivalent to 1119. But the present writer has not been able to discover it in the only printed edition of the text of Mahabharata-tatparya-nirnaya (1833 saka, published by T. R. Krsnacarya). Bhandarkar, however, approaches the problem by another path also. He says that the list preserved in several of the Mathas gives the date of Madhva as saka 1119, and, as Madhva lived for 79 years, the date of his birth was 1040 saka. Bhandarkar, however, regards saka 1119 as the date of his birth, and not of his death as given in the Matha list. He says that the inscription in the Kurmesvara temple at Srikurma is in a Taluka of the Ganjam district in which Narahari-tlrtha is represented to have constructed a temple and placed in it an idol of Narasimha dated saka 1203 (Epigraphica Indica, Vol. vi, p. 260). The first person therein mentioned is Purusottama-tlrtha, who is the same as Acyutapreksa, then his pupil Ananda-tlrtha, then Narahari-tlrtha, the pupil of Ananda-tlrtha. Narahari-tlrtha was probably the same as Narasimha, the ruler of the Taluk mentioned above, from saka 1191 to 1225. He is mentioned in inscriptions at Srlkurman bearing the date saka 1215, which is represented as the eighteenth year of the king's reign. He was Narasimha II, who was panegyrized in the Ekavali. From other inscriptions we get Narahari's date as between 1186 and 1212 saka. These records confirm the tradition that Narahari-tirtha was sent to Orissa by Ananda-tlrtha. Now Narahari-tlrtha's active period ranged between 1186 to 1215. His teacher Madhva could not have died in sakai 119, i.e. sixty-seven years before him. Bhandarkar therefore takes 1119 (as mentioned in the Matha list)

as the date of the birth of Madhva, not as the date of his death. This date of Madhva's birth, saka 1119 or a.d. i 197, has been accepted by Grierson and Krisnasvami Aiyar, and has not so far been challenged. We have no authentic information about the life of Madhva. All that we can know of him has to be culled from the legendary and semi-mythical lives of Madhva, called the Madhva-vijaya, and the Mani-manjari of Narayana Bhatta, son of Trivikrama, who was an actual disciple of Madhva. Some information can also be gathered from the adoration hymn of Trivikrama Pandita. Madhva seems to have been a born enemy of Sankara. In the Mani-manjari, Narayana Bhatta gives a fanciful story of a demon, Manimat, who interpreted the Vedanta. Manimat was born as a widow's bastard, and therefore he was called Sankara; with the blessing of Siva he mastered the sastras at Saurastra, invented the doctrine of surya-mdrga, and was welcomed by persons of demoralized temperament. He really taught Buddhism under the cloak of Vedanta. He regarded Brahman as identified with Surya. He seduced the wife of his Brahmin host, and used to make converts by his magic arts. When he died, he asked his disciples to kill Satyaprajfia, the true teacher of the Vedanta; the followers of Sankara were tyrannical people who burnt down monasteries, destroyed cattle and killed women and children. They converted Prajfia-tlrtha, their chief opponent, by force. The disciples of Prajfia-tlrtha, however, were secretly attached to the true Vedantic doctrine, and they made one of their disciples thoroughly learned in the Vedic scriptures. Acyutapreksa, the teacher of Madhva, was a disciple of this true type of teachers, who originated from Satyaprajfia, the true Vedic teacher, contemporary with Sankara.

Madhva was an incarnation of Vayu for the purpose of destroying the false doctrines of Sankara, which were more like the doctrines of the Lokayatas, Jainas and Pasupatas, but were more obnoxious and injurious.

Madhva was the son of Madhyageha Bhatta, who lived in the city of Rajatapltha, near Udipi, which is about 40 miles west of Srrigeri, where there was a celebrated matha of Samkara. Udipi is even now the chief centre of Madhvism in South Kanara. The ancient name of the country, which now comprises Dharwar, the North and the South Kanara, and the western part of the State of Mysore, was Tuluva (modern Tulu), which is mostly inhabited

by the Madhvas. Grierson, writing in 1915, says that there are about 70,000 Madhvas in the locality. Elsewhere they are more distributed. It must, however, be noted that from the South of Hyderabad to Mangalore, that is, the whole of the North and the South Kanara, may also be regarded as the most important centre of Vlra-Saivism, which will be dealt with in the fifth volume of the present work. The village of Rajatapltha, where Madhva was born, may probably be identified with the modern Kalyanapura. He was a disciple of Acyutapreksa, and received the name of Purnaprajna at the time of initiation and later on another name, Ananda-tlrtha; he is known by both these names. He at first studied the views of Sankara, but soon developed his own system of thought, which was directly opposed to that of Sankara. He refuted twenty-one Bhdsyas which were written by other teachers who preceded him; and Sesa, the disciple of Chalari-nrsimhacarya, the commentator on the Madhva-vijaya of Narayana Bhatta, enumerates the designations of these commentators on the Brahma-sutra as follows; BharatI vijaya; Samvidananda; Brahmaghosa; Satananda; Vagbhata; Vijaya; Rudra Bhatta; Vamana; Yadavaprakasa; Ramanuja; Bhartrpra-pafica; Dravida; Brahmadatta; Bhaskara; Pisaca; Vrittikara; Vijaya Bhatta; Visnukranta; Vadlndra; Madhavadesaka; Sankara. Even in Rajatapithapura he once defeated a great scholar of the Sankara school who came to visit Madhva's teacher Acyutapreksa. He then went to the South with Acyutapreksa and arrived at the city of Visnumangala 1 . From here he went southwards and arrived at Anantapura (modern Trivandrum). Here he had a long fight with the Sarikarites of the Srngeri monastery. Thence he proceeded to Dhanuskoti and Ramesvaram, and offered his adoration to Visnu. He defeated on the way there many opponents and stayed in Ramesvaram for four months, after which he came back to Udipi. Having thus established himself in the South as a leader of a new faith, Madhva started on a tour to North India, and, crossing the Ganges, went to Hardwar, and thence to Badarika, where he met Vyasa. He was here asked by Vyasa to write a commentary on the Brahma-sutra repudiating the false Bhdsya of Sankara. He then returned to Udipi, converting many Sankarites on the way, such as Sobhana Bhatta and others residing near the banks of the Godavarl 2 . He at last converted Acyutapreksa to his own doctrines. In the 1 Madhva-viyaya, v. 30. 2 Ibid. ix. 17.

eleventh and the thirteenth chapters of the Madhva-vijaya we read the story of the persecution of Madhva by Padma-tlrtha, the head of the Srngeri monastery, who tried his best to obstruct the progress of the new faith initiated by Madhva and even stole away Madhva's books, which were, however, returned to him through the intercession of the local Prince Jayasimha of Visnumangala; the faith continued to grow, and Trivirama Pandita, the father of Narayana Bhatta, the author of Mani-manjari and Madhva-vijaya, and many other important persons were converted to the Madhva faith. In his last years Madhva again made a pilgrimage to the North and is said to have rejoined Vyasa, and to be still staying with him. He is said to have lived for seventy-nine years and probably died in 1198 saka or a.d. 1276. He was known by various names, such as Purnaprajna, Ananda-tlrtha, Nandl-tlrtha and Vasudeva 1 .

The treatment of the philosophy of Madhva which is to follow was written in 1930; and so the present writer had no opportunity of diving into Mr Sarma's excellent work which appeared some time ago, when the manuscript of the present work was ready for the Press. Padmanabhasura's Madhva-siddhanta-sara contains a treatment of Madhva's doctrines in an epitomized form. Madhva wrote thirty-seven works. These are enumerated below 2 ;

(1) The Rg-bhdsya a commentary to the Rg-veda, 1. 1-40; (2) The Krama-nirnaya, a discussion on the proper reading and

1 A few works in English have appeared on Madhva. The earliest accounts are contained in "Account of the Madhva Gooroos" collected by Major MacKenzie, 24 August 1800, printed on pp. 33 ff. of the "Characters" in the Asiatic Annual Register, 1804 (London, 1806); H. H. Wilson's "Sketch of the religious sects of the Hindus," reprinted from Vols, xvi and xvii of Asiatic Researches, London, 1861, 1, pp. 139 ff.; Krishnaswami Aiyar's £rlMadhva and Madhvaism, Madras; R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaisnavism, J§aivaism and Minor Religious Systems; Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. xxn, "Dharwar," Bombay, 1884; G. Venkoba Rao's "A sketch of the History of the Maddhva Acharyas," beginning in Indian Antiquary, xliii (1914), and C. M. Padmanabhacarya's Life of .Madhvacarya. S. Subba Rao has a complete translation of the commentary of Sri Madhvacarya on the Brahma-sutra and a translation in English of the Bhagavad-gltd with the commentary according to fsri Madhvacarya's Bhasya. The preface of this Bhagavad-gltd contains an account of Madhva's life from an orthodox point of view. There is also P. Ramchandra Roo's The Brahma Sutras, translated literally according to the commentary of S*ri Madhvacarya (Sanskrit, Kumbakonam, 1902); G. A. Grierson has a very interesting article on Madhva in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. vm; Mr Nagaraja £arma has recently published a recondite monograph on the philosophy of Madhva.

2 See Helmuth von Glasenapp's Madhvas Philosophic des Vishnu-Claubens, P- 13-

order of the Aitareya-Brdhmana, iv. 1-4, Aitareya-Aranyaka, iv. 1, and the Vedic hymns cited therein; (3) The Aitareya-upanisad-bhdsya; (4) The Brhaddranyaka-upanisad-bhdsya; (5) Chdndogya-upanisad-bhdsya; (6) Taittiriya-upanisad-bhdsya\ (7) Isdvdsya-upanisad-bhdsya; (8) Kdthaka-upanisad-bhdsya; (9) Mundaka-upanisad-bhasya; (10) Mdndukya-upanisad-bhdsya; (11) Prasno-panisad-bhdsya; (12) Kenopanisad-bhdsya; (13) Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya; (14) Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya; (15) Bhagavad-gitd-tatparya-nirnaya; (16) Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya; (17) Brahma-sutra-bhdsya; (18) Brahma-sutrdnubhdsya; (19) Brahma-sutrdnu-vydkhydna; (20) Brahma-sutrdnuvydkhydna-nirnaya\ (21) Pra-mdna-laksana\ (22) Kathd-laksana; (23) Upddhi-khandana; (24) Mdydvdda-khandana\ (25) Prapanca-mithydtdnumdna-khandana\ (26) Tattvoddyota; (27) Tattva-viveka; (28) Tattva-samkhydna; (29) Visnu-tattva-nirnaya; (30) Tantra-sdra-samgraha; (31) Krsnd-mrta-mahdrnava; (32) Yati-pranava-kalpa; (33) Sadacdra-smrti; (34) Jayanti-nirnaya or the Jayanti-kalpa; (35) Yamaka-bhdrata; (36) Nrsimha-nakha-stotra; (37) Dvddasa-stotra.

In the list given in the Grantha-mdlikd-stotra of Jaya-tlrtha we have Sannydsa-paddhati instead of Brahma-sutrdnuvydkhyd-nydya-nirnaya. The Catalogus Catalogorum of Aufrecht refers to the report on the search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency during the year 1882-3 by R. G. Bhandarkar, and enumerates a number of other books which are not mentioned in the Grantha-mdlikd-stotra. These are as follows:

Atmajfidna-pradesa-tikd, Atmopadesa-tikd, Arya-stotra, Upade-sasahasra-tikd, Upanisat-prasthdna,Aitareyopanisad-bhdsya-tippani 7 Kdthakopanisad-bhdsya-tippam, Kenopanisad-bhdsya-tippani, Kau-sitakyupanisad-bhdsya-tippani, Khapuspa-tlkd, Guru-stuti, Govinda-bhdsya-plthaka, Govinddstaka-tikd, Gaudapddiya-bhdsya-tlkd, Chdndogyopanisad-bhdsya-tippani, Taittiriyopanisad-bhdsya-tippani, Taittiriya-iruti-vdrttika-tikd,Triputiprakarana-tikd,Ndrdyanopani-sad-bhdsya-tippani, Nydya-vivarana, Pancikarana-prakriyd-vvva-rana, Prasnopanisad-bhdsya-tippam, Brhajjdbdlopanisad-bhdsya, Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya - tippani, Brhaddranyaka - vdrttika - tikd, Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-tikd, Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-nirnaya, Brahmd-nanda, Bhakti-rasdyana, Bhagavad-gitd-prasthdna, Bhagavad-gltd-bhdsya-vivecana, Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya-tippani, Mita-bhdsini, Rdmottara-tdpanlya-bhdsya, Vdkyasudhd-tikd, Visnusaha-

srandma-bhdsya, Veddnta-vdrttika, Sankara-vijaya, Sankardcdrya-avatdra-kathd, Satasloka-tikd, Samhitopanisad-bhdsya, Samhito-panisad-bhdsya-tippam, Sattattva, Saddcdra-stuii-stotra, Stnrti-vivarana, Smrti-sdra-samuccaya, Svarupa-nirnaya-tikd, Harimide-stotra-flkd.

Succession List of Madhva Gurus.

Bhandarkar in his search for Sanskrit MSS. in 1882-3 gives the names of teachers with the dates of their deaths. Thus Ananda-tlrtha or Madhva was succeeded by Padmanabha-tlrtha 1126 saka, and he byNarahari-tlrtha 1135 saka; Madhava-tlrtha 1152; Aksobhya-tlrtha 1169; Jaya-tlrtha 1190; Vidyadhiraja-tlrtha 1254; Kavlndra-tlrtha 1261; Vaglsa-tlrtha 1265; Ramachandra-tlrtha 1298; Vidyani-dhi-tlrtha 1306; Raghunatha-tlrtha 1364; Raghuvarya-tlrtha 1419; Raghuttama-tlrtha 1457; Vedavyasa-tlrtha 1481; Vidyadhlsa-tlrtha 1493; Vedanidhi-tlrtha 1497; Satyavrata-tirtha 1560; Satyani-dhi-tlrtha 1582; Satyanatha-tlrtha 1595; Satyabhinava-tlrtha 1628; Satyapurna-tlrtha 1648; Satyavijaya-tirtha 1661; Satyapriya-tlrtha 1666; Satyabodha-tirtha i705;Satyasannidhana-t!rthai7i6; Satya-vara-tlrtha 1719; Satyadhama-tlrtha 1752; Satyasara-tlrtha 1763; Satyaparayana-tlrtha 1785; Satyakama-tlrtha 1793; Satyesti-tlrtha 1794; Satyaparayana-tirtha 1801; Satyavit-tlrthawas living in 1882, when the Search for Sanskrit MSS. was being written. Thus we have a list of thirty-five Gurus, including Madhva, from 1198 saka (the year of the death of Madhva) to Satyavit-tlrtha, who was living in saka 1804 or a.d. 1882. This list was drawn up in consonance with the two lists procured at Belgaumand Poona. It is largelyat variance with the list given in the introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sutra by Baladeva. Baladeva gives the list as follows:

Madhva, Padmanabha, Nrhari, Madhava, Aksobhya, Jaya-tlrtha, Jnanasimha, Dayanidhi, Vidyanidhi, Rajendra, Jayadharma, Purusottama-tlrtha, Brahmanda-tlrtha, Vyasa-tlrtha, Laksmlpati, Madhavendra, Isvara. Isvara was a teacher of Caitanya. We see that the list given by Baladeva is right as far as Jaya-tlrtha; but after Jaya-tlrtha the list given by Baladeva is in total discrepancy with the two lists from the Madhva Mathas in Belgaum and Poona. Under the circumstances we are unable to accept the list of Gurus given by Baladeva, which has many other discrepancies into details whereof we need not enter.

Important Madhva Works.

The Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya. This work of Madhva consists of thirty-two chapters and is written in verse. In the first chapter Madhva begins with a very brief summary of his views. He says there that the four Vedas, the Pancardtras, the Mahd-bhdrata, the original Rdmdyana, and the Brahma-sutras are the only authoritative scriptural texts, and that anything that contradicts them is to be regarded as invalid. The Vaisnava Purdnas, being essentially nothing more than an elaboration of the Pancardtras, should also be regarded as valid scriptures. The smrti literature of Manu and others is valid in so far as it does not come into conflict with the teachings of the Vedas, the Mahdbhdrata, the Pancardtras and the Vaisnava Purdnas 1 . Other sdstras such as those of Buddhism were made by Visnu to confuse the Asuras, and Siva also produced the Saiva Sdstra for the same object at the command of Visnu. All the sdstras that speak of the unity of the self with Brahman either in the present life or at liberation are false. Visnu is the true Lord, and is also called Narayana or Vasudeva. The process of the world is real and is always associated with five-fold differences, viz. that between the self and God, between the selves themselves, between matter and God, between matter and matter, and between matter and self 2 . It is only the gods and the best men that may attain salvation through knowledge and grace of God; ordinary men pass through cycles of births and rebirths, and the worst are cursed in hell. Neither the demons nor those who are eternally liberated have to go through a cycle of birth and rebirth. The demons cannot

1 rg-ddayas catvdrah panca-rdtram ca bhdratam mula-rdmdyanam Brahma-sutram mdnam svatah smrtam.

Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya, i. 30. a-viruddham tu yat tu asya pramdnam tac ca ndnyathd etad-viruddham yat tu sydn na tan mdnam kathancana vaisnavdni purdndni pdncardtrdtmakatvatah pramdndny evam manvddydh smrtayo'py anukulatah.

Ibid. 1. 31-32.

2 jagat-pravdhah satyo'yam panca-bheda-samarwitah. jivesayor bhidd caiva jlva-bhedah paras-param jadesayor jaddndm ca jada-jlva-bhidd tathd panca bhedd ime nitydh sarvdvasthdsu nityasah muktdndm ca na hlyante tdratamyam ca sarvadd.

Ibid. 1. 69-71.

under any circumstances attain salvation. The theory of eternal damnation is thus found only in Madhva, and in no other system of Indian philosophy. Men can attain salvation when they worship God as being associated with all good qualities and as being blissful and omniscient. Even in the state of liberation there are individual differences between the selves, and the perfect and desireless (niskdma) worship of God is the only means of salvation. It is only through devotion (bhakti) that there can be liberation; even the emancipated enjoy the eternal flow of pleasure through devotion; bhakti, or devotion, is here defined as an affection with the full consciousness of the greatness of the object of devotion 1 , and it is regarded as the universal solvent. Even the performance of all religious duties cannot save a man from hell, but bhakti can save a man even if he commits the worst sin. Without bhakti even the best religious performances turn into sin, and with bhakti even the worst sins do not affect a man. God is pleased only with bhakti and nothing else, and He alone can give salvation.

In the second chapter Madhva says that in the Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya he tries to summarize the essential teachings of the Mahabharata, the text of which in his time had become thoroughly corrupt; and that, difficult as the Mahabharata itself is, it had become still more difficult to get to the root of it from these corrupt texts. He further says that in order to arrive at the correct reading he had procured the text of the Mahabharata from various countries and that it is only by comparison of these different texts that he made his attempt to formulate its essential teachings in consonance with the teachings of other sdstras and the Vedas 2 . According to Madhva the Mahabharata is an allegory, which shows a struggle between good and evil; the good representing the Pandavas, and the evil representing the sons of Dhrtarastra. The object of the Mahabharata is to show the greatness of Visnu. Madhva does not follow the order of the story as given in the Mahabharata, he omits most of the incidental episodes, and supplements the story with others culled from other Purdnas and

1 bhaktyarthdny akhildny eva bhaktir moksdya kevald muktdnam apt bhaktir hi nitydnanda-sva-rupinl jndna-purva-para-sneho nityo bhaktir itlryate.

Mahabhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya, 1. 106—7.

2 sdstrdntardni sanjdnan veddms cdsya prasddatah

dese dese tathd granthdn drstvd caiva prthagvidhdn. Ibid. 11. 7.

the Ramayana. Thus he gives a summary of the Ramayana and also the story of Krsna in the Bhagavata-purdna as being a part of the Mahdbhdrata. In his treatment of the general story ^lso he insists on the super-excellence of Bhlma and Krsna.

There are several commentaries on this work of Madhva, viz., that by Janardana Bhatta, called the Paddrtha-dipikd; by Varada-raja, called the Mahdsubodhini or the Prakdsa; by Vadirajasvaml; by Vitthalacarya-sunu; by Vyasa-tlrtha; the Durghatdrthaprakdsikd t by Satyabhinava Yati: the Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd (called also the Paddrthadipikd); the Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd (called also Bhdvacandrikd), by Srinivasa; and the Mahdbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaydnukramanikd, which is a small work giving a general summary of the work in verse. There were also other commentaries by Krsnacarya, Laksmana Simha and Jaya-khandin Simha.

In the Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya Madhva selects some of the important verses from the twelve skandhas of the Bhdgavata-purdna, and adds short annotations with the selected verses from the selected chapters of each of the skandhas. These are not continuous, and many of the chapters are sometimes dropped altogether ; they are also brief, and made in such a manner that his own dualistic view may appear to be the right interpretation of the Bhdgavata. He sometimes supports his views by reference to the other Purdnas, and in conclusion he gives a short summary of his view as representing the true view of the Bhdgavata. The Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya is commented upon by various writers; some of the commentaries are Bhdgavata-tdtparya-vydkhyd (called also Tdtparya-bodhini),Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd-vivarana, Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd-prabodhini, Bhdgavata-tdt-parya-nirnaya-vydkhyd-padya-ratndvaliy Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nir-naya-vydkhyd-prakdsa, by Srinivasa (a brief work in prose), and Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-tikdy by Jadupati, Chalari and Veda-garbhanarayanacarya.

The Gitd-tdtparya of Madhva is a work in prose and verse, giving a summary of the essence of the Gitd as understood by Madhva. It is a continuous summary of all the eighteen chapters of the Gitd in serial order. The summary, however, often quotes verses from the Gitd, which, however, are sometimes interrupted by small prose texts serving as links, sometimes of an explanatory

nature, sometimes referring to purdnic and other texts in support of Madhva's interpretations, and sometimes introducing the context and the purpose of the verses of the Gltd —they sometimes introduce also discussions in prose against the monistic interpretation of the Gitd by Sarikara. The Tdtparya, a work of about 1450 granthas, is commented upon by the famous Madhva author Jaya-tlrtha; the commentary is called Bhagavad-gitd-tdtparya- nirnaya-vydkhyd or Nydya-dipikd. This Nydya-dipikd was commented upon by Vitthala-suta-srinivasacarya or Tamraparnl-srinivasacarya in a work called Tdtparya-dipikd-vydkhyd-nydya-dipa-kiranavali. The Bhagavadgltd-tdtparya had at least two other commentaries, the Tdtparya-tippani, by Padmanabha-tlrtha, and the Nydya-dipa-bhdva-prakdsa, by Satyaprajna-bhiksu. In addition to this Madhva wrote also a work styled Gitd-bhdsya, in which he takes up the important slokas, chapter by chapter, and in the course of commenting on them discusses many important problems of a controversial nature. Thus, following Kumarila, he says that it is because the sdstra is aparijneya (of transcendent origin) that there is an absolute validity of the sdstras. Regarding the performance of karmas he says that they are to be performed because of the injunctions of the sdstras, without any desire for fruit. The only desires that should not be abandoned are for greater knowledge and a greater rise of bhakti; even if the karmas do not produce any fruit, they will at least produce the satisfaction of the Lord, because in following the injunctions of the sdstras the individual has obeyed the commands of God. He also controverts the Sarikara-view of monism, and says that, if God reflects Himself in men, the reflection cannot be identified with the original. The so-called upddhi or condition is supposed to make the difference between the Brahman and the individual. It is not also correct to say that, as water mixes with water, so also the individual at the time of salvation meets with God and there is no difference between them; for even when water mixes with water, there is difference, which explains the greater accumulation of water. So, in the state of salvation, the individual only comes closer to God, but never loses his personality. His state of moksa is said to be the most desirable because here one is divested of all sorrowful experiences, and has nothing to desire for oneself. It is in accordance with the difference in personality of different individuals; the state of

salvation differs with each person. The common element in the state of salvation is the fact that no emancipated person has to suffer any painful experience. Madhva also takes great pains to show that Narayana or Visnu is the greatest or the highest Lord. In dealing with the third chapter he says that in the beginningless world even one karma may lead to many births and the accumulated store of karmas could never have yielded their full fruits to any person; therefore, even if one does not do any karma, he cannot escape the fruits which are in store for him as the result of his past karmas; consequently no good can be attained by the non-performance of karma. It is only the karma performed without any motive or desire that associates with knowledge and leads to salvation; so the non-performance of karma can never lead to salvation by itself. Madhva repudiates the idea that salvation can be attained by death in holy places, as the latter can only be attained by knowledge of Brahman. One is forced to perform the karmas by the force of one's internal samskaras or sub-conscious tendencies. It is unnecessary to show in further detail that in this way Madhva interprets the Glta in support of his own doctrines; and he also often tries to show that the view propounded by him is in consonance with the teachings of other Puranas and the Upanisads. There is a number of works on Madhva's interpretation of the Gitd: Gitdrtha-samgraha by Raghavendra, Gltd-vivrti by Ragha-vendra Yati, Gitd-vivrti by Vidyadhiraja Bhattopadhyaya, and Prameya-dipikd by Jaya-tlrtha, which has a further commentary on it, called Bhdva-prakdsa. Madhva wrote another commentary on the Brahma-sutra, the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya. It is a small work of about 2500 granthas, and the commentary is brief and suggestive 1 . He wrote also another work, the Anubhdsya, which is a brief summary of the main contents and purport of the Brahma-sutra. This has also a number of commentaries, by Jaya-tirtha, Ananta Bhatta, Chalari-nrsimha, Raghavendra-tirtha and Sesacarya. There is also a work called Adhikarandrtha-samgraha, by Padmanabhacarya. The Brahma-sutra-bhdsya of Ananda-tirtha has a commentary by Jaya-tlrtha, called Tattva-prakdsikd. This has a number of commentaries: the Tdtparya-prakdsikd-bhdva-bodha and the Tdtparya-prakdsikd-gata-nydya-vivarana by Raghuttama Yati, and Bhdva-dipikd or Tattva-prakdsikd-tippanl, the Tantra-dipikd,

1 A verse containing thirty-two letters is called a grantha.

by Raghavendra Yati, Tdtparya-candrika, by Vyasa-tirtha, which had other commentaries, viz. the Tdtparya-candrtkd-prakdsa by Kegava Yati, Tdtparya-candrikd-nydya-vivarana by Timman-nacarya (or Timmapura-raghunathacarya), and Tdtparya-candriko-ddharana-nydya-vivarana. Besides these the Tattva-prakdsikd had other commentaries; the Abhinava-candrikd by Satyanatha Yati, one by Srinivasa called Tattva-prakdsikd-vdkydrtha-manjari, and also the Vdkydrtha-muktdvali by the same author. The Tdtparya-candrika had another commentary, by Gururaja, and the Tattva-prakdsikd had another, the Tantra-dlpikd. The Bhdsya of Madhva was also commented upon by Jagannatha Yati (the Bhdsya-dipikd), by Vitthala-suta-srinivasa (the Bhdsya-tippani-prameya-muktdvali), by Vadiraja (the Gurvartha-dipikd), by Tamraparni-siinivasa, and by Sumatlndra-tirtha. There are also two others, the Brahma-sutra-bhdsydrtha-samgraha and the Brahma-sutrdrtha. The Anubhdsya of Madhva was commented upon by Nrsimha, Jaya-tlrtha, Ananta Bhatta, Chalari-nrsimha, Raghavendra-tirtha and Sesacarya. Further, Madhva wrote another work on the Brahma-sutra called the Anuvydkhydna. This was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha in his Panjikd and Nydya-sudhd, and also by Jadupati and Srlnivasa-tirtha. There is also another commentary on it, called Brahma-sutrdnuvydkhydna-nyaya-sambandha-dipikd. Of these the Nydya-sudhd of Jaya-tirtha is an exceedingly recondite work of great excellence. Anuvydkhydna is commented upon by Raghuttama in his Nydya-sutra-nibandha-pradipa and also in his Anuvydkhyana-tikd. The Nydya-sudhd itself was commented on by several writers. Thus we have commentaries by Srinivasa-tirtha, Jadupati, Vitthala-sutananda-tirtha, by Kesava Bhatta (the Sesa-vdkydrtha-candrikd), by Ramacandra-tirtha, Kundalagirisuri, Vidyadhisa, Timmannarya, Vadiraja, and Raghavendra Yati. We have also the Nydyasudho-panydsa, by Sripadaraja. The Anuvydkhydna is a small work in verse which follows chapter by chapter the essential logical position of all the Brahma-sutras. Madhva says there that in rendering the interpretations he followed the trustworthy scriptural texts—the Vedas —and also logical reasoning 1 . He further says in the introduction that it is for the purpose of clearing his views in a proper manner that

1 dtma-vdkyataya tena sruti-mulatayd tathd

yukti-mulatayd caiva prdmdnyam trividham mahat.

Anuvydkhydna, i. i.

he writes the Anuvydkhydna, though he had already written a bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra. He says in the first chapter that the Omkara which designates the Brahman and which is also the purport of Gayatri is also the purport of all the Vedas and one should seek to know it. Those who seek to know the Brahman please God by such an endeavour, and by His grace are emancipated. The existence of all things, actions, time, character and selves depends upon God, and they may cease to exist at His will. God gives knowledge to the ignorant and salvation to the wise. The source of all bliss for the emancipated person is God Himself. All bondage is real, for it is perceived as such; nor is there any means by which one can prove the falsity of bondage, for if there were any proofs of its falsity, the proofs must be existent, and that would destroy the monistic view. The mere one cannot split itself into proof and the object of proof. So all experiences should be regarded as real. That which we find in consonance with practical behaviour should be regarded as real. The monists assert that there are three kinds of existence, but they cannot adduce any proofs. If the universe were really nonexistent, how could it affect anybody's interests in a perverse manner? Brahman cannot be regarded as being only pure "being," and the world-appearance cannot be regarded as false, for it is never negated in experience. If this world is to be known as different from pure non-being or the non-existent, then the non-existent has also to be known, which is impossible. It has been suggested that illusion is an example of non-existence, viz., the appearance of a thing as that which it is not. This virtually amounts to the assertion that appearance consists only of a being which does not exist, and this is also said to be indefinable. But such a position leads to a vicious infinite, because the reality of many entities has to depend on another and that on another and so on. Existence of a thing depends upon that which is not being negated, and its not being negated depends upon further experience and so on. Moreover, if the pure differenceless entity is self-luminous, how can it be covered by ajndnal Again, unless it is possible to prove the existence of ajndna, the existence of falsehood as a category cannot be proved. It is needless, however, for us to follow the whole argument of the Anuvydkhydna, as it will be dealt with in other forms as elaborated by Vyasa-tlrtha in his Nydydmrta in controversy with the Advaita-siddhi.

Madhva also wrote a Pramdna-laksana, Kathd-laksana, Mithydtvanumana-khandana f Upddhi-khandana, Mdyd-vdda-khan-dana, Tattva-samkhydna, Tattvoddyota, Tattva-viveka, Visnu-tattva-nirnaya, Karma-nirnaya 1 . The Pramdna-laksana has a number of commentaries: Nydya-kalpalatd, by Jaya-tlrtha, Sannydya-dipikd, and others by Kesava-tlrtha, Panduranga, Padmanabha-tirtha, and Candakesava. The Nydya-kalpalatd of Jaya-tlrtha is a work of 1450 granthas; it has a commentary called Nydya-kalpalatd-vydkhyd, by two other authors. One of them is a pupil of Vidyadhlsa Yati, but nothing is known about the author of the other work. There are also two other commentaries, the Prabodhini and the Nydya-manjari, by Candakesavacarya. Other works relating to the same subject (the Madhva logic) are the Nydya-muktdvali, by Raghavendra Yati, Nydya-mauktikd-mdld, by Vijaylndra, and Nydya-ratndvali, by Vadiraja. Jaya-tlrtha himself wrote a work called Pramdna-paddhati, which has a large number of commentaries (by Ananta Bhatta, Vedesa-bhiksu, Vijaylndra, Vitthala Bhatta, Satyanatha Yati, Nrsimha-tlrtha, Raghavendra-tlrtha, Narayana Bhatta, Janardana Bhatta, and two others by unknown authors, the Bhdva-dipa and the Paddrtha-candrikd). The Kathd-laksana of Madhva was commented on by Padmanabha-tirtha, Kesava Bhattaraka, and Jaya-tlrtha. The Mithydtvanumana-khandana of Madhva has at least four commentaries, by Jaya-tlrtha, the fourth being the Manddra-manjari. The Upddhi-khandana has at least three commentaries, by Jaya-tlrtha, Ananta Bhatta and Snnivasa-tlrtha. Both Srinivasa-tlrtha and Padmanabha-tirtha wrote commentaries on Jaya-tirtha's commentary named Upddhi-khandana-vydkhyd-vivarana. The Mdyd-vdda-khandana of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha, Srinivasa-tirtha, Vyasa-tirtha, Kesavamisra, Ananta Bhatta and Padmanabha-tirtha. The Tattva-samkhydna of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha, Snnivasa-tirtha, Ananta Bhatta, Venkatadrisuri, Satyaprajna Yati, Satyaprajna-tlrtha, Maudgala Narasimhacarya, Timmannacarya, Gururaja and Yadupati. The commentary of Jaya-tlrtha, the Tattva-samkhydna-vivarana, was commented upon by Satya-dharma Yati (Satya-dharma-tippana). The Tattvoddyota of Madhva

1 These ten works of Madhva are called the dasaprakarana. Sometimes, however, the Mithydtvanumana-khandana is replaced hy Rgveda-brahma-pancika.

was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha, Yadupati, Vedesa-bhiksu, Padmanabha-tlrtha, Srlnivasa-tlrtha, Narapandita, Raghavendra-tirtha, Vijayindra, Gururaja (or Kesava Bhattaraka). The Tattva-viveka of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tirtha, Ananta Bhatta and Srinivasa-tlrtha.

In the Kathd-laksana, Madhva tries to give an estimate of the nature of various wholesome discussions (vdda) as distinguished from unwholesome discussions (wrangling, vitandd). Vdda is discussion between the teacher and the pupil for the elucidation of different problems or between two or more pupils who are interested in the discovery of truth by reasoning. When this discussion, however, takes place through egotism, through a spirit of emulation, for the sake of victory through controversy, or for the attainment of fame, the discussion is called jalpa. Unwholesome discussion, vitandd, is undertaken for the purpose of discrediting the true points of view by specious argument. There may be one or more presidents (prasnika) in a discussion, but such a person or persons should be strictly impartial. All discussions must be validly based, on the scriptural texts, and these should not be wrongly interpreted by specious argument 1 . The Kathd-laksana of Madhva seems to have been based on a work called Brahma-tarka. The nature of vdda, jalpa, and vitandd according to the Nyaya philosophy has already been treated in the first volume of the present work 2 .

It is unnecessary to enter into the Prapanca-mithydtvdnumdna-khandana, Upddhi-khandana and Mdydvdda-khandana, because the main subject-matter of these tracts has been dealt with in our treatment of Vyasa-tlrtha's Nydydmrta in controversy with the Advaita-siddhi.

The Tattva-samkhydna is a small tract of eleven verses which relates in brief some of the important tenets of Madhva's doctrines. Thus it says that there are two categories—the independent and the dependent; Visnu alone is independent. The category of the dependent is of two kinds—the existent and the non-existent. The non-existent or the negation is of three kinds—negation before production (pragabhdva), negation by destruction (dhvamsd-

1 Mr Nagaraja !§arma has summarized the contents of the Kathd-laksana, utilizing the materials of the commentators Jaya-tlrtha, Raghavendrasvami and Vedesa-tirtha, in the Reign of Realism.

2 On the subject of the nature of katha and the conditions of disputation see also Khandana-khanda-khadya, pp. 20 ff., Benares, 1914.

bhdva), and universal negation (atyantdbhdva). The existents are again conscious or unconscious. The conscious entities are again twofold, those who are associated with sorrows and those who are not so. Those who are associated with sorrows are again twofold, viz., those who are emancipated and those who are in sorrow. Those who are in sorrow are again twofold, viz., those who are worthy of salvation and those who are not. There are others who are not worthy of salvation at any time. The worst men, the demons, the rdksasas and the pisdcas are not worthy of salvation at any time. Of these there are two kinds, viz., those who are already damned in hell and those who pursue the course of samsdra but are doomed to hell. The unconscious entities are again threefold, the eternal, the non-eternal, and the partly eternal and partly non-eternal. The Vedas alone are eternal. The sacred literature of the Purdnas, time and prakrti are both eternal and non-eternal; for, when in essence the teachings of the Purdnas are eternal, time and prakrti are eternal; in their evolution they are non-eternal. The non-eternal again is twofold—the created and the uncreated (sarnslista and asarnslista). The uncreated ones are mahat, aham, buddhi, manas, the senses, the tanmdtras and the five bhutis. The world and all that exists in the world are created. Creation really means being prompted into activities, and as such the created entities undergo various stages: God alone is the inward mover of all things and all changes. The Tattva-viveka of Madhva is as small a work as the Tattva-samkhydna, consisting only of a dozen granthas, and deals more or less with the same subject: it is therefore unnecessary to give a general summary of its contents.

The Tattvoddyota, however, is a somewhat longer work in verse and prose. It starts with a question, whether there is a difference between the emancipated souls, and Madhva says that the emancipated souls are different from God because they had been emancipated at a particular time. They cannot be both different and non-different from God, for that would be meaningless. The concept of anirvacaniya of the Vedantists has no illustration to support it. Madhva takes pains to refute the theoiy of anirvacaniya with the help of scriptural texts, and he holds that the so-called falsity of the Sankarites cannot be supported by perception, inference or implication. There is no reason to think that the world-appearances

as such cannot be negated 1 . He further says that, if everything in the world were false, then the allegation that the world would be contradicted in experience would also be false. If the contradiction of the world be false, then virtually it amounts to saying that the world-experience is never contradicted. If it is said that the world-appearance is different from being and if the predicate "being" means the class-concept of being, then it is a virtual admission of a plurality of existents, without which the class-concept of being is impossible. If however the predicate "being" means pure being, then, since such a pure "being" is only Brahman, its difference from the world would be an intelligible proposition, and it would not prove the so-called anirvar.anlya. It is said that falsity is that which is different from both being and non-being, and that would virtually amount to saying that that which is not different is alone true 2 . On such a supposition the plurality of causes or of effects or the diversities of grounds in inferences must all be discarded as false, and knowledge would be false. Knowledge implies diversity; for the knower, the knowledge and the object of knowledge cannot be the same. Again, it is wrong to hold that ignorance rests in the object of knowledge or the Brahman; for the ignorance always belongs to the knowledge. If on the occasion of knowledge it is held that the ignorance belonging to the objects is removed, then, the ignorance being removed in the object by one person's knowledge of it, all persons should be able to know the object. If any knowing of the jug means that the ignorance resting in the jug is removed, then, the ignorance being removed, the jug should be known even by persons who are not present here 3 . Again, if by the knowledge of any object the ignorance resting in another object be removed, then by the knowledge of the jug the ignorance in other objects could be removed.

Again, a material object is that which never can be a knower.

1 na ca bddhyam jagad ity atra kiiicin mdnam.

Tattvoddyota, p. 242.

2 sad-vilaksanatvam a-sad-vilaksanatvam ca mithyd ity a-vilaksanam eva satyam sydt. Ibid. p. 242(a).

3 nahi jndna-jneyayor ekdkdratd nahi ajnasya ghatdsrayatvam brahmdsrayatvam vd asti; pumgatam eva hi tamojndnena nivartate; visaydsrayamced ajnanam nivartate tarhi ekena jndtasya ghatasya

any air ajndtatvam na sydt. Ibid. p. 242.

5-2

For that reason the self, as a knower, can never be regarded as material. But according to the monists the dtman which is equalized with Brahman, being without any quality, can never be a knower, and, if it cannot be a knower, it must be of the nature of a material object, which is impossible. Also the self, or the dtman, cannot be a false knower, for the category of falsehood as the indefinable (or anirvacanlyd) has already been refuted. If materiality means non-luminousness {aprakdsatvd) y then we have to admit that the self, which is differ en celess, is unable to illumine itself or anything else; and thus the self would be non-luminous. The self cannot illumine itself, because then it would itself be the subject and object of its work of illumination, which is impossible. The other objects, being false (according to the monists), cannot be illuminated either. If they are no objects and if they are only false, they cannot be illuminated. Thus the monists fail to explain the nature of the self-luminousness of Brahman. Again, the argument that things which are limited in time and space are false does not hold either; for time and the prakrti are not limited by time and space, and therefore they cannot be regarded as false, as the monists wish to think. Again, if it did hold, things which are limited by their own nature and character would consequently be false. Thus, the selves would be false, since they are different from one another in their character.

Moreover, the world is perceived as true and real, and there is no one who has experienced it to be false (the perception of the smallness of the sun or of the moon is an illusion, due to the distance from which they are seen; such conditions do not hold regarding the world as we perceive it). There is no reason which supports the view that the world is the product of ignorance. Again, the analogy of a magician and his magic is inapplicable to the world; for the magician does not perceive his magic creation, nor is he deluded by it. But in the case under discussion God (the Isvara) perceives His own creation. Therefore the world cannot be regarded as magic or mdyd; for God perceives everything directly. Thus, from whatever point of view one may discuss the doctrine of mdyd, one finds it untenable, and there are no proofs which can support it.

Madhva further holds that in the Brahma-sutra, Book n, not only are various other philosophies refuted but that even the monistic doctrine has been refuted. The refutation of Buddhism

is in reality also a refutation of the monists, who are in reality nothing but crypto-Buddhists or Buddhists in disguise 1 . The sunyavddi Buddhists hold that truth is of two kinds, that which is samvrta, or of limited or practical importance only, and that which is paramartha, or ultimately real. If one truly discusses the nature of things, there is no reality, and what is perceived as real is only an appearance. What is called the pdramdrthika reality means only the cessation of all appearance 2 . There is no difference between the qualityless Brahman and the sunya of the Buddhists. The quality-less Brahman is self-luminous and eternal; the sunya of the Buddhists is unknowable by mind or speech, and is also difference-less, self-luminous, and eternal. It is opposed to materiality, to practicality, to pain and suffering, and to cessation and the defects of bondage 3 . It is not actually a real-positive entity, though it supports all positive appearance; and, though in itself it is eternal, from the practical point of view it appears in manifold characters. It is neither existent nor non-existent, neither good, nor bad—it is not a thing which one should either leave aside or take, for it is the eternal sunya 4 . It may be observed in this connection that the monists also do not believe in the reality of the characters of being and non-being, because the Brahman is devoid of all characters and qualities. Like sunya of the Buddhists, it is unspeakable, though it is referred to by all words, and it is unknowable, though all knowledge refers to it. Neither the Sankarites nor the Sunyavadins believe in the category of being or positivity as characters. The

1 na ca nir-visesa-brahma-vddinah sunydt has cid vis'esah; tasya nirvisesam svayanibhutam nirlepam ajardmaram sunyam tattvam vijneyam manovdcdm agocaram.

Tattvoddyota, p. 243(a).

2 satyam ca dvividham proktam samvrtam pdramdrthikam samvrtam vyavahdryam sydn nirvrtam pdramdrthikam

vicdryamdnena satyan cdpi pratlyate yasya tat samvrtam jndnam vyavahdra-padan cayat. Ibid. p. 243(a).

3 nir-visesam svayam bhutam nirlepam ajardmaram sunyam tattvam avijneyam manovdcdm agocaram jddya-samvrti-duhkhdnta-purva-dosa-virodhi yat nitya-bhdvanayd bhdtam tad bhdvam yogindm nayet bhdvdrtha-pratiyogitvam bhdvatvam vd na tattvata visvdkdranca samvrtya yasya tat padam aksayam.

Ibid. p. 243(a). * ndsya sattvam asattvam vd na doso guna eva vd

heyopddeya-rahitam tac chunyam padam aksayam.

Ibid. p. 243.

Sunyavadin does not regard the sunya or the void as a character. The view of the Sankarites, therefore, is entirely different from belief in a personal God, endowed with characters and qualities (which is the general purport of all valid scriptural texts). If the Brahman be void of all characters, it is beyond all determination. The monists think that the Brahman is absoluteless, differenceless, and this precludes them from resorting to any argument in support of their view; for all arguments presuppose relativity and difference. In the absence of any valid argument, and in the face of practical experience of the reality of the world, there is indeed nothing which can establish the monistic view. All arguments that would prove the falsity of the world will fall within the world-appearance and be themselves false. If all selves were identical, then there would be no difference between the emancipated and the un-emancipated ones. If it is held that all difference is due to ignorance, then God, who has no ignorance, would perceive Himself as one with all individual selves, and thus share their sufferings; but the scriptural text of the Gitd definitely shows that God perceives Himself as different from ordinary individual selves. The experience of suffering cannot also be due to uptidhi (or condition) which may act as a limit; for in spite of diversity of conditions the experiencer remains the same. Moreover, since God is free from all conditions, the difference of conditions ought not to prevent Him from perceiving His equality with all beings in sharing their sufferings. Those also who hold that there is only one individual and that all misconceptions are due to Him are wrong; for at his death there should be cessation of the differences. There is also no proof in support of the view that all notion of difference and the appearance of the world is due to the misconception of only one individual. Thus there are no proofs in support of the monistic view as held by the Sankarites. It is therefore time that the upholders of the mdyd doctrine should flee, now that the omniscient Lord is coming to tear asunder the darkness of specious arguments and false interpretations of spiritual texts 1 .

The Karma-nirnaya of Madhva deals with the nature of karma or scriptural duties, which forms the subject-matter of the

1 paldyadhvam palayadhvam tvarayd mdyi-ddnavdh

sarvajno harir dydti tarkdgama-dardribhid.

Tattvoddyota, p. 245(a).

PUrva-mimdmsd. The Purva-mimdmsd not only practically ignores the existence of God but also denies it. Madhva was himself a great believer in a personal God and therefore wished to interpret the Mlmamsa in an authentic manner. He held that the various gods, e.g., Indra or Agni, stood for Visnu or Narayana. The Purva-mimdmsd was satisfied with providing for heaven as the object of all performance of sacrifices, but with Madhva the ultimate goal was true knowledge and the attainment of emancipation through the grace of God. He disliked the idea that the scriptural sacrifices are to be performed with the object of attaining heaven, and he emphasized his notion that they should be performed without any motive; with him they should be performed merely because they are religious injunctions or the commands of God. He further held that it is only by such motiveless performance of actions that the mind could be purified for the attainment of the grace of God. The motiveless performance of sacrifices is therefore in a way preliminary and accessory to the attainment of wisdom and the grace of God.

Thus, as usual, Madhva tries to refute the argument of the monists against the possibility of possession by God of infinite attributes and in favour of a differenceless Brahma. He further says that the texts such as satyam,jndnam, anantam, Brahma, which apparently inspires a qualityless Brahman, are to be subordinated to other texts which are of a dualistic nature. Proceeding by way of inference, he says that the world, being of the nature of an effect, must have an intelligent cause—a maker—and this maker is God. The maker of this world must necessarily be associated with omniscience and omnipotence. Madhva cites the evidence of the Bhdgavata-purdna in favour of a saguna Brahma, a Brahma associated with qualities. Where the texts refer to Brahman as nirguna, the idea is that the Brahman is not associated with any bad qualities. Also the Brahman cannot be devoid of all determination, visesa; the denial of determination is itself a determination, and as such would have to be denied by the monists; and this would necessarily lead to the affirmation of the determination. Madhva then resorts to his old arguments against mdyd> mtthyd, and anirvacaniya, and points out that the logic of excluded middle would rule out the possibility of a category which is neither sat nor asat. There is really no instance of a so-called amrvacamya. An

illusion, after it is contradicted, is sometimes pointed out as an instance of anirvacaniya, but this is wholly wrong; for in the case of an illusion something was actually perceived by the senses but interpreted wrongly. The fact that something was actually in contact with the visual sense is undisputed; and, when the illusion is contradicted, the contradiction means the discovery that an object which was believed to be there is not there. The object that was erroneously perceived—e.g., a snake—was a real object, but it did not exist where it was thought to exist. To say that the illusion is false (mithya) only means that the object illusorily perceived does not exist there. The mere fact that an object was illusorily perceived cannot mean that it was really existent; and nevertheless its non-existence was contradicted; so it was neither existent nor nonexistent. The only legitimate point of view is that the illusorily perceived object did not exist while it was perceived, i.e. it was asat. The rope which was perceived as "snake" is later on contradicted, when the perception of "snake" disappears; but the world as such has never been found to disappear. Thus there is no similarity between the perception of the world and the perception of the illusory snake. Moreover that which is anirvacaniya is so called because it is hard to describe it on account of its uniqueness, but that does not prove that it is a category which is neither existent nor non-existent. Though it may be sufficiently described, still one may not exhaust its description. A jar is different from a cloth and also different from the merely chimerical hare's horn, viz., a jar is different from an existent cloth and a non-existent hare's horn; but that does not make a jar anirvacaniya, or false. The jar as shown above is sadasad-vilaksana, but it is not on that account non-existent.

Again, the meaning of the phrase sadasad-vilaksana is very vague. In the first place, if it means the conception of a difference (bheda), then the meaning is inconsistent. The monists hold that only the Brahman exists, and therefore, if the difference between the existent and the non-existent exists, there will be dualism. But in reply it may be held that the affirmation of dualism is only possible as a lower degree of reality which is called the vyavaharika. The meaning of this word is not clear. It cannot mean a category which is different from both being and non-being, since such a category is logically invalid. If it means only conditional being, then

even the conception of the highest reality is conditioned by human knowledge, and is therefore conditional (vydvahdrika); and the application of the term to illusory perception or normal perception alone is doubtful. In the second place, the term sadasad-vilaksana also cannot mean identity between the Brahman and the world; for such identity is open to contradiction. The monists can therefore affirm neither the reality of difference nor the reality of absolute identity between the world and Brahman.

The view of the monists that there are different degrees of reality, and that there is identity between them in essence and difference only in appearance, cannot be established, unless the truth of degrees of reality can be established. They hold that the world (which has an inferior degree of reality) is superimposed on the Brahman, or that Brahman has manifested Himself as the world; but such an expression is invalid if there is absolute identity between the world and the Brahman. The phrase "absolute identity" would be merely a tautology, and the scriptural texts so interpreted would be tautological. The monists argue that even identical expressions have satyarn jndnam anantam, and are not tautological, because they serve to exclude their negatives. To style Brahman "satya" or "jiidna" means that Brahman is not asatya and ajndna. But such an interpretation would destroy their contention that all the scriptural epithets have an akhanddrtha, i.e., refer to one differenceless Brahman; for according to their own interpretation the scriptural epithets do not have only one significance (viz., the affirmation of pure differenceless being), but also the negation of other qualities; and in that case the final significance of all scriptural epithets as referring to the differenceless Brahman is contradicted. Again, the anirvacaniyatd of the world depends upon a false analysis of illusion; and so the statement that the differencelessness of Brahman depends on the very illusoriness of the world is not established by any monist by any valid argument. The difference between the world-appearance and Brahman cannot be regarded by the monists as ultimately real; for in that case "difference" is a category having a co-existent reality with Brahman. Again, the concept of difference between the existent and the non-existent requires classification; and, unless this is done, the mere assertion that the world-appearance is both identical with and different from Brahman would have no meaning.

That which is different from the non-existent is existent and that which is different from the existent is non-existent or chimerical. The non-existent has no determination; for it cannot be known by any means, and as such its difference from the existent cannot be known either, since to know the difference between two entities one must know the two entities fully. No one can argue about whether the hare's horn is different or not different from a tree. Again, if sat or "existent" means the ultimately differenceless real, then, since such a difference has no character iri it, it is not possible to form any concept of its difference from any other thing. Thus it is not possible to form any concept of anything which is different from the existent and also from the non-existent; if the world is different from the non-existent, it must be real; and if the world is different from the existent, it must be the hare's horn. The law of excluded middle again rules out the existence of anything which is neither existent nor non-existent; in a pair of contradictory judgments one must be right. Thus the reality of Brahman is endowed with all qualities and as a creator and sustainer of the world He cannot be denied.

Madhva then contends with the Prabhakaras, who hold that the ultimate import of propositions must lead to the performance of an action. If that were the case, the Vedic propositions would never have any import implying the reality of Brahman; for Brahman cannot be the object of the activity of man. Madhva holds that the purpose of all Vedic texts is the glorification of God; and, further, that what is effected by activity among finite human beings is already pre-established with infinite God. All actions imply istasddhanatd (pleasurable motive) and not mere activity. Nothing will be put into action by any man which is distinctly injurious to him. If the chief emphasis of all actions thus be istasddhanatd, then the assertion of the Mlmamsa school, that the import of all possibilities is kdryatd, is false; istasddhanatd includes kdryatd. The supreme istasddhanatd of all actions is the attainment of emancipation through the grace of God. It is therefore necessary that all sacrificial actions should be performed with devotion, since it is by devotional worship alone that one can attain the grace of God. The Karma-nirnaya is a small work of less than 400 granthas.

In the Visnu-tattva-nirnaya, a work of about 600 granthas,

Madhva discusses a number of important problems. He declares that the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Pancardtras, the Rdmdyana, the Visnu-purdna and all other sacred literature that follows them are to be regarded as valid scriptures (sad-dgama). All other texts that run counter to them are to be counted as bad scriptures (dur-dgama), and by following them one cannot know the real nature of God. It is neither by perception nor by inference that one can know God; it is only by the Vedas that one can know the nature of God. The Vedas are not produced by any human being (apauru-seya); unless the transcendental origin of the Vedas is admitted, there can be no absolute validity of religious duties; all ethical and religious duties will be relative. No human commands can give the assurance of absence of ignorance or absence of false knowledge; nor can it be supposed that these commands proceed from an omniscient being, for the existence of an omniscient being cannot be known apart from the scriptures. It will be too much to suppose that such an omniscient being is not interested in deceiving us. But, on the other hand, if the Vedas are regarded as not having emanated from any person, we are not forced to make any other supposition; the impersonal origin of the Vedas is valid in itself, because we do not know of any one who has written them. Their utterances are different from other utterances of an ordinary nature, because we know the authors of the latter. The Vedas exist in their own nature and have been revealed only to the sages, and their validity does not depend on anything else; for, unless this is admitted, we can have no absolute criterion of validity and there will be infinite regress. Their validity does not depend on any reasoning; for good reasoning can only show that the process of thought is devoid of logical defects, and cannot by itself establish validity for anything. Since the Vedas are impersonal, the question of the absence of logical defects does not arise. All validity is self-evident; it is non-validity which is proved by later experience. Nor can it be said that the words of Vedic utterances of one syllable are produced at the time of utterance; for in that case they would be recognized as known before. Such recognition cannot be due to similarity; for in that case all recognitions would have to be considered as cases of similarity, which would lead us to the Buddhist view; recognitions are to be considered as illusory. Thus the self-validity of the Vedas has to be accepted as the absolute determinant

yd Madhva and his School [ch.

of all important problems 1 . These Vedas were originally perceived by God; He imparted them to sages, who at the beginning of each creation, remembered the instructions of their previous birth. The alphabets and words are also eternal, as they are always apparent in the mind of the eternal God; so, though the syllables appear in the dkdsa, and though the Vedas consist of a conglomeration of them, the Vedas are eternal. The Mlmamsa view that the acquirement of words is associated with activity is wrong; for words and their meanings are already definitely settled, and it is only by physical gestures that meanings are acquired by individual people. The purpose of a proposition is finished when it indicates its meaning, and the validity of the proposition is in the realization of such a meaning. While one is acquainted with such a meaning and finds that the direction involved in it, if pursued, will be profitable, one works accordingly, but when one finds it to be injurious one desists from it. All grammars and lexicons are based on the relation already existent between words and their meanings, and no action is implied therein.

All the scriptures refer to Narayana as omniscient and the creator of all things. It is wrong to suppose that the scriptures declare the identity of the individual selves with God; for there is no proof for such an assertion.

The existence of God cannot be proved by any inference; for inference of equal force can be adduced against the existence of God. If it is urged that the world, being an effect, must have a creator or maker just as a jug has a potter for its maker, then it may also be urged on the contrary that the world is without any maker, like the self; if it is urged that the self is not an effect and that therefore the counter-argument does not stand, then it may also be urged that all makers have bodies, and since He has no body, God cannot be a creator. Thus the existence of God can only be proved on the testimony of the scriptures, and they hold that God is different from the individual selves. If any scriptural texts seem to indicate the identity of God and self or of God and the world, this will be contradicted by perceptual experience and inference, and consequently the monistic interpretations of these texts would

1 vijneyam paramam Brahma jndpikd paramd srutih

anddi-nityd sd tac ca vind tarn na ca gamyate.

Vi§nu-tattva-virrirnaya, p. 206.

be invalid. Now the scriptures cannot suggest anything which is directly contradicted by experience; for, if experience be invalid, then the experience of the validity of the scriptures will also become invalid. The teaching of the scriptures gains additional strength by its consonance with what is perceived by other pramdnas', and, since all the pramdnas point to the reality of diversity, the monistic interpretation of the scriptural texts cannot be accepted as true. When any particular experience is contradicted by a number of other pramdnas, that experience is thereby rendered invalid. It is in this manner that the falsity of the conch-shell-silver is attested What was perceived as silver at a distance was contradicted on closer inspection and by the contact of the hand, and for that reason the conch-shell-silver perceived at a distance is regarded as invalid. An experience which is contradicted by a large number of other pramdnas is by reason of that very fact to be regarded as defective 1 . The comparative value of evidence can be calculated either by its quantity or its quality 2 . There are two classes of qualitative proofs, viz., that which is relative (upajivaka) and that which is independent (upajivya); of these the latter must be regarded as the stronger. Perception and inference are independent sources of evidence, and may therefore be regarded as upajivya, while the scriptural texts are dependent on perception and inference, and are therefore to be regarded as upajivaka. Valid perception precedes inference and is superior to it, for the inference has to depend on perception; thus, if there is a flat contradiction between the scriptural texts and what is universally perceived by all, the scriptural texts have to be so explained that there may not be any such contradiction. By its own nature as a support of all evidence, perception or direct experience, being the upajivya, has a stronger claim to validity 3 . Of the two classes of texts, viz., those which are monistic and those which are dualistic, the latter is supported by perceptual evidence. If it is urged that the purpose of the sruti

1 bahu-pramdna-viruddhdndm dosajanyatva-niyamdt; dosa-janyatvam ca balavat-pramdna-virodhdd eva jndyate.

adustam indriyam tv aksam tarko'dustas tathdnumd dgamo'dustavdkyam ca tddrk cdnubhavah smrtah balavat-pramdnatai caiva jneyd dosd na cdnyathd. Ibid. p. 262 a (4).

2 dvi-vidham balavatvan ca bahutvdc ca svabhdvatah. Ibid.

3 Madhva here states the different kinds of pramdnas according to Brahma-tar ka. The account of the pramdnas is dealt with in a separate section.

texts is to transcend perception and that it is by perception alone that we realize pure being, then it follows that the dualistic texts, which contradict ordinary perception, are to be regarded as more valid on the very ground that they transcend perception. So, whichever way we look at it, the superiority of the duality texts cannot be denied. Again, when a particular fact is supported by many evidences that strengthens the validity of that fact. The fact that God is different from the individual and the world, is attested by many evidences and as such it cannot be challenged; and the final and ultimate import of all the Vedic texts is the declaration of the fact that Lord Visnu is the highest of all. It is only by the knowledge of the greatness and goodness of God that one can be devoted to Him, and it is by devotion to God and by His grace that one can attain emancipation, which is the highest object of life. Thus it is through the declaration of God and His goodness that the sruti serves to attain this for us.

No one can have any attachment to anything with which he feels himself identical. A king does not love his rival; rather he would try to inflict defeat on him by attacking him; but the same king would give away his all to one who praised him. Most of the ascriptions of the texts endow God with various qualities and powers which would be unexplainable on monistic lines. So Madhva urges that the ultimate aim of all sruti and smrti texts is to speak of the superexcellence of Visnu, the supreme Lord.

But his opponents argue that ascription or affirmation of qualities to reality depends upon the concept of difference; the concept of difference again depends upon the separate existence of the quality and the qualified. Unless there are two entities, there is no conception of difference; and, unless there is a conception of difference, there cannot be a conception of separate entities. Thus these two conceptions are related to each other in a circular manner and are therefore logically invalid 1 . Madhva in reply says that the above argument is invalid, because things are in themselves of the nature of difference. It is wrong to argue that differences are meaningless because they can only be realized with reference to

1 na ca visesana-vise$yatayd bheda-siddhih, visesana-viiefya-bhdvas ca bheddpekfah dharmi-pratiyogy-apek$aya bheda-siddhir bheddpeksam ca dharmi-pratiyogitvam ity anyonydsrayatayd bhedasydyuktih. Visnu-tattva-vinirnaya, p. 264.

certain objects; for, just as unity has a separate meaning, so the difference is also realized by itself. It is wrong to think that first we have the notion of the differing objects in themselves in their unity and that then the differences are realized; to perceive the object is to perceive the difference. Difference is as simple and analysable as unity. Unity is also a simple notion, yet it can be expressed in the form of a relation of identity—such as that of Brahman and individual self, as the monists say. In the same way difference is a simple notion, though it may be expressed a6 subsisting between two entities. It is true that in cases of doubt and illusion our notion of difference is arrested, but so it is also in the case of our notion of unity. For to perceive an object is not to perceive its unity or identity; to perceive objects is to perceive their uniqueness, and it is this uniqueness which constitutes difference 1 . The expression "its difference" signifies the very uniqueness of the nature of the thing; for, had it not been so, then the perception of the object would not have led us to realize its separateness and difference from others. If such a difference was not realized with the very perception of the object, then one might easily have confused oneself with a jug or with a piece of cloth; but such a confusion never occurs, the reason being that the jug, as soon as it is perceived, is perceived as different from all other things. Difference therefore is realized as the very nature of things that are perceived; doubts occur only in those cases where there is some similarity, while in most other cases the difference of an entity from other entities is realized with the very perception of the entity. Just as, when a number of lights are seen at a glance, they are all known in a general manner, so difference is also known in a general manner, though the particular difference of the object from any other specific object may not be realized immediately upon perception. When a number of articles is perceived, we also perceive at once that each article is different, though the specific difference of each article from the other may not be realized at once. We conclude therefore that perception of difference is dependent upon a prior perception of multiplicity as a series of units upon which the notion

1 padartha-sva-rupatvad bhedasya na ca dharmi-pratiyogy-apeksaya bhedasya svarupatvam aikyavat-svarupasyaiva tathdtvat, sva-rupa-siddhd vat tad asid-dhis ca jivesvaraikyam vadatah siddhaiva, bhedas tu sva-rupa-darsana eva siddhih, prayah sarvato vilaksanam hi padartha-sva-rupam drsyate. Ibid.

of difference is superimposed. That in the perception of each entity its specific nature and uniqueness is perceived cannot be denied even by the Vedantists, even by the monists, who regard each entity as being different from the Brahman. Thus the circular reasoning with which the monists associate the perception of difference is a fallacy and is untenable. If an object in the very revelation of its nature did not also reveal its special difference or uniqueness, then the perception of all things would be identical. Moreover each difference has its own unique character; the difference from a jug is not the same as the difference from a cloth. Thus the perception of difference cannot be challenged as invalid; to say that what is perceived in a valid manner is false is a denial of experience, and is invalid. The illusory perception of the conch-shell silver is regarded as illusory only because it is contradicted by a stronger perceptual experience. No syllogistic reasoning has the power to challenge the correctness of valid perceptual experience. No dialectical reasoning can prove the invalidity of direct and immediate experience. Upon this reasoning all arguments denying the differences of things are contradicted by the scriptural texts, by perception and by other arguments; the arguments of those who challenge the reality of difference are absolutely specious in their nature. It is idle to say that in reality there is no difference though such difference may be realized in our ordinary practical experience (vydvahdrika). It has already been demonstrated that falsehood defined as that which is different from both the existent and the non-existent is meaningless. To attempt to deny the non-existent because it is unworthy of experience is meaningless; for, whether it was or was not experienced, there would be no need to deny it. The difference of anything from the non-existent would not be known without the knowledge of the non-existent. The appearance of the silver in the conch-shell cannot be described as something different from the existent and the non-existent; for the silver appearance is regarded as non-existent in the conch-shell; it cannot be argued that, since such an appearance was realized, therefore it could not have been non-existent. The perception of the nonexistent as the existent is the perception of one thing as another: it is of the nature of illusion. It cannot be said that the non-existent cannot be perceived even in illusion; for it is admitted by the monists that the anirvacanlya, which has no real existence, can be

perceived. Nor can it be held that such a perception is itself anirvacaniya (or indefinable); for in that case we should have a vicious infinite, since the first anirvacaniya has to depend on the second and that on the third and so on. If the silver appearance was in reality anirvacaniya by nature, it would have been perceived as such, and that would have destroyed the illusion; for, if the silver-appearance was known at the time of perception as being anirvacaniya (or indefinable), no one would have failed to realize that he was experiencing an illusion. The word mithyd, "false", does not in reality mean anirvacaniya; it should mean non-existence. Now there cannot be anything which is neither existent nor non-existent; everyone perceives that either things are existent or they are not; no one has perceived anything which is neither existent nor nonexistent. Thus the supposition of the so-called anirvacaniya and that of the perception of the non-existent are alike invalid; the perception of difference is valid, and the monistic claim falls to the ground.

The scriptures also assert difference between the individual selves and the Brahman; if even the scriptural texts are false, then it is idle to preach monism on scriptural grounds. It is on scriptural grounds that we have to admit that Brahman is the greatest and the highest; for the purport of all the valid scriptures tends to such an assertion—yet no one can for a moment think that he is one with Brahman; no one feels "I am omniscient, I am omnipotent, I am devoid of all sorrows and all defects"; on the contrary our common experience is just the opposite, and it cannot be false, for there is no proof of its falsity. The scriptures themselves never declare the identity of the self with the Brahman; the so-called identity text (tat tvam asi, "That art thou") is proclaimed with illustrations which all point to a dualistic view. The illustration in the context of every " identity " (or monistic) text shows its real purport, viz., that it asserts the difference between Brahman and the selves. When it is said that, when one is known, everything is known, the meaning is that the chief object of knowledge is one, or that one alone is the cause; it does not mean that other things are false. For, if that one alone were the truth and everything else were false, then we should expect the knowledge of all falsehood to be derived from the knowledge of the truth, which is impossible (nahi satya-jnanena mithyd-jnanam bhavati). It cannot be said that the know-

ledge of the conch-shell leads to a knowledge of the silver; for the two awarenesses are different. It is only by knowing "this is not silver" that one knows the conch-shell; so long as one knows the silver (which is false), one does not know the conch-shell (which is true). By knowing an entity one does not know the negation of the entity. The knowledge of the non-existence of an entity is preceded by the knowledge of its existence elsewhere. It is customary for people to speak of other things as being known when the most important and the most essential thing is known; when one knows the principal men of a village, one may say that one knows the village. When one knows the father, one may say that he knows the son; "O! I know him, he is the son of so and so, he is known to me"; from one's knowledge of one person one may affirm the knowledge of other persons like him; by knowing one woman one may say "O ! I know women." It is on the basis of such instances that the scriptural texts affirm that by the knowledge of one everything else is known. There is no reason for saying that such affirmations declare the falsity of all other things except Brahman. When the texts assert that by knowing one lump of earth one knows all earthen-wares, the idea is that of similarity, since surely not all earthen-wares are made out of one lump of earth; the text does not say that by knowing earth we know all earthen-wares; what it does say is that by knowing one lump of earth we know all earthenwares. It is the similarity between one lump of earth and all other earthen-wares that justifies the text. The word " vdcdrambhanam" does not mean falsehood, generated by words, for in that case the word namadheya would be inapplicable. We conclude that the scriptures nowhere declare the falsehood of the world; on the contrary, they abound in condemnation of the view that the world is false 1 .

The highest self, the Brahman, is absolutely independent, omniscient, omnipotent and blissful, whereas the ordinary self, though similar to Him in character, is always under His control, knows little and has little power. It is wrong to suppose that self is one but appears as many because of a false upddhi or condition,

1 asatyam apratifthatn tejagad dhur arilsvaram

a-paras-para-sambhutam kim anyat kama-haitukam etayi drftim avaftabhya naftdtmdno'lpa-buddhayah.

Glta, xvi. 8. 9, as quoted by Madhva.

and impossible to conceive that the self could be misconceived as not-self. The so-called creation of illusory appearance by magic, in imitation of real things, is only possible because real things exist; it is on the basis of real things that unreal illusions appear. Dreams also occur on the basis of real experiences which are imitated in them. Dream creations can take place only through the functioning of the subconscious impressions (vdsand) ; but there is no reason to suppose that the world as such, which is never contradicted and which is truly experienced, is illusory, like dream creations. Moreover the Lord is omniscient and self-luminous, and it is not possible that He should be covered by ignorance. If it is argued that the one Brahman appears as many through a condition (or upddhi) and that He passes through the cycles of birth and rebirth, then, since these cycles are never-ending, Brahman will never be free from them and He will never have emancipation because His association with upddhi will be permanent. It is no defence to say that the pure Brahman cannot have any bondage through conditions; that which is already associated with upddhi or condition cannot require a further condition for associating the previous condition with it; for that will lead to a vicious infinite. Again, the thesis of the existence of a false upddhi can be proved only if there is a proof for the existence of ignorance as an entity; if there is no ignorance, there cannot be any falsehood. Again, as upddhi cannot exist without ignorance, nor ignorance without upddhi, this would involve a vicious circle. According to the hypothesis omniscience can be affirmed only of that which is unassociated with a false upddhi; so that, if the pure Brahman is itself associated with ignorance, there can never be emancipation; for then the ignorance will be its own nature, from which it cannot dissociate itself. Moreover, such a permanent existence of ignorance would naturally lead to a dualism of the Brahman and ignorance. If it is held that it is by the ajndna of the jiva (soul) that the false appearance of the world is possible, then it may be pointed out that there is a vicious circle here also; for without the pre-existence of ajndna there is no jiva, and without jiva there cannot be ajndna ; without ajndna there is no upddhi, and without upddhi there is no ajndna. Nor can it be held that it is the pure Brahman that appears as ignorant through illusion; for, unless ajndna is established, there cannot be illusion, and, unless there is illusion, there

6-2

cannot be ajnana. From another point of view too it may be urged that the monists support an impossible proposition in saying that, when all the individuals are emancipated, the Brahman will be emancipated, since the living units or the souls are far more numerous than even the atoms; on the tip of an atom there may be millions of living units, and it is impossible to conceive that they should all attain salvation through the knowledge of Brahman. It also cannot be said that there is nothing to be surprised at the logical certainty of falsehood; for it must be a very strong argument against our opponent, that they cannot prove the falsehood of all things which are immediately and directly perceived; and, unless such proofs are available, things that are perceived through direct experience cannot be ignored. We all know that we are always enjoying the objects of the world in our experience, and in view of this fact how can we say that there is no difference between an experience and the object experienced? When we perceive our food, how can we say that there is no food? A perceptual experience can be discarded only when it is known that the conditions of perception were such as to vitiate its validity. We perceive a thing from a distance; we may mistrust it in certain respects, since we know that when we perceive a thing at a distance the object appears small and blurred; but, unless the possibility of such distorting conditions can be proved, no perception can be regarded as invalid. Moreover, the defects of a perception can also be discovered by a maturer perception. The falsehood of the world has never been proved as defective by any argument whatever. Moreover the experience of knowledge, ignorance, pleasure and pain cannot be contradicted; so it has to be admitted that the experience of the world is true, and, being true, it cannot be negated; therefore it is impossible to have such an emancipation as is desired by the monists. If that which is directly experienced can be negated merely by specious arguments without the testimony of a stronger experience, then even the perception of the self could be regarded as false. There is no lack of specious arguments about the existence of the self; for one may quite well argue that, since everything is false, the experience of the self also is false, and there is no reason why we should distinguish the existence of other things from the experience of the self, since as experience they are of the same order. It will be an insupportable assumption that the experience of the self belongs to a different

order, wherefore its falsity cannot be affirmed. Nor is it possible to affirm that all illusions occur on the basis of self-experience; for, in order to assert that, one must first prove that the experience of the self is not illusory, while all other experiences are so— which is exactly the point contested by the Madhvas. If it is urged that illogicality only shows that the experience is false, then it may also be urged that the illogicality or the inexplicable nature of the experience of the self in association with the objective experience only proves the falsity of the experience of the self and can lead to nothing; for the monists urge that all experiences may be mere semblances of experience, being only products of avidya. The avidya itself is regarded as inexplicable, and all reality is supposed to depend not on experience, but on the logical arguments; in which case one may as well say that objects are the real seers and the subject that which is seen. One may say too that there may be false appearances without a seer; the illogicality or inexplica-bility of the situation is nothing to shy at, since the maya is illogical and inexplicable; a fact which makes it impossible to indicate in what manner it will create confusion. Creating confusion is its sole function, and therefore one may say that either there are appearances without any seer, illusions without a basis, or that the objects are the so-called seers and the self, the so-called seer, is in reality nothing but an object.

Again, if all differences are regarded as mere false appearances due to upadhi, why should there not on the same analogy be experience of reality? Though feelings of pleasure and pain appear in different limbs of one person, yet the experiencer is felt as the same. Why should not experiences in different bodies or persons be felt as belonging to the same individual?—the analogy is the same. In spite of the difference oiupddhis (such as the difference between the limbs of one person), there is the feeling of one experiencer; so in the different upadhis of the bodies of more than one person there may be the appearance of one experiencer. And again, the destruction of one upadhi cannot liberate the Brahman or the self; for the Brahman is associated with other upadhis and is suffering bondage all the same.

Again, one may ask whether the upadhi covers the whole of the Brahman or a part of it. The Brahman cannot be conceived as made up of parts; if the association of upadhi were due to another upadhi, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, since the Brahman

is all-pervading, there cannot be any difference through upddhi, and no conception of a part of the Brahman is possible; upddhi is possible only of things that are limited by time or place. Again, for the same reason experiences through different upddhis must be of one and the same Brahman, and in that case there ought to be the appearance of one experience through all the different bodies, just as the experience of pleasure and pain in the different limbs of a person are attributed to him alone.

Again, the pure Brahman cannot pass through cycles of births and rebirths, because it is pure. Then the birth, rebirth and bondage of the monists must be of Brahman as associated with upddhi and may a. Now the question is: is the Brahman associated with mdyd different from pure Brahman or identical with it? If it be identical with pure Brahman, then it cannot suffer bondage. If it is not identical, then the question is whether it is eternal or non-eternal: if it is not eternal, then it will be destroyed, and there will be no emancipation; if it is eternal, then one has to admit that the mdyd and Brahman remain eternally associated, which virtually means the ultimate reality of two entities. If it is urged that Brahman in pure essence is one, though He appears as many in association with the upddhi, the simple reply is that, if the pure essence can be associated with upddhi, the essence in itself cannot be regarded as pure. To say that the upddhi is false is meaningless, because the concepts of falsehood and upddhi are mutually interdependent. Nor can it be said that this is due to beginningless karma ; for, unless the plurality of the upddhis can be proved, the plurality of the karma cannot be proved either, as the two concepts are interdependent. So the monistic view is contradicted by all our means of knowledge; and all the sruti texts support the pluralistic view. Both the mdyd and the Brahman are incapable of description on a monistic view; it is difficult too to realize how the Brahman or the monist can express Himself; for, if He is one and there is no activity, He ought not to be able to express Himself. If He cannot express Himself to others who do not exist, He cannot express Himself to Himself either; for self-action is impossible (na ca svendpi jneyatvam tair ucyate kartr-karma-virodhdt). There cannot be any knowledge without a knower; the knowledge that is devoid of the knower and the known is empty and void, since none of us has experienced any knowledge where there is no knowledge and the knower.

The Visnu-tattva-nirnaya of Madhva had a comment called the Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tikd by Jaya-tlrtha, Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tikd-tippantby Kesavasvamin, Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tippaniby&rinivasa and Padmanabha-tirtha, Bhaktabodha by Raghuttama; it had also another commentary, called Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tikopanydsa. Besides these there were independent works on the lines of Visnu-tattva-nirnaya called Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-vdkydrtha and Vanamall Misra's Visnu-tattva-prahdsa 1 .

The Nydya-vivarana of Madhva is a work of more than six hundred granthas, which deals with the logical connection of the different chapters of the Brahma-sutra. A number of commentaries was written on it, by Vitthala-sutananda-tlrtha, Mudgalananda-tirtha, and Raghuttama; Jaya-tirtha also wrote on it the Nydya-vivarana-panjikd. Raghavendra, Vijaylndra and Vadiraja wrote respectively Nydya-muktdvali, Nydya-mauktikamdld, and Nydya-ratndvali, on the lines of Madhva's Nydya-vivarana. Madhva wrote it after he had finished his Bhdsya, Anubhdsya and Anuvydkhydna; it is needless for us to follow the work in detail, but we may briefly indicate Madhva's manner of approach. He says that the Brahma-sutra was written in order to discredit the monistic interpretations of the Upanisads. Thus with the monist Brahman cannot be a subject of enquiry, because He is self-luminous; in opposition to this view the Brahma-sutra starts with the thesis that Brahman, being the supreme person who is full of all qualities, can hardly be known by our finite minds. There is then a natural enquiry regarding the extent of the greatness of the supreme being, and in the second siitra it is shown that Brahman cannot be identical with the individual selves, because He is the source from which the world has come into being and it is He who supports the world also. In the third sutra we learn that the Brahman-causality of the world cannot be known except through scripture; in the fourth we read that the scriptures from which we can know the Brahman cannot be any other than the Upanisads. In this way, all through his first chapter, Madhva tries to show that, if we interpret the doubtful sruti texts on the basis of those whose meanings are clear and definite, we find that they too declare the superiority and transcendence of the supreme Lord. The same process of reconciling the sruti texts with

1 ato jnatr-jneyabhdvdt jndnam apt sunyataiva; atah s&nya-vdddn na kaicid visesah; na ca jnatr-jneya-rahitam jndnam kvacid drstam. Op. cit. p. 275 (17).

the idea of showing the transcendence of God over individual selves goes on through the remaining chapters of the first book. In dealing with the fourth book Madhva discusses his pet view that not all persons can be liberated, since only a few can be worthy of liberation 1 . He further says that God must be worshipped continually by chanting His excellent qualities every day. The scriptural duties as well as meditation (dhydna) and its accessories (postures, etc.) are to be carried out; without meditation there cannot be a direct intuition of God 2 . It cannot be urged that with the rise of knowledge all karmas are destroyed and salvation comes by itself; for knowledge can remove only the unripe (aprarabdha) karmas. The fruit of the prdrabdha or ripe karmas has to be enjoyed till they are exhausted. Thus Madhva favours the doctrine of jivanmukti. Though it has been said that the rise of true knowledge removes the aprarabdha karmas, yet the real agency belongs to God; when the true knowledge rises in a man, God is pleased, and He destroys the unripe karmas 3 . At the time of death all wise persons pass on to fire and from there to vdyu, which takes them to Brahman, since it is only through vdyu that one can approach Brahman. Those who return to the world pass through smoke; and there are others who because of their sinful character pass on to the lowest world. Even in the state of salvation the emancipated beings enjoy devotion as pure bliss.

The Tantra-sdra-samgraha of Madhva is a work of four chapters on ritual, which deals with the methods of worshipping Visnu by the use of mantras; and various processes of ritualistic worship are described. It is commented upon by Chalari-nrsimhacarya, Chalari-sesacarya, Raghunatha Yati and Srinivasacarya. Jaya-tirtha wrote in verse a small work called Tantra-sdrokta-pujdvidhi; Srinivasacarya also wrote a small work on the same lines, the Tantra-sdra-mantroddhdra.

Madhva wrote also another small work, called Saddcdra-smrti, in forty verses; this too is a work on rituals, describing the normal duties of a good vaisnava There is a commentary by Dronacarya (Saddcdra-smrti-vydkhyd).

1 mahd-phalatvdt sarvesdm asaktyd eva upapannatvdt; anyathd sarva-purusdsa-kyasyaiva sddhanatayd sarvesdm moksdpatteh. Nydya-vivarana, p. 16(a).

* dhydnam vind aparoksa-jndndkhya-visesa-kdrydnupapatteh. Ibid.

* karmdni ksapayed visnur aprdrabdhdm vidyayd prdrabdhdni tu bhogena ksapayan svam padam nayet. Ibid. 16.

He wrote also another small work, called Krsndmrta-mahdrnava. The present writer has not been able to trace any commentary on it. It consists of two hundred and forty-two verses, describing the forms of worshipping Visnu, and emphasizes the indispensable necessity of continual meditation on the super-excellent nature of God and of worshipping Him; it speaks also of repentance and meditation on God's name as a way of expiation of sins. Madhva further says that in this present Kali age bhakti of God is the only way to emancipation. Meditation on God alone can remove all sins 1 ; no ablutions, no asceticism are necessary for those who meditate on God; the name of God is the only instrument for removing sins. So the whole of the Krsndmrta-mahdrnava describes the glory of God, as well as the methods of worshipping Him; and, further, the duties of the good vaisnavas during the important tithis.

Madhva wrote another small work, the Dvddasa-stotra, consisting of about one hundred and thirty verses. No commentary on this has been traced by the present writer.

He wrote also another very small work, in two verses, the Narasimha-nakha-stotra, and another, the Yamaka-bhdrata, of eighty-one verses. This latter was commented upon by Yadupati and Timmanna Bhatta; and in it Madhva describes the story of Krsna in brief, including the episodes of Vrndavana and that of Hastinapur in association with the Pandavas.

He wrote also the Rg-bhdsya, i.e., a commentary on some selected verses of the Rg-veda, which was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha, Srinivasa-tlrtha, Verikata, Chalari-nrsimhacarya, Raghavendra, Kesavacarya, Laksmlnarayana and Satyanatha Yati. Two anonymous works are known to the present writer which were written on the lines of the Rg-bhdsya; they are Rg-artha-cuddmani and Rg-arthoddhdra. Raghvendra Yati also wrote a work on the same lines, called Rg-artha-manjari. Madhva's commentary on the hoponisat was commented on by Jaya-tlrtha, Srinivasa-tlrtha, Raghunatha Yati, Nrsimhacarya and Satyaprajna Yati, and Raghavendra-tlrtha wrote a separate work on Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka and Mdndukya Upanisads, which follows Madhva's line of interpretation of these Upanisads. Madhva's

1 smaranad eva krsnasya pdpasamghxiUapanjarah

satadhd bhedam dyati girir vajrahato yathd.

Krptdmrta-maharnava, verse 46.

commentary on the Aitareyopanisad was commented upon by TamraparnI Srinivasa, Jaya-tlrtha, Visvesvara-tlrtha and Nara-yana-tlrtha; and Narasimha Yati wrote a separate treatise, the Aitareyopanisad-khanddrtha, on which a commentary, the Khandar-tha-prakdsa y was written by Srinivasa-tlrtha. The Kafhopanisad-bhdsya of Madhva was commented upon by Vedesa. Vyasa-tlrtha wrote* a commentary, the Kenopanisad-bhdsya-fikdy on Madhva's Kenopanisad-bhdsya, while Raghavendra-tlrtha wrote a separate work (the Kerwpanisad-khandartha). The Chandogyopanisad-bhdsya of Madhva was commented upon by Vyasa-tlrtha; Vedesa and Raghavendra-tlrtha wrote a separate work, the Chandogyopanisad-khanddrtha. The Talavakdra-bhdsya of Madhva had the following commentaries: the Talavakdra-bhdsya-tikd, by Vyasa-tlrtha, and Talabavdra-fippani, by Vedesa-bhiksu; Nrsimha-bhiksu wrote the Talavakdra-khanddrtha-prakdHkd. The Prasnopanisad-bhdsya of Madhva was commented upon by Jaya-tlrtha in the Prasno-panisad-bhdsya-tikd, which had two commentaries, the Prasno-panisad-bhdsya-tikd-tippana by Srinivasa-tlrtha. The Brhadd-ranyaka-bhdsya of Madhva had commentaries (Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya-tikd) by Raghiittama, Vyasa-tlrtha and Srinivasa-tlrtha, and Raghuttama Yati wrote a separate work on it, called the Brhaddran-yaka-bhdva-bodha. The Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya of Madhva had two commentaries on it, by Vyasa-tlrtha and Krsnacarya, and Raghavendra Yati wrote a separate work on it, the Mdndukya-khanddrtha. The Mundakopanisad-bhdsya of Madhva has the following commentaries: the Mundahopamsad-bhdsya-tlkd by Vyasa-tlrtha and Narayana-tlrtha; Mundakopanisad-bhdsya-tikd-tippanl by Krsnacarya; and Mundakopanisad-bhdsya-vydkhyd by Nrsimha-bhiksu.

Teachers and Writers of the Madhva School.

Historical enquiry about the Madhvas was probably first started by KrsnasvamI Ayer, with a paper in which he tried to solve the question of the age of Madhva 1 : but he was not in a position to utilize the archaeological data as was done by H. Krsna Sastrt 2 . The conclusions at which he arrived were in some

1 Madhvdcdrya, a Short Historical Sketch, by C. N. KrsnasvamI Ayer, M.A.

2 See his article, Epigraphica Indica, vol. vi, pp. 260-8.

cases against the records of the Madhva mathas, and the Madhva-Siddhanta UnnahinI Sabha, which is annually held at a place near Tirupati, took serious objections to his statements; Subba Rao, in the introduction to his translation of the Gitd-bhdsya of Madhva, severely criticized Krsna SastrT for his orthodox bias, stating that he was not posted in all the facts of the question 1 . Later on C. M. Padmanabhacarya also tried to deal with the subject, utilizing the epigraphical data, but only partially 2 ; his book deals with all the central facts of Madhva's life according to the traditional accounts. We have already dealt with the outline of Madhva's life. Madhva, on his way from Badarikasram to South India, had met Satya-tirtha and had journeyed together with him through the Vanga and Kalinga countries. In the Telugu country Madhva was challenged by Sobhana Bhatta, a famous monist, who was defeated and converted to Madhva faith. This Sobhana Bhatta was then styled Padmanabha-tlrtha. Madhva had dispute with another scholar who was a prime minister in the Kalinga country; he too was converted by Madhva, and was called Narahari-tlrtha. In the meantime the Kalinga king had died, leaving an infant son, and Narahari-tlrtha was asked to take charge of the child and administer the state on his behalf. At the instance of Madhva Narahari carried on the regency for twelve years and brought out for him the images of Rama and Slta which were in the treasury of the Kalinga kingdom. Madhva at one time had a hot discussion leading to a dispute with Padma-tlrtha, a prominent monist of the locality, who, upon being defeated, fled, carrying with him the library of Madhva; at the intercession, however, of a local chieftain, Jayasimha, the books were restored. Later on Madhva defeated another monist, Trivikrama Pandita, who became converted to the Madhva faith, and wrote the Madhva-vijaya. After the death of Madhva Padmanabha-tlrtha became pontiff and was succeeded by Narahari-tlrtha; we have already given the list of the pontiffs in succession, with their approximate dates as far as they are available from the list of the Madhva gurus in the Madhva mathas of the South. In an article on the outline history of the Madhvacaryas

1 See The Bhagavadgita, by Subba Rao, M.A., printed at the Minerva Press, Madras.

2 The Life of Madhvacarya, by C. M. Padmanabhacarya, printed at the Progressive Press, Madras.

G. Venkoba Rao gives the following chronology of the principal facts of Madhva's life: birth of Madhva, saka 1118; assumption of holy orders, saka 1128; tour to the South; pilgrimage to Badari; conversion of Sobhana Bhatta, Syamasastri and Govinda Bhatta; second tour to Badari; beginning of Narahari's regency, saka 1186; end of Narahari's regency, saka n 97; death of Madhvacarya and accession of Padmanabha, saka 1197: death of Padmanabha-tlrtha, saka 1204; Narahari's pontificate, saka 1204-5.

Grierson, in his article on the Madva-charita in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (vol. vm), thinks that the influence of Christianity on Madhvism is very apparent; he says that Madhva's birth-place was either in the ancient city of Kalyanapura or close to it. Kalyanapura has always been reputed one of the earliest Christian settlements in India; these Christians were Nestorians. Again, among the legends described in Narayana's Madhva-vijaya there is one which holds that the spirit of the deity Anantesvara appeared to a Brahman and made him a messenger of good news to proclaim that the kingdom of Heaven was at hand. The child, Madhva, was being led through a forest by his parents when their passage was obstructed by evil spirits, who, being rebuked by Madhva, fled away. The child Madhva was at one time missed by his parents at the age of five and he was found teaching the way to worship Visnu according to the sdstras. In his tour in the Southern districts Madhva is said to have increased the store of food to meet the needs of his followers. In his Northern tour he walked over water without wetting his feet, and on another occasion he pacified the angry sea by his stern look. From these miracles attributed to him, and from the facts that there is great similarity between the bhakti doctrine of Madhva and the devotionalism of the Christians, and that Madhva flourished in a place where there were Christians, Grierson thinks that Madhvaism had an element of Christian influence. The fact also that according to Madhva salvation can be secured only through the intermediary of the wind god Vdyu has been interpreted in favour of the above thesis. I think, however, that there is not sufficient ground in these arguments for tracing a Christian influence on Madhva. The doctrine of bhakti is very old, and can be traced in a fairly developed form even in some of the Vedic and Upanisadic verses, the Gitd, the Mahdbhdrata and the earlier Purdnas. There may have been some Christians in

Kalyanapura, but there is no evidence that they were of such importance as to influence the orthodox faith of Madhva. He, like all other teachers, urges again and again that his doctrines are based on the Vedas, the Gitd, the Pancardtras and the Mahdbhdrata ; nor do we find any account of discussion between Madhva and the Christians; and he is never reported to have been a polyglot or to have had access to Christian literature. Though occasionally vdyu is accepted as an intermediary, yet the main emphasis is on the grace of God, depending upon the knowledge of God; there is not the slightest trace of any Trinity doctrine in Madhva's school of thought. Thus the suggestion of a probable Christian influence seems to be very far-fetched. Burnell, however, supports the idea in his paper in The Indian Antiquary, 1873-4; but Garbe considers it probable that Kalyanapura might have been another Kalyana, in the north of Bombay, while Grierson thinks that it must have been the Kalyana in Udipi, which is close to Malabar.

Burnell again points out that before the beginning of the ninth century some Persians had settled at Manigrama, and he further suggests that these Persians were Manicheans. But BurneH's view was successfully controverted by Collins, though he could not deny the possibility that "Manigrama" was derived from the name Manes {want). Grierson supports the idea of Burnell, and co-relates it with the peculiar story of Manimat, the demon supposed to have been born as Sankara, a fabulous account of whom is given in the Manimanjari of Narayana. It cannot be denied that the introduction of the story of Manimat is rather peculiar, as Manimat plays a very unimportant part as the opponent of Bhlma in the Mahdbhdrata; but there is practically nothing in the philosophy or theology of Sankara, which is a form of dualism wherein two principles are acknowledged, one light (God) and the other darkness.

Padmanabha-tlrtha succeeded Madhva in the pontificate in a.d. 1197 and died in 1204; he wrote a commentary on the Anuvydk-hdna, the Sannydya-ratndvalt. Narahari-tlrtha, who is said to have been a personal disciple of Madhva, held the pontificate from 1204 to 1213 *; he wrote a tippani on the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya of Madhva. We do not know of any work by Madhava-tlrtha, the next pontiff

1 For a discussion on Narahari's career and date see Epigraphica Indica, vol. vi, p. 206, etc.

(1213-30). Aksobhya-tirtha held the pontificate from 1230 to 1247, and then Jaya-tlrtha from 1247 to 1268. It is held by some that he was a pupil not only of Aksobhya-tirtha, but also of Padmanabha-tlrtha 1 ; he was the most distinguished writer of the Madhva school, and composed many commentaries of a very recondite character, e.g., Rg-bhdsya-tikd on Madhva's Rg-bhdsya, Vyakhyana-vivarana on Madhva's Isopanisad-bhdsya, Pramopanisad-bhdsya-tikd> Prameya-dipika on the Gitd-bhdsya, Nydya-dipikd on the Gitd-tdtparya-nirnaya, and Tattva-prakdsikd on the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya. His most learned and incisive work, however, is his Nydya-sudhd, which is a commentary on the Anuvydhhydna of Madhva; it is a big work. He begins by referring to Aksobhya-tirtha as his teacher. The work forms the principal source-book of most of the writers of the Madhva school; it was commented upon by Raghavendra Yati in a work called Nydya-sudhd-parimala. C. M. Padmanabhacarya says of the Nydya-sudhd that in the whole range of Sanskrit literature a more masterly commentary is unknown.

Ramanuja and Madhva.

We know that the system of Madhva, being a defence of dualism and pluralism, regarded Sankara and his followers as its principal opponents, and therefore directed its strongest criticism against them. Madhva flourished in the thirteenth century, and by that time many of the principal exponents of monism, like Vacaspati, PrakaSatman, Suresvara and others, had written scholarly treatises in support of the monistic philosophy of Sankara. Madhva and his followers, Jaya-tlrtha, Vyasa-tlrtha and others, did their best to refute the monistic arguments for the falsity of the world, and to establish the reality and the plurality of the world and the difference between self and Brahman, which latter was conceived as a personal God. They in their turn were attacked by other writers of the Sankara school, and we have a long history of attacks and counter-attacks between the members of these two important schools of thought. But readers may naturally be curious about the relation between the school of Madhva and the school of Ramanuja. Madhva himself says little or nothing

1 Helmuth von Glasenapp, Madhva's Pkilosophie des Vishnu-Glaubens, 1923, P- 52.

which may be interpreted as a direct attack upon his predecessor Ramanuja; but in later times there is evidence of recondite disputes between the followers of the Ramanuja school and those of the Madhva. For instance, Parakala Yati, in the sixteenth century, wrote Vijayindra-pardjaya, which is evidently a treatise containing refutations of some of the most important doctrines of the Madhva philosophy. It seems desirable to give a short account of this treatise, which is rare and available only in a manuscript form.

Parakala Yati takes his views from Venkata's Tattva-muktd-kaldpa, and often quotes verses from it in support of his own views. His attack is made upon Madhva's view which discards the Ramanuja division of categories (dravya, " substance," and adravya, "non-substance") and his view of the qualities as constituents of the substance; and this forms the subject-matter of the first two sections of the Vijayindra-pardjaya.

In describing Madhva's position upon the question of difference between substance and qualities, the writer says that the Madhvas think that the expression "the blue jug" is justified by the fact that the "blueness" enters into the "sufficient description" of the jug and has no separate existence from it. It is wrong, they say, to affirm that the qualities of the jug stood apart from the jug and entered into it at any particular moment; the conception of the jug carries with it all of its qualities, and these have no separate existence, that is, they are a-prthak-siddha from the jug. Parakala Yati points out that, since we know that the unqualified jug assumes a blue colour by heat, the blue colour may be regarded as different from the jug 1 . The qualities, colour etc., have the substance as their support, and they may flow into it or not according to circumstances or conditions. It cannot be said that the determining condition for the influx of qualities is nothing but the nature of the substance, consisting of inseparability from the qualities; for the possibility of such an inseparable association is the matter under dispute and cannot therefore be taken as granted; moreover, the existence of an upddki is relevant only when the entities are different and when the association of the hetu with the sddhya is true only under certain

1 ghate pdkena nailyam utpannam ityananyathd-siddha-pratyakfam ca tatra pramdnam kinca rupddi svddhikarandd bhitmam svdsraye sphdre asya dgamopddhi-dharmatvdt. Vijayindra-pardjaya, p. 3 (MS.).

circumstances; in which case these circumstances are called the determining condition of association (upddhi) 1 .

But, if the Madhvas argue that even the Ramanujas admit the inseparable nature of substance and qualities, to this the reply would be that according to Ramanuja a-prthak-siddhatva or "inseparability" only means that at the time of the union (of the quality and the substance) the constituent elements cannot be separated 2 . The mere fact that the expression "blue jug" apparently means the identity of the blueness and the jug without any qualifying suffix denoting "possession" should not be regarded as actually testifying to the identity of "blue" and the jug. The Madhvas themselves do not regard the blueness and jugness as the same and so they have to admit that blueness somehow qualifies the jug. Such an admission would repudiate their own theory 3 . If blueness as something different from blue be associated with lotus-ness, then the admission of the fact that, when the words blue and lotus are used adjectivally and substantively with the same suffix, they mean one and the same identical thing is by itself no sound logic. If they are understood as different, then one is substance and the other is not.

As a matter of fact our perceptual experience discloses a qualified character of all substances and qualities. No true follower of the Upanisads can believe that perception reveals the pure indeterminate nature of being. If no distinction can be made out between characters and substances, then it will not be possible to distinguish one substance from another; for one substance is distinguished from another only by reason of their characters.

Moreover, the distinction between substance and qualities is evident from other pramdnas also. Thus a blind man can dispute about the touch-feeling of an object, but he cannot do so about the colour. So the colour and touch-feeling have to be regarded as distinct from the object itself. Moreover, we speak of a jug as having colour, but we do not say that a jug is colour. So it must be

1 na ceha aprthak-siddhatvam upadhistasya sddhyarupatve

sddhana-vydpakatvdd bheda-ghatito hi vydpya-vydpaka-bhdvah.

Vijaylndra-pardjayo. 3 rupdder madlyam aprthak-siddhatvam samsaktam pate anyatra netum asakyatvam era. tac ca tadrupdbhdve'pi rupdntarena dharma-sattayd avirodhitayd na prthaksiddhatvena virudhyate. Ibid.

3 tasya tvayd'pi akhanddrthatvdnabhyupagamdt viiistdrthatve tvad-abhimata-siddheh. Ibid. p. 4.

admitted that a denial on Madhva lines of the classification of categories as dravya and adravya is illogical; it must be held that the adravya, though entirely different from dravya, remains in association with it and expresses its nature as characters of qualities. Parakala Yati then takes up a number of Upanisad passages and tries to show that, if distinction of qualities and substances is not admitted, then most of the sruti texts are inadmissible.

There are some Madhvas who hold that there is both difference and identity, and that even with careful observation the dravya and the adravya cannot be distinguished, and therefore no distinction can be made between dravya and adravya as the Ramanujas make. To this Parakala Yati replies that the rule that determines the reality of anything must be based upon the principle of non-contradiction and then unconditional invariability 1 . The expression "blue jug," wherein the "jugness" and "blueness" may appear in one, may be contradicted by other equally valid expressions, such as "blueness in jug," "blue-coloured jug," and it would thus be ineffective to determine the nature of reality merely by following the indication of the expression "blue jug", which may show an apparent identity between the blue and the jug. The very fact that the jug appears as qualified shows that it has a distinction in the quality that qualifies it. Nor can it be said that because a particular colour is always associated with a particular substance that colour and substance are one and the same; for a conch-shell associated with white colour may also sometimes appear as yellow. Moreover, when one substance carries with it many qualities, it cannot be regarded as being at the same time identical with all the manifold qualities 2 . The distinction of substances on the basis of qualities will also be erroneous, if, like qualities, the special natures of the substances be themselves naturally different 3 . If a thing can be at the same time identical with many qualities, then that involves acceptance of the Jaina view of saptabhangi. Thus, from whatever point of view the Madhva attempt to refute the classification of dravya and adravya is examined, it is found to be faulty and invalid.

1 yastu abadhito ndnyatha-siddhai ca pratyayah sa evartham vyavasthdpayati. Ibid, p. 30.

2 kinca paraspara-bhinnair gunair ekasya guninah abhedo'pi na ghatate iti tad-abhedopajivanena ity uktir apt ayukta Ibid. p. 33.

3 gunagata-bheda-vyavaharo nir-nibandhanasca syat yadi gunavat gunidharma-visesah svata eva syat. Ibid.

One of the important doctrines in which Madhva differs from others is that the experience in emancipation is not the same with all saints or emancipated persons. This view is supported by some of the Purdnas and also accepted by the Vaisnavas of the Gaudlya school; but the Ramanujas as well as the Sankarites were strongly against it, and therefore the. followers of the Ramanuja school criticized Madhva strongly on this point. Thus Srinivasa Acarya wrote a separate prakarana work called Ananda-tdratamya-khandana. But a much longer and more critical attempt in this direction was made by Parakala Yati in the fourth chapter of his Viyajindra-pardjaya. Both these works exist in manuscript.

In the fourth chapter of the fourth book of the Brahma-sUtra the question of how the emancipated ones enjoy their experience after emancipation is discussed. It is said here that it is by entering into the nature of the supreme Lord that the emancipated beings participate in the blissful experiences by their mere desire (sam-kalpd). There are however others who hold that the emancipated enjoy the blissful experiences directly through themselves, through their bodies, as mere attempts of intelligence. It is because in the emancipated state one is entitled to all kinds of blissful experiences that one can regard it as a state of summum bonum or the highest good. But the emancipated persons cannot have all the enjoyable experiences that the supreme Lord has; each individual soul is limited by his own rights and abilities, within which alone his desires may be rewarded with spontaneous fruition. Thus each emancipated person is entitled to certain types of enjoyment, limited by his own capacity and rights.

Again, in the third chapter of the third book of the Brahma-sutra different types of worship are prescribed for different people: and such a difference of worship must necessarily mean difference in the attainment of fruits also. Thus it must be admitted that in the state of emancipation there are grades of enjoyment, experienced by emancipated persons of different orders.

This view is challenged by the Ramanujas, who refer to the textual quotations of the Upanisads. The passages in the Brahmd-nanda-valli of the Taittiriya Upanisad, where different kinds of pleasures are associated with men, gandharvas and other beings, are not to be interpreted as different kinds of pleasures enjoyed by different kinds of emancipated beings. According to the Ramanuja

view individuals in an unemancipated state are under the complete control of the supreme Lord. But in the emancipated state, when they become free, they are all in harmony with God and share and participate in all His joys; they are parts of Him. The emancipated person is like a good wife who has no separate will from her husband and enjoys with her husband all that he does or feels. Thus the emancipated souls, being completely associated with God, enjoy and participate in all His joys: and there cannot be any degrees of enjoyment among the different emancipated persons 1 . Sense-enjoyment, however, is not possible, as such enjoyment of Brahman at the time of emancipation would have to be the experience of the nature of Brahman, and Brahman Himself also has the self-realizing experience; this enjoyment, therefore, being only of the nature of the self-realizing experience of Brahman, cannot have any degrees or grades in it. The enjoyment of ordinary men, being of a sensuous nature, is only the contraction and expansion of their intelligence, and is therefore distinguishable into higher or lower, greater or smaller grades or degrees of enjoyment. The Madhvas think that in the stage of emancipation there are many diverse kinds of experiences, and consequently that there are degrees or grades of enjoyment associated with such experience in accordance with the capacity of the saint; but all the scriptural texts indicate that at the time of salvation one has the experience of the nature of Brahman, and, if this were admitted, there could not possibly be degrees or grades in emancipation.

In the fifth chapter Parakala Yati, continuing the discussion, says that there is no difference in the enjoyment attained at emancipation on the ground that the methods of approaching God may be different with different persons; for, however different the methods may be, the results attained are the same, viz., the realization of the nature of Brahman. There may be some beings who are capable of greater bhakti or devotion and some who are capable of less, but that does not make any difference in the attainment of the final

1 pdratantryam pare purnsi prapya nirgata-bandhanah

svdtantryam atulam prapya tenaiva saha modate iti muktdh svadehdtyaye karma-ndsdc ca svatantrases atvena sarlratayd bhoktur brahmana eva icchdm anusrtya svdnusangika-tulya-bhoga phalaka-tad-bhaktyaivo-pakarana-bhutdh yathdpatni-vydpdrddayah patyur evam muktdndm sdstra-siddhdh parasparavydpdrd api brahmana eva sarvasartrakatayd sarlriny eva sarlra-bhoga-nydydt. Vijaylndra-pardjaya, p. 43.

mukti, and, mukti being the same for all, its enjoyment must also be the same. The analogy of the different kinds of sacrifices leading to different results does not apply to this case; for these sacrifices are performed by external means and therefore their results may be different; but emancipation is attained by spiritual means, viz., bhakti. The argument that the bliss of the emancipated, being the bliss of an individual self, cannot be of the same nature is not valid either; for in the emancipated state the individuals enjoy the bliss of the realization of Brahman, which is homogeneous and ubiquitous. It is wrong too to argue that the bliss of the emancipated, being like the bliss that we experience in our worldly lives, must be capable of degrees of enjoyment. The argument that, since we have a sufficient description or definition of Brahman in regarding it as superlatively blissful, individuals cannot in the same sense be regarded as superlatively blissful, is invalid; for, since the Brahman is limitless (ananta), it will be wrong to limit it by such a definition as the above, since it is inapplicable to Him. The question of its conflict with the individuals who are superlatively blissful in the state of emancipation does not arise. It is also wrong to say that the bliss of Brahman, being possessed by Brahman, cannot be enjoyed by anybody else, since enjoyment (bhoga) really means favourable experience; the wife may thus enjoy the good qualities of her husband, the teacher of his pupil, the parents of their son. The emancipated person realizes the identity of Brahman in himself, and this realization of the nature of Brahman in himself is bliss in the superlative degree. It does not imply any decrease of qualities of Brahman, but it means that in realizing the qualities in oneself one may find supreme bliss 1 .

1 yady atra tadlyatvena tacchesatvam tarhi rdjapurufa-bhogye rajni vyabhi-carah, bhogo hi svanukulatva-prakaraka-saksatkarah tadvisayatv am eva bhogy-atvam, tac ca ddsam prati svamini si$yam praty dcarye putram prati mdtarai pitari ca sarvamibhava-siddham. Vijaylndra-parajaya, p. 124.

CHAPTER XXVI

MADHVA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS

Madhva not only wrote a Bhdsya on the Brahma-sutras y but also described the main points of his views regarding the purport of the Brahma-sutras in a work called the Anuvyakhydna. Jaya-tirtha wrote a commentary on the Bhdsya of Madhva, known as Tattva-prakdsikd. Vyasa Yati wrote another commentary on the Tattva-prakdsikd, the Tdtparya-candrikd, in which he draws attention to and refutes the views of the Vedanta writers of other schools of interpretation and particularly of the Sarikara school 1 . Ragha-vendra Yati wrote a commentary on the Tdtparya-candrikd, the Candrikd-prakdsa. Kesava Bhattaraka, a pupil of Vidyadhlsa, wrote another commentary on it, the Candrikd-vdkydrtha-vivrti, but it extends only to the first book. Raghavendra Yati wrote another commentary on the Tattva-prakdsikd, the Bhava-dipika, in which he answered the criticisms of his opponents and explained the topics in a simpler manner. In the present section I shall try to trace the interpretation of the Brahma-sutras by Madhva in the light of these commentaries, noting its difference from the interpretation of Sankara and his commentators. There are, of course, several other commentaries on the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya and its first commentaries, as also on the Anuvyakhydna. Thus Trivi-krama Panditacarya wrote a commentary, the Tattva-pradipikd, on Madhva's Bhdsya. Nrsimha wrote a Bhdva-prakdsa and VijayTndra Yati a Nydyddhva-dipikd thereon. Again, on the Tattva-prakdsikd of Jaya-tlrtha there are at least five other commentaries, e.g., Bhdva-candrikd, Tattva-prakdsikd-bhdva-bodha, Tattva-prakdsikd-gata-nydya-vivarana, Nydya-mauktikd-mdld and Prameya-muktavail by Narasimha, Raghuttama Yati, VijayTndra Yati and Srinivasa. On the Tdtparya-candrikd there are at least two other commentaries, by Timmanacarya and Vijayindra Yati, called Candrikd-nydya-vivarana and Candrikddarpana-nydya-vivarana. On the Anuvyakhydna there is the Nydya-sudhd of Jaya-tlrtha and Sudhd

1 See Helmuth von Glasenapp's Madhva's Philosophic des Vishnu-Glaubens, Bonn and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 51-64.

102 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

of Vijaylndra Yati; and on the Nydya-sudhd there is a number of commentaries such as that by Narayana, Nydya-sudhd-tippani by Yadupati, Vdkydrtha-candrikd by Vidyadhiraja, and the commentary by Srinivasa-tlrtha 1 .

Interpretation of Brahma-sutra i. i. i.

In commenting on the first sutra of Badarayana's Brahma-sutra (athdtobrahma-jijndsd, "now therefore Brahma-enquiry"), Sankara holds that the word "now" (atha in Sanskrit) does not refer to any indispensable necessity for previous ritualistic performances of Vedic observances in accordance with Vedic injunctions as interpreted by the Mimamsa canons, but that it refers only to the previous possession of moral qualifications, such as self-control, etc., after which one becomes fit for the study of Vedanta. The word "therefore" refers to the reason, consisting in the fact that the knowledge of Brahman alone brings about the superior painless state of all-blessedness, and justifies the enquiry of Brahman. As Brahman is the self, and as the self stands immediately revealed in all our perceptions, Brahman is also always directly known to us. But, as there are divergences of opinion regarding the nature of self, there is scope for Brahma-enquiry. So, though by the general knowledge of self, Brahman is known, the enquiry is necessary for the special knowledge of Brahman or the nature of self.

Madhva explains the reason (atah) for Brahma-enquiry as being the grace of the Lord Visnu—as greater favours from the Lord Visnu can be acquired only by proper knowledge of Him, Brahma-enquiry, as a source of Brahma-knowledge, is indispensable for securing His favours. Brahma-enquiry is due to the grace of the great Lord; for He alone is the mover of all our mental states 2 . There are, according to Madhva, three stages of fitness for the study of Vedanta. A studious person devoted to the Lord Visnu is in the third, a person endowed with the sixfold moral qualifications of self-control, etc., is in the second, and the person who is solely attached to the Lord and, considering the whole world to be

1 See Helmuth von Glasenapp's Madhva s Philosophic des Vishnu-Glaubens, Bonn and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 51-64.

2 atha-sabdasydtah-sabdo hetv-arthe samudlritah. parasya brahmano Visnoh prasdddd iti va bhavet. sa hi sarva-mano-vrtti-prerakah samudahrtah.

Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, 1. 1. 1.

transitory, is wholly unattached to it, is in the first stage of fitness 1 . Again, the performance of the Vedic observances can entitle us only to the inferior grace of the Lord, listening to the scriptural texts to a little higher degree of grace; but the highest grace of the Lord, leading to mukti, can be secured only through knowledge 2 . Right knowledge can be secured only through listening to scriptural texts (sravana), reflection (manana), meditation (nididhydsana) and devotion (bhakti) ; no one acquires right knowledge without these. The word "Brahman", Madhva holds, means the great Lord Visnu. One of the most important points which Madhva wishes to emphasize against Sankara in regard to the first sutra, as he brings out clearly in his Nydya-vivarana, consists in his belief that even the root meaning of Brahman means "the great" or "endowed with all qualities of perfection", and hence it cannot be identified with the imperfect individual souls, since we know from the Upanisads that the world sprang forth from it 3 . Our object in getting ourselves employed in Brahma-enquiry is the attainment of knowledge of Visnu as the all-perfect One, from whom we imperfect beings are in a sense so different; Lord Visnu will be pleased by this our knowledge of Him, and He will release us from our bondage. In the Anuvydkhydna Madhva tries to emphasize the fact that our bondage is real, and that the release is also real, as effected by the grace of the Lord Visnu. Madhva argues that, if sorrow, pain, etc.—all that constitutes bondage—were false and unreal, there would be some proof (pramdna) by which this is established. If such a proof exists, the system naturally becomes dualistic. The form-less and difference-less Brahman (according to Sankara's view) cannot itself participate in any demonstration of proof. Also the falsehood of the world-appearance cannot be defined as that which is contradicted by knowledge (jndna-bddhyatva) ; for, if the concept of Brahman is pure and differenceless intelligence, it cannot involve within it the notion that it is different from the world-appearance (anyathdtva) or that it negates it, which is necessary if the Brahma-knowledge is said to

1 Ibid.

2 karmandtrddhamah proktah prasadah sravanadibhir madhyamo jndna-sampattya prasadas tuttamo matah. Ibid.

3 Brahma-sabdena purna-gunatvoktendnubhava-siddhdlpagunojlvdbhedah.

Nydya-vivarana of Madhva, I. i. i.

104 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

contradict the world-appearance. When the Brahman is considered to stand always self-revealed, what is the ajndna of Sankara going to hide? If it is said that it hides the false differences of an objective world, then a further difficulty arises—that the false differences owe their existence to ajndna, but, in order that ajndna might hide them, they must be proved to have a separate existence independent of ajndna, so that it may hide them. Here is then a clear case of a vicious circle; the very name ajndna shows that it can yield no knowledge of itself and it is therefore false; but even then such a false entity cannot have any existence, as the want of knowledge and ajndna are so related that we have either a vicious infinite (anavasthd) or a vicious circle (anyonydsraya) ; for in any specific case ignorance of any entity is due to its ajndna, and that ajndna is due to a particular ignorance, and so on. Sarikara's interpretation thus being false, it is clear that our sorrow and bondage are real, and the Vedas do not hold that the Brahman and the individual souls are identical—for such an explanation would openly contradict our experience 1 .

The Tdtparya-candrikd, a recondite commentary by Vyasa Yati on the Tattva-prahdsikd of Jaya-tlrtha, not only explains the purport of the Bhdsya of Madhva, but always refers to and tries to refute the views of opponents on most of the disputed points 2 . It raises a few important philosophical problems, in which it criticizes the views of the followers of Sarikara—Vacaspati, Prakasatman and others—which could hardly be overlooked. Thus it refers to the point raised by Vacaspati in his Bhdmati, a commentary on the Bhdsya of Sankara, viz., that there is no validity in the objection that there is no necessity of any Brahma-enquiry on the ground that the individual soul, which is identical with Brahman, is directly and immediately experienced by us, and that even the extinction of nescience (avidyd) cannot be considered as the desired end, since, though the self is always experienced as self revealed, such an experience does not remove the avidyd; and that, since the notion of the ego is implied even in studying and understanding Vedantic

1 satyatvdt tena duhkhddeh pratyakfena virodhatah na brahmatvam vaded vedo flvasya hi kathamcana.

Anuvydkhydna, I. i. i.

2 prati-sutram prakasyeta ghatandghatane mayd szHydnya-pakfayoh samyag viddmkurvantu surayah.

Op. cit. verse 10.

texts, the Vedantic passages which seem to describe Brahman as the pure identity of subject-objectless intelligence, being and blessedness, have to be otherwise explained to suit our ordinary experience. For it is certain that the self-revealed Vedanta passages denote the Brahman of the above description, and, since these cannot have any other meaning, our so-called experience, which may easily be subject to error, has to be disbelieved. The result arrived at according to the Bhdmati then is that the unmistakable purport of the Vedanta texts is the differenceless reality, the Brahman, and that, since this pure Brahman is not directly revealed in experience (suddho na bhdti), an enquiry regarding the nature of pure Brahman is justified 1 .

The objection which Vyasa-tlrtha raises against the above view of Vacaspati is that, if in our ordinary experience the "pure" does not reveal itself, what could this mean? Does it mean that that which does not reveal itself is a difference from the body, the negation of our character as doer and enjoyer, or non-difference between Brahman and dtman, or the negation of mere duality? But is this non-revealing entity different from the self? If so, then it is contrary to the general monistic Vedantic conclusion; and, if it is urged that the existence of a negative entity will not involve a sacrifice of the monistic principle, it can be pointed out that such a view of negation has already been refuted in the work called Nydydmrta. If such a non-revealing entity is false, then it cannot for the scriptures be the subject of instruction. If, again, it is held that it is the self (dtman) that does not reveal itself in experience, then this can be held only in the sense that dtman has two parts, that one part is revealed while the other is not, and that there is some imaginary or supposed difference (kalpita-bheda) between the two, such that, though the self is revealed (grhita), its non-revealing (abhdsamdna) part (amsa) does not seem to have been revealed and experienced (agrhita iva bhdti). But, if even this is the case, it is acknowledged that there is no real difference between any two supposed parts of the self; the non-appearing part must be endowed with an unreal and illusory difference (kalpita-bheda), and no Vedanta can undertake the task of instructing in the nature of such an illusory and non-appearing self. The non-appearing part may be either real or unreal; if it is unreal, as it must be on such a supposition, it cannot

1 Ibid. pp. 15-17.

106 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

be an object of the Vedanta to instruct about its nature. For, if the illusory non-appearing remains even when the self is known, this illusion can never break; for all illusory images break with the true knowledge of the locus or the support (adhisthdna) of such illusions (e.g. with the knowledge of the conch-shell the illusory image of silver vanishes) 1 . Moreover, the dtman is self-revealed, and so it cannot be said that it does not appear in experience as self-revealed (svaprakasatvena bhdvayogdt). If it is argued that, though self-revealed, yet it may be covered by avidyd, the answer to such an objection is that, if the avidyd could cover the revelation of the self, the avidyd itself and its products such as pain, sorrow, etc., could not be revealed by it; for it is acknowledged that the revelation of these is effected by the self-revealing self 2 . It is also evident that intelligence (cit) or the being self-revealed (sphurati) cannot also remain not-revealed (asphurati). Nor can it be held that, though pure intelligence is itself in its purity self-revealed (sva-prakdka), yet, since it is opposed to ajndna only through the mental states (vrtti) and not by itself, and since ordinarily there is no vrtti for itself, it can lie covered by the ajndna and, being thus hidden in spite of its self-revealing character, can become a fit subject of enquiry. Such a supposition is not true; for, if the pure intelligence is not opposed to nescience (ajndna), the sorrow, etc. which are directly known by pure intelligence should have remained covered by ajndna. The view is that pleasure, pain, etc. cannot be considered to have a reality even while they are not perceived. A mental state or vrtti of the form of an object is only possible when the object is already existent; for according to Vedanta epistemology the antahkarana or mind must rush out through the senses and get itself transformed into the form of the object, and for this the object must exist previously; but feelings such as pleasure, pain, etc., have no existence except when they are felt; and, if it is said that a vrtti is necessary to apprehend it, then it must be admitted to have a previous objective existence, which is impossible 3 . It must be admitted, therefore, that feelings are directly known by

1 adhifthdna-jndnasyaiva bhrama-virodhitayd tasmin saty apt bheda-bhramasya tan-nimittakdgrhJtaropasya vd abhyupagame mrvartakdntarasydbhdvdt tad-anivrtti-prasangdt. yad uktam abhdsamdno'rnsa atmatiriktas cet satyo mithyd vd iti tatra mithyd-bhuta iti brumah. Candrikd-vdkydrtha-vivrti, p. 18.

2 sva-prakdsasydpi avidyd-vasdd abhdne avidydder duhkhddei ca prakdso na sydt, tasya caitanyaprakdsddMnaprakdsdc copagamdt. Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 19.

pure intelligence, without the intervention of a vrtti or mind-state, and that would be impossible if the cit had no opposition of ajndna; for then the cit by itself would always have remained hidden, and there could not have been any apprehension of pain, etc. 1 Another point also arises in this connection in our consideration of the theory of perception of ordinary objects according to the Sankara school of Vedanta. For it is held there that even in the mincj-states corresponding to the perception of objects (such as "this jug") there is the revelation of pure intelligence as qualified by the mind-state-form of a jug; but if this is so, if our perception of jug means only the shining of pure intelligence (cit) with the mind-state-form of a jug added to it, then it cannot be denied that this complex percept necessarily involves the self-revelation of pure intelligence 2 .

Further, it cannot be suggested that there is an appearance of an element of non-self (andtman) and that this justifies our enquiry; for, if this non-self shines forth as an extraneous and additional entity along with the self-revealing intelligence, then, since that does not interfere with the revelation of this pure intelligence, there is no occasion for such an enquiry. It is evident that this non-self cannot appear as identical (tdddtmya) with the self; for, when the pure intelligence shines as such, there is no room for the appearance of any element of non-self in this manner (adhisthdne tattvatah sphurati andtmdropdyogdc ca). An analogy has been put forth by Vacaspati in his Bhdmati, where he wishes to suggest that, just as the various primary musical tones, though intuitively apprehended in our ordinary untutored musical perception, can only be properly manifested by a close study of musical science (gandharva-sdstra), so the true Brahma-knowledge can dawn only after the mind is prepared by realizing the purport of the Vedanta texts and their discussions, and so, though in the first instance in our ordinary experience there is the manifestation of the self-revealing cit, yet the Brahma-enquiry is needed for the fuller realization of the nature of Brahman. But this analogy does not apply; for in the case of our knowledge of music it is possible to have a general apprehension which becomes gradually more and more differenti-

1 sva-rupa-cito'jndna-virodhitve tad-vedye duhkhdddv ajndna-prasangdt.

Candrika, p. 20.

2 tvan-mate ayatn ghata ityddy-aparokfa-vrtterapi ghatddyavatchinna-cid-vifayatvdc ca. Ibid.

108 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

ated and specially manifested with the close study of the musical science; but in the case of our knowledge of Brahman, the self-revealing intelligence, the self, this is not possible; for it is absolutely homogeneous, simple and differenceless—it is not possible to have a general and a special knowledge. It is the flash of simple self-revelation, absolutely without content, and so there cannot be any greater or lesser knowledge. For the very same reason there is no truth in the assertion contained in the Bhdmati, that, though by a right understanding of the great Vedantic text "that art thou" one may understand one's identity with Brahman, yet owing to the objections of disputants there may be doubt about Brahman which might justify a Brahma-enquiry. For, when the simple contentless pure intelligence is once known, how can there be any room for doubt? So, since the pure monistic interpretations of certain Upanisad texts are directly contradicted by ordinary experience, some other kinds of suitable interpretations have to be made which will be in consonance with our direct experience.

The general result of all these subtle discussions is that the Sankara point of view (that we are all identical with Brahma, the self-revealing cit) is not correct; for, had it been so, this self-revealing must be always immediately and directly known to us, and hence there would have been no occasion for the Brahma-enquiry ; for, if the Brahman or the self is always directly known to us, there is no need for enquiry about it. As against the Sankara point of view, the Madhva point of view is that the individual souls are never identical with Brahman; the various ordinary concepts of life are also real, the world is also real, and therefore no right knowledge can destroy these notions. If we were identical with Brahman, there would be no necessity for any Brahma-enquiry; it is only because we are not identical with Brahman that His nature is a fit subject of enquiry, because it is only by such knowledge that we can qualify ourselves for receiving His favour and grace, and through these attain emancipation. If the self is identical with Brahman, then, such a self being always self-revealed, there is no need of enquiry for determining the meaning of the Brahma part {Brahma-kanda) of the Vedas, as there is for determining the meaning of the karma part (karma-kdnda) of the Vedas; for the meaning of the Brahma-kanda does not depend on anything else for its right comprehension (dharmavad brahma-

kdnddrthasydtmanah paraprakdsyatvdbhdvdt) 1 . Though such a Brahman is always self-revealed in our experience, yet, since by the realization of such a Brahman we are not in any way nearer to liberation (moksa), no benefit can be gained by this Brahma-enquiry. So the explanations of this sutra, as given by Sankara, are quite out of place. By Brahman is meant here the fullness of qualities (guna-purtti), which is therefore different from jiva, which is felt as imperfect and deficient in qualities (apurna) 2 .

Madhva also disapproves of the view of Sankara that Brahma-enquiry must be preceded by the distinction of eternal and non-eternal substances, disinclination from enjoyments of this life or of the other life, the sixfold means of salvation, such as self-control, etc., and desire for liberation. For, if we follow the Bhdmatl, and the eternal (nitya) and not-eternal (anitya) be understood as truth and falsehood, and their distinction, the right comprehension of Brahman, as the truth, and everything else as false (brahmaiva satyam anyad anrtam iti vivekah), then it may very well be objected that this requirement is almost the ultimate thing that can be attained—and, if this is already realized, what is the use of Brahma-enquiry? Or, if the self is understood as nitya and the non-self as anitya, then again, if this distinction is once realized, the non-self vanishes for good and there is no need to employ ourselves in discussions on the nature of Self. The explanation of the Panca-pddika-vivarana is that the word nitydnitya-viveka means the comprehension that the result of Brahma-knowledge is indestructible, whereas the result of karma, etc. is destructible (dhvamsa-pratiyogi). But this is not justifiable either; for the appearance of silver in the conch-shell being always non-existent (atyantdbhdva), the word "destructible" is hardly applicable to it. If it is said that in reality the coach-shell-silver is non-existent (pdramdrthikatvd-kdrena atyantdbhdvah), but in its manifested form it may be said to be destroyed (svarupena tu dhvamsah), this is not possible either; for no definite meaning can be attached to the word "in reality" (pdramdrthika), which is explained as being "non-contradiction" (abddhyatva); "non-contradiction" means "in reality"; and thus we have an argument in a circle (anyonydsraya). Brahma, being

1 Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 36.

2 jijndsya-brahma-sabdena guna-purty-abhidhayina apurnatvenanubhutaj jlvdd bhinnam pratlyate. Ibid. p. 46.

no Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

formless (nirdkdra), might itself be considered as non-existent (atyantabhava-pratiyogitvasya nirdkdre brahmany api sambhavdt) 1 . Again, if, as the Vivarana has it, even sense-objects (visaya) serve only to manifest pleasure, which is but the essence of self (dtma-svarupa), then there is no reason why the enjoyment of sense-objects should be considered different from the enjoyment of liberation. Again, the desire for liberation is also considered as a necessary requirement. But whose is this desire for liberation (mumuksutva)} It cannot belong to the entity denoted by ego (aham-artha) ; for this entity does not remain in liberation (aham-arthasya muktdv ananvaydt). It cannot be of the pure intelligence (cit) ; for that cannot have any desire. Thus the interpretations of the word "now" (atha), the first word of the sutra, were objected to by the thinkers of the Madhva school. Their own interpretation, in accordance with the Bhdsya of Madhva as further elaborated by Jaya-tlrtha, Vyasa-tlrtha, Raghavendra Yati and others, is that the word atha has, on the one hand, an auspicious influence, and is also a name of Narayana 2 . The other meaning of the word atha is that the enquiry is possible only after the desired fitness (adhikdrdnan-tarydrthah) 3 . But this fitness for Brahma-enquiry is somewhat different from that demanded by the Sankara school, the views of which I have already criticized from the Madhva point of view. Madhva and his followers dispense with the qualifications of nitydnitya-vastu-viveka, and they also hold that desire for liberation must be illogical, if one follows the interpretation of Sankara, which identifies jiva and Brahman. The mere desire for liberation is not enough either; for the sutras themselves deny the right of Brahma-enquiry to the Sudras 4 . So, though any one filled with the desire for liberation may engage himself in Brahma-enquiry, this ought properly to be done only by those who have studied the Upanisads with devotion, and who also possess the proper moral qualities of self-control, etc. and are disinclined to ordinary mundane enjoyments 5 .

1 Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 69.

2 evam ca atha-sabdo mangaldrtha iti bhdsyasya atha-sabdo vighnotsdrana-sd-dhdranakaram dtmakdnamistheya-vtsnu-smarandthasabdoccdranarilpa-mangala-prayojanakah prasastarupdnanu§theya-rupa-vi^nv-abhidhdyakas ca iti artha-dvayam drastavyam. Ibid. p. 77. The same view is also expressed in the Tattva-pradlpa, a commentary on Madhva's Bhdsya by Trivikrama Panditacarya.

3 Anubhdsya. * Brahma-sutra, 1. 3. 34-8.

6 mukti-yogyatva-bhakti-piirvakddhyayana - sama-damddi - vairdgya-sampatti-rupddhikdrdrpanena, etc. Tattva-prakdsikd-bhdva-dtpikd, p. 12.

The word "therefore" {atah) in the sutra means "through the grace or kindness of the Lord Visnu"; for without His grace the bondage of the world, which is real, cannot be broken or liberation attained. Jaya-tlrtha in his Nydya-sudhd on the Anuvydkhydna of Madhva here anticipates an objection, viz., since liberation can be attained in the natural course through right knowledge, as explained by Sankara and his followers on the one hand and the Nydya-sutra on the other, what is the usefulness of the intervention of Isvara for producing liberation? All sorrow is due to the darkness of ignorance, and, once there is the light of knowledge, this darkness is removed, and it cannot therefore wait for the grace of any supposed Lord 1 . The simplest answer to such an objection, as given in the Nydya-sudhd, is that, the bondage being real, mere knowledge is not sufficient to remove it. The value of knowledge consists in this, that its acquirement pleases the Lord and He. being pleased, favours us by His grace so as to remove the bondage 2 .

The word "Brahman" (which according to Sankara is derived from the root brhati-, "to exceed" (atisayana), and means eternity, purity and intelligence) means according to the Madhva school the person in whom there is the fullness of qualities {brhanto hy asmin gundh). The argument that acceptance of the difference of Brahman and the souls would make Brahman limited is not sound; for the objects of the world are not considered to be identical with Brahman nor yet as limiting the infinitude of Brahman; and the same sort of answer can serve in accepting the infinitude of Brahman as well as in accepting His difference from the souls 3 . The infinitude of Brahman should not therefore be considered only in the negative

1 tathd ca jndna-svabhdva-labhydydm muktau kim isvara-prasadena; na hi andhakdra-nibandhana-duhkha-nivrttaye pradtpam upadaddndh kasyacit prabhoh prasddam apeksante. Nydya-sudhd, p. 18.

2 The Tattva-prakdiikd says that the letter a means Visnu, and atah therefore means through the grace of Visnu: akdra-vdcydd visnos tat-prasdddt, p. 4. The Bhdmafi, however, following £ahkara, explains the word atah as meaning "since the Vedas themselves say that the fruits of sacrifices are short-lived, whereas the fruits of Brahma-knowledge are indestructible and eternal". So that through the Vedas we have disinclination from mundane and heavenly joys {ihdmutra-phala-bhoga-virdgah), and these through Brahma-enquiry. But the Candrikd points out that such a connection with vairdgya, as signified by atah, is remote and, moreover, the connection with vairdgya was already expressed by the word atha.

3 Tdtparya-fikd, pp. 89-93.

way, as not being limited by difference, but as being fullness in time, space and qualities; for otherwise even the Buddhist momentary knowledge would have to be considered as equal to Brahman, since it is limited neither by time nor by space 1 .

Coming to the formation of the compound Brahma-enquiry (brahma-jijndsd), the Candrikd points out that neither Sankara nor his followers are justified in explaining Brahman as being in the objective case with reference to the verb implied in "enquiry" (jijndsd); for Brahma—being pure and absolute intelligence, open only to direct intuition—cannot be the fit object of any enquiry which involves discussions and arguments 2 . But, of course, in the Madhva view there cannot be any objection to Brahma being taken as the object of enquiry. According to both the Nydya-sudhd and the Tdtparya-candrikd the word "enquiry" (jijndsd) in Brahma-enquiry (brahma-jijndsd) means directly (rudhi) argumentative reasoning (manana) and not desire to know, as the followers of Sankara would suggest 3 . The object of Brahma-enquiry involving reasoned discussions is the determination of the nature of Brahman, whether He possesses the full perception of all qualities, or has only some qualities, or whether He has no qualities at all 4 .

Not only did the followers of Madhva try to refute almost all the points of the interpretation of this sutra by Sankara and his followers, but Madhva in his Anuvydkhydna, as interpreted in the Nydya-sudhd and Nydya-sudhd-parimala, raised many other important points for consideration, which seem to strike the position of Sankara at its very root. A detailed enumeration of these discussions cannot be given within the scope of a single chapter like the present; and I can refer to some only of the important points. Thus the very possibility of illusion, as described by Sankara, is challenged by Jaya-tirtha, following the Anuvydkhydna.

1 bauddhdbhimata-ksanika-vijndndder api vastutah kdlddy abhdvena apari-cchinnatva-prasangdc ca; tasmdd deiatah kdlatas caiva gunatas cdpi purnatd brahmatd, na tu bhedasya rdhityam brahmatesyate. Tdtparya-ttkd, p. 94.

a para-pakse vicar a-jany a-jiidna-karmano brahmano vicdra-karmatvdyogdt, aparoksa-vrtti-vydpyasya phala-vydpyatva-niyamac ca. Ibid. p. 95.

3 The Bhdmatt, however, holds that the primary meaning of the word jijndsd is " desire to know "; but, since desire to know can only be with reference to an object which is not definitely known (jiidtum icchd hi sandigdha-visaye nirnaydya bhavati), it means by implication reasoned discussion (vicdra), which is necessary for coming to any decided conclusion.

4 tasmdd veddntddind'pdta-prattte brahmani saguna-nirgundlpagunatvddind vipratipatter jijndsyatvam. Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 109.

He says that the individual is by nature free in himself in all his works and enjoyments, and is dependent only on God. That such an individual should feel at any time that he was being determined by some other agent is certainly due to ignorance (avidyd) 1 . Ignorance, so far as it may be said to be existent as such in the self, has real being {avidyddikam ca svarUpenatma-sambandhitvena sad eva). So the intellect (buddhi), the senses, the body and external sense-objects (visaya) are really existent in themselves under the control of God; but, when through ignorance they are conceived as parts of my self, there is error and illusion (avidyddi-vasdd dtmiyatayd adhydsyante). The error does not consist in their not having any existence; on the contrary, they are truly existent entities, and sorrow is one of their characteristics. The error consists in the fact that what belongs distinctly to them is considered as belonging to an individual self. When through ignorance such a false identification takes place, the individual thinks himself to be under their influence and seems to suffer the changes which actually belong to them; and, being thus subject to passions and antipathy, suffers rebirth and cannot get himself absolutely released except by the worship of God. Those who believe in the mdyd doctrine, like Sarikara and his followers, however, hold that the sorrow does not exist in itself and is false in its very nature (duhkhddikam svarupendpi mithyd). Sarikara says that we falsely identify the self with the non-self in various ways; that may be true, but how does that fact prove that non-self is false? It may have real existence and yet there may be its false identification with the self through ignorance. If the very fact that this non-self is being falsely identified with the self renders it false, then the false identification, on the other side, of the self with the non-self ought to prove that the self also is false 2 . As the selves, which are bound, are real, so the sense-objects, etc., which bind them, are also real; their false identification through ignorance is the chain of bondage, and this also is

1 tasya pardyattatvdvabhdso\'idyd-nimittako bhramah. Nydya-sudhd, p. 26.

* atrahipramdtr-pramdna-prameya-kartr-karma-kdrya-bhoktr-bhoga-laksana-vyavahdra-trayasya idrirendriyddisu aham-mamddhydsa-purahsaratva-pradar-ianena ryavahdra-kdrya-lingakam anumdnam vyavahdrdnyathdnupapattir vd adhydse pramdnam uktam. na cdnendntahkarana-sarirendriya-visaydndm tad-dharmdndm duhkhddlndm ca mithyatvam sidhyati svarupa-satdm api tdddtmya-tatsambandhitvdbhydm dropenaiva vyavahdropapatter. na ca dropitatvamdtrena mithyatvam; dtmarro'pi antahkaranddisu dropitatvena mithydtva-prasangdt.

Ibid.

real, and can be removed only through knowledge by the grace of God.

The idea suggested by the Sarikara school, that the notion of an individual as free agent or as one enjoying his experiences is inherent in the ego (aham-kdra), and is simply associated with the self, is also incorrect; for the notion of ego (aham-kdra) really belongs to the self and it is present as such even during deep sleep (susupti), when nothing else shines forth excepting the self, and we know that the experience of this state is "I sleep happily". This notion "I," or the ego, therefore belongs to the self 1 .

If everything is false, then the very scriptures by which Sankara would seek to prove it would be false. The answer to such an objection, as given by Sankarites, is that even that which is false may serve to show its own falsehood and the truth of something else, just as in the case of acquired perception, e.g. in the case of surabhi-candana, "fragrant sandal," the sense of sight may reveal the smell as well as the colour. But the counter-reply to this answer naturally raises the question whether the false scriptures or other proofs are really existent or not; if they are, then unqualified monism fails; for their existence would necessarily mean dualism. If, on the other hand, they do not exist at all, then they cannot prove anything. The answer of Sankara, that even the false can prove the true, just as a line (a unit) by the side of zeros might signify various numbers, is incorrect; for the line is like the alphabet signs in a word and like them can recall the number for which it is conventionally accepted (sanketita), and is therefore not false (rekhdpi varnepaddm-iva arthe sanketite tarn smdrayatiti no kimcid atra mithyd asti) 2 .

Nor can it be maintained that the bondage of sorrow, etc. is not real; for it is felt to be so through the direct testimony of the experience of the spirit (sdkstn) 3 . Its unreality or falsehood cannot be proved by the opponent; for with him truth is differenceless (nirvisesa): but any attempt to prove anything involves duality between that which is to be proved and that whereby it is to be

1 aham-pratyayasya dtma-visayatvdt. Nydya-sudhd, p. 27. It also distinguishes two words of the same form, aham, though one is an avyaya word and the other the nominative singular of the word asmad. It is the former that is used to denote an evolutionary product of prakrti, whereas the latter denotes the self.

a Several other examples of this type furnished by &aiikara and his followers are here given and refuted in the same manner.

3 duhkhddi-bandha-satyatdydm sdksi-pratyaksam eva upanyastam. Ibid. p. 30.

proved, and that a differenceless entity may be the proof cannot be established by the differenceless entity itself; for this would involve a vicious circle. If the world were false, then all proofs whereby this could be established would also by the same statement be false; and how then could the statement itself be proved?

As has just been said, the opponents, since they also enter into discussions, must admit the validity of the means of proof (pramdna or vyavahrti); for without these there cannot be any discussion (kathd) ; and, if the proofs are admitted as valid, then what is proved by them as valid (prameya or vydvahdrika) is also valid 1 . In this connection Jaya-tlrtha raises the points contained in the preliminary part of the Khandana-khanda-khddya of Sriharsa, where he says that it is, of course, true that no discussions are preceded by an open non-acceptance of the reality of logical proofs, but neither is it necessary to accept the validity of any proof before beginning any discussion. Those who begin any discussion do so without any previous forethought on the subject; they simply do not pay any attention to the ultimate existence or non-existence of all proofs, but simply begin a discussion as if such a question did not need any enquiry at the time 2 . In a discussion what is necessary is the temporary agreement (samaya-bandha) or the acceptance for the purpose of the discussion of certain canons of argument and proofs; for that alone is sufficient for it. It is not necessary in these cases that one should go into the very nature of the validity or invalidity, existence or non-existence of the proofs themselves 3 . So even without accepting the ultimate existence and validity of the pramdnas it is possible to carry on a discussion, simply through a temporary mutual acceptance of them as if they did exist and were valid. So it is wrong to say that those who do not believe in their existence cannot legitimately enter into a proper discussion. After referring to the above method of safeguarding the interests of the upholders of the may a doctrine, Jaya-tlrtha says that, whatever may be mutual agreement in a discussion, it remains an undeniable fact

1 vyavahdrikam vyavahdra-visayo duhkhddi. Ibid. p. 31.

2 na brumo vayam na santi pramdnddini iti svikrtya kathdrabhyeti kim noma santi na santi pramdnddini ityasydm cintdydm uddsinaih yathd svikrtya tdni bhavatd vyavahriyante tathd vyavahdribhir eva kathd pravartyatdm. Ibid. p. 32.

3 tac ca vyavahdra-niyama-bandhdd eva...sa ca pramdnena tarkena ca vyavahartavyam ityddi-rupah; na ca pramdnddindm sattdpi ittham eva tubhyam angikartum ucitd, tddrsa-vyavahdra-niyama-mdtrenaiva kathd-pravrtteh. Ibid.

116 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

that, if the proofs do not exist, nothing at all can be proved by such non-existing entities. Either the pramdnas exist or they do not; there is no middle course. If they are not admitted to be existent, they cannot prove anything. You cannot say that you will be indifferent with regard to the existence or non-existence of pramdnas and still carry on a discussion merely as a passive debater; for our very form of thought is such that they have either to be admitted as existent or not. You cannot continue to suspend your judgment regarding their existence or non-existence and still deal with them in carrying a discussion 1 . You may not have thought of it before starting the discussion; but, when you are carrying on a discussion, the position is such that it is easy to raise the point, and then you are bound to admit it or to give up the discussion. Dealing with the pramdnas by mutual agreement necessarily means a previous admission of their existence 2 .

The Sankarites generally speak of three kinds of being, real (pdramdrthika), apparent (vydvahdrika) and illusory (prdtibhdsika). This apparent being of world-appearance (jagat-prapanca) is neither existent nor non-existent (sad-asad-vilaksana). The scriptures call this false, because it is not existent; and yet, since it is not absolutely non-existent, the proofs, etc. which are held within its conception can demonstrate its own falsehood and the absolute character of the real 3 . Such a supposition would indeed seem to have some force, if it could be proved that the world-appearance is neither existent nor non-existent; which cannot be done, since non-existence is nothing but the simple negation of existence (tasya sattvdbhdvdvya tirekdt). So that which is different from existent must be nonexistent, and that which is different from non-existent must be existent; there is no middle way. Even the scriptures do not maintain that the world-appearance has a character which is different from what is existent and what is non-existent (sad-asad-vilaksana).

With regard to the question what may be the meaning of the

1 sattvdsattve vihdya pramdna-svarUpasya huddhau dropayitum asakyatvena uddsinasya tat-svikdrdnupapatteh. Nydya-sudhd, p. 34.

* pramdnair vyavahartavyam iti ca niyama-bandhanam pramd-karana-bhdvasya niyamdntarbhdvdn niyata-purva-sattva-rupam karanatvam pramd-ndndtn anddaya na paryavasyati. Ibid. p. 34.

3 tatra vydvahdrikasya prapancasya sad-asad-vilaksanasya sad-vilaksanatvdd upapannam srutyddind mithydtva-samarthanam asad-vilaksanatvdt tad-antar-gatasya pramdnddeh sddhakatvam ca iti. Ibid. p. 35.

phrase "different from existents" (sad-vilaksana), after suggesting numerous meanings and their refutations, Jaya-tlrtha suggests an alternative interpretation, that the phrase might mean "difference (vailaksanya) from existence in general (sattd-sdmdnya)". But surely this cannot be accepted by the opponent; for the acceptance of one general existence would imply the acceptance of different existents, from which the abstraction can be made 1 . This cannot be accepted by a Sankarite, and, as for himself, he does not accept any general existence apart from the individual existents (dravyddy-atirikta-sattva-sdmdnyasyaiva anangikdrdt). The Sankarites say that the indefinable nature of this world-appearance is apparent from the fact that it is ultimately destructible by right knowledge and that this world-appearance is destructible by right knowledge and that this world-appearance is destructible is admitted even by the Madhvas. To this objection Jaya-tlrtha replies that, when the Madhvas say that the world is destroyed by the Lord, it is in the same sense in which a jug is reduced to dust by the stroke of a heavy club 2 . But even such a destruction, in our view, is not possible with regard to prakrti; and this destruction is entirely different from what a Sarikarite would understand by the cessation (bddha) through knowledge (jndna). For that, as Prakasatman writes in his Vivarana, means that the nescience (ajndna) ceases with all its effects through knowledge (ajndnasya sva-kdryena vartamdnena pravilinena vd saha jndnena nivrttir bddhah). Cessation {bddha), according to the Madhvas, proceeds through right knowledge (samyag-jndna) regarding something about which there was a different knowledge (anyathd-jndna). The existence of any such category as "different-from-existent and non-existent" (sad-asad-vilaksana) cannot be defined as corresponding to that which ceases through right knowledge; only that which you falsely know about anything can cease through right knowledge: the example of conch-shell-silver does not prove anything; for we do not admit that there is anything like conch-shell-silver which existed and was destroyed through right knowledge, since in fact it never existed at all. Not only in the case of conch-shell-silver, but in the case of the

1 sattd-sdmdnydngikdre ca sad-bhedo durvdra eva; na hy ekdsrayam sdmdnyam asti. Ibid. p. 38.

2 mudgara-prahdrddind ghatasyeva isvarasya jndnecchd-prayatna-vydpdrair vindsa eva. Ibid. p. 39.

n8 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

dkdsa, etc., too, the assertion that it is sad-asad-vilaksana is utterly wrong; for, being eternal, it can never cease.

Error or illusion consists in knowing a thing differently from what it is (anyathd-vijndnam eva bhrdntih). Now conch-shell-silver is a simple case of anyathd-vijndna or anyathd-khydti, and there is nothing here of sad-asad-vilaksanatva or jndna-nivartyatva (possibility of being removed by knowledge); for it does not exist. It may be objected that, if it did not exist, one could not have the notion (pratiti) of it: no one can have any notion of that which does not exist; but the conch-shell-silver is to all appearance directly perceived. The answer to this is that even the opponent does not admit that there is any such concomitance that what does not exist cannot yield any notion of it; for when the opponent speaks of anything as being asad-vtlaksana, i.e. different-from-the-non-existent, he must have a notion of what is non-existent; for, if any one is to know anything (e.g., a jug) as being different from some other thing (e.g., a piece of cloth), then, previously to this, in order to know this difference he must have known what that thing (a jug) is 1 . This again raises the epistemological problem, whether it is possible to have knowledge of the non-existent. Thus it may be asked whether the sentence "There are horns on the head of the man" conveys any meaning; and, if it does, whether it is of any existing or of a non-existing entity. It cannot be the first; for then we should have actually seen the horns; there must be notion of the non-existent entity of the horn, and so it has to be admitted that we can know non-existent entities. It cannot be said that this is not nonexistent, but only that it is indefinable (anirvacaniya) ; for, if even entities like the hare's horn or man's horn should not be regarded as non-existent, then from what is it intended to distinguish conch-shell-silver? for asad-vilaksana must be admitted to have some meaning; asat cannot mean "indefinable"; for in that case conch-shell-silver, which is described as being different from asat, would be definable 2 . Not only can the non-existent be the object of knowledge, but it can also be the subject or the object of a verb. Thus, when it is said "the jug is being produced, ghatojdyate" this refers

1 yo yadvilaksanarh pratyeti sa tat-pratltimdn yathd ghata-vilaksanah pat a iti pratltimdn devadatto ghata-pratitimdn ityanumdndt. Nydya-sudhd, p. 57.

2 nirupdkhydd iti cet tarhi tad-vailaksanyam ndma sopdkhxdnatvam eva. Ibid. p. 58.

to the non-existent jug, as being the subject of the verb "to be produced, jay ate" \ for it will be shown later that Sankara's theory of the previous or simultaneous existence of effects, even before the causal operation (sat-karya-vadd), is false. Therefore, since the nonexistent may be known, the objection that conch-shell-silver cannot be non-existent, because it is known, is invalid.

But a further objection is raised, that, while it is not denied that the non-existent may be known, it is denied that the non-existent cannot appear as directly perceived and as existent {aparoksatayd sattvena ca) ; as if one should find horns on the head of a man, as he finds them on the head of a cow. But in the case of the conch-shell-silver what is perceived is directly perceived as existent; so the conch-shell-silver must be non-existent. In answer to this the following may be urged: those who do not regard conch-shell-silver as non-existent, but as indefinable (anirvacaniya), have to accept the appearance of identity of "this" and the silver (tdam-rajatayoh). Illusion, according to these Sankarites, is the appearance of something in that which is not so (atasmims tad itipratyaya iti). This is not, of course, anyatha-khyati (a different appearance from the real); for the basis of the illusion (adhisthdna, as the conch-shell of the illusory silver) is not here false in itself, but only false in its appearance as silvery or associated with a false appearance (samsrsta-riipa) ; but the illusory appearance (adhydsta) is false both in itself (svarupa) and also as associated with the object before the observer; this is admitted by the holders of the may a doctrine. The holders of the anyatha-khyati view of illusion think that both the conch-shell and the silver are real, only the appearances of identity of conch-shell with silver and of silver with conch-shell are false 1 . This appearance of the false or the non-existent is both immediate (aparoksa), as is well known to experience, and endowed with real existence; for otherwise no one could be moved by it (sattvend-pratltdu pravrttyanupapattes ca). Until the illusion is broken this association of the non-existent silver with the "this" does not differ in the least from the perception of real silver before the observer. The opponents would say that this is not a false and non-existent association (anyathdtvam yady asat sydt), as the Madhvas hold; but it is difficult to understand what they can mean by such an objec-

1 anyathd-khydti-vddibhir adhisthdndropyayor ubhayor apt samsrsta-rupenaiva asattvam svarupena tu sattvam ity anglkrtam. Ibid. p. 58.

120 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

tion; for such an association of silver with the conch-shell cannot be real (sat), since, if it was so, why should it appear only in the case of illusions (bhrdnti), where the first perception is contradicted, as in "this is not silver"? Again, those who think that in the case of illusion the silver is indefinable (anirvacaniya) may be asked what is the nature of that which appears as indefinable. Does it appear as non-existent or as illusory? It cannot be so; for then no one would trouble about it and try to pick it up, knowing it to be nonexistent or illusory. So it has to be admitted that it appears as existent. This agrees with our experience of the illusion ("this silver"). The mere notion of silver is not enough to draw us towards it, apart from our notion of it as existing. But this has no real existence, since then it cannot be indefinable; if this is nonexistent, then it has to be admitted that the non-existent appears in immediate perceptual experience and as endowed with existence. The opponents however may point out that this is not a right analysis of the situation as they understand it. For in their view the true "this" in the conch-shell and its association with silver is as indefinable as the indefinable silver itself, and so the silver in the appearance of silver is indefinable, and so their mutual connection also is indefinable. It is the reality in the conch-shell that becomes indefinably associated with the silver. The answer to this is that such a view is open to the serious defect of what is known as the vicious infinite (anavastha). For, when it is said that the mutual association (samsarga) of "thisness" and "silverness" and the association of the reality of the conch-shell with the silver are both indefinable, it may be asked what exactly is meant by calling them indefinable. It is not of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience (vydvahdrika) ; for the illusory silver is not of any ordinary use. If it is illusory (prdtibhdsika), does it appear to be so or does it appear as if it was of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience? If it did appear as illusory, no one would be deluded by it, when he knows it to be illusory, and he would not trouble to stoop down to pick it up. If it did appear as if it was of the nature of ordinary phenomenal experience, then it could not be really so; for then it could not be illusory. If it was not so and still appeared to be so, then the old point, that the non-existent can appear to immediate perception as existent, has to be admitted. If this appearance of silver as being of the nature of an object of ordinary

phenomenal experience is itself considered as being indefinable, then the same sorts of questions may again be asked about it, and the series will be infinite; this would be a true case of a vicious infinite, and not like the harmless infinite of the seed and the shoot; for here, unless the previous series is satisfactorily taken as giving a definite solution, the succeeding series cannot be solved, and that again depends in a similar way on another, and that on another and so on, and so no solution is possible at any stage 1 . Therefore the old view that even the unreal and the non-existent may appear as the real and the existent has to be accepted; and the world-appearance should not be considered as indefinable (anirvacaniya).

Interpretation of Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 2.

The literal translation of the second sutra, janmddy asya yatah, is "from which production, etc., of this". The purport of Sankara's commentary on this sutra may briefly be stated as follows: "Production, etc." means production, existence and destruction. Production, existence and destruction of this world-appearance, which is so great, so orderly and so diversified, is from that ultimate cause, God (Isvara); and neither the paramdnus nor the inanimate prakrti can be its cause. This rule is not intended to stand as an inference in favour of the existence of God, but is merely the description of the purport of the Upanisad texts on the nature of Brahman 2 ; for the ultimate grasp of the nature of Brahman, which is beyond the range of our sense-organs, can only come through the right comprehension of the meaning of Upanisad texts.

Jaya-tlrtha, in commenting on the Bhdsya of Madhva and the Anuvydkhydna, follows Madhva in explaining this sutra as a definition (laksana) of Brahman, intended to differentiate Him from beings of His class, viz., the souls (jiva), and inanimate objects, which belong to a different class. The idea is that that from which the production, etc., of the world takes place is Brahman, and there are important sruti texts which say that the world was produced from Brahman 3 . It has already been pointed out that by "pro-

1 Nyaya-sudhd, p. 59.

2 janmddi-sutram ndnumanopanyasartham kim tarhi vedanta-vdkya-pradar-sandrtham.

3 Jaya-tlrtha refers to another interpretation of the sutra as jarnna ddyasya hiranyagarbhasya yatas tad brahma. The Tdtparya-candrikd discusses the points of view raised in the Nyaya-sudhd and elsewhere with regard to the meaning of

i22 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

duced, etc." in the sutra Sankara understood production (srsti), existence (sthiti) and destruction (laya or bhanga), and he there reconciled the six stages of existent things (bhdva-vika) referred to by Yaska in the Nirukta, such as being produced, to continue to exist, to grow, to change, to decay and to be destroyed, as being included within the three stages referred to by him; for growth and change are included within production (janma), and decay is included within destruction. Madhva, however, includes eight different categories in the term "production, etc."; these with him are production (srsti), existence (sthiti), destruction (samhdra), control (niyama), knowledge (jndna), ignorance (ajndna), bondage (bandha) and release (moksa) 1 . The existence of all these qualities implies the fullness of qualities signified by the name Brahman. That single being in whom all the above-mentioned eightfold qualities exist is called Brahman.

Generally two kinds of definitions are distinguished from each other, viz., essential (svariipa-laksana) and accidental (tatastha-laksana). Prakasatman, the writer of the Panca-pddih.d-vivara.na, speaks of this definition of Brahman as being of the latter type, since it is only in association with mdyd that Brahman can be said to be the cause of the production, etc., of the world-appearance. In itself

Brahman as referred to by the word yatah. Brha, a constituent of the word brahman, has several technical meanings (rudhi), such as jati (class-notion), jlva, Kamaldsana or Brahma. But the word is not used here in its technical sense, but in the etymological sense, which signifies the entity in which there is a fullness of qualities; for it is only in this sense that the Upanisad texts alluded to in connection with this sutra and the previous one become significant. Again, on the basis of other texts, which speak of Him (from which everything is produced) as lying in the ocean, Brahman here means Visnu (as in the Samdkhya-sruti, dydvdprthivl param mama yonir apsu antah samudre), because it is only in Him that there is the fullness of all qualities. This characteristic would not apply to any of the other technical (rudhi) senses, such as jati or jlva; and so it is that, though the rudhi sense is stronger than the etymological sense (yaugika), yet the latter has preference here: brahma-sabdasya jive rildhatve'pi bddhaka-sadbhdvdt tad brahma iti sruty-uktam brahma visnur eva (Tattva-prakdsikd). It may also be added that, according to the Tattva-prakdsikd, Tdtparya-candrikd and other Madhva works, it is held that, though ordinarily brahma has the technical sense of jlva, yet with scholars the word always has the technical meaning of Visnu. Thus a distinction is drawn between the ordinary technical sense (rudhi) and the technical sense with scholars (vidvad-rudhi), and preference is given to the latter: vidusdm brahma-sabdena visnu-vyakti-pratlteh (Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 120).

1 Anubhdsya of Madhva or Brahma-sutra, 1. 1.2. Madhva quotes for his authority a passage from the Skanda-purdna:

utpatti-sthiti-samhdra-niyatir jiidnam dvrtih bandha-moksam ca purmdd yasmdt sa harir ekardt.

it is of the nature of pure bliss (dnanda), which is also identical in its nature with pure knowledge 1 . Madhva and his followers, however, consider the characteristics mentioned in the sutra as essential and do not think that the essences of dnanda and fiva are in any sense anything else but qualities, in which case they would not be essences identical with Brahman, as would be required by what may be called a svarupa-laksana ; for dnanda is as much a characteristic as any other characteristic is, and, if dnanda could be regarded as a defining essence, then the characteristic of being the cause of the world might also be regarded as a defining essence 2 . If His being the cause involves qualities unessential to Himself, then in His purity He could neither be dnanda, whether as a class notion, as a desirable feeling (anukula-vedand), as being the dearest one (parama-premdspada), or as being opposed to sorrow; for, if these be the nature of dnanda, it must by its very nature be associated with inessential traits (sopddhikatvdt). So knowledge also must express something and must therefore by its very nature be connected with something outside of itself (artha-prakdsdtmakatvena sopddhikam eva) ; for knowledge is inseparably connected with the knower and the known (jndnasya jndtr-jneya-sdpeksatvdt). It has been urged in the Panca-pddikd-vivarana that the knowledge which forms the essential defining characteristic of Brahman is all-illuminating revelation which is not in any way conditioned by its being dependent on, or its being inseparably connected with, objects 3 . But the fact that it can reveal everything implies possession of power, and this power is necessarily connected with the object with reference to which it is effective. Moreover, if any power can be considered as being an essential defining characteristic, then the power of producing the world and of affecting it in other ways (as referred to in the sutra) might also be considered as an essential defining characteristic 4 . The objection, that the essence (svariipa) of anything cannot be expressed by a reference to anything other than itself, is not valid; for a thing wholly unrelated

1 Panca-pddikd-vivarana, pp. 222—3.

2 dnandam laksanam iti cet tarhi jagat-kdranam laksanam astu.

Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 140.

3 anena sarvajna-s'abdena sarvdvabhdsa-ksamam vijfiapti-mdtram ddityddi-prakdsavad avisayopddhikam vijndnam eva brahma-svarupa-laksanam.

Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 210. * sdmarthyasya sakti-rupatvdd, visaya-nirupyatvdc ca, jagaj-jananddi-sdmarthyasyaiva svarupa-laksanatvopapattes ca. Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 141.

124 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

to, and devoid of all reference to, any other thing cannot be known (svarupasya sva-vedyatvdt). It is further held by the opponents that an accidental defining characteristic like that of the Brahman being the cause of the world (tatastha-laksana) —as, for example, indicating a house by a temporary association, as that of a crow sitting on the roof of it—is not an inherent and intrinsic characteristic (ananvayi), whereas an essential characteristic like ananda is an inherent and intrinsic constituent (kdrydnvayl) of the thing. But such an objection cannot rule out the causality, etc., of Brahman as being inessential; for we want to know Brahman in its essence as the cause or kdrana of the world, as much as by any other characteristic. The essential feature of Brahman is its fullness of qualities, as the ultimate cause of production, etc., and these are in no sense less essential than His nature as ananda. Like the power of burning in fire, these powers of world-creation, etc., are coextensive with the essence of Brahman. It is indeed surprising, says Vyasa-tlrtha, that the Sankarites should enter into any long discussion with regard to the distinction of essential and accidental definitions; for all definitions mean the making known of object by its distinctive characteristics such as are well known 1 . But, as the Sankarites believe in absolutely unqualified Brahman, how do they undertake to define it? All definitions must proceed through the means of known qualities 2 . Whether a definition (laksana) be svarupa or tatastha, it must proceed by way of enumerating distinctive characteristic qualities; and, as the Brahman of the opponents has no qualities, it cannot be defined at all.

Ramanuja in his interpretation of this sutra asserted that the characteristic qualities and powers of Brahman referred to in the sutra belong to Brahman as He is immanent; but the Upanisads also define Him in His essential characteristic features, as transcendent, by speaking of Him as being truth, knowledge, the infinite (satyam jnanam anantam brahma); and this distinguishes Him from the souls and inanimate objects, which also are held within Him. But Vyasa-tlrtha points out that Madhva has by implication denied this in his Anuvydkhydna, where he distinctly asserted the causality of

1 prasiddhasya asadharana-dharmasya laksanatvena; also asddhdrana-dharmo hi laksanam parikirtyate. Tdtparya-candrikd, pp. 140, 143.

2 svarupam vd tatastham vd laksanam bhedakam matam sajdtiydd vijatiyat tac-cddvaiti-mate katham. Ibid. p. 143.

Brahman as its own intrinsic constitutive definition 1 . Vyasa-tirtha says that in defence of the Ramanuja point of view it may be urged that, as a special form of a jug would differentiate it from all other things, yet its possession of smell constitutes its nature as earth, so, though causality, etc., differentiate Brahman from others, yet it is His nature as truth, knowledge and infinite that really differentiates Him from souls and inanimate objects. But Vyasa-tirtha contends that this is wrong, since the special form of a jug differentiates it from cloth, etc., and not from earth; an earthen jug is itself earth; but the special form which distinguishes an earthen jug from other objects (such as cloth, etc.) also by that very fact shows that it belongs to a class different from them. Here also the causality which differentiates Brahman from souls, etc., also shows that He is different in nature from them. So the fact that Brahman is the ultimate cause of production, etc., constitutes its essential defining characteristic. He, Brahman, not only possesses these qualities, but in reality His qualities are infinite, and their possession forms His defining characteristic (ananta-guna-sattvam eva brahmano laksanam) 2 .

The two principal Vedanta texts by which the Sankarites seek to establish their theory of absolute monism (advaita) are "that art thou" (tat tvam asi) and "Brahma is truth, knowledge, infinite" (satyam jndnam anantam brahma). Now Madhva urges that, since these may also be otherwise interpreted directly (mukhydrtha) on the basis of difference, it is not proper to explain them on the basis of non-difference with an indirect and distant meaning (laksana) 3 . The Nydya-sudhd points out that with the monistic interpretation the difficulty arises, how to identify the qualityless (nirguna) with the qualified (saguna), as in the case of the souls; the qualityless is indeterminable by itself (nirguna syaiva nirupayitum asakyatvdt)*. If this nirguna brahma were entirely different from the saguna Brahma or Isvara acknowledged by the Sankarites, then there would be a duality; if the relation is held to be indefinable (anirvacaniya),

1 asyodbhavddi-hetutvam sdksdd eva sva-laksanam. Op. cit.

2 Nydya-sudhd, p. 107.

3 bhedenaiva tu mukhydrtha-sambhave laksanam kutah. Anuvydkhydna, p. 5. nanu abhedam upddaya sutra-laksanam vd dsrayanlya-bhedam updddya

mukhya-vrttir na iti sandihyate; vayam tu brumah, dvitiya eva paksah sreydn. Nydya-sudhd, p. 101. * Ibid. p. 102.

126 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brakma-sutras [ch.

then the criticisms against the indefinable suggested in the first sutra apply to it 1 . If, however, it is urged that the unity or identity referred to in the above passages is with regard to the Brahman as pure self-revealing intelligence and the same element as forming the principal reality of jiva, then it becomes difficult to understand how the Upanisads can have the presumption of revealing the self-revealing intelligence 2 . Moreover, it may be objected that, if the Brahman is nothing else but pure intelligence, then its "unity 1 ' with jiva as taught by the Upanisads, being different from Brahman, is false; for "unity " is not pure intelligence, and, if unity is false, then duality becomes true. If the " unity " was identical with pure intelligence, then with the self-shining of pure intelligence there would be the self-shining of "unity" too, and even for expressing the "unity" it would not be necessary to take the help of the Upanisads or of anything else.

Another question of importance arises in connection with the attribution of the epithets "truth," "knowledge," "infinite" to Brahman. Is Brahman, to whom all these qualities are attributed, a simple unity in Himself, or is He a complex of many qualities, truth, knowledge, infinite, etc., which have different connotations and are not synonymous? Pure intelligence (caitanya) is one, but these epithets are many. How can we conceive the one caitanya to coexist in itself with the many attributes which are said to belong to it? How is the plurality of these attributes to be implied in the unity of the one 3 ? To this the answer that Madhva gives in his Anuvydkhydna, which is further explained by Jaya-tirtha, is that it has to be admitted that in the unity of Brahman there is some special virtue (atisaya) which represents difference and serves its purpose; there is no other way of solving the difficulty, and this is the only solution left (gaty-antardbhdvdd arthdpattyd). This special virtue, which serves to hold and reconcile plurality without sacrificing its

1 In such Upanisad passages as sdksl cet kevalo nirgunas ca (Svet. vi. n) the word nirguna, " qualityless," could be given a modified meaning, in view of the fact that the strict direct meaning is not possible even in the context of the sentence; for in the very passage itself the brahman is said to be not only nirguna, but sdksl (direct perceiver) also, and this is evidently a guna. It is not possible to attribute a guna and to call it nirguna at the same time. Nydya-sudhd, p. 102.

2 svaprakasa-caitanydtmakam ca sdstra-pratipddyam ceti vydhatam.

Ibid. p. 103.

3 caitanyam ekam satyatvadiny anekdni iti samkhyd-vailaksariyam ityddi-bhedakdrydni cdvagamyante. Ibid. p. 106.

unity, is called by the Madhvas visesa ; this vUesa exists not only in Brahman, but in all other things. Thus, for example, a cloth is not different from its whiteness, since both of them form one indissoluble whole. So it has to be admitted that there is in cloth such a special virtue, a visesa, by which it remains one with itself and yet shows the plurality of qualities with which it is sure to form a whole. These viiesas are infinite in number in the infinite number of objects, though there is no intrinsic difference in the nature of these visesas. Each whole or unity may be said to possess as many visesas as there are qualities through which it expresses itself, and each of these visesas is different from the others according to the difference of the quality with which it is associated; but these visesas are not considered as requiring other visesas for their connection with the thing, and so there is no vicious infinite (ana-vastha). So there is not only one visesa in each thing, but there are as many vUesas as there are different qualities unified with it 1 .

The result attained by the first two sutras, then, is that Brahman, as defined by the second sutra, is the object of enquiry for those who seek release.

Interpretation of Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 3—4.

Sankara gives two interpretations of this sutra, sdstra-yonitvat ("because of its being scripture-cause"), expounding the compound "scripture-cause" in two ways, first, as "the cause of the scriptures," secondly as "that of which the scripture is the cause or source of revelation or pramdna." The force of the first meaning is that Brahman is omniscient not only as being the cause of the production, etc., of the world, but also as being the cause of the revelation of the Vedas, since no one but an omniscient being could be the source of the Vedas, which are the greatest repository of knowledge unfathomable by human intellect. The second meaning suggests that it is the Vedas only which can prove to us that Brahman is the cause of the production, etc., of the world 2 .

1 tepy ukta-laksana-visesd asesato'pi vastusu pratyekam anantdh santy ato nokta-dosdvakdsah; anemia hi upalaksanam; yatra yavanto vyavahdrds tatra tdvanto visesa iti jndtavyam. Ibid. p. 106.

It may be noted in this connection that the Madhvas were more or less forced to this position of accepting the visesas, as they could not accept the samavdya relation of the Nydya-vaisesika, which is rejected by the Brakma-sutras.

2 sdstrdd eva pramdndj jagato janmadi-kdranam brahma adhigamyate.

Bhdsya of &ankara, I. 1.3.

128 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

The Madhvas accept the second meaning and object to the first, on the ground that His being the source of the Vedas does not in any way add anything to His omniscience beyond what was implied in His being the cause of the production, etc., of the world, as described in the first sutra 1 . The commentators on Madhva's Bhdsya and Anuvydkhydna, Jaya-tlrtha, Vyasa-tlrtha and others, following Madhva's explicit statements, argue in detail that the word "scripture" (sdstra) in the sutra means the Vedas Rk, Sdman, Yajus and Aiharva, and not the Saiva dgamas, which hold that Siva is the cause of the production, etc., of the world 2 . The Madhva commentators try to emphasize the fact that inference by itself is helpless to prove Brahman to be the cause of the production, etc., of the world.

Sutra I. 1.4. Sankara here supposes a mimdmsd objection that the Vedas cannot have for their purport the establishing of Brahman, since they are always interested in orders and prohibitions with reference to some kind of action. He refutes it by saying that a proper textual study of the Upanisads shows that their principal purport is the establishing of pure Brahman, and that it has no connection whatever with the performance of any action.

Madhva holds that this sutra (tat tu samanvaydt, "that however through proper relationing") means that it is intended to indicate that all the scriptures (sdstra) agree in holding Visnu as Brahman and the ultimate cause, and not Siva or any other gods, as held by

1 katham ca ananta-paddrthakasya prapancasya kartrtvena na sphufam tad-eka-desa-veda-kdranatvena sphutlbhavisyati sarvajnam. Jaya-tlrtha further argues that there is no such concomitance whereby from the authorship of the Vedas omniscience can be inferred. Again, if the authorship of the Vedas means the literary composition representing facts known by sense experience or inference, it must be admitted that the Vedas have been composed like any other ordinary book (pauruseya) ; and, if the authorship means only utterance like that by a teacher, that may not mean even a thorough knowledge of the contents of the Vedas. Nydya-sudhd, pp. in, 112.

2 The other scriptures which the Madhvas admitted as authoritative are the Pancardtra, Mahdbhdrata and Rdmdyana and not the Sdmkhya, Yoga or Pdsupata. Thus Madhva says in his Bhdsya: Rg-yajuh-sdmdtharvas ca bhdratam panca-rdtrakam, mula-rdmdyanam caiva sdstrdnlty abhidhiyate. Whatever else agrees with these has to be accepted as valid, and the other so-called scriptures have to be rejected. The Pancardtra and the Vedas are in thorough agreement, and therefore the word sdstra in the sutra refers to the Pancardtra; so that by declaring the validity of the Pancardtra alone the Vedas, which agree with it, are also accepted as valid, but everything else which is in disagreement with it is rejected. Thus Madhva says in his bhdsya on this siitra: veda-pancardtrayor aikydbhiprdyena paiica-rdtrasyaiva prdmdnyam uktam.

others. The mlmdmsd objection and Sankara's own views are, of course, all rejected on grounds similar to those already dealt with in the first sutra 1 .

A general review of the other important topics of the Brahma-sutras.

On the topic (adhikarana) contained in sutras 5-11 Sankara suggests the following argument against the supposed Samkhya claim that the ultimate causality is attributed in the Upanisads to prakrii and not to Brahman: he says that prakrtt is foreign to the Upanisads; for they speak of perceiving (iksater ndsabdam) 2 , and perceiving can only be true of an intelligent agent. Brahman being all-revealing eternal intelligence, omniscience and perceiving (iksati) can very well be attributed to it. The word "perceiving" (iksati) of the text cannot be otherwise explained; for its reference to an intelligent agent is further emphasized by its being called dtman (self), a word whose application to conscious agents is well known 3 ; and we are certain that the word dtman cannot mean prakrti; for the instruction of liberation is given to it 4 . Moreover, the whole chapter ends in the same vein, and there is no further correction of the sense in which the dtman, etc., have been used, as might have been the case, if this dtman had been rejected later on as bearing a meaning irrelevant to the teaching of release 5 . Moreover, the cause referred to in the above passages is also spoken of in the same textual connection as being the last place of dissolution, to which everything returns 6 . Moreover, there is in all Vedanta texts 7 a complete agreement in regard to such an interpretation, and there are also explicit statements of the Upanisads (srutatvdc ca Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 11), which declare an Isvara to be the ultimate cause of the world 8 . So according to Sarikara the purport of this topic is that according to these sutras Brahman is the ultimate cause and not prakrtt.

1 See Tdtparya-candrikd (on I. i. 4), pp. 201-4.

2 The Upanisad passage referred to is tad aiksata bahu sydm, etc. Chdndogya, vi. 2. 3.

3 gaunas cet ndtma-sabddt, Brahma-sutra, 1. 1. 6; see also anena jivena dtmand anupravisya {Chdndogya, vi. 3. 2).

4 tan-nisthasya moksopadesdt. Ibid. 1. 1. 7; also text referred to. Chdndogya, VI. 14. 2. s heyatva-vacandc ca. Ibid. 1. 1.8.

6 svdpyaydt, ibid. 1. 1. 9; also Chdndogya, vi. 8. 1.

7 gati-sdmdnydt. Ibid. 1. 1. 10. 8 Svetdsvatara, vi. 9.

130 Madhva* s Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

Madhva and his followers do not find any reference to a refutation of the Samkhya doctrine, but a simple assertion of the fact that Brahman is not undescribed by the sdstras, because they themselves enjoin that He should be perceived 1 . Unless Brahman could be described by the sdstras, there would be no meaning in their reference to the possibility of discussing it. This refers to the highest soul, Brahman, and not only to the lower and qualified soul, because it is said that liberation depends on it, and it is also said that the final return of all things in the great dissolution takes place in it; the nirguna Brahman is also definitely described in the Upanisad texts.

On the sixth topic {sutras 12-19) Sarikara tries to prove, by a comparison of the several passages from the Taittiriya Upanisad and the supposed objections from the other Upanisads, that the word "blissful," anandamaya (in Taittiriya, 11. 5) refers to the supreme soul or Brahman; Madhva and his followers contend that the word anandamaya refers to Visnu and to him alone, and not to any other deity. All the other sutras of this adhikarana are explained as giving contextual references and reasons in support of this interpretation 2 .

1 Brahma-sutra, I. i. 5. This is quite a different interpretation of the rule and surely not less cogent. The objection raised against Jsarikara's interpretation is that his reference to the Samkhya as being foreign to the Vedas (asabdd) is not accepted by the adherents of the Sarnkhya, and there are certainly passages in the Upanisads (e.g. Svet. iv. 51) which have to be taken as distinct references to the Samkhya. Moreover, if Brahman could not be grasped and described by any of the pramdnas, there would be hardly any proof of its existence; it would be like the hare's horn.

2 The Nydya-sudhd points out that Jsankara's commentary is based on an untenable hypothesis that two kinds of Brahman are referred to in the Upanisads, Brahman as under the cover of avidyd, and as pure Brahman. Of the Upanisad passages (those which refer to the former), some are said to be for purposes of worship and consequent material advantage (updsandni abhyudaydrthdni), some for attaining gradually the progressive stages towards liberation (krama-mukty-arthdni), etc. Jayatirtha says that this theory is wholly wrong, since it is quite unwarrantable to hold that Brahman is of two kinds (brahmano dvairupyasya aprdmdnikatvdt); for all the Vedanta texts refer to Narayana, the repository of all qualities, but some describe him as being endowed with omniscience, omnipotence, all-controlling power, beauty, etc., some with the negative qualities of being devoid of sin, sorrow, ordinary elemental bodies (prdkrta-bhdntikara-vigraha-rahitatva), and others describe Him as unspeakable and beyond speech and thought (to show His deep and mysterious character); others again leave out all the qualities and describe Him as the one, and yet others as the soul of all (sarvdtmaka) ; but these are all but different descriptions of the supreme person Visnu (parama-purusa), and do not in any way refer to two different kinds of Brahman. It is only through a misconception (that Brahman has only a unitary

On the seventh topic {sutras 20, 21) Sarikara discusses the meaning of a passage {Chdndogya, 1. 6. 6, 7, 8), and comes to the conclusion that the person referred to as being in the orb of the sun and the eye is supreme Brahman. But Madhva refers to a quite different passage and quite a different relation of contexts; and he holds that the indwelling person referred to in that passage is Narayana, the supreme lord 1 . On the eighth topic {sutra 22) Sarikara discusses Chdndogya, 1. 9. 1, and concludes that the word dkdsa there does not mean elemental dkdsa, but supreme Brahman. Madhva also takes the same passage as being indicated by the sutra and comes to the same conclusion; but with him supreme Brahman always means Visnu. On the ninth topic {sutra 23) Sarikara discusses Chdndogya, 1. 11. 4, 5, and concludes that the word prdna there is used to denote Brahman and not the ordinary prdna, which is a modification of vdyu. Madhva, however, comes to the same conclusion with reference to the use of the word prdna in another passage of the Taittiriya Aranyaka 2 . On the tenth topic {sutras 2.4-2.7) Sarikara discusses Chdndogya, in. 13.7, and concludes that the word jyotih there means Brahman and not ordinary light. Madhva does not discuss this topic in the Anuvydkhydna; in his Bhdsya he comes to the same conclusion, but with reference to a quite different text.-The 25th sutra, which according to Sarikara belongs to the tenth topic, is considered by Madhva as forming a separate topic, where the word chandas, meaning gdyattrl {Chdndogya, in. 12. 1, gdyattri vd idam sarvam bhutam, "gdyattrl is all this"), means Visnu and not the metre of that name or the combination of letters forming that metre. The next and last topic of the first chapter of the first book {sutras 28-31) is explained by Sarikara as referring to the Kausitaki passage III. 1. 2, 3, where the word prdna is said by him to refer to Brahman, and not to any air current. Madhva, however, takes this topic in reference to a

nature) that these have been so interpreted by Jsankara, who had no previous teachers who knew the Vedas to guide him (tato vydkula-buddhayo guru-sampraddya-vikald asruta-veda-vydkhydtdrah sarvatrdpi veda-rupatdm anusanda-dhdnd vedam chindanti). Nydya-sudhd, p. 124.

1 According to Madhva doubt occurs in regard to the following passage of the Taittiriya, whether the word antah-pravista in it refers to the supreme self or to some other being: antah-pravistam kartdram etam antas candramasi manasd carantam sahaiva santam na vijdnanti devdh. Taittiriya Aranyaka, m. 11. 5.

2 tad vai tvam prdno' bhavah; mahdn bhagati; prajdpateh; bhujah karifya-mdnah; yaddevdn prdnayanneveti. Ibid.

132 Madhva* s Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

number of other passages occurring in the Aitareya, where the word prdna occurs, and holds that textual comparisons show that the word in those passages refers to Visnu and not to ordinary air currents, or souls, etc.

The second chapter of the first book has altogether seven topics or subjects of discussion according to both Sankara and Madhva. On the first topic Madhva, referring to certain Vedic passages, seeks to establish that they refer to Narayana as the culmination of the fullness of all qualities 1 . Though He is capable of rousing all the powers of all objects even from a distance, yet He in a sportive way (lilayd) is present everywhere and presides over the budding energies of all objects. It is further pointed out that the succeeding passages distinguish the all-pervading Brahman from jivas, or souls, by putting the former in the accusative and the latter in the nominative case in such a way that there ought not to be any doubt that the references to the qualities of all-pervadingness, etc., are to Brahman and not to the jivas 2 . Sankara, however, refers to an altogether different text {Chdndogya, in. 14. 1) as hinted at by the topic and concludes, after a discussion of textual comparisons, that the passage alludes to Isvara and not to jiva. On the second topic Madhva raises with reference to Brhad-dranyaka, 1. 2. 5, the doubt whether the "eats" (atti) refers to the destructive agency of Visnu or of Aditi, and decides in favour of the former, and states that Visnu is also often called by the name Aditi 3 . Sarikara, how-

1 Aitareya-Aranyaka, m. 2. 3. 2 Ibid.

3 Some interesting points on this topic are here noted by Jaya-tlrtha in his Nydya-sudhd on the Anuvydkhydna. Thus Jaya-tirtha says that an objection may be made that God, being the producer and the destroyer of the universe, is consequently eternal, but actions (kriyd) are non-eternal: and how then can the two contradictory qualities reside in God (nitydnityayoh katham abhedah sydt)? The answer to the objection is that even actions in God are static (na kevalam tsvarah sthirah api tu sa tadiya-visesa-dharmo'pi kryd-rupah sthirah) ; and this is not impossible, since there is no proof that all actions must be of a vibratory (parispandd) nature (which may not exist in God). Again, there can be no objection to admitting vibrations to be eternally existing in God. As motion or action can as a result of continuous existence for many moments produce contacts and so forth, so eternally existing motion or action could produce contacts and separations at particular moments (yathd aneka-kdla-vartirty api kriyd kaddcit samyogddi drabhate na ydvat sattvam, tathd nitydpi kaddcit samyogddy drabhatdm ko virodhah). All actions exist eternally in God in potential form as sakti, and it is only when this is actualized (vyakti) that real transformations of energy and performance of work happen (sakti-rupena sthirah sa yadd vyajyate, tadd vyavahdrdl-ambanam); actuality is but a condition or special state of potential power (vyakti-sabdena s'akter eva avasthdvis'esasya znvaksitatvdt). In this connection Java-tirtha

ever, holds that the topic relates to Katha, 1. 2. 24, and concludes that the "eater" there alluded to is Isvara and not jiva or agni 1 . The third topic relates according to both Madhva and Sankara to Katha, 1. 3. 1, and the dual agents alluded to there are according to Madhva two forms of Isvara, while according to Sankara they are jiva and Isvara. Madhva wishes to lay stress on what he thinks the most important point in relation to this topic, viz., that brahtna and jiva are, upon the cumulative evidence of the* Upanisad texts, entirely distinct 2 . On the fourth topic Madhva alludes to a passage in Chdndogya, iv. 15, where a doubt seems to arise about the identity of the person who is there alluded to as being seen in the eye, i.e., whether this person is fire (agni) or Visnu, and Madhva concludes on textual grounds that it is Visnu 3 . Sankara also alludes to the same passage here; he comes to a similar conclusion, and holds that the person referred to is Isvara. The fifth topic is said, according to both Sankara and Madhva, to allude to Brhad-dranyaka, in. 7. 1. 2, where an inner controller (antar-yamin) of the world is referred to, and it is concluded that this inner controller is Visnu (Isvara according to Sankara) or jiva. One of the sutras of this topic (sariras-cobhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhiyate) points out clearly that in both recensions of the Brhad-aranyaka, in. 7. 22 (the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas), the soul (sdrira) is distinctly said to be different from the inner controller. Sankara could not ignore this; but he, of course, thinks that the difference is due to the fact that the jiva is limited by the limitation of ajndna, as the unlimited akdka is by a jug (ghatdkdsavad upddhi-paricchinnatvdt). Vyasa-tlrtha, in his Tdtparya-candrikd, makes this an occasion for a severe criticism of the adherents of the theory of Advaita Vedanta.

also indulges in a long argument and discussion to prove that karma or actions are directly perceived and not merely inferred (pratyaksdsritam karma praty-aksam eva).

1 The Tdtparya-candrikd objects to &ankara's interpretation, pointing out that the word caracara in the sutra is not mentioned in the text referred to, and the word odana in the text ought to mean destruction (samhdrya). Madhva quotes the Skanda and Brahma-vaivarta pur anas in support of his view.

* Madhva quotes in support of his view Brahma-pur ana, Pairigi-sruti, Bhdllaveya-sruti, etc. Sankara, however, seems to be fighting with an opponent (dkseptr) who held that the dual agents alluded to in the passage cannot be either buddhi and jiva or Jiva and IsVara.

3 Jaya-tirtha, in his Nydya-sudha on this topic, points out that the quality that we possess of being controlled by God and the necessity that He should always remain as the controller have also been so ordained by God.

134 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

He says that, if, in spite of such manifest declarations of duality, these sutras are otherwise explained, then even the Buddhists may be considered to be making a right interpretation of the sutras, if they explain their purport to be the unreality of everything except the sunya ("the Void"). The Buddhists make their opposition from outside the Vedas, but the holders of the mdyd doctrine do it from within the Vedas and are therefore the more dangerous 1 . The sixth topic is said to relate to the Mundaka, I. i. 6 (according to both Madhva and Sankara), and it is held by both that bhuta-yoni there and aksara in Mundaka, I. 1.7, refer to Visnu (Isvara according to Sankara) and not to prakrti or jiva. In sutra 26 {rupopanyasac ca) of this topic Sankara first tries to refute a previous interpretation of it, attributed to Vrttikara, who is supposed to hold here (on the ground of the contents of the Mundaka passages (11. 1. 4) immediately following it) the view that Isvara has for His self the entire changing universe {sarva-vikaratmakam ruparh upanyasyamanarh pasyamah). With reference to sutra 21 of this topic, Vyasatlrtha points out in his Tdtparya-candrikd that, in opposing the supposition that, since only inanimate things can be the cause of other immediate things, it is only prakrti that can be the cause of this immediate world; Vacaspati points out that in the occurrence of illusions through illusory superimpositions without real change (vivarta) there is no condition that there should be any similarity between the basis of illusion (adhisthdna) and the illusion imposed [dropya) on it. There is nothing to prevent illusions taking place through the perceiver's mental deficiencies, his ignorance or passions, without any similarity. The world is an illusory imposition on Brahman, the pure and unchangeable:

invartas tu prapanco'yam brahmano parinaminah anadi-sadhanodbhuto na sarupyam apeksate.

Vyasa-tlrtha, of course, cannot agree to this interpretation of Sankara, and tries to argue on the basis of other Upanisad texts,

1 advaitibhir vydkriyate katham va dvaitadiifanam sutrayatdm savsiddhanta--tydgam vinaiva tu yadi mithyarthavadini sutramtyeva kartavyam, sutra-vydkhyd tarhi veda-bddhya-mithydtva-bodhako bauddhdgamo'pi vedasya vydkhya-rupah prasajyate, bauddho'pi brahma-sutram vydkhydyate yathd tathd bhavamiva mithyaifo'rthah kimtu tattvam sunyameveti klrttayet, asad-vetyddivcanam tasya sydt tattva-vedakam. svoktam srutibhih sutre yatnena sadhitam mithydrthatdm katham bruydt sutrdndm bhdsyakrt svyam. saugatd veda-bdhyd hi veddprdmdnya-vddinah, avaidikd iti jndtvd vaidikaih parivarjitdh. veddn pravisya veddndm aprdmdnyam prasddhayan mdyl tu yatnatas tyajyah.

and also on the analogy of creation given there as of a spider (and not of the rope-snake, as would be the case with vivarta), that it should be admitted that the qualified Visnu is referred to here 1 . The seventh topic is said to relate to Chdndogya, v. 11, and the doubt arises whether the word Vaisvdnara used there refers to fire or to Visnu; Madhva, upon a comparison of contextual passages, decides in favour of the latter (Sankara prefers Isvara) 2 .

The first topic of the third chapter of the first book is said to allude to Mundaka, 11. 11. 5, and it is held by Madhva that the "abode of Heaven and earth" (dyu-bhv-ddy-dyatana) refers to Visnu and not to Rudra. Sankara holds that it signifies Isvara and not prakrti, vdyu or jiva z . The second topic is said to relate to certain passages in the Chdndogya (such as vil. 23, 24, vil. 15, 1, etc.), where prdna is described as great, and the conclusions of Madhva and Sarikara respectively are that prdna here means Visnu and Isvara. The third topic is said to relate to Brhad-dranyaka, III. 8, 7, 8, where the word aksara is said to mean Visnu according to Madhva and Brahman according to Sankara, not "alphabetic sign," which also is ordinarily meant by that word. The fourth topic alludes, according to Madhva, to Chdndogya, VI. 2. 1, and it is held that the word sat, there used, denotes Visnu and not prakrti, as the word aiksata ("perceived") occurs in the same context. With Sankara the topic alludes to Pras'na, V. 2, 5. This is opposed by Vyasa-tirtha in his Tdtparya-candrikd on textual grounds 4 . The fifth topic is said to allude to Chdndogya, vill. 1. 1, and the word dkdsa there used is said to refer to Visnu 5 . The sixth topic is said to relate to the Mundaka, and the light there alluded to is said to be the light of brahman and not some other light or soul. The seventh topic is

1 Jaya-tirtha discusses on this topic, in accordance with the discussions of the Anuvydkhydna, the reality of negative qualifications, and argues that negation, as otherness from, has a full substantive force. Thus such qualifications of Brahman as adrsya, etc., are real qualities of Him.

2 With reference to rule 26 of this topic (1. 2. 26) &ahkara notes a different reading (purusavidham apt cainatn adblyate) for that which he accepts (purufam apt cainam adhlyate). The former, however, is the reading accepted by Madhva.

3 In the concluding portions of the first rule of this topic &ahkara refers to the views of some other interpreter as apara aha. It is hard to identify him; no clue is given by any of the commentators on &arikara.

4 Tdtparya-candrikd, pp. 610-12. In the first rule of this topic &ankara quotes the view of some other interpreter, which he tries to refute.

5 In sutra 19 of this topic a different interpretation of Chdndogya, viii. 11, by some other interpreter is referred to by &arikara. He also refers in this sutra to more than one interpretation of the Brahma-sutra.

136 Madhva's Interpretation ofthe Brahma-sutras [ch.

said to allude to Katha y 11. 4. 13, and Madhva holds that the word "Lord" (Isvara), there used, signifies not air, but Visnu. Sankara, however, thinks that the difficulty is with regard to another word of the sentence, viz., purusa, which according to him means Isvara and not jlva. The eighth topic purports to establish that even the gods are entitled to higher knowledge. The tenth topic is said to allude to Katha, n. 6. 2, and it is held that the prdna, which is there referred to as shaking the world, is neither thunder nor wind, but God. The eleventh topic, according to Madhva, alludes to Brhad-dranyaka, iv. 3. 7, and it is held that the word jyotih used there refers to Visnu and not to Jlva. Sankara, however, thinks that the topic alludes to Chdndogya, vm. 12. 3, and maintains that the word jyotih used there means Brahman and not the disc of the Sun. The twelfth topic is said to allude to Chdndogya, vm. 14. 1, and dkdsa, as there used, is said to refer to Visnu according to Madhva and to Brahman according to Sankara. The thirteenth topic, according to Madhva, alludes to Brhad-dranyaka, iv. 3. 15, and it is held that asanga ("untouched") in this passage refers to Visnu and not to Jlva. Sankara, however, thinks that the allusion is to Brhad-dranyaka, iv. 3.7, and that vijndnamaya ("of the nature of consciousness") refers to Brahman and not to Jlva.

The fourth chapter of the first book is divided into seven topics. Of these the first topic discusses the possible meaning of avyakta in Katha, 1. 3. 11, and Sankara holds that it means "human body," while Madhva says that it means Visnu and not the prakrti of the Samkhya 1 . The second topic, containing three siitras, is supposed to allude to Svetdsvatara, iv. 5, according to Sankara, who holds that it refers to the material principles of fire, water and earth and not to

1 The word avyakta, ordinarily used to denote prakrti on account of its subtleness of nature, can very aptly be used to denote Brahman, who is the subtlest of all and who by virtue of that subtlety is the ultimate support (dsraya) of prakrti. Jsankara's interpretation of avyakta as the subtle material causes of the body is untenable; for, if the direct meaning of avyakta is forsaken, then there is nothing to object to in its referring to the prakrti of the Samkhya. The supposed Samkhya argument—that the assertion contained in the passage under discussion (that avyakta is superior {para) to mahat and purusa is superior to avyakta) can be true only if by avyakta prakrti is meant here—is not true; for since all qualities of prakrti are dependent on God, attributes which could be applied to prakrti could also be applied to God its master (pradhdnddigata-pardvaratvddi-dhar-mdndm bhagavad-adhlnatvdt). Tdttva-prakds'ikd, p. 67.

In this topic the sutra, vadatlticen naprdjno hi prakarandt (1. 4. 5), as read by Saiikara, is split up by Madhva into two sutras, vadatiti cen na prdjno hi and prakarandt, which are counted as 1. 4. 5 and 1. 4. 6 respectively.

prakrti 1 ; according to Madhva it is more an extension of the previous topic for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that, like many other words (camasa, etc.), avyakta here means Visnu and not prakrti.

With Madhva, however, the second topic begins with sutra 1. 4. 9, and not with 1. 4. 8 as with Sankara. With Madhva the second topic is restricted to 1. 4. 9 and I. 4. 10, and it alludes to a passage beginning vasante vasante jyotisd yaja, which is regarded by others as alluding to the Jyotistoma sacrifice; Madhva holds that the word jyotis here used does not refer to the Jyotistoma sacrifice, but to Visnu. The third topic with both Madhva and Sankara consists of sutras 12, 13 and 14, and they both allude here to the same passage, viz., Brhad-dranyaka, iv. 4. 17; Sankara thinks that it refers to the five vdyus, not to the twenty-five categories of the Samkhya, but Madhva holds that it refers to Visnu. He has been called "five" (panca-jandh), possibly on account of the existence of five important qualities, such as of seeing (caksustva), of life (prdnatva), etc. The fourth topic according to Sankara conveys the view that, though there are many apparently contradictory statements in the Upanisads, there is no dispute or contradiction regarding the nature of the creator. Madhva, however, holds that the topic purports to establish that all the names, such as dkdsa, vdyu, etc., of things from which creation is said to have been made, refer to Visnu. Madhva contends that the purport of the Samanvaya-sutra (1. 1. 4) is that all words in the Upanisads refer to Visnu and Visnu alone, and it is in accordance with such a contention that these words (dkdsa, etc.), which seem to have a different meaning, should prove to refer to Visnu and Visnu alone. These proofs are, of course, almost always of a textual character. Thus, in support of this contention Madhva here quotes Brhad-dranyaka, ill. 7. 12, etc. The fifth topic, consisting of 1. 4. 16 (1. 4. 15 according to Sankara), 23 (1. 4. 24 according to Sankara) according to Madhva, is to the effect that there is no difficulty in the fact that words which in the Upanisads are intended to mean Visnu are seen to have in ordinary linguistic usage quite different meanings. Sankara, however, counts the topic from 1. 4. 15-18 and holds that it alludes to Kausttaki Brdhmana, iv. 19, and that the being who is there sought to be known is not Jiva, but Isvara; this is opposed by Vyasa Yati in his 1 ajatn ekam lohita-sukla-krpiam, etc. Svetdsvatara, iv. 5.

138 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

Tdtparya-candrikd on grounds of sutra context, which according to him does not justify a reference to the meanings of passages after the concluding remarks made shortly before in this very chapter 1 . The sixth topic, consisting with Sankara of 1. 4. 19-22, alludes to Brhdd-aranyaka, iv. 5. 6 and concludes that dtman there refers to Brahman and not to jiva enduring the cycles of samsdra. Madhva, however, thinks that the sixth topic (1. 4. 24-28) concludes after textual discussions that even those words, such as prakrtt, etc., which are of the feminine gender, denote Visnu; for, since out of Visnu everything is produced, there cannot be any objection to words of feminine gender being applied to him. With Sankara, however, the seventh topic begins with 1. 4. 23-27 (Sankara's numbering), and in this he tries to prove that Brahman is not only the instrumental cause, but also the material cause (updddna-kdrana) of the world. To this the obvious Madhva objections are that, if the material cause and the instrumental cause of the universe could be identical, that could also have been the case with regard to a jug; one could assume that the potter and the mud are identical. Stray objections are also taken against the Bhdmati, which supposes that material cause here means "the basis of illusion" {bhramd-dhisthdna). Sankara, however, has an eighth topic, consisting of only the last sutra of I. 4, which corresponds to the seventh topic of Madhva. Madhva holds that the import of this topic is that such words as asat ("non-existent") or sunya also denote Visnu, since it is by His will that non-existence or even the hare's horn is what it is. Sankara, however, holds that the topic means that so far the attempts at refutation were directed against the Sarnkhya doctrine only, because this had some resemblance to the Vedanta doctrines, in that it agreed that cause and effect were identical and also in that it was partly accepted by some lawgivers, for instance Devala and others—while the other philosophical doctrines such as the Nyaya, VaiSesika, etc., which are very remote from the Vedanta, do not require any refutation at all.

The first chapter of the second book contains thirteen topics. The whole chapter is devoted to refuting all objections from the point of view of the accepted works of other schools of thinkers. Madhva holds that the first topic is intended to refute the objections

1 Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 821. Other objections also are made to &ahkara's interpretation of this topic.

of other schools of believers, such as the Pasupata, etc., who deny that Visnu is the ultimate cause of the world 1 . But these views have no validity, since these teachings are not in consonance with the teaching of the Vedas; all such doctrines are devoid of validity. The Vedas are not found to lend any support to the traditional canonical writings (smrti) known as the Pancardtra or to those of the Pasupatas or of the Yoga, except in certain parts only. Sankara, however, takes this topic as refuting the opinion that the Vedic texts are to be explained in consonance with the Samkhya views on the ground that the Samkhya represents some traditional canonical writings deserving of our respect; if models of interpretation were taken from the Samkhya, that would come into conflict with other canonical writings such as Manu, the Gitd, etc., which deserve even greater respect than the Samkhya. That the Samkhya is entitled to respect is due to the fact that it is said to represent Kapila's view; but there is no proof that this Kapila is the great sage praised in the Upanisads; and, if this is not so, the Samkhya's claim to respect vanishes.

The second topic of Madhva (third of Sankara) is supposed by him to import that no one could, on account of the unfruitfulness of certain Vedic sacrifices in certain cases, doubt the validity of the Vedas, as one could the validity of the Pasupata texts; for the Vedas are eternal and uncreated and, as such, are different from other texts. The authority of the Vedas has to be accepted on their own account and is independent of reference to any other text 2 . If under the circumstances, in spite of the proper performance of any sacrifice, the desired results are not seen to follow, that must be explained as being due to some defects in the performance 3 . The

1 According to Madhva the topic consists of the first three sutras, while &ahkara has one topic for the first two sutras and another for the third sutra (etena yogah pratyuktah), and the latter merely asserts that the arguments given in the first topic against the Samkhya refute the Yoga also.

2 Madhva mentions here the following text as being alone self-valid, quoting it from the Bhavisyat-purdna in his Bhdsya (n. i. 5).

rg-yajus-sdmdtharvds ca mula-rdmdyanam tathd bhdratam parica-rdtram ca veda ity eva sabditah purdndni ca yanlha vaisnavd nivido, viduh svatah-prdmdnyam etesdm ndtra kirhcid vicdryate.

3 There is not only a discrepancy in the division of topics, and the order of sutras, between Madhva and &ahkara, but also addition of a new sutra in Madhva's reading of the text of the Brahma-sutras. Thus the second topic with Madhva consists of the fourth and the fifth sutras only, and the third topic of the sixth and the seventh sutras. But the fifth sutra is the sixth in the isankara's text and the

140 Madhva s Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

main points of the third topic of Sarikara {sutras 4-12) are as follows : It may be objected that the unconscious and impure world could not have been produced from the pure Brahman of the pure intelligence, and that this difference of the world as impure is also accepted in the Vedas; but this is not a valid objection; for the Upanisads admit that even inanimate objects like fire, earth, etc., are presided over by conscious agents or deities; and such examples as the production of hair, nails, etc., from conscious agents and of living insects from inanimate cow-dung, etc., show that it is not impossible that the unconscious world should be produced from Brahman, particularly when that is so stated in the Upanisads. There cannot be objection that this would damage the doctrine of coexistence or pre-existence of effects {sat-karya-vdda) ; for the reality of the world, both in the present state and even before its production, consists of nothing but its nature as Brahman. In the state of dissolution everything returns to Brahman, and at each creation it all joins the world cycle, except the emancipated ones, as in the awakened state after dreams; and such returns of the world into Brahman cannot make the latter impure, just as a magician is not affected by his magic creations or just as the earth-forms of jug, etc., cannot affect their material, earth, when they are reduced thereto. Moreover, such objections would apply also to the objectors, the Samkhyas. But, since these difficult problems which cannot be settled by experience cannot be solved by inference— for, however strongly any inference is based, a clever logician may still find fault with it—we have to depend here entirely on Vedic texts.

The third topic of Madhva {sutras 6, 7) is supposed to raise the objection that the Vedas are not trustworthy, because they make impossible statements, e.g., that the earth spoke {mrd abravtt); the objection is refuted by the answer that references to such conscious actions are with regard to their presiding deities (abhimdni-devatd). The fourth topic of Madhva [sutras 8-13) is intended to refute other supposed impossible assertions of the Vedas, such as that concerning the production from non-existence {asat)\ it is held that,

sixth of Madhva 19 the fifth of £ahkara. The seventh sutra of Madhva 19 altogether absent in Sarikara's text. The third topic of Sarikara consists of sutras 4-11. But the topics of Madhva are as follows: second topic, sutras 4, 5; third topic, sutras 5, 6, 7; fourth topic, sutras 8—13, the thirteenth being the twelfth of Sahkara's text. &arikara has for his fourth topic this sutra alone.

if it is urged as an answer that there may be some kind of nonexistence from which on the strength of Vedic assertions production is possible (though it is well-known that production is impossible from all kinds of non-existence, e.g., a hare's horn), yet in that case the state of dissolution (pralaya) would be a state of absolute nonexistence (sarva sattva), and that is impossible, since all productions are known to proceed from previous states of existence and all destructions must end in some residue 1 . The answer given to these objections is that these questions cannot be decided merely by argument, which can be utilized to justify all sorts of conclusions. Sankara's fourth topic consists of only the twelfth sutra, which says that the objections of other schools of thought which are not generally accepted may similarly be disregarded.

The fifth topic of Sankara (sutra 11. 1. 13) is supposed by him to signify that the objection that the enjoyer and the enjoyable cannot be identified, and that therefore in a similar way Brahman cannot be considered as the material cause of the world, cannot hold, since, in spite of identity, there may still be apparent differences due to certain supposed limitations, just as, in spite of the identity of the sea and the waves, there are points of view from which thev may be considered different. According to Madhva, however, this topic means that those texts which speak of the union of jiva with Brahman are to be understood after the analogy of ordinary mixing of water with water; here, though the water is indistinguishably mixed, in the sense that the two cannot be separated, still the two have not become one, since there has been an excess in quantity at least. By this it is suggested that, though the jiva may be inseparably lost in Brahman, yet there must be at least some difference between them, such that there cannot be anything like perfect union of the one with the other 2 .

The sixth topic, consisting of the same sutras in Sankara and Madhva {sutras 14-20), is supposed by Sankara to affirm the identity of cause and effect, Brahman and the world, and to hold that the apparent differences are positively disproved by scriptural texts and arguments. Sarikara holds that Chdndogya, vi. 1. 1,

1 sata utpattih sasesa-vindsas ca hi loke drftah. Madhva-bhdfya, 11. i. 10.

1 It is pointed out by Vyasa-tlrtha that Sahkara's interpretation is wrong, both with regard to the supposed opponent's view {p&rva-pakfd) and as regards the answer (siddhdnta). The illustration of the sea and the waves and foam (phena-taranga-nydya) is hardly allowable on the vivarta view. Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 872.

142 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

definitely asserts the identity of Brahman with the world after the analogy of clay, which alone is considered to be real in all its modifications as jug, etc. So Brahman (like clay) alone is real and the world is considered to be its product (like jug, etc.). .There are many Upanisad texts which reprove those who affirm the many as real. But this again contradicts ordinary experience, and the only compromise possible is that the many of the world have existence only so long as they appear, but, when once the Brahma-knowledge is attained, this unreal appearance vanishes like dream-experiences on awaking. But even from this unreal experience of the world and from the scriptures true Brahma-knowledge can be attained; for even through unreal fears real death might occur. The practical world (vydvahdrika) of ordinary experience exists only so long as the identity of the self with Brahman is not realized; but, once this is done, the unreal appearance of the world vanishes. The identity of cause and effect is also seen from the fact that it is only when the material cause (e.g. clay) exists that the effect (e.g. ghata) exists, and the effects also ultimately return to the cause. Various other reasons are also adduced in 11. 1. 18 in favour of the sat-kdrya-vdda. Madhva, however, takes the topic in quite a different way. Brahman creates the world by Himself, without any help from independent instruments or other accessories; for all the accessories and instruments are dependent upon Him for their power. Arguing against Sankara's interpretation, Vyasa-tlrtha says that the unreal world cannot be identified with Brahman (anrtasya visvasya satya-brahmdbheddyogdt). Moreover, abheda cannot be taken in the sense in which the Bhdmatl takes it, namely, as meaning not "identity", but simply "want of difference "; for want of difference and identity are the same thing {bheddbhdve abhedadhrariuydt). Moreover, if there is no difference (bheda), then one cannot be called true and the other false {bheddbhdve satydnrta-vyavasthdyogdc ca). The better course therefore is to admit both difference and non-difference. It cannot be said that ananyatva ("no-other-ness") is the same as imposition on Brahman {brahmany dropitatvam). What Vyasa-tlrtha wants to convey by all this is that, even if the Upanisads proclaim the identity of Brahman and the world, not only does such an identity go against Sankara's accepted thesis that the world is unreal and untrue and hence cannot be identified with Brahman, but his explanation that "identity" means illusory imposition

(dropa) is unacceptable, since no one thinks the conch-shell to be identical with its illusory imposed silver. There are no grounds for holding that knowledge of the basis should necessarily involve knowledge of the imposed, and so the former cannot be considered as the essence of the latter; and the knowledge of earth does not remove the knowledge of jug, etc., nor does knowledge of earth imply knowledge of its form as jug 1 . Jaya-tirtha in his Nyaya-sudhd on this topic formulates the causal doctrine of the Madhva school as being bheddbheda theory, which means that effect is in some ways identical with cause and in other ways different. Thus it opposes both the extremes—the complete difference of cause and effect as in Nyaya, and their complete identity as in Sankara or the Samkhya. He argues that, if the effect were already existing identical with the cause, then that also would be existent previously in its cause, and so on till the original root cause is reached. Now, since the root cause is never produced or destroyed, there could be no production or destruction of ordinary things, such as cloth, jug, etc., and there could be no difference between eternal entities, such as soul, etc., and non-eternal entities, such as jug, etc., and causal operations also would be useless. Moreover, if the effect (e.g., cloth) is previously existent in the cause (e.g., threads), it ought to be perceptible; if the existence of anything which is in no way perceptible has to be accepted, then even the existence of a hare's horn has to be admitted. If the effect (e.g., cloth) were already existent, then it could not be produced now; the effect, again, is largely different from the cause; for, even when the effect is destroyed, the cause remains; the causes are many, the effect is one; and the utility, appearance, etc., of them both also widely vary. It is urged sometimes that production of the effect means its manifestation {vyakti) and its destruction means cessation of manifestation {avyakti). This manifestation and non-manifestation would then mean perception {upalabdhi) and non-perception (anupalabdhi). That would mean that whatever is perceived at a particular time is produced at that time. If the effect were previously existent, why was it not perceived at that time? In case everything must exist, if it is to appear as produced, then it may be asked whether the manifestation {abhivyakti) was also existent before the appearance

1 mrt-tattva-jndtie'pi tat-samsthdna-visesatva-rupa-ghatatvd-jndnena ghatas tattvato najndta iti vyavahdrdt. Tdtparya-candrikd, p. 879.

144 Madhvas Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

of the effect; if so, then it ought to have been visible at the time; if the manifestation also requires another manifestation and that another, then there is infinite regress. The point cf view of causal conception accepted by Jaya-tlrtha is that, if the cause of production exists, there is production, and if sufficient cause of destruction exists, there is destruction. A hare's horn is not produced, because there is not a sufficient cause for its production, and dtman is not destroyed, because there is not a sufficient cause for its destruction 1 . The seventh topic with Saiikara {sutras 21-23) is said to answer the objection that, if Brahman and jiva are identical, then it is curious that Brahman should make Himself subject to old age, death, etc., or imprison Himself in the prison-house of this body, by pointing out that the creator and the individual souls are not one and the same, since the latter represent only conditional existence, due to ignorance; so the same Brahman has two different forms of existence, as Brahman and zsjiva. According to Madhva the topic is intended to introduce a discussion in favour of Isvara being the creator, as against the view that individuals themselves are the creators. According to him this topic consists of sutras 21-26; with Sarikara, however, of sutras 24 and 25, which according to him mean that, on account of the existence of diverse powers, it is possible that from one Brahman there should be the diversified creation. Again, sutras 26-28 form according to Sarikara the ninth topic, which purports to establish that it is possible that the world should be produced from the bodiless Brahman. The eighth topic begins with Madhva from the 28th sutra, as counted by him, and extends to the 32nd. According to Madhva the object of this topic is to refute the arguments urged against the all-creatorship of Visnu. Thus it refutes the objections that, if Brahman worked without any instrument, His whole being might be involved even in creating a single straw, etc. Everything is possible in God, who possesses diverse kinds of power. According to Sarikara sutras 30, 31, forming the tenth topic, maintain that Brahman possesses all powers and can perform everything without the aid of any sense organs. Sutras 33 and 34 (32 and 33 of Sankara's counting) form a new topic, which maintains that, though all His wishes are always fulfilled, yet He

1 yasya ca vinasa-kdranam zidyate tat sad apt nirudhyate, na ca khara-visana-janrnam atmavinase va karanam asti iti tayor janana-vindsdbhdvah.

Nydya-sudhd, p. 302.

creates this world only in play for the good of all beings. The same is also here the purport of Sankara's interpretation of this topic. The tenth topic, consisting of sutras 34-36, is said to maintain that the rewards and punishments bestowed by God upon human beings are regulated by Him in accordance with the virtuous and sinful deeds performed by them, and that He does so out of His own sweet will to keep Himself firm in His principle of justice, and therefore He cannot be said to be in any way controlled in His actions by the karma of human beings, nor can He be accused of partiality or cruelty to anyone. The same is also the purport of Sankara's interpretation of this topic. The chapter ends with the affirmation that the fact of Visnu's being the fullness of all good qualities (sadd-prdpta-sarva-sad-gunam) is absolutely unimpeachable.

In the second chapter of the second book, which is devoted to the refutation of the views of other systems of Indian thought, Madhva and Sankara are largely in agreement. It is only in connexion with the twelfth topic, which Sankara interprets as a refutation of the views of the Bhagavata school, that there is any real divergence of opinion. For Madhva and his followers try to justify the authority of the Pancardtra and interpret the topic accordingly, while Sankara interprets it as a refutation of the Bhagavata school.

The third chapter of the second book begins with a topic introducing a discussion of the possibility of the production of dkdsa, since two opposite sets of Upanisad texts are available on the subject. Madhva's followers distinguish two kinds of dkdsa, dkdsa as pure vacuity and dkdsa as element; according to them it is only the latter that is referred to in the Upanisad texts as being produced, while the former is described as eternal. The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth topics relate to the production of air, the being (sat) or Brahman, fire and earth, and it is held that Brahman alone is originless and that everything else has come out of Him. These topics are almost the same in Sankara and Madhva. The seventh topic maintains according to Madhva that Visnu is not only the creator, but also the destroyer of the world. According to Sankara, however, this topic asserts that the successive production of the elements from one another is due not to their own productive power, but to the productive power of God Himself. The eighth

146 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

topic holds that the destruction of elements takes place in an order inverse to that in which they were produced. Madhva accepts the same meaning of the topic. The ninth topic, according to Madhva, discusses whether it is true that all cases of destruction must be in inverse order to their production, and it is decided in the affirmative; the objection that, since vijndna is produced from manas and yet the latter is destroyed first, trfese two must be considered as exceptions, is not correct, since in reality vijndna is not produced out of manas. Manas has two senses, as "category" and as " inner organ" (antahkarana), and the word vijndna also means "category" and "understanding" (avabodha). Where vijndna is said to rise from manas, it is used only in a general way, in the sense of understanding as arising from grasping (dlocana); Sankara, however, interprets this topic as consisting only of the 16th sutra (while Madhva takes the 15th and 16th sutras from this topic), asserting that the production of the sense faculties does not disturb the order of the production of the elements. The tenth topic of Madhva, the 17th sutra, is supposed to hold that there cannot be any destruction of Visnu. With Sankara this topic, the 16th sutra, is said to hold that birth and death can be spoken of only with regard to body and not with regard to the soul. The eleventh topic (the 17th sutra with Sankara) means that the birth of jiva is true only in a special sense, since in reality jiva has neither birth nor death. The eleventh topic, consisting of the 18th and 19th sutras, gives according to Madhva the view that the individual souls have all been produced from God. According to Madhva the twelfth topic {sutras 20-27) deals with the measure of jivas. The topic gives, according to him, the view that the jiva is atomic in size and not all-pervading. Being in one place, it can vitalize the whole body, just as a lamp can illuminate a room by its light, which is a quality of the lamp; for a substance may be pervading by virtue of its quality 1 . The thirteenth topic (27th sutra), according to Madhva, is supposed to affirm the plurality of souls. The fourteenth topic (sutras 28, 29) demonstrates that Brahman and jiva are different. The fifteenth topiG of Madhva shows that, though the souls are produced from God, yet they are not destructible. The souls are like reflections from the Brahman, and they therefore must persist as long as the Brahman remains and

1 A discussion is raised here by Jaya-tirtha regarding the nature of light, and it is held that light is of the nature of a quality and not a substance.

must therefore be eternal. The conditions (upddhi) through which these reflections are possible are twofold, external (bdhya) and essential (svarupa). The external condition is destroyed, but not the essential one 1 . The souls are thus at once one with the Brahman and different; they depend on God for their existence and are similar to Him in nature. The sixteenth topic seeks to establish the nature of souls as consciousness and pure bliss, which are however revealed in their fullness only in the state of emancipation by the grace of God, while in our ordinary states these are veiled, as it were by ignorance (avidyd) 2 . The seventeenth topic seeks to reconcile the freedom of action of the jiva with the ultimate agency of God. It is God who makes the jivas work in accordance with their past karmas, which are beginningless (anddi). Thus, though God makes all jivas perform all their works, He is guided in His directorship by their previous karmas. The eighteenth topic seeks to establish that, though the jivas are parts of God, they are not parts in the same sense as the part-incarnations, the fish-incarnation, etc., are; for the latter are parts of essential nature (svarupdmsa), whereas the former are not parts of an essential nature (jivdndm asvarupdrh-satvam); for, though parts, they are different from God. The nineteenth topic asserts that the jivas are but reflections of God.

With Sankara, however, these sutras yield quite different interpretations. Thus the twelfth topic (sutra 18) is supposed to assert that even in deep sleep there is consciousness, and the circumstance that nothing is known in this state is due to the fact that there is no object of which there could be any knowledge (visaydbhdvdd iyam acetayamdnatd na caitanydbhdvdt). The thirteenth topic (sutras 19-32) discusses upon his view the question whether, in accordance with the texts which speak of the going out of self, the self should be regarded as atomic, or whether it should be regarded as all-pervasive; and he decides in favour of the latter, because of its being identical with Brahman. The fourteenth topic (sutras 33-39), after considering the possible agency of mind, senses, etc., denies them and decides in favour of the agency of soul, and holds that the

1 jtzopddhir dvidhdproktah svarupam bdhya eva ca, bdhyopddhir layam ydti muktdv anyasya tu sthitih.

Tattva-prakdiikd, p. 119.

2 evam jlva-svarupatvena mukteh purvam apt sato jndndnanden isvara-prasddendbhivyakti-Ttimittena dnandl bhavati; prdg anabhivyaktatvena anubhavd-bhdva-prasangdt. Ibid. p. 120.

148 Madhva s Interpretation of the Brahma-sutras [ch.

buddhi and the senses are only instruments and accessories. Yet in the fifteenth topic (sutra 40) Sankara tries to establish this agency of the self, not as real, but as illusory in presence of the conditions of the sense-organs, intellect, etc. (upadhi-dharma-dhydsenaiva dtmanah kartrtvam na svdbhdvikam). Upon the sixteenth topic (sutras 41-42) Sankara tries to establish the fact that God helps persons to perform their actions in accordance with their previous karma. The seventeenth topic (sutras 43-53) is interpreted by Sankara as stating the view that the difference between the selves themselves and between them and Brahman can be understood only by a reference to the analogy of reflection, spatial limitations or the like; for in reality they are one, and it is only through the presence of the limiting conditions that they appear to be different.

In the fourth chapter of the first book the first topic of both Sankara and Madhva describes the origin of the pranas from Brahman 1 . The second topic of Madhva, containing the 3rd sutra of Sankara's reading, describes the origin of manas from Brahman. The 4th sutra, forming the third topic of Madhva, holds the view that speech (vdk) also is produced from Brahman, though we sometimes hear it spoken of as eternal, when it is applied to the Vedas. The 5th and the 6th sutras, forming the fourth topic, discuss the purports of various texts regarding the number of the pranas, and hold the view that they are twelve in number. The fifth topic of Madhva, consisting of the 7th sutra, states the view that the pranas are atomic by nature and not all-pervasive, and that hence there cannot be any objection to the idea of their being produced from Brahman. The sutras 8 and 9, forming the sixth topic, show the production of pranas from Brahman. The sutras 10 and 11, forming the seventh topic, show that even the principal (mukhya) prdna is dependent on Brahman for its production and existence. In the eighth topic, consisting of the 12th sUtra, it is held that the modifications (vrtti) of the principal prdna are like servants, so their functions are also in reality derived from Brahman. The ninth topic, consisting of the 13th sutra, repeats textual proofs of the atomic character of prdna. The tenth topic, consisting of sutras 14-

1 This topic consists according to Sarikara of only four sutras, and according to Madhva of the first three sutras. Of these the third sutra (pratijndnuparodhac ca) happens to be absent in £arikara's reading of the Brahma-sutras.

16, states the view that the senses are instruments of Brahman, though in a remote way they may also be regarded as instruments of the jiva. The eleventh topic, consisting of the 17th to the 19th sutras, states the view that all the other twelve prdnas, excepting the thirteenth or the principal (mukhya) prana, are so many senses. The difference between these and the principal prana consists in this, that the work of these other prdnas, though depending principally on Brahman, also depends on the effort of jiva (isvara-paravasd hi indriydndm pravrttir jiva-prayatndpeksaiva), but the functioning of the mukhya prana does not in any way depend on the individual souls (mukhyaprdnasya pravrttir na purusa-prayatndpeksayd). The twelfth topic (20th sutra) shows that all our bodies also are derived from Brahman. The last topic (21st sutra) instils the view that our bodies are made up not of one element, but of five elements.

According to Sahkara, however, the chapter is to be divided into nine topics, of which the first has already been described. The second topic (sutras 5-6) holds the view that there are eleven senses, and not seven only as some hold, after the analogy of seven prdnas. The third topic (7th sutra) states that the senses are not all-pervasive, as the adherents of Sarhkhya hold, but are atomic by nature. The fourth topic (8th sutra) states that the mukhya prana is a modification of Brahman, like any other prana. The fifth topic (sutras 9-12) states that prana is not simply vdyu, but a subjective modification of it in the fivefold form, and its general function cannot be properly explained by reference to the individual actions of the separate prdnas, like the movement of a cage by a concerted effort of each one of the birds encaged therein; for the actions of the prdnas do not seem to be in any way concerted. As there are five states of mind, desire, imagination, etc., so the five prdnas are but modifications of the principal prana. The sixth topic (13th sutra) states that this principal prana is atomic by nature. The seventh topic (sutras 14-16) states that the prdnas in their functioning are presided over by certain deities for their movement and yet these can only be for the enjoyment of the jivas. The eighth topic (sutras 17-19) states that the senses (conative and cognitive) are different categories (tattvdntara) from the principal prana. The ninth topic (sutras 20-22) states that the jiva is not the creator, who is Is vara.

CHAPTER XXVII

A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

Ontology.

The philosophy of Madhva admits the categories, viz., substance (dravya), quality (guna), action {karma), class-character (sdmdnya), particularity (visesa), qualified (visista) whole (arnsi), power (sakti), similarity (sddrsya) and negation (abhdva) 1 . Dravya is defined as the material cause (updddna-kdrana) 2 . A dravya is a material cause with reference to evolutionary changes (parindma) and manifestation (abhivyakti) or to both. Thus the world is subject to evolutionary changes, whereas God or souls can only be manifested or made known, but cannot undergo any evolutionary change; again, ignorance (avidyd) may be said to undergo evolutionary changes and to be the object of manifestation as well. The substances are said to be twenty, viz., the highest self or God (paramdtman), Laksmi, souls (jiva), unmanifested vacuity (avydkrtdkdsa), prakrti, the three gunas, mahat, ahamkdra, buddhi, manas, the senses (indriya), the elements (bhuta), the element-potentials (mdtra), ignorance (avidyd), speech-sounds (varna), darkness (andha-kdra), root-impressions (or tendencies) (vdsand), time (kdla), reflection (pratibimba).

The qualities of Madhva are of the same nature as those of the Vaisesika; but the inclusion of mental qualities, such as self-control

1 In the Tattva-samkhydna (p. 10) it is said that reality (tattva) is twofold, independent (svatantra) and dependent (asvatantra), and elsewhere in the Bhdsya it is said that there are four categories (paddrtha), viz., God, prakrti, soul (flva) and matter (jada):

isvarah prakrtir jivo jadam ceti catustayam paddrthdnam sannidhdndt tatreso visnurucyate. But the present division of Madhva's philosophy, as admitting of ten categories, is made in view of similar kinds of division and classification used by the Vaisesika and others.

2 There is another definition of dravya, when it is denned as the object of a competitive race in the second canto of Bhdgavata-tdtparya, also referred to in the Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra. Thus it is said: dravyam tu dravana-prdpyam dvayor vivadamdnayoh purvam vegdbhisambandhdddkdsas tu, pradesatah. But this does not seem to have been further elaborated. It is hardly justifiable to seek any philosophical sense in this fanciful etymological meaning.

(sama), mercy (krpd), endurance (titiksd), strength (bala), fear (bhaya), shame (lajjd), sagacity (gdmbhirya), beauty (saundarya), heroism {saurya), liberality (auddrya), etc., is considered indispensable, and so the qualities include not only the twenty-four qualities of the syncretist Vaisesika, but many more.

Actions (karma) are those which directly or indirectly lead to merit (punya) or demerit (pdpd). There are no actions which are morally absolutely indifferent; even upward motion and the like —which may be considered as indifferent (uddsina) karmas —are indirectly the causes of merit or demerit. Karmas are generally divided into three classes, as vihita, i.e., enjoined by the sdstra, nisiddha, prohibited by it, and uddsina, not contemplated by it or indifferent. The latter is of the nature of vibration (partspanda), and this is not of five kinds alone, as the Vaisesika supposes, but of many other kinds 1 . Actions of creation, destruction, etc., in God are eternal in Him and form His essence (svariipa-bhutdh); the contradictory actions of creation and destruction may abide in Him, provided that, when one is in the actual form, the other is in the potential form 2 . Actions in non-eternal things are non-eternal and can be directly perceived by the senses.

The next question is regarding jdti, or universals, which are considered by the Nyaya-Vaisesika as one and immutable. These are considered in the Madhva school as eternal only in eternal substances like the jivas, whereas in non-eternal substances they are considered to be destructible and limited specifically to the individuals where they occur. There are in destructible individuals no such universals, which last even when the individuals are destroyed. An objection is raised that, if the existence of permanent universals is not agreed to, then the difficulty of comprehending concomitance (vydpti) would be insurmountable, and hence inference would be impossible. The answer that is given on the side of Madhva is that inference is possible on the basis of similarity (sddrsya), and that the acceptance of immutable universals is not

1 The syncretistic Vaisesika view, that action is of five kinds, is described here; for it is held that the Vaisesika view that by simple rectilineal motion (gamatta), circular motion (Jbhramana) or other kinds of motion could be got, is strongly objected to, because circular motion is not a species of rectilinear motion; and hence the Vaisesika classification of karma into five classes is also held to be inadequate.

2 srsti-kale srsti-kriya vyakty-dtmand vartate, anyada tu sakty-dtmand, evam samhdra-kriydpi. Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra, p. 4.

necessary for that purpose; and this also applies to the comprehension of the meaning of words: when certain objects are pointed out as having any particular name, that name can be extended to other individuals which are extremely similar to the previous objects which were originally associated with that name 1 . A difference is also drawn between jdti ("universal") and upddhi ("limiting condition") in this, that the latter is said to be that which depends for its comprehension upon the comprehension of some other primary notion, while the former is that whose comprehension is direct and does not depend upon the comprehension of some other notion 2 . Thus the universal of cow (gotva) is known immediately and directly, whereas the notion of the universal of " cognizability" (prameyatva) can only be known through the previous knowledge of those things which are objects of knowledge. So the universal of cognizability is said to be upddhi, and the former jdti. It is further objected that, if objections are taken against an immutable universal existing in all individuals of a class at one and the same time, then the same objection may be taken against the acceptance of similarity, which must be supposed to exist at one time in a number of individuals. The answer to this is that the relation of similarity between two or three individuals is viewed in Madhva philosophy as existing uniformly between the number of individuals so related, but not completely in any one of them. When two or three terms which are said to be similar exist, the relation of similarity is like a dyadic or triadic relation subsisting between the terms in mutual dependence 3 ; the relation of similarity existing between a number of terms is therefore not one, but many, according as the relation is noted from the point of view of one or the other of the terms. The similarity of A to B is different from the similarity of B to A, and so forth {bhinndbhinnam sddrsyam iti siddham).

1 anugata-dharmam vinapi sddrsyena sarvatra vydpty-ddi-graha-sambhavdt , ayam dhumah etat-sadrsas ca vdhni-vydpya ity evam-kramena vydpti-grahah, "even without the basis of the existence of identical characteristics, comprehension of vydpti is possible on the basis of similarity, e.g., 'This is smoke and entities similar to these are associated with fire, etc.'" Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra,

2 itara-nirupanddhina-nirupanakati<am upadhi-lakfanam and anya-nirupand-dhlna-nirupanatvam jdtitvam. Ibid. p. 7.

3 eka-nirupitdparddhikarana-vrttitvena tri-vikrama-nydyena tat-svikdrdt, pratiyogitvdnuyogitvddivat. Ibid. p. 6.

We next come to the doctrine of specific particulars {visesa) in the Madhva school. It supposes that every substance is made up of an infinite number of particulars associated with each and every quality that it may be supposed to possess. Thus, when the question arises regarding the relation of qualities to their substances (e.g., the relation of colour, etc., to a jug) if any quality was identical with the substance, then the destruction of it would mean destruction of the substance, and the words denoting the substance and the quality would mutually mean each other; but that is not so, and this difficulty can be solved only on the supposition that there are specific particulars corresponding as the basis to each one of the qualities. As to the exact relation of these to their substance there are divergences of view, some holding that they are identical with the substance (abheda), others that they are different (bheda), and others that they are both identical and different (bheddbheda). Whatever view regarding the relation of the qualities to the substance is accepted, the doctrine of specific particulars (visesa) has to be accepted, to escape the contradiction. Thus visesas in each substance are numberless, corresponding to the view-points or qualities intended to be explained; but there are no further visesas for each visesa, as that would lead to an infinite regress. For a satisfactory explanation of the diverse external qualities of God it is necessary to admit eternal visesas in Him. In order to explain the possibility of a connection of the continuous eternal space or vacuity (akasa) with finite objects like jug, etc. it is necessary to admit the existence of visesas in akasa 1 . It will be seen from the above that the acceptance of visesas becomes necessary only in those cases where the unity and difference of two entities, such as the substance and the qualities or the like, cannot otherwise be satisfactorily explained. For these cases the doctrine of visesas introduces some supposed particulars, or parts, to which the association of the quality could be referred, without referring to the whole substance for such association. But this does not apply to the existence of visesa in the atoms; for the atoms can very well be admitted to have parts, and the contact with other atoms can thus be very easily explained without the assumption of any visesa. An atom may be admitted to be the smallest unit in comparison with

1 at o gaganddi-vibhu-dravyasya ghatadina samyoga-tadabhdvobhaya-mrvdhako viseso'nanya-gatya svikaranlyah. Ibid. p. 9.

everything else: but that is no reason why it should not be admitted to be bigger than its own parts. If the atoms had not parts, they could not be held to combine on all their ten sides 1 . So the Vaisesika view, admitting visesas in atoms, has to be rejected. It is well worth remembering here that the Vaisesikas held that there were among the atoms of even the same bhuta y and also among the souls, such specific differences that these could be distinguished from one another by the yogins. These final differences, existing in the atoms themselves, are called visesas by the Kanada school of thinkers. This conception of visesa and its utility is different from the conception of visesa in the Madhva school 2 .

Samavdya, or the relation of inherence accepted in the Nyaya-Yaisesika school, is discarded in the system of Madhva on almost the same grounds as in Sankara's Bhdsya on the Brahma-sutras. The view is that the appearance of the cause in the effect and of the qualities in the substance is manifestly of the nature of a relation and, as this relation is not contact (samyoga), it must be a separate relation, viz., the relation of inherence (samavdya). But in the same way samavdya (e.g., in the sentence iha tantusu pata-samavdyah) itself may have the appearance of existing in something else in some relation, and hence may be in need of further relations to relate it. If without any such series of relations a relation of inherence can be related in the manner of a quality and a substance, then that sort of relatedness or qualifiedness (visistatd) may serve all the purposes of samavdya. This brings us to the acceptance of "related" or "qualified" as a category separate and distinct from the categories of quality (guna) and substance (dravya) and the relation involved between the two 3 . So also the whole (arnsi) is not either the relations or the parts or both, but a separate category by itself.

Power (sakti), as a separate category, exists in four forms: (i) as mysterious— acintya-sakti —as in God, (ii) causal power

1 anydpeksayd paramanutve'pi svdvayavdpeksayd mahattvopapatteh:.. .kim ca paramdnor avayavananglkdre tasya dasadiksv abhisarhbandho na sydt. Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra, p. 10.

2 asmad-visistdndm yogindm nityesu tulydkrti-guna-kriyesu paramdnusu muktdtmasu ca anya-nimittdsambhavad yebhyo nimittebhyah •pratyddhdram vilaksano'yam vilaksano'yam iti pratyaya-vydvrittih, desa-kala-viprakarse ca paramdnau sa evdyam iti pratyabhijndnam ca bhavati te antyd visesdh.

Prasasta-pdda-bhdsya, pp. 321-2.

3 visistam visesana-visesya-tatsambandhdtiriktam avaiyam angikartavyam. Madhva-siddhanta-sara, p. 11.

{karana-sakti or sahaja-sakti), which naturally exists in things and by virtue of which they can produce all sorts of changes, (iii) a power brought about by a new operation in a thing called the adheya-sakti, as in an idol through the ritual operations of the installation ceremony (pratisthd), and (iv) the significant power of words (pada-sakti). Negation is said to be of three kinds: (i) the negation preceding a production (prdg-abhdva), (ii) that following destruction (dhvarnsdbhdva), (iii) as otherness (anyonydbhdva), e.g., there is the negation of a jug in a pot and of a pot in a jug: this is therefore the same as differences, which are considered as the essence of all things 1 . When things are destroyed, their differences are also destroyed. But the five differences between God and souls, between souls themselves, between inanimate objects themselves, between them and God, and between them and the souls, are all eternal; for the differences in eternal things are eternal and in non-eternal things non-eternal 2 . The fourth kind of negation, atyantd-bhdva, is the non-existence belonging to impossible entities like the hare's horn.

God, or Paramatman, is in this system considered as the fullness of infinite qualities. He is the author of creation, maintenance, destruction, control, knowledge, bondage, salvation, and hiding (dvrti). He is omniscient, and all words in their most pervading and primary sense refer to Him. He is different from all material objects, souls and prakrti, and has for His body knowledge and bliss, and is wholly independent and one, though He may have diverse forms (as in Vdsudeva, Pradyumna, etc.); all such forms of Him are the full manifestation of all His qualities.

The souls (jiva) are naturally tainted with defects of ignorance, sorrow, fear, etc., and they are subject to cycles of transformation. They are infinite in number. They are of three kinds, viz., those who are fit for emancipation (mukti-yogya), e.g., gods such as Brahma, Vayu, etc., or sages, like Narada, etc., or like the ancestors (pitr), or kings like Ambarisa, or advanced men; these advanced

1 bhedas tu sarva-vastundm svarupam naijam avyayam. Ibid. p. ao.

2 Jaya-tlrtha, however, in his Nyaya-sudha, i. 4. 6 (adhikarana, p. 222), holds that differences (whether in eternal or in non-eternal things) are always eternal: na ca kaddpi paddrthdndtn anyonya-tdddtmyam asti iti anityanam apt bhedo nitya eva ity dhuh. Padmanabha-tlrtha also in his San-nydya-ratndvali or Anuvyd-khydna holds exactly the same view on the same topic (1. 4. 6): vindsino'pi ghatdder dharma-rupo bhedah para-vddy-abhyupagataghatatvddi-jdtivan nityo'-bhyupagantavyah.

souls think of God as being, bliss, knowledge and dtman. It is only the second class of souls that are subject to transmigration and suffer the pleasures of Heaven and the sufferings of Earth and Hell. There is a third class of beings, the demons, ghosts and the like. Each one of these souls is different from every other soul, and even in emancipation the souls differ from one another in their respective merits, qualifications, desires, etc.

Next comes the consideration of unmanifested space (avydkrta dkdso dig-rupah), which remains the same in creation and destruction. This is, of course, different from dkdsa as element, otherwise called bhutdkdsa, which is a product of the tdmasa ego and is limited. Akdsa as space is vacuity and eternal 1 .

Prakrti also is accepted in the Madhva system as the material cause of the material world 2 . Time is a direct product of it, and all else is produced through the series of changes which it undergoes through the categories of mahat, etc. Prakrti is accepted here as a substance (dravya) 3 and is recognized in the Madhva system as what is called mdyd, a consort of God, though it is called impure (dosa-yukta) and material (jada), evolving (parindmini), though under the full control of God, and may thus be regarded almost as His will or strength (Harer icchdthavd balam). This prakrti is to the world the cause of all bondage (jagabhandhdtmikd)*. The subtle bodies (linga-sarira) of all living beings are formed out of the stuff of this prakrti. It is also the source of the three gunas (guna-trayddy-updddna-bhuta). It is held that during the time of the great creation prakrti alone existed and nothing else. At that time God out of His creative desire produced from prakrti in three masses sattva, rajas and tamas 5 . It is said that rajas is double of tamas and sattva is double of rajas. Sattva exists by itself in its pure form: rajas and tamas are always mixed with each other and with sattva. Thus sattva exists not only in this pure form, but also as an element in the mixed rajas variety and tamas variety. In the mixed rajas there are for each part of rajas a hundred parts of sattva and one hundredth part of tamas. In the tamas mixture there are for

1 bhutdkdsdtiriktdyd deia-kdla-paricchinndyds tdrkikddy-abhimata-disd evd-smdkam avyakrtakasatvdt. Tdtparya-candrikd, 11. 3. 1 (p. 932). Also Nydya-sudhd, 11. 3. 1.

2 sdksdt paramparayd vd viivopdddnam prakrtih. Paddrtha-samgraha, 93.

3 Nydya-sudhd and San-nydya-ratndvalt on the Anmydkhydna, 11. 1.6 (p. 21).

4 Bhdgavata-tdtparya, ill. 10. 9 (p. 29). 6 Madhva-siddhanta-sdra, p. 36.

each part of tamas ten parts of sattva and one-tenth part of rajas. At the time of the world-dissolution (vilayd) ten parts return to sattva and one part to rajas with one part in tamas. The evolution of the mahat-tattva takes place immediately after the production of the three gunas, when the entire amount of the produced rajas becomes mixed with tamas; the mahat-tattva is constituted of three parts of rajas and one part of tamas. With reference to the later derivatives this mahat-tattva is called sattva 1 . In the category ahamkdra (that which is derived immediately after mahat) there is for every ten parts of sattva one part of rajas and a tenth part of tamas. From the sattva of the tamas part of it the manas, etc., are produced, out of the rajas part of it the senses are produced, and out of the tamas the elements are produced. They are at first manifested as tan-mdtras, or the powers inherent in and manifested in the elements. As ahamkdra contains within it the materials for a threefold development, it is called vaikarika, taijasa and tdmasa accordingly. In the Tattva-samkhyana buddhi-tattva and manas-tattva are said to be two categories evolving in succession from ahamkdra. The twenty-four categories counted from mahat are in this enumeration mahat, ahamkdra, buddhi, manas, the ten indriyas (senses), the five tan-mdtras and the five bhutas 2 . As buddhi is of two kinds, viz., buddhi as category and buddhi as knowledge, so manas is also regarded as being of two kinds, manas as category and manas as sense-organ. As sense-organ, it is both eternal and non-eternal; it is eternal in God, LaksmI, Brahma and all other souls,

1 Bhdgavata-tdtparya, m. 14, by Madhvacarya. In this passage the original sattva is spoken of as being the deity Sri, the original rajas as Bhu, and the original tamas as Durga, and the deity which has for her root all the three is called Mahd-laksml. The Lord Jandrdana is beyond the gunas and their roots.

2 There seems to be a divergence of opinion regardingthe place of the evolution of buddhi-tattva. The view just given is found in the Tattva-samkhyana (p. 41): asamsrstam mahan aharh buddhir manah khdni dasa matra-bhutani panca ca, and supported in its commentary by Satyadharma Yati. This is also in consonance with Kapha, 1. 3. 10. But in the passage quoted from Madhva's Bhdsya in the Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra it is said that the vijnana-tattva (probably the same as buddhi-tattva) arises from the mahat-tattva, that from it again there is manas, and from manas the senses, etc.:

vijnana-tattvam mahatah samutpannam caturmukhat, vijndna-tattvdc ca mono manas-tattvacca khadikam. The way in which Padmanabha Suri tries to solve the difficulty in his Paddrtha-samgraha is that the buddhi-tattva springs directly from the mahat-tattva, but that it grows in association with taijasa ahamkdra {taijasahamkdrena upacita). This explains the precedence of ahamkdra as given in the Tattva-samkhyana. Buddhi, of course, is of two kinds, as knowledge {jndna-rupa) and as category (tattva).

as their own essence (svarupa-bhutam) or self. The non-eternal manas, as belonging to God, brahma, individual souls, etc., is of five kinds; manas, buddhi, ahamkdra, citta and cetana, which may also be regarded as the vrttis or functions of manas. Of these manas is said to be that to which is due imagination (samkalpa) and doubt (vikalpd) ; buddhi is that to which is due the function of coming to any decision (niscaydtmikd buddhi); ahamkdra is that through the functioning of which the unreal is thought of as real (asvarupe svarupa-matih), and the cause of memory is citta. The senses are twelve, including five cognitive, five conative, manas and the sdksindriya, as buddhi is included within manas. The senses are considered from two points of view, viz., from the point of view of their predominantly tejas materials, and as being sense-organs. In their aspects as certain sorts produced in course of the evolution of their materials they are destructible; but as sense-organs they are eternal in God and in all living beings. As regards the bodily seats of these organs, these are destructible in the case of .all destructible beings. The internal sense of intuition (sdksi) can directly perceive pleasure and pain, ignorance, time and space. The sense-data of sounds, colours, etc., appearing through their respective sense-organs, are directly perceived by this sense of intuition. All things that transcend the domain of the senses are intuited by the sense of intuition (sdksi), either as known or unknown. To consider the sdksi-jndna as a special source of intuitive knowledge, indispensable particularly for the perception of time and space, is indeed one of the important special features of Madhva's system. In Sankara Vedanta sdksi stands as the inextinguishable brahma-Ught, which can be veiled by ajndna, though ajndna itself is manifested in its true nature, ignorance, by the sdksi 1 . Madhva holds that it is through the intuitive sense of sdksi

1 yat-prasdddd avidyddi sphuraty eva divd-nisam tarn apy

apahnute'vtdyd ndjndnasydsti duskaram.

Advaita-brahma-siddhi, p. 312.

As this work also notices, there are in Sankara Vedanta four views on the status of sdksi. Thus the Tattva-suddhi holds that it is the light of Brahman, appearing as if it were in the/ira; the Tattva-pradipikd holds that it is Isvara manifesting Himself in all individual souls; the Veddnta-kaumudi holds that it is but a form of Isvara, a neutral entity which remains the same in all operations of the jiva and is of direct and immediate perception, but is also the nescience (avidyd) which veils it. The Kutastha-dipa considers it to be an unchangeable light of pure intelligence in jiva, which remains the same under all conditions and is hence called sdksi.

that an individual observes the validity of his sense-knowledge and of his own self as the ego (aham). Our perception of self, on this view, is not due to the activity of mind or to mental perception (manonubhava) ; for, had it been so, one might as a result of mind activity or mental functioning have doubted his own self; but this never happens, and so it has to be admitted that the perception of self is due to some other intuitive sense called sdksi. Sdksi thus always leads us to unerring and certain truths, whereas, wherever in knowledge there is a discriminating process and a chance of error, it is said to be due to mental perception 1 .

The tan-mdtras are accepted in Madhvaism as the subtler materials of the five grosser elements (bhutas). It must be noted that the categories of ahamkdra and buddhi are considered as being a kind of subtle material stuff, capable of being understood as quantities having definite quantitative measurements (parimdna) 2 .

Ignorance (avidya) is a negative substance (dravya), which by God's will veils the natural intelligence of us all 3 . But there is no one common avidya which appears in different individuals; the avidya of one individual is altogether different from the avidya of another individual. As such, it seems to denote our individual ignorance and not a generalized entity such as is found in most of the Indian systems; thus each person has a specific (prdtisviki) avidya of his own.

Time (kdla) is coexistent with all-pervading space (avydkrta dkdsa), and it is made directly from prakrti stuff having a more primeval existence than any of the derived kinds 4 . It exists in itself

1 yat kvacid vyabhicdri sydt darsanam mdnasam hi tat. Anuvydkhyana. evam sa devadatto gauro na vd paramdnuh gurutvddhikaranam na vd iti

samsayo mdnasah. Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra, p. 44.

2 Manu-brhaspaty-ddayas tu ahamkdrdt parimdnato hlnena buddhi-tattvena svocita-parimdnena parimita-desa-paryantam avasthitam visnum pasyanti soma-suryam tu buddhi-tattvdt parimdnato hlnena manas-tatvena parimita-desa-paryantam avasthitam visnum pasyatah varunddayas tu dkds'a-vdyv-ddi-bhutaih kramena parimdnato dasdhinaih parimita-desa-paryantam avasthitam visnum yogyatdnusdrena pasyanti.

San-nydya-ratndvatt and Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra, p. 49.

3 atah paramesvara eva sattvddi-gunamay-dvidydvirodhitvena avidyayd svddhlnayd prakrtyd acintyddbhutayd svasaktyd jivasya sva-prakdsam api svarupa-caitanyam apy dcchddayati. Nydya-sudhd on the topic oijijiidsa.

* The objection that, if time is made out of prakrti stuff, from whence would mahat, etc., be evolved, is not valid; for it is only from some parts of prakrti that time is evolved, while it is from other parts that the categories are evolved: sarvatra vydptdndm katipaya-prakrti-suksmdndm kdlopdddnatvam, katipaydndm mahad-ddy-updddnatvam katipaydndm ca mula-rupena avasthdnam. Madhva-siddhdnta-sdra, p. 64.

(sva-gata) and is, like space, the vehicle (ddhdra) of everything else, and it is also the common cause of the production of all objects.

Darkness (andhakdra) is also considered as a separate substance and not as mere negation of light. A new conception of pratibimba ("reflection") is introduced to denote the fivas, who cannot have any existence apart from the existence of God and who cannot behave in any way independent of His will, and, being conscious entities, having wilL and feeling, are essentially similar to him; though reflections, they are not destructible like ordinary reflections in mirrors, but are eternal {pratibimbas tu bimbdvinabhuta-sat-sadrsah) 1 .

The system of Madhva admits the qualities (guna) more or less in the same way as the Nyaya-Vaisesika does; the points of difference are hardly ever of any philosophical importance. Those which deserve to be mentioned will be referred to in the succeeding sections.

Pramanas (ways of valid knowledge).

Pramdna is defined as that which makes an object of knowledge cognizable as it is in itself (yathdrtham pramdnam) 2 . The function of pramdna consists both in making an entity object of knowledge through the production of knowledge {jndna-jananadvdva jneyatd-sampddakatvena), either directly (sdksdt) or indirectly (asdksdt) 3 . There are two functions in a pramdna, viz. (i) to render an entity an object of knowledge (jneya-visayikarana) and (2) to make it cognizable (jneyatd-sampddana) 3 . So far as the function of making an entity an object of knowledge is concerned, all pramanas directly perform it; it is only with reference to the second function that there is the distinction between the two kinds of pramanas, kevala and arm, such that it is only the former that performs it directly and only the latter that performs it indirectly (parampard-krama) 4 . These two functions also distinguish a pramdna from the pramdtd ("subject") and the prameya ("object"), since neither the subject

1 Paddrtha-samgraha, 193.

2 Madhva's definition of pramdna in his Pramdna-laksana is elaborated by Jaya-tlrtha in his Pramdna-paddhati as jfieyam anatikramya vartamdnam yathd-vasthitam eva jfieyam yad vifayikaroti ndnyathd tat pramdnam (p. 8).

3 Jaya-tlrtha-vijaya-tippanl on the Pramdna-paddhati by Janardana.

4 Ibid. Also kevalam visayasya jneyatvam jndnam upddhitayd karanam tu taj-janakatayd sampddayanti ity etavantam visesam dsritya kevaldnu-pramdna-bhedah samarthitah. Nydya-sudhd, 11. 1. 2 (p. 249).

nor the object can be called the instrumental causes of knowledge, though they may in some sense be admitted as causes, and they do not cause an entity to be an object of knowledge either. Our knowledge does not in any way modify an object of knowledge, but an entity becomes known when knowledge of it is produced. Truth, by which is understood exact agreement of knowledge with its object, belongs properly to knowledge alone (jndnasyaiva mukhyato ydthdrthyam). The instruments of knowledge can be called true (yathdrtha) only in an indirect manner, on the ground of their producing true knowledge (yathdrtha-jndna-janaka yathdrtha) 1 . But yet the definition properly applies to the instruments as well, since they are also yathdrtha in the sense that they are also directed to the object, just as knowledge of it is. So far as they are directed towards the right object of which we have right knowledge, their scope of activity is in agreement with the scope or extent of the object of knowledge. So it is clear that pramdna is twofold: pramdna as true knowledge (kevala pramdna) and pramdna as instrument (sddhana) of knowledge (anu pramdna). This kevala pramdna is again twofold, as consciousness (caitanya) and as states (vrtti). This consciousness is described by Jaya-tlrtha as superior, middling and inferior (uttama-madhyamddhama), as right, mixed, and wrong; the vrtti is also threefold, as perception, inference, and scriptures (dgama). The anu pramdna also is threefold, as perception, inference and scriptures. A question arises, whether the term pramdna could be applied to any right knowledge which happens to be right only by accident (kdkatdllya) and not attained by the proper process of right knowledge. Thus, for example, by a mere guess one might say that there are five shillings in one's friend's pocket, and this knowledge might really agree with the fact that one's friend has five shillings in his pocket; but, though this knowledge is right, it cannot be called pramdna; for this is not due to the speaker's own certain knowledge, since he had only guessed, which is only a form of doubt (vaktur jndnasya samiayatvena aprasangdi) 2 . This also applies to the case where one makes an inference on the basis of a misperceived hetu, e.g., the inference of fire from steam or vapour mistaken for smoke.

The value of this definition of pramdna as agreement with objects of knowledge (yathdrtha) is to be found in the fact that it 1 Ibid. * Ibid. p. 250.

includes memory (smrti) of previous valid experience as valid, whereas most of the other systems of Indian philosophy are disposed so to form their definition as purposely to exclude the right of memory to be counted as pramana 1 . Salikanatha's argument, as given in his Prakarana-pancikd, on the rejection of memory from the definition of pramana is based on the fact that memory is knowledge produced only by the impressions of previous knowledge (pilrva-vijndna-samskdra-mdtrajam jndnam); as such, it depends only on previous knowledge and necessarily refers to past experience, and cannot therefore refer independently to the ascertainment of the nature of objects 2 . He excludes recognition {pratya-bhijnd) from memory, as recognition includes in its data of origin direct sense contact; and he also excludes the case of a series of perceptions of the same object {dhdrd-vdhika jndna) ; for though it involves memory, it also involves direct sense contact, but the exclusion of memory from the definition of pramana applies only to pure memory, unasscciated with sense contact. The idea is that that which depends on or is produced only by previous knowledge does not directly contribute to our knowledge and is hence not pramana.

The reason why Jaya-tlrtha urges the inclusion of memory is that memory may also agree with an object of knowledge and hence may rightly be called pramana. It may be that, while I am remembering an object, it may not still be there or it may have ceased to exist, but that does not affect the validity of memory as pramana, since the object did exist at the time of previous experience referred to by memory, though it may not be existing at the time when the memory is produced. If it is argued that, since the object is not in the same condition at the time of memory as it was at the time of experience, memory is not valid, in that case all knowledge about past and future by inference or scriptures would be invalid, since the past and future events inferred might not exist at the time of

1 Here Jaya-tirtha refers to the definitions of the Mlmarnsa as anadhigatdrtha-gantr pramdnam and as anubhutih pramdnam. The first refers to Rumania's definition and the second to that of Prabhakara. Kumarila defines pramana (as found in the Codand-sutra 80, Sloka-vdrttika) as firm knowledge (drdham vijndnam) produced (utpannam) and unassociated with other knowledge {ndpi jnandntarena samvddam rcchati). The second definition is that of Prabhakara as quoted in fsalikanafha's Prakarana-pancikd, p. 42: pramdnam anubhutih.

2 smrtir hi tad-ity-upajdyamdnd prdctm pratttim anur"dhyamdnd na svdtan-tryena artham paricchinatti iti na pramdnam. Prakarana-pancikd, p. 42.

experience. If it is argued that the object of previous knowledge changes its state and so cannot in its entirety be referred to as the object of memory, then that destroys the validity of all pramdnas; for nothing can be made an object of all the pramdnas in its entirety. Also it cannot be objected that, if the thing does not change its state, then memory should grasp it as an entity which has not changed its state. This is not valid either; for memory does not grasp an object as if it had not changed its state, but as "it was so at that time" (taddsan tadrsa iti). Memory is absolutely indifferent with regard to the question whether an object has changed its state or not. Since memory agrees with real objective facts it has to be considered valid, and it is the special feature of the present definition that it includes memory as a valid definition, which is not done in other systems. The validity of memory as a pramdna is proved by the fact that people resort to it as valid knowledge in all their dealings, and only right knowledge is referred to by men (loka-vyavahdra). There is no way of establishing the validity of the pramdnas of perception, etc., except the ultimate testimony of universal human experience 1 .

Moreover, even the validity of the sacred writings of Manu is based on the remembered purport of the Vedas, and thence they are called smrti 2 . Again, the argument that memory has no validity because it does not bring us any fruit (nisphald) is not right; for the validity depends on correctness of correspondence and not on fruitfulness. Want of validity (aprdmdnya) is made evident through the defect of the organs or the resulting contradiction (bddhaka-pratyaya). It may also be noted that memory is not absolutely fruitless; thus the memory of happy things is pleasant and strengthens the root impressions also (samskdra-patana). Again, it is argued that that alone could be called pramdna which involves the knowledge of something new, and that therefore memory, which does not involve new knowledge, cannot be counted as pramdna. If it is required that an object of knowledge should be pramdna, then the eternal entities about which there cannot be any new knowledge cannot be the objects of pramdna. If the require-

1 na hy asti pratyaksddi-prdmdnya-sddhakam anyad loka-vyavahdrdt. Nydya-sudhd, 11. i. 2 adhikarana, p. 251.

2 te hi srutyddindnubhutdrtham smrtvd tat-pratipddakam grantham dracayati. Ibid. p. 252.

ment of new knowledge is not considered to refer to objects of knowledge, but only to the method or process of knowledge, then the knowledge involved in continuous perception of an object (dhdrdvdhika jfidna) could not be considered as pramdna. The Buddhists might, of course, answer that each new moment a new object is produced which is perceived; the Samkhya might hold that at each new moment all objects suffer a new change or parindma\ but what would the Mlmamsaka say? With him the object (e.g., the jug) remains the same at all successive moments. If it is argued that in the knowledge of an object abiding in and through successive moments we have at each particular moment a new element of time involved in it and this may constitute a newness of knowledge in spite of the fact that the object of knowledge has been abiding all through the moments, the same may be argued in favour of memory; for it manifests objects in the present and has reference to the experience as having happened in the past (smrtir api vartamdna-tat-kdlatayd anubhutam artham atita-kdlatayd avagdhate). Jaya-tlrtha maintains that it is not possible to show any necessary connection between prdmdnya (validity), and the requirement that the object should be previously unacquired (anadhigatdrtha) either through association (sdhacdrya), or through that and the want of any contradictory instance; for on the first ground many other things associated with prdmdnya would have to be claimed to be anadhigata, which they are not, and the second ground does not apply at least in the case of continuous knowledge (dhdrd-vdhika jfidna). For in the case of continuous knowledge successive moments are regarded as pramdna in spite of there being in them no new knowledge.

If it is objected "how could it be the function of pramdna to make an already-known object known to us" (adhigatam evdrtham adhigamayatd pramdnena pistam pistam sydt), what does the objection really mean? It cannot mean that in regard to a known object no further cognition can arise; for neither is knowledge opposed to knowledge, nor is want of knowledge a part of the conditions which produce knowledge. The objection to the rise of a second knowledge of a known object on the ground of fruitlessness has already been answered. Nor can it be said that a pramdna should not be dependent on anything else or on any other knowledge; for that objection would also apply to inference, which is admitted by all

to be a pramana. So pramana should be so defined that memory may be included within it. Chalari-gesacarya quotes an unidentified scriptural text in support of the inclusion of memory in pramana 1 . Jaya-tlrtha, in a brief statement of the positive considerations which according to him support the inclusion of memory in pramana, says that memory is true (yathdrtha). When an object appears in consciousness to have a definite character in a particular time and at a particular place and has actually that character at that time and at that place, then this knowledge is true or yathdrtha. Now memory gives us exactly this sort of knowledge; "it was so there at that time." It is not the fact that at that time it was not so. Memory is directly produced by the manas, and the impressions (samskdra) represent its mode of contact with the object. It is through the impressions that mind comes in contact with specific objects (samskdras tu manasas tad-artha-sannikarsa-rupa eva). It may be objected that, the object referred to by memory having undergone many changes and ceased in the interval to exist in its old state, the present memory cannot take hold of its object; the answer is that the objection would have some force if manas, unaided by any other instrument, were expected to do it; but this is not so. Just as the sense-organs, which are operative only in the present, may yet perform the operation of recognition through the help of the impressions (samskdra), so the manas also may be admitted to refer by the help of the impressions to an object which has changed its previous state 2 .

The conception of pramana is considered a subject of great importance in Indian philosophy. The word pramana is used principally in two different senses, (i) as a valid mental act, as distinguished from the invalid or illusory cognitions; (ii) as the instruments or the collocations of circumstances which produce knowledge. Some account of pramana in the latter sense has already been given in Vol. 1, pp. 330-2. The conflicting opinions regarding the interpretation of pramana as instruments of know-

1 smrtih pratyaksam aitihyam anumdnacatustayath pramanam iti vijneyam dharmddy-arthe mumuksubhih.

Pramdna-candrikd, p. 4.

2 samskara-sahakrtam. manah anamibhutam apt nivrtta-purvdvasthdm vtsayl-kurvat smaranam. janayet iti ko dosah; vartamdna-visaydni apt indriydni sahakdri-sdmarthydt kdldntara-sambandhitdm. api gocarayanti; yathd sathskdra-sahakrtdrri soyam ity atlta-vartamdnatva-visiftavisayapratyabhijnd-sddhandni prdkrtendri-ydni mano-vrtti-jndnarh janayanti. Pramdna-paddhati, p. 24.

ledge is due to the fact that diverse systems of philosophy hold different views regarding the nature and origin of knowledge. Thus the Nyaya defines pramdna as the collocation of causes which produces knowledge {upalabdhi or prama). The causes of memory are excluded from pramdna simply on verbal grounds, namely that people use the word smrti (memory) to denote knowledge produced merely from impressions (samskdra-mdtra-janmanah) and distinguish it from prama, or right knowledge, which agrees with its objects 1 .

The Jains, however, consider the indication of the object as revealed to us (arthopadarsakatva) as prama, and in this they differ from the Buddhist view which defines prama as the actual getting of the object (artha-prdpakatva). The Jains hold that the actual getting of the object is a result oipravrtti, or effort to get it, and not of pramdna 2 . Though through an effort undertaken at the time of the occurrence of knowledge and in accordance with it one may attain the object, yet the function of jndna consists only in the indication of the object as revealed by it 3 . Prama is therefore according to the Jains equivalent to svdrtha-paricchitti, or the outlining of the object, and the immediate instrument of it, or pramdna, is the subjective inner flash of knowledge, leading to such objective artha-paricchitti, or determination of objects 4 . Of course svdrtha-paricchitti appears to be only a function of jndna and thus in a sense identical with it, and in that way pramdna is identical with jndna. But it is because the objective reference is considered

1 pramd-sddhanam hi pramdnam na ca smrtih prama lokadhlnavadharano hi sabddrtha-sambandhah. lokas ca samskdra-mdtra-janmanah smrter anydm upala-bdhim arthdvydbhicdrinlm pramdm dcaste tasmdt tad-dhetuh pramdnam iti na smrti-hetu-prasangah. Tdtparya-akd, p. 14.

* pravrtti-muld tupddeydrtha-prdptir na pramdnddhlnd tasydh purusecchd-dhlna-pravrtti-prabhavatvdt. Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda, p. 7.

3 yady apy anekasmdt jndna-ksandt pravrttau artha-prdptis tathdpi paryd-locyamdnam artha-pradarsakatvam eva jiidnasya prdpakatvam ndnyat. Ibid.

The reflection made here against the Buddhists is hardly fair; for by pravart-takatva they also mean pradarsakatva, though they think that the series of activities meant by pramdna-vydpdra is finally concluded when the object is actually got. The idea or vijiidna only shows the object, and, when the object is shown, the effort is initiated and the object is got. The actual getting of the object is important only in this sense, that it finally determines whether the idea is correct or not; for when the object which corresponds exactly to the idea is got the idea can be said to be correct. Nydya-bindu-tlkd, pp. 3, 4.

* anya-nirapekfatayd svdrtha-paricchittisddhakatamatvdd jndnam eva pramdnam. Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda, p. 5.

here to be the essence of pramd, that jndna, or the inner revelation of knowledge, is regarded as its instrument or pramdna and the external physical instruments or accessories to the production of knowledge noted by the Nyaya are discarded. It is the self-revelation of knowledge that leads immediately to the objective reference and objective determination, and the collocation of other accessories {sdkalya or sdmagrt) can lead to it only through knowledge 1 . Knowledge alone can therefore be regarded as the most direct and immediately preceding instrument (sddhakatama). For similar reasons the Jains reject the Samkhya view of pramdna as the functioning of the senses (aindriya-vrtti) and the Prabhakara view of pramdna as the operation of the knower in the knowing process beneath the conscious level 2 .

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Buddhist view on this point, as explained by Dharmottara, came nearer the Jain view by identifying pramdna and pramdna-phala in jndna ("knowledge"). Thus by pramdna Dharmottara understands the similarity of the idea to the object, arising out of the latter's influence, and the idea or jndna is called the pramdna-phala, though the similarity of the idea to the object giving rise to it is not different from the idea itself 8 . The similarity is called here pramdna, because it is by virtue of this similarity that the reference to the particular object of experience is possible; the knowledge of blue is possibly only by virtue of the similarity of the idea to the blue.

The Madhva definition of pramdna as yathdrtham pramdnam means that by which an object is made known as it is. The instrument which produces it may be external sense-contact and the like, called here the anupramdna corresponding to the sdmagri of the Nyaya, and the exercise of the intuitive function of the intuitive sense {kevala pramdna) of sdksi, which is identical with self. Thus it combines in a way the subjective view of Prabhakara and the Jains and the objective view of the Nyaya.

1 For other Jain arguments in refutation of the sdmagri theory of pramdna in the Nyaya see Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda, pp. 2-4.

* etenendriya-vrttih pramdnam ity abhidadhdnah sdmkhyah pratyakhydtah ... eUnaPrabhdkaro'pyartha-tathdtva-prakdsakojndtr-vydpdro'jndna-rupo'pi pramdnam iti pratipddayan prativyudhah patipattavyah. Ibid. p. 6.

3 yadi tarhi jndnam pramiti-rupatvdt pramdna-phalam kim tarhi pramdnam ity aha; arthena saha yat sdrupyam sddrsyam asya jndnasya tat pramdnam iha... nanu ca jndndd avyatiriktam sddrsyam: tathd ca sati tad eva jndnam pramdnam tad eva pramdna-phalam. Nydya-bindu-tlkd, p. 18.

Svatah-pramanya (self-validity of knowledge).

In the system of Madhva the doctrine of self-validity {svatah-pramanya) means the consideration of any knowledge as valid by the intuitive agent (sdksi) which experiences that knowledge without being hindered by any defects or any other sources of obstruction 1 . The sdksi is an intelligent and conscious perceiver which can intuitively perceive space and distance, and when the distance is such as to create a suspicion that its defect may have affected the nature of perception, the intelligent intuitive agent suspends its judgment for fear of error, and we have then what is called dotibt (saTHsdya) 2 . Vyasa Yati, in his Tarka-tdndava, expresses the idea in the language of the commentator of the Tattva-nirnaya by saying that it is the sdksi that is capable of comprehending both the knowledge and its validity, and even when obstmcted it still retains its power, but does not exercise it 3 . When there is an illusion of validity (prdmdnya-bhrama), the sdksi remains inactive and the manas, being affected by its passions of attachment, etc., makes a mis-perception, and the result is an illusory perception. The operation of the sdksi comprehending the validity of its knowledge is only possible when there is no obstruction through which its operation may be interfered with by the illusory perceptions of manas. Thus, though there may be doubts and illusions, yet it is impossible that the sdksi, experiencing knowledge, should not at the same time observe its validity also, in all its normal operations when there are no defects; otherwise there would be no certainty anywhere. So the disturbing influence, wherever that may be, affects the natural power (sahaja sakti) of the sdksi, and the doubts and illusory perceptions are created in that case by the manas. But,

1 dofddy-apratiruddfiena jndna-grdhaka-sdksind

svatastvam jndnamdnatvanirniti-niyamo hi nah.

Yukti-mallikd, i. 311. 1 yato duratva-do$ena sva-grhltena kunthitah,

na niscinoti prdmdnyam tatra jndna-grahe'pi sva desa-stha-viprakarso

hi duratvam sa ca sdkfindvagra hltum sakyate yasmdd dkasavydkrto hyasau.

Ibid. 1. 313, 314. * sdksyena jndnam tat-prdmaryyam ca visaylkartum kjamah, kintu pratibaddho jndnamdtram grhltvd tat-prdmdnya-grahandya na kramate. Tarka-tdndava, p. 7. KSghavendra-tlrtha, in commenting on this, writes: prdmdnyasya sahaja-sakti-vifayatvam pratibandha-sthale yogyatd asti.

wherever there are no distracting influences at work, the saksi comprehends knowledge and also its validity 1 .

The problem of self-validity of knowledge in Mlmamsa and Vedanta has already been briefly discussed in the first volume of the present work 2 . A distinction is made between the way in which the notion that any knowledge is valid arises in us or is cognized by us (svatah-prdmdnya-jnapti) and we become aware of the validity of our awareness, and the way in which such validity arises by itself from considerations of the nature of objective grounds (svatah-prdmdnyotpatti). The former relates to the subjective and spontaneous intuitive belief that our perceptions or inferences are true; the latter relates to the theory which objectively upholds the view that the conditions which have given rise to knowledge also by its very production certify its truth. The word pramanya in svatah-prdmdnya is used in the sense of pramdtva or true certainty.

According to the difference of epistemological position the nature of the subjective apperception of the validity of our knowledge differs. Thus, the followers of Prabhakara regard knowledge as self-luminous, meaning thereby that any moment of the revelation of knowledge involves with it the revelation of the object and the subject of knowledge. Any form of awareness (jiidna-grdhaka), such as "I am aware of the jug," would according to this view carry with it also the certainty that such awareness is also true, independent of anything else (jndna-grahakdtiriktdnapeksatvam). The followers of Kumarila, however, regard knowledge (jiidna) as something transcendent and non-sensible (atindriya) which can only be inferred by a mental state of cognition (jndtatd), such as " I am aware of the jug," and on this view, since the mental state is the only thing cognized, knowledge is inferred from it and the validity attaching to it can be known only as a result of such inference. Since there is a particular form of awareness (jndtatd) there must be valid knowledge. The validity attaching to knowledge can only be apparent, when there is an inference; it is, therefore, dependent on an inference made by reason of the awareness (jndtatd) of the particular form (yavat-svdsraydnumiti-grdhyatvam).

1 manasd kvacid apramdydm apiprdmdnya-grahena sarvatra tenaiva prdmdnya-grahane asvarasa-prasangena prama-rupesu grhlta-tat-tat-prdmdnye asvarasya niyamena yathdrthasya prdmdnya-grdhakasya sdksino avaiyam apeksitatvdt. Bhdva-vildsint, p. 50 (by Surottama-tlrtha on Yukti-tncdlikd).

8 A History 0/ Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 268 n., 372-5, 484.

The analysis of the situation produced when we know an object as it appears consists on this view in this, that it distinguishes knowledge as a permanent unit which in association with the proper sense-contact, etc., produces the particular kinds of awareness involving specific and individual objectivity {visayatd or karmatd), such as " I know a jug." In this view objectivity, being the product of knowledge, cannot be identified with knowledge. It should be noted that, objectivity (visayatd) remaining the same (e.g., "a jug on the ground" is not the same as "ground on the jug," though the objectivity of the connected jug and ground is the same), there may be important differences in the nature of such objectivity through a difference of relations. In such cases the view held is that objectivity is different from knowledge; knowledge is the invariant (nitya) entity; objectivity remaining the same, a difference of relations (prakdratd) may give rise to a difference in the nature of awareness (jndtatd)', each jndtatd or awareness means therefore each specific objectivity with its specific relations; it is only this jndtatd that is directly and immediately perceived. Knowledge is therefore a transcendent entity which cannot be intuited (atindriya), but can only be inferred as a factor conditioning the awareness. The rise of an awareness gives rise to the notion of its validity and the validity of knowledge (jndna) which has conditioned it 1 . The necessity of admitting a transcendent existence of jndna, apart from the varying states of awareness, is due probably to the desire to provide a permanent subjective force, jndna, which, remaining identical with itself, may ultimately determine all states of awareness. Another important Mlmamsa exponent, Murari Misra, thinks that the objective knowledge (e.g., knowledge of a jug) is followed by the subjective self-consciousness, associating the knowledge of the object with the self (anuvyavasdya), and it is this anuvyavasdya which determines the final form of knowledge resulting in the intuition of its own validity 2 . A general definition to

1 Bhdtta-cintdmani, by Gaga Bhafta, pp. 16-18. The inference, however, as Mathuranatha points out in his commentary on the Tattva-cintdmani on prdmdnya-vdda (p. 144), is not of the form, as iyam jndtatd ghatatvavati ghatatva-prakdraka-jndna-janyd ghatatvavati ghatatva-prakdraka-jfidtatdtvdt, but as aliatn jndnavdn jndtatdvattvdt.

2 jndnasydtlTidriyataydpratyaksd-saT^hcivenasva-janya-jndtatd-lifigakdnumiti-sdmagri sva-niftha-prdmdnya-niscayitd iti Bhdttdh; jndtatd ca jndta iti pratlti-siddho jndnoajanya-visaya-samavetah prdkatydparandmd atirikta-paddrthavisesah. MathurSnatha on Pramdna-vdda-rahasya of the Tattva-cintdmani, p. 126 (Asiatic Society's edition).

cover all these three types of svatah-prdmdnya of Prabhakara, Rumania Bhatta and Murari MisYa is given by Ganges^ in his Tattva-cintdmani as follows: the validity of any knowledge (except in the case where a knowledge is known to be false, e.g., this knowledge of silver is false) is communicated by the entire system of collocations giving rise to that knowledge and by that alone 1 . Vyasa-tlrtha, in discussing the value of this definition, points out several defects in its wording and criticizes it by saying that the condition imposed, that the knowledge should be communicated by the same system of collocating circumstances that produces the validity, is defective in defining the svatah-prdmdnya position, since the condition is fulfilled even on the paratah-prdmdnya theory; for there also the conditioning circumstances which communicate to us the validity of any knowledge are the same which make the rise of knowledge possible 2 . The definition of self-validity proposed by Vyasa-tlrtha agrees with the second alternative definition given by Garigesa in his Tattva-cintdmani: it dispenses with the necessity of admitting the collocating circumstances or conditions as producing knowledge; it defines self-validity of knowledge as that characteristic of it which is not grasped by any knowledge having for its object the matter of which the validity is grasped, i.e., the same knowledge which grasps an object does in the same act, without entering into any further mediate process, grasp its validity as well 3 . It will be seen that such a view is different from that of the Bhatta and Misra views of self-validity; for on the Bhatta view self-validity is affirmed of knowledge which can be inferred only and not directly taken with a specific awareness (as " I know this jug"), and in the Misra view self-validity is affirmed only as a result of anuvyavasaya, associating the cognition with the self (as " I know") 4 .

1 tad-aprdmanya-grdhaka-ydvaj-jiidna-grdhaka-sdmagft-grdhyatvam. Ibid. p. 122. The jndna-grdhaka-sdmagft is, however, different with the three Mimamsa views, viz., self-luminous knowledge in the case of Prabhakara, inference in the case of Bhattas and self-consciousness as anuvyavasdya in the case of Murari Misra.

2 tathd ca ydvati prdmdnyavisayikd sdmagfi tad-grdhyatvam svatastvam ity uktam syat; tathd ca etddrs'asvatastvasya paratastvapaksayd sattvdt siddha-sddhanam. Tarka-tdndava, p. 12.

3 taj-jndna-visayaka-jndndjanya-jndna-visayatvam eva svatastvam. Tarka-tdndava, p. 15, and Tattva-cintdmani, p. 122.

* The above definition of svatah-prdmdnya, agreed to by Vyasa-tlrtha, has been given in the Tattva-cintdmani as a definition in which there is a general agreement in the views of the three schools of Mimamsa (mata-traya-sddhdrana); it involves a special interpretation of the word jndna-visaya in taj-jndna-visayaka as jndndnubandhi-visayatdsraya (see Mathuranatha's commentary, p. 144).

Vyasa-tlrtha emphasizes the view that in the absence of faults and doubts (dosa-iankddind andskanditah) the subjective realization of an objective fact carries validity with it. He points out that it is not correct to say that sense-contact with a larger surface of the object can be regarded as the cause why the knowledge so produced is considered as valid; for it is well known that in spite of such sense-contact there may be error, if there are the defects (dosa) which render mal-observation possible. So it is better to hold that the validity of knowledge arises from the datum of knowledge (jndna-sdmagrt) itself. Sense-contact is useful only when there are doubts and other obstructions in the production of knowledge; but it does not by itself produce validity of knowledge 1 . Even the absence of defects is not the cause of the validity of knowledge; for the absence of defects is only a negative factor, which is no doubt necessary, but is not by any means the constitutive element of the positive realization of self-validity, which proceeds immediately and directly from the datum of knowledge 2 . Even in spite of the presence of defects there might by chance be true knowledge 3 . All illusory knowledge, however, is due to the presence of defects (dosa); for in that case the object of which a knowledge is produced is not before us, and there is no actual sense contact with it. So the followers of Madhva hold the theory of paratah-aprdmdnya y which in their view means that all cases of invalid knowledge are due to sources (namely dosas or defects) other than the datum of knowledge 4 . Vadiraja points out in this connection in his Yukti-mallikd that the absence of defect, being a qualifying characteristic of the datum of knowledge, cannot by itself be regarded as an independent cause of right knowledge. In most cases of perception under normal conditions we have right knowledge, and it is only in special circumstances that there comes doubt and the necessity of scrutiny is realized. If in every step of knowledge there were doubt regarding its validity, then there would be an infinite regress (anavastha), and hence we could never feel the validity and certainty of any knowledge 5 . Vyasa-tlrtha also emphasizes the infinite regress on any

1 Tarka-tdndava, pp. 83-90.

2 dosdbhdvasydpeksitatve' pi pramd-janana-saktih sahdyd. Ibid. p. 88.

8 uktam hi Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tikdydm dosdbhdvo'pi na prdmdnya-kdranam, yddrcchika-samvddddisu saty api dose pramd-jndnodaydt. Ibid. p. 89. * Ibid. p. 98. Also Visnu-tattva-nirnaya, p. 2. 6 Yukti-mallikd, si. 343-70and Bhdva-vildsinl of Surottama-tirthaonthesame.

view like that of the Nyaya, where the validity of knowledge has to be determined by subsequent tests from without (paratastvd-numdna). He points out that the realization of the validity of our knowledge leads us to action (pramanya-nUcayasya pravart-akatvam) 1 . But, if the validity of each knowledge has to be tested by another, we have naturally an infinite regress 2 . The self-conscious self (sdksi), however, knows its states, its pleasures and pains directly and immediately, and there is no possibility of doubt in such cases of undoubted self-validity of knowledge.

Illusion and Doubt.

The above discussion of self-validity of knowledge naturally leads us to enquire concerning the Madhva theory of illusion and the way in which it refutes the other theories of illusion accepted by other schools of Indian Philosophy. Illusion is in Madhva's system of Philosophy knowing of an object in a manner different from what it is (anyathd-vijndnam eva bhrdntih), and the contradiction (bddha) of illusion consists in the knowing of the illusory form as false through the rise of the right knowledge (samyag-jnana). What this means is that this illusion is a knowledge in which one entity appears as another; that which is non-existent appears as existent, and that which is existent appears as non-existent 3 . The illusions are produced by the senses affected by the defects. The defects do not only obstruct; they can also cause a wrong representation of the object, so they are not only responsible for non-observation, but also for mal-observation. Now the point arises that that alone can be an object of knowledge which can in some way affect its production; in an illusory knowledge of silver in respect of conch-shell, the silver, being non-existent, cannot have any part in producing the knowledge and therefore cannot be an object of knowledge. To this Jaya-tirtha replies that even a nonexistent entity may be an object of knowledge; we all infer past events and refer things to persons who have long ceased to exist. In such cases the non-existent entities may be said not to have produced the knowledge, but to have determined (nirupaka) it 4 . Such determination, it may be held, does not presuppose the immediate existence of that entity, since it may well be considered as

1 Tarka-tandava, pp. 41-6. 2 Ibid. pp. 46-50.

3 Nyaya-sudha, p. 46. * Ibid. p. 48.

limited to the idea, concept or knowledge produced, without having reference to the presence or existence of any corresponding objective entity. It may be objected that in the case of the visual perception of an object, it is definite that it is produced by the object through sense-contact; but in the case of illusion of silver in the conch-shell the silver is really absent, and therefore it cannot have any sense-contact, and consequently no visual perception of it is possible. The answer given to this objection is that it is the affected visual organ that, being in contact with conch-shell, causes the rise of a cognition representing it as a piece of silver which did not exist at all 1 . It ought not to be argued, says Jaya-tlrtha, that, if there can be knowledge without an object, then no knowledge can be trustworthy; for as a rule knowledge is self-valid {autsargikam jndndndm prdmdnyam). The self-conscious agent (sdksi) perceives and certifies to itself the validity of the mental states without the mediation of any other process or agent. This direct certitude or "belief as true," realized by ourselves in our capacities as conscious perceivers in every case where the knowledge produced is not affected or influenced by defects which cause mal-observation and non-observation, is what is understood as the self-validity of knowledge 2 . In the case of an illusory perception (e.g., of a piece of conch-shell as silver) there is an appearance of one thing as another, and that this is so is directly perceived or felt (anubhava) ; had it not been that a piece of conch-shell was perceived as silver, why should a man who sought silver stoop to pick up the conch-shell? The illusory perception of silver does not differ in appearance from a case of a real perception of silver.

Jaya-tlrtha, in arguing against the Mlmamsa view of illusion of conch-shell-silver as consisting of the memory of silver and the perception of conch-shell and the inability to distinguish between them, says that the appearance of silver in such cases has none of the characteristics of memory, and the activity generated by this false belief cannot be explained merely by the supposition of a non-distinction of difference between a memory-image and a visual percept. A mere negation involving the non-distinction of two entities cannot lead anyone to any definite choice. Moreover, if one

1 suktikd-sannikrftam dustam indriyam tarn eva atyantdsadrajatdtmena avagrahamdnam jndnam janayati. Nydya-sudhd, p. 48. * Ibid. p. 48.

is conscious of the memory-image as what it is and of the percept as what it is, then how is it that their difference is not realized?

Against the explanation of illusion by the Sankara school Jaya-tirtha urges that the view that conch-shell-silver is indescribable or indefinite {anirvdcya) is also not correct, for such an indescribable character would mean that it is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor neither existent-nor-existent. Of these the first and the last alternatives are accepted on the Madhva view also. The second view cannot be correct; for it cannot be denied that even the non-existent silver did appear to us as being before us. It can be replied that such an appearance was due to the presence of the defect; for that which was non-existent could not be the object of knowledge, and, as the followers of Sankara think that the knowledge of the locus (adhisthdna), the "this," is a true mental state, how can any defect interfere? 1 If it is indescribable, why should conch-shell-silver appear as existent at the time of perception and non-existent later on, and why should it not appear as indescribable at any time? Moreover, the Sankarite will find it immensely difficult to explain what non-existence is.

Vadiraja points out in his Yukti-mallikd that in ordinary perception the eye comes into contact with an entity, the "this" before it, which may be regarded as the substantive (visesya), and by grasping the substantive, the entity, its character as "jug" is also grasped, because the one is associated in a relation of identity with the other. But in illusory perception the character "silver" is not associated with the substantive "this," and hence through sense-contact with the "this," the conch-shell, the silver cannot be known; and hence such illusory knowledge can only be explained by supposing it to be due to the presence of defects. So the data of knowledge (jndna-sdmagrt) in the case of right knowledge and illusory knowledge are different; in the case of the former we have the ordinary datum of knowledge, whereas in the case of the latter we have an extraneous influence, namely that of dosa. And absence of dosa, being but the natural characteristic of any datum of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an extraneous cause of right knowledge 2 .

1 mdya-vadi-mate adhislhdna-jnanasya antahkarana-vrttitvena satyatvdn na dosa-janyatvam. Ibid. p. 55.

2 Yukti-mallikd, Guna-saurabha, slokas 460-500.

Right knowledge, it should be observed, is distinguished from two other kinds of knowledge, namely illusory knowledge (vipa-ryaya) and doubt (samsaya), by virtue of the fact that it alone can lead to a definite and settled action 1 . Some say that doubt may be considered to be of five kinds 2 . The first is due to the observation of common characteristics of two objects; thus, finding an object at some distance to be as high as a man, one might be led to remember both the stump of a tree and a man, and, not being able to distinguish the~ special features of each, viz., the holes, the rough and hard surface, etc. (in the case of the tree) and the movement of the head, hands and feet (in the case of a man), one would naturally doubt "is it the stump of a tree, or a man?" Again, seeing that the special characteristic (asddhdrano dharmd) of dkdsa is sound, one might doubt if sound (iabda) is eternal as sound. Again, seeing that followers of Samkhya and Vai£esika quarrel (vipratipatti) regarding the physical nature (bhautikatva) of the senses, there may be doubt whether the senses are physical or not. Again, when after digging a well we find (upalabdhi) water, there may be a doubt whether the water was already there and only manifested by the digging operation, or whether it was non-existent but produced by the digging operation. Again there maybe a rumour that a ghost resides in a certain tree, but, when we go to it and do not see (anupalabdhi) it, there may be a doubt whether the ghost really was there and was not seen by reason of its power of rendering itself invisible, or whether it did not exist at all in the tree. Others, however, include the fourth and the fifth views, those of finding and not finding (upalabdhi and anupalabdht), within the first type, viz., that of the

1 avadharanatvam ca nifkampa-pravrtti-janana-yogyatvam. Janardana's Jaya-tlrtha-vijaya (a commentary on the Pramdna-paddhati), p. 10.

2 Vatsyayana, in interpreting Nydya-sutra, 1. 1. 23, thinks that doubt is of five kinds, viz., through samdna-dharma, aneka-dharma, vipratipatti, upalabdhi and anupalabdhi, the first two being objective occurrences of common and uncommon features, and the last two subjective conditions of presence and absence of knowledge. The examples as given by him are the same as have been given below. Uddyotakara, however, interprets the above rule to refer only to the first three types of doubt, viz., samdna-dharmopapatti, aneka-dharmopapatti and vipratipatti {Nydya-varttika, pp. 87, 96-9). Kanada, in his Vaiseftka-sutras, (11. 11. 17, 18, 19, 20) speaks of doubt as being of two kinds, interna 1 (e.g., when anyone doubts whether the predictions of the astrologer, which were found true in some cases and false in others, are likely to be correct in any particular case) and external (e.g., when one doubts whether a stump before him is a tree or a man). External doubt is again of two kinds, (i) when the objec* is seen in totality, and (ii) when a part of it only is seen. Nydya-kandali, pp. 175-6.

perception of common characteristics (sddhdrana dharma), and thus hold that there are only three kinds of doubt 1 . Jaya-tirtha, however, thinks that the other two varieties, that of the special characteristics (asadhdrana dharma) and that of conflicting views (vipratipatti) may also be included in the first type; for a special characteristic cannot by itself lead to the remembering of two objects leading to doubt. To know that sound is the special characteristic of dkdsa is not to remember any two objects between which there may be doubt, and doubt must be preceded by the remembering of two objects. Common characteristics may either be positive or negative. Thus space (dkdsa) has a set of characteristics which are not to be found in eternal things and a set of characteristics which are not to be found in non-eternal things (nitya-vydvrttatva-visistam dkdsa-gunatvam and anitya-vydvrttatva-visistam dkdsa-gunatvam). There may be doubt whether sound, which is a special characteristic of dkdsa, is one of those qualities which the dkdsa has in common with eternal things or with non-eternal things. Thus, this doubt also is to be classed with doubts of the first type, viz., that of the perception of common features. The followers of Madhva, by virtue of their theory of specific particulars (visesa), can agree to the existence of two opposite sets of qualities in a thing. So, in the case of conflicting views (vipratipatti) also, the doubt may be said to rise through perception of the common qualities in physical and non-physical objects, so that one might very well doubt whether the senses, on account of certain qualities which they have in common with physical objects, are physical or whether, on account of the other qualities which they have in common with non-physical objects, are non-physical. So on Madhva's system doubt is of one kind only. Jaya-tirtha says that the followers of the Vaisesika think that apart from doubt and illusion (viparyaya) there are two kinds of false knowledge, viz., uncertainty (anadhya-vasdyd) and dreams. Uncertainty is different from doubt; for it is not an oscillation between two entities, but between an infinite number of possibilities, e.g., what is this tree called? Jaya-tirtha says that uncertainty in such cases cannot be called knowledge at all; it is a mere enquiry (samjnd-visayam jijndsd-mdtram) : thus, though I know that this tree is different from many other trees

1 This is Uddyotakara's view of Nydya-sutra, I. i. 23, as has been mentioned before.

which I know, I still do not know its name and enquire about it. Most dreams are due to sub-conscious memory impressions and so far as these are there they are not false; the error consists in our conceiving these, which are mere memory images, as actually existing objectively at the time; and this part is therefore to be considered as illusion (viparyaya). Probability (sarpbhavand, also called uha) is also to be considered as a kind of doubt, in which the chance of one of the entities is greater than that of the other (e.g., "it is very probable that that is the man who was standing outside the house") 1 .

It is evident from the above that doubt is here considered only as a mental state of oscillation; its importance in stimulating philosophical enquiry and investigation, its relations to scepticism and criticism are wholly missed. The classifications of Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara and Kanada are of hardly any philosophical importance. This being so, it is much better to take doubt in the way in which Jaya-tlrtha has done.

Defence of Pluralism (Bheda) 2 .

The difference between God and the individual (jiva) is perceived on our side by us and on God's side by Him. We know we are different from Him, and He knows that He is different from us; for, even though we may not perceive God, we may perceive our difference in relation to Him; the perception of difference does not necessarily mean that that from which the difference is perceived should also be perceived; thus even without perceiving a ghost one can say that he knows that a pillar is not a ghost 3 .

Again, the difference of the individuals from Brahman can also be argued by inference, on the ground that the individuals are objects of sorrow and suffering, which the Brahman is not 4 . And, since the Brahman and the individuals are permanent eternal entities, their mutual difference from each other is also eternal and real. It is argued that the suffering of sorrow belongs to the limited

1 Pramdna-paddhati, pp. 10-13; also jfaya-tlrtha-vijaya thereon. 1 The materials of this section are taken from Vyasa-tirtha's Bhedojjlvana and the Vydkhyd-sarkard of Sarinivasa.

* sapratiyogika-paddrtha-pratyakse na pratiyogi-pratyakfam tantram... stambhah pisdco na ity ddau vyabhicdrdt. Bhedojjlvana, p. 13.

* jivo brahma -pratiyogika - dharmi - sattd - samdna - sattdka - biiedddhikaranam brahmanyanusamhita-duhkhdnusamdhdtrtvddzyatirekenabrahmavat. Ibid. p. is.

soul and not to the pure consciousness; it is this pure consciousness which is the individual (jiva), and, since the suffering exists only so long as there is limitation, the difference ultimately vanishes when the limitation vanishes, and cannot therefore be real. But the Madhvas do not consider such individuals, limited in nature, to be false, and hence the difference depending on their nature is also not false. There being an eternal and real difference between the nature of the individuals and that of God, namely that the former suffer pain while the latter does not, the two can never be identical. The individual souls are but instances of the class-concept "soulhood," which is again a sub-concept of substance, and that of being. Though the souls have not the qualities of substances, such as colour, etc., yet they have at least the numerical qualities of one, two, three, etc. If this is once established, then that would at once differentiate this view from the Sankara view of self as pure self-shining consciousness, leading to differenceless monism. The self as a class-concept would imply similarity between the different selves which are the instances or constituents of the concept, as well as difference among them (insomuch as each particular self is a separate individual numerically different from all other selves and also from God). The supposition of the adherents of the Sankara school is that there is no intrinsic difference among the selves, and that the apparent difference is due to the limitations of the immediately influencing entity, the minds or antahkaranas, which is reflected in the selves and produces a seeming difference in the nature of the selves, though no such difference really exists; but Vyasa-tlrtha urges that the truth is the other way, and it is the differences of the selves that really distinguish the minds and bodies associated with them. It is because of the intrinsic difference that exists between two individual selves that their bodies and minds are distinguished from each other. The Upanisads also are in favour of the view that God is different from the individual souls, and the attempt to prove a monistic purport of the Upanisad texts, Vyasa-tlrtha tries to demonstrate, may well be proved a failure 1 .

This defence of difference appears, however, to be weak when compared with the refutations of difference by Citsukha in his Tattva-pradipikdy Nrsimhasrama muni in his Bheda-dhikkdra, and

1 He refers to the Upani§ad text dva suparnd, etc.

180 A Review of the Philosophy of Madhva [ch. xxvii

others. Citsukha goes directly into the concept of difference and all the different possible ways of conceiving it: difference as the nature of things (svarupa), difference as mutual negation (anyonya-bhdva, e.g., the jug is not cloth, the cloth is not a jug), difference as distinctness (prthaktva), difference as separateness of qualities (vaidharmya), and difference as manifested in the variety of categories, each of which has its own separate definition (bhinna-laksana-yogitva-bheda) ; but Vyasa-tlrtha does not make any attempt squarely to meet these arguments. A typical example of how the notion of difference is refuted by these writers has already been given in the first volume of the present work 1 .

CHAPTER XXVIII

MADHVA LOGIC

Perception.

PramAna has already been defined as true correspondence with objects, and it has also been mentioned that it is divided into two kinds, kevala-pramdna and anu-pramdna. Kevala-pramdna is that by which direct and immediate intuition of objects of cognition is made; in fact it is both the intuitive process and the intuition. Four kinds of such direct intuition are admitted in the Madhva school of thought, viz., God's intuition, intuition of His consort Laksmi, intuition of sages (Yogins), intuition of ordinary persons 1 . God's intuition is always correct, independent (svatantram), beginningless and eternal, perfectly clear and has its scope or field everywhere (sarvdrtha-visayakam). Laksmi's intuition is dependent on Isvara and inferior in clearness to His knowledge; it is equally beginning-less, eternal, and correct, and has for its object everything except the entire extent of God Himself.

The specially efficient knowledge attained by yoga is that which belongs to Yogins: these are of three kinds. The first is of those straight sages (rju-yogin) who deserve Brahmahood. Excepting that this kind knows Isvara and Laksmi only partially, it knows everything; this knowledge increases with the increase of yoga, until mukti is attained. These sages know of God more than other individual souls can do. Next to these comes the knowledge of Gods (tdttvika-yogi-jtldnam); it is inferior in scope to the knowledge of Yogins. Next comes the knowledge of ordinary persons, and of these also there are three classes in a descending order of merit; first, those that deserve liberation, secondly those that suffer rebirth, thirdly those who are in a still lower state of existence. Pramdna as intuition (kevala) is to be distinguished from anu-pramdna, as means of such intuition, which may be of three kinds, perception, inference, and testimony of the scriptures (dgama). The contact of any faultless sense-organ with a faultless object.

1 Isvata-jnanam laksmi-jndnam yogi-jndnam ayogi-jnanam ceti. Nyaya-paddhati, p. 16.

Objects become faulty through excessive remoteness, excessive nearness, excessive smallness, intervening obstruction, being mixed up with things similar to them, being manifested, and being similar to other things (sadrsya). Cognitive senses are of two kinds, the intuitive faculty of the cognitive agent which is identical with himself, and the ordinary cognitive senses of smell, taste, eye, touch, ear and manas; by the power of the intuitive faculty are perceived the self and its qualities, ignorance, manas and its faculties, and all sense-knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., time and space 1 . The visual organ is supposed to perceive large objects having colour, and manas is the superintendent of all sense-organs and the faculty of memory. The faults of manas, in consequence of which errors are committed, are the passions and attachments, and those of the other senses are diseases like jaundice, etc., and the distracting influence of intervening medium, such as glass, etc. The ordinary cognitive senses produce the states of manas. The sense-organs are like so many instruments which have contact with the objects of cognition. The intuitive faculty also by virtue of its functions (existing as identical with itself and yet separately by virtue of visesa) may be considered to be in contact. The verdict of intuitive faculty need not necessarily always be objectively valid, though it is always capable of correctly intuiting the contents of sense-observations. In God and Yogins it is both subjectivity and objectivity in agreement with facts; in ordinary persons it may or may not in any particular case be in agreement with the objective parts, or, in other words, its contents may or may not correspond to objective facts, but it is always correct in intuiting what is brought to it by the senses 2 .

Jaya-tlrtha dispenses with the necessity of sixfold contact as advocated by the followers of the Nyaya 3 . This has to be so, because the samavaya relation is not admitted in the system of Madhva, nor is it admitted that there is any difference between things and their qualities (guna-guny-abheda). Sense-contact therefore takes place according to Jaya-tlrtha as one event; on the one

1 indriya-sabdena jndnendriyam grhyate, tad dvi-vidham, pramdtr-svarupam prdkrtam ca tatra svarupendriyam sdkslty ucyate; tasya visaya dtma-svarupam tad-dharmah avidyd-manas-tad-vrttayah bdhyendriya-jndna-sukhddayah kdlavyd-krtdkdsas ca. Pramdna-paddhati, p. 22.

2 Ibid. p. 26.

3 See A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 (first edition), p. 334.

hand, because there is no difference between qualities and things, on the other because the self and its qualities are directly perceived by the intuitive entity and there is no necessity of admitting the contact of manas, and hence no need to admit a sixfold contact as is proposed by the followers of the Nyaya.

Again, we know that the Nyaya draws a distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) knowledge; according to this system, indeterminate knowledge means the simple cognition of the object in itself without any of the eightfold conceptual determinations as regards substance-concept (dravya-vikalpo yathd dandi), as "the possessor of a stick," as regards quality-concept (guna-vikalpoyathdsuklah), as "white", as regards action-concept (kriyd-vikalpo yathd gacckati), as "he goes", as regards class-concept (jdti-vikalpo yathd gauh), as "cow", as regards ultimately distinguishing characteristic (visesa-vikalpo yathd visistah paramdnuh), as "the atoms have ultimate characteristics by virtue of which the sages can distinguish one atom from another", as regards the concept of relation of inseparable inherence (samavdya-vikalpo yathd pata-samavdyavantds tantavah), as "the threads in a piece of cloth", as regards the concept of name (ndma-vikalpo yathd Devadatta), as "the man Devadatta", as regards the concept of negation (abhdva-vikalpo yathd ghatd-bhdvavad bhu-talam), as in "there is no jug on the ground". But Jaya-tlrtha says that none of these distinctions between determinate and indeterminate perceptions can be accepted, as they are based on the assumption of the two categories of specific ultimate characteristics (visesa) and the relation of inseparable inherence (samavdya), both of which are invalid. The name of a percept is also known by memory operating at a later moment, and the negation of an entity is known to depend on the memory of the entity itself. Though not all these concepts are produced at the first moment of perception, yet, since some of the concepts, such as substance, quality, action, etc., are grasped at the first moment of perception, there is no reason to suppose the existence of indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyaksa). All perception is determinate. The Nyaya view that the feeling of usefulness of an object or of its being undesirable is the result of perception is not correct: for these are obtained by inference 1 . When a man avoids

1 Nyaya-manjafi, pp. 67-71.

a thorn, it is because of his past experience that he judges that it would cause him pain; when he turns to something which is desirable, it is from the inference of the experience of it as having felt desirable in the past.

Inference (Anumana).

The cause of inference is a faultless reason (through which by virtue of its association anything can be ascertained). The nature of this association or concomitance is described by Jaya-tlrtha as being inseparable concomitance (avindbhdva). Vyasa-tlrtha urges in the Tarka-tdndava that this inseparable concomitance ought really to mean contradiction of experience leading to inadmissible assumption or implication {anupapatti). When anything experienced in a particular space-time relation must be invalid except on the assumption of some other thing, in some other space-time relation, it must be admitted that such a particular relation subsisting between the two is a relation of concomitance (vydpti), leading to the inference of the latter through the former 1 .

Vyasa-tlrtha urges that this view of. inference has also been supported by Madhva in his Pramdna-laksana, where he says that the residual method (parisesa) is the essential method in all cases of valid inference 2 . Reduction to absurdity in regard to any valid experience is what necessitates the supposition in an act of inference. 3 Jaya-tlrtha in his Pramdna-paddhati has indeed defined concomitance {vydpti) as inseparability (avind-bhdva); this inseparable concomitance cannot be described as being in all cases agreement in absence, i.e., the absence of the reason, hetu, in all cases of the absence of the probandum (sddhya), or the inferred entity; for there are cases where, in spite of the absence of such negative instances, inference is possible, e.g., sound is expressible on account of its being an object of knowledge; now here no such negative instance is available where there would be no expression; hence in such cases of impossible-negative (kevald-nvayi) inferences the above definition of concomitance, which

1 yad-desa-kdla-sambaddhasya yasya yad-desa-kdla-sambaddhena yena vina-nupapattis tasyiva tena saha vydptih. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 1).

* parisefo'rthdpattir anumdnam ity avise$ah. Pramdna-laksana and Pramdna-lakfana-tikd, p. 27.

s anumdnam apt dvasyakdnupapattyaivagamakam. Tarka-tdndava (MS.,p. 2).

requires the existence of negative instances for the ascertainment of concomitance, would not apply. Also no kind of spatial association of the reason and consequence (sddhya) can be urged as being an indispensable condition of concomitance: for there can be the inference of rain in the upper part of a country from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower part, and there is no spatial contiguity between the reason and consequence. So the main point in concomitance determining inference is the reduction of an incontrovertible experience into an impossibility, which necessitates the assumption of the inferred entity. It is this which has also been described as the law of unconditional and invariable association (sdhacarya-niyama). In the well-known example of fire and smoke what is described as the unconditional and invariable coexistence of the absence of smoke in all cases of the absence of fire is also a case of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti). It would apply with equal force in the cases of impossible-negatives (kevalanvayi) ; for there also the impossible absence of the consequence would render the reason absurd; and hence the assumption of the consequence is necessary. Vyasa-tlrtha refutes at great length the definition of inference given by Gahgesa in his Tattva-cintdmani, where he explains concomitance as the coexistence of consequence and reason as qualified by the fact of the absence of the latter in each case of the absence of the former. Had it not been for the fact that in inferences of the type of impossible-negatives (kevalanvayi) no negative instances are available where we might have been acquainted with cases of absence of the consequence being also cases of absence of the reason (sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam), Gahgesa would have been glad to define concomitance (vydpti) as unconditional and invariable non-existence of the reason in all cases of the non-existence of the consequence (sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam). But owing to the above difficulty Gahgesa was forced to define concomitance as coexistence (sdmdnddhikaranya) of the consequence and reason where the reason is also qualified as the repository of the negation of all possible conditions which could invalidate its unconditional and invariable relation to the consequence (sddhya) 1 . The insight of Gahgesa in formulating such a definition consists in this, that he

1 pratiyogy-asamdnadhikcnrana-yat-samdnddhikaranatyantdbhdva-pratiyogitd-vacchedakavacchinnam van na bhavati tena samam tasya samdnadhikaranyam vyaptih. Tattva-cintamani, Part 11, p. ioo (ed. 1888, Bibliotheca Indica).

thinks that universal existence of the reason in case of the consequence is alone sufficient for an inference of the latter from the former, provided that the reason is pure and unmixed by the presence of any other "entity. It is the presence of other entities mixed with the reason that may invalidate its universal coexistence with the consequence; so, if that could be eliminated, then mere universal existence of the reason in cases of the consequence would be sufficient to establish a relation of concomitance between the former and the latter.

Vyasa-tlrtha, however, points out that the existence of the reason in cases of the consequence is not universally valid in all cases of inference. Thus in the inference of rain in the upper regions from perceiving a rise of water in the river in the lower regions there is no spatial coexistence of the reason in the consequence; so also in the inference that the constellation Rohini will shortly rise in the east because the constellation Krttikd has already risen. In all such cases and in all cases of inference the view of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti) can always define concomitance in the best possible way and therefore can also serve as the best ground for all kinds of inference, including the class known as impossible-negatives {kevcddnvayi). For in the example given of that class, "this is expressible because it is an object of knowledge", we can argue that the denial of non-expressibility is a necessary postulate for the validity of the incontrovertible experience of its being an object of knowledge 1 . An objection may be raised that, non-expressibility being as fictitious an entity as a round square, there would be no meaning in further denying it. To this Vyasa-tlrtha's reply is that negation may apply even to the fictitious and the non-existent (aprdmdnikdf.

It is evident that this view of concomitance is a later development of theory by Vyasa-tlrtha. For Jaya-tlrtha, in his Pramdna-paddhati, describes concomitance as being inseparable existence (avindbhdva), which he explains as invariable coexistence (sdha-carya-niyama) and also as invariable relation (avyabhicaritah sambandhahf. Janardana, however, in his commentary on the

1 idam vacyam jneyatvat kevalanvayi anumanam.

2 tatra sadhyabhavasya asattvad eva sadhyabhave sati sadhanasya yopapattis tad-abhava-rupanupapatteh sattvat; mamnate'pramdnikasyapi nisedha-prati-yogitvat. Tarka-tandava (MS., p. 6).

3 Pramana-paddhati, p. 30.

Pramdna-paddhati, holds that this sdhacarya-niyama of Jaya-tlrtha must be interpreted to mean the reductio ad absurdum of Vyasa-tirtha; otherwise it would be evident to all that his view of concomitance has been intended by the above definition of Jaya-tlrtha; and he supports his view by pointing out that both in the Pramdna-laksana and in his commentary on the Pramdna-laksana Jaya-tlrtha has included inference by residues (parisesa) and implication (arthdpatti) within inference, as he thought that the methods of these are practically methods of inference itself 1 . But this only proves that parisesa and arthdpatti are also kinds of inference and not that the method of anupapatti involved in them should be regarded as being the only possible form of inference. Had he thought this to be so, he would certainly have mentioned it and would not have limited his definition of concomitance to invariable coexistence {sdhacarya-niyama). Chalari-sesacarya, who faithfully follows the footprints of Jaya-tlrtha, often repeating his language also, explains this invariable coexistence of Jaya-tlrtha as "where there is smoke, there is fire"; but he remarks that this invariable coexistence means only the existence of an invariable relation of the reason to the consequence (atra sahacaryam hetoh sddhyena sam-bandha-mdtram vivaksitam), and not merely existence in the same place (sdmdnddhikaranya). Coexistence therefore is said to mean here unfailing relation to the consequence (avyabhicarita-sadhya-sambandho vydptih), and this is vydpti 2 . He also refers to Gaftgesa's definition of vydpti, noted above, and points out that this definition of vydpti would be inapplicable in those instances of inference where there is no spatial coexistence (e.g., the inference of rain in the upper regions from the rise of water in the river in the lower regions) 3 . He points out on the strength of such instances that concomitance cannot be defined as coexistence (sdmdnddhikaranya), but is an unfailing relation which may hold between a cause and an effect existing in different places. On the strength of these instances Chalari-sesacarya argues in favour of concomitance without co-

1 anupapatter vydptitvam ca pramdna-lak$ane parisefdrthdpattih anumd-visefa ity atrdrthdpattir iva anumdnam apt dvasyakdnupapattyaiva gamakam ity uktatvdt. Tarka-tdndava (MS., pp. 1-2). Also Pramdna-laksana-plkd, pp. 5-7.

2 Cf. Garigesa's alternative definition of vydpti in the section on Viiefa-vydpti: yat-sambandhitdvacchedaka-rupavattvam yasya tasya sd vydptih. Tattva-cintdmani, Part 11, p. 156.

s na tu samdnddhikaranyam eva. Pramdna-candrikd, p. 8 a.

existence {vyadhikarana-vydpti) as being possible, and therefore advocates the dropping of the coexistence as a necessary condition of concomitance. Vyasa-tlrtha seems to have profited by these remarks and, instead of remaining content with "unfailing relation" of Chalari-sesacarya, explained this "unfailing relation" as being the definite relation of reductio ad absurdum (anupapatti) 1 .

Tarka (Ratiocination).

The determining oscillation constituent in a mental process leading to inference is called tarka or uha 2 . Gautama, in his Nydya-sutra, describes it as being ratiocination with a view to knowledge of truth, involving attempt at determination of any fact as possessing a particular character, based on a proper enquiry regarding the cause of such a determination. Thus there is a desire to know the truth about the nature of selves as knowers. Are they produced or are they uncreated? If they were created, they would suffer destruction, like all created things, and would not suffer or enjoy the fruits of their own deeds. If they are uncreated, they may very well continue to exist for ever to suffer or enjoy the fruits of their deeds and undergo rebirth. So the self which undergoes rebirth and enjoys or suffers the fruits of all its deeds must necessarily be uncreated 3 . Vatsyayana says that tarka is neither included within the accepted pramanas nor is it a separate pramdna, but is a

1 Pramdna-candrikd, pp. 8 a, 9

2 uhatvam ca mdnasatva-vydpyo jdti-visesah " tarkaydmi" ity anubhava-siddhah. Visvandtha-vrtti, 1, p. 40.

Tarka is used in the sense of uha by Jayanta also in the Nydya-mafijarl, p. 586. Jayanta says that its function as uha consists in weakening the chances of the weak alternative, thereby strengthening the probability of the stronger alternative and so helping the generation of a valid knowledge of the certainty of the latter alternative. The meaning of tarka here must be distinguished from the meaning "inference" (anumdna), which it has in Brahma-sutra, 11. 1. 12 (tarkd-pratisthdndt.. .), and also from its use as the science of logic (dnvlkfiki), one of the fourteen subjects of learning (vidyd-sthdna). Ydjnavalkya-smrti, I. 3; also Nydya-manjarJ, pp. 3-4. Uha is with Samkhya a quality of buddhi and with the Mimamsakas it is a process of application of recognized linguistic maxims for the determination of the sense of words or of ■ sentences (yuktyd prayoga-nirupanam ithah), ibid. p. 588. Here uha is used practically in the sense of " inference " and is such a pramdna. But here in the Nydya uha or tarka stands between right knowledge and doubt. Thus Jayanta says: tad esa mlmdmsaka-kalpyamdno nohah pramdna-vyatirekam eti pramdna-sandehadasdntardlavartl tu tarkah kathito'tra sdstre (p. 590).

s Nydya-sutra, 1. 1. 40 and Vatsyayana's Vrtti on it.

process which helps the pramanas to the determination of true knowledge 1 . KesavaMisra, mhisTarka-bhdsya, is inclined to include it under doubt 2 . But Annam Bhatta, in his Tarka-dipikd, says that, though tarka should properly be counted under false knowledge (viparyaya), yet, since it helps the pramanas, it should be separately counted 3 . The usefulness of tarka in inference consists in assuring the mind of the absence of any cases of failure of existence of the reason in the consequence and thereby helping the formation of the notation of the concomitance of the reason and the consequence 4 . Visvanatha says that tarka clears away the doubts regarding the possible cases of failure (vyabhicdra) of the reason (e.g., if smoke existed in any instance where there was no fire, then fire would not be the cause of smoke), and thereby renders the knowledge of concomitance infallible and so helps the work of inference not in a direct, but in an indirect way (parathparayaf. Visvanatha further adds that such a tarka is of five kinds, namely consideration of the fallacy of self-dependence {atmdsraya, e.g., if the knowledge of this jug is produced by the knowledge of this jug, then it should be different from it), mutual dependence (anyonydsraya, e.g., if this jug is the object of the knowledge as produced by the knowledge, then it should be different from this jug), circle (cakraka, if this jug is produced by something else produced by this jug, then it should be different from anything produced by something else produced by this jug), vicious infinite (anavasthd, e.g., if the class concept "jug" refers to all jugs, it cannot refer to things produced by the jug), contradictory experience (pramdna-bddhitdrthaka-prasanga, e.g., if smoke exists where there is no fire, then it could not be produced by fire, or if there was no fire in the hill, there would be no smoke in it) 6 .

1 tarko na pramdna-samgrhlto na pramdndntaram; pramananam anugrahakas tattva-jndndya parikalpyate.

Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, I. i. i.

2 Tarka-bhdsya, p. 44. 4 Tarka-dipikd, p. 88.

3 vyabhicdra-jndndbhdva-sampddakatvena tarkasya vydpti-grahe upayogah. Bhavdnandi on LHdhiti, quoted in Nydya-kosa, footnote, p. 292.

b tathd ca dhumo yadi vahni-vyabhicdrl sydt vahni-janyo na sydt ity anena vyabhicdra-sankd-nirdse nirankusena vydpti-jndnena anumitir iti paramparayd evdsya upayogah. Visvandtha-vrtti, 1. 1. 40.

• Each of the first three has three varieties, according as it refers to knowledge {jnapti), production (utpatti) and existence (sthiti). Thus the threefold example of atmdsraya would be (i) etad-ghata-jndnam yady etat-ghata-janyam sydt etad-ghata-bhinnam sydt, (ii) ghato'yam yady etad-ghata-janakah sydt, etad-ghata-

Mathuranatha, in explaining the function of tarka in the formation of the notion of concomitance (vydpti), says that, even when through noticing the existence of smoke in all known cases of fire and the absence of smoke in all those places where there is no fire, one decides that smoke is produced by fire or not, it is there that tarka helps to remove all legitimate doubts. As Garigesa shows, such a tarka would proceed thus: Either smoke is produced by fire or it is not produced there. So, if smoke is produced neither by fire nor by not-fire, it is not produced at all. If, however, there are the doubts whether smoke is from not-fire, or whether it can sometimes be where there is no fire, or whether it is produced without any cause (ahetuka), then none of us can have the notion of inseparable existence of fire in all cases of smoke so as to lead us to action (sarvatva sva-kriyd-vydghdtah) x . A course of thought such as is called tarka is helpful to the formation of the notion of concomitance only when a large number of positive and negative cases has been actually perceived and a provisional certainty has been reached. Even when the provisional certainty is reached, so long as the mind is not cleared by the above tarka the series of doubts (samsaya-dhdrd) might continue to rise 2 . It cannot be urged, says Gangesa, that, even when by the above method the notion of concomitance has been formed, there might still arise doubts whether fire might not be the cause of smoke or whether smoke might be without any cause; for, had it been so, you would not always (niyata) make fire when you wanted smoke, or eat when you wanted to satisfy your hunger, or use words to carry your ideas to

bhinnah syat, (iii) ayam ghato yady etad-ghata-vrttih syat, tathdtvena upalabhyeta. Example of anyonyasraya in jnapti: ayam ghato yady etad-ghata-jndna-janya-jndna-visayah syat etad-ghata-bhinnah syat. Example of cakraka in utpatti: ghatoyam yady etad-ghata-janya-janya-janyah syat tada etad-ghata-janya-janya-bhinnam syat. Madhava, in his Sarva-dars'ana-samgraha, speaking of older Nyaya tradition, adds seven others, vyaghata (contradiction), pratibandhi-kalpana (irrelevant thesis), laghava (minimum postulation), gaurava (too much postulation), utsarga (general rule), apavdda (exception), vaijdtya (class-difference). But Visvanatha, whose list of these varies somewhat from the above, as he drops vyaghata and has prathamopasthitatva, and vinigamana-viraha for pratibandhi-kalpand, apavdda and vaijdtya, holds that these are not properly tarka, but are so called only because they help as accessories to pramdnas (pramdna-sahakdritva-rupa-sddharmydt tathd vyavahdrah). Visvandtha-vrtti, I. 1. 40.

1 Gahgesa on tarka and Mathuranatha's commentary thereon. Tattva-cintdmani, Part n, pp. 219-28.

8 Ibid. p. 220; see also KamakhyanStha's note, also p. 228.

others. Such regular attempts themselves show that in such cases there are no doubts (sankd); for, had there been doubts, these attempts would not be so invariable. It is not possible that you would be in doubt whether fire is the cause of smoke and yet always kindle fire when you try to get smoke. The existence of doubt in such cases would contradict your invariable attempt to kindle fire whenever you wanted smoke; doubts can be admitted only so long as one's actions do not contradict (sva-kriyd-vydghdta) them 1 .

Sriharsa, however, arguing from the Vedanta point of view, denies the power of tarka to dispel doubt. He urges that, if it is said that tarka necessarily dispels doubts in all cases and helps the formation of any particular notion of concomitance, then this statement must itself depend on some other notion of concomitance, and so on, leading us to a vicious infinite (anavasthd). Moreover, the fact that we know the universal coexistence of fire and smoke, and do not perceive any other element universally abiding in the fire which is equally universally coexistent with fire, does not prove that there is no such element in it which is really the cause of smoke (though apparently fire may appear as its cause). Our perception can certify only the existence or non-existence of all that is visible under the normal conditions of visual perception; it cannot say anything regarding the presence or absence of entities not controlled by these conditions, or we could only say that in the absence of fire there is absence of a specific kind of smoke; we could not say that there would be absence of all kinds of smoke; for it is just possible that there is some other kind of cause producing some special kind of smoke which we have not yet perceived; mere non-perception would not prove that such a special kind of smoke does not exist at all, since perception applies only to entities that are perceptible and is guided by its own conditions, and cannot therefore apply to entities which cannot be brought under those conditions 2 . The tarka which is supposed to dispel doubt by the supposition of contradiction of experience and which would thus support conco-

1 tad eva hy dsankyate yasminn dsankyamdne sva-kriyd-vydghdto na bhavatlti; na hi sambhavati svayam vahny-ddikam dhumddi-kdryydrtham niyamata upddatte tat-kdranam tan netydsankyate ca. Ibid. p. 232.

2 tad-adarianasya dpdtato hetv-antara-prayojydvdntara-jdty-adarsanena ayo-gyatayd avikalpyatvdd apy upapatteh; yadd tu hetv-antara-prayqjyo dhumasya viseso drahsyate taddsau vikalpisyate iti satnbhdvandyd durmvdratvat.

Srihar?a's Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 680.

mitance, not being itself grounded on concomitance, would naturally fail to do its part; for, if such groundless tarka could be supposed to establish concomitance, that would itself be contradiction (vydghdta). Udayana had said that, if even when no doubt is present you suppose that doubt might arise in the future, that can only be due to inference, so inference is valid. No doubts need be entertained regarding the concomitance underlying tarka, as that would lead to the contradiction of our own actions; for we cannot say that we believe fire to be the cause of smoke and still doubt it. Sriharsa had replied to this by saying that, where there is experience of failure of coexistence, that itself makes the supposition of concomitance doubtful; when there is no experience of failure of coexistence, there is no end of indefinite doubts lurking about; for these unknown doubts are only put an end to when a specific failure of coexistence is noticed; so under no circumstances can doubts be dispelled by tarka 1 . The main point of the dispute consists in this, that, while Srlharsa is afraid to trust tarka because of the supposed doubts, Udayana thinks that, if we are so pessimistic, then we should have to stop all our actions. None of them, however, discusses the middle course of probability, which may lead us to action and may yet not be considered as proved valid inference. Vardhamana, however, in commenting on the above verse of Udayana, refers to Gangesa as holding that tarka does not lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance 2 .

Vyasa-tlrtha, however, in his Tarka-tandava, urges that tarka is not an indispensable condition of the notion of concomitance; by faith in trusty persons, or from inherited tendencies, as a result of experiences in past life, or through acquiescence in universally

1 Udayana's verse ran as follows:

s'artkd ced anumdsty eva na cec chankd tatastaram vydghdtavadhir asankd tarkah sankdvadhir matah.

Kusumdnjali, m. 7. £riharsa gave his reply to this by slightly changing Udayana's words as follows: vydghdto yadi sankdsti na cec chankd tatastaram vydghdtavadhir asankd tarkah s'ankdvadhih kutah.

Khandana-khanda-khddya, p. 693. Gangesa suggests that the word vydghdta in Sriharsa means failure of coexistence (sahdnavasthdna-niyama), while in Udayana it means contradiction of one's own actions (sva-kriyd-vydghdtah). But, as Vyasa-tirtha shows, the word may be taken in the latter sense even in Srlharsa. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 25).

2 atrdsmatpitrcarandh, tarko na vydpti-grdhakah kintu vyabhicdra-jndndbkdva-saharkrtam sahacdra-darsanam.

Prakds'a, m, p. 26.

accepted views, we may have a notion of concomitance without going through the process of tarka. He seems, however, to be largely in agreement with the view of tarka as held by Garigesa according to the above statement of Vardhamana, in holding that tarka does not lead directly to the establishment of concomitance. For he says that tarka does not directly lead us to the establishment of concomitance, since concomitance is directly grasped by a wide experience (bhuyo-darsana) of coexistence, qualified by a knowledge of absence of failure of coexistence 1 . Vacaspati also holds more or less the same view when he says that it is the sense-organ, aided by the memory of wide experience, that grasps this natural relation of concomitance 2 . Vyasa-tlrtha says that the determination of absence of vitiating conditions (upadhi), which is a function of tarka, becomes necessary only in some kinds of inference; it is not always awaited. If it were always necessary, then tarka being required for all notions of concomitance and concomitance being the basis of tarka, there would be a vicious infinite 3 . If failures of coexistence are not known, then from cases of coexistence the self may immediately form the notion of concomitance 4 . What is necessary therefore is to dispel the doubts as to failure of coexistence (vyabhicara-sanka-nivrtti-dvara). But such doubts come only occasionally (kvacitkaivd) and not always; and such occasional doubts require to be dispelled by only an occasional recourse to tarka. It cannot be argued that the possibility of doubts may remain in all cases and hence in all cases there is necessity for the exercise of the tarka; for it may well be asked, do such doubts arise of themselves in our minds or are they raised by others? On the first supposition one may have doubts even as to the perception of one's hands and feet, or one might even have doubts in regard to one's doubts, which would render even the doubts invalid. If it is held that doubts arise only when other possible alternatives are suggested, then it has to be agreed that there will be many cases where no such

1 api ca tarko na sdkfdd vydpti-grdhakah bhiiyo-darsana-vyabhicdrddarsana-sahakrta-pratyakfenaiva tad-grahandt. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 20).

2 bhuyo-dariana-janita-samskdra-sahitam indriyam eva svdbhdvika-samban-dha-grdhi. Tdtparya-tikd.

3 This has already been pointed out above in dealing with &rlharsa's objections.

4 adrste vyabhicdre tu sddhakam tad ati sphutam jndyate sdksinaivdddhd mdnavadho na tad bhavet.

Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 21).

alternatives would be suggested or the probability of one of them might be so strongly suggested that there will be no occasion for doubts. So it must be admitted that in many cases we have a natural belief in certain orders of coexistence, where no doubts arise of themselves (sva-rasika-visvdsasydvasyakatvdn na sarvata sankd) 1 ; no one is seen going through a never-ending series of doubts all his life (na cdvirala-lagna-sankd-dhdrd anubhuyate). On the second supposition also, no one can suggest that doubts may always arise: in the relation of smoke and fire one cannot suggest that there may still be some other entity, different from fire, which causes smoke; for, if this were a sensible entity, it would have been perceived, and, if it were non-sensible, there would be no proof at all that a non-sensible entity existed or could exist. For, if Sriharsa should be so doubtful of all things, it might be suggested that in all the proofs in favour of monism (advaita) there may be a thousand faults and in the arguments of the dualists there may be a thousand good points, and so in consequence of these doubts you could not come to any conclusion establishing your doctrine of monism 2 . If a belief in a concomitance arises, the mere indefinite possibility of doubt does not shake one off his natural conviction of the concomitance as valid 3 . If you yourself would eat whenever you had hunger to appease, you cannot say that you have still doubts that eating may not after all be the cause of appeasing of hunger. Moreover, what is gained by urging that possibility of doubts always remains? Is it meant to destroy the validity of all inference or of all notions of concomitance? No one who wishes to admit the usefulness of inference would think of destroying the means—the notion of concomitance—by which it is established. If concomitance is not established, the Vedantist will find that it is impossible to understand the meanings of those Vedic monistic words by which he wishes to establish monism. Again, if inference is to be valid, that can only be established by inference and not by perception. Without inference the Vedantist could neither establish anything nor refute any assertions made by his opponents, contradicting his own doctrines. It seems therefore that Sriharsa would

1 Tarka-tdndava, pp. 22-3. 2 Ibid. p. 24.

3 na hi grdhya-samsaya-mdtrain niscaya-pratibandhakam; na ca utpannasya vyapti-niscayasya balavad bddhakam asti yena autsargikam prdmdnyam apodyeta. Ibid. p. 24.

carry out an inference as if there were no fear of the supposed doubts and yet, merely for the sake of saying it, say that there is a possibility of the existence of doubts in all inferences 1 .

The main points that arise from the above discussion are that, while Sriharsa would argue that tarka cannot remove the doubts threatening the validity of any notion of concomitance and while the Naiyayikas would hold that tarka, on account of its function of removing doubts from notions of concomitance, is a necessary factor of all inferential process, Vyasa-tlrtha argues that, though the power of tarka in removing doubts is admitted, yet, since in many of our inferences no doubts requiring the help of tarka would arise, it is not true that tarka is a necessary factor in all inferences 2 . From what has been said above it will appear that there is some subtle difference of opinion in the Nyaya school regarding the real function of tarka. But the general tendency seems to be to restrict the function of tarka to removing doubts and thereby paving the way for the formation of the notion of concomitance; but it does not directly produce the notion of concomitance (na tu vydpti-grdhaka) nor does it verify particular inductions by the application of general principles of uniformity of nature 3 .

1 Ibid. pp. 25-31.

2 It cannot, however, be said that the Nyaya would urge the necessity of tarka in all instances of inference. The older Nyaya writers do not say anything explicitly on the subject; but Visvanatha, in his Muktdvatl, states that tarka is necessary only in those cases where there are doubts regarding the forming of the notion of concomitance. Where no doubts naturally arise, there is no necessity of tarka {yatra svata eva sankd ndvatarati tatra na tarkapeksaplti). Muktdvatl, 137.

Dinakara, however, in his commentary on the Muktdvatl 137, thinks that there are two kinds of tarka, clearance of doubts and the formation of concomitance (tarkas ca divividho samsaya-pariiodhako vydpti-grdhakas ca). This however is directly opposed to the view of Vardhamana cited above.

3 The wording of Dr Seal's brief references to the subject of tarka in A History qfHindu Chemistry by Dr P. C. Ray (p. 264) is inexact. He says there: " Tarka or Uha, then, is the verification and vindication of particular inductions by the application of the general principles of Uniformity of Nature and of Causality, principles which are themselves based on repeated observation (bhuyo-darsana) and the ascertainment of innumerable particular inductions of Uniformity or Causality {bhuyo-darsana-janita-samskdra-sahitam indriyam eva svabhdvika-satnbandha-grdhi Vacaspati)." Thus tarka also helps in dispelling doubt (sandeha).

On its function in clearing the way to the formation of the notion of concomitance: mdrga-sddhana-dvdrena tarkasya tattva-jfidndrthatvam iha vivaksitam. Nydya-manjarl, p. 586. Mathuranatha also points out that the function of tarka is to supply such grounds that doubts may not arise, but it is not vydpti-grdhaka (tarkah sankanutpattau prayojakah...). Mathuranatha on Tattva-cintdmani, Part H, p. 240.

So far Vyasa-tirtha has been using the word tarka in the accepted Nyaya sense and, using it in that sense, he has been showing that the removal of doubts is not indispensable for the formation of the notion of concomitance. Tarka consists according to him, however, in the necessary awakening of the knowledge of absence of the reason owing to absence of the consequence; taken from this point of view, it becomes identical with inference (anumdna). Jaya-tirtha also says in his Pramdna-paddhati that tarka means the necessary assumption of something else (consequence), when a particular character or entity (reason) is perceived or taken for granted (kasyacid dharmasydngikare'rthdntarasydpddanam tarkah) 1 . Granted that there is no fire in the hill, it must necessarily be admitted that there is no smoke in it; this is tarka and this is also inference 2 . Tarka is thus the process by which the assumption of one hypothesis naturally forces the conclusion as true. This is therefore a pramdna, or valid source of knowledge, and should not be considered as either doubt or false knowledge, as some Nyaya writers did, or, as other Nyaya writers considered it to be, different from both doubt and decision (nirnaya). Thus according to Vyasa-tirtha tarka has a twofold function, one as the dispeller of doubts and a help to other pramdnas, and the other as inference. The main point that Vyasa-tirtha urges against Udayana (who holds the function of tarka to be merely the removal of undesirable assumptions) and against Vardhamana (who holds that the function of tarka is merely the removal of doubt of the absence of the consequence) is that, if tarka does not take account of the material discrepancy or impossibility of facts involved in the assumption of the absence of the consequence (fire) when the smoke is present, then even the doubts or undesirable assumptions will not be removed; and, if it does take account thereof, then it yields new knowledge, is identical with inference, and is a pramdna itself 3 . Tarka may be treated as a negative inference, e.g., "had it been

1 Pramdna-paddhati, p. 36 a. manmate tu ahglkrtena sddhydbhdvena saha anahglkrtasya sddhandbhdvasya vydpakatva-prama vd sddhyabhdvdnglkdra-nimittaka-sddhandbhdvasydnglkartavyatva-pramd vd tarkyate'nena iti vyutpattyd tarkah. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 78).

2 parvato nirdhumatvendngikartavyah niragnikatvena anglkrtatvdd hradavat ity anumdnam eva tarkah. Ibid. p. 84.

3 kith ca para-mate tarkasya kim visaya-pariiodhane upayogah kim Udayana-rltyd anista-prasanjanatvamdtrena upayogah, kim vd Varddhamdnddi-rityd sddhydbhdva-sandeha-nivarttanena. Ibid. p. 92.

without fire, it would have been without smoke; but it is not so". Being such a negative inference, it stands as an independent inference, and, as it may also be used to strengthen a positive inference, it may also be considered in that case an additional support to it {pratndndndm anugrdhaka), just as what is known by perception may again be strengthened by inference 1 . Its function in removing doubts in other cases remains just as it has been shown before; but everywhere the root principle involved in it is necessary supposition rendering other alternatives impossible (anyathdnupapatti), which is the principle also in inference 2 .

Concomitance (Vyapti).

The word vydpti in Sanskrit is a noun formed from the root vydp y "to pervade". The consequence (e.g., fire) pervades all cases of smoke, i.e., the circle of the consequence is not smaller than the circle of smoke and encloses it; consequence is therefore called the pervader (vydpaka) and the reason (e.g. smoke) as the object of this action of pervading is called the pervaded (vydpya). Thus in the case of smoke and fire there is an unfailing relation (avyabhicdritd-sambandha) between them and the former is called vydpya and the latter vydpaka. This unfailing relation may however be of four kinds. First, the two circles might coincide (samavrtti), in which case the reason may be treated as consequence and inferred from the consequence treated as reason and vice versa. Thus one may argue both ways: it is sinful because it is prohibited in the Vedas and it is prohibited in the Vedas because it is sinful; here the two circles coincide. Secondly, when one circle is smaller than the other, as in the case of smoke and fire (rvyunddhika-vrtti) ; the circle of fire is larger than the circle of smoke and so one could infer smoke from fire, but not fire from smoke— vydpya is smaller than the vydpaka. Thirdly, where the two circles are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parihdrenaiva vartate), e.g., the class-concept cow (gotva) and the class-concept horse (asvatva); where there is one, there is not the other. There is a relation of exclusion here, but not the relation of a vydpya and vydpaka. Fourthly, where the two are

1 sddhandnumdnam vinaiva yadi niragnikah sydt tarhi nirdhumah sydt tathd cdyam nirdhuma iti tarka-rupdnumdnenarva agnisiddheh. Ibid. p. 90.

2 sdksdd anyathdrtupapatti-pramdpaka-tarka-visaya-krta-virodhasya sattvdt.

Ibid. p. 89.

sometimes mutually exclusive, yet sometimes found to be coincident ; thus cooking is done by women, yet there are men who cook; cook and males are mutually exclusive, though there may be some males who cook {kvacit samdvista apt kvacit paraspara-parihd-renaiva vartate). The circle of cooking is divided between males and females. Here also there is a relation between cooking and males, but it is not unfailing (avyabhicdrita) ; unfailing relation means that, where there is one, there must be the other also.

When a man observes the coexistence of fire and smoke, he naturally revolves in his mind " is it in this place that fire and smoke are seen together, while in other places and at other times the presence of one excludes the presence of the other, or are they always found together"; then by observing in several instances, he finds that, where there is smoke, there is fire, and that, where there is no fire, there is no smoke, and that in some cases at least there is fire, but no smoke. These observations are followed by a consideration such as this: "since, though in many cases fire coexists with smoke, in some cases at least fire is found where there is no smoke, does smoke, although in all the cases known to me it exists with fire, ever remain without it, or does it always coexist with fire?" Then again the consideration arises that the relation of smoke to fire is determined by the presence of wet wood (ddrendhana), which may be called a vitiating condition (upddhi), i.e., had this condition not been there, there would have been unqualified coexistence of fire with smoke, and vice versa. This vitiating condition (upddhi) exists in all cases of smoke, but not in all cases of fire 1 . Where the coexistence is not determined by any such vitiating condition, the coexistence is universally mutual. There are some qualities which are common to both fire and smoke (e.g., both of them are objects of knowledge: yathd prameyatvam), and these cannot determine the connection. There are other qualities which do not belong either to smoke or fire, and these also cannot determine the connection. It is only the vitiating condition of the presence of wet wood which by its absence can dissociate fire from smoke, but cannot dissociate smoke from fire. If there were any such condition which was present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke, then the inference of fire from smoke would have been faulty as the

1 This vitiating condition will therefore falsify an inference such as " There is smoke in the hill because there is fire."

inference of smoke from fire is faulty. Now, so far as we have observed, there is no such condition which is present in all cases of fire, but not in all cases of smoke; the fear that there may be some vitiating conditions which are too subtle for our senses is illegitimate; for, if it is neither perceived nor known by any other sources of knowledge (pramdndntara-vedya), the doubt that it may still somehow exist cannot arise. So, when we are satisfied that there are no vitiating conditions, there arises the notion of invariable concomitance (avindbhdva-pramitih) 1 . So the invariable concomitance is grasped by perception aided by wide experience, associated with absence of any knowledge of exception to coexistence and ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, operating as accessories. When once the mutual invariable relation between smoke and fire is grasped, then, wherever smoke is perceived, fire is inferred 2 . This description of the formation of the notion of concomitance seems to be more or less the same as the Nyaya view; there also the perceiving of coexistence, associated with the knowledge of absence of exception, is said to lead to the formation of the notion of concomitance 3 .

1 Vyasa-tlrtha remarks here that the ascertainment of the absence of vitiating conditions is necessary in most cases where there are doubts as to their possible existence, but should not be insisted upon as indispensable in all cases; for then, this ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions being dependent on determination of concomitance and that on previous ascertainment of absence of vitiating conditions, there would be infinite regress (anavasthd) : yd tu Paddhatav upddhi-niscayasya sahakdritvoktih sd tu upddhi-sankdsthdbhiprdyd na tu sdrva-trikdbhiprdyd anyatha upddhy-abhdva-niscayasya vydpti-sdpeksa-tarkddhtnatvend-navasthdpdtdt. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 22).

2 Pramdna-paddhati, pp. 31-5.

3 vyabhicdra-jndna-viraha-sahakrtam sahacdra-darsanam vydpti-grdhakam. Tattva-cintdmani, p. 210. Legitimate doubts regarding invariable concomitance may be removed by tarka, as has already been described above.

Vyasa-tlrtha, following the Nydya-sudhd, defines vitiating conditions (upddhi) as sddhya-vydpakatve sati sddhandvydpaka upddhir iti; and he objects to Udayana's definition of it as sddhya-sama-vydptatve sati sddhandvydpaka upddhih and also to Gangesa's definition of it as paryavasita-sddhya-vydpakatve sati sddhandvydpaka upddhih. But the purport aimed at by these various definitions is the same, as has been explained above. The distinctions are more verbal and scholastic than logical or philosophical; it will therefore be an unnecessary digression to enter into these. See the whole discussion on upddhi in Vyasa-tirtha's Tarka-tdndava (MS., pp. 44-60-

Epistemological Process in Inference.

The Nyaya holds that, when a person acquainted with the relation of concomitance existing between smoke and fire sees smoke on a hill, he remembers the relation of concomitance (vydpti-smarana), that this smoke is invariably and unconditionally connected with fire 1 ; then the two ideas are connected, namely, that the smoke which has unconditional invariable relations with fire is in che hill. It is this third synthesis of knowledge that leads us to the inference of fire in the hill. Vyasa-tirtha, following the Nydya-sudhd, argues that this view may be true in all those cases where a concomitance (vydpti) is remembered on seeing the reason (hetu), but, where the concomitance is remembered without seeing the reason, the threefold synthesis cannot be admitted. Prabhakara, however, holds that all inference proceeds from two distinct propositions, and no synthesis is required. The two propositions are "smoke is pervaded by fire" and "the hill is smoky." Prabhakara holds that, since knowledge as formulated in the above two propositions must invariably and unconditionally precede all inference, there is no necessity for believing their synthesis to be the cause of inference, since no such synthesis really happens. Vyasa-tirtha, however, argues that such a synthesis is a real psychological state in inference and other mental operations, such as recognition, etc. Moreover, if the identity of the smoke (with which fire was found invariably present) with the smoke now perceived in the hill were not established by the synthesis of the two propositions, it would be a syllogism of four terms and hence invalid 2 . Moreover, the movement of thought involved in inference requires such a synthesis, without which the two propositions would be unrelated and statical (nirvydpdka) and no inference would follow.

Various Considerations regarding Inference.

Inference is of three kinds: (i) of cause from effect (kdryd-numdna), as the inference of fire from smoke, (ii) of effect from cause (kdrandnumdna), as the inference of rain from gathering

1 ayarn dh&mo vahni-vydpya or vahni-vydpya-dhumavdn ayam iti. Nyaya view.

2 evam ca kimcit prameyatn vahni-vydpyam paravatai ca prameyavdn iti jnana-dvayam iva kaicid dharmo vahni-vydpyah parvatas ca dhumavdn iti visa-halitam paraspara-vartandbhijnam jnana-dvayam api ndnumiti-hetuh.

Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 68).

clouds, (iii) inference of a different order from cause-effect types (akdrya-kdrandnumdna), as the inference of colour from taste (rase rupasyd). From another point of view inference is of two kinds: (i) drsta, where the inferred object is perceivable (pratyaksa-yogya), as of fire from smoke, and (ii) sdmdnyato-drsta, where it is not perceivable (pratyaksdyogya), as of the existence of the sense of vision from the perception of colours. This division of inference into drsta and adrsta may be made from another point of view. Thus, when an inference is made on the basis of the concomitance directly observed between two entities (e.g., fire and smoke), it is called drsta; but, when an inference is made on the basis of similarity or analogy, it is called sdmdnyato-drsta, as the inference that, just as ploughing, etc., lead to the production of crops, so sacrifices also produce heavenly enjoyments, since they have this similarity that both are results of effort. Inference may again be considered as being of two kinds: (i) inference of one right knowledge from another right knowledge (sddhandnumdna), e.g., of fire from smoke, (ii) the inference of false knowledge (dusandnumdna), e.g., "this cannot prove its conclusion, since it is contradicted by experience." Again, some hold that inference is of three kinds: (i) by absolute agreement in presence (where no case of absence is possible), (ii) by absolute absence (where no outside positive instance is possible), and (iii) by combination of agreement in presence and absence; in accordance with this it is kevaldrwayi (impossible-negation), kevala-vyatireki (impossible-position) and anvaya-vyatireki (joint positive-negative). Thus the proposition "all objects of knowledge are expressible" is an example of the first type of inference, since no negative instance is possible of which we could say that this is not an object of knowledge and is not also expressible; the proposition "all living bodies are endowed with souls, since they have lives" is an example of inference of the second type. This can only be proved by an appeal to negative instances such as "all those who are not endowed with souls are not living "; for, since the proposition comprehends all positive instances, no positive instances apart from the proposition under consideration are available. The third type is the ordinary one of inference where concomitance is experienced through both positive and negative instances.

Inference is said again to be of two kinds: first svdrtha, where the knowledge of the reason with its concomitance rises in one's

own mind of itself, and secondly pardrtha, where such a knowledge is for the instruction of others. As regards the constituent propositions (avayava) of inference, Vyasa-tirtha discusses the ten-proposition view of older Nyaya writers (jaran-naiydyika), also the five-proposition view of the later Nyaya writers 1 , the three-proposition view of the Mimamsa, and also the two-proposition view of example and the application of reason (uddharanopanayar) of the Buddhists. Vyasa-tirtha urges that, since the value of these constituent propositions consists in reminding persons of a particular concomitance or in rousing an enquiry in those who did not know it before, there is necessity only for as many propositions as are necessary for the purpose, in accordance with the circumstances under which the inference is being made or the state of mind of the person who makes it—so that there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition, reason and example are necessary, there may be cases where only the enunciating proposition combined with the reason is necessary (agni-vydpta-dhumavdn parvato'gnimdn iti hetu-garbha-pratijnd), or, when in certain cases the discussion presupposes the enunciating proposition, only the reason may be necessary, and so on 2 . So there is no fixed rule as to the number of constituent propositions necessary for inference; it all depends upon the nature of the case whether two, three or more propositions are necessary.

Both Jaya-tirtha and Vyasa-tirtha devote a long discussion to the division of fallacies {upapatti-dosd) and criticize the Nyaya division of the same; but, as these have but little philosophical bearing, I feel inclined to omit them 3 .

Testimony.

Madhva and his followers admitted only three kinds of means of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, and the testimony of the Vedas. All other kinds of means of knowledge (pramdna) admitted in other systems, such as arthdpatti, sambhava, etc., are shown to be but modes of inference 4 . The Vedas are regarded as having by

1 jijn&sd-samiaya-sakya-prdptih prayojana-samsayanirdsdh pratyna-hetOddha-ranopanaya-nigamandni iti dasdvayavd iti jaran-naiydyikd dhuh. Tarka-tdndava.

2 vivddenaiva pratijiid-siddhau kutah parvato'gnimdn iti prasne agni-vydpta-dhumavattvdd iti hetu-mdtrena vd. Tarka-tdndava (MS., p. 10).

3 See Pramdna-paddhati, pp. 48-79; also Tarka-tdndava (MS., pp. 114 et seq.).

4 Pramdna-paddhati, pp. 86-90.

themselves independent force of knowledge. They are uncreated (apauruseya) and eternal (nitya). They are valid means of knowledge, and yet, since their validity is not derived from the speech of any person, they must be regarded as uncreated 1 . No attempt, however, was made to prove that the Vedas were valid means of knowledge; but, as their validity was not questioned by any of the Hindu schools, that was taken as accepted, and then it was argued that, since they were not uttered by anyone, they were uncreated and eternal. It was sought to establish this uncreatedness of the Vedas as against the Nyaya view that they were created by God (Isvara). Vyasa-tlrtha argues that it is better to accept the direct validity of the Vedas on the ground of their being uncreated, than to do it in an indirect way through the admission of an omniscient being as their author; for there is no certainty that even such authors would not try to deceive mankind by false statements. Buddha himself is an incarnation of God, and yet he deceived the people by false teachings. Tradition also does not ascribe any author to the Vedas. If they had been created, they would be of the same kind as the holy scriptures of the Buddhists or Jains. If the importance of scriptures were to be judged by the number of people who followed them, then the Mahomedan scriptures would have a superior place. God may be regarded as the great teacher of the Vedas, being the first person who uttered and taught them 2 . He did not create them and He remembers them always; so that there is no chance of the Vedic order of words being destroyed. Ordinarily the claim of facts to validity is prior to that of the words which express them, and the latter depends on the former; but in the case of the Vedas the words and passages have a validity which is prior to facts and independent of them. The Madhva view thus combines the Nyaya and the Mlmamsa views of the Vedas without agreeing with either.

1 paurtifeya-sabdapramanakatve sati sapramanakatvat.

Tarka-tandava (MS., p. ioo).

8 isvaro'pi hy asman-mate Veda-sampraddya-pravartakatvdn mahopa-

dhydya eva. Ibid. p. 122.

CHAPTER XXIX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS

Vyasa-tirtha, Madhusudana and Ramacarya on the Falsity of the World.

The Vedantists urge that the world-appearance is false. But before entering into any discussion about the nature of falsehood it is required that the Vedantists should give a definition of falsehood. Five principal definitions have been adduced by the old Vedantists; of these the first is that falsehood is that which is the absence of being as well as the absence of non-being (sattvdtyantd-bhdvattve sati asattvdtyantatd-bhdvavattva-rupam vitisfam 1 ). But Vyasa-tirtha urges that, since one of these is the negation of the other, joint assertion of them both will be against the Law of excluded middle and therefore will be self-contradictory; the fact that both being and non-being may be admitted independently is no reason for their joint admission (e.g., the hare and horn both exist separately, but the hare's horn exists nowhere). To this the reply of Madhusudana is that the Law of excluded middle does not apply to every case of the relation between being and non-being. Thus the false-appearances have being so far as they appear and non-being so far as they are non-existent; exclusion of being does not necessarily lead us to non-being, and vice versa. To this the retort given by the author of Tarangini is that the Sankarites themselves say that, if a thing has no being, it cannot appear, which shows that they themselves admit the Law of excluded middle, the force of which can never be denied, as Logic amply demonstrates in the examination of any and every specific relation of being and non-being.

The second definition of falsehood by the Sankarites is that falsehood is that which can be denied at all times even where it appears to exist (pratt-pannopddhu traikdlika-nisedha-prati-yogitvam). To this Vyasa-tirtha says that, if the denial is true, then this true thing would exist side by side with Brahman and thus the

theory of extreme monism would break down (nisedhasya tattrikatve advaita-hdnih) ; if the denial is false or true only in a limited manner (vydvahdrika), then the world-appearance would become true. Again, what does the denial actually mean? These supposed appearances are said to be produced from a material cause, and they are perceived as existing at the time of perception; and, if it is held that even then they have no existence at all as such, then they must be absolutely without being, like the chimerical hare's horn. If it is held that the difference of the world-appearance from chimerical entities like the hare's horn, etc., is that they are absolutely indescribable, then the reply is that the very term "indescribable" describes their nature. Again, that which is absolutely non-existing cannot in any way appear in knowledge (asatah a-pratitav\ and therefore it is not possible to make reference to it or to relate it in any way to anything else. The Sankarites themselves hold that what is non-existing cannot appear in knowledge (asac cet na pratiyeta), and thus they themselves deny the possibility of any being-in-knowledge of that which is non-existing. Again, reality is not the same as mere appearance in knowledge, and consequently, if Brahman remained always uncontradicted in knowledge, its reality could not on that ground be affirmed. Again, it is not true that words denoting absolutely non-existing and chimerical things, such as the hare's horn, produce no knowledge; for they also produce some notion; the difference between ordinary illusions and the chimerical entities is this that, while the ground of the ordinary illusions is right and valid, chimerical entities have no ground at all. Therefore, since chimerical entities can also be made objects of awareness they appear in knowledge as non-existing. The Vedic text "non-being alone existed in the beginning" {asad eva idam agre dsit) also testifies to the fact that "non-being" may appear as existent. Also non-being cannot be defined as that which is different from mere "being" (sat) and "the indescribable" (a-nirvdcya); for the latter can only be understood through the concept of non-being and vice versa. Thus non-being may be defined as that which is different from that being which cannot at all times be denied at all places (sdrvatrika-traikdlika-nisedha-prati-yogitva-rupa-sadanyasyaiva tattvdc ca). If the indescribable (a-nirvdcya) is defined as that which can be denied at all times, it is the same as non-being itself. Also non-being cannot be defined

206 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

as that which is incapable of fulfilling any practical purpose; for even the conch-shell-silver, which is admitted to be false, can serve to rouse an effort to grasp it in the deluded person and thus be considered to have some kind of practical efficiency, and the pure Brahman, which is regarded as ultimately real, is itself unable to serve any practical purpose of any kind. Again, falsehood or non-being cannot be defined as that which has no nature of its own; for, if that were so, then the denial of falsehood could not be said to be directed to its own nature as such; nor could the nature of falsehood be regarded as itself false, since such an interpretation would rest on a mere technical assumption of the meaning of falsehood, and it would not in the least clear the points at issue; for, if the nature of the so-called entity persisted in its own time and place, it would be meaningless to call such a nature false in itself. Such an assumption would also mean that no distinction is made between that which can serve practical efficiency and that which cannot; if that which persists in time and place and can serve a practical purpose could be called false, then there would be no difference between being and non-being, and the absence of the real could be said to be as much a cause of cloth as the thread itself. Thus absolute non-being may be defined as that which can always be denied in all places (sarvatra traikalika-nisedha-pratiyogitvam). Also it cannot be held that "non-being" (asat) cannot be the object of an absolute denial simply because it is non-being, as is said in the Nyaya-makaranda of Anandabodha; for, if an absolute denial cannot have any object, then the reason "because it is non-being" as adduced above would have no object itself and would therefore be inapplicable. Moreover, just as positive entities can be denied, so the specific negations referring to positive entities may also be denied and so lead on to their corresponding positive affirmations. Again, it is also agreed that specific positive entities come into being through the negation of their corresponding negations immediately prior to their coming into being {prdg-abhava). This also proves that denial or negation does not necessarily require positive characters or entities for the operation and their function of negation. The whole upshot of this discussion is that, if falsehood means absolute denial of anything where it appears in knowledge, then the implication is that no reality can be affirmed; for what could be affirmed either as false or as true would only apply to

entities as they are known, and in that case even the reality of Brahman would be conditional, namely, so far as it is known. Again, absolute negation (sarvatra traikdlika-nisedha-pratiyogitvam) cannot be distinguished from what is known as chimerical entities. And, if the world-appearance could be an object of absolute negation, its status would be no better than that of chimerical entities (e.g., the hare's horn).

In reply to the objections of Vyasa-tlrtha against the definition of falsehood, that, if falsehood be real, then that implies dualism, and that, if falsehood is false, that implies re-affirmation of the world as real, Madhusudana says that, since the denial is itself identical (so far as its ultimate ground is concerned) with Brahman, the reality of falsehood does not imply dualism; for the reality of the denial does not imply the reality of the phenomenon, denial of which has been denied by the denial of all phenomena. It has only so much reality as is implied in the ground of all phenomena, which is the Brahman. Again, the falsehood of the falsehood does not imply the affirmation of the reality of the world-appearance; for in the case of the conch-shell-silver, though it is known that not only was it false, but, since it is never existent, it never exists, and never will exist, and the attribution of falsity to it is also false, the conch-shell-silver is not for the matter of that re-affirmed as real. It is wrong to suppose that the falsity of the falsity or the denial of the denial is re-affirmation in all cases; it is only when the reality and the denial have the same status and identically the same scope that the denial of the denial means an affirmation; but, when the scope of their meaning varies, the denial of the denial does not imply an affirmation. It may further be pointed out that, when the denial of the denial is intended to re-affirm the positive entity, the denial of the denial leads to affirmation. But, when a denial denies both the positive entity and the denial (which is itself taken as an independent entity), the second denial does not lead to affirmation 1 . The denial of the world-appearance is the denial of the relaity of the very world-appearance as such (svarupena), like the denial of the conch-shell-silver. The fact that the world-appearance is

1 Tatra hi nisedhasya nisedhe pratijogi-sattvam dydti, yatra nisedhasya nisedha-buddhyd pratiyogisattvam vyavasthdpyate, na nisedha-mdtram nisedhyate, yatha rajate na idam rajatam iti jndndantaram idam na arajatam iti jndnena rajatam vyavasthdpyate. yatra tu prati-yogi-nisedhayor ubhayor apt nisedhas tatra na prati-yogi-sattvam. Advaita-siddhi, pp. 105-6.

208 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

believed to be a product of ajndna does not in the least imply that its very nature cannot be false; for what is by its very nature false would be so, whether produced or not. The denial of the conch-shell-silver ("this is not silver") means that the conch-shell-silver is other than the real market-silver, i.e., the negation here is that of otherness (anyo-anya-abhdva). But, when it is said that "here is no silver," the negation is one of non-existence, and the falsity of the appearance is thereby definitely declared (sd ca purovartti-rajatasyawa vydvahdrikam atyanta-abhdvam visayikaroti iti kantho-ktam eva mithydtvam), whereas in the former case falsehood is only implied {idam sdbda-nirdiste purovarti-prdtitika-rajate rajata-sabda-nirdista-vydvahdrika-rajata-anyonya-abhdua-pratiter drthi-kam mithydtvam) 1 . Now, if the world-appearance be denied ("there is no world-appearance here"), then, since there is no world-appearance anywhere else, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of the world-appearance, i.e., world-appearance is as non-existent as any chimerical entity, e.g., the hare's horn. The reply to such an objection, that there is a difference between the absolute negation of the world-experience as indescribable (anirvdcya) and the absolute negation as chimerical (tucca), is that the latter has not even a seeming appearance anywhere, whereas the former appears as really existent until it is contradicted (kvachid apy upddhau sattvena pratity-anarhatvam atyanta-asattvam ydvad bddham pratitiyogyatvam prdtitika-sattvam). It must further be noted in this connection that the denial which leads to falsehood must have the same relation and the same extent and scope as the content which is being denied {yena rupena yad-adhikaranatayd yat pratipannam tena rupena tan-nistha-atyanta-abhdva-pratiyogitvasya pratipanna-padena sucitatvdt ; tac ca rupam ambandha-viseso'vacchedakavisesas ca) 2 . The Sahkarites, moreover, do not admit negation as a separate category, but consider the negation to be identical with the unqualified nature of the locus where the negation appears. Brahman has no qualities, and this does not therefore mean that it has a negative quality; for, there being more separate negations, the negation of all qualities simply means the pure nature of Brahman. The attribution of so-called positive qualities also as infinitude, etc., means the negation of the opposite qualities of falsehood and limitation, which ultimately

implies a reversion to the pure nature of Brahman, etc. {adhikarana-atirikta - abhdva - abhyupagamena ukta - mithydtva - abhdva - rupa-satyatvasya Brahma-svarupa-virodhdt) 1 .

Ramacarya, in his Tarangini, refuting the view of Madhusudana, says that, excepting the case of the negation of the negation-prior-to-becoming (prdg-abhdva), the negation of negation means positing and therefore, since no third alternative is possible, the denial of the denial of an entity necessarily posits. Again, the assertion of Madhusudana, that the illusion consists in the appearance of the illusory silver as the real silver of the market, is groundless; for the material cause that produced the illusory silver is different from the material cause of the silver of the market. The illusory silver ceases to exist only when there is true knowledge removing the ignorance which was the material cause of the illusory silver (prdttbhdsikasya svopdddna-jndna-nivartaka jndna-visayenaiva vd tdddtmya-pratttesca): where the same material cause produces two different appearances (e.g., the cloth and the whiteness) they may be experienced as identical. But, when the material causes are entirely different, their products can never be experienced as identical 2 . Again, it has been urged by Madhusudana that the denial that constitutes falsehood must be qualified by the same conditions and relations whereby the positive entities were qualified; but this is unmeaning, for no amount of such conditioning can gainsay the truth that the negation of negations means position, until some definite proof of the existence of a third alternative escaping the sphere of the Law of Excluded Middle can be adduced 3 .

Vyasa-tirtha says that falsehood moreover cannot be defined as absolute denial of reality; for, unless the meaning of denial is understood, the meaning of reality cannot be comprehended and vice versa. The point at issue here is whether conch-silver is denied in its very nature as such or whether its reality is denied. The former alternative is denied on the ground that, if it were accepted, then it would be difficult to account for the awareness of the conch-silver as existing in front of the perceiver; for, if it was absolutely non-existent, it could not be directly perceived. But it may be pointed out with the same force that the second alternative is also unacceptable, because, when the conch-silver was perceived, it was

1 Ibid. p. 156. 2 Nydydmrta-taranginl, p. 16(a).

3 Tarangini, p. 20.

div I4

210 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

also perceived to be real, and, if that is so, how can that reality be denied? If in reply to this it is suggested that the reality of the conch-shell-silver is only a relative reality and not an absolute reality, then it may be pointed out that, if once a degree of reality be admitted, then infinite regress will follow; for one may as well ask whether the absolute reality is absolutely absolute or relatively absolute and so on. Again, falsehood is defined as that which is liable to be destroyed by knowledge in its function as knowledge. But Vyasa-tlrtha does not tolerate such a position and says that knowledge of past events and things, even though false, ceases by itself without waiting to be destroyed by the so-called right knowledge; also it is not felt that the silver is destroyed by the knowledge of the conch-shell. It is further urged that right knowledge of the conch-shell also removes the error which, so far as it was an error, was true, and this shows that knowledge removes not only falsehood, but also true things, and on that account the definition in question cannot be a true definition of falsehood. Moreover, when an illusion is removed, the removal is not due to the function of cognition as such, but is by virtue of its perceptual immediacy {aparoksa-adhydsam prati jndnasya-aparoksatayd nivartakatvena jndnatvena anivartakatvdc ca) 1 . Again, if a falsehood is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge which destroys the very material cause of the falsehood (svopdddna ajndna-nwartaka jndna-nivartyatvam) y the objection will be that it does not apply to the beginningless illusion 2 . It may similarly be held that the definition of falsehood as appearance in the place where it does not exist (svdtyanta-abhdva-adhikarane eva pratlyamdnatvam) may also be refuted; for many objections occur, as has already been pointed out, according as we consider the negation to be relatively real or illusory. Again, if falsehood be defined as that which is different both from being and non-being, then, since it has already been pointed out that non-being means absolute denial, the appearances or illusions would be inexplicable. If it be defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge, then that can prove its momentary character, but not its false nature (dhi-ndsyatve anityatd eva sydt na mrsdtmataf '. In reply to the objection of Vyasa-tlrtha concerning the definition of falsehood as that which is liable to be destroyed by know-

1 Nydydmrta, p. 39(6). 2 Ibid. p. 40.

ledge, Madhusudana says that the real meaning of the definition is that the entity which is destroyed, both in its causal aspect and the aspect as effect, on account of the rise of knowledge is false. The jug though destroyed as effect by the stroke of the club is not destroyed in its causal aspect as the earthy pot. The hare's horn does not exist at all: so its non-existence is not due to knowledge. Again, since the conch-shell-silver appears in consciousness and is destroyed immediately after the rise of true knowledge, its dissolution must be due to knowledge. Also it is not wrong to say that falsehood is negated by knowledge in its function as knowledge; for the later knowledge does not negate the prior knowledge by its function as knowledge, but merely on account of its posteriority; and therefore the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge only in its function as knowledge clearly keeps aloof the case of the negation of the prior knowledge by the later, to which it was supposed that the above definition of falsehood could wrongly be extended. It is well, however, to point out that falsehood is negated by knowledge not in an indirect manner, but directly and immediately (vastutas tu sdksdtkdratvena jndna-nivartyatvam vivaksttam) 1 .

To this Ramacarya replies that it is Madhusudana who says that the definition of falsehood as that which can be negated by knowledge means the general absence of an entity through the rise of knowledge (jndna-prayukta-avasthiti-sdmdnya-viraha-pratiyogi-tvam jndna-nivartyatvam (see Advaita-siddhi, p. 168, and Tarangtni, p. 22) 2 . It may be asked whether the word "generally" (sdmdnya) or the negation is qualified by the existence (avasthityd sdmdnyam vd visisyate viraho vd). The first alternative would mean the negation of the cause of an entity through the rise of knowledge; for the word avasthiti-sdmdnya means cause. But in that case there would be an illicit extension of the definition of falsehood to the negation of the prior knowledge by the posterior knowledge; for the posterior knowledge destroys the cause of the persistence of the prior knowledge, and it would not apply to the beginningless avidyd. In the second alternative, i.e., if the word sdmdnya is

1 jndnatva-vyapya-dharmena jnanamvartyatvam ityapi sadhu, uttarajnanasya purva-jfidna-nivartakatvatn na jndnatvavyapyadharmena kintu icchddi-sadhd-ranenodicyatmavisesagunatvena udicyatvena veti na siddha-sadhanadi.

Advaita-siddhi, pp. 171-2.

2 Ibid. p. 178.

212 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

qualified by the negation, then it may be pointed out that the Sankarite never admits a general negation as distinguished from the negation of any special entity. Moreover, since the conch-shell-silver is denied in its very nature as false, it cannot be said that its general absence (that is, both as cause and effect) was due to the rise of knowledge; for it is not admitted to be existent at any time 1 . Again, as it has been shown by Vyasa-tlrtha that there ought not to be any difference between the non-existence of the conch-shell-silver and that of the hare's horn, the non-existence of the hare's horn might equally be said to be due to knowledge, if the nonexistence of the conch-shell-silver be said to be due to the rise of knowledge.

In supporting the fourth definition of falsehood as "appearance in the locus of its own absence" (svdtyanta-abhdva-adhikarane eva pratiyamdnatvam) or as the "absence in the locus of its own existence" (svdsraya nistha-atyanta-abhdva-pratiyogitvam), Madhusudana says that, since an entity may be both present and absent in one identical time, so it may be both present and absent in one identical space. To this Ramacarya replies that, if this is admitted, then there is no difference between existence and nonexistence, and ordinary experience is inexplicable (tathd sati bhdvdbhdvayor ucchinnakathd sydt iti vydvahdrikyapi vyavasthd na sydt) ; consequently dualism and its negation, monism, would be the same, and the monistic knowledge would be unable to dispel the dualistic consciousness.

In support of the fifth definition of falsehood as difference from the real {sad-viviktatvam mithydtvam) Madhusudana defines existence of reality as that which is established by knowledge and not invalidated by defects. The definition of existence is further modified by him as that which appears as existent through proofs not invalidated by defects. By this qualification he excludes chimerical entities and Brahman; for chimerical entities do not appear as existent, and Brahman, though it exists in itself, is never an object to any mind to which it appears as existent (satvd-prakdraka-pratiti-visayatdbhdvdt).

The existent is defined as that which is established by proof (pramdna-siddha), and this is again as that which is uncontradicted.

1 htkti-rajatader-avasthity-anglkare svarupena nifedhokty-ayogas-ca.

Taranginl, p. 22.

To this it is objected by Ramacarya that Brahman is not the object of any proofs, whereas the world, which is established by all proofs, is ultimately contradicted 1 .

The question is raised by Vyasa-tlrtha whether falsehood itself is contradicted or uncontradicted. If it is uncontradicted, then falsehood becomes real, and the doctrine of monism fails. If it is urged in reply that falsehood is identical with the ground of illusion, the Brahman, then the meaning of the phrase "world-appearance is false" (prapanco mithya) is that the world-appearance is identical with Brahman {mithya being identical with Brahman), and this is not disputed by us; for Brahman, being all-pervasive, is in a sense identical with the world-appearance. Moreover, if falsehood be identical with Brahman, the general argument that those things alone are false which are cognizable would be faulty, because falsity, being identical with Brahman, would itself be un-cognizable. If falsehood be contradicted, then it is self-false (bddhyd), and the world would become real. Even if it is again urged that falsehood is not identical with Brahman, but is one with the reality of Brahman as underlying the second denial or the falsehood of the falsehood, to this the reply would be that our very inquiry centres round the question whether the second denial is itself contradicted or uncontradicted, and it is well known that, since the underlying reality is everywhere pure consciousness, the underlying reality of the second falsehood has no separate or independent existence regarding which any affirmation could be made. It is clear that, if in the first case the assertion of falsehood being identical with Brahman be meaningless, the attempt at an extension by making it identical with the pure consciousness underlying the second denial does not in reality lead to any new meaning. If it is again urged that, since the conch-shell-silver is false, the falsehood which is a quality of this conch-shell-silver is necessarily false; if the substance is false, its quality is necessarily false, and therefore the falsehood of this falsehood does not reaffirm the reality of the conch-shell-silver. Since both the falsehoods are based on the falsehood of the substance to which they are attributively associated the negation of negation does not mean a position. The negation of a negation can mean a position only if the substance be real. But this is clearly a confusion; for the absence of qualities follows on the

1 Taranginl, p. 23.

214 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

absence of the substance only when such qualities are dependent on the nature of the substance; but falsehood is not so, since it is naturally opposed to that to which it refers 1 . Moreover, if the falsehood of the conch-shell-silver becomes false merely because it is associated with the illusory silver, though it is affirmed by an experience of contradiction, then it might equally well be real because of its ultimate association with Brahman, the ground reality of all things; or on the other hand the conch-shell might equally well be false because of its association with the illusory silver, and the non-existent would also be existent because of its association with existence, and vice versa*. Moreover, the conch-shell-silver is not regarded by the Sankarites as absolutely nonexistent, like the chimerical hare's horn, and therefore falsehood cannot be considered to be so on account of its association therewith. Again, the argument that falsehood has not the same status of existence as the world-appearance to which it refers and therefore the assertion of falsehood does not hurt extreme monism, is wrong: for, if falsehood has only a relative existence (vydvahd-riktve), the world of our daily experience, which is opposed to it and which is attested by perception, ought to be regarded as ultimately real. Thus our former objection remains valid, that, if falsehood be uncontradicted, the doctrine of monism fails and, if contradicted, the world would be real 3 .

Madhusudana has the former reply to the above objection that, when the position and negation have a different order of being, the negation of the negation does not imply affirmation. If the negation refers to a relative existence, then such negation does not take away the assertion of a fanciful existence 4 . Thus an entity may be in different senses both true and false. Madhusudana further says that, when the denial is due to a specific quality, then the negation of negation cannot be an affirmation. Here both the conch-shell and its quality are denied on account of their common

1 dharmy-asattve dharmdsattvam tu dharmi-sattvdsdpeksa-dharma-visayam; mithydtvam tu tat-pratikulam. Nydydmrta, p. 44.

2 Ibid. p. 45.

3 mithydtvam yady abddhyam sydt syad advaita-mata-ksatih mithydtvam yadi bddhyam sydt jagat-satyatvam dpatet.

Ibid. p. 47. * paraspara-viraha-rupatve'pi visama-satvdkayor avirodhdt vydvahdrika-mithydtvena vydvahdrika-satyatvdpahdre'pi kdlpanika-satyatvdnapahdrdt.

Advaita-siddhi, p. 217.

attribute of plausibility. Thus it may be said with impunity that both the horse and the cow may be denied in an elephant 1 .

To this Ramacarya's reply is that existence and non-existence naturally exclude each other, and their denial is therefore not due to any other specific property. That existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive is acknowledged even by the Sankarites when they speak of maya as being different both from existence and nonexistence 2 .

An important argument establishing the falsity of the world rests upon the fact that the world is cognizable; all that is cognizable is false, like dream experiences. At this point Vyasa-tlrtha seeks to analyse what may be meant by the word cognizable. Several alternative meanings are offered, of which the first is termed vrtti-vya.pya.tva, i.e., that which is a content of a mental state. The Sankarites are thus supposed to say that all that can be a content of a mental state is false. To this Vyasa-tlrtha's reply is that Brahman and the self must also be the content of at least some kind of mental state, and therefore, if the thesis of the Sankarites be accepted, Brahman also would be false. If it is said that Brahman in its purity can never be the object of any mental state, and it can be so only when it is associated with ajndna, to this the reply is that, if Brahman in its purity cannot manifest itself in awareness, it can never establish itself, and such a theory directly militates against the self-revealing nature of Brahman. Again, it is urged that, though Brahman is self-revealing, yet it cannot be the content of any mental state; for the very expression "Brahman is pure and self-revealing" would make it the content of that verbal cognition; if the expression carries no sense, then there is no meaning in it. Moreover, if Brahman as associated with ajndna be admitted to be the content of a mental state, it would through such an association be a constituent of that mental content and therefore a content in itself. It cannot, moreover, be said that the objection cannot apply to Brahman because Brahman can be a content only in association and not in its nature; for, since the same conditions apply to eternal and transcendental entities of an indeterminate character which

1 Advaita-siddhi, p. 213.

2 na tdvat paraspara-viraharupayor ekanisedhyatd-avacchedakdvachinnatvam sambhavati tvaydpi satyatvamithydtvayoh paraspara-samuccaye virodhdt bibhyatd sad-asad-vailaksanyasdrupye'anglkdracca. Tarangini, p. 26.

216 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

cannot be contents of consciousness in themselves, but only in later associated forms, Brahman would not be false on that account. Again, it is wrong to suppose that, when an object is known, the content of that mental state has the same form as the object of awareness; for we may know a hare's horn through a verbal cognition without assuming that the mental state has the same form as a hare's horn. The assumption therefore that the content of awareness must have the same form as its object is wholly invalid. It is clearly found to be so in the case of Brahma-knowledge; for no awareness can have an infinitude as its content. So to say that an awareness has content as an object simply means that it refers thereto {tad-visayatvam eva tad-dkdratvam) 1 . Since this is so, the condition of perception that pure consciousness must be reflected in the mental state in superimposition upon the physical object is wholly unnecessary. Thus the objection, that all that is cognizable is on that account false, is invalid.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the pure consciousness, which is always self-revealing, is never the content of any awareness. It only appears to be so in association with the ajndna modifications which alone can become the content of knowledge. Thus in all circumstances the pure consciousness is self-revealing and it can never be the content of itself. Madhusudana would admit all the suggested interpretations of cognizability offered by Vyasa-tlrtha, excepting the second (phala-vydpyatva) 2 ; he, however, admits that a stricter criticism would require the definition to be slightly modified by excluding cognizability through verbal cognition (vastutas tu sdbddjanya-vrtti-visayatvam eva drsyatvam) ; in this way, though one may be aware of chimerical entities through verbal propositions, they would not on that account be called false; for they are absolutely non-existent entities, which cannot be called either false or true 3 . Madhusudana further interprets cognizability as that which has a definite formal content (sva-prakdraka-vrtti-visayatvam eva drsyatvam). By the term "formal" (sva-prakdraka)

1 Nydydmrta, p. 57.

2 The suggested interpretations of cognizability (drsyatva) as given by Vyasa-tirtha are of seven kinds: kim idam drsyatvam; vrtti-vydpyatvam vd; phala-vydpyatvatn vd; sddharanam vd; kaddcid-kathatncid-visayatvam vd; sva-vyavahdre svdtirikta-samvid-antardpeksd-niyatir vd; a-sva-prakdsatvam vd. Ibid. p. 49.

he means any describable characteristic (sopdkhyah kas'cid dharmah) and thereby excludes Brahman, which means purity having no describable characteristic: on the other hand, even the cognition of negations may be described as having the character of negativity. The effect of this interpretation is that cognizability is limited to all that comes within the purview of relative and pragmatic experience. In attempting to clear the meaning of cognizability Madhusudana defines it as that which is somehow in relation with pure consciousness (cid-visayatva). This, being identical with self, is devoid of any such two-term relation. In the attempt to classify the meaning further, cognizability of things is defined as dependence for revelation on an alien consciousness {sva-vyavahdre svdtirikta-samvid-apeksd-niyaii-rupam drsyatvam) or as the character of being other than the self-revealing (a-sva-prakdsatva-rupatvam drsyatvam). It is clear therefore that anything other than pure consciousness depends on pure consciousness for revelation.

Ramacarya, in attempting to refute Madhusudana, says that merely from the knowledge of the concomitance of impurity (asuddhatva) and dependent revelation (a-sva-prakdsatva) one cannot say that pure consciousness is self-revealed; but such a conclusion can be arrived at only when it is known that pure consciousness has no impurity in it. Again, the concomitance of dependent revelation and impurity can be known only when their opposites, "purity" and "self-revealingness," are known to coexist with pure consciousness; thus the knowledge of concomitance of pure consciousness with self-revealingness and that of impure consciousness with dependent revelation are mutually independent. There is therefore no way in which it can be asserted that only pure consciousness is self-revealing 1 . The other reason adduced for falsehood is that the world-appearance is false because it is material. Now what is this materiality? Its character is given as "nons knower" (ajndtrtva), "ignorance" (ajndnatva), as "non-self-revealing" (a-sva-prakdsatva), or "non-self." If the first meaning of materiality be accepted, then it may be pointed out that according

1 na tavad a-sva-prakdsatvdsuddhatvayor vydpya-vydpaka-bhdva-grahamd-trena suddhe sva-prakdsatd paryavasyati kintu suddhe asva-prakdsatva-vydpa-kasya asuddhatvasya vydvrttdu jnatdydm eva. tathd ca vydpaka-vyatireka-grahd.rth.can avaiyam suddha-jndnam. kimcdsva-prakdsatvdsuddhatvayor vyd-pya-vydpaka-bhdva-graho'pi tadubhayavyatirekayoh suddhatva-svaprakdsatvayoh suddhe sahacdra-grahe saty eveti ghatta-kutl-prabhdta-vrttdntah. Taranginl, p. 31.

to the Sarikarites the ego is false, and yet it is the knower; the pure consciousness, which according to the Sahkarites is the only reality, is not itself the knower. If it is suggested that pure consciousness may be regarded as the knower through false assumption, then it may well be said that false assumption would validate any false reasoning, and that would be of no avail. Even the body appears as the knower when one says, " I, the white man, know," yet on that account the body cannot be regarded as the knower. The second interpretation, which defines materiality as ignorance {ajndna), cannot be held; for phenomenal knowledge is partly true and partly false. Again, it may in this connection be asked whether the knowledge of the self (dtman) has any content or not. If it has, then that content must necessarily be the object of a cognizing activity, and it is impossible that the cognizing activity of the self should direct its activity towards the self. If it is urged in reply that the self has no activity to be directed to itself, but the fact that it is distinguished as self is its cognition of itself, the obvious reply to this is that the cognition of all things is nothing more than the fact that they are distinguished in their specific characters. If again the knowledge of the self has no content, then it is no knowledge at all. If any knowledge be admitted which does not illuminate any object, then even a jug can be called knowledge. Therefore, if materiality be defined as ajndna or ignorance, then even the self would for the above reasons be ajndna. In this connection it may well be remembered that knowledge requires both the object and the knower: there cannot be any experience without the experiencer and the thing experienced. Again, if the self be regarded as mere knowledge, it may well be asked whether that knowledge is right knowledge or illusion. If the former, then, since the modifications of the avidyd are known by the self, these would be true. It cannot be the latter, because there is no defect associated with the self. Neither can the self be regarded as bliss: for the phenomenal enjoyment of worldly objects is not admitted as bliss, and there is no way in which the degrees of pleasure or bliss which may lead ultimately to the highest bliss can be admitted; for, once a degree of pleasure is admitted, an extraneous element naturally creeps in. Thus falsity of the world on the ground that it is material is unacceptable in any sense of the term 1 .

1 This argument that the world is false on account of its materiality is adduced in the Tattva-suddhi.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the second and third interpretations of materiality, i.e., that which is ignorance is material or that which is non-self is material, would be quite suitable. In finding fault with Vyasa-tlrtha's exposition of knowledge Madhusudana says that, if knowledge be defined as that which illuminates an object, then even during emancipation objects would be illuminated, which is impossible; the relation of knowledge to objects is extraneous and therefore illusory. If it is objected that, if no objects are revealed during release, then even bliss is not revealed, and in that case no one would care to attain release, the reply is that the emancipated state is itself bliss and there is no separate manifestation of bliss as obtainable therein. The association of an object is perceivable only in sense-knowledge; in the knowledge of the self there is no association with the senses, and it is unreasonable to demand that even then objects should be manifested in knowledge. When it is said that self is of the nature of immediate knowledge, the suggestion that then it must be either valid or erroneous is unacceptable. For the exclusive classification of knowledge as valid or invalid applies to ordinary experienced knowledge. But the self as knowledge is like the indeterminate knowledge that is neither valid nor invalid.

Ramacarya, however, says that, if the association of knowledge with objects be extraneous, then at the time of the dawn of ultimate knowledge the self should not be regarded as its object. If it is said that this is only so in the case of perceptual knowledge, where pure consciousness is reflected through the vrtti of the form of the object, then the connection of the knowledge with the object would be false; for in that case the necessity of vrtti and the reflection of consciousness through it would have to be admitted at the dawn of the knowledge of the self in the ultimate stage. The relation of the object to knowledge therefore cannot be extraneous and therefore false. In reply to Madhusudana's statement that, just as according to the Naiyayikas, though universals and individuals are mutually correlated, yet in the state of ultimate dissolution the universals remain even though there are no individuals, so there may be a state where there is knowledge, but no object; for the sphere of knowledge is wider than that of knowledge with objects. Ramacarya says that even in the state of pralaya, where there is no individual, the knowledge of the universals has the individuals within it as its constituents. Again, the association of objects with

220 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

knowledge does not mean that the objects produce knowledge, but that knowledge is associated with the objects. Again, if the association with the object be regarded as meaning "necessarily produced by objects," or if it necessarily means "in whichever place or at whichever time this object exists there is knowledge," then the Sankarites would not be able to affirm the unity of the soul. For, since the unity exists in Brahman, it could not be generated by the individual soul. And again, if it is affirmed that, whenever there is unity with Brahman, there is unity with the soul, then, since the Brahman is always one, all individual souls will be emancipated; it will also be impossible to determine the unity of individual souls and the unity of Brahman. So the objects do not generate the determinate knowledge, but are associated with it.

It is argued that whatever is limited and finite is false; now this limitation may be by time or space or by other entities {paricchin-natvatn api desatah kdlato vastuto vd). Now as to this Vyasa-tlrtha says that time and space cannot be limited by time and space and this is so much the case that even the supreme reality, the Brahman, is often spoken of as existing always and everywhere; time and space are thus universal characteristics and cannot be denied of others or of themselves. Thus the observation of Vacaspati, that whatever does not exist in some places and in some time is on that account absent everywhere and always, and that what is existent must always and everywhere be so {yat sat tat sadd sarvatra sad eva ... tathd ca yat kaddcit kutracid asat tat sadd sarvatra asadeva), is wholly invalid; for, if by non-existence at some particular time existence at any other time can be invalidated, then by existence at that time non-existence at other times may also be invalidated. It is as good logic to say that, because it will not exist then, therefore it does not exist now, as to say that, because it exists now, it must exist then 1 . Again, what is meant by spatial limitation? If it means non-association with all bodies (sarva-murttdsamyogitvam) or the non-possession of the supreme measure (parama-mahat-parimdndnadhikaranat'vam), then even Brahman is so; for He is untouchable (asanga) and He has no measure as His quality; if it means possession of limited measure (parimdna), then parimdna or "measure," being a quality, cannot belong to a quality; so qualities would not be limited (guna-karmddau gundnanglkdrdt). Again, 1 Nydyamfta, p. 79.

temporal limitation cannot be associated with negation as "otherness"; for, if the limitation as otherness be denied at any time, then all things in the world would be one. Now limitation by other entities (which is the third definition of limitation) means "difference" (bhinnatva); but such a limitation (according to the Sankarites) is absent in the world of everyday experience; for they deny the reality of difference. Again, difference from falsehood exists also in the self: therefore the argument of Anandabodha, that whatever things exist divided (vibhaktatvdt) are on that account false, is invalid. It is, again, wrong to suppose that the unlimited nature of being consists in the fact that it alone remains universal, whereas everything else changes and must therefore be considered to be imposed upon it, since, when we say "a jug exists," "a jug moves," the jug seems to remain unchanged, while its verb changes, as "exists" and "moves." As "many" is associated with "one," so "one" also is associated with "many"; so nothing can be made of the argument that what remains constant is unlimited and valid and what is changeful is false.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that, since the Sankarites do not admit universals, it is wrong to suppose that in all cases of the existence of a cow there is something like the cow-universal which persists, and, if that is not so, then the only other explanation is that it is the individuals that come and go and are imposed upon the persistent experience of being, which alone is therefore real. Now, again, it may be argued, the Brahman, as being, is always covered by ajndna; it has no distinguishable form, and so it is wrong to think that Brahman is manifested as being in our experience of the world-objects. To this the reply is that Brahman is itself not covered by ajndna (sad-dtmand na brahmano muldjndnend-vrtatvam) : it is only by the limitations of the specific forms of world-objects that its nature is hidden; when the obstacles of these specific forms are broken by the function of the vrtti modification of the mind, the Brahman underlying these objects manifests itself as pure being. It cannot be objected that Brahman, as such a pure being, has no visual characteristics and therefore cannot be perceived by the eye; for Brahman is not perceivable by any of the senses or by any specific sense 1 .

1 na ca rupddi-h&natayd cdksusatvddy-artupapattih bddhikd iti vdcyam, prati-myatendriya-grdhyesv eva rupddy-apeksd-niyamdt sarvendriya-grdhyam tu sad-rupam brahma ndto rupddi-hlnatve'pi cdksusatvddy anupapattih sattvdydh parair apt sarvendriya-grdhyatva-dbhyupagamdt ca. Advaita-siddhi, p. 318.

222 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

Ramacarya in reply says that the universal (as "cow") has to be accepted; for otherwise how can the so-called universal as being be sometimes manifested as cow and at other times as other objects? Again, it is wrong to say that Brahman is not in itself covered by the avidyd; for it is said that, even when the being-aspect is revealed, the aspect as bliss may still remain covered; then, since being and bliss must be one (for otherwise the monism would fail), the veil must also be over the being-aspect as well. Again, as Brahman has no form and no characteristic, it cannot be said to be grasped by all the senses {atyantam avyakta-svabhdvasya brahmanas caksur-ddi-sarvendriyagrdhyatve mdndbhdvdt) 1 .

The argument that falsehood consists in the non-existence of the whole in the parts is attacked by Vyasa-tlrtha. He says that, so far as concerns the view that, because part and whole are identical, therefore the whole cannot be dependent on the part, he has no objection. If the whole is not dependent upon anything else and not on its parts either, then it may not be dependent on anything at all; but it cannot on that account be called false. But it may be pointed out that perception shows that the whole is dependent on the parts and rests in them, and therefore on the evidence of perception its non-existence in the parts cannot be admitted. The question arises whether "non-existence" or "negation" is valid or invalid: if it is valid, then monism breaks down, and, if it is invalid, then non-existence is denied, which will be in favour of Vyasa-tlrtha. Now it cannot be urged that the existence of negation cannot be fatal to monism: for negation includes position as a constituent. Again, Brahman is denoted by the term advitlya ("devoid of any second"); this involves a negation, and, if negation is invalid, then its demolition of Brahman will also be invalid. Further, the denial of a second to Brahman may mean a denial not only of positive entities, but of negative entities also; positivity itself means the negative of the negative. Also, if negation is admitted, then, since one of its forms is "otherness," its admission means the admission of otherness and hence of duality. Moreover, it would be difficult for the Sankarites to describe the nature of negation; for, if no positive entities can be described, it goes without saying-that it will be still more difficult to describe negative entities. Moreover, not only is the non-existence of the whole in

the parts contradicted by perceptual experience, but it is opposed to reason also; for, since the whole cannot be subsistent anywhere else, if it is not admitted to be subsistent in the parts, its very nature is inexplicable (anydsamavetasydmsitvam etat-tantu-samavetatvam vind na yuktam) 1 .

Again, the view that, since without knowledge nothing is revealed, the so-called things are nothing but knowledge, is wrong; for the things are experienced not as being themselves knowledge, but as those things of which we have knowledge (ghatasya jndnam iti hi dhih na tu ghato jndnam iti).

In reply to the above Madhusudana says that, since the experience of cause and effect cannot be explained without assuming some difference between them, such a difference must be admitted for practical purposes, in spite of the fact that they are identical. Discussion regarding the validity or invalidity of negation is brushed aside by Madhusudana as being out of place. Again, the opposition of perception is no objection; for perception is often illusory. Also, the objection that, if the whole, which is not elsewhere, is also not in the parts, its existence is inexplicable, is invalid; for, though the whole may not exist in the parts as an independent entity, it may still be there as identical with the material cause, the parts; for being materially identical {etat-samavetatva) with anything does not necessarily follow from a denial of its negation therein; for, if it were so, then all such qualities as are devoid of negative instances (being on that account present in it) would be materially identical with the thing 2 . But what really determines a thing's material identity with another thing is that the former's negation-prior-to-existence (prdg-abhdva) must be in it (kintu etan-nistha-prdg-abhdva-pratiyogitvdd aikyam). The objection of Vyasa-tlrtha, that a cloth can have its negation in threads only when such threads are not its constituent parts, is invalid, for the very reason that what determines material identity is the existence of the prior-to-existence negation (prdg-abhdva-pratiyogitva) of the whole in the part or of the effect in the cause, and therefore it is not proper to say that a cloth can non-exist only in such threads as are not

1 tatha ca amsitva-rupa-hetor etat-tantu-niftkdtyantabhava-pratiyogitva-rupa-sadhyena virodhah. Nyayamrta-prakasa, p. 86.

8 etannisthatyantdbhava-pratiyogitvam hi etatsamavetatve prayqjakam na bhavati, parturiate kevaldnvayi-dharma-matrasya etatsamavetatvdpatteh.

Advaita-siddhi, p. 324.

constituents of it: for the condition of the non-existence of the cloth in the threads is not the fact of the threads not being a constituent of the cloth, but the absence of the prior-to-existence negation of the cloth in the threads.

An objection is urged by Vyasa-tlrtha that for the self-same reasons on account of which the world is called false Brahman as well may be regarded as false; for Brahman is the substratum of all our experience and therefore may be regarded as false. As to this Madhusiidana says that, so far as Brahman is associated with ajndna, it is false, but, so far as it is beyond our practical experience, it is real. Moreover, if no ground-reality be admitted, then, the whole world-appearance being an illusion, we shall be landed in pure nihilism. Again, the objection that Brahman, being different from non-existent entity, is like the conch-shell-silver, which also, though not real, is different from non-existent entity, cannot be maintained. For difference from non-existent entity is difference from that which cannot appear anywhere as existent, and that alone is different from it which appears somewhere as an existent entity; but this cannot apply to Brahman, since pure Brahman does not appear anywhere as an existent entity.

Vyasa-tlrtha, after adopting a number of tentative definitions of being, finds fault with them all, and says that, in whatever way being may be defined by the Sahkarites, that would be applicable in the same manner to the being of the world. Briefly speaking, the definition of being comes to be "that which at all times and in all places cannot be denied" (sarva-desa-kdla-sambandhi-nisedha-pratiyogitvam sattvam). It may also be defined as that which, being different from non-being, is not a false imposition, or as that which at some time or other is directly and rightly felt as existing (astitva-prakdraka-pramdnam prati kaddcid sdksdd-visayatvani).

In reply to the above attempt at a definition of being by Vyasa-tlrtha, Madhusiidana says that our perceptual experience is absolutely illegitimate in discerning truth as distinguished from falsehood or as opposed to it 1 . Truth and falsehood being mutually related, all attempts at defining them by mutual opposition become circular, and therefore illegitimate; definitions of being which refer in some way or other to the experience of being as such are also

1 cakfurddy-adhyakfa-yogya-mithyatva-virodhi-satvaanirukteh.

Advaita-siddhi, pp. 333-4.

false, as they involve the very concept of being which is to be defined. It is also wrong to say that the world has as much reality of the same order as that of Brahman; for falsehood and reality cannot have the same order of being. The being of Brahman is of the nature of one pure luminous consciousness, and it is clear that the material world cannot have that order of being. Now falsehood is defined as non-existence at all times and places (sarva-desiya-traikdlika-nisedha-pratiyogitvam); reality is its opposite. Sense-perception can never bring to us such a negation, and therefore it also cannot bring to us the opposite of negation, i.e., reality. The fact that some things are perceived to exist somewhere at some time is irrelevant; for even a false appearance may have such a temporary perceptual existence. There is a Nyaya view to the effect that there is a special mode of presentation of universals (sdmdnya-pratydsatti), by which all the individuals that come under such universals are presented in consciousness, and that it is by this means alone that inductive generalization leading to deductive inference is possible. On this view the contention is that, though all negations of an entity at all times and places may not be visually perceived, they may be presented to consciousness by the above means of presentation, and, if they are thus presented to consciousness, their negation, viz., the reality, may also be perceived.

Madhusudana's reply to this is, that there is no such special mode of presentation of universals by which all the individuals associated with them are also present in consciousness, i.e., there is no such sdmdnya-pratydsatti as is admitted by the Nyayayikas. He then indulges in a polemic against such a sdmdnya-pratydsatti and tries to show that deductive inferences are possible through the association of the special characteristics of the universals as determining the concomitance 1 ; thus, if there is no sdmdnya-pratydsatti and if all the negations at all times and places cannot be presented to consciousness, their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either.

The reply of Ramacarya is that, though such negations at all times and all places may not be perceived by the senses, yet there

1 vydpti-smrti-prakdrena vd paksadharmatd-jndnasya hetuta; mahdnaslya eva dhumo dhumatvena vydpti-smrti-visayo bhavati, dhumatvena parvatiya-dhuma-jndnam cdpijdtam, tac ca sdmdnya-laksanam vinaiva; tdvataiva anumiti-siddheh; .. .pratiyogitdvacchedaka-prakdraka-jfidndd eva tat-sambhavena tad-artham sakala-pratiyogi-jndna-janikdydh sdmdnya-pratydsatty anupayogdt.

Advaita-siddhi, pp. 338, 341.

is no reason why their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived; when one sees a jug, one feels that it is there and nowhere else. One perceives the objects negated and not the negation itself 1 . He further says that, though sdmdnya-pratyasatti may not be admitted, yet the unperceived negations may be known by inference, and thus the objection of Madhusudana that, unless sdmdnya-pratyasatti is admitted, such negations cannot be known and their opposite, reality, cannot be perceived either, is doubly invalid 2 .

Madhusudana further says that the testimony of the testifying consciousness (sdksl) in experience reveals only present entities, and in that way the world-objects are relatively real. But the testifying consciousness cannot in any way show whether they will be contradicted in future or not; the testifying consciousness is thus incapable of defying a future denial of world-experience, when the Brahma-knowledge is attained.

Vyasa-tirtha had objected to the Vedanta thesis that there is one Being, self-identical with pure consciousness, on which all the so-called forms of object and content of knowledge are imposed, pointing out that the mere fact that one experiences that a jug exists does not prove that the jug is imposed upon the pure being; for pure existence can never be perceived and all the characteristics, including false appearances, may also be considered to have the same existential character as existence itself.

Madhusudana's simple reply is that instead of admitting a number of individual entities it is much better to admit one constant being"on which the various forms of objects are imposed. The assertion of Vyasa-tlrtha that perceptual evidence is by its very nature stronger than inference, which is slow in establishing itself on account of the various conditions that it has to depend on, is objected to by Madhusudana, who says that, when perceptual evidence is contradicted by inference and scriptural testimony (e.g., as in the perception of the small dimensions of planetary bodies), it is the former that is negated. So perception has also to depend for its validity on its non-contradiction and other means of proof, and the other means of proof have no more to depend on perception than perception on them. So all these means of proof, being relatively dependent, are of inferior validity to the Vedic testimony, which, not being a man-made document, has naturally an inalien-

1 Taranginl, p. 61. 2 Ibid. p. 63.

able claim to validity. It is well known that perception through one sense, say the visual, has often to be woven together with perception through other senses, e.g., the tactile, for arriving at valid experience of facts, as in the perception "fire is hot." Thus perceptual evidence has no right of superior validity by reason of being perceptible, though it may be admitted that in certain spheres perception may dispel an ignorance which is not removed L»y inference 1 . The objection that an inferential evidence, because it establishes itself slowly (on account of its dependence on many facts), is of inferior validity to perception because this comes quicker is invalid; for validity depends upon proper examination and discovery of faultlessness and not on mere quickness. Moreover, since there are many scriptural texts declaring the oneness of all, which cannot be justified except on the assumption of the falsity of the world, and since such an admission would not take away from perception its natural claim to validity in the relative sphere, a compromise may well be effected by allowing perceptual validity to remain uncontrolled in the relative sphere and admitting the scriptural validity of oneness in the absolute sphere.

Again, Vyasa-tirtha urges that, since inference and scriptural testimony both depend on visual and auditory perception, it will be wrong to think that the former could invalidate the latter. If perception is not valid in itself, then all inference and scriptural testimony would be invalid, since their data are supplied by perception.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the scriptural testimony does not challenge the data supplied by perception, but challenges their ultimate validity, which can never be supplied by perceptual experience 2 . The bare fact that one knowledge springs up because it was preceded by another is no reason why it is to be less valid; the judgement "this is not silver, but conch-shell" is not less valid because it could not have come into being unless there had been a previous error with the perception of conch-shell as silver. It is said that the validity of sense-evidence is determined by a critical examination depending on correspondence. To this Madhusudana's

1 ndpi anumdnddy-anivartita-dinmohanddi-nivartakatvena prdbalyam; etdvatd hi vaidharmya-mdtram siddham. Advaita-siddhi, p.355.

2 yat-svarupam upayujyate tanna bddhyate, bddhyate ca tdtvikatvdkdrah, sa ca nopajlvyate kdranatve tasydpravesdt. Ibid. p. 363.

reply is that, so far as concerns the validity of an awareness according to correspondence, the Sarikarites have nothing to say against it. What he challenges is that the ultimate validity or ultimate non-contradiction cannot be revealed by any critical examination. It is again argued that, if perception is invalid, the knowledge of concomitance arrived at through it is invalid, and therefore all inference is invalid. This is, however, wrong; for even by a false reasoning a right inference may be possible; from an illusory reflection it is possible to infer the existence of the thing reflected. Moreover, falsity of the evidence (inferential or perceptual) does not imply the falsity of the thing known; so the objection that, if perception is not regarded as valid, then all knowledge becomes invalid, is illegitimate.

Vyasa-tlrtha urges that, if perceptual testimony can be contradicted in any place by inference, then any and every inference can contradict perception, and fire can be regarded as cold and a hare as having a horn, which is impossible.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that not any and every inference can be regarded as superior to perception, since it is well known that an illegitimate inference leads to no valid conclusion. The instances which have been adduced by Vyasa-tlrtha are instances of illegitimate inferences, the fallacy of which is apparent. It is never admitted by anyone that an illegitimate inference is stronger than perception; but it also cannot be denied that there are many instances of illegitimate perception which are rightly denounced by right inferences.

Vyasa-tlrtha further says that the science of mimdmsd itself admits in various places the superior validity of perception, and recommends a twisting interpretation of such scriptural passages as are not in harmony with perception. The scriptural text, "That art thou," is directly contradicted in perceptual experience, and therefore should be so interpreted as not to come into conflict therewith.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that it is indeed true that certain scriptural passages which deal with ordinary mundane affairs are thus brought into harmony with experience and are sometimes interpreted in accordance with perception; but that is no reason why those texts which refer to ultimate experience and which do not refer to the accessory details of sacrifices should also be subordinate to perception.

Vyasa-tirtha says that it is wrong to suppose that perception is invalidated by inference or scriptural testimony; what happens in the case of perceptual illusions is that in both cases perception is vitiated by various types of defects, the presence of which is also known by perception.

To this Madhusudana's simple reply is that the presence of defects cannot be known by perception itself, and that most cases of illusory perception are invalidated by stronger inference. When it is said that the moon is no bigger than a foot the illusory perception is no doubt due to the defect of the long distance, but that this is so can be known only by an inference based upon the observation of the diminution of sizes in trees on distant hill-tops. Thus, though there are cases in which one perception invalidates another, there are also cases in which an inference invalidates a perception.

A question arises whether the present perception of the world-appearance may ultimately be contradicted; but to this Vyasa-tlrtha says that such a fear of future contradiction may invalidate even that knowledge which contradicts this perception. Ordinarily the waking experience contradicts dream-experience, and, if waking experience be also contradicted, then there would be nothing to contradict dream-experience. In this way it will be difficult to find an instance of false experience. The knowledge that contradicts the illusory perception comprehends within it things which are not known at the time of illusory perception (e.g., the knowledge of the conch-shell which was not present at the time of perception of illusory shell-silver). But it cannot be urged that the knowledge that would contradict world-experience would have the specific nature of not being comprehended within the knowledge of world-appearance. Again, a knowledge that contradicts another knowledge must have a content; contentless knowledge has no opposition to false cognitions, yet Brahma-knowledge is regarded as content-less. Moreover, contradiction is possible only there, where a defect is, and that defect lies with the Sankarites, who give a monistic interpretation of scriptural texts. Again, if the monistic experience is certified by monistic texts, the dualistic experience is also certified by dualistic texts, and a knowledge that would contradict and negate the world-experience would involve a duality by the very fact of such negation. Moreover, the last experience which would contradict the world-experience, being itself an experience, would

be equally liable to contradiction; and, if uncontradicted experience be also doubted as being liable to contradiction, then there would be no end to such doubts.

Madhusudana, in reply to the above objection of Vyasa-tirtha, emphasizes the point that it is no essential character of a knowledge that contradicts another that it should have a content; what is essential here is that a right knowledge should be grounded in the realization of the reality and thereby negate the false knowledge. It is also wrong to think that, when Brahma-knowledge negates world-appearance, an affirmation of duality is involved; for the Brahma-knowledge is of the very nature of reality, before which the falsehood, which has only appearance and no existence, naturally dissolves away. He further says that doubts regarding validity can only arise when it is known that there are defects; but, since there can be no defects in Brahma-knowledge, no doubts can arise. The assertion of Vyasa-tirtha that, if the world-appearance is false, then it is wrong to speak of the self as being of the nature of pure bliss on the ground that the experience of dreamless sleep reveals such a blissful state, is unwarranted, because the nature of self as blissful is known directly from scriptural testimony, and the experience of dreamless sleep is consistent with it.

Nature of Knowledge.

Vyasa-tirtha argues that, if the reasons, cognizability, etc., are supposed to indicate the falsity of the world-appearance and if they are applied to the inferential apparatus, then they also are false; and, if they are not false, then all the world-appearance is false, and the argument for the falsity of the world is fallacious. Vyasa-tirtha says further that, if the Sahkarite be asked to explain the nature of true reality, he will naturally be liable to confusion. It cannot be regarded as an object of awareness, because chimerical entities are also objects of awareness; it cannot be described as direct awareness, because then it would not belong to any eternal and transcendental entities which are unperceiving, and the world-appearance also, which is directly perceived, would not be false, and the inference, e.g., of fire based upon an illusory perception of the reason (e.g., the water-vapour in a lake), would also be true. Knowledge does not contribute to the existence of things all their properties;

even if fire is not known as fire, it can burn all the same. Thus existence does not depend upon any kind of awareness. It is also wrong to define reality as practical behaviour; for, unless the nature of world-appearance is known, the nature of practical behaviour is not known. The world as such must be either existent or non-existent, and there is no other third way of subsistence; the non-existence of the world cannot be proved by any existent proof, because existence and non-existence are opposed to each other; nor can it be proved by non-existent proofs, simply because they are non-existent. There cannot be any being such that it exists in common with non-being and ultimate being 1 .

Madusudana says that the false may be distinguished from the true by exactly the same kind of considerations which lead the opponent to distinguish between the perception of the blueness of the sky and the ordinary objects of experience such as a jug, a rope, etc. The nature of reality that has been conceded to the world-appearance is that it is not contradicted by anything other than Brahma-knowledge.

Vyasa-tlrtha points out that the contention of the Sankarites that there cannot be any relation between knowledge and its contents is borrowed from the Buddhists, who consider awareness and its objects to be the same. The Sankarites hold that, if the objects are considered to be real, then it is difficult to show how there can be any relation between knowledge and the objects revealed by it; for the two accepted relations of contact and inseparable inherence (samavdya) cannot hold between them. The relation of objectivity is also too obscure to be defined; and therefore it must be admitted that the relation between knowledge and the objects is wholly illusory.

To this Vyasa-tlrtha replies that, though all objects are regarded by the Sankarites as illusorily imposed upon the one supreme per-ceiver, the Brahman, yet for explanation of specific cognitions of specific individuals, sense-contact, leading to the rise of different perceptions of different individuals, is admitted by them. The Sankarites are not idealists to the same extent as the Buddhists are. Even if it be admitted that pure consciousness may appear different under various conditions, yet there is no reason why the world-

1 napi sat-trayanngatam sat-dvaydnugatam vd satva-samdnyam tantram. Nydydmrta, p. 174.

objects should be considered as impositions upon pure consciousness. Even the admission of the world-objects as illusory impositions does not help us very much; for there cannot be any knowledge of these world-objects without the cognitive function (vrtti) of the mind. Again, if all world-objects are illusory impositions, then it is meaningless to put into the modus operandi of the perceptual process a reflection of the pure consciousness through its specific functions, or into the specific cognitive senses the consciousness underlying the objects 1 . The mere fact that neither contact nor inseparable relation can be of any avail does not necessarily imply that perceptual forms are all illusory; for, if there is an actual experience, then relations have naturally to be imagined to explain the situation 2 . Again, if it be admitted for argument's sake that there is no way of proving the validity of the assumption of a relation between knowledge and its object, yet that would not prove the falsity of the objects themselves; what it would do at the utmost would be to deny the validity of relations subsisting between knowledge and its objects. Again, if the Sankarite finds no difficulty in admitting the relation of the pure consciousness to the vrtti, why does he find any difficulty in admitting such a relation to the objects 3 ? Even if the world-objects be regarded as indescribable, yet their existence may be regarded as being indescribable in the same way as that of Brahman. The Sarikarite has also to admit the existence of the objective world and to offer explanations for the way in which it is perceived. The only difference of this view from that of the realists is that, while the Sarikarite considers the objects to be ultimately false, the realist considers them to be real; and the same reason that leads the Sarikarites to consider them as having a higher order of reality than the merely illusory leads the realists to consider them as ultimately real 4 . The Brahman itself is in a sense as indescribable as the world-objects 5 . Things, so far as they

1 Nydydmrta, p. 191.

' Ibid. p. 193: pramita-vastvanusdrena hi prakriyd kalpyd na tu sva-kalpita-prakriydnurodhena pramita-tydgah.

3 yddrsam vifayatvam te vrttim prati ciddtmanah

tddrsam visayatvam me drsyasydpi drsam prati. Ibid. p. 205 a.

4 tava sa dkdrah sad-vilaksanah mama tu sanniti anirucyamdno'pi sa tava yena mdnena aprdtibhdsikah tenaiva mama tdtviko'stu. Ibid. p. 205.

6 kldrk tat pratyag iti cet tddrsl drg iti dvayam

yatra na prasaraty etat pratyag ity-avadhdraya iti brahmany api durnirupatvasya uktatvdc ca. Ibid. p. 206 a.

are known and so far as they have certain common characteristics, can well be described, though in their unique nature each of them has such peculiarities that they cannot be properly defined and expressed. Each human face may be well known by the uncontradicted testimony of our senses; but still it cannot be described with its own specific and peculiar characteristics 1 . So it is difficult to describe the specific nature of Brahman as the identity of pure being, bliss and consciousness; yet its reality is not denied. The same is the case with the world-objects, and, though they are indescribable in their specific natures, yet their reality cannot be denied 2 .

Madusudana generally passes over many of the points of objection raised by Vyasa-tirtha; one of these points is that relations are grasped directly and that there is no incongruity in thinking that, if relations cannot be mediated, they can yet be grasped directly by the senses. Madhusudana's contention is that, if relations be described as self-subsistent, then they cannot be explained and must therefore be regarded as false. Vyasatlrtha now refers to the Sankarite account of perception, and says that in their view the objects are supposed to be there and the veil over them is removed by the mind {antahkarana) transforming itself into the form of the object; he says also, that, if this is so, then the objects of perception cannot be regarded as mental. If the objects were merely mental, the application of the sense-organs would be unnecessary for their perception; in dreams mental objects are "perceived," but the visual organs are not exercised. The difference between the ordinary practical experience of the world and that of dreams is only that the former is longer in duration, and so, if in dream-experience the mental objects can be perceived without the exercise of the visual organ, there is no reason why the world-objects also cannot be perceived in the same way. Moreover, in the case of non-perceptual cognition (paroksajfiana) the Sankarites themselves admit that the objects are illuminated without any direct operation of antahkarana, in association with the senses, involving an actual

1 tasmdt pramitasya ittham iti mrvaktum asakyatvam pratipurusa-mukham spastd-vddhita -drstidrstam vilaksana-samsthdna-visesasya vd sattve'py adbhutatvdd eva yuktam. Ibid. p. 206.

2 tasmdt nirvacandyogyasydpi visvasya iksukslrddi-mddhuryavad brahmavac ca prdmdnikatvdd eva sattva-siddheh. Ibid. p. 206.

contact with the objects. There is no reason why the same thing cannot take place in ordinary perception. The difference of the antahkarana transformation in the two cases might equally well explain the difference between the perceptual (a-paroksa) and non-perceptual (paroksa) cognitions, and for this it is not necessary to assume that in one case the antahkarana goes out and in another case remains inside. It cannot be held that an immediate intuitive character belongs to the antahkarana; for the antahkarana itself being non-intuitive and non-self-illuminating by nature, its modifications also cannot be intuitive or self-illuminating. The mere fact that antahkarana has fire elements in it does not make it self-illuminating ; for then many objects which are supposed to be made up of fire elements would be self-illuminating. Again, it is wrong to suppose that the manifestation of consciousness must be non-transitive by nature; for, though one may speak of the illumination of an object in non-transitive terms, one speaks of knowing in transitive terms. If it is not admitted that the transitive or intransitive character of an action is often of a verbal nature, it would be difficult for a Sankarite to speak of a modification of antahkarana (which is non-transitive) as equivalent to knowing an object. Moreover, if it is held that it is only the pure consciousness outside the vrtti that is illuminated, then the past, wherein there is no pure consciousness manifesting it, could not reveal itself to us; so it is wholly unwarrantable to conceive of an intermediatory means in order to explain the relation between knowledge and its objects. Even if it be admitted that the antahkarana goes outside the body, yet it is difficult to conceive of the nature of pure consciousness, which is supposed to illumine the object, either as consciousness reflected in the vrtti of antahkarana (as stated by Bharatl-tlrtha), or as the pure consciousness which is the ground of the appearance of objects manifested by the consciousness reflected in the antahka-rana-vrtti {vrtti-pratibimbita-caitanyabhivyaktam visayddhisthdnam caitanyam), as supposed by Suresvara .The question is whether consciousness as manifested in the antahkarana illumines the object or whether the ground-consciousness underlying the objects manifests the objects. Neither of these views is tenable. The first view is not possible because, the consciousness reflected in the anlahkarana-vrtti being false, it is not possible that the world-objects should be imposed on such an illusory entity; the second view is also im-

possible; for, if the consciousness reflected in the antahkarana-vrtti be supposed to remove the veil of the object, it may as well be held to manifest it, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to suppose that the ground-consciousness illumines the object.

Further, it cannot be admitted that the vrtti assumes the form of the gross physical objects; for then it would be as gross and material as the objects are. Moreover, the existence of an object assumes therewith the existence of the negation of other entities; and, if the antahkarana is supposed to take the form of an object, it must also assume the negative forms; it is, however, difficult to conceive how the antahkarana can be supposed to assume the positive and the negative forms at one and the same time. Again, following the same supposition in the case of the final intuition, it has to be assumed that the antahkarana-vrtti assumes the form of Brahman; this, however, has no form, so that the antahkarana-vrtti must be supposed to be here both formless and endowed with form —which is absurd.

Moreover, it is not legitimate to suppose that it is the consciousness underlying the finite self (jiva-caitanya) that reveals the object; for, on the supposition that the objects are illusory superpositions on pure consciousness or on the consciousness underlying the objects, the Sankarite theory fails; for in this case the perceiving consciousness, being consciousness underlying the jiva, would be different either from pure consciousness or from the consciousness underlying the objects, which is supposed to be the basis of the illusory creations. The jiva itself, moreover, cannot be regarded as the basis of the creation; for it is itself an illusory creation. For the same reasons also it cannot be asserted that it is the Brahma-consciousness that illumines the object. Thus the Brahman, being itself as underlying the objects, an illusory creation, cannot be regarded as also illuminating the objects. The pure consciousness underlying the objects, being itself veiled by ajndna, should not also be able to manifest itself; and thus all knowledge of objects would be impossible. If it is argued that, though the pure consciousness is veiled, yet the consciousness limited by the object-form may be manifested by the vrtti of the antahkarana, that is not correct: for it cannot be admitted that the consciousness limited by the object-forms is itself the basis of those object-forms, since that would amount to an admission that the object-forms are their own

236 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

basis, which would be a fallacy of self-dependence (dtmdsraya), and the original contention of the Sarikarites that the objects are illusorily imposed upon pure consciousness fails. Moreover, if the process of knowledge is admitted to be such that the antahkarana-vrtti manifests the pure consciousness as limited by objective forms, then the case of final intuition (Brahman-knowledge), where objective characteristics are absent, would be inexplicable. Again, the Sankarites hold that in deep dreamless sleep the antahkarana is dissolved; and, if that were so, the jiva, which is the consciousness limited by a particular antahkarana, would be renewed after each dreamless sleep, and thus the fruits of the karma of one jiva ought not to be reaped by the new jiva. The view that the pure consciousness is reflected through a vrtti is also inadmissible; for reflections can happen only between two visible objects. The view that consciousness is transformed into a particular state is also inadmissible, since by hypothesis consciousness is unchangeable. Consciousness being entirely unsupported by anything else (andsritatvdt), the analogy of the relation of universal and particular as explaining the conditioning of consciousness is also inadmissible. Moreover, if the consciousness underlying the jiva be regarded as manifesting the objects, then, since such a consciousness always exists in an unveiled form, there is no meaning in saying that in effecting its spontaneous manifestation the operation of the vrtti is necessary. Also the pure consciousness cannot be regarded as being limited by the vrtti just as limitless space is supposed to be limited by a jug; for the pure consciousness is all-pervading and, as such, it must also pervade the vrtti and cannot therefore be regarded as being inside it. Neither can the pure consciousness be compared with the ray of light manifesting colour; for the ray of light does so only with the help of accessories, whereas pure consciousness manifests things by itself. Again, if things are manifested spontaneously by the unveiled consciousness {andvrta-cit yadi visaya-prakdsikd), then, since such a consciousness is in touch with objects not only so far as their forms and colours are concerned, but also with their other characteristics such as weight, these also ought to be illuminated along with qualities such as colour, etc. Moreover, the relation of consciousness to the object cannot be of the nature of eternal contact, but must be of the nature of illusory imposition upon it (consciousness); this being so, the

relation of consciousness to the object is already there, since all things in the world are imposed upon consciousness. The supposition therefore of a vrtti as an intermediary is quite uncalled for 1 . Again, if the Brahma-consciousness stands in need of the help of a vrtti in order to manifest things, it has no claim to be called by itself omniscient. If it is suggested that Brahman, being the material cause of all, is competent without the help of any conditions to illuminate the world, which is identical with it, then the reply will be that, if Brahman be regarded as transforming itself under the limitation of objective forms, then such a transformation of the limited Brahman does not justify the accepted thesis of the Sankarites that all objects are illusorily imposed on the pure consciousness 2 . It is also not possible to say that it is the pure consciousness, unconditioned by any object-form, that forms the ground cause; for, if that were so, it could not be called omniscient, since omniscience can be affirmed only in relation to object-forms 3 . The supposition that the conception of vrtti is necessary for the removal of the veil is also wrong; for such a veil must attach either to the pure consciousness or to limited consciousness. The former is impossible, since the pure consciousness which forms the basis of all appearances is the intuitive perceiver of all ajnana and its forms, and as such, being self-luminous, cannot have any veil attached to it. The second also is impossible; for without the help of the pure consciousness ajnana itself would be without any locus standi, and without the ajnana there would be no limited consciousness and no veil of ajnana. Again, admitting for argument's sake that there is a veil of ajnana over the objects, the conception of its removal by a vrtti is impossible; for, if the ajnana belongs to the individual perceiver, then, if it is destroyed for one individual, it remains the same for another; if it belongs to the object, as is supposed, then, when it is removed by the vrtti of one individual, the

1 cito visayopardgas tdvat samyogddi-rupo nasty eva. tasya drsyatvd-prayo-jakatvdt kintu tatrddhyastatva-rupa eveti vdcyam. sa ca vrttyapeksayd purvam apy astiti kitn cito visayopardgdrthayd vrttyd.

SSrinivasa's Nydydmrta-prakdsa on the Nydydmrta, p. 226.

2 visista-nisthena parindmitva-rupena sarvopdddnatvena visista-brahmanah sarvajnatve tasya kalpitatvenddhisthanatvdyogena tatra jagad-adhydsdsambhavdt ddhydsika-sambandhena prakds'ata iti bhavad-abhimataniyamabhanga-prasangah. Ibid. p. 227a.

s ndpi suddha-nistham adhisthdnatvam sdrvajnydder visista-nisthatvdt.

Ibid. p. 226 a.

object should be manifest to other individuals, so that, when a person sees an object, that object should be visible also to other persons at other places. Again, is the ajfidna to be accepted as one, according to the author of the Vivarana, or as many, according to the author of the Ista-siddhi} In the former case, when by one right knowledge ajfidna is removed, there ought to be immediate emancipation. If the ajfidna is not removed, then the silver-appearance of conch-shell should not have been contradicted, and the form of conch-shell could not have been manifested. It cannot be said that in the case of the perception of conch-shell through negation of the silver-appearance the ajfidna is merely dissolved (just as a jug is reduced to dust by the stroke of a club, but not destroyed), which can only be done through Brahma-knowledge; for ajfidna is directly opposed to knowledge, and without destroying ignorance knowledge cannot show itself. If the ajfidna were not removed by the knowledge of the conch-shell, then the manifested consciousness would have no relation to the conch-shell, and it could not have been manifested, and in spite of the contradiction the illusion would have remained. Nor can it be suggested that, though ajfidna may be removed in some parts, it might continue in others; for ajfidna and consciousness are both partless. Nor can it be suggested that, just as by the influence of certain precious stones the burning capacity of fire can be stopped, so by the knowledge of the conch-shell the veiling power of avidyd is suspended; for the antahkarana-vrtti in the form of the conch-shell, being produced through the agency of the visual organ and other accessories, cannot be in touch with the pure self, which is devoid of all characteristics, and therefore it cannot remove the veiling power. If it is suggested that the vrtti of the form of the conch-shell is in association with the pure consciousness, under the limited form of the conch-shell, and can therefore remove the veil, then the underlying pure consciousness ought to be directly intuited. Avidyd cannot have the material objects as its support; for they are themselves the product of avidyd. So the veiling power of avidyd also can have no reference to the material objects, since a veil can hide only what is luminous; the material objects, not being luminous, cannot be veiled. So there is no meaning in saying that the veil of the objects is removed in perception. If, again, it is said that the veil has reference to the pure self, as modified by the

material characteristic, and not to the material characteristic, then with the knowledge of the conch-shell the veil of the conch-shell underlying it might be removed, and this ought to bring immediate emancipation. If it is suggested that the ajndna which forms the substratum of the illusory silver is but a special modified state of a root ajndna which forms the material of the conch-shell, then that virtually amounts to an assumption of many ajfidnas independent of one another; and, that being so, it would not necessarily follow that the knowledge of the conch-shell could dispel the illusory appearance of silver.

On the view of the author of the Ista-siddhi, if the existence of many ajfidnas is admitted, then the question is whether by the operation of one vrtti only one ajndna is removed or all the ajfidnas. In the former view the conch-shell could never remain unmani-fested even in the case of illusion, since vrtti manifesting the illusory silver would also manifest silver; and on the second view, there being infinite ajfidnas, which cannot all be removed, conch-shell would never be manifested. This criticism would apply equally well to the former view that there is only one root ajndna of which there are many states. Again, it is difficult to understand how the conch-shell, which has a beginning in time, can be associated with beginningless avidyd. Further, if it is urged in reply that the be-ginningless avidyd limits the beginningless pure consciousness and that later, when other objects are produced, the ajndna appears as the veil of pure consciousness limited by those object-forms, the reply is that, if the veil associated with pure consciousness is the same as the veil associated with consciousness in limited object-forms, then, with the knowledge of any of those objects, the veil of pure consciousness would be removed, and immediate emancipation would result.

Ramadvaya, the author of the Veddnta-kaumudi, suggests that, just as there is an infinite number of negations-precedent-to-production (prdg-abhdva), and yet, when anything is produced, only one of them is destroyed, or just as, when there is a thunderbolt falling upon a crowd, only one of them may be killed, while others may only disperse, so with the rise of knowledge only one ajndna may be removed, while others may persist. Vyasa-tlrtha replies that the analogy is false, since (according to him) negation-precedent-to-knowledge is not a veil but merely the absence of the

causes of knowledge. Knowledge, moreover, is not the cause of the cessation of such negation, but behaves as an independent entity, so that one knowledge may produce its effects, while the negation -precedent-to-production of other cognitions of its class may remain. The presence of a cause produces the effect, but it does not involve the condition that for the production of the effect the negations-precedent-to-production of all causes of the same class should be removed. In the case of the Vedantists, since the vrtti removes the veil of one ajndna, there may still be other ajndna-veWs to suspend the operation of cognition. On the view that darkness is absence of light, darkness is not a veil of objects, but merely absence of the conditions of light; nor is light supposed in its operation to destroy darkness, but directly to produce illumination. Darkness, also, should not be regarded as negation of individual light, but as absence of light in general; so that, even if there is one light, there is no darkness. The ajndnas also possess no constituent material forms; so the analogy of scattering crowds of men cannot apply to them.

Madhusudana, in replying to the above criticism of Vyasa-tlrtha, says that the contention of the latter that whatever is imaginary or mental (kalpita) necessarily has no other being than the percipi (pratiti-mdtra-sariratva), is wrong; for in the instance under discussion, when logic shows that the relation between the perceiver and the perceived is so absurd that the perceived entities cannot be anything more than illusory, perception shows that the perceived entities do persist even when they are not perceived. The persistence of the perceived entities is well attested by experience and cannot be regarded as imaginary, like the illusory perception of silver.

But yet it may be objected that, just as in mediate knowledge (paroksa) no necessity is felt for admitting a vrtti, so in immediate perception also there may be an illumination of the object without it. The reply to this is that in mediate knowledge also a mediate (paroksa) vrtti is admitted; for there also the illumination takes place by the manifestation of consciousness through a mediate vrtti 1 . It is wrong to contend that, since the pure consciousness is the principle of manifestation in both cases, mediate cognition

1 parokfasthale'pi paroksa-vrtty-uparakta-caitanyasya iva prakdsakatvat. Advaita-siddhi, p. 480.

should, on our theory, be expected to behave as immediate; for in the case of immediate perception there is a direct identity of consciousness and the object through the vrtti, and therefore the object behaves as the object of cognition in that specific direct relation. The mediacy or immediacy of cognition depends on the specific nature of the object, and not on the specific modifications of the vrtti in the two cases, nor can the two be regarded as two different classes of cognition; for on such a supposition such cognition or recognition as "this is the man I knew," where there seems to be a mixture of mediate and immediate cognition, will involve a joint operation of two distinct classes of cognition in the same knowledge; which is obviously absurd.

It must be borne in mind that the vrtti by itself is merely an operation which cannot constitute conscious illumination; the vrtti can lead to an illumination only through its association with pure consciousness, and not by itself alone. It is wrong to suppose that there is no difference between a transitive (as when one says "I know a jug") and an intransitive (as when one says "the jug has come into consciousness") operation; for the distinction is well attested in experience as involving a direct and an indirect method. The same vrtti (operation), however, cannot be regarded as both transitive and intransitive at the same time, though with different and indifferent circumstances an operation may be both transitive and intransitive. Such instances of experience as "the past is revealed" are to be explained on the supposition that the pure consciousness is revealed through a particular modification of the vrtti as past.

Again, it is contended by the opponents that, though it may be admitted that pure consciousness manifests the object, yet there is no necessity why the antahkarana should be supposed to go out of the body and be in contact with the object of perception. The difference between mediate and immediate knowledge may well be accounted for on the supposition of different kinds of mediate or immediate operation through which the consciousness is revealed in each case 1 : for, just as in mediate knowledge there is no actual contact of the antahkarana-vrtti with the object, but yet the cognition is possible through the presence of adequate causes which

1 paroksa-vailaksanydya visayasyabhivyaktdparoksa-cid-uparaga eva vakta-vyah. Ibid. p. 482.

generate such cognition, the same explanation may be adduced in explaining immediate cognition of objects. To this the reply is that the Sarikarites do not consider that the antahkarana-vrtti must assume the form of the object, but they certainly do consider it to be indispensable. There should be in immediate cognition an actual contact between the object and the vrtti. If the vrtti so acts in any particular case, that does not constitute its essential function in conditioning the awareness. Thus the function of the ray of light in illumination is that it dispels darkness; that it also spreads over the object is only an accidental fact 1 . The mere fact that a vrtti may be in contact with an object does not necessarily mean that it assumes its form; thus, though the antahkarana-vrtti may travel up to the pole star or be in contact with objects having an atomic structure, that does not imply that all objects in the space intermediate between the eye and the star or the atoms should be perceived; such perceptions are baffled through the absence of such accessory causes as might have caused the vrtti to assume their form. In the case of tactile perception the antahkarana-vrtti comes into contact with the object through the tactile organ; there is no restriction such that the antahkarana should come out only through the eye and not through other organs 2 . The contention that in the case of other mental operations, such as desire or aversion, there is no assumption of the migration of antahkarana outside is pointless; for in these cases there is not a removal of a veil as in the case of cognition.

Madhusudana urges that the basis or the ground-consciousness (adhisthana-caitanya) which illumines everything is directly connected with the objects through illusory imposition. This self-illuminating entity can, indeed, manifest all that is associated with it; but, as it is, it is in an unmanifested state, like a veiled lamp, and the operation of the vrtti is regarded as necessary for its manifestation. In the case of mediate knowledge this unmanifested consciousness manifests itself in the form of the vrtti; and in the case of immediate perception through the contact of the vrtti the veil of ajndna is removed, since the vrtti extends so as to reach the objects.

1 visayesu abhivyakta-cid-upardge na tad-dkdratva-mdtram tantram.

Advaita-siddhi, p. 482.

2 na ca spdrsana-pratyakse caksuradivat niyata-golakadvdrd-bhdvena antah-karana-nirgaty-ayogdd dvarandbhibhavdnupapattir iti vdcyam. sarvatra tat-tad-indriyddhisthdnasyaiva dvdratva-sambhavdt. Ibid. p. 482.

So in the case of mediate cognition the knowledge is of a mental state, and not of an object, whereas in immediate perception the illumination is of the object through the association of the vrtti. In the case of mediate cognition there is no way by which the antahkarana could go out.

To the objection of Vyasa-tlrtha that it is absurd to think of the antahkarana as taking the shape of gross physical objects, Madhu-sudana's reply is that "taking the shape of an object" only means the capacity of the vrtti to remove the veil of ajndna which had stood in the way of the affirmation of the existence of the object 1 ; thus the functioning of the vrtti consists only in the removal of the veil of ajndna.

To the objection that, if the pure consciousness is veiled by ajndna, no cognition is possible, Madhusudana's reply is that, though ajndna in its extensive entirety may remain intact, yet a part of it may be removed by coming into association with the vrtti, and thus the object may be revealed.

To the objection of Vyasa-tlrtha that in the last emancipatory intuition one would expect that the antahkarana should have the form of Brahman as object (which is absurd, Brahman being formless), the reply of Madhusudana is that the Brahman which forms the object of the last immediate intuition, being absolutely unconditioned, does not shine as associated with any particular form. The manifestation of objects in worldly experience is always with specific condition, whereas, the object of this last manifestation being without any condition, the absence of any form is no objection to it; its cognition results in the absolute cessation of all ajndna and thus produces emancipation. Again, the objection that, if during dreamless sleep the antahkarana is dissolved, then on reawakening there will be new antahkarana, and thus the deeds associated with the former antahkarana will have no continuity with the new antahkarana, is invalid; for even in deep sleep the causal antahkarana remains, what is dissolved being the manifested state of the antahkarana.

Again, the objection that there cannot be any reflection in the antahkarana because it has neither manifest colour {udbhutd-rupatvdt) nor visibility, is invalid; for what may be regarded as the

1 astitvadi tdd-vifayaka - vyavahdra -pratibandhaka -jndna-nivartana -yogy-atvasya tad-dkdratva-rupatvdt. Ibid. p. 483.

necessary qualification for reflection is not visibility or the possession of colour, but transparence, and such transparency is admitted to belong to antahkarana or its vrtti. The ajndna, which is regarded as constituted of the three gunas, is also considered to be capable of reflection by virtue of the fact that it contains sattva as one of its elements.

The objection that, as a ray of light illuminates not only colours, but also other entities, so the pure consciousness also should illuminate not only the colour of the object, but also its other properties, such as weight, is invalid; for the pure consciousness is not in touch with any quality or characteristic, and therefore can illuminate only those characters which are presented to it through the transparent vrtti; this is why, in the case of the illusion "this is silver," the vrtti implied in the cognition "this" does not manifest the illusory silver, for the manifestation of which a separate vrtti of avidyd has to be admitted. The antahkarana-vrtti, however, can directly receive the reflection of the pure consciousness and therefore does not require for such a reflection a further vrtti, and there is accordingly no vicious infinite. The function of the vrtti is to manifest the identity of the ^^-consciousness and the consciousness underlying the object, without which the relation between the knower and the known as "this is known by me" could not be manifested 1 .

Though Brahman is absolutely untouched by anything, yet, since all things are illusorily imposed upon it, it can manifest them all without the aid of mdyd; this justifies the omniscience of Brahman, and the criticism that the pure Brahman cannot be omniscient is invalid.

Regarding the destruction of the veil of ajndna it may be pointed out that the veiling power of the ajndna pertaining to one individual is destroyed by the functioning of his vrtti, so that he alone can perceive, and not any other individual in whose case the veiling power has not been destroyed. The difference between the veiling power and darkness is this: the veiling power has relation both to the object and to the perceiver, whereas darkness relates only to the object; so that, when darkness is destroyed, all can see, but not so in the case of the veiling power. This refutes the criticism that, if

1 jlvacaitanyasyddhifthdna-caitanyasya vabhedabhivyaktarthatvad vrtteh. anyathd mayedam viditam iti sambandhavabhaso na sydt. Advaita-siddhi, p. 485.

there is one ajndna, the perception of one object ought to lead to immediate emancipation.

The criticism that, since knowledge must necessarily dispel ignorance, the illusion of silver cannot be destroyed, is invalid; for knowledge destroys ignorance only in the last instance, i.e., only before emancipation. The knowledge of the conch-shell cannot destroy the supreme veiling power of the root ajndna covering the unlimited consciousness, but can only remove the relative ajndna covering the limited consciousness, thereby opening up the consciousness underlying the limited object-forms, and so producing the contradiction of the illusory silver and the intuition of the conch-shell.

The objection that ajndna cannot veil the material objects, because they are not luminous, is quite beside the point; for the Sarikarite theory does not assume that the ajndna veils the material objects. Their view is that the veiling relates to the pure consciousness on which all material objects are illusorily imposed. The ajndna veiling the underlying consciousness veils also the material objects the existence of which depends on it, being an imposition upon it. When by the vrtti the ground-consciousness of an object is manifested, the result is not the manifestation of the pure consciousness as such, but of the limited consciousness only so far as concerns its limited form with which the vrtti is in contact. Thus the objection that either the removal of the veil is unnecessary or that in any particular cognition it necessarily implies emancipation is invalid.

Again, the states of the ignorance must be regarded as being identical with it, and the knowledge that is opposed to ignorance is also opposed to them; so the states of ajndna can very well be directly removed by knowledge. The objection that there are many ajndnaSy and that even if one ajndna is removed there would be others obstructing the manifestation of cognition, is invalid; for, when one ajndna is removed, its very removal is an obstruction to the spread of other ajndnas to veil the manifestation, so that, so long as the first ajndna remains removed, the manifestation of the object continues.

An objection is put forward that, the consciousness being itself partless, there cannot be any manifestation of it in part, with reference to certain object-forms only. If it is held that such conditioned manifestation is possible with reference to the conditioning

fact of object-forms, then even previous to the existence of definite object-forms there cannot be any ajnana, or, in other words, ajnana cannot exist as a pre-condition, it being only coterminous with definite object-forms. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the object-forms, being imposition upon pure consciousness and the latter being their ground, the manifestation of consciousness with reference to any object-form depends upon the removal of ajnana with reference to the illusory creation of that object-form imposed upon the ground-consciousness. The ajnana itself does not constitute the object-form; therefore the removal of ajnana has reference not to object-forms as separate and independent entities, but only to the creation of such object-forms imposed upon the ground-consciousness. Thus there is no objection; the existence of ajnana as a pre-condition is such that, when along with itself object-forms are created, the veil on these is removed by the vrtti contact leading to their cognition. The position is that, though the ground-consciousness reveals the object-forms imposed upon it, yet such a revelation takes place only with reference to that perceiver whose vrtti comes into contact with the object, and not with reference to others. The condition of the revelation is that the consciousness underlying the perceiver, the vrtti and the object-form becomes identical, as it were, through the imposition of the vrtti upon the object. This tripartite union being a condition of the manifestation of an object to a particular perceiver, the object, revealed by the ground-consciousness underlying it, is not manifested to other perceivers.

The World as Illusion.

Vyasa-tlrtha tried to refute the Sarikarite theory that the world is an illusory imposition. He contends that, if the world is an illusory creation, it must have a basis (adhisthdna) which in a general manner must be known, and must yet be unknown so far as its special features are concerned. Brahman, however, has no general characteristic, and, since it is devoid of any specific peculiarities, any affirmation that it stands as the entity of which the specific peculiarities are not known would be inadmissible 1 . To this

1 adhifthdnatva-sdmdnyatve jridte saty ajndta-visesavattvasya prayoja-katvdt. brahmanah samdnya-dharmopetatvddind tdvat jndtatvam na sambhavati. nissdmdnyatvdt. ajndta-visesavattvam ca na sambhavati nirvlsesatvdnglkdrdt. Jirinivasa's Nydydmrta-prakdsa, on the Nydydmrta, p. 234.

Madhusudana's reply is that a knowledge of the general characteristic of the locus of illusion is by no means indispensable; what is necessary is that the true nature of the object should be known without any of its specific details. In the case of Brahman the nature is self-luminous bliss, but the specific characters of such bliss, as greater or less, and any variation in its quality, are not known; so there is no impropriety in considering Brahman as the locus of illusion. But the defence may be made in another way; for Madhusudana says that an imaginary general characteristic and special features may well be conceived of Brahman without involving the fallacy of the circle (anyonydsraya), if we assume the beginningless character of all such imaginary qualities. The characters of Brahman as being and bliss may be regarded as generic, and the fullness of the bliss may be regarded as specific. So the quality of existence or being that is found in all things may be regarded as a generic quality of Brahman, on the basis of which the illusions take place in the absence of the specific quality of Brahman as fullness of bliss. The inadequacy of the reply is obvious; for the objection was made on the ground that all illusions are psychological in their nature and are possible only through confusion of individual things, which have both universal and specific qualities, whereas the Brahman, being the absolute, is devoid of all characters on the basis of which any illusion is possible.

Vyasa-tlrtha in this connection further points out that, if it is suggested that an illusion can remain when there is no cognition antagonistic to illusory perception and that the ajndna in itself is opposed not to the illusion of world-appearance, but to its form as vrttiy the reply is that, since the definition of ajndna is "that which is opposed to consciousness," the above view, which considers that the ajndna is not opposed to consciousness, would hardly justify us in speaking of ajndna as ajndna; for, if it is not opposed to knowledge, it has no right to be so called. Moreover, the self and the not-self, the perceiver and the perceived, are so different from each other, that there is no scope for illusion between them. Thus Vedantists themselves assert that, among entities that are spatially separated or whose essences are entirely different, the speaker and the person spoken to, there cannot be any possibility of doubt about their identity. Moreover, unless the nature of the locus of

248 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

illusion is hidden from view, there cannot be an illusion, and the pure consciousness, being always self-manifested, is such that its nature can never be hidden; and so it is difficult to conceive how there can be an illusion. Again, the "self," which is the nature of Brahman, is never associated with the objects of world-appearance, which are always apparent to us as non-self, and, this being so, how can these objects be regarded as an imposition upon the self, as in the case of the illusion of silver, which is always associated with "this" as its locus? The position cannot be justified by saying that all objects of world-appearance are associated with "being," which is the nature of Brahman; for this does not imply that these objects are not imposed upon being as its locus, since in these instances existence appears as a quality of the objects, like colour, but the objects do not appear as illusory qualities imposed upon existence, which should have been the case, if the former are to be regarded as an illusory imposition upon the latter. Nor can it be asserted that the "being" is a self-luminous entity underlying the world-objects; for, if it were so, then these world-objects should have manifested themselves directly through their association with that pure consciousness, and the acceptance of a vrtti would be wholly unnecessary. It is also wrong to say that the manifestation of an object implies that the object is an imposition upon the fact of manifestation; for the latter appears as being only qualitative in relation to the object 1 . It is sometimes suggested that the knowledge of the true basis is not essential for explanation, because even an illusory notion of such a basis is sufficient to explain illusion, and therefore, even if the true basis (Brahman) is not apparent in perception, it is no valid objection to the possibility of illusion. But the reply to such a view is that the infinite occurrences of previous illusion would then be competent to explain present illusion, and there would be no point in admitting the existence of the true Brahman as being the foundation-truth of all illusory appearance; which would land us in Buddhist nihilism 2 .

If the world-appearance, which is supposed to be false, is able to exert causal efficiency and behave as real, a thing well attested by scriptural texts affirming the production of sky from the self,

1 ghatah sphurati tasya ca sphurananubhavatvenc ghatanubhavatvdyogat. Nydyamrta, p. 236. 8 Ibid. p. 237a.

then it is clearly different from ordinary illusions, which have no such causal efficiency (artha-kriyd-kdritva). Moreover, following the analogy of the conch-shell-silver, which is regarded as false in relation to the silver of the silversmith, one may likewise expect that the world-appearance should be false only in relation to some other real world-appearance; but no such real entities are known.

Again, it is suggested in the Vivarana that, though there is no real similarity between Brahman and illusion, yet there is no difficulty in admitting that even without any real similarity there is the world-illusion based upon Brahman through some imaginary similarity. But in reply to these it may be pointed out that such an imaginary similarity can only be supposed to be due to avidyd; but avidyd itself, being imaginary, will itself depend on some other illusion, and such an illusion would demand another similarity, and thus there would be a vicious circle. It is suggested that illusions are possible even without similarity, as in the case of red crystal; but in reply it may be said, first, that red crystal is a case of a reflection of the red in the crystal and may hence not stand in need of any similarity as the cause of the illusion, whereas in all other cases which are not of this nature an illusion would naturally require some kind of similarity as pre-condition; secondly, here also it may be admitted that the red substance and the crystal substance have this similarity between them, that they are both made up of the same substance, and such a similarity is not admissible between Brahman and the world. Again, it is well known that without the agency of extraneous defect there can be no false knowledge, since otherwise all knowledges may be invalid by themselves. So also there cannot be any illusion without a perceiver able to have both the false knowledge and the right knowledge to contradict it; and for this the presence of the body and the senses are indispensable. In the state of dissolution, though there may be ajndna, yet, there being no body, there cannot be either illusion or right knowledge.

It cannot be suggested that, just as in ordinary illusions of conch-shell-silver, ordinary defects of observation having relative existence are to be admitted, so the world-illusion also is to be explained on the supposition of the existence of such relative defects. The reply to such a suggestion is, that, unless the status of world-illusion is determined, no meaning can be attached to the

status of the defects producing the world-appearance, which has a relative existence. The tables cannot be turned on the dualists by supposing that on their side also the reality of the defects, body and senses, can be affirmed only when the non-illusory nature of the world is known, and that the knowledge of the latter is dependent upon that of the former; for knowledge of the reality of the world is to be obtained directly from experience, and not through such a logical quibble. It may also be pointed out that, if the analogy of the conch-shell-silver be pursued, then, since the defects there have the same status as the locus of the illusion, viz., the "this" of the conch-shell, so in the world-illusion also the defects should have the same status as the locus.

Again, if the defects are not regarded as ultimately real, but only as illusory, then it must be admitted that there are in the world no real defects, which would imply that our world-knowledge is valid. The assumption that defect, the body, the senses, etc., are all illusory demands that this be due to the presence of other defects; these in turn must depend on some other defects, and thus we may have a vicious infinite. If the defects are spontaneously imagined in the mind, then the self-validity of knowledge must be sacrificed. If it is urged that the avidya is either beginningless or self-sustained and immediate (like the concept of difference), there is no vicious infinite, the reply is that, if avidya is self-sustained and beginningless, it ought not to depend upon any locus or ground of world-illusion, Brahman, as its adhisthana. Again, if the experience of avidya be not regarded as due to some defects, it could not be regarded as invalid. But it would be difficult to imagine how avidya could be due to some defect; for then it would have to exist before itself in order to produce itself. Again, the conception that the world is an illusion because it is contradicted is false, because the contradiction itself is again contradicted; this may lead to a vicious infinite, since it cannot be admitted that the knowledge that contradicts is itself contradicted.

Just as in the silver illusion the locus of the illusion has the same kind of existence as the defect, so in the world-illusion also the locus of the illusion might have the same kind of relative existence as the defects; which would mean that Brahman also is relative. Moreover, it is wrong to say that the knowledge of the locus (adhisthana) of the world-illusion is ultimately real, while the defects have only a

relative existence; for such a different treatment would be unjustifiable, unless the defects should be found to be contradicted, whereas it has been shown above that the very concept of contradiction is illegitimate. It cannot be said that the falsehood of the defects constitutes their contradiction; for the concept of defect is unintelligible without the comprehension of falsehood; moreover, in all illusions the knowledge of the locus seems to have no antagonism to the defects which cause the illusion. Therefore there is no reason why, even if the world-appearance be regarded as illusion, the knowledge of the Brahman as the locus of the illusion should be able to dispel the defect which has produced it. Therefore, just as the Brahman is real, so the defects are also real. If bondage were absolutely false, no one would have tried to be liberated from it; for that which is non-existent cannot come into being. Again, if the bondage itself were an illusory imposition upon Brahma, it could not be expected that the intuitional knowledge of Brahman should be able to dispel it. Moreover, the supposition that the world-appearance is illusion is directly contradicted in most of the sutras of the Brahma-sutra, e.g., the definition of Brahman as "that which causes the birth, sustenance and dissolution of the world." So, from whichever way we can look at it, the supposition that the world-process is illusory is found to be wholly illogical.

Madhusudana's contention that the position that an illusion is possible only when the locus is hidden only so far as its special features are concerned holds good in the case of world-illusion also; for, though Brahman is manifest so far as its nature as pure being is concerned, it is hidden in regard to its nature as fullness of bliss. The condition that illusion is only possible when there is no knowledge contradicting the illusion holds good in the case of world-illusion; for the knowledge that contradicts the ajndna constituting the world illusion must be of the nature of a vrtti cognition. Thus, so long as there is no vrtti cognition of the pure nature of Brahman, there is no cognition contradicting the world-cognition; for the pure consciousness in its own nature is not opposed to ajndna. The objection that the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived, the self and the non-self, is so obvious that one cannot be mistaken for the other, is met by Madhusudana with the supposition that in the case of the silver-illusion also the difference between the presented "this" and the unpresented "that" (silver) is known and

252 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

yet there is an illusion. Moreover, the difference conceived in a particular manner cannot thwart the imposition of identification of any two entities in other forms; thus, though the opposition between the perceiver and the perceived, self and the not-self, is quite obvious in this particular form, yet the distinction between "being" and "jug" is not at all apparent; for the notion of the jug is permeated through and through by the notion of being, so that there is no difficulty in conceiving the possibility of false identification between the being and the jug 1 . Moreover, nature as being is an object of all cognition, so that, though formless like time, it can well be conceived to be an object of visual perception, like time 2 .

The world-illusions occur in a successive series, the later ones being similar to the previous ones. This is all the condition that is needed; it is not at all necessary that the illusory forms that are imposed should also be real. It is sufficient that there should be a cognition of certain forms giving place to certain other forms. What is necessary for a silver-illusion is that there should be a knowledge of silver; that the silver should also be real is quite unimportant and accidental. So the reality of the world-appearance as an entity is never the condition of such an illusion. The objection that, following the same analogy, it may also be contended that the reality of the locus of illusion is quite uncalled-for and that an awareness of such a locus is all that is needed in explaining an illusion, is invalid; for the locus of illusion is not the cause of illusion through awareness of it, but through ignorance of it. Moreover, if the reality of the locus of reality is not demanded as a pre-condition of illusion, contradiction of illusion will be meaningless; for the latter dispels only the illusory notion regarding a real entity.

The objection that, if the world-illusion is capable of practical efficiency and behaviour, it cannot be regarded as invalid, is untenable; for dreams also have some kind of practical efficiency. The story in the scriptural texts of the creation of the sky from the self need not lead us to think of the reality of such scriptural texts; for the scriptures speak of the dream-creations also. The objection

1 na hi rupdntarena bheda-graho rupdntarenddhydsa-virodhi. san-ghata ity-ddi-pratyaye ca sad-rupasydtmano ghatddy-anuvidhdyatayd bhdnun na tasya ghatddy-adhydsddhifthdnd-nupapattih. Advaita-siddhi, p. 495.

2 sad-rupena ca sarva-jndna-vifayatopapatter na rupddi-hinasydpy dtmanah kdlasyeva cdkfusatvddy anupapattih. Ibid. p. 495.

that, if the root-impression of illusion at the beginning of creation be due to those of other cycles, then the root-impressions of previous birth ought to manifest themselves in each and every experience of this life, is invalid; for not all root-impressions of previous birth are manifested in this life, and the agency of such root-impressions in influencing the experiences of this life, as in the case of the instinctive desire of the baby to suck its mother's breasts, is to be accepted in those cases where they do in fact occur. So also the objection that illusion cannot be due to the root-impressions of one's own wrong imagination, because before the erroneous perception takes place there cannot be root-impressions of illusory perceptions, and therefore the existence of the illusory world existent as a prior fact and a pre-condition of one's illusory perceptions, cannot be regarded as valid; for it is just the nature of things that is responsible for two kinds of illusions such that, though bangles can be made out of the illusory silver in the silversmith's shop, nothing can be done with the illusory silver in the conch-shell. So the root-impressions of one's own illusion may act as constituent stuff of the illusion of the world-appearance, and even before the occurrence of such illusory experience of the world-appearance the stuff of the world-appearance, derived from the root-impression of one's own illusion, may already be objectively there as a pre-condition of the illusory perception. The objection that, since illusory perceptions must have as their pre-condition a similarity between the entities falsely identified, and since also no such similarity can be traced between Brahman and the world-appearance, there cannot be any false identification between them, is invalid; first, because avidyd, being beginningless, does not stand in need of any similarity. Secondly, the supposition that similarity is an essential pre-condition of illusion is likewise false; for even in those cases where similarity seems to induce illusion it does so by generating a mental state congenial to production of illusion, and, if such a mental state is produced in other ways, say as a fruit of one's own karma and adrsta, the necessity that the similarity should behave as a pre-condition vanishes, and so the indispensable character of similarity as a pre-condition to illusion cannot be admitted. Invalid also is the objection that, if there may be an illusion without defect, then that means that all cognitions are by themselves invalid and that, if illusions be regarded as due to

254 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

defects, then defects also are results of illusory impositions, and thus there will be a vicious infinite; for illusion through beginning-less avidya does not belong to defects, and, though illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the beginningless avidya-defect, this does not render all cognitions invalid, since only illusions which have a temporal beginning are due to the defect of avidya, and, since avidya itself is beginningless, it cannot stand in need of any defects, and so there cannot be any vicious infinite. It must be borne in mind that, though illusion in time is due to defects, or dosa, the beginningless defect of avidya, it is not necessarily due to any such defect, and therefore stands directly and spontaneously as an illusory creative agent; and is called illusion, not because it is produced by defects, but because it is contradicted by Brahma-knowledge. Thus the objection that avidya is due to defect, and defect is due to avidya, is invalid; that which is a product of defects is bound to be contradicted; but the converse of this is not necessarily true.

It cannot be urged that, if avidya is independent of dosa, the world-illusion may be regarded as independent of the locus or basis of illusion, viz., the Brahman; for, though the basis of illusion may not be regarded as producing illusion, it has to be regarded as the support and ground thereof and also as its illuminator 1 .

Again, the objection that illusion must depend on sense-functioning, on the existence of the body, is invalid; for these are necessary only for intuitive perception. But in the cases of illusion, of the imposition of the avidya upon the pure consciousness, the latter is the spontaneous reflector of the avidya creations, and so for the purpose there is no necessity of the sense-functioning.

Again, it is urged that, since the defects are imaginary impositions, the negation of defects becomes real, and therefore the defects, being unreal, cannot render the knowledge of world-appearance unreal; and, if this is so, the world-appearance being real, this would be our admission of reality (as an illustration of this, it is urged that the criticism of the Buddhists against the Vedas, being invalid and illusory, cannot stultify the validity of the Vedas). To this the reply is that the criticism of the defects pointed out against the Vedas by the Buddhists is illusory, because the defects are only imagined by them; the Vedas are not affected

by this, because their truth is affirmed by our practical experience. The defects imagined are not therefore coterminous with the reality of the Vedas; the defect of avidyd and the manifold world-appearance have the same kind of existence—one is the effect of the other; and thus, if the defects are illusory, their product (the world) also becomes illusory, and so the illusory nature of defects does not prove the reality of the world. The world-appearance is called relatively true only because it is not contradicted by anything else except the Brahma-knowledge. Its relative character therefore does not depend upon the determination of the nature of falsehood, which in its turn might be conceived to be determinable by the nature of the world as relative, thus involving a vicious nature of dependence 1 . It is urged that the reality of the defects is directly grasped by the senses, and that therefore they can behave as the cause of error only if they are ultimately real; to this the reply is that the existence of the defects can be grasped only by the senses, but that they will never be contradicted at any time (traikdlikd-bddhyatva) can never be ascertained on any intuitive basis, and so the reality of the defects can never be affirmed. It must always be borne in mind that the defects have never the same status as pure consciousness, upon which illusory conch-shell is imposed. Nor can it be said that the knowledge which contradicts the world-appearance is real on the ground that, if it were not real, it would require some other knowledge to contradict it and this would land us in a vicious infinite; for this final contradiction of world-appearance may well be regarded as contradicting itself also, for the very simple reason that the content of this contradiction applies to the whole range of the knowable, and this final contradiction, being itself within the field of the knowable, is included within the contradiction. It is urged that, if bondage is false in the sense that it is at all times non-existent, there is no reason why anyone should be anxious to remove that which is already non-existent; to this the reply is that the true (Brahman) can never cease to exist—the falsity of the bondage means that it is an entity which is liable to cease immediately on the direct intuition of the basic truth. It is like the case of a man who has forgotten that he has his necklace round his neck and is anxiously searching for it, and who the instant he is reminded of it gives up his search. It is wrong to suppose that,

1 Ibid. p. 499.

because no effort could be directed towards the chimerical, which is non-existent at all times, therefore no effort could be made for the removal of the illusory; for, though the illusory and the chimerical may be in agreement so far as their non-existence at all times is concerned, there is no reason why these two should agree in other respects also. The concept of the cessation of the bondage may not have any other content than the intuition of the real, or it may be regarded as indefinable or of an entirely unique nature. The illusory bondage and the world-appearance can cease only when the basic truth, the Brahman, is intuited, just as the silver illusion ceases with the knowledge of the conch-shell on which it is imposed. The objection that some of the sutras of Badarayana imply the existence of a realistic world is invalid, if it is remembered that the import of those sutras merely points to the existence of a relative order of things which ceases entirely as soon as the basic truth on which they are imposed is known.

The drsti-srsti view is the supposition that the existence of all things consists in their being perceived. Vyasatlrtha says that, if things existed only so long as they are perceived, then they would be only momentary; and so all the objections against Buddhist momentariness, to the effect that they do not admit the permanence of things as attested by recognition, might equally well be levelled against the Sankarites themselves. To this Madhusudana's reply is that, though the existence of objects as realities is not admitted, yet their existence in the causal state, as ajndna, is on this view not denied; this would be its difference from the Buddhist position, which does not admit any such causal existence of things.

If the world-objects have no existence outside their perception, then they are plainly independent of definite causes, and, if that is so, then the definite cause-and-effect relation between sacrifices and their fruits, and the import of all the Vedantic texts regarding definite cause and effect, are meaningless. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the specification of cause-and-effect relation in the scriptures and the experience of them in mundane life is like cause and effect in dreams; these dream-causes and their effects also have a certain order among themselves, known by contradiction in experiences.

It is objected that on the drsti-srsti view (that the objects do not exist prior to perception) world-experience is inexplicable. It would

be difficult also to explain how, if the "this" which forms a basis of illusion is not already there outside us, there can be any sense-relation to it and to the foundation of the illusory image. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the ordinary explanation of illusion depending upon sense-relation and other conditions is only an explanation for people of the lower order. For people of the higher order the definition of illusion would be "the manifestation of a true entity in association with a false one," and such a definition would hold good even on the drsti-srsti view. The consciousness underlying the "this" is a substance, and the false silver is manifested in association with it.

It is further objected that at the time of the illusory perception ("this is silver"), if there is no conch-shell as an objective fact, then the illusion cannot be explained, as is generally done, as effect of ignorance about the conch-shell. The reply is that, even if the conch-shell is absent, the ajnana that forms its stuff is there. To the objection that the two perceptions "this is silver" and "this is not silver" are directed to two different perceptions and do not refer to one common objective fact, and that therefore neither of them can be regarded as the contradiction of the other, since such a contradiction is only possible when two affirmations refer to one and the same objective fact—the reply is that on the analogy of dream-experiences the contradiction is possible here also. Vyasa-tirtha further says that, since the contradiction of an illusion is not an objective fact, but a mere perception, it has no better status than the illusory perception and therefore cannot be regarded as necessarily truer than the illusion which it is supposed to contradict. He further says that in dreamless sleep and in dissolution, since there is no differential perception as between Brahman and the jiva t such a difference between Brahman and the fvoa ceases in each dreamless sleep and in each cyclic dissolution. Thus in the absence of difference between Brahman and the jiva there cannot be at the end of each dreamless sleep and dissolution any return to world-experience. In the case of a person who is sleeping and whose root-impressions on that account are not perceivable (and are therefore nonexistent), there is no explanation how the world-experience may again be started. Emancipation also, being only a perception, cannot have a better status of existence than the world-experience; moreover, if the pure consciousness appeared as all the world-

DIV 17

258 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch. xxix

objects, then there could not have been any time when such objects could remain unmanifested.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the relation of jiva and Brahman, beingbeginningless, does not depend upon perception; in dreamless sleep, though the root-impressions vanish as effect, they still remain in their causal character; emancipation also, being of the nature of Brahman, has the pure intuitive character of perception.

An objection is urged that, if pure consciousness is the intuition of objects, then they should always be manifested. To this the reply is that perception here means the manifestation of consciousness through a vrtti which does not stand in need of further vrtti for its relation to consciousness; the possibility of illusion without bodies can well be explained by analogy with dreams. Again, the objection that, since the perception is as much an illusory intuition as the object of which it is conceived to be the essence, the object in itself ceases to have its essence as mere intuition, is invalid; because, though the perception has no other existence than the intuition itself, that is no bar to the conception of the object as having no essence but perception. An objection may again be raised that recognition shows permanent existence of objects; but reply to it may easily be found in the illustration of dream-experiences, and also in the possibility of accidental agreement between the mis-perception of different perceivers. The objection that the notion of identity of Brahman and jiva, being itself mental, cannot contradict duality is invalid; for the notion of such identity is identical with the self and therefore cannot be called mental. Again, the intuition of the ultimate truth cannot itself be called invalid because it is mental; for its validity depends upon the fact that it is never contradicted.

CHAPTER XXX

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE DUALISTS AND THE MONISTS (CONTINUED)

A Refutation of the definition of Avidya (nescience).

A vi d ya is defined as that beginningless positive entity which is removable by knowledge. The objection to this, as given by Vyasa-tlrtha, is, first, that, the objects of the world being in time, the ignorance that limits the consciousness underlying it cannot be beginningless. Moreover, since according to the Vedantist negation has no constituent material stuff as its material cause, ajndna cannot be regarded as its cause. Even on the assumption of illusory negation ajndna, which is regarded as being in its nature positive, cannot be regarded as its cause; for, if negation has for its cause a positive entity, then the unreal may have the real as its cause. Again, if ajndna is not the cause of the negation, then knowledge ought not to be able to dispel it, and the negation of a jug should not be liable to cease on its negation. Again, on the Sankarite view the ajndna is supposed to veil the object; we cannot have any cognition of Brahman, because it is hidden by ajndna. They also hold that the vftti knowledge cannot intuit Brahman. If that is so, then in the last emancipatory knowledge through vrtti there is no intuition of Brahman; without this the ajndna concealing Brahman cannot be removed, and hence emancipation is impossible. Again, if it is supposed that the ajndna is removed, then in the jivan-mukti state the saint ought to have no experience of worldly things.

Again, it must be admitted that knowledge removes ajndna directly and spontaneously, without waiting for the assistance of any accessory cause; for otherwise, when a thing is known, its ignorance would not have vanished spontaneously with it. But, if that were so, then in cases where an ajndna is associated with certain conditions, the removal of the ajndna would not stand in need of the removal of the conditions also together with it. What is to be expected is that the ajndna should be removed Irrespective of the removal of the conditions, and this is not admitted. Again, if it is held that the removal of the conditions is awaited, then pure

consciousness cannot be regarded as capable of removing avidyd directly. Again, if knowledge can directly and spontaneously remove ajndna, then it is useless to restrict the scope by saying that it removes only the beginningless ajndna. The restriction is imposed in order to distinguish the cosmic avidyd from the phenomenal avidyd of silver-illusion, and if the spontaneous removal of ajndna serves in both places, there is no utility in restricting the scope. It cannot be said that the epithet "beginningless" is given to ajndna because it is the product of beginningless illusory imposition through defects; for it has already been pointed out that such a view would lead to a vicious infinite, because there can be no defect without avidyd. Again, ajndna cannot be beginningless, because whatever is different from knowledge and also from negation cannot be beginningless like the illusory silver. Again, it is wrong to define ajndna as positive; for on the Sankarite view ajndna is different from both positive and negative, and therefore cannot be negative. If an entity is not positive, it must be negative; for, being different from positive, it cannot also be different from negative. Again, if there is an entity which is not a negation and has no beginning, it is not capable of being negated, but has an un-negatived existence like the self. The self also cannot be designated by any predicate explaining its positiveness, except that it is not negated. It has been pointed out in the Vivarana that it is immaterial whether an entity is beginningless or has a beginning; for in either case it may be destructible, provided that there is sufficient cause for its destruction. The general inference that a beginningless positive entity cannot cease has its exception in the special case of ajndna, which would cease to exist with the dawn of jridna. If it is urged that, since ajndna is both beginningless and different from negation, it ought to persist eternally, like the self, it may also be urged on the opposite side that, since ajndna is different also from " positive," it ought to be liable to destruction, like negation-precedent-to-production. To this the reply is that the inference is that no beginningless positive entity is confronted with anything which can oppose or destroy it. Any refutation of this argument must take the form of citing an instance where the concomitance fails, and not of any mere opposite assertion. No instance can be adduced to illustrate the assertion that the beginningless ajndna can be removed by jridna; for the removal of ignorance by knowledge is always with

reference to such ignorance as has a beginning in time, as in the case of silver-illusion. So all that could be said would be that whatever opposes ignorance destroys it, and such a general statement has no special application to the case of the supposed beginningless ajndna. Again, if ajndna is regarded as different from positive entity, then it is like negation, and its cessation would mean position once more. Again, ajndna (or ignorance) cannot have any existence apart from its perception, and, since ajndna has always as its basis the pure consciousness, its perception can never be negative, so that it can never cease to exist 1 . Moreover, if ajndna is false in the sense that it is non-existent in the locus in which it appears, it cannot be destroyed by knowledge. No one thinks that the illusory silver is destroyed by the perception of the conch-shell.

The second alternative definition of ajndna is thai it is the material cause of illusion. But according to the Sankarite theory that there are different ajndnas corresponding to the different jndnas, the knowledge of the conch-shell would remove ignorance of it, and the knowledge of a negation would remove ignorance of it; but in neither of these cases can ignorance be defined as a constituent of illusion. Negation, in itself, has no constituent material cause, and thus it cannot have ajndna as a constituent.

There is a Sankarite view that mdyd is the material cause of the world and Brahman is its locus. On such a view, mdyd or ajndna being the material cause of the world, and illusion (bhrama) being a part of the world, ajndna becomes a constituent cause of bhrama, and not vice versa. On the other view, that both Brahma and mdyd are causes of the world-appearance, mdyd cannot by itself become the cause of illusion. Moreover, an illusion, being itself different from a positive entity, is more like negation and cannot have any constituent material of its own, and so it cannot itself be the constituent material of ajndna. Moreover, on the Sankarite view, the illusory object, "having no being" (sad-vilaksanatvena), has no constituent, and so the illusory cannot be a constituent of ajndna. If anything is to be a constituent of anything, it must be positively existing, and not merely different from non-existents. Again, whenever anything is a material stuff of other things, the former appears as a constant factor of the latter; but neither the illusory

1 pratiti-mdtra-sarirasya ajndnasya ydvat sva-vifaya-dhl-rupa-sdkfi-sattvam anuvrtti-niyamena nivrtty-ayogac ca. Nydydmrta, p. 304.

silver nor its knowledge appears as ajndna. Thus the two definitions of ajndna fail.

In reply to this Madhusudana says that the ajndna which forms the stuff of the illusory silver is the beginningless ajndna. The ajndna is called positive in the sense that it is different from the negative. It is for this reason that the ajndna which is regarded as the material stuff of the illusory negation can be regarded as different from negation, and therefore it can be regarded as constituent of the illusory negation. It is by no means true that the effect must be of exactly the same stuff as the cause. Things which are absolutely similar in nature or absolutely dissimilar cannot be related to each other as cause and effect; it is for this reason that truth cannot be the material stuff of untruth. For in that case, since truth never ceases to manifest itself, and never suffers change, untruth also would never cease to manifest itself. The truth, however, can behave as the cause of untruth in the sense that it remains as the basis of the illusory changes of the untruth. It is wrong also to suppose that, since the ajndna of Brahman cannot be removed through a vrtti, which itself is a manifestation of ajndna, Brahma-knowledge itself becomes impossible; for, so far as Brahman is a content, this ajndna (as content) can be removed by a vrtti. In the case of jtvan-mukti, though the ultimate cessation may be delayed through absence of the obstructive factors of the right karmas of the past and other conditions, these may well be regarded as liable to cessation through knowledge. Certain causes may produce certain effects; but that such production may be delayed for some reason does not invalidate the causal character of the cause. It is well admitted by the Sankarites that knowledge directly removes ajndna, the removal being itself a part of ajndna.

It is wrong to suppose that whatever is imaginary must necessarily be an idea due to defects or must have a temporal beginning; but it must be a product which is simultaneous with the imagination that produces it 1 .

It is also wrong to suppose that, if any entity is not positive, it must be negative or that, if it is not negative, it must be positive; for there is always scope for a third alternative, viz., that which is neither positive nor negative. According to the Sankarites the

1 kalpitatva-m&tram hi na dofa-janya-dhl-mdtra-sariratve sdditve vd tantram. kimtu prdtibhdsa-kalpaka-samdnakdtlna-kalpakattvam. Advaita-siddhi, p. 544.

principle of the excluded middle is a false premiss of logic, and thus they admit the possibility of an extra-logical category, that which is neither positive nor negative. The supposed inference that beginningless positive entity must necessarily be permanent, like the self, is false; for it is only in the case of self that beginningless positive entity is found eternally to persist.

It is also wrong to suppose that, since ajndna is always manifested through pure consciousness, it can never cease to exist; for there is no law that whatever is manifested by the saksi-consGious-ness must remain during the whole period while the sdksi persists; so there is no incongruity in supposing that the ajndna ceases, while the $afoz-consciousness persists. Moreover, the avidyd that becomes manifested is so only through the $<zfoi-consciousness as modified or limited by it; such a limited consciousness may cease to exist with the cessation of the avidyd. It is also wrong to suppose that through the operation of the vrtti the avidyd ceases to exist; for even in such cases it persists in its subtle causal form.

When avidyd is defined as being constituted of the stuff of illusion (bhramopdddna) y what is meant is that it is changing and material. It is not necessary to suppose also that a cause and effect must necessarily be positive; for the self, which is a positive entity, is neither a cause nor an effect. What constitutes the defining characteristic of a material cause is that it is continuous with all its effects {anvayi-kdranatvam updddnatve tantram); and what is an effect must necessarily have a beginning in time. A negation-precedent-to-production of knowledge cannot be regarded as the material cause of illusion; for such negation can only produce the correlative positive entity with which it is connected. It cannot therefore be the cause of production of illusion; so there is no incongruity in supposing that ajndna or illusion, neither of which is real, are related to each other as cause and effect. It is also not correct to contend that a material cause should always be found to persist as a perceivable continuous constituent of all its effects; the colour of the material cause of a jug is not found in the jug. The fact that, when the ajndna is removed with the knowledge of the conch-shell, no illusion is experienced, is no proof that ajndna is not a constituent of illusion. Not all things that are related as cause and effect are always experienced as such. Thus the definitions of ajndna as anddi-bhdva-rupatve satijndna-nivartyatvam or as bhramopdddnatvam are valid.

Perception of ajnana (ignorance).

The Sarikarites urge that ajndna can be directly intuited by perception and that therefore its existence is attested by perception. In regard to this Vyasa-tlrtha says that what is regarded as perception of ignorance as a positive entity is nothing more than negation of knowledge. Thus the substratum of the ego (aham-artha) is not admitted to be a support of the positive entity of ignorance. The apperception " I am ignorant" is to be explained therefore as being the experience of absence of knowledge and not of a positive ignorance (ajndna). Again, since neither pleasure, pain, nor the illusory entities cognized in illusion are directly manifested by the ^^-consciousness, absence of such knowledge (e.g., "I do not know pleasure," "I do not know pain," "I do not know conch-shell-silver") is to be explained as negation of knowledge and not as due to an experience of positive ignorance. So also, when one says " I do not know what you say," there is only an experience of negation of knowledge and not of positive ignorance. In mediate knowledge also, since the illumination does not proceed by direct removal of the veil of ajnana from the face of the object, the theory that all knowledge which does not involve the removal of ajnana involves an intuition of positive ignorance would land us into the position that, when something is known in mediate knowledge, one should feel as if he did not know it, since no ajndna is directly removed here.

On the Sankarite view it is not admitted that there is any veil covering material objects; consequently the explanation of the experience of ignorance in such cases as "I do not know what you say" is to be found in the supposition, not of a positive ignorance, but of absence of knowledge. It may be contended that, though there may not be any ajndna veiling the objects, yet these very material creations represent the creative (viksepa) part of ajndna and so the experience of the unknown objects represents an experience of positive ajndna, since ajndna creations do not always arrest knowledge. Thus, for instance, when a jug is known as a jug, if someone says that it is a cloth and not a jug, that does not produce a confusion in the perceiver of the jug, though the delusive words of the speaker must be supposed to produce a false im-

pression—a viksepa of ajndna. It will be shown later that the experience "I do not know" with reference to a material object does not refer to pure consciousness as limited by material qualities 1 . On the view which admits the vrtti in order to explain the reflection of pure consciousness no ajndna can be admitted as veiling the consciousness under material limitations. Moreover, if the experience "I am ignorant" (aham ajnah) is explained as being a direct intuition of ajndna and, as such, different from the experience "there is no knowledge in me" (mayi jndnam ndsti), then the two propositions "the ground without the jug" and "there is no jug in the ground" are different in meaning, which is absurd; for certainly the two propositions do not differ in meaning, any more than any other two propositions, e.g., " I have a desire" and " I have no antipathy." There is no difference between the two concepts of absence of knowledge and ignorance. Again, when one is engaged in Vedantic discipline for the attainment of Brahma-knowledge, there is at that time the negation-precedent-to-the-production of Brahma-knowledge; for, if it were not so, then there would be the Brahma-knowledge and there would be no necessity for Vedantic discipline. Now a negation-precedent-to-production cannot be known without the knowledge of the entity to which it refers. If this is admitted, then without the knowledge of Brahman there cannot be any knowledge of its negation-precedent-to-production; and, if there is knowledge, then Brahman becomes known, and, if it is considered that such a negation of Brahma-knowledge is known as a positive entity by direct intuition (as it would be on the theory of the direct intuition of ajndna), then Brahman also would be known directly at the stage of the negation precedent to it, which is self-contradictory.

Moreover, the concept of ajndna is clearly that of negation of knowledge, as in the sentence "I do not know." Even in cases when one says "I am ignorant" the sense of negation is apparent, though there is no negative particle. The Vivarana also admits the opposition of ajndna to knowledge; and, if this were admitted, then with the knowledge of such opposition there would not be knowledge of ignorance as a positive entity, and without such knowledge of opposition there will be no knowledge of ajndna, that being the

1 jade na jdndmlty anubhavasya jaddvacchinnam caitanyam visaya iti cen na, nirasifyamdnatvdt. Nydydmrta, p. 309(c).

266 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

essential concept of ajndna. Even a negation of knowledge which has a reference to the object of which there is the negation may also have no such reference when it is taken up as being itself an object of the enquiry of knowledge. Thus there is no way in which ajndna can be regarded as anything but a negation of knowledge; and the supposition that ajndna, though in its analytical concept it involves two constituents—knowledge and its negation—yet is only a name for a positive concept which does not involve these constituents, is wrong 1 . If ajndna can be removed by vrtti knowledge, it is unnecessary to suppose that it has any other meaning different from that involved in its constituent negative particle qualifying knowledge. Experience also shows that ajndna has no other meaning than the negation of knowledge; so, unless the entity which is the defining reference of ajndna is known, there cannot be any knowledge of ajndna. But such a defining reference being Brahma-knowledge which has no ajndna associated with it, the inclusion of the defining reference would make the concept impossible: hence there cannot be any knowledge of ajndna 2 .

The reply made by the Sankarites is that the defining reference of ajndna is Brahma-knowledge and this Brahma-knowledge as sa/wf-consciousness, being the manifester of ajndna, is not opposed to it; for it is only the vrtti shade mind that is opposed to ajndna. So, there being no opposition between the Brahma-knowledge as sa/jw-consciousness and the ajndna, it is quite possible to have a knowledge of ajndna in spite of the fact that Brahma-knowledge becomes in a sense its constituent as a defining reference. But it may be pointed out in reply that the awareness of Brahma-knowledge is the stf&^z-consciousness; the experience "I do not know" is a negation of vrtti knowledge and, as such, it may be referred to the sfl/w£-consciousness even when there is no vrtti knowledge. Thus the solution in the theory that ajndna is nothing but negation of knowledge would be just the same as in the theory of ajndna as positive entity. If it is contended that, though denial of knowledge may be related to the defining reference in a general manner, yet it may, in its specific form, appear as a mere positive ignorance

1 jndndbhdvo'pi hi prameyatvddindjndne pratiyogy-ddi-jndndnapeksa etena nipune kusaladi-iabdavat bhava-rupa-jnane ajndnasabdo rudha iti nirastam. Nyayamrta, p. 312.

1 apt ca bhava-rQpajftanavacchedaka-vifayasydjndne ajndna-jndndyogdt jiidne ca ajndnasaivdbh&vdt katham bhdva-rupdjndnajndnam. Ibid. p. 313.

without involving such an explicit relation to the defining reference —to this the reply is that, even if this contention is admitted, it does not lend any support to the admission of a positive ignorance; for even in the case of a negation of knowledge one may well admit that, though it may be generally related to a defining reference, yet in any specific case it may not always involve such a reference. It is further urged by some that an entity may be known directly and that such knowledge may not involve always the specific defining relations of that entity; it is only the latter type of knowledge which makes doubt impossible. But the fact that there may be doubt regarding an object that is known shows clearly that an object may be known without its specific and negative relations being manifested at the same time.

Moreover, if ajndna cannot be grasped by the vrtti knowledge, then there also cannot be any possibility of inference regarding ajndna. When one says "you do not know the secret," the hearer to whom the secret is presented through a mediate cognitional state would not be able to have the awareness of the ajndna, if the ajndna could not be presented through a vrtti cognition. It cannot be said that the mediate cognitional state is not opposed to ajndna; for, if that were so, then even when an entity was known through a mediate cognition he might have had the experience that he did not know it. It is admitted by the Saftkarites that the vrtti of direct intuition through perception is opposed to ajndna] and, if vrtti of mediate cognition also is opposed to ajndna, then there is no mental state through which ajndna can be known.

The experience in deep dreamless sleep, "I did not know anything so long," also refers to absence of knowledge, and not to any positive ignorance. It cannot be said that, since at that time all other knowledge has ceased (there being no awareness of the per-ceiver or of any other content), there cannot be any awareness regarding the absence of knowledge; for the objection would be the same with regard to the experience of positive ignorance. If it is urged that in that state ajndna is experienced directly as a positive entity, but its relationing with regard to its special defining reference becomes apparent in the waking state, the same explanation may equally well be given if the experience in the dreamless sleep be regarded as being that of absence of knowledge; for negation of knowledge may also be experienced as a knowable

268 Controversy betzveen Dualists and Monists [ch.

entity without any relation to its defining reference; or the so-called experience of ignorance may be explained as an inference of the absence of knowledge, in the dreamless state, made from physical and physiological conditions in the waking state. In the Sankarite view also, since the ego cannot be experienced in that state, the experience "I did not know anything" must be regarded as being in some sense illusory. If it is urged that in the dreamless state ajndna, being reflected through a state of avidyd (avidyd-vrtti), is intuited by the sa&w-consciousness, then it might equally well be intuited in the same manner in the waking state also. If it is regarded as being intuited directly by the «z&«-consciousness, then, being an eternal cognition, it would have no root-impression (sarnskdra) and could not be remembered. Moreover, if it is not agreed that the absence of knowledge in the dreamless state is a matter of inference from conditions in the waking state, then the absence of knowledge in the dreamless state cannot in any other way be proved; for it cannot be inferred from a positive ajndna, since the negation of knowledge, being material (jada), has no ajiidna associated with it as a veiling factor. Moreover, if from ajndna, a positive entity, the negation of knowledge can always be inferred, then from the negation of attachment in the dreamless state positive antipathy will have to be inferred. Thus the ajndna can never be regarded as being susceptible of direct intuition.

Madhusudana's reply is that, though the ego perceived cannot be a support of the ajndna, yet, since the antahkarana in its causal form is falsely identified with the pure consciousness which is the support of the ajndna, the ajndna appears to be associated with the ego perceived. This explains the experience in the dreamless sleep, "I did not know anything." In the case of the experience "I do not know the jug" also, though there cannot be any veil on the jug, yet, since ajndna has for its support consciousness limited by the jug-form, there is the appearance that the jug-form itself is the object of the veil of ajndna. The objection that in the mediated cognition, there being the veil of ajndna on the object, there ought to be the negation of awareness is also invalid; for, when the ajndna is removed from the knower, the enlightenment of knowledge cannot be obstructed by the presence of the ajndna in the object.

The objection of Vyasa-tlrtha that ajndna is only a negation of knowledge and that therefore, instead of admitting ajndna as

existing as a positive entity in the perceiver, it is better to admit the negation of knowledge only, is invalid; for the experience of negation of knowledge is invalid in this form, because negation implies the defining reference as a constituent. In order to know that "there is no knowledge in me" there must be a knowledge of knowledge in me, which is self-contradictory. The experience of negation of knowledge in the perceiver without involving any relation to a defining reference can only be valid in the case of positive ajndna. A specific negation can never appear as a universal negation; for, if this were admitted, then even when there is a particular book on the table there may be an experience of there being no book on the table; since according to the proposed theory of the opponent a specific negation of this or that book is to appear as universal negation. Madhusudana urges that what constitutes the difference between negations is not a difference between negations per se, but is due to the difference among the defining references which are a constituent in them. It is thus impossible that the experience of one's ignorance could be explained on the supposition that such an experience referred to experience of negation; for it has already been shown that such negation can be neither specific nor universal. So the experience of ignorance is to be regarded as the experience of a positive entity.

It may however be contended that the concept of ajndna also involves a reference by way of opposition to knowledge and thus implies knowledge as its constituent, so that all the objections raised against the concept of negation apply equally well to the concept of ajndna. The reply is that on the Sahkarite view the pure Mfoz-consciousness grasps at the same time both ajndna and the object as veiled by it without consequent destruction or contraction of either of them. Thus there is no chance of any self-contradiction; for the awareness of ajndna does not involve any process which negates it 1 . If it is contended by the opponent that in the case of the awareness of negation also a similar reply is possible (on the assumption that the object of negation is directly known by the sofoz-consciousness), Madhusudana's reply is that, since ajndna can be known by safoz-consciousness, its defining reference is also

1 pramdna-vrtti-nivartyasydpi bhdva-rupdjndnasya sdksi-vedyasya virodhi-nirupaka-jnana-tad-vydvartaka-visaya-grahakena sdksind tat-sddhakena tad-anasdd vydhaty-anupapatteh. Advaita-siddhi, p. 550.

270 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

intuited thereby—in the same manner; but, since negations are not intuited directly by the safoz-consciousness, but only through the pramdna of non-perception, the defining reference of ajndna also cannot be intuited by the sdksi. It cannot be contended that negation no less than knowledge may be manifested by the sdksi-consciousness; for knowledge implies the non-existence of negation, and so the two cannot be manifested by safot-consciousness at the same time; but unproduced knowledge may appear in a qualitative relation to ajndna> since, the relation being qualitative, there is no contradiction between the two, and this explains the possibility of the knowledge of ajndna. The Sankarites do not admit that the knowledge of a qualified entity presupposes the knowledge of the quality; and so the objection that, the entity which forms the defining relation of ajndna not being previously known, ajndna cannot have such defining reference as its adjectival constituent is invalid 1 .

An objection may be raised to the effect that, since Brahma-knowledge is to be attained by a definite course of discipline, so long as that is not passed through there is a negation-precedent-to-Brahma-knowledge; and admission of such a negation exposes the Sankarites to all the criticisms which they wished to avoid. The reply is to be found in the view that instead of admitting a negation-precedent here the Sankarites assume that there may either be knowledge of Brahman or ajndna relating to it, i.e., instead of admitting a negation-precedent-to-Brahma-knowledge, they admit a positive ignorance regarding Brahma-knowledge; and thus there is no contradiction.

Vyasa-tlrtha's contention is that negation of an entity does not necessarily imply the knowledge of any particular entity in its specific relations as a constituent of the knowledge of it, and such knowledge may arise without any specific reference to the particularities of the defining reference. In such experience as "I do not know" no specific defining reference is present to the mind and there is only a reference to entities in general. On such a view, since the knowledge of the defining reference is not a constituent of the knowledge of negation, there is no contradiction on the ground

1 na ca avacchedakasya visayddeh prdgajiidne katham tad-visistdjndna-jnanam. visesana-jndnddhlnatvdd visifta-jridnasyeti vdcyam visesana-jndnasya visifta-jiidna-jiianatve mdndbhdvdt. Advaita-siddhi, p. 550.

that, since negation is affirmed with regard to the defining reference, its presence as a constituent is impossible. To this Madhusudana's reply is that no negation of any particular entity can appear merely in a general reference without regard to the specific relations of that particular entity. If it is urged that no negation-precedent can appear in association with the specific particularities of the defining reference as a constituent and that all negations-precedent can appear only in a general reference, the criticism is answered by Madhusudana to the effect that such negations-precedent as are associated only with the general reference to their defining character are impossible 1 . The opponent of Madhusudana is supposed to argue that the nature of the defining reference in a negation involves only that particular content which is a character inherent in the thing or things negated. Such characters, forming the content of the knowledge of negation, may indeed constitute the defining limit as such of a thing or things negated; but such an objective reference is wholly irrelevant for the knowledge of any negation. What is essential in the knowledge of the negation is the content, which, indeed, involves the character associated with the things negated, and so the defining reference involved in the knowledge of negation has reference only to such characters as are psychologically patent in experience and do not imply that they are objectively the defining characters of the things negated. Thus, since on such a view the knowledge of negation does not involve as a constituent the things negated, there is no such contradiction as is urged by the Sarikarites. As to this Madhusudana says that such a reply does not provide any escape from the strictures already made by him; for the opponents seem to think that it is sufficient if the defining reference involved in a negation is regarded as a defining character of the knowledge of negation and does not involve the supposition that at the same time it is also the defining character of the objects negated, and they hold that in a knowledge of negation the particular entity that is negated does not appear in its specific character, but only generically, and, if this were so, then, even when an object is present in a spot as a particular, there may be an experience of negation of it in a general manner, since according to the opponents' supposition particular negations always appear

1 pratiyogitdvacchedaka-prakdraka-jnd.nabha.vena prdg-abhdva-pratttir asid-dhaiva. Ibid. p. 552.

only generically. Thus, when one says "I have no knowledge," if knowledge here has only a generic reference, the proposition is absurd, since the knowledge of not having knowledge is itself a knowledge, and in the proposition the negation of knowledge, having a general reference, contradicts the very supposition of not having knowledge.

It may be urged that, if the above criticisms against the knowledge of negation be valid, then the same would apply to negation-precedent also. To this Madhusudana's reply is that there is no necessity to admit "negation-precedent"; for the real meaning of the so-called negation-precedent is future production, which, again, means nothing more than that time-entity which is not qualified by any object or its destruction—such object being that which is supposed to be the defining reference of the so-called negation-precedent. This is also the meaning of futurity 1 . It must be noted in this connection that production must be defined as a specific relation which stands by itself; for it cannot be defined in terms of negation-precedent, since the negation-precedent can be defined only in terms of production, and thus, if negation-precedent is made a constituent of the definition of production, this entails a vicious circle. So, even if negation-precedent be admitted, it would be difficult to show how it could be intuited; and, on the other hand, one loses nothing by not admitting negation-precedent as a separate category. The negation involved in a negation-precedent is equivalent, so far as merely the negation is concerned, to the absence of the negated object at a particular point of time, which, again, has for its content a specific negation limited by a particular time, where the specific object appears only in a generic relation. An analysis of this shows that in negation-precedent (prag-abhava) there is negation of a specific object as limited by the present, yet that specific object does not appear in its character as specific and particular, but only in a generic manner 2 . The dilemma here is that negation of a specific object (visesabhdva) cannot have for the content of its defining reference merely the generic character of the thing negated, without involving any of its particularities; and, if

1 bhavisyatvam ca pratiyogi-tad-dhvamsdnddhdra-kdla-sambandtiitvam. Ad-vaita-siddhi, p. 552.

2 iheddnlm ghato ndstiti pratltis tu sdmdnya-dharmdvacchinna-pratiyogitdka-tat-kdldvacchinna-ydvad-visesdbhdva-visayd. Ibid. p. 553.

this is so, then there cannot be any negation-precedent involving this condition. Again, if the possibility of such a contingency be admitted, then general negation (sdmdnyabhdvd) is impossible; for no negation limited by any kind of particularity either of time or of object would be entitled to be called a general negation. Thus both the negation-precedent and the general negation appear to be interdependent in their conception, and so thwart each other that neither of them can be admitted. The main contention of Madhusudana in all these cases is that no specific object can as defining reference in any negation appear only in a generic nature devoid of relation to particularity. Thus, when one says "I do not know," the experience involved in such a proposition is not that of the negation of a particular object appearing only in a generic aspect. If this contention is admitted, then the experience involved in "I do not know" cannot be interpreted as being one of general negation.

Again, it is a matter of common experience that the mere locus of the negation can itself furnish the awareness of negation; thus the bare spot is also the negation of the jug on it. Looked at from this point of view, even positive entities may yield a comprehension of negation. It is wrong to suggest that the nature of the defining reference defines the nature of the negation; for, if this were so, then it would have been impossible that the different negations, such as negation-precedent, destruction, etc., should be classed as different, since they all have the same defining reference. According to the view of Madhusudana the differences of negation are due to illusory impositions no less than are differences in positive entities.

Even if it is held that there is only one negation, which under different conditions appears as diverse, the Sankarites will have nothing to object to; for according to them both negation and position are but illusory impositions. But Madhusudana points out that, since the experience "I am ignorant" does not (even under the trenchant analysis undergone above) disclose as its origin any negation, it must be admitted that it is due to the experience of the positive entity of ajnana.

So Madhusudana further urges that the apperception in the waking state of the experience of the dreamless sleep, viz., "I did not know anything so long," refers to a positive ajnana. Now, if this apperception be an inference, the opponent points out that it

274 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

may be an inference of negation of knowledge and not of positive ignorance. For one may well infer that, since he existed and during the interval between the two waking stages had a state of mind, that state must have been a state of absence of knowledge. The apperception cannot be said to be mere memory; for memory can only be through root-impressions. The intuition of the sdksi-conscious-ness being eternal, no root-impression can be produced by such knowledge; for the mechanism of root-impressions is only a psychological device for producing memory by such cognitions as are transitory. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the apperception under discussion cannot be called an inference; for the inference is based on the ground that the sleeper had a mental state during the dreamless condition. But, if he had no knowledge at the time, it is impossible for him to say that he was at that time endowed with any specific mental state. It also cannot be said that negation of knowledge during dreamless sleep can be inferred from the fact that at that time there was no cause for the production of knowledge; for the absence of such cause can be known only from the absence of knowledge (and vice versa), and this involves a vicious circle. Nor can it be said that absence of cause of knowledge can be inferred from the blissful condition of the senses, which could happen only as a consequence of the cessation of their operation; for there is no evidence that the cessation of the operation of the senses would produce the blissful condition. It must be noted in this connection that intuition of ajndna is always associated with absence of knowledge; so that in every case where there is an intuition of ajndna the inference of absence of knowledge would be valid. The so-called non-perception is really an inference from positive ajndna; thus, when one has perceived in the morning an empty yard, he can infer from the absence of the knowledge of an elephant in it the fact of his positive ignorance of an elephant there. Thus the apperception of absence of knowledge can be explained as inference. It can also be explained as a case of memory. The objection that the intuition of ajndna cannot have any root-impression is also invalid; for the ajndna which is the object of the sakrc-consciousness during dreamless sleep is itself a reflection through a vrtti of ajndna, since it is only under such conditions that ajndna can be an object of safoz-consciousness. Since a vrtti is admitted in the intuition of ajndna, with the cessation of the vrtti

there must be a root-impression and through that there can be memory of the vrtti, as in the case of the memory of any other cognition 1 . It cannot be contended that, if ajndna requires for its cognition a vrtti state, then, if there is no such vrtti, there may be doubt regarding ajndna', for there cannot be any ajndna regarding ajndna, and doubt itself, being a modification of ajndna, has the same scope as ajndna. It cannot be urged that, like ajndna, negation may also be perceived by the safoz-consciousness; for, since negation is always associated with its defining reference, it cannot be intuitively perceived by the indeterminate intuitive sdksi-conscious-ness. Though ajndna involves an opposition to knowledge, yet the opposition is not as such intuited in the dreamless state. Madhu-sudana says that it is contended that, since there is a continuous succession of ajndna states, from the dreamless condition to the waking stage (for in the waking state also all cognitions take place by reflection through ajndna states), there is no occasion for a memory of the dreamless intuition of ajndna; for through sam-skdras memory is possible on the destruction of a vrtti state of cognition. To this the reply is that the ajndna state of dreamless condition is of a specific nature of darkness (tamasi) which ceases with sleep, and hence there is no continuity of succession between this and the ordinary cognitive states in the waking condition. From one point of view, however, the contention is right; for it may well be maintained that in the dreamless state ajndna exists in its causal aspect, and thus, since the ajndna is the material for experience of both dreamless sleep and waking state, there is in reality continuity of succession of ajndna, and thus there cannot be any memory of dreamless experience of ajndna. It is for this reason that Suresvara has discarded this view. The view taken by the author of the Vivarana follows the conception of sleep in the Yoga-sutras, where a separate vrtti in the dreamless state is admitted. Thus the experience of the dreamless state may well be described as relating to experience of positive ajndna.

1 ajfidnasydjnana-vrtti-prativimbita-sdksi-bhasyatvena vrtti-ndsdd eva satnskd-ropapatteh. Advaita-siddhi, p. 557.

276 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

Inference of ajfiana.

It is held by Prakasananda in his Vivarana that ajndna can be inferred; the form of the inference that he suggests is: "A valid cognition is associated with a positive veil upon its object, which veil is removable by the cognition itself, and such a veil is different from the negation-precedent of its self. " l Vyasa-tirtha, in refuting this inference, starts by criticizing the concept of the minor term (paksa, i.e., pramdna-jndna). He says that according to the above form of inference consciousness of pleasure, which is a valid cognition, should also appear after removing the veil on itself, but the pleasure-consciousness, being of the nature of sdkst-conscious-ness, is unable (according to the theory of the Sankarites themselves) to remove ajndna. If the concept of the minor term is narrowed to vrtti-jndna, or cognitive states in general, then also it is not possible; for, if a mediate cognitive state be supposed to remove the veil upon its object, that would mean that there is a direct revelation of intuitive consciousness through the object, which would be the same as saying that mediate cognition is perception. If the concept of the minor be narrowed down to immediate perception, then the above definition would not apply to mediate cognition, which is a valid cognition. Even in the case of the immediate cognition of error there is an element of the intuition of "being" to which also the above definition would apply; for certainly that does not manifest itself after removing a veil of non-being, since the intuition of being is universal. Moreover, if that could remove the ajndna, then ajndna would have no being and so could not be the material cause of illusion. The ajndna which has "being" for its support is regarded as the material cause of illusion, but is never the object of illusion itself. If the concept of the minor is further narrowed, so as to mean merely the cognitive states, excluding the underlying "being," then in the case of successive awareness of the same entity the awareness at the second and third moments cannot be supposed to remove the veil itself, since that was removed by the first awareness. If the concept of the

1 vivdda-gocardpannam pramdna-jndnam sva-prng-abhdva-vyatirikta-sva-visaydvarana-sva-nivartya-sva-desa-^ata-vastv-antara-purvakam bhavitum arhati aprakdsitdrtha-prakdsakatvdd andhakdre prathamotpanna-pradlpa-prabhdvad iti. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 13.

minor term is further narrowed, so as to mean merely the direct cognition of the material object, then also, since the Sankarites do not admit that there are veils on the object, the object-cognition cannot be regarded as having removed such a veil. If in answer to this it is held that the mental state, e.g., the cognition of jug, involves a limitation of the pure consciousness by the jug-form and, since the ajndna has the same scope as the above limitation, the removal of the veil on the jug-form limitation means also the removal of the veil of ajndna to that extent, the reply is, first, that on the view that there is only one ajndna the above explanation does not hold; secondly, since the pure consciousness, limited in any form, is not self-luminous, it cannot, according to the Sankarites, be associated with a veil, which can only be associated with the pure self-luminous consciousness. Moreover, if the removal of the veil is spoken of as having reference only to material objects, then, since the verbal proposition "this is a jug" has the same content as the jug itself, the removal of the veil with reference to the material object—the jug—which has the same content as the mediate verbal proposition, ought not to take place.

Again, since on the Sankarite view the z>rttz-knowledge is itself false, there cannot be any possibility that illusory objects should be imposed upon it. On the other hand, if the pure consciousness, as manifested by the vrtti, be synonymous with knowledge, then, since such a consciousness is the support of ajndna, it cannot be regarded as removing ajndna. Thus the requirement of the inference that knowledge establishes itself by removing ajndna fails; further, the requirement of the definition that the veil that is removed has the same location as the knowledge fails, since the ajndna is located in pure consciousness, whereas the cognition is always of the conditioned consciousness.

The inference supposes that there is a removal of the veil because there is a manifestation of the unmanifested; but this cannot hold good, since the Brahma-knowledge cannot be manifested by any thing other than pure consciousness, and the self-luminous, which is the basis of all illusions, is ever self-manifested, and thus there is np possibility here of the unmanifested being manifested. Moreover, if the ajndna be a positive entity existing from beginning-less time, then it would be impossible that it should be removed. It is also impossible that that which is a veil should be beginning-

less. So it is possible to have such counter-arguments as that beginninglessness can never be associated with veils, since it exists only as beginningless, like the negation-precedent; or that a valid knowledge can never remove anything else than negation, because it is knowledge. The manifestation of the unmanifested does not imply any positive fact of unmanifestation, but may signify only an absence of manifestation. Moreover, the light manifests the jug, etc., by removing darkness, because light is opposed to darkness, but the manifestation of knowledge cannot be opposed to ajndna; for pure consciousness underlying the objects is not opposed to ajndna. The opposition of vrtti to ajndna is irrelevant; for vrtti is not knowledge. What may be said concerning the rise of a new cognition is that it removes the beginningless negation of the knowledge ot an object of any particular person.

Madhusudana in reply says that the term "valid knowledge," which is the minor term, has to be so far restricted in meaning that it applies only to the vrtti-knowledge and not to the sdksi-consdous-ness which reveals pleasure or bliss; the vrtti-knowledge also has to be further narrowed down in its meaning so as to exclude the substantive part (dharmy-arnsa) of all cognitions, the "this" or the " being" which is qualified by all cognitive characters. Pramdna-jndna, or valid knowledge, which is inferred as removing a veil, means therefore only the cognitive characters revealed in the vrtti. Even in the case of paroksa (mediate knowledge) there is the removal of its veil, consisting in the fact of its non-existence to the knower; which veil being removed, the object of the mediate cognition is revealed to the knower. Thus the valid cognition includes the cognitive characters as appearing both in mediate and in immediate vrttis. The reason for the exclusion of the substantive part, or the "this," from the concept of valid knowledge under discussion is apparent from the fact that there is no error or illusion regarding the "this"; all errors or doubts can happen only with regard to the cognitive characters. The "this" is as self-existent as the experience of pleasure. There cannot, therefore, be any such objection as that in their case also there is a revelation of the unknown and therefore a removal of the veil. If, however, it is urged that, though there may not be any error or doubt regarding the "this," yet, since there remains the fact that it was first unknown, and then known, and therefore it involves the removal of a

veil, there would be objection on the part of the Sankarites to admitting such a removal, which may well be effected by the cognitive state or the pramdna-vrtti. In such a case, however, the removal of the veil is not of the ordinary nature; for this ajndna, which consists only in the fact that the entity is unknown, is different from the ajndna the extent and limit of which can be regarded as a positive ignorance having the same defining reference as the object of cognition. In this view, therefore, the ajndna is to be defined as that which has the capacity of producing errors, since there cannot be any error with regard to the substantive part, the "this." The fact that it remains unknown until cognized involves no ajndna according to our definition. Thus it may well be supposed that in the case of the cognition of the "this" there is, according to the definition contemplated in the scheme of the inference of ajndna under discussion, no removal of ajndna.

In the case of continuous perception, though the object may remain the same, yet a new time-element would be involved in each of the succeeding moments, and the removal of the veil may be regarded as having a reference to this new factor. It is well known that according to the Sankarites time can be perceived by all the pramdnas. Again, the objection that, since material objects can have no veil and since the ajndna cannot be said to hide pure consciousness which is its support, it is difficult to say which of these is veiled by ajndna, is not valid; for, though the pure consciousness exists in its self-shining character, yet for its limited appearance, as "it exists," "it shines," ajndna may be admitted to enforce a limitation or veiling and to that extent it may be regarded as a veil upon that pure consciousness. Madhusudana further adds arguments in favour of the view that ajndna can be inferred; these are of a formal nature and are, therefore, omitted here.

The theory of Avidya refuted.

Vyasa-tlrtha says that it cannot be assumed that an entity such as the avidyd must exist as a substratum of illusion, since otherwise illusions would be impossible; for it has been shown before that the definition of avidyd as the material cause of illusion is untenable. Moreover, if it is held that illusions such as the conch-shell-silver are made out of a stuff, then there must also be a producer who

280 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

works on the stuff to manufacture the illusions. Neither God nor the individual can be regarded as being such a producer; nor can the changeless Brahman be considered to be so. Again, avidyd, being beginningless, ought to be as changeless as Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman be regarded as the material cause of the world, there is no necessity for admitting the existence of avidyd; for under the Sarikarite supposition Brahman, though not changing, may nevertheless well be the basis of the illusions imposed upon it. If that were not so, then avidyd, which needs a support, would require for the purpose some entity other than Brahman. It may be suggested that the supposition of avidyd is necessary for the purpose of explaining the changing substratum of illusion; for Brahman, being absolutely true, cannot be regarded as the material cause of the false illusion, since an effect must have for its cause an entity similar to it. But, if that is so, then Brahman cannot be regarded as the cause of the sky or other physical elements which are unreal in comparison with Brahman. It cannot be urged that, since the individual and the Brahman are identical in essence, without the assumption of avidyd the limited manifestation of bliss in the individual would be inexplicable; for the very supposition that Brahman and the individual are identical is illegitimate, and so there is no difficulty in explaining the unlimited and limited manifestation of bliss, in Brahman and the individual, because they are different. Madhusudana in reply to the above says that antahkarana (or mind) cannot be regarded as the material cause of illusion; first, because the antahkarana is an entity in time, whereas illusions continue in a series and have no beginning in time; secondly, the antahkarana is in its processes always associated with real objects of the world, and would, as such, be inoperative in regard to fictitious conch-shell-silver—and, if this is so, then without the supposition of avidyd there would be no substratum as the material cause of avidyd. Brahman also, being unchangeable, cannot be the cause of such illusion. It cannot be suggested that Brahman is the cause of illusion in its status as basis or locus of illusion; for, unless the cause which transforms itself into the effect be admitted, the unchanging cause to which such effects are attributed itself cannot be established 1 , since it is only when certain transformations have

1 na ca vivartddhisthdnatvena sukty-dder ivopdddnatvam avidydm antarend-t&ttvikdnyathd-bhdva-laksanasya vivartasysambhavdt. Advaita-siddhi, p. 573.

been effected that they are referred to a certain ground or basis as belonging to it.

Again, if ajndna be itself invalid, as the Sankarites say, it is impossible that it should be amenable to the different valid means of proof. If it is contended that ajndna has only an empirical existence (vydvahdrika), then it could not be the stuff of the ordinary illusory experience; for the stuff of the empirical cannot be the cause of the illusory, and there is no evidence that the avidyd is illusory. If it is contended that the valid means of proof serve only for negating the non-existence of avidyd, then the reply is that, since the ajndna is grasped by the faultless sdksi-conscious-ness, it must be admitted to be valid. It is wrong also to suppose that the means of proof negate only the non-existence of ajndna; for, unless the nature of ajndna could be known by inference, the negation of its non-existence could also not be known. It must also be noted that, when the valid means of proof reveal the ajndna, they do so as if it were not an illusory conch-shell-silver known by the sa&w-consciousness, but a valid object of knowledge, and they also do not reveal the non-existence of ajndna in the locus of its appearance. Thus the valid means of proof by which ajndna is supposed to be made known indicate its existence as a valid object of knowledge. The avidyd, therefore, may be regarded as non-eternal (being removable by knowledge), but not false or invalid. The statement of the Sankarites, therefore, that avidyd is invalid by itself and yet is known by valid means of proof, is invalid.

If avidyd is apprehended by the pure faultless consciousness, it should be ultimately true, and it ought to persist after emancipation. It cannot be said that it may not persist after emancipation, since, its esse being its percipi, so long as its perception exists (as it must, being apprehended by the eternal pure consciousness) it also must exist. If it is held that avidyd is known through a vrtti, then the obvious difficulty is that the two conditions which can generate a vrtti are that of valid cognitive state (pramdna) or defects (dosa), and in the case of the apprehension of avidyd neither of these can be said to induce the suitable vrtti. There being thus no possibility of a vrtti, there would be no apprehension of avidyd through the reflection of consciousness through it. Again, the vrtti, being itself an avidyd state, would itself require for its comprehension the help of pure consciousness reflected through another vrtti, and that

another, and so on; and, if it is urged that the comprehension of the vrtti does not stand in need of reflection through another vrtti, but is directly revealed by ^^-consciousness, then such a vrtti would be experienced even after emancipation. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive how an entity like avidyd, whose esse is percipi, can be regarded as capable of conditioning a vrtti by the reflection of the consciousness through which it can be known. For there is no esse of the thing before it is perceived, and according to the supposition it cannot be perceived unless it has a previous esse.

The reply of Madhusudana is that the above objections are invalid, since the ajndna, being perceived by the sdksi-conscious-ness, which is always associated with the perceiver, has no such ontological appearance or revelation. In reply to some of the other criticisms Madhusudana points out that, avidyd being a defect and being itself a condition of its own vrtti, the objections on these grounds lose much of their force.

Vyasa-tlrtha says that the Sankarites think that, since everything else but the pure consciousness is an imaginary creation of avidyd, the avidyd can have for its support only Brahman and nothing else. He points out that it is impossible that ignorance, which is entirely opposed to knowledge, should have the latter as its support. It may well be remembered that ignorance is defined as that which is removable by knowledge. It cannot be said that the opposition is between the z>rttz-knowledge and ajndna; for, if that were so, then ajndna should be defined as that which is opposed to knowledge in a restricted sense, since vrtti-knowledge is knowledge only in a restricted sense (the real knowledge being the light of pure consciousness). If consciousness were not opposed to ignorance, there could not be any illumination of objects. The opposition of ignorance to knowledge is felt, even according to the Sankarites, in the experience " I do not know." It is also well known that there is no ignorance with regard to pleasure or pain, which are directly perceived by the sdksi. This is certainly due to the fact that pure consciousness annuls ajndna, so that whatever is directly revealed by it has no ajndna in it. It is contended that there are instances where one of the things that are entirely opposed to each other may have the other as its basis. Persons suffering from photophobia may ascribe darkness to sunshine, in which case darkness is seen to be based on sunshine; similarly, though knowledge and ignorance are

so much opposed, yet the latter may be supposed to be based on the former. To this the reply is that, following the analogy where a false darkness is ascribed to sunlight, one may be justified in thinking that a false ajndna different from the ajndna under discussion may be based on the pure consciousness. Moreover, the experience "I am ignorant" shows that the ignorance (avidya) is associated with the ego and not with pure consciousness. It cannot be suggested that, both the ego and the ignorance being at the same time illusorily imposed on the pure consciousness, they appear as associated with each other, which explains the experience "I am ignorant"; for without first proving that the ajndna exists in the pure consciousness the illusory experience cannot be explained, and without having the illusory experience first the association of ajndna with pure consciousness cannot be established, and thus there would be a vicious circle. It is also wrong to suppose that the experience "I am ignorant" is illusory. Moreover, the very experience "I am ignorant" contradicts the theory that ajndna is associated with pure consciousness, and there is no means by which this contradiction can be further contradicted and the theory that ajndna rests on pure consciousness be supported. The notions of an agent, knower, or enjoyer are always associated with cognitive states and therefore belong to pure consciousness. If these notions were imposed upon the pure consciousness, the ajndna would belong to it (which, being a false knower, is the same as the individual self or jiva), and, so would belong to jiva; this would be to surrender the old thesis that ajndna belongs to pure consciousness. It is also not right to say that the ajndna of the conch-shell belongs to the consciousness limited by it; it is always experienced that knowledge and ignorance both belong to the knower. If it is contended that what exists in the substratum may also show itself when that substratum is qualified in any particular manner, and that therefore the ajndna in the pure consciousness may also show itself in the self or jiva, which is a qualified appearance of pure consciousness, to this the reply is that, if this contention is admitted, then even the pure consciousness may be supposed to undergo through its association with ajndna the world-cycles of misery and rebirth. The supposition that the jiva is a reflection and the impurities are associated with it as a reflected image and not with the Brahman, the reflector, is wrong; for, if the ajndna is associated

284 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

with pure consciousness, it is improper to think that its effects should affect the reflected image and not Brahman. Moreover, the analogy of reflection can hold good only with reference to rays of light, and not with reference to consciousness. Again, if the jivas be regarded as a product of reflection, this will necessarily have a beginning in time. Moreover, the reflection can occur only when that through which anything is reflected has the same kind of existence as the former. A ray of light can be reflected in the surface of water and not in mirage, because water has the same status of existence as the ray of light; but, if Brahman and ajndna have not the same kind of existence, the former cannot be reflected in the latter. Moreover, ajndna, which has no transparency, cannot be supposed to reflect Brahman. Again, there is no reason to suppose that the ajndna should be predisposed to reflect the Brahman, and, if the ajndna is transformed into the form of dkdsa, etc., it cannot also at the same time behave as a reflector. Moreover, just as apart from the face and its image through reflection there is no other separate face, so there is also no separate pure consciousness, apart from Brahman and the jiva, which could be regarded as the basis of ajndna. Also it cannot be suggested that pure consciousness as limited by the jiva-form is the basis of the ajndna; for without the reflection through ajndna there cannot be any jiva, and without the jiva there cannot be any ajndna, since on the present supposition the ajndna has for its support the consciousness limited by jiva, and this involves a vicious circle. Again, on this view, since Brahman is not the basis of ajndna, though it is of the nature of pure consciousness, it may well be contended that pure consciousness as such is not the basis of ajndna, and that, just as the jiva, through association with ajndna, undergoes the cycles of birth, so Brahman also may, with equal reason, be associated with ajndna, and undergo the painful necessities of such an association.

The analogy of the mirror and the image is also inappropriate on many grounds. The impurities of the mirror are supposed to vitiate the image; but in the present case no impurities are directly known or perceived to exist in the ajndna, which stands for the mirror; even though they may be there, being of the nature of root-impressions, they are beyond the scope of the senses. Thus, the view that the conditions which are perceived in the mirror are also reflected in the image is invalid.

It cannot be held that, just as in the Nyaya view the soul is associated with pain only through the intermediacy of body, so the pure consciousness may be regarded as associated with ajndna in association with its limited form as jiva; for, since pure consciousness is itself associated with the mischievous element, the ajndna, the attainment of Brahmanhood cannot be regarded as a desirable state.

Madhusudana in reply says that pure consciousness, in itself not opposed to ajndna, can destroy ajndna only when reflected through modification of ajndna as vrtti, just as the rays of the sun, which illuminate little bits of paper or cotton, may burn them when reflected through a lens. It is wrong also to suppose that the ignorance has its basis in the ego; for the ego-notion, being itself a product of ajndna, cannot be its support. It must, therefore, have as its basis the underlying pure consciousness. The experience "I am ignorant" is, therefore, to be explained on the supposition that the notion of ego and ignorance both have their support in the pure consciousness and are illusorily made into a complex. The ego, being itself an object of knowledge and removable by ultimate true knowledge, must be admitted to be illusory. If ajndna were not ultimately based on pure consciousness, then it could not be removable by the ultimate and final knowledge which has the pure consciousness as its content. It is also wrong to suppose that the ajndna qualifies the phenomenal knower; for the real knower is the pure consciousness, and to it as such the ajndna belongs, and it is through it that all kinds of knowledge, illusory or relatively real, belong to it. The criticism that, there being ajndna, there is the phenomenal knower, and, there being the phenomenal knower, there is ajndna, is also wrong; for ajndna does not depend for its existence upon the phenomenal knower. Their mutual association is due not to the fact that avidyd has the knower as its support, but that ignorance and the ego-notion are expressed together in one structure of awareness, and this explains their awareness. The unity of the phenomenal knower and the pure consciousness subsists only in so far as the consciousness underlying the phenomenal knower is one with pure consciousness. It is well known that, though a face may stand before a mirror, the impurities of the mirror affect the reflected mirror and not the face. The reflected image, again, is nothing different from the face itself; so,

286 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

though the pure consciousness may be reflected through impure ajndna, impurities affect not the pure consciousness, but the jiva, which, again, is identical in its essence with the consciousness. It must be noted in this connection that there are two ajndnas, one veiling the knower and the other the object, and it is quite possible that in some cases (e.g., in mediate knowledge) the veil of the object may remain undisturbed as also the veil of the subject.

It is wrong to suppose that reflection can only be of visible objects; for invisible objects also may have reflection, as in the case of dkdsa, which, though invisible, has its blueness reflected in it from other sources. Moreover, that Brahman is reflected through ajndna is to be accepted on the testimony of scripture. It is also wrong to contend that that which is reflected and that in which the reflection takes place have the same kind of existence; for a red image from a red flower, though itself illusory and having therefore a different status of existence from the reflecting surface of the mirror, may nevertheless be further reflected in other things. Moreover, it is wrong to suppose that ajndna cannot be predisposed to reflect pure consciousness; for ajndna, on the view that it is infinite, may be supposed to be able to reflect pure consciousness in its entirety; on the view that it is more finite than pure consciousness there is no objection that a thing of smaller dimensions could not reflect an entity of larger dimensions; the sun may be reflected in water on a plate. Moreover, it is not a valid objection that, if ajndna has transformation into particular forms, it is exhausted, and therefore cannot reflect pure consciousness; for that fraction of ajndna which takes part in transformation does not take part in reflection, which is due to a different part of ajndna. Again, the criticism that, in contradistinction to the case of reflection of a neutral face appearing as many images, there is no neutral consciousness, apart from the jlva and Brahman, is ineffective; for the neutral face is so called only because the differences are not taken into account, so that the pure consciousness also may be said to be neutral when looked at apart from the peculiarities of its special manifestation through reflection.

It must be noted that the function of reflection consists in largely attributing the conditions (such as impurities, etc.) of the reflector to the images. This is what is meant by the phrase

upddheh pratibimba-paksapdtitvam (i.e., the conditions show themselves in the images). It is for this reason that the impurities of ajndna may show themselves in the reflected jivas without affecting the nature of pure consciousness.

Also it cannot be said that mdyd is associated with Brahman; for, if this mdyd be ajndna, then the possibility of its association with Brahman has already been refuted. Maya, being ajndna, also cannot be regarded as a magical power whereby it is possible to show things which are non-existent (aindrajdlikasyeva avidya-mdna-pradarsana-saktih); for, since ajndna in general has been refuted, a specific appearance of it, as magic, cannot be admitted; also it is never seen that a magician demonstrates his magical feats through ajndna. If mdyd be regarded as a special power of Brahman by which He creates the diverse real objects of the world, then we have no objection to such a view and are quite prepared to accept it. If it is held that mdyd is a power of deluding other beings, then, since before its application there are no beings, the existence of mdyd is unjustifiable. Again, if such a power should be regarded as having a real existence, then it would break monism. If it be regarded as due to the false imagination of the jivas, then it cannot be regarded as deluding these. If it be regarded as due to the false imagination of Brahman, then it must be admitted that Brahman has ajndna, since without ajndna there cannot be any false imagination.

The view of Vacaspati that avidyd resides in the jlva is also wrong—for, if jiva means pure consciousness, then the old objection holds good; if jlva means pure consciousness as limited by reflection from ajndna or the ajndna-product, the buddhi, then this involves a vicious circle; for without first explaining avidyd it is not possible to talk about its limitation. If it is said that avidyd, standing by itself without any basis, produces the jivas through its reference to pure consciousness, and then, when the jiva is produced, resides in it, then it will be wrong to suppose that avidyd resides in the jiva; even the production of the jiva will be inexplicable, and the old objection of the vicious circle will still be the same. Nor can it be held that, the jiva and the avidyd being related to each other in a beginningless relation, the criticism of the vicious circle through mutual dependence is unavailing is not correct; for, if they do not depend on each other, they also cannot

determine each other. If the ajndna and the jiva are not found to be related to each other in any of their operations, they also cannot depend upon each other; that which is entirely unrelated to any entity cannot be said to depend on it. It is held that the difference between jiva and Brahman consists in the fact of the former being a product of avidyd, and it is also held that the avidyd has the jiva as its basis, so that without the knowledge of jiva there cannot be avidyd, and without the knowledge of avidyd there cannot be any jiva.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the so-called vicious circle of mutual dependence is quite inapplicable to the case under discussion, since such mutual dependence does not vitiate the production, because such production is in a beginningless series. There is not also a mutual agency of making each other comprehensible; for, though the ajndna is made comprehensible by pure consciousness, yet the latter is not manifested by the former. There is, further, no mutual dependence in existence; for, though the ajndna depends upon pure consciousness for its existence, yet the latter does not depend upon the former. Madhusudana further points out that according to Vacaspati it is the ajndna of the jiva that creates both the isvara and the jiva.

The ajndna is supposed to veil the pure consciousness; but the pure consciousness is again supposed to be always self-luminous, and, if this is so, how can it be veiled? The veil cannot be of the jiva, since the jiva is a product of ajndna; it cannot be of the material objects, since they are themselves non-luminous, so that no veil is necessary to hide them. The veiling of the pure consciousness cannot be regarded as annihilation of the luminosity of the self-luminous (siddha-prakdsa-lopah); nor can it be regarded as obstruction to the production of what after it had come into existence would have proved itself to be self-luminous; for that whose essence is self-luminous can never cease at any time to be so. Moreover, since the self-luminosity is ever-existent, there cannot be any question regarding production of it which the ajndna may be supposed to veil. Again, since it is the nature of knowledge to express itself as related to objects, it cannot stand in need of anything else in order to establish its relationing to the objects, and there cannot be any time when the knowledge will exist without relationing itself to the objects. Moreover, on the Sankarite view

the pure consciousness, being homogeneous in its self-luminosity, does not stand in need of any relationing to objects which could be obstructed by the veil. Nor can it be said that the veil acts as an obstruction to the character of objects as known {prakatya-pratibandha) ; even according to the Sankarites the prdkatya, or the character of objects as known, is nothing but pure consciousness. It cannot be said that such awareness as "this exists," "it does not shine" cannot be said to appertain to pure consciousness; for even in denying the existence of consciousness we have the manifestation of consciousness. Even erroneous conceptions of the above forms cannot be said to be the veil of ajndna; for error arises only as a result of the veiling of the locus (e.g., it is only when the nature of the conch-shell is hidden that there can appear an illusory notion of silver) and cannot therefore be identified with the veil itself. Citsukha defines self-luminosity as that which, not being an object of awareness, has a fitness for being regarded as immediate (avedyatve sati aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogyatvam). The view that the self-luminosity is the fitness for not being immediate or self-shining as an explanation of the veil of ajndna that exists in it, is wrong, for that is self-contradictory, since by definition it has fitness for being regarded as immediate.

Again, a veil is that which obstructs the manifestation of that which is covered by it; but, if a self-luminous principle can manifest itself through ajndna, it is improper to call this a veil.

Again, if a veil covers any light, that veil does not obstruct the illumination itself, but prevents the light from reaching objects beyond the veil. Thus a light inside a jug illuminates the inside of the jug, and the cover of the jug only prevents the light from illuminating objects outside the jug. In the case of the supposed obstruction of the illumination of the pure consciousness the same question may arise, and it may well be asked "To whom does the veil obstruct the illumination of the pure consciousness?" It cannot be with reference to diverse jivas \ for the diversity of jivas is supposed to be a product of the action of the veil, and they are not already existent, so that it may be said that the pure consciousness becomes obstructed from the jivas by the action of the veil. It is also wrong to suppose that the illumination of the Brahman so far differs from that of ordinary light that it does not manifest itself to itself; for, if that were so, it might equally remain unmanifested

D IV 19

290 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

even during emancipation and there would be no meaning in introducing ajnana as the fact of veiling. It is held that even while the safo*-consciousness is manifesting itself the ajnana may still be there, since the safoz-consciousness manifests the ajnana itself. It is further held that in such experiences as "I do not know what you said" the ajnana, though it may not veil anything, may yet be manifested in pure consciousness, as may be directly intuited by experience. To this the reply is that the conception of the ajnana aims at explaining the non-manifestation of the unlimited bliss of Brahman, and, if that is so, how can it be admitted that ajnana may appear without any veiling operation in the manifested consciousness? Though in the case of such an experience as " I do not know what you said" the ajnana may be an object of knowledge, in the case of manifestation of pleasure and pain there cannot be any experience of the absence of manifestation of these, and so no ajnana can appear in consciousness with reference to these. Moreover, even when one says "I do not know what you say" there is no appearance of ajnana in consciousness; the statement merely indicates that the content of the speaker's words is known only in a general way, excluding its specific details. So far, therefore, there is thus a manifestation of the general outline of the content of the speaker's words, which might lead, in future, to an understanding of the specific details. Anyway, the above experience does not mean the direct experience of ajnana. Just as God, though not subject like ourselves to illusions, is yet aware that we commit errors, or just as we, though we do not know all things that are known by God, yet know of the omniscience of God, so without knowing the specific particularities of ajnana we may know ajnana in a general manner. If the above view is not accepted, and if it is held that there is a specific cognitive form of ajnana, then this cognitive form would not be opposed to ajnana, and this would virtually amount to saying that even the cessation of ajnana is not opposed to jndna, which is absurd. Moreover, if ajnana were an object of knowledge, then the awareness of it would be possible only by the removal of another ajnana veil covering it.

Again, if it is said that ajnana exists wheresoever there is a negation of the vrtti-jndna, which alone is contradictory to it, then it should exist also in emancipation. But, again, when one says " I do not know," the opposition felt is not with reference to vrtti-

knowledge specifically, but with reference to knowledge in general. Moreover, if caitanya (pure consciousness) and ajndna were not opposed to each other, it would be wrong to designate the one as the negation of the other, i.e., as knowledge (jndna) and ignorance (ajndna). Moreover, if cognitions are only possible and ignorances can only be removed through the manifestation of the self-shining pure consciousness, it stands to reason that it is the pure consciousness that should be opposed to ajndna. It is also unreasonable to suppose that the self could have ajndna associated with it and yet be self-luminous. There ought to be no specific point of difference between the vrtti and the $afo/-consciousness in their relation to ajndna; for they may both be regarded as opposed to ajndna. If the $a£«-consciousness were not opposed to ajndna, then it could not remove ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is no reason to suppose that no ajndna can be associated with whatever is manifested by ^/^-consciousness. It is indeed true that there is no ajndna in the knower, and the knower does not stand in need of the removal of any ignorance regarding itself. The self is like a lamp ever self-luminous; no darkness can be associated with it. It is for this reason that, though ordinary objects stand in need of light for their illumination, the self, the knower, does not stand in need of any illumination. It is also wrong to suppose that the pure consciousness is opposed to ajndna only when it is reflected through a vrtti state, and that in the case of the experience of pleasure the $afo£-consciousness is reflected through a vrtti of the pleasure-form; for, if this is admitted, then it must also be admitted that the pleasure had a material existence before it was felt, and thus, as in the case of other objects, there may be doubts about pleasure and pain also; and so the accepted view that the perception of pleasure is also its existence must be sacrificed. Thus it has to be admitted that pure consciousness is opposed to ignorance regarding pleasure, pain, etc. There is, therefore, as regards opposition to knowledge no difference between pure consciousness and pure consciousness manifested through a vrtti. Nor can it be said that pleasure, pain, etc., are perceived by the pure consciousness as reflected through the vrtti of the antahkarana; for the vrtti of the antahkarana can arise only through sense-functioning, and in the intuition of internal pleasure there cannot be any such sense-function. Nor can it be a reflection through the vrtti of avidyd; for that is possible

only in the presence of a defect or defects. If, like things immersed in darkness, like absence of knowledge, ajndna be utter unmani-festation, then it cannot be manifested by the ^^'-consciousness. Again, if it is held that vrtti is opposed to ajncina, then, since there exists the ego-vrtti forming the jlva and the object-formed vrtti representing the knowledge of the material objects, it might well be expected that these vrttis would oppose the existence of ajndna and that there would be immediate emancipation.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that the ajndna is called a veil in the sense that it has a fitness (yogyatd) by virtue of which it is capable of making things appear as non-existent or unmanifested, though it may not always exert its capacity, with the result that in dreamless sleep the operation of the veil exists, while in emancipation it is suspended. Generally speaking, the veil continues until the attainment of Brahma-knowledge. It may be objected that the concept of a veil, being different from that of pure consciousness, is itself a product of false imagination (kalpita), and therefore involves a vicious circle; to this the reply would be that avidyd is beginning-less, and hence, even if a false imagination at any particular stage be the result of a preceding stage and that of a still further preceding stage, there cannot be any difficulty. Moreover, the manifestation of the dvarana does not depend on the completion of the infinite series, but is directly produced by pure consciousness. It must be remembered that, though the pure consciousness in its fulness is without any veil (as during emancipation), yet on other occasions it may through the operation of the veil have a limited manifestation. Against the objection of Vyasa-tirtha that pure consciousness, being homogeneous, is incapable of having any association with a veil, Madhusudana ends by reiterating the assertion that veiling is possible—for which, however, no new reason is given. To the objection that ihe veil, like the jug, cannot avert the illumination of the lamp inside, and can obstruct only with reference to the things outside the jug, but that in the case of the obstruction of pure consciousness no such external entity is perceivable, Madhusudana's reply is that the obstruction of the pure consciousness is with reference to the jlva. The veiling and the jlva being both related to each other in a beginningless series, the question regarding their priority is illegitimate. Madhusudana points out that, just as in the experience "I do not know what you say" the

ignorance is associated with knowledge, so also, in the manifestation of pleasure, pleasure is manifested in a limited aspect with reference to a particular object, and such limitation may be considered to be due to the association with ajndna which restricted its manifestation. Madhusudana contends that in such experiences as " I do not know what you say" the explanation that there is a general knowledge of the intention of the speaker, but that the specific knowledge of the details has not yet developed, is wrong; for the experience of ajndna may here be regarded from one point of view as having reference to particular details. If the specific details are not known, there cannot be any ignorance with reference to them. But, just as, even when there is the knowledge of a thing in a general manner, there may be doubt regarding its specific nature, so there may be knowledge in a general manner and ignorance regarding the details. It may also be said that ignorance is directly known in a general manner without reference to its specific details. Vyasa-tirtha had contended that the knowledge of ignorance could only be when the particulars could not be known; thus God has no illusion, but has a knowledge of illusion in general. Against this Madhusudana contends that in all the examples that could be cited by the opponents ignorance in a general manner can subsist along with a knowledge of the constituent particulars. Again, it is argued that, since ajndna is an object of knowledge, it would be necessary that the veil of ajndna should be removed; this is self-contradictory. To this Madhusudana's reply is that, just as in the case of the knowledge of specific space-relations the presence of an object is necessary, but yet but for the knowledge of its negation presence of the object would be impossible, so also in the case of the knowledge of ajndna the removal of a further veil is unnecessary, as this would be self-contradictory.

It may be urged that ajndna is known only when the object with reference to which the ignorance exists is not known; later on, when such an object is known, the knower remembers that he had ignorance regarding the object; and the difference between such an ajndna and negation of jfidna (jndndbhdva) lies in the fact that negation cannot be known without involving a relationing to its defining reference, whereas ajndna does not stand in need of any such defining reference. To this supposed explanation of ajndna by Vyasa-tirtha Madhusudana's reply is that the Sarikarites virtually

294 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

admit the difference between ajnana and abhdva, against which they have been contending so long. Moreover, when one says " I do not know what you say," the ajnana with reference to the speech of the speaker is directly known at the present time, and this would be inexplicable if the cognition of ajnana did not involve a cognition of the defining reference. So, since ajnana is cognized along with its object, there is no discrepancy in the object being manifested in its aspect as under the grasp of ajnana as intuited by the saksi-consciousness. Madhusudana urges that the pure consciousness can remove ajnana only by being reflected through the pramana-vrtti and not through its character as self-luminous or through the fact of its being of a class naturally opposed to ajnana 1 . The difference between the vrtti and the saksi-consciousness in relation to ajnana consists in the fact that the former is opposed to ajnana, while the latter has no touch of ajnana. The latter, i.e., the saksi-consciousness, directly manifests pleasures, pains, etc., not by removing any ajnana that was veiling them, but spontaneously, because the veil of ajnana was not operating on the objects that were being directly manifested by it 2 .

Ajnana and Ego-hood (ahamkara).

The Sarikarites hold that, though during dreamless sleep the self-luminous self is present, yet, there being at the time no non-luminous ego, the memory in the waking stage does not refer the experience of the dreamless state to the ego as the self; and the scriptural texts also often speak against the identification of the self with the ego. In the dreamless stage the ego is not manifested; for, had it been manifested, it would have been so remembered.

To this Vyasa-tirtha's reply is that it cannot be asserted that in dreamless sleep the self is manifested, whereas the ego is not; for the opponents have not been able to prove that the ego is something different from the self-luminous self. It is also wrong to say that the later memory of sleeping does not refer to the ego; for all memory refers to the self as the ego, and nothing else. Even when

1 pramdna-vrtty-updrudha-prakdiatvena nivarlakalvarn brumah, na tu jdti-visesenn, prakaiatva-matrena vd. Advaita-nddhi, p. 590.

2 sdksini yad ajnana-virodhitvam anubhuyate tan ndjndna-nivartakatva-nibandlianam, kintu sva-visayecchddau ydvatsattvam prakdsad ajndndprasakti-nibandhanam. Ibid. p. 590.

one says " I slept," he uses the " I," the ego with which his self is associated. The Vivarana also says that recognition is attributed to the self as associated with the antahkarana. If the ego were not experienced as the experiencer of the dreamless state, then one might equally well have entertained doubts regarding it. It is wrong also to suppose that the entity found in all perceivers is the self, and not the ego; for, howsoever it may be conceived, it is the ego that is the object of all such reference, and even the Vivarana says that the self, being one in all its experiences in separate individuals, is distinct only through its association with the ego. It cannot be said that reference to the ego is not to the ego-part, but to the self-luminous entity underlying it; for, if this be admitted, then even ignorance would have to be associated with that entity. The ajndna also appears in experiences as associated with the ego, and the ego appears not as the sleeper, but as the experiencer of the waking state, and it recognizes itself as the sleeper. Nor can it be denied that in the waking state one remembers that the ego during the sleep has experienced pleasure; so it must be admitted that in dreamless sleep it is the ego that experiences the sleep. The fact that one remembers his dream-experience as belonging to the same person who did some action before and who is now remembering shows that the action before the dream-experience and the present act of remembering belong to the same identical ego, the experiencer; even if the underlying experiencer be regarded as pure consciousness, yet so far as concerns the phenomenal experiencer and the person that remembers it is the ego to which all experience may be said to belong. Moreover, if the ego is supposed to be dissolved in the dreamless sleep, then even the bio-motor functions of the body, which are supposed to belong to the ego, would be impossible. Moreover, since our self-love and our emotion for self-preservation are always directed towards the self as the ego, it must be admitted that the experiences of the permanent self refer to the ego-substratum. It cannot be urged that this is possible by an illusory imposition of the ego on the pure self; for this would involve a vicious circle, since, unless the pure self is known as the supreme object of love, there cannot be any imposition upon it and, unless there is an imposition of the ego upon it, the self cannot be known as the supreme object of love. Moreover, there is no experience of a self-love which could be supposed to be directed to

296 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

pure consciousness and not to the phenomenal self. Similar criticisms may also be made in the case of the explanation of such experience as "I shall attain the ultimate bliss," as based on the imposition of the ego upon the pure self 1 . Moreover, if the notion of the ego has as a constituent the mind, then such experience as "my mind," where the mind and the ego appear as different, would be impossible, and the experience of mind and ego would be the same. Moreover, all illusions have two constituents—the basis and the appearance; but in the ego no such two parts are experienced. It is also wrong to suppose that in such experiences as " I appear to myself" {aham sphurami) the appearance in consciousness is the basis and "appear to myself" is the illusory appearance 2 . For, the appearance (sphurana) of the ego being different from the ego-substance (aham-artha), there is no appearance of identity between them such that the former may be regarded as the basis of the latter. The ego is, thus, directly perceived by intuitive experience as the self, and inference also points to the same; for, if the ego is enjoined to go through the ethical and other purificatory duties, and if it is the same that is spoken of as being liberated, it stands to reason that it is the ego substance that is- the self. Vyasa-tlrtha further adduces a number of scriptural texts in confirmation of this view.

To this Madhusudana's reply is that, if the ego-substance had been present in sleep, then its qualities, such as desire, wish, etc., would have been perceived. A substance which has qualities can be known only through such qualities: otherwise a jug with qualities would not require to be known through the latter. It is true, no doubt, that we affirm the existence of the jug in the interval between the destruction of its qualities of one order and the production of qualities of another order. But this does not go against the main thesis; for though a qualified thing requires to be known through its qualities, it does not follow that a qualityless thing should not be knowable. So it must be admitted that, since no qualities are apprehended during deep sleep, it is the qualityless self that is known in deep sleep; if it had not been perceived, there would have been no memory of it in the waking state. Moreover,

1 \ydydmrta, p. 283(a).

2 iha tu sphuranamdtram adhifthdnamiti sphurdmity eva dhlr iti cen na. Ibid. p. 38(a).

during dreamless sleep the self is perceived as supporting ignorance (as is testified by the experience "I did not know anything in deep sleep"), and hence it is different from the ego. The memory refers to pure consciousness as supporting ajndna, and not to the ego. It is true that the Vivarana holds that recognition (pratyabhijnd) can be possible only of pure consciousness as associated with the antahkarana; but, though this is so, it does not follow that the apprehension (abhijnd) of the pure consciousness should also be associated with the antahkarana. In the dreamless state, therefore, we have no recognition of pure consciousness, but an intuition of it. In the waking stage we have recognition not of the pure consciousness, but of the consciousness as associated with ajndna. The emphasis of the statement of the Vivarana is not on the fact that for recognition it is indispensable that the pure consciousness should be associated with the antahkarana, but on the fact that it should not be absolutely devoid of the association of any conditioning factor; and such a factor is found in its association with ajndna, whereby recognition is possible. The memory of the ego as the experiencer during dreams takes place through the intuition of the self during dreamless sleep and the imposition of the identity of the ego therewith. It is the memory of such an illusory imposition that is responsible for the apparent experience of the ego during dreamless sleep. It is wrong to suggest that there is a vicious circle; for it is only when the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self that there can be illusory identity and it is only when there is illusory identity that, as the ego does not appear during dreamless state, the belief that it is different is enforced. For it is only when the self is known to be different from the ego that there can be a negation of the possibility of the memory of the self as the ego. Vyasa-tlrtha says that, the ego-substratum (aham-artha) and the ego-sense (aham-kdra) being two different entities, the manifestation of the former does not involve as a necessary consequence the manifestation of the latter, and this explains how in the dreamless state, though the ego-substratum is manifested, yet the ego-sense is absent. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the ego-substratum and the ego-sense are co-existent and thus, wherever the ego-substratum is present, there ought also to be the ego-sense, and, if during the dreamless state the ego-substratum was manifested, then the ego-sense should also have

been manifested with it. He adds that the same objection cannot be made in regard to the manifestation of the self during the dreamless state; for the self is not associated with the ego-sense. Vyasa-tirtha has said that, just as the Sankarites explain the manifestation of ajndna in the dreamless state as having reference to objective entities only, and not to the pure safaz-consciousness (as it could not without contradiction be manifested and be at the same time the object of ajndna), so the manifestation of the ego-substratum is not contradicted by the association with ajndna, but may be regarded as having reference to extraneous objective entities. To this Madusudana's reply is that there is no contradiction in the appearance of ajndna in the sdksi-consciousness, as it may be in the case of its association with the ego-substratum, and so the explanation of Vyasa-tirtha is quite uncalled-for.

Madhusudana says that the ego-substratum may be inferred to be something different from the self, because, like the body, it is contemplated by our ego-perception or our perception as "I." If it is held that even the self is contemplated by the ego-perception, the reply is that the self, in the sense in which it is contemplated by the ego-perception, is really a non-self. In its essential nature the self underlying the ego-perception cannot be contemplated by the ego-perception. Again, the view of Vyasa-tirtha, that the fact of our feeling ourselves to be the supreme end of happiness shows that supreme happiness belongs to the ego-substratum, is criticized by the Sankarites to the effect that the supreme happiness, really belonging to the self, is illusorily through a mistaken identity imposed upon the ego-substratum. This criticism, again, is criticized by the Madhvas on the ground that such an explanation involves a vicious circle, because only when the supremely happy nature of the ego-substratum is known does the illusory notion of identity present itself; and that only when the illusory notion of identity is present is there awareness of that supremely happy nature. To this, again, the reply of Madhusudana is that the experiencing of the dreamless stage manifests the self as pure consciousness, while the ego-substratum is unmanifest; thus through the testimony of deep sleep the ego-substratum is known to be different from the self. The ego-substratum is by itself unmani-fested, and its manifestation is always through the illusory imposition of identity with the pure self. What Madhusudana wishes to

assert is that the supremely happy experience during deep sleep is a manifestation of the pure self and not of the ego-substratum; the ego is felt to be happy only through identification with the pure self, to which alone belongs the happiness in deep sleep.

The objection of Vyasa-tirtha is that in emancipation the self is not felt as the supreme end of happiness, because there is no duality there, but, if such an experience be the nature of the self, then with its destruction there will be destruction of the self in emancipation. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the experience of the self as the end of supreme happiness is only a conditional manifestation, and therefore the removal of this condition in emancipation cannot threaten the self with destruction.

It is urged by the Sankarites that the agency (kartrtva) belonging to the mind is illusorily imposed upon the self, whereby it illusorily appears as agent, though its real changeless nature is perceived in deep sleep. Vyasa-tirtha replies that there are two specific illustrations of illusion, viz., (i) where the red-colour of the japd-fiower is reflected on a crystal, whereby the white crystal appears as red, and (ii) where a rope appears as a dreadful snake. Now, following the analogy of the first case, one would expect that the mind would separately be known as an agent, just as the japd-flower is known to be red, and the pure consciousness also should appear as agent, just as the crystal appears as red. If the reply is that the illusion is not of the first type, since it is not the quality of the mind that is reflected, but the mind with its qualities is itself imposed, there it would be of the second type. But even then the snake itself appears as dreadful, following which analogy one would expect that the mind should appear independently as agent and the pure consciousness also should appear so.

Madhusudana in reply says that he accepts the second type of illusion, and admits that agency parallel to the agency of the mind appears in the pure consciousness and then these two numerically different entities are falsely identified through the identification of the mind with the pure consciousness. As a matter of fact, however, the illusion of the agency of the mind in the pure consciousness may be regarded as being of both the above two types. The latter type, as nirupddhika, in which that which is imposed (adhyasyamdna, e.g., the dreadful snake), being of the Vydvahdrika type of existence, has a greater reality than the illusory knowledge

300 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

(the rope-snake which has only a prdtibhdsika existence), as has been shown above. It may also be interpreted as being a sopadhika illusion of the first type, since both that which is imposed (the agency of the mind) and that which is the illusory appearance (the agency of the pure consciousness) have the same order of existence, viz., Vydvahdrika, which we know to be the condition of a sopadhika illusion as between japd-f\oxver and crystal.

Madhusudana points out that ego-hood (aham-kdra) is made up of two constituents, (i) the underlying pure consciousness, and (ii) the material part as the agent. The second part really belongs to the mind, and it is only through a false identification of it with the pure consciousness that the experience "I am the doer, the agent" is possible: so the experience of agency takes place only through such an illusion. So the objection that, if the agency interest in the mind is transferred to the ego-substratum, then the self cannot be regarded as being subject to bondage and liberation, is invalid; for the so-called ego-substratum is itself the result of the false identification of the mind and its associated agency with the pure consciousness. Vyasa-tlrtha had pointed out that in arguing with Samkhyists the Sankarites had repudiated (Brahma-sutra, II. 3. 33) the agency of the buddhi. To this Madhusudana's reply is that what the Sankarites asserted was that the consciousness was both the agent and the enjoyer of experiences, and not the latter alone, as the Samkhyists had declared; they had neither repudiated the agency of buddhi nor asserted the agency of pure consciousness.

Vyasa-tlrtha says that in such experience as "I am a Brahmin" the identification is of the Brahmin body with the "I" and this "I" according to the Sarikarites is different from the self; if that were so, it would be wrong to suppose that the above experience is due to a false identification of the body with the "self"; for the "I" is not admitted by the Sankarites to be the self. Again, if the identity of the body and the self be directly perceived, and if there is no valid inference to contradict it, it is difficult to assert that they are different. Moreover, the body and the senses are known to be different from one another and cannot both be regarded as identical with the self. Again, if all difference is illusion, the notion of identity, which is the opposite of "difference," will necessarily be true. Moreover, as a matter of fact, no such illusory identification of the body and the self ever takes place; for, not to speak of men,

even animals know that they are different from their bodies and that, though their bodies change from birth to birth, they themselves remain the same all through.

Madhusudana says in reply that the false identification of the body and the ego is possible because ego has for a constituent the pure consciousness, and thus the false identification with it means identification with consciousness. Moreover, it is wrong to say that, if perception reveals the identity between the body and self, then it is not possible through inference to establish their difference. For it is well known (e.g., in the case of the apparent size of the moon in perception) that the results of perception are often revised by well-established inference and authority. Again, the objection that, all difference being illusory, the opposite of difference, viz., false identification, must be true, is wrong; for in the discussion on the nature of falsehood it has been shown that both the positive and the negative may at the same time be illusory. Moreover, the false identification of the body with the self can be dispelled in our ordinary life by inference and the testimony of scriptural texts, whereas the illusion of all difference can be dispelled only by the last cognitive state preceding emancipation. Madhusudana holds that all explanation in regard to the connection of the body with the self is unavailing, and the only explanation that seems to be cogent is that the body is an illusory imposition upon the self.

Indefinability of World-appearance.

It is urged by Vyasa-tlrtha that it is difficult for the Sankarites to prove that the world-appearance is indefinable (anirvdcya), whatever may be the meaning of such a term. Thus, since it is called indefinable, that is in itself a sufficient description of its nature; nor can it be said that there is an absence of the knowledge or the object which might have led to a definition or description; for in their absence no reference to description would be at all possible. Nor can it be said that indefinability means that it is different from both being and non-being; for, being different from them, it could be the combination of them. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the indefinability consists in the fact that the world-appearance is neither being nor non-being nor being-and-non-being. Indefinability may also be said to consist in the fact that the world-

appearance is liable to contradiction in the context wherein it appears. It cannot be said that the above position does not carry us to a new point, since one existent entity may be known to be different from any other existent entity; for the negation here is not of any particular existence, but of existence as such. If it is possible to assert that there may be an entity which is neither existence nor non-existence, then that certainly would be a new proposition. Madhusudana further points out that "existence" and "nonexistence" are used in their accepted senses and, both of them being unreal, the negation of either of them does not involve the affirmation of the other, and therefore the law of excluded middle is not applicable. When it is said that the indefinability consists in the fact that a thing is neither being nor non-being, that means simply that, all that can be affirmed or denied being unreal, neither of them can be affirmed; for what is in itself indescribable cannot be affirmed in any concrete or particularized form 1 .

Vyasa-tlrtha contends that the inscrutable nature of existence and non-existence should not be a ground for calling them indefinable; for, if that were so, then even the cessation of avidyd, which is regarded as being neither existent nor non-existent nor existent-nonexistent nor indefinable, should also have been called indefinable. The reply of Madhusudana to this is that the cessation of avidyd is called unique, because it does not exist during emancipation; he further urges that there is no incongruity in supposing that an entity as well as its negation (provided they are both unreal) may be absent in any other entity—this is impossible only when the positive and the negative are both real. Madhusudana further says that being and non-being are not mutual negations, but exist in mutually negated areas. Being in this sense may be defined as the character of non-being contradicted, and non-being as incapability of appearing as being. It may be argued that in this sense the world-appearance cannot be regarded as different from both being and non-being. To this the reply is that by holding the view that being and non-being are not in their nature exclusive, in such a way that absence of being is called non-being and rice versa, but that the absence of one is marked by the presence of another, a possibility

1 na ca tarhi sad-ddi-vailaksanyoktih katham tat-tat-pratiyogi-durniriipatd-mdtre prakatandya, na hi svarupato durnirupasya kimcid api rupam vdstavam sambhavati. Advaita-siddhi, p. 621.

is kept open whereby both may be absent at one and the same time. Thus, if eternity and non-eternity be defined as being-associated-with-destruction and being-unassociated-with-destruction, then they may be both absent in generality, which has no being; and, again, if eternity be defined as absence of a limit in the future, and non-eternity be defined as liability to cessation on the part of entities other than being, then negation-precedent-to-production (prdg-abhava) may be defined as an entity in which there is neither entity nor non-entity; for a negation-precedent-to-destruction has a future and at the same time cannot be made to cease by any other thing than a positive entity, and so it has neither eternity nor non-eternity in the above senses. So the false silver, being unreal, cannot be liable to contradiction or be regarded as uncontradicted. The opponent, however, contends that the illustration is quite out of place, since generality (samanyd) has no destruction and is, therefore, non-eternal, and negation-precedent-to-production is non-eternal, because it is destroyed. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the Sarikarites do not attempt to prove their case simply by this illustration, but adduce the illustration simply as a supplement to other proofs in support of their thesis. The reason why the qualities of being and non-being may be found in the world-appearance without contradiction is that, being qualities of imaginary entities (being and non-being), they do not contradict each other 1 . If an entity is not regarded as non-eternal in a real sense, there is no contradiction in supposing it to be non-eternal only so long as that entity persists. Madhusudana puts forward the above arguments to the effect that there is no contradiction in affirming the negation of any real qualities on the ground that those qualities are imaginary 2 , against the criticism of Vyasa-tlrtha that, if the world-appearance is pronounced by any person for whatever reasons to be indefinable, then that itself is an affirmation, and hence there is a contradiction. To be indefinable both as being and as non-being means that both these are found to be contradicted in the entity under consideration. When it is said that the imaginary world-appearance ought not to be liable to being visible, invisible,

1 dkarmina eva kalpitatvena viruddhayor api dharmayor abhdvdt. Ibid. p. 622.

2 atdttvika-hetu-sad-bhdvena tdttvika-dharmdbhdvasya sddhanena vydghdtd-bhdvdt. Ibid. p. 623.

contradicted or uncontradicted, there is a misunderstanding; for it is certainly outside such affirmations in any real sense, but there is no incongruity in the affirmation of these qualities as imaginary appearances, since they are presented in those forms to all experience. The whole point is that, when qualities that are contradictory are in themselves imaginary, there is no incongruity in their mutual negation with reference to a particular entity; if the mutual negation is unreal, their mutual affirmation is equally unreal. Vyasa-tlrtha argues that indefinability of the world-appearance (anirvdcytva) cannot mean that it is not the locus of either being or non-being; for both non-being and Brahman, being qualityless, would satisfy the same conditions, and be entitled to be called indefinable. It cannot be said that Brahman may be regarded as the locus of imaginary being, for the reply is that the same may be the case with world-appearance. Again, since Brahman is quality-less, if being is denied of it, absence of being also cannot be denied; so, if both being and absence of being be denied of Brahman, Brahman itself becomes indefinable. The reply of Madhusudana is that the denial of both being and non-being in the world-appearance is indefinable or unspeakable only in the sense that such a denial applies to the world appearance only so long as it is there, whereas in the Brahman it is absolute. Whereas the main emphasis of the argument of Vyasa-tlrtha is on the fact that both being and non-being cannot be denied at the same time, Madhusudana contends that, since the denial of being and the affirmation of it are not of the same order (the latter being of the Vydvahdrika type), there is no contradiction in their being affirmed at the same time. In the same way Madhusudana contends that the denial of quality in Brahman (nirvisesatva) should not be regarded as a quality in itself; for the quality that is denied is of imaginary type and hence its denial does not itself constitute a quality. Vyasa-tlrtha further urges that, following the trend of the argument of the Saiikarites, one might as well say that there cannot be any contradiction of the illusory conch-shell-silver by the experiential conch-shell, the two being of two different orders of existence: to this Madhusudana's reply is that both the illusory and the experiential entities are grasped by the sdksi-con-sciousness, and this constitutes their sameness and the contradiction of one by the other; there is no direct contradiction of the illusory by the experiential, and therefore the criticism of Vyasa-tlrtha fails.

Nature of Brahman.

Vyasa-tirtha, in describing the nature of illusion, says that, when the subconscious impression of silver is roused, the senses, being associated with specific defects, take the "thisness" of conch-shell as associated with silver. There is, therefore, no production of any imaginary silver such as the Sankarites allege; the silver not being there, later perception directly shows that it was only a false silver that appeared. Inference also is very pertinent here; for whatever is false knowledge refers to non-existent entities simply because they are not existent. Vyasa-tirtha further points out that his view of illusion (anyathd-khydti) is different from the Buddhist view of illusion (a-sat-khydti) in this, that in the Buddhist view the appearance "this is silver" is wholly false, whereas in Vyasa-tirtha's view the "this" is true, though its association with silver is false.

Vyasa-tirtha further points out that, if the illusory silver be regarded as a product of ajndna, then it will be wrong to suppose that it is liable to negation in the past, present and future; for, if it was a product of ajndna, it was existing then and was not liable to negation. It is also wrong to say that the negation of the illusory appearance is in respect of its reality; for, in order that the appearance may be false, the negation ought to deny it as illusory appearance and not as reality, since the denial of its reality would be of a different order and would not render the entity false.

Vyasa-tirtha had contended that, since Brahman is the subject of discussion and since there are doubts regarding His nature, a resolution of such doubts necessarily implies the affirmation of some positive character. Moreover, propositions are composed of words, and, even if any of the constituent words is supposed to indicate Brahman in a secondary sense, such secondary meaning is to be associated with a primary meaning; for as a rule secondary meanings can be obtained only through association with a primary meaning, when the primary meaning as such is baffled by the context. In reply to the second objection Madhusudana says that a word can give secondary meaning directly, and does not necessarily involve a baffling of the primary meaning. As regards the first objection the reply of Madhusudana is that the undifferentiated

306 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

character of Brahman can be known not necessarily through any affirmative character, but through the negation of all opposite concepts. If it is objected that the negation of such opposing concepts would necessarily imply that those concepts are constituents of Brahma-knowledge, the reply of Madhusudana is that, such negation of opposing concepts being of the very nature of Brahman, it is manifested and intuited directly, without waiting for the manifestation of any particular entity. The function of ordinary propositions involving association of particular meanings is to be interpreted as leading to the manifestation of an undivided and unparticularized whole, beyond the constituents of the proposition which deal with the association of particular meanings.

Vyasa-tirtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as dif-ferenceless, then He cannot be regarded as identical with knowledge or with pure bliss, or as the one and eternal, or as the saksi-consciousness. Brahman cannot be pure consciousness; for consciousness cannot mean the manifestation of objects, since in emancipation there are no objects to be manifested. To this Madhusiidana's reply is that, though in emancipation there are no objects, yet that does not detract from its nature as illuminating. To Vyasa-tirtha's suggestion that Brahman cannot be regarded as pure bliss interpreted as agreeable consciousness (anukula-vedanatva) or mere agreeableness (anukulatva), since this would involve the criticism that such agreeableness is due to some extraneous condition, Madhusiidana's reply is that Brahman is regarded as pure bliss conceived as unconditional desirability {nirupddhikestarupatvat). Madhusudana urges that this cannot mean negation of pain; for negation of pain is an entity different from bliss and in order that the definition may have any application it is necessary that the negation of pain should lead to the establishment of bliss. Vyasa-tirtha further argues that, if this unconditional desirability cannot itself be conditional, then the blissful nature of Brahman must be due to certain conditions. Moreover, if Brahman's nature as pure bliss be different from its nature as pure knowledge, then both the views are partial; and, if they are identical, it is useless to designate Brahman as both pure knowledge and pure bliss. To this Madhusiidana's reply is that, though knowledge and bliss are identical, yet through imaginary verbal usage they are spoken of as different. He further urges that objectless

pure knowledge is defined as pure bliss 1 ; pure bliss is nothing but pure perceiver (drg-anatirekdt). On this view again there is no difference between bliss and its consciousness. Vyasa-tlrtha contends that, if Brahman is regarded as non-dual, then that involves the negation of duality. If such a negation is false, then Brahman becomes dual; and, if such a negation is affirmed, then also Brahman becomes dual, for it involves the affirmation of negation. To this Madhusudana's reply is that the reality of negation is nothing more than the locus in which the negation is affirmed; the negation would then mean nothing else than Brahman, and hence the criticism that the admission of negation would involve duality is invalid.

Regarding the ^^-consciousness Vyasa-tlrtha contends that the definition of sdksi as pure being is unacceptable in the technical sense of the word as defined by Panini. To this Madhusudana's reply is that sdksi may be defined as the pure consciousness reflected either in avidyd or a modification of it; and thus even the pure being may, through its reflection, be regarded as the drastd. The objection of circular reasoning, on the ground that there is interdependence between the conditions of reflection and the seeing capacity of the seer, is unavailing; for such interdependence is beginningless. The sa/tft-consciousness, according to Madhusudana, is neither pure Brahman nor Brahman as conditioned by buddhi, but is the consciousness reflected in avidyd or a modification of it; the sofot-consciousness, though one in all perceivers, yet behaves as identified with each particular perceiver, and thus the experiences of one particular perceiver are perceived by the sdksi-consciousness as identified with that particular perceiver, and so there is no chance of any confusion of the experience of different individuals on the ground that the ^^'-consciousness is itself universal 2 .

1 etena visayanullekhi-jnanam evdnandam ity apt yuktam. Advaita-siddhi,

p. 75»-

* sarva-jlva-sadharanyepi tat-tqj-jlva-caitanyabhedenabhivyaktasya tat-tad-duhkhadi-bhdsakataya atiprasangdbhavdt. Ibid. p. 754.

Refutation of Brahman as material and instrumental cause.

Vyasa-tirtha says that a material cause always undergoes transformation in the production of the effect; but Brahman is supposed to be changeless, and, as such, cannot be the material cause. There are, however, three views: viz., that Brahman and may a are jointly the cause of the world, just as two threads make a string, or that Brahman with may a as its power is the cause, or that Brahman as the support of maya is the cause. The reconciliation is that the Brahman is called changeless so far as it is unassociated with maya either as joint cause or as power or as instrument. To this Vya-satirtha says that, if the permanently real Brahman is the material cause of the world, the world also would be expected to be so. If it is said that the characteristics of the material cause do not inhere in the effect, but only a knowledge of it is somehow associated with it, then the world-appearance also cannot be characterized as indefinable (or anirvacya) by reason of the fact that it is constituted of maya. Since only Brahman as unassociated with maya can be called changeless, the Brahman associated with maya cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world, if by such material cause the changeless aspect is to be understood. If it is urged that the changes are of the character (maya), then, since such a character is included within or inseparably associated with the characterized, changes of character involve a change in the characterized, and hence the vivarta view fails. If the underlying substratum, the Brahman, be regarded as devoid of any real change, then it is unreasonable to suppose that such a substratum, in association with its power or character, will be liable to real change; if it is urged that the material cause may be defined as that which is the locus of an illusion, then it may be pointed out that earth is never regarded as the locus of an illusion, nor can the conch-shell be regarded as the material cause of the shell-silver.

The reply of Madhusiidana is that Brahman remains as the ground which makes the transformations of maya possible. The Brahman has a wider existence than maya and so cannot participate in the changes of maya. Further, the objection that, if the Brahman is real, then the world which is its effect should also be real is not

valid; for only the qualities of the transforming cause (as earth or of gold) are found to pass over to the effect, whereas, Brahman being the ground-cause, we have no analogy which should lead us to expect that it should pass on to the effect.

Vyasa-tlrtha further says that, just as one speaks of the being of jugs, so one may speak of the non-being of chimerical entities, but that does not presuppose the assertion that chimerical entities have non-being as their material cause. Again, if the world had Brahman for its material cause, then, since Brahman was pure bliss, the world should also be expected to be of the nature of bliss, which it is not. Again, on the vivarta view of causation there is no meaning in talking of a material cause. Moreover, if Brahman be the material cause, then the antahkarana cannot be spoken of as being the material and transforming cause of suffering and other worldly experiences.

Vyasa-tirtha, in examining the contention of the Sahkarites that Brahman is self-luminous, says that the meaning of the term "self-luminous" (svaprakdsa) must first be cleared. If it is meant that Brahman cannot be the object of any mental state, then there cannot be any dissension between the teacher and the taught regarding the nature of Brahman; for discussions can take place only if Brahman be the object of a mental state. If it is urged that Brahman is self-luminous in the sense that, though not an object of cognition, it is always immediately intuited, then it may be pointed out that the definition fails, since in dreamless sleep and in dissolution there is no such immediate intuition of Brahman. It cannot be said that, though in dreamless sleep the Brahman cannot be immediately intuited, yet it has the status or capacity (yogyatd) of being so intuited; for in emancipation, there being no characters or qualities, it is impossible that such capacities should thus exist.

Even if such capacity be negatively defined, the negation, being a category of world-appearance, cannot be supposed to exist in Brahman. Moreover,- if Brahman can in no way be regarded as the result of cognitive action, then the fact that it shines forth at the culmination of the final knowledge leading to Brahmahood would be inexplicable. Nor can it be argued that pure consciousness is self-luminous, i.e., non-cognizable, because of the very fact that it is pure consciousness, since whatever is not pure consciousness is not self-luminous; for non-cognizability, being a quality, must

310 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

exist somewhere, and, if it is absent everywhere else, it must by reduction be present at least in pure consciousness. But it may be urged that, even if pure consciousness be self-luminous, that does not prove the self-luminosity of the self. The obvious reply is that the self is identical with pure consciousness. To this Vyasa-tirtha's objection is that, since there cannot be any kind of quality in the self, it cannot be argued that self-luminosity exists in it, whether as a positive quality, or as a negation of its negation, or as capacity. For all capacity as such, being outside Brahman, is false, and that which is false cannot be associated with Brahman. If non-cognizability is defined as that which is not a product of the activity of a mental state (phala-vydpyatvam), and if such non-cognizability be regarded as a sufficient description of Brahman, then, since even the perception of a jug or of the illusory silver or of pleasure and pain satisfies the above condition, the description is too wide, and, since the shining of Brahman itself is the product of the activity of the destruction of the last mental state, the definition is too narrow 1 . It cannot be said that phala-vydpyatva means the accruing of a speciality produced by the consciousness reflected through a mental state, and that such speciality is the relationing without consciousness on the occasion of the breaking of a veil, and that such a phala-vydpyatva exists in the jug and not in the self. Nor can it be said that phala-vydpyatva means the being of the object of consciousness of the ground manifested through consciousness reflected through a mental state. For the Sarikarites do not think that a jug is an object of pure consciousness as reflected through a vrtti or mental state, but hold that it is directly the object of a mental state. It is therefore wrong to suggest that the definition of phala-vydpyatva is such that it applies to jug, etc., and not to Brahman. By Citsukha pure self-shiningness of consciousness is regarded as an objectivity of consciousness, and, if that is so, Brahman must always be an object of consciousness, and the description of it as non-objectivity to consciousness, or non-cognizability, would be impossible. Citsukha, however, says that Brahman is an object of consciousness (cid-visaya), but not an object

1 ndpi phalavyapyatvam drsyatva-bhange ukta-rltyd prdtibhdsike rupyddau vydvahdrike avidydntahkarana-tad-dharma-sukhddau ghatddau ca laksanasyd-tivydpteh. tatroktarityaiva brahmano'pi carama-vrtti-pratibimbita-cid-rupa-phala-vydpyatvendsambhavdc ca. Nydydmrta, p. 507(6).

of cognizing activity (cid-akarmatva). If, following Citsukha, avedyatva (or non-cognizability) be regarded as the status of that which is not the object of a cognitive operation, and if by cognitive operation one expresses that consciousness is manifested through a particular objective form, as in the case of a jug, then, since Brahman also in the final stage is manifested through a corresponding mental state, Brahman also must be admitted to be an object of cognitive operation; otherwise even a jug cannot be regarded as an object of cognitive operation, there being no difference in the case of the apprehension of a jug and that of Brahman. If it is urged that object of cognizability means the accruing of some special changes due to the operation of cognizing, then also Brahman would be as much an object as the jug; for, just as in the case of the cognition of a jug the cognizing activity results in the removal of the veil which was obstructing the manifestation of the jug, so final Brahma-knowledge, which is an intellectual operation, results in the removal of the obstruction to the manifestation of Brahman. The objectivity involved in cognizing cannot be regarded as the accruing of certain results in the object of cognition through the activity involved in cognizing operation; for, the pure consciousness not being an activity, no such accruing of any result due to the activity of the cognizing operation is possible even in objects (as jug, etc.) which are universally admitted to be objects of cognition. If reflection through a mental state be regarded as the cognizing activity, then that applies to Brahman also; for Brahman also is the object of such a reflection through a mental state or idea representing Brahman in the final state.

Citsukha defines self-luminosity as aparoksa-vyavahara-yogy-atva, i.e., capability of being regarded as immediate. A dispute may now arise regarding the meaning of this. If it signifies "that which is produced by immediate knowledge," then virtue and vice, which can be immediately intuited by supernatural knowledge of Yogins and Gods, has also to be regarded as immediate; and, when one infers that he has virtue or vice and finally has an immediate apprehension of that inferential knowledge, or when one has an immediate knowledge of virtue or vice as terms in inductive proposition (e.g., whatever is knowable is definable, such a proposition including virtue and vice as involved under the term "know-able"), one would be justified in saying that virtue and vice are also

312 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

immediate, and thus immediacy of apprehension would be too wide for a sufficient description of Brahman. Thus, though virtue and vice are not cognizable in their nature, it is yet possible in the case of Yogins and of God to have immediate apprehension of them, and so also in our case, so far as concerns the direct apprehension of inference of them.

If immediacy signifies "that which may be the object of immediate knowledge," and if the self be regarded as immediate in this sense, then it is to be admitted that the self is an object of immediate cognition, like the jug 1 . Nor can it be urged that the immediacy of an object depends upon the immediacy of the knowledge of it; for the immediacy of knowledge also must depend upon the immediacy of the object. Again, Vyasa-tlrtha contends that immediacy cannot signify that the content is of the form of immediacy (aparoksa-ity-dkdra); for it is admitted to be pure and formless and produced by the non-relational intuition of the Vedantic instructions.

Vyasa-tlrtha, in his Nydydmrta, tries to prove that Brahman is possessed of qualities, and not devoid of them, as the Sarikarites argue; he contends that most of the scriptural texts speak of Brahman as being endowed with qualities. God (Isvara) is endowed with all good qualities, for He desires to have them and is capable of having them; and He is devoid of all bad qualities, because He does not want them and is capable of divesting Himself of them. It is useless to contend that the mention of Brahman as endowed with qualities refers only to an inferior Brahman; for, Vyasa-tlrtha urges, the scriptural texts do not speak of any other kind of Brahman than the qualified one. If the Brahman were actually devoid of all qualities, it would be mere vacuity or sunya, a negation; for all substances that exist must have some qualities. Vyasa-tlrtha further contends that, since Brahman is the creator and protector of the world and the authorizer of the Vedas, He must have a body and organs of action, though that body is not an ordinary material body (prdkrtdvayavddi-nisedha-paratvdt); and it is because His body is spiritual and not material that in spite of the possession of a body He is both infinite and eternal and His abode is also spiritual and eternal 2 .

1 vastuna dparoksyam aparoksa-jnuna-visayatvam ced dtmdpi ghatddivad vedyah syat. Nydydmrta, p. 511(a). - Ibid. pp. 496-8.

Again, it is also wrong to say that Brahman is both the material cause and the instrumental cause of the world, as the substance-stuff of the world and as the creator or modeller of the world; for the material cause undergoes modifications and changes, whereas the Brahman is unchangeable. Brahman, again, is always the master, and the individual selves or souls are always His servants: so God alone is always free (nitya-mukta), whereas individual souls are always related and bound to Him 1 . The gunas belong to prakrti or may a and not to the individual souls; and therefore, since the gunas of prakrti are not in the individual souls, there cannot be any question of the bondage of individual souls by them or of liberation from them. Whatever bondage, therefore, there is by which thegunas tie the individual souls is due to ignorance (avidya). The gunas, again, cannot affect God; for they are dependent (adhina) on Him. It is only out of a part of God that all individual souls have come into being, and that part is so far different from God that, though through ignorance the individual souls, which have sprung forth from this part, may be suffering bondage, God Himself remains ever free from all such ignorance and bondage 2 . The may a or prakrti which forms the material cause of the world is a fine dusty stuff or like fine cotton fibres (suksma-renumayi sd ca tantu-vayasya tantuvat), and God fashions the world out of this stuff 3 . This

1 muktav api svdmi-bhrtya-bhdva-sadbhdvena bhakty-ddi-bandha-sadbhdvdt nitya-baddhatvam jlvasya krsnasya tu nitya-muktatvam eva. Bhdva-vildsinl (p. 179) on Yukti-mallikd.

ekasyaiva mamdmsasya jivasyaivam mahdmate

bandhasydvidyaydnddi vidyayd ca tathetarah

sva-bhinndmsasya jlvdkhyd ajasyaikasya kevalam

bandhas ca bandhdn moksas ca na svasyety aha sa prabhuh.

Yukti-mallikd, p. 179. The Bhdva-vildsinl (p. 185) also points out that, though God has His wives and body and His heavenly abode in Vaikuntha, yet He has nothing to tie Himself with these; for these are not of prakrti-stufi, and, as He has no trace of the gunas of prakrti. He is absolutely free; only a tie of prakrt 1 -stuff can be a tie or bondage But prakrti cannot affect Him; for He is her master— mama gund vastuni ca sruti-smrtisu aprdkrtatayd prasiddhdh. It may be noted in this connection that the Madhva system applies the term mdyd in three distinct senses: (i) as God's will (harer icchd); (ii) as the material prakrti (mdydkhydprakrtir jada); and (iii) mdyd or mahd-mdyd or avidya, as the cause of illusions and mistakes (bhrama-hetus ca tndyaikd mdyeyam trividhd matd). Yukti-mallikd, p. 188. There is another view which supposes mdyd to be of five kinds; it adds God's power (sakti) and influence (tejas).

3 This stuff is said to be infinitely more powdery than the atoms of the Naiyayikas (tdrkikdbhimata-paramdnuto'py ananta-gunita-suksma-renumayl). Bhdva-vildsinl, p. 189. The Srlmad-bhdgavata, which is considered by Madhva

prakrti is eightfold, inasmuch as it has five modifications as the five elements, and three as manas, buddhi and ahamkdra. The mdyd, by the help of which God creates the world, is like the mother of the world and is called, in the theological terminology of the Madhva school, Laksmi. The creative mdyd, or the will of God, is also called the svarupa-mdyd, because she always abides with the Lord. The may a as prakrti, or as her guiding power (maydsrayin), is outside of God, but completely under His control 1 .

God is referred to in the Gltd and other sacred texts as possessing a universal all-pervading body, but this body is, as we have already said, a spiritual body, a body of consciousness and bliss (jndndnanddtmako hy asaii). This His universal body transcends the bounds of all the gunas, the mdyd and their effects. All throughout this universal all-transcending spiritual body of the Lord is full of bliss, consciousness and playful activity 2 . There is no room for pantheism in true philosophy, and therefore Vedic passages which seem to imply the identity of the world and God are to be explained as attributing to God the absolute controlling power 3 . Again, when it is said that the individual souls are parts of God, it does not mean that they are parts in any spatial sense, or in the sense of any actual division such as may be made of material objects. It simply means that the individual souls are similar to God in certain respects and are at the same time much inferior to Him 4 .

and his followers to be authoritative, speaks of the four wives of Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, as Maya, Jaya, Krti and Jaanti, which are but the four forms of the goddess Jsri, corresponding to the four forms of Hari as Vamadeva, Sahkarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Yukti-mallikd, p. 191.

1 It is curious to note that the mdyd which produces illusion and which affects only the individual souls, counted in one place referred to above as the third mdyd, is counted again as the fourth mdyd, and prakrti (or jada-mdyd and mdyd-srl) as the second and the third mdyds. Yukti-mallikd, p. 192 a, b.

2 The Bhdva-vildsinX (p. 198), giving the meaning of the word sarJra (which ordinarily means "body," from a root which means "to decay") with reference to God, assigns a fanciful etymological meaning; it says that the first syllable sa means bliss, ra means " play," and Ira means " consciousness." In another place Varadaraja speaks of the Lord as being of the nature of the pure bliss of realization and the superintendent of all intelligence: vidito'si bhavdn sdksdt purusah prakrteh parah kevaldnubhavdnandasvarupas sarva-buddhi-drk. Yukti-mallikd, p. 201.

3 atah purufa eveti prathamd pancaml yadd soda sarva-nimittatva-mahimd purnsi varnyate. yadd tu saptaml sarvddhdratvam varnayet tadd suktasyaikdrthatd caivam satyeva syan na cdnyathd. Ibid. p. 211.

4 tat-sadriatve sati tato nyunatvam jlvasya amsatvam na tu ekadesatvam. Nydydmyta, p. 606.

It may be pointed out in this connection that as God is all-pervasive, so the individual souls are by nature atomic, though by their possession of the quality of consciousness, which is all-pervasive, they can always feel the touch of any part of their body just as a lamp, which, remaining at one place, may have its rays illuminating all places around it 1 .

At the end of pralaya God wishes to create, and by His wish disturbs the equilibrium of prakrti and separates its three gunas, and then creates the different categories of mahat, buddhi, manas and the five elements and also their presiding deities; and then He permeates the whole world, including the living and the nonliving 2 . In all the different states of existence (e.g., the waking, dream, deep sleep, swoon and liberation) it is God who by His various forms of manifestation controls all individual souls, and by bringing about these states maintains the existence of the world 3 . The destruction or pralaya also of the world is effected by His will 4 . Moreover, all knowledge that arises in all individual souls either for mundane experience or for liberation, and whatever may be the instruments employed for the production of such knowledge, have God as their one common ultimate cause 5 .

Liberation (moksa).

Bondage is due to attachment to worldly objects, and liberation is produced through the direct realization of God (aparoksa-jndnam Visnoh). This is produced in various ways, viz.: Experience of the sorrows of worldly existence, association with good men, renunciation of all desires of enjoyment of pleasures, whether in this world

1 Nydydmrta, p. 612. The view that the atomic soul touches different parts of the body at different successive moments for different touch-experiences is definitely objected to.

2 Paddrtha-samgraha-vydkhydna, pp. io6-8.

3 The five manifestations of God, controlling the five states above mentioned (waking, dream, etc.), are called Prdjfia, Visva, Taijasa, Bhagavdn and Turtya Bhagavdn respectively.

4 There are two kinds of destruction or pralaya in this system: (a) the mahd-pralaya, in which everything but prakrti is destroyed, only absolute darkness remains, and prakrti stops all her creative work, except the production of time as successive moments; (ft) the secondary destruction, called avdntara pralaya, which is of two kinds, one in which along with our world the two imaginary worlds are also destroyed, and one in which only the living beings of this world are destroyed. Ibid. pp. 117-19.

6 Ibid. p. 119.

316 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

or in some heavenly world, self-control and self-discipline, study, association with a good teacher, and study of the scriptures according to his instructions, realization of the truth of those scriptures, discussions on the proper meaning for strengthening one's convictions, proper respectful attachment to the teacher, respectful attachment to God (paramdtma-bhakti), kindness to one's inferiors, love for one's equals, respectful attachment to superiors, cessation from works that are likely to bring pleasure or pain, cessation from doing prohibited actions, complete resignation to God, realization of the five differences (between God and soul, soul and soul, soul and the world, God and the world and between one object of the world and another), realization of the difference between prakrti and purusa, appreciation of the difference of stages of advancement among the various kinds of men and other higher and lower living beings, and proper worship (updsand). As regards the teachers here referred to, from whom instructions should be taken, two distinct types of them are mentioned: there are some who are permanent teachers (niyata guru) and others who are only occasional teachers (aniyata guru). The former are those who can understand the nature and needs of their pupils and give such suitable instructions to them as may enable them to realize that particular manifestation of Yisnu which they are fit to realize; the occasional teachers are those who merely instruct us concerning God. In another sense all those who are superior to us in knowledge and religious discipline are our teachers. As regards worship, it is said that worship (updsand) is of two kinds: worship as religious and philosophical study, and worship as meditation (dhydna) 1 ; for there are some who cannot by proper study of the scriptures attain a true and direct realization of the Lord, and there are others who attain it by meditation. Meditation or dhydna means continual thinking of God, leaving all other things aside 2 , and such a meditation on God as the spirit, as the existent, and as the possessor of pure consciousness and bliss is only possible when a thorough conviction has been generated by scriptural studies and rational thinking and discussions, so that all false ideas have been removed and all doubts have been dispelled.

1 updsand ca dvividJid, satatam sdstrdbhydsa-riipd dhydna-rupd ca. Madhva-siddhdnta-sara, p. 500.

2 dhydnam ca itara-tiraskdra-purvaka-bhagavad-visayakdkhanda-smrtih. Ibid. p. 502. This dhydna is the same as nididhydsana.

God alone is the cause of all bondage, as well as of all liberation 1 . When one directly realizes the nature of God, there arises in him devotion (bhakti) to the Lord; for without personal, direct and immediate knowledge of Him there cannot be any devotion. Devotion (bhakti) consists of a continual flow of love for the Lord, which cannot be impaired or affected by thousands of obstacles, which is many times greater than love for one's own self or love for what is generally regarded as one's own, and which is preceded by a knowledge of the Lord as the possessor of an infinite number of good and benign qualities 2 . And when such a bhakti arises, the Lord is highly pleased (atyartha-prasdda), and it is when God is so pleased with us that we can attain salvation.

Though individual souls are self-luminous in themselves, yet through God's will their self-luminous intelligence becomes veiled by ignorance (avidya). When, as a modification of the mind or inner organ (antahkarana), direct knowledge of God arises, such a modification serves to dispel the ignorance or avidya; for, though avidya is not directly associated with the mind, yet such a mental advancement can affect it, since they are both severally connected with the individual self. Ordinarily the rise of knowledge destroys only the deeds of unappointed fruition, whereas the deeds of appointed fruition (prarabdha-karmd) remain and cause pleasure and pain, cognition and want of cognition. So ordinarily the realization of God serves to destroy the association of prakrti and the gunas with an individual, as also his kartnas and subtle body (linga-deha),

1 God maintains or keeps in existence all other entities, which are all wholly dependent on Him. He creates and destroys only the non-eternal and eternal-non-eternal entities. Again, with reference to all beings except LaksmI, it is He who holds up the veil of positive ignorance (bhdva-rupd avidya) of prakrti, either as the first avidya, the gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas, or as the second avidya of desire (kdma), or as the third avidya of actions of appointed fruition {prdrabdha-karma), or as the subtle body, or finally as His own will. It is the last, the power of Hari, which forms the real stuff of all ignorance; the avidya is only an indirect agent {paramesvara-saktir eva svarupdvarand mukhyd, avidya tu nimitta-mdtrani) ; for, even if avidya is destroyed, there will not arise supreme bliss, unless God so desires it. It is again He who gives knowledge to the conscious entities, happiness to all except those demons who are by nature unfit for attaining it, and sorrow also to all except LaksmI, who is by nature without any touch of sorrow. Tattva-samkhydna-vivarana and Tattva-samkhydna-tlppana, pp. 43-7.

2 paramesvara-bhaktir noma niravadhikanantdnavadya-kalydna-gunatvd-jndnapurvakah svdtmdtmiya-samasta-vastubhyah aneka-gunddhikah antardya-sahasrenapi apratibaddhah nirantara-prema-pravdhah. Nydya-sudhd on Anuvyd-khydna.

318 Controversy between Dualists and Monists [ch.

consisting of the senses, five prdnas and manas, until the deeds of appointed fruition are exhausted by suffering or enjoyment 1 . During pralaya the liberated souls enter the womb of God and cannot have any enjoyment; but again after creation they begin to enjoy. The enjoyment of liberated souls is of four kinds: sdlokya, sdmipya, sdrupya and sdyujya (sdrsti being counted as a species of sdyujya and not a fifth kind of liberation). Sdyujya means the entrance of individual souls into the body of God and their identification of themselves with the enjoyment of God in His own body; sdrsti-moksa, which is a species of sdyujya-moksa, means the enjoyment of the same powers that God possesses, which can only be done by entering into the body of God and by identifying oneself with the particular powers of God. Only deities or Gods deserve to have this kind of liberation; they can, of course, at their will come out of God as well and remain separate from Him; sdlokya-moksa means residence in heaven and being there with God to experience satisfaction and enjoyment by the continual sight of Him. Sdmipya-moksa means continuous residence near God, such as is enjoyed by the sages. Sdrupya-moksa is enjoyed by God's attendants, who have outward forms similar to that which God possesses 2 . The acceptance of difference amongst the liberated souls in the states of enjoyment and other privileges forms one of the cardinal doctrines of Madhva's system; for, if it is not acknowledged, then the cardinal dualistic doctrine that all individual souls are always different from one another would fail 3 . It has already been said that liberation can be attained only by bhakti, involving continuous pure love (sneha) 4 . Only gods and superior men deserve it, whereas ordinary men deserve only to undergo rebirth, and the lowest men and the demons always suffer in hell. The Gods cannot go to hell, nor can the demons ever attain liberation, and ordinary persons neither obtain liberation nor go to hell 5 .

1 Bhdgavata-tdtparya, I. 13, where a reference is made also to Brahma-tar ka.

2 Jaya and Vijaya, the two porters of God, are said to enjoy Sdrupya-moksa.

3 muktdndm ca na hlyante tdratamyam ca sarvadd. Mahdbharata-tatparya-nirnaya, p. 4. See also Nydydmrta.

4 acchidra-sevd (faultless attendance) and niskdmatva (desirelessness) are also mentioned as defining the characteristic bhakti. Gifts, pilgrimage, tapas, etc., also are regarded as secondary accessories of attendance on, or sevd of, God. Ibid. p. 5.

As the imperative duties of all men upwards of eight years and up to eighty years of age, Madhva most strongly urges the fasting on the Ekddast (eleventh day of the moon), marking the forehead with the black vertical line characteristic of his followers even to the present day. One should constantly worship Lord Krsna with great devotion {bhakti) and pray to Him to be saved from the sorrows of the world. One should think of the miseries of hell and try to keep oneself away from sins, and should always sing the name of Hari, the Lord, and make over to Him all the deeds that one performs, having no desire of fruits for them 1 .

1 Krsnamrta-maharnava.

CHAPTER XXXI THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

Vallabha's Interpretation of the Brahma-sutra.

Most systems of Vedanta are based upon an inquiry regarding the ultimate purport of the instruction of the text of the Upanisads which form the final part of the Vedas. The science of mimarrisa is devoted to the enquiry into the nature of Vedic texts, on the presumption that all Vedic texts have to be interpreted as enjoining people to perform certain courses of action or to refrain from doing others; it also presumes that obedience to these injunctions produces dharma and disobedience adharma. Even the study of the Vedas has to be done in obedience to the injunction that Vedas must be studied, or that the teacher should instruct in the Vedas or that one should accept a teacher for initiating him to the holy thread who will teach him the Vedas in detail. All interpreters of Mlmamsa and Vedanta agree on the point that the study of the Vedas implies the understanding of the meaning by the student, though there are divergences of opinion as to the exact nature of injunction and the exact manner in which such an implication follows. If the Brahmacarin has to study the Vedas and understand their meaning from the instruction of the teacher at his house, it may generally be argued that there is no scope for a further discussion regarding the texts of the Upanisads; and if this is admitted, the whole of the Brahma-sutra, whose purpose is to enter into such a discussion, becomes meaningless. It may be argued that the Upanisad texts are pregnant with mystic lore which cannot be unravelled by a comprehension of the textual meaning of words. But, if this mystic lore cannot be unravelled by the textual meaning of the word, it is not reasonable to suppose that one can comprehend the deep and mystic truths which they profess to instruct by mere intellectual discussions. The Upanisads themselves say that one can comprehend the true meaning of the Upanisads through tapas and the grace of God 1 .

1 a-laukiko hi veddrtho na yuktyd pratipadyate tapas a

veda-yuktyd tu prasdddt paramatmanah.

Vallabha's Bhdsya on Brahma-sutra (Chowkhamba edition, p. 13).

To this Vallabha's reply is that, since there are diverse kinds of sdstras offering diverse kinds of instructions, and since Vedic texts are themselves so complicated that it is not easy to understand their proper emphasis, an ordinary person may have legitimate doubt as to their proper meaning, unless there is a sdstra which itself discusses these difficulties and attempts to solve them by textual comparisons and contrasts; it cannot be denied that there is a real necessity for such a discussion as was undertaken by Vyasa himself in the Brahma-sutra 1 .

According to Ramanuja the Brahma-sutra is a continuation of the Mimdmsd-sutra; though the two works deal with different subjects, they have the same continuity of purpose. The study of the Brahma-sutra must therefore be preceded by the study of the Mimdmsd-sutra. According to Bhaskara the application of the Mimdmsd-sutra is universal; all double-born people must study the Mimdmsa and the nature of dhartna for their daily duties. The knowledge of Brahman is only for some; a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman can therefore be only for those who seek emancipation in the fourth stage of their lives. Even those who seek emancipation must perform the daily works of dharma; the nature of such dharma can only be known by a study of the Mimdmsa. The enquiry regarding Brahman must therefore be preceded by a study of the Mimdmsa. It is also said by some that it is by a long course of meditation in the manner prescribed by the Upanisads that the Brahman can be known. A knowledge of such meditation can only be attained by a knowledge of the due nature of sacrifices. It is said also in the smrtis that it is by sacrifices that the holy body of Brahman can be built (mahd-yajnais ca yajnais ca brahmiyam kriyate tanulif ; so it is when the forty-eight samskdras are performed that one becomes fit for the study or meditation on the nature of the Brahman. It is also said in the smrtis that it is only after discharging the three debts—study, marriage, and performance of sacrifices—that one has the right to fix his mind on Brahman for emancipation. According to most

1 sandeha-vdrakam sdstratn buddhi-dosdt tad-udbfiavah viruddha-sastra-sambheddd angais cdsakya-niscayah tasmdt sutrdnusdrena kartavyah sarva-nirnayah anyathd bhraiyate svdrthdn madhyamas ca tathdvidhah.

Ibid. p. 20.

2 Manu, II. 28.

people the sacrificial duties are useful for the knowledge of Brahman; so it may be held that enquiry about the nature of Brahman must follow an enquiry about the nature of dharma 1 .

But, even if the theory of the joint-performance of sacrifice and meditation on Brahman be admitted, it does not follow that an enquiry into the nature of Brahman must follow an enquiry about the nature of dharma. It can only mean that the nature of the knowledge of Brahman may be held to be associated with the nature of dharma, as it is properly known from the Mimamsa-sastra. On such a supposition the knowledge of the nature of the self is to be known from the study of the Brahma-sutra; but since the knowledge of the self is essential even for the performance of sacrificial actions, it may well be argued that the enquiry into the nature of dharma must be preceded by an enquiry about the nature of the self from the Brahma-sutra 2 . Nor can it be said that from such texts as require a person to be self-controlled (sdnto ddnto, etc.) it may be argued that enquiry into the nature of dharma must precede that about Brahman: the requirement of self-control does not necessarily mean that enquiry about the nature of dharma should be given precedence, for a man may be self-controlled jeven without studying the Mimdmsd.

Nor can it be said, as Sankara does, that enquiry into the nature of Brahman must be preceded by a disinclination from earthly and heavenly joys, by mind-control, self-control, etc. On this point Bhaskara argues against the Vallabha views, and his reason for their rejection is that such attainments are extremely rare; even great sages like Durvasas and others failed to attain them. Even without self-knowledge one may feel disinclined to things through sorrows, and one may exercise mind-control and self-control -even for earthly ends. There is moreover no logical relation between the attainment of such qualities and enquiry about the nature of Brahman. Nor can it be argued that, if enquiry into the nature of Brahman is preceded by an enquiry into the Mimdmsd, we can attain all these qualities. Moreover, an enquiry about the nature of Brahman can only come through a conviction of the importance of

1 Purusottama's commentary on Yallabhacarya's Anubhdsya, pp. 25-6.

2 piirvam vedunta-ricdrena tad avaganlavyam nand-balair dtma-svarupe vipratipanna-vaidikanam veda-rdkyair eva tan nirasasyavasyakatvdt jndte tayoh sza-rupe karmani sukhena pravrtti-darsanam. Ibid. p. 27.

the knowledge alone, and for the comprehension of such importance the enquiry about Brahman is necessary: there is thus an argument in a circle. If it is held that, when knowledge of the Vedantic texts is properly acquired by listening to instruction on the Vedas, one may then turn to an enquiry into the nature of Brahman, that also is objectionable; for, if the meaning of the Vedantic texts has been properly comprehended, there is no further need for an enquiry about the nature of Brahman. If it is held that the knowledge of Brahman can come only through the scriptural testimony of such texts as "that art thou" or "thou art the truth," that too is objectionable : for no realization of the nature of Brahman can come by scriptural testimony to an ignorant person who may interpret it as referring to an identity of the self and the body. If by the scriptural texts it is possible to have a direct realization of Brahman, it is unnecessary to enjoin the duty of reflection and mediation. It is therefore wrong to suppose that an enquiry into the nature of Brahman must be preceded either by dharmavicara or by the attainment of such extremely rare qualities as have been referred to by Sankara. Again, it is said in the scriptures that those who have realized the true meaning of the Vedanta should renounce the world; so renunciation must take place after the Vedantic texts have been well comprehended and not before. Again, without an enquiry into the nature of Brahman one cannot know that Brahman is the highest object of attainment; without a knowledge of the latter one would not have the desired and other attainments of the mind and so be led to a discussion about Brahman. Again, if a person with the desired attainments listens to the Vedantic texts, he would immediately attain emancipation and there would be no one to instruct him.

The enquiry about the nature of Brahman does not require any preceding condition; anyone of the double-born caste is entitled to do it. The Mimamsakas say that all the Vedantic texts insisting upon the knowledge of Brahman should be interpreted as injunctions by whose performance dharma is produced. But this interpretation is wrong; though any kind of prescribed meditation (updsand) may produce dharma, Brahman itself is not of the nature of dharma. All dharmas are of the nature of actions (dharmdsya ca kriya-rupatvat); but Brahman cannot be produced, and is therefore not of the nature of action. The seeming injunction for meditation

on Brahman is intended to show the greatness of Brahma-knowledge ; such meditations are merely mental operations akin to knowledge and are not any kind of action. This Brahma-knowledge is also helpful for the proper discharge of one's duties; for this reason people like Janaka had it and so were able to discharge their duties in the proper manner. It is wrong to suppose that those who do not have the illusory notion of the self as the body are incapable of performing karma; for the Gitd says that the true philosopher knows that he does not work and yet is always associated with work; he abnegates all his karmas in Brahman and acts without any attachment, just as a lotus leaf never gets wet by water. The conclusion is therefore that only he who knows Brahman can by his work produce the desired results; so those who are engaged in discussing the nature of dharma should also discuss the nature of Brahman. The man who knows Brahman and works has no desire for the fruits of his karma, for he has resigned all his works to Brahman. It is therefore wrong to say that only those who are desirous of the fruits of karma are eligible for their performance; the highest and the most desired end of karma is the abnegation of its fruits 1 . It is the intention of Vallabha that both the Purva-mimdmsd and the Uttara-mimdmsd (or the Brahma-sutra) are but two different ways of propounding the nature of Brahman; the two together form one science. This in a way is the view of all the Vedantic interpreters except Sarikara, though they differ in certain details of mode of approach 2 . Thus according to Ramanuja the two Mlmdmsds form one science and the performance of sacrifices can be done conjointly with continual remembering of Brahman, which (with him) is devotion, meditation and realization of Brahman. According to Bhaskara, though the subject of the Purva-mimdmsd is different from that of the Uttara-mimdmsd, yet they have one end in view and form one science, and the ultimate purport of them both is the realization of the nature of Brahman. According to Bhiksu the purpose of the Brahma-sutra is to reconcile the apparently contradictory portions of the Vedantic texts which have

1 phala-kdmddy-atmpayogdt anenaiva tat-samarpandt nityatvdd apy artha-jiidnasya no phala-prepsur adhikari. Puru§ottama's commentary on Vallahha-carya's Anubhasya, p. 43.

2 prakara-bhedenapi kdnda-dvayasydpi brahma-pratipddakatayaikavdkyatva-samarthanan mimdmsd-dvayasyaika-sdstrasya sucanena vrttikdra-iirodhato?pi bodhitah. Ibid. p. 46.

not been taken by Purva-mlmdmsd. The purpose of the Brahma-sutra is the same as that of the Purva-mimdrnsd, because enquiry into the nature of the Brahman is also due to the injunction that Brahman should be known, and the highest dharma is produced thereby. The Uttara-mimdrnsd is a supplement of the Purva-mlmamsa. According to Madhva it is those who have devotion who are eligible for enquiry into the nature of Brahman.

Vallabha combines the second and the third sutra of Adhydya 1, Pdda 1, of the Brahma-sutra and reads them as Janmddyasya yatah, sastrayonitvat. The commentator says that this is the proper order, because all topics (adhikaranas) show the objections, conclusions and the reasons; the reasons would be missing if the third sutra (sastrayonitvat) were not included in the second, forming one adhi-karana. Brahman is the cause of the appearance and disappearance of the world, and this can be known only on the evidence of the scriptures. Brahman is thus the final and the ultimate agent; but, though production and maintenance, derangement and destruction are all possible through the agency of Brahman, yet they are not associated with Him as His qualities. The sutra may also be supposed to mean that that is Brahman from which the first (i.e., dkdsa) has been produced 1 .

The view of Sankara that Brahman is the producer of the Vedas and that by virtue of this He must be regarded as omniscient is rejected to-day by Purusottama. To say the Vedas had been produced by God by His deliberate desire would be to accept the views of the Nyaya and Vaisesikas; the eternity of the Vedas must then be given up. If the Vedas had come out of Brahman like the breath of a man, then, since all breathing is involuntary, the production of the Vedas would not show the omniscience of God (nihsvd-sdtmaka-vedopdddnatvena abuddhi-purvaka-nihsvdsopdddna-puru-sadrstdnta-sandthena pratisddhanena apdstam) 2 . Moreover, if Brahman had produced the Vedas in the same order in which they existed in the previous kalpa, He must in doing so have submitted Himself to some necessity or law, and therefore was not independent 3 . Again, the view of Sankara that the Brahman associated

1 Janma ddyasya dkdsasya yatah. Anubhdsya, p. 61.

8 Commentary on Anubhdsya, p. 64.

* tddrsdnupurvl-racanayd asvdtantrye rdjdjndmivddaka-rdja-dutavaddnu-purvl-racand-mdtrenesvara-sdrvqjndsiddhyd vydkhyeya-grantha-virodhdc ca. Ibid. p. 64.

with ajndna is to be regarded as the omniscient Isvara can be accepted on his authority alone.

It is no doubt true that the nature of Brahman is shown principally in the Upanisads, and from that point of view the word sdstra-yoni, "he who is known by the Upanisads," may well be applied to Brahman; yet there may be a legitimate objection that other parts of the Vedas have no relevant connection with Brahman. The reply is that it is by actions in accordance with other parts of the Vedas that the mind may be purified, and thus God may be induced to exercise His grace for a revelation of His nature. So in a remote manner other parts of the Vedas may be connected with the Vedas. So the knowledge of the Vedanta helps the due performance of the scriptural injunctions of other parts of the Vedas. The karma-kdnda and the jndna-kdnda are virtually complementary to each other and both have a utility for self-knowledge, though the importance of the Upanisads must be superior.

We know already that Ramanuja repudiated the idea of inferring the existence of God as omniscient and omnipotent from the production of the world, and established the thesis that God cannot be known through any means of proof, such as perception, inference, and the like, but only through the testimony of the scriptural texts.

The tendency of the Nyaya system has been to prove the existence of God by inference; thus Udayana gives nine arguments in favour of the existence of God. The first of these is that the word, being of the nature of effect, must have some cause which has produced it (kdrydnumdna). The second is that there must be some one who in the beginning of the creation set the atoms in motion for the formation of molecules (dyqjandnumdna). The third is that the earth could not have remained hanging in space if it were not held by God (dhrtyanumdna). The fourth is that the destruction of the world also requires an agent and that must be God (vind-sdnutndna). The fifth is that meanings ascribed to words must have been due to the will of God (paddnumdna). The sixth is that merit and demerit, as can be known from the prescription of the Vedas, must presume an original acquaintance of the person who composed the Vedas (pratyanwndna). The seventh is that the scriptures testify to the existence of God. The eighth (vdkydnumdna) is the same as the seventh. The ninth is as follows: the accretion of the

mass of atoms depends upon their number, as they are partless; the numerical conception is dependent upon relative mental comparison on the part of the perceiver; at the time of creation there must have been some one by whose numerical conception the accretion of mass is possible. This is the ninth anumdna (samkhyd-numdna). Though God is regarded as the cause of the world, yet He need not have a body; for cause as producer does not necessarily involve the possession of a body; there are others, however, who think that God produces special bodies, the avatdra of Rama, Krsna, etc., by which He acts in special ways.

Vijnana-bhiksu, however, thinks that the Samkhya categories of buddhi, etc., being products, presume the existence of their previous causes, about which there must be some intuitive knowledge, and whose purpose is served by it; such a person is Isvara. The procedure consists in inferring first an original cause (the prakrti) of the categories, and God is He who has direct knowledge of the prakrti by virtue of which He modifies it to produce the categories, and thus employs it for His own purpose.

There are some who hold that even in the Upanisadic texts there are instances of inferring the nature of Brahman, and though Badarayana does not indulge in any inferences himself, he deals with such texts as form their basis. The point of view of the syllogists has been that the inferences are valid inasmuch as they are in consonance with the Upanisad texts. But Vallabha agrees with Ramanuja and Bhaskara that no inference is possible about the existence of God, and that His nature can only be known through the testimony of the Upanisadic texts 1 .

The nature of Brahman.

Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the world. There is no diversity of opinion regarding the Brahman as the instrumental (nimitta) cause of the world, but there is difference of opinion whether Brahman is its creator or whether He is its material cause, since the Vedanta does not admit the relation of samavdya, the view that Brahman is the inherent (samavdyi) cause of the world. The objection against Brahman being the samavdyi

1 The commentator Purusottama offers a criticism of the theistic arguments after the manner of Ramanuja. Commentary on Anubhasya, pp. 74-8.

kdrana is further enhanced by the supposition that, if He were so He must be liable to change {samavdyitve vikrtatvasydpatteh). Vallabha holds that the sutra "tat tu samanvaydt" establishes the view that Brahman is the inherent cause (samavdyikdrana), because it exists everywhere in His tripartite nature, as being, thought and bliss. The world as such (the prapanca) consists of names, forms and actions, and Brahman is the cause of them all, as He exists everywhere in His tripartite forms. The Samkhyists hold that it is the sattva, rajas and tamas which pervade all things, and all things manifest these qualities; a cause must be of the nature of the effects, since all effects are of the nature of sattva, rajas and tamas. So the reply is that there is a more serious objection, because the prakrti (consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas) is itself a part of Brahman (prakrter api svamate tadamsatvdif. But yet the Samkhya method of approach cannot be accepted. The pleasure of prakrti is of the nature of ignorance, and is limited by time and space; things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others; they are pleasant at one time and not pleasant at another; they are pleasant in some places and unpleasant in other places. But the bliss of Brahman is unlimited by conditions; the relation of. bliss and the self as associated with knowledge is thus different from the pleasure of prakrti (dtmdnandajndnena prdkrtikapriyatvddau bddhadarsandt) 3 . The Brahman therefore pervades the world in His own true nature as knowledge and bliss. It is by His will that He manifests Himself as many and also manifests His three characters—thought, being and bliss—in different proportions in the material world of antarydmins. This pervasion of Brahman as many and all is to be distinguished from the Sankarite exposition of it. According to Sankara and his followers the phenomenal world of objects has the Brahman as its basis of reality; the concrete appearances are only impositions on this unchanging reality. According to this view the concrete appearances cannot be regarded as the effects of Brahman, or, in other words, Brahman cannot be regarded as the updddna or the material cause of the stuff of the concrete objects. We know that among the Sankarites also there are diverse opinions regarding the material cause of the world. Thus the author of the Paddrtha-nirnaya thinks that Brahman and mdyd are jointly the

1 Vallabha's Anubhdsya, p. 85.

2 Puru§ottama's commentary, p. 86.

cause of the world, Brahman being the unchanging cause and mdyd being the transforming cause. Sarvajnatmamuni, the author of the Samksepa-sdriraka, thinks that Brahman is the material cause through the instrumentality of mdyd. Vacaspati Misra thinks that the mdyd resting in jlva as associated with Brahman jointly produces the world; mdyd here is regarded as the accessory cause (sahakdri). The author of the Siddhdnta-muktdvali thinks that the mdyd-sakti is the real material cause and not the Brahman; Brahman is beyond cause and effect 1 .

Vallabha, however, disagrees with this view for the reason that according to this the causality of Brahman is only indirect, and as regards the appearances which are illusory impositions according to Sankara no cause is really ascribed; he therefore holds that Brahman by His own will has manifested Himself with preponderance of the elements of being, consciousness, and bliss in His three forms as matter, soul and the Brahman. Brahman is therefore regarded as the samavdyikdrana of the world 2 .

Bhaskara also holds that Brahman is at once one with the world and different from it, just as the sea is in one sense one with the waves and in another sense different from them. The suggestion that a thing cannot be its opposite is meaningless, because it is so experienced. All things as objects may be regarded as one, but this does not preclude their specific characters and existence; in reality there is no opposition or contradiction, like heat and cold or as between fire and sparks, between Brahman and the world, for the world has sprung out of Him, is maintained in Him and is merged in Him. In the case of ordinary contradiction this is not the case; when the jug is produced out of the earth, though the earth and the jug may seem to be different, yet the jug has no existence without the earth—the former is being maintained by the latter. So, as effect, the world is many; as cause, it is one with Brahman 3 .

Vallabha's point of view is very close to that of Bhaskara, though not identical; he holds that it is the same Brahman who is present in all His fullness in all objects of the world and in the selves. He only manifested some qualities in their preponderating

1 See Siddhantalesa (ed. Lazaras, 1890), pp. 12-13.

2 anaropitandgantuka-rupena artuvrttir eva samavdya iti idam eva ca tada-tmyam. Purusottama's commentary on Anubhdsya, p. 90.

3 kdryarupena ndndtvam, abhedah kdranatmand hemdtmand yathd'bhedah kundalddydtmand bhedah. Bhdskara-bhdsya, p. 18.

manner in the different forms; multiplicity therefore does not involve any change. It is for this reason that he prefers the term samavayikarana to updddnakdrana] according to him the concept of samavayikarana consists in universal and unconditional pervasion. The concept of updddna involves a concept of change, though the effects caused by the change are maintained by the updddna (or the material cause) and though it ultimately merges into it 1 . So far as the Brahman may be regarded as being one with all the multiplicity, Vallabha is in agreement with Bhaskara.

Vallabha again denies the relation of samavdya, like other Vedantic thinkers, though he regards Brahman as the samavayikarana of the world. His refutation of samavdya follows the same line as that of the other Vedantic interpreters, Sankara and Ramanuja, and need not be repeated here. Samavdya, according to Vallabha, is not a relation of inherence such as is admitted by the Nyaya writers; with him it means identity (tdddtmya). According to the Nyaiyayikas samavdya is the relation of inherence which exists between cause and effect, between qualities and substance, between universals and substance; but Vallabha says, that there is no separate relation of inherence here to combine these pairs; it is the substance itself that appears in action, qualities and as cause and effect. It is thus merely a manifestation of identity in varying forms that gives us the notion of diversity in contraries; in reality there is no difference between the varying forms which are supposed to be associated together by a relation of inherence 2 .

Purusottama, in his Prasthdna-ratndkara, says that mdyd is a power of Brahman, and is thus identical with Him {mdydyd api bhagavac-chaktitvena saktimad-abhinnatvdff ; ; mdyd and avidyd are the same. It is by this mdyd that God manifests Himself as many. This manifestation is neither an error nor a confusion; it is a real manifestation of God in diverse forms without implying the notion of change or transformation. The world is thus real, being a real manifestation of God. Brahman Himself, being of the nature of

1 nanv atrvpdddna-padam parityajya samavdyi-padena kuto vyavahdra iti ced ucyate. loke updddna-padena kartr-kriyayd vydptasya paricchinnasyaivdbhidhdna-darsandt prakrtir hy asyopdddnam iti. Purusottama's commentary, p. 118.

2 nanu diisite samavdye ayuta-siddhayoh kah sambandho'ngikartavyah iti cet tdddtmyam eva iti brumah. katham iti cet ittham pratyaksdd yad-dravyam yad-dravya-samavetam tad taddtmakamiti vydpteh.. .kdrana-kdrya-tdddtmyam dravyayor nirvivddam. Ibid. p. 627.

3 Prasthdna-ratndkara, p. 159.

sat, cit and dnanda, can manifest Himself in His partial aspects in the world without the help of any instrument. It is possible to conceive Brahman in His aspects or characters as knowledge, bliss, activity, time, will, mdya y and prakrti. The kdla represents the kriya-sakti or power of action. The determination of the creation or dissolution through time {kdla) means the limitation of His power of action; determined by this power of action His other parts act consonantly with it. By His will He conceives His selves as different from Him and through different forms thus conceived He manifests Himself; in this way the diverse characters of Brahman manifesting Himself in diverse forms manifest Himself also as differing in diverse ways. Thus, though He is identical with knowledge and bliss, He appears as the possessor of these. The power of God consists in manifesting His nature as pure being, as action and as producing confusion in His nature as pure intelligence. This confusion, manifesting itself as experiential ignorance (which shows itself as egotism), is a part of the may a which creates the world, and which is instrument of God as pure bliss in His manifestation as the world. This mdyd thus appears as a secondary cause beyond the original cause, and may sometimes modify it and thereby act as a cause of God's will. It must, however, be understood that mdyd thus conceived cannot be regarded as the original cause; it serves in the first instance to give full play to the original desire of God to become many; in the second place it serves to create the diversity of the grades of existence as superior and inferior. It is in relation to such manifestation of God's knowledge and action that God may be regarded as the possessor of knowledge and action. The aspect of mdyd as creating confusion is regarded as avidyd. This confused apperception is also of the nature of understanding such as we possess it; through this confused understanding there comes a desire for association with the nature of bliss conceived as having a separate existence and through it come the various efforts constituting the life in the living. It is by virtue of this living that the individual is called jiva. The nature as being when posited or a product of the action appears as inanimate objects, and is later on associated again with action and goes to manifest itself as the bodies of the living. So from His twofold will there sprirg forth from His nature as pure being the material prdnqs, which serve as elements of bondage for the jivas and are but manifestations of His nature as

being: there also spring forth from His nature as pure intelligence the jivas which are the subject of bondage; and there spring forth like sparks from His nature as pure bliss the antaryamins which control the jivas 1 . So among the jivas who are bound there may be some with whom God may be pleased and to whom He may grant the complete power of knowledge; the confusing may a leaves its hold upon such persons; they thus remain in a free state in their nature as pure intelligence, but they have not the power to control the affairs of the Universe.

Brahman may be described in another way from the essential point of view (svarupa) and the causal point of view (karana). From the essential point of view God may be viewed in three aspects, as action, knowledge, and knowledge and action. The causes prescribed in the sacrificial sphere of the Vedas represent His nature in the second aspect. The third aspect is represented in the course of bhakti in which God is represented as the possessor of knowledge, action and bliss. In the aspect as cause we have the concept of the antaryamins, which, though they are in reality of the essential nature of Brahman, are regarded as helping the jivas in their works by presiding over them 2 ; the antaryamins are thus as infinite in number as the jivas. But apart from these antaryamins, God is also regarded as one antaryamin and has been so described in the Antaryami-brahman.

The Categories.

Time is also regarded as a form of God. Activity and nature (karma-svabhavam) are involved in the concept of time or kala. Time in its inner essence consists of being, intelligence, and bliss, though in its phenomenal appearance it is manifest only with a slight tinge of being 3 . It is supra-sensible and can be inferred only from the nature of effects (kdrydnumeya). It may also be defined

1 evam ca ubhabhydm icchdbhydm sac-cid-dnandarupebhyo yathd-yatham prdnadyd jadas cid-amsa-jiva-bandhana-parikara-bhutdh sadamsdh jivas cidamsd bandhanlyd dnanddmsds tan-niydmakd antar-y aminos ca visphulinga-nydyena vyuccaranti. Commentary on Anubhdsya, pp. 161-2.

2 antarydminam sva-rupa-bhtitatve'pi jtvena saha kdrye pravesdt tad-bheddndm dnantye'pi kdranl-bhuta-vaksyamdna-tattva-sarlre pravisya tat-sahdya-karanat kdrana-kotdv eva niveso na tu sva-rupa-kotau. Ibid. pp. 164—5.

3 etasyaiva rupdntaram kala-karma-svabhdvdh kdlasydmsa-bhutau karma-svabhdiau tatra antah-sac-ci-ddnando vyavahdre isat-sattvdmsena prakatah kala iti kdlasya svarupa-laksanam. Ibid. p. 165.

as eternally pervasive and the cause and support of all things. Time is the first cause that disturbs the equilibrium of the gunas. The sun, the moon, etc., are its ddhibhautika forms, the atoms are its ddhyatmika form, and God is its ddhidaivika form. The time that the sun takes in passing an atom is the time-atom; being thus too small it cannot be any further divided. It is only by the conglomeration of the smallest time-units that long spans of time are produced; for time is not one whole of an all-pervasive character of which the smaller units of time are parts.

Karma or action of all descriptions is regarded as universal; it only manifests itself in diverse forms and specific conditions as specific actions of this or that individual. Since it is this universal karma that manifests itself as different actions of diverse men, it is unnecessary to admit adrsta as a separate category belonging to self, which remains after the destruction of a karma and gives its fruit after a remote time; it is also unnecessary to admit dharma and adharma as important categories; for they are all included in the concept of this universal karma, which manifests itself in diverse forms under diverse conditions. The application of the terms dharma and adharma is thus only the method of logical interest; it thus explains how the specific can produce svarga without the intermediary of adrsta, or how the karma of one person [putresti, " sacrifice ") can produce fruit in another, i.e., the son. How a karma should manifest itself in its fruits or with reference to the performer and other persons is determined by the conditions and as explained in the scriptures; the production of a fruit in specific forms in specific centres does not mean its destruction but its disappearance 1 .

Svabhdva ("nature") is admitted as a separate category. It also is identified with God; its function consists in the inducement of God's will. It is therefore defined as that which produces change (parindma-hetutvam tal-laksanam); it is universal and reveals itself by itself before all other things. There may, however, be subtle changes which are not at first noticeable; but, when they become manifest, they presume the function of svabhdva, without which they could not have come about. It is from this that the twenty-

1 tal-laksanam ca vidhi-nisedha-prakarena laukika-kriyabhih pradesato'-bhivyanjana-yogyd vydpikd kriyeti. ..etenaivadrstasyapyatma-gunatvam nirdkrtarn reditavyam. evamcdpurvddrstadharmddharmddipadairapidamevocyate. atah sddhdranye'pi phala-vyavasthopapatier na karma-ndndtvamity api. ddna-himsddau tu dharmddharmddi-prayogo' bhivyanjakatvopddhind bhdktah. Ibid. pp. 168—9.

eight categories have evolved: they are called tattva, because they are of the nature of "that," i.e., God; all lattvas are thus the unfolding of God. The causality involved in the manifestation of svabhdva is a specific causality following a definite cause, and is giving rise to the evolutionary series of the tattvas; in this sense it is different from the causality of God's will, and is only a cause in the general manner. Of these categories sattva may be counted first. Sattva is that which, being of the nature of pleasure and luminosity of knowledge and non-obstructive to the manifestation of pleasure, behaves as the cause of attachment to pleasure and knowledge in individuals 1 . Rajas is that which, being of the nature of attachment, produces clinging or desire for actions in individuals. Tamas is that which produces in individuals a tendency to errors, laziness, sleep, etc. There is a difference between the Samkhya conception of these gunas and Vallabha's characterization of them (which is supposed to follow the Pancardtra, Glta and Bhdgavata). Thus, according to the Samkhya, the gunas operate by themselves; but this is untenable, as it would lead to the theory of natural necessity and atheism. Nor can rajas be defined as being of the nature of sorrow; for the authoritative scriptures speak of its being of the nature of attachment. When these qualities are conceived as being produced from God, they are regarded as being of the nature of mdyd as the power of intelligence and bliss of God 2 . These {sattva, rajas and tamas) should be regarded as identical with mdyd and products of mdyd. Nor are these gunas for the sake of others (pardrtha), as is conceived by the Samkhya; nor are they inextricably mixed up with another, but their co-operation is only for building the purusa. God thus manifests Himself as the form of the mdyd, just as cotton spreads itself as threads. God, as unqualified, produces all His qualities by Himself; in His nature as pure being He produces sattva, in His nature as bliss He produces tamas, in His nature as intelligence He produces rajas 3 .

Purusa or dtman may be defined from three points of view: it may be defined as beginningless, qualityless, the controller of

1 sukhdndvarakatve prakdsakatve sukhdtmakatve ca sati sukhdsktyd jridnd-saktyd ca dehino dehddy-dsakti-janakam sattvam. Commentary on Anubhasya, p. 170.

2 ete ca gund yadd bhagavatah sak r isdd eva utpadyante tada mdyd cic-chakti-rupd dnanda-rupd vijneyd. Ibid. p. 171.

3 sad-amsat sattvam, dnanddmsdt tamah, cidamsdt rajas. Ibid. p. 172.

prakrtt, and apperceivable as the object of the notion of " I"; it may also be defined as purely self-luminous; and, again, as that which, though not in reality affected by the qualities or defects of the universe, is yet associated with them. In the self-being of a self-luminous and blissful nature there is some kind of consciousness and bliss in the absence of all kinds of objects, as in deep dreamless sleep. It is thus consciousness which represents the true nature of the self, which, in our ordinary experience, becomes associated with diverse kinds of ignorance and limits itself by the objects of knowledge. The purusa is one, though it appears as many through the confusing power of maya due to the will of God. The notion of the doer and the enjoyer of experiences is thus due to misconception. It is for this reason that emancipation is possible; for, had not the self been naturally free and emancipated, it would not be possible to liberate it by any means. It is because the self is naturally free that, when once it is liberated, it cannot have any further bondage. If the bondage were of the nature of association of external impurities, then even in emancipation there would be a further chance of association with impurities at any time; it is because all bondage and impurities are due to a misconception that, when once this is broken, there is no further chance of any bondage 1 . Prakrtt, however, is of two kinds: (a) as associated with ignorance, causing the evolutionary series, and (b) as abiding in God and holding all things in God—the Brahman. Jlva, the phenomenal individual, is regarded as a part of the purusa. It may be remembered that the concept of purusa is identical with the concept of Brahman; for this reason the jlva may on the one hand be regarded as a part of the purusa and on the other as part of the Brahman, the unchangeable. The various kinds of experiences of the jlva, though apparently due to karma, are in reality due to God's will; for whomsoever God wishes to raise, He causes to do good works, and, whomsoever He wishes to throw down, He causes to perform bad works. Prakrtt is in its primary sense identical with Brahman; it is a nature of Brahman by which He creates the world. As Brahman is on the one hand identical with the qualities of being, intelligence and bliss, and on

1 evam tasya kevalatve siddhe yas tasmin kartrtvddina sagunatvapratyayah sa srsty-anukula-bhagavad-icchayd prakrty-ddy-aviveka-krtah.. .ata eva ca mukti-yogyatvam. anyathd bandhasya svdbhdvikatvdpattau moksa-sdstra-vaiyarthyd-patteh svdbhdvikasya nasayogdt pravrtti-vidhau tu anusthdna-laksandprdmdnyd-pattes ca...so'yam na nana, kintv-eka eva sarvatra. Ibid. pp. 175—6.

the other hand regarded as associated with them, so also the prakrti may be regarded as the identity of the ganas and also as their possessor. This is the distinction of Vallabha's conception of prakrti from the Samkhya view of it. The other categories of mahat, etc., are also supposed to evolve from the prakrti more or less in the Samkhya fashion: manas, however, is not regarded as an indriya-

The Pramanas.

Purusottama says that knowledge (jndna) is of many kinds. Of these, eternal knowledge (nitya-jndna) is of four kinds: the essential nature of God, in which He is one with all beings and the very essence of emancipation (moksa); the manifestation of His great and noble qualities; His manifestation as the Vedas in the beginning of the creation; His manifestation as verbal knowledge in all know-able forms of the deity. His form as verbal knowledge manifests itself in the individuals; it is for this reason that there can be no knowledge without the association of words—even in the case of the dumb, who have no speech, there are gestures which take the place of language .This is the fifth kind of knowledge. Then there are one kind of sense-knowledge and four kinds of mental knowledge. Of mental knowledge, that which is produced by manas is called doubt (sa?nsaya) ; the function of manas is synthesis (samkalpa) and analysis (vikalpa). The function of buddhi is to produce knowledge as decision, superseding doubt, which is of an oscillatory nature. The knowledge of dreams is from ahamkdra (egoism) as associated with knowledge. Citta perceives the self in the state of deep dreamless sleep. There is thus the fourfold knowledge of the antah-karana; this and sense-knowledge and the previous five kinds of knowledge form the ten kinds of knowledge. From another point of view will (kdma), conceiving (samkalpa), doubt (vicikitsd), faith (sraddhd), absence of faith (asraddhd), patience (dhrti), absence of patience (adhrti), shame (hri), understanding ( dhi), fear (bhl), are all manas. Pleasure and pain also belong to it, because they are not associated with the senses. Knowledge does not stay only for three moments, but stays on until it is superseded by other objects of knowledge, and even then it remains as impression or sartiskdra. This is proved by the fact that manas can discover it in memory when it directs its attention towards it; it is because the manas is

busy with other objects and it ceases to be discovered. Memory can be strengthened by proper exercise, and things can be forgotten or wrongly remembered through diverse kinds of defects; in these cases also knowledge is not destroyed, but only remains hidden through the effect of mdyd.

The knowledge that is associated with the pramdnas is the sdttvika knowledge; the sattva is associated with pramd (or right knowledge), and when it disappears there is error. Pramd is defined as uncontradicted knowledge or knowledge that is not liable to contradiction 1 . The increase of the sattva by which knowledge is produced may be due to various causes, e.g., scriptures, objects, people, country, time, birth, karma, meditation, mantras, purifications, samskdras. The knowledge which is primarily predominant in sattva is the notion that one universal essence is present everywhere; this knowledge alone is absolutely valid. The knowledge which is associated with rajas is not absolutely valid; it is that which we find in all our ordinary or perceptual scientific knowledge, which is liable to errors and correction. This rajas knowledge at the time of its first manifestation is indeterminate in its nature, conveying to us only the being of things. At this stage, however, we have the first application of the senses to the objects which rouse the sattva quality, and there is no association with rajas; as such this indeterminable knowledge, though it forms the beginning of rajas knowledge, may be regarded as sdttvika. Later on, when the manas functions with the senses, we have the samkalpa knowledge, and regard it as rajas. The pure sensory knowledge or sensation is not regarded as inherent in the senses. The sense-operation in the first instance rouses the sattva, and therefore the knowledge produced by the application of the senses in the first instance does not convey with it any of the special qualities of the senses, visual, auditory and the like, but merely the being, which is not the specific quality of any sense, but only a revelation of the nature of sattva; such knowledge, though roused by the senses, does not belong to them. It is by the function of the vikalpa of the manas that this knowledge as pure being assumes distinct forms in association with sense-characteristics. The application of this function is too rapid to be easily apprehended by us, and for this

1 a-bddhita-jndnatvam badha-yogya-vyatiriktatvam vd tal-laksanam.

Prasthdnaratndkara, p. 6.

reason we often fail to detect the prior existence of the nirvikalpa knowledge.

In the case of determinate knowledge, whether it be simple as of a jug, or complex as of a jug on the ground, we have the same procedure of having first through the senses the indeterminate perception of the being, which by a later influence of rajas becomes associated with names and forms; it is the being given by the senses, which appears in names and forms through the influence of the antahkarana as moved by the rajas in association with the senses. The principle followed in perception is analogous to the cosmic appearance of Brahman as manifold, in which the pure Brahman by His will and thought shows Himself as the many, though He remains one in Himself all the time; in the case of perception the senses by their first application cause an influx of sattva, resulting in the apperception of pure being, which later on becomes associated with diverse names and forms through the rajas element of the antahkarana operating with the senses. The determinate knowledge is of two kinds: visista-buddhi and samuhdlambana-buddhi; the former means associated knowledge ("a man with a stick"), and the latter means knowledge as conglomeration of entities ("a stick and a book"). The knowledge of simple objects (such as a jug) is regarded as an associated knowledge. All these varied types of determinate cognitions are in reality of one type, because they all consist of the simple process of a revelation of being by the senses and an attribution of names and forms by the antahkarana.

From another point of view the determinate knowledge can be of five kinds: (i) samsaya (doubt), (ii) viparydsa (error), (iii) niscaya (right knowledge), (iv) smrti (memory), (v) svapna (dream).

Doubt is defined as the apprehension of two or more opposite attributes or characters in the same object {ekasmin dharmini viruddha-ndnd-koty-avagdhi jndnatn samsayam). Error is defined as the apprehension of external objects other than those with which the senses are in contact. Niscaya means right apprehension of objects; such an apprehension must be distinguished from memory, because apprehension (anubhava) always means the intuition of an object, while memory is purely internal though produced by a previous apprehension. Such a right knowledge can be perception, inference, verbal knowledge, and analogy (upamiti, which arises

through the senses associated with a knowledge of similarity: sddrsyddi-sahakrtendriydrtha-samsargajanyd).

This right knowledge can be of two kinds: perception (pratyaksa) and that which is not perception (paroksa). Perception arises from a real contact of the sense and its objects (indriyartha-sat-samprayoga-janyam jnanam) 1 . Memory (smrti) is defined as knowledge which is produced neither by sleep nor by external objects, but by past impressions, which consist of the subtle existence of previous apprehensions. Dream-experiences are special creations, and should therefore be distinguished from the world of things of ordinary experience; they are out of and through mayd by God. This is indeed different from the view of Madhva; for according to him the dream-appearances are without any stuff and should not be regarded as creations; they are mere illusions produced by thought. The dream-appearances being creations according to Vallabha, their knowledge is also to be regarded as real. Dreamless sleep is a special class of dream-experience in which the self manifests itself (tatra dtma-sphuranamtu svata evd). Reflection (as synthesis or analysis, or by the methods of agreement and difference, or as mental doubt, or meditation) is included within memory. Shame, fear (hri, bhi), etc., are the functions of egoism and not cognitive states. Recognition is regarded as right knowledge {niscaya). In the case of firm knowledge growing out of habit the impressions of past knowledge act as a determinant (sahakdri), and in the case of recognition memory acts as a determinant 2 . Recognition is thus regarded as due to memory rather than past impressions. The reason for this preference is that, even though there may be an operation of past impressions, the function of memory is a direct aid to it. Recognition is distinguished from memory in this, that, while the latter is produced directly from past impressions, the former is produced in association with the present perception, directly through the operation of memory, and indirectly through the operation of past impressions.

1 Prasthdnaratnakara, p. 20.

2 abhydsa-janye drdha-pratiti-rupe jnane yatha purvdnubhava-samskdrah sahakdri tathdpratyabhijndydm smrtih sahakdrinl, visesanatdvacchedaka-prakdraka-mscaydrtham tasyd avasyam apeksandt. ato yatha'nugrdhakdntara-pravese'pi yaihdrthdnubhavatvdnapdydd abhydsajndnam micaya-rupam tathd smrtyd visayena ca purva-sthita-jndnasyoddlpandt pratyabhijfid'pi iti jneyam. Ibid. P- 25.

The distinction between right knowledge and error consists in the fact that the latter contains somewhat more than the former; thus, in the case of conch-shell-silver, right knowledge consists in the perception of conch-shell, but false knowledge consists in the further attribution of silver to it; this additional element constitutes error 1 . There may be cases which are partly correct and partly false and in these knowledge may be called right or false according as there is or is not a preponderance of right knowledge. Upon this criterion of Purusottama painting, art creations and impersonations in dramatic perceptions have a preponderance of right knowledge, as they produce through imitation such pleasures as would have been produced by the actual objects which they have imitated.

Purusottama makes a distinction between karana (the instrumental) and karana (the cause). Karana is a unique agent, associated with a dynamic agent with reference to the effects that are to be produced {vydpdravad asddhdranam) ; karana is that seat of power which may produce appearance and disappearance of forms {dvirbhdva-saktyddhdratvam kdranatvam). That which produces particular forms, or works for the disappearance of certain forms, is regarded as corresponding causes; hence the power which can make the effects of a material cause manifest for our operation is regarded as the dvirbhdva-karana of that effect. Avirbhdva, "manifestation of appearances," is that aspect of things by which or in terms of which they may be experienced or may be operated upon, and its negation is "disappearance" {tirobhdva) 2 . These powers of manifestation and disappearance belong primarily to God, and secondarily to objects with which He has associated them in specific ways. The Naiyayika definition of cause as invariable unconditional antecedent of the effect is regarded as invalid, inasmuch as it involves a mutual dependence. Invariable antecedence to an effect involves the notion of causality and the notion of causality involves invariable antecedence; so unconditionality involves the notion of causality and causality involves unconditionality.

Cause is of two kinds: identity (tdddtmya, also called samavdyi), and instrument. This identity however involves the notion of

1 bhrama-pramd-samuhdlambanam tu, eka-desa-vikrtam ananyavad bhavatlti nydyena bhramddhikye viparyasa eva. pramadhikye ca niscayah. Prasthdnarat-ndkara, pp.25-6.

2 updddnasya kdryam yd vyavahdra-gocaram karoti sd saktir dvirbhdvikd. dvirbhdvasca vyavahdra-yogyatvam. tirobfidvasca tadayogyatvam. Ibid. p. 26.

identity-in-difference, in which difference appears as a mode of the identity which is to be regarded as the essence of causality. Purusottama discards the notion of substance and quality, which is explained on the basis of the relation of samavdya, and in which substance is regarded as the cause of quality; a quality is only an appearance simultaneous with the substance, and the latter cannot be regarded as the cause of the former. The concept of material cause (updddna-kdrana) is of two kinds: unchanging (e.g., the earth unchanging, in jugs, etc.), and changing (e.g., knowledge appearing as a function of the mind, the instrumental cause). The contact of parts or movement involved in the material cause is not regarded as a separate cause, as it is by the Naiyayika, but is regarded as a part of the material cause.

The nature of concomitance that determines the nature of a hetu is of two kinds: anvaya and vyatireka. Anvaya means agreement in presence of an element such that to its sole presence (in the midst of many irrelevant elements or conditions present with it) the effect is due 1 . Vyatireka means the negation of that element which involves the negation of the effect, i.e., that element which does not exist if the effect is absent (kdrydtirekenanavasthdnam). The causal movement (vydpdra) is that which exists as a link between the cause and the effect; thus sense-object contact has for its dynamic cause the movement of the senses. In the case of God's will no dynamic movement is regarded necessary for the production of the world.

The pratyaksa pramdna, the means of perceptual experience, is defined as the sense-faculties corresponding to the different kinds of perception. There are thus six pramdnas, viz., visual, tactual, gustatory, auditory, olfactory and mental; as opposed to the monistic Vedantic view of Sankara, manas is regarded here as a sense-faculty. All faculties are regarded as being atomic in their nature. The visual organ can perceive colours only when there is a " manifested colour" (udbhuta-riipavattva); the atoms of ghosts are not visible because they have no manifested colour. So for perception of all sense-qualities by the corresponding senses we have to admit that the sense-qualities, of touch, of smell, etc., must be manifested in order to be perceived.

1 Tatra sva-sva-vyapyetara-ydvat-kdrana-sattve yat-sattve avasyam yat-sattvam anvayah. Ibid. p. 32.

In agreement with the monistic Vedanta of Sankara tamas (darkness) is regarded here as a separate category and not as the mere negation of light. Negation itself is regarded as the positive existence of the locus in which the negation appears with specific reference to the appearance or disappearance of the negated object. Thus in the case of negation-precedent-to-production {prdg-abhdvd) of a jug, the simple material cause which will be helpful to the production or the appearance of the jug is regarded as the negative-precedent-to-production of the jug. In the case of negation of destruction (dhvamsdbhdva) the cause is helpful to the disappearance of the jug, and is thus associated with the special quality that is regarded as the negation of destruction. The concept of negation is thus included in the conception of the cause; negation is thus a specific mode of samavdyi kdrana and therefore identical with it.

Regarding the manner in which visual cognitions of things are possible, the Samkhya and Vedanta uphold the subsistence of a vrtti {vrtti means mental state). When after looking at a thing we shut our eyes, there is an after-image of the object. This after-image cannot belong to the object itself, because our eyes are shut; it must itself belong to the ahamkdra or the buddhi. It is supposed by the Samkhya and the Vedanta that this vrtti goes to external objects near and far and thereby produces a relation between the buddhi and the object. It may naturally be objected that this vrtti is not a substance and therefore cannot travel far and wide. The Samkhya and the Vedanta reply again that, since such travelling is proved by the facts of perception, we have to admit it; there is no rule that only existing substances should be able to travel and that in the absence of substance there should be no travelling. The Naiyayikas, however, think that certain rays emanate from the eye and go to the object, sense-contact is thereby produced in association with the manas and dtman, and the result is sense-cognition; they therefore do not admit the existence of a separate vrtti. Purusottama, however, admits the vrtti, but not in the same way as the Vedantists and the Samkhya; according to him this vrtti is a state of the buddhi which has been roused through the category of time and has manifested a preponderance of sattva quality. Time is hereby admitted as a category existing in the buddhi and not in the senses as it is in the Vedanta of Sankara (explained by Dharmaraja-dhvarindra in

the Veddnta-paribhdsa). According to him time does not possess any colour, but can yet be perceived by the visual organs. But according to Purusottama time is a determinant of the buddhi and is the agent responsible, along with other accessories, for mental illumination; he says further that rays from the object penetrate the eye-ball and produce there certain impressions which remain even when the rays are cut off by the shutting of the eye. These retinal impressions are accessory to the production of illumination in the buddhi as the manifestation of sattva-guna 1 . Vrtti is thus a condition of buddhi.

In the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver it is supposed that by the power of rajas the impressions of silver experienced before are projected on to the object of perception, and by tamas the nature of conch-shell as such is obscured; in this manner a conch-shell is perceived as silver.

The indeterminate knowledge arises at that stage in which the buddhi functions at the first moment of sense-operation; and it becomes determinate when in association with the sense-faculty there is modification in the buddhi as vrtti. Though with the rise of one vrtti a previous one disappears, it still persists in the form of impression (samskdra) ; when these samskdras are later roused by specific causes or conditions, we have memory.

The intuition of God is not, however, produced by the ordinary method of perception only by God's grace, which is the seed of bhakti in all, can His nature be intuited; in the individual this grace manifests itself as devotion 2 .

1 ukta-sannikarsa-janyam api savikalpakam jndnam caksusadi-bhedena buddhi-vrttyd janyata iti vrttir vicdryate. tatra netra-mmllane krte bahir-drsta-paddrthasyeva kasciddk/iro netrdntarbhdsate. sa dkdro na bahya-vastunah. asrayam atihdya tatra tasydsakya-vacanatvdt. atah sa dntarasyaiva kasyacana bhavitum arhatlti

yd buddhi-vrttih satnskdrddhdnddyartham janyata ity ucyate sa vrttir buddher na tattvdntaram ndpy antahkar ana-par indmdntaram. kintu buddhi-tattvasya kdla-ksubdha-sattvddi-guna-krto'vasthd-visesa eva. na ca tasyavasthd-visesatve nirgamdbhdvena visaydsamsargdt tad-dkdrakatvam vrtter durghatatvam iti san-kyam. mdyd-gunasya rajasascancalatvena viksepakatvena ca darpane mukhasyeva netra-golake'pi bdhya-visaydkdra-samarpana-tad-dkdrasya sughatatvdt. sa evam mdyika dkdro nayana-kiranesu netra-mudranepratydvrttesu golakdntar anubhuyate. Prasthdnaratndkara, pp. 123—5.

2 varanam canugrahah. sa ca dharmdntaram eva, na tu phaldditsd. yasyd-nugraham icchdmltivdkydt. sa ca bhakti-blja-bhutah. ato bhaktyd mam abhijdndti, bhaktyd tvananyayd sakyah bhaktyd'ham ekayd grdhya ity ddisu na virodhah. Ibid. p. 137.

Inference (anumdna) as a pramdna is defined as instrument by which influential knowledge is attained; in other words, inference is the knowledge which is derived through the mediation of other knowledge, a process which is, of course, affected by the knowledge of concomitance (vydpti-jndna). Vydpti means the unconditioned existence of hetu in the sddhya, i.e., where there is a hetu, there is a sddhya, and wherever there is absence of sddhya, there is absence of hetu; hetu is that by which one proceeds to carry on an inference, and sddhya is affirmation or denial. Following the Sdmkhya-pravacana-sutra Purusottama says that, when there is an unconditional existence of one quality or character in another, there may be either a mutual or a one-sided concomitance between them; when the circle of the hetu coincides with the circle of the sddhya, we have samavydpti, and when the circle of the hetu falls within the circle of the sddhya, there is visama-vydpti 1 .

Purusottama does not admit the kevaldnvayi form of inference; for in the Brahman there is the absence of the sddhya. The objection that such a definition will not hold good in the case of inference (where no negative existences are available), namely, that it is knowledge because it is definable, is invalid; for the Brahman is neither know-able nor definable. Even when an object is knowable in one form, it may be not knowable in another form. So even in the aforesaid inference negative instances are available; therefore the kevaldnvayi form of inference, where it is supposed that concomitance is to be determined only by agreement, cannot be accepted 2 .

When the co-existence of the hetu with the sddhya is seen in one instance or in many, it rouses the part-impressions and though in the memory of them necessary co-existence, and, following that, the hetu determines the sddhya. When we see in the kitchen the coexistence of fire and smoke, the necessary co-existence of the smoke with the fire is known; then later on, when smoke is seen in the hill and the co-existence of the smoke with the fire is remembered, the smoke determines the existence of the fire: this right knowledge is called anumiti. It is the linga that is the cause of the anumiti. Two

1 niyata-dharma-sdhitye ubhayor ekatarasya vd vydptir iti. ubhayoh sama-vydptikayoh krtakatvdnityatvddi-rupayorekatarasya zisama-zydptikasya dhumd-der niyata-dharrna-sdhitye a-vyabhicarita-dharma-rupe sdmdnddhikaranye vydptih. Prasthamiratndkara, pp. 139—40.

2 sarvatrdpi kenacid rupena jiieyatvddi-sattT'e'pi rupdntarena tad-abhdvasya sarvajanJnatvdc ca kevaldm-ayi-sddhyakdnumdnasyaivdbhdvdt. Ibid. p. 141.

kinds of anumdna are admitted by Purusottama, viz., kevala-vyatireki, where positive instances are not available and the concomitance is only through negation, and anvaya-vyatireki, where the concomitance is known through the joint method of agreement and difference.

Five propositions are generally admitted for convincing others by inference; these are pratijnd, hetu, uddharana, upanaya, and nigamana. Thus "the hill is fiery" is the pratijnd, "because it is smoky" is the hetu, "as in the case in the kitchen" is the uddharana, "whatever is smoky is fiery and whatever is not so is not so" is the upanaya, "therefore the smoke now visible is also associated with fire" is nigamana. But these need not be regarded as separate propositions; they are parts of one synthetic proposition 1 . But Purusottama in reality prefers these three, viz., pratijnd, hetu and drstdnta.

Purusottama does not admit either upamdna or anupalabdhi as separate pramdnas. Upamdna is the pramdna by which a previous knowledge of similarity between two objects of which one is known enables one to know the other when one sees it; thus a man who does not know a buffalo, but is told that it is similar in appearance to the cow, sees the buffalo in the forest and knows it to be a buffalo. The sight of it makes him remember that a buffalo is an animal which is similar in appearance to the cow, and thus he knows it is a buffalo. Here perception as helped by memory of similarity is the cause of the new apprehension of the animal as a buffalo; what is called upamdna thus falls within perception.

Purusottama also admits arthdpatti, or implication, as separate pramdna, in the manner of Parthasarathimisra. This arthdpatti is to be distinguished from inference. A specific case of it may be illustrated by the example in which one assumes the existence of someone outside the house when he is not found inside; the knowledge of the absence of a living person from the house is not connected with the knowledge of the same man's presence outside the house as cause and effect, and yet they are simultaneous. It is by the assumption of the living individual outside the house that his non-existence in the house can be understood; the complex notion of life and non-existence in the house induces the notion of his existence outside the house. It is the inherent contradiction that

1 Ibid. p. 143.

leads us from the known fact to the unknown, and as such it is regarded as a separate pramdna.

Purusottama thinks that in some cases where knowledge is due to the accessory influence of memory its validity is not spontaneous, but is to be derived only through corroborative sources, whereas there may be other cases where knowledge may be self-valid.

Concept of bhakti.

Madhva, Vallabha and Jlva GosvamI were all indebted to the Bhdgavata-purana, and held it in high reverence; Madhva wrote Bhdgavata-tdtparya, Jlva GosvamI Sat-sandarbha, and Vallabha wrote not only a commentary on the Bhdgavata (the Subodhini) but also a commentary {Prakdsa) on his own kdrikds, the Tattvadipa, based on the teachings of the Bhdgavata. The Tattvadipa consists of four books: the Sdstrdrthanirupana, the Sarvanirnaya of four chapters, Pramdna, Prameya-phala, and the Sddhand, of which the first contains 83 verses, the second 100 verses, the third no and the fourth 35. The third book, of 1837 verses, contains observations on the twelve skandhas of the Bhdgavata-purana. The fourth book, which dealt with bhakti, is found only in a fragmentary condition. This last has two commentaries on it, the Nibandha-tippana, by Kalyanaraja, and one by Gotthulal (otherwise called Balakrsna). The Prakdsa commentary on the kdrikds was commented upon by Purusottama in the Avarana-bhanga, but the entire work has not been available to the present writer. According to the Tattvadipa the only sdstra is the Gild, which is sung by the Lord Himself, the only God is Krsna the son of DevakI, the mantras are only His name and the only work is the service of God, the Vedas, the words of Krsna (forming the smrtis), the sutras of Vyasa and their explanations by Vyasa (forming the Bhdgavata) are their four pramdnas. If there are any doubts regarding the Vedas, they are solved by the words of Krsna; any doubts regarding the latter are explained by reference to the sutras, and difficulties about the Vydsa-sutras are to be explained by the Bhdgavata. So far as the other smrtis are concerned, such as that of Manu and others, only so much of them is valid as is in consonance with these; but, if they are found contradictory in any part, they are to be treated as invalid. The true object of the sdstras is

devotion to Hari, and the wise man who takes to devotion is best of all; yet there have been many systems of thought which produce delusion by preaching creeds other than that of bhakti. There is no greater delusion than devoting oneself to sdstras and not to God; such devotees are always under bondage and suffer birth and rebirth. The culmination of one's knowledge is omniscience, the culmination of dharma is the contentment of one's mind, the culmination of bhakti is when God is pleased. With mukti there is destruction of birth and rebirth; but the world, being a manifestation of Brahman, is never destroyed except when Krsna wishes to take it back within Himself. Wisdom and ignorance are both constituents of mdyd.

Bhakti consists in firm and overwhelming affection for God with a full sense of His greatness; through this alone can there be emancipation 1 . Though bhakti is the sddhand and moksa is the goal, yet it is the sddhand stage that is the best. Those who enter into the bliss of Brahman have the experience of that bliss in their selves; but those devotees who do not enter into this state nor into the state of jivan-mukti, but enjoy God with all their senses and the antahkarana, are better than the jivan-muktas, though they may be ordinary householders 2 .

The jiva is atomic in nature, but yet, since the bliss of God is manifested in it, it may be regarded as all-pervasive. Its nature as pure intelligence cannot be perceived by the ordinary senses, but only by yoga, or knowledge through that special vision by which one sees God. The views of the monistic Vedanta that the jivas are due to avidyd is repudiated on the ground that, if avidyd was destroyed by right knowledge, the bodily structure of the individual formed through the illusion of avidyd would immediately be destroyed and as jivan-mukti would be possible.

Brahman is described here as sacciddnanda —all-pervasive, independent, omniscient. He is devoid of any reduplication, either of this class or of a different class or as existing in Him— i.e., jivas,

1 mdhdtm.ya-jndna-pu.rvas tu sudrdhah sarvato'dhikah, sneho bhaktir iti proktas tayd muktir na cdnyathd.

Tattvdrthadlpa, p. 65.

2 sva-tantra-bhaktdndm tu gopikddi-tulydndm sarvendriyais tathd'ntah-karanaih sva-rupena cd'nanddnubhavah. ato bhaktdndm jivan-muktyapeksayd bhagavat-krpd-sahita-grhdsrama eva visisyate. Vallabha's commentary on Tattvadlpana, p. 77.

the material world and the antarydmi: these are the three forms of God, they are not different from Him 1 . He is also associated with a thousand other noble qualities, purity, nobility, kindness, etc.; He is the upholder of the universe, controller of mdyd. God is on the one hand the samavaya and the nimittakdrana of the world, delights in His creation, and sometimes takes delight in withdrawing it within Himself; He is the repository of all contradictory qualities and causes delusion in various forms and appearances and disappearances of worldly manifestation. He is the changeable as well as the unchangeable 2 . Since the creation is a manifestation of Himself, the diversity of existence and the diversity in the distribution of pleasure and pain cannot make Him liable to the charge of cruelty or partiality. The attempt to explain diversity as due to karma leads to the further difficulty that God is dependent on karma and is not independent; it also leaves unexplained why different persons should perform different karmas. If God as antarydmin Himself makes us perform good or bad actions, He cannot also make us responsible for the same and distribute happiness to some and displeasure to others: but on the view that the whole creation is self-creative and that self-manifestation and the jivas are nothing but God all these difficulties are removed 3 . God is the creator of the world, yet He is not saguna, possessed of qualities; for the simple reason that the elements that constitute His qualities cannot stand against Him and deprive Him of His independence. Since He is the controller of the qualities, their existence and non-existence depend on Him. The conception of the freedom of God thus necessarily leads to the concept of His being both saguna and nirguna. The view of Sankara that Brahman appears as the world through the bondage of avidyd is a delusive teaching (pratdrand-sdstra), because it lowers the dignity of God, and it should be rejected by all devotees.

1 sa-jdtlya-vijdtlya-sva-gata-dvaita-varjitam. . . . sa-jdtlyd jlvd, vijdtiya jaddh, sva-gatd antar-ydminah. trisv api bhagavdn anusyutas trirupas ca bhavatlti tair nirupitam dvaitam bhedas tad varjitam. Tattvdrthadlpa and the commentary on it, p. 106.

2 sarva-vdddnavasaram ndnd-vdddnurodhi tat. ananta-murti tad brahma kutastham calam eva ca. ■ciruddha-sarva-dharmdnamdsrayam yukty-agocaram. dzirbhdza-tirobhdvair mohanam bahu-rupatah. Ibid. p. 115.

3 dtma-srfter na vaisamyam nairghrnyam cdpi vidyate. pakfdntare'pi karma sydn niyatam tat punar brhat.

Ibid. pp. 129-30.

He who thinks of God as all and of himself as emanating from Him, and who serves Him with love, is a devotee. In the absence of either knowledge or love we have only a lower kind of devotee; but in the absence of both one cannot be a devotee, though by listening to the scriptures one may remove one's sins. The highest devotee leaves everything; his mind is filled with Krsna alone; for him there is no wife, no home, no sons, no friends, no riches, but he is wholly absorbed in the love of God. No one, however, can take the path of bhakti except through the grace of God. Karma itself, being of the nature of God's will, manifests itself as His mercy or anger to the devotee; He approaches with His mercy and relieves him even if he be in a low state, and those who do not obey His commands or proceed in the wrong path He approaches with anger and causes to suffer. It is said that the law of karma is mysterious; the reason is that we do not know the manner in which God's will manifests itself; sometimes by His grace He may even save a sinner, who may not have to take the punishment due to him.

In the Sdndilya-sutra bhakti is defined as the highest attachment (pardnurakti) to God. Anurakti is the same as rdga; so the sutra " pardnuraktir isvare" means highest attachment to the object of worship (drddhya-visayaka-rdgatvam) 1 . This attachment is associated with pleasure (sukha-niyato rdga). We remember that in the Visnu-purdna Prahlada expresses the wish that he may have that attachment to God that is experienced with regard to sense-objects 2 . One must find supreme pleasure in God; it is this natural and spontaneous attachment to God that is called bhakti 3 . Even if there is no notion of worship, but merely love, there also we can apply the term bhakti, as in the case of gopts towards Krsna. But ordinarily it arises from the notion of the greatness of God. This devotion, being of the nature of attachment, is associated with will and not with action; just as in the case of knowledge no action is necessary, but the only result is enlightenment, so the will that tends

1 £dndilya-sutra, l. 2. (commentary by Svapnesvara).

2 yd prltir a-vivekdndm visayesv anapdyiril, tarn unusmaratah sd me hrdaydn mdpasarpatu.

Visnu-purdna, 1. 20. 19.

3 Compare Gltd, x. 9:

mac-cittd mad-gata-prdnd bodhayantah paras-param kathayantas ca mam nityam tusyantica rarranti ca

to God is satisfied with devotion or attachment 1 . Bhakti cannot also be regarded as knowledge: jndna and bhajana are two different concepts. Knowledge may be only indirectly necessary for attachment, but attachment does not lead to knowledge. A young woman may love a young man; this love does not lead to any new knowledge, but finds its fulfilment in the love itself. In the Visnu-purana we hear of the gopis' attachment of emancipation through excess of love; so attachment may lead to emancipation without any knowledge" 2 . Yoga, however, is accessory both to knowledge and to bhakti. Bhakti is different also from sraddha (or faith), which may be an accessory even to karma. According to Kasya bhakti with the notion of the majesty of God leads to emancipation. According to Badarayana this emancipation consists in the nature of self as pure intelligence. According to Sandilya emancipation is associated with the notion of transcendence, immanence in the self. Through an excess of devotion understanding of the buddhi is dissolved in the bliss of God; it is this buddhi which is the upddhi or condition through which God manifests Himself as the jwa.

Gopesvarajl Maharaja, in his Bhakti-martanda, follows the interpretation of bhakti in the Sandilya-sutra and enters into a long discussion regarding its exact connotation. He denies that bhakti is a kind of knowledge or a kind of sraddha (or faith); nor is bhakti a kind of action or worship. Ramanuja defines bhakti as dhruvam smrti, and regards it as only a kind of knowledge. Various forms of worship or prescribed ritual connected therewith lead to bhakti, but they cannot themselves be regarded as bhakti. In the Bhakti-cintdmani, bhakti has been defined as yoge viyogavrttiprema, i.e., it is that form of love in which even when the two are together they are afraid of being dissociated and when they are not together they have a painful desire for union 3 . Sandilya, Haridasa and Guptacarya also follow the same view. Govinda Chakravarti, however, defines

1 na kriydkrty-apeksand jiidnavat. Sdndilya-sutra, I. i. 7. sd bhaktir na kriydtmikd bhavitum arhati prayatndnuvedhdbhdvdt. Commentary on Svapnes-vara.

2 tathdpi brahma-visayinydh rater brahma-visaya-jndnopakdrakatvam na pratyaksa-gamyam. kintu tarunyddeh ratau tathddarsanena brahmagocardydm apy anumdtavyam. Svapnesvara's commentary on—1. 2. 15, ibid.

3 A-drfte darsanotkanthd drste vislesa-bhirutd nddrftena na drftena bhavatd labhyate sukham.

Bhakti-martanda, p. 75.

this love as the yearning which never ceases even in spite of many difficulties and dangers 1 , and Paramartha Thakkuna, in his Premalaksana-candrikd 2 , as an unspeakable yearning referring to an object. Visvanatha, in his Premarasdyina, defines it as a loving yearning or desire. Gunakara supplements the view of the Bhakti-cintdmani and defines it as that which culminates in intense enjoyment 3 .

Gopesvarajl Maharaja differs from all these definitions of bhakti that regard yearning and desire as its principal element. No desire can be an object of desire (purusdrtha); in the love of a son or any other dear relation we do not find any kind of desire playing a part; moreover desire refers to an unattained object, while bhakti, attachment, is not so.

Some say that bhakti is the cause of the melting of the mind; that is not acceptable either, for it has no reference to the object. There are others who define it as the object or condition with reference to which the amorous sentiment called love flows 4 . This definition is too wide, because all bhakti must have a reference to God, and according to it bhakti becomes a part of sex-sentiment. Gopesvarajl, however, refers to the Tattvadipa-prakdsa of Vallabha and accepts the view there adopted, according to which bhakti is composed of the root bhaj and suffix kti\ the suffix means "love" and the root "service." It is the general rule that root and suffix together form a complete meaning in which the meaning of the suffix is dominant; bhakti thus means the action of bhaj, i.e., service (sevd). Sevd (service) is a bodily affair (e.g., strisevd, ausadhasevd). Service, in order that it may be complete, implies love, and without love the service would be troublesome, but not desirable; love also for its completion requires service. This view has been objected to by Purusottama in his Bhakti-hamsa-vivrti.

Referring to the Tattva-dlpa-prakdia Gopesvarajl Maharaja thinks that according to Vallabha bhakti means sneha or affection, but, if we take the word analytically, it means sevd or service; he thinks that both prema and sevd form the connotative meaning of

1 gddha-vyasana-sdhasra-sampdte'pi nir-antaram na hlyate yadtheti svddu tat prema-laksanam. Ibid.

2 vastu-mdtra-visayini vacandnarhd samlhd prema. Ibid.

3 yathd yoge viyoga-vrttih prema tathd viyoge yoga-vrttir api prema. Ibid. * yam upadhim samdsritya rasa ddyo nigadyate tarn

upddhim budhottamsdh premeti paricaksata. Ibid. p. 76.

bhakti 1 . He, however, develops further the concept of bhakti, and says that the idea of sevd forming the connotation of bhakti means the state of mind which slowly lowers down and merges itself into God 2 .

One of the results of bhakti or rather one of its characteristics has been described as the oneness of all with the self (sarvdtma-bhdva). Through the deep notion of love one sees everywhere one's beloved, and even in separation one always perceives one's beloved round one; but, God being all, it is natural that through intense attachment to Him one should perceive Him in all things; for these are all manifestations of God 3 . This identity of the self with all cannot be regarded as an illustration of Vedantic monism, as is explained by the followers of maryada-marga ; it is associated with intense love. This view of the pusti-mdrga (Vallabha school) is also shared by Haricarana, who is quoted by Gopesvara in support of his own view 4 .

Bhakti is regarded as parallel to the other rasas described in the alamkdra-sdstra; as such, it affects the manas and the body with intense delight, coalescing with God, as it were 5 ; affection is thus the dominant phase (sthdyi-bhava) of the bhakti-rasa. Some have defined it as a reflection of God in the melted heart; this has been objected to both by Purusottama in his Pratibimba-vdda and by Gopesvara on the ground that formless God cannot have His reflection, and also on the ground that this would

1 prema-yurvdkam kdyika-vydpdratvam bhaktitvam...athavd sri-krsna-visayaka-prema-purvaka-kdyika-vydpdratvam. Bhakti-mdrtanda, p. 79.

2 tasmin krsne purvam dvarjitam tata dyattam tadadhlnam tatah kramena

bhagavad-ekatdnam gambhlratdm prdptam yac cetas tad eva sevdrupam.

samddhdv iva bhagavati layam prdptam iti ydvat. Ibid. p. 82.

He further quotes a passage from Vallabha's Bhakti-vardhinl in support of his statement:

tatah prema tathd saktir vyasanafica yadd bhaved iti,

yadd sydd vyasanam krsne krtdrthah sydt tadaivahi. Ibid. p. 82.

3 vigddha-bhdvena sarvatra tathdnubhava-rupam yat kdryam tddriapriya-tvdnubhavah, iti sarvdtma-bhdvo laksitah. Bhdsya-prakdsa on Brahma-sutra, que 'ed in Bhakti-mdrtanda, p. 85.

4 atah sarvdtma-bhdvo hi tydgdtmdpeksayd yutah bhdva-

svarupaphalakah sva-sambandha-prakdiakah. dehddi-sphurti-rahito visaya-tydga-pilrvakah bhdvdtma-kdma-sambandhi-ramanddi-kriydh. sva-tantra-bhahti-sabddkhyah phaldtmd jndyatdm janaih.

Ibid. p. 86.

5 yatra manahsarvendriydndm dnanda-mdtra-kara-pdda-mukhodarddi-bhagavad-rupatd tatra bhakti-rasa eva. Ibid. p. 102.

make bhakti identical with God, and it is difficult to identify affection with the melting of the heart 1 . If dtmdnubhava be understood merely as the comprehension of identity with the self, in the fashion of Sahkara monism, then there would be no pleasure in the attachment of God 2 .

The assertion of the philosophic identity of the self and the Brahman is only for the purpose of strengthening the nature of bhakti] it merely shows that the oneness that is felt through attachment can also be philosophically supported. In the intensity of love there is revealed a feeling of oneness with Krsna which is to be regarded as one of the transitory phases (vydbhicdri bhava) of the emotion of bhakti, of which affection is the dominant phase (sthdyi bhava); the feeling of oneness is thus not the culminating result, but only a transitory phase. Thus bhakti does not result finally in knowledge; knowledge is an anga of bhakti 3 . As God is spiritual, so also is bhakti spiritual; as by the measures of fire objects become more or less heated, so relative proximity to God gives an experience of greater or less intensity of bhakti*.

Bhakti may be classified as phala-rupa ("fruit"), as sddhana-rilpa ("means"), and as saguna. The saguna-bhakti is of three kinds, as forming part of different kinds of meditation, as part of knowledge, and as part of karma. These again may be of eighty-one kinds, as associated with different kinds of quality. Bhakti as a phala is of one kind, and as sddhand (" means") is of two kinds, viz., as part of knowledge (jndndngabhuta), and as directly leading to emancipation (bhaktih svatantryena muktiddtri). The jndndngabhuta-bhakti is itself of two kinds, as saguna and nirguna, of which the former is of three kinds, jiidna-misra, vairdgya-misra and kartna-

1 It is interesting to refer here to the definition of bhakti as given by jlva in the Sat-sandarbha (p. 274), where bhakti is described as a dual existence in God, and, the bhakta being itself of the nature of blissful experience, sva-rupasakteh sdrabhutd hlddinl noma yd vrttis tasyd eva sdrabhuta-vrttiviseso bhaktih sa ca ratyaparaparydyd. bhaktir bhavati bhaktesu ca niksipta-nijdbhayakotih sarvadd tisthati. ata evoktam bhagavdn bhakto bhaktimdn.

2 kena kam pasyet iti sruteh bheda-vilopakatvena bhajandnanddntardya-bhutam yadi svdlmatvena jndnam sampddayed bhajandndam nddadydt.

Bhakti-mdrtanda, p. 136.

3 ati-gddha-bhdvo > bhedasphurtir api ek ovydbhicdribhdvah. na tu sdrvadika-stadd svdtmdnam tattvena visimsanti. Ibid. p. 139.

* yathd bhagavdn mdnaslyas tadvad bhagavatsambandha-naikatydt tnana-sydvirbhavantl bhaktir api mano-dharmatvena vyavahriyate. yathd vahni-naikatya-tdratamyena bhaktyanubhava-tdratamyam. Ibid. p. 142.

d iv 23

misra. The jndna-misra ("mixed with knowledge") may be of three kinds, high, middling and lower. The vairdgya-misra ("mixed with detachment") is only of one kind. The karma-misra ("mixed with action") is of three kinds.

The principal means by which bhakti is attained through the grace of God is purity of heart. There are sixteen means prescribed for attaining purity of heart, of which some are external and some internal. The three externals are ablutions, sacrifices and image-worship. The practice of meditation of God in all things is the fourth. The development of the sattva character of the mind is the fifth. Abnegation of all karmas and cessation of attachment is the sixth; showing reverence to the revered is the seventh. Kindness to the poor is the eighth. To regard all beings as one's equals and friends is the ninth. Yamas and niyamas are the tenth and eleventh respectively. Listening to the scriptures from teachers is the twelfth, and listening to and chanting of God's name is the thirteenth. Universal sincerity is the fourteenth. Good association is the fifteenth. Absence of egoism is the sixteenth.

There is however a difference of view between two important schools of the bhakti-path. Those who follow the maryddd-bhakti think that bhakti is attainable by one's own efforts in following specific courses of duties and practices; the followers of the pusti-bhakti think that even without any effort bhakti can be attained by the grace of God alone 1 .

The Vallabhas belong to the pusti-bhakti school and therefore do not admit the absolute necessity of personal effort. The followers of the marvddd school also agree that the sadhanas are to be followed only so long as affection does not show itself; when once that has manifested itself, the sadhanas can no longer be regarded as determining it, for it manifests itself spontaneously. For the followers of the pusti school the sadhanas can at no stage determine the bhakti; for it is generated through the grace of God {pustimarge varanam eva sadhanam). According to the maryddd school sins are destroyed by the practice of the sadhanas and emancipation attained through the rise of affection. To the followers of the pusti school the grace of God is sufficient to destroy obstructions of sins, and there is no definite order about the practices following affection or

1 krti-sddhya-sddhana-sddhya-bliaktir maryddd-bhaktih tadrahitdndm bhaga-vad-anugrahaika-prdpya-pusti-bhaktih. Hliakti-mdrtanda, p. 151.

affection following the practices 1 . In the Pancardtra bhakti is defined as affection associated with the majesty of God; but the association of the majesty of God is not a necessary part of bhakti. Purusottama defines bhakti as attachment to God with detachment from all fruits. Purity of mind can be attained both by knowledge and bhakti as produced by pusti or the grace of God; so the only condition that can be attached to the rise of affection is the grace of God.

It is impossible to say for what reason God is pleased to extend His grace; it cannot be for the relief of suffering, since there are many sufferers to whom God does not do so. It is a special character of God, by which He adapts certain people for manifesting His grace through them.

As regards the fruit of bhakti, there are diverse opinions. Vallabha has said in his Sevdphala-vivrti that as a result of it one may attain a great power of experiencing the nature of God (a-laukika-sdmarthya), or may also have the experience of continual contact with God (sdjujya), and also may have a body befitting the service of God (sevopayogi deha). This is his description of the pusti-mdrga. He has also described two other margas, the pravdha and the maryddd, in his Pusti-pravdha-maryddd. The pravdha-mdrga consists of the Vedic duties which carry on the processes of birth and rebirth. Those however who do not transgress the Vedic laws are said to belong to the maryddd-mdrga. The pusti-mdrga differs from the other two margas in this, that it depends upon the grace of God and not on Vedic deeds 2 ; its fruits are therefore superior to those of other margas 3 .

Vallabha, in his Bhakti-vardhini, says that the seed of bhakti exists as prema or affection due to the grace of God, and, when it is firm, it increases by renunciation, by listening to the bhakti-sdstra, and by chanting God's name. The seed becomes strong when in

1 maryadaydm hi sravanddibhih pdpaksaye premotpattis tato muktih. pujti-mdrgdiigikrtes tu atyanugraha-sddhyatvena Ultra pdpdder aprati-bandhakatvdc chravanadirupd premarupd ca yugapat paurvdparyena vd vaiparltyena vd bhavati. Ibid. p. 152.

2 ato redoktatve'pi veda-tatparya-gocuratve'pi jlva-krtavaidha-sddhanesvu-praveidt tad-asddhya-sudhandt phala-railaksanydc ca sva-rupatah kdryatah phalatai cotkarsdc ca vedokta-sddhanebhyo'pi bhinnaiva tat taddkdrikd pusfir-astityato hetoh siddham iti mdrga-trayo'tra na sandeha ityarthah.

Commentary on Pusti-pravdha-maryddd-bhedah, p. 8.

3 vest* sddhana-dvdrd bhaklyabhivyaktih tesu sd anudbhutd bfidva-rupena manasi tisthati, tatah pujadisu sddlianes zanusthlyamdnesu premddi-riipena kramdd udbhutd bhavati. Bhakti-vardhirii-zivrti (by Purusottama), sloka 5.

the householder's state one worships Krsna, following one's caste-duties with a complete absorption of mind. Even when engaged in duties one should always fix one's mind on God; in this way there grows the love which develops into attachment or passion. The firm seed of bhakti can never be destroyed; it is through affection for God that other attachments are destroyed, and by the development of this affection that one renounces the home. It is only when this affection for God grows into a passion {vyasana) that one attains one's end easily. The bhakti rises sometimes spontaneously, sometimes in association with other devotees, and sometimes through following favourable practices 1 . Gradual development of bhakti is described through seven stages in an ascending order; these are bhdva, prema, pranaya, sneha, raga, anuraga, and vyasana. The passion or vyasana for God, which is the deepest manifestation of affection, is the inability to remain without God (tadvindna sthatum asaktih); it is not possible for a man with such an attachment to stay at home and to carry on his ordinary duties. In the previous stages, though one may try to remain at home like a guest in the house, yet he always feels various obstructions in the proper manifestation of his emotion; worldly attachments are always obstacles to the divine attachment of worldly ties which helps the development of bhakti 2 .

Vallabha, however, is opposed to renunciation after the manner of monistic sannydsa, for this can only bring repentance, as being inefficacious 3 . The path of knowledge can bring its fruit in hundreds of births and it depends upon various other practices; the path of bhakti therefore should be taken up instead of the path of knowledge 4 . Renunciation in the bhakti-mdrga proceeds only out of the necessity of the bhakti and for its proper maintenance, and not as a matter of duty.

The fruits of bhakti have already been described as a-laukika-siimarthya, sdyujya and sevopayogi-deha, and are further discussed

1 See note 3, p. 355.

3 snehdiukti-vyasandndm vindsanam. tatha sati krtam-api sarvam vyartham syut. tena tat-tydgam krtvd yateta. Balakrsna's commentary on Bhakti-vardhinl, sloka 6.

3 atah kalou sa san-nydsah pascdt tdpdya ndnyathd. pdsanditvam bhavet cdpi tasmdt jndne na sam-nyaset.

Vallabha's San-nydsa-nirnaya, sloka 16.

4 jiidndrtham tittaraiigain ca siddhir janmasataih, jiidnam ca sddhandpeksam yajiiddi-snnandn matam param. San-nydsa-nirnaya of Vallabha, with Gokula-natha's Vivarana, sloka 15.

in Vallabha's Sevdphala, upon which various commentators have written with their several differences. Thus Devaklnandana and Purusottama think that a-laukika-sdmarthya means that God has a special dvesa or that He favours the devotee with a special inspiration, enabling him to experience the nature of the full bliss of God. Hariraja, however, thinks that it means the capacity for experiencing the separation of God; Kalyanaraja thinks that it means participation in divine music in heaven with God. Goplsa thinks that it means special fitness (svarupa-yogyatd) for experiencing the supernatural joy of worshipping God 1 . The second fruit of bhakti (sdyujya) is considered by Purusottama, Baca Goplsa, and Devaklnandana to be the merging of the devotee in the nature of God; Hariraja, however, regards it as a capacity for continual association with God.

The obstacles to bhakti are regarded as udvega, pratibandha, and bhoga. Udvega means fear caused by evil persons or unsteadiness of mind through sins; pratibandha means obstacles of a general nature, and bhoga means ordinary experiences of pleasures and pains of body and mind. These obstacles can be removed by comprehending the false nature of causes that give rise to them; but if on account of the transgressions of the devotee God is angry and does not extend His mercy, then the obstacles cannot be removed 2 . The true knowledge, by which the false comprehension giving rise to the obstacles can be removed, consists in the conviction that everything is given by God, everything is Brahman, that there is no sddhand, no phala and no enjoyer 3 . He who tries to enjoy the blessed nature of God easily removes the obstacles. The experiencing of God's nature as a devotee is better than the bliss of Brahman itself and the pleasure of sense-objects (visaydnandabrahmdnanddpeksayd bhajandnandasya mdhdttvdt). Mental unsteadiness as a result of

1 tatra alaukika-sdmarthyam nama para-prdpti-vivarana-srutyukta-bhagavat-sva-rupanubhave pradipavaddvesa iti sutrokta-rltika-bhagavaddvesajd yogyatd yayd rasdtmakasya bhagavatah purna-sva-rupdnanddnubhavah. s'rl-devakl-nandandddvapyevam dhuh. sri-hari-rdyds tu bhagavad-virahdnubhava-sdmarthyam ity dhuh. iri-kalydna-rdyds tu bhagavatd saha gdnddi-sdmarthyam mukhydndm evetydhuh. tathd goplndntvalaukika-bhqjandnanddnubhave sva-rupa-yogyatd itydhuh. Purusottama's commentary on Sevdphala, sloka i.

2 kaddcit duhsangadind ati-paksapdti-prabhu-priya-pradveserta taddrohe prabhor atikrodhena prdrthanaydpi ksama-sam-bhavand-rahitena tasmin prabhuh phala-pratibandham karotlti sa bhagatat-krta-pratibandhah.

Hariraja's commentary on Sevdphala, sloka 3.

3 vivekas tu mamaitad eva prabhund krtam sarvam brahmdtmakam ko'ham kinca sddhanam kirn phalam -to data ko bhoktd ityddi-rupah. Ibid.

attachment to worldly things stands in the way of extension of God's grace; it can be removed by abnegating the fruits of karma. The emancipation that has been spoken of before as a result of bhakti is to be interpreted as the three-fold Sevdphala, superior, middling and inferior, viz., a-laukika-sdmarthya (uttama-sevdphala), sayujya (madhyama-sevaphala) and bhajanopayogi deha (adhama-sevd-phala) l .

Topics of Vallabha Vedanta as explained by Vallabha's followers.

A number of papers, which deserve some notice, were written by the followers of Vallabha on the various topics of the Vedanta. According to the Bhagavata-purdna (in. 7, 10-11), as interpreted by Vallabha in his Subodhini, error is regarded as wrong attribution of a quality or character to an entity to which it does not belong 2 . Taking his cue from Vallabha, Balakrsna Bhatta (otherwise called Dallu Bhatta) tries to evolve a philosophic theory of illusion according to the Vallabha school. He says that in the first instance there is a contact of the eye (as associated with the manas) with the conch-shell, and thereby there arises an indeterminate knowledge (sdmdnyajndna), which is prior to doubt and other specific cognitions; this indeterminate cognition rouses the sattvaguna of the buddhi and thereby produces right knowledge. It is therefore said in the Sarvanirnaya that buddhi as associated with sattva is to be regarded as pramdna. In the Bhdgavata (in. 26. 30) doubt, error, definite knowledge, memory and dream are regarded as states of buddhi; so the defining character of cognition is to be regarded as a function of buddhi. Thus it is the manas and the senses that produce indeterminate knowledge, which later on becomes differentiated through the function of buddhi. When through the tamas quality of mdyd the buddhi is obscured, the conch-shell with which the senses are in contact is not perceived; the buddhi, thus obscured, produces the notion of silver by its past impression of silver, roused by the shining characteristic of the conch-shell, which is similar to

1 bhakti-mdrge sevdyd uttama-madhyama-sddhdranddhikdrakramena etat phala-trayam eva, no moksddih. Hariraja's commentary on Sevdpfiala, sloka 6.

2 yathd jale candramasah pratibimbitasya tena jalena krto gunah kampddi-dharmah dsanno vidyamdno mithyaiva drsyate no. vastutascandrasya evam andtmano dehader dharmo jamna-bandha-duhkhddirupo drastur dtmano jlvasya na isvarasya. Subodhini, in. 7. 11.

silver. In the Sankara school of interpretation the false silver is created on the conch-shell, which is obscured by avidyd. The silver of the conch-shell-silver is thus an objective creation, and as such a relatively real object with which the visual sense comes in contact. According to Vallabha the conch-shell-silver is a mental creation of the buddhi 1 . The indefinite knowledge first produced by the contact of the senses of the manas is thus of the conch-shell, conch-shell-silver being a product of the buddhi; in right knowledge the buddhi takes in that which is grasped by the senses. This view of illusion is called anyakhydti, i.e., the apprehension of something other than that with which the sense was in contact. The Sankara interpretation of illusion is false; for, if there was a conch-shell-silver created by the mdyd, it is impossible to explain the notion of conch-shell; for there is nothing to destroy the conch-shell-silver which would have been created. The conch-shell-silver having obscured the conch-shell and the notion of conch-shell-silver not being destructible except without the notion of the conch-shell, nothing can explain how the conch-shell-silver may be destroyed. If it is suggested that the conch-shell-silver is produced by mdyd and destroyed by mdyd, then the notion of world-appearances produced by mdyd may be regarded as destructible by mdyd, and no effort can be made for the attainment of right knowledge. According to Vallabha the world is never false; it is our buddhi which creates false notions, which may be regarded as intermediate creation (antardliki). In the case of transcendental illusion—when the Brahman is perceived as the manifold world—there is an apprehension of Him as being, which is of an indefinite nature. It is this being which is associated with characters and appearances, e.g., the jug and the pot, which are false notions created by buddhi. These false notions are removed when the defects are removed, and not by the intuition of the locus of the illusion; the intellectual creation of a jug and a pot may thus be false, though this does not involve the denial of a jug or a pot in the actual world 2 . So the notion of world-creation and world-destruction are false notions created by us. The jiva, being a part of God, is true; it is false only

1 iad idatn bauddham eva rajatam buddhya visayi-kriyate. na tu sdmdnya-jndne cahsur-visayt-bhutarn iti vivekah. Vadavali, p. 3.

2 atrdpi bauddha eva ghato mithya, na tu prapancdntar-vartlti niskarsah. Ibid. p. 6.

in so far as it is regarded as the subject of the cycle of birth and rebirth. The falsity of the reality of the world thus depends on the manner in which it is perceived 1 ; so, when one perceives the world and knows it as Brahman, his intellectual notion of the real diversity of the world vanishes, though the actually perceived world may remain as it is 2 . The creation of mdyd is thus not external, but internal. The visible world, therefore, as such is not false; only the notion of it as an independent reality, apart from God, is false. The word mdyd is used in two senses, as the power of God to become all, and as the power of delusion; and the latter is a part of the former.

Purusottama, however, gives a different interpretation in his Khydtivdda. He says that the illusion of conch-shell-silver is produced by the objective and the external projection of knowledge as a mental state through the instrumentality of mdyd; the mental state thus projected is intuited as an object 3 . This external projection is associated with the rising of older impressions. It is wrong to suppose that it is the self which is the basis of illusion; for the self is the basis of self-consciousness and in the perception of the conch-shell-silver no one has the notion " I am silver."

Speaking against the doctrine of the falsity of the world, Giridhara Gosvami says in his Prapancavdda that the illusoriness of the world cannot be maintained. If the falsity of the perceived world is regarded as its negation in past, present and future, then it could not have been perceived at all; if this negation be of the nature of atyantdbhdva, then, since that concept is dependent on the existence of the thing to be negated and since that thing also does not exist, the negation as atyantdbhdva does not exist either. If the negation of the world means that it is a fabrication of illusion, then again there are serious objections; an illusion is an illusion only in comparison with a previous right knowledge; when no comparison with a previous right knowledge is possible, the world cannot be an illusion.

1 tatha ca siddham visayata-vaisistyena prapancasya satyatvam mithydtvan-ca. evam svamate prapancasya pdramdrthika-vicdre brahmdtmakatvena satyatvam. Vdddvali, p. 8.

2 tathatra caksuh-samyukta-prapanca-visayake brahmatva-jndne utpanne bauddha eva prapanco nasyati. na tu caksur-grhito'yam ity arthah. Ibid. p. 8.

3 atah sukti-rajatadi-sthale mdyayd bahih-ksipta-buddhi-vrtti-rupam jndnam eva arthdkdrena khydyata iti mantavyam. Ibid. p. 121.

If the nature of the world be regarded as due to avidyd, one may naturally think, to whom does the avidyd belong? Brahman (according to the Sankarites) being qualityless, avidyd cannot be a quality of Brahman. Brahman Himself cannot be avidyd, because avidyd is the cause of it. If avidyd is regarded as obscuring the right knowledge of anything, then the object of which the right knowledge is obscured must be demonstrated. Again, the Sankarites hold that the jtva is a reflection of Brahman on avidyd. If that is so, then the qualities of the jtva are due to avidyd as the impurities of a reflection are due to the impurity of the mirror. If that is so, the jiva being a product of the avidyd, the latter cannot belong to the former. In the Vallabha view the illusion of the individual is due to the will of God.

Again, the avidyd of the Sankarites is defined as different from being and non-being; but no such category is known to anybody, because it involves self-contradiction. Now the Sankarites say that the falsity of the world consists in its indefinableness; in reality this is not falsity—if it were so, Brahman Himself would have been false. The s'ruti texts say that He cannot be described by speech, thought or mind. It cannot be said that Brahman can be defined as being; for it is said in the text that He is neither being nor non-being (na sat tan ndsad ity ucyate). Again, the world cannot be regarded as transformation (vikdra) ; for, if it is a vikdra, one must point out that of which it is a vikdra; it cannot be of Brahman, because Brahman is changeless; it cannot be of anything else, since everything except Brahman is changeable.

In the Vallabha view the world is not false, and God is regarded as the samavdyi and nimitta-kdrana of it, as has been described above. Samavdyi-kdrana is conceived as pervading all kinds of existence, just as earth pervades the jug; but, unlike the jug, there is no transformation or change (vikdra) of God, because, unlike the earth, God has will. The apparent contradiction, that the world possessed of quality and characters cannot be identified with Brahman, is invalid, because the nature of Brahman can only be determined from the scriptural texts, and they unquestionably declare that Brahman has the power of becoming everything.

In the Bheddbheda-svarupa-nirnaya Purusottama says that according to the satkdryavdda view of the Vedanta all things are existent in the Brahman from the beginning. The jlvas also, being

the parts of God, exist in Him. The difference between the causal and the effect state is that in the latter certain qualities or characters become manifest. The duality that we perceive in the world does not contradict monism; for the apparent forms and characters which are mutually different cannot contradict their metaphysical character of identity with God 1 . So Brahman from one point of view may be regarded as partless, and from another point of view as having parts.

There is a difference, however, between the prapanca and the manifold world and sarnsdra, the cycle of births and rebirths. By the concept of samsdra we understand that God has rendered Himself into effects and the jivas and the notion of their specific individuality as performers of actions and enjoyers of experience. Such a notion is false; there is in reality no cause and effect, no bondage and salvation, everything being of the nature of God. This idea has been explained in Vallabha Gosvaml's Prapanca-samsdra-bheda. Just as the sun and its rays are one and the same, so the qualities of God are dependent upon Him and identical with Him; the apparent contradiction is removed by the testimony of the scriptural texts 2 .

Regarding the process of creation Purusottama, after refuting the various views of creation, says that Brahman as the identity of sat, cit, and dnanda manifests Himself as these qualities and thereby differentiates Himself as the power of being, intelligence and action, and He is the delusive mdyd. These differentiated qualities show themselves as different; they produce also the notion of difference in the entities with which they are associated and express themselves in definite forms. Though they thus appear as different, they are united by God's will. The part, as being associated with the power of action, manifests itself as matter. When the power of intelligence appears as confused it is the jiva 3 . From the point of view of the world the Brahman is the vivartakdrana\ from the point of view of the self-creation of God, it is parindtna*.

1 srsti-dasdydm jagad-brahmanoh kdrya-kdrana-bhdvdj jagajjlvayor amsdmsi-bhdvuc ca upacdriko bhavan ndpi na vdstavdbhedam nihanti. teneddrilm api bheda-sahimur evd'bhedah. Vdddvali, p. 20.

2 vddakathd of Gopesvarasvami in Vdddvali, p. 31.

3 See Puru§ottama's Srftibhedavdda, p. 115.

* evam ca antard-srftim prati vivarlopdddnatvam dtma-srstim prati parind-myupdddnatvam brahmanah. Ibid. p. 113.

Vitthala's Interpretation of Vallabha's Ideas.

Vitthala, the son of Vallabha, wrote an important treatise called Vidvanmandana upon which there is a commentary, the Suvarna-sutra, by Purusottama. The central ideas of this work may now be detailed.

There are many Upanisadic texts which declare that Brahman is without any determinate qualities (nirvisesa) and there are others which say that He is associated with determinate qualities, i.e., He is savisesa. The upholders of the former view say that the gunas or dhartnas which are attributed by the other party must be admitted by them as having a basis of existence somewhere. This basis must be devoid of qualities, and this qualityless being cannot be repudiated by texts which declare the Brahman to be endowed with qualities; for the latter can only be possible on the assumption of the former, or in other words the former is the upajtvya of the latter. It may, however, be argued that the sruti texts which declare that the Brahman is qualityless do so by denying the qualities; the qualities then may be regarded as primary, as the ascertainment of the qualityless is only possible through the denial of the qualities. The reply is that, since the sruti texts emphasize the qualityless, the attempt to apprehend the qualityless through qualities implies contradiction; such a contradiction would imply the negation of both quality and qualityless and lead us to nihilism (sunya-vdda). If, again, it is argued that the denial of qualities refers only to ordinary mundane qualities and not to those qualities which are approved by the Vedas, then there is also a pertinent objection; for the sruti texts definitely declare that the Brahman is absolutely unspeakable, indefinable. But it may further be argued that, if Brahman be regarded as the seat of certain qualities which are denied of it, then also such denial would be temporarily qualified and not maintained absolutely. A jug is black before being burnt and, when it is burnt, it is no longer black, but brown. The reply proposed is that the qualities are affirmed of Brahman as conditioned and denied of Brahman as unconditioned. When one's heart becomes pure by the worship of the Brahman as conditioned he understands the nature of Brahman as unconditioned. It is for the purpose of declaring the nature of such a Brahman that the texts declare Him to be qualityless: they declare Him to be endowed

with qualities when He is conditioned by avidya. To this Vitthala says that, if Brahman is regarded as the Lord of the world, He cannot be affirmed as qualityless. It cannot be argued that these qualities are affirmed of Brahman as conditioned by avidya; for, since both Brahman and avidya are beginningless, there would be a continuity of creation; the creation, being once started by avidya, would have nothing else to stop it. In the Vedantic text it is the Brahman associated with will that is regarded as the cause of the world; other qualities of Brahman may be regarded as proceeding from His will. In the Sarikarite view, according to which the will proceeds from the conditioned Brahman, it is not possible to state any reason for the different kinds of the will. If it is said that the appearance of the different kinds of will and qualities is the very nature of the qualities of the conditioned, then there is no need to admit a separate Brahman. It is therefore wrong to suppose that Brahman exists separately from the gunas of which He is the seat through the conditions. In the Brahma-sutra also, immediately after launching into an enquiry about Brahman, Badarayana defines His nature as that from which the creation and destruction of the world has proceeded; the Brahma-siitra, however, states that such creative functions refer only to a conditioned Brahman. It is wrong to say that, because it is difficult to explain the nature of pure Brahman, the Brahma-sutra first speaks of the creation of the world and then denies it; for the world as such is perceived by all, and there is no meaning in speaking of its creation and then denying it—it is as if one said " My mother is barren". If the world did not exist, it would not have appeared as such. It cannot be due to vdsand; for, if the world never existed, there would be no experience of it and no vdsand. Vdsand also requires other instruments to rouse it, and there is no such instrument here.

It cannot be said that the avidya belongs to the jivas, because the jivas are said to be identical with Brahman and the observed difference to be due to false knowledge. If knowledge destroys avidya, then the avidya of the jiva ought to be destroyed by the avidya underlying it. Again, if the world is non-existent, then its cause, the avidya, ought also to be non-existent. What is jiva} It cannot be regarded as a reflection of Brahman; for only that which has colour can have reflection; it is not the formless sky that is reflected in the sky, but the rays of the sun hovering above.

Moreover, avidyd is all-pervasive as Brahman: how can there be reflection? Again such a theory of reflection would render all our moral efforts false, and emancipation, which is their result, must also be false; for the means by which it is attained is very false. Moreover, if the Vedas themselves are false, as mere effects of avidyd, it is wrong to suppose that the nature of Brahman as described by them is true. Again, in the case of reflections there are true perceivers who perceive the reflection; the reflected images cannot perceive themselves. But in the case under discussion there are no such perceivers. If the Paramatman be not associated with avidyd, He cannot perceive the jivas, and if He is associated with avidyd, He has the same status as the jivas. Again, there is no one who thinks that jiva is a reflection of the Brahman or? the antah-karana; upon such a view, since the jivanmukta has an antahkarana, he cannot be a jivanmukta. lithe jiva is a reflection on avidyd, then the jivanmukta whose avidyd has been destroyed can no longer have a body. Since everything is destroyed by knowledge, why should there be a distinction in the case of the prdrabdha karma} Even if by the prdrabdha karma the body may continue to exist, there ought not to be any experience. When one sees a snake his body shakes even when the snake is removed; this shaking is due to previous impressions, but prdrabdha karma has no such past impressions, and so it ought to be destroyed by knowledge; the analogy is false. It is therefore proved that the theory of the jiva as reflection is false.

There is another interpretation of the Sankara Vedanta, in which it is held that the appearance of the jiva as existing separate from Brahman is a false notion; impelled by this false notion people are engaged in various efforts for self-improvement 1 . On this explanation too it is difficult to explain how the erroneous apprehension arises and to whom it belongs. The jiva himself, being a part of the illusion, cannot be a perceiver of it, nor can the nature of the relation of the avidyd and the Brahman be explained; it cannot be contact, because both avidyd and Brahman are self-pervasive; it cannot be illusory, since there is no illusion prior to illusion; it cannot

1 asmin pakse jlvasya vastuto brahmatve bheda-bhanasya jiva-padavacyatayai ca dustatvam na tu svariipatirekatvam na vd moksasya apurusdrthatvam na vd pdralaukika-prayatna-pratirodhah. Purusottama's Suvarna-siitra on Vidvan-mandana, p. 37.

be unique, since in that case even an emancipated person may have an error. Again, if avidya and its relation are both beginningless and jiva be also beginningless, then it is difficult to determine whether avidya created jiva or jiva created avidya.

It must therefore be assumed that the bondage of the jivas or their existence as such is not beginningless. Their bondage is produced by avidya, which is a power of God, and which operates only with reference to those jivas whom God wishes to bind. For this reason we have to admit a number of beings, like snakes and others, who were never brought under the binding power of avidya 1 . All things appear and disappear by the grace of God as manifesting (dvirbhdva) and hiding (tirobhdva). The power of manifesting is the power by which things are brought within the sphere of experience (anubhava-visayatva-yogyatdvirbhdvah), and the power of hiding is the power by which things are so obscured that they cannot be experienced (tad-avisaya-yogya tatirobhdvah). Things therefore exist even when they are not perceived; in the ordinary sense existence is defined as the capacity of being perceived, but in a transcendental sense things exist in God even when they are not perceived. According to this view all things that happened in the past and all that may happen in the future—all these exist in God and are perceived or not perceived according to His will 2 .

"Wig jiva is regarded as a part of God; this nature of jiva can be realized only on the testimony of the scriptures. Being a part of God, it has not the fullness of God and therefore cannot be as omniscient as He. The various defects of the jiva are due to God's will: thus, in order that the jiva may have a diversity of experience, God has obscured His almighty power in him and for securing his moral efforts He has associated him with bondage and rendered him independent. It is by obscuring His nature as pure bliss that the part of God appears as the jiva. We know that the followers of Madhva also regard the jivas as parts of God; but according to them they are distinct from Him, and the identity of the Brahman and the jiva is only in a remote sense. According to the Nimbarkas

1 yad-bandhane tad-icchd tarn eva sa badhnati. Purusottama's Suvania-sutra,

2 asmin kale asmin dese idam karyam idam bharatu iti iccha-visayatvam dtir-bhmah tada tatra tat ma bhavatu iti iccha-visayatvam tiroblulvah. Ibid. p. 56.

iivas are different from God, and are yet similar to Him: they too regard jivas as God's parts, but emphasize the distinctness of the iivas as well as their similarity to Him. According to Ramanuja God holds the jivas within Himself and by His will dominates all their functions, by expanding or contracting the nature of the jiva's knowledge. According to Bhzskara jiva is naturally identical with God, and it is only through the limiting conditions that he appears as different from Him. According to Vijnana-bhiksu, though the jivas are eternally different from God, because they share His nature they are indistinguishable from Him 1 .

But the Vallabhas hold that the jivas y being parts of God, are one with Him; they appear as jivas through His function as dvirbhava and ttrobhdva, by which certain powers and qualities that exist in God are obscured in the jiva and certain other powers are manifested. The manifestation of matter also is by the same process; in it the nature of God as intelligence is obscured and only His nature as being is manifested. God's will is thus the fundamental determinant of both jiva and matter. This also explains the diversity of power and character in different individuals, which is all due to the will of God. But in such a view there is a serious objection; for good and bad karmas would thus be futile. The reply is that God, having endowed the individual with diverse capacities and powers for his own self-enjoyment, holds within His mind such a scheme of actions and their fruits that whoever will do such actions will be given such fruits. He does so only for His own self-enjoyment in diverse ways. The law of karma is thus dependent on God and is dominated by Him 2 . Vallabha, however, says that God has explained the goodness and badness of actions in the scriptures. Having done so, He makes whoever is bent upon following a particular course of conduct do those actions. Jiva's will is the cause of the karma that he does; the will of the person is determined by his past actions; but in and through them all God's will is the ultimate dispenser. It is here that one distinguishes the differences between the maryada-marga and the pusti-mdrga: the maryada-

1 flvanam nitya-bhinnatvam anglkrtya avibhdga-laksanam angikrtya sajd-tiyatve sati avibhdga-pratiyogitvam amsatvam tad-anuyogitvam ca amsitvam. Suvarna-sutra, p. 85.

2 krldaiva tnuktyd anyat sarvain upasarjanlbhiitam tathd ca tadapeksyd bhagavan vicitra-rasdnubhavdrtham evam yah karisyati tarn evam karisydmiti svayam eva kdryddau cakdra. Vidvan-mandana, p. 91.

mdrga is satisfied that in the original dispensation certain karmas should be associated with certain fruits, and leaves the individual to act as he pleases; but the pusti-marga makes the playful activity of God the cause of the individual's efforts and also of the law of karma 1 .

The Upanisad says that, just as sparks emanate from fire, so the jivas have emanated from Brahman. This illustration shows that the jivas are parts of God, atomic in nature, that they have emanated from Him and may again merge in Him. This merging in God (Brahma-bhdva) means that, when God is pleased, He manifests His blissful nature as well as His powers in the jiva 2 . At the time of emancipation the devotees merge in God, become one with Him, and do not retain any separate existence from Him. At the time of the incarnation of God at His own sweet will He may incarnate those parts of Him which existed as emancipated beings merged in Him. It is from this point of view that the emancipated beings may again have birth 3 .

It is objected that the jivas cannot be regarded as atomic in nature, because the Upanisads describe them as all-pervasive. Moreover, if the jivas are atomic in natnre, they would not be conscious in all parts of the body. The analogy of the sandal-paste, which remaining in one place makes the surrounding air fragrant, does not hold good; for the surrounding fragrance is due to the presence of minute particles. This cannot be so with the souls; consciousness, being a quality of the soul, cannot operate unless the soul-substance is present there. The analogy of the lamp and its rays is also useless; the lamp has no pervasive character; for the

1 dcdryas tu yathd putram yatamana-valam va paddrtha-guna-dosau varnayan api yat-prayatndbhinivesam pasyati tathaiva kdrayati. phala-ddndrtham irutau karmapeksd-kathandt phaladdne karmdpeksah karma-karane fiva-krta-prayatnd-peksah, prayatne tat-karmdpeksah, svargddi-kdme ca lokapravdhdpeksah kdraya-tlti na brahmano dosagandho'pi, na caivam amsvaratvam. marydddmdrgasya tathaiva nirmdndt. yatra tvanyathd tatra pusti-mdrgdngikdra itydhuh. ayamapi paksah svakrtamaryddayd eva hetutvena kathandn marydddkarane ca krideccham rte hetvantarasya sambhavdd asmaduktdnndtiricyate. Vidvan-mandana, p. 92.

2 brahma-bhdvasca bhagavad-ukta-sddhanakaranena santustdt bhagavata dnanda-prdkatyat svaguna-svarupaisvaryddi-prdkatydc cetijiieyam Ibid. p. 96.

3 mokse jlva-brahmanor abhinnatvdd abhinncsvabhdvenaiva nirupandd

ityarthah. tenddi-madhydvasdnesu suddha-brahmana evopdddnatvdt svdvatd-

rasamaye kriddrtharn sdksdd yogyds ta eva bhavanttti tdnapy avatar ay atlti

punar nirgama-yogyatvam, idameva, muktdnupasrpya vyapadeidditisutrenoktam

muktd api lild-vigraham krtvd bhajanti iti. Ibid. p. 97.

illumination is due to the presence of minute light-particles. To this Vitthala replies that Badarayana himself describes the nature of the jivas as atomic. The objection that qualities cannot operate in the absence of the substance is not valid either. Even the Naiyayikas admit that the relation of samavdya may exist without the relata. The objection that the fragrance of a substance is due to the presence of minute particles of it is not valid; for a piece of musk enclosed in a box throws its fragrance around it, and in such cases there is no possibility for the minute particles of the musk to come out of the box; even when one touches garlic, the smell is not removed even by the washing of the hand. It must therefore be admitted that the smell of a substance may occupy a space larger than the substance itself. There are others who think that the soul is like fire, which is associated with heat and light, the heat and light being comparable to consciousness; they argue that, being of the nature of consciousness, the soul cannot be atomic. This is also invalid; for the Upanisad texts declare that knowledge is a quality of the soul, and it is not identical with it. Even heat and light are not identical with fire; through the power of certain gems and mantras the heat of the fire may not be felt; warm water possesses heat, though it has no illumination. Moreover, the Upanisad texts definitely declare the passage of the soul into the body, and this can only be possible if the soul is atomic. The objection that these texts declare the identity of souls with Brahman cannot be regarded as repudiating the atomic nature of the jivas; because this identification is based on the fact that the qualities of knowledge or intuition that belong to the jivas are really the qualities of God. The jivas come out of Brahman in their atomic nature and Brahman manifests His qualities in them, so that they may serve Him. The service of God is thus the religion of man; being pleased with it God sometimes takes man within Himself, or at other times, when He extends His highest grace, He keeps him near Himself to enjoy the sweet emotion of his service 1 .

The Sarikarites think that Brahman is indeterminate (nirvisesa) and that all determination is due to avidya. This view is erroneous;

1 ata eva sahaja-hari-ddsya-tadamsatvena brahma-svarupasya ca nijanisarga-prabhu-srigokula-ndtha-carana-kamala-ddsyam eva sva-dharmah. tena cdtisam-tustah svayam prakatlbhuya nija-gundms tastnai dattd svasmin praveiayati svarupdnanddnnbhavdrtham. athavd'tyanugrahe nikate sthdpayati tato'dhika-rasa-ddsya-karandrtham iti. Ibid. p. no

d iv 24

for the supposed avidyd cannot belong to the jivas; if it did, it could not affect the nature of Brahman. Nor can it belong to Brahman, because Brahman, being pure knowledge, is destructive of all avidyd; again, if the avidyd belonged to the Brahman from be-ginningless time, there would be no nirvisesa Brahman. It must therefore be admitted that Brahman possesses the power of knowledge and action and that these powers are natural to and identical with Him. Thus God, in association with His powers, is to be regarded as both determinate and indeterminate; the determinate forms of Brahman are, however, not to be regarded as different from Brahman or as characters of Him; they are identical with Brahman Himself 1 .

If mdyd is regarded as the power of Brahman, then Vallabha is prepared to admit it; but, if mdyd is regarded as something unreal, then he repudiates the existence of such a category. All knowledge and all delusion come from Brahman, and He is identical with so-called contradictory qualities. If a separate mdyd is admitted, one may naturally enquire about its status. Being unintelligent (jadd), it cannot of itself be regarded as the agent (kartr); if it is dependent on God, it can be conceived only as an instrument—but, if God is naturally possessed of infinite powers, He cannot require any such inanimate instrument. Moreover, the Upanisads declare that Brahman is pure being. If we follow the same texts, Brahman cannot be regarded as associated with qualities in so far as these gunas can be considered as modifications of the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas. It is therefore to be supposed that the mdyd determines or modifies the nature of Brahman into His determinate qualities. To say that the manifestation of mdyd is effected by the will of God is objectionable too; for, if God's will is powerful in itself, it need not require any upddhi or condition for effecting its purpose. In reality it is not possible to speak of any difference or distinction between God and His qualities.

1 brahmanyapi murtamurtarupe sarvatah veditavye evam tvanena prakdrena veditavye brahmana ete rupe iti; kintu brahmaiva iti veditavye. Vidvan-mandana, p. 138.

Life of Vallabha (1481-1533).

Vallabha was born in the lineage of Yajnanarayana Bhatta; his great-grandfather was Garigadhara Bhatta, his grandfather Ganapati Bhatta, and his father Laksmana Bhatta. It is said that among themselves they performed one hundred somaydgas (soma sacrifices). The family was one of Telugu Brahmins of South India, and the village to which they belonged was known as Kamkar Khamlh; his mother's name was Jllamagaru. Glasenapp, following N. G. Ghosh's sketch of Vallabhacarya, gives the date of his birth as a.d. 1479; but all the traditional accounts agree in holding that he was born in Pamparanya, near Benares, in Samvat 1535 (a.d. 1481), in the month of Vaisdkha, on the eleventh lunar day of the dark fortnight. About the time of his birth there is some discrepancy of opinion; but it seems very probable that it was the early part of the night, when the Scorpion was on the eastern horizon. He was delivered from the womb in the seventh month underneath a tree, when Laksmana Bhatta was fleeing from Benares on hearing of the invasion of that city by the Moslems; he received initiation from his father in his eighth year, and was handed over to Visnucitta, with whom he began his early studies. His studies of the Vedas were carried on under several teachers, among were them Trirammalaya, Andhana-rayanadiksita and Madhavayatindra. All these teachers belonged to the Madhva sect. After his father's death he went out on pilgrimage and began to have many disciples, Damodara, Sambhu, Svabhu, Svayambhu and others. Hearing of a disputation in the court of the king of Vidyanagara in the south, he started for the place with his disciples, carrying the Bhdgavata-purdna and the symbolic stone (sdlagrdma Hid) of God with him. The discussion was on the problem of the determinate nature of Brahman; Vallabha, being of the Visnusvami school, argued on behalf of the determinate nature of Brahi.ian, and won after a protracted discussion which lasted for many days. He met here Vyasa-tirtha, the great Madhva teacher. From Vidyanagara he moved towards Pampa and from there to the Rsyamukha hill, from there to Kamakasni, from there to Kanci, from there to Cidambaram and from there to Ramesvaram. Thence he turned northwards and, after passing through many places, came to Mahisapuri and was well received by the king of that place; from there he came

to Molulakota (otherwise called Yadavadri). From there he went to Udipi, and thence to Gokarna, from where he again came near Vidyanagara (Vijayanagara) and was well received by the king. Then he proceeded to Panduranga, from there to Nasik, then by the banks of the Reva to MahismatI, from there to Visala, to a city on the river Vetravati to Dhalalagiri, and from there to Mathura. Thence he went to Vrndavana, to Siddhapura, to the Arhatpattana of the Jains, to Vrddhanagara, from there to Visva-nagara. From Visvanagara he went to Guzerat and thence to the mouth of the river Sindh through Bharuch. From there he proceeded to Bhamksetra, Kapilaksetra, then to Prabhasa and Raivata, and then to Dvaraka. From there he proceeded to the Punjab by the banks of the river Sindh. Here he came to Kuruksetra, from there to Hardwar and to Hrslkesa, to Gangottri and Yamunottri. After returning to Hardwar he went to Kedara and Badarikasrama. He then came down to Kanauj, then to the banks of the Ganges, to Ayodhya and Allahabad, thence to Benares. From there he came to Gaya and Vaidyanatha, thence to the confluence of the Ganges and the sea. He then came to Purl. From there he went to Godavarl, proceeded southwards and came again to Vidyanagara. Then he proceeded again to Dvaraka through the Kathia-wad country; from there he came to Puskara, thence again to Brndavana and again to Badarikasrama. He then came again to Benares; after coming again to the confluence of the Ganges he returned to Benares, where he married Maha-laksmI, the daughter of Devanna Bhatta. After marriage he started again for Vaidyanatha and from there he again proceeded to Dvaraka, thence again to Badarikasrama; from there he came to Brndavana. He again returned to Benares. He then came to Brndavana. From there he came to Benares, where he performed a great sotnaydga. His son Vitthalanatha was born in 1518 when he was in his thirty-seventh year. For his later life he renounced the world and became a sannydsin. He died in 1533. He is said to have written eighty-four works and had eighty-four principal disciples.

Works of Vallabha and his Disciples.

Of the eighty-four books (including small tracts) that Vallabha is said to have written we know only the following; Antahkarana-prabodha and commentary, Acdrya-kdrikd, Anandddhikarana, Aryd, Ekdnta-rahasya, Krsndsraya, Catuhslokibhdgavata-tikd> Jalabheda, Jaiminisutra-bhdsya-mimdmsd, Tattvadipa (or more accurately Tattvdrthadipa and commentary), Trividhalildndmdvali, Navaratna and commentary, Nibandha, Nirodha-laksana and Vivrti, Patrdva-lambana, Padya, Paritydga, Parivrddhdstaka, Purusottamasahasra-ndma, Pusti-pravdha-marydddbheda and commentary, Purva-mimdmsd-kdrikd, Premdmrta and commentary, Praudhacaritandma, Bdlacaritandman, Bdlabodha, Brahma-sutrdnubhdsya, Bhakti-vardhinl and commentary, Bhakti-siddhdnta, Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya, Bhdgavata-tattvadipa and commentary, Bhdgavata-purdna-tikd Subodhini, Bhdgavata-purdna-dasamaskandhdnukramanikd, Bhdga-vata-purdna-paficamaskandha-tikd^Bhdgavata-purdna-ikddasaskan-dhdrthanirupana-kdrikdy Bhdgavatasdra-samuccaya, Mangalavdda, Mathurd-mdhdtmyciy Madhurdstaka, Yamundstaka, Rdjalildndma, Vivekadhairydsraya, Vedastutikdrikd, Sraddhdprakarana, Srutisdra, Sannydsanirnaya and commentary, Sarvottamastotra-tippana and commentary, Sdksdtpurusottamavdkya, Siddhdnta-muktdvali, Sid-dhdnta-rahasya, Sevdphala-stotra and commentary, Svdminyastaka 1 .

The most important of Vallabha's works are his commentary on the Bhdgavata-purdna (the Subodhini), his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, and his commentary Prakdsa on his own Tattvadipa. The Subodhini had another commentary on it called the Subodhini-lekha and the Subodhini-yojana-nibandha-yojana ; the commentary on the Rasapancddhydya was commented upon by Pltambara in the Rasapancddhydyi-prakdsa. Vallabha's commentary on the Brahma-sutra, the Anubhdsya, had a commentary on it by Purusottama (the Bhdsya-prakdsa), another by Giridhara (Vivarana), another by Iccharama (the Brahma-sutrdnubhdsya-pradipa), and another, the Balaprabodhini, by Srldhara Sarma. There was also another commentary on it, the Anubhdsya-nigudhdrtha-dipikd by Lalu Bhatta, of the seventeenth century; another by Muralidhara, the pupil of Vitthala (the Anubhdsya-vydkhyd), and the Veddnta-candrikd by an

1 See Aufrecht's Catalogus Catalogorum.

anonymous writer. Vallabha's own commentary Prakdsa on the kdrikds he had written had a commentary on the first part of it, the Avarana-bhanga by Pltambaraji Maharaja. The Tattvdrthadlpa is divided into three sections, of which the first, the Sdstrdrtha-prakarana, contains 105 kdrikds of a philosophical nature; the second section, the Sarvanirnaya-prakarana, deals w ith eschatology and matters relating to duties; the third, the Bhdgavatdrtha-prakarana, containing a summary of the twelve chapters of the Bhdgavata-purdna, had a commentary on it, also called the Avarana-bhanga, by Purusottamaji Maharaja. There was also another commentary on it by Kalyanaraja, which was published in Bombay as early as 1888.

Coming to the small tracts of Vallabha, we may speak first of his Sannydsa-nirnaya, which consists of twenty-two verses in which he discusses the three kinds of renunciation: the sannydsa of karma-mdrga, the sannydsa of jndna-mdrga and the sannydsa of bhakti-mdrga. There are at least seven commentaries on it, by Gokulanatha, Raghunatha, Gokulotsava, the two Gopesvaras, Purusottama and a later Vallabha. Of these Gokulanatha (1554-1643) was the fourth son of \ itthalanatha; he also wrote commentaries on Sri Sarvottama-stotra, Vallabhdstaka, Siddhdnta-muktdvali, Pusti-pravdha-maryddd, Siddhdnta-rahasya, Catuhsloki, Dhairyydsraya, Bhakti-vardhini and Sevdphala. He was a great traveller and preacher of Vallabha's views in Guzerat, and did a great deal to make the Subodhini commentary of Vallabha popular. Raghunatha, the fifth son of Vitthalanatha, was born in 1557; he wrote commentaries on Vallabha's Sodasa-grantha and also on Vallabhdstaka, Madhnrdstaka, Bhakti-hamsa and Bhakti-hetu; also a commentary on Purusottama-ndma-sahasra, the Ndma-candrikd. Gokulotsava, the younger brother of Kalyanaraja and uncle of Ilariraja, was born in 1580; he also wrote a commentary on the Sodasa-grantha. Gopesvara, the son of Ghanasyama, was born in 1598; the other Gopesvara was the son of Kalyanaraja and the younger brother of Ilariraja. Purusottama, also a commentator, was born in 1660. Vallabha, son of Vitthalaraja, the other commentator, great-great-grandson of Raghunatha (the fifth son of Vallabhacarya) was born in-1575, and wrote a commentary on the Anubhdsya of Vallabhacarya. He should be distinguished from the earlier Vallabha, the son of Vitthalesvara.

The Sevdphala of Vallabha is a small tract of eight verses which discusses the obstacles to the worship of God and its fruits; it was commented upon by Kalyanaraja. He was the son of Govindaraja, the second son of Vitthalanatha, and was born in 1571; he was the father of Hariraja, and wrote commentaries on the Sodasa-grantha and also on the rituals of worship. This work was also commented on by Devakinandana, who was undoubtedly prior to Purusottama. One Devakinandana, the son of Raghunatha (the fifth son of Vitthalanatha), was born in 1570; a grandson of the same name was born in 1631. There was also a commentary on it by Haridhana, otherwise called Hariraja, who was born in 1593; he wrote many small tracts. There was another commentary on it by Vallabha, the son of Vitthala. There were two other Vallabhas—one the grandson of Devakinandana, born in 1619, and the other the son of Vitthalaraja, born in 1675; it is probable that the author of the commentary of the Sevdphala is the same Vallabha who wrote the Subodhini-lekha. There are other commentaries by Purusottama, Gopesa, and Lalu Bhatta, a Telugu Brahmin; his other name was Balakrsna Diksita. He probably lived in the middle of the seventeenth century; he wrote Anubhdsya-nigudhdrtha-prakdsikd on the Anubhdsya of Vallabha and a commentary on the Subodhini (the Subodhini-yojana-nibandha-yojana Sevdkaumudi), Nirnaydrnava, Prmeya-ratndrnava, and a commentary on the Sodasa-grantha. There is another commentary by Jaya-gopala Bhatta, the son of Cintamani Diksita, the disciple of Kalyanaraja. He wrote a commentary on the Taittiriya Upanisad, on the Krsna-karndmrta of Bilvamarigala, and on the Bhakti-vardhini. There is also a commentary by Laksmana Bhatta, grandson of Srlnatha Bhatta and son of Goplnatha Bhatta, and also two other anonymous commentaries.

Vallabha's Bhakti-vardhini is a small tract of eleven verses, commented upon by Dvarakesa, Giridhara, Balakrsna Bhatta (son of the later Vallabha), by Lalu Bhatta, Jayagopala Bhatta, Vallabha, Kalyanaraja, Purusottama, Gopesvara, Kalyanaraja and Balakrsna Bhatta; there is also another anonymous commentary.

The Sannydsa-?iirnaya, the Sevdphala and the Bhakti-vardhini are included in the Sixteen Tracts of Vallabha (the Sodasa-grantha) ; the others are Yamundstaka, Bdlabodha, Siddhdnta-muktdvali,

Pusti-pravdha-maryddd, Siddhdnta-rahasya, Navaratna, Antah-karanaprabodha, Vivekadhairyydsraya, Krsndsraya, Catuhsloki, Bhakti-vardhini, Jalabheda and Pancapddya. The Yamundstaka is a tract of nine verses in praise of the holy river Yamuna. Bdlabodha is a small tract of nineteen verses, in which Vallabha says that pleasure (kdma) and extinction of sorrow (moksa) are the two primarily desirable things in the world; two others, dharma and artha, are desirables in a subsidiary manner, because through artha or wealth one may attain dharma, and through dharma one may attain happiness. Moksa can be attained by the grace of Vimu. Siddhdnta-muktdvali is a small tract of twenty-one verses dealing with bhakti, which emphasize the necessity of abnegating all things to God. Pusti-pravdha-marydda is a small tract of twenty-five verses, in which Vallabha says that there are five kinds of natural defects, due to egotism, to birth in particular countries or times, to bad actions and bad associations. These can be removed by offering all that one has to God; one has a right to enjoy things after dedicating them to God. Navaratna is a tract of nine verses in which the necessity of abnegating and dedicating all things to God is emphasized. Antahkarana-prabodha is a tract of ten verses which emphasize the necessity of self-inspection and prayer to God for forgiveness, and to convince one's mind that everything belongs to God. The Vivekadhairyydsraya is a small tract of seventeen verses. It urges us to have full confidence in God and to feel that, if our wishes are not fulfilled by Him, there must be some reason known to Him; He knows everything and always looks to our welfare. It is therefore wrong to desire anything strongly; it is best to leave all things to God to manage as He thinks best. The Krsndsraya is a tract of eleven verses explaining the necessity of depending in all matters on Krsna, the Lord. Catuhsloki is a tract of four verses of the same purport. The Bhakti-vardhini is a tract of eleven verses, in which Vallabha says that the seed of the love of God exists in us all, only it is obstructed by various causes; when it manifests itself, one begins to love all beings in the world; when it grows in intensity it becomes impossible for one to be attached to worldly things. When love of God grows to this high intensity, it cannot be destroyed. The Jalabheda contains twenty verses, dealing with the different classes of devotees and ways of devotion. The Pancapddya is a tract of five verses.

xxxi] Works of Vallabha and his Disciples zil

Vitthaladiksita or Vitthalesa (1518-88), the son of Vallabha, is said to have written the following works: Avatar a-tdr atomy a-stotr a ^ Aryd y Krsna-premdmrta t Gita-govinda-prathamdstapadi-vivrti, Gokuldstaka,Janmdstami-nirnaya,yalabheda-tikd,Dhruvdpada-tikd, Ndma-candrikd, Nydsddesavivarana-prabodha t Premdmrta-bhdsya, Bhakti-hamsa, Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya, Bhagavata-svatantratd, Bhaga-vadgitd-tdtparya, Bhagavad-gitd-hetu-nirnaya, Bhdgavata-tattva-dipikd, Bhdgavata-dasama-skandha-vivrti, Bhujanga-praydtdstaka, Ydmundstaka-vivrti, Rasasarvasva, Rdma-navami-nirnaya, Valla-bhdstaka, Vidvan-mandana, Viveka-dhairyydsraya-tikd, Siksd-pattra, Srngdrarasa-mandana, Satpadi, Sannydsa-nirnaya-vivarana, Samayapradipa, Sarvottama-stotra with commentary, commentary on Siddhdnta-muktdvali, Sevdkaumudi, Svatantrdlekhana and Svdmistotra 1 . Of these Vidyd-mandana is the most important; it was commented on by Purusottama and has already been noticed above in detail. A refutation of the Vidyd-mandana and the Suddhddvaita-mdrtanda of Giridhara was attempted in 1868 in a work called Sahasrdksa by Sadananda, a Sarikarite thinker. This was again refuted in the Prabhanjana by Vitthalanatha (of the nineteenth century) and there is a commentary on this by Govardhanasarma of the present century. From the Sahasrdksa we know that Vitthala had studied Nyaya in Navadvipa and the Vedas, the Mimdmsd and the Brahma-sutra, that he had gone to different countries carrying on his disputations and conquering his opponents, and that he was received with great honour by Svarupasimha of Udaypur. Vitthala's Yamundstakavivrti was commented on by Hariraja; his commentary on Vallabha's Siddhdnta-muktdvali was commented on by Brajanatha, son of Raghunatha. The Madhurdstaka of Vallabha was commented on by Vitthala, and his work was further commented on by Ghanasyama. The Madhurdstaka had other commentaries on it, by Hariraja, Balakrsna, Raghunatha and Vallabha. Vitthala also wrote commentaries on the Nydsadesa and the Pustipravdha-maryddd of Vallabha. His Bhakti-hetu was commented on by Raghunatha; in this work Vitthala discusses the possible course of the rise of bhakti. He says that there are two principal ways; those who follow the maryddd-mdrga follow their duties and attain God in course of time, but those who follow the pusti-mdrga depend entirely on the grace of God. God's grace is not conditioned by 1 See Aufrechts' Catalogus Catalogorum.

good deeds, such as gifts, sacrifices, etc., or by the performance of the prescribed duties. The jivas as such are the natural objects to whom God's grace is extended when He is pleased by good deeds. But it is more appropriate to hold that God's grace is free and independent of any conditions; God's will, being eternal, cannot be dependent on conditions originated through causes and effects. The opponents' view—that by good deeds and by prescribed duties performed for God, bhakti is attained, and through bhakti there is the grace of God and, through that, emancipation—is wrong; for though different persons may attain purity by the performance of good deeds, yet some may be endowed with knowledge and others with bhakti; and this difference cannot be explained except on the supposition that God's grace is free and unconditioned. The supposition that with grace as an accessory cause the purity of the mind produces bhakti is also wrong; it is much better to suppose that the grace of God flows freely and does not require the cooperation of other conditions; for the scriptures speak of the free exercise of God's grace. Those whom God takes in the path of maryada attain their salvation in due course through the performance of duties, purity of mind, devotion, etc.; but those to whom He extends His special grace are accepted in the path of pusti-bhakti; they attain bhakti even without the performance of any prescribed duties. The prescription of duties is only for those who are in the path of maryada; the inclination to follow either the maryada or the pusti path depends on the free and spontaneous will of God 1 , so that even in the maryadd-marga bhakti is due to the grace of God and not to the performance of duties 2 . Vitthala's view of the relation of God's will to all actions, whether performed by us or happening in the course of natural and material causes, reminds us of the doctrine of occasionalism, which is more or less of the same period as Vitthala's enunciation of it; he says that whatever actions happened, are happening or will happen are due to the immediately preceding will of God to that effect; all causality is thus due to God's spontaneous will at the preceding

1 yesu jlvesu yathd bhagavadiccha tathaiva tenant pravrtter avasyakatrat. Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya, p. 7.

2 In the Bhakti-hamsa (p. 56) of Vitthala it is said that bhakti means affection (sneha): bhaktipadasya saktih sneha eva. Worship itself is not bhakti, but may lead to it; since bhakti is of the nature of affection, there cannot be any viddhi or injunction with reference to it.

moment 1 . The causality of so-called causes and conditions, or of precedent-negations (prdg-abhdva), or of the absence of negative causes and conditions, is thus discarded; for all these elements are effects, and therefore depend upon God's will for their happening; for without that nothing could happen. God's will is the ultimate cause of all effects or happenings. As God's will is thus the only cause of all occurrences or destructions, so it is the sole cause of the rise of bhakti in any individual. It is by His will that people are associated with different kinds of inclinations, but they work differently and that they have or have not bhakti. Vitthala is said to have been a friend of Akbar. His other works were commentaries on Pusti-pravdha-maryddd and Siddhdnta-muktdvali, Anubhdsya-pilrtti (a commentary on the Anubhdsya), Nibandha-prakdsa, Subodhini-tippani (a commentary on the Subodhini), otherwise called Sannydsdvaccheda. Vallabhacarya's first son was Gopi-nathaji Maharaja, who wrote Sddhanadipaka and other minor works, and Vitthala was his second son. Vitthala had seven sons and four daughters.

Pltambara, the great-grandson of Vitthala, the pupil of Vitthala and the father of Purusottama, wrote Avatdravdddva.il, Bhakti-rasatvavdda, Dravya-suddhi and its commentary, and a commentary on the Pusti-pravdha-maryddd. Purusottama was born in 1670; he wrote the following books; Subodhini-prakdsa (a commentary on the Subodhini commentary of Vallabha on the Bhdga-vata-purdna), Upanisad-dipikd, Avarana-bhanga on the Prakdsa commentary of Vallabha on his Tattvattha-dipika, Prdrthand-ratndkara, Bhakti-hamsa-viveka, Utsava-pratdna, Suvarna-sutra (a commentary on the Vidvanamandana) and Sodasa-grantha-vivrti. He is said to have written twenty-four philosophical and theological tracts, of which seventeen have been available to the present writer, viz., Bheddbheda-svarupa-nirnaya, Bhagavat-pratikrti-pujanavdda, Srsti-bheda-vdda, Khydti-vdda, Andhakdra-vdda, Brahmanatvddi-devatddi-vdda, Jiva-pratibimbatva-khandana-vdda, Avirbhdva-tirobhdva-vdda, Pratibimba-vdda, Bhaktyutkarsa-vdda, Urddhva-pundra-dhdrana-vdda, Mdladhdrana-vdda, Upadesa-visaya-sankd-nirdsa-zdda, Murti-pujana-vdda, Sankha-cakra-dhdrana-vdda. He

1 yada yadd vat yat karyyam bhavati bhdvi abhud vd tat-tatkdlopddhau kramikenaiva tena tena hetund tat tat karyyam karisye iti tatah purvam bhagavad-icchd asty dsid vd iti mantavyam. Ibid. p. 9.

also wrote commentaries on Sevdphala, Sannydsa-nirnaya and Bhakti-vardhinl, the Bhdsya-prakdsa and the Utsava-pratdna. He wrote these commentaries also; Nirodha-laksana, Jalabheda, Panca-pddya, and the Tirtha commentary on the Bhakti-hamsa of Vitthala on the Siddhdnta-muktavali and the Bala-bodha. He also wrote a sub-commentary on Vitthala's Bhdsya on the Gdyatri, a commentary on Vallabhdstaka, the Veddnta-karanamdla and the Sdstrdrtha-prakarana-nibandha, and a commentary on the Gitd. He is said to have written about nine hundred thousand verses, and is undoubtedly one of the most prominent members of the Vallabha school.

Muralldhara, the pupil of Vitthala, wrote a commentary on Vallabha's Bhdsya called the Bhdsya-tlkd; also the Paratattvdnjana, Bhakti-cintdmani, Bhagavanndma-darpana, Bhagavannama-vai-bhava. Vitthala's great-grandson Vallabha, born in 1648, wrote the Subodhinl-lekha, a commentary on the Sevdphala, a commentary on the Sodas'a-grantha, the Gltd-tattva-dlpanl, and other works. Gopesvaraji Maharaja, the son of Kalyanaraja and the great-grandson of Vitthala, was born in 1595, and wrote the Rasmi commentary on the Prakdsa of Vallabha, the Subodhinl-bubhutra-bodhinl, and a Hindi commentary on the Siksdpatra of Hariraja. The other Gopesvara, known also as Yogi Gopesvara, the author of Bhakti-mdrtanda, was born much later, in 1781. Giridharji, born in 1845, wrote the Bhdsya-vivarana and other works.

Muralldhara, the pupil of Vitthala, wrote a commentary on Vallabha's Anubhdsya, a commentary on the Sdndilya-sutra, the Paratattvdnjana, the Bhakti-cintdmani, the Bhagavanndma-darpana and the Bhagavannama-vaibhava. Raghunatha, born in 1557, wrote the commentary Ndma-candrikd on Vallabha's Bhakti-hamsa, also commentaries on his Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya and Vallabhdstaka (the Bhakti-tarangini and the Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya-vivrti). He also wrote a commentary on the Purusottama-stotra and the Vallabhdstaka. Vallabha, otherwise known as Gokulanatha, son of Vitthala, born in 1550, wrote the Prapanca-sara-bheda and commentaries on the Siddhdnta-muktavali, Nirodha-laksana, Madhura-staka, Sarvottamastotra, Vallabhdstaka and the Gdyatri-bhdsya of Vallabhacarya. Kalyanaraja, son of Govindaraja, son of Vitthala, was born in 1571, and wrote commentaries on the. Jalabheda and the Siddhdnta-muktavali. His brother Gokulastava, born in 1580,

wrote a commentary called Trividhdndmdvali-vivrti. Devakinandana (1570), son of Raghunatha and grandson of Vitthala, wrote the Prakdsa commentary on the Bdla-bodha of Vallabhacarya. Ghanasyama (1574), grandson of Vitthala, wrote a sub-commentary on the Madhurdstaka-vivrti of Vitthala. Krsnacandra Gosvami, son of Brajanatha and pupil of Vallabhacarya, wrote a short commentary on the Brahma-sutra, the Bhdva-prakdsikd, in the fashion of his father Brajanatha's Maricikd commentary on the Brahma-sutra. This Brajanatha also wrote a commentary on Siddhdnta-muktdvali. Hariraja (1593), son of Kalyanaraja, wrote the £iksd-patra and commentaries on the Siddhdnta-muktdvali, the Nirodha-laksana, Pancapddya, Madhurdstaka, and a Parisista in defence of Kalyanaraja's commentary on the Jalabheda. Gopesa (1598), son of Ghanasyama, wrote commentaries on the Nirodha-laksana, Sevdphala and Sannydsanirnaya. Gopesvaraji Maharaja (1598), brother of Hariraja, wrote a Hindi commentary on Hariraja's Siksapdtra. Dvarakesa, a pupil of Vitthala, wrote a commentary on Siddhdnta-muktdvali. Jayagopala Bhatta, disciple of Kalyanaraja, wrote commentaries on the Sevdphala and the Taittirlya Upanisad. Vallabha (1648), great-grandson of Vitthala, wrote commentaries on the Siddhdnta-muktdvaliy Nirodha-laksana, Sevdphala, Sannydsa-nirnaya, Bhakti-vardhini, Jalabheda and the Madhurdstaka. Brajaraja, son of Syamala, wrote a commentary on the Nirodha-laksana. Indivesa and Govardhana Bhatta wrote respectively Gdyatryartha-vivarana and Gdyatryartha. Sri-dharasvami wrote the Bdla-bodhini commentary on the Anubhdsya of Vallabha. Giridhara, the great-grandson of Vitthala, wrote the Siddhddvaita-mdrtanda and the Prapanca-vdda, following Vidvdna-mandana. His pupil Ramakrsna wrote the Prakdsa commentary on the Siddhddvaita-mdrtanda, and another work, the Suddhddvaita-parikskdra. Yogi Gopesvara (1787) wrote the Vddakathd, Atmavdda, Bhakti-mdrtanda, Caturthddhikaranamdld, the Rasmi commentary on the Bhdsya-prakdsa of Purusottama, and a commentary on Purusottama's Veddntadhikaranamdld. Gokulotsava wrote a commentary on the Trividhdndmdvali of Vallabha. Brajesvara Bhatta wrote the Brahmavidyd-bhdvana, Haridasa the Hariddsa-siddhdnta, Iccharama the Pradipa on Vallabha's Anubhdsya and Nirbhaya-rama, the pupil of the Adhikarana-samgraha.

Visnusvamin.

Visnusvamin is regarded by tradition as being the earliest founder of the visuddhddvaita school which was regenerated by Vallabha. Sridhara, in his commentary on the Bhagavata-purdna, also refers to Visnusvamin, and it is possible that he wrote a commentary on the Bhagavata-purdna; but no such work is available. A brief account of Visnusvamin's views is available in the Sakala-caryd-mata-samgraha (by an anonymous writer), which merely summarizes Vallabha's views; there is nothing new in it which could be taken up here for discussion. This work, however, does not contain any account of Vallabha's philosophy, from which it may be assumed that it was probably written before the advent of Vallabha, and that the view of Visnusvamin contained therein was drawn either from the traditional account of Visnusvamin or from some of his works not available at the present time. It is unlikely, therefore, that the account of Visnusvamin in the Sakalacaryd-mata-samgraha is in reality a summary statement of Vallabha's views imposed on the older writer Visnusvamin. Vallabha himself, however, never refers to Visnusvamin as the originator of his system; there is a difference of opinion among the followers of Vallabha as to whether Vallabha followed in the footsteps of Visnusvamin. It is urged that while Vallabha emphasized the pure monistic texts of the Upanisads and regarded Brahman as undifferentiated, as one with himself, and as one with his qualities, Visnusvamin emphasized the duality implied in the Vedantic texts 1 . Vallabha also, in his .Subodhini commentary on the Bhagavata-purdna (ill. 32. 37) describes the view of Visnusvamin as propounding a difference between the Brahman and the world through the quality of tamas, and distinguishes his own view as propounding Brahman as absolutely qualityless 2 . The meagre account of Visnusvamin given in Sakalacaryd-mata-samgraha does not lend us any assistance in discovering whether his view differed from that of Vallabha, and, if it did, in what points. It is

1 Thus Nirbhayarama, in Adhikarana-samgraha (p. i), says: tasydpi durbo-dhatvena vydkhyana-sdpeksatayd tasya vyakhyatdro Visnusvdmi-madhva-pra-bhrtayo brahmddvaita-vddasya sevya-sevaka-bhdvasya ca virodham marwdnd abheda-bodhaka-srutisu laksanayd bheda-paratvam suddham bhedam angtcakruh.

2 te ca sdmpratam Visnusvamyanusdrinah tattva-vddino Rdmdnujas ca tamo-rajah-sattvair bhinnd asmat-pratipaditdc ca nairgunvddasya. Ibid. p. i.

also not impossible that the author of Sakalacaryd-mata-samgraha had not himself seen any work of Visnusvamin and had transferred the views of Vallabha to Visnusvamin, who, according to some traditions, was the originator of the Suddhadvaita system 1 .

According to the Vallabha-dig-vijaya there was a king called Vijaya of the Pandya kingdom in the south. He had a priest Devasvamin, whose son was Visnusvamin. Sukasvamin, a great religious reformer of North India, was his fellow-student in the Vedanta; it is difficult to identify him in any way. Visnusvamin went to Dvaraka, to Brndavana, then to Purl, and then returned home. At an advanced age he left his household deities to his son, and having renounced the world in the Vaisnava fashion, came to Kancl. He had many pupils there, e.g., Sridevadarsana, Srikantha, Sahasrarci, Satadhrti, Kumarapada, Parabhuti, and others. Before his death he left the charge of teaching his views to Sri-devadarsana. He had seven hundred principal followers teaching his views; one of them, Rajavisnusvamin, became a teacher in the Andhra country. Visnusvamin's temples and books were said to have been burnt at this time by the Buddhists. Vilva-mangala, a Tamil saint, succeeded to the pontifical chair at Srirarigam, Vilva-mahgala left the pontifical chair at Kancl to Deva-mahgala and went to Brndavana. Prabhavisnusvamin succeeded to the pontifical chair; he had many disciples, e.g., Srikanthagarbha, Satyavati Pandita, Somagiri, Narahari, Srantanidhi and others. He installed Srantanidhi in his pontifical chair before his death. Among the Visnusvamin teachers was one Govindacarya, whose disciple Vallabhacarya is said to have been. It is difficult to guess the date of Visnusvamin; it is not unlikely, however, that he lived in the twelfth or the thirteenth century.

1 This tradition is found definitely maintained in the Vallabha-dig-vijaya, written by Jadunathaji Maharaja.

CHAPTER XXXII

CAITANYA AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Caitanya's Biographers.

C a it any a was the last of the Vaisnava reformers who had succeeded Nimbarka and Vallabha. As a matter of fact, he was a junior contemporary of Vallabha. So far as he is known to us, he did not leave behind any work treating of his own philosophy, and all that we can know of it is from the writings of his contemporary and later admirers and biographers. Even from these we know more of his character and of the particular nature of his devotion to God than about his philosophy. It is therefore extremely difficult to point out anything as being the philosophy of Caitanya. Many biographies of him were written in Sanskrit, Bengali, Assamese and Oriya and a critical study of the materials of Caitanya's biography in Bengali was published some time ago by Dr Biman Behari Mazumdar. Of the many biographies of Caitanya those by Murarigupta and Vrndavanadasa deal with the first part of Caitanya's life, and the latter's work is regarded as the most authoritative and excellent treatment of his early life. Again, Krsnadasa Kaviraja's Life, which emphasizes the second and third parts of Caitanya's life, is regarded as the most philosophical and instructive treatment of his most interesting period. Indeed, Vrndavanadasa's Caitanya-bhdgavata and Krsnadasa Kaviraja's Caitanya-caritdmrta stand out as the most important biographical works on Caitanya. We have already mentioned Murarigupta, who wrote a small work in Sanskrit, full of exaggerations, though he was a contemporary. There are also biographies by Jayananda and Locanadasa, entitled Caitanya-mangala. Some Govinda and Svarupa Damodara, supposed to have been personal attendants of Caitanya, were said to have kept notes, but these are apparently now lost. Kavi Karnapura wrote the Caitanya-candrodaya-ndtaka, which may be regarded as the principal source of Krsnadasa Kaviraja's work. Vrndavanadasa was born in saka 1429 (a.d. 1507); he had seen Caitanya during the first fifteen years of his life. Caitanya died in saka 1455 (a.d. 1533) and the Caitanya-bhdgavata

was written shortly after. Krsnadasa Kaviraja's work, Caitanya-caritamrta, was written long afterwards. Though there is some dispute regarding the actual date of its completion, it is well-nigh certain that it was in saka 1537 (a.d. 1616). The other date, found in Prema-vilasa, is saka 1503 (a.d. 1581), and this had been very well-combatted by Professor Radha Govinda Nath in his learned edition of the work. The Caitanya-candrodaya-nataka was written by Kavi Karnapura in saka 1494 (a.d. 1572). It would thus appear that for the most authentic account of Caitanya's life one should refer to this work and to Vrndavanadasa's Caitanya-bhagavata. Kaviraja Krsnadasa's Caitanya-caritamrta is, however, the most learned of the biographies. There was also a Caitanya-sahasra-nama by Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya, the Govinda-vijaya of Parama-nandapurl, songs of Caitanya by Gauridasa Pandita, the Gaudaraja-vijaya of Paramananda Gupta, and songs of Caitanya by Gopala Basu.

The Life of Caitanya.

I shall attempt here to give only a brief account of Caitanya's life, following principally the Caitanya-bhagavata, Caitanya-candrodaya-nataka and Caitanya-caritamrta.

There lived in Navadvlpa Jagannatha Misra and his wife Sad. On a full-moon day in Spring (the month of Phalguna), when there was an eclipse of the moon, in saka 1407 (a.d. 1485), Caitanya was born to them. Navadvlpa at this time was inhabited by many Vaisnavas who had migrated from Sylhet and other parts of India. Thus there were Srivasa Pandita, Srirama Pandita, Candrasekhara; Murarigupta, Pundarika Vidyanidhi, Caitanya-vallabha Datta. Thus the whole atmosphere was prepared for a big spark of fire which it was the business of Caitanya to throw into the combustible material. In Santipura, Advaita, a great Vaisnava very much senior to Caitanya, was always regretting the general hollowness of the people and wishing for someone to create new fire. Caitanya's elder brother Visvarupa had gone out as an ascetic, and Caitanya, then the only son left to his parents, was particularly cherished by his widowed mother SacI Devi, the daughter of Nllambara Chakravarti.

Navadvlpa was at this time under Moslem rulers who had grown tyrannical. Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya, son of Visarada

Pandita and a great scholar, had gone over to Orissa to take refuge under the Hindu king there, Prataparudra.

Caitanya studied in the Sanskrit school {tot) of Sudarsana Pandita. His study in the school was probably limited to the Kalapa grammar and some kavyas. Some later biographers say that he had also read Nyaya (logic); there is, however, no proper evidence in support of this. He had, however, studied at home some Purdnas, notably the great devotional work, Qrlmad-bhagavata. As a student he was indeed very gifted; but he was also very vain, and always took special delight in defeating his fellow-students in debate. From his early days he had shown a strong liking for devotional songs. He took a special delight in identifying himself with Krsna. Among his associates the names of the following may be mentioned: Srinivasa Pandita and his three brothers, Vasudeva Datta, Mukunda Datta and Jagai, the writer, Srigarbha Pandita, Murarigupta, Govinda, Sridhara, Gaiigadasa, Damodara, Candra-sekhara, Mukunda, Sanjaya, Purusottama, Vijaya, Vakresvara, Sanatana, Hrdaya, Madana and Ramananda. Caitanya had received some instruction in the Vedas also from his father. He had also received instruction from Visnu Pandita and Gaiigadasa Pandita. At this period of his life he became intimately acquainted with Haridasa and Gadadhara.

Caitanya's first wife, Laksmi Devi, daughter of Vallabha Misra, died of snake-bite; he then married Visnupriya. After his father's death he went to Gaya to perform the post-funeral rites; there he is said to have met saintly persons like Paramananda Purl, Isvara Puri, Raghunatha Purl, Brahmananda Purl, Amara Purl, Gopala Purl, and Ananta Purl. I le was initiated by Isvara Purl and decided to renounce the world. He came back, however, to Navadvlpa and began to teach the Bhagavata-purana for some time.

Nityananda, an ascetic (avadhuta), joined him in Navadvlpa. His friendship further kindled the fire of Caitanya's passion for divine love, and both of them, together with other associates, began to spend days and nights in dancing and singing. It was at this time that through his influence and that of Nityananda, two drunkards, Jagai and Madhai, were converted to his Vaisnava cult of love. Shortly after this, with his mother's permission, he took the ascetic life and proceeded to Katwa, and from there to Santipur to meet Advaita there. From this place he started for Purl with his followers.

Such is the brief outline of Caitanya's early life, bereft of all interesting episodes, and upon it there is a fair amount of unanimity among his various biographers.

Krsnadasa Kaviraja's Bengali work, Caitanya-caritdmrta^ is probably one of the latest of his biographies, but on account of its recondite character has easily surpassed in popularity all other biographies of Caitanya. He divides Caitanya's life into three parts: Adilila (the first part), Madhya-lila (the second part) and Antyalila (the last part). The first part consists of an account of the first twenty-four years, at the end of which Caitanya renounced the world. He lived for another twenty-four years, and these are divided into two sections, the second and the last part of his life. Of these twenty-four years, six years were spent on pilgrimage; this marks the middle period. The remaining eighteen years were spent by him in Purl and form the final period, of which six years were spent in preaching the cult of holy love and the remaining twelve years in deep ecstasies and suffering pangs of separation from his beloved Krsna, the Lord.

After his renunciation in the twenty-fourth year of his life, in the month of Magha (January), he started for Brndavana and travelled for three days in the Radha country (Bengal). He did not know the way to Brndavana and was led to Santipura by Nitya-nanda. Caitanya's mother, along with many other people, Srlvasa, Ramai, Vidyanidhi, Gadadhara, Vakresvara, Murari, Suklambara, Srldhara, Vyaya, Vasudeva, Mukunda, Buddhimanta Khan, Nandana and Sanjaya, came to see him at Santipur. From Santipur Caitanya started for Purl with Nityananda, Pandita Jagadananda, Damodara Pandita and Mukunda Dutta by the side of the Ganges, by way of Balesvar (in Orissa). He then passed by Yajpur and Saksigopala and came to Purl. Having arrived there, he went straight to the temple of Jagannatha, looked at the image and fell into a trance. Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya, who was then residing at Purl, brought him to his house; Nityananda, Jagadananda, Damodara all came and joined him there. Here Caitanya stayed for some time at the house of Sarvabhauma and held discussions with him, in the course of which he refuted the monistic doctrines of Sarikara 1 .

1 There is considerable divergence about this episode with Sarvabhauma; the Sanskrit Caitanya-caritdmrta and the Caitanya-candrodaya-ndtaka do not agree with the description in the Caitanya-caritdmrta in Bengali of Krsnadasa Kaviraja as given here.

After some time Caitanya started for the South and first came to Kurmasthana, probably a place in the Ganjam district (South Orissa); he then passed on by the banks of the Godavari and met Ramananda Ray. In a long conversation with him on the subtle aspect of the emotion of bhakti Caitanya was very much impressed by him; he passed some time with him in devotional songs and ecstasies. He then resumed his travel again and is said to have passed through Mallikarjuna-tlrtha, Ahobala-Nrsimha, Skanda-tlrtha and other places, and later on came to Srirarigam on the banks of the Kaveri. Here he lived in the house of Verikata Bhatta for four months, after which he went to the Rsabha mountain, where he met Paramananda Purl. It is difficult to say how far he travelled in the South, but he must have gone probably as far as Travancore. It is also possible that he visited some of the places where Madhvacarya had great influence, and it is said that he had discussions with the teachers of the Madhva school. He discovered the Brahma-samhitd and the Krsna-karndmrta, two important manuscripts of Vaisnavism, and brought them with him. He is said to have gone a little farther in the East up to Nasika; but it is difficult to say to what extent the story of these tours is correct. On his return journey he met Ramananda Ray again, who followed him to Purl.

After his return to Purl, Prataparudra, then King of Purl, solicited his acquaintance and became his disciple. In Purl Caitanya began to live in the house of KasI Misra. Among others, he had as his followers Janardana, Krsnadasa, Sikhl Mahiti, Pradyumna Misra, Jagannatha Dasa, Murari Mahiti, CandanesVara and Simhesvara. Caitanya spent most of his time in devotional songs, dances and ecstasies. In a.d. 1514 he started for Brndavana with a number of followers; but so many people thronged him by the time he came to Panihati and Kamarahati that he cancelled his programme and returned to Purl. In the autumn of the next year he again started for Brndavana with Balabhadra Bhattacarya and came to Benares; there he defeated in a discussion a well-known teacher, Prakasananda, who held monistic doctrines. In Brndavana he met Sri-rupa GosvamI, Uddhavadasa Madhava, and others. Then he left Brndavana and Mathura and went to Allahabad by the side of the Ganges. There he met Vallabha Bhatta and Raghupati Upadhyaya, and gave elaborate religious instruction to

Sri-rupa. Later on Caitanya met Sanatana and imparted further religious instruction to him. He returned to Benares, where he taught Prakasananda; then he came back to Purl and spent some time there. Various stories are narrated in the Caitanya-caritdmrta, describing the ecstatic joy of Caitanya in his moods of inspiration; on one occasion he had jumped into the sea in a state of ecstasy and was picked up by a fisherman. It is unfortunate, however, that we know nothing of the exact manner in which he died.

Emotionalism of Caitanya.

The religious life of Caitanya unfolds unique pathological symptoms of devotion which are perhaps unparalleled in the history of any other saints that we know of. The nearest approach will probably be in the life of St Francis of Assisi; but the emotional flow in Caitanya seems to be more self-centred and deeper. In the beginning of his career he not only remained immersed as it were in a peculiar type of self-intoxicating song-dance called the kirtana, but he often imitated the various episodes of Krsna's life as told in the Purdnas. But with the maturity of his life of renunciation his intoxication and his love for Krsna gradually so increased that he developed symptoms almost of madness and epilepsy. Blood came out of the pores of his hair, his teeth chattered, his body shrank in a moment and at the next appeared to swell up. He used to rub his mouth against the floor and weep, and had no sleep at night. Once he jumped into the sea; sometimes the joints of his bones apparently became dislocated, and sometimes the body seemed to contract. The only burden of his songs was that his heart was aching and breaking for Krsna, the Lord. He was fond of reading the dramas of Ramananda Ray, the poems of Candidasa and Vidyapati, the Krsna-karndmrta of Vilva-marigala and the Gita-govinda of Jayadeva; most of these were mystic songs of love for Krsna in erotic phraseology. Nowhere do we find any account of such an ecstatic bhakti in the Puranas, in the Gitd or in any other religious literature of India—the Bhdgavata-purdna has, no doubt, one or two verses which in a way anticipate the sort of bhakti that we find in the life of Caitanya—but without the life of Caitanya our storehouse of pathological religious experience would have been wanting in one of the most fruitful harvests of pure emotionalism

in religion. Caitanya wrote practically nothing, his instructions were few and we have no authentic record of the sort of discussions that he is said to have held. Me gave but little instruction, his preaching practically consisted in the demonstration of his own mystic faith and love for Krsna; yet the influence that he exerted on his contemporaries and also during some centuries after his death was enormous. Sanskrit and Bengali literature during this time received a new impetus, and Bengal became in a sense saturated with devotional lyrics. It is difficult for us to give any account of his own philosophy save what we can gather from the accounts given of him by his biographers. Jlva GosvamI and Baladeva Vidyabhusana are probably the only persons of importance among the members of his faith who tried to deal with some kind of philosophy, as we shall see later on.

Gleanings from the Caitanya-Caritamrta on the subject of Caitanya's Philosophical Views.

Krsnadasa Kaviraja, otherwise known as Kaviraja GosvamI, was not a contemporary of Caitanya; but he came into contact with many of his important followers and it may well be assumed that he was in possession of the traditional account of the episodes of Caitanya's life as current among them. He gives us an account of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma's discussion with Caitanya at Purl, in which the latter tried to refute the monistic view. The supposed conversation shows that, according to Caitanya, Brahman cannot be indeterminate (nirvisesa); any attempt to prove the indeter-minateness of Brahman would only go the other way, prove His determinate nature and establish the fact that He possesses all possible powers. These powers are threefold in their nature: the Visnu-sakti, the ksetrajfia-sakti, and the avidyd-sakti. The first power, as Visnu-sakti, may further be considered from three points of view, the hlddinl, saudhini and samvit. These three powers, bliss, being, and consciousness, are held together in the transcendent power (pard-sakti or Visnu-sakti) of God. The ksetrajfia-sakti or jlva-sakti (the power of God as souls of individuals) and the avidyd-sakti (by which the world-appearances are created) do not exist in the transcendent sphere of God. The Brahman is indeed devoid of all prdkrta or phenomenal qualities, but He is indeed full of non-

phenomenal qualities. It is from this point of view that the Upanisads have described Brahman as nirguna (devoid of qualities) and also as devoid of all powers (nihsaktika). The individual souls are within the control of mdyd-sakti; but God is the controller of the mdyd-sakti and through it of the individual souls. God creates the world by His unthinkable powers and yet remains unchanged within Himself. The world thus is not false; but, being a creation, it is destructible. The Sarikarite interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is wrong and is not in consonance with the purport of the Upanisads.

In chapter vm of the Madhya-lild of the Caitanya-caritdmrta we have the famous dialogue between Caitanya and Ramananda regarding the gradual superiority of the ideal of love. Ramananda says that devotion to God comes as the result of the performance of caste-duties. We may note here that according to the Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu bhakti consists in attaching oneself to Krsna for His satisfaction alone, without being in any way influenced by the desire for philosophic knowledge, karma or disinclination from worldly things (vairdgya), and without being associated with any desire for one's own interests 1 .

The Visnu-purdna, as quoted in the Caitanya-caritdmrta, holds the view that it is by the performance of caste-duties and dsrama-duties that God can be worshipped. But the point is whether such performance of caste-duties and dsrama-duties can lead one to the attainment of bhakti or not. If bhakti means the service of God for His sake alone (dnukulyena Krsndnusevanam), then the performance of caste-duties cannot be regarded as a necessary step towards its attainment; the only contribution that it may make can be the purification of mind, whereby the mind may be made fit to receive the grace of God. Caitanya, not satisfied with the reply of Ramananda, urges him to give a better account of bhakti. Ramananda in reply says that a still better state is that in which the devotee renounces all his interests in favour of God in all his performance of duties; but there is a still higher state in which one renounces all his duties through love of God. Unless one can renounce all thoughts about one's own advantage, one cannot proceed in the path of love. The next higher stage is that in which devotion is

1 anyabhildsitdsunyam jndna-karmddy-andvrtam. dnukulyena Krsndnusevanam bhaktiruttamd.

Bhaktirasdmrta-sindhu, i. i. 9.

impregnated with knowledge. Pure devotion should not have, however, any of the obstructive influences of knowledge; philosophical knowledge and mere disinclination obstruct the course of bhakti. Knowledge of God's nature and wisdom regarding the nature of the intimate relation of man with God may be regarded as unobstructive to bhakti. The natural and inalienable attachment of our mind to God is called prema-bhakti; it is fivefold: sdnta (peaceful love), ddsya (servant of God), sakhya (friendship with God), vdtsalya (filial attitude towards God), and mddhurya (sweet love, or love of God as one's lover). The different types of love may thus be arranged as above in a hierarchy of superiority; love of God as one's bridegroom or lover is indeed the highest. The love of the gopis for Krsna in the love-stories of Krsna in Brndavana typifies this highest form of love and particularly the love of Radha for Krsna. Ramananda closes his discourse with the assertion that in the highest altitude of love, the lover and the beloved melt together into one, and through them both one unique manifestation of love realizes itself. Love attains its highest pitch when both the lover and the beloved lose their individuality in the sweet milky flow of love.

Later on, in Madhya-lild, chapter xxix, Caitanya, in describing the nature ofsuddhd bhakti (pure devotion), says that pure devotion is that in which the devotee renounces all desires, all formal worship, all knowledge and work, and is attached to Krsna with all his sense-faculties. A true devotee does not want anything from God, but is satisfied only in loving Him. It shows the same symptoms as ordinary human love, rising to the highest pitch of excellence.

In chapter xxn of Madhya-lild it is said that the difference in intensity of devotion depends upon the difference of the depth of emotion. One who is devoted to Krsna must possess preliminary moral qualities; he must be kind, truthful, equable to all, non-injurious, magnanimous, tender, pure, selfless, at peace with himself and with others; he must do good to others, must cling to Krsna as his only support, must indulge in no other desires, must make no other effort than that of worshipping Krsna, must be steady, must be in full control of all his passions; he should not be unmindful, should be always prepared to honour others, be full of humility and prepared to bear with fortitude all sorrows; he should indulge in association with true devotees—it is by such a course

that love of Krsna will gradually dawn in him. A true Vaisnava should give up the company of women and of all those who are not attached to Krsna. He should also give up caste-duties and dsrama-duties and cling to Krsna in a helpless manner. To cling to Krsna and to give oneself up to Him is the supreme duty of a Vaisnava. Love of Krsna is innate in a man's heart, and it is manifested under encouraging conditions. Love for God is a manifestation of the hlddini power of God, and by virtue of the fact that it forms a constituent of the individual soul, God's attraction of individual souls towards Him is a fundamental fact of human life; it may remain dormant for a while, but it is bound to wake under suitable conditions.

The individual souls share both the hlddini and the samvit sakti of God, and the mdyd-sakti typified in matter. Standing between these two groups of power, the individual souls are called the tatastha-sakti. A soul is impelled on one side by material forces and attractions, and urged upwards by the hlddini-sakti of God. A man must therefore adopt such a course that the force of material attractions and desires may gradually wane, so that he may be pulled forward by the hlddini-sakti of God.

Some Companions of Caitanya.

A great favourite of Caitanya was Nityananda. The exact date of his birth and death is difficult to ascertain, but he seems to have been some years older than Caitanya. He was a Brahmin by caste, but became an avadhuta and had no caste-distinctions. He was a messenger of Caitanya, preaching the Vaisnava religion in Bengal during Caitanya's absence at Purl; he is said to have converted to Vaisnavism many Buddhists and low-caste Hindus of Bengal. At a rather advanced stage of life, Nityananda broke the vow of asceticism and married the two daughters of Surjadas Sarkhel, brother of Gaurdasa Sarkhel of Kalna; the two wives were Vasudha and Jahnavi. Nityananda's son Vlrachand, also known as Vira-bhadra, became a prominent figure in the subsequent period of Vaisnava history.

Prataparudra was the son of Purusottamadeva, who had ascended his throne in 1478, and himself ascended the throne in 1503. He was very learned and took pleasure in literary disputes.

Mr Stirling, in his History of Orissa (published in 1891), says of him that he had marched with his army to Rameswaram and took the famous city of Vijayanagara; he had also fought the Mahome-dans and prevented them from attacking Purl. Caitanya's activities in Purl date principally between 1516 and 1533. Ramananda Ray was a minister of Prataparudra, and at his intercession Caitanya came into contact with Prataparudra, who became one of his followers. The influence of Caitanya together with the conversion of Prataparudra produced a great impression upon the people of Orissa, and this led to the spread of Vaisnavism and the collapse of Buddhism there in a very marked manner.

During the time of Caitanya, Hussain Shaha was the Nawab of Gaur. Two Brahmins, converted into Islam and having the Mahomedan names Sakar Malik and Dabir Khas, were his two high officers; they had seen Caitanya at Ramkeli and had been greatly influenced by him. Later in their lives they were known as Sanatana and Rupa; they distributed their riches to the poor and became ascetics. Rupa is said to have met Caitanya at Benares, where he received instruction from him; he wrote many Sanskrit works of great value, e.g., Lalita-mddhava, Vidagdhamddhava, Ujjvalanilamani, Utkalikd-vallarl (written in 1550), Uddhava-duta, Upadesdmrta, Kdrpanya-punjikd, Gangdstaka, Govindaviruddvali, Gaurdngakalpataru, Caitanydstaka, Ddna-keli-kaumudi, Ndtaka-candrikd, Padydvali, Paramdrtha-sandarbha, Priti-sandarbha, Pre-mendu-sdgara, Mathurd-mahimd, Mukundamuktd-ratndvali-stotra-tikd t Ydmundstaka, Rasdmrta, Vildpa-kusumdnjali, Brajavildsa-stava, Siksddasaka, Samksepa Bhdgavatdmrta, Sddhana-paddhati, Stavamdld, Hatnsa-duta-kdvya, Harindmdmrta-vydkarana, Hare-krsna-mahdmantrdrtha-nirupana, Chando'stddasaka.

Sanatana wrote the following works: Ujjvala-rasa-kand t Ujjvala-nilamani-tikd, Bhakti-bindu, Bhakti-sandarbha, Bhdgavata-krama-sandarbha, Bhdgavdtamrta, Yoga-sataka-vydkhydna, Visnu-tosinl y Haribhakti-vildsa, Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu. Sanatana had been put in prison by Hussain Shah when he heard that he was thinking of leaving him, but Sanatana bribed the gaoler, who set him at liberty. He at once crossed the Ganges and took the ascetic life; he went to Mathura to meet his brother Rupa, and returned to Purl to meet Caitanya. After staying some months in Purl, he went to Brnda-vana. In the meanwhile Rupa had also gone to Purl and he also

returned to Brndavana. Both of them were great devotees and spent their lives in the worship of Krsna.

Advaitacarya's real name was Kamalakara Bhattacarya. He was born in 1434 and was thus fifty-two years older than Caitanya; he was a great Sanskrit scholar and resided at Santipur. He went to Nabadvlpa to finish his studies. People at this time had become very materialistic; Advaita was very much grieved at it and used to pray in his mind for the rise of some great prophet to change their minds. Caitanya, after he had taken to ascetic life, had visited Advaita at Santipur, where both of them enjoyed ecstatic dances; Advaita was then aged about seventy-five. It is said that he had paid a visit to Caitanya at Purl. He is said to have died in 1539 according to some, and in 1584 according to others (which is incredible).

Apart from Advaita and Nityananda there were many other intimate companions of Caitanya, of whom Srlvasa or Srinivasa was one. He was a brahmin of Sylhet who settled at Navadvipa; he was quite a rich man. It is not possible to give his exact birth-date, but he had died long before 1540 (when Jayananda wrote his Caitanya-niatigala); he was probably about forty when Caitanya was born. As a boy Caitanya was a frequent visitor to Srivasa's house. He was devoted to the study of the Bhdgavata, though in his early life he was more or less without a faith. He was also a constant companion of Advaita while he was at Navadvipa. When Caitanya's mind was turned to God after his return from Gaya, Srivasa's house was the scene of ecstatic dances. Srlvasa then became a great disciple of Caitanya. NarayanI, the mother of Brndavanadasa, the biographer of Caitanya, was a niece of Srlvasa.

Ramananda Ray, the minister of Prataparudra and author of the Jagannatha-vallabha, was very much admired by Caitanya. He was a native of Vidyanagara, in Central India. The famous dialogue narrated in the Caitanya-caritamrta shows how Caitanya himself took lessons from Ramananda on the subject of high devotion. Ramananda Ray on his part was very fond of Caitanya and often spent his time with him.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JIVA GOSVAMl

AND BALADEVA VID Y A B H 0 S AN A,

FOLLOWERS OF CAITANYA

Ontology.

JIva GosvamI flourished shortly after Caitanya. He wrote a running commentary on the Bhdgavata-purdna which forms the second chapter (Bhdgavata-sandarbha) of his principal work, the Sat-sandarbha. In this chapter he says that, when the great sages identify themselves with the ultimate reality, their minds are unable to realize the diverse powers of the Lord. The nature of the Lord thus appears in a general manner (sdmdnyena laksitam tathaiva sphnrat, p. 50), and at this stage the powers of Brahman are not perceived as different from Him. The ultimate reality, by virtue of its essential power (svarupasthhitayd eva saktyd), becomes the root support of all its other powers (pardsdm api saktindm muld-srayarupam), and through the sentiment of devotion appears to the devotees as the possessor of diverse powers; He is then called Bhagavan. Pure bliss (dnanda) is the substance, and all the other powers are its qualities; in association with all the other powers it is called Bhagavan or God 1 . The concept of Brahman is thus the partial appearance of the total personality denoted by the word Bhagavan; the same Bhagavan appears as Paramatman in His aspect as controlling all beings and their movements. The three names Brahman, Bhagavan and Paramatman are used in accordance with the emphasis that is put on the different aspects of the total composite meaning; thus, as any one of the special aspects of God appears to the mind of the devotee, he associates it with the name of Brahman, Bhagavan or Paramatman 2 .

The aspect as Brahman is realized only when the specific qualities and powers do not appear before the mind of the devotee.

1 dnanda-mdtram visesyam samastdh saktayah visesandni visisto Bhagavan. Sat-sandarbha, p. 50.

2 tatraikasyaiva i-isesana-bhedena tad avisistatvena ca pratipddandt tathaiva tat-tad-upusakapurusdnubhava-bheddc ca dvirbhdva-ndmnor bhedah. Ibid. p. 53.

In realizing the pure consciousness as the nature of the devotee's own self the nature of the Brahman as pure consciousness is also realized; the realization of the identity of one's own nature with that of Brahman is effected through the special practice of devotion 1 . In the monistic school of Vedanta, as interpreted by Sarikara, we find that the identity of the self with the Brahman is effected through the instruction in the Vedantic maxim: "that art thou" {tat Warn asi). Here, however, the identity is revealed through the practice of devotion, or rather through the grace of God, which is awakened through such devotion.

The abode of Bhagavan is said to be Vaikuntha. There are two interpretations of this word; in one sense it is said to be identical with the very nature of Brahman as unobscured by may a 2 ; in another interpretation it is said to be that which is neither the manifestation of rajas and tamas nor of the material sattva as associated with rajas and tamas. It is regarded as having a different kind of substance, being the manifestation of the essential power of Bhagavan or as pure sattva. This pure sattva is different from the material sattva of the Samkhyists, which is associated with rajas and tamas, and for this reason it is regarded as aprdkrta, i.e., transcending the prdkrta. For this reason also it is regarded as eternal and unchanging 3 . The ordinary gunas, such as sattva, rajas and tamas, are produced from the movement of the energy of kdla (time); but the sattva-Vaikuntha is not within the control of kdla*. The Vaikuntha, thus being devoid of any qualities, may in one sense be regarded as nirvisesa (differenceless); but in another sense differences may be said to exist in it also, although they

1 Ibid. p. 54. nana suksma-cid-rupatvam paddrthdnubhave katham purna-cid-dkdra-rupa-madiya-brahma-svarupam sphuratu tatrdha, ananyabodhyd-tmatayd cid-dkdratd-sdmyena suddha-tvam paddrthaikyabodhya-svarupatayd. yady api tddrg-dtmdnubhavdnantaram tad-ananya-bodhyatd-krtau sddhaka-saktir ndsti tathdpi pilrvam tadartham eva krtayd sarvatrapi upajivyayd sddhana-bhaktyd drddhitasya sri-bhagavatah prabhdvdd eva tad api tatrodayate. Ibid.

P- 54-

2 yato vaikunthdt param Brahmdkhyam tattvam param bhinnam na bhavati. svarupa-sakti-visesdviskdrena mdyayd ndvrtam tad ev tad-rupam. Ibid. p. 57.

3 yatra vaikunthe rajas tamas ca na pravartate. tayor misram sahacaram jadam yat sattvam na tad api. kintu anyad eva tac ca yd susthu sthdpayisyamdnd mdydtah para bhagavat-svarupa-saktih tasydh vrttitvena cid-rupam suddha-sattvdkhyam sattvam. Ibid. p. 58.

4 Ibid. p. 59. This view, that the gunas are evolved by the movement of kdla, is not accepted in the ordinary classical view of Sarnkhya, but is a theory of the Paficaratra school. Cf. Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, chs. 6 and 7.

398 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

can only be of the nature of the pure sattva or the essential power of God 1 .

The essential power {svarupa-sakti) and the energy (mdyd-sakti) are mutually antagonistic, but they are both supported in God 2 . The power of God is at once natural (svdbhdvika) and unthinkable {acintya). It is further urged that even in the ordinary world the powers of things are unthinkable, i.e., neither can they be deduced from the nature of the things nor can they be directly perceived, but they have to be assumed because without such an assumption the effect would not be explainable. The word "unthinkable" {acintya) also means that it is difficult to assert whether the power is identical with the substance or different from it; on the one hand, power cannot be regarded as something extraneous to the substance, and, on the other, if it were identical with it, there could be no change, no movement, no effect. The substance is perceived, but the power is not; but, since an effect or a change is produced, the implication is that the substance must have exerted itself through its power or powers. Thus, the existence of powers as residing in the substance is not logically proved, but accepted as an implication 3 . The same is the case in regard to Brahman; His powers are identical with His nature and therefore co-eternal with Him. The concept of "unthinkableness" (acintyatva) is used to reconcile apparently contradictory notions {durghata-ghatakatvam hy acintyatvam). The internal and essential power (antaranga-svariipa-sakti) exists in the very nature of the Brahman (svariipena) and also as its various manifestations designated by such terms as Vaikuntha, etc. (vaikunthddi-svarfipa-vaibhava-riipena)*. The second power (tatasthasakti) is represented by the pure selves. The third power {bahiranga-mdyd-sakti) is represented by the evolution of all cosmical categories and their root, the pradhdna. The analogy offered is that of the sun, its rays and the various

1 nanu gunudy-abhdvdn nirrisesa evasau loka ity diamkya tatra visesas tasydh iuddha-satlvatmikayah svarupdnatirikta-sakter eva vilclsa-rilpa iti. Sat-sanJarhha,

P- 59-

2 te ca srariipa-sakti-mdyd-iakti paraspara-viruddhe, tathd tayor vrttayah sva-sva-gana eva parasparuviruddha api bahvyah tathdpi tasam ekatn nidhanam lad eva. Ibid. p. 61.

3 lake hi sarvesiim bhdvdndm mani-mantrddinam saktayah acintya-jtidna-{•ocardh acintyam tarkdsaham yaj-jiidnam kdrydny athdnupapatti-pramdnakam tusya gocardh santi. Ibid. pp. 63-4.

colours which are manifested as the result of refraction. The external power of mdyd (bahiranga-sakti) can affect the jivas but not Brahman.

The maya. is defined in the Bhdgavata (as interpreted by Sridhara) as that which is manifested without any object and is not yet perceivable in its own nature, like an illusory image of darkness 1 . This is interpreted in a somewhat different form in the Bhdgavata-sandarbha, where it is said that maya is that which appears outside the ultimate reality or Brahman, and ceases to appear with the realization of Brahman. It has no appearance in its own essential nature, i.e., without the support of the Brahman it cannot manifest itself; it is thus associated with Brahman in two forms as jiva-mdyd and guna-mdyd. The analogy of dbhdsa, which was explained by Sridhara as "illusory image," is here interpreted as the reflection of the solar light from outside the solar orb. The solar light cannot exist unless it is supported by the solar orb. But though this is so, yet the solar light can have an independent role and play outside the orb when it is reflected or refracted; thus it may dazzle the eyes of man and blind them to its real nature, and manifest itself in various colours. So also the analogy of darkness shows that, though darkness cannot exist where there is light, yet it cannot itself be perceived without the light of the eyes. The prakrti and its developments are but manifestations or appearances, which are brought into being outside the Brahman by the power of the mdyd; but the movement of the maya, the functioning of the vital prdnas, manas and the senses, the body, are all made possible by the fact that they are permeated by the original essential power of God (antaranga-sakti) 2 . Just as a piece of iron which derives its heat from the fire in which it is put cannot in its turn burn the fire or affect it in any manner, so the mdyd and its appearances, which derive their essence from the essential power of God, cannot in any way affect God or His essential power.

The selves can know the body; but they cannot know the ultimate reality and the ultimate perceiver of all things. It is through mdyd that different things have an apparently independent existence and

1 rte'rtham yat pratiyeta na pratiyeta catmani

tad vidydd atmano may am yatha bhasam yatha tamah. - svarupa-bhutakhyam antarangam saktim sarvasydpi pravrtty-anyatha-nupapattya. Ibid. p. 69.

400 Jiva Gosvami and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

are known by the selves; but the true and essential nature of Brahman is always one with all things, and, since in that state there is no duality, there is nothing knowable and no form separate from it. The ultimate reality, which reveals all things, reveals itself also—the heat rays of fire, which derive their existence from the fire, cannot burn the fire itself 1 . The gunas — sattva, rajas and tamas —belong to the jiva and not to Brahman; for that reason, so long as the selves (jiva) are blinded by the power of mdyd, there is an appearance of duality, which produces also the appearance of knower and knowable. The mdyd is again described as twofold, the guna-mdyd, which represents the material forces (jaddtmikd), and the dtma-mdyd, which is the will of God. There is also the concept of jiva-mdyd, which is, again, threefold—creative (Bhu)> protective ($ri) y and destructive (Durgd). The dtma-mdyd is the essential power of God 2 . In another sense mdyd is regarded as being composed of the three gunas. The word yoga-mdyd has also two meanings—it means the miraculous power achieved through the practice of the yoga when it is used as a power of the Yogins or sages; when applied to God (paramesvara), it means the manifestation of His spiritual power as pure consciousness (cic-chakti-vildsa). When mdyd is used in the sense of dtma-mdyd or God's own mdyd, it has thus three meanings, viz., His essential power (svarupa-sakti), His will involving knowledge and movement (jndna-kriye), and also the inner dalliance of His power as consciousness (cic-chakti-vildsa) 3 . Thus, there is no mdyd in Vaikuntha, because it itself is of the nature of mdyd or svarupa-sakti; the Vaikuntha is, thus, identical with moksa (emancipation).

Once it is admitted that the unthinkable power of God can explain all contradictory phenomena and also that by yoga-mdyd God can directly manifest any form, appearance or phenomena, it was easy for the Vaisnavas of the Gaudiya school to exploit the idea theologically. Leaving aside the metaphysical idea of the non-Vaisnava nature of the relation of God with I lis powers, they tried

1 svarupa-vaibhare tasya jivasya rasmi-sthdnlyasya mandalasthdriiyo ya dtmd paramdtmd sa era svarupa-saktyd sarvam abhilt, anddita eva bhavann dste, na tu tat-pravesena, tat tatra itarah sajivah kenetarena karana-bhutena kam paddrtham pasyet, na kendpi kam api pasyet ity-arthah; na hi rasmayah svasaktyd sitrya-mandaldntargata-vaibhvam prakdsayeyuh, na cdrciso valinim nirdaheyuh. Sat-sandarbha, p. 71.

2 miyate anayd iti mdyd-iabdena sakti-mdtram api bhanyate. Ibid. p. 73.

by an extension of the metaphysical formula to defend their religious belief in the theological nature of the episodes of Krsna in Vrndavana, as related in the Bhdgavata. Thus they held that Krsna, including His body and all His dress and ornaments and the like, the Gopis, with whom He had dalliance, and even the cows and trees of Vrndavana, were physically existent in limited forms and at the same time unlimited and spiritual as a manifestation of the essential nature of God. The Vaisnavas were not afraid of any contradiction, because in accordance with the ingeniously-devised metaphysical formula the supra-logical nature of God's power was such that through it He could manifest Himself in all kinds of limited forms, and yet remain identical with His own supreme nature as pure bliss and consciousness. The contradiction was only apparent; because the very assumption that God's power is supra-logical resolves the difficulty of identifying the limited with the unlimited, the finite with the infinite 1 . The author of Sat-sandarbha takes great pains to prove that the apparent physical form of Krsna, as described in the Bhdgavata-purana, is one with Brahman. It is not a case in which the identity is to be explained as having absolute affinity with Brahman (atyanta-tdddttnya) or as being dependent on Brahman: if the Brahman reveals itself in pure mind, it must appear as one, without any qualitative difference of any kind; if, in associating Brahman with the form of Krsna, this form appears to be an additional imposition, it is not the revelation of Brahman. It cannot be urged that the body of Krsna is a product of pure sattva ; for this has no rajas in it, and therefore there is no creative development in it. If there is any rajas in it, the body of Krsna cannot be regarded as made up of pure sattva; and, if there is any mixture of rajas, then it would be an impure state and there can be no revelation of Brahman in it. Moreover, the text of the Bhdgavata-purana is definitely against the view that the body of Krsna is dependent only on pure sattva, because it asserts that the body of Krsna is itself one and the same as pure sattva or pure

1 Ibid. pp. 70-92. satya-jndndnantdnandaika-rasa-murtitvdd yugapad eva sarvam api tat-tad-rupam vartata eva, kintu yuyam sarvadd sarvam na pasyatheti (p. 87). tataica yadd tava yatrdmse tat-tad-updsand-phalasya yasya rupasya prakdsanecchd tadaiva tatra tad-rupam prakds'ate iti. iyam kadety asya yuktih. tasmdt tat tat sarvam api tasmin srl-krsna-rupe'ntarbhutam ity evam atrdpi tdtparyam upasamharati (p. 90). tad ittham madhyamdkdra eva sarvddhdratvdt bibhutvam sddhitam. sarva-gatatvdd api sddhyate. citram vataitad ekena vapusd yugapat prthak grhesu dvyasta-sdhasram striya eka uddvahat.

402 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhsana [ch.

consciousness 1 . Again, since the body of Krsna appears in diverse forms, and since all these forms are but the various manifestations of pure consciousness and bliss, they are more enjoyable by the devotee than the Brahman 2 .

In the Paramdtma-sandarbha the jiva or individual is described as an entity which in its own nature is pure and beyond mdyd, but which perceives all the mental states produced by mdyd and is affected by them. It is called Ksetrajna, because it perceives itself to be associated with its internal and external body (ksetra) 3 . In a more direct sense God is also called Ksetrajna, because He not only behaves as the inner controller of mdyd but also of all those that are affected by it and yet remains one with Himself through His essential power 4 . The Ksetrajna should not be interpreted in a monistic manner, to mean only a pure unqualified consciousness {nirvisesam cid-vastu), but as God, the supreme inner controller. The view that unqualified pure consciousness is the supreme reality is erroneous. Consequently a distinction is drawn between the vyasti-ksetrajna (the individual person) and the samasti-ksetrajna (the universal person)—God, the latter being the object of worship by the former. This form of Go'd as the inner controller is called Paramatman.

God is further supposed to manifest Himself in three forms: first, as the presiding lord of the totality of selves and the prakrti, which have come out of Him like sparks from fire—Sankarsana or Mahavisnu; secondly, as the inner controller of all selves in their totality (samasti-jivdntarydmi) — Pradyumna. The distinction between the first and the second stage is that in the first the jiva and the prakrti are in an undifferentiated stage, whereas in the second the totality of the jivas has been separated outside of prakrti and stands independently by itself. The third aspect of God is that in which He resides in every man as his inner controller.

The jivas are described as atomic in size; they are infinite in number and are but the parts of God. Maya is the power of God,

1 tasya suddha-sattvasya prakrtatvam tu nisiddham eva tasmdt na te prakrta-sattva-parindma na vd tat-pracurdh kintu sva-prakdsatd-laksana-iuddha-sattva-prakdsitd. Sat-sandarbha, p. 148, also pp. 147-8.

2 Ibid. p. 149. 3 Ibid. p. 209.

4 mdydyam mdyike'pi antar-ydmitayd praristo'pi svarupa-saktyd svarupa-stha eva na tu tat-samsakta ity arthah, vdsudevatvena sarva-ksetra-jndtrtvat so'parah ksetrajna dtmd paramdtmd. tad evam api mukhyam ksetrajnatvam paramdtmany eva. Ibid. p. 210.

and the word is used in various senses in various contexts; it may mean the essential power, the external power, and it has also the sense of pradhdna 1 .

The author of the Sat-sandarbha denies the ordinary Vedantic view that the Brahman is pure consciousness and the support (dsraya) of the objects (visaya or mdyd or ajndna). He regards the relation between mdyd and Brahman as transcendental and supra-rational. Just as various conflicting and contradictory powers may reside in any particular medicine, so also various powers capable of producing manifold appearances may reside in Brahman, though the manner of association may be quite inexplicable and unthinkable. The appearance of duality is not due to the presence of ajndna (or ignorance) in the Brahman, but through His unthinkable powers. The duality of the world can be reconciled with ultimate monism only on the supposition of the existence of the transcendent and supra-rational powers of God. This fact also explains how the power of God can transform itself into the material image without in any way affecting the unity and purity of God 2 . Thus both the subtle jlvas and the subtle material powers of the universe emanate from Paramatman, from whom both the conscious and the unconscious parts of the universe are produced. Paramatman, considered in Himself, may be taken as the agent of production (mmitta-kdrana), whereas in association with His powers He may be regarded as the material cause of the universe (updddna-kdrana) 3 . Since the power of God is identical with the nature of God, the position of monism is well upheld.

On the subject of the relation between the parts and the whole the author of the Sat-sandarbha says that the whole is not a conglomeration of the parts, neither is the whole the transformation of the parts or a change induced in the parts. Nor can the whole be regarded as different from the parts or one with it, or as associ-

1 tadevam sandarbha-dvaye sakti-traya-vivrtih krtd. tatra ndmdbhinnatd-janita-bhrdnti-hdndya samgraha-slokdh mdyd sydd antarangdydm bahirangd ca sd smrtd

pradhdne'pi kvacid drstd tad-vrttir mohinl ca sd,

ddye traye sydt prakrtii cic-chaktis tvantarangikd

suddha-jwe'pi te drste tathesa-jndna-vlryayoh.

cinmayd-sakti-vrtyos tu vidyd-s'aktir udtryate

cic-chakti-vrttau mdydydm yoga-mdyd soma smrtd

pradhdndvydkrtd-vyaktam traigunye prakrteh param

na mdydydm na cic-chaktdv ityddyuhyam vivekibhih. Ibid. p. 245.

2 Ibid. p. 249. 3 Ibid. p. 250.

404 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

ated with it. If the whole were entirely different from the parts, the parts would have nothing to do with the whole; if the parts were inherent in the whole, then any part would be found anywhere in the whole. Therefore the relation between the parts and the whole is of a supra-logical nature. From this position the author of the Sat-sandarbha jumps to the conclusion that, wherever there is an appearance of any whole, such an appearance is due to the manifestation of Paramatman, which is the ultimate cause and the ultimate reality {tasmdd aikya-buddhydlambana-rupam yat pratiyate tat sarvatra paramdtma-laksanam sarvakdranam asty eva, p. 252). All manifestations of separate wholes are, therefore, false appearances due to similarity; for wherever there is a whole there is the manifestation of God. In this way the whole universe may be regarded as one, and thus all duality is false 1 .

Just as fire is different from wood, the spark and the smoke (though the latter two are often falsely regarded as being identical with the fire), so the self, as the separate perceiver called Bhagavan or Brahman, is also different from the five elements (the senses, the antahkarana and the pradhdna) which together pass by the name of jiva 2 .

Those who have their minds fixed on the Supreme Soul (Paramatman) and look upon the world as its manifestation thereby perceive only the element of ultimate reality in it; whereas those who are not accustomed to look upon the world as the manifestation of the supreme soul perceive it only as the effect of ignorance; thus to them the Paramatman, who pervades the world as the abiding Reality, does not show Himself to be such. Those who traffic in pure gold attach no importance to the various forms in which the gold may appear (bangles, necklaces and the like), because their chief interest lies in pure gold; whereas there are others whose chief interest is not pure gold, but only its varied unreal forms. This world is brought into being by God through His inherent power working upon Himself as the material cause; as the world is brought

1 tasmat sarvaikya-buddhi-niddndt prthag dehaikya-buddhih sddrsyabhramah sydt, purvdpardvayavdnusandhdne sati parasparam dsayaikatva-sthitatvend'vaya-vatvsddhdranyena caikyasddriydt praty-avayavam ekatayd pratlteh, so'yam deha iti bhrama eva bhavatl'ty arthah, prati-vrksam tad idam vanam itivat.

Sat-sandarbha, p. 253.

2 yatholmukdt visphulingdd dhumdd api svasatnbhavdt apy dtmatvena vimatdd yathagnih prthag ulmukdt bhutendriydntahkarandt pradhdndj-jlva-samjnitdt

dtmd tathd prthag drastd bhagavan brahma-samjnitah. Ibid. p. 254.

into being, He enters into it, controls it in every detail, and in the last stage (at the time of pralaya) He divests Himself of various forms of manifestation and returns to Himself as pure being, endowed with His own inherent power. Thus it is said in the Visnu-purdna that the ignorant, instead of perceiving the world as pure knowledge, are deluded by perceiving it as the visible and tangible world of objects; but those who are pure in heart and wise perceive the whole world as the nature of God, as pure consciousness.

Status of the World.

Thus in the Vaisnava system the world is not false (like the rope-snake), but destructible (like a jug). The world has no reality; for, though it is not false, it has no uninterrupted existence in past, present and future; only that can be regarded as real which is neither false nor has only an interrupted existence in time. Such reality can only be affirmed of Paramatman or His power 1 . The Upanisads say that in the beginning there existed ultimate Reality, sat; this term means the mutual identity of the subtle potential power of Brahman and the Brahman. The theory of satkaryavada may be supposed to hold good with reference to the fact that it is the subtle power of God that manifests itself in diverse forms (suksmdvasthd-laksana-tac-chaktih). Now the question arises, whether, if the world has the ultimate sat as its material cause, it must be as indestructible as that; if the world is indestructible, then why should it not be false (like the conch-shell-silver) and, consequently, why should not the vivarta theory be regarded as valid? The reply to such a question is that to argue that, because anything is produced from the real (sat), therefore it must also be real (sat) is false, since this is not everywhere the case; it cannot be asserted that the qualities of the effect should be wholly identical with the qualities of the cause; the rays of light emanating from fire have not the power of burning 2 . Sridhara, in his commentary on the Visnu-purdna, asserting that Brahman has an unchangeable and a changeable form, explains the apparent incongruity in the possibility of the changeable coming out of the unchangeable on the

1 tato vivarta-vddindm iva rajju-sarpa-van na mithydtvam kintu ghata-van nasvaratvam eva tasya. tato mithydtvdbhdve api tri-kdldvyabhicdrd-bhdvdj jagato na sattvam vivarta-parindmdsiddhatvena tad-dosa-dvaydbhavavaty eva hi vastuni sattvam vidhiyate yaihd paramdtmani tacchaktau vd. Ibid. p. 255.

2 Ibid. p. 256.

406 jfiva Gosvaml a?id Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

basis of the above analogy of fire and the rays emanating from it. Again, in other cases an appearance like that of silver manifesting itself from the conch-shell is wholly false, as it has only appearance, but no utility; so there are many other things which, though they are believed to have a particular nature, are in reality quite different and have entirely different effects. Thus some wood poison may be believed to be dry ginger, and used as such; but it will still retain its poisonous effects. Here, in spite of the illusory knowledge of one thing as another, the things retain their natural qualities, which are not affected by the illusory notion.

The power a thing has of effecting any change or utility cannot be present at all times and places, or with the change of object, and so the power of effecting any change or utility, not being an eternal and all-abiding quality, cannot be regarded as the defining character of reality; so a false appearance like the conch-shell-silver, which has merely a perceivable form, but no other utility or power of effecting changes, cannot be regarded as real. Only that is real which is present in all cases of illusory objects or those which have any kind of utility; reality is that which lies as the ground and basis of all kinds of experience, illusory or relatively objective. The so-called real world about us, though no doubt endowed with the power of effecting changes or utility, is yet destructible. The word "destructible," however, is used only in the sense that the world returns to the original cause—the power of God—from which it came into being. The mere fact that we deal with the world and that it serves some purpose or utility is no proof that it is real; for our conduct and our dealings may proceed on the basis of blind convention, without assuming any reality in them. The currency of a series of conventions based on mutual beliefs cannot prove either their reality or their nature as knowledge (vijfiana) without any underlying substratum. Thus the currency of conventions cannot prove their validity. The world thus is neither false nor eternal; it is real, and yet does not remain in its apparent form, but loses itself in its own unmanifested state within the power of Brahman; and in this sense both the satkdrya and the parinama theories are valid 1 .

It is wrong to suppose that originally the world did not exist at all and that in the end also it will absolutely cease to exist; for, since

absolute reality is altogether devoid of any other kind of experience, and is of the nature of homogeneous blissful experience, it is impossible to explain the world as an illusory imposition like the conch-shell-silver. It is for this reason that the world-creation is to be explained on the analogy of parinama (or evolution) and not on the analogy of illusory appearances like the conch-shell-silver or the rope-snake. Through His own unthinkable, indeterminable and inscrutable power the Brahman remains one with Himself and yet produces the world l ; thus it is wrong to think of Brahman as being the ground cause. If the world is eternally existent as it is, then the causal operation is meaningless; if the world is absolutely non-existent, then the notion of causal operation to produce the absolutely non-existent is also impossible. Therefore, the world is neither wholly existent nor wholly non-existent, but only existent in an unmanifested form. The jug exists in the lump of clay, in an unmanifested form; and causal operation is directed only to actualize the potential; the world also exists in the ultimate cause, in an unmanifested form, and is actualized in a manifest form by His natural power operating in a definite manner. It is thus wrong to suppose that the may a of the jiva, from which comes all ignorance, is to be regarded as the cause of the majesty of God's powers; God is independent, all-powerful and all-creator, responsible for all that exists in the world. It is thus wrong to suppose that the jiva creates the world either by his own powers or by his own ajildna; God is essentially true, and so He cannot create anything that is false 2 .

The Vaisnava theory thus accepts the doctrine of ultimate dissolution in prakrti (prakrti-laya). In the time of emancipation the world is not destroyed; for being of the nature of the power of God it cannot be destroyed; it is well known that in the case of jivan-mukti the body remains. What happens in the stage of emancipation is that all illusory notions about the world vanish, but the world, as such, remains, since it is not false; emancipation is thus a state of subjective reformation, not an objective disappearance of the world. As the objective world is described as identical with

1 ato acintya-sankhyd-svarupdd acyutasyaiva tava parindma-svlkdrena dravina-jdtlndm dravya-mdtrdndm mrl-lohddlndrn vikalpd vedd ghata-kundalddayas tesdm panthdno mdrgdh prakdrds tair eva asmdbhir upamiyate na tu kutrdpi bhrama-rajatddibhih. Ibid. p. 260.

2 satya-svdbhdvikdcintya-saktih paramesvaras tuccha-mdyikam api na kurydt. Ibid. p. 262.

408 Jwa Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

God's powers, so also are the senses and the buddhi. When the Upanisad says that the manas is created by God, this merely means that God is identical with the cosmic manas, the manas of all beings, in His form as Aniruddha 1 . The ultimate cause is identical with the effect; wherever the effect is new (apurva), and has a beginning and an end, it is illusory; for here the concept of cause and effect are mutually interdependent and not separately determinable. Until the effect is produced, nothing can be regarded as cause, and, unless the cause is determined, the effect cannot be determined 2 ; so to validate the concept of causality the power as effect must be regarded as already existent in the cause. It is this potential existence of effect that proves its actual existence; thus the world exists as the natural energy of God, and as such it is eternally real. Even the slightest change and manifestation cannot be explained without reference to God or independently of Him; if such explanation were possible, the world also would be self-luminous pure consciousness.

It has been said that the jivas are indeed the energy of God, but that still they may suffer from the defect of an obscuration of their self-luminosity. The jivas, being of the nature of tatastha sakti, are inferior to the essential power of God, by which their self-luminosity could be obscured 3 . This obscuration could be removed by God's will only through the spirit of enquiry regarding God's nature on the part of the jivas. According to the Sat-sandarbha the world is a real creation; but it refers with some approval to another view, that the world is a magical creation which deludes the jivas into believing in a real objective existence of the world. This view, however, must be distinguished from the monistic view of Sankara (which is that the real creator by His real power manifests the world-experience to a real perceiver) 4 , and it also differs from the Sat-sandarbha in that the latter regards the world as a real creation.

1 atas tan-mano'srjata manah prajdpatim ity ddau manah-sabdena samasti-mano'dhisthdtd s'rlmdn aniruddha eva. Sat-sandarbha, p. 262.

antah-karana-bahih-karana-visaya-rupena paramdtma-laksanam jndnam eva bhdti tasmdd ananyad eva buddhyddi-vastu ity-arthah. Ibid. p. 263.

2 ydvat kdryam na jdyate tdvat kdranatvam mrt-suktydder na siddhyati kdranatvdsiddhau ca kdryam na jdyate eveti paraspara-sdpeksatva-dosdt. Ibid. p. 265.

3 Ibid. p. 266.

4 satyenaiva kartd satyam eva drastaram prati satyaiva tayd saktyd vastunah sphurandt lake api tathaiva drsyata iti. Ibid. p. 268.

It must, however, be maintained that the main interest of the Vaisnavas is not in these hair-splitting dialectical discussions; theirs is professedly a system of practical religious emotionalism, and this being so it matters very little to a Vaisnava whether the world is real or unreal. His chief interest lies in the delight of his devotion to God 1 . It is further held that the ordinary experience of the world can well be explained by a reference to world-analogies; but the transcendental relation existing between God, the individual, the souls and the world can hardly be so explained. The Upanisad texts declare the identity of the jlva and paramesvara; but they only mean that paramesvara and the jlva alike are pure consciousness.

God and His Powers.

Returning to the Sat-sandarbha, one stumbles over the problem how the Brahman, who is pure consciousness and unchangeable, can be associated with the ordinary gunas of prakrti. The ordinary analogy of play cannot apply to God; children find pleasure in play or are persuaded to play by their playmates; but God is self-realized in Himself and His powers, He cannot be persuaded to act by anybody, He is always dissociated from everything, and is not swayed by passions of any kind. As He is above the gunas, they and their actions cannot be associated with Him. We may also ask how the jlva, who is identical with God, can be associated with the beginningless avidya. He being of the nature of pure consciousness, there ought not to be any obscuration of His consciousness, either through time or through space or through conditions or through any internal or external cause. Moreover, since God exists in the form of the jivas in all bodies, the jivas ought not to be under the bondage of afflictions or karma. The solution of such difficulties is to be found in the supra-rational nature of the maya-sakti of God, which, being supra-logical, cannot be dealt with by the apparatus of ordinary logic. The fact that the power of God can be conceived as internal (antaranga) and external (bahiranga) explains why what happens in the region of God's external power cannot affect His own internal nature; thus, though God in the form of jivas may be under the influence of mdyd and the world-experience arising therefrom, He remains all the time unaffected in His own internal

1 satyam na satyam nah krsna-pdddbjdmodam antard

jagat satyam asatyam vd ko'yam tasmin durdgrahah. Ibid. p. 269.

4io Jiva Gosvami and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

nature. The supra-logical and supra-rational distinction existing between the threefold powers (svarupa or antaranga, bahiranga, and tatastha) of God and their relation to Him explains difficulties which ordinarily may appear insurmountable. It is this supra-logical conception that explains how God can be within the sway of may a and yet be its controller 1 . The jiva in reality is not under the sway of afflictions, but still he appears to be so through the influence of God's may a; just as in dreams a man may have all kinds of untrue and distorted experiences, so also the world-experiences are imposed on the self through the influence of God's mdyd. The appearance of impurity in the pure jiva is due to the influence of mdyd acting as its upddhi (or condition)—just as the motionless moon appears to be moving on the ripples of a flowing river. Through the influence of mdyd the individual jiva identifies himself with the prakrti and falsely regards the qualities of the prakrti as his own 2 .

God's Relation to His Devotees.

The incarnations of God are also to be explained on the same analogy. It is not necessary for God to pass through incarnations or to exert any kind of effort for the maintenance of the world; for He is omnipotent; all the incarnations of God recounted in the Purdnas are for the purpose of giving satisfaction to the devotees (bhaktas). They are effected by the manifestation of the essential powers of God (svarupa-saktydviskarana), out of sympathy for His devotees. This may naturally be taken to imply that God is affected by the sorrows and sufferings of His devotees and that He is pleased by their happiness. The essential function of the essential power of God is called hlddim, and the essence of this hlddim is bhakti, which is of the nature of pure bliss. Bhakti exists in both God and the devotee, in a dual relation 3 . God is self-realized, for

1 Sat-sandarbha, p. 270.

2 yathd jale pratibimhitasya eva candramaso jalopddhikrtah kampddi-guno dharmo drsyate na tvdkdsa-sthitasya tadvad andtmanah prakrti-rupopddher dharmah dtmanah suddhasydsann api aham eva so'yam ity avesdn tndyayd upddhi-tdddtmydpanndhamkdrdbhdsasya pratibimba-sthdnlyasya tasya drastur ddhyd-tmikdvasthasya eva yady api sydt tathdpi suddhah asau tad-abheddbhimdnena tarn pasyati. Ibid. p. 272.

3 parama-sdra-bhuUlyd api svarupa-sakteh sdra-bhutd hlddim ndma yd vrttis tasya eva sdra-bhuto vrtti-viseso bhaktih sd ca raty-apara-parydyd. bhaktir bhagavati bhaktesu ca niksipta-nijobhaya-kotih sarvadd tisthati. Ibid. p. 274.

the bhakti exists in the bhakta, and being a power of God it is in essence neither different from nor identical with Him. Bhakti is only a special manifestation of His power in the devotee, involving a duality and rousing in God a special manifestation of delight which may be interpreted as pleasure arising from the bhakti of the devotee. When God says that He is dependent on the bhakta, the idea is explicable only on the supposition that bhakti is the essence of the essential power of God; the devotee through his bhakti holds the essential nature of God within him. Now the question arises whether God really feels sorrow when the devotees feel it, and whether He is moved to sympathy by such an experience of sorrow. Some say that God, being all-blissful by nature, cannot have any experience of sorrow; but others say that He has a knowledge of suffering, not as existing in Himself, but as existing in the devotee. The writer of Sat-sandarbha, however, objects that this does not solve the difficulty; if God has experience of sorrow, it does not matter whether He feels the pain as belonging to Himself or to others. It must therefore be admitted that, though God may somehow have a knowledge of suffering, yet He cannot have experience of it; and so, in spite of God's omnipotence, yet, since He has no experience of the suffering of men, He cannot be accused of cruelty in not releasing everyone from his suffering. The happiness of devotees consists in the experience of their devotion, and their sorrow is over obstruction in the way of their realization of God. God's supposed pity for His devotee originates from an experience of his devotion, expressing itself in forms of extreme humility (dainydtmaka-bhakti), and not from experience of an ordinary sorrow. When God tries to satisfy the desires of His devotee, He is not actuated by an experience of suffering, but by an experience of the devotion existing in the devotee. If God had experience of the sorrows of others and if in spite of His omnipotence He had not released them from them, He would have to be regarded as cruel; so also, if He had helped only some to get out of suffering and had left others to suffer, He would have to be regarded as being only a partial God. But God has no experience of the sorrows of others; He only experiences devotion in others. The efficacy of prayer does not prove that God is partial; for there is no one dear to Him or enemy to Him; but, when through devotion the devotee prays for anything to Him, He being present in his heart in one through the

412 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

devotion, grants him the object of his desire; so it is not necessary for God to pass through stages of incarnation for the protection or maintenance of the world; but still He does so in order to satisfy prayers to God. All the incarnations of God are for the fulfilment of the devotee's desires. The inscrutability of God's behaviour in the fulfilment of His devotee's desires is to be found in the inscrutability of the supra-rational nature of the essential power of God. Though all the works of God are absolutely independent and self-determined, yet they are somehow in accord with the good and bad deeds of man. Even when God is pleased to punish the misdeeds of those who are inimical to his devotees, such punishment is not effected by the rousing of anger in Him, but is the natural result of His own blissful nature operating as a function of His hlddini 1 . But the writer of the Sat-sandarbha is unable to explain the fact why the impartial and passionless God should destroy the demons for the sake of His devotees, and he plainly admits that the indescribable nature of God's greatness is seen when, in spite of His absolute impartiality to all, He appears to be partial to some. Though He in Himself is beyond the influence of mdyd, yet in showing mercy to His devotees He seems to express Himself in terms of mdyd and to be under its sway. The transition from the transcendent sattva quality of God to His adoption of the ordinary qualities of prakrti is supra-rational and cannot be explained. But the writer of the Sat-sandarbha always tries to emphasize the facts that God is on the one hand actuated by His purpose of serving the interest of His devotees and that on the other hand all His movements are absolutely self-determined—though in the ordinary sense self-determination would be incompatible with being actuated by the interest of others. He further adds that, though it may ordinarily appear that God is moved to action in certain critical happenings in the course of world-events or in the life of His devotee, yet, since these events of the world are also due to the manifestation of His own power as mdyd, the parallelism that may be noticed between world-events and His own efforts cannot be said to invalidate the view that the latter are self-determined. Thus

1 atha yadi kecit bhaktdndm eva dvisanti tadd tadd bhakta-paksa-pdtdntah-pdtitvdd bhagavatd svayam taddvese api na dosah pratyuta bhakta-visayaka-tad-rateh posakatvena hlddim-vrtti-bhutdnandolldsa-viiesa evdsau. Sat-sandarbha. p. 278.

His own efforts are naturally roused by Himself through the impulsion of bhakti, in which there is a dual manifestation of the essential power of God, as existing in Himself and in the heart of the devotee. It has already been said that bhakti is the essence of the essential power of God which has for its constituents the devotee and God. The prompting or rousing of God's powers through world-events is thus only a mere appearance (pravrtyd bhdsa), happening in consonance with the self-determining activity of God. It is further said that God's activity in creating the world is also motivated by His interest in giving satisfaction to His devotees. Time is the defining character of His movement, and, when God determines Himself to move forward for creation through time-movement, He wishes to create His own devotees, merged in the prakrti, out of His mercy for them. But in order to create them He must disturb the equilibrium of the prakrti, and for this purpose His spontaneous movement as thought separates the power (as jiva-mdyd) from His essential power (svarupa-sakti)', thus the equilibrium of the former is disturbed, and rajas comes into prominence. The disturbance may be supposed to be created in an apparent manner (tacchesatdtmakaprabhdvenaivoddipta) or by the dynamic of kdla 1 . When God wishes to enjoy Himself in His manifold creation, He produces sattva, and, when He wishes to lie in sleep with His entire creation, He creates tamas. Thus all the creative actions of God are undertaken for the sake of His devotees. The lying in sleep of God is a state of ultimate dissolution. Again, though God exists in all as the internal controller, yet He is not perceived to be so; it is only in the mind of the devotee that He really appears in His true nature as the inner controller.

The author of the Sat-sandarbha is in favour of the doctrine of three vyuhas as against the theory of four vyuhas of the Pafica-ratras. He therefore refers to the Mahdbhdrata for different traditions of one, two, three and four vyuhas, and says that this discrepancy is to be explained by the inclusion of one or more vyuhas within the others. The Bhdgavata-purdna is so called from the fact that it accepts Bhagavan as the principal vytiha 2 . The enquiry (jijndsd) concerning this Brahman has been explained by Ramanuja as dhydna, but according to the Sat-sandarbha this dhydna is nothing

1 Ibid. p. 283. 2 Ibid.

414 Jiva Gosvdml and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

but the worship of God in a definite form; for it is not easy to indulge in any dhydna (or worship of God) without associating it with a form on which one may fix his mind. Brahman is described as unchanging ultimate truth, and, as sorrow only is changeable, He is also to be regarded as wholly blissful. Brahman is also regarded as satyam, because He is the self-determiner, and His existence does not depend on the existence or the will of anything else. He, by his power as self-luminosity, dominates His other power as mdyd, and is in Himself untouched by it. This shows that, though mdyd is one of His powers, yet in His own nature He is beyond mdyd. The real creation coming out of mdyd consists of the three elements of fire, water and earth partaking of each other's parts. The Sarikarites say that the world is not a real creation, but an illusory imposition like the silver in the conch-shell; but such an illusion can only be due to similarity, and, if through it the conch-shell can be conceived as silver, it is also possible that the silver may also be misconceived as conch-shell. It is by no means true that the ground {adhisthdna) of illusion should be one and the illusion manifold; for it is possible to have the illusion of one object in the conglomeration of many; the collocation of many trees and hills and fog may produce the combined effect of a piece of cloud. The world of objects is always perceived, while the Brahman is perceived as pure self-luminosity; and, if it is possible to regard Brahman also as illusory, that will practically mean that Brahman cannot any longer be regarded as the ground of the world. The world therefore is to be regarded as real. The monistic view, that the Brahman is absolutely devoid of any quality, is false; for the very name Brahman signifies that He is supremely great. The world also has not only come out of Him, but stays in Him and will ultimately be dissolved in Him. Moreover, the effect should have some resemblance to the cause, and the visible and tangible world, of which God is the cause, naturally signifies that the cause itself cannot be absolutely devoid of quality 1 . Even on the supposition that Brahman is to be defined as that from which the world-illusion has come into being, the point remains, that this in itself is a distinguishing quality; and, even if Brahman be regarded as self-luminous, the self-luminosity itself is a quality which distinguishes

1 sddhya-dharmdvyabhicdri-sddhana-dharmdnvita-vastu-visayatvdn na tattv apramdnam. Sat-sandarbha. p. 27.

Brahman from other objects. If self-luminosity is a distinguishing quality, and if Brahman is supposed to possess it, He cannot be regarded as qualityless 1 .

Nature of bhakti.

The author of the Sat-sandarbha discusses in the Krsna-sandarbha the then favourite theme of the Vaisnavas that Lord Krsna is the manifestation of the entire Godhood. The details of such a discussion cannot pertinently be described in a work like the present one, and must therefore be omitted.

In the Bhakti-sandarbha the author of the Sat-sandarbha deals with the nature of bhakti. He says that, though the jivas are parts of God's power, yet through beginningless absence of true knowledge of the ultimate reality their mind is turned away from it, and through this weakness their self-knowledge is obscured by mayd; they are habituated to looking upon the pradhdna (the product of sattva, rajas and tamas) as being identical with themselves, and thereby suffer the sorrows associated with the cycles of birth and re-birth. Those jivas, however, who by their religious practices have inherited from their last birth an inclination towards God, or those who through a special mercy of God have their spiritual eyes opened, naturally feel inclined towards God and have a realization of His nature whenever they listen to religious instruction. It is through the worship of God that there arise the knowledge of God and the realization of God, by which all sorrows are destroyed. In the Upanisads it is said that one should listen to the Upanisadic texts propounding the unity of Brahma and meditate upon them. Such a course brings one nearer God, because through it the realization of Brahma is said to be possible. The processes of astanga-yoga may also be regarded as leading one near to God's realization. Even the performance of karma helps one to attain the proximity of God; by performing one's duties one obeys the commands of God, and in the case of obligatory duties the performer derives no benefit, as the fruits of those actions are naturally dedicated to God. Knowledge associated with bhakti is also

1 jagaj-janmddi-bhramo yatas tad brahmen svotpreksd-pakfe ca na nir-visesa-vastu-siddhih bhrama-mulam ajnanam ajndna-sdksi brahmeti upagamdt. sdksitvam hi prakdsaikarasatayd ucyate. prakdsatvatn tu jaddd vydvartakarn svasya parasya ca vyavahdra-yogyatdpddana-svabhdvena bhavati. tathd sati savis-esatvam tad-abhdve prakdsataiva na sydt tucchataiva sydt. Ibid. p. 291.

416 Jiva Gosvami and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

negatively helpful by detaching one's mind from objects other than God; yet bhakti alone, exhibited in chanting God's name and in being intoxicated with emotion for God, is considered to be of supreme importance. The two forms of bhakti have but one objective, namely, to afford pleasure to God; they are therefore regarded as ahetukl. The true devotee finds a natural pleasure in chanting the name of God and absorbing himself in meditation upon God's merciful actions for the sake of humanity. Though the paths of duty and of knowledge are prescribed for certain classes of persons, yet the path of bhakti is regarded as superior; those who are in it need not follow the path of knowledge and the path of disinclination from worldly things 1 . All the various duties prescribed in the sdstras are fruitful only if they are performed through the inspiration of bhakti y and, even if they are not performed, one may attain his highest only through the process of bhakti.

Bhakti is also described as being itself the emancipation (mukti) 2 . True philosophic knowledge (tattva-jndna) is the secondary effect of bhakti. True tattva-jndna consists in the realization of God in His three-fold form, as Brahman, Para-matman and Bhagavan in relation to His threefold powers, with which He is both identical and different. This reality of God can only be properly realized and apperceived through bhakti 3 . Knowledge is more remote than realization. Bhakti brings not only knowledge, but also realization (jndna-mdtrasya kd vdrttd saksdd api kurvanti) ; it is therefore held that bhakti is much higher than philosophic knowledge, which is regarded as the secondary effect of it. The true devotee can realize the nature of God either in association with His Powers or as divested of them, in His threefold form or in any one of His forms, according as it pleases him. The effect of one's good deeds is not the attainment of Heaven, but success in the satisfaction of God through the production of bhakti. The nididhya-sana of the Upanisads means the worship of God (updsand) by reciting the name and glory of God; when one does so with full attachment to God, all the bonds of his karma are torn asunder. The real difficulty however lies in the generation in one's mind of

1 bhajatdmjndna-vairagydbhydsena prayojanam ndsti. Sat-sandarbha, p. 481.

2 niscald tvayi bhaktir yd saiva muktir jandrdana (quotation from Skanda-purdna, Revukhanda). Ibid. p. 451.

a natural inclination for turning to God and finding supreme satisfaction in reciting His name and glories. By association with true devotees one's mind gradually becomes inclined to God, and this is further intensified by the study of religious literature like the Bhagavata-purana. As an immediate result of this, the mind becomes dissociated from rajas and tamas (desires and afflictions), and by a further extension of the attachment to God there dawns the wisdom of the nature of God and His realization; as a result, egoism is destroyed, all doubts are dissolved, and all bondage of karma is also destroyed. Through reciting God's name and listening to religious texts describing His nature one removes objective ignorance regarding the nature of God, by deep thought and meditation one dispels one's own subjective ignorance through the destruction of one's illusory views regarding God, and by the realization and direct apprehension of God the personal imperfection which was an obstacle to the comprehension of the nature of God is destroyed. The following of the path of bhakti is different from the following of the path of duties in this, that, unlike the latter, the former yields happiness both at the time of following and also when the ultimate fulfilment is attained 1 . Thus one should give up all efforts towards the path of obligatory or other kinds of duties {karma), or towards the path of knowledge or of disinclination {vairagya) 2 . These are fruitless without bhakti; for, unless the works are dedicated to God, they are bound to afflict one with the bondage of karma, and mere knowledge without bhakti is only external and can produce neither realization nor bliss; thus neither the obligatory (nitya) nor the occasional (naimittika) duties should be performed, but the path of bhakti should alone be followed. If the ultimate success of bhakti is achieved, there is nothing to be said about it; but, even if the path of bhakti cannot be successfully followed in the present life, there is no punishment in store for the devotee; for the follower of the path of bhakti has no right to follow the path of knowledge or of duties (bhakti-rasikasya karma-nadhikdrat) 3 . God manifests Himself directly in the conscious processes of all men, and He is the world-soul 4 ; and He alone is

1 karmanusthanavan na sadhaita-kdle sadhya-kale va bhahtyanusthanam duhkha-rupam pratyuta sukha-rupam eva. Ibid. p. 457.

2 Ibid. p. 457. 3 Ibid. p. 460.

4 sarvesam dhl-vrttibhih anubhiitam sarvam vena sa eka eva sarvantatdtma. Ibid. p. 460.

418 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

to be worshipped. Since bhakti is in itself identical with emancipation, our ultimate object of attainment is bhakti (bhaktir eva-bhidheyam vastu). A man who is on the path of bhakti has no need to undergo troublous efforts for self-concentration; for the very devotion would by itself produce self-concentration in a natural and easy manner through the force of the devotional emotion. The place of bhakti is so high that even those who have attained saintli-ness or the stage of jwan-mukti and whose sins have been burnt away may have their fall, and their sins may re-grow through the will of God, if they are disrespectful to God 1 . Even when through bhakti the bondage of karma has been destroyed, there is scope for a still higher extension of bhakti, through which one attains a still purer form of his nature. Thus bhakti is a state of eternal realizations which may subsist even when the impurities of bondage are entirely removed. God is the supreme dispenser of all things; through His will even the lowest of men may be transformed into a god, and the gods also may be transformed into the lowest of men. The existence of bhakti is regarded as the universal dispeller of all evils; thus bhakti not only removes all kinds of defects, but even the impending evils of karmas which are on the point of fructification (prdrabdha-karma) are destroyed through its power 2 . A true devotee therefore wants neither ordinary emancipation nor anything else, but is anxious only to pursue the path of bhakti.

To a devotee there is nothing so desired as God. This devotion to God may be absolutely qualityless (nirguna). The true knowledge of God must be the knowledge of the qualityless (nirguna), and therefore true devotion to Him must also be qualityless (nirguna); for, in w hatever way bhakti may manifest itself, its sole object is the qualityless God. The meaning of the word "qualityless" (or nirguna) is that in itself it is beyond the gunas. It has been explained before that bhakti is nothing but a manifestation of God's essential power, and as such it has God only as its constituent, and it must therefore be regarded as beyond the gunas; but in its expression bhakti may appear both as within or without the gunas. Knowledge of Brahman may also be regarded as occurring in a twofold form;

1 jlvan-muktd api punar bandhanam yanti karmabhih

yady acintya-mahd-saktau bhagavaty aparadhinah.

Sat-sandarbha, p. 505. Ibid. p. 516.

as identity between the self and God, as in the case of the so-called Brahma-vadins; and with a certain kind of duality, as in the case of devotees. For this reason, though bhakti consists of knowledge and action, it is to be regarded as nirguna, because it refers to God alone, who is beyond all gunas. Bhakti is thus obviously a transcendental process. It is no doubt true that sometimes it is described as being associated with gunas (saguna); but in all such cases such a characterization of bhakti can only be on account of its association with intellectual, volitional or emotional qualities of the mind 1 . Bhakti really means " to live with God "; since God Himself is beyond the gunas, residence with or in God must necessarily mean a state beyond the gunas. There are others, however, who distinguish bhakti as worshipful action and as God-realizing knowledge, and according to them it is only the latter that is regarded as being beyond the gunas (nirguna). But, though the actual worshipping action is manifested in and through the gunas, the spiritual action determining it must be regarded as outside the material influences 2 .

A question may here naturally arise, that if God is always of the nature of pure bliss, how is it possible for the devotee to please Him by his bhakti} This has already been explained, and it may further be added that bhakti is a mode of the self-realization of God's own blissful nature; its mode of operation is such that here the hlddint power of God works itself by taking in the devotee as its constituent and its nature is such that it is blissful not only to God, but also to the devotee 3 . The appearance of bhakti in a devotee is due to God's will manifesting His self-realizing power in him, and such a manifestation of His will is to be interpreted as His mercy. So God is the real cause of the appearance of bhakti in any individual. It is to be remembered that not only the rise of bhakti but even the functioning of the sense-powers is due to the influence of God;.thus God realizes Himself through men in all their conduct, though in bhakti alone His highest and most blissful nature expresses itself for the highest satisfaction of the devotee, and this must therefore be regarded as an act of His special grace. It is said in the scriptures that even a short recitation of God's name is

1 yat tu sri-kapila-devena bhakter api nirguna-sagundvasthdh kathitds tat punah purusdntahkarana-gund eva tasydm upacaryante iti sthitam. Ibid. p. 520. - Ibid. p. 522. 3 Ibid. p. 523.

27-2

420 Jiva Gosvami and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

sufficient to satisfy God, and those who consider these texts as exaggeration (arthavdda) are punished by God. But the true devotee does not cease from reciting the name of God because a single recital has been sufficient to please Him; for the very recital of God's name fills him with thrills of great joy. But still there are cases in which a single recital is not sufficient to produce the realization of God; in such cases it is to be presumed that the devotee is a great sinner. To those who are great sinners God is not easily inclined to extend His mercy; such persons should continually recite the name of God until their sins are thereby washed away and the desired end is attained. The recital of God's name is by itself sufficient to destroy even the worst of sins; but insincerity of mind (kautilya), irreligiosity (asraddhd), and attachment to those things which impede our attachment to God are the worst vices; for through their presence the revelation of the process of bhakti in the mind is obstructed, and such persons cannot attach themselves to God 1 . Thus much learning and consequent crookedness of heart may prove to be a much stronger impediment to the rise of bhakti than even the commission of the deadliest of sins or submersion in deep ignorance; for God is merciful to the latter but not to the former; such attitudes of mind can only be due to the existence of very grave long-standing sins. A single recital is sufficient for success only when there are no previous sins and when no serious offences are committed after the recital of the name 2 ; but, if at the time of death one recites the name of God, then a single recital is sufficient to dispel all sins and bring about intimate association with God 3 .

Without religious faith (sraddhd) it is not possible for a man to follow the path either of knowledge or of duties; but stil! religious faith is an indispensable condition for those who wish to follow the path of bhakti. Once the religious bhakti is roused one should give up the path of knowledge and of duties. Bhakti does not require for its fulfilment the following of any ritual process. Just as fire naturally by itself burns the straw, so the recital of God's name and His glories would by itself, without the delay of any intermediary process, destroy all sins. Religious faith is not in itself a part of bhakti, but it is a pre-condition which makes the

1 Sat-sandarbha, pp. 532-4. 2 Ibid. p. 536.

rise of bhakti 1 possible. In following the path of bhakti one should not try to follow also the path of knowledge or of duties; such a course will be a strong impediment to the acceleration of bhakti. If bhakti produces proximity to God, then, since God has three powers—Brahman, Paramatman, and Bhagavan—it is possible to have three kinds of proximity; of these the third is better than the second, and the second is better than the first. The realization of God as endowed with forms is superior to His realization without any forms. The true devotee prefers his position as the servant of God to any other so-called higher position of power and glory 2 ; he therefore wishes for pure bhakti, unassociated with any other so-called beneficial results. It is these devotees, who want God and God alone, that are called the ekantins, who are superior to all other types of devotees; this kind of bhakti is called dkincana-bhakti. It may be argued, that since all individuals are parts of God, and since they are naturally attached to Him as parts to wholes, the dkincana-bhakti should be natural to them all; but to this the reply is that man is not a part of God so far as He is in His own essential nature, but he is a part of Him so far as He is endowed with His diverse powers, including His neutral powers (tatastha-sakti). Man is a part of God in the sense that both externally and internally he is in direct connection with God; but still he has his own instincts, tendencies, habits and the like, and it is these that separate him from God. For this reason, though man shares in the life of God and has the same life as He, yet, being hidden in his own sheath of ideas and tendencies, he cannot indulge in his natural truth-right of devotion to God except through the grace of God 3 . When a man is not under the sway of great obstructive sins such as crookedness and the like, association with other devotees gives an occasion to God for extending His grace in rousing devotion in his mind. It cannot be said that all beings must necessarily attain salvation; the number of souls is infinite, and only those will attain salvation who may happen to awaken His grace. Man from beginningless time is

1 bhakti is said to have nine characteristics, as follows:

sravaiiam klrtanam vifnoh smaranam pada-sevanam arccanam vandanam ddsyam saukhyam atma-mvedanam.

Ibid. p. 541. But it is not necessary that bhakti should be pursued in all these ninefold forms.

2 ko mudho ddsatam prdpya prdbhavam padam icchati. Ibid. p. 551.

3 Ibid. p. 553.

422 Jiva Gosvdml and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

ignorant of God and is disinclined from Him; and this natural impediment can only be removed by association with true devotees (sat-sanga); God descends into men through the grace of good devotees who have at some time or other suffered like other ordinary people and are therefore naturally sympathetic to them 1 . God Himself cannot have sympathy with men, for sympathy presupposes suffering; God is of the nature of pure bliss and could not have experienced the suffering of ordinary beings.

The best devotee is he who perceives God in all beings, and also perceives all beings as parts of himself and of God as He reveals Himself in him 2 . The second type of devotee is he who has love for God, friendship for His devotees, mercy for the ignorant and indifference with reference to his enemies 3 . The lower type of devotee is he who worships the image of God with faith and devotion, but has no special feeling for the devotees of God or other persons 4 . There are other descriptions also of the nature of the best devotee: thus it is said in the Gitd that he whose heart is pure and unafflicted by the tendencies of desire and deeds, and whose mind is always attached to God, is to be regarded as the best devotee 5 ; it is further said that the best devotee is he who makes no distinction between himself and others, or between his own things and those of others, and is the friend of all persons and at absolute peace with himself 6 ; and, further, that the best devotee is he whose heart is held directly by God and holds within it in bonds of love the lotus-feet of God 7 .

From another point of view bhakti is defined as service (sevd) or as that by which everything can be attained; the former is called svarUpa-laksana and the latter tatastha-laksana. Bhakti is again regarded as being of a threefold nature: as merely external (dropa-

1 Saf-sandarbha, p. 557.

* sarva-bhutesu yah pasyed bhagavad-bhdvam dtmanah.

bhQtani bhagavaty dtmany esa bhagavatottamah. Ibid. p. 561. s l&vare tad-adhlnesu bdlisesu dvisatsv api

prema-maitri-krpopeksd yah karoti sa madhyamah. Ibid. p. 562.

* arccdydm eva haraye pujdm yah sraddhayeate

na tad-bhaktesu cdnyefu sa bhaktah prdkrtah smrtah.

Ibid. p. 564.

5 na kdma-karma-bljdnam yasya cetasi sambhavah vdsudevaika-nilayah sa vai bhagavatottamah. Ibid. p. 564.

6 na yasya svah para iti vittesv dtmani vc bhidd sarva-bhuta-stthrc chdntah sa vai bhagavatottamah. Ibid. p. 565.

siddha), as due to association with other devotees (sanga-siddha), and as due to a sincere spirit of natural affection for God (svarupa-siddha). In the first two cases the bhakti is called fictitious (kitava), and in the last it is called real (akitava) 1 . The most direct action to be performed in the path of bhakti is to listen to and recite the names and glories of God, but indirectly associated with it there is also the dedication of all actions to God. In doing this one includes even his bad deeds; a devotee not only dedicates the fruits of his religious duties, ordinary duties of life, but also those which are done through the prompting of passions. He confesses to God all the imperfections of his nature and all the bad deeds that he has performed, and prays to Him for His grace by which all his sins are washed away. The devotee prays to God that he may be intoxicated by love for Him in the same manner that a young woman is smitten with love for a young man or vice versa 2 . When a man performs an action through motives of self-interest, he may suffer through failures or through deficient results; but, when one dedicates his actions to God, he no longer suffers any pains through such failures. All actions and their fruits really belong to God; it is only through ignorance or false notions that we appropriate them to ourselves and are bound by their ties. But, if those very actions are performed in the true perspective, we cannot in any way be bound down by their effects; thus those actions which are responsible for our births and rebirths can destroy that cycle and free us from their bondage, when it is realized they belong not to us, but to God 3 . If it is argued that the performance of mandatory actions produces a new and unknown potency (apurva) in the performer, then also it may be argued that the real performer in the man is his inner controller (antar-ydmin), which impels him to do the action, and so the action belongs to this inner controller—God; and it is wrong to suppose that the performer of the action is the real agent 4 . Thus all the Vedic duties can be performed only by God as the supreme agent, and so the fruits of all actions can belong only to Him. The dedication of our actions to God may again be of a twofold nature: one may perform an action with the express object of

1 Sat-sandarbha, pp. 581-2.

2 yuvatlnam yatha yum yundnca yuvatau yathd mano'bhiramate tadvan mono me ramatdm tvayi.

Vismi-purdnam, ibid. p. 58

3 Ibid. p. 584. * Ibid. p. 585.

424 Jvva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

pleasing God thereby, or he may perform the action without any desire to reap their fruits, and may dedicate them to God—one is karma-sannydsa and the other phala-sannydsa. Actions may be motivated either through desires or for the sake of God, i.e., leaving the effects to God or for pleasing God, and this last is said to be due to pure bhakti. These three types of actions are classified as kdmand-nimitta, naiskarmya-nimitta and bhakti-nimitta. True devotees perform all their actions for the sake of pleasing God and for nothing else 1 . Bhakti again may be regarded as associated with karma, and as such it may be regarded as sakdma, kaivalya-kdma and bhakti-mdtra-kdma. When one becomes devoted to God for the fulfilment of ordinary desires, this is regarded as sakdma-bhakti. Kaivalya-kdma-bhakti may be regarded as associated with karma or with karma and knowledge {jndna) ; this is to be found in the case of one who concentrates upon God and enters into the path of yoga, practises detachment, and tries to conceive of his unity with God, and through such processes frees himself from the bondage of prakrti; through knowledge and action he tries to unify the jlvdtman with the paramdtman. The third type may be associated either with karma or with karma and jndna.' Of these the first class expresses their devotion by reciting God's name and glories, by continually worshipping Him, and by dedicating all their actions to God. The second class of devotees add to their duties of worship to God the continual pursuit of an enlightened view of all things; they think of all people as manifestations of God; they are patient under all exciting circumstances and detach themselves from all passions; they are respectful to the great and merciful to the humble and the poor, and friendly to their equals; they practise the virtues included within yama and niyama, destroy all their egotism, and continue to think of the glory of God and to recite His name. He who, however, has the highest type of bhakti —the akincana-bhakti —in him it is such that simply on hearing the name of God his mind flows to Him just as the waters of the Ganges flow into the ocean. Such a one does not accept anything that may be given to him; his only pleasure exists in being continuously immersed in God.

From another point of view bhakti can be divided into two classes, vaidhi and rdgdnuga. The vaidhi-bhakti is of two kinds, leading him to devote himself to God, and to worship without any

ulterior motive. It is vaidhl because here the prompting to the course of bhakti comes from scriptural sources (otherwise called vidhi, or scriptural injunctions). The vaidhi-bhakti is of various kinds, such as seeking of protection (sarandpatti), association with good teachers and devotees, to listen to God's name and to recite His name and glories 1 . Of these sarandgati is the most important; it means seeking protection of God upon being driven to despair by all the dangers and sufferings of life. Thus in sarandgati there must be a driving cause which impels one to seek the protection of God as the sole preserver. Those who turn to God merely out of deep attachment for Him are also impelled by their abhorrence of their previous state, when their minds were turned away from God. It also implies a belief either that there is no other protector, or a renunciation of any other person or being to whom one had clung for support. One should leave all hope in the Vedic or smrti injunctions, and turn to God as the only support. Sarandpatti may be defined as consisting of the following elements: (i) to work and think always in a manner agreeable to God, (ii) to desist from anything that may in any way displease God, (iii) strong faith that He will protect, (iv) clinging to Him for protection, (v) to throw oneself entirely into God's hands and to consider oneself entirely dependent on Him, and (vi) to consider oneself a very humble being waiting for the grace of God to descend on him 2 . Of all these the main importance is to be attached to the adoption of God alone as sole protector, with whom the other elements are only intimately associated. But next to the solicitation of the protection of God is the solicitation of help from one's religious teacher (guru) and devotion to his service, as well as to the service of great men, by whose association one may attain much that would be otherwise unattainable 3 . One of the chief forms in which the vaidhi-bhakti manifests itself is in regarding oneself as the servant of God, or in considering God as our best friend. The sentiments of service and friendship should be so deep and intense as to lead one to renounce

1 atha vaidhl-blieddh sarandpatti-sri-gurv-ddi-sat-sevd-sravana-kirtand-dayah. Sat-sandarbha, p. 593.

2 sarandpatter laksanam vaisnava-tantre, dnukulyasya samkalpah prdtikulya-vivarjanam raksisyatlti visvdso goptrtve varanam tathd dtma-nik§epa-kdrpanye sadvidhd iarandgatih. Ibid. p. 593.

3 Ibid. pp. 595-604.

426 Jlva Gosvdml and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

one's personality entirely to God; this complete renunciation of oneself to God is technically called dtma-nivedana. The rdgdnuga, or purely emotional type of bhakti, must be distinguished from vaidhi-bhakti; since the rdgdnuga-bhakti follows only the bent of one's own emotions, it is difficult to define its various stages. In this form of bhakti the devotee may look upon God as if He were a human being, and may turn to Him with all the ardour and intensity of human emotions and passions; thus one of the chief forms in which this type of bhakti manifests itself is to be found in those cases where God is the object of a type of deep love which in human relation would be called sex-love. Sex-love is one of the most intense passions of which our human nature is capable, and, accordingly, God may be loved with the passionate intensity of sex-love. In following this course of love the devotee may for the time being forget the divinity of God, may look upon Him as a fellow-being, and may invest Him with all the possibilities of human relations and turn to Him as if He were his intimate friend or a most beloved husband. He may in such circumstances dispense entirely with the ritualistic formalities of worship, meditation, recital of His names or glories, and simply follow his own emotional bent and treat God just as may befit the tendency of his emotion at the time. There may however be stages where the rdgdnuga is mixed up with vaidhi, where the devotee follows some of the courses of the vaidhi-bhakti and is yet passionately attached to God. But those who are simply dragged forward by passion for God are clearly above the range of the duties of vaidhi-bhakti; not only through such passionate attachment to God, but even when one's mind is filled with a strong emotion of anger and hatred towards God, so as to make one completely forget oneself and to render oneself entirely pervaded by God's presence—even as an object of hatred—one may, by such an absorption of one's nature in God, attain one's highest. The process by which one attains one's highest through rdgdnuga-bhakti is the absorption of the nature of the devotee by God through an all-pervading intense emotion. For this reason, whenever the mind of a man is completely under the sway of a strong emotion of any description with reference to God, he is absorbed, as it were, in God's being and thus attains his highest through a complete disruption of his limited personality.

In the sixth section, the Priti-sandarbha, the author of the Sat-sandarbha deals with the nature of bliss (priti) as the ultimate reality and object of the best of our human efforts. The ultimate object or end of man is the attainment of happiness and the destruction of sorrow; only when God is pleased can one secure the ultimate extinction of sorrow and the attainment of eternal happiness. God, the ultimate reality, is the ultimate and infinite bliss, though He may show Himself in diverse forms. The individual or the jiva> not having any true knowledge of God and being obscured by tndyd, fails to know His true nature, becomes associated with many subjective conditions, and undergoes the sorrow of beginningless cycles of births and rebirths. The realization of the highest bliss consists in the realization of the ultimate reality; this can happen only through the cessation of one's ignorance and the consequent ultimate cessation of one's sorrows. Of these the former, though expressed in a negative form, is in reality positive, being of the nature of the self-luminosity of the ultimate reality and the self-manifestation of the same. The latter, being of the nature of a negation through destruction, is eternal and unchangeable—such that, when sorrows are once ultimately uprooted, there cannot be any further accretion of sorrow. The realization of God is thus the only way of attaining the highest happiness or bliss 1 . Emancipation (mukti) is the realization of God, accompanied as a consequence by that cessation of the bondage of egoism which is the same thing as existence in one's true nature. This existence in one's own nature is the same thing as the realization of one's own nature as the supreme soul (Paramatman). But in this connection it must be noted that the jiva is not identical with the supreme soul; for it is only a part of it; its nature as bliss is thus to be affirmed only because of the fact that its essence is derived from the essence of the supreme soul. The realization of God, the absolute whole, is only through the realization of His part as the supreme soul (amsena amsi-prdpti). This can be attained in two ways, first, as the attainment of Brahmahood by the revelation of His knowledge as constituting only His essential powers along with the destruction of individual ignorance (which is a state or function of mdyd only);

1 rdrastdtiiayahldda-sukha-bhavaika-laksand

bhesajam bhagavat-praptir ekantdtyantikd mata.

Vifnv-purdna, Sat-sandarbha, p. 674.

428 Jlva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

secondly, as the realization of God in His personal nature, as associated with His supra-rational powers in a personal manner. Emancipation (mukti) may be achieved both in life and after death; when one realizes the true nature of God, one's false apprehension of His nature vanishes and this is one's state of mukti; at death also there may be a revelation of God's true nature, and a direct and immediate realization of His nature as God.

Ultimate Realization.

The realization of the nature of ultimate reality may again be of a twofold nature: abstract, i.e., as Brahman, and concrete, i.e., as personal God or the supreme soul (Faramatman). In the latter case the richness of the concrete realization is further increased when one learns to realize God in all His diverse forms 1 . In this stage, though the devotee realizes the diverse manifold and infinite powers of God, he learns to identify his own nature with the nature of God as pure bliss. Such an identification of God's nature manifests itself in the form of the emotion of bhaktiov joy (priti); the devotee experiences his own nature as joy, and realizes his oneness with God through the nature of God as bliss or joy. It is through the experience of such joy that the ultimate cessation of sorrow becomes possible, and without it the devotee cannot realize God in association with all His diverse and infinite powers. By the intimate experience of the joyous nature of God His other attributes, characters and powers can also be revealed to him. Man naturally seeks to realize himself through joy; but ordinarily he does not know what is the true object of joy, and thus he wastes his energies by seeking joy in diverse worldly objects. He attains his true end when he realizes that God is the source of all joy, that He alone should be sought in all our endeavours, and that in this way alone can one attain absolute joy and ultimate liberation in joy. The true devotee wishes to attain kaivalva; but kaivalya means " purity," and, as the true nature of God is the only ultimate purity, kaivalya would mean the realization of God's nature. The joy of the realization of God and God alone should therefore be regarded as the true kaivalya, the ultimate nature of God.

In the state of jivan-mukti the individual, through a true knowledge of himself and his relation to God, comes to realize that the

world is both being and non-being, and has therefore no real existence in its own true nature, but is only regarded as part of himself through his own ignorance (avidyd). The mere negation of the world is not enough; for there is here also the positive knowledge of the true nature of the individual as dependent on God. In this stage the individual realizes the falsity of associating world-experiences with his own nature, and learns to identify the latter as a part of God. In this state he has to experience all the fruits of his deeds which are on the point of yielding fruits, but he feels no interest in such experiences, and is no longer bound by them 1 . As a further culmination of this stage, the functioning of may a in its individual form as ignorance {avidya) ceases with the direct and immediate revelation of the true nature of God and with participation in His true nature as joy; the complete cessation of may a should therefore be regarded as the final state of mukti 2 .

It should be borne in mind that the jiva is a part of the ultimate reality in association with the energy of God as represented in the totality of the jivas. The ultimate reality is like the sun and the jivas are like the rays which emanate from it. From their root in God they have sprung out of Him, and, though seemingly independent of Him, are yet in complete dependence on Him. Their existence outside of Him also is not properly to be asserted; for in reality such an appearance of existence outside Him is only the effect of the veil of may a. The comparison of the jivas with the rays merely means that they have no separate existence from that body whose rays they are, and in this sense they are entirely dependent on God. When the jivas are regarded as the power or energy of God, the idea is that they are the means through which God expresses Himself. As God is endowed with infinite powers, it is not difficult to admit that the jivas, the manifestations of God's power, are in themselves real agents and enjoyers, and the suggestion of the extreme monist, that to assert agency or enjoyability of them is illusory, is invalid; for agency in an individual is a manifestation of God's power. It is through that that the jivas pass through the cycle of samsara, and it is through the operation of the essential power of God that they learn to perceive the identity of their own nature with God and immerse themselves in emotion towards Him. The view that there is

1 asya prdrabdha-karma-mdtrdnam anabhiniveienaiva bhogah. Ibid. p. 678.

2 Ibid. p. 678.

43o Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

no experience of joy in the state of emancipation is invalid; for in that case the state of emancipation would not be desirable. Moreover, the view that in the state of emancipation one becomes absolutely identical with Brahman, which is of the nature of pure joy, is also wrong; for no one wishes to become identical with joy, but to experience it. The extreme form of monism cannot therefore explain why the state of emancipation should be desirable; if emancipation cannot be proved to be an intensely desirable state, there will be no reason why anyone should make any effort to attain it. It may further be added that, if the ultimate reality be of the nature of pure bliss and knowledge, there is no way of explaining why it should be subject to the obscuring influence of mdyd. The conception of whole and part explains the fact that, though the jivas are not different from God, yet they are not absolutely identical, being indeed entirely dependent on Him. The proper way of regarding God is to recognize Him as presiding over all beings as they are associated with their specific conditions and limitations—as varied personalities and yet as one; this is the way to unify the concept of Paramatman with that of Bhagavan 1 .

The Joy of bhakti.

Joy in God may be of a twofold nature. By an extension of meaning joy may be that attachment to God which produces the realization of the true conception of God {bhagavad-visayamikalya-tmakas tad-anagata-sprha dimayo jnana-visesas tat-pritih). But there is a more direct experience of joy in God which is directly of an intensely emotional nature; this type of bhakti is also called rati. This is also described as bhakti as love (preman). Just as one is attracted to physical objects by their beauty, apart from any notion of utility, so one may also be attracted by divine beauty and the diverse qualities of God, and fall into intense love with Him. It has already been said above that the joy of God manifests itself in the hearts of His devotees and produces their joyful experience of God.

1 Apart from the higher kind of mukti reserved for the most superior type of bhaktas there are other kinds of inferior liberation described as sdlokya (coexistence with God), sdrsti (the advantage of displaying the same miraculous powers as God), surupya (having the same form as that of God), sdmlpya (having the privilege of always being near God), sayujya (the privilege of entering into the divine person of God). A true bhakta, however, always rejects these privileges, and remains content with his devotion to God. Sat-sandarbha, p. 691.

This may be regarded as an active phase of God's joy as distinguished from His nature as pure joy. God's joy is said to be of two kinds: His nature as pure joy (svariipdnanda), and His nature in the active phases of the joy of His own powers (svarupa-saktyd-nanda). This last is again of two kinds, viz., mdnasdnanda and aisvarydnanda, i.e., joy as the active operation of bhakti, and joy in His own majesty 1 . When a devotee is attached to God by a sense of His greatness or majesty, such a state of mind is not regarded as an instance of joy or priti; but, when the bhakti takes a purely emotional form as the service of God, or as immediately dependent on Him, or as attached to Him through bonds of intense love (like those of a bride for her lover, of a friend for his friend, of a son for his father or of the father for his child), we have bhakti as priti. Priti or "joy" manifests itself in its most intense and elevated form when the attraction has all the outward appearance of physical love, and all the well-known exciting factors and modes of enjoyment of that emotion; but, as this emotion is directed towards God and has none of the biological or physiological accompaniments of physical love, it should be sharply distinguished from that love; but it has all the external expressions of erotic love. For this reason it can be properly described only in terms of the inward experience and the outward expressions of erotic love. Joy {priti) is defined as an emotional experience constituting an inclination and attraction towards its object 2 . In ordinary emotions the objects to which they have reference are worldly objects of sense or ideas associated with them, but in godward emotions God is their only object. Such a joy in God flows easily (svdbhdviki) through God's grace, and is not the result of great efforts; it is superior to emancipation 3 . This joy may grow so much in intensity that the devotee may forget himself

1 Ibid. p. 722

2 tatra ulldsdtmako jfidna-visesah sukham; tathd visaydnukiilydtmakas tad - dnukulydnugata - tat - sprhd-tad-anubhava-hetukolldsa-maya - jndna-viiesa-priyatd. Ibid. p. 718.

3 The yearning implied in bhakti is almost a distressing impulse and is not only erotic in type. Thus it is said:

ajdta-paksd iva mdtaram khagdh

stanyam yathd vatsatardh ksudhdrtdh

priyam priyeva vyusitam visanno

mano'ravinddksa didrksate tvdm. Ibid. p. 726. Two stages are sometimes distinguished according to the intensity of the development of joy, viz., udaya, Isad-udgama; the latter has again two stages. The culminating stage is called prakatodaydvasthd.

completely and feel himself as one with God; this is technically called mahdbhdva 1 . In a general sense bhakti may be said to produce a sense of unique possession (mamatd), and consequently great attachment of heart; this emotion may express itself in various forms. But there is also the other quieter form (sdnta) of devotion, in which the devotee feels himself to be of God, but not that God is his, like Sanaka and other devotees of his type 2 . Here also there is a remote sense of God's possession, i.e., as master—as looking forward for His grace as a master (bhrtyatva), protector (pdlyatva), or as a fond parent (lalyatva). One may also enjoy God in himself, assuming the role of a parent and looking upon God as a dear child; this kind of emotion is called vdtsalya. But, as has been said above, the most intense joy in God takes the conjugal form; the difference between eroticism (kdma) and this type of love (rati) is that the former seeks self-satisfaction, while the latter seeks the satisfaction of the beloved God; yearning is the common element in both. These devotees, through their dominant emotion of love, restrict their relation to God solely to His aspect of sweetness (mddhurya), as a great lover. The affection of Radha for Ksrna is said to illustrate the highest and intensest form of this love. The Vaisnava writers frequently explain this love in accordance with the analysis of ordinary mundane love current in books of rhetoric (alamkdra-sdstra). In treating of the subject of bhakti it is impossible not to make a short reference to the well known work of Rupa GosvamI, Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu. This work is divided into four books, pfirva, daksina, pascima, and uttara, and each of these is divided into chapters called laharis. In writing out the chapters of the Bhakti-sandarbha and the Priti-sandarbha Jiva GosvamI, the nephew of Rupa, was much indebted to the above work of the latter, on which he had also written a commentary, Durgama-sangamana, after the

1 Sat-sandarbha, p. 732. There occurs here a quotation from Ujjvala-nila-mani to illustrate the situation:

rddhdyd bhavatasca citta-jatuni svedair vildpya kramad yunjann adri-nikunja-kunjara-pater nirdhuta-bheda-bhramam citrdya svayam anvaranjayad iha brahmanda-harmyodare bhiiyobhir naza-rdga-hingula-phalaih irngdra-cdruh krtih.

2 saty api bheddpagame ndtha taz'dham na mdmaklnas tvam samudro hi tarangah hvacana samudro na tdrangah. Ibid. p. 735. harer gtina dvh'idhdh bhakta-citta-samskdra-hetai'as tadabhimdna-visesya-hetavas'cdnye... (p. 733)-jiidna-bhaktir bhaktir vatsalyam maitrl kdnta-bhdvasca (p. 738). Though all these different varieties of bhakti are mentioned, it is admitted that various other forms may arise from these simply by their mutual mixture in various degrees.

completion of the Bhdgavata-sandarbha. Superior {uttama) bhakti is here defined as the mental state and the associated physical actions for yielding satisfaction to Krsna (dnukulyena krsnd-nusilanam) without any further desire, motive or object of any description; such a bhakti must not be associated with any monistic philosophical wisdom, such as that of extreme monists like Sankara, or the philosophical wisdom of Samkhya, Yoga and other systems, nor with the performance of any obligatory or occasional duties as enjoined in the smrti literature 1 . Such a bhakti has six characteristics. First, it destroys sins, their roots and ignorance. Sins are of two kinds, those which are not in a state of fruition (aprdrabdha), and those which are (prdrabdha); and bhakti removes them both. The roots of sins are evil tendencies of the mind, otherwise called the karmdsayas, and these too are destroyed by bhakti, which, as it is concrete wisdom, also destroys ignorance (avidyd). Secondly, it is described as holy or good (subhada). Through bhakti one renders happiness to the world and is attached by bonds of friendship and love to all people; as a devotee is a friend of all, all beings are also his friends. Thirdly, a devotee is so much satisfied with his joy in bhakti that emancipation has no attractions for him. Fourthly, the attainment of bhakti is extremely difficult; for even with the utmost effort one may not attain it without the grace of God. Fifthly, the joy of bhakti is infinitely superior to the joy of emancipation through Brahma-knowledge. Sixthly, bhakti overcomes God to such an extent that He is completely drawn to the service of His devotee. Even a little bhakti is superior to much philosophical learning; philosophical and logical discussions lead to no certainty, and the thesis established by an able reasoner may easily be disproved by another who is abler; such logical discussions are only barren and ineffectual for true realization.

Rupa distinguishes three kinds of bhakti: sddhana, bhdva and preman 2 . The sddhana-bhakti stands for the different means whose

1 anydbhildsitd-sunyam jndna-karmddy-andvrtam

dnukulyena krsndnusllanam bhaktir uttama. - Ibid I2i Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu, I. i. 9.

sd bhaktih sddhanam bhavah premd ceti tridhoditd. In commenting upon this passage Jlva GosvamI says that bhakti is of two kinds, sddhana and sddhya; of these the second is of pure emotionalism and consists of five varieties: bhdva, prema, pranaya, sneha and rdga. The author of Ujjvala-nlla-mani adds three more, mdna, anurdga and mahd-bhdva. Rupa has not mentioned these last because they are but variant forms of prema.

div 28

434 Jiva Gosvdml and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

adoption enables the mental emotion to emerge in a natural way as bhdva-bhakti (also called sddhya-bhakti). But Rupa further adds that the natural devotional emotion cannot be produced by any course of conduct or any effort; for bhakti is the highest good and as such is eternal. Nothing that is eternal can be produced; the true devotional emotion therefore cannot be created—it already exists in the heart, and the function of the sddhana-bhakti is merely to manifest it in the heart in the enjoyable form 1 . This sddhana-bhakti is of two kinds, vaidhi and rdgdnuga 2 : these have already been described above. One is within the sphere of vaidhi-bhakti only so long as natural attachment to God does not reveal itself within one's heart. It is said that one who has a logical mind and is well read in the sastras, and is also a man of firm conviction with a great faith in the Vaisnava religion, is best fitted for vaidhi-bhaktP. Desire for worldly happiness or for emancipation is the greatest obstacle to the rise of bhakti. One following the path of bhakti incurs no demerit if he does not perform the obligatory and other duties as enjoined in the Vedas; but he is at fault if he does not perform the true duties of a Vaisnava; but even in such cases a Vaisnava need not perform any expiatory duties; for the mere recital of God's name is sufficient to remove all his sins. No injunctions of the sastras have any reference to a devotee. The complete code of moral virtues and many ritualistic duties are counted as preliminary conditions for a person following the path of bhakti*. In many undeserving pupils too much learning or indulgence is regarded as a great obstruction of the path of bhakti 5 . A devotee of the vaidhi type should meditate upon the beauty of God and all His qualities and glories, and learn to regard himself as His servant; one of the conditions of meditation upon God as master is to train oneself in dedicating all one's actions to God. He should also try

1 krti-sddhyd bhavet sddhya-bhdvd sd sddhanabhidhd mtya-siddhasya bhdvasya prdkatyam hrdi sddhyatd.

Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu, i. 2. 2.

2 Ibid. 1. 2. 4.

3 sdstre yuktau ca nipunah sarvathd drdha-niicayah praudha-sraddho''dhikdri yah sa bhaktdvuttamah matah.

Ibid. 1. 2. 11. * Ibid. 1. 2. 42, etc.

5 na sisydn anubadhnlta granthdn naivdbhyased bahun

na vydkhydm upayunjlta ndrambhdn drabhet kvacit.

to generate in himself the firm conviction that God is the greatest friend of His devotees; one should try to look upon God as one's best friend. The Sastric duties should be performed only so long as there is no real inclination of the mind towards God, to recite His name, to listen to His glories, and to say them with joy. As soon as this stage comes, one is on the path of vaidhi-bhakti and must follow its specific duties, so that it may continually grow into a truly natural and irresistible emotion. Here begins the stage of sddhya-bhakti with bhdva. Even before we come to this there is another stage of sddhana-bhakti, the raganuga. It is only when one transcends this stage that one can come to a still higher stage of the sddhya-bhakti with its successive developments. Rdgdnuga-bhakti is said to be an imitation of the rdgdtmikd 1 . The rdgdtmikd-bhakti is the bhakti as natural attachment; rdga means "attachment". This rdgdtmikd-bhakti may be of the type of erotic emotion (kdma) or the assumption of other relationships 2 , such as friendship, parenthood, etc. The rdgdnuga-bhakti is that where there is no natural attachment, but where there is an effort to imitate the forms of natural emotional attachment, and it may be associated with the diverse steps taken for the furtherance of vaidhi-bhakti. The distinction of prema (spiritual love) and kdma has already been explained above. Though kdma is often used in connection with the intoxicating love of God, yet it is used in the sense of prema 3 . The rdgdnuga-bhakti thus following the two kinds of subdivision of rdgdtmikd-bhakti is itself also of two kinds, kdmdnuga and sambandhdnuga.

From the second stage of sddhana-bhakti as raganuga we come to the stage oibhdva-bhakti y which also evolves itself into ever more

1 virdjantim abhivyaktdm vraja-vdsi-janddisu rdgdtmikdm anusrtd yd sd rdgdnugocyate. Ibid. I. 2. 131.

2 It is said that in the case of natural attachment, even when it takes the form of an inimical relationship to God, it is superior to any type of vaidhi-bhakti where there is no such natural attachment. Thus it is said in Jiva's Durgama-safigamana, 1. 2. 135: yathd vairdnubandhena martyas tanmayatdm iydt na tathd bhakti-yogena iti me rtiscitd matih tad api rdgamaya-kdmddy-apekfayd vidkima-yasya cittdvesa-hetutve'tyanta-nyunatvam iti vyanjandrtham eva. yesu bhdva-mayefu nindito'pi vairdnubandho vidhimaya-bhakti-yogdc chresthdh. The natural feeling of enmity towards God can be regarded as bhdvdtmikd (or emotional) but not as rdgdtmikd. It cannot also be regarded as bhakti, for there is no desire here to please God; it therefore stands on a separate basis; it is inferior to rdgdtmikd-bhakti but superior to vaidhi-bhakti.

3 premaiva gopa-rdmdnam kdma ityagamat prathdm. Ibid. 1. 2. 142, 143.

436 Jiva Gosvdinl tmd Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

intense forms until it reaches the stage of mahd-bhdva already described. It is regarded as the manifestation of the pure transcendent sattva (the blissful nature of God). Bhakti has already been defined as behaviour that is intended to please God and which has no further object or end in view; as such it would involve some kind of effort (cestd-riipa) on the part of the devotee. But here the meaning is modified to denote only the emotional condition of mind, including physiological and physical changes produced in the body by it, and as roused by emotive conditions such as the object of love, excitants of love, the feeding emotions, external manifestation determining and increasing the original dominant emotion 1 . The first stage of natural attachment to God as love is called bhdva and is associated with slight physiological effects like shedding tears or the rising of the hair on the body and the like 2 . This emotion is of a transcendental nature and of the nature of the power of God, involving consciousness and bliss; therefore it is on the one hand self-revealing (svaprakdsa) and self-enjoying, and on the other hand it reveals the nature of God, whose power it is, and to whom it refers. Being a power of God it appears in the mental states of the devotee, becomes identified with them, and manifests itself in identity with them. Bhakti, as it appears in the devotee, is thus an identity of the transcendent and the phenomenal, and reveals the dual function of enjoying the sweetness of the nature of God and the self-revealing sweet enjoyable nature of its own. It is thus cognitive with reference to its object, and involves a dual enjoyment of God's sweet nature as well as the sweet nature of bhakti itself. It is the root of all rati (or enjoyment) and is therefore also called rati 3 . An inferior amount of it is generally common to all,

1 sarirendriya-vargasya vikdrdndm vidhdyikdh bhdva-vibhava-janitds citta-vrttayah tritdh.

Durgama-sangamana, 1. 3. 1.

2 premnas tu prathamdvasthd bhdva ity abhidhiyate sdttvikdh sralpa-mdtrdh syuryatrdsru-pulakddayah.

Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu, 1. 3. 3.

3 asau suddha-sattva-visesarupa-rati-mula-rupatvena mukhya-vrttyd tac-chabda-vdcyd sd ratih iri-krmddi-sarz-a-prakdsakatvena hetund svayam-prakdsa-rupd'pi prapancika-tat-priya jananam mano-vrttau dvir-bhuya tat-tdddtmyam vrajanti tad-vrttyd prakdsyarad bhdsamdno brahmavat tasydh sphurantl, tathd svasatkrtcna purvottaravasthdbhydm kdrana-kdryya-rupena sri-bhagavadadi-mddhuryydnubhavena svdmsena svdda-rupd'pi yam krstiddirupdm tesam dsvddasya hetutdm samvidamsena sddhakatamatdm pratipadyate hlddinyamse tu svayam hlddayanti tisthati. Durgama-sangamana, 1. 3. 4.

but the superior appearance which continues to grow is rare and comes only through the grace of God or His devotees. So even in the vaidhl and the rdgdnuga also there is, no doubt, some amount of bhava of the inferior type. The natural attachment to God of the superior type which arises without going through the ordinary prescribed path of bhakti (the sddhana-bhakti), is generally due to the grace of God.

In the first stage of the bhdva-bhakti the devotee manifests in himself a nature which remains absolutely unperturbed, even though there may be causes of perturbation; he always spends his time in reciting God's name with strong emotion; he is unattached to sense-objects, and, though great, he is always extremely humble, and has always the strong conviction of attaining the ultimate realization of God. He is also always extremely anxious to attain his end and always finds pleasure in the name of God 1 . The internal characteristic of bhava, as rati, is extreme smoothness and liquidity of heart, but, wherever such a state is associated with other desires, even be it of emancipation, it should not be regarded as signifying the true state, and is called ratydbhdsa; for this is a state of absolute self-contentment, and it cannot be associated with any other desire of any kind.

When bhava deepens, it is called prema; it is associated with a sense of possession in God and absolute detachment from all other things. This may rise from a direct development of bhava, or through the immediate grace of God; it may be associated with a notion of the greatness of God or may manifest itself merely as an enjoyment of the sweetness of God. The development of bhakti depends on a special temperament derived in this life as a result of previous good deeds, and also on the efforts of this life. There is an elaborate description of the various characteristics of different kinds of joyous emotion with reference to God, and the various kinds of relationships on the assumption of which these may grow, but these can hardly be treated here.

Rupa GosvamI wrote another work, Samksepa-Bhdgavatdmrta which is a well recognized book in the Vaisnava circle. It has at least two commentaries, one by Jlva GosvamI, and another, a later one, by Brindavana Candra Tarkalankara; the latter was the pupil of Radhacarana Kavindra. In this book Rupa describes the various

1 Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu, I. 3. 11-16.

438 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

types of God's incarnation in accordance with the testimony of the Purdnas: Krsna is, of course, regarded as the highest God. His elder brother Sanatana also wrote a work, Brhad-bhdgavatd-mrta, with a commentary on it, the Dig-darsana, in which he narrates the episodes of certain devotees in quest of God and their experiences.

The Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyabhusana.

Baladeva was Vaisya by caste and born in a village near Remuna in the Balesvar subdivision of Orissa; he was a pupil of vairdgi Pitamvara Dasa, and was generally known as Govinda Dasa. He was the disciple of a Kanouj Brahmin, Radha Damodara Dasa, the author of Veddnta-Syamantaka. Radha Damodara was a disciple of Nayanananda, the son of Radhananda, and a pupil of his grandfather, Rasikananda Murari, who was a disciple of Syamananda, a junior contemporary of Jiva Gosvami. Syamananda was a disciple of Hrdaya Caitanya, who in his turn was a disciple of Gauridasa Pandita, a disciple of Nityananda. Baladeva himself had two well known disciples, Nanda Misra and Uddhava Dasa; he wrote his commentary on Rupa Gosvaml's Stava-mdld in the Saka era 1686 (or a.d. 1764). He is known to have written at least the following fourteen works: Sdhitya-kaumudi and its commentary, Krsndnandi; Govinda-bhdsya\ Siddhdnta-ratna; Kdvya-Kaustubha; Gitd-bhusana, a commentary on the Gitd; a commentary on Radha Damodara's Chandah-Kaustubha; Prameya-ratndvall and its commentary, Kdnti-mdld; a commentary on Rupa's Stava-mdld; a commentary on Rupa's Laghu-bhdgavatd-mrta; Ndmdrtha-suddhikd, a commentary on Sahasra-ndma; a commentary on Jaya Deva's Candrdloka; Siddhdnta-darpana; a commentary on Tattva-sandarbha\ a commentary on Rupa's Ndtaka-candrikd. He also wrote commentaries on some of the important Upanisads 1 .

Baladeva's most important work is his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, otherwise known as Govinda-bhdsya. This has a sub-commentary on it called Suksma; the name of the author of this commentary is not known, though it has been held by some to be a work of Baladeva himself. Baladeva has also summarized the

1 M. M. Gopinath Kaviraja's introduction to Siddhdnta-ratna, Part n. A. K. Sastri, in his introduction to Prameya-ratndvall, strongly criticizes the view that Baladeva was a Vaisya. No satisfactory proofs are available on either side.

contents of his Govinda-bhdsya in the Siddhdnta-ratna, to which also there is a commentary. M. M. Gopinath Kaviraja says that the Siddhdnta-ratna was written by Baladeva himself. There is nothing to urge in support of this assertion; the natural objection against it is that a Vaisnava like Baladeva should not speak in glowing terms of praise of his own work 1 . Siddhdnta-ratna is regarded by Baladeva not as a summary of Govinda-bhdsya, but as partly a supplementary work and partly a commentary 2 . It is probable that the writer of the Suksma commentary on the Govinda-bhdsya is also the writer of the commentary on Siddhdnta-ratna; for there is one introductory verse which is common to them both 3 . The Siddhdnta-ratna contains much that is not contained in the Govinda-bhdsya.

The eternal possession of bliss and the eternal cessation of sorrow is the ultimate end of man. This end can be achieved through the true knowledge of God in His essence (svarupatah) and as associated with His qualities by one who knows also the nature of his own self (sva-jndna-purvakam). The nature of God is pure consciousness and bliss. These two may also be regarded as the body of God (na tu svarupdd vigrahasya atirekah). His spirit consists in knowledge, majesty and power 4 . Though one in Himself, He appears in many places and in the forms of His diverse devotees. These are therefore but modes of His manifestation in self-dalliance, and this is possible on account of His supra-logical powers, which are identical with His own nature 5 . This, however, should not lead us to suppose the correctness of the bheddbheda doctrine, of the simultaneous truth of the one and the many, or that of difference

1 sdndrdnanda-syandi govinda-bhdsyam jlydd etat sindhu-gdmbhlryya-sambhrt yasmin sadyah samsrute mdnavdndm mohocchedi jay ate tattva-bodhah.

Commentary on Siddhdnta-ratna, p. i.

2 Ibid.

3 dlasydd apravrttih sydt pumsdtn yad grantha-vistare govinda-bhdsye samksipte tippanl kriyate'tra tat.

Suksma commentary, p. 5, and the commentary on Siddhdnta-ratna, p. 1.

4 Siddhdnta-ratna, pp. 1—13.

5 ekam eva sva-rupam acintya-saktyd yugapat sarvatrdvabhdty eko'pi san; sthdndni bhagavad-dvirbhdvdspaddni tad-vividha-lild-sraya-bhutdni vividha-bhdvavanto bhaktdi ca. Govinda-bhdsya, m. 2. 11.

440 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [en.

and unity 1 ; just as one actor, remaining one in himself, shows himself in diverse forms, so God also manifests Himself in diverse forms, in accordance with diverse effects and also in accordance with the mental plane and the ways in which diverse devotees conceive of Him 2 . On account of His supra-logical powers the laws of contradiction do not apply to Him; even contradictory qualities and conceptions may be safely associated in our notion of Him. So also His body is not different in nature from Him: He is thus identical with His body. The conception of a body distinct from Him is only in the minds of the devotees as an aid to the process of meditation; but, though this is imagination on their part, such a form is not false, but as a matter of fact is God Himself (deha eva dehl or vigraha evatma atmaiva vigrahah). On account of the transcendent nature of God, in spite of His real nature as pure consciousness and bliss He may have His real nature in bodily form, as Krsna. This form really arises in association with the mind of the devotee just as musical forms show themselves in association with the trained ears of a musician 3 . In this connection it may be observed that according to Baladeva even dream-creations are not false, but real, produced by the will of God and disappearing in the waking stage through the will of God 4 . These forms appearing in the minds of the devotees are therefore real forms, manifested by God through His will working in association with the minds of the devotees. In this connection it may also be pointed out that the jivas are different from God. Even the imagined reflection of Brahman in avidya, introduced by the extreme monists to explain jiva as being only a reflection of Brahman and as having no real existence outside it, is wrong; for the notion of similarity or reflection involves difference. The jivas are atomic in nature, associated with the qualities of prakrti, and absolutely dependent on God. Though Brahman is all-pervasive, yet He can be grasped by knowledge and devotion. A true realization of His nature and even a sensuous perception of Him is possible only through sddhya-bhakti,

1 The Suksma commentary on m. 2. 12 says that God's maya-sakti has three functions: hladinl, sandhini, and samvit; it is through His maya-sakti, i.e., the power as mdyd, that He can manifest Himself in diverse ways.

2 dhyiitr-bhedat karyya-bheddc ca anekataya pratito'pi harih svarupaikyam svasmin na muhcati. Govinda-bhdsya, in. 2. 13.

3 tan-murtatvam khalu bhakti-vibhavitena hrdd grdhyam gandharvdnusilitena srotrena rdga-murtatvam iva. Ibid. in. 2. 17.

not through sddhana-bhakti. The consciousness and bliss of God may be regarded either as the substance of God or as His attributes. This twofold way of reference to God is due to the admission of the category of visesa, by which, even in the absence of difference between the substance and the quality, it is possible to predicate the latter of the former as if such a difference existed. Visesa is spoken of as the representative of difference (bheda-pratinidhi); that is, where no difference exists, the concept of visesa enables us to predicate a difference; yet this visesa is no mere vikalpa or mere false \erbal affirmation. The ocean can be spoken of as water and waves by means of this concept of visesa. The concept of visesa means that, though there is no difference between God and His qualities, or between His nature and His body, yet there is some specific peculiarity which makes it possible to affirm the latter of the former; and by virtue of this peculiarity the differential predication may be regarded as true, though there may actually be no difference between the two. It is by virtue of this concept that such propositions as " Being exists," "Time always is," "Space is everywhere," may be regarded as true; they are neither false nor mere verbal assumption; if they were false, there would be no justification for such mental states. There is obviously a difference between the two propositions "Being exists" and "Being does not exist"; the former is regarded as legitimate, the latter as false. This proves that though there is no difference between "being" and "existence" there is such a peculiarity in it that, while the predication of existence to being is legitimate, its denial is false. If it were merely a case of verbal assumption, then the latter denial would also have been equally possible and justifiable. This peculiarity is identical with the object and does not exist in it in any particular relation. For this reason a further chain of relations is not required, and the charge of a vicious infinite also becomes inadmissible. If the concept of visesa is not admitted, then the notion of "qualified" and "quality" is inexplicable 1 . The concept of visesa in this sense was first introduced by Madhva; Baladeva borrowed the idea from him in interpreting the relation of God to His powers and qualities. This interpretation is entirely different from the view of Jlva and others who preceded Baladeva; we have already seen how Jlva interpreted the situation merely by the doctrine of the supra-logical

1 Ibid. in. 2. 31.

442 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

nature of God's powers and the supra-logical nature of the difference and identity of power and the possessor of power, or of the quality and the substance. Baladeva, by introducing the concept of visesa, tried to explain more clearly the exact nature of supra-logicality (acintyatva) in this case; this has been definitely pointed out in the Suksma commentary 1 .

The bliss of God is different from the bliss of the jivas, both in nature and in quantity, and the nature of their knowledge is different. Brahman is thus different in nature both from the world and from the jivas. All the unity texts of the Upanisads are to be explained merely as affirming that the world and the jivas belong to God (sarvatra tadiyatva-jnanarthah). Such a way of looking at the world will rouse the spirit of bhakti. The revelation of God's nature in those who follow the path of vaidhi-bhakti is different from that in those who follow the ruci-bhakti; in the former case He appears in all His majesty, in the latter He appears with all His sweetness. When God is worshipped in a limited form as Krsna, He reveals Himself in His limited form to the devotee, and such is the supra-logical nature of God that even in this form He remains as the All-pervasive. It is evident that the acceptance of visesa does not help Baladeva here and he has to accept the supra-logical nature of God to explain other parts of his religious dogmas.

God is regarded as being both the material cause of the world and as the supreme agent. He has three fundamental powers: the supreme power, visnu-sakti, the power as ksetrajna, the power as avidyd. In His first power Brahman remains in Himself as the unchangeable; His other two powers are transformed into the jivas and the world. The Sarnkhyist argues that, as the world is of a different nature from Brahman, Brahman cannot be regarded as its material cause. Even if it is urged that there are two subtle powers which may be regarded as the material cause of the world and the jivas, their objection still holds good; for the development of the gross, which is different from the subtle, is not explained. To this the reply is that the effect need not necessarily be the same as or similar to the material cause. Brahman transforms Himself into the world, which is entirely different from Him. If there were absolute oneness between the material cause and the effect, then

1 tenaiva tasya vastvabhinnatvam sva-nirvahakatvam ca svasya tadrse tad-bhavojjpnbhakam acintyatvam sidhyati. Sukpna on Govinda-bhdsya, m. 2. 31.

one could not be called the cause and the other the effect; the lumpy character of the mud is not seen in the jug, which is its effect; in all cases that may be reviewed the effect must necessarily be different from the material cause. Such a modification does not in any way change the nature of Brahman. The changes are effected in His powers, while He remains unchanged by the modification of His powers. To turn to an ordinary example as an illustration, it may be pointed out that "a man with the stick" refers to none other than the man himself, though there is a difference between the man and the stick; so though the power of the Brahman is identical with Brahman in association with His powers, yet the existence of a difference between Brahman and His powers is not denied 1 . Moreover, there is always a difference between the material cause and the effect. The jug is different from the lump of clay, and the ornaments from the gold out of which they are made; also they serve different purposes and exist in different times. If the effect existed before the causal operation began, the application of the causal operation would be unnecessary; also the effect would be eternal. If it is held that the effect is a manifestation of that which was already existent, then a further question arises, whether this manifestation, itself an effect, requires a further manifestation, and so on; thus a chain of manifestations would be necessary, and the result would be a vicious infinite. Still, Baladeva does not deny the parindma or the abhivyakti theory; he denies the Samkhya view that even before the causal operation the effect exists, or that a manifestation {abhivyakti) would require a chain of manifestations. He defines effect as an independent manifestation (svatantra-bhivyaktimattvam kila karyatvam), and such an effect cannot exist before the action of the causal operatives. The manifestation of the world is through the manifestation of God, on whom it is dependent. Such a manifestation can only happen through the causal operation inherent in God and initiated by His will. Thus the world is manifested out of the energy of God, and in a limited sense the world is identical with God; but once it is separated out of Him as effect, it is different from Him. The world did not exist at any time before it was manifested in its present form; therefore it is wrong to suppose that the world was at any stage identical with God, though God may always be regarded as the material cause of the

1 Ibid. 11. 1. 13.

444 J lva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidydbhusana [ch.

world 1 . Thus after all these discussions it becomes evident that there is really no difference of any importance between Baladeva's views and the Samkhya view. Baladeva also admits that the world exists in a subtle form in God as endowed with His energies. He only takes exception to the verbal expression of the karika that the effect exists in the cause before the action of the causal operatives; for the effect does not exist in the cause as effect but in a subtle state. This subtle state is enlarged and endowed with spatio-temporal qualities by the action of the causal operatives before it can manifest itself as effect. The Samkhya, however, differs in overstressing the existence of the effect in the cause, and in asserting that the function of the causal operatives is only to manifest openly what already existed in a covered manner. Here, however, the causal operatives are regarded as making a real change and addition. This addition of new qualities and functions is due to the operation of the causal will of God; it is of a supra-logical nature in the sense that they were not present in the subtle causal state, and yet have come into being through the operation of God's will. But, so far as the subtle cause exists in God as associated with Him, the world is not distinct and independent of God even in its present form 2 . The jivas too have no independence in themselves; they are created by God, by His mere will, and having created the world and the jivas He entered into them and remained as their inner controller. So the jivas are as much under natural necessity as the objects of the physical world, and they have thus no freedom of action or of will 3 . The natural necessity of the world is but a manifestation of God's will through it. The spontaneous desire and will that is found in man is also an expression of God's will operating through man; thus man is as much subject to necessity as the world, and there is no freedom in man. Thus, though the cow which gives milk may seem to us as if it were giving the milk by its own will, yet the vital powers of the cow produce the milk, not the cow; so, when a person is perceived as doing a particular action or behaving in a particular manner or willing something, it is not he who is the

1 Goi'inda-bhasya, II. i. 14.

2 tasmad ekam eva jlva-prakrti-saktimad brahma jagad-updddnam tadd-tmakarn ca iti siddham evam kdrydvasthatve'py avicintyatva-dharma-yogdd apracyuta-purvdvastham cdvatisthate. Ibid. 11. 1. 20.

3 cetanasydpi jivasydsma-kdstha-lostravad asvdtantrydt svatah kartrtva-rupdndpattih. Ibid. 11. 1. 23.

agent, but the supreme God, who is working through him 1 . But the question may arise, if God is the sole cause of all human willing and human action, then why should God, who is impartial, make us will so differently? The answer will be that God determines our action and will in accordance with the nature of our past deeds, which are beginningless. A further objection may be made, that if God determines our will in accordance with our past deeds, then God is dependent in His own determining action on the nature of our karmas; which will be a serious challenge to His unobstructed freedom. Moreover, since different kinds of action lead to different kinds of pleasurable and painful effects God may be regarded as partial. The reply to these objections is that God determines the jlvas in accordance with their own individual nature; the individual jivas are originally of a different nature, and in accordance with their original difference God determines their will and actions differently. Though God is capable of changing their nature, He does not do so; but it is in the nature of God's own will that He reserves a preferential treatment for His devotee, to whom He extends His special grace 2 . God's own actions are not determined by any objective end or motive, but flow spontaneously through His enjoyment of His own blissful nature. His special grace towards His devotees flows from His own essential nature; it is this special treatment offered to His devotees that endears Him to them and that rouses others to turn towards Him 3 .

Bhakti is also regarded as a species of knowledge (bhaktir api jiidna-viseso bhavati)*. By bhakti one turns to God without any kind of objective end. Bhakti is also regarded as a power which can bind God to us 5 ; this power is regarded as the essence of the hladinl power of God as associated with consciousness. The consciousness here spoken of is identical with the hldda, and its essence consists in a favourable outflow of natural inclination 6 . This is thus identical with God's essential nature as consciousness and bliss; yet it is not regarded as identical with Him, but as a power of

1 Ibid. 11. 1. 24.

2 na ca karma-sdpeksatvena isyarsya asvdtantryam; ...anddi-jlva-svabhdvd-nusdrena hi karma kdrayati sva-bhdvam anyathd-kartum samartho'pi kasydpi na karoti. Ibid. n. i. 35.

3 Ibid. 11. 1. 36.

4 Commentary on Siddhdnta-ratna, p. 29.

5 bhagavad-vaHkdra-hetu-bhutd saktih. Ibid. p. 35.

6 hldda-bhinna samvid, yas taddnukulyamiah sa tasydh sarah. Ibid. p. 37.

446 Jiva Gosvdmi and Baladeva Vidyabhusana [ch.

Him 1 . Though bhakti exists in God as His power, yet it qualifies the devotee also, it is pleasurable to them both, and they are both constituents of it 2 . It will be remembered that, of the three powers, samvit is superior to sandhini and hladini is superior to samvit. God not only is, but He extends His being to everything else; sandhini is the power by which God extends being to all. He is Himself of the nature of consciousness; samvit is the power by which His cognitive action is accomplished and by which He makes it possible for other people to know. Though He is of the nature of bliss, He experiences joy and makes it possible for others to have joyous experiences; the power by which He does this is called hladini. 3 True bhakti cannot have any object outside itself, simply for the reason that it is itself an experience of God as supreme bliss. That there is a kind of bliss other than sensuous pleasure is proved by our experience of our own nature as bliss during deep sleep. But, since we are but atoms of God's energy, it is necessarily proved that God's nature is supreme and infinite bliss; once that bliss is experienced, people will naturally turn away from worldly sensuous pleasure to God, once for all.

True knowledge destroys all merit and demerit, and so in the jivan-mukti man holds his body only through the will of God. The effect of obligatory duties is not destroyed, except in so far as it produces meritorious results—admission to Heaven and the like— and it helps the rise of true knowledge; when the true knowledge dawns, it does not further show itself. It is also stated in the Kausltakl Upanisad that the merits of a wise man go to his friends and his demerits to his foes; so in the case of those devotees who are anxious to enter communion with God the meritorious effects of their deeds are distributed to those who are dear to Him, and the effects of their sinful actions are distributed to His enemies 4 . So, as the effects of the fructifying karma are distributed to other persons, the principle that all fructifying karmas must produce

1 svarupdnatirekinyapi tad-visesatayd ca bhdsate'nyathd tasya saktir iti vyapedesa-siddheh. Siddhdnta-ratna, p. 38.

2 bhagavat-svarupa-visesa-bhuta-hlddinyddi-sdrdtmd bhaktir bhagavad-vis-esanatayd bhakte ca prthag-visesanatayd siddhd tayor dnanddtisayayo bhavati. Ibid. p. 39.

3 tatra saddtmd'pi yayd sattam dhatte daddti ca sd sarva-desa-kdla-dravya-vydpti-hetuh sandhini, samvid-dtmd'pi yayd samveiti samvedayati ca sd samvit, hldddtmd'pi yayd hlddate hlddayati ca sd hladini. Ibid. pp. 39-40.

their effects is satisfied, and the devotee of God is released from them. The best way for true advancement can only be through the association of saintly devotees. Our bondage is real, and the destruction of the bondage is real and eternal. Even in the state of ultimate emancipation the jivas retain their separate individuality from God.

In the sixth and seventh chapters of the Siddhdnta-ratna Baladeva tries to refute Sankara's doctrine of extreme monism; but as these arguments contain hardly anything new but merely repeat the arguments of the thinkers of the Ramanuja and the Madhva Schools, they may well be omitted here. In his Prameya-ratndvall Baladeva gives a general summary of the main points of the Vaisnava system of the Gaudlya School. If one compares the account they give of Vaisnava philosophy in the Bhdgavata-sandarbha with that given in Baladeva's Govinda-bhdsya and Siddhdnta-ratna, one finds that, though the fundamental principles are the same, yet many new elements were introduced by Baladeva into the Gaudlya school of thought under the influence of Madhva, and on account of his personal predilections. The stress that is laid on the aspect of difference between Isvara and the jiva and the world and the concept of visesa, are definite traces of Madhva influence. Again, though Baladeva admires the ruci-bhakti as the best form of bhakti, he does not lay the same emphasis on it as is found in the works of Rupa, Sanatana or Jiva. His concept of bhakti is also slightly different from that of Jiva; he does not use the older terminologies (antaranga and bahiranga sakti), and does not seek the explanation of his system on that concept. His Prameya-ratna-mdld has an old commentary, the Kdnti-mdld, by one Krsnadeva Vedanta Vaglsa. In the Prameya-ratna-mdld he pays his salutation to Ananda-tlrtha or Madhva, whom he describes as his boat for crossing the ocean of samsdra. He gives also a list of the succession of teachers from whom he derived his ideas, and he thinks that by a meditation upon the succession of gurus one would succeed in producing the satisfaction of Hari. He further says that four sampraddyas or schools of Vaisnavas, the Sri, Brahma, Rudra, and Sanaka, will spring forth in Orissa (Utkala) in the Kali yuga, which may be identified with Ramanuja, Madhva, Visnusvamin, and Nimbaditya. He enumerates the succession of his teachers, in the following order: Srikrsna, Brahma, Devarsi-

Badarayana, Madhva, Padmanabha, Nrhari, Madhava, Aksobhya, Jaya-tlrtha, Jnana-sindhu, Vidyanidhi, Rajendra, Jayadharma, Purusottama, Brahmanya, Vyasa-tlrtha, Laksmlpati, Madhavendra, Isvara, Advaita, Nityananda and also Sri Caitanya 1 . The system of thought represented by Baladeva may well be styled the Madhva-Gaudiya system; we have had recently in Bengal a school of Yaisnavas which calls itself Madhva-Gaudlya.

1 See an earlier list by Kavi-Karnapura, in his fanciful or legendary treatise (jaura-ganoddesa-dipikd.

abhava, 150, 294

abhava-vikalpo, 183

abhijna, 297

Abhimana, 41

Abhinava-candrikd, 62

abhivyakti, 143, 150, 443

Abnegation, 354

Absolute, 73

Absolute forgetfulness, 49

Absolute negation, 207

Accessories, 88

acchidra-sevd, 3i8n.

Accidental, 122

Account of the Madhva Gurus, 54

acintya, 16, 18, 19, 37, 398

acintya-sakti, 154

acintyatva, 398

acintya-visesa-mahimnd, 19

Action, 3, 150

Acyutapreksa, 53

adliarma, 4

adhikarana, 129, 130, 134, 325, 326

Adhikarana-samgraha, 381, 382 n.

adhisthdna, 106, 119, 175, 250, 414

adhisthdna-caitanya, 242, 414

adkina, 313

adhyasta, 119

adhyasyamdna, 299

Aditi, 132

adravya, 97

adrsya, 135 n.

adrsta, 201, 333

advaita, 125 n., 194, 385, 448

Advaita-siddhi, 63, 65, 208 n., 211, 214, 215, 216 «., 221, 223, 224, 227, 240W., 242«., 2497:., 252/1., 254, 269, 270«., 275/1., 280/1., 302

advaya-tattva, 14

Affliction, 12, 44

After-image, 342

Agent, 299

Agni, 71

ahatn, 66, 159

aham-ajnah, 265

aham-artha, no, 264, 296, 297

ahamkdra, 24, 27, 31, 32 n., 40, 41, 47, 114, 150, 157, 158, 159, 314, 336

ahatn sphurdmi, 296

ahetuka, 190

ahetukl, 416

ahimsd, 9

Ahirbudhnya-samhitd, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45; categories, development of, 40-1; God in, 40; purusa in, 43; sakti, myati, kdla, etc., 44; time in, 40

Ahobala-Nrsimha, 388

aiksata, 135

aindrajdlikasyeva avidyamana-pradar-sana-saktih, 2

aindriya-vrtti, 167

aisvarydnanda, 431

^itareja-^Jranyafej, 55, 132n.

Aitareya-Brdhmana, 55

Aitareya-upanisad-bhdsya, 55

Aitareyopanisad, 90

Aitareyopanisad-bhdsya-tipparil, 5 5

ajndna, 63, 73, 83, 104, 106, 107, 117, 122, 152, 208, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221, 224, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 256, 257, 259, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 297, 298, 305, 326, 403; criticism of, 261 ff.; inference of, 276 ff.; Madhu-sudana's reply to the criticism of the view that ajndna is egohood, refuted, 296 ff.; nature of its destruction discussed, 244 ff.; perception of, 264 ff.; relation to Brahman, 266; relation to dreamless sleep, 267; relation to egohood criticized, 294; relation to knowledge, 269; relation to negation, 270 ff.; relation to vrtti, 267, criticized, 277; reply to Madhu-sudana's criticism, 273; views of other Vedantic authors refuted,

274 a/«a«a-product, 287 ajndnatva, 217 akarpanya, 9

akarya-kdrandnumdna, 201 Akbar, 379

akincana-bhakti, 421, 424 akitava, 423 aksara, 135

Index

Aksobhya-tirtha, 56, 94, 421, 448

alamkdra-idstra, 352, 432, 438

a-laukika-sdmarthya, 355, 356, 357, 358

Allahabad, 372, 388

All-pervading, 159

All-pervasive, 148, 159, 365

Amaru Puri, 386

Ambarlsa, 155

Amfta-ranginl, 1

amsa, 105

amsena amsi-prdpti, 427

amsl, 150, 153

anadhigatdrtha-gantr-pramdnam, 162 n.

anadhyd-vasdya, 177

Analogy, 85, 100, 338

ananta, 100

Ananta Bhatta, 62, 64, 65

anantam, 71

Anantapura, 53

ananvayi, 124

ananyatva, 142

anasuyd, 9

anavasthd, 104, 120, 189, 191, 199/2.

anddyavidyd-yuktasya, 30

andsritatvdt, 236

andtman, 107

andhakdra, 150, 160

Aniruddha, 27, 38, 313 n., 314, 408

anirvacanlya, 66, 68, 71, 72, 80, 81, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 175, 205, 304

anirvacanlyatd, 73

anirvdcya, 208, 301, 308

Annam Bhatta, 189

antahkarana, 149, 179, 233, 234, 236, 241, 243, 280, 291, 295, 297, 309, 317, 328, 336, 338, 347, 404

Antahkarana-prabodha, 373, 376

antahkarana-vrtti, 216, 238, 242, 244

antaranga svarupa-sakti, 13, 398

antaranga-sakti, 399

antarydmi-brahman, 332

antary'dmins, 328, 332, 348, 423

Antyalild, 387

anubhava, 174, 338

anubliava svarupa, 48

anubhava-visa\atva-yogyatdvirbhdvah, 366

Anubhdsya, 62, 87, non., 122, 322, 3247:., 325, 327, 328, 329, 332, 334, 373, 374. 375. 378, 380. 381; commentaries thereon, 61—2

Anubhdsya-nigudhdrtha-dlpikd,

Anubhdfya-nigudhdrtha-prakdsikd, 37 5

Anubhdfya-purtti, 379

Anubhdfya-vydkhyd, 373

Anukramanikd, 2, 167

anukula, 306

anukula-vedand, 123, 306

anumdna, 167, i88n., 196, 344, 327,

345

anumiti, 344

anupalabdhi, 143, 176

anupapatti, 184, 186, 187, 188

anurakti, 349

anurdga, 356, 433 n.

Anuvydkhydna, 62, 63, 87, 93, 94, 101, 103, 104, in, 112, 124, 126, 128, 131, 132/1., 156; account of, 62-3

Anuvyakhydna-tlkd, 62

anuvyavasdya, 170

anvaya, 341

Anvaya-bodhini, 1

anvaya-vyatireka, 48

anvaya-vyatireki, 201, 345

anvayi-kdranatvam updddnatve tan-tram, 263

anyakhydti, 359

anyathd-jndna, 117

anyathd-khydti, 305

anyathdnupapatti, 197

anyathdtva, 103

anyathd-vijndnam eva bhrdntih, 173

anyatvam, 39 n.

anyonyd-bhdva, 180

anyonyasraya, 104, 109, 247

<"*£«, 353 Angirah smrti, 6 aparokfa, 119 aparoksa-jndnam, 315 apauruseya, 203 apavdda, igon. Appearance of silver, 239 Appearances, 73, 85 aprdmdnika, 186 aprdmdnya, 163 aprdrabdha, 433 aprdrabdha karmas, 88 a-prtliak-siddha, 95, 96 apurva, 4, 408, 423 Arhatpattana, 372 artha, 376

artha-kriya-kdritva, 249 artha-nivrttih, 39 n. artlia-paricchitti, 166 artha-prdpakatva, 166 art/iavattva, 39 n. arthavdda, 420 arthdpatti, 187, 202, 345

45i

arthopadarsakatva, 166

arupasya ciddtmanah, 12

asac cet na pratlyeta, 205

asad eva idam ogre dslt, 205

asad-vilaksana, 11, 118

asamslista, 66

asanga, 220

asat, 118, 206

asatah-pratttav, 205

a-sat-khydti, 305

asddhdrano dharma, 176, 177

Asiatic Annual Register, 54 n.

asphuratl, 106

asprhd, 9

Assamese, 384

asteya, 9

astitva, 39 n.

Asuras, 57

a-sva-prakdsatva, 217

a-sva-prakdsatva-rupatvam drsyatvam,

217 asvatantra, 150 ft. as'akti, 39 n. asraddhd, 336, 420 asuddhatva, 217 Asvaghosa, 32 n. asvatva, 197 astdnga-yoga, 414 ata/z, inn. al/i£, no

aihdto brahma-jijnasd, 102 athdto dharma-jijndsd, zn., 102 atlndriya, 169, 170 Atomic, 315 Atomic self, 20 Atoms, 153 atlt, 132

atyanta-tdddtmya, 401 atyantdbhdva, 66, 109, 155, 360 atyartha-prasdda, 317 auddrya, 151 Auditory perception, 227 Aufrecht, 55, 373 n., 377 «• ausadhasevd, 351 autsargikam, 174 avadhuta, 386, 393 avakdsa-praddyi, 41 avasthiti-sdmdnya, 211 avatar a, 327

Avatara-taratamya-stotra, 377 Avatdravdddvali, 379 avdntara pralaya, 315 n. avedyatva, 311 avedyatve sati aparoksa-vyavahdra-

yogyatvam, 289

avidyd, 17, 21, 22, 44, 104, 106, 113, i3on., 136, 146, 147, 150, 169, 202, 222, 238, 239, 249, 250, 253, 254, 255, 263, 268, 279, 280, 281, 282, 288, 291, 292, 302, 313 n., 317, 331, 347, 348, 359, 361, 364, 365, 366, 369, 370, 409, 429; criticism of, 263; definition criticized, 259ff.; in relation to i>rtti", 282; its theory as a veil criticized, 288 ff.; Ma-dhusudana's reply to criticism refuted, 280 ff.; the doctrine of mdyd and ajndna criticized, 261 ff.; theory of, refuted, 279 ff.; the view that it can be known criticized, 293; various problems in relation to it raised and criticized, 284 ff.; views of different Vedantic authorities criticized, 286 ff.

avidyd-karmasamjnd, i6n.

avidyd-sakti, 12, 390

avidyddi-vasdd, 113

avindbhdva, 184, 186, 199

avisesa, 36

avyabhicarita-sddhya-sambandho vydp-tih, 187

avyabhicaritd-sambhandha, 197

avyabhicaritah sambandhah, 186

avyabhicdritd, 198

avyakta, 136, 137

avyakti, 32, 143

avydkrtdkdsa, 150, 159

Awareness, 209, 215, 231, 289

Ayodhya, 372

dcdra, 7

Acdryakdrikd, 373

ddhdra, 160

ddheya-sakti, 155

ddheyatmika, 333

ddhibhautika, 333

Adiltld, 387

dgama, 161, 181

dkdsa, 35, 41, 135, 137, 145, 146, 153, 177, 284, 286, 325, 380

dlocana, 146

dnanda, 20, 123, 124, 312, 331, 396

Anandabodha, 206, 221

dnandamaya, 130

Ananda-tirtha, 53, 54, 56, 447

Anandddhikarana, 373

dnukulyena Krsndnusevanam, 391

dnukulyena krsnd-nustlanam, 433

drddhya-visayaka-rdgatvam, 349

drdrendhana, 198

drjava, 9

29-2

Index

dropa, 143

dropa-siddha, ^ii

atopy a, 134

Arya, 373, 377

Arya-stotra, 55

Asuri, 36

dsrama, 10

dsrama-duties, 391, 393

air ay a, 403

Atmajnana-pradeia-tlka, 55

atma-maya, 14, 400

dtman, 14, 21, 32, 49, 68, 105, 126, 129,

138, 154, 334, 342, 4'6 dtmanas tusti, 6, 8 dtma-nivedana, 426 Atmapriyd, 1 dtma-svarupa, no dtmavdda, 381 dtmdnubhava, 353 dtmdsraya, i89n., 236 Atmopadesa-tikd, 55 dvarana, 292

dvarana-bhanga, 346, 374, 378, 379 dvesa, 347

avirbhdva, 340, 366, 367 Arirbhavatirobfidva-vada, 379 «7 irbhava-saktyddhdratvam , 340 dvrti, 155 dyojandnumdna, 3

Badarl, 92

Badarika, 53

B;idarikasram, 91, 372

bahavah, 39 n.

bahiranga, 409, 410

bahiraiiga-mdyd, 14

bahiraiiga - may a- sakti, 398

bahiraiiga-sakti, 13, 399

/)rt/a, 43, 151

Balabhadra Bhat^acarya, 388

Baladeva, 18, 19, 56, 390, 438, 443, 444, 447; bhakti doctrine of, 445; causal operation, theory of, 443; doctrine of riscsa as bheda-prati-nidhi, 441 ; God and the duties, 446; God and souls, 442; God, views on, 18-19; indebtedness to Madhva, 447; philosophy of, 438; theory of jlras, 441 ; will of God and the souls,

444 bandlia, 122

handhii-nultram vivaksitarn, 187 Badarayana, 39, 102, 364, 369 bddha, 117, 173 hddha!'.a -pru tyaya, 163

bddhya, 213

Bdlabodha, 373, 375, 380, 381

Bdlacaritandtnan, 373

Balakrsna Bhatta, 346, 356 n., 375, 377

Balakrsna Diksita, 375

Balakrsna Yati, 2

Bdlaprabodhim, 373

Balesvar, 387, 438

Beauty, 151

Beginningless, 24

Behaviour, 252

Being, 303

Belgaum, 56

Benares, 65 n., 371, 372, 388, 389

Beneficial effects, 6

Bengal, 18, 20, 384, 387, 390

Bengali literature, 390

Bhagavad-gltd, 1, 38, 54, 91 n.

Bhagavad-gitd-bhdsya, 55, 373

Bhagavad-gltd-bhdsya-vivecana, 5 5

Bhagavad-gltd-hetu-nirnaya, 377

Bhagavad-gltd-prasthdna, 55

Bhagavad-gitd-tdtparya, 55, 60, 377

Bhagavad-gitd-tdtparya-nirnaya-vyd-khyd, 60

bhagavad visaydnukulydtmakas tad-anugata-sprha dimaya jiiana-visesas tat-pritih,-43o

Bhagavallild-cintdmani, 1

Bhagavdn, 315 n., 396, 397, 413, 416, 421, 430

Bhagavan Hari, 38

Bhagavanndma-darpana, 380

Bhagavannd?na-vaibhava, 380

Bhagaz'at-pratikrti-pujanavdda, 379

Bhagavat-tdtparya, 3i8n., 377

bhajana, 350, 351

bhajanopovogi dena adhama-seva-phala, 358

bhakta, 350, 410, 411

Bhaktabodha, 87

bhakti, 30, 58, 60, 89, 92, 99, 100, 317, 319, 332, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356, 357, 358, 376, 377, 378, 378w., 379, 388, 389, 39i, 392, 413, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 433, 435 «-, 445,446,447; Rupa Gosvami's treatment of, 432

Bhakti-bindu, 394

Bhakti-cintanumi, 350, 351, 380

Bhakti-hamsa, 374, 377, 378/1., 380

Bhakti-hamsa-vireka, 379

Bhakti-hamsa-virrti, 351

Bhakti-httu, 374, 377

453

Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya, 377, 380 Bhakti-hetu-nirnaya-vivrti, 380 bhakti-mdrga, 356, 374 Bhakti-martanda, 3Son., 352 n., 353n.,

35411., 380, 381 bhakti-mdtra-kdma, 424 bhakti-nimitta, 424 WiaAtfi-path, 354 Bhakti-rasatvavdda, 379 Bhakti-rasdmrta-sindhu, 39on., 391,

432, 433, 434«-, 436«-, 437

Bhakti-rasdyana, 55

bhaktir-evdbhideyam vastu, 418

Bhakti-sandarbha, 394, 414

bhakti-sdstra, 355

Bhakti-siddhdnta, 373

Bhakti-tarangint, 380

Bhakti-vardhini, 352 n., 356 n., 373, 374, 375, 376, 380, 381

Bhakti-vardhinl-vivrti, 355

bhaktih svdtantryena muktiddtrl, 353

Bhaktyutkarsa-vada, 379

Bhandarkar, R. G., 51, 54, 55, 56

bhanga, 122

Bhartrprapanca, 53

Bharuch, 372

Bhavisyat-purdna, 139 n.

Bhdgavata-candrikd, 1

Bhagavata cult, vyuha doctrine of, 27

Bhdgavata-dasama-skandha-vivrti, 377

Bhdgavata-purdna, 1, 2, 10, i2n., 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24n., 26, 27, 28 n., 30if., 32, 33, 34n., 38, 47, 49, 59, 7i, 334, 346, 358, 373, 374, 379, 382, 386, 389, 396, 399, 401, 413, 417; atoms, conception of, 26; Brahman, Bhagavan and Paramat-man, 13; categories, evolution of, 35; commentaries, 1—2; date and authorship, 1; devotion in, 28-29; dharma, idea of, 2; diversity of the number of categories, 30-1; emancipation in, method of, 28; eschato-logy in, 49-50; God as Brahman, 11-12; God, idea of Visnusvami, 12; God and individual soul, 14; God, Jlva and Ramanuja on, 17; God and His mdyd as prakrti, 26; God, nature of, 14; God, nature of His powers, 17; God and purusa, 24 ff.; God, reconciliation of personal and impersonal view, 13; God, three names, significance of, 15; God, three distinct powers of, 13; God with and without powers, 16;

God as transcendent, 12-13; God, Madhva, Caitanya, and Baladeva on, 18; God, unthinkable nature of, 16; God and Vaikuntha, 15; Jiva's interpretation of, 19 ff.; Jiva's interpretation contradictory, 26; karma doctrine in, 49-50; mahat and ahamkdra, 27; Mahalaksmi, idea of, 13; mdyd as sakti according to &ridhara, 12; mdyd, idea of, 12; prakrti, the idea of, 34; purusa as pure experience in, 47—8; purusa and prakrti, 27-8; Samkhya in, different from that of Isvarakrsna and Patanjali, 30; Samkhya philosophy in, 24 ff.; Samkhya schools in, 45-6; time, conception of, as contrasted with that of Jlva, 26-7; theistic Samkhya in, 47-8; wholes, conception of, 26; world as illusory, 26; yoga and bhakti, 29-30

Bhdgavata-purdna-dasamaska ndhdnuk-ramanikd, 373

Bhagavata - pur ana ikddasaskandhdr -thanirupanakdrikd, 373

Bhagavata - purdna - pancamaskandha -tikd, 373

Bhagavata - purdna - prathama - sloka -tikd, 1

Bhdgavata-purdna-tlkd Subodhinl, 373

Bhdgavata-purdndrka-prabhd, 1

Bhdgavata-sandarbha, 396, 399, 433,

447 Bhdgavata-svatantratd, 377 Bhdgavatasdra-samuccaya, 373 Bhagavata school, 145 Bhagavata School of Samkhya, 32 Bhdgavata-tattvadlpa, 373 Bhdgavata-tattva-dipikd, 377 Bhdgavata-tdtparya, 1, 59, 15011.,

i56n., 157"-, 346 Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya, 55, 59;

commentaries on, 59 Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-tikd, 59 Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd-

prakasa, 59 Bhdgavata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd-

vivarana, 59 Bhagavata - tdtparya - vydkhyd-padya -

ratndvall, 59 Bhagavatas, 7 Bhdgavatdmrta, 394 Bhdgavatdrtha-prakarana, 374 Bhdmatl, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, m,

138, 142

Index

BharatJvijaya, 53

Bhaskara, 53, 322, 327, 329, 367

bhdfya, 53, 63, 87, 101, 150*.

Bhdfya-dipikd, 62

Bhdfya-prakdsa, 352, 373, 380, 381

Bhdfya-tikd, 380

Bhdfya-tippam-prameya-muktdvali, 62

Bhatta, 171

Bhdtta-cintdmam, 170

bhava, 333, 356, 433, 433 n., 435, 437

bhdva-bhakti, 434, 438

Bhava-candrikd, 59, 101

Bhdva-dlpa, 61, 64

Bhdva-prakdsikd, 1, 101, 381

bhdva-rupa avidyd, 3177*.

bhdva-vikdra, 122

Bhdva-vildsinl, 169ft., 313, 314

bhdvya, 42

bheda, 142, 178

Bheda-dhikkdra, 179

bheda-pratinidhi, 441

bheddbheda, 143, 153, 439

Bheddbheda-svarupa-nirnaya, 361, 379

Bhedojjlvana, 178 n.

bhinna-lak$ana-yogitva-bheda, 180 n.

bhinnatva, 221

Wtf, 336

Bhlma, 59

fc/jqga, 100, 357

bhoktf-bhogya, 43

bhrdnti, 120

bhrtyatva, 432

Bhujanga-praydtdftaka, 377

.B/jm, 157 n.

6/jfita, 150, 153, 159

bhuta-yoni, 134

bhutddi, 35, 41

bhutdkdsa, 156

bhutis, 66

bhuyo-darsana, 192, 195 n.

Bibliotheca Jndica, 1 85 n.

Bilvamahgala, 375

Biman Behari Mazumdar, Dr, 384

Biological, 28, 431

Bio-motor activities, 41

Birth, 49, 86, 347

Bliss, 20, 29, 156, 219, 222, 335, 419

Blissful, 414

Blue jug, 96, 97

'Blueness', 97

Bombay, 93, 374

Bombay Gazetteer, 54

Bondage, 23, 63, 102, 156, 255, 313,

3*5, 3i7, 335, 347, 366, 417, 418,

425; of egoism, 427

Bondage, 63, 156, 255, 313, 315, 3*7, 335, 347, 366, 417, 418, 425

Bonn, 102 n.

Bopadeva, z

Brahma-bhdva, 368

Brahmacarin, 320

Brahmadatta, 53

Brahma-enquiry, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, no, 112

Brahmaghosa, 53

Brahmahood, 285, 427

brahma-jijndsd, 112

Brahma-kdnda, 108

Brahma-knowledge, 102, 107, 216, 230, 231, 236, 255, 265, 266, 270, 277, 292, 433

brahma-light, 158

Brahman, n, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 33, 34, 39, 40, 49, 57, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 81, 84. 85, 86, 87, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109,

112, 121, I22«., 123, 126, 129, 131,

138, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148, 151,

I58, 178, 206, 207, 212, 213, 214, 215, 2l6, 217, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 232, 233, 243, 244, 246, 247,

250, 26ij 262, 280, 283, 286, 287,

288, 289, 290, 304, 306, 307, 308,

309, 3", 312, 321, 322, 323, 324,

325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 33O, 331,

332, 335, 338, 3+4, 347, 353, 357, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 368, 369, 37o, 37i, 390, 394, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 414, 415, 418, 420, 428, 430, 440, 442, 443, 447; Citsukha's definition criticized by Vyasa-tirtha, 311; material and instrumental cause according to Vyasa-tlrtha, 308 ff.; nature described by Vyasa-tirtha, 314-15; nature of, according to Vyasa-tirtha, 305 ff.; nature according to Vallabha contrasted with that of Bhaskara, 329

Brahman-causality, 87

Brahma-samhitd, 388

Brahma-sutra, 38, 39, 47, 53, 547*., 56, 62,63,68, 87, 98, no, 121, 122, 127, 129, i3on., 135, 148*., 153, 251, 300, 320, 321, 322, 324, 352, 364, 373, 377, 381, 438; criticism of other interpretations according to Vallabha and his followers, 330-2; peculiarity of Vallabha's interpretation, 328 ff.; Vallabha's interpreta-

455

Brahma-sQtra (cont.)

tion contrasted with that of Rama-nuja, 321 ff.; Vallabha's interpretation contrasted with that of &ankara,

325 Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, 55, 93, 94, 101,

102 «.; commentaries thereon, 61 Brahma-sutra-bhdfya-nirnaya, 55 Brahma-sQtra-bhdfya-tlkd, 55 Brahma - sutra - bhdjydrtha - samgraha,

62 Brahma-sutrdnubhdsya, 55, 373 Brahma-sutrdnubhdsya-pradtpa, 373 Brahma-sutrdnuvydkhydna, 55 Brdhma-sutrdnuvydkhydna-nirnaya, 5 5 Brahma - sutrdnuvydkhyd - nydya - nir -

naya, 55 Brdhma-sutrdnuvydkhydna-nydya-

sambandha-dlpikd, 62 Brahma-sutrdrtha, 62 Brahma-tarka, 65, 77 n. Brahma-vaivarta, 133 n. Brahma-vddins, 419 Brahma, 122 «., 155 brahmd-dhisthdma, 138 Brahmananda, 2, 55 Brahmananda Puri, 386 Brahmd-nanda-valtl, 98 Brahmanda-tlrtha, 56 Brahmin, 300, 393 Brahmins, 9 brahmopdddna, 263 Braja-bhusana, 1 Brajanatha, 377, 381 Brajaraja, 381 Brajavildsa-stava, 394 Brahmanya, 448

Brdhmanatvddidevatddi-vdda, 379 Brhad-dnayaka, 132 Brhad-dranyaka, 136, 137, 138 Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya, 90 Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya-tikd, 90 Brhaddranyaka-bhasya-tippara, 55 Brhaddranyaka-bhdva-bodha, 90 Brhaddranyaka-upanisad-bhdsya, 55 Brhaddranyaka-vdrttika-tlkd, 5 5 Brhad-Bhdgavatdmrta, 438 Brhajjdbdlopanisad-bhdsya, 55 brhanto hy asmin gunah, 111 Brhaspati, 6r., 9 Brndavana, 372, 383, 387, 388, 392,

394, 395 Brndavana Candra Tarkalahkara, 437 Buddha, 203 Buddha-carita, 32 «.

Budharanjinl, 2

buddhi, 24, 32«., 40, 41, 45, 49,

66, 113, 133"-, 15°. 157"-, 158,

300, 314, 327, 336, 342, 350, 358,

408 Buddhimanta Khan, 387 buddhir adhyavasdyim, 40 Buddhism, 52, 68 Buddhists, 7, 75, 134, 202, 203, 231,

254, 256, 383 buddhi-tattva, 157 Burnell, 93

Caitanya, 56, 126, 291, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396; his biographers, 384; his companions, 393 ff.; his life, 385 ff.; his philosophy as deduced from Caitanya-caritdmrta, 390-3

Caitanya-bhdgavata, 385

Caitanya-candrodaya-nataka,i&4,2$s,

387 Caitanya-caritdmrta, 385, 387, 389,

391, 395 Caitanya-mangala, 384 Caitanya-sahasra-ndma, 385 Caitanya-vallabha Datta, 385 Caitanydstaka, 394 caksuftva, 137 camasa, 137 Candanesvara, 388 Candrasekhara, 385, 386 Candrdloka, 438 Candrikd, 107 n. Candrikd-nydya-vivarana, 101 Candrikd-prakdsa, 101 Candrikd-vdkydrtha-vivrti, 105-7 Candakesavacarya, 64 Candidasa, 389 car dear a, 133 n. caritra, 8

Caste distinctions, 393 Caste duties, 391, 392 Catalogus Catalogorum, 55, 373,

377 «• Categorically imperative, 3 Categories, 30, 31, 46, 153, 159 Category, 146 Catuhsloki, 374, 376 Catuhsloklbhagavata-tlkd, 373 Caturthddhikaranamdld, 381 Causality, 129, 195, 379, 408 Causal movement, 341 Causal operation, 407, 443 Cause-effect, 201

Index

Cause-and-effect relation, 256

Central India, 395

Cessation, 117

cestd-riipa, 436

cetana, 158

cetya-cetana, 43

Chalari Nrsimhacarya, 53, 59, 62, 88,

197 Chalari-sesacarya, 88, 165, 188, 197 Chandah-Kaustubha, 438 chandas, 131 Chando' stddaiaka, 394 Chdndogya, izgn., 131, 133, 136 Chdndogyopanisad-bhdsya, 55, 90 Chdndogyopanisad-bhdsya-tippanl, 5 5 Chandogyopanisad-khandartha, 90 Chimerical, 205, 208, 230 Christian literature, 93 Christianity, 92 Christians, 92, 93 cic-chakti, 13, 14 cic-chakti-vilasa, 400 Cidambaram, 371 cid-visayatva, 217 Cintamani Diksita, 375 cit, 106, 107, 331, 362 Citsukha, 179, 180, 310, 311 citta, 24, 27, 158, 336 citta-prasdntatd, 10 Class-character, 150 Class-concept, 66, 179, 197 codana-sutra, 162 n. Co-existence, 187, 192, 194, 198,

344 Cognitive, 31, 182 Cognitive agent, 182 Cognitive characters, 278 Cognitive form, 290 Cognitive senses, 47 Cognizable, 215 Cognizing activity, 218 Collins, 93 Conative, 31 Concentration, 28 Concept, 256 Conch-shell, 80, 82, 119, 120, 227,

229, 238, 239, 245, 255, 257, 261,

3°4, 305. 343. 359, 4©6 Conch-shell-silver, 118, 207, 209, 211,

213, 214, 224, 249, 250, 264, 279,

281, 340, 359, 360, 405 Concomitance, 151, 185, 187, 193, 194,

195, 196, 199, 201, 217, 225, 228,

260, 341, 344, 345 Conditional, 73

Conditionally imperative, 3

Conditioning of consciousness, 236

Conditions, 379

Consciousness, 20, 26, 211, 215, 217, 225, 234, 236, 238, 241, 246, 247, 258, 259, 290, 297, 307, 329, 369, 397, 401

Consequence, 197

Contact, 153

Contentment, 7, 28

Contradiction, 190 n., 229, 255, 257,

3°4 Cosmic knowledge, 22 Cow-universal, 221 Creation, 42, 155, 348, 364, 408 Creative opinion, 21 Creative power, 44 Crypto-Buddhists, 69 Crystal, 249, 299 Cudamani Cakravarti, 1

Dabir Khas, 394

dainydtmaka-bhakti, 411

daiva, 21

daksind, 432

Dallu Bhatta, 358

dama, 9

Darkness, 342

Dasaprakarana, 64 n.

dayd, 9, 10

Dayanidhi, 56

Damodara, 371, 386, 387

ddna, 9

Ddna-keli-kaumudl, 395

ddsya, 392

Deductive inference, 225

Deeds,. 378

Definition, 124

Degree of reality, 72

deha-dehin, 43

Delusion, 370

Demerit, 446

Desire, 49, 351

Destruction, 109, 143

Determinate, 370

Determinate cognitions, 33

Determinate knowledge, 338

deva, 441

Devaki, 346

Devakinandana, 357, 375, 381

Devala, 9

Deva-mangala, 383

Devanna Bhatta, 372

Devarsi-Badarayana, 447

Devotee, 417, 418

457

Devotion, 23, 28, 29, 30, 58, 317, 324,

347, 378, 392, 413, 421

Devotion to God, 78

Devotional emotion, 418

Devotional literature, 1

Dhairyydsraya, 374

Dhanuskoti, S3

dharma, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 37, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 347, 363, 376; Bhdgavata-purdna on, 10; Devala, Yajfiavalkya and Maha-bharata on, 9-10; evolution of the idea of, 2-11; extension of meaning according to later smrtis, 9; Govin-daraja on, 8; Kumarila on, 3; Manu and Medhatithi on, 6; Mimarpsa and Vedic sense of, 2; Prabhakara on, 4; jSridhara on, 10; Vedic idea of, 5; versus adharma, 4; yoga on, 10

Dharmaraja-dhvarindra, 342

dharmasya ca kriya-rupatvat, 323

dharmavad, 108

dharmavicdra, 322

Dharmottara, 167

dharmy-amsa, 278

Dharwar, 52, 54 n.

Dhavalagiri, 372

dhdra-vdhika jndna, 162, 164

dhl, 336

dhruvam, 350

Dhruvapdda-flkd, 377

dhrti, 336

dhrtyanumdna, 326

dhvamsa-pratiyogi, 109

dhvamsdbhdva, 65, 155, 342

dhydna, 10, 88, 316, 413, 414

Differenceless, 115

Differences, 58, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 97, 99, 115, 179, 205, 221, 223, 226, 233. 269, 300, 441

Dig-darsana, 438

Dinakara, 195 n.

Disappearance, 340

Dissolution, 47

dofq, 172, 175, 254, 281

dosa-yukta, 156

Doubt, 173, 194, 338

drastd, 307

Dravida, 53

dravya, 3, 97, 150, 156, 159

Dravya-suddhi, 379

Dream, 83

Dream-appearances, 229, 339

Dream creations, 83

Dream-experience, 258, 295, 339 Dreamless deep sleep, 33, 230, 257,

274. 275. 29s, 309, 355 Dreamless sleep, 257 Dronacarya, 88 drdham-vijndnam, 162 n drg-anatirekdt, 307 drsta, 201 drftdnta, 345 drstdrtlia, 5 drsti-srsti, 256, 257 Dualism, 72, 93, 212 Duality, 49, 114 Duration, 233 durdgama, 75

Durgama-sangamana, 432,435/1.,436/1. Durga, 157 n. durghata-ghatakatvam, 16 durghata-ghatakatvam hy acintyatvam,

398' Durghatdrthaprakasikd, 59 Durvasas, 322 dusandnumdna, 201 dva suparand, 1 79 n. Dvddasa-stotra, 55, 89 Dvaraka, 372, 383 Dvarakesa, 375, 381 dvidhd-bhdvam rcchati, 42 Dynamic agent, 340 dyu-bhv-ddy-dyatana, 135

Earth, 156

Eclectic, 32

Ego, 20, 114, 264, 283, 294, 295, 297

Ego-hood, 28, 294

Egoism, 49

Ego-part, 295

Ego-perception, 298

Ego-sense, 297, 298

Ego-substratum, 295,297,298,299,300

Ego-wrMi, 292

Egotism, 65

ekasmin dharmini viruddha-ndnd-koty-avagdhi jndnam samsayam, 338

ekatva, 39

Ekddasa-skandha-tdtparya-candrikd, 2

Ekddasl, 319

ekdntins, 421

Ekdvali, 51

elan, 24

Elephant, 215

Emancipation, 21, 33, 99, 108, 245, 257, 258, 259, 299, 301, 306, 309, 335, 35o, 418, 428, 430, 447

Empirical existence, 281

Index

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,

54"-. 92 Endurance, 151 Enemies, 4 Energy, 41, 42 Energy of God, 429 Enjoyment, 100 Enmity, 29

Epigraphica Indica, 51, 93 n. Epilepsy, 389 Epistemological process in inference,

200 Equilibrium, 26, 31, 37, 48 Erotic emotion, 435 Erotic love, 431 Error, 113 Essence, 151 Essential, 122

Essential characteristics, 124 etat-samavetatva, 223 Eternal, 69, 109, 203, 378 Eternal contact, 236 Eternal damnation, 58 Eternity, 303 Evolution, 35, 37, 407 Evolutionary categories, 46 Excluded middle, 302 Existence, 302 Experience, 77, 99, 161, 168, 186, 212,

221, 263, 266, 269, 315, 411 Expiation of sins, 89 Eye-ball, 342

Fallacy of the circle, 247

False, 34, 67, 72, 81, 125, 165, 205, 211, 217, 305, 340, 360, 365

False appearance, 406

False identification, 251

False imagination, 287, 292

False reasoning, 228

False silver, 305

Falsehood, 83, 84, 204, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 221, 222, 224, 225; controversy on, 204 ff.; criticism of Madhusudana and Rama-carya, 209 ff.; five definitions of, criticized, 204 ff.; its definition criticized, 206 ff.; Madhusudana's reply criticized, 216 ff.; of the world criticized, 225 ff.; versus contradiction, 213

Falsity, 85, 215

Falsity of the world, 360

Fear, 151

Fire, 190, 194, 198, 200, 344

Formless, 18

Francis of Assisi, St, 389

Gadadhara, 387

gandha-mdtra, 41

gandharvas, 98

gandharva-sdstra, 106—7

Gangdstaka, 394

Ganges, 424

Ganjam, 51, 388

Garigadasa Pandita, 386

Garigesa, 53, 171, 185, 190, 190*7., 192, 199 n., 372, 388, 394

Garigottrl, 372

Ganapati Bhatfa, 371

Gandadusa, 386

Garbe, 93

Gaudapddlya-bhdsya-akd, 55

Gaudardja-vijaya, 385

Gaudlya school, 400

Gaura-ganoddesa-dtpika, 448 n.

Gaurdngakalpata.ru, 394

Gaurdasa Sarkhel, 393

Gaurldasa Pandita, 385

Gaya, 372, 386

gdmbhirya, 151

Gayatri, 63, 131

Gdyatri-bhdsya, 380

Gdyatryartha, 381

Gdyatryartha-vivarana, 381

Generality, 303

Generic quality, 247

Ghanasyama, 374, 377, 381

ghate mrdvat, 46

ghato jdyate, 118

Ghosh, N. G., 371

Ghost, 178

Giridhara, 373, 375, 377, 387

Giridhara Gosvaml. 360

Giridharji, 380

Gtta-govinda, 389

Gtta -govinda -prathamdstapadl-vivrti, 377

Gtta, 45, 60, 70, 82 n., 92, 93, 314, 324, 334, 346, 380, 389, 422, 438

Gttd-bhdsya, 60, 91, 94

Gttd-bhusana, 438

Gltdrtha-samgraha, 61

Gttd-tattva-dipanl, 380

Gttd-tdtparya, 59; commentaries thereon, 60; works on, 61

Gttd-tdtparya-nirnaya, 94

Gttd-vivrti, 61

Glasenapp, 51 n., 941., ioin., 102n., 37i

459

God, 3, ii, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, S8, 63, 68, 70, 7i, 75, 76, 78, 89, 93, 99, 113, 121, I32n., 133"-, 136, 144, 145. 147, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 178, 179, 182, 293, 3", 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 325, 326, 327, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 33&, 339, 34©, 343, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 35i, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 360, 361, 366, 367, 369, 370, 371, 375, 376, 377, 378, 390, 39i, 392, 396, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 406, 408, 410, 411, 412, 414, 416, 417, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 436, 437, 439, 440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447

God as love, 436

God's grace, 358

God's power, 42

God's will, 362

Godavarl, 53, 372

Gokarna, 372

Gokulanatha, 374, 380

Gokuldstaka, 377

Gokulotsava, 374, 381

Gopala Basu, 385

Gopala Cakravartl, 1

Gopala Purl, 386

Gopesa, 375

Gopesvara, 352, 374, 375, 380

Gopesvaraji Maharaja, 350, 351, 380, 38i

Goplnatha Bhafta, 375

Gopinathajl, 379

Goplnath Kaviraja, 438, 439

gopis, 349, 392, 401

GosvamI, 432

gotva, 152, 197

Govardhana Bhafta, 381

Govardhanasarma, 377

Govinda, 384, 386

Govinda Bhafta, 92

Govinda-bhdsya, 438, 439, 440 n., 442 n., 444"-, 446 n., 447

Govinda-bhasya-plthaka, 55

Govinda ChakravartI, 350

Govinda Dasa, 438

Govindaraja, 8, 375, 380

Govinda-vijaya, 385

Govindaviruddvah, 394

Govinddstaka-tlkd, 55

Grace, 29, 78

Grace of God, 391 Grammars, 76 Grantha-mdlikd-stotra, 55 Grierson, 52, 92, 93 Ground-cause, 309 Ground-consciousness, 245 grhlta, 105 guna, 3, 12, 15, 21, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34,

150, 313. 317"-, 334, 363, 364, 37o,

397, 400, 409 guna-guny-abheda, 182 guna-karmddau gundnangJkdrdt, 220 guna-mdyd, 16, 399 guna-purtti, 109 Guna-saurabha, 175 n. guna-trayddy-upddana-bhuta, 156 guna-vikalpo, 183 Gunakara, 351 Guptacarya, 350 Gururaja, 64, 65 Guru-stuti, 55 Guru-susrusd, 9 Gurvartha-dipikd, 62 Guzerat, 372

Hamsa-duta-kavya, 394 Hardwar, 53, 372 Harekr^na-mahdmantrdrtha-nirupana,

394 Hare's horn, 74, 141, 144, 205, 207,

208, 212, 214 Hari, 28, 41, 3i4«-» 3 X 9 Hari-bhaktivildsa, 394 Haribhanu, 1 Haricarana, 352 Haridasa, 350, 381, 385, 386 Hariddsa-siddhdnta, 381 Haridhana, 375 Harimlde-stotra-Bkd, 56 Harindmdmrtavydkarana, 394 Hariraja, 357, 358, 374, 375, 377, 380,

38i Hastinapur, 89 Heat, 369

Heat-light potential, 35 Heaven, 2, 15, 92, 156 Hell, 156 Heroism, 151

hetu, 95, 161, 200, 344, 345 Hindi, 380

Hindu Chemistry, 36 n. History of Hindu Chemistry, 195 n. History of Indian Philosophy, A, 169 n. History of Orissa, 394 hladim, 14, 390, 393, 410, 419, 440

hlddinl samvit, 12 hlddirii-sakti, 393 Homogeneous, 42 hri, 10, 336 Hrdaya, "jn., 386 Hrdaya Caitanya, 438 hrdayena abhyanujndta, 8 Hrsikesa, 372 Hussain Shaha, 394 Hyderabad, 53 Hypothesis, 196

Iccharama, 373, 381

idam-rajatayoh, 118

Idealistic monism, 33

Identity, 73, 79, 97, 122, 141, 200,

233. 340

Ignorance, 20, 21, 22, 66, 68, 83, 113, 122, 150, 158, 159, 217, 218, 219, 245, 257, 259, 267, 269, 283, 293, 313. 328, 347, 359, 417, 427, 429, 433

Illumination, 241, 289

Illusion, 28, 32, 80, 81, 83, 119, 132, 134, 168, 173, 178, 205, 209, 213, 224, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 252, 2 53> 254, 256, 257, 260, 261, 264, 280, 300, 305, 339, 414; avidyd and dosa in, 254 ff.; conception of, criticised by Vyasa-tirtha as against Mad-husQdana, 247ff.; drsti-srsti view criticized, 256 ff.; objections against the criticism by Madhusudana refuted, 257-8; possibility criticized, 251 ff-

Illusion and arthakriydkdritva, 252 ff.

Illusion of silver, 174, 248, 347

Illusory, 22, 26, 32, 33, 75, 83, 120, 174, 209, 219, 228, 255, 281, 283, 285, 286, 301, 304, 305

Illusory bondage, 256

Illusory creation, 246

Illusory experience, 281, 283

Illusory identity, 297

Illusory image, 257, 399

Illusory imposition, 232, 242, 248,

254. 273. 329, 407 Illusory intuition, 258 Illusory knowledge, 172 Illusory negation, 262 Illusory notation, 289 Illusory objects, 406 Illusory perception, 174, 229, 230,

343 Illusory qualities, 248

Illusory silver, 239, 245, 253, 261, 262, 305

Illusory superimpositions, 134

Illusory world, 253

Images, 178

Imaginary appearances, 304

Immediacy, 241

Immediacy of knowledge, 312

Immediate cognition, 242, 312

Immediate intuition, 243

Immediate perception, 243

Impersonations, 340

Implication, 345

Imposition, 248

Impossible-negation, 201

Impossible negative, 184

Incarnation, 38, 412

Indefinable, 120, 301, 302, 303

Indescribable, 205

Indeterminate, 370

Indeterminate cognition, 358

Indeterminate knowledge, 219

India, 1

Indian Antiquary, 54 n., 93

Indian philosophy, 11, 24, 58, 162, 173

Individual, 58

Individual selves, 21, 32

Individual souls, 24, 146, 158

Indra, 71

indriya, 150

indriya-nigraha, 9

indriydrtha-sat-samprayaga -janyam jndnam, 339

Inductions, 195

Inference, 77, 161, 183, 187, 188, 192, i°4i *95» 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 227, 229, 260, 274, 276, 281, 301, 305, 344; Vyasa-tirtha on, 200

Infinite, 126

Infinite bliss, 446 •

Infinite regress, 210

Inherent energy, 48

Injunction, 5

Inspiration, 389

Instrumental, 327

Instrumentality, 329

Intelligence, 335, 350

Intuition, 181, 235, 256, 258, 265, 274, 338

Intuitive consciousness, 276

Intuitive faculty, 182

Intuitive perception, 254

Intuitive process, 181

Invalid, 183, 243, 244, 245, 268, 269, 274, 281, 369

461

Invariable, 185

Invariable antecedence, 340

Invariable relation, 199

Islam, 394

istasadlianata, 74

Ista-siddhi, 239

tksita, 129

Isd, 89

lsdvdsya-upanisad-bhdsya, 5 5

Isopanisad-bhdsya, 94

Isvara, 12, 24 w., 40, 41, 46, 47, 56, 68, 121, 132, 133, 135. 136, 137. 144, 203, 288, 312, 326, 327, 447, 448

Isvarakrsna, 30, 36, 39

isvara-paravasd, 149

Isvara Puri, 386

Jadunathaji Maharaja, 383 n. jada, 150, 370 Jaddtmikd, 400 jagabandhdtmikd, 156 Jagadananda, 387 Jagannatha, 387 Jagannatha Dasa, 388 Jaganndtha-vallabha, 395 Jagannatha Yati, 62 jagat-prapaiica, 116 Jagai, 386

Jaiminisutra-bhdsya-mlmdmsd, 373 Tains, 7, 45, 52, 65, 97, 115, 167, 203,

372

Jalabheda, 373, 376, 380, 381

Jalabheda-tlkd, 377

Janaka, 324

Janardana, 157, 160, 186, 324, 388

Janardana Bhatta, 1, 59, 64

Janmddyasya yatah, sdstrayonitvdt, 325

Janmdstami-nirnaya, 377

japd-f\o\\er, 299, 300

jaran-naiydyika, 202

Java, 313 n., 318/1.

Jayadeva, 389

Jayagopala Bhatta, 175, 375, 381

Jaya-mangald, 1

Jayanti-kalpa, 55

Jayarama, 1

Jayasimha, 54, 91

Jaya-tirtha, 55, 56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 87, 88, 89, 90, 94, 101, no, in, 115, 117, 121, 126, 128, 132?*., i33 w -. 143, 162, 174, 175, 177, 178, 182, 184, 186, 187, 196, 202, 448

Jaya-tlrtha-vijaya-tippanl, 160 n.

Jayakhandin Simha, 59

Jayananda, 385

Jahnavi, 393

jdti, 151, 152

jdti-vikalpo, 183

Jealousy, 29

jijndsd, 413

jiva-caitanya, 235

jiva-form, 284

Jiva Gosvami, 16, 346, 396, 438, 447; Brahman, nature of, 397; bhakti, nature of, 415 ff.; criticism of the Sahkarites, 414; different saktis, concept of, 399-400; God, views on, 19-20; God and His powers, 409; God and the souls, 408; God's relation to His devotee, 410 ff.; mdyd and beyond mdyd, 402; mdyd doctrine, 399; mdyd, ideas on, 21-2; nature of the world, 404; ontology, 396 ff.; Paramatman, idea of, 23; parindma doctrine of, 22; part in the whole, relation of, 403; self, views on, 20; selves, theory of, 399 ff.; status of the world, 405 ff.; the joy of bhakti, 403 ff.; ultimate realization, nature of, 428 ff.

jiva-mdyd, 16, 413

jivanmukta, 365

jivanmukti, 39 n., 88, 259, 262, 347, 406, 418, 428, 446

Jiva-pratibimbatva-ktiandana-vdda, 379

jiva-sakti, 390

jlvas, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 34, 83, 109, 126, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 144, 146, 149, 150, 155, 179, 257, 284, 285, 287, 288, 289, 292, 335. 347, 348, 350, 361, 362, 364, 366, 367, 368, 370, 378, 399, 409, 410, 414, 429, 440, 442, 444,

447 jivdtman, 424 jriapti, iSgn. jndna, 10, 71, 73, 117, 122, 166, 167,

170. 235, 260, 261 293, 336, 350 jndna-bddhyatva, 103 jiidna-grdhaka, 169 jndna -grdhakdtiriktdnapeksa tvam, 169 jndna-guhaya, 24 jiidna-kdnda, 326 jndna-mdrga, 374 jndna-mdtrasya kd vdrttd sdksdd api

kurvanti, 416 jndna-misra, 353, 354 jndna-mfila-kriydtmaka, 40, 41, 43 jndna-rupa, 157W.

Index

jnana-sdmagri, 175 Jnanasimha, 56 Jftana-sindhu, 448 jndna-sriye, 400 jnanabhava, 293 jndndm prdmdnyam, 174 jndndnanddtmako hy asau, 314 jndndngabhuta, 353 jndndftgabhuta-bhakti, 353 jnatatd, 169, 170 jneyatd-sampddana, 160 jneya-visaylkarana, 160 'Jugness', 97 jyotih, 131, 136 Jyotiftoma, 137

kaivalya, 248

kaivalya-kdma, 424

kaivalya-kdma-bhakti, 424

Kalana, 393

Kalapa grammar, 386

Kali, 51

Kali yuga, 447

Wpa, 325

kalpita, 292

kalpita-bheda, 105

kalya-kdla, 43

Kalyanapura, 53, 92, 93

Kalyanaraja, 346, 357, 374, 375, 380, 381

Kamalakara Bhattacarya, 395

Kamaldsana, 122 n.

Kanada, 153, 176*1., 178

Kapila, 24, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 44, 139

Kapila Samkhya, 44

Kapilaksetra, 372

karma, 21, 22, 25, 33, 45, 49, 61, 86, 88, 145, 147, 150, 151, 253, 317, 324. 333, 337, 348, 349, 35°, 353, 354, 358, 367, 39i, 409, 415, 417, 418, 428, 444; nature of, 49-50

karma-kdnda, 326

karma-mdrga, 374

karma-misra 353, 354

Karma-nirnaya, 64, 70, 74

karma-svabhdvam, 332

karmdsayas, 433

kartr, 37, 370

kartrtva, 43

kathd, 115

Kathd-laksana, 55, 64, 65; account of,

65 Kathiawad, 372 Katwa, 386 Katha, 89, 133, 136

Kaura Sadhu, 1

Kaufltakl, 131, 137, 446

Kaufltakyupanifad-bhdfya-tippanl, 5 5

kautilya, 420

Kavlndra-tlrtha, 56

kdkatdtlya, 161

Kdla, 22, 25, 31, 37, 40, 47, 150, 159,

33i, 4U kdma, 336, 376, 432, 435 kdmand-nimitta, 424 Kamaka§ni, 371 Kdmdkhydndtha, 190 n. Kamarahati, 388 Kdnti-mdld, 438, 447 Kanci, 383 Kanvas, 133 kdrana, 328, 332, 340 kdrana-sakti, 155 kdrandnumdna, 200 kdrikd, 39 n., 444 Kdrpanya-punjikd, 394 kdryatd, 74

kdrydnumdna, 200, 326 kdrydnumeya, 332 kdrydtirekendnavasthdnam, 341 Kasi Misra, 388

Kdthakopanisad-bhdsya-tippam, 5 5 Kaveri, 388 Kdvya-Kaustubha, 438 kdvyas, 386 Kedara, 372 Kena, 89

Kenopanisad-bhdsya, 55, 90 Kenopanisad-bhd$ya-tlppanl, 55 Kenopanisad-khanddrtha, 90 Kesava Bhatta, 62 Kesava Bhattaraka, 64, 101 Kesavadasa, 1 Kesava Misra, 64, 189 Kesavasvamin, 87 Kesava-tlrtha, 64 Kesava Yati, 62 kevala, 160, 181 kevala pramdna, 161, 167, 181 kevala-vyatireki, 201, 345 kevaldnvayi, 185, 186, 344 Khandana-khanda-khddya, 65 n., 115,

191 n., 192 Khanddrtfia-prakdsa, 90 Khapuspa-ttkd, 55 Khydtivdda, 360, 379 kitava, 423 kirtana, 389 klesa, 12, 45 Knower, 66, 68, 86

4 6 3

Knowledge, 21, 66, 81, 84, 86, 117, 126, 156, 160, 161, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170, 189, 223, 230, 349; its nature in emancipation discussed, 243 ff.; Madhusudana's defence strongly criticized, 240 ff.; nature and function of vrtti and ajnana discussed, 236 ff.; the views of Ista-siddhi and Ramadvaya criticized, 239 ff.; views of Madhusudana criticized by Vyasa-tlrtha, 230 ff.

Knowledge of God, 392

Krama-nirnaya, 54

kriyd, 3, 42

kriyd-sakti, 331

kriya-vikalpo, 183

krpd, 151

Krsna, 15, 45, 59, 346, 349, 353, 356, 376, 386, 387, 389, 392, 395, 401, 402, 432, 438, 440, 442

Krsnadasa Kaviraja, 385, 387, 388, 390

Krsna-karndmrta, 375, 388, 389

Krsna-padl, 1

Krsna-premdmrta, 377

KrsnasvamI Ayer, 52, 90

Krsna Sastrl, 90, 91

Krsnacarya, 51, 59, 90

Krsndmrta-mahdrnava, 55, 89, 319*1.

Krsndnandl, 438

Krsndsraya, 373, 376

Krti, 313 n.

Krttikd, 186

ksamd, 9, 10

ksdnti, 9

ksetra, 402

ksetrajna, 32 n., 402, 442

ksetrajna-sakti, 390

ksetrajnakhya y 16 n.

Kulluka, 8

Kumarapada, 383

Kumarila Bhafta, 3, 60, 171

Kumbakonam, 54 n.

Kundalagirisuri, 62

Kuruksetra, 372

Kurvesvara temple, 51

Kusumdrqali, ig2n.

kutastha, 37, 43

Kutastha-dlpa, 158 n.

kvdcitkaiva, 93

Laghu-bhdgavatd-mrta, 438 lajja, 151 laksana, 121, 124 Laksmana Bhafta, 371, 375

Laksmana Simha, 59

Laksml, 150, 157, 181, 314, 317

LaksmI Devi, 386

Laksmlpati, 56, 448

Lalita-mddhava, 394

Law of excluded middle, 204, 209

Lalu Bhatta, 373, 375

lalyatva, 432

lamas, 3i7n.

Legitimate inference, 228

Leipzig, 102 n.

Lexicons, 76

Liberality, 151

Liberation, 58, 315, 318

Light, 369

Light-heat, 31

Light-particles, 369

Limitation, 221

Limited consciousness, 245

Limited measure, 220

Limiting condition, 152

linga, 37, 344

linga-deha, 317

lihga-sarlra, 49, 156

tllayd, 24

Locanadasa, 385

Locus, 342

Locus of illusion, 252

Logic, 71, 204

loka-vyavahdra, 163

Lokayatas, 52

Lord, 34

Love, 28, 351

Low-caste, 393

Loyalty, 3

Lump of earth, 82

MacKenzie, Major, 54n.

Madana, 386

Madhurdstaka, 373, 374, 377, 380, 381

Madhusudana, 204, 207, 211, 212, 214, 216, 219, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 233, 242, 243, 251, 256, 257, 258, 262, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 278, 279, 280, 282, 285, 288, 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305,

397 Madhva, 1, 18, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 70, 71, 74, 75, 82, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 121, 122, 128, 130, 131, 132,

133. 135. 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 145, 146, 148, 156, 158, 177, 182,

Index

Madhva (cont.)

184, 190, 203, 318, 319, 339, 346, 371, 388, 441, 447, 448; Anubhdsya and commentaries thereon, 61; Anuvyakhyana, account of, 62-3; Anuvyakhyana with commentaries thereon, 62; aprdmdnya, 163; avidya doctrine, 159-60; dkdsa doctrine, 153-4; bliakti, view regarding, 58; Bhagavata-tatparya-nirnaya and commentary thereon, 59; Bhagavata-tatparya-nirnaya, manner of treatment in, 59; bheda, nature of, 178 ff.; discussion of the meaning of the word Brahman, 111-12 ff.; his interpretation of the Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 1, 102 ff.; interpretation of Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 2, 121 ff.; interpretation of Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 3-4, 127; his interpretation of the Brahma-sutras elaborated by many other writers, 101; logical connection of the Brahma-sutras, 87; monistic interpretation of Brahman, difficulties in, 125 ff.; other conditions of Brahma-knowledge are discarded, no—11; what leads to Brahma enquiry, 102; a review of the important topics of the Brahma-sutras, i29ff.; Brahma-sutra-bhdsya, 61; Christianity, influence of, on, 92-3; concomitance in Madhva, 197 ff.; date of, 51; eternal damnation in, 58; definition of Brahman, discussions on, 121 ff.; difference (bheda), concept of, 73-4; view regarding five-fold differences, 57; difference, reality of, 178-9; difference as conceived by Ssarikara criticized, 179—80; discussions, condition of, 115; discussion (vdda), nature of, 65; doubts defined, i76fT.; his view regarding the emancipated, 57-8; emancipated souls, distinction among, 66; error, nature of, 1 18 ff.; falsehood, notion of, criticized, 84; falsity of the world, doctrine, discarded, 114; falsity of the world criticized in the Tattvoddyota, 67; Gitd-tdtparya, account of, 59 ff.; Gitd-tdtparya, manner of treatment in, 59; God as eternal perceiver of the world, 68; God's possession of many qualities defended, 71; God, collocation of pramdnas leading to, 78; God, proof of existence, 76;

God, nature of, 75; identity incomprehensible without difference, 79— 80; identity, notion of, denied, 82; notion of absolute identity (akhan-ddrtha) criticized, 73; identity of selves denied, 70; identity of the self and the world denied, 68; inference, 184 ff.; various kinds of inference in, 200-1; inference as svdrthdnu-mdna and pardrthdnumdna, 202; illusion defined, 173; illusion and doubt, 173 ff.; illusion, Mimarnsa view of, criticized, 174; illusion, Sankara view criticized, 175; karma, prdrabdha and aprdrabdha, discussion of, 88; nature of karma in, 61; karma-nirnaya, account of, 70 ff.; kathd-laksana, account of, 65; intuitive knolwedge, 181; nature of knowledge discussed by Vyasa-tirtha as against Madhusudana, 230 ff.; krsndmrta-mahdrnava, account of, 89; life of, 51 ff.; Mahdbhdrata, view regarding, 58; Mafidbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya, 57—8; Mahdbhd-rata-tdtparya-nirnaya, commentary of, 59; mayd doctrine discarded, 113; Aldydvdda-khandana with commentaries thereon, 64; memory as pramdna, 162; mithyd and anirva-carilya, 80—1; mithydtvdnumdna-khandana with commentaries thereon, 64; Mimarnsa doctrine of karma criticized, 71; moksa (liberation), nature described by the followers of Madhva, 315; moksa, different types of, 318; moksa, ways that lead to it, 316; the monism of Sankara cannot be the basis of Brahma-enquiry, 103; monism, refutation of, by Vyasa-tirtha, 204 ff.; nitydnitya-viveka cannot be a condition of Brahma-knowledge, 109; nonexistence, nature of, 80; Nydya-vivarana, account of, 87; ontology, 150 ff.; criticism of, by Parakala Yati, 95; perception, condition of, 182; perception, Nyaya definition and condition denied, 182-3; Pra-bhakara view discussed, 74; prakrti doctrine, 156 ff.; pramdnas, 160 tf.; pramdnas, agreement with objects, 161; pramdna, criticism of other definitions of, 164; pramdna, Buddhist view of, considered, 167;

465

Madhva (cont.)

pramdna, definition of, 160 ff.; pramdnas, Jaina view of, considered, 166; Pramdna-laksana and commentaries thereon, 64; pramdnas, nature of, 77; pramdna, two senses of, 165; pramdna, Nyaya view considered, 167; Ramanuja and, 94 fT.; Ramanuja's criticism of Brahman criticized, 124; degrees of reality criticized, 73; degrees of reality, discussions on, 116 ff.; repentance and meditation, 89; samavdya doctrine, 154; Ssarikarites and Buddhists compared, 69-70; Sahkarites criticized as crypto-Buddhists, 68-9; Ssarikara's interpretation of the different topics of the Brahma-siitras criticized, 129 ff.; Sarikara's interpretation criticized, 127 ff.; iakti doctrine, 154-5; Sdliarcya theory of Garigesa refuted, 185; sdstra in relation to God, 60; his view regarding smrti and idstras, 57; view regarding sdstra, 60; self cannot be identical with Brahman, 108; self cannot be self-illuminating, 68; souls, different kinds of, 155-6; criticism of, on the nature of emancipated souls, 98-100; svatah-prdmdnya theory considered, 168 ff.; svatah-prdmdnya in relation to doubts, 172; svatah-prdmdnya explained, 168; svatah-prdmdnya theory of, distinguished from that of the Mimamsa and the Vedanta, 169 ff.; tarka, 193; tarka, nature of, 188 ff.; tarka, Mathura-natha and Gangesa cricitized, 190; tarka, Nyaya view criticized, 189; torfta, Sriharsa's view criticized, 191; tarka, Udayana's view criticized, 192; Tattva-satnkhydna, account of, 65—6; Tattva-samkhydna with commentary, 64; some doctrines summarized in the Tattva-samkhydna, 65-6; Tattvoddyota, account of, 66 ff.; Tattvoddyota with commentaries thereon, 64-5; teachers of Madhva's school, 56; testimony in Madhva, 202 ff.; true belief, 174; upddhi criticized, 85-6; upddhi, notion of, 82-3; upddhi-khandana with commentaries thereon, 64; universal and inference, 151—2; the view of Vacaspati and Prakasatman

refuted by Vyasa-tlrtha, 104 rT.; Vedas, revelation of, 75; visesa doctrine, 153; Visnu-tattva-nirnaya, account of, 74 ff.; vydpti as anupa-patti, 184; world cannot be an illusion, 72; the view of world as illusion criticized, 246 ff.; status ot the world, brief description of, 63; world cannot be sadasad-vilaksana, 73; works of Madhva, 54 ff.; commentaries on his works, 55-6; works on logic of, 64

Madhva-bhdsya, 141 w.

Madhva mathas, 91

Madhva school, 143, 153

Madhva-siddhdnta-snra, 54, 150;/., 15m., I52n., 154"-. 156"., 157". 159 n.

Madhva-vijaya, 53, 54, yi

Madhvas Philosophic des Vishnu -Glaubens, 54 n., 102 n.

Madhvacarya, 157/1.

Madhvdcdrya, The Life of, 91 n.

Madhvacarya, a Short Historical Sketch, 90 n.

Madhyallla, 387, 392

madhyama-sevaphala, 358

Madhyageha Bhatta, 52

Magic, 68

Magician, 287

mahat, 25, 27, 31, 35, 40, 41, 46, 47, 66, 150, 156

Mahat-tattva, 157

Malidbhdrata, 9, 38, 57, 58, 59, 75, 92, 93, i28n., 413

Malidbhdrata-tatparya-nirnaya, 51,55, 57, 58, 318 n.

Mahdbharata-tatparya-nirnaydnuk-ramanikd, 59

Malidbhdrata-tdtparya-nirnaya-vydkhyd, 59

maJidbhdva, 432, 433 n., 436

mahdbhutas, 24

Maha-laksmi, 13, I57n., 372

mahd-mdyd, 313 n.

Mahd-pralaya, 315 n.

Mahdsubodhirii, 59

Alahdvisnu, 402

mahd-yajnais ca yajnais ca brdhmiyam kriyate tanuh, 321

Mahispuri, 371

Mahomedan scriptures, 203

Malabar, 93

Mallikarjuna-tirtha, 388

Mal-observation, 173

30

Index

mamatd, 432

manas, 24, 31, 36, 41, 47, 40, 66, 108,

146, 150, 157, 158, 165, 16X, 182,

314, 3i8, 336, 337, 341, 342, 352,

358, 408 Manddra-mafijurl, 64 Manes, 93 Mangalore, 53 Manicheans, 93

Manifestation of appearance, 340 manonubhava, 159 mantras, 337, 346. 360. Manu, 6, 8, 34(1 Manu-samhitu, 6 n. Manvartha-candriku, 8 mangala, 9 Mahgalavdda, 373 matii, 93

' Manigrama *, 93 Mani-manjari, 52, 54, 93 Manimat, 52, 93 Maricika, 381 Market silver, 208 maryadd, 355, 378 maryddd school, 354 maryddd-mdrga, 352, 355, 367, 377 maryddd-mdrga bhakti, 378 Mathura, 372, 388 Mathurd-mahimd, 394 Mathurd-muhdtmya, 373 Mathuranatha, 170M., 190W., 195 n. Material, 313 Material cause, 138, 205, 209, 261,

330, 340, 341> 443 Material stuff, 259 Materiality, 218 Matha list, 51 Mathas, 51, 52 Maudgala, 64 tnayi jildnam nusti, 265 Madhavadesaka, 53 Madhava-tirtha, 56 Madhavayatindra, 371 Madhavendra, 56 Madhai, 386 mddhurya, 392 Madhva-Gaudlya, 448 Madhyandinas, 133 Mdgha, 387 MahismatI, 372 Mdlddhdrana-zdda, 379 mana, 433 n. mdnasdnanda, 431 Mdndiikya-khandarthu, 90 Mandukya Upanisads, 89

Mdndukya-upanisad-bhdsya, 5 5 Mdndukyopanisad-bhdsya, 90 mdtra, 150 Mdthara-vrlti, 39 n. Matharacarya, 39 n. nulyd, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, zz, 23, 24, 26, 33, 34, 47, 48, 68, 71, S5, 113, 122, 156, 215, 242, 261, 287, 308, 3U, 3'4, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 334, 337, 339, 347, 348, 359, 360, 370, 397, 399, 400, 402, 403, 407, 409, 410, 412, 430 mdydkhyd prakrtir jadd, 313 n. may d-power, 12

mdyd-sakti, 12, 329, 391, 393, 398, 409 Mdydvdda-khandana, 55, 64, 65 mdyayd api bhagavac-diakitvena sakti-

mad-abhinnatvdt, 330 Medhatithi, 6, 7, 8 Mediacy, 241

Mediate cognition, 240, 243 Mediate knowledge, 240, 242 Mediation, 89, 316, 321, 324, 337, 354 Memory, 163, 166, 178, 275, 294, 337,

339 Memory image, 175 Mercy, 151, 420 Merit, 151, 446 Mind-control, 322 Minerva Press, Madras, 91 Minimum postulation, 190;/. Miraculous powers, 40 Mirage, 284 Misra, 171 Mitabhdsitii, 55 mithya, 71, 72, 81, 213 yiithydtvdnumdna-khandana, 64 Mitra Misra, gn. Mimamsakas, 323 Mimamsa, 28, 76, 102, 129, 161, 164,

169, 170, 228, 321, 322, 377 .\Iimdmsd-sutra, 2, 3, 5, 321 Mimdmsd-sdstra, 322 moksa, 109, 122, 315, 336, 347, 376 Molulakota, 372 Momentary, 256 Monism, 60, 221, 222, 362 Monist, 63, 71, 84, 86, 91, 194, 212,

213, 362 Monistic, 32, 33, 84, 229 Moral virtues, 434 Morality, 9 Moslem, 371, 385 Movement, 42 mrdi ghatavat, 46

467

mrtyuratyanta-vismrtih, 49

MudgalSnanda-tirtha, 87

mukhya, 149

Muktdndm ca na hlyante tdratamyam

ca sarvadd, 318 n. Muktavali, 195 n. mukti, 99, 347, 427, 428, 429 mukti-yogya, 155 Mukunda, 386, 387 Mukunda Datta, 386, 387 Mukundamuktdratndvali - stotra - tlka,

394 Multiplicity, 79 mumuksutva, no, 143 Mundaka, 89, 134, 135 Mundaka-upanisad-bhdsya, 55, 90 Mundakopanisad-bhdsya-tikd, 90 Mundakopanisad-bhdsya-tikd-tippani,

90 Mundakopanisad-bhasya-vydkhyd, 90 Muralidhara, 373, 380 MurSri, 170, 171 n., 387 Murarigupta, 384, 385, 386 Murari Mahiti, 388 Murari Misra, 171 Mutual negations, 302 Murti-pujana-vdda, 379 Mysore, 52 Mystic feeling, 3 Mystical, 3

nacarirala - lagna-iankd-dhdrah anu-

bhuyate, 194 naimittika, 417 naiskarmya-nimitta, 424 Naiyayikas, 219, 225, 330, 342, 369 Nanda Misra, 438 Nandi-tirtha, 54 Narahari, 91, 92, 383 Narahari-tirtha, 51, 56, 91, 93 Narapandita, 65 Narasirnha, 101 Narasimha-nakha-stotra, 89 ' Narasirnha Yati, 90 Narasirnhacarya, 1, 64 na sat tan ndsad ity ucyate, 361 Nasik, 372, 388 Navadvipa, 377, 386 Navadvipa Jagannatha Misra, 385 Navaratna, 373, 376 Nawab of Gaur, 394 Nagaraja Ssarma, 65 n. Ndma-candrikd, 377, 380 ndmadheya, 82 ndma-vikalpo, 183

Ndmdrtha-suddhikd, 438

Narada, 155

Ndrdyana, 38, 57, 61, 71, 102, no, 132

NSrayana Bhatta, 52, 53, 54, 64

Narayana-tlrtha, 90

Narayani, 395

Ndrdyanopanisad-bhdsya-tipparii, 5 5

Ndtaka-candrikd, 438

Negation, 150, 155, 208, 209, 211, 212,

213, 214, 222, 223, 225, 226, 229,

240, 259, 260, 261, 266, 269, 270,

273. 3°2, 305, 306, 307, 309, 342 Negation of ignorance, 20 Negation of knowledge, 267, 268, 269 Negation-precedent, 272, 273, 276,

278 Negation-precedent-to-Brahma-know-

ledge, 270 Negation-precedent-to-production,

239, 263, 264, 277, 303, 342 Negative inference, 196 Negative instances, 223 Nibandha, 373 Nibandha-prakdsd, 2, 379 Nibandha-tippana, 346 Nimbarka, 384 nididhydsana, 103 nigamana, 345 nihsaktika, 391 nimitta, 21, 327 nimittakdrana, 348, 361, 403 nirdkdra, no Nirbhayarama, 381, 382 n. nirguna, 29, 71, 126, 348, 353, 418, 419 nirguna brahma, 125 nirnaya, 196 Nirnaydrnava, 375 Nirodha-laksana, 373, 380, 381 Nirukta, 122 nirupddhika, 299 nirupddhikestarupatvdt, 306 nirvikalpa, 183, 338 nirvikalpa pratyaksa, 183 nirvisaya, 10

nirvisesa, 18, 114, 363, 369, 370, 390 nirviiesam cid-vastu, 402 nirvisesatva, 304 nirvydpaka, 200 niicaya, 338, 339 niscaydtmikd buddhi, 158 nisedhasya tdttvikatve advaita-hdnih,

205 nifkdma, 58 niskdmatva, 318 n. nisphald, 163

Index

nifiddha, 151

nitya, 14, 170, 203, 417

ttitya-jndna, 336

nitya-mukta, 313

Nityasvarupa Brahmacari, i8n.

nitya-tad-asrayatva-tac-che$atva-

mbandhanah, 20 ttityatva, 442

Nityananda, 386, 387, 393, 395, 448 nitydnitya-viveka, 109 niyama, 122, 354, 424 niyata, 190 niyata guru, 316 niyaft, 39, 44 Nilakantha, 38 Nilambara Chakravarti, 385 Non-being, 204, 205, 302, 304 Non-cognizability, 311 Non-contradiction, 226, 228 Non-eternal, 151 Non-eternity, 303 Non-existent, 63, 81, 82, 211, 212,

214, 215, 222, 224, 231, 250, 251,

256, 302 Non-expressibility, 186 Non-illusory, 250 Non-injury, 3, 10, 28 Non-luminous, 68 Non-material, 16 Non-objectivity, 310 Non-perception, 191, 274 Non-perceptual, 233 Non-self, 27, 229, 248 Non-sensible, 194 Non-spatial, 16 Non-stealing, 28 Non-validity, 75 North India, 383 Notion, 118 Nrhari, 56, 448 Nrsimha, 62 Nrsimha-bhiksu, 90 Nrsimha-nakha-stotra, 55 Nrsimha-tirtha, 64 Nrsimha^rama, 179 Nydsadesa, 377

Nydsadesavivarana-prabodha, 377 Nyaya, 143, 167, 173, 183, 195 n., 196,

200, 202, 203, 285, 325, 326, 330,

386 Nydya-bindu-ttkd, i66n., 167 n. Nydya-dlpabhava-prakasa, 60 Nydya-dipikd, 60, 94, 101 Nydya-kalpalatd, 64 Nydya-kalpalatd-vydkhyd, 64

Nydya kandatl, 176 n.

Nydya-kofa, 189 n.

Nydya-makaranda, 206

Nydya-manjarl, 64,183 n., 188 n., 195 n.

Nydya-mauktika-mdld, 64, 87, 101

Nydya-muktdvali, 64, 87

Nydya-ratndvatl, 64, 87, 438

Nydya-sudhd, 62, 94, 101, in, 112, 113, 116, 118, 121 n., 125 n., 126 n., I28n., 13071., 13m., 132*1., 143, 155, 156"., 160, 173 n., i74"-» 199 n., 200

Nydya-sudhd-parimala, 94, 112

Nydya-sudhd-tippara, 102

Nydya-sudhopanydsa, 62

Nydya-sutra, 176 n., 177 n., 188

Nydya-sutra-nibandha-pradlpa, 62

Nyaya-Vaisesika, 151, 160

Nydya-vdrttika, 176 n.

Nydya-vivarana, 55, 87, 88 n., 103

Nydy&dhva-dlpikd, 101

Nydydmrta, 63, 65, 105, 204, 2ion., 214-ti., 216, 220, 231, 232, 237H., 246 n., 248 n., 265, 266, 296, 310, 3i2 1 3i4n., 315*.

Nydyamrta-prakdsa, 223 n., 246 n.

Nydydmrta-tarangirii, 209 n.

nyunddhika-vrtti, 197

Object-cognition, 277

Object-forms, 235, 237, 246

Objective, 417

Obligatory, 417

Obligatory duties, 415

Occasional, 417

odana, 133ft.

Omnipotent, 326, 411

Omniscience, 43, 237, 244, 290, 326,

347 Omkara, 63

Orissa, 51, 384, 386, 447 Otherness, 222

Pada-ratndvali, 1 pada-sakti, 155 paddnumdna, 326 paddrtha, ison. Paddrtha-candrikd, 64 Paddrtha-dlpikd, 59 Paddrtha-nirnaya, 328 Paddrtha-samgraha, 156 n., I57n.,

160 Padmandbha, 56, 157 n., 448 Padmanabhacarya, C. M., Life of

Madhvdcdrya, 54 n., 94

469

Padmanabhasura, 54 Padmanabha-tlrtha, 56, 60, 64, 65, 87,

91. 92, 93. 94, 155 Padma-purdna, 36 n. Padma-tlrtha, 54, 91 Padydvali, 394 Pain, 182, 357 Pamparanya, 371 Panihati, 388 Panorama of illusions, 49 Pantheistic, 39 paOca-jandh, 137 Panca-pddikd-vivarana, 109, 123 n M

276 n. Pancapddiya, 376, 380, 381 Paficaratra, 7, 9, 37, 44, 57, 75, 93,

128n., 145, 334, 355 Paficaratra dgamas, 36 Pancama-skandha-tikd, 2 PancaSikha, 38, 39 n. Panclkarana-prakriyd-vivarana, 55 Panjikd, 62

Pandita Jagadananda, 387 para, 16 n. Parabhuti, 383 Parakala Yati, 95, 97, 99 param, 11

parama-premdspada, 123 parama-purufa, 14, 13011. parama-purufdrthatd, 14 Paramarsi, 39 parama-sukha-rupatva, 14 Paramananda Gupta, 385 Paramananda Puri, 385, 388 paramdrtha, 69, 351 Paramdrtha-sandarbha, 394 Paramatman, 11, 12, 14, 20, 21,

22, 23, 150, 155, 365, 396, 402,

403, 404, 405, 420, 424, 427, 428,

430 paramdtma-parindma eva, 22 Paramdtma-sandarbha, 402 paramdtma-prakrti, 316 paramesvara, 11, 400, 409 parampard-krama, 160 paraspara-parihdrenaiva vartate, 197 parasparanupravesat tattvdndm, 30 paratah-apramanya, 172 paratah-prdmdnya, 171 paratastvd-numdna, 173 Paratattvanjana, 380 pardmdyd, 16 n. pardnurakti, 349 pardnuraktir isvare, 349 pardrtha, 202, 334

pard-sakti, 390

parindma, 22, 164, 406, 407, 443

parindma-hetutvam tal-laksanam, 333

parindminl, 156

parifpanda, 40, 132/1.

parisefa, 184, 187

Parisifta, 381

parokfa, 234, 240, 278, 339

parokfa-ity-akara, 312

parokfa-jfidna, 233

paropakdrdya, 5

Particularity, 150

Partless, 327, 362

paryavasita-sddhya-vydpakatve sati

sddhandvydpaka upddhih, 199 n. Passions, 409 pascima, 432 Patanjali, 28, 35 n., 36 Patrdvalambana, 373 Pandavas, 89 Panduraiiga, 64, 372 Pandya, 383 Pdnini, 307 papa, 151

paramarthika, 69, 116 pdrdmdrthikatvd-kdrena atyantdbhd-

vah, 109 pdramparayd, 189 pdrdrthya, 39 n. pdrdrthyam, 39 n. Pasupata, 7, 8, 52, 139 Patanjala, 36 Perception, 77, 181, 194, 197, 216,

222, 223, 228, 257, 345 Perceptual experience, 341 Permanent, 83 Perpetual immediacy, 210 Persians, 93 p/w/a, 353, 357 phala-rupa, 353 phala-sannydsa, 424 phala-vydpyatva, 216, 310 Phdlguna, 385 phenataranga-nydya, 141 n. Phenomenal self, 31 Philosophy, 314, 384, 390 Photo-phobia, 282 Physical love, 431 Physiological, 431, 436 Pillar, 178 pisdcas, 66 Pltambara, 379

Pltambaraji Maharaja, 373, 374 Pleasure, 182, 357 Plurality, 19, 94

30-3

Index

Pointed fruition, 317

Poona, 56

Positive ignorance, 274

Positive entities, 206

Positive veil, 276

Possibility, 194

Posterior knowledge, 211

Postures, 88

Power, 42, 43, 150, 153; three-fold, of

God, 13 Prabhanjana, 377 Prabhakaras, 371., 4, 74, 162 n., 167,

169, 171 n. Prabhasa, 372 Prabhavisnusvamin, 383 Prabodhini, 1 Practical behaviour, 231 Practical efficiency, 206, 252 pradhdna, 398, 404, 414 Pradlpa, 381 Pradyumna, 38, 155, 313 n., 314 n.,

402 Pradyumna Misra, 388 Pradyumna-vyuha, 27 Pragmatic experience, 217 Prahlada, 349 Prajna-tirtha, 52 Prajna, 315 n. prakarana, 98 Prakarana-pancikd, 162 prakdrata, 170

Prakdsa, 1, 59, 192, 346, 374, 379 Prakasananda, 276, 388, 389 Prakasatman, 94, 104, 117 prakrtdvayavddi-nisedhi-paratvdt, 312 prakrti, 12, 13, 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,

3i» 32, 34. 35. 37. 4°. 42, 44. 4°. 47, 49, 66, 68, 134, 135, 136 n., 137, 155, 156, 159. 313, 314, 315, 3i6, 317, 327, 33i. 335, 373, 399, 402, 410, 412, 413, 425,440; categories, evolution of, 35; idea of, in Vifnu-purdna and Bhdgavata-purdna, 34

prakrti-laya, 407

prakrti-stuS, 313 n.

pralaya, 47, 141, 219, 318

pramd, 166, 167, 337

Pramd-laksana, 50, 64, 160, 184, 187

pramdna, 37, 77, 96, 116, 160, 162, 163, 165, 167, 181, 188, 189, 196, 202, 212, 270, 281, 318, 337, 341,

344. 345, 346. 358 pramdna-bddhitdrthaka prasanga, 189 Pramdna-candrikd, 165, 187 n., 188 n. pramdna-jndna, 276

Pramdna-paddhati, 64, 160, 165, 178,

182, 186, 196, 202 pramdna-phala, 167 Pramdna-vdda-rahasya, 170 n. pramdna-vrtti, 279 pramdna-vydpdra, 166 n. pramdndntara-vedya, 199 prameya, 115, 160 Prameya-dipikd, 61, 94 Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda, 166 n., 167 Prameya-muktdvali, 101 prameya-pltala, 346 Prameya-ratna-mdld, 447 Prameya-ratndrnava, 375 Prameya-ratndvati, 438*1., 447 prameyatva, 152 pranaya, 356, 433 n. prapanca, 328 Prapanca-mithydtvdnumdna-khandatia,

55, 65 Prapanca-sdra-bheda, 380 Prapaiica-vdda, 360, 381 prapafico mithyd, 213 Prasthdna-ratndkara, 330, 337, 339 n.,

340, 343 Prasna, 1, 90 prasnikd, 65

Prasnopanisad-bhdsya, 55, 90, 154 Prasnopanisad-bhdsya-tlka, 90, 94 Prasnopani$ad-bhdsya-tikd-tippana, 90 Prasnopamfad-bhdsya-tippdm, 55 pratarana-sdstra, 348 Prataparudra, 386, 388, 393, 394, 395 pratibandha, 357 pratibandhi-kalpand, 190 n. pratibhdsika, 300 pratibimba, 150 Pratibimba-vdda, 352, 379 pratijnd, 345 prati-pannopddhu traikdlika-nisedha-

pratiyogitvam, 204 pratlti, 118 pratya-bhijfid, 162 pratyaksa pramdna, 341 pratyaksa-yogya, 201 pratyanumdna, 326 pravrtti, 166 prdg-abhdva, 155, 206, 209, 223, 239,

272, 303. 342, 379 prdgabhdva-pratiyogitva, 223 prdkatya-pratibandha, 289 prdmdnya, 168 prdmdnya-bhrama, 168 prdmdnya-niscayasya-pravartakatvam,

173

471

/>rd«tf, 37, 40, 41, 132, 135, 136, 148,

331, 399 prdnatva, 137 prdndydma, 28 prdrabdha, 88, 433 prdrdbdha-karma, 317, 365, 418 Prdrthandratndkara, 379 prdtibhdsika, 120 prdtisviki, 159 Precedent-negations, 379 prema, 351, 355, 356, 430, 433, 435,

437

Premalaksana-candrikd, 351

Premarasdyana, 351

Prema-vilasa, 385

Premdmrta, 373

Premdmrta-bhdsya, 377

Pre/tiendusdgara, 394

Pride, 29

/>rlfc, 427, 428, 431

Prltisandarbha, 394, 427, 432

Probability, 178, 194

probandum, 184

Production, 143

Progressive Press, Madras, 9 m.

projjhita, 10

Proposition, 272

prthaktva, 180

pumdmsah, 39 n.

Punjab, 372

Pundarlka Vidyanidhi, 385

Purdnas, 5, 15, 16, 36, 66, 386, 389

purdnic, 18

Pure bliss, 307, 401

Pure consciousness, 213, 216, 231, 237, 239, 244, 246, 254, 257, 258, 263, 265, 277, 279, 283, 284, 285, 286, 289, 291, 292, 296, 297, 299, 300, 309. 3". 3i6, 403, 409

Pure experience, 48

Pure intelligence, 125

Pure self, 238, 299

Purity, 9, 378

Purity of heart, 354

Puri, 372, 383, 387, 389, 390, 394

Puri Caitanya, 388

purusa, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39, 40. 45, 47, 48. 136, 316, 334, 335

purusdrtha, 351

Purusottama, 2, 322 n., 327 n., 330, 336, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 346, 3Si, 355, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365 n., 366 n., 373, 374, 375, 377, 379, 380, 381, 386, 393, 448

Purusottamadeva, 393

Purusottamaji Maharaja, 374 Purusottama-tlrtha, 56 Puskara, 372 pusti-bhakti, 359, 378 pusti-mdrga, 352, 367, 368, 377 pustimdrge varanam eva sddhanam, 354 Pusti-pravdha-maryddd, 355, 374, 375,

376, 377, 379 Pusti-pravdha-maryaddbheda, 373 Pusti school, 354 Purnaprajfia, 54 purva, 432

Purva-mlmdmsd, 71, 325 Purva-mimdmsd-kdrikd, 373 purva-paksa, 14m. piirva-vijndna, 162 Psychical personality, 28

Qualified, 150 Qualities, 3, 96, 149, 153 Qualityless, 24, 296, 418

Raghunatha, 374, 375, 377, 380, 386,

387 Raghunatha Yati, 88 Raghupati Upadhyaya, 388 Raghuvarya-tirtha, 56 Raghuttama-tlrtha, 56, 61, 62, 87, 90,

101 Raivata, 372 rajas, 29, 31, 37, 40, 41, 44, 46, 156,

157, 317, 328, 334, 337, 338, 343,

370, 397, 400. 401, 4 ! 7 Rajatapithapura, 53 Rana-vrtti, 234 Rasa-maiijarl, 1 rasa-mdtra, 41 Rasdmrta, 394 Rasikananda Murari, 438 Rasmi, 380, 381 rati, 437

Ratiocination, 188 Rational, 3 ratydbhasa, 437 Ray, P. C, 36 n., 195 n. Radha, 387, 432 Radha Govinda Nath, 385 Radhananda, 438 rdga, 356, 433 n. rdgdnugd, 424, 426, 435 rdganugd-bhakti, 426, 435 rdgdtmikd-bhakti, 435 Raghavendra, 61, 87 Raghavendra-tlrtha, 62, 64, 65, 90,

168 n.

Index

Raghavendra Yati, 61, 62, 64, 90, 94,

no Rdjatlldndma, 373 Rajavisnusvamin, 383 Raj end ra, 448 rdkfasas, 66 Rama, 91, 327 Ramacandra-tirtha, 56, 62 Ramakrsna, 381 Rdmanavamlmrnaya, 377 Ramacarya, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217,

219, 222, 225 Ramadvaya, 239 Ramli, 387

Ramananda, 8, 391, 392 Ramananda Ray, 386, 388, 389, 394,

395 Ramananda-tlrtha, 2 Ramlnuja, 1, 17, 18, 19, 20, 53, 94, 95,

96, 98, 321, 324, 326, 327, 350, 367,

413, 447 Rdmdyana, 57, 59, 75 Rame^waram, 53, 371, 394 Ramkell, 394

Rdmottara-tdpanlya-bhdfya, 55 Rao, S. Subba, 54 n. Rdsapaiicddhydya, 373 Rdsapancddhydyl-prakdsa, 373 Rdsasarvasva, 377 Real, 68, 69, 120, 213 Reality, 17, 18, 19, 26, 28, 33, 34, 94,

210, 225, 230, 404 Reality of falsehood, 207 Reason, 102, 185, 186 Rebirth, 86, 347 Recognition, 339

reductio ad absurdum, 185, 186, 187 Reduction, 184, 186 Reflection, 2, 339 Relation of consciousness, 236 Relative existence, 214, 251 Relative reality, 210 Religious duties, 29, 75 Religious fervour, 3 Renunciation, 356 Residue, 141 Reva, 372 Revelation, 123 Rhetoric, 432 Right inference, 228 Right knowledge, 178, 218, 249, 340 Ritual process, 420 Ritualistic worship, 88 Rituals, 3 Rohinl, 186

Roo, P. Ramchandra, 54*1. Root-cause, 143 Root-desires, 45 Root-impressions, 253, 257, 258, 274,

275, 284 Rope-snake, 300 Round square, 186 ruci-bhakti, 442 Rudra, 135, 447 Rudra Bhafta, 53 rudhi, 112

Rupa, 394, 433, 447 Rupa GosvamI, 437; treatment of

bhakti, 432 rupa-tanmatra, 27, 35, 41 rddhi, 378 n. Rg-artha-cuddmani, 89 Rg-artha-manjafl, 89 Rg-arthoddhdra, 89 Rg-bhd§ya, 54, 89 Rg-bhdfya-tlkd, 94 Rgveda-brahma-pancikd, 64 n. Rg-yajuh-sdmdtharvas ca bhdratam,

I28n. TJu-yogin, 181

saccid-dnanda isvara, 12

Sacrifices, 2, 4, 71

Sacrificial, 322

sadasad-vilaksana, 72, 116, 117, 118

Saddcdra-smrti, 58, 88

Saddcdra-smrti-vydkhyd, 88

Saddcdra-stuti-stotra, 56

sad-dgama, 75

Sadananda, 377

sadd-prdpta-sarva-gunam, 145

sad-vilaksanatvena, 117, 261

sad-viviktatvam, 212

sa eva ksobhako brahman ksobhyas ca

purufottamah, 35 Sagacity, 151 Sagara, 38

saguna, 71, 125, 348, 353, 419 sahaja-sakti, 155, 168 sahakdfi, 329, 339 Sahasrdkfa, 377 Sahasrarci, 383 Sahasra-ndma, 438 Saint, 99

Sakaldcdrya-mata-samgraha, 382 Sakar Malik, 394 sakdma, 424 sakdma-bhakti, 424 sakhya, 392 Salvation, 88

473

samavdya, 153, 182, 183, 231, 327,

330, 34i» 348, 369 samavdyi, 183, 327, 361 samavdyi-kdrana, 328, 329, 330, 361 samavdyitve vikrtatvasydpatteh, 328 samavrtti, 197 samaya-bandha, 115 Samaya-pradlpa, 377 samasti-jlvdntarydml, 402 sambandhdnugd, 435 samuhdlambana-buddhi, 338 Sam vara Dasa, 438 samvit, 390, 440 n. samvit-sakti, 393 sambhava, 202 sambhdvand, 178 Samhitopanisad-bhdsya, 56 Samhitopanisad-bhdfya-tippani, 56 samkalpa, 98, 158, 336, 337 Samkarfana, 27, 38 sanikoca-vikdsdbhyam, 34 Samkfepa Bhdgavatdmrta, 394 samsdra, 28, 66, 120, 138, 362, 429,

447 sarnskdra, 336, 337, 343 sarnskdra-mdtra-jamnanah, 166 samskdra-patana, 163 samskdras, 61, 165 samsaya, 168, 176, 336, 338 samslista, 66 Samvidananda, 53 samyag-jndna, 117 samyoga, 153 samiaya-dhdrd, 190 Sanaka, 447

Sandtana, 2, 386, 389, 394, 438, 447 Sandal paste, 20 sandhim, 13, 390, 440 n., 446 sartrtydsa, 9, 356 Sannydsa-nirnaya, 356, 373, 375, 380,

381 Sonnydsa-nirnaya-vivarana, 377 Sannydsa-paddhati, 55 Sarmydya-ratndvati, 73, 151 Sannydya-dlpikd, 64 Sanskrit, 384, 390 Sanskrit literature, 94 sariga-siddha, 423 sanketita, 114 Sanjaya, 386 saptabhangi, 97

Sarva-darsana-samgraha, 190*1. sarva-desa-kdla-sambandhi-nifedha-

pratiyogitvam sattvam, 224, 225 Sarvajna-sukti, 12 n.

Sarvajnatmamuni, 329 Sarvanirnaya, 346, 358 Sarvanirnaya-prakarana, 374 Sarva-samvddinl, 16, 18 n., 22 n. sarvatra tadtyatva-jndndrthah, 442 sarvatra traikdlika-nifedha pratiyogi-

tvam, 206, 207 sarvdrtha vifayakam, 181 sarva-sattva, 141 sarvdtma-bhdva, 352 sarvdtmaka, 130*1. Sarvottamastotra, 377, 380 Sarvottamastotra-tippana, 373 5af, 74, 120, 149, 205, 331, 362, 405 sat-kdrya-vdda, 119, 142, 361, 406 sat-sanga, 422 ia«ua, 31, 40, 46, 157, 3*7, 328, 334,

337. 354, 397, 4°o, 401, 436 sattva-gunas, 44, 343, 358 sattvd-prakdraka-pratiti-visayatdbhd-

vdt, 212 sattva-sdmdnyasyaiva ananglkdrdt, 117 sattva-Vaikuntha, 397 sattvdbhdvdvya tirekdt, 116 sattd-sdmdnya, 117 satya, 9, 11, 71, 73 Satyabodha-tirtha, 56 Satyadharma Yati, 157 n. Satya-dharma-tippana, 64 Satyadhrti, 383 Satyakama-tlrtha, 56 satyam, 414

satyam jndnam anantam brahtna, 125 Satyanatha-tirtha, 56 Satyanatha Yati, 62, 64 Satyanidhi-tirtha, 56 Satyaparayana-tirtha, 56 Satyaprajna, 52 Satyaprajna-bhiksu, 60 Satyaprajfia-tirtha, 56, 64, 91 Satyapurna-tlrtha, 56 Satyasannidhana-tirtha, 56 Satyasara-tirtha, 56 Satya-tirtha, 91 Satyavara-tlrtha, 56 Satyavati Pandita, 383 Satyavijaya-tirtha, 56 Satyavit-tirtha, 56 Satyavrata-tlrtha, 56 Satyabhinava-tirtha, 1 Satyabhinava Yati, 59 Satyesti-tirtha, 56 saundarya, 151 Saurasfra, 52 savikalpa, 183

Index

savis'esa, 363

sddhakatama, 167

sadhana, 161, 346, 347, 353, 354, 357,

433

sddhana-bhakti, 433, 434, 435, 437, 441

Sddhana-paddhati, 394

sddhana-rupa, 353

sddhandnumdna 201

sddhdrana dharma, 177

sddhya, 184,185, 344

sddhya-bliakti, 434, 435

sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam, 185

sddrs'ya, 150, 151, 182

sddrsyddi-sahakrtendriydrtha-samsar-gajanya, 339

sdhacarya-niyama, 185, 186, 187

Sdhitya-K.aum.udi, 438

sdhya, 95

sdjujya, 355

Sdksdtpurusottamavdkya, 373

sdksi, 33, 114, 159, 168, 173 263, 282, 307

saAsi-consciousness, 263, 266, 268, 269, 270, 274, 275, 281, 290, 291, 292, 298, 306, 307

Saksigopala, 387

sdksi-jnana, 158

sdksindriya, 158

Sdlikandtha, 162 n.

sdlokya-moksa, 318

sdmagrl, 167, 172

Saman, 128

sdmdnddhikaranya, 185, 187

sdmdnya, 150, 211, 303

sdmdnydbhdva, 273

sum any aj nana, 358

sdmdnyato-drsta, 201

sdmdnya-pratyd satti, 225

sdmdnyena laksitam tathaiva sphurat, 396

sdmipya, 318

Sdmipya-moksa, 318

Sarnkhya, 24, 26, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 4i. 44. 45, 47, 130, 136, 137, 138, 139, 143. 176, 327, 342, 398, 433". Ahirbudhnya description of, 37; Ahirbudhnya and Sasti-tantra, 36-7; Asvaghosa's account of, 32 «.; categories of, 24-5; difference between the Bhdgavata and classical schools, 32; diversity in the enumeration of categories, 30-1; in fJJtd and Ahirbudhnya, 45; God in, place of, 36; God :md prakrti, 26; Kapila in relation to, 38; as described in

Mdthara-vrtti, 39; monistic intei-

pretation of, 33; schools of, 36, 45-7 Sarnkhya categories, 32, 36 n. Sarnkhya God, 46 Sdmkhya-kdrikd, 36, 39, 45 Sdmkhya-pravacana-sutra, 344 sdmkhydnumdna, 327 Samkhyist, 328, 442 Sdrdrtha-darsinl, 1 sdrsti, 318, 430 n. sdrsti-moksa, 318 sdrupya, 318 Sarvabhauma Bhattacarya, 385, 387,

389 sdttvika, 29, 41, 337 Scorpion, 371 Scriptural, 99 Scriptural command, 3 Scriptural injunctions, 3 Scriptural testimony, 227, 229 Scriptural texts, 76, 81, 248, 252 Scriptures, 36, 114, 337 Seal, Dr, 36 n., 195 n. Seer, 85 Self, 31, 48, 49, 68, 84, 105, 129, 217

248, 260, 291, 299, 323, 335, 353,

360 Self-advancement, 28 Self-completeness, 42, 43 Self-concentration, 418 Self-consciousness, 20, 360 Self-contentment, 437 Self-contradictory, 265, 289, 361 Self-control, 10, 28, 316, 322 Self-creation, 362 Self-creative, 348 Self-dependence, 236 Self-determination, 412 Self-determined thought, 42 Self-determiner, 414 Self-discipline, 316 Self-enjoying, 99, 367, 436 Self-enjoyment, 99, 367 Self-evolving energy, 44 Self-experience, 84 Self-interest, 423 Self-knowledge, 11, 336 Self-love, 295

Self-luminosity, 288, 289, 414, 415 Self-luminous, 69, 237, 247, 248, 291,

295, 310, 335 Self-luminous consciousness, 277 Self-luminousness, 68 Self-luminous principle, 289 Self-purification, 29

475

Self-revealing, 106, 215, 216

Self-shining, 24

Self-subsistent, 233

Self-validity, 168, 169, 173, 174

Selves, 58

Sense-characteristics, 337

Sense-cognition, 342

Sense-contact, 172, 174, 182

Sense-data, 158

Sense-evidence, 227

Sense-experience, 239

Sense-faculties, 41, 343

Sense-faculty, 341

Sense-gratification, 7

Sense-knowledge, 159, 182, 219, 337

Sense-object, 341

Sense-operation, 343

Sense-organ, 158, 193, 233

Sense-powers, 419

Sense-qualities, 341

Sense-relation, 257

Senses, 3, 337

Sensible, 194

Sensory , 28

Service, 351

Sesa-vdkydrtha-candrikd, 62

Sesacarya, 62

sevd, 351, 422

Sevakaumudi, 377

Sevdphala, 357, 358, 374, 375, 380, 381

Sevdphala-stotra, 373

Sevdphala-vivrti, 355

sevopayogi deha, 355

Sex-attractions, 10

Sex-love, 426

Sex-restriction, 10

Shame, 151, 339

Shell-silver, 308

siddha-prakdsa-lopah, 288

Siddhapura, 372

Siddhddvaita-mdrtanda, 381

siddhdnta, 141 n.

Siddhdnta-muktdvali, 373, 374, 375,

376, 377, 379, 380, 381 Siddhdnta-rahasya, 373, 374, 376 Siddhdnta-ratna, 19 n., 438,439,445 n.,

446 n., 447 Siddhanta Unnahini Sabha, 91 Silver, 120, 359, 414 Silver-appearance, 81, 238 Silver-illusion, 250, 251, 260, 261 Silversmith, 249 Similarity, 150 Sirnhesvara, 388 Sindh, 372

Sinful, 4

Sins, 420

Sita, 91

Skanda, 133 n.

Skanda-purdna, 122

Skanda-purand, Revdkhanda, 416 n.

Skanda-tirtha, 388

skandhas, 346

" Sketch of the religious sects of the

Hindus", 54 n. Smoke, 191, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200,

299, 344

smrti, 5, 6, 78, 163, 166, 321, 338, 339, 346, 425; relation to Vedic injunction, 5

smrti literature, 4, 433

Smrti-sdra-samuccaya, 56

smrti-sile ca tad-viddm, 7

smrti texts, 7

Smrti-vivarana, 56

Snake, 72

sneha, 318, 351, 356, 433

Sneha-puraifl, 1

Solar light, 399

Solar sphere, 49

somaydgas, 371, 372

sopddhika, 300

sopddhikatvdt, 123

Souls, 49, 132, 155, 179, 285, 317

South India, 91, 371

South Kanara, 52

Southern w r ay, 49

Space, 168, 182

Space-relations, 184, 293

sparsa-tanmatra, 35, 41, 42

Spatial coexistence, 187

Spatial limitation, 220

Special virtue, 126

Specious arguments, 84

sphuratl, 106

Spiritual, 42

Spiritual law, 3

Spontaneity, 42

srsti, 122

Srstibhedavdda, 362 n., 379

staimitya-rupa, 42

Stava-mdla, 394, 438

sthdyi-bhdva, 352, 353

sthiti, 39 n., 122

Stirling, Mr, 394

Strength, 42, 151

Subha Rao, 91

Sub-concept, 179

Sub-conscious, 178, 305

Subject, 160, 286

Index

Subject-object forms, 42

Subject realization, 172

Subjective ignorance, 417

Subodhini, 1, 2, 24 n., 346, 358, 373,

374. 379, 382 SubodhinJ-bodhini, 380 SubodhinJ-lekha, 373, 375, 380 SubodhinJ-prakdsa, 379 Subodhini-tipparS, 379 SubodhinJ-yojana-nibandha-yojana, 373 SubodhinJ-yojana-nibandha-yojana Se-

vdkaumudi, 375 Subsistence, 231 Substance, 3, 96, 150, 153, 213 Substratum, 224, 283 Sudar£ana Pandita, 386 Sudarsana Suri, 1 sudarsanatd, 42 Sudha, 101

sukha-niyato-rdgah, 349 Sumatlndra-tirtha, 62 Sun, 28 Supra-logical, 17, 18, 19, 22, 401, 409,

410, 439, 442 Supra-rational, 410, 412, 428 surabhi-candana, 114 SuresVara, 94, 275 Surottama-tlrtha, 169, 172 n. Suvarna-sutra, 363, 365 n., 366, 367,

379 suksma, 438, 439, 440, 442 suksmdvasthd-laksana-tac-chaktih, 405 surya-marga, 52 sutra, 138, 148, 325 svabhdva, 31, 47, 333, 334 Svabhu, 371 svacchanda-cinmaya, 42 sva-dharma-vartitva, 9 sva-gata, 160 sva-jndna-purvakam, 439 sva-kriyd-vydghdtah, 190, 191 Svapnesvara, 350 n. sva-prakdraka-vrtti-visayatvam eva

drsyatvam, 216 svaprakdia, 106, 309, 436 svaprakdsatvena bhdvayogdt, 106 sva-rasika-visvdsasydvasyakatvdn na

sarvata sanka, 194 svarga, 333 Svarga-khanda, 36 n. svarupa, 11, 119, 124, 332, 410 svarupasthhitaya eva saktyd, 396 svarupa-bhutam, 158 svarupa-bhuta-iakti, 1 7 svarUpa-bhutdh, 151, 158

Svarupa Damodara, 384 svarupa-lakfana, 123, 422 svarQpa-matih, 158 svarupa-mdya, 314 Svarupa-nirnaya-ttkd, 56 svarupa-siddha, 423 Svarupasimha, 377 svarupasya sva-vedyatvdt, 124 svarupa-iakti, 15, i6n., 21, 22, 398, 400 svarQpa-iaktyd nanda, 431 svarupa-saktydvifkdrana, 410 svarupatah, 439 svarupa-yogyatd, 357 svarupananda, 431 svarupena, 207 svatah-prdmdnya, 168, 171 svatantra, 150*1., 181 svatantrd bhivyaktimattvam kila kdr-

yatvam, 443 Svatantrdlekhana, 377 Svayambhu, 371 svdbhdvika, 398 svdbhdviki, 431 Svaminyastaka, 373 Svdmi-stotra, 377 svdrtha, 201 svdrtha-paricchitti, 166 svatyantd-bhavd-dhikarane eva pratt-

yamanatvam, 210 svopdkhyah kascid dharmah, 217 Sylhet, 395 Syllogism, 200 Sahara, 2

Sabara-bhdfya, 3*1. sabda, 176

iabda-tanmatra, 27, 35, 41 Sad Devi, 385 Saivaism and Minor Religious Systems,

Si

Saiva Sdstra, 57

iafoz, 13, 37, 39, 41, 43. 44, 150, 153, 323

saktimdn, 13

satna, 10, 151

£ambhu, 371

£ankara, 17, 52, 53, 60, 93, 94, 101, 103, 108, 112, 113, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 175, 176, 179, 322, 325, 328, 341, 342, 348, 353, 359, 397, 447

£ahkara Vedanta, 158*1., 365

Sankara-vijaya, 56

£ahkarite, 16, 69, 70, 98, 116, 124, 125, 175, 204, 215, 218, 220, 221, 224,

477

Sahkarite (cont.)

228, 230, 231, 232, 237, 245, 256, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 271, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282, 289, 290, 293, 298, 299, 300, 304, 3°S, 328, 361, 364, 369, 373, 377, 391

iankd, 191

iankd-nivrtti-dvdra, 193

Sankha-cakra-dhdrana-vdda, 379

sarandgati, 425

sarandpatti, 425

iarirasya visesa-vrttih, 39*1.

Sarma, Nagaraja, 54 n.

Satailoka-tikd, 56

Satananda, 53

iauca, 9, 151

saury a, 151

idlagrdma hid, 371

sdnta, 392, 432

Santi, 313*1.

Santipur, 386, 387, 395

sdnto ddnto, 322

Sandilya, 350

Sdndilya-iutra, 350, 380

Sdndilya-sutra-bhakti, 349, 350

Sdstra-dipikd, 3«.

sdstras, 52, 92, 128, 151, 321, 346

sdstrayonitvdt, 325, 326

Sdstrdrthanirupana, 346

Sdstrdrtha-prakarana, 374

Sdstrdrtha-prakarana-nibandha, 380

Sikhi Mahiti, 388

Siksddasaka, 394

Siksdpdtra, 380, 381

Siva, 52

Stla, 8; Medhatithi on, 7

Sobhana Bhafta, 53, 91, 92

sraddhd, 9, 350, 420

Srdddhdprakarana, 373

Srantanidhi, 383

srdvana, 103

Sri Caitanya, 448

Sri, i57n.

Srldevadasana, 383

Srldhara, 10, 11, 12, 26 n., 27 n., 46*1., 381, 382, 386, 387, 399, 405

Srldhara-svaml, 1

Sridhara Sarma, 373

Srlharsa, 115, 19m., 192, 194

Srikantha, 383

Srikanthagarbha, 383

Srikrsna, 447

Srikurma, 51

Srimad-bhdgavata, 31, 386

Sri Madhva and Madhvaism, 54 n.

Srtnatha, 2

SSrinStha Bhafta, 375

Srinivasa, 1, 59, 62, 64, 65, 87, 89, 90,

98, 101, 102, 178, 237, 246 Srinivasa Pandita, 386 Srlnivasa-tlrtha, 64, 90 Srlpadaraja, 62 Srlrama Pandita, 385 SSrlrarigam, 383, 388 S§rl-rupa, 389 SrI-rupa Gosvami, 388 Sri Sarvottama-stotra, 374 Srivasa, 387, 395 Srivasa Pandita, 385 sruti, 78, 86, 97, 121, 361, 363 Srutisdra, 373 Srngdra-rasa-mandana, 377 Srngeri Monastery, 53, 54 subhada, 433 Suddhd bhakti, 392 Suddhadvaita, 383 Suddhddvaita-mdrtanda, 377 Suddhddvaita-parikskdra, 381 suddho na bhdti, 105 sukapaksiya, 1 Suklambara, 387 Sudras, no sunya, 69, 70, 136, 3*2 sunyatva-rupini, 42 sunyavddins, 69 Svetdsvatara, 129 n. Svetdsvatara Upanisad, 38, 136, 137 Syamala, 381 Syamalal Gosvami, 13*1. Sydmasdstri, 92 Syamananda, 438 Sasti-tantra, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45; as

described in Ahirbudhnya, 39 Satpadi, 377 Sat-sandarbha, \zn., 13 n., 15 n., 2in.,

22 n., 346, 353"-. 380, 396 n., 400,

401, 402, 403, 404, 406, 408, 411,

412, 413. 415, 427 Sattattva, 56

Sodasa-grantha, 374, 375, 380 Sodasa-grantha-vivrti, 379

tacchesatdtmakaprabhdvenaivoddipta,

413 Tactile, 226

tad-avisaya -yogya tdtirobhdva ,366 tadvindna sthdtum asaktih, 356 tad-visayatvam eva taddkdratvam, 216 taijasa, 35, 41, 157, 315*1.

Index

taijasa-ahamkdra, 27, 36

Taittirlya Upanisad, 98, 131, 375, 381

Taittirlya-upanisad-bhdsya, 5 5

Taittiriya-sruti-vdrttika-tikd, 55

Talavakdra-bhdsya, 90

Talavakdra-bhdsya-tikd, 90

Talavakdra-khanddrtha-prakdsikd, 90

Talavakard-tippanl, 90

Jamas, 31, 37, 40, 156, 157, 328, 334,

342, 343, 37o, 397, 400, 414. 417 tanmdtras, 24, 31, 35, 37, 46, 147, 156 tantra, 39 n. Tantra-dlpikd, 61, 62 Tantra-sdra-mantroddhdra, 88 Tantra-sdra-samgraha, 55, 88 Tantra-sdrokta-pujdvidhi, 88 tantusu pata-samvdyah, 154 tapas, 9

Tarangini, 209, 211, 217, 222 tarfca, 188n. f 189, 190, 191, 192, 193,

194,195,196,199, 202, 203; as stated

by Vyasa-tlrtha, 196; in Madhva,

3rlhar?a and Vyasa-tlrtha on, 193-6 Tarka-bhdsya, 189 Tarka-dtpikd, 189 Tarka-tdndava, 168/1., 17m., 172/1.,

173 n., 184, 187, 192, 193, 194, 200 tarkas ca dvividho samsuya-parisodhako

vydpti-grdhakas ca, 195 n. tasmdd aikya-buddhydlambana-rupam

yat pratlyate, 404 Taste-potential, 35 tat tu samarrvaydt, 128, 328 tat Warn asi, 81, 397 tattva, 334 Tattva-ctntdmanl, 170, 171, 187, 195,

199/j. Tattvadlpana, 346, 347"-, 373 Tattva-dtpa-prakdsa, 351 tattva-jndna, 416 Tattva-muktdkaldpa, 95 Tattia-nirnaya, 168 Tattra-pradlpa, now. Tattva-pradipikd, 1, 179 Tattra-prakdsikd, 61, 62, 94, 101, 104,

122, 147 Tattva-prdkaiikd-bhdva-bodha, 1 o 1 Tattva-prakdiika-gata-nydya-vivarana,

101 Tattva-prakdsikd-tippani, 61 Tattva-prakdsikd-vdkydrtha-maujarl,

62 Tattva-samkhydna, 35, 64, 65, 66, 150,

157 Tattva-sandarbha, 14/1., 16, 18, 438

tattva-suddhi, 158, 218/1. tattvato-parindmah, 22 Tattva-viveka, 55, 64, 65 Tattvdrthadipa, 348, 374 n., 379 Tattvoddyota, 55, 64, 66, 69, 70n. tatastha, 124, 408, 410 tatastha-lakfana, 122, 124, 422 tatastha-sakti, 14, 21, 124, 393, 398,

408, 410, 421 tdddtmya, 107, 330, 340 tdmasa, 29, 35, 41, 156, 157, 275 tdmasa-ahamkdra, 27 tdmasa guna, 44

Tdmraparnl-srinivdsdcdrya, 60, 62, 90 tdrkikdbhimata-paramdnuto, 313 n. Tdtparya-bodhim, 59 Tdtparya-candrikd, 62, ioi, 104, 109,

112, 121, 122, 124, 129, 133/7., 134,

135, 138, 141, 143, 156 Tdtparya-candrikd-nydya-vivarana,

62 Tdtparya-candrikd-prakdsa, 62 Tdtparya-candrikoddharana-nydya-

vivarana, 62 Tdtparya-dipikd, 1 Tdtparya-dipikd-vydkhyd-nydya-dipa-

kirandvali, 60 Tdtparya-prakdsikd-bhdva-bodha, 61 Tdtparya-prakdsikd-gata-nydya-

vivarana, 61 Tdtparya-tlkd, in, 112/1., 166/1., 193 Tdtparya-tippam, 60 te/Vw, 31, 43, 92, 158, 373, 375 Telugu, 375 Telugu Brahmins, 371 Testimony, 202; Vyasa-tlrtha on, 203 Texts, 99 Theistic yoga, 34 Thought-activity, 41 Time, 26, 27/1., 31, 156, 182, 332 Time-moments, 26 Time-sense, 26 Time-units, 332 Timmanna Bhafta, 89 Timmannacarya, 62, 64, 101 tipparil, 93

tirobhdva, 340, 366, 367 titiksd, 151 Ttrtha, 380 fo/, 386

traikulika-bddhyatva, 255 Trar.scendant nature, 48 Transcendence of God, 88 Travancore, 388 Trinity doctrine, 93

479

Trirammalaya, 371

Trivandrum, 53

TrividJianamdvah, 381

Trivikrama, 52

Trivikrama Pandita, 54, 91, 101

Truth, 126, 224

Truthfulness, 28

Tuluva, 52

turlya, 315 n.

tusti, 39 n.

Udayana, 192, 196, 199, 326 Udaypur, 377 uddharana, 345 uddharanopanaya, 202 udbhuta-riipatvat, 243, 341 Uddhava, 45

Uddhavadasa Madhava, 388 Uddlwva-duta, 394 Uddyotakara, 176 n., i77"-» 178 Udipi, 52, S3, 93, 372 udvego, 257, 357 ujjvala. 433 "•

Ujjvala-nilamani, 394, 433". Ujjvala-mlamani-tikd, 394 Ujjvala-rasa-kand, 394 Ultimate cause, 315 Ultimate knowledge, 219 Ultimate reality, 427 Unconditional, 185 Unconditional antecedent, 340 Unconditional invariability, 97 Unconditioned, 378 Unfailing relation, 197, 198 Unhappiness, 4 Uniformity of nature, 195 Unity, 79, 125 Universal, 152, 221, 222 Universal body, 314 Universal coexistence, 191 Universal negation, 66 Universal sincerity, 354 Universe, 332 Unreal, 22

Upadesa-visaya-sankd-nirdsa-vdda, 379 Upadesdmrta, 394 Upadisasahasra-tlkd, 55 upajwaka, 77 upajlvya, 363 upalabdhi, 143, 166, 176 upamdna, 345 upamiti, 338 upanaya, 151, 345

Upanisads, 96, 97, 98, 122, 128, 129, 134. 139, 142, 14S. 179, 320, 321,

326, 363, 368, 369, 370, 382, 391,

414, 442 Upanisad-dlpika, 379 Upanisat-prasthdna, 55 upapatti-dosa, 202 updddna, 21,138, 328, 330 updddna-kdrana, 138, 150, 330, 341,

403 updddndmsa, 24 upddhi, 60, 70, 83, 85, 86, 95, 96, 147,

152, 193. 198, 199"-. 3SO, 37o Upddhi-khandana, 55, 64, 65 Upddhi-khandana-vydkhyd-vivarana,

64 upddheh pratibimba-paksapdtitvam, 287 updsand, 316, 323 Utility, 406 Utkala, 447 Utkalikd-vallart, 394 utsarga, 190 n. Utsava-pratdna, 379, 380 uttama, 433

uttama-madhyamddhama, 161 uttara, 432 Uttara-mimdmsd, 324 u/uz, 1 88 k. Crddhva-pundra-dhdrana-vdda, 379

Vacuity, 153

vahni-vydpya, 152 n.

vaidharmya, 180

vaidhi, 424, 425, 426, 435

vaidhi-bhakti, 424, 426, 435, 442

Vaidyanatha, 372

vaijdtya, i9on.

vaikdrika, 27, 41, 157

vaikdrika ahamkdra, 35, 41

Vaikuntha, 15, 313, 397, 398, 400

vaikunthddi-svarupa-vaibhava-rupena,

398" vailaksanya, 117 vairdgya, 40, in, 391, 417 vairdgya-misra, 353, 354

Vaisvdnara, 135

Vaisesika, 150, 151 n., 153, 176, 177,

325 Vaisesika Sutras, 176 n. Vaisnava-purdnas, 57 Vaisnava religion, 434

Vaisnavas, 17, 36, 98, 384, 393, 400,

401, 405, 407, 409, 432 Vaisnavism, 20, 388, 393, 400 Vaisnavism, Saivaism and Minor Religious Systems, 51, 54 n.

Index

VakreSvara, 386, 387

Valid, 161

Valid cognition, 276

Valid knowledge, 278

Validity, 75, 169, 171, 186, 253, 346

Validity of memory, 163

Vallabha, 1, 2, 320, 321, 322, 324, 327, 328, 329, 330, 346, 350, 351, 352, 355, 356, 357, 359, 361, 363, 367, 37i. 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 380, 381, 383, 384; bhakti its classification, 353; bhakti its fruits, 355; bhakti, obstacles to, 357; the concept of bhakti, 346 ff.; concept of bhakti compared with that of the Bhdga-vata-purdna and other literature, 346 ff.; Vallabha (Gopesvarjl) concept of bhakti, 350 ff.; his concept of pusti-bhakti, 354 \bhakti and the rasas, 352 ff.; method of the attainment of bhakti, 354; bhakti and the metaphysical doctrine of monism, 348-9; bhakti and prema, 355-6; disciples and works, 373 ff.; life of, 371; his opposition to monistic sannydsa, 356; his outlook of the Upanisads, 326; Vedanta categories according to > 332 ff.; Vedantic categories discussed and criticized, 332-6; interpretation of the Vedanta by his followers, 358 ff.; his view contrasted with that of Nyaya and Vijftana-bhiksu, 326-7; VisnusvamI, relation with, 382; as interpreted by Vifthala, 363 ff.

Vallabha (Purusottama), arthdpatti or implication, 345; causality, nature of, 341; distinction between instrument and cause, 340; doubt, 337-8; inference, 344—5; indeterminate and determinate knowledge, 337-8; right knowledge as perception and inference, 339-40; perceptual experience, 341—2; illusory perception, nature of, 343; doctrine of mdyd explained by, 330-1; pramdnas, treatment of, 336 ff.

Vallabha Bha«a, 388

Vallabha-dig-vijaya, 383 n.

Vallabha Gosvami's Prapanca-samsdra-bheda, 362

Vallabha-Misra, 386

Vallabhacarya, 2

Vallabhdstaka, 358, 374, 377, 380

Vanamall, 87

Variga, 91

Varadaraja, 59, 314

Vardhamana, 192, 193, 196, 393

varna, 150

vastutas tu iabdajanya-vrtti-vifayat-

vam eva driyatvam, 216 Vacaspati, 94, 104, 105, 107, 134, 193,

195, 220, 287, 288 vdcdrambhanam, 82 vdda, 65 Vadakatha, 381 Vdddvali, 359 n., 360, 362 n. Vadiraja, 62, 64, 87, 175 VadirajasvamI, 59 Vadlndra, 53 Vagbhafa, 53 Vaglsa-tlrtha, 56 vdk, 148

Vdkyasudhd-tlkd, 55 vdkydnumdna, 3 Vdkydrtha-candrikd, 102 Vdkydrtha-muktdvali, 62 Vamadeva, 27 Vamana, 53

vdsand, 43, 45, T 5°, 364 Vasudeva, 2, 27, 38, 54, 57, 155, 313"-,

314. 387 Vasudeva Datta, 386 Vasudha, 393 vdtsalya, 392, 432 Vatsyayana, 178, 188, 432 Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, lSgn. vdyu, 52, 88, 93, 131, 135, 137, "55 Vedagarbhanarayanacarya, 59 Vedanidhi-tlrtha, 56 Vedas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 48, 63, 66, 76, 108,

in, 127, 134, 139, 163, 197, 203,

254, 312, 320, 346, 363, 365, 377,

423, 425; smrti, relation, 5 Vedastutikdrikd, 373 Vedavyasa-tlrtha, 56 Vedanta, 49, 52, 101, 105, 106, 107,

125, 138, 158, 169, 320, 326, 327,

342, 361, 383, 397 Veddnta-candrika, 373 Veddnta-kaumusi, 158, 239 Vedanta-kdranamdld, 380 Veddnta-Syamantaka, 438 Veddnta-vdrttika, 56 Veddntddhikaranamdld, 381 Vedantic texts, 105, 323 Vedantist, 194 Vedantists, 80, 240, 247 Vedesa-bhiksu, 64, 65, 90

481

Vedic, 203

Vedic commands, 2, 3, 5

Vedic deeds, 7, 355

Vedic dharma, 7

Vedic duties, 7, 355

Vedic hymns, 55

Vedic injunctions, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11

Vedic observances, 102, 103

Vedic performances, 37

Vedic rituals, 3, 4

Vedic sacrifices, 2

Vedic testimony, 226

Vedic texts, 5, 74

Vehkata, 95

Verikata Bhafta, 388

Vehkatadrisuri, 64

Venkoba Rao, G., 92

Verbal cognition, 215

Verbal knowledge, 336, 338

Verification, 195 n.

Vrndavna, 372

VetravatI, 372

vibhaktatvat, 221

Vibrations, 132*1.

Vibratory, 40

Vicious circle, 83, 249, 284, 287,

297 Vicious infinite, 23, 63, 81, 85, 104,

193, 244 250, 254, 260 Vidagdhamddhava, 394 Vidvana-mandana, 363, 365, 367*1.,

37o n., 379, 381 Vidyadhiraja Bhattopadhyaya, 61 Vidyadhiraja-tlrtha, 56, 102 VidyadhlSa-tlrtha, 56, 62, 64, 101 Vidyanidhi, 56, 148, 387, 448 Vidyapati, 389 vidya-sthana, i88n. vidyd-sakti, 12 Vijaya, 53, 318*1. 386 Vijaya Bhatta, 53 Vijayadhvaja-tirtha, 1 Vijaya-dhvajl, 24*1. Vijayanagara, 371, 372, 394 Vijayindra, 64, 65, 87, 95*1., 96*1., 98,

9971., 100, 101 Vijaylndra-pardjaya, 95, 96*1., 99*1.,

100 n. tnjndna, 9, 20, 27*1., 146, 406 Vijnana-bhiksu, 367 vtjndnamaya, 136 vijiiana-tattva, 157*1. vikalpa, 158, 336 vikdra, 32*/., 361 vikfepa, 264, 265

vikjepa-iakti, 24 n.

vilaya, 157

Vildpakusumdrijali, 394

Vilva-mangala, 383, 389

xnnaya, 9

Vindication, 195*1.

viparyaya, 176, 178, 189, 338

Virtue, 2, 40

Visual organs, 342

Visual perception, 191, 252

Vi&lS, 372

Vi&rada Pandita, 385

viieja, 18, 127, 150, 153, 182, 183,442,

447 visefabhdva, 272 visefa-vikalpa, 183 viiefya, 175 visifta, 150 viiifta-bduddhi, 338 viiiftatd, 153 viiuddhddvaita, 382 Viiva, 315*1. VisVanagara, 372 Visvanatha, 189, 190, 351 VisVanatha CakravartI, 1 Vi&vandtha-vrtti, 188*1., 189, 190 Visvarupa, 190, 385 VisVesvara, 2 VisVesVara-tlrtha, 90 vifaya, no, 113 vifayatd, 170 vifaya-tydga, 10 vifaydnandabrahmditanddpekfayd bha-

jandnandasya mahattvat, 357 Viptoh, 315 Visnu, 19, 37, 40, 41. 53. 57. 58, 61,

65, 71, 89, 92, I02, I03, III*!., 122, 125, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 145, 376

Visnucitta, 371

Vifnudharmottara, 9*1.

Visnukranta, 53

Visnumahgala, 53, 54, 65

Visnu Pandita, 386

Visnupriya, 386

Vijnu-purdna, 16, 34, 36*1., 75, 349,

35o, 39i, 405, 423. 427 n-Visnu Purl, 2

Vifnusahasrandma-bhdfya, 55 visnu-samkalpa-coditdt, 37 Vifnu-sakti, 390, 442 Visnusvamln, 1, 12, 347, 371, 382, 383,

447 Visnu-tattiva-nirnaya, 55, 64, 74, 78, 87, 172*1.

Index

l'isnu-tattva-nirnaya-ttkopanydsa, 87

Visnu-tattva-nirnaya-tippanl, 87

Vifnu-tattva-prahdsa, 87

Visnutosinl, 394

vitanda, 65

Vitiating conditions, 198, 199

Vi«hala, 363, 369, 372, 373, 374, 375,

377, 379. 380, 381; interpretation of

Vallabha's ideas, 363 ff. Vitthala Bhatta, 64 Vitthala-suta-srinivasa, 62 Vitthalasutananda-tirtha, 62, 87 Vitthala-suta-srinivasacarya, 60 Vitthalacarya-sunu, 59 Vivarana, 117, 141, 238, 249, 265, 275,

276, 277, 295. 297, 373 vivarta, no, 134, 308, 309, 405 vivartakdrana, 362 Vivekadhairyydsraya, 373, 376 Vivekadfwiryydsraya-tlkd, 377 viyogo, 39 n. Virabhadra, 393 Virachand, 393 Vlramitrodaya, 5*1., bn., Sn. Viramitrodaya-paribhdsdprakdia, 5 w.,

bn. vtrya, 42, 43 Vrndavana, 89 Vrndavanadasa, 384, 385 Vrndavana Gosvami, 2 Vrddhanagara, 372 vrtti, 8, 106, 148, 188, 219, 232, 234,

236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245,

246, 248, 258, 259, 262, 263, 265,

266, 267, 274, 275, 277, 278, 281,

291, 3io, 34i, 343 vrtti-jndna, 276, 290 Vrttikara, 53, 134 urf/i-knowledge, 277, 278, 282 vrtti modification, 221 vyabhicdra, 189 vyabhicdri bhava, 353 vyaktdvyakta, 43 vyakti, i32n., 143 vyasana, 356 vyasti-ksetrajna, 402 vyavahdrika, 73, 80, 115, 116, 120,

142, 204, 281. 299, 300, 304 Vyaya, 387 vydghdta, 190, 192 Vydkhyd-sarkard, 178*1. Vydkhydna-vivarana, 94 vydpaka, 197 vydpdra, 197, 341 vydpdravad asddhdranam, 340

vydpti, 151, 152, 184, 185, 187, 190, 197; its nature, 197-8; Vy8sa-tirtha on its nature, 199

vydpti-grdh-aka, 195 n.

vydpti-smarana, 200

Vyasa, 30, 53, 54

Vydsa-bhdsya, 35 n., 36

Vydsa-smrti, 5 n.

Vyasa-tirtha, 56, 59, 62, 63, 65, 90, '34, '35, '4'. '95, 196. 199, 202, 203, 204, 209, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 270, 279, 282, 292, 293, 294, 298, 448

vyulias, 27 ft., 413

Waking state, 267

Whole, 153

Wilson, H. H., 54«.

Wisdom, 40, 347

World-appearance, n, 17, 63, 73, 205, 207, 2J3, 214, 217, 224, 229, 230, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 301, 303; Vyasa-tirtha's view of, 302 ff.; its indefinability criticized, 301 ff.

World-creation, 359

World-events, 412

World-experience, 25, 32, 25b

World-illusion, 251

World objects, 221, 232, 233, 248

World-soul, 417

Wrangling, 65

Yadupati, 1, 59, 62, 64, 65, 89, 102 Yajus, 128 yama, 424

Yamaka-bhdrata, 55, 89 yamas, 354 Yamunottri, 372 yathd prameyatvam, 198 Yathdrtha, 161, 165 yathdrtham pramdnam, 160, 167 Yati-pranava-kalpa, 55 Yadavaprakasa, 53 Yadavadri, 372 Yajnanarayana Bhatta, 371 Yajfiavalkya, 10 Ydjiiavalkya-smrti, 188 Yajpur, 387

Ydmundstaka, 373, 375, 376, 394 Ydmundstaka-vivrti, 377 ydvat-svdsraydnumiti-gfdhyatvam, 169 yoga, 8n., 10, ibn., 27, 28, 30, 33, 39,

128, 347, 350, 400, 433 yoga-mdyd, ibn., 400

Yoga-sHtra, 35 n., 275 yogo, 39 n.

Yogasatakavyakhydna, 394 yogyatd, 20, 292, 311

Yoga-vdrttika, 27 n. Yonagiri, 383

ycge viyogavrtti-prema, 350 >'"./»' J'0£«t 30

Yogi Gopesvara, 380, 381 yi/j samddhu, 30

Yogins, 153, 181, 182, 311, 312, 400 Yukti-mallikd, 168, 169, 172, 175, 313, Yogi-ydjnavalkya, 8n. 314

A HISTORY

OF

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY THE LATE SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

VOLUME V SOUTHERN SCHOOLS OF SAIVISM

CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE SYNDICS OF THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London Office: Bentley House, n.w. i American Branch: New York

Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge (Brooke Crutchley, University Printer)

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

A MEMOIR

The late Surendranath Dasgupta was born in Kusthia, a subdivision of Bengal, in October 1885 (10th of Asvina). He came from a well-known family in Goila, District Barishal, East Bengal. This family was particularly known for its great tradition of Sanskrit learning and culture. His great-grandfather was a distinguished scholar and also a Vaidya (physician of the Ayurvedic school of medicine). He was known by his title "Kavindra", and was running a Sanskrit institution known as "Kavindra College", which continued in existence up to the time of the partition of India in 1947. This institution maintained about 150 students with free board and lodging, and taught Kavya, Grammar, Nyaya, Vedanta and Ayurveda in traditional Indian style. Professor Das-gupta's father, Kaliprasanna Dasgupta, was the only member of the family who learnt English and took up the job of a surveyor.

In his early years, between five and eight, while he did not know any Sanskrit, he showed certain remarkable gifts of answering philosophical and religious questions in a very easy and spontaneous manner. He could demonstrate the various Yogic postures (asanas) ; and used to pass easily into trance states, while looking at the river Ganges or listening to some Kirtan song. He was visited by hundreds of learned men and pious saints at his father's residence at Kalighat and was styled "Khoka Bhagawan" (Child God). Mention may particularly be made of Srimat Bijay Krishna Goswami, Prabhu Jagat Bandhu and Sivanarayan Paramhansa. He was sometimes taken to the Theosophical Society, Calcutta, where a big audience used to assemble, and the boy was put on the table and questioned on religious and theological matters. The answers that he gave were published in the Bengali and English newspapers along with the questions. Some of these are still preserved.

He was educated at Diamond Harbour for a time, and then for seven years in the Krishnagar Collegiate School and College. He was interested in Sanskrit and science alike, and surprised the professor of chemistry by his proficiency in the subject so much that he never taught in the class unless his favourite pupil was

present. He took his M.A. degree from Sanskrit College, Calcutta, in 1908. His fellow-students noticed with interest his habits and peculiarities. He took no care of his clothes and hair; he studied on a mat with a pillow for his table; and his place was littered with books and papers. Though he did not talk very much, he already had a reputation for scholarship when he was an M.A. student at the Sanskrit College. His scholarship in Panini was so great that when even his teachers had differences of opinion about a grammatical matter, he was called out of his class to solve it. His first research work on Nyaya, which was written while he was in the Sanskrit College, was read out before the Pandits, and was very highly appreciated by them and the then Principal, the late Mahamaho-padhyaya H. P. Sastri. Incidentally it may be noted that Nyaya was not one of the subjects of his M.A. curriculum. After his childhood, both as a student and as a young man, he had many striking religious and spiritual experiences, which were known to a group of his intimate friends and admirers.

One of the peculiar traits of Dasgupta was that he seldom wished to learn anything from others. He had an inner pride that led him to learn everything by his own efforts. He never wanted any stimulus from outside. Whenever he took up any work, he threw his whole soul and being into it. He passed his M.A. in Philosophy in 1910, as a private candidate, summarising all the prescribed books in his own way. He was twice offered a state scholarship to study Sanskrit in a scientific manner in Europe, but as he was the only child of his parents, he refused out of consideration for their feelings. He began his service at Rajshahi College as an officiating lecturer in Sanskrit. He was soon provided with a permanent professorship at Chittagong College, where he worked from 1911 to 1920 and from 1922 to 1924.

Chittagong was to him like a place of banishment, being far away from the great libraries of Calcutta. The College was newly started and had none of the facilities that it possesses now. But Dasgupta had taken the resolution that he would dedicate himself to the study of the Indian " Sastras" in their entirety. For him to take a resolution was to accomplish it, and while many of his colleagues enjoyed club life in an easy-going manner, he continued his studies for fourteen hours or more a day, in spite of the teasing of his friends. At this time Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi of

Cassimbazar made an offer of 300 rupees a month for Dasgupta to start his library; this is now one of the best of its kind, containing many unpublished manuscripts and over 15,000 printed books. It was given by him as a gift to the Benares Hindu University on his retirement from the Calcutta University. Love of knowledge seems to have been the guiding passion of the professor's life. He never sought position or honour, though they were showered upon him in quick succession in his later days. He had a unique sincerity of purpose and expression, and the light that came from his soul impressed kindred souls.

When Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, came to visit Chittagong College, he had a long talk with Professor Dasgupta in his classroom, and was so much impressed by it that he expressed the desire that the first volume of the History of Indian Philosophy might be dedicated to him. Originally Dasgupta's plan was to write out the history of Indian systems of thought in one volume. Therefore he tried to condense the materials available within the compass of one book. But as he went on collecting materials from all parts of India, a huge mass of published and unpublished texts came to light, and the plan of the work enlarged more and more as he tried to utilise them. As a matter of fact, his was the first and only attempt to write out in a systematic manner a history of Indian thought directly from the original sources in Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit. In a work of the fourteenth century a.d., the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhavacarya, we find a minor attempt to give a survey of the different philosophical schools of India. But the account given there is very brief, and the work does not give an exhaustive survey of all the different systems of philosophy. In the present series the author traced, in a historical and critical manner, the development of Indian thought in its different branches from various sources, a considerable portion of which lies in unpublished manuscripts. He spared no pains and underwent a tremendous amount of drudgery in order to unearth the sacred, buried treasures of Indian thought. He revised his original plan of writing only one volume and thought of completing the task in five consecutive volumes constituting a series. He shouldered this gigantic task all alone, with the sincerest devotion and unparalleled enthusiasm and zeal.

Dasgupta had taken the Griffith Prize in 1916 and his doctorate

in Indian Philosophy in 1920. Maharaja Sir Manindra Chandra Nandi now urged him to go to Europe to study European philosophy at its sources, and generously bore all the expenses of his research tour (1920-22). Dasgupta went to England and distinguished himself at Cambridge as a research student in philosophy under Dr McTaggart. During this time the Cambridge University Press published the first volume of the History of Indian Philosophy (1921). He was also appointed lecturer at Cambridge, and nominated to represent Cambridge University at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris. His participation in the debates of the Aristotelian Society, London, the leading philosophical society of England, and of the Moral Science Club, Cambridge, earned for him the reputation of being an almost invincible controversialist. Great teachers of philosophy like Ward and McTaggart, under whom he studied, looked upon him not as their pupil but as their colleague. He received his Cambridge doctorate for an elaborate thesis on contemporary European philosophy. The impressions that he had made by his speeches and in the debates at the Paris Congress secured for him an invitation to the International Congress at Naples in 1924, where he was sent as a representative of the Bengal Education Department and of the University of Calcutta; later on, he was sent on deputation by the Government of Bengal to the International Congress at Harvard in 1926. In that connection he delivered the Harris Foundation lectures at Chicago, besides a series of lectures at about a dozen other Universities of the United States and at Vienna, where he was presented with an illuminated address and a bronze bust of himself. He was invited in 1925 to the second centenary of the Academy of Science, Leningrad, but he could not attend for lack of Government sanction. In 1935, 1936 and 1939 he was invited as visiting professor to Rome, Milan, Breslau, Konigsberg, Berlin, Bonn, Cologne, Zurich, Paris, Warsaw and England.

While in Rome he delivered at the International Congress of Science in 1936 an address on the Science of Ancient India with such success that shouts of "Grand' uomo" cheered him through the session of the day. This led eventually to the conferment of the Honorary D.Litt. upon him by the University of Romejin 1939. He was on that occasion a state guest in Rome and military honours were accorded to him. At this time he read out before many

cultured societies English translations of his own Bengali verses called Vanishing Lines. The appreciation that these verses received secured for him a special reception and banquet at the Poets' Club. Before this, only two other Indian poets had been accorded this reception: Tagore and Mrs Naidu. Laurence Binyon spoke of his poems in the following terms: "I am impressed by the richness of imagination which pervades the poems and the glow of mystic faith and fervent emotion—reminding me of one of William Blake's sayings: 'Exuberance is beauty'. It would be a great pity if the poems are not published in English."

The University of Warsaw made him an honorary Fellow of the Academy of Sciences. He was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature. The Societe des Amis du Monde of Paris offered him a special reception, and M. Renou, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Paris, wrote to him afterwards: "While you were amongst us, we felt as if a Sarikara or a Patanjali was born again and moved amongst us." Kind and simple and gentle as he was, Dasgupta was always undaunted in challenging scholars and philosophers. In the second International Congress of Philosophy in Naples, the thesis of his paper was that Croce's philosophy had been largely anticipated by some forms of Buddhism, and that where Croce differed he was himself in error. On account of internal differences Croce had no mind to join the Congress, but the fact that Dasgupta was going to challenge his philosophy and prove it to be second-hand in open congress, induced him to do so. In the same way he challenged Vallee Poussein, the great Buddhist scholar, before a little assembly presided over by McTaggart. In the meetings of the Aristotelian Society he was a terror to his opponents, his method of approach being always to point out their errors. He inflicted this treatment on many other scholars, particularly Steherbatsky and Levy.

Disinterested love of learning and scientific accuracy were his watchwords. He had to make a most painstaking tour of South India to collect materials for his great History. Though he was well known as a scholar of Sanskrit and philosophy, his studies in other subjects, such as physics, biology, anthropology, history, economics, political philosophy, etc. are very considerable. Above all, he developed a new system of thought which was entirely his own. A brief account of this appeared in Contemporary Indian Philosophy

edited by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead and published by Allen and Unwin.

In 1924, as a mark of recognition of his scholarship, he was admitted to I.E.S. service in Calcutta Presidency College and was posted as Head of the Department of Philosophy. In 1931 he became Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, and ex-officio Secretary of the Bengal Sanskrit Association. In the latter capacity he had to arrange about 218 papers in Sanskrit for Sanskrit Title Examinations for about ten thousand candidates coming from all parts of India. During the eleven years of his principalship in Sanskrit College he had worked in various ways for the advancement of Sanskrit learning and culture in India.

In 1942 he retired from Sanskrit College and was appointed King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Science in the University of Calcutta. He worked there for three years and delivered the Stephanos Nirmalendu lectures on the history of religions. He had been suffering from heart trouble since 1940, but was still carrying on his various activities and research work. In 1945 he retired from the Calcutta University and was offered the Professorship of Sanskrit at Edinburgh which had fallen vacant after the death of Professor Keith. The doctors also advised a trip to England. On his arrival in England he fell ill again. In November 1945 he delivered his last public lecture on Hinduism in Trinity College, Cambridge. Since then he was confined to bed with acute heart trouble. He stayed in England for five years (1945-50). Even then he published the fourth volume of his History of Indian Philosophy at the Cambridge University Press, the History of Sanskrit Literature at Calcutta University, Rabindranath the Poet and Philosopher with his Calcutta publishers, and a book on aesthetics in Bengali. In 1950 he returned to Lucknow.

In 1951, through friendly help given by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he started writing the fifth and final volume of the History of Indian Philosophy. He had also planned to write out his own system of philosophy in two volumes. His friends and students requested him several times to complete the writing of his own thought first. But he looked upon his work on Indian philosophy as the sacred mission of his life, and thought himself to be committed to that purpose. His love of his mother country and all that is best in it always had precedence over his personal aspirations.

With strong determination and unwavering devotion he brought his life's mission very near its completion. Till the last day of his life he was working for this, and completed one full section just a few hours before his passing away, on 18 December 1952. Even on this last day of his life, he worked in the morning and afternoon on the last chapter of the section of Southern Saivism. He passed away peacefully at eight in the evening while discussing problems of modern psychology. All his life he never took rest voluntarily and till his end he was burning like a fire, full of zeal and a rare brightness of spirit for the quest of knowledge. His plan of the fifth volume was as follows:

(1) Southern Schools of Saivism.

(2) Northern Schools of Saivism.

(3) Philosophy of Grammar.

(4) Philosophy of some of the Selected Tantras.

Of these the first was to be the largest section and covers more than a third of the proposed work according to his own estimate. He collected manuscripts from various sources from Southern India and completed his survey of the different schools of Southern Saivism. This is now being published by the Cambridge University Press.

Another aspect of his life, which showed itself in trances and in deep unswerving devotion and faith in his Lord, never left him. These were manifest in him even as a child, and continued all through his life. In trials and troubles and sorrows he was fearless and undaunted. In difficulties he had his indomitable will to conquer; he bore all his sufferings with patience and fortitude. His faith in God sustained him with an unusual brightness and cheerfulness of spirit. He never prayed, as he thought there was no need of it since his dearest Lord was shining in his heart with sweetness, love and assurance. That is why in different critical stages of his illness he never gave up hope, and tried to cheer up his worried wife and attending doctors. It was through sheer determination and unshaken faith that he carried out his life's mission nearly to completion when God took him away—maybe for some purpose known to him alone.

It now remains to thank the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for the very kind interest that they have shown in the

publication of this fifth volume of the History of Indian Philosophy by my husband. The Indian Government have permitted me to complete the remaining portion of the work as planned by the author. It is a great task and a very sacred obligation that I owe to my husband, both as his disciple and wife, and I do not know how far I shall be able to fulfil it. It all depends on God's will. But the work as it stands now is self-complete and will serve the need of enquiring minds about the different important schools of Saivism from the beginning of the Christian era. The references to texts and manuscripts have been duly checked. I beg the forgiveness of readers for any mistake that might remain.

SURAMA DASGUPTA University of Lucknozv, India 19 June 1954

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXXIV LITERATURE OF SOUTHERN SAIVISM

PAGE

i The Literature and History of Southern iSaivism .... i

2 The Agama Literature and its Philosophical Perspective ... 20

3 ^iva-jnana-bodha by Meykandadeva 24

4 Matanga-paramesvara-tantra 28

5 Pauskaragama 29

6 Vatuldgama 38

7 Vatula-tantram 38

CHAP 1LK. XXXV VlRA-SAIVISM

1 History and Literature of Vfra-Saivism 42

2 Anubhava-sutra of Mayi-deva 61

CHAPTER XXXVI PHILOSOPHY OF S~RlKANTHA

1 Philosophy of iSaivism as expounded by Srikantha in his Commentary on the Brahma-stttra and the Sub-commentary on it by Appaya Dlksita 65

2 The Nature of Brahman 77

3 Moral Responsibility and the Grace of God 85

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE SAIVA PHILOSOPHY IN THE PURANAS

1 The Saiva Philosophy in the §iva-mahapurdna .... 96 2, 3 iSaiva Philosophy in the VdyaiHya-santhita. of the Siva-mahapurana

Section 1 106

Section 2 "8

CHAPTER XXXVIII SAIVA PHILOSOPHY IN SOME OF THE IMPORTANT TEXTS

PAGE

i The Doctrine of the Pdsupata-sutras . . . . . .130

2 The iSaiva Ideas of Manikka-vachakar in Tiru-vachaka . . .149

3 Manikka-vachakar and iSaiva Siddhanta . . . . . .154

4 iSaiva Philosophy according to Bhoja and his commentators . . 159

5 Sripati Pandita's Ideas on the Vedanta Philosophy, called also the !§rikara-bhd$ya which is accepted as the Fundamental Basis of Vira-saivism 173

INDEX ... 191

CHAPTER XXXIV

LITERATURE OF SOUTHERN 6AIVISM

The Literature and History of Southern &aivism.

The earliest Sanskrit philosophical literature in which we find a reference to Saivism is a bhdsya of Sankara (eighth century) on Brahma-siltra n. 2. 37. In the commentary on this Sutra, Sankara refers to the doctrines of the Siddhantas as having been written by Lord Mahesvara. The peculiarity of the teachings of the Siddhantas was that they regarded God as being only the instrumental cause of the world. Here and elsewhere Sankara has called the upholders of this view Isvara-karanins. If Siva or God was regarded as both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, according to the different Siddhanta schools of thought, then there would be no point in introducing the sutra under reference, for according to Sankara also, God is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world. Sankara seems to refer here to the Pasupata system which deals with the five categories, such as the cause (karana), effect (kdrya), communion (yoga), rules of conduct (vidhi) and dissolution of sorrow (duhkhdnta) 1 . According to him it also holds that Pasupati (God) is the instrumental cause of the world. In this view the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas also attribute the same kind of causality to God, and offer the same kind of arguments, i.e. the inference of the cause from the effect.

Vacaspati Misra (a.d. 840), in commenting on the bhdsya of Sankara, says that the Mahesvaras consist of the Saivas, Pasupatas, the Karunika-siddhantins and the Kapalikas. Madhava of the fourteenth century mentions the Saivas as being Nakullsa-pasupatas who have been elsewhere mentioned as Lakulisa-pasupatas or Lakulisa-pasupatas, and they have been discussed in another section of the present work. Madhava also mentions the Saiva-darsana in which he formulates the philosophical doctrines found in the Saivdgamas and their cognate literature. In addition to this he devotes a section to pratyabhijnd-darsana, commonly

1 The skeleton of this system has already been dealt with in another section as Pdsupata-sdstras.

called Kasmlr Saivism. This system will also be dealt with in the present volume. Vacaspati mentions the Karunika-siddhantins and the Kapalikas. Ramanuja in his bhasya on Brahma-sutra II. 2. 37 mentions the name of Kapalikas and Kalamukhas as being Saiva sects of an anti-Vedic character. But in spite of my best efforts, I have been unable to discover any texts, published or unpublished, which deal with the special features of their systems of thought. We find some references to the Kapalikas in literature like the Malati-madhava of Bhavabhuti (a.d. 700-800) and also in some of the Puranas. Anandagiri, a contemporary of Sankara and a biographer, speaks of various sects of Saivas with various marks and signs on their bodies and with different kinds of robes to distinguish themselves from one another. He also speaks of two schools of Kapalikas, one Brahmanic and the other non-Brahmanic. In the Atharva-veda we hear of the Vratyas who were devotees of Rudra. The Vratyas evidently did not observe the caste-rules and customs. But the Vratyas of the Atharva-veda were otherwise held in high esteem. But the Kapalikas, whether they were Brahmanic or non-Brahmanic, indulged in horrid practices of drinking and indulging in sex-appetite and living in an unclean manner. It is doubtful whether there is any kind of proper philosophy, excepting the fact that they were worshippers of Bhairava the destroyer, who also created the world and maintained it. They did not believe in karma. They thought that there are minor divinities who perform various functions in world creation and maintenance according to the will of Bhairava. The Sudra Kapalikas did not believe also in the caste-system and all these Kapalikas ate meat and drank wine in skulls as part of their rituals. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar thinks on the authority of Siva-mahapurana that the Kalamukhas were the same as the Mahavratadharas. But the present author has not been able to trace any such passage in the Siva-mahapurana, and Bhandarkar does not give any exact reference to the Siva-mahd-purana containing this identification. The Mahdvrata, meaning the great vow, consists in eating food placed in a human skull and smearing the body with the ashes of human carcasses and others, which are attributed to the Kalamukhas by Ramanuja. Bhandarkar also refers to the commentary of Jagaddhara on the Malati-madhava, where the KapaKka-vrata is called Mahdvrata. Bhandarkar further points out that the ascetics dwelling in the temple of

Kapalesvara near Nasik are called the Mahavratins 1 . Be that as it may, we have no proof that the Kapalikas and Kalamukhas had any distinct philosophical views which could be treated separately. Members of their sects bruised themselves in performing particular kinds of rituals, and could be distinguished from other Saivas by their indulgence in wines, women, and meat and even human meat. Somehow these rituals passed into Tantric forms of worship, and some parts of these kinds of worship are found among the adherents of the Tantric form of worship even to this day. Tantric initiation is thus different from the Vedic initiation.

Frazer in his article on Saivism in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics says that, in some well-known temples in South India, the ancient blood-rites and drunken orgies are permitted to be revived yearly as a compromise with the aboriginal worshippers, whose primitive shrines were annexed by Brahmin priests acting under the protection of local chieftains. These chieftains, in return for their patronage and countenance, obtained a rank as Ksatriyas with spurious pedigrees. Frazer further gives some instances in the same article in which non-Brahmins and outcastes performed the worship of Siva and also offered human sacrifices, and one of the places he mentions is Srisaila, the Kapalika centre referred to by Bhavabhuti. These outcaste worshippers were ousted from the temple by some of the Buddhists, and thereafter the Buddhists were thrown out by the Brahmins. By the time of Sankara, the Kapalikas developed a strong centre in Ujjain. We, of course, do not know whether the South Indian cult of blood-rites as performed by Brahmins and non-Brahmins could be identified with the Kapalikas and Kalamukhas; but it is quite possible that they were the same people, for Srisaila, mentioned by Bhavabiiti, which is described as an important Kapalika centre, is also known to us as a centre of bloody rites from the Sthala-mahatmya records of that place as mentioned by Frazer. The Kapalikas and Kalamukhas were anti-Vedic according to the statement of Ramanuja in Brahma-sutra 11.2. 37. Sankara also, according to Anandagiri, did not hold any discussion with the Kapalikas, as their views were professedly anti-Vedic. He simply had them chastised and whipped. The Kapalikas, however, continued in their primitive

1 Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems, by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (1913), p. 128.

form and some of them were living even in Bengal, as is known to the present writer. The habit of smearing the body with ashes is probably very old in Saivism, since we find the practice described in the Pdsupatasutra and in the bhasya of Kaundinya.

The Karunika-siddhantins mentioned by Vacaspati have not been referred to by Madhava (fourteenth century) in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha, and we do not find a reference to these in any of the Saivdgamas. But from the statement of Saiva philosophy in the Vdyaviya-samhitd of the Siva-tnahdpurdna, as discussed in another section (pp. 106-29), ** * s not difficult for us to reconstruct the reasons which might have led to the formation of a special school of Saivism. We find that the doctrine of grace or karund is not always found in the same sense in all the Agamas, or in the Vdyaviya-samhitd, which was in all probability based on the Agamas. Ordinarily the idea of grace or karund would simply imply the extension of kindness or favour to one in distress. But in the Saivdgamas there is a distinct line of thought where karund or grace is interpreted as a divine creative movement for supplying all souls with fields of experience in which they may enjoy pleasures and suffer from painful experiences. The karund of God reveals the world to us in just the same manner as we ought to experience it. Grace, therefore, is not a work of favour in a general sense, but it is a movement in favour of our getting the right desires in accordance with our karma. Creative action of the world takes place in consonance with our good and bad deeds, in accordance with which the various types of experience unfold themselves to us. In this sense, grace may be compared with the view of Yoga philosophy, which admits of a permanent will of God operating in the orderliness of the evolutionary creation (parindmakrama-niyama) for the protection of the world, and supplying it as the basis of human experience in accordance with their individual karmas. It is again different from the doctrine of karund of the Ramanuja Vaisnavas, who introduce the concept of Mahalaksml, one who intercedes on behalf of the sinners and persuades Narayana to extend His grace for the good of the devotees.

The word 'siva' is supposed to have been derived irregularly from the root l vas kdntan*. This would mean that Siva always fulfils the desires of His devotees. This aspect of Siva as a merciful Lord who is always prepared to grant any boons for which prayers

are offered to Him is very well depicted in the Mahdbhdrata and many other Puranas. This aspect of Siva is to be distinguished from the aspect of Siva as rudra or sarva or the god of destruction.

We have seen that we know practically nothing of any importance about the Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas. The other doctrines of Saivism of the South are those of the Pasupatas, the Saiva doctrines derived from the Agamas and the Vaisnavas. The other schools of Saivism that developed in Kasmlr in the ninth and tenth centuries will be separately discussed. The Pdsupata-sutra with the Pancartha bhdsya of Kaundinya was first published from Tri-vandrum in 1940, edited by Anantakrisna Sastri. This bhdsya of Kaundinya is probably the same as the Rdsikara-bhdsya referred to by Madhava in his treatment of Nakulisa-pdsupata-darsana in Sarva-darsana-samgraha. Some of the lines found in Kaun-dinya's bhdsya have been identified by the present writer with the lines attributed to Rasikara by Madhava in his treatment of the Nakulisa-pasupata system. Nakulisa was the founder of the Pasupata system. Aufrect in the Catalogus Catahgorum mentions the Pdsupata-sutra 1 . The Vdyaviya-samhitd 11. 24. 169, also mentions the Pdsupata-sdstra as the Pancdrtha-vidyd 2 . Bhandarkar notes that in an inscription in the temple of Harsanatha which exists in the Sikar principality of the Jaipur State, a person of the name of Visvarupa is mentioned as the teacher of the Pancdrtha-lakuldmndya. The inscription is dated v.e. 1013 = a.d. 957. From this Bhandarkar infers that the Pasupata system was attributed to a human author named Lakulin and that the work composed by him was called Pancartha. This inference is not justifiable. We can only infer that in the middle of the tenth century Lakulisa's doctrines were being taught by a teacher called Visvarupa, who was well reputed in Jaipur, and that Lakulisa's teachings had attained such an authoritative position as to be called dmndya, a term used to mean the Vedas.

In the Pdsupata-sutra published in the Trivandrum series, the first sutra as quoted by Kaundinya is athdtah pasupateh pasupatam

1 Bhandarkar notes it in his section on the Pasupatas, op. cit. p. 121 n.

2 The present writer could not find any such verse in the edition of &iva-mahapurdna printed by the Venkatesvara Press, as n. 24 contains only seventy-two stanzas.

yogavidhim vyakhydsydmah. Here the yoga-vidhi is attributed to Pasupati or Siva. In the Sutasamhitd iv. 43. 17, we hear of a place called Nakula and the Siva there is called Nakulisa. The editor of the Pdsupata-sutra mentions the names of eighteen teachers beginning with Nakulisa 1 . These names are (1) Nakulisa, (2) Kausika, (3) Gargya, (4) Maitreya, (5) Kaurusa, (6) Isana, (7) Paragargya, (8) Kapilanda, (9) Manusyaka, (10) Kusika, (11) Atri, (12) Pingalaksa, (13) Puspaka, (14) Brhadarya, (15) Agasti, (16) Santana, (17) Kaundinya or Rasikara, (18) Vidyaguru. The present writer is in agreement with the view of the editor of the Pdsupata-sutra, that Kaundinya the bhdsyakdra lived somewhere from the fourth to the sixth century a.d. The style of the bhdsya is quite archaic, and no references to the later system of thought can be found in Kaundinya's bhdsya. We have already seen that according to the Swa-mahdpurdna there were twenty-eight yogacaryas and that each of them had four disciples so that there were 112 yogacaryas. Out of these twenty-eight yogacaryas the most prominent were Lokaksi, Jaigisavya, Rsabha, Bhrgu, Atri and Gautama. The last and the twenty-eighth acarya was Lakulisa, born at Kaya-vatarana-tirtha. Among the 112 yogacaryas, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatana, Kapila, Asuri, Pancasikha, Parasara, Garga, Bhargava, Angira, Suka, Vasistha, Brhaspati, Kuni, Vamadeva, Svetaketu, Devala, Salihotra, Agnivesa, Aksapada, Kanada, Kumara and Ruru are the most prominent 2 .

1 These names are taken from Rajasekhara's Saddarsana-samuccaya composed during the [middle of the fourteenth century. Almost the same names with slight variations are found in Gunaratna's commentary on Saddarsana-samuccaya.

2 See Siva-mahapurana, Vayavlya Samhita 11. 9, and also Kurma-purana 1. 53. The Vdyu-purana describes in the twenty-third chapter the names of the four disciples of each of the twenty-eight acaryas. Visuddha Muni mentions the name of Lakulisa in his work called Atma-samarpana. See also Introduction to the Pdsiipata-sutra, p. 3n.

The list of twenty-eight teachers given in the Siva-mahapurana does not always tally with the list collected by other scholars, or with that which is found in the Attna samarpana by Visuddha Muni. It seems therefore that some of these names are quite mythical, and as their works are not available, their names are not much used. Visuddha Muni summarises the main items of self-control, yama, from the Pasupata-sastra, which are more or less of the same nature as the yamas or measures of self-control as found in the Yogasdstra introduced by Pataftjali. It is not out of place here to mention that the concept of God in Yogasdstra is of the same pattern as that of the Pasupati in the Pdsupata-sutra and bhdsya.

Mr Dalai in his introduction to Ganakarika says that the Lahullsa-pasupata-dariana is so called from Lakullsa, who originated the system. Lakullsa means " a lord of those bearing a staff". Lakullsa is often regarded as an incarnation of God Siva with a citron in the right hand and a staff in the left. The place of the incarnation is Kayarohana in Bhrgu-ksetra which is the same as Karavana, a town in the Dabhoi Taluka of the Baroda State. In the Karavana-mahatmya it is said that a son of a Brahmin in the village Ulkapuri appeared as Lakullsa and explained the methods and merits of worshipping and tying a silken cloth to the image of the God Lakullsa. This work is divided into four chapters; the first is from the Vayu-purdna, the remaining three are from the Siva-mahapurana. At the commencement of the work, there is obeisance to Mahesvara, who incarnated himself as Lakuta-panisa. There is a dialogue there between Siva and Parvati, in which the latter asks Siva of the merits of tying a silken cloth. Siva then relates the story of his incarnation between the Kali and Dvapara yugas as a Brahmin named Visvaraja in the family of the sage Atri. His mother was Sudarsana. Some miraculous myths relating to this child, who was an incarnation of Siva, are narrated in the Karavana Mahatmya, but they may well be ignored here.

We have already mentioned the name of Atri as being one of the important teachers of the Pasupata school. But according to the account of these teachers as given above, Nakullsa should be regarded as the first founder of the system. We have seen also that by the middle of the tenth century there was a teacher of the Pancartha-lakulamnaya, which must be the same as the doctrine propounded in the Pasupata-sutra. It is difficult to say how early the concept of Pasupati might have evolved. From the Mohenjo-daro excavations we have a statuette in which Siva is carved as sitting on a bull, with snakes and other animals surrounding Him. This is the representation in art of the concept of the lord ofpasus or pasupati, which is found in pre-Vedic times. The concept of Siva may be traced through the Vedas and also through the Upanisads and particularly so in the Svetasvatara Upanisad. The same idea can be traced in the Mahabharata and many other Puranas. The religious cult of Siva, which defines the concept of Siva in its various mythological bearings, has to be given up here, as the interest of the present work is definitely restricted to

philosophical ideas and the ethical and social attitude of the followers of Siva 1 .

It must, however, be said that the Saiva philosophy and the worship of Siva had spread itself far and wide throughout the whole of the peninsula long before the eighth century a.d. We have the most sacred temples of Siva in the north in Badrikasrama, in Nepal (Pasupati-natha), in Kasmir, in Prabhasa, in Kathiawar (the temple of Somanatha), in Benaras (the temple of Visvanatha), the Nakulisvara temple in Calcutta, and the temple of Ramesvaram in extreme South India. This is only to mention some of the most important places of Siva-worship. As a matter of fact, the worship of Siva is found prevalent almost in every part of India, and in most of the cities we find the temples of Siva either in ruins or as actual places of worship. Siva is worshipped generally in the form of the phallic symbol and generally men of every caste and women also may touch the symbol and offer worship. The Saiva forms of initiation and the Tantric forms of initiation are to be distinguished from the Vedic forms of initiation, which latter is reserved only for the three higher castes. But as the present work is intended to deal with the philosophy of Saivism and Tantricism, all relevant allusions to rituals and forms of worship will be dropped as far as possible.

The Jaina writer Rajasekhara of the middle of the fourteenth century mentions the name of Saiva philosophy in his Sad-darsana-samuccaya and calls it a yoga-mata 2 . He describes the Saiva ascetics as holding staves in their hands and wearing long loin cloths {praudha-kauplna-paridhdyinah). They had also blankets for covering their bodies, matted locks of hair, and their bodies were smeared with ashes. They ate dry fruits, bore a vessel of gourd (tumbaka), and generally lived in forests. Some of them had wives, while others lived a lonely life. Rajasekhara further says that the Saivas admitted eighteen incarnations of Siva, the Overlord, who creates and destroys the world. We have already mentioned the names of the teachers that are found in Saddarsana-samuccaya. These teachers were particularly adored and among

1 Those who are interested in the study of the evolution of the different aspects of God Siva, may consult Bhandarkar's Vaisnavism and Saivism, and also the article on Saivism by Frazer in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

2 atha yoga-matam brumah, s'aivam-ity-apara-bhidham. Rajasekhara's Sad-darsana-samuccaya, p. 8 (2nd edition, Benares).

them it was Aksapada who enunciated a system of logic in which he discussed the pramanas, perception, inference, analogy and testimony and also described the sixteen categories that are found in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama or Aksapada. Rajasekhara mentions the names of Jayanta, Udayana, and Bhasarvajna. Thus according to Rajasekhara the Naiyayikas were regarded as Saivas. It does not seem that Rajasekhara had made any definite study of the Nyaya system, but based his remarks on the tradition of the time 1 . He also regards the Vaisesikas as Pasupatas. The Vaisesika saints wore the same kind of dress and the marks as the Naiyayikas and admitted the same teachers, but they held that the perception and inference were the only two pramanas and that the other pramanas were included within them. He also mentions the six categories that we find in the Vaisesika-sutra. Rajasekhara calls the Naiyayikas Yaugas. The Vaisesika and the Nyaya are more or less of the same nature and both of them regard the dissolution of sorrow as ultimate liberation. Gunaratna, the commentator of Haribhadra Suri's Saddarsana-samuccaya was a Jaina writer like Rajasekhara and he was in all probability a later contemporary of him. Many of his descriptions of the Naiyayikas or Yaugas seem to have been taken from Rajasekhara's work, or it may also have been that Rajasekhara borrowed it from Gunaratna, the descriptions being the same in many places. Gunaratna says that there were found kinds of Saivas such as the Saivas, Pasupatas, Mahavratadharas and the Kalamukhas 2 . In addition to these both Gunaratna and Rajasekhara speak of those who take the vow (vratins) of service to Siva and they are called Bharatas and Bhaktas. Men of any caste

1 srutanusaratah proktam naiydyika-matam maya. Ibid. p. 10.

2 saivah pdsupatascaiva mahdvrata-dharas tathd, turydh kdlamukhd mukhyd bkedd ete tapasvindm.

Gunaratna's commentary on Haribhadra's Saddarsana-samuccaya, p. 51 (Suali's edition, Calcutta, 1905).

According to Gunaratna, therefore, the Mahavratadharas and the Kalamukhas are entirely different. The Kapalikas are not mentioned by Gunaratna. These four classes of Saivas were originally Brahmins and they had the sacred thread. Their difference was largely due to their different kinds of rituals and behaviour (acard) :

adhara-bhasma-kaupina-jata-yajnopavitinah, sva-svacaradi-bhedena caturdha syus tapasvinah.

Ramanuja mentions the names of Kapalikas and Kalamukhas as being outside the pale of the Vedas (veda-bahya). In Sankara-vijaya of Anandagiri also the Kapalikas are represented as being outside the pale of the Vedas. But the Kalamukhas are not mentioned there.

could be included in the class of Bharatas (servants) and Bhaktas (devotees) of Siva. The Naiyayikas were always regarded as devotees of Siva and they were called Saivas. The Vaisesika philosophy was called Pasupata 1 . Haribhadra also says that the Vaisesikas admitted the same divinity as the Naiyayikas 2 .

Excluding the Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas, about whom we know very little except the traditional imputations against their rituals and non-Vedic conduct, we have the text of the Pasupata system and the Saiva philosophy as described in the Saiva Agamas. We have also the Pdsupata-sdstra as described in the Vdyamya samhitd, the Saiva philosophy of Srikantha as elaborated by Appaya Dlksita, and the Saiva philosophy as expounded by King Bhoja of Dhara in his Tattva-prakdsa as explained by Srikumara and Aghora-sivacarya. We have also the Vira-£aivism which evolved at a later date and was explained in a commentary on Brahma-sutra by Sripati Pandita who is generally placed in the fourteenth century 3 . Srlpati Pandita was posterior to the Pa^upatas and Ramanuja, and also to Ekorama and the five acaryas of the Vira-saiva religion. Sripati was also posterior to Madhavacarya. But it is curious that Madhava seems to know nothing either of Virasaivism or of Sripati Pandita. He was of course posterior to Basava of the twelfth century, who is generally regarded as being the founder of Vira-saivism. As Hayavadana Rao points out, Sripati was posterior to Srikantha, who wrote a bhasya on the Brahma-sutra*. We have treated in a separate section the philosophy of Srikantha. Srikantha lived somewhere in the eleventh century and may have been a junior contemporary of Ramanuja. Srikantha in his treatment of Brahma-sutra ill. 3. 27-30, criticises the views of Ramanuja and Nimbarka. Hayavadana Rao thinks on inscriptional grounds that Srikantha was living in a.d. 1122 5 .

Meykandadeva, the most famous author of the Tamil translation of the Sanskrit work Siva-jnana-bodha belonged to Tiru-

1 See Gunaratna's commentary, p. 51.

2 devata-visayo bhedo nasti naiydyikai}i samam, vaisesikanam tattve tu vidyate'sau nidarsyate.

Haribhadra's Saddarsana-samuccaya, p. 266.

3 C. Hayavadana Rao's Stikara-bhdsya, Vol. 1, p. 31.

4 Ibid. p. 36. 6 Ibid. p. 41.

xxxiv] Literature and History of Southern Saivism n

venneyllur near the South Arcot district. There is an inscription in the sixteenth year of the Chola King Rajaraja III (a.d. 1216-48) which records a gift of land to an image set up by Meykanda. This fixes the date of Meykandadeva, the disciple of Paranjoti muni to about the middle of the thirteenth century. Hayvadana Rao after a long discussion comes to the view that Meykanda actually lived about a.d. 1235, if not a little earlier 1 . From inscriptional sources it has been ascertained that Srikantha, the commentator of Brahma-sutra lived about a.d. 1270. It is quite possible that Meykanda and Srikantha were contemporaries. The philosophical difference between Meykanda and Srikantha is quite remarkable, and the two persons cannot therefore be identified as one 2 . Srikantha thinks that the world is a transformation of the cicchakti of the Lord. It does not provide for the creation of the material world, does not speak of the anava-mala, and is apparently not in favour ofjivan-mukti. Further Srikantha appears to establish his system on the basis of the sruti. Meykanda, however, tries to establish his system on the basis of inference, and there are many other points of difference as will be easily seen from our treatment of Meykandadeva. It does not seem that Srikantha had any relation with Meykandadeva.

Sripati quotes from Haradatta in very reverential terms. Hayvadana Rao refers to an account of the life of Haradatta as given in the Bhavisyottara-purdna, and to the writings of his commentator Siva-linga-bhupati, which would assign Haradatta to the Kali age 3979, corresponding roughly to a.d. 879. In the £iva-rahasya-dipika> however, Kali age 3000 is given as a rough approximation of the date of Haradatta. Professor Shesagiri Sastri accepts the former date as a more correct one and identifies the Haradatta quoted in Sarva-darsana-samgraha as being the same as the author of Harihara-taratamya and the Caturveda-tatparya-samgraha. As we have mentioned elsewhere, Haradatta was the author of the Ganakarika. Mr Dalai in all probability had confused the two in his introduction to the Ganakarika, in which he says that Bhasarvajna was the author of Ganakarika. In reality Haradatta wrote only the Karikd, and the Nyaya author Bhasar-

1 Ibid. p. 48.

2 Ibid. p. 49. The systems of Srikantha and of Meykanda have been dealt with in separate sections of the present work.

vajna wrote a commentary on it called the Ratnatika 1 . Sripati also quotes from Siddhanta sikhdmani, a Virasaiva work written by Revanarya.

It is curious to note that though Vira-saivism was founded at least as early as the time of Basava (a.d. i 157-67), Madhava in the fourteenth century does not know anything of Vira-saivism. It is, however, doubtful if Basava was really the founder of Vira-saivism in India. We have got some sayings in Canarese known as the vaccinas of Basava, but we find that his name is seldom mentioned as a teacher of any articles of the Vlra-saiva faith. There is a semi-mythical account of Basava in a work called Basava-purana. It is said there that Siva asked Nandin to incarnate himself in the world for the propagation of the Vlra-saiva faith. Basava was this incarnation. He was a native of Bagevadi from where he went to Kalyana where Vijjala or Vijjana was reigning (a.d. 1157-67). His maternal uncle, Baladeva, was the minister, and he himself was raised to that position after his death. Basava's sister was given away to the king. He was in charge of the treasury and spent large sums in supporting and entertaining the Lingayat priests or mendicants called Jangamas. When the king came to know of this, he became angry and sent troops to punish him. Basava collected a small army and defeated these troops. The king brought him back to Kalyana and there was apparently some reconciliation between them. But Basava later on caused the king to be assassinated. This depicts Basava more as a scheming politician than as a propounder of new faith.

Returning to our treatment of the literature of the Pasupatas, we see that between the Vaisnavas and the monists like the Sankarites we have a system of thought representing the monotheistic point of view. This view appears in diverse forms in which God is sometimes regarded as being established as upholding the universe, but beyond it; sometimes it is held that God is beyond the world and has created it by the material of His own energy; at other times it

1 The colophon of the Ganakarika runs as follows:

dcarya-bhdsarvajna-viracitayam ganakdrikdydm ratnaUkd parisamapta. This led to the confusion that the Ganakarika was the composition of Bhasar-vajna, who only wrote the commentary. This Haradatta must be distinguished from the Haradatta of the Padamanjarl on the Kasikd-vrtti, and also from the commentator of the Apastamba-sutra.

has been held that God and energy are one and the same. Sometimes it has been held that God has created the world by His mercy or grace and that His grace is the inner dynamic force which follows the course of creation and maintenance. It is in this way that a compromise has been made between the theory of grace and the theory of karma. There are others, however, who think that we do not as of necessity have a right to reap the fruits of our actions, but we have to be satisfied with what is given to us by God. The Pasupatas hold this view, and it is important to notice that the Nyaya which admits the doctrine of karma also thinks that we are only entitled to such enjoyments and experiences as are allotted to us by God. The fact that both the Nyaya and the Pasupatas think that God can be established by inference, and that the grace of God is ultimately responsible for all our experiences, naturally leads us to link together the Nyaya-vaisesika view with the Pasupata view. The tradition is preserved in the two Saddarsana-samuccayas of Rajasekhara and Haribhadra with Gunaratna, which, as well as the benedictory verses in most Nyaya works until the tenth and eleventh centuries, justify the assumption that the Nyaya-vaisesika was a school of Pasupatas which paid more emphasis to evolving a system of logic and metaphysics. The Pasupata system generally accepted the caste-division, and only those belonging to higher castes could claim to attain spiritual liberation. Yet as time rolled on we find that men of all castes could become devotees or servants of God and be regarded as Saivas. We find the same kind of gradual extension and withdrawal of caste system among the Vaisnavas also. Both in Saivism and Vaisnavism, bhaktior devotion to God came to be regarded as the criterion of the faith.

We have already referred to the statement in the Karavana-mdhdtmya about how the Lord incarnated Himself as a descendant of Atri. He is said to have walked to Ujjain and taught a Brahmin there called Kusika who came from Brahmavarta. These teachings were in the form of the present sutras called the Pancdrtha, the main substance of which has already been described. It is generally believed that the original sutras, divided into five chapters {pancartha), were composed somewhere in the first or the second century a.d. The bhasya of Kaundinya is probably the same as the Rdslkara bhasya. Kaundinya does not mention the name of any writer contemporary to him. He refers to the Samkhya-yoga but

not to Vedanta or the Upanisads. It is interesting to note therefore that this system does not pretend to claim the authority of the Upanisads or its support. The authority of the sutras is based on the assumption that they were composed by Pasupati himself. There are many quotations in the work of Kaundinya, but it is not possible to identify their sources. The style of Kaundinya's bhasya reminds one of the writings of Patanjali the grammarian, who probably lived about 150 B.C. Kaundinya is generally believed to have lived between a.d. 400-600, though I do not know why he could not be placed even a century or two earlier. The date of Ganakarika is rather uncertain. But Bhasarvajna wrote a commentary on it called Ratnatika. He seems to have lived in the middle of the tenth century a.d. It is interesting to note that the temple of Somanatha is also mentioned in the Karavana-mahatmya as one of the most important Pasupata centres.

In the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhava of the fourteenth century, we find a treatment of Nakulisa-pasupata system, the Saiva system and the Pratyabhijna system of Kasmir. The Nakulisa-pasupata system is based upon the Pasupata-sutra and the bhasya of Kaundinya called also the Rasikara-bhasya. The Saiva system is based on the various Saivagamas and also on the Tattva-prakasa of Bhoja. Thus Madhava mentions about ten Saiva works which, with many others, have been available to the present writer either in whole manuscripts or in fragments 1 . Sankara, in his bhasya on the Brahma-sutra 11. 2. 37, speaks of the Mahesvaras along with others who regarded God as the instrumental cause, but not the material cause. He does not seem to distinguish the subdivisions of the Mahesvaras. But Vacaspati speaks of four subdivisions of the Mahesvaras. Madhava, however, treats the two types of the Saiva school as Nakulisa-pasupata and Saiva in two different sections. From Sankara's bhasya it appears that he was familiar only with the Pancartha of the Pasupata-sutra. But Anandagiri in his Sankara-vijaya refers to six different kinds of Saiva sects such as Saiva, Raudra, Ugra, Bhatta, Jangama and Pasupata. These different sects bore different kinds of marks on

1 The works mentioned by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha are as follows: Mrgendragama, Pauskaragama, Tattva-prakasa of Bhoja, Soma-sambhu's bhasya, Aghora-sivacarya's commentary on Tattva-prakasa, Kalotta-ragama, Ramakanda's commentary on Kalottard, Kiranagama, Saurabheyagama and Jndna-ratnavah.

their bodies and distinguished themselves from one another by various rituals. But most of their specific religious literature now in all probability has long disappeared. The Pasupatas have a literature, and the sect is still living. But the external signs of the Pasupatas as found in Sankara-vijaya are entirely different from those which are found in Gunaratna's commentary. Gunaratna (fourteenth century) regards the Kanadas as Pasupatas. He also regards the Naiyayikas, called also the Yaugas, as being Saivites of the same order as the Kanadas, and behaving in the same manner, and bearing the same kind of marks as the Kanadas. From the description of the Saiva sects by Anandagiri very little can be made out of the doctrines of those Saiva sects. One can only say that some of those Saivas believed that God was the instrumental cause (nimitta karana), besides the material cause {updddna kdrana). Sankara refuted this type of Saivism in his commentary on Brahma-sutra 11. 2. 37. Both Pasupatas and the followers of the Savvagama held the instrumentality of God, while Sankara regarded God as being both the instrumental and material cause. In the Sankara-vijaya we also find reference to some schools of Saivism, the members of which wore the stone phallic symbols on their bodies. They held a doctrine similar to the sat-sthala doctrine of the Vira-saivas, though we find the proper formulation of the Vira-saiva system at least five hundred years after Anandagiri. We have seen that Vacaspati Misra in his Bhdmati speaks of four types of Saivas. Madhava of the fourteenth century describes only two sects of Saivas as Nakulisa-pasupata and the Saivas of the Agamas, excluding the separate treatment of the Pratyabhijnd system generally known as the Kasmlr school of Saivism.

The Saivagamas or Siddhantas are supposed to have been originally written by Mahesvara, probably in Sanskrit. But it is said in §iva-dharmottara that these were written in Sanskrit, Prakrt and the local dialects 1 . This explains the fact that the Agamas are available both in Sanskrit and some Dravidian languages such as Tamil, Telegu, and Kanarese. It also explains the controversy as to whether the Agamas or Siddhantas were originally written in

1 samskrtcdh prakrtair vakyair yasca sisydnuruptah

desa-bhafd-dyupayais ca bodhayet sa guruh smrtah. Siva-dharmottara quoted in iSiva-jndna-siddhi. (MS. no. 3726, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore.)

Sanskrit or in the Dravidian tongue. The present writer had the good fortune to collect a large number of the Agamas either as complete wholes or in fragmentary portions. Many of the manuscripts are in a decaying state and some of them have been completely lost. The Sanskrit manuscripts on which our present attempt is founded are available in the big manuscript libraries at Triplicane, Adyar and Mysore. It is curious to note that Benares, the principal seat of Saivism, has but few manuscripts of importance. The important Siddhantas and Agamas are quite numerous and most of them are in manuscripts mainly in South India 1 . The same works may be found also in many cases in the whole Dravidian language; but the inspiration and the thought are almost always taken from Sanskrit. The essence of Dravidian culture is therefore almost wholly taken from Sanskrit, at least so far as philosophy is concerned.

The study of old Tamil is fairly difficult, and those who had made a lifelong study of Tamil, like Pope or Schomerus, had but little time to dig into Sanskrit to any appreciable extent. The present writer, being unacquainted with the Dravidian languages, had to depend almost wholly on the Sanskrit literature, but has taken good care to ascertain that the works in Dravidian, pertinent to the subject, are well represented in the Sanskrit manuscripts.

It is difficult to ascertain the respective dates of the Agamas. We only feel that most of the Agamas mentioned above were completed by the ninth century a.d. Some of them were current in the time of Sankaracarya, who lived some time in the eighth or

1 Some of the Agamas are as follows: Kanaka, Yogaja, Cintya, Kdrana, Ajita, Dtpta, Suksma, Amsumdna, Suprabheda, Vijaya, Nihsvdsa, Svdyatnbhuva, Vlra, Raurava, Makuta, Vimala, Candra-jndna, Bimba, Lalita, Santana, Sarvokta, Pdramesvara, Kirana, Vdtula, iSiva-jndna-bodha, Anala, Prodgtta.

In the Siva-jndna-siddhi we find extensive quotations from other Agamas and Tantras as illustrating the philosophical and religious position of Siddhantas. The works from which the quotations have been taken are as follows: Hima-samhitd, Cintya-visva, Siva-dharmottara (purdna), Pauskara, Siddha-tantra, Sarva-matopanydsa, Para, Ratna-traya, Nivdsa, Mrgendra, Jndna-kdrikd, Ndda-kdrikd, Kalottara, Visva-sarottara, Vdyavya, Mdtanga, iSuddha, Sarva-jndnottara, Siddhdnta-rahasya, Jndna-ratndvati, Meru-tantra, Svacchanda and Devt-kdlottara.

Most of the above Agamas are written in Sanskrit characters in about half a dozen Dravidian languages, such as Tamil, Telegu, Kanarese, Grantha and Nandi-nagri. Several Tantras based on these Agamas are also found as Sanskrit compositions in Dravidian scripts. So far as the knowledge of the present writer goes, there is hardly anything of philosophical value or systematic thought which is available in Dravidian, and not available in Sanskrit.

ninth century a.d. Some of the Puranas also mention the names of some of the Agamas referred to above. The bhasya of Kaundinya on the Pasupata-sutras has many untraceable quotations, but there is no mention of the names of the Agamas referred to above, though one might have expected reference to the names of some of these Agamas, as they carry on the same faith in different fashions. On the other hand, the Agamas do not mention the name of the Pasupata-sutras or the bhasya of Kaundinya. It seems, therefore, that though later writers sometimes mixed up the Pasupata and the Agamic systems, as for example the Vayaviya-samhita, or in later times Appayadiksita, Sankara himself speaks only of the Siddhantas written by MahesVara. Vacaspati refers to four schools of Saivism, and Madhava refers to two schools of southern Saivism, Nakullsa-pasupata and the Saivas. In still later times, in the Jaina tradition as kept by Rajasekhara and Gunaratna, we find the names of a long list of teachers of the Pasupata school. We find also the names of twenty-eight yogacaryas, each having four disciples, in the Vayaviya-samhita.

We have already discussed in a separate section the essence of the Agamic system as preserved in the Tattva-prakasa of Bhoja with the commentary of Srfkumara and Aghora-sivacarya. Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha also mentions the names of some of the Agamas and Agamic writers referred to above.

Schomerus in his Der Saiva Siddhdnta, in which he describes the particular form of Saiva monism, speaks of the names of various other schools of Saivism as he picks them up on a commentary on Siva-jnana-bodha 1 . The Saiva-siddhanta view dealt with by Schomerus is one of the many trends of Saiva thought that was prevalent in the country. Schomerus thinks that they are more or less the same except the Pasupata, the Virasaiva and the Praty-abhijna. Schomerus does not seem to utilise the texts of the Agamas and to show in what way they proceeded with the subject. We have, however, in our treatment of Agamic Saivism, tried to utilise the materials of the Agamas that are still available as complete wholes or in fragments. But a large part of the Agamas deals

1 He puts them in two groups: (i) Pasupata, Mavrata-vada (possibly Maha-vrata), Kapalika, Varna, Bhairava, Aikya-vada; (ii) Urdha-saiva, Anadi-saiva, Adi-saiva, Maha-saiva, Bheda-saiva, Abheda-saiva, Antara-saiva, Guna-Saiva, Nirguna-saiva, Adhvan-Saiva, Yoga-^aiva, Jnana-saiva, Anu-saiva, Kriya-^aiva, Nalu-pada-saiva, J§uddha-3aiva.

with rituals, forms of worship, construction of the places of worship and mantras, and the like. These have no philosophical value and could not, therefore, be taken account of and had simply to be ignored.

The Agamic Saivism belongs principally to the Tamil country, the Pasupata to Gujarat and Pratyabhijna to Kasmir and the northern parts of India. The Vlra-saiva is found mostly among the Kanarese-speaking countries. Schomerus points out that it is sometimes claimed that the Agamas were written in the Dravidian languages in prehistoric times, and that they owe their origin to revelation by Siva, to Nandiperuman in the form of Srikantha-rudra in the Mahendra Parbata in Tinivelly District. Owing to a great flood much of these twenty-eight Agamas were lost. The rest is now available in the Sanskrit translations and even the Dravidian texts abound with Sanskrit words. But this claim cannot be substantiated in any way. The reference to the Agamas is found in the Vayaviya-samhita of the Siva-mahdpurdna and the Suta-samhita 1 . The references show that the Kamika and other Agamas were written in Sanskrit, as they formed a cognate literature with the Vedas. Portions of the Kamika in Sanskrit quotations have been available to the present writer; similarly Mrgendra, which formed a part of the Kamika, is wholly available in Sanskrit. In the section on the Agamic Saivism the present writer has drawn his materials from these Agamas. It has already been noted that there is a definite text in the Svayambhuvagama that these Sanskrit works were translated into Prakrt and other local dialects. We are, therefore, forced to think that the assertion that these Agamas were originally written in Dravidian and then translated into Sanskrit, seems only to be a mythical patriotic belief of the Tamil people.

Schomerus mentions the names of twenty-eight Saivagamas, though he sometimes spells them wrongly 2 . He further mentions

1 In Suta-samhita, part I, ch. 2, we find that the Vedas, Dharmasastras, Puranas, Mahabharata, Vedangas, Upavedas, the Agamas such as Kamika, etc. the Kapdla and the Lakula, the Pasupata, the Soma and the Bhairavdgamas and such other Agamas are mentioned in the same breath as forming a cognate literature. Suta-samhita is generally regarded as a work of the sixth century a.d.

2 Kamika, Yogaja, Cintya, Kdraruz, Ajita, Dipta, Suksma, Sdhasraka, Atfsuman, Suprabheda, Vijaya, Nihsvdsa, Svdyambhuva, Anila, Vira, Raurava, Makuta, Vimala, Candrahdsa, Mukha-jug-bimba or Bimba, Udglta or Prodglta, Lalita, Siddha, Santana, Ndrasimha, Paramesvara, Kirana and Vdtula. Most of these have been already mentioned by the present writer and some of them are in his possession. Schomerus says that these names are found in J§rlkantha's bhdsva, but the present writer is definite that they are not to be found there.

the names of fourteen canonical texts forming the materials of the Saiva-siddhanta Sastra. They are written in Tamil and the present writer only has the privilege of having the Sanskrit texts of the most important of them called the Siva-jnana-bodha of Meykanda-deva 1 .

Meykandadeva's Siva-jndna-bodha is a brief summary in twelve verses of an argumentative character taken from Rauravdgama, These twelve verses have also commentaries called Vdrtika and a number of other sub-commentaries. Meykandadeva's real name was Svetabana, and there are a number of mythical statements about him. A great scholar Arul-nanti Sivacarya became the disciple of Meykandadeva. Namah-sivaya-desika was the fifth disciple in succession of Meykandadeva, and Umapati, who was the third successor of Meykandadeva, lived in a.d. i 313. It is held, therefore, that Meykanda lived in the first third of the thirteenth century. Umapati was also the author of the Pauskaragama.

The earliest Tamil author of Saiva-siddhanata is Tirumular, who probably lived in the first century a.d. Only a part of his writings has been translated in the Siddhanta-dipika by N. Pillai. The later four Acaryas of Saiva-siddhanta are Manikka-vachakar, Appar, Jfiana-sambandha and Sundara, who flourished probably in the eighth century. Later on we have two important Saiva-siddhanta writers, Nampiyandar and Sekkilar. The former has a collection of works which passed by the name of Tamil-veda. He flourished probably towards the end of the eleventh century.

This Tamil-veda is even now recited in Saivite temples of the south. It consists of eleven books; the first seven are of the nature of hymns. Of three Acaryas, Appar ', Jnana-sambandha and Sundara, the eighth book is Tiru-vachaka, the ninth again consists of hymns. In the tenth book we find again some hymns of Tirumular. A part of the eleventh book contains mythological legends which form the groundwork of Periya-purana, the basis of the most important Tamil legends of the Tamil saints. The book was completed by the eleventh century. The Saiva-siddhanta

1 The Tamil works referred to by Schomerus as forming the group of the Saiva-siddhanta Nostra are as follows: Siva-jMna-bodha, Siva-jnana-siddhi, Irupavirupathu, Tiruvuntiyar, Tirukkalirrupadiyar, Unmaivilakka, Siva-prakdsa, Tiruvarudpayan, Vind-venba, Porripakrodai, Kodikkavi, Nencuviduttttu, Un-mainerivilakka and Sankalpa-nirakarana. The Siva-jndna-bodha of twelve verses is supposed to be a purport of the Rauravdgama and it has eight commentaries.

school sprang forth as a school of Saivism in the thirteenth century with Meykandadeva and his pupils Arulnanti and Umapati.

The account of Saivism, as can be gathered from the Tamil sources, may be found in Pope's translation of Tiru-vdchaka, Der Saiva-siddhanta by Schomerus, and in the writings of N. Pillai. The present writer is unfamiliar with the Tamil language and he has collected his account from original Sanskrit manuscripts of the Agamas of which the Tamil treatment is only a replica.

The Agama Literature and its Philosophical Perspective.

The philosophical views that are found in the Agama literature had been briefly summarised in the Sarva-darsana-satngraha under Saivism and have also been treated fairly elaborately in some of the sections of the present work. The Agama literature is pretty extensive, but its philosophical achievement is rather poor. The Agamas contain some elements of philosophical thought, but their interest is more on religious details of the cult of Saivism. We find therefore a good deal of ritualism, discussion of the architectural techniques for the foundation of temples, and mantras and details of worship connected with the setting up of the phallic symbol of Siva. Yet in most of the Agamas there is a separate section called the Vidya-pdda in which the general philosophical view underlying the cult is enunciated. There are slight differences in the enunciation of these views as we pass on from one Agama to another. Most of these Agamas still lie unpublished, and yet they form the religious kernel of Saivism as practised by millions of people in different parts of India. There may thus be a natural inquiry as to what may be the essential tenets of these Agamas. This, however, cannot be given without continual repetitions of the same kind of dogmatic thought. The present work is, of course, mainly concerned with the study of philosophy, but as the study of Saiva or Sakta thought cannot be separated from the religious dogmas with which they are inseparably connected, we can only take a few specimens of the Agamas and discuss the nature of thought that may be discovered there. In doing this we may be charged with indulging in repetitions, but we have to risk it in order to be able to give at least a rapid survey of the contents of

some of the most important Agamas. In what follows, the reader will have the opportunity of judging the literary contents of the philosophical aspects of some of the important Agamas, thereby getting a comprehensive view of the internal relation of Saivism to other branches of Indian philosophy.

The Mrgendrdgama has often been quoted in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha. This work is said to be a subsidiary part of Kdmikdgama, supposed to be one of the oldest of the Agamas, and has been referred to in the Suta-samhitd which is regarded as a work of the sixth century. The Suta-samhitd refers to the Kami-kdgama with the reverence that is due to very old texts.

Mrgendrdgama 1 opens the discussion of how the old Vedic forms of worship became superseded by the Saiva cult. It was pointed out that the Vedic deities were not concrete substantial objects, but their reality consisted of the mantras with which they were welcomed and worshipped, and consequently Vedic worship cannot be regarded as a concrete form of worship existing in time and space. But devotion to Siva may be regarded as a definite and concrete form of worship which could, therefore, supersede the Vedic practices. In the second chapter of the work, Siva is described as being devoid of all impurities. He is omniscient and the instrumental agent of all things. He already knows how the individual souls are going to behave and associates and dissociates all beings with knots of bondage in accordance with that.

The Saivdgama discusses the main problem of the production, maintenance, destruction, veiling up of the truth and liberation. These are all done by the instrumental agent, God Siva. In such a view the creation of the world, its maintenance and destruction are naturally designed by the supreme Lord in the beginning, yet things unfold in the natural course. The changes in the world of our experiences are not arranged by the later actions of beings. But yet the attainment of liberation is so planned that it cannot take place without individual effort.

Consciousness is of the nature of intuitive knowledge and spontaneous action (caitanyam drk-kriyd-rupam). This conscious-

1 Since writing this section on the basis of the original manuscript the present writer has come across a printed text of the Vidya and Yogapada of Mrgendrdgama published in 1928 by K. M. Subrahmanya Jsastri, with a commentary by Bhafta-narayana Kan^ha called Mrgendra-vrtti, and a sub-commentary by Aghora-sivacarya called Mrgendra-vrtti-dlpika.

ness always abides in the soul, and some of the categories for the application of this consciousness are discussed along with the various religio-moral conducts called caryd. There is also a brief criticism for refuting Vedanta, Samkhya, Vaisesika, Buddhism and Jainism.

The Saivdgama holds that, from perceiving our bodies and other embodied things, we naturally infer that there is some instrumental agent who must be premised as the cause of the world. A difference of effects naturally presumes a difference in the cause and its nature. Effects are accomplished through particular instruments. These instruments are all of a spiritual nature. They are also of the nature of energy. In the case of inference the concomitance is generally perceived in some instances. But in the case of attributing creation to Siva we have no datum of actual experience, as Siva is bodyless. But it is held that one can conceive the body of Siva as being constituted of certain mantras. When anyone is to be liberated, the quality of tamas as veiling the consciousness of the individual is removed by God. Those whose tamas is removed naturally ripen forth for the ultimate goal of liberation. They have not to wait any longer for Siva to manifest their special qualities. We have already seen that Siva is the manifesting agent or abhiv-yanjaka of all our activities.

The source of all bondage is mahesvari sakti which helps all people to develop and grow in their own pattern (sarvanugrahika). Though there may be many cases in which we suffer pain, yet the mahesvari sakti is regarded as being of universal service. The explanation is to be found in the view that often it is only through the way of suffering that we can attain our good. Siva is always directing the sakti for our own good, even though we may seem to suffer in the intervening period (dharmino'nugraho nama yat-taddharmanuvartanam). All actions of the Lord are for the sake of the individual souls, that is, for making them wise and act forward, so that ultimately they may be purged of their malas.

The different causal chains manifest different kinds of chains in the effects. The Saiva view accepts sat-kdrya-vada and so admits that all the effects are there. It is only in the manner in which the causal chains manifest that different kinds of chains are effected. Thus the same malas appear in diverse forms to different kinds of persons and indicate different stages of progress. The mala is

regarded as the unholy seed that pervades the whole world and manifests through it and is ultimately destroyed. It is through these manifestations that one can infer the existence of God, the instrumental cause {kartoH-numlyate yena jagad-dharmena hetuna). This mala is inanimate, for such a theory suits the nature of effects. It is easier to assume preferably one cause of mala than many. The cloth is manifested by the action of the weaving spindles. The substance of the cloth would have been manifested in other forms according to the action of the various accessories, for all the effects are there, though they can only be manifested through the operation of accessories. It is difficult to imagine the concept of productive power. It is better to assume that the things are already there and are revealed to us by the action of the different kinds of causes 1 .

The individual souls are all-pervasive and they possess eternal power by the Power of God. The only trouble is that on account of the veils of mala they are not always conscious of their nature. It is through the action of Siva that these veils are so far removed that the individual souls may find themselves interested in their experiences. This is done by associating the individual minds with the thirty-six kalds produced from the disturbance of maya. We have already discussed the nature of these thirty-six tattvas or categories in our treatment of the philosophy of Tattva-prakasika of Bhoja. It is through these categories that the veils are torn asunder and the individual becomes interested in his experiences. Kala means that which moves anybody (prasaranam preranam sa kurvati tamasah kala). The individual soul has to await the grace of God for being associated with these kalds for all his experiences, as he is himself unable to do so on his own account. The karma done by a man also remains embedded in Prakrti and produces effects by the category of niyati.

1 sdnvaya-vyatirekdbhydm rudhito vd 'vaslyate,

tadvyakti-jananam noma tat-kdraka-samdsraydt. tena tantu-gatdkdram patdkdrd'barodhakam, vemddind 'paniydtha patavyaktih prakdsyate.

Ninth patala.

Siva-jfiana-bodha. By Meykandadeva

This is a brief work of twelve karikas (sometimes called sutras), and taken from Rauravdgama, as has already been pointed out. It has a number of commentaries. Its Tamil translation forms the basic work of the Siva-jndna-siddhi school of thought, and has been elaborated by many capable writers. The general argument of the Siva-jndna-siddhi is as follows:

This world, consisting of males, females and other neutral objects, must have a cause. This cause is not perceivable, but has to be inferred. Since it has come into being in time, it may be presumed that it has a creator. Moreover the world does not move of itself and it may, therefore, be presumed that there must be an agent behind it.

The world is destroyed by God and is re-created by Him to afford proper facilities to the malas for their proper expression. The position, therefore, is that though the material cause (updddna) is already present, yet there must be a nimitta-kdrana or instrumental agent for the creation and the maintenance of the world. At the time of dissolution the world-appearance becomes dissolved in the impurities or malas. After a period, the world again reappears through the instrumentality of Siva. Siva thus on the one hand creates the world, and on the other hand destroys it. It is said that as in the summer all roots dry up and in the rains they shoot up again into new plants, so though the world is destroyed the impressions of the old malas remain inlaid in the prakrti, and when the proper time comes they begin to show themselves in diverse forms of world creation according to the will of God. The creation has to take a definite order in accordance with the good and bad deeds of persons. This creation cannot take place spontaneously by compounding the four elements.

God is the instrumental agent through which the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction take place. The Saiva view of Meykandadeva is entirely opposed to the purely monistic theory of Sankara. The jiva cannot be regarded as identical with Brahman. It is true that in the Upanisads the individual soul (or jiva) and Brahman are both regarded as self-luminous and inner-controlled, but that does not mean that the self and the Brahman are identical.

The instrumental agent is one. The individual souls being bound by bondage or pdsa cannot be regarded as being identical with the ultimate agent or Brahman.

The deeds of a person do not automatically produce effects. The effects are associated with the person in accordance with the will of God. The deeds themselves are inanimate and they cannot therefore produce effects spontaneously. All effectuation is due to God, though it does not imply any change of state in the nature of God. An analogy is taken to illustrate how changes can be produced without any effort or change in the changeless. Thus the sun shines far away in the sky and yet without any interference on its part, the lotus blooms in the lake on the earth. So God rests in His self-shiningness, and the changes in the world are produced apparently in a spontaneous manner. God lives and moves in and through all beings. It is only in this sense that the world is one with God and dependent on Him.

The very denial of the different assertions that the self is this or that proves the existence of the self through our self-consciousness. We thereby assume the existence of an unconditioned self, because such a self cannot be particularised. It is easily seen that such a self is not the same as any of the visible organs or internal organs or the manas.

The self is different from the inner organs, the mind and the senses; but yet they can be taken as forming a joint view of reality, as in the case of the sea. The waves and billows and the foam and the wind form one whole, though in reality they are different from one another. The malas which are supposed to be mainly embedded in the mdyd, naturally stick to our bodies which are the products of mdyd, and being there they pollute the right perspective as well as the right vision of all things. The commentator, whose name is untraceable, adduces the example of the magnet and iron filings to explain the action of God on the world without undergoing any change. It is the power of Siva working in and through us by which we can act or reap the fruits of our action according to our deeds.

Siva is to be known through inference as the cause which is neither visible nor invisible. His existence thus can only be known by inference. The acit or unconscious material passes before Siva, but does not affect it, so that Siva is quite unconscious of the world-appearance. It is only the jivas that can know both the

world and Siva 1 . When a saint becomes free from impurities of three kinds, the dnava, mdyika and kdrmana-mala, the world appearance vanishes from before his eyes, and he becomes one with the pure illumination.

Suradantacarya in his Vydkhydna-kdrikd repeats the above ideas, but holds that Siva through His omniscience knows all about the world and the experiences of all beings, but He is not affected by them 2 . Another fragmentary commentary of an unknown author, who had written a commentary on Mrgendra called Mrgendra-vrtti-dipikd, which sometimes refers to the SvdyambhuvdgamaandtheMdtanga-paramesvara-dgama, discusses some of the main topics of Siva-jndna-bodha in the work called Pasupati-pdsa-vicdra-prakarana.

Pasu is defined as pure consciousness (cinmdtra) covered with impurities. The pasu goes through the cycle of birth and rebirth, and it goes also by the name dtman. It is all-pervading in space and time. The pure consciousness is of the nature oijndna and kriyd. The Agamas do not believe that the soul is one. It is pure consciousness that appears as distinct from one another by their association of different kinds of mala which are integrated with them from beginningless time 3 .

Its body consists of all the categories, beginning with kald and running up to gross matter. The soul is called anisvara because it may have a subtle body, but not the gross one, so that it is unable to enjoy its desire. The soul is regarded as akriya or devoid of action. Even when through knowledge and renunciation it avoids all action, the body may go on by the successive impulses of previous actions {tisthati samskdra-vasdt cakra-bhramavad-dhrta-s'arirah). Though there are many souls, they are spoken of in the singular number as pasu in the universal sense.

The mala is regarded as being included within pdsa. It is not therefore a different category. The pure self-consciousness is entirely different from the impurity or mala. How can then the mala affect the purity of the pure consciousness? To this the reply

1 nacit-cit sannidhau kintu na vittas te ubhe mithah, prapanca-sivayor vetta yah sa dtmd tayoh prthak.

2 .. .sivo jandti visvakam, sva-bhogyatvena tu param naiva jandti kincana.

3 anena mala-yukto vijnana-kevala uktah. sammudha ityanena pralayena kaldder upasamhftatvdt samyak mudhah. Pasupati-pdsa-vicdra-prakarana (Adyar Library manuscript).

is that as pure gold may be associated with dross without affecting its nature, so the pure consciousness that constitutes the Siva within us may remain pure, even though it may be covered with mala from beginningless time. The mala thus does not affect the nature of the self as Siva.

It is by the grace of Siva, attained through proper initiation in Saivism by a proper preceptor, that the impurities can be removed, and not by mere knowledge as such. The mala being the nature of substance, it can be removed only by an action on the part of God. Mere knowledge cannot destroy it. The malas being beginningless are not many but one. According to different kinds of karma, the malas have distinct and different kinds of bondage. The different distinctive powers and obscurations made by the mala serve to differentiate the different selves, which basically are all Siva. Liberation does not mean any transformation, but only the removal of particular malas with reference to which different individual entities as jivas were passing through the cycle of birth and rebirth. This removal is effected by Siva when the Saiva initiation is taken with the help of proper preceptors 1 .

The malas consist of dharma and adharma, and may be due to karma or mdyd; they also constitute the bondage or the pdsas. This Agama refers to Mrgendragama, the doctrines of which it follows in describing the nature oipdia, mala, etc. The pdsa is really the tirodhanasakti of Siva. The pdsas are threefold: (1) sahaja, those malas with which we are associated from beginningless time and which stay on until liberation; (2) dgantuka, meaning all our senses and sense-objects; and (3) sumsargika, that is those which are produced by the intercourse of sahaja and the dgantuka mala.

The creation and the manifestation of our experiences take place in accordance with our karma as revealed by God. Just as a field sown with seeds does not produce the same kind of crop for every peasant, so in spite of same kinds of actions we may have different kinds of results manifested to us by God. The karmas and other things are all inanimate, and thus it is only by the will of God that different kinds of results are manifested to us. The Saiva view thus upholds the satkdrya-vdda theory and regards God as abhivyanjaka or manifestor of all our experiences and karmas.

1 evan ca pdsd-panayanad atmanah sarva-jnatva-sarva-kartrtvatmaka-sivatvdbhivyaktir eva mukti-dasdydm, na tu parinama-svarupa-vindsah.

Matanga-paramesvara-tantra.

The Saiva sastra is described as sat-padartha and catus-pada and not as tri-paddrtha and catus-pada; formerly it was written by Sada-siva in ten million verses and Ananta summarised it in one lakh verses, which has been further summarised in 3500 verses. The six categories are (1) pati\ (2) sakti; (3) triparva; (4) pasu; (5) bodha; and (6) mantra.

Sakti or energy is the means by which we can infer pati, the possessor of sakti. In inference we sometimes infer the possessor of the quality by its quality, and sometimes the cause from the effect or the effect from the cause. Sometimes the existence of a thing is taken for granted on the authority of the Vedas. From the body of Siva, which is of the nature of mantras, the sakti emanates downwards in the form of bindu, which later on develops into the world 1 . Siva enters into the bindu and unfolds it for various types of creation. The diversity in the world is due to a difference in karma and guna of the individual souls, where the individual souls may be regarded as the container and the karma as contained. The individual souls are responsible for their actions and have to enjoy their good or bad fruits. God is the controller of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. It is He who is the instrumental cause of the world, and the energies are the material cause and are regarded as the samavayi-kdrana of the world. This world is the production of maya. As the rays of the sun or the moon induce the blooming of flowers spontaneously without any actual interference, so the Siva manifests the world by His mere proximity.

Seven sahaja-malas have been enumerated as follows: (1) moha, (2) mada, (3) rdga, (4) visdda, (5) sosa, (6) vaicitta and (7) harsa.

The kalas are produced from maya, and it is in association with maya that they carry on their work, just as paddy seeds can produce shoots in association with the husk in which they are enclosed.

The souls as they are driven through the world, become attached to worldly things through kald. This association is further

1 It is traditionally believed that the mantras or hymns constitute the body of a deity.

tightened by vasand ; so the souls become attached to all enjoyments, and this is called rdga. With all attachments there is sorrow, and therefore non-attachment to all sense-pleasures leads to the best attainment of happiness.

The nature of kala and niyati are discussed in the same way as in other books of Saiva-siddhanta.

Maya comes out from God as an expression of His subtle energy, and from maya there evolves the pradhdna, which in its first stage is only pure being or satta. Later on other categories evolve out of it and they supply the materials for the experience oipurusa. The purusa and the prakrti thus mutually support each other in the development of categories and experience.

The ahankara infuses the self in and through the sense-organs and operates as their functions. The same may be said regarding the application of ahankara in and through the tanmdtras. The ahankara thus represents the entire psychic state in a unity. The ahankara is present also in dormant state in trees, plants, etc.

Pauskaragama.

In the Pauskaragama jiidna is defined as consisting of the energy inherent in Siva. Six categories described are "patih kundalini maya pasuh pdsas ca kdrakah." Lay a, bhoga and adhikdra are the three functions of sakti. Maya as generated by the actions of men, supplies the elements by which the objects of experience and experience are made. Pasu is that which experiences and reacts. The categories beginning from kala to earth (ksiti) are real entities. Laya is called bondage and is regarded as the fifth category. The sixth category is equal to bhukti, mukti, vyakti, phala, kriyd and diksd taken together. Bindu and anus are the real entities. When the manifold creation shrinks into the bindu, we have that stage in Siva which is called dissolution (laya). In the original state actions of the type of sadrsa parinama go on. Siva is described as vispasta cinmdtra and vyapaka. His energies only can operate, while He remains unmoved. When the energies begin to operate in the bindu, the bindu becomes fit for being the data of experience. This state of bindu with Siva reflected in it is called the sadd-siva. Even in this stage there is really no change in Siva. When the energies

are in the state of operation, we have the state of creation, and the experience of it is called bhoga.

The point arises that if the bindu is itself active in creation, then its relation with Siva becomes redundant. On the other hand, if the bindu is moved by Siva to active operation, Siva becomes changeable. The reply is that an agent can affect any material in two ways, either by his simple desire or by his organised effort, as in the case of the making of a pot by the potter. Siva moves the bindu simply by His samkalpa, and therefore He does not suffer any change. In the case of the action of the potter also, it is by the wish of Siva that the potter can act. Therefore, Siva is the sole agent of all actions performed by animate beings or by inanimate matter.

It maybe said that Siva is wholly unconditioned, and therefore He can remain the sole agent without undergoing any change. Another tentative answer is that in the presence of Siva, the bindu begins to work without any causal efficiency (compare the movement oiprakrti in the presence of purusa).

The bindu has sometimes been described as santyatita and other times as the material cause of the creation. This difficulty is explained on the assumption that part of the bindu is santyatita and the other part is responsible for being the material cause of the world. The third category including the bindu and Siva is called Isvara. Siva produces commotion in bindu merely by His presence. In this way Siva is not only the instrumental agent of all happenings in the inanimate, but He also is responsible for all actions of the human body which are seemingly produced by the human will.

Knowledge and activity are in essence identical, and for that reason, when there is action (vyapdra), we may feel as if we are the agents of those actions. The element of action that seems to express itself is thus something more than the action, and it is called the adhikara-kriya. The action and that which is acted upon is the result of guna-samkalpa. Siva stands as the citi-iakti which makes all energies dynamic, as the sun makes the lotus bloom from a distance without any actual interference.

In further explaining the philosophical situation Siva says that a part of the bindu is in the transcendental {santyatita) state, while the other part is responsible for the creative action. This second category, that is, the lower half of the bindu, is supposed to be moved by Siva. The energies are often classified under different

names as performing different functions. Sakti and saktiman are the same. They are only differently classified according to their diverse functions.

The inanimate world is inoperative without the action or the interference of a conscious being. That conscious being is God Siva; even the milk in the udder of the cow flows by the active affection of the cow for the calf. The illustration of the magnet drawing the iron filings does not fit in, for there also is the person who brings the magnet near the iron filings.

It cannot, however, be urged that the purusas themselves could be regarded as active agents, for according to the scriptural texts they are also moved to activity by the will of God 1 .

The world-appearance cannot be proved to be false or illusory. It is made up of the stuff of one common object called maya, which is later on conceived as functioning in different ways called sattva, rajas and tamas. The maya stuff is the repository of all karmas. But yet not all persons gain the fruits of all their karmas. They have to depend upon some other being for the proper fruition of their karmas. This is where God comes in as the ultimate bestower of the fruits of karma.

Mala or impurity is always associated with all souls. The Agama tries to refute the epistemological view of other systems of thought like the Carvaka and the monism of Sankara. The Agama holds that since the souls are eternal, their knowledge must also be eternal due to eternal unchanging cause. The difference of knowledge in individuals is due to the obscuration of their knowledge by the various veils of mala. The original cause of knowledge is all-pervading and is the same in all persons 2 .

The self is realised as revealing itself and others. If it is supposed that the self is reflected through buddhi, then even buddhi

1 vivddddhydsitam visvam visva-vit-kartr-purvakatn, karyatvdd dvayoh siddham kdryatn kumbhddikam yathd.

First patala.

2 tac ceha vibku-dharmatvdn na ca kvdcitkam isyate, nityatvam iva tendtmd sthitah sarvdrtha-drk-hriyah. jndtrtvam api yadyasya kvdcitkam vibhutd kutah, dharmino ydvatl vydptis tdvad-dharmasya ca sthitih, yathd pata-sthitam sauklyam patam vydpydkhilam sthitam, sthitam vydpyaivam dtmanam jndtrtvam api sarvadd,

na ca nirvisayam jndnam pardpeksam svarupatah.

Fourth patala.

also may be regarded as conscious self. So the idea of explaining the situation as being the reflection of consciousness in buddhi, also fails. Again this reflection of consciousness in buddhi cannot be regarded as conscious entity. It may also be pointed out that the consciousness as spirit cannot be reflected in buddhi which is known as spiritual. The view of mutual reflection of consciousness into buddhi and buddhi into consciousness is also untenable. It has, therefore, to be admitted that the soul as an eternal being can perceive all things and act as it likes. If the qualities inhere permanently or temporarily in an entity, then that inherence in the entity must be of a permanent or of a temporary nature as the case may be. The consciousness of the soul should, therefore, be regarded as co-extensive with its being. The selves are atomic in size and cannot therefore pervade the whole body. We have already said that the self in revealing itself also reveals other things. We must remember in this connection that an entity like the fire cannot be distinguished from the energy that it has.

Again the objects perceived cannot be regarded as mere ignorance (ajndna), for one cannot deal with mere ajnana> just as one cannot bring water without a pitcher. The things we perceive are real entities. This ajndna cannot be taken in the sense of prdgabhava, for then that would imply another origination of knowledge; or it could be explained as wrong knowledge. This wrong knowledge may be regarded as accidental or natural. If it is accidental or natural, then it must be due to some causes and cannot, therefore, be regarded as wrong knowledge. If it is wrong knowledge only arising occasionally, then it cannot contradict right knowledge. Ordinarily one cannot expect the illusoriness of silver to contradict the knowledge of conch-shell 1 . For this reason the self, which is intuitively realised as all-consciousness, cannot be regarded as having only limited knowledge. That appearance of the souls possessing limited knowledge must be due to its association with impurities. The energy of consciousness is eternal, and therefore its nature cannot be disturbed by the association of impurities which may constitute experience, as arising from dharma and adharma. The malas are regarded as sevenfold, and include within them the passions of mada, moha, etc. These malas are

1 kin caitad anyatha-jnanam na samyag jndna-bddhakam.

Fourth patala.

regarded as being natural to the souls. The mala of moha appears in various forms, as attachment to wife, son, money, etc.

It is only the spiritual that can contradict the non-spiritual. Two spiritual entities or the non-spiritual entities cannot contradict each other. One soul cannot be contradicted by another soul.

If the association of malas with the souls is regarded as beginningless, then how can they veil the nature of the self, and what must be the nature of this veil? It cannot be said that this veiling means the covering of what was already illuminated; for in that case, this obscuration of illumination of an entity, which is of the nature of light, must mean its destruction. The reply is that the energy of consciousness (cicchakti) cannot be veiled by the malas. The malas can only arrest its function.

Sakti is defined as being of the nature of immediate intuition and action. If that is so, the sakti is associated with knowable objects. How can then the objects be different from the energy? In reply it is said that the intuitive knowledge and action (drkkriyd), the sakti, as such remains united as drk and kriya. They are indivisibly connected as one, and it is for us to think of them as divided into drk and kriya 1 . All words denoting particular objects are for others and are under the veil of mala. By the suppression of mala, the energy is turned away from sense objects. In this way the mala operates against the cicchakti, and thereby malas obscure the omniscient character of the souls.

In the fifth chapter, the Agama deals with the different kinds of pdsas or bonds. These bonds are kola, avidya, rdga, kala and niyati. These five categories are regarded as proceeding from mdya. The consciousness shows itself through these kalds. The consciousness is associated with both intuitive knowledge and the power of work. The kalds reflect the consciousness of the soul only partially. This reflection is effected in accordance with one's karma.

All experience is due to the functioning of the power of knowledge and of the objects to be known. This is technically called grdhaka and grahya. It is by the association of consciousness that the kalds appear to be functioning for the apprehension of things. From kala comes vidyd. Kala supplies the basis of experience as time and space. Later on other categories of the intellect also

1 avibhdgasya bhagoktau tad-vibhaga upddhitah.

Fourth patala.

evolve and we have the concept of buddhi as deliberate decision. In this way the different categories such as ahankdra or abhimdna are produced. They in themselves would not be conscious except through the consciousness which impregnates them.

The buddhi manifests itself through diverse forms according to their vdsands. A full enumeration of them is given in the texts, but we omit them as they are not philosophically important. They, however, include the various instinctive tendencies and delusions which are enumerated in Samkhya and other places.

The difficulty is that the buddhi and ahankdra seem to cover the same ground. How is it then possible to distinguish buddhi from ahankdra} To this the reply is that when something is deliberately known as this or that, we have the stage of buddhi. But in the stage of ahankdra we seem to behave as knowers, and all objects that come to our purview are labelled as parts of our knowledge. There is no means by which the ego-consciousness of any individual can be confused with the ego-consciousness of another. They are thus realised as different from one another 1 .

The Agama describes the three kinds of creation as sdttvika, rdjasa and tdmasa as proceeding from three kinds of ahankdra, and describes the origination of jndnendriyas, karmendriyas, tanmdtras and manas. When things are perceived by the senses and their value as this or that is attested by an inner function, so that the red can be distinguished from the blue, that inner function is called manas 2 .

When we perceive an animal having certain peculiarities, then we can extend the use of the word to denote another animal having the same kind of features. The inner function by which this is done is manas.

The Agama gives an elaborate description of the cognitive senses and particularly of the organ of the eye. The mere proximity of consciousness cannot generate the activity. This can only be generated by the association of the consciousness with the sense organs.

The Agama criticises the Buddhist position and supposes that the Buddhist doctrine of artha-kriyd-kdritd can hold good only if the entities are not momentary, but have extensive existence.

1 yady abhinnam ahankrt syau devadatto 'pyaham matih, anyasydm upajayeta natmaikatvam tatah sthitam. Sixth patala.

2 caksusa locite hy arthe tamartham buddhi-gocaram, vidadhatiha yad vipras tanmanah paripathyate. Sixth patala.

Speaking of the gunas, the Agama refuses to admit their substantive nature. It is only when certain gunas are in a collocated state that we call them guna reals.

Our senses can only perceive certain objective qualities, but they cannot perceive any substratum behind them. Therefore it is logically incorrect to infer any substratum, which may be called gunas as reals. After a discussion about what may be the original material cause either as partless atoms or as immaterial prakrti, the Agama decides in favour of the latter. But this prakrti is not the state of equilibrium (samyavastha) ofthegunas as the Samkhya holds.

The Agama discusses the prdpya-karitva and aprapya-kdritva of the different senses. It also says that movement does not belong originally to every atom, but it belongs only to the living atoms, the souls. It cannot also be due to the mere presence of other things.

When the manas is associated with cicchakti, then it attains the knowledge of all things by the exercise of the internal organs. At the first moment this knowledge is indeterminate. Later on various determinations become associated with it. The perception of things at different times becomes synthetised and concretised, otherwise the various memory images might arise before the mind and prevent the formation of a synthetic image, as we find in the case of a concrete perception.

It is only the ego-consciousness or the abhimana that produces in us the sense agency (katrtva). Without this sense of abhimana there would be no difference between the self and other material objects. From ego-consciousness there proceeds the deliberate consciousness of decision (niscaya).

Knowledge of things cannot arise merely from buddhi, for the stuff of buddhi is material. Consciousness can only arise occasionally in consequence of its relation with cicchakti. If the mental states are always changing, then they cannot be perceived as constant, though they may appear to be so, like the flame of a lamp which changes from moment to moment, but yet appears to be the same.

Turning to the doctrine of artha-kriya-karita of the Buddhists, the Agama says that if the doctrine of artha-kriya-karita be accepted, then the existence of things cannot properly be explained. The proper view is that of parindma-vada. If the things are momentary, then effects cannot be produced, for a thing must remain for at least two moments in order to produce an effect. If

the two moments are separate entities, then one cannot be the cause of the other. The causal change can only be with reference to the existing things, but not with regard to the entities which are momentary. In order that there may be a production, the thing must remain for two moments at least. Things that are existent need not always be productive. The production of an effect may depend on accessory causes. A jug cannot be produced by threads, but the threads may produce a piece of cloth. This shows that the effect is always already in the cause.

It cannot also be held that our mental states are identical with the external objects, for in that case it would be difficult to explain the multiplicity of our cognitive states in accordance with their objects. We would not be able to explain how one entity assumes so many diverse forms. The only course left is to admit some external objects with which our senses come into contact. These objects consist of a conglomeration of tanmatras. It is in and through this conglomeration of tanmatras that new qualities arise to which we give the names of different bhutas. The difference between tanmatras and bhutas is that the former are more subtle and the latter more gross. This view is somewhat different from the Samkhya view, for here the bhutas are not regarded as different categories, but only as a conglomeration of tanmatras. The idea that the gunas are certain objective entities is again and again repudiated. It is held that it is the conglomeration of gunas that is regarded by us as substantive entity.

The Agama then criticises the theory of atoms which are part-less. It is held that the partless atoms cannot have sides in which other atoms could be associated. The question is raised that tanmatras being formless (amurta) cannot themselves be the causes of all forms. The world of forms thus leads us to infer some material as its cause. To this Siva replies that the prakrti can be regarded as being endowed with form and also as formless 1 .

Siva in further replying to the questions says that things having form must have other entities endowed with forms as their causes. Therefore one may infer that the atoms are the causes of the world. In that case one cannot deny the fact that the atoms have forms. In further discussing the subject Siva says that the atoms are many

1 mdyd tu parama murta nitydnityasya karanam,

ekaneka-vibhdeddhya vastu-rupd sivdtmikd. Sixth patala.

and they have parts. So they are of the same type as other effects, such as jug, etc. As such the cause of the world must be regarded as being something which is formless. All effects are anitya, dependent on others (asrita), and have parts and are many. The Saivism, therefore, holds that their cause must be different, it must be one, independent and partless. Therefore it discards the view that the atoms are the material cause of the world 1 . The gross elements gradually evolved from the five tanmatras.

The Agama refutes the view that akasa is mere vacuity. Had it been a vacuity, it would have been a negation, and a negation always belongs to the positive entity. The Agama also refutes the possibility of akasa being regarded as any kind of negation. Sabda is regarded as the specific quality of akasa.

The Agama says that it admits only four pramanas: pratyaksa, anumana, sabda, and arthapatti. In reality it is pure consciousness devoid of all doubts that constitutes the truth underlying the pramanas. Doubt arises out of the oscillation of the mind between two poles. Memory refers to objects experienced before. In order that any knowledge may attain to the state of proper validity, it must be devoid of memory and doubt.

Pure consciousness is the real valid part in knowledge. Buddhi being itself a material thing cannot be regarded as constituting the valid element of knowledge. It is in and through the kalas that the pure consciousness comes into contact with the objective world. This perception may be either nirvikalpa or savikalpa. In the nirvikalpa perception there is no reference in the mind to class concepts or names. By the nirvikalpa perception one can perceive things as they are without any association of names, etc.

Perception is of two kinds: (1) as associated with the senses, and (2) as unassociated with the senses as in the case of intuitive knowledge by yoga. When associated with senses the perceptive function removes the veil between the objects and the self, so that the objects can be directly perceived. In explaining the nature of perception the Agama follows the Nyaya technique of samyukta-samavaya, etc., for explaining the situation. It believes like Nyaya in five types of propositions, namely pratijna, hetu> drstanta, upanaya and nigamana.

1 tato na paramanunam hetutvam yuktibhir matam. Sixth patala.

Vatulagama 1 .

Vatulagama from Adyar with commentary seems to be almost identical with the Vatulagama of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute, only with this difference that the Vatulagama of Mysore contains more verses in the concluding tenth chapter in which the Vira-saiva doctrine is praised above other Saiva doctrines. But the original beginning is more or less like the general Saiva doctrine as may be found in Tattva-prakasika with Aghora-sivacarya's commentary. There is also the tendency to derive the existence of Siva as the ultimate reality on the basis of inference, as may be found in the Siddhanta systems of Saivism, such as the Mrgendra-gama or in the Lakulisa-Pasupata system. The supplementary portion of Vatulagama introduces the doctrine of linga-dharana of the Vira-saivas, but does not say anything about its specific philosophy or about its other doctrines associated with sat-sthala.

Vatula-tantram 2 .

&iva-tattva is of three kinds: (1) niskala, (2) sakala and (3) niskala-sakala. Siva may be distinguished in ten ways:

(1) tattva-bheda, (2) varna-bheda, (3) cakra-bheda, (4) varga-bheda, (5) mantra-bheda, (6) pranava, (7) brahma-bheda, (8) anga-bheda, (9) mantra-jata, (10) kila. Though previously it has been said to be of three kinds, it has three forms again: (1) subrahmanya-siva,

(2) sada-siva and (3) mahesa.

Siva is called niskala when all His kalas, that is parts or organs or functions, are concentrated in a unity within Him. In further defining the nature of niskalatva, the author says that when the pure and impure elements that contribute to experience are collected together and merged in the original cause, and remain there as the budding cause of all powers that are to develop the universe, we have the niskala stage. The commentator supports this idea by quotations from many texts. The sakala-niskala is that in which the deeds of persons are in a dormant state, and when the time of creation comes it associates itself with the bindu state for

1 Oriental Research Institute, Mysore.

2 Adyar Library manuscript.

the formation of the world. The bindu represents the mdyopdddna with which Siva associates Himself for the creation 1 . These different names oisakala and niskala and sakala-niskala of Siva are but different moments in Siva and do not constitute any actual transformation in Him, for He always remains unchanged in Himself. In Siva, therefore, there is no change. The changes are to be found in the bindu and the anus 2 .

God can only be proved by anumdna as being the instrumental cause of the world. This is taking the old Saiva view of the Siddhanta, like the Mrgendragama. The agency of God is to be explained by the supposition that by His desire everything is accomplished. He does not take to any instrument or organs for accomplishing any act. Thus when the potter makes his pot, it is through the infusion of God's power that he can do so. In the case of the potter, the agency is different, because he works with his instruments and organs. Siva through His energy can know and do all things.

Siva creates all things by His simple samkalpa and this creation is called the suddhadhva. The author refers to Tattva-prakasika of Bhoja and the commentary on it by Aghora-sivacarya.

Sakti is the will of God and that is called bindu. From that arises ndda which is a source of all speech 3 .

We have given some analysis of some of the important Agamas just to show the nature of the subjects that are dealt with in these Agamas. A more comprehensive account of the Agamas could easily have been given, but that would have involved only tiresome repetition. Most of the Agamas deal with the same sort of subjects more or less in the same manner with some incidental variations as

1 mahesah sakalah bindu-mdyopdddna-janita-tanu-karanddibhir dtmdnam yadd suddhdsuddha-bhogam prayacchati tadd siva-sangakah sa eva bhagavdn sakala ity ucyate.

2 laya-bhogddhikdrdndm na bhedo vdstavah sive, kintu vindor anundnt ca vdstavd eva te matdh.

3 saktir iccheti vijneyd iabdo jnanam ihocyate, vdgbhavant syat kriyd-saktih kald vai sodaia smrtah. yd paramesvarasya icchd sd saktir iti jneya, saktestu jdyate sabdafr. Yat paramesvarasya jnanam tadeva sabdah. sabddt jdyate vagbhavah. yd paramesvarasya kriyd sa tu vdgbhavah. sodasa svardh kald ity ucyante.

Quoted from Pauskaragama:

acetanam jagad viprds cetana-prerakam vind, pravrttau vd nivrttau vd na svatantram rathddivat.

regards their emphasis on this or that subject. They also sometimes vary as regards their style and mode of approach. Thus the Agama called Siva-jnana-siddhi deals with the various subjects by quotations from a large number of Agamas. This shows that there was an internal unity among the various Agamas. From these collective works we can know much of the contents of the different Agamas. This is important as some of these Agamas are scarcely available even as a single manuscript.

The date of these Agamas cannot be definitely fixed. It may be suggested that the earliest of them were written sometime in the second or third century a.d., and these must have been continued till the thirteenth or fourteenth century. In addition to the theological or religious dogmatics, they contain discussions on the nature of the various ducts or nadis in connection with the directions regarding the performance of yoga or mental concentration. There are some slight disputations with rival systems of thought as those of the Buddhists, Jains and the Samkhya. But all this is very slight and may be practically ignored. There is no real contribution to any epistemological thought. We have only the same kind of stereotyped metaphysical dogma and the same kind of argument that leads to the admission of a creator from the creation as of the agent from the effects. Thus apparently the material cause, the upadana karana, described asprakrti and sometimes atoms, is different from the instrumental cause, God. But in order to maintain the absolute monistic view that Siva alone is the ultimate reality, this material cause is often regarded as the sakti or energy which is identical with God. Sometimes the entire creation is described as having an appearance before the individuals according to their karma through God's power of bondage. The individual souls are all infected by various impurities derived from maya or karma. These impurities are ultimately destroyed by the grace of God, when the Saiva initiation is taken.

These Agamas are also full of directions as regards various religious practices and disciplines, and also of various kinds of rituals, mantras, directions for the building of temples or of setting up of various kinds of phallic symbols, which, however, have to be entirely omitted from the present treatment of Saivism. But it is easy to see that the so-called Saiva philosophy of the Agamas is just a metaphysical kernel for upholding the Saiva religious life and

practices. These consist largely in inspiring the devotees to lead an absolutely moral life, wholly dedicated to Siva, and full of intoxicating fervour of devotion, as one may find in Tiru-vdchaka of Manikka-vachakar. This devotion is the devotion of service, of a life entirely dedicated to Lord Siva.

CHAPTER XXXV VfRA-SAIVISM

History and Literature of Vira-saivism.

The name * Vlra-saiva' as applied to a particular Saiva sect appears to be of a later date. Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha of the fourteenth century a.d., who mentions the Pasupatas and the Agamic Saivas, does not seem to know anything about the Vira-saivas. Sankara and Vacaspati and Ananda-giri of the eighth and the ninth centuries do not seem to know anything of the Vira-saivas. Neither are they alluded to in any of the Saivagamas. The Vdtula-tantra seems to have two editions (in manuscript), and in one of them the sat-sthala doctrine is mentioned in the form of an appendix, which shows that this introduction was of the nature of an apocrypha. The doctrine of linga-dharana in the manner in which it is done by the Lifigayats of the Vira-saivas can hardly be traced in any early works, though later Vlra-saiva writers like Sripati and others have twisted some of the older texts which allude to linga to mean the specific practices of linga-dharana as done by the Lingayats.

There is a general tradition that Basava, a Brahmin, son of Madiraja and Madamba was the founder of the Vlra-saiva sect. From his native place Bagevadi, he went to Kalyan near Bombay, at a comparatively young age, when Vijjala was reigning there as king (a.d. 1157-67). His maternal uncle Baladeva having resigned on account of illness, Basava was appointed as the minister in complete charge of Vijjala's treasury and other administrative functions. According to another tradition Basava succeeded in deciphering an inscription which disclosed some hidden treasure, and at this, King Vijjala was so pleased that he gave Basava the office of prime minister. According to the Basava-purdna, which narrates the life of Basava in a mythical puranic manner, Basava, on assuming the office, began to distribute gifts to all those who professed themselves to be the devotees of Siva. This led to much confusion and heart-burning among the other sects, and it so happened that King Vijjala cruelly punished two of the devotees

of Siva. At this, by the instigation of Basava, one of his followers murdered Vijjala. Bhandarkar gives some other details, which the present writer has not been able to trace in the Basava-purana (the source, according to Bhandarkar himself) 1 .

The Basava-purana was written after the time of Sripati Pandita. It is said there that at one time Narada reported to Siva that, while other religions were flourishing, the Saiva faith was with few exceptions dying out among the Brahmins, and so it was decaying among other castes also. Lord Siva then asked Nandi to get himself incarnated for taking the Vlra-saiva faith in consonance with the Varnasrama rites 2 . If this remark is of any value, it has to be admitted that even after the time of Sripati Pandita the Vlra-saiva faith had not assumed any importance in the Carnatic region. It also indicates that the Vlra-saiva faith at this time was not intended to be preached in opposition to the Hindu system of castes and caste duties. It has been contended that Basava introduced social reforms for the removal of castes and caste duties and some other Hindu customs. But this claim cannot be substantiated, as, in most of the Vlra-saiva works, we find a loyalty to the Hindu caste order. There is, of course, a tendency to create a brotherhood among the followers of Siva who grouped round Basava, as he was both politically and financially a patron of the followers of Siva. The Basava-purana also says that Basava was taken before the assembly of pandits for the performance of the rite of initiation of the holy thread at the age of eight, according to the custom of compulsory initiation among the Brahmins. Basava, however, at that early age protested against the rite of initiation, on the grounds that the holy thread could purify neither the soul nor body, and that there were many instances in the puranic accounts where saints of the highest reputation had not taken the holy thread. We find no account of Basava as preaching a crusade against Hindu customs and manners, or against Brahmanism as such.

Basava's own writings are in Canarese, in the form of sayings or musings, such as is common among the devotees of other sects of Saivism, Vaisnavism, etc. The present writer had the occasion to go through a large mass of these sayings in their English translations. On the basis of these it can be said that they contain a

1 See Bhandarkar's Vaisnavism and Saivism, p. 132.

2 varndcdrdnurodhena saivacaran pravartaya. Basava-purana, ch. II, verse 32.

rapturous enthusiasm for the God Siva, who to Basava appeared as the Lord Kudala Sangama. These sayings referred to Siva as the supreme Lord, and to Basava himself as his servant or slave. They also contain here and there some biographical allusions which cannot be reconstructed satisfactorily without the help of other contemporary evidence. So far as can be judged from the sayings of Basava, it is not possible to give any definite account of Vira-saiva thought as having been propounded or systematised by Basava. According to Basava-purana, the practice of linga-dharana seems to have been in vogue even before Basava. Basava himself does not say anything about the doctrine of sat-sthala, and these two are the indispensably necessary items by which Vira-saivism can be sharply distinguished from the other forms of Saivism, apart from its philosophical peculiarity. On this also Basava does not seem to indicate any definite line of thought which could be systematised without supplementing it or reconstructing it by the ideas of later Vira-saiva writers. Though the kernel of the Vira-saiva philosophy may be traced back to the early centuries of the Christian era, and though we find it current in works like Suta-samhita of the sixth century a.d., yet we do not know how the name Vira-saiva came to be given to this type of thought.

In the work Siddhdnta-sikhdmani, written by Revanacarya some time between Basava and Sripati, we find the name 'Vira-saiva' associated with the doctrine of sthala, and this is probably the earliest use of the term in available literature. Siddhdnta-sikhdmani refers to Basava and is itself referred to by Sripati. This shows that the book must have been written between the dates of Basava and Sripati. The Siddhdnta-sikhdmani gives a fanciful interpretation of the word, 'vira' as being composed of 'vi' meaning knowledge of identity with Brahman, and 'ra' as meaning someone who takes pleasure in such knowledge. But such an etymology, accepting it to be correct, would give the form 'vira' and not 'vira.' No explanation is given as to how 'vi' standing for 'vidya,' would lengthen its vowel into 'vi.' I therefore find it difficult to accept this etymological interpretation as justifying the application of the word 'vira' to Vira-saiva. Moreover, most systems of Vedantic thought could be called vira in such an interpretation, for most types of Vedanta would feel enjoyment and bliss in true knowledge of identity. The word 'vira' would thus not

be a distinctive mark by which we could distinguish Vira-saivas from the adherents of other religions. Most of the Agamic Saivas also would believe in the ultimate identity of individuals with Brahman or Siva. I therefore venture to suggest that Vira-saivas were called Viras or heroes for their heroic attitude in an aggressive or defensive manner in support of their faith.

We have at least two instances of religious persecution in the Saiva context. Thus the Chola King Koluttunga I, a Saiva, put out the eyes of Mahapurna and Kuresa, the Vaisnava disciples of Ramanuja, who refused to be converted to Saivism. The same sort of story comes in the life of Basava where the eyes of two of his disciples were put out by Vijjala, and Vijjala got himself murdered by Basava's followers. These are but few instances where violence was resorted to for the spread of any religion, or as actions of religious vengeance. I suppose that the militant attitude of some Saivas, who defied the caste rules and customs and were enthusiasts for the Saiva faith, gave them the name of Vira-saiva or Heroic Saiva. Even the Siddhanta-Hkhdmani refers to the view of Basava that those who decried Siva should be killed 1 . Such a militant attitude in the cause of religion is rarely to be found in the case of other religions or religious sects. In the above context Siddhanta-Hkhdmani points out in the ninth chapter that, though Vira-saivas are prohibited from partaking in the offerings made to a fixed phallic symbol sthdvara-linga, yet if there is a threat to destroy or disturb such a symbol, a Vira-saiva should risk his life in preventing the aggression by violent means.

So far our examination has not proved very fruitful in discovering the actual contribution to Vira-saiva philosophy or thought, or even the practice of sat-sthala and linga-dhdrana, made by Basava. He must have imparted a good deal of emotional enthusiasm to inspire the Saivas of different types who came into contact with him, either through religious fervour or for his

1 atha vtra-bhadrdcara-basavesvaracdram sucayan bhaktd-cara-bhedam prati-pddayati —

siva-nindakaram drstva ghdtayed athava sapet, sthanam vd tat-parityajya gacched yady-aksamo bhavet.

Siddhdnta-sikhdmani, ch. 9, verse 36. It is further introduced in the context:

nanu prdna-tydge durmaranam kim na sydt, sivdrtham mukta-jivas cecchiva-sdyujyam dpnuydt.

financial and other kinds of patronage. It seems from the Basava-purana that his financial assistance to the devotees of Siva was of rather an indiscriminate character. His money was poured on all Saivas like showers of rain. This probably made him the most powerful patron of the Saivas of that time, with the choicest of whom he founded a learned assembly where religious problems were discussed in a living manner, and he himself presided over the meetings.

The present writer is of opinion that the kernel of Vira-saiva thought is almost as early as the Upanisads, and it may be found in a more or less systematic manner by way of suggestion in the writings of Kalidasa who lived in the early centuries of the Christian era 1 . The Suta-samhitd, a part of the Skanda-purdna, seems to teach a philosophy which may be interpreted as being of the same type as the Vira-saiva philosophy propounded by Sripati, though the commentator interprets it in accordance with the philosophy of Sankara. The Suta-samhitd gives a high place to the Agama literature such as the Kdmika, and others, which shows that it was closely related with the Agamic Saivism 2 .

But it is difficult to say at what time the Vira-saiva sect was formed and when it had this special designation. Vira-saivism differs from the Agamic Saivism and the Pasupata system in its philosophy and its doctrine of sthala, the special kind of linga-dhdrana and also in some other ritualistic matters which are not quite relevant for treatment in a work like the present one. It is unfortunate that Siddhdnta-sikhdmani, a work probably of the thirteenth century, should contain the earliest reference to Vira-saivism in literature. A small manuscript called Vira-saiva-guru-parampard gives the names of the following teachers in order of priority: (1) Visvesvara-guru, (2) Ekorama, (3) Viresaradhya, (4) Vira-bhadra, (5) Viranaradhya, (6) Manikyaradhya, (7) Buccay-yaradhya, (8) Vlra-mallesvararadhya, (9) Desikaradhya, (10) Vrsabha, (11) Aksaka and (12) Mukha-lingesvara. In the Vira-sawdgama*, eighth patala, it is said that in the four pithas or pontifical seats, namely yoga-pitha, mahd-pitha, jndna-pitha and

1 See author's A History of Sanskrit Literature, Vol. 1, pp. 728 et seq.

2 Suta-samhitd, yajna-vaibhava-khanda, ch. 22, verses 2 and 3. See also ch. 20, verse 22; ch. 39, verse 23.

3 Madras manuscript.

soma-pitha, there were four teachers of different priority, Revana, Manila, Vamadeva 1 , and Panditaradhya. These names are of a mythical nature, as they are said to be referred to in the different Vedas. But the names that we have quoted above from the Vira-iawa-guru-parampard form a succession list of teachers up to the time of the teacher of the author of the manuscript 2 . On studying the succession list of teachers, we find that we know nothing of them either by allusion or by any text ascribed to them, excepting Vlra-bhadra, who has been referred to in the Siddhdnta-sikhdmani^. We cannot say how much earlier Vlra-bhadra was than the author of the Siddhdnta-sikhdmani. But since Vlra-bhadra is mentioned along with Basava in the same context, we may suppose that this Vlra-bhadra could not have been much earlier than Basava. So if we are safe in supposing that Vlra-bhadra lived somewhere in the twelfth century, we have only to compute the time of the three Acaryas who lived before Vlra-bhadra. According to ordinary methods of computation we can put a hundred years for the teaching period of the three teachers. This would mean that Vlra-saivism as a sect started in the eleventh century. It is possible that these teachers wrote or preached in the Dravidian tongue which could be understood by the people among whom they preached. This would explain why no Sanskrit books are found ascribed to them. Basava was probably one of the most intelligent and emotional thinkers, who expressed his effusions in the Kaunada language.

But about our specification of the succession list of Vira-saiva teachers much remains yet to be said. It does not explain anything about the other lines of teachers, of whom we hear from stray allusions. Thus we hear of Agastya as being the first pro-pounder of the Saiva faith. We find also that one Renukacarya wrote the work, Siddhdnta-sikhdmani based upon the verdict of other Vira-saiva works and giving us the purport of the mythical dialogue that took place between Renuka-siddha and Agastya some time in the past. The Renuka-siddha was also called Revana-siddha, and it is supposed that he expounded the Vira-saiva Sastra to Agastya in the beginning of the Kali age. We find at a much later date one Siddha-ramesvara, who was impregnated with

1 Another reading is Rama-deva (eighth and sixteenth patalas).

2 asmad-acarya-paryantam bande guru-paramparam. (Madras manuscript.) 8 Siddhdnta-sikhamani. avataranika of the 36th verse, ch. 9.

the doctrine of Vira-saivism; it is in his school of thought that we have a person called Siva-yoglsvara, who gives us the supposed purport of the dialogue between Ranuka and Agastya, as it had traditionally come down to him, supplementing it with the teachings of other relevant literature. In the family of Siddha-ramesvara there was born one Mudda-deva, a great teacher. He had a son called Siddha-natha, who wrote a work called Siva-siddhdnta-nirnaya containing the purport of the Agamas. The other teachers of the time regarded him as the most prominent of the Vira-saiva teachers (Vira-saiva-sikhd-ratna) and Renukacarya, who called himself also Siva-yogin, wrote the work, Siddhdnta-sikhdmani. We thus see that there was a long list of Vira-saiva teachers before Renukacarya, who probably lived somewhere in the thirteenth century. Even if we do not take this into account, Renukacarya, the author of Siddhdnta-sikhdmani says that he had written the work for the elucidation of the nature of Siva by consulting the Saiva Tantras beginning from the Kdmikdgama to the Vdtuldgama and also the Puranas. He further says that the Vira-saiva Tantra is the last of the Saiva Tantras and therefore it is the essence of them all 1 .

But what is exactly the content of the Vira-saiva philosophy as explained in the Siddhdnta-sikhdmani} It is said that Brahman is the identity of 'being,' 'bliss' and 'consciousness,' and devoid of any form or differentiation. It is limitless and beyond all ways of knowledge. It is self-luminous and absolutely without any obstruction of knowledge, passion or power. It is in Him that the whole world of the conscious and the unconscious remains, in a potential form untraceable by any of our senses, and it is from Him that the whole world becomes expressed or manifest of itself, without the operation of any other instrument. It implies that when it so pleases God, He expands Himself out of His own joy, and thereby the world appears, just as solid butter expands itself into its liquid state. The qualities of Siva are of a transcendent nature (aprdkrta). The character of being, consciousness and bliss is power (sakti). It is curious, however, to note that side by side with this purely ultra-monistic and impersonal view we find God Siva as being endowed with will by which He creates and destroys the

1 Siddhanta-sikhdmani, ch. i, verses 31-2.

world. As we shall have occasion to notice later on, the whole doctrine of sat-sthala, which forms the crux of Vlra-saiva thought, is only an emphasis on the necessity on the part of every individual to look upon him and the world as being sustained in God and being completely identified with God. There are, indeed, many phrases which suggest a sort of bheddbheda view, but this bheddbheda or difference in unity is not of the nature of the tree and its flowers and fruits, as such a view will suggest a modification or transformation of the nature of Siva. The idea of bheddbheda is to be interpreted with the notion that God, who is transcendent, appears also in the form of the objects that we perceive and also of the nature of our own selves.

The Siddhanta-sikhdmani was based on the Agamas and therefore had the oscillating nature of philosophical outlook as we find in the different Agamas. Thus in Siddhanta-sikhdmani, ch. v, verse 34, it is said that the Brahman is without any form or quality, but it appears to be the individual souls (jivas) by its beginningless association with avidyd or nescience. In that sense jiva or the individual soul is only a part of God. Siddhanta-sikhdmani further says that God is the controller, the mover (preraka) of all living beings. In another verse it says that Brahman is both God and the souls of beings at the same time. In pure Siva there are no qualities as sattva, rajas and tamas 1 . Again Siddhanta-sikhdmani oscillates to the Vedanta view that the individual souls, the objects of the world as well as the Supreme Controller, are all but illusory imposition on the pure consciousness or Brahman 2 . The Siddhanta-sikhdmani admits both avidyd and mdyd after the fashion of Sankarites. It is in association with avidyd that we have the various kinds of souls and it is with the association of mdyd that Brahman appears as omniscient and omnipotent. It is on account of the avidyd that the individual soul cannot realise its identity with Brahman, and thus goes through the cycle of births and rebirths.

Yet there is another point to note. In the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali, it is said that the nature of our birth, the period of life

1 guna-traydtmikd saktir brahma-nisthd-sandtani, tad-vaisamydt samutpanna tasmin vastu-traydbhidhd.

Siddhdnta-sikJidmani, ch. v, verse 39.

2 bhoktd bhojyam prerayitd vastu-trayamidam smrtam, akhande brahma-caitanye kalpitam guna-bhedatah.

Ibid. ch. v, verse 41.

and the nature of our experiences, are determined by our karma, and that the law of the distribution of the fruits of karma is mysterious. But the effects of karma take place automatically. This view is only modified by the Pasupatas and the Naiyayikas who belong to their fold. It is interesting to notice that the Siddhanta-sikhamani borrows this idea of karma from the Pasupatas, who hold that the distribution of karma is managed and controlled by God. Siddhanta-sikhamani thus seems to present before us an eclectic type of thought which is unstable and still in the state of formation. This explains the author's ill-digested assimilation of elements of thought on Pasupata doctrine, the varying Agama doctrines, the influence of Samkhya, and ultimately the Vedantaof the Sankarites. This being so, in the thirteenth century we cannot expect a systematic Vira-saiva philosophy in its own individual character as a philosophical system in the time of Basava. It will be easy for us to show that Allama-prabhu, the teacher of Basava, was thoroughly surcharged with the Vedantism of the Sankara school.

In the Sankara-vijaya Anandagiri, a junior contemporary and a pupil of Sankara gives a long description of the various types of the devotees of Siva who could be distinguished from one another by their outward marks. Sankara himself only speaks of the Pasupatas and the Saivas who followed the Siddhantas or the Agamas, in which God Siva has been described as being the instrumental cause, different from the material cause out of which the world has been made. Vacaspati in his Bhamati, a commentary on the bhasya of Sankara on the Brahma-sutra II. 2. 37, speaks of four types of the followers of Siva. Of these we have found ample literature of the Saivas and the Pasupatas, and had ventured to suggest that the Karunika-siddhantins were also the followers of the Agamic Saiva thought. But we could find no literature of the Kapalikas or of the Kalamukhas referred to in the bhasya of the same sutra by Ramanuja. In the Suta-samhita we find the names of the Kamika and other Agamas, the Kapalikas, the Lakulas, the Pasupatas, the Somas, and the Bhairavas, who had also their Agamas. These Agamas branched off into a number of sections or schools 1 . In our investigation we have found that the Lakulas and the Pasupatas were one and the same, and we have the testimony of Madhava, the author of the Sarva-darsana-samgraha, to the same effect. 1 Suta-samhita iv, Vajna-vaibhava-khanda, ch. xxn, verses 2-4.

Suta-samhita was probably a work of the sixth century a.d., while Madhava's work was of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it seems that the Pasupatas were earlier than the Lakulas. Neither Sankara nor Vacaspati speaks of the Lakullsas as being the same as the Pasupatas. But some time before the fourteenth century the Lakulisas and Pasupatas had coalesced and later on they remained as one system, as we find them regarded as one by Appaya Dlksita of the sixteenth century in his commentary, Veddnta-kalpataru-parimala on Brahma-sutra 11. 2. 37. But there can be but little doubt that the Lakulas had their own Agamas long before the sixth century a.d., which is probably the date of Suta-samhita. We find references to the Bhairavas, and the name Bhairava is given to Siva as the presiding male god wherever there is the Sakti deity representing the limbs of Sakti, the consort of Siva and the daughter of Daksa. But we have not been able to secure any Agamas containing an account of the philosophical doctrine of this creed of Bhairavism, though we have found ritualistic references to Bhairava. The Suta-samhita also refers to the Agamic rsis such as Sveta, etc.; each of these twenty-eight rsis had four disciples, thus making the number one hundred and twelve. They are also referred to in the Suta-samhita (Book iv, ch. xxi, verses 2-3), where they are described as smearing their bodies with ashes and wearing the necklaces of rudraksa. We have noticed before that Siva-mahapurana also refers to them. The existence of so many Saiva saints at such an early date naturally implies the great antiquity of Saivism. These Saiva saints seem to have been loyal to the Varnasrama dharma or duties of caste and the stages of life.

A later Agama probably of the thirteenth century called the Vira-sawagama speaks of the four schools of thought, Saiva, Pasupata, Varna and Kula. Saiva is again divided into Saumya and Raudra. The Saumya is of five kinds including demonology and magic as antidote to poison. The Saiva school is called Daksina, and the cult of Sakti is called Varna. The two can be mixed together as Varna and Daksina, and regarded as one school. The Siddhanta sastra is called pure Saiva belonging only to Siva. There is, however, another sect, or rather three schools of a sect, called Daksina, Kalamukha and Mahavrata 1 . Bhandarkar has suggested that the Kala-mukhas and the Mahavratadharins are

1 See Ramanuja's bhdfya {Sn-bha$yd) t 11. 2. 37.

4-2

one and the same. The Siddhantas again are divided into three sects: Adi-saiva, Maha-saiva and Anta-saiva. These subdivisions of Saivism have sprung from the Pasupata-saivism. The writer of the Vira-saivdgama says that Saivism scattered itself into infinite variety of schools of thought or bands of devotees and had a huge literature for supplementing their position 1 . All these sects have now practically vanished with their literature if they had any.

From the testimony of the same Agama it appears that Vira-saivism was not a part of the older Saivas, but it originated as a doctrinal school which accepted four lingas in the four pontifical seats, the worship of Siva as sat-sthala and their special rites and customs. This view may be correct, as we cannot trace the Vira-saiva as a system of thought in any of the earlier works on Saivism. We have a number of Vira-saivagamas such as Makutdgama, Suprabhedagamciy Vira-saiva'-gama and the like in manuscript. But none of them, excepting the Basava-rdjiya called also Vira-saiva-sdroddhdra (manuscript) with the bhdsya of Somanatha, make any reference to Basava or even the Vira-saiva philosophy. The Basava-rdjiya also speaks of Basava as being the incarnation of the bull of Siva and the patron of Saivas. But the author of the work does not say anything about the philosophical doctrine of Basava, but only describes the idea of sat-sthala in an elaborate manner.

Professor Sakhare in his introduction to Linga-dhdrana-candrikd of Nandikesvara quotes a passage from Svdyambhuvdgama in which the mythical origins of Revana-siddha from Somesa-linga, of Marula-siddha from Siddhesa-linga, of Panditarya from Mallikdrjuna-linga, of Ekorama from Rdmandtha-linga, and of Visvaradhya from the Visvesa-linga, are described. We have no further evidence of these teachers or the nature of their teachings. We do not even know if they called themselves Vira-saivas. This account does not tally with the description found in the Vira-saiva-guru-parampard y or with the other Vira-saiva texts published or unpublished with which we are familiar.

The gotras and the pravaras of the Vira-saivas, given in the Suprabheddgama as emanating from the unknown past, are quite

1 samudra-sikatasamkhyas samayas santi kotisah. Vlra-saivdgama (Madras manuscript).

fanciful and need not further be discussed. Such a discussion could shed no historical light on the origin and development of the Vira-saiva philosophy and dogmatics.

We have seen before that there is a tradition which links Agastya, Renuka or Revana-siddha, Siddha-rama and Renuka-carya, the author of the Siddhdnta-sikhamani. Sripati mainly bases his arguments on the Upanisads and the Puranas, but he also refers to Agastya-sutra and Renukacarya. He does not, however, refer to Basava and the contemporaries who were associated with him, such as Allama-prabhu, Cannabasava, Macaya, Goga, Siddha-rama and Mahadevi 1 . This seems to show that the Vlra-saivism had two or more lines of development which later on coalesced and began to be regarded as one system of Vira-saiva thought. From Basava's vacanas it is difficult to assess the real philosophical value of the faith that was professed by Basava. In the Prabhu-linga-lila and the Basava-purana we find a system of thought which, in the absence of other corroborating materials, may be accepted as approximately outlining the system of thought which was known as Vlra-saivism in Basava's time.

We find that the doctrines of sthala and linga-dhdrana were known to the author of the Prabhu-linga-lila. But though in one place, where instruction was being given to Basava by Allama-prabhu, sat-sthala is mentioned, yet the entire emphasis throughout the book is on the doctrine of unity of the self with Siva, the ground of the reality 2 . In the above passage it is held that there are double knots associated with the gross, the subtle and the cause, in accordance with which we have the six sthalas in three groups of a pair of each. Thus the two knots associated with the gross go by the name of bhakta and mahesvara; those with the subtle as associated with prana are called prana and prasada-lingi sthalas;

1 Thus it appears from iSripati's statement in the Srikara-bhasya II. 2. 37, p. 234, and in. 3. 3, p. 347, that Revana-siddha, Marula-siddha, Rama-siddha, Udbhataradhya, Vemanaradhya were real teachers who had expressed their views or articles of faith in some distinctive works. But unfortunately no trace of such works can be discovered, nor is it possible to enunciate the actual views propounded by them. Whether isrlpati had himself seen them or not is merely a matter of conjecture. He does not quote from the works of those teachers, and it is just possible that he is only making statements on the strength of tradition. In another passage (n. 1. 4) Sripati mentions the names of Manu, Vamadeva. Agastya, Durvasa, Upamanyu, who are quite mythical puranic figures along with Revana-siddha and Marula-siddha.

2 See Prabhu-linga-lila, ch. 16, pp. 132-4.

those with the cause are of an emotional nature, and are called sarana and aikya sthalas. In other works such as Basava-rdjiya, Vira-saivagama and Siddhdnta-sikhdmani the names of sthalas extend to one hundred and one. But in none of those works is the idea of these different sthalas explained to show their philosophical importance. In Prabhu-linga-lila we hear that Canna-basava knew the mystery of sat-sthala, but we do not know exactly what that mystery was. In this connection guru, linga, cara y prasdda and pddodaka are also mentioned. The whole emphasis of the book is on the necessity of realising the unity of the self and, indeed, of anything else with Siva. Allama decries the external ritualism and lays stress on the necessity of realising the ultimate reality of the universe and the self with Siva. He vehemently decries all forms of injury to animal life, and persuades Goga to give up ploughing the ground, as it would involve the killing of many insects. Allama further advised Goga to surrender the fruits of all his actions to God and carry on his duties without any attachment. As a matter of fact the Vira-saiva thought as represented by Allama can hardly be distinguished from the philosophy of Sankara, for Allama accepted one reality which appeared in diverse forms under the condition of mdyd and avidyd. In that sense the whole world would be an illusion. The bhakti preached by Allama was also of an intellectual type, as it consisted of a constant and unflinching meditation and realisation of the ultimate reality of all things with Siva. This view of bhakti seems to have influenced Renukacarya, the author of Siddhdnta-Hkhdmani, who describes inner devotion (dntara-bhakti) in almost the same type of phraseology 1 .

In his teachings to Muktayl, Allama says that just as the sucking babe is gradually weaned from the mother's milk to various kinds of food, so the real teacher teaches the devotee to concentrate his

1 linge prariam samadhaya prdne lingam tu sambhavam,

svastham manas tatha krtva na kincic cintayed yadi. sabhyantara bhaktir iti procyate siva-yogibhih, sd yasmin vartate tasya jlvanam bhra§ta-vijavat.

Siddhdnta-Ukhamani, ch. 9, verses 8-9. tatah savadhanena tat-prdna-linge, samlkrtya krtydni vismrtya matyd, mahd-yoga-sdmrajya-paftdbhifikto, bhajed dtmano lifiga-taddtmya-siddhim.

Prabhu-linga-tlld, ch. 16, verse 63.

mind on external forms of worship and later on makes him give them up, so that he ultimately becomes unattached to all kinds of duties, and attains true knowledge by which all his deeds are destroyed. There is not much use in learning or delivering speeches, but what is necessary, is to realise the unity of all with Siva 1 .

In his conversation with Siddha-rama and Goraksa, he not only demonstrates the non-existence of all things but Siva, but he also shows his familiarity with a type of magical yoga, the details of which are not given and cannot be traced in the Yogasastra of Patanjali. In the instruction given by Allama to his pupil Basava, the former explains briefly the nature of bhakti, sat-sthala and yoga. It seems that the restful passivity that is attained by yoga is nothing but complete and steady identification of the ultimate truth, Siva, with all the variable forms of experience, and our life and experience as a complete person. This yoga leading to the apperception of the ultimate unity can be done by arresting all the vital processes in the nervous centres of the body at higher and higher grades, until these energies become one with the supreme reality, God Siva. It is in this way that the cakras are traversed and passed over till the Yogin settle down in Siva. The entire physical processes being arrested by the peculiar yoga method, our mind does not vaccilate or change, but remains in the consciousness of the pure Lord, Siva.

The teacher of Basava, Allama, says that without a strong effort to make the mind steady by the complete arrest of the vital forces, the Vayu, there can be no bhakti and no cessation to bondage. It is by the arrest of these vital forces or Vayu, that the citta or the mind of the Vira-saiva becomes arrested and merged in the elemental physical constituents of the body, such as fire, water, etc. The maya is a product of manas, and vayu also is regarded as a product of manas, and this vayu becomes the body through the activity of the manas. The existence of the body is possible only by the activity of the vital forces or vayu, which keep us away from realising the unity of all things with Siva, which is also called bhakti. The Vira-saiva has, therefore, to take recourse to a process opposite to the normal course of activity of the vdyus by concentrating them on one point, and by accepting the mastery of the vdyus over the different cakras or nerve plexuses (technically

1 See Prabhu-linga-llla, ch. 12, pp. 57-8.

known as the control of the six cakras), which would in their own way be regarded as the six stages or stations of the process of the control of the vayus, the sat-sthalas 1 . It is thus seen that according to the description given in Prabhu-linga-lila. of the doctrine of sat-sthala, the process of sat-sthala is to be regarded as an upward journey through a hierarchy of stations, by which alone the unity with Siva can be realised. The instruction of this dynamic process of yoga is a practical method of a semi-physiological process by which the ultimate identity of God and soul can be realised. In Sankara's monistic philosophy it is said that the realisation of the ultimate identity of the self with Brahman is the highest attainable goal of life. It is, however, said that such an enlightenment can be realised by proper intuition of the significance of the monistic texts such as "thou art that." It refuses to admit any practical utility of any dynamic course of practice which is so strongly advised in the Vira-saiva doctrine of sat-sthala as taught by Allama.

Allama had met Goraksa in one of his travels. Goraksa, who was also probably a Saiva, had by his yogic processes attained such miraculous powers that no stroke of any weapon could produce an injury on him. He made a demonstration of it to Allama. Allama in reply asked him to pass a sword through his body. But to Goraksa's utter amazement he found that when he ran through Allama's body with his sword, no sound of impact was produced. The sword passed through Allama's body as if it were passing through vacant space. Goraksa wanted humbly to know the secret by which Allama could show such miraculous powers. In reply Allama said that the maya becomes frozen, as does the body, and when the body and the maya both become frozen, shadow forms appear as real 2 , and the body and the mind appear as one. When the body and the maya are removed in the heart, then the shadow is destroyed. At this, Goraksa further implored Allama to initiate him into those powers. Allama touched his body and blessed him, and by that produced an internal conversion. As an effect of this, attachment vanished and with the disappearance of attachment, antipathy, egotism and other vices also disappeared. Allama further said that unless the self could realise that the association with the body was false, and the two were completely separated, one could

1 Prabhu-linga-lild, part in, pp. 6-8 (1st edition).

2 Ibid. p. 25 (1st edition).

not realise the true identity with the Lord Siva, devotion to whom was the cause of all true knowledge. It is only by the continual meditation of Siva and by the proper processes of breath control, that it is possible to realise the ultimate unity.

There is a subtle difference between the proper and practical adoption of the dynamic process of sat-sthala and the realisation of unity as taught by the Sankara Vedanta. In the Sankara Veddnta, when the mind is properly prepared by suitable accessory processes, the teacher instructs the pupil or the would-be saint about the ultimate knowledge of the unity of the self and the Brahman, and the would-be saint at once perceives the truth of his identity with Brahman as being the only reality. He also at once perceives that all knowledge of duality is false, though he does not actually melt himself into the nothingness of pure consciousness or the Brahman. In the Vlra-saiva system the scheme of sat-sthala is a scheme of the performance of yogic processes. By them the vital processes as associated with the various vital forces and the nerve plexuses, are controlled, and by that very means the yogin gets a mastery over his passions and is also introduced to new and advanced stages of knowledge, until his soul becomes so united with the permanent reality, Siva, that all appearance and duality cease both in fact and in thought. Thus a successful Vlra-saiva saint should not only perceive his identity with Siva, but his whole body, which was an appearance or shadow over the reality, would also cease to exist. His apparent body would not be a material fact in the world, and therefore would not be liable to any impact with other physical bodies, though externally they may appear as physical bodies.

A similar philosophical view can be found in the work called Siddha-siddhanta-paddhati attributed to Goraksa-nath, who is regarded as a Saiva saint, an incarnation of Siva Himself. Many legends are attributed to him and many poems have been composed in vernaculars of Bengali and Hindi, extolling the deeds and miraculous performances of his disciples and of himself. His date seems to be uncertain. References to Goraksa are found in the works of writers of the eighth to fifteenth centuries, and his miraculous deeds are described as having taken place in countries ranging from Gujarat, Nepal and Bengal and other parts of northern and western India. One of his well-known disciples was called Matsyendra-natha. Siva is called Pasupati, the lord of animals,

and the word goraksa also means the protector of the cattle. In the lexicons the word go means the name of a rsi and also the name of cattle. There is thus an easy association of the word goraksa with the word pasupati. Goraksa's views are also regarded as the views of Siddhanta. This reminds us of the fact that the Saiva doctrines of the South were regarded as having been propounded by Mahesvara or Siva in the Siddhantas, an elaboration of which has elsewhere been made in this work as the Agama philosophy of the Siddhantas. Only a few Sanskrit books on the philosophical aspects of the teachings of Goraksa-nath have come down to us. There are, however, quite a number of books in the vernaculars which describe the miraculous powers of the Kanphata Yogis of the school of Goraksa-nath, also called Gorakh-nath.

One of these Sanskrit works is called Siddha-siddhanta-paddhati. It is there that the ultimate reality of the unmoved, and the immovable nature of the pure consciousness which forms the ultimate ground of all our internal and external experiences, are to be sought. It is never produced nor destroyed, and in that sense eternal and always self-luminous. In this way it is different from ordinary knowledge, which is called buddhi. Ordinary knowledge rises and fades, but this pure consciousness which is identified as being one with Siva is beyond all occurrence and beyond all time. It is, therefore, regarded as the ground of all things. It is from this that all effects, for example, the bodies, the instruments or the karanas (senses, etc.), and the agents, for example, the souls or the jivaSy shoot forth. It is by its spontaneity that the so-called God as well as His powers are manifested. In this original state Siva shows itself as identical with His sakti. This is called the samarasya y that is, both having the same taste. This ultimate nature is the original ego, called also kula, which shows itself in various aspects. We should distinguish this ultimate nature of reality, which is changeless, from the reality as associated with class concepts and other distinguishing traits. These distinguishing traits are also held up in the supreme reality, for in all stages of experience these distinguishing features have no reality but the ultimate reality, which holds them all in the oneness of pure consciousness. Since the distinguishing characteristics have no further reality beyond them than the unchangeable ground-consciousness, they ulti-

mately have to be regarded as being homogeneous {sama-rasa) with ubiquitous reality.

The concept of sama-rasa is homogeneity. A thing which appears as different from another thing, but is in reality or essence the same, is said to be sama-rasa with the first one. It is also a way in which the bhedabheda theory of the reality and the appearance is explained. Thus a drop of water is in appearance different from the sheet of water in which it is held, but in fact it has no other reality and no other taste than that sheet of water. The ultimate reality, without losing its nature as such, shows itself in various forms, though in and through them all it alone remains as the ultimately real. It is for this reason that though the ultimate reality is endowed with all powers, it does not show itself except through its various manifesting forms. So the all-powerful Siva, though it is the source of all power, behaves as if it were without any power. This power therefore remains in the body as the ever-awaking hundalini or the serpentine force, and also as manifesting in different ways. The consideration of the body as indestructible is called kaya-siddhi.

We need not go into further detail in explaining the philosophical ideas of Goraksa as contained in Siddha-siddhdnta-paddhati, for this would be to digress. But we find that there is a curious combination of Hatha-yoga, the control of the nerve plexuses, the idea of the individual and the world as having the same reality, though they appear as different, as we find in the lecture attributed to Allama in Prabhu-linga-lila. It also holds a type of bhedabheda theory and is distinctly opposed to the monistic interpretation of the Upanisads as introduced by Sankara.

The idea of sat-sthala must have been prevalent either as a separate doctrine or as a part of some form of Saivism. We know that there were many schools of Saivism, many of which have now become lost. The name sat-sthala cannot be found in any of the sacred Sanskrit works. We have no account of Vira-saivism before Siddhdnta-sikhdmani. Descriptions of it are found in many works, some of the most important of which are Prabhu-linga-llld and Basava-purana. We also hear that Canna-basava, the nephew of Basava, was initiated into the doctrine of sat-sthala. In Prabhu-linga-lild we hear that Allama instructed the doctrine of sat-sthala to Basava. We also find the interesting dialogue between Allama

and Goraksa in the Prabhu-linga-lild. We have also examined briefly some of the contents of Siddha-siddhanta-paddhati of Goraksa, and we find that the sat-sthala doctrine preached by Allama was more or less similar to the Yoga doctrine found in the Siddha-siddhanta-paddhati. If we had more space, we could have brought out an interesting comparison between the doctrines of Allama and Goraksa. It is not impossible that there was a mutual exchange of views between Goraksa and Allama. Unfortunately the date of Goraksa cannot be definitely known, though it is known that his doctrines had spread very widely in various parts of India, extending over a long period in the Middle Ages.

The interpretation of sat-sthala is rather different in different works dealing with it. This shows that, though the sat-sthala doctrine was regarded as the most important feature of Vira-saivism after Basava, we are all confused as to what the sat-sthala might have been. As a matter of fact we are not even certain about the number. Thus in Vira-saiva-siddhanta (MS.) we have a reference to 101 sthalas, and so also in Siddhdnta-sikhdmani. But elsewhere in Sripati's bhasya y Anubhava-sutra of Mayi-deva, and in Prabhu-linga-lild and Basava-purdna we find reference to six sthalas only.

In the same way the sthalas have not been the same in the various authoritative works. The concepts of these sthalas are also different, and they are sometimes used in different meanings. In some works sthala is used to denote the six nerve plexuses in the body or the six centres from which the power of God is manifested in different ways; sometimes they are used to denote the sixfold majestic powers of God and sometimes to denote the important natural elements, such as earth, fire, air, etc. The whole idea seems to be that the macrocosm and microcosm being the same identical entity, it is possible to control the dissipated forces of any centre and pass on to a more concentrated point of manifestation of the energy, and this process is regarded as the upward process of ascension from one stage to another.

Anubhava-sutra of Mayi-deva 1 .

Upamanyu, the first teacher, was born in Aaipura. The second teacher was Bhlma-natha Prabhu. Then came Maha-guru Kales-vara. His son, well versed in srauta and smarta literature and their customs and manners, was Sri Boppa-natha. Boppa-natha's son was Sri Naka-raja Prabhu, who was well versed in Vira-saiva rites and customs of religion. The disciple of Naka-raja was San-gamesvara. Sangamesvara's son was Mayi-deva. He is well versed in the knowledge of Sivddvaita, and he is a sat-sthala-Brahma-vadi. The Saivagamas begin with Kdmika and end with Vdtula. Vdtula-tantra is the best. Its second part, called Pradipa, contains the Siva-siddhdnta-tantra. Sat-sthala doctrine is based on the principles of the Gita together with the older views. It is supported by the instructions of teachers and self-realisation by anubhuti and by arguments. In the Anubhava-sutra there are (i) the guru-parampara; (2) the definition of sthala', (3) the linga-sthala; (4) the anga-sthala; (5) the linga-samyoga-vidhi; (6) the lingarpana-sadbhdva ; (7) the sarvdnga-linga-sdhitya ; and (8) the kriya-visrdnti.

Sthala is defined as one Brahman identically the same with sat, cit and ananda, which is called the ultimate category of Siva—the ground of the manifestation of the world and dissolution. He is also the category from which the different categories of mahat, etc. have sprung forth. l Stha 1 means Sthana and 'la' means lay a. It is the source of all energies and all beings have come from it and shall return into it. It is by the self-perturbation of the energy of this ultimate category that the various other sthalas are evolved. This one sthala may be divided into the linga-sthala and the Anga-sthala. As the empty space can be distinctively qualified as the space inside the room or inside the jar, so the dual bifurcation of sthala may appear as the object of worship and the worshipper.

Siva remaining unchanged in Himself appears in these two forms. It is the same Siva which appears as pure consciousness and also as the part of linga. The part of linga, lingdnga is also called jtva or the individual souls.

1 Anubhava-sutra forms the second part of Siva-siddhanta-tantra, which is complete in two parts. The first part is Visesartha-prakaiaka. Anubhava-sutra is written by Mayi-deva; it is evident from the colophons of Anubhava-sutra. It is also mentioned in the last colophon of Siva-siddhanta-tantra.

As sthala is of two parts, Brahma and jiva, so His sakti is also twofold. It is indeterminate and is called Mahesvara. It assumes two forms by its own pure spontaneity. One part of it may be regarded as associated with linga, the Brahman, and the other with anga, the jiva. In reality sakti and bhakti are the same 1 . When the energy moves forward for creation it is called sakti as pravrtti, and as cessation nivrtti is called bhakti 2 . On account of the diverse nature of bhakti its indeterminateness disintegrates into various forms. The twofold functions of sakti as the upper and the lower show themselves in the fact that the upper one tends to manifest the world and the lower one, appearing as bhakti, tends to return to God. In these twofold forms the same sakti is called mdyd and bhakti. The sakti in the linga appears as the bhakti in the anga, and the unity of linga and anga is the identity of Siva and jiva.

The linga-sthala is threefold, as: (i) bhdva-linga; (2) prana-linga; and (3) ista-Unga. The bhdva-linga can only be grasped through inner intuition as pure Being, and this bhdva-linga is called niskala. Prdna-Unga is the reality as grasped by thought and as such it is both indeterminate and determinate. The ista-Unga is that which fulfils one's good as self-realisation or adoration, and it is beyond space and time.

The ultimate sakti as being pure cessation and beyond all, is sdntyatita; the next one is iccha-sakti, called also vidya as pure knowledge. The third one is called the kriya-sakti which leads to cessation. The three saktis of icchd,jndna and kriya become sixfold.

The six sthalas are again described as follows:

(1) That which is completely full in itself, subtle, having no beginning nor end, and is indefinable, but can be grasped only by the intuition of the heart as the manifestation of pure consciousness, is called the mahdtma-linga.

(2) That in which we find the seed of development as consciousness beyond the senses, called also the saddkhya-tattva, is called prasada-ghana-linga.

(3) The pure luminous purusa, which is without inward and outward, without any form, and known by the name Atman, is called the cara-linga.

1 Sakti-bhaktyor na bhedo 'sti. Anubhava-sutra, p. 8.

2 saktya prapanca-srspih sydu,

bhaktya tad-vilayo matah. Ibid.

(4) When this by the icchd-sakti manifests itself as the ego, we have what is called Siva-linga.

(5) When it by its own knowledge and power and omnipotence assumes the role of an instructor for taking all beings beyond the range of all pleasures, it is called guru-linga.

(6) The aspect in which by its action it upholds the universe and holds them all in the mind, is called the dcdra-linga.

There are further divisions and sub-divisions of these sthalas, anga-sthala.

'Am' means Brahma and 'ga' means that which goes. Anga-sthala is of three kinds as yoganga, bhoganga and tyaganga. In the first, one attains the bliss of union with Siva. In the second, bhoganga, one enjoys with Siva, and in tyaganga one leaves aside the illusion or the false notion of the cycle of births and rebirths. Yoganga is the original cause, the bhoganga is the subtle cause and tyaganga is the gross one. Yoganga is the dreamless state, bhoganga is the ordinary state of sleep, and tyaganga is the waking state. Yoganga is the state of prajnd, bhoganga is taijas and tyaganga is visva. Yoganga is called the unity with Siva and sarana-sthala. Bhoganga is twofold, prana-lingi and prasddi. The gross is twofold, bhakta-sthala and mahesvara sthala. Again prdjna is aikya-sthala and sarana-sthala. The taijas is prana-lingi and prasddi. Visva again is twofold as mahesvara and bhakta-sthala. The unity, the sarana, the prana-lingi, the prasddi, the mahesvara and the bhakta may be regarded as the successive of the six sthalas.

Again omnipotence, contentment, and beginningless consciousness, independence, unobstructedness of power and infinite power —these are the parts of God, which being in sat-sthala are regarded as six types of bhakti depending on various conditions. The bhakti manifests itself in diverse forms, just as water manifests in various tastes in various fruits. The bhakti is of the nature of Siva. Then it is of the nature of dnanda or bliss. Then it is of the nature of anubhava or realisation. Then it is of the nature of adoration {naisthiki) and the sixth is of the nature of bhakti among good men. It is further said that all those classifications are meaningless. The truth is the identity of myself and everything, all else is false—this is aikya-sthala. By the self-illumination of knowledge, the body and senses appear as having no form, being united with God; when everything appears as pure, that is called the sarana-sthala.

When one avoids all illusions or errors about body, etc., and conceives in the mind that one is at one with the linga, that is called the prdna-linga, or cara-sthala. When one surrenders all objects of gratification to God, it is called the prasdda-sthala, and when one fixes one's mind on God as being one with Him—it is called mdhesvara-sthala. When the false appears as true and the mind is detached from it by the adorative action of bhakti, and the person becomes detached from the world—this is called bhakti-sthala. Thus we have another six kinds of sat-sthala.

Again from another point of view we have another description of sat-sthala, such as from Atman comes dkasa, from dkdsa comes vdyu, from vdyu comes agni, from agni comes water and from water—earth. Again the unity of Atman with Brahman is called vyomdnga. Prdna-linga is called vdyvanga, and prasdda is called analdnga, and mahesvara is called jaldnga and the bhakta is called bhumyanga. Again from bindu comes ndda, and from ndda comes kald, and reversely from hold to bindu.

Unlike the Vaisnavas, the Anubhava-sutra describes bhakti not as attachment involving a sense-duality between the worshipper and the worshipped, but as revealing pure oneness or identity with God in the strongest terms. This implies, and in fact it has been specifically stated, that all ceremonial forms of worship involving duality are merely imaginary creations. In His sportive spirit the Lord may assume diverse forms, but the light of bhakti should show that they are all one with Him.

CHAPTER XXXVI

PHILOSOPHY OF SRlKANTHA

Philosophy of Saivism as expounded by Srikantha in his Commentary on the Brahma-sutra and the Sub-commentary on it by Appaya Diksita.

Introductory

IT has often been stated in the previous volumes of the present work that the Brahma-sutra attributed to Badarayana was an attempt at a systematisation of the apparently different strands of the Upanisadic thought in the various early Upanisads, which form the background of most of the non-heretical systems of Indian philosophy. The Brahma-sutra had been interpreted by the exponents of different schools of thought in various ways, for example, by Sankara, Ramanuja, Bhaskara, Madhva, Vallabha, and others, and they have all been dealt with in the previous volumes of the present work. Vedanta primarily means the teachings of the Upanisads. Consequently the Brahma-sutra is supposed to be a systematisation of Upanisadic wisdom; and its various interpretations in diverse ways by the different exponents of diverse philosophical views, all go by the name of the Vedanta, though the Vedanta philosophy of one school of thinkers may appear to be largely different from that of any other school. Thus while the exposition of the Brahma-sutra by Saiikara is monistic, the interpretation of Madhva is explicitly pluralistic. We have seen the acuteness of the controversy between the adherents of the two schools of thought, extending over centuries, in the fourth volume of the present work.

As Srikantha expounded his views as an interpretation of the Brahma-sutra and accepted the allegiance and loyalty to the Upanisads, the work has to be regarded as an interpretation of the Vedanta. Like many other interpretations of the Vedanta (for example, by Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, or Nimbarka), the philosophy of Srikantha is associated with the personal religion, where Siva is regarded as the highest Deity, being equated with

Brahman. It can, therefore, be claimed as an authoritative exposition of Saivism. Saivism, or rather Saiva philosophy, also had assumed various forms, both as expressed in Sanskritic works and in the vernacular Dravidian works. But in the present work, we are only interested in the exposition of Saiva philosophy in Sanskrit works. The present writer has no access to the original Dravidian literature such as Tamil, Telegu and Canarese, etc., and it is not within the proposed scheme of the present work to collect philosophical materials from the diverse vernacular literature of India.

In introducing his commentary, Srikantha says that the object of his interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is the clarification of its purport since it has been made turbid by previous teachers 1 . We do not know who were these previous teachers, but a comparison between the commentary of Saiikara and that of Srikantha shows that at least Sankara was one of his targets. Sankara's idea of Saiva philosophy can briefly be gathered from his commentary on the Brahma-sutra II. 2. 35-8, and his view of the Saiva philosophy tallies more with some of the Puranic interpretations which were in all probability borrowed by Vijfiana Bhiksu in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra called Vijiianamrta-bhasya, and his commentary on the Isvara-gita of the Kurma-purana. Sankara lived somewhere about the eighth century A.D., and his testimony shows that the sort of Saiva philosophy that he expounded was pretty well known to Badarayana, so that he included it as a rival system for refutation in the Brahma-sutra. This shows the great antiquity of the Saiva system of thought, and in a separate section we shall attend to this question.

Sankara came from the Kerala country in the South, and he must have been acquainted with some documents of Saiva philosophy or the Saivagamas. But neither Sankara nor his commentators mention their names. But obviously Srikantha followed some Saivagamas, which were initiated in early times by one called Sveta, an incarnation of Siva, who must have been followed by other teachers of the same school, and according to Srikantha's own testimony, twenty-eight of them had flourished before

1 Vydsa-sutram idam netram vidugdm brahma-darsane.

purvdcdrycdh kalusitam srtkanthena prasadyate.

Srikantha's bhd§ya, introductory verse, 5.

Srikantha and had written Saivdgama works. The original teacher Sveta has also been mentioned in the Vdyaviya samhita of the Siva-mahdpurdna 1 .

In the initiatory adoration hymn Srikantha adores Siva, the Lord, as being of the nature of ego-substance (aham-paddrtha). The sub-commentator Appaya Diksita (a.d. 1550), in following the characterisation of Siva in the Mahdbhdrata, tries to give an etymological derivation in rather a fanciful way from the root vasa, ' to will/ This means that the personality of Siva, the Lord, is of the nature of pure egohood and that his will is always directed to the effectuation of good and happiness to all beings. This ego-hood is also described as 'pure being' (sat), 'pure consciousness' (cii) and 'pure bliss' (dnanda). Srikantha further says that his commentary will expound the essence of the teachings of the Upanisads or the Vedanta and will appeal to those who are devoted to Siva 2 . Srikantha describes Siva on the one hand as being the category of aham or egohood which forms the individual personality, and at the same time regards it as being of the nature of' pure being,' 'pure consciousness,' and 'pure bliss.' He thinks that this individual personality can be regarded only in unlimited sense to be identified with the infinite nature of Siva. Appaya Diksita in commenting on this verse quotes the testimony of some of the Upanisads to emphasise the personal aspect of the God Siva as a personal God. Ordinarily the word * sac-cid-dnanda-riipdya ' would be used in the writings of monistic Vedanta of the school of Sankara, in the sense of a concrete unity of 'pure being,' 'pure consciousness,' and 'pure bliss.' But that kind of interpretation would not suit the purposes of a purely theistic philosophy. For this reason Appaya says that the words ' sae-cid-dndnda' are the qualities of the supreme God Siva and that this is indicated by the terminal word 'rupdya,' because Brahman as such is arupa or formless. The expansion of the limited individual into the infinite nature of Siva also implies that the individual enjoys with Him qualities of bliss and consciousness. In a Sankarite interpretation the person who attains liberation becomes one with Brahman, that

1 Siva-tnahdpurdna, Vdyaviya samhita I. 5. 5 et seq. (Venkatesvara Press, Bombay, 1925).

2 om namo'ham-paddrthdya lokdndm siddhi-hetave, sacciddnanda-rupdya s'ivdya paramdtmane. 1.

Preliminary adoration to Siva by Srikantha.

is, with the unity of sat, cit and dnanda. He does not enjoy consciousness or bliss but is at once one with it. The Brahman in the system of Sankara and his school is absolutely qualityless and differenceless (nirvisesa). Ramanuja in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra tries to refute the idea of Brahman as qualityless or differenceless and regards the Brahman as being the abode of an infinite number of auspicious and benevolent characters and qualities. This is called saguna-brahman, that is, the Brahman having qualities. The same idea is put forward in a somewhat different form by Srlkantha. Except in the Puranas and some older Sanskrit literature, the idea of a Brahman with qualities does not seem to be available in the existent philosophical literature outside Ramanuja. Ramanuja is said to have followed the Bodhayana-vrtti which, however, is no longer available. It may, therefore, be suggested that Srikantha's bhasya was inspired by the Bodhayana-vrtti, or by Ramanuja, or by any of the Saivagamas following a simple theistic idea.

On the one hand Lord Siva is regarded as the supreme and transcendent Deity, and on the other he is regarded as the material cause of this material universe, just as milk is the material cause of curd. This naturally raises some difficulties, as the supreme God cannot at the same time be regarded as entirely transcendent and also undergoing changes for the creation of the material universe which is to be regarded as of the nature of God Himself. To avoid this difficulty Appaya summarises the view of Srlkantha and tries to harmonise the texts of the Upanisads, pointing to monistic and dualistic interpretations. He thus says that God Himself is not transformed into the form of the material universe, but the energy of God which manifests itself as the material universe is a part and parcel of the entire personality of God. The material universe is not thus regarded either as illusion or as an attribute of God (in a Spinozistic sense), nor is the universe to be regarded as a part or a limb of God, so that all the activities of the universe are dependent on the will of God, as Ramanuja holds in his theory of Visistddvaita; nor does Srlkantha regard the relation between the universe and God as being of the same nature as that between the waves or foam and the sea itself. The waves or foam are neither different from nor one with the sea; this is called the bhedabheda-vdda of Bhaskara. It may also be noted that this view of Srlkantha

is entirely different from the view of Vijnana Bhiksu as expressed in the Vijndndmrta-bhasya, a commentary on the Brahma-sutra in which he tries to establish a view well known in the Puranas, that the prakrti and the purusa are abiding entities outside God and are co-existent with Him; they are moved by God for the production of the universe, for the teleological purposes of enjoyment and experience of the purusas, and ultimately lead the purusas to liberation beyond bondage. It may not be out of place here to refer to the commentary of Sankara on the Brahma-sutra (n. 2. 37 et seq.) where he tried to refute a Saiva doctrine which regards God as the instrumental cause that transforms the prakrti to form the universe, a view somewhat similar to that found in the Vijnanamrta-bhasya of Vijnana Bhiksu. This Saiva view seems to have been entirely different from the Saiva view expressed by Srikantha, expressly based on the traditions of the twenty-eight yogacaryas beginning with Sveta. Lord Siva, the supreme personal God, is regarded as fulfilling all our desires, or rather our beneficent wishes. This idea is brought out by Appaya in his somewhat fanciful etymology of the word * siva>' a twofold derivation from the root vasa and from the word l siva' meaning good.

Srikantha adores the first teacher of the Saiva thought and regards him (Sveta) as having made the various Agamas. But we do not know what these Agamas were. Appaya in his commentary is also uncertain about the meaning of the word 'nanagama-vidhayine. 1 He gives two alternative interpretations. In one he suggests that the early teacher Sveta had resolved the various contradictions of the Upanisadic texts, and had originated a system of Saiva thought which may be properly supported by the Upanisadic texts. In the second interpretation he suggests that the word ' nanagama-vidhayine' that is, he who has produced the various Agamas, only means that the system of Sveta was based on the various Saivagamas. In such an interpretation we are not sure whether these Agamas were based on the Upanisads or on other vernacular Dravidian texts, or on both. 1 In commenting upon the bhasya of Sankara on the Brahma-sutra (n. 2. 37), Vacaspati says in his Bhamati that the systems known as Saiva,

1 asmin pak§e 'ndndgama-vidhdyind'ity

asya ndndvidha-pahipatddy-dgama-nirtnatrd ity arthah. Appaya's commentary on iarikantha's bhasya (Bombay, 1908), Vol. 1, p. 6.

Pasupata, Karunika-siddhantin, and the Kapalikas are known as the fourfold schools called the Mahesvaras 1 . They all believe in the Samkhya doctrine of prakrti, mahat, etc., and also in some kind of Yoga on the syllable om\ their final aim was liberation and end of all sorrow. The individual souls are called pasus and the word 'pdsa' means bondage. The Mahesvaras believe that God is the instrumental cause of the world as the potter is of jugs and earthen vessels.

Both Sankara and Vacaspati regard this Mahesvara doctrine, based upon certain treatises (Siddhanta) written by Mahesvara, as being opposed to the Upanisadic texts. None of them mentions the name of the teacher Sveta, who is recorded in Srikantha's bhasya and the Siva-mahapurana. It is clear therefore that, if Sankara's testimony is to be believed, this word' nanagama-vidhayine* cannot mean the reconciliatory doctrine based on the Upanisads as composed by Sveta and the other twenty-seven Saiva teachers 2 . We have already pointed out that the Saiva doctrine, that we find in Srikantha, is largely different from the Mahesvara school of thought which Sankara and Vacaspati wanted to refute. There Sankara had compared the Mahesvara school of thought as being somewhat similar to the Nyaya philosophy.

What the Siddhanta treatises, supposed to have been written by Mahesvara, were, is still unknown to us. But it is certain that they were composed in the beginning of or before the Christian era, as that doctrine was referred to by Badarayana in his Brahma-sutra.

1 Ramanuja, however, in his commentary on the same sutra mentions as the fourfold schools the Kapalas, the Kalamukhas, the Pasupatas, and the fsaivas.

2 The Vdyaviya-samhitd section mentions the names of the twenty-eight yogacaryas beginning with fsveta. Their names are as follows:

jSveta/t sutdro madanah suhotrah kanka eva ca, laagaksis ca mahamayo jaiglsavyas tathaiva ca. 2. dadkivahas-ca r$abho munir ugro 'trir eva ca, supalako gautamai ca tathd vedasira munih. 3. gokarnas-ca guhdvdsl sikhadi caparah smrtah, jatdmdll cdttahdso ddruko langull tathd. 4. mahdkdlai ca iuh, ca dandl mundlsa eva ca, savi$nus soma-sarmd ca lakuhsvara eva ca. 5. Vdyaviya-samhitd n. 9, verses 2-5 (compare Kurma-purdna 1. 53, 4 et seq.).

The names of their pupils are given from 11. 9, verses 6-20 (compare

Kurma-purdna 1. 53, 12 et seq.).

Each one of the yogacaryas had four disciples. The better known of them are

as follows (Vdyaviya-samhitd 11. 9, 10 et seq.): Kapila, Asuri, Pancasikha,

Parasara, Brhadasva, Devala, Jsalihotra, Aksapada, Kanada, Uluka, Vatsa.

Srikantha definitely says that the souls and the inanimate objects, of which the universe is composed, all form materials for the worship of the supreme Lord. The human souls worship Him directly, and the inanimate objects form the materials with which He is worshipped. So the whole universe may be regarded as existing for the sake of the supreme Lord. Srikantha further says that the energy or the power of the Lord forms the basis or the canvas, as it were, on which the whole world is painted in diverse colours. So the reality of the world lies in the nature of God Himself; the universe, as it appears to us, is only a picture-show based on the ultimate reality of God who is regarded as definitely described and testified in the Upanisads 1 . On the testimony of Srikantha, the philosophy of Saivism as interpreted by him follows an interpretation of the Upanisads and is based on them. It is unfortunate that most of the scholars who have contributed articles to the study of Saivism or written books on it, have so far mostly ignored the philosophy propounded by Srikantha, although his work had been published as early as 1908.

We have already seen that Sankara in his bhasya on the Brahmasutra 11. 2. 37, had attributed the instrumentality of God as being the doctrine of the Siddhanta literature supposed to have been written by MahesVara. Appaya, in commenting upon the same topic dealt with by Srikantha, says that this is the view which may be found in the Saivagamas when they are imperfectly understood. But neither he nor Srikantha mentions the names of any of the Saivagamas which have come down to us, which describe the instrumentality of God. So Srikantha also undertakes to refute the view of Saivism which holds that God is only the instrumental cause of the world. We may therefore infer that some of the Saivagamas were being interpreted on the line of regarding God as being the instrumental cause of the world.

Srikantha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra 11. 2. 37 and the commentary of Appaya on it bring out some other important points. We know from these that there were two types of Agamas, one meant for the three castes {Varna) who had access to the Vedic

1 tuja-sakti-bhitti-mrmita-mkhila-jagajjald-dtra-Tiikurumbah t

sa jayati sivah pardtmd nikhildgama-sara-sarvasvam. 2. bhavatu sa bhavatarri siddhyai paramatma sarva-mangalo-petah, cidacinmayah prapancah seso' seso' pi yasyaisah. 3.

Introductory verses, fsrikantha's bhasya.

literature, and the other for those that had no access to the Vedic literature. These latter Agamas might have been written in the Dravidian vernaculars, or translated into the Dravidian vernaculars from Sanskrit manuals. Srikantha's own interpretation of the Brahma-siltra is based mainly on the views propounded in the Vdyaviya-samhita section of the Siva-mahdpurdna. In the Kurma-purdna and the Vardha-purdna also we hear of different types of Saivdgamas and Saiva schools of thought. Some of the Saiva schools, such as Lakulisa or Kapalikas, are regarded in those Puranas {Kurma and Vardha) as being outside the pale of Vedic thought, and the upholders of those views are regarded as following delusive Sastras or scriptures (mohd-sdstra). In reply to this it is held that some of those schools follow some impure practices, and have on that account been regarded as moha-sdstra. But they are not fully opposed to the Vedic discipline, and they encourage some kinds of adoration and worship which are found in the Vedic practice. The Agamas of this latter type, that is, which are for the Sudras and other lower castes, are like the well-known Agamas such as Kdmika, Mrgendra, etc. It is urged, however, that these non-Vedic Agamas and the Vedic Saivism as found in the Vdyaviya-samhita are essentially authoritative, and both of them owe their origin to Lord Siva. Their essential doctrines are the same, as both of them regard Siva as being both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. It is only that some superficial interpreters have tried to explain some of the Agamas, emphasising the instrumentality of the supreme Lord, and the above topic of the Brahma-sutra is intended to refute such a view of the supreme Lord as being only the efficient or instrumental cause.

It is curious to note that the two systems of Saiva philosophy called Ldkulisa-pdsupata and the Saiva-darsana as treated in the Sarvadarsana-samgraha, deal mainly with the aspect of God as the efficient cause of the universe; they lay stress on various forms of ritualism, and also encourage certain forms of moral discipline. It is also surprising to note that the Sarva-darsana-samgraha should not mention Srikantha's bhdsya, though the former was written somewhere about the fourteenth century a.d. and Srikantha's bhdsya must have been written much before that time, though it is not possible for us as yet to locate his time exactly. Neither does the Sarva-darsana-samgraha refer to any Puranic materials as

found in the Siva-mahapurana, the Kurma-purana and the Varaha-purana. But we shall treat of the systems later on in other sections and show their relation with the philosophy as propounded in Srikantha's bhdsya, so far as manuscript material and other published texts are available.

In interpreting the first sutra of the Brahma-sutra 'athdto-brahma-jijndsa, Srikantha first introduces a long discussion on the meaning of the word l atha. y The word 'atha' generally means ' after,' or it introduces a subject to a proper incipient. Srikantha holds that the entire Mimdmsd-sutra by Jaimini, beginning with "athdto dharma-jijiidsd" to the last sutra of the Brahma-sutra iv. 4. 22 "anavrttih sabddd andvrttih sabddt" is one whole. Consequently the brahma-jijndsa or the inquiry as to the nature of Brahman must follow the inquiry as to the nature of dharma, which forms the subject-matter of the Purva-mimdmsd-sutra of Jaimini. We have seen in our other volumes that the subject-matter of the Purva-mimdmsd starts with the definition of the nature of dharma, which is regarded as being the beneficial results accruing from the dictates of the Vedic imperatives " codand-laksanortho dharmah"). The sacrifices thus are regarded as dharma, and these sacrifices are done partly for the attainment of some desired benefits such as the birth of a son, attainment of prosperity, a shower of rain, or long residence in heaven after death; partly also as obligatory rites, and those which are obligatory on ceremonial occasions. Generally speaking these sacrificial duties have but little relation to an inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Sankara, therefore, had taken great pains in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra as well as in his commentary on the Gttd, to show that the sacrificial duties are to be assigned to persons of an entirely different character from those who are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. The two parts of sacrifices {karma) and knowledge (Jnana) are entirely different and are intended for two different classes of persons. Again, while the result of dharma may lead to mundane prosperity or a residence in heaven for a time and will, after a time, bring the person in the cycle of transmigratory birth and death, the knowledge of Brahman once attained or intuited directly, would liberate the person from all bondage eternally. So, these two courses, that is the path of karma and the path of knowledge, cannot be regarded as complementary to each other. It is

wrong to regard them as segments of the same circle. This is what is known as the refutation by Sankara of the joint performance of karma and jiiana, technically called the jnana-karma-samuccaya-vdda.

Srikantha here takes an entirely opposite view. He says that the Brahmin who is properly initiated with the holy thread has a right to study the Vedas, has even an obligatory duty to study the Vedas under a proper teacher, and when he has mastered the Vedas he also acquaints himself with their meaning. So the study of the Vedas with a full comprehension of their meaning must be regarded as preceding any inquiry or discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. As dharma can be known from the Vedas, so the Brahman has also to be known by the study of the Vedas. Consequently, one who has not studied the Vedas is not entitled to enter into any discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. But then it cannot be said that merely after the study of the Vedas one is entitled to enter into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. For such a person must, after the study of the Vedas, discuss the nature of dharma, without which he cannot be introduced into a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman. So the discussion about the nature of Brahman can only begin after a discussion on the nature of dharma 1 . He further says that it may be that the principles and maxims used in the interpretation of Vedic injunctions as found in the Purva-mimdmsd were necessary for the understanding of the Upanisadic texts leading to a discussion on the nature of Brahman. It is for this reason that a discussion of the nature of dharma is indispensably necessary for the discussion of the nature of Brahman.

It cannot, however, be said that if sacrifices lead to an understanding of the nature of Brahman, what is the good of any discussion on its nature. One might rather indulge in a discussion of the nature of dharma, because when the Vedic duties are performed without desire for the fulfilment of any purpose, that itself might purify the mind of a man and make him fit for inquiring into the nature of Brahman, for, by such a purposeless performance of

1 tarki kint anantaram asyarambhah. dharma-vicdrdnantaram. Srlkantha's bhdsya i. i. i, Vol. i, p. 34.

na vayam dharma-brahma-vicdra-rupayos sdstrayor atyanta-b-hedavddinah. kintu ekatva-vddinah. Ibid.

Vedic sacrifices, one may be purified of one's sins, and this may lead to a proper illumination of the nature of Brahman 1 . He also makes references to Gautama and other smrtis to establish the view that only those who are initiated in the Vedic ceremonial works are entitled to abide with Brahman, and get commingled with him. The most important point is that only those Vedic sacrifices which are done without any idea of the achievement of a purpose lead finally to the cessation of sins, and thereby making the Brahma-illumination possible. In the case of such a person the result of karma becomes the same as the result of knowledge. The karmas are to be performed until true knowledge dawns. Consequently one can say that the discussion on the nature of Brahman must be preceded by the discussion on the nature of dharma accruing from the prescribed Vedic duties. The inquiry after the nature of Brahman is not meant as the carrying out of any Vedic mandate, but people turn to it for its superior attraction as being the most valued possession that one may have, and one can perceive that only when one's mind is completely purified by performing the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, can one attain the knowledge of Brahman. It is only in this way that we can regard the discussion on the nature of dharma as leading to the discussion of the nature of Brahman. If the mind is not purified by the performance of the Vedic duties in a disinterested manner, then the mere performance of the Vedic duties does not entitle anyone to inquire about the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Dlksita, in commenting on the above bhdsya of Srikantha, says that the discussion on the nature of Brahman means a discussion on the texts of the Upanisads. Such discussions would naturally lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahman. The word 'brahman 1 is derived from the root 'brmhati' meaning 'great' which again is not limited by any qualification of time, space, or quality, that is, which is unlimitedly great. We have to accept this meaning because there is nothing to signify any limitation of any kind (samkocakabhavat). The Brahman is different from all that is animate (cetana) and inanimate (acetana). There are two kinds of energy: that which is the representative of the material power or energy (jada-sakti), which transforms itself in the form of

1 tasya phaldbhisandhi-rahitasyapdpdpanayana-rupacitta-s'uddhi-sampddana-dvdrd bodha-hetutvdt. fsrlkantha's bhdsya I. i. i, Vol. I, p. 39.

the material universe under the direction or instrumentality of the Brahman; and there is also the energy as consciousness (cicchakti), and this consciousness energy, as we find it in animate beings, is also controlled by the Brahman 1 . The Brahman Himself is different from the phenomenal world consisting of inanimate things and conscious souls. But as the conscious souls and unconscious world are both manifestations of the energy of God called Brahman or Siva or any other of His names, God Himself has no other instrument for the creation and maintenance of the world. So the greatness of Brahman is absolutely unlimited as there is nothing else beyond Him which can lend Him any support. The two energies of God representing the material cause and the spiritual force may be regarded somehow as the qualities of God.

Just as a tree has leaves and flowers, but still in spite of this variety is regarded as one tree, so God also, though He has these diversified energies as his qualities, is regarded as one. So, when considered from the aspect of material and spiritual energies, the two may be differentiated from the nature of Brahman, yet considered internally they should be regarded as being one with Brahman. These two energies have no existence separate from the nature of God. The word' brahman' means not only unlimitedness, it also means that He serves all possible purposes. He creates the world at the time of creation and then leading the souls through many kinds of enjoyment and sorrow, ultimately expands them into His own nature when the liberation takes place.

Appaya Dlksita, after a long discussion, conclusively points out that not all persons who had passed through the discipline of sacrificial duties are entitled to inquire about the nature of Brahman. Only those who, by reason of their deeds in past lives, had had their minds properly purified could further purify their minds in this life by the performance of the Vedic duties without any desire for fruit, and can attain a discriminative knowledge of what is eternal and non-eternal, and have the necessary disinclination (vairagya) y inner control and external control of actions and desire for liberation, thereby qualifying themselves for making an

1 tasya cetanacetana-prapanca-vilak$anatva-bhyupagamena vastu-paricchinat-vad ity dsankdm nirasitum adya-vise$anam. sakcda-cetanacetana-prapanca-karyaya tadrupa-parinaminya parama-saktya jada-sakter may ay a niyamakatvena tatauthrstayacicchaktyavisistasya. £ivdrkatnani-dipikd, Appaya's commentary, Vol. I, p. 68.

inquiry about the nature of Brahman. Appaya Diksita thus tries to bridge over the gulf between the standpoint of Srikantha and the standpoint of Sankara. With Sankara it is only those inner virtues and qualities, desire for liberation and the like that could entitle a person to inquire about the nature of Brahman. According to Sankara the discussion on the nature of Vedic duties or their performance did not form an indispensable precedent to the inquiry about the nature of Brahman. But Appaya Diksita tries to connect Srikantha's view with that of Sankara by suggesting that only in those cases where, on account of good deeds in past lives, one's mind is sufficiently purified to be further chastened by the desireless performance of Vedic duties, that one can attain the mental virtues and equipments pointed out by Sankara as an indispensable desideratum for inquiry into the nature of Brahman.

Appaya Diksita tries to justify the possibility of a discussion regarding the nature of Brahman by pointing out that in the various texts of the Upanisads the Brahman is variously described as being the ego, the food, the bio-motor force (prdna), and the like. It is necessary, therefore, by textual criticism to find out the exact connotation of Brahman. If Brahman meant only the ego, or if it meant the pure difFerenceless consciousness, then there would be no scope for discussion. No one doubts his own limited ego and nothing is gained by knowing Brahman, which is pure difFerenceless consciousness. For this reason it is necessary to discuss the various texts of the Upanisads which give evidence of a personal God who can bestow on His devotee eternal bliss and eternal consciousness.

The Nature of Brahman.

Srikantha introduces a number of Upanisadic texts supposed to describe or define the nature of Brahman. These apparently are in conflict with one another, and the contradiction is not resolved either by taking those definitions alternately or collectively, and for this reason it is felt necessary to enter into a textual and critical interpretation of those texts as yielding a unified meaning. These texts describe Brahman as that from which everything has sprung into being and into which everything will ultimately return, and

taht, it is of the nature of pure bliss, pure being and pure consciousness. Appaya Diksita says that, such qualities being ascribed to various deities, it is for us to find out the really ultimate Deity, the Lord Siva, who has all these qualities. He also introduces a long discussion as to whether the ascription of these diverse epithets would cause any reasonable doubt as to the entity or person who possesses them. He further enters into a long discussion as to the nature of doubt that may arise when an entity is described with many epithets, or when an entity is described with many contradictory epithets, or when several objects are described as having one common epithet. In the course of this discussion he introduces many problems of doubt with which we are already familiar in our treatment of Indian philosophy 1 . Ultimately Appaya tries to emphasise the fact that these qualities may be regarded as abiding in the person of Siva and there can be no contradiction, as qualities do not mean contradictory entities. Many qualities of diverse character may remain in harmony in one entity or person.

Lord Siva is supposed to be the cause of the creation of the world, its maintenance, and its ultimate dissolution, or the liberation of souls, through the cessation of bondage. All these qualities of the production of the world, its maintenance, etc., belong to the phenomenal world of appearance, and cannot therefore be attributed to the Lord Siva as constituting His essential definition. It is true that a person may, by his good deeds and his disinclination to worldly enjoyments and devotion, attain liberation automatically. But even in such cases it has to be answered that, though the person may be regarded as an active agent with reference to his actions, yet the grace of God has to be admitted as determining him to act. So also, since all the epithets of creation, maintenance, etc., belong to the world of appearance, they cannot be regarded as in any way limiting the nature of Lord Siva. They may at best be regarded as non-essential qualities by which we can only signify the nature of Brahman, but cannot get at His own true nature. The application of the concept of agency to individual persons or inanimate things is only one of emphasis; for, from certain points of view, one may say that a person attains liberation by his own action, while from another point of view the whole action of the individual may be

1 See especially the third volume of the present work dealing with the problem of doubt in Venkata.

regarded as being due to the grace of God. So, from one point of view the laws of the world of appearance may be regarded as natural laws, while from another all the natural laws may be regarded as being the manifestations of the grace of God.

It may be urged that if Lord Siva is all-merciful why does He not remove the sorrows of all beings by liberating them? To this question it may be said that it is only when, by the deeds of the persons, the veil of ignorance and impurity is removed that the ever-flowing mercy of God manifests itself in liberating the person. Thus there is a twofold action, one by the person himself and the other by the extension of mercy on the part of God in consonance with his actions.

Again, the dissolution of the world of appearance is not a magical disappearance, but rather the return of the grosser nature of the prakrti or primal matter into its subtle nature of the same prakrti. The world as a whole is not illusion, but it had at one time manifested itself in a grosser form of apparent reality, and in the end it will again return into the subtle nature of the cosmic matter or prakrti. This return into the nature of the subtle prakrti is due to the conjoint actions of all animate beings as favoured by the grace of God.

The second sutra, which describes or defines Brahman as that from which all things have come into being, into which all things will ultimately return, and wherein all things are maintained, regards these qualities of production, maintenance, and dissolution of all things, according to Srikantha as interpreted by Appaya, as being the final determinant causal aspect, both material and instrumental, by virtue of which the nature of Brahman as God or Isvara can be inferred. So according to Srikantha and Appaya this sutra 'janmddy-asya yatah' should be regarded as a statement of infallible inference of the nature of Brahman. Sankara in his commentary had definitely pointed out that those who regard Isvara or God as the cause of all things and beings interpret this sutra as an example of inference, by which the unlimited nature of Brahman could be directly argued; and that such a definition, in that it points out the reasons, is sufficient description, not too wide nor too narrow. Therefore, by this argument one can understand the Brahman as being the supreme and unlimited Lord of the whole of the material and spiritual universe. Sankara definitely

refuses to accept such an interpretation, and regards it as merely stating the general purport of the Upanisadic texts, which say that it is from Brahman that everything has come into being, and that it is in and through Brahman that everything lives, and that ultimately everything returns into Brahman. The main point at issue between Sankara and Srikantha is that, while Sankara refuses to accept this sutra as establishing an argument in favour of the existence of Brahman, and while he regards the purpose of the Brahma-sutra as being nothing more than to reconcile and relate in a harmonious manner the different texts of the Upanisads, Srikantha and the other Saivas regard this sutra as an inferential statement in favour of the existence of the unlimited Brahman or the supreme Lord Siva 1 .

Ramanuja also does not interpret this sutra as being an inferential statement for establishing the nature and existence of Brahman. He thinks that by reconciling the apparently contradictory statements of the Upanisadic texts, and by regarding Brahman as the cause of the production, maintenance, and dissolution of the world, it is possible to have an intuition or apprehension of the nature of Brahman through the Upanisadic texts 2 .

Srikantha tries to interpret the various epithets of Brahman such as ananda or bliss, sat or being, jnana or consciousness, and the fact that in some texts Siva is mentioned as the original cause of the world in the sense that Siva is both the original and ultimate cause of the universe. He raises the difficulty of treating these epithets as applying to Brahman either alternately or collectively. He also further raises the difficulty that in some of the Upanisadic texts prakrtiy which is inanimate, is called the may a and the cause of the inanimate world. If Brahman is of the nature of knowledge or consciousness then He could not have transformed Himself into the material world. The transformation of pure consciousness into the material universe would mean that Brahman is changeable and this would contradict the Upanisadic statement that the Brahman is absolutely without any action and in a state of pure passivity.

1 etad evdnumdnam samsdriv-vyatirikte-svardstitvddi-sddhanam manyanta Isvara-kdraninah. nanu ihdpi tad evopanyastam jamnddi-sutre, na\ veddnta-vdkya-kusuma-grathandrthatvdt sutrdndm. !§ankara's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra I. I. 2.

8 Ramanuja's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra i. i. 2.

From this point of view the objector might say that all the epithets that are ascribed to Brahman in the Upanisads cannot be applied to it at the same time, and they may not be taken collectively as the defining characteristics of the nature of Brahman. Srikantha, therefore, thinks that the abstract terms as truth, consciousness, bliss, etc., that are applied to Brahman, are to be taken as personal qualities of the Supreme Lord. Thus, instead of regarding Brahman as pure consciousness, Srikantha considers the Supreme Lord as being endowed with omniscience, eternally self-satisfied, independent, that is, one who always contains his power or energy, and one who possesses omnipotence. He is eternally self-efficient {nitya aparoksa) and never depends on any external thing for the execution of his energy or power (anapeksita-bdhya-karana). Lord Siva, thus being omniscient, knows the deeds of all animate beings and the fruits of those deeds to which they are entitled, and He also knows the forms of bodies that these animate souls should have in accordance with their past deeds, and He has thus a direct knowledge of the collocation of materials with which these bodies are to be built up 1 . The fact that the Brahman is described as dnanda or bliss is interpreted as meaning that Lord Siva is always full of bliss and self-contented 2 .

In the Upanisads it is said that the Brahman has the akasa as his body (akdsa-sarlram brahma). It is also said in some of the Upanisads that this akasa is bliss (dnanda). Srikantha says that this akasa is not the elemental akasa (bhutakdsa); it merely means the plane of consciousness (ciddkdsa), and in that way it means the ultimate material (para-prakrti), which is the same as the ultimate energy. Appaya points out that there are people who think that the energy of consciousness is like an instrument for creating this universe, as an axe for cutting down a tree. But Appaya denies this view and holds that the ultimate energy is called the akasa 3 . It is this energy of consciousness

1 anenasakala-cetana-bahu-vidha-karma-phala-bhogdnu-kula-tat-tac-charira-nirmdnopdya-sdmagri-visesa jnam brahma nimittam bhavati. Srlkantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra I. i. 2, p. 121.

2 parabrahma-dharmatvena ca sa eva dnando brahmeti pracuratvdd brahmat-venopacaryate. tddrsdnanda-bhoga-rasikam brahma mtya-trptam ity ucyate. Ibid. p. 122.

3 yasya sa paramd devi saktir dkasa-samjmtd. Appaya's commentary, Vol. 1, p. 123.

(cicchakti) that is regarded as pervading through all things and it is this energy that undergoes the transformations for the creation of the universe. It is this cicchakti that is to be regarded as the original force of life that manifests itself in the activities of life. All kinds of life functions and all experiences of pleasure are based on the lower or on the higher level of this ultimate life force, called also the cicchakti or akasa.

Again, Brahman is described as being of the nature of being, consciousness and bliss (dnanda). In this case, it is held that Brahman enjoys His own bliss without the aid of any external instrumentality. And it is for this reason that the liberated souls may enjoy bliss of a superlative nature without the aid of any external instruments. The truth as consciousness is also the truth as pure bliss which are eternal in their existence not as mere abstract qualities, but as concrete qualities adhering to the person of Lord Siva. Thus, though the Brahman or Lord Siva may be absolutely unchangeable in Himself, yet His energy might undergo the transformations that have created this universe. Brahman has thus within Him both the energy of consciousness and the energy of materiality which form the matter of the universe (cid-acit-prapanca-rupa-sakti-visistatvam svabhabikam eva brahmanah). As the energy of Brahman is limitless, he can in and through those energies form the material cause of the universe. As all external things are said to have 'being' as the common element that pervades them all, it represents the aspect of Brahman as ' being,' in which capacity it is the material cause of the world. The supreme Lord is called Sarva, because all things are finally absorbed in Him. He is called Isdna, because He lords over all things, and He is hence also called Pasupati. By the epithet pasupati it is signified that He is not only the Lord of all souls (J>asu) t but also all that binds them (pdsa). The Brahman thus is the controller of all conscious entities and the material world 1 .

It has been said that the mdya is the primal matter, prakrti y which is the material cause of the universe. But God or the Lord Siva is said to be always associated with the maya t that is, He has no separate existence entirely apart from the mdya. In such a view, if the mdya is to be regarded as the material cause of the universe,

1 anena ctd-acin-myamakcan brahmeti vijnayate. &rlkantha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra I. i. 2, p. 127.

then the Lord Siva, who is associated with the mayd, has also to be, in some distant sense, regarded as the material cause of the universe. So the final conclusion is that the Brahman as associated with subtle consciousness and subtle materiality is the cause, and the effect is the universe which is but gross consciousness as associated with gross matter 1 . It is true, indeed, that the facts of production, maintenance, and dissolution are epithets that can only apply to the phenomenal world, and therefore they cannot be regarded as essential characteristics determining the nature of Brahman as an inferential statement. Yet the production, maintenance, and dissolution of the world of phenomena may be regarded as a temporary phase (tatastha-laksana) of the nature of Brahman. It should also be noted that when mayd transforms itself into the world by the controlling agency of God, God Himself being eternally associated with mayd, may in some sense be regarded as being also the material cause of the world, though in His supreme transcendence He remains outside the mayd. The difference between this view and that of Ramanuja is that, according to the latter, the Brahman is a concrete universal having the entire materiality and the groups of souls always associated with Him and controlled directly by Him, as the limbs of a person are controlled by the person himself. The conception is that of an entire organisation, in which the Brahman is the person and the world of souls and matter are entirely parts of Him and dominated by Him. The position of Sankara is entirely different. He holds that the central meaning of the sutra is just an interpretation of the texts of Upanisads which show that the world has come out of Brahman, is maintained in Him, and will ultimately return into Him. But it does not declare that this appearance of the world is ultimately real. Sankara is not concerned with the actual nature of the appearance, but he has his mind fixed on the ultimate and

1 'may am tu prakrtim vidydd' iti may ayah prakrtitvam Jsvardtmikdyd eva 'mdyinam tu mahesvaram' iti vdkya-sesdt. sukpna-cid-acid-visi$tam brahma kdranam sthula-cid-acid-visiftam tat-kdryam bhavati. Srikantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra I. I. 2, pp. 134 et seq.

satyam mdyopdddnam iti brahmdpy updddnam eva. aprthak-siddha-karyd-vasthd srayatva-rupam hi mdydyd updddnatvam samarthamyam. tat-samarthya-mdnam eva brahma-paryantam ayati. nitya-yoge khalu mdyinam iti mdyd-sabdddi-nipratyayah. tatas ca mayaydh brahma-prthak-iiddhyaiva tad-aprthak-siddhdyah kdrydvasthdyd api brahmaprthak-siddhis siddhyati.

Appaya Dik§ita's commentary, Vol. 1, p. 134.

unchangeable ground which always remains true and is not only relatively true as the world of appearance 1 .

We have said above that Srikantha regarded the second sutra as indicating an inference for the existence of God. But in the course of later discussions he seems to move to the other side, and regards the existence of Brahman as being proved by the testimony of the Vedas. The general argument from the unity of purpose throughout the universe cannot necessarily lead to the postulation of one creator, for a house or a temple which shows unity of purpose is really effected by a large number of architects and artisans. He also thinks that the Vedas were produced by God. That is also somehow regarded as additional testimony to His existence. The nature of Brahman also can be known by reconciling the different Upanisadic texts which all point to the supreme existence of Lord Siva. In Brahma-sutra n. i. 18, 19 Snkantha says that the Brahman as contracted within Himself is the cause while, when by His inner desire He expands Himself, He shows Himself and the universe which is His effect 2 . This view is more or less like the view of Vallabha, and may be regarded as largely different from the idea of Brahman as given by Srikantha in 1. 1. 2. Srikantha, in further illustrating his views, says that he admits Brahman to be the ultimate material cause of the universe only in the sense that the prakrti, from which the world is evolved, is itself in Brahman. So as Brahman cannot remain without His sakti or energy, He can be regarded as the material cause of the world, though He in Himself remains transcendent, and it is only His may a that works as an immanent cause of the production of the world. He thus says that there is a difference between the individual souls and the Brahman, and there is a difference between the prakrti and the Brahman. He would not admit that the world of appearance is entirely different from Brahman; neither would he admit that they are entirely identical. His position is like that of the modified

1 For the view of !§ankara and his school, see Vols. 1 and n. For the view of Ramanuja and his school see Vol. III.

2 " ciddtmaiva hi devo" ntah-sthitam icchd-vasdd bahih. yoglva mrupdddnam arthajdtam prkdsayed' iti. nirupdddnam iti anapeksitopdddndntaram svayam upaddnam bhiitvety arthah. tatah parama-kdrandt parabrahmanah sivdd abhinnam evajagat kdryam iti.. .yathd samkucitah suksma-rUpahpatahprasdrito mahdpata-kiiti-rupena kdryam bhavati, tathd brahmdpi samkucita-rupam kdranam prasdrita-rupam kdryam bhavati. iSrlkantha's bhd$ya, Vol. 11, p. 29.

monists, like that of the Visistadvaita-vdda of Ramanuja. Brahman exists in quite a transcendent manner, apart from the individual souls and the inanimate world. But yet, since the individual souls and the material universe are emanations from His energy, the world of souls and matter may be regarded as parts of Him, though they are completely transcended by Himself 1 .

Moral Responsibility and the Grace of God.

The question is, why did the supreme Lord create the whole universe? He is always self-realised and self-satisfied, and He has no attachment and no antipathy. He is absolutely neutral and impartial. How is it, then, that He should create a world which is so full of happiness to some (e.g. the gods) and so full of sorrow and misery to others? This will naturally lead us to the charge of partiality and cruelty. Moreover, since before the creation there must have been destruction, it will necessarily be argued that God Himself is so cruel as to indulge in universal destruction out of simple cruelty. So one may naturally argue that what purpose should God have in creating a world which is not a field for the attainment of our own desires and values. The reply given to this is that God indulges in the creation and destruction of the world in accordance with the diversity of human deeds and their results (karma and karmaphala).

It cannot be argued that before the creation there were no souls, for we know from the Upanisadic texts that the souls and God both exist eternally. As the souls have no beginning in time, so their deeds also are beginningless. This may lead to an infinite regress, but this infinite regress is not vicious. The series of births and deaths in the world in different bodies is within the stream of beginningless karma. Since God in His omniscience directly knows by intuition the various kinds of deeds that the individual

1 bhedabheda-kalpanam visistddvattam sddhaydmah na vayam brahma-prapaHcayor atyantam eva bheda-vddinah ghata-patayor iva. tad-ananyatva-para-sruti-virodhdt. na vd'tyantd-bheda-vddinah sukti-rajatayor iva. ekatara-mithyatvena tat-svdbhdvika-guna-bheda parasruti-virodhdt. na ca bheddbheda-vddinah, vastu-virodhdt. kin tu sarlra-sarlrinor iva guna-guninor iva ca visist-advaita-vadinah. prapanca-brahm anor ananyatvam noma mrd-ghatayor iva guna-guninor iva ca kdrya-kdranatvena visesana-visesyatvena ca vindbhdva-rahitatvam. !§rikantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra n. i. 22, Vol. II, p. 31.

would perform, He arranges suitable bodies and circumstances for the enjoyment or suffering of such deeds already anticipated by Him. So the difference in creation is due to the diversity of one's deeds. The time of destruction comes when the souls become tired and fatigued by the process of birth and death, and require some rest in dreamless sleep. So the effectuation of dissolution does not prove the cruelty of God.

Now, since the pleasures and sorrows of all beings depend upon their deeds (karma), what is the necessity of admitting any God at all? The reply is that the law of karma depends upon the will of God and it does not operate in an autonomous manner, nor does it curb the freedom or independence of God. This, however, would lead us in a circular way to the same position, for while the pleasures and sorrows of men depend upon the deeds of men and the law of karma, and since the law of karma depends upon the will of God, it actually means that the pleasures and sorrows of beings are due indirectly to the partiality of God.

Again, since the karma and the law of karma are both unintelligent, they must be operated by the intelligence of God. But how could God before the creation, when beings were devoid of the miseries of death and birth, were not endowed with any bodies, and were therefore in a state of enjoyment, associate them with bodies, lead them to the cycle of birth and rebirth, and expose them to so much sorrow? The reply is that God extends His grace to all {sarvanugrahaka paramesvara) ; and thus, since without the fruition of one's deeds (karmapdkam antarena) there cannot be pure knowledge, and since without pure knowledge there cannot be the liberation of enjoying bliss in a superlative manner, and since also without the fruition of karma through enjoyment and suffering there cannot be the relevant bodies through which the souls could enjoy or suffer the fruits of karma, bodies have necessarily to be associated with all the souls which were lying idle at the time of the dissolution. So when in this manner the deeds of a person are exhausted through enjoyment or suffering, and the minds of beings become pure, it is only then that there may arise self-knowledge leading to the supreme bliss of liberation.

It may again be asked that, if God is absolutely merciful, why could not He arrange for the fruition of the deeds of all persons at one and the same time and allow them to enjoy the bliss of

liberation? The reply is that, even if God would have extended His grace uniformly to all persons, then those whose impurities have been burnt up would be liberated and those whose impurities still remained could only attain salvation through the process of time. Thus, though God is always self-contented, He operates only for the benefit of all beings.

From the interpretation of Appaya it appears that the word grace (annugraha) is taken by him in the sense of justice. So God does not merely extend His mercy, but His mercy is an extension of justice in accordance with the deeds of persons, and therefore He cannot be regarded as partial or cruel 1 . Appaya anticipates the objection that in such a view there is no scope for the absolute lordship of God, for He only awards happiness and misery in accordance with the law of karma. It is therefore meaningless to say that it is He, the Lord, that makes one commit sins or perform good deeds merely as He wishes to lower a person or to elevate him. For God does not on His own will make one do bad or good deeds, but the persons themselves perform good or bad actions according to their own inclinations as acquired in past creations, and it is in accordance with those deeds that the new creation is made for the fulfilment of the law of karma 2 . Appaya further says that the good and bad deeds are but the qualities of the mind (antahkarana) of the persons. At the time of dissolution these minds are also dissolved in the maya and remain there as unconscious impressions or tendencies (vasana), and being there they are reproduced in the next creation as individual bodies and their actions in such a way that, though they were dissolved in the maya, they do not commingle, and each one is associated with his own specific mind and deeds at the next birth 3 . In the Agamas, where thirty-six categories

1 evam ca yathd narapatih prajdndm vyavahdra-darsane tadlya-yuktdyukta-vacandnusdrena anugraha-nigraha-visesam kurvan pak§apdtitva-lak§anam vai-samyatn na pratipadyate evam Isvaro'pi tadlya-karma-visesd-nusdrena vi$ama-srstim kurvan na tatpratipadyate. Appaya Dlk§ita's commentary, Vol. n, p. 47.

2 paramesvaro na svayam sddhvasddhuni karmani kdrayati, tais sukha-duhkhddini ca notpddayati, yenatasya vaisamyam dpatet. kin tu prdvina eva tathdbhutdni karmani yarn sva-sva-rucyanusdrenapurva-sargesu kurvanti tdny eva punas-sargesu vi$ama-sr$ti-hetavo bhavanti. Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 48.

3 parmeivarastu purva-sarga-krtdndm tat-tad-antahkarana-dharmarupdndm sadhva-asddhu-karmandm pralaye sarvdntah-karandndm vilinatayd mdydydm eva vasand-rupatayd lagndndm kevalam asankarena phala-vyavasthdpakah. anyathd mdydydm sankirne§u karma-phalam anyo grhnlydt. Appaya Dlk§ita's commentary, Vol. 11, p. 48.

(tattva) are counted, the law of karma called niyati is also counted as one of the categories. Though the category of niyati is admitted, it cannot operate blindly, but only under the superintendence of God, so that the actions or fruits of action of one may not be usurped by another. Pure niyati or the law of karma could not have done it. The view supported here is that when, at the time of dissolution, all karmas are in a state of profound slumber, God awakens them and helps the formation of bodies in accordance with them, and associates the bodies with the respective souls, and makes them suffer or enjoy according to their own deeds.

The problem still remains unexplained as to how we are to reconcile the freedom of will of all persons with the determinism by God. If God is regarded as being responsible for making us act in the way of good or of evil, then deferring God's determination to beginningless lives does not help the solution of the difficulty. If God determines that we shall behave in a particular manner in this life, and if that manner is determined by the actions of our past lives ad infinitum, then when we seek for the original determination we are bound to confess that God is partial; for He must have determined us to act differently at some distant period and He is making us act and suffer and enjoy accordingly. So the ultimate responsibility lies with God. In reply to this it is held by Appaya, interpreting the commentary of Srikantha, that we were all born with impurities. Our bondage lies in the veil that covers our wisdom and action, and God, who possesses infinite and manifold powers, is always trying to make us act in such a manner that we may ultimately purify ourselves and make ourselves similar to Him. The dissolution of our impurities through natural transformation is like that of a boil or wound in the body which disappears only after giving some pain. The Vedic duties which are obligatory and occasional help to cure us of these impurities, just as medicine helps to cure a wound, and this may necessarily cause misery of birth and death. It is only when our deeds fructify that knowledge can spring from them. So also by the performance of obligatory and occasional deeds as prescribed in the Vedas, our karmas become mature and there arises in us a spirit of disinclination (vairagya), devotion to Siva and an inquiry after Him, which ultimately produces in us the wisdom that leads to liberation. The fruition of one's karma cannot take place without the environment

of the world such as we have it. Thus, for the ultimate liberation we must perform certain actions. God makes us perform these actions, and according to the manifold character of our deeds He creates different kinds of bodies, making us do such actions as we may suffer from, and thereby gradually advance towards the ultimate goal of liberation. In accordance with the diversity of our original impurities and actions, we are made to perform different kinds of deeds, just as a medical adviser would prescribe different kinds of remedies for different diseases. All this is due to the supreme grace of God. Srikantha's usage of the word karma means that by which the cycle of birth and death is made possible through the agency of God 1 . In the dissolution, of course, there cannot be any process for the fulfilment or fruition of action, so that state is supposed to be brought about only for giving a rest to all beings.

In Brahma-sutra n. 3. 41 Srikantha seems to make it definitely clear that the individual souls themselves do things which may be regarded as the cause of their acting in a particular way, or desisting from a particular way of action, in accordance with the nature of the fruition of their past deeds. It is further said that God only helps a person when he wishes to act in a particular way, or to desist from a particular action. So a man is ultimately responsible for his own volition, which he can follow by the will of God in the practical field of the world. The responsibility of man rests in the assertion of his will and the carrying of the will into action, and the will of God helps us to carry out our will in the external world around us. Man performs his actions in accordance with the way in which he can best satisfy his interests. He is therefore responsible for his actions, though in the actual carrying out of the will he is dependent on God. God thus cannot be charged with partiality or cruelty, for God only leads the individual souls to action in accordance with His own will and inner effort 2 .

1 bhasye "karma-pakam antarene'tyadi-vakyesu karma-sabdah kriyate" nena satnsara iti karana-vyutpattya va paramesvarena pakvah kriyata hi karma-vyutpattya va malavaranapa.ro drastavyah. Appaya Dlksita's commentary, Vol. 11, p. 50.

2 ato jlva-krta-prayatnapeksatvat karmasu jlvasya pravartaka Isvaro na vaisamyabhdk. tasyapi svadhtna-pravrtti-sadbhavdt vidhi-nisedhadi-vaiyartham ca na sambhavatlti siddham. Srlkantha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra n. 3. 41, P- 157-

It is curious to note, however, that Appaya thinks that, even allowing for the inner human effort of will, the individual is wholly dominated by God. Appaya thus leaves no scope for the freedom of the will 1 .

In Brahma-sutra II. 2. 36-8 Srikantha makes a special effort to repudiate the view of Sankara, that the Saivas believed in a doctrine that God was the instrumental cause of the world, and could be known as such through inference. He also repudiates the view that the Brahman or Siva had entered into the prakrti or the primal matter, and thereby superintended the course of its evolution and transformation into the universe. For in that case He should be open to the enjoyment and suffering associated with the prakrti. Srikantha therefore holds that according to the Saiva view the Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe, and that He cannot be known merely by reason, but by the testimony of the Vedic scriptures. There is here apparently an oscillation of view on the subject as propounded by Srikantha. Here and in the earlier parts of his work, as has been pointed out, Srikantha asserts that, though God is the material cause of the universe, He is somehow unaffected by the changes of the world 2 . The ultimate Brahman or Siva is associated with a subtle energy of consciousness and materiality which together are called cicchakti, and as associated with the cicchakti, God Siva is one and beyond everything. When in the beginning of creation there comes out from this supreme maya or cicchakti the creative maya which has a serpentine motion, then that energy becomes the material cause of the entire world. It is from this that four categories evolve, namely as sakti, Saddsiva, Mahesvara, and Suddha-vidya. After that comes the lower maya of a mixed character, which is in reality the direct material cause of the world and the bodies. Then comes time {kala\ destiny (niyati), knowledge (vidya), attachment (raga), and the souls. In another line there comes from the impure maya the entire universe and the bodies of living beings. From that comes intelligence (buddhi), egotism (ahafikara), manas, the fivefold cognitive senses, the fivefold conative senses, the fivefold subtle

1 tatha ca paramesvara-kdrita-purva-karma-tnula-svecchddfane yatne, para-mesvaradla.na.tvan na hlyate. Appaya's commentary, Vol. n, p. 156.

2 jagad-upadana-nimitta-bhutasyapi paramesvarasya "niskalatn niskriyam" ityadi-irutibhir nirvikdratvam apy upapadyate. Srikaitfha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra n. 2. 38, p. iog.

causes of gross matter called tanmatra, and also the fivefold elements of matter. Thus are the twenty-three categories. Counting the previous categories, we get thirty-six categories altogether. These are well known in the Saiva texts and they have been established there both logically and by reference to the testimony of the scriptural texts. A distinction is made, as has been shown above, between the pure maya. and the impure maya. The impure maya includes within itself all the effects such as time and the impure souls. The word vyakta is used to denote the material cause or the purely material world, including the mental psychosis called buddhi.

The category of Siva is also sometimes denoted by the term sakti or energy 1 . The word siva-tattva has also been used as merely Siva in the Vayaviya-samhita.

We have seen before that Sankara explained this topic of the Brahma-sutra as refuting the view of the different schools of Saivas or Mahesvaras who regard God as being the instrumental cause of the universe. Srikantha has tried to show that God is both the material cause and the instrumental cause of the universe. In his support he addresses texts from the Vayaviya-samhita of the Siva-mahapurana to show that, according to the Vedic authority, God is both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe. But Srikantha says that, though the Agamas and the Vedic view of Saivism are one and the same, since both of them were composed by Siva, in some of the Agamas, such as the Kanaka, the instrumental side is more emphasised; but that emphasis should not be interpreted as a refutation of the view that God is also the material cause of the universe. It is true that in some sects of Saivism, such as the Kapalikas or Kalamukhas, some of the religious practices are of an impure character and so far they may be regarded as non-Vedic; and it is possible that for that reason, in the Mahabharata and elsewhere, some sects of Saivism have been described as non-Vedic. Yet from the testimony of the Varaha-purana and other Puranas, Saivism or the Pdsupata-yoga has been regarded as Vedic. Srikantha and Appaya took great pains to bridge the gulf between the vernacular Saivism and the

1 siva-tattva-iabdena tu siva evocyate. na tu atra siva-tattva-sabdah para-saktiparah. sakti-sabdas tat-karya-dvitiya-tattva-rupa-saktiparah. Appaya Dlksita's commentary, Vol. n, p. no.

Sanskritic, that is, those forms of Saivism which were based on the authority of the Vedas and were open to the first three castes (varna), and those which are open to all castes. Both try to make out that the present topic was not directed against the views propounded in the Saivagamas as Sankara explained, but against other views which do not form any part of the Saiva philosophy.

In some texts of the Kalpa-sutras we hear of objections against the valid authority of some of the texts, but these objections do not apply to the Agamas composed by Siva. It is said that Siva cannot be the material cause of the universe, because the Upanisads hold that the Brahman is changeless, and in this way an attempt is made to refute the parinama doctrine. Parinama means "change from a former state to a latter state." It is further held that sakti or energy is in itself changeless. Even if that sakti be of the nature of consciousness, then such a change would also be inadmissible. Against this view it is held that there may be change in the spiritual power or energy {cicchakti) on the occasion of a desire for creation or a desire for destruction. The cicchakti which is within us goes out and comes into contact, in association with the senses, with the external objects, and this explains our perception of things. So, since we have to admit the theory of the functional expansion (vrtti) of the cicchakti, it is easy to admit that the original sakti has also its functional expansion or contraction 1 .

According to the Saiva school as propounded by Srikantha, the individual souls have not emanated from God, but they are coexistent with Him. The apparent scriptural texts that affirm that souls came out of Brahman like sparks from a fire are interpreted as meaning only the later association of souls with buddhi and manas, and also with the different bodies. It must also be said that the souls are the conscious knowers, both by way of senses and by the manas. The manas is explained as a special property or quality of knowledge which the soul possesses and by virtue of which it is a knower. This manas must be differentiated from a lower type of manas which is a product oiprakrti, and which becomes associated with the soul in the process of birth and rebirth through association

1 tesvapi sisrksa-satnjihir$adi-vyavaharena Hva-cicchakteh "cicchaktir artha-satnyogo-dhyaksam indriya-tndrgata" iti cicchakti-vrtti-nirgama-vyavaharena jiva-cicchaktes ca parit^amitvam aviskrtatn eveti bhavah. Appaya Dlksita's commentary, Vol. n, p. 112.

with the power of may a. This power gives it a special character as a knower, by which it can enjoy or suffer pleasure and pain, and which is limited to the body and the egoism. It is by virtue of this manas that the soul is called a jiva. When through Brahma-knowledge its threefold association with impurities is removed, then it becomes like Brahman, and its self-knowledge in a liberated state manifests itself. This knowledge is almost like Brahma-knowledge. In this state the individual soul may enjoy its own natural joy without the association of any of the internal organs, merely by the manas. The manas there is the only internal organ for the enjoyment of bliss and there is no necessity of any external organs. The difference between the individual soul and God is that the latter is omniscient and the former knows things only particularly during the process of birth and rebirth. But in the actual state of liberation the souls also become omniscient 1 . Srikantha also holds that the souls are all atomic in size, and that they are not of the nature of pure consciousness, but they all possess knowledge as their permanent quality. In all these points Srikantha differs from Sankara and is in partial agreement with Ramanuja. Knowledge as consciousness is not an acquired quality of the soul as with the Naiyayikas or the Vaisesikas, but it is always invariably co-existent in the nature of the selves. The individual souls are also regarded as the real agents of their actions, and not merely illusory agents, as some philosophical theories hold. Thus Samkhya maintains that the prakrti is the real agent and also the real enjoyer of joys and sorrows, which are falsely attributed to the individual souls. According to Srlkantha, however, the souls are both real agents and real enjoyers of their deeds. It is by the individual will that a soul performs an action, and there is no misattribution of the sense of agency as is supposed by Samkhya or other schools of thought. The souls are ultimately regarded as parts of Brahman, and Srikantha tries to repudiate the monistic view that God falsely appears as an individual soul through the limitations of causes and conditions (upadhi) 2 .

1 tat-sadrsa-gunatvdt apagata-samsdrasya jivasya svarupdnanddnubhava-sddhanam manorupam antah-karanam anapeksita-bdhya-karanam asti iti gamy ate. jnajOau iti jivasya ajnatvatn kimcij jnatvam eva. asamsdrinah paramesvarasya tu sarvajnatvam ucyate. atah samsdre kimcij jnatvam muktau sarvajnatvam itijndtd eva dtmd. Jsrikantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, n. 3. 19, pp. 142-3.

2 Srikantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, 11, 3. 42-52.

Regarding the view that karmas or deeds produce their own effects directly, or through the intermediary of certain effects called apurva, Srlkantha holds that the karmas being without any intelligence (acetana) cannot be expected to produce the manifold effects running through various births and various bodies. It has therefore to be admitted that, as the karmas can be performed only by the will of God operating in consonance with the original free will of man, or as determined in later stages by his own karma, so the prints of all the karmas are also distributed in the proper order by the grace of God. In this way God is ultimately responsible on the one hand for our actions, and on the other for the enjoyment and suffering in accordance with our karmas, without any prejudice to our moral responsibility as expressed in our original free inclination or as determined later by our own deeds. 1

In the state of liberation the liberated soul does not become one with the Brahman in its state of being without any qualities. The Upanisadic texts that affirm that the Brahman is without any qualities do so only with the view to affirm that Brahman has none of the undesirable qualities, and that He is endowed with all excellent qualities which are consistent with our notion of God. When in the state of liberation the liberated souls become one with the Brahman, it only means that they share with God all His excellent qualities, but they never become divested of all qualities, as the monistic interpretation of Sankara likes to explain. It has been pointed out before that God may have many attributes at one and the same time, and that such a conception is not self-contradictory if it is not affirmed that he has many qualities of a contradictory character at one and the same time. Thus, we can speak of a lotus as being white, fragrant and big, but we cannot speak of it as being both blue and white at the same time. 2

Srikantha holds that only those karmas which are ripe for producing fruits {prarabdha-karmd) will continue to give fruits, and will do so until the present body falls away. No amount of knowledge or intuition can save us from enjoying or suffering the fruits of karma that we have earned, but if we attain true knowledge by continuing our meditation on the nature of Siva as being one with ourselves, we shall not have to suffer birth and rebirth of the

1 J§rlkan$ha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra, III. 2. 37-40.

2 J§rlkantha's bhasya on Brahma-sutra, III. 3. 40.

accumulated karmas which had not yet ripened to the stage of giving their fruits of enjoyment or suffering 1 .

When all the impurities {mala) are removed and a person is liberated, he can in that state of liberation enjoy all blissful experiences and all kinds of powers, except the power of creating the universe. He can remain without a body and enjoy all happiness through his mind alone, or he can at one and the same time animate or recreate many spiritual bodies which transcend the laws of prakrtiy and through them enjoy any happiness that he wishes to have. In no case, however, is he at that stage brought under the law of karma to suffer the cycles of birth and rebirth, but remains absolutely free in himself in tune with the Lord Siva, with whom he may participate in all kinds of pleasurable experiences. He thus retains his personality and power of enjoying pleasures. He does this only through his mind or through his immaterial body and senses. His experiences would no longer be of the type of the experiences of normal persons, who utilise experiences for attaining particular ends. His experience of the world would be a vision of it as being of the nature of Brahman 2 .

1 £rlkantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, IV. i. 19.

2 &rlkantha's bhdsya on Brahma-sutra, iv. 4. 17-22.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE &AIVA PHILOSOPHY IN THE PURANAS

The Saiva Philosophy in the Siva-mahapurana.

We shall discuss the antiquity of the Saiva religion and philosophy in a separate section. It is a pity that it is extremely difficult, nay, almost impossible, to trace the history of the continuous development of Saiva thought from earliest times. We can do no more than make separate studies of different aspects of Saiva thought appearing in different contexts, and then try to piece them together into an unsatisfactory whole. This is largely due to various factors. First, the Saiva thought was expressed both in Sanskrit and also in Dravidian languages. We do not yet know definitely if the Dravidian texts were but translations from Sanskrit sources, or were only inspired by Sanskrit writings. Later writers, even in the Puranas, hold that Siva was the author of all Saiva scriptures either in Sanskrit or in Dravidian. This, of course, refers to the earliest writings, the Agamas.

We do not know the exact date of the earliest Agamas. The word 'agama* needs a little explanation. It means "texts that have come down to us", and which are attributed either to God or to some mythical personage. We have a list of twenty-eight Sivacaryas in the Vdyaviya-samhita of the Siva-mahapurana, and these have been referred to as late as the tenth century a.d. But there is nothing to prove the historical existence of these Saiva teachers, nor do we know what Agamas we owe to each of them. We have no direct knowledge of any Dravidian philosophical culture before the Aryan culture had penetrated into the South. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine how there could be Dravidian works of philosophy which ran parallel to the Sanskrit works.

The other difficulty is that most of these supposed Agamas of the past are not now available. Most of the Agamas that we get now are written in Sanskrit in various Dravidian scripts. The records of the schools of Saiva philosophy mentioned by Sankara in his bhasya on the Brahma-sutra must have been written in Sanskrit, but the present writer is quite unable to identify all the

schools referred to in the seventh or eighth centuries with the existing records of Saiva thought. There was a great upheaval of Saiva thought from the twelfth century, contemporaneously with the revival of Vaisnava thought in Ramanuja, but Ramanuja himself does not refer to all the schools of Saivism referred to by Sankara and Vacaspati Misra in his Bhamati commentary. Ramanuja only mentions the Kalamukhas and the Kapalikas, and no literature about their philosophical views is now available. The Kapalika sect probably still exists here and there, and one may note some of their practices, but so far we have not been able to discover any literature on the practices of the Kalamukhas. But we shall revert again to the problem when we discuss the antiquity of Saiva thought and its various schools. The three schools of Southern Saivism that are now generally known are the Vira-saivas, the Sivajfiana-siddhi school and the school of Saivism as represented by Srikantha. We have dealt with the Saivism of Srikantha in two sections. The school of Pasupata-Saivism is mentioned in the fourteenth century in Madhava's Sarva-darsana-samgraha and the Pasupata school is referred to in the Mahabharata and many other Puranas. In the Siva-mahdpurdna, particularly in the last section called the Vdyaviya-samhitd, we have a description of the Pasupata philosophy. I shall, therefore, now try to collect the description of the Pasupata system of thought as found in the Vdyaviya-samhitd of the Siva-mahdpurdna.

The Siva-mahdpurdna, according to the testimony of the Purana itself, is supposed to have been a massive work of one hundred thousand verses divided into seven sections, written by Siva Himself. This big work has been condensed into twenty-four thousand verses by Vyasa in the Kaliyuga. We know nothing about the historicity of this Vyasa. He is supposed to have written most of the Puranas. The present Siva-mahdpurdna, however, contains seven sections, of which the last section called the Vdyaviya-samhitd is divided into two parts and is supposed to elucidate the view of the different schools of Saivism. According to our interpretation it shows only one school of Saivism, namely the Pasupata-Saivism in two variant forms. None of the works that we have been able to discover so far have been attributed to Siva or Mahesvara, though Sankara in his bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra 11. 2, 37 refers to Siddhanta works written by Mahesvara. We have traced some of

the Agamas, but these Agamas are not called Siddhanta, nor are they supposed to owe their authorship to Mahesvara. On the evidence of the Siva-mahapurana, we have quite a number of Saiva teachers who are regarded as incarnations of Siva and also many of their disciples, but we know nothing about these mythical teachers. One teacher called Upamanyu is often referred to in the Vayaviya-samhita section as instructing the principles of Saivism. The account of Saivism given by Sankara in his bhasya referred to above, is very meagre, but it seems to indicate that the Saivas regarded prakrti as the material cause and Siva as the instrumental or efficient cause; and it is this latter view that Sankara mainly criticises as the school of Isvara-karanins, implying thereby the view that the Upanisads cannot tolerate the idea of a separate efficient cause as Isvara. Vacaspati also points out that the prakrti being the material cause could not be identified with the efficient cause, the Isvara. In Saivism we are faced with the problem of solving the issue between Sankara and the Saivas. Our treatment of Srikantha's bhasya has shown the direction in which the Saivas want to solve the difficulty, but Srikantha's bhasya is probably a work not earlier than the eleventh century, and many other works of Saivism can be traced only as far back as the twelfth century a.d. On the testimony of the Siva-mahapurana, which must have been written before the time of Sankara, we know that Saiva works by great Saiva teachers were written both for those who adhered to the Varnasrama dharma and for those who did not care for the Varnasrama dharma and were not privileged to study the Vedas. The latter class of works must therefore have been the Dravidian works of the South, many of which are now lost, and of which only some traditions are available in the Sanskrit Agamas. We have already dealt with these in another section. We shall have occasion to show that the Kagmlr form of Saivism was more or less contemporaneous with Sankara.

In the second section of the Swa-mahapurana called the Rudra-samhita, we are told that at the time of the great dissolution, when all things were destroyed, there was only darkness, no sun, no planets, no stars, no moon, and no day and night; there is only pure vacuity devoid of all energy. There was no sensibility of any kind; it was a state when there was neither being nor non-being; it was beyond all mind and speech, beyond all name and form. But yet

in that neutral state there existed only the pure being, the pure consciousness, infinite and pure bliss, which was immeasurable and a state in itself; it had no form and was devoid of all qualities 1 . This was purely of the nature of pure consciousness, without beginning and end and without any development. Gradually there arose a second desire or will by which the formless was changed into some form by its own playful activities. This may be regarded as the all-creating pure energy, of which there is no parallel. The form created by this energy is called sadasiva. People also call Him Isvara, or God. The lone energy, spontaneously moving, created from itself its own eternal body, which is called pradhdna, prakrti, or mdyd, and which generates the category of buddhi. This mdyd or prakrti is the creator of all beings and is regarded as coming into contact with the supreme purusa, the Siva, called Sambhu, who is different from God. This sakti or energy is also regarded as kdla or time.

From prakrti came the mahat or buddhi and from buddhi came the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tatnas, and from them the threefold ahankdra. From ahankdra came the tanmdtras, the five bhutas, the five conative senses, and the five cognitive senses, and manas.

In the Kaildsa-samhitd of the Siva-mahdpurdna the view of Saivism is described as being the Sivadvaita system or the monistic theory of Saivism 2 . It is said here that since all living beings are constituted of a male and a female part, the original cause must also be represented by a male and a female principle united. As a matter of fact, the Samkhyas had taken that idea from this statement, and had regarded the original cause as being prakrti and purusa. But they tried to establish it merely on rational grounds; they were not disposed to establish it in a theistic sense. For that reason, though some of the Samkhya categories may be accepted, yet the Samkhya philosophy as a whole, being a purely rationalistic system, ought to be abandoned. The Brahman is regarded in the Vedas as being the unity of sat, cit and dnanda, and it is in the neuter gender. The

1 satyam jnanam anantam ca pardnandam param-mahah. aprameyam anddhdram avikdram andkrti, nirgunam yogigamyan ca sarva-vydpyeka-kdrakam.

Siva-mahdpurdna, n. i. 6, nc, d-12.

2 utpdtya ajndna-sambhutam samsaydkhyam visa-drumam, sivddvaita-mahd-kalpa-vrk$a-bhamir yathd bhavet.

Ibid. vi. 16. 11.

7-2

being represented in Brahman means that all negation of being is excluded. The neuter character of the being represents the fact that it is the purusa, and this purusa also is of an illuminating nature. The pure consciousness in the unity of sat-cid-dnanda represents the female part. So the two parts that are regarded as male and female are the illuminating part {prakasa) and the pure consciousness, and these two together are the generating causes of the world. So in the unity of sac-cid-dnanda we have the unity of Siva and Sakti. This illumination is also sometimes impeded, as the flame of a wick is impeded by smoke and other impurities. These are the malas which do not belong to Siva, but are seen in the fire of pure consciousness. It is on this account that the cicchakti or the energy of pure consciousness is seen in an impure state in human souls. It is for the expulsion of this mala that the pervasiveness of sakti or energy is to be assumed as existing in all time. Sakti thus is the symbol of bala or strength. In the para-mdtman there is both the Siva-aspect and the sakti-aspect. It is by the connection of Siva and Sakti that there is dnanda or bliss. The Atman is pure consciousness and this consciousness holds within it all knowledge and all energy; it is independent and free, and that is its nature. In the Siva-sutra, jnana or knowledge has been described as a bondage, but the word jnana there means only finite, limited or turbid knowledge which all human beings have, and in this way alone can knowledge be regarded as bondage.

The Sakti or energy is also called spanda or vibration. Knowledge, movement and will are like the three sides of Siva, and human beings get their inspiration from between these. As we have said above, the Siva and Sakti combined gives the supreme sakti called parasakti, and from this parasakti there evolves the cicchakti or power of consciousness. From this comes the sakti or bliss or dnanda-sakti, from this the will-power or icchd-sakti, and from this come jndna-sakti, or power of knowledge, and the power of motivation, or kriya-sakti. The first category of vibration in the category of Siva is called siva-tattva. The world and the souls are entirely identical with Siva, and such a knowledge leads to liberation.

The supreme Lord contracts Himself and manifests Himself as the individual purusas or souls who enjoy the qualities oftheprakrti. This enjoyment takes place through the function of fivefold kald,

such as that which leads the individual to action; that which leads him to discover the true reality of twofold vidyd; that which attaches him to the objects of sense (rdga); kala or time which makes things happen in succession; niyati, which is used in a peculiar sense, not of destiny but of conscience, that is, it is the factor by which one decides what one should do or not do 1 .

The purusa or the individual souls possess in a cumulative way the qualities of knowledge, will, etc. The so-called citta or the psychic plane is constituted of the various qualities existent in the prakrti. From buddhi come the various senses and subtle matter.

The system of thought referred to above, the Sivadvaita system, is arranged in rather a clumsy manner. The points that emerge from the above statements can be briefly summarised. First, it regards the Brahman as being an undifferentiated Being or Non-being, when there is nothing but void in the universe. From this Being-and-Non-being, the Brahman, there sprang forth an entity which represents within it the two principles of male and female energy which pervades all living beings. It is out of this principle, the Siva, that we have, on the one hand the individual selves which are but contractions of the nature of the supreme Lord, and on the other we have the world evolving out of the female energy side, the prakrti, more or less in the Samkhya fashion. The purusa is supposed to have within him fivefold categories, through which he can experience joys and sufferings of his intercourse with the world as such. These individuals, on account of the contraction that they suffered, show themselves as impure as a flame in a wick appears smoky. Thus the whole system tends towards a sort of monism without being purely idealistic. The closeness or its affinity with Srikantha's philosophy will be immediately apparent, though there are differences in the mode of expression. There are certain passages which remind us of some form of Kasmir Saivism, which though a monism, is largely different from the monism as expressed herein. We also find here a reference to the spanda theory of Kasmir Saivism. But in spite of this we need not think that the monistic Saivism was first enunciated in this Purana or in this chapter. We shall have occasion to show that some form of distinctly monistic Saivism with relative

1 idam tu mama kartavyam idam neti niyamikd,

niyatis sydt.... Siva-mahapuraija, vi. 16. 83.

bias could be traced to the beginnings of the Christian era. The Kasmlr Saivism flourished probably from the seventh to the eleventh century a.d. It may, therefore, be thought that the chapter under reference of the Siva-tnahdpurdna was probably written somewhere about the ninth or the tenth century a.d., which may also be regarded as the time of Srikantha, though we are not sure if he flourished somewhere at the eleventh century a.d. after Ramanuja. We discuss these matters further in the appropriate sections.

In the second chapter of the Rudra-samhitd of the Ska-mahd-purdna 1 , Siva is supposed to say that the highest reality, the knowledge of which brings liberation, is pure consciousness, and in that consciousness there is no differentiation between the self and the Brahman 2 . But strangely enough Siva seems to identify bhakti or devotion with knowledge. There can be no knowledge without bhakti 3 . When there is bhakti or devotion, there is no distinction of caste in the way of attaining the grace of God. Siva then classifies the different types of bhakti. The nature of devotion, as described in this chapter under consideration, shows that bhakti was not regarded as an emotional outburst, as we find in the Caitanya school of bhakti. Here bhakti is regarded as listening to the name of Siva, chanting it, and meditating on Him as well as worshipping Him and regarding oneself as the servitor to Siva, and also to develop the spirit of friendship through which one can surrender oneself to God Siva. The chanting of the name of Siva is to be associated with the legendary biography of Siva as given in the Puranas. The meditation on Siva is regarded as amounting to the development of the idea that Siva is all-pervasive and is omnipresent. And this makes the devotee fearless. It is through bhakti that true knowledge and the disinclination to worldly things can occur.

In iv. 41 four types of liberation are described as sdrupya, sdlokya, sdnnidhya, and sdyujya. We have already discussed in the fourth volume the nature of those types of liberation which are also

1 Siva-mahapurana 11. 2. 23.

1 paratattvam vijdnjH vijiianam paramesvari

dviGyam smaranam yatra naham brahmeti suddhadhih.

Stva-mahapurana 11. 2. 23. 13.

bhaktau jnane na bhedo hi

vijiianam na bhavaty eva sati bhakti-virodhmah.

Ibid. 11. 2. 23. 16.

admitted by the followers of the Madhva school of Yaisnavas. And this liberation is only granted by Siva who is beyond all the gunas of prakrti.

The ultimate nature of Siva is described here (rv. 41) as being changeless (ntrvikdrin) and beyond prakrti. He is of the nature of pure knowledge, unchangeable, all-perceiving. The fifth kind of liberation called the kmvalya can be attained only by the knowledge of Siva and His ultimate nature. The whole world springs out of Him and returns to Him and is always pervaded by Him. He is also designated as being the unit}* of being, consciousness, and bliss (sac-cid-ananda); He is without any qualities or conditions, pure, and cannot be in any way made impure. He has no colour, no form and no measure. Words cannot describe Him and thoughts cannot reach Him. It is the Brahman which is also called Siva. Just as space (dkdsa) pervades all things, so He pervades all things. He is beyond the range of maya and beyond conflict (drandiatita). He can be attained either through knowledge or through devotion, but the way of devotion is easier to follow than the way of knowledge. In the next chapter (iv. 42) it is said that it is from Siva, the ultimate Brahman, that prakrti as associated with purusa (individual souls) is produced 1 . This evolution of prakrti as associated with purusa is called the category of Rudra, which is only a transformation of Siva, the highest Brahman, just as golden ornaments may be regarded as transformations of gold. The formless Siva is considered as having a form only for the advantage of meditation.

All that one can know or see in the universe, in the highest or the lowest, is only Siva, and the character of things in their plurality is formed from Him. Siva alone remains the same unchangeable reality before the creation, and at the dissolution of the creation. The pure Siva is regarded as qualified only when one considers Him as being the possessor of s'akti or energy with which in reality He is identical. It is through the will of Siva that all operations in the world can go on. He knows them all, but no one knows Him. Having created the world He remains away from it and is not involved with it. But it is in His form as pure consciousness that He is seen in and through the world, as the sun is seen in

1 tasmdt prakrtir vtpanna purusena samamritd.

Ibid. rv. 42. 3.

his reflections. In actuality Siva does not enter into this world of change. In reality Siva is the whole of the world, though the world appearances seem to occur in a time series of discontinuity. Ajnana or nescience only means misunderstanding, it is not a substance that stands by Brahman and could be regarded as a dual entity 1 .

According to the Vedantins the reality is one, and the individual soul {jiva) y which gets deluded by avidya or nescience and thinks itself to be different from the Brahman, is only a part of it. But when released from the grasp of nescience it becomes one with Siva, and Siva, as we have already said, pervades all things without being actually in them. One can attain liberation by following the path indicated by the Vedanta. As fire, which exists in the wood, can be manifested by the constant rubbing of the wood, so by the various processes of devotion one can attain Siva, but one must be convinced of the fact that whatever exists is Siva, and it is only through illusion that various names and forms appear before us 2 . Just as the ocean, or a piece of gold, or a piece of mud may appear in various shapes, though actually they remain the same, so it is only by various conditions through which we look at things that they appear so different, though they are actually nothing but Siva. There is actually no difference between the cause and the effect 3 , yet through illusion one thinks of something as cause and something else as effect. From the seed comes the shoot, appearing as different from the seed, but ultimately the shoot grows into a tree and fructifies and thereby reduces itself into fruit and seed. The seed stays on and produces other shoots and the original tree is destroyed. The true seer is like the seed from which there are many transformations, and when these have ceased we have again the true seer. With the removal of nescience {avidya) a person is dissociated from egoism and becomes pure, and then through the grace of God Siva he becomes what he really is, that is, Siva. Just

1 ajnanam ca mater bhedo nasty anyacca dvayam punah. g: darianesu ca sarvesu mati-bhedah pradarsyate.

Siva-mahapurana I v. 43. 8 c, d.

2 bhrantya nana-svarUpo hi bhdsate sankaras soda.

Ibid. IV. 43. i5C,rf.

3 karya-karanayor bhedo vastuto na pravartate, kevalam bhranti-buddhyaiva tad-abhave sa nasyati.

Ibid. iv. 43. 17.

as in a mirror one can see one's body reflected, so one can see oneself reflected in one's pure mind, that is Siva, which is one's real character.

We thus see that in this school of Saivism as described in the Siva-mahapurana iv. 43, we have a monistic system of Saivism which is very much like the monistic system of Sankara. It believes that the plurality of appearance is false, and that the only reality is Brahman or Siva. It also believes that this false appearance is due to the interference of nescience. It does not admit any difference between cause and effect, but yet it seems to adhere to the monotheistic faith that God Siva can bestow liberation on those who are devoted to Him, though it does not deny that the Brahman can be attained by the way indicated in the Upanisads. It says that jndna comes from bhakti or devotion, from bhakti comes love (prema) y and from prema one gets into the habit of listening to episodes about the greatness of Siva, and from that one comes into contact with saintly people, and from that one can attain one's preceptor. When in this way true knowledge is attained, one becomes liberated. The practice of the worship of the preceptor is also introduced here. It is said that if one gets a good and saintly preceptor, one should worship him as if he were Siva Himself, and in this way the impurities of the body will be removed, and it will be possible for such a devotee to attain knowledge.

We thus see that in this chapter, though Saivism is interpreted purely on Vedantic lines, the doctrine of theism and the doctrine of preceptor worship are somehow grafted into it, though such doctrines cannot fit in with the monism of the Upanisads as interpreted by Sankara. This system, therefore, seems to present a specimen of Saivism different from what we had in the second book of the Siva-mahdpurdna y and different also from the philosophy of Saivism as presented by Srikantha and Appaya Diksita.

r

Saiva Philosophy in the Vayaviya-samhita of the Siva-mahapurana.

§i

The Siva-mahapurdna seems to be a collection of seven treatises, called Samhitas, dealing with different aspects of the worship of Siva, myths of Siva, and philosophy of Saivism. Though there is a general agreement on the fundamental patterns of Saiva thought in the various systems of Saivism, yet these patterns often present marked differences, which ought to be noted for the sake of a detailed study of Saivism. This is particularly so, as no other system of thought which had spread so far and wide all over India from the days of the hoary past has suffered so much mutilation and destruction of its literature as did Saivism. We have some older records in the Vedas and the Upanisads, and also in the Indus Valley Civilization period, but the systematic Saiva thought has lost most of its traces from pre-Christian times, until we come to the ninth or tenth centuries a.d. Most of the Agama works written in Sanskrit and in Dravidian are not now available, and it is even difficult to identify the systems of Saiva thought as referred to by Sankara in the eighth century a.d. Our treatment of Saivism can therefore be only gleanings from here and there, and it will not have any proper historical perspective. Even writers in the eleventh or the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are unable to indicate the proper texts and their mutual relations, at least so far as Sanskrit works are concerned. Much of what is written about the Dravidian texts and their authors is either mythological or largely unhistorical. Even the Siva-mahdpurdna seems to be a composite work written at different times. It consists of collections of thought more or less different from each other, and points to different levels of attitude of Saiva thought. It is not therefore possible to give a consistent account of the whole work of the £iva-mahapurdna\ I have accordingly attempted to give an estimate of Saivism as delineated in Chapters n, iv, vi and vn. But as the philosophical level of the seventh Samhita, the Vayaviya-samhita, seems to be somewhat different from that of the Siva-mahapurana, I shall try briefly to review the contents of the

Vdyamya-samhitd, which may be regarded as a school of Pasupata Saivism. I shall try later on to give estimates of other forms of Saivism so far as they have been available to me.

In vii. 1. 2. 19 of the Vayaviya-samhitd, the ultimate God is regarded as being the original cause, the cause of maintenance, as the ground, and also as the cause of destruction of all things. He is called the ultimate purusa, the Brahman, or the paramdtman. The pradhdna or the prakrti is regarded as His body, and He is also regarded as the agent who disturbs the equilibrium of prakrti 1 . He manifests Himself in twenty-three different categories and yet remains absolutely undisturbed and unchanged. Though the world has been created and maintained by the supreme Lord, yet people do not know him under the delusion of mdyd or nescience.

In vii. 1. 3 it is said that the ultimate cause is that which is unspeakable and unthinkable, and it is that from which the gods Brahma, Visnu and Rudra have sprung forth, together with all gross matter and sense faculties. He is the cause of all causes and is not produced from any other cause. He is omnipotent and the Lord of all. The supreme Lord stands silent and rooted in one place like a tree and yet He pervades the whole universe. Everything else in the universe is moving excepting their final cause, the Brahman. He alone is the inner controller of all beings, but yet He Himself cannot be recognised as such, though He knows all. Eternal power, knowledge, and action belong naturally to Him. All that we know as destructible (ksara) and indestructible (aksara) have sprung from the supreme Lord, by whose ideation they have come into being. In the end of the mdyd, the universe will vanish with the disappearance of the individual souls 2 . The supreme Lord, like an omnipotent artist, has painted the canvas of world appearance, and this appearance will ultimately return to Him. Every being is under His control and He can only be realised through supreme devotion (bhakti). Only the true devotees can have any real communication with Him. The creation is gross and subtle, the former is visible to all, and the latter only to the yogins, but beyond that there is a supreme Lord of eternal knowledge and

1 namah pradhdna-dehdya pradhdna-ksobha-kdrine, trayo-vitnsati-bhedena vikrtdy-avikdrine.

Vayavlya-satnhitd vii. i. 2. 19.

2 bhuyo yasya pasor ante visva-mdyd nivartate.

Ibid. vii. 1. 3. 13.

bliss, and unchangeable. Devotion to God is also due to the extension of grace by God. As a matter of fact, the grace is produced out of devotion and the devotion is produced out of grace, just as the tree grows out of a seedling and a seedling grows out of a tree.

When one tries to think oneself as being of the nature of the supreme Lord, then His grace is extended to such a person and this increases his merit and his sins are attenuated. By a long process of attenuation of sins through many births, there arises devotion to God, as the supreme Lord with the proper consciousness of it. As a result of that there is a further extension of grace, and in consequence of that one can leave off all desires for the fruits of one's action, though one may be working all the same.

By the renunciation of the fruits of karma, one becomes associated with the faith in Siva. This can be either through a preceptor or without a preceptor. The former is much preferable to the latter. Through knowledge of Siva one begins to discover the sorrows of the cycles of birth and rebirth. In consequence of that there is a disinclination to all sense-objects {vairdgya). From this comes emotion (bhdva) for the supreme Lord, and through this emotion one is inclined to meditation, and one is then naturally led to renounce actions. When one thus concentrates and meditates on the nature of Siva one attains the state of yoga. It is through this yoga again that there is a further increase of devotion, and through that a further extension of the grace of God. At the end of this long process the individual is liberated, and he then becomes equal to Siva (siva-sama), but he can never become Siva. The process of the attainment of liberation may be different in accordance with the fitness of the person concerned.

In vn. i. 5 Vayu is supposed to say that the knowledge of pasu, the individual souls, pdsa or the bondage, and pati, the supreme Lord, is the ultimate object to all knowledge and faith, and this only can lead to supreme happiness. All sorrows proceed from ignorance, and they are removed through knowledge. Knowledge means limitation by objectivity. This objectivisation through knowledge may be with reference to material objects and non-material things (jada and ajada). The supreme Lord controls them both. The individual souls are indestructible and are therefore called aksara; the bondage {pdsa) is destructible and therefore

called ksara; and that, which is beyond these two, is the supreme Lord.

Vayu, in further explaining the subject, says that prakrti can be regarded as ksara, and purusa as the aksara, and the supreme Lord moves them both to action. Again prakrti is identified with maya and purusa is supposed to be encircled by maya. The contact between maya and the purusa is through one's previous deeds by the instrumentality of God. The maya is described as the power of God. The impurity or mala consists in its power to veil the nature of consciousness of the souls. When divested of this mala the purusa returns to its original natural purity. The association of the veil of maya with the soul is due, as we have said before, to previous deeds and this gives the opportunity for enjoying the fruits of our actions. In connection with this, one should also note the category of kald which means knowledge, attachment, time, and niyatiox destiny. The individual person enjoys all this through his state of bondage. He also enjoys and suffers the fruits of his good and bad deeds. The association with the impurities {mala) is without a beginning, but it may be destroyed with the attainment of liberation. All our experiences are intended for experiencing the fruits of our karma through the gates of our external and internal senses and our body.

Vidya or knowledge is here defined as that which manifests space and action (dik-kriya-vyanjaka vidya). Time or kdla is that which limits or experiences (kdlo'vacchedakah), and niyati is that which determines the order of things, and rdga or attachment impels one to do actions. The avyakta is the cause consisting of the three gunas; from it come all objects and to it everything returns. This prakrti, called also pradhdna or avyakta, manifests itself in the form of pleasure, pain, and numbness. The method of the manifestation of the prakrti is called kald. The three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas come out of prakrti. This is distinctively a new view, different from the classical Samkhya theory. In the classical Samkhya theory, prakrti is merely the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, and there prakrti is nothing but that which is constituted of the equilibrium between the three gunas. These gunas permeate through the prakrti in a subtle state as oil permeates through the seeds of sesamum. It is out of the modification of the avyakta or pradhdna that the five tanmdtras and five gross matter-elements, as well as five cognitive and five conative senses and the

no Saiva Philosophy in the Pur anas [ch.

manas, come into being. It is the causal state as such that is called the unmanifested or the avyakta. The effects as transformations are called the vyakta or the manifested; just as a lump of clay may be regarded as the unmanifested and the earthen vessels made out of it are regarded as the manifested. The manifold world of effects find their unity in the unmanifested prakrti, and all bodies, senses, etc. are regarded as being enjoyed through purusa.

Vayu, in further explaining the subject, says that, though it is difficult to find out any proper reason for admitting a universal soul, yet one is forced to admit a universal entity which experiences the enjoyments and sufferings, and which is different from intellect, the senses, and the body. This entity is the permanent enjoyer of all human experiences, even when the body perishes {ayavad-deha-vedandt). It is this universal entity to which all objects of experience appeal, it is called the inner controller in the Vedas and the Upanisads. It pervades all things, yet it manifests itself here and there under certain circumstances and is itself unperceivable. It cannot be seen by the eye nor by any of the senses. It is only by the right wisdom of the mind that this great soul or Atman can be realised. It is unchangeable in all changes and it is the perceiver of all things, though it cannot be perceived itself. Such a great soul is different from the body and the senses, and those who consider it as being identical with the body cannot perceive it. It is by being associated with the body that it undergoes all impurities and suffering, and is drawn to the cycles of births and rebirths by its own deeds. As a field that is flooded with water soon generates new shoots, so in the field of ignorance the karma begins to shoot up and produce bodies which are the source of all miseries. Through the cycle of birth and rebirth one has to experience the fruits of one's karma and so the process goes on. This universal entity appears as many and manifests various intellectual shades in different persons 1 . All our human relations are accidental and contingent, like two pieces of floating wood drawn together by the waves and then separated again. All beings, from the plants to Brahma, are the pasus or manifestations of this

1 chdditas ca vtyuhtai ca sartrair e$u laksyate,

candra-bimba-vad dkdse taralair abhra-sartcayaih, aneka-deha-bhedena bhinnd vrttir ihdtmanah.

Siva-mahapurana vn. i. 5. 56 et seq.

purusa. It is the purusa that is bound by the ties of pleasure and pain, and is like the plaything of the great Lord. It is ignorant and impotent, and cannot provide for its pleasure or arrange for the dispelling of sorrow.

We have already seen the nature of the pasu and the pdsa. The pdsa is the energy or sakti of Siva manifesting itself as prakrti; it evolves the material world, the subjective world, as well as pleasures and pains, which fetter the universal soul, the pasu, appearing as many under different conditions and circumstances. We cannot fail to note that the purusa or Atman here is not many as the purusas of the Samkhya or the Atmans of the Nyaya, or of some other systems of Saiva thought. The idea of the Vedantic monism is eclectically introduced here, and we are faced with the conception of one purusa which appears as many in different bodies under different conditions. This one purusa is all-pervading, and it is on account of its being reflected through various conditions that it appears in various divergent forms of things, ranging from Brahma to a blade of grass.

But the supreme Lord who possesses an infinite number of excellent and attractive qualities is the creator of both the pasu and the pdsa. Without Him there could not be any creation of the universe, for both the pasu and the pdsa are inanimate and without knowledge. We must remember that according to Samkhya the purusas are nothing but pure consciousness, but here they are regarded as the reflection of one conscious entity appearing as many through its being reflected in various conditions or environments. Beginning from the prakrti down to the atoms, we have only the inanimate things entering into various modifications. This could not have been if they were not created and moulded by an intelligent creator. This world consisting of parts is an effect, and must therefore have an agent to fashion it. The agency as the supreme Lord, the Creator, belongs to Siva and not to the soul or to the bondage. The soul itself is moved into activity by the motivity of God. When an individual thinks of himself as the agent of his action, it is only a wrong impression of the nature of causality (ayathd-karana-jndna). It is only when one knows oneself to be different from the true motivating agent that one may ultimately attain immortality. The ksara and aksara, that is, the pdsa and the pasu, are all associated with each other and they are both main-

tained by the supreme Lord in their manifested and unmanifested forms. The so-called plurality itself is pervaded by the supreme Lord. God alone is the Lord of all and the refuge of all. Though one, He can uphold the universe by His manifold energies.

This sixth chapter of the first part of the Vayaviya-samhita deals mostly with the contents derived from the Svetasvatara Upanisad and may be regarded as an expansion of the philosophy of the Svetasvatara Upanisad. The Lord Himself pervades all things and there is no tinge of impurity in Him. Various other texts of the Upanisad are also collated with it for the same purpose, and the Brahman is identified with Siva. In the previous volumes of the present work, attempts have been made to show that the Upanisads were interpreted in the Brahma-sutras y in the Gita, and also in the commentaries of the various schools of interpreters of the Brahma-sutras in accordance with the specific views of the relevant authors. In the Siva-mahapurana we find also the same attempt to adapt the Upanisadic texts for the promulgation of the Saiva view of philosophy. It is again and again emphasised that there is only one Lord and there is no one second to Him, yet the idea of may a or prakrti is introduced to explain the transformation of the world of appearance. We have seen before that maya is regarded as the energy or sakti of Brahman. But we do not find much discussion about the relationship of this energy with God. It is said also in accordance with the Upanisads that God is naturally endowed with knowledge and power. But we have not the philosophical satisfaction to know what is exactly the nature of knowledge and power, and how this power is exerted, and what knowledge can mean in relation to the supreme Lord, who has no senses and no manas.

In VII. i. 6. 67 the Lord is described as one who produces time and is the Lord of all the gunas and the liberator of all bondage. A question is raised as regards the nature of kala or time. In reply to such a question Vayu says that kala appears before us in the form of successive moments and durations. The real essence of kala is the energy of Siva. Kala therefore cannot be outstripped by any being whatsoever. It is, as it were, the ordering power of God 1 . The kala thus is an energy of God that emanates from Him

1 niyogarupam tsasya balam visva-niydmakam.

Siva-mahapur&na vil. 1. 7. 7.

and pervades all things. For this reason everything is under the domination of time. But Siva is not fettered by time; He is the master of all time. The unrestricted power of God is manifested through time, and for this reason no one can transcend the limits of time. No amount of wisdom can take us beyond time, and whatever deeds are done in time cannot be outstripped. It is time which decides the fates and destinies of persons in accordance with their deeds, yet no one can say what is the nature of the essence of time.

We have so far seen that the prakrti as superintended by purusa evolves as the world before us by the inexorable will and order of God. The order of the evolution of the prakrti or the avyakta into different categories is more like what we have in the classical Samkhya. The creation is a process of emanation or emergence from the state of avyakta in the well-known classical line of Samkhya, and the dissolution takes place by a process of retrogression, in which the same process is reversed until the whole world of appearance returns to avyakta or prakrti.

Turning again to the nature and function of Siva, the supreme Lord, it is said that there is nothing but the tendency for helping others that may be regarded as the essential nature of Siva. He has nothing to do but help all beings to attain their best through their actions. He is otherwise without any specific character, except to be of service to the world consisting of the pasu and the pasa. This extension of the grace of the Lord is often described as His ordering will. It is for the fulfilment of the function of the Lord's will that one has to admit the existence of something for the good of which the will of the Lord goes forward. For this reason God may not be said to be dependent on others for the exercise of His will. It is in and through the function of His will that things come into being and move forward in an orderly process in accordance with karma. The independence of God means that He is not dependent on anything else; dependence means the condition in which one thing depends on another 1 .

The whole world is supposed to be dependent on ajnana or nescience, there is nothing of reality in the visible appearance of the world. All the characters of Siva as described in the scriptures

1 atah svdtantrya-sabddrihan anapeksatva-laksanah.

Ibid. vii. 1. 31. 7.

are only conditional assumptions; in reality there is no form that one can ascribe to Siva 1 .

All that has been said so far about the evolution of the world is based upon logical assumptions, while the transcendental reality of God is beyond all logic. It is by imagining God to be something of the nature of our Atman that we attribute the supreme lordship to Him. Just as fire is different from the wood but cannot be seen without it, so we ascribe the lordship to Siva, in and through the persons in whom He is manifested. It is by a similar extension of thought that the image of Siva is also regarded as Siva and is worshipped.

Siva always helps all beings and never does harm to anyone. When it may seem apparent that he has punished somebody, it is only for the good of others. In many cases the punishment awarded by Siva is for purging the impurities of the beings concerned. The basis of all good and evil deeds is to be found in the ordinance of God, that one must behave in this way and not in the other way. Goodness means abidance in accordance with His will. He who is engaged always in doing good to others is following the commandment of God, and he cannot be made impure. God only punishes those who could not be brought to the right path by any other course, but his punishment is never due to any spirit of anger or resentment. He is like the father who chastises the son to teach him the proper course. He who tyrannises over others deserves to be chastened. God does not injure others to cause them pain, but only to chasten them and make them fitter for the right path. He is like a doctor who gives bitter medicine for curing a malady. If God remained indifferent to the vices and sins of beings, then that would also be improper for Him, for that would be a way of encouraging people to follow the wrong path; and that also would be denying the proper protection to persons who ought to be protected and whom God is able to protect. The Lord Siva is like fire; on contact with Him all impurities are resolved. When a piece of iron is put into fire, it is the fire that burns and not the iron; so all the inanimate objects of the world are pervaded by Siva, the supreme Lord, and He alone shines through all the appearances.

1 ajnanadhisthitam sambhor na kincid iha vidyate,

yenopalabhyate 'smabhis sakalenapi niskalah.

Siva-mahdpurana vn. i. 31. 9 et seq.

The grace of Siva is not like the ordinary good qualities of friendship, charity, etc., but it cannot be regarded as a good or a bad quality. It means only the will of God leading to the benefit of all beings. Obedience to His commandments may be regarded as identical with the highest good, and the highest good is the same as obedience to His commandments. God, therefore, may be regarded as doing good to all and not merely to one individual. In this manner the individual good is associated with the good of humanity at large, and this can only be effected when all beings follow the commandments of God. The things in the world would behave in their own manners according to their specific nature. It is the function of God to make them grow in consonance with one another as far as their nature should permit. The natural character of things is an important limitation to the scope of this development. One can only melt gold by fire, but not charcoal, so God can only liberate those whose impurities have been purged, but not those who are still in an impure condition. Things which naturally can evolve into some other thing can be made to do so by the will of God. So God's will is only effective when it acts in co-operation with the natural tendency and the effective limits of the things. The individual souls are naturally full of impurities, and it is for that reason that they pass through the cycle of birth and rebirth. The association of the souls with karma and illusion is really what is called samsara, the passage through the cycle of birth and rebirth. Since Siva is not associated with any such karma and is absolutely pure, He can be the real agent for the motivation for the development of the animate and inanimate world. The impurity of the soul is natural to the soul and not accidental.

In the theory of the classical Samkhya as represented in the karika of Isvarakrisna or the Samkhya-sutra, the teleology is made to abide in the prakrti, which out of its own necessity impels the prakrti to evolve in the twofold scheme of the psychical and the physical world for serving the purusas in twofold ways of the experience of pleasure and pain, and the attainment of liberation through knowledge. In this sense prakrti is supposed to move for the fulfilment of the purpose of the purusas. In the Patanjala school of Samkhya, called also the Yoga-sutra as explained by Vyasa and Vacaspati, the gunas forming the prakrti have a natural obstruction which limits their scope of development. It is admitted

that there is the permanent will of God, that things would evolve in particular directions in accordance with the karma of the individuals. The energy of the prakrti or the gunas flows naturally in the direction from which the obstruction has been removed. God does not of Himself push the prakrti to move in a particular direction. The function lies in the removal of obstructions in the way of the development in particular channels. Had there been no such obstruction or if all obstructions were removed, then every thing could have become every other thing. There would be no definite order of evolution and no limitation to various conditions and by time and place. In the system that we are now dealing with the natural obstructions of individuals are frankly admitted as being due to the existence of impurities, and it is held that by the all-pervading nature of God the souls can be emancipated only when the natural obstructions are washed off. For this purpose the individual persons have to exert themselves and through the near proximity of God, the process of pacification is held; this is called the grace of God, not grace in the ordinary sense of the term, but a cosmic operation which helps all things and persons to develop in accordance with their respective deserts. The commandment of God is not like the commandment of a Mosaic god, but it simply means the carrying on of the cosmic process for the good of all. In the carrying out of this process some people must suffer for their own good and some people may attain rewards according to their merits. God Himself transcends all the appearances of the world; He does not actually exert His will to effect anything, but the very fact that all things are pervaded by Him produces the removal of such impurities as are consistent with the development of the cosmos as a whole.

Though the soul is the same, yet some of the souls are in bondage, as also, there are others who are in a state of liberation. Those who are in bondage may also be in different conditions of progress and may have accordingly different kinds of knowledge and power. The impurities associated with the soul may be regarded as green (ama) and ripe (pakva), and in these two forms they are responsible for the commission of all actions leading to birth and rebirth. But even though all souls are associated with mala or impurities, they are pervaded in and through by Siva; and as the malas are purged, the proximity of Siva becomes more

manifest, and the individual becomes more and more pure, until he becomes like Siva. The differences of the souls are only due to the conditioning factor of the mala. It is in accordance with the nature and condition of the mala that one soul appears to be different from the other. The root cause for all the suffering in the world is the impurities, and it is the function of the divine doctor, Siva, to lead us through knowledge far away from the impurities. Knowledge alone is a means by which all sins may be removed. It may be objected that, since God is all-powerful He could liberate human beings without making them undergo suffering. To this question it is suggested in reply that misery and suffering constitute the nature of the samsara of birth and rebirth. It has already been stated before that God's omnipotence is somehow limited by the natural conditions of the materials on which the will of God operates. The nature of the malas or the impurities being of the nature of sorrow and pain, it is not possible to make them painless, and for this reason, in the period in which one passes through the process of the expurgation of malas through samsara, one must necessarily suffer pain. The individual souls are by nature impure and sorrowful, and it is by the administration of the order which acts as medicine, that these individuals are liberated. The cause of all impurities that generate the samsara is the maya and the material world, and these would not be set in motion in any way without the proximity of Siva. Just as iron filings are set in motion by the presence of a magnet without the magnet's doing anything by itself, so it is by the immediate proximity of God that the world process is set in motion for its benefit. Even though God is transcendent and does not know the world, the fact of His proximity cannot be ruled out. So He remains the superintending cause of the world. All movement in the world is due to Siva. The power by which He controls the world is His ordering will which is the same as His proximity. We are reminded of the analogical example introduced by Vacaspati in his commentary on the Yogasutra-bhasya, where it is said that though the purusa does not do anything, yet its proximity produces the special fitness (yogyata) on account of which the prakrti moves for the fulfilment of the purposes of the purusa. The example of the magnet and the iron filings is also given in that connection. As the whole world is but a manifestation of Siva's own power, we may quite imagine that

when there was nothing in the world, He alone existed with His majestic order of will and there in the functioning of that will He was not in any way polluted by the worldly impurities.

In this connection Vayu is supposed to say that knowledge is of two kinds, mediate (paroksa) and immediate (aparoksa). That which is known by reason or by instruction is called mediate knowledge. Immediate knowledge, however, can only dawn through practice of a high order, and without such immediate knowledge there cannot be any liberation.

§2

In the present section of the Vayaviya-samhitd vn. 2, we find a modification of the philosophical view as expressed in the previous section, and this deserves some special attention. In the previous section it was stated that the impurities of the individual souls were natural to themselves, and God's will had to refashion them or remould them or purge the impurities through the cycles of birth and rebirth, in accordance with the natural limitations of the individual souls, so that though God's will operates uniformly through all, the development is not uniform. The sufferings of human beings are due to the obstacles and resistance offered by the inherent impurities of different souls. For this reason it is not possible for God to liberate all souls without making them undergo the cycles of birth and rebirth and sorrow.

The view that the souls are by nature impure is found also among the Jainas and among the followers of the Pancaratra school 1 . In the Vedanta view, as explained in the school of Sankara, the individual souls are no doubt regarded as the same as Brahman, but yet it is believed that the individual souls are associated with the beginningless nescience or Avidya which can be destroyed later on by the realisation of the true nature of the Self. Thus in a way, the individual souls remain within a covering of impurity from beginningless time. But in the second section of the Vdyaviya-satnhita that we are now dealing with, it is said that God Himself binds all beings through the impurities, the maya and the like,

1 See the relevant portion of Jainism in Vol. I (pp. 169 et seq.) and the philosophy of Paficaratra, especially of the Ahirbudhnya-samhitd in Vol. Hi (pp. 21 et seq. and 34 et seq.).

and He alone can liberate them when He is pleased to do so in accordance with the devotion of the beings concerned 1 . All the twenty-four categories of Samkhya are to be regarded as being due to the action of maya 2 , and they are called the visayas or objects which are the bonds or ties by which the individuals are bound. By binding all beings, from the blade of a grass up to Brahman, the highest god, the great Lord makes them perform their own duties. It is by the order of the Lord that the prakrti produces the buddhi for the service of the purusas, and from buddhi there arise the ego, the senses, the subtle matters (tantnatras), and the gross matter. It is by the same order that the different beings are associated with different bodies suitable to them. The world order is maintained in its uniform process by the will of God. This will or order of God cannot be transcended by anybody. It is in accordance with the same commandment of God as controlling all processes that one attains riches and knowledge through the performance of meritorious deeds, or that the sinners are punished. The parable of the Kena Upanisad is quoted to show that the powers of all deities and natural forces are derived from God. The whole world thus may be regarded as manifestations of Lord Siva.

In different forms and functions and superintendence Lord Siva is called by different names. Thus, when He enjoys the prakrti and the purusa He is called isana. This liana appears in its eightfold form, technically called astamurti; these are: earth, water, fire, air, the akdsa, the soul, the sun and the moon. So these are the forms of Siva as performing different functions and called by different names such as sarvi, bhavi, raudri, etc. Raudri is the form in which the whole world is vibrating. The soul itself, as we have seen above, is a form of Siva.

The proper worship of Siva consists in giving protection from fear to all people, to do good to everybody, and to be of service to

1 mala-mdyd-dibhih pdsaih sa badhndti pasun patih, sa eva mocakas tesdm bhaktyd samyag-updsitah.

Siva-mahdpurdna. vii. 2. 2. 12 et seq.

2 Mdyd is twofold: the prakrti and the iuddhamdyd. From the latter spring up the deities Brahma, Visnu and Rudra. The former is the prakrti of the Samkhya into which all beings return, and for that reason prakrti is called lifiga, whereas the classical Samkhya restricts the term to the mahat and calls prakrti the alinga. There mahat is called linga, as it points to some original cause behind it and prakrti being the ultimate cause does not point to any other original cause behind it. See ibid. vn. 2. 34. 7 et seq.

everybody. It is by satisfying all people that God becomes satisfied. Any injury done to any living being is an injury done to one of the forms of God itself.

We have seen above that the whole world is a personification of God. This pantheistic doctrine should be distinguished from the monism of the Vedanta as explained by Sankara and his followers. In the Vedanta the reality is Brahman as sac-cid-ananda, and everything else that we perceive is but an imposition on the reality of Brahman. They are ultimately false and their falsehood is discovered when the person attains liberation. So the world appears, but there may be a time when it may absolutely disappear before a liberated person. Here, however, the material world as such in all its various forms of the living and non-living is regarded as but different real forms of God, which are controlled by God, and are set in motion by God for the benefit of the souls, which latter again are but forms of God.

In this connection the question is raised as to the way in which God pervades the world as the male and the female powers. In reply to such a question Upamanyu is supposed to have replied that the energy or sakti called the great female Deity (mahadevi) belongs to mahadeva, the Great Lord, and the whole world is a manifestation of them both. Some things are of the nature of consciousness and some things are of the nature of the unconscious. Both of them can be pure or impure. When consciousness is associated with the unconscious elements, it passes through the cycles of birth and rebirth and is called impure. That which is beyond such associations is pure. Siva and His sakti go together, and the whole world is under their domination. As it is not possible to distinguish the moon from the moonlight, so it is not possible to distinguish the sakti from Siva. So the sakti or the power of the saktiman, the possessor of the power, the supreme Lord, are mutually dependent. There cannot be sakti without Siva, and there cannot be Siva without sakti. It is out of this sakti that the whole world is created through the process of prakrti or maya and the three gunas. Everywhere the operation of the sakti is limited by the will of Siva and ultimately this goes back into Siva. From the original iakti as inherent in Siva, there emanates the 'active energy' (kriyakhyd sakti). By the disturbance of the original equilibrium there arises ndda, and from that arises bindu,

and from bindu arises saddsiva, and from saddsiva arises Mahesvara, and from him arises true knowledge {suddha-vidya\ and this is called the logos or the power of speech. This also manifests itself in the form of the alphabetical sounds. From this manifestation of maya comes kala or time, niyati, kala and vidyd. From this maya again come out the three gunas constituting the unmanifested {avyakta). From the avyakta there evolve the categories as described in the Samkhya. In brief it may be said that as the body is permeated by the inner controller, so the whole world is permeated by Siva in His form as sakti. For this reason all the living and the non-living are but manifestations of the sakti. It is the supreme Lord that is associated with knowledge, activity and will, and through them all the supreme Lord controls and pervades the world. The order of the world and the world process is also determined by His will.

That which is imaginatively perceived by the supreme Lord is put into a fact by His will; so, just as the three gunas arise in Him as the three manifested energies, so the whole world, which is identified with Siva, is also the form of His energy, because it has come into being through His energy 1 . This sakti of Siva is the maya.

The Siva-mahdpurdna refers to the Saivdgamas as being instructions given by Siva to Siva. It seems, therefore, that the Saivagamas were written long before the Siva-mahdpurana, and it is the substance of the Saivdgamas that is collected in the Siva-mahdpurana in the elucidation of the Pasupata view. The instructions of the Saivagamas are supposed to have been given as the means for the attainment of the highest good through the mercy of Siva, for the benefit of the devotees of Siva 2 .

Turning to the practical side of the attainment of direct or intuitive knowledge, we find that Siva says that He is only properly approached through sincere faith in Him (sraddha) and not by

1 evam sakti-samdyogdc chaktimdn ucyate sivah, sakti-saktimaduttham tu saktam saivam idam jagat.

Siva-mahapurana vn. 2. 4. 36.

2 sftkanthena sivenoktam sivayai ca sivdgamah, swdsritdndm karunydc chreyasdm ekasddhanam.

Ibid. vii. 2. 7. 38 et seq. It is difficult to say whether this is a reference to the Mahakarunika school of Jaaiva thought, as referred to by &ankara in the bhdsya in the penultimate topic of the criticism of Jsaivism. Brahma-sutra 11. 2.

tapas, chanting, or various postures of the body {asanas), or even by instructional knowledge. Faith is the basis on which one should stand and this faith can be attained by following the natural duties of the four varnas or castes and the dsramas or the stages of life. Faith is thus regarded not as a spontaneous emotion but as the consequence of a long traditional practice of the duties assigned to each caste and to each stage of life.

The Saiva dharma consists of knowledge, action, rigid conduct, and yoga. The knowledge is the knowledge of the nature of souls, the objects, and the supreme Lord. Action is the purification in accordance with the instruction of the preceptor. Carya or the right conduct means the proper worship of Siva in accordance with the caste rights as instructed by Siva. Yoga means the arresting of all mental states, excluding the constant thinking of God. Knowledge arises from vairagya or disinclination towards worldly things, and from knowledge comes yoga; sense-control, called yama, and niyama remove the sins and when a man is disinclined to worldly objects he gradually turns to the path of yoga. In this connection, universal charity, non-injury, truthfulness, abstention from stealing, and supreme faith, teaching, performing sacrifices and meditation on one's identity with God are regarded as natural accessories. For this reason those who wish to attain liberation should keep themselves away from virtue and vice, merit and demerit. Those who have attained the state in which the stone and gold are of equal value, or have no value, need not worship God, because they are liberated beings.

Purity of mind is a hundredfold better than purity of body, because without the purity of the mind nobody can be pure. God accepts only the internal states of man (bhava); that which is performed without any sincere emotion is merely an imitation. Devotion to God ought to be spontaneous, not practised for any advantage. Even when a man is attached to God for the attainment of some advantage, it may please God according to the depth of the emotion which is displayed by him. We find that the external expression of emotion as manifested in bodily movements, interest in listening to the adoration of Siva, the choking of the voice, the shedding of tears, and the constant meditation and dependence on God, are regarded as the significant signs of a true devotee, whatever may be his caste and status in society.

We have already seen that the practical way towards liberation should be through the attainment of knowledge of the nature of souls, the objects that bind them and the supreme Lord. This knowledge should be supplemented by action in accordance with the direction of the Teacher, who in Saiva cult is to be regarded as the incarnation of Siva. This action called kriyd is to be supplemented by the prescriptive duties allotted to the different castes and stages of life in the scriptures, and the duty which consists of the worship of God goes by the name of caryd. This has further to be supplemented by a process of devotional meditation, with Siva as the centre of attention, when all other mental states have been inhibited. The scriptures dealing with these subjects are twofold, one of Vedic origin, the other of independent origin. These latter are of twenty-eight kinds (like the Agamas), called Kamika, etc., which also go by the name of Siddhanta 1 .

In vii. 1. 32 certain esoteric and obscure physiological processes are described by which one can bring oneself in contact with immortality as inherent in Siva, the Mahadeva 2 .

In vii. 2. 37 the yoga is described as being of five kinds: mantrayoga, sparsayoga, bhdvayoga, abhdvayoga and mahayoga. The mantrayoga is that in which by constant repetition of certain mantras the mental states becomes steady. When this is associated with breath control it is called sparsayoga. When this state is further on the progressive scale and becomes dissociated from the necessity of chanting the mantras, it is called the bhdvayoga. By further advancement of this yoga process, the world appearance in its various forms entirely disappears, and this is called the abhavayoga. At this stage the yogin is not concerned with the world. He

1 H. W. Schomerus in his Saiva-siddhanta, p. 3, says that there are six and sixteen schools of Jsaivism, according to a commentary on Siva-jndna-bodha which we shall refer to later on. These schools as referred to by Schomerus are:

I. Pasupata, Mavratavada(?), Kapalika, Varna, Bhairava and Aikyavada. II. Crdhvasaiva, Anadisaiva, Adisaiva, Mahasaiva, Bhedasaiva, Abheda-saiva, Antarasaiva, Gunasaiva, Nirgunasaiva, Adhvansaiva, Yogasaiva, Jnanasaiva, Anusaiva, Kriyasaiva, Nalupadasaiva(P) and &uddhasaiva. We do not know what were the contents of these different schools of Jsaivism and we cannot also identify any particular texts giving the views of any of these schools of &aivism. In our treatment we have noted different types of Jsaivism, and many of them go by the name of Pasupata-Jsaivism, but whether this Pasupata-Jsaivism was also divided into different schools having different names, it is impossible for us to judge for want of definite materials, either published or unpublished.

2 See verses 45-56 (vii. 1. 32).

thinks of himself as being of the nature of Siva, and of being one with Him, and he is dissociated from all conditions. This is called the state of mahayoga. At this stage one becomes disinclined to all worldly objects of attachment, whether as experiences by the senses or as prescribed by the scriptures. Of course, this practice of yoga includes the practices of yama and niyama as prescribed in the Yoga-sutras, and also the practice of the different postures, the breath-control (prdndydma), the holding back of the mind from other objects (pratydhdra), the practice of concentration on particular objects (dhdrand), and also meditation (dhydna), and becoming one with the object (samddhi). The processes of the different kinds of yoga and their accessories are described in the Saiva scriptures, and also in the Kamika and the other Agamas. So far as the Swa-mahdpurana is concerned we do not find much difference between the practices of the different accessories such as yama, and niyama, dsana, etc., and those that are described in the Yogasdstra of Patanjali. The only important difference is that, while in Patanjali's yoga the mind has to be concentrated first on the gross objects, then on the subtle entities or tanmdtras, then on the ahankdra or egohood, and then on buddhi, here in the Saiva yoga, the yogin has to meditate on the divine nature of Siva. In the Yogasdstra also it is prescribed that one may meditate upon Isvara, and it is through devotion to him that liberation may be granted to any yogin. The treatment of a yogin in Yogosdstra may take a twofold course: one meditation on Isvara, the other the ascending scale of meditation on subtler and subtler categories, as a result of which the mind becomes absolutely shorn of all primitive tendencies and impressions, and becomes ultimately lost in the prakrti itself, never to return again. The Yoga of Patanjali, therefore, seems to be a double synthesis of associating the Samkhya doctrine and Samkhya metaphysics with the pre-existent system of yoga-practice which we find in Buddhism, and the association of the theistic cult of Isvara, who hangs rather loosely with the yoga system.

The Siva-mahdpurdna goes on with the description of prdndydma, consisting of: piiraka, the filling of the body with air through the nose; recaka, the expelling of the air out of the body; and kumbhaka, the process of keeping the body still after inflating it. By the processes of prdndydma one may leave the body at will.

The advancement oipranayama is made gradually by lengthening the respiratory and inhibitory time. In this way there are four different classes oipranayama called kanyaka, madhyama, uttama, and para. That which is associated with the emotional expression of sweating, shivering, etc., is due to the expression of the sentiment of bliss on account of which tears flow spontaneously and there is sometimes incoherent speech, swooning. It should be noted that such states do not occur nor are recommended in the yoga of Patafijali. In this connection the discussion about pranayama is introduced and we hear of the five vayus or bio-motor forces called prana, apdna, samana, udana, and vyana. The prdnavdyu consists of five other types of vdyu, namely ndga, kurma, krkara, devadatta, and dhananjaya which performs the different functions of the pranavayu. The apdnavdyu is the bio-motor force by which all that is taken in by way of food and drink is assimilated and drawn down to the lower cavities. The vyana is the bio-motor force that pervades the whole body and develops it. The udana is that which affects the vital glands and the body. The samana is that which provides the circulation through the body. When the functions and the forces of these vayus are properly co-ordinated in accordance with the will of the yogin, he is able to burn up all the defects and maladies of the body and preserve his health in the proper manner, his power of assimilation becomes greater and his exertions become less. He becomes light in body, can move about quickly, and has energy and excellence of voice. He suffers from no diseases and has sufficient strength and vigour. He has power of retention, memory, usefulness, steadiness, and contentedness. He can perform asceticism and destroy his sins and perform sacrifice and make gifts as people should.

Pratydhdra is effort of mind, by which the mind controls itself in relation to the objects to which the senses may be attracted. One who desires happiness should practise the virtue of disinclination and also try to attain true knowledge. It is by controlling one's senses that one can raise oneself up. When in this way the mind can be steadily attached to some object we have the state of dhdrand. This object to which the mind should be steadily attached is nothing but Siva. In the proper state of dhdrand the mind should not be dissociated even for a moment from its object, Siva. It is from the steadiness of the mind that dhdrand can proceed. So

by continuous practice of dhdrand the mind should be made constant and steady. The word 'dhyana' is derived from the root dhyai denoting the thinking of Siva with an undisturbed mind. Therefore this state is called dhyana. When a person is in the state of dhyana, the object of his meditation is constantly repeated in the same form without the association of any other idea. This constant flow of the same sort of image or idea is called dhyana 1 . It is remembered that one should perform tapa or chanting the name or the mantras and pass into dhyana, and when dhyana is broken one should go on with tapa and from that again to dhyana, and so on until the yoga is firmly attained. Samddhi is regarded as the last state of yoga in which the mind is illuminated with intuitive wisdom (prajndloka). It is a state which itself seems to be nothing in essence and where the object alone shines like a limitless, wave-less ocean 2 . After fixing the mind on the object of meditation, the saint looks like a fire which is being extinguished, he does not hear nor smell nor see nor touch anything, nor does his mind think. He does not understand anything, he is like a piece of wood. So when one's soul becomes lost in Siva one is said to be in the state of samddhi. It is like a lamp that burns in a steady flame. From this state of samddhi the saint never breaks off.

It must, however, be noted that in the course of the practice of this yoga many obstacles come in, and they have to be conquered. Some of these are indolence, troublesome diseases, carelessness, doubt as to the proper object of meditation, inconstancy of mind, absence of faith, illusory notions, pain, melancholia, attachment to objects. Indolence refers both to bodily and mental laziness. The diseases, of course, come through the disturbances of the three dhdtus — vayu, pitta, and kapha. Carelessness (pramdda) comes through the non-utilisation of the means of performing the yoga. A doubtful inquiry as to what may be the true object of meditation is called sthdna-samasyd. Absence of faith means the

1 dhyeyavasthita-cittasya sadrsah pratyayas ca yah, pratyayantara-nirmuktah pravdho dhyanam ucyate, sarvam anyat parityajya siva eva sivankarah.

Siva-mahdpurana vn. 2. 37. 52-3.

2 samadhina ca sarvatra prajnalokah pravartate, yad-artha-matra-mrbhasam stinritodadhi-vat-sthitatn, svarupa-sunyavad bhdnam samddhir abhidhtyate.

Ibid. vii. 2. 37. 61-2.

continuance of the yoga process without the proper emotion. All sorrow comes through false knowledge. These sorrows are divided into three classes, in accordance with the classical Samkhya classification, as adhyatmika, ddhibhautika, and adhidaivika. Disappointment is the frustration of one's desires, and causes mental troubles which are called daurmanasya. When the mind is drawn to various objects of desire it is said to be in a state of flirtation. When these obstacles are overcome then come other obstacles in the way of the appearance of miraculous powers.

The word 'yoga' in the Pasupata-yoga is used as a derivative from the root 'yujiryoge,' and not from i yuj samadhau,' as we find the word used in Patanjali's Yoga. The true yoga can only arise by the proper integrative knowledge of the meditation, the object of meditation, and the purpose of meditation. In meditating on Siva one should also meditate upon the energy of Siva, as the whole world is pervaded by them both.

Among the miraculous powers which are regarded as obstacles in the progressive path of yoga one counts pratibha, which means the power of knowing subtle things, things that are passed, and things that are obscure from our eyes, and things that are to come in future. In the Nyaya-manjari Jayanta mentions the word pratibha in an entirely different sense. He means by pratibha there an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, "tomorrow my brother will come." It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sound without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world, and also the power of having heavenly visions. So by these miraculous powers one may taste heavenly delights and exquisite pleasures of touch and smell of a higher order. So one may attain all kinds of miraculous powers, and one has a full command of all things that one may wish to have. It is unnecessary for us to dilate further on the various types of miraculous powers which the yogin may attain, and which may detract him from his onward path toward attaining the mahayoga or the highest yoga, that is, the union with Siva.

But it is interesting to notice that the same chapter on the Pasupata-yoga introduces certain methods which are not to be found in Patanjali's Yoga. Thus in vn. 2. 38, in a description of a particular posture of yoga, one is advised to fix one's attention on

the tip of the nose and not to look at one side or the other. One sits down unmoved, like a piece of stone, and tries to think of Siva and Sakti within oneself, as if they were installed in the seat of the heart, and meditates on them. One may also concentrate on one's navel, throat, palatal cavity and the spot between the eyebrows. One should think of a lotus having two, six, ten, twelve or sixteen petals, or a sort of quadrangle wherein one may place the Siva. The lotus in the spot between the eyebrows consists of two petals which are as bright as lightning. So in the case of other lotuses having a number of petals the vowels are associated with each of the petals from the bottom upwards. The consonants beginning with ka and ending in fa may also be regarded as being associated with the lotus, and should be meditated upon. In rather an obscure manner the different consonants are supposed to be associated with the different petals of the imaginary lotuses, and one should steadily meditate upon Siva and Sakti as associated with the letters of the petals.

In order to proceed on the path of yoga it may be necessary to meditate upon some of the recognised images of Siva, such as the different gross images of Siva mentioned in the Saiva scriptures.

Meditation should at first commence with an object, and later on it becomes objectless. But the learned people always discard the state of meditation in which there is no object, and it is said that dhyana consists in the stretching out of an intellectual state 1 . For this reason, in the state of dhyana it is the mere buddhi, or the intellectual state that flows on, which may often be regarded as having no object. So what is called an objectless {nirvisaya) dhyana is only meditation on subtle entities. It is also often said that when meditation is upon some particular form of Siva it is called savisaya, and when this is in a formless state as an extension of the knowledge of self, it is called nirvisaya. This savisaya dhyana is also called sabija, and the nirvisaya dhyana is called nirbija. As a result olpranayama and meditation, the mind becomes transparent, and then thoughts of Siva continually recur. As we have said above, dhyana means nothing more than the constant flow of an intellectual state (buddhi) of the form of Siva. It is this continuous flow of

1 tatra nirvisayam dhyanam nastlty eva satam matam,

buddher hi santatih kdcid dhyanam ity abhidhlyate.

Siva-mahapurana vn. 2. 39. 5.

an intellectual state that is regarded as an object of dhydna 1 . Both happiness and liberation come from dhydna; for this reason, one should always try to practise dhydna. There is nothing greater than dhydna 2 . Those who perform dhydna are dear to Siva, not those who only perform the rituals.

1 buddhi-pravdha-rupasya dhydnasydsydvalambanam, dhyeyam ity ucyate sadbhis tacca sdmbah svayam sivah.

Siva-tnahdpurdna vn. 2. 39. 19.

2 ndsti dhydna-samam tlrtharp, ndsti dhydnasamani tapah, ndsti dhydnasamo yajnas tasmdd dhydnam samdcaret.

Ibid. vii. 2. 39. 28.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

Saiva philosophy in some of the important texts

The Doctrine of the Pasupata-sutras.

Some of the philosophical doctrines of the Pasupata system of Saivism are discussed in the relevant sections. But the formal and ritualistic sides of the system, which have often been referred to elsewhere, as for example in the treatment of Saivism in the Sarva-darsana-samgraha, need an authoritative explanation. This is found in the Pasupata-sutras with the bhasya of Kaundinya, published in 1940 by the Oriental Manuscripts Library of the University of Travancore, Trivandrum. It is said that Siva incarnated Himself as Nakuli^a and so was the author of the Pasupata-sutras. The bhasya by Kaundinya is also an ancient one, as may be judged from the style of the writing. The editor of the Pasupata-sutras, A. Sastri, thinks that Kaundinya may have lived between the fourth and sixth centuries. The Pasupata-sutras together with the bhasya of Kaundinya do not give us any philosophy of Saivism. They deal almost wholly with the rituals, or rather modes of life. It may be quite possible that such ascetic forms of life existed from early times, and that later the philosophy of Saivism was added. Though these ascetic forms of life had but little connection with the Saiva philosophy as propounded later, they have a general anthropological and religious interest, as these forms of asceticism remain connected with the life of those who believe in the Saiva philosophy. In the Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhava the Pasupata system is not identified with any form of philosophy, but with different kinds of ascetic practices. When Saiikara refutes the Saiva system, he does not specifically mention any philosophical doctrines of an elaborate nature. He only brands the Saivas as those who believe in God as the creator of the world (isvara-kdraniri). Of course, the Naiyayika is also an isvara-karanin and he is also a Saiva by faith. The other doctrines of the Naiyayika are largely taken from the Vaisesika, and Sankara in his joint criticism of Nyaya and Vaisesika had referred to them. The Naiyayika thus shares his theistic

conviction with the Saivas. But while the Saivas of the Pasupata school lay emphasis on ascetic rituals, the Naiyayika laid stress on logical arguments. It will therefore not be out of place if we treat the general outline of the Pasupata sect on its ascetic side, though it may not be regarded as a contribution of philosophical value.

Kaundinya, the commentator, in the beginning of his bhasya y offers adoration to Pasupati who had created the whole world, beginning from the Brahman for the good of all. He says that the five subjects of discussion in the Pasupata system are effect (kdrya), cause (kdrana), meditation {yoga), behaviour {yidhi), and dissolution of sorrow (duhkhdnta) 1 .

The teaching of the Pasupata system is for the total annihilation of all kinds of sorrow and this teaching can only be communicated to proper disciples. When the disciple follows the ascetic practices recommended by the Lord, he attains liberation through His grace. It has been noticed before that the Saiva is called Mahakarunika. In our exposition of the Saiva thought we have examined carefully the doctrine of grace or karund, and have also seen how this doctrine of grace is associated with the doctrine of karma and the theory of rebirth, in accordance with the justice implied in the theory of karma. But here in the Pdsupata-sutra we are told that liberation comes directly from the grace of Siva. The word pasu means all conscious beings, excluding the saints and the all powerful ones. Their animality or pasutva consists in the fact that they are impotent and their impotence is their bondage. This bondage, which means their complete dependence on the causal power, is beginningless. The word pasu is connected with the word pdsa, which means "cause and effect", and is technically also called kald. All animals are thus bound by cause and effect, the sense images and their objects, and become attached to them. The word pasu is also derived irora pasyati. Though the animals are all-pervasive and are of the nature of pure consciousness, they can only perceive

1 The editor of the Pdsupata-sutras gives the following list of the succession of teachers from Nakullsa: Nakullsa, Kausika, Gargya, Maitreya, Kaurusa, Isana, Paragargya, Kapilanda, Manusyaka, Kusika, Atri, Pirigala, Pu§paka, Brhadarya, Agasti, Santana, Raslkara (Kaundinya), and Vidyaguru. The seventeenth guru called Raslkara has been identified with Kaundinya by the editor. This has been done on the supposition that Kaundinya occurs as the gotra name in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad vi. 2 and 4.

132 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

their bodies; they do not understand the nature of cause and effect and they cannot go beyond them. The Pasupati is so called because He protects all beings. Kaundinya definitely says that the liberation from sorrow cannot be attained by knowledge (jndna), disinclination (vairdgya), virtue (dharma) and giving up of one's miraculous powers (aisvarya-tyaga), but by grace (prasdda) alone 1 .

The person who is regarded as fit for receiving the Saiva discipline must be a Brahmin with keen senses. The instruction of the teacher, leading to devotional practices and exciting desire for becoming Siva, is given out of a spirit of charity to those who wish to annihilate all sorrow.

The word 'yoga* is used to denote the contact of the self with isvara or God (dtmesvara-samyogo yogah). The contact thus means that the person who was otherwise engaged leads himself to the supreme object of isvara; or it may also mean that the contact is due to the dual approach of both God and the person, until they meet. The yoga must have disinclination to worldly things as the first condition.

Yoga cannot be attained by mere knowledge but one has to take to a certain course of action called yoga-vidhi. Vidhi means action. Thus we have the effect (kdrya) which is the dissolution of pleasure and pain, the cause, the yoga and the vidhi, and these are the five categories which form the subject-matter of discussion of the Pdsupata-sdstra.

Describing the two kinds of perceptual knowledge Kaundinya distinguishes between sense perception and self-perception. By the senses one can perceive various kinds of sense objects, such as sound, touch, colour, taste, smell and the objects to which they belong. In reality, most perceptions occur through sense-object contact, and are manifested in their totality in diverse aspects through such a contact, and are regarded as valid (pramdna). Self-perception means the totality of the relation that is produced by citta and antahkarana, the mind and the thought. Inference (anumdna) is naturally based upon perception. The relationship between the thought, the mind, and the self expresses itself in diverse forms and produces diverse impressions and memories.

1 tasmat prasdddt sa duhkhdntah prdpyate. na tu jndna-vairdgya-dharma-isvarya-tydga-tndtrdd ity arthah. Pdsupata-sutras (commentary, p. 6).

And these lead to other kinds of awareness, or those which can be inferred from them.

Inference is of two kinds, drsta (perceived) and sdmanyato drsta (perceived through universals). The first again is of two kinds, called pilrvavat and sesavat. Pilrvavat is that which is affiliated with a previous experience. It has been seen to have six fingers, and now we find it of six fingers; therefore it is the same as the previous one. When an animal is recognised as a cow on the evidence of its horns and the hanging neck, this is said to be an inference of the type of sesavat. The sesavat inference is intended to distinguish a class of things from others. As an example of sdmanyato drsta (perceived through universals), it is said that as the location at different places of the same object cannot take place, one can infer that the moon and the stars which change places are travelling in the sky. Agama or testimony is the scriptural testimony that is handed down to us from MahesVara through His disciples. The Pdsupata-sdstra only admits perception, inference, and testimony; all other kinds of pramdnas are regarded as falling within them.

It is the individual perceiver to whom things are proved by means of the pramdnas. The object of the pramdnas are the fivefold categories, namely kdrya, kdrana, yoga, vidhi, and the dissolution of sorrow. Awareness or thought product is called samvid, samcintana, or sambodha. It is through these that knowledge is revealed. The process of knowledge continues from the first moment of inception to the completion of the knowledge.

Turning to the practices, it is said that one should collect ashes and bake them, and then smear the body in the morning, midday, and afternoon with these ashes. The real bathing is of course through the attainment of virtue by which the soul is purified. One should also lie down on the ashes and remain awake, for the person who is afraid of the cycles of birth and rebirth cannot have time to sleep. The ashes are to be used for bathing instead of water, both for purification and for bearing the signs of a Saiva. The ashes (bhasman) are therefore called linga, or sign of a Pasupata ascetic. We must note here that the word linga, which is often used in connection with the Saiva doctrine for a phallic sign, is here regarded as a mere indicatory sign of a person's being a Pasupata ascetic. The ashes which besmear the body are indicators

134 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

of the person being a Pasupata ascetic. The bhasman therefore is regarded as linga. These ashes distinguish the Pasupata ascetic from the adherents of other sects.

The Pasupata ascetic may live in the village, in the forest, or in any place of pilgrimage, and there he may employ himself in muttering the syllable om> laughing, singing, dancing, and making peculiar sounds through his mouth and lips.

In introducing moral virtues, great emphasis is laid on the yatnas consisting of non-injury, celibacy, truthfulness, and non-stealing. Next to these are the niyamas consisting of non-irritability (akrodha) y attendance on the teachers, purity, lightness of diet, and carefulness (apramdda). Of these two yama and niyama, yama is regarded as being most important. Non-injury in the fashion of the Jainas is highly emphasised, and is regarded as the best of all virtues. We have translated brahma-carya by celibacy, but in reality it means all kinds of sense control, particularly the palate and the sex organs; association with women is strongly deprecated. Though verbal truth implying agreement of statements to facts is appreciated, it is held that the final standard of truth is the amount of good that is rendered to people by one's words. Even a misstatement or a false statement, if beneficial to all beings, should be regarded as preferable to a rigorous truthful statement. It is interesting to note that the Pasupata system forbids all kinds of commercial dealings and trades, as they may cause pain to persons involved in mutual intercourse. Absence of anger (akrodha) has been enumerated above as a virtue. This includes both mental apathy consisting of jealousy, enmity, vanity and desire for the evil of others in one's own mind, as well as any action that may be committed in accordance with them. The Pasupata ascetic has to earn his living by mendicancy alone.

It has been said above that the Pasupata ascetic should be a Brahmin. It is prohibited for him to address women or Sudras, except under special circumstances. Under such exceptional circumstances one should purify oneself by bathing in ashes and also prdndydma, and the muttering of the raudrigdyatri.This prescription of practising prdndydma, etc., in case one has to meet a woman or a Sudra and to talk to them, is suggested for purifying the mind of the ascetic, for otherwise on being forced to meet them the ascetic may get angry in his mind, and that may cause injury to his own mind.

When the mind is purified, and one proceeds on the line of yoga with the Mahesvara, the supreme Lord, one attains various miraculous powers 1 .

The Mahesvara, regarded also as Brahman, is beginningless and indestructible; He is unborn and without any kind of attachment. When one knows the nature of the Lord, one should take refuge in Him and follow the practices described by Him in His scriptures.

The supreme Lord is regarded as producing and destroying all things out of His nature as a playful being. The Lord is supreme as he controls the movements and tendencies of all beings. His eternity consists in his continual knowledge and action, by which he pervades all. He is called Rudra because he is associated with fear on the part of all 2 .

The supreme Lord, being in Himself, creates, maintains and destroys the universe, that is, in Him the universe appears and dissolves like the stars in the sky. God creates the world at His will, as the world of effects exists in His own power and energy, and remains also by virtue of His power.

In explaining the position further, it is said in the bhasya (11. 5) that the category of Mahesvara is the all-pervasive one, and that the twenty-five categories like purusa, pradhana, etc., are permeated by the supreme category. So also the category of the purusa, being the category of the self, is the all-pervading one, and the twenty-four categories of pradhdna, etc., are permeated by purusa. So also in the field of the categories, the buddhi is all-pervasive and the twenty-two other categories, beginning with ahankarO) are permeated by buddhi. So also the ahankdra is all-pervasive and the eleven senses are permeated by it; so again the eleven senses are the all-pervasive ones and the subtle five tanmdtras are permeated by them. So also in the case of gross matter, where the same processes may be assigned to dkdsa, vdyu, tejas, etc.

The question is raised as regards the starting-point of difference between the cause and the effect. The writer of the bhasya (11. 5) says that it has to be understood on the analogy of a mixture of

1 See Pdsupata-sutras I. 21-37.

2 rutasya bhayasya drdvandt samyqjandd rudrah.

Pdsupata-sutras 11. 4 (commentary).

136 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

turmeric and water; in turmeric water you have on the one hand the qualities of water, and on the other the qualities of turmeric. So when the supreme Lord is considered as being associated with the pleasures and pains that He gives to all beings, and the bodies with which He associates them, we may have a conception of a whole. So God can be associated with pleasures and pains that belong to the prakrti, though He himself is absolutely unchangeable. The same analogy may explain the other categories of pradhana and prakrti. Being all-pervasive, the supreme Lord naturally pervades both the causal and the efficient states. The effect as identified in the cause is eternal; the cause, the Lord, is eternal, and all creation takes place in and through Him. Arguing in this way the world becomes eternal, for if the protector is eternal, the things to be protected must also be eternal. The world being eternal, the supreme Lord only connects the relevant parts of it in a relevant order. The grace of God consists in bringing about the proper association of the relevant parts.

God's will being all powerful and unlimited, He can create changes in the world and in the destinies of men according to His own pleasure. He does not necessarily depend upon the person or his karma or action 1 . God's will may operate either as the evolutionary process or as an interference with the state of things by inducing bondage or liberation. There is, however, a limit to the exercise of God's will in that the liberated souls are not associated with sorrow again. The limit of the effect world is that it is produced, helped and dissolved or changed by the causal category, the supreme Lord. This, therefore, is the sphere of cause and effect. Those who want the cessation of all sorrows should devote themselves to the worship of the Lord Siva and to no one else.

It is advised that the Pasupata ascetic should not be too much delighted on the attainment of miraculous powers. He should go on behaving like a Pasupata ascetic, smearing his body with ashes and smiling and so on, both in places of pilgrimage and temples, and also among people in general. These are called carya. In this carya the joy of the ascetic should be manifested in its pure form

1 karma-kdminai ca mahesvaram apeksante, na tu bhagavan isvarah karma purusam vd'peksate. ato na karmdpeksa isvarafi. Pdsupata-sutras 11. 6 (commentary).

and not associated with any form of vanity which goes with the attainment of miraculous powers.

The process of spiritual worship can only be done through the surrendering of oneself in one's mind to the supreme Lord, and to continue to do it until the goal is reached. When one gives oneself up entirely to Siva alone, he does not return from the state of liberation. This is the secret of self-surrender 1 .

The supreme Lord, called Vamadeva, jyestha, Rudra, is also called Kala. It is within the scope of His function to associate the different beings in different kinds of bodies and in different states of existence, with different kinds of experiences, pleasurable and painful, through the process of time. The individual beings are called kdlya as they happen to be in God or Kala. The term kala is given to the effects {kdlya) and their instruments {karana). Thus, the five elements, earth, water, etc., are called kala as kdrya or effect. So also are their properties. The eleven senses together with ahankara and buddhi are called karana. God Himself is vikarana or without any senses, so there is nothing to obstruct His powers of perception and action. It is God who associates all things and beings with the different kalds as kdlya and karana. The supreme Lord is regarded as sakala and niskala, immanent and transcendent, but even in His transcendental aspect He has in Him all the powers by which He can extend His grace to all beings.

In the third chapter it is said that the real Saiva ascetic may dispense with all the external practices, so that no one will recognise him as a Saiva ascetic, and will not give him a high place in society. When the Saiva ascetic is thus ignored by the people among whom he lives, this very degradation of him serves to remove his sins. When the ascetic bears the insults showered upon him by ignorant persons, he naturally attains fortitude. People may often abuse him as a lunatic, an ignorant man, or a dullard, etc., and in such circumstances he should get away from the public attention and fix his mind on God. With such behaviour he is not only purified but is spiritually ennobled. When a person thus moves about like a poor lunatic, besmeared with ashes and dirt, with

1 aikdntikdtyantika-rudra-samipa-prapter ekantenaiva andvrtti-phalatvdd asd-dhdrana-phalatvdc cdtma-praddnam atiddnam. Ibid. n. 15 (commentary).

138 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

beard and nails and hair uncut, and when he does not follow habits of cleanliness, he is naturally regarded as an outcast. This leads him further on the path towards disinclination, and the insults he bears meekly make him advanced spiritually.

When a person is firm in yama and niyama practices, and meekly suffers the indignities and abuses showered on him by other people, he is well established in the path of asceticism.

Throughout the whole of the fourth chapter of the Pasupata-sutras the pasupata-vrata is described as a course of conduct in which the ascetic behaves or should behave as a lunatic, ignorant, epileptic, dull, a man of bad character, and the like, so that abuses may be heaped on him by the unknowing public. This will enliven his disinclination to all worldly fame, honours, and the like, and the fact the people had unknowingly abused him would raise him in the path of virtue. When by such a course of action and by yoga one attains the proximity of the great Lord, one never returns again. India is supposed to have performed the pasupata-vrata in the earliest time.

In the fifth chapter the process of pasupata-yoga is more elaborately discussed. The supreme Lord is referred to by many names, but they all refer to the same being, the supreme Lord, and yoga means a steady union of the soul with Him. For this purpose the person should be completely detached from all objects, present, past and future, and be emotionally attached to Maheg-vara 1 . The union of the self with Siva must be so intimate that no physical sounds and disturbances should lead the person away. In the first stages the attachment with Siva takes place by the withdrawal of the mind from other objects, and making it settle on the Lord; then the association becomes continuous.

The soul or the Atman is defined as the being that is responsible for all sense cognitions, all actions, and all attachments to objects. The constant or continuous contact of the self with the supreme Lord constitute its eternity. We can infer the existence of the self from the experiences of pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy, and consciousness. The self is regarded as unborn in the sense that it is not born anew along with the chain of sensations and other activities of the mind, or in other words it remains the same

1 evam mahesvare bhdvasthis tadasangitvam ity arthah. Pdsupata-sutras v. 1 (commentary).

through all its experiences. It is called maitra in the sense that it can remain in a state of equanimity and in attachment with the supreme Lord, when all its desires, antipathies, and efforts have disappeared.

The detachment referred to above can only be attained by the control of all the cognitive and conative senses, manas and buddhi and ahankara. The control of the senses really means that their activities should be directed towards good acts, and they should not be allowed to stray away into the commission of evil deeds 1 .

Kaundinya says that the definition of the goal as described by Samkhya and Yoga is not true. That is not the way to liberation. The teachings of Samkhya and Yoga are impure. To be liberated means to be connected with Lord Siva, and not to be dissociated from all things 2 .

The ascetic should live in some vacant room; he should devote himself to study and meditation, and make himself steady. He should be in continuous meditation for at least six months; and as he advances on the path oiyoga, he begins to attain many miraculous powers through the grace of the supreme Lord.

The Pasupata ascetic should live on mendicancy and should bear all hardships like animals. The yogin who has realised his goal, is not affected by any actions or sins. He is also unaffected by any mental troubles or physical diseases.

To sum up the whole position, one may say that when one becomes absolutely detached from all one's actions and sins, one should continue to meditate by drawing one's mind from all other objects and concentrating the mind on Siva or on some symbolic name. We have already seen that yoga has been defined as the continuous connection of the self with the Lord, and this is also called sdyujya, that is, being with God. The supreme Lord has the infinite power of knowledge and action by which He controls everything, and this Lord should be meditated upon in His aspect as formless (niskala). God should not be approached with the association of any of the qualities attributed to Him. This is expressed by the sutra v. 27, in which it is said that God is

1 tasmad akusalebhyo vyavartayitvd kamatah kusale yqjitdni (yada), tadd jitoni bhavanti. Pdsupata-sutras v. 7 (commentary).

2 ayarn tu yukta eva. na mukta iti visuddham etad darsanam drastavyam. Ibid. v. 8 (commentary).

140 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

unassociated with anything that can be expressed by speech. The supreme Lord is therefore called vdg-visuddha. The ascetic should often better stay in the cremation grounds where, not having any association, he will have greater time to devote to meditation, and attain merit or dharma which is identified with the greatness that is achieved by yama and niyama. In this way the ascetic cuts asunder all impurities. This cutting asunder of impurities means nothing more than taking away the mind from all sense objects and concentrating the mind on the Lord (yantrana-dhdrandtmakas chedo drastvyah). This cheda or dissociation means the separating of the self from all other objects. By this means all the network of causes that produce the defects are cut asunder. The defects are the various sensations of sound, touch, etc., for from these we get in our minds desire, anger, greed, fear, sleep, attachment, antipathy, and delusion. Then again these defects manifest themselves in our efforts to earn things, to preserve them, to be attached to them, and to indulge in injuring others. As a result of this, one afflicts oneself and also others. When one is afflicted oneself, one suffers, and if one afflicts others, then also on account of this vice one suffers. All such suffering thus is associated with the self. The sense objects are like the fruits of a poisoned tree which at the time of taking may appear sweet, but in the end will produce much suffering. The suffering of a man commences from the time of his being born, and continues throughout life till the time of death, so one should see that one may not have to be born again. The pleasures of enjoying sense objects have to be maintained with difficulty, and they produce attachment; when they disappear they produce further sorrow. Moreover, it is hardly possible to enjoy a sense object without injuring other persons. Even in wearing ordinary apparel one has to kill many insects. So one should refrain from enjoyment of all sense objects and be satisfied with whatever one gets, vegetable or meat, by begging.

The dissociation recommended above is to be done through buddhi, the internal organ (antahkarand) which is conceived as being put in motion through merit, meditation, commandments and knowledge. The buddhi is also called citta. Citta means to know and to give experience of p leasure and pain, to collect merit and demerit and other impressions. So, as buddhi is called citta,

it is also called manas and the internal organ, antahkarana. The mind has thus to be dissociated from all sense objects by the self, and attached to Rudra or Siva. When this is done then all intention of merit and demerit disappears; it slides away from the self like the old coil of a snake, or falls down like a ripe fruit. The self which is thus fixed in Siva becomes static (niskriya) and is also called niskala. The mind in this state is devoid of all good and bad thoughts. When this yoga ideal is reached, the person becomes omniscient, and he cannot any further be drawn to any kind of illusory notions. So the liberated person, according to this saiva-yoga, does not become a kevalin like the yogin following the Patanjala discipline, but he becomes omniscient and has no sorrows, and this happens by the grace of God. He becomes absolutely liberated in the sense that he can arrest any future aggression of evil or time, and he is not dependent on anybody. In this way he attains or he shares the supreme power of the Lord. Neither does he become subject to all the sufferings of being in the mother's womb, or being born, and the like. He is free from the sorrows due to ignorance, from which is produced egotism, which leads one to forget that one is bound. So the liberated person becomes free from all sorrows of birth and rebirth and all bodily and mental sorrows as well.

The supreme Lord is also called Siva, because He is eternally dissociated from all sorrows.

We thus see that there are five categories in this system. First, there is the pati or the Lord which is the cause, which is called by various names, Varna, Deva, Jyestha, Rudra, Kamin, Sankara, Kala, Kala-vikarana, Bala-vikarana, Aghora, Ghoratara, Sarva, Sarva, Tatpurusa, Mahadeva, Omkara, Rsi, Vipra, Mahanlsa, Isana, Isvara, Adhipati, Brahma, and Siva 1 . The Samkhya system admits pradhana as the cause, but in the Pasupata system God, as distinguished from the pradhana, is the cause.

The category of effect is the pasu, and pasu is described as knowledge, the means of knowledge, and the living beings. They are produced changed, or dissolved. By knowledge we understand the scriptures, wisdom, merit, attainable objects, values, desires, etc., leading up to the dissolution of all sorrows. The second constituent of pasu called kala is of two kinds: as effect, such as

1 Pdsupata-sutras v. 47 (commentary).

142 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

earth, water, air, etc., and as the instrument of knowledge, such as buddhi, egoism, manas, and internal organs, etc. The living beings, the pasus, are of three types, the gods, men and animals. The category of pradhana, which is regarded as cause in Samkhya, is regarded as effect in the Pasupata-sdstra. Whatever is known or visible (pasyana) is called pdsa, and is regarded as effect. So purusa, which is regarded as cause elsewhere, is regarded as an effect, a pasu, here. We have already discussed the categories of yoga and vidhi leading to the dissolution of all sorrows.

A survey of the Pasupata-sutras with Kaundinya's bhdsya leads us to believe that it is in all probability the same type of Lakullsa-Pasupata system as referred to by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha in the fourteenth century. It may also be the same system of Pasupatas as referred to by Sankara in his bhdsya on the second book of the second chapter of the Brahma-sutra. There is no reference here to the doctrine of mdya, nor to the doctrine of monism as propounded by Sankara. Even at the time of emancipation the liberated souls do not become one with Siva, the supreme Lord, but the emancipation only means that by mental steadiness the devotee is in perpetual contact with Siva, and this is what is meant by the word sdyujya. We also hear that, though God is omnipotent, He has no power over the liberated souls. Apparently the world and the beings were created by God, but this Pasupata system does not make any special effort to explain how this world came into being. It is only in acknowledging Siva as the instrumental cause of the world in this sense, that this Pasupata system is very different from the Saiva system of Srlkantha and of the Vdyawya-samhitd, where the monistic bias is very predominant. Here we have monotheism, but not monism or pantheism or panentheism. It may also be pointed out that the Pasupata system as represented in this work is a Brahmanical system. For it is only Brahmins who could be initiated to the Pasupata doctrines, but at the same time it seems to break off from Brahmanism in a variety of ways. It does not recommend any of the Brahmanical rites, but it initiates some new rites and new ways of living which are not so common in the Brahmanical circle. It keeps some slender contact with Brahmanism by introducing the meditation on the syllable om. But as regards many of its other rituals it seems to be entirely non-Vedic. It does not refer to any of the Dravidian works as its

source book, and yet it cannot be identified with the Pasupata system of Srikantha or the Vdyaviya-samhitd.

It is also important to know that the Pasupata system of the Pdsupata-siltras has but little connection with the idea ofprakrti as energy or otherwise, as we find in the Puranic Pasupata system. None of the categories of Samkhya appear to be of any relevance regarding the creation of the world. About Yoga also one must always distinguish this Pdsupata-yoga and the Pdsupata-yogas referred to in the Puranas or in the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali. The word yoga is used in the sense of continuous contact and not the suppression of all mental states (atta-vrtti-nirodha), as we find in the Pdtanjala-yoga. The emphasis here is on pratydhdra, that is, withdrawing the mind from other objects and settling it down to God. There is therefore here no scope for nirodha-samddhi, which precedes kaivalya in Pdtanjala-yoga. It may not be impossible that the Saiva influence had somehow impressed upon the Yoga-sutra of Patanjali, which apparently drew much of its material from Buddhism, and this becomes abundantly clear if we compare the Vydsa-bhdsya on the Yoga-sutra with the Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu. The Sdmkhya-sutra that we now possess was probably later than the Yoga-sutra, and it therefore presumed that the metaphysical speculations of Samkhya could be explained without the assumption of any God for which there is no proof. The Yoga-sutra did not try to establish Isvara or God which is also the name for Siva, but only accepted it as one of its necessary postulates. As a matter of fact, none of the systems of Indian philosophy tried to establish God by any logical means except the Naiyayikas, and according to tradition the Naiyayikas are regarded as Saivas.

In this connection, without any reference to some Agama works to which we may have to refer later on, we can trace the development of the Pasupata system in the tenth, eleventh, and up to the fourteenth centuries. It has been said before that the Isvara-karanins, referred to by Sankara, may refer to the Naiyayikas, and now I shall be referring to Ganakdrikd, a Pasupata work attributed to Haradattacarya, on which Bhasarvajna wrote a commentary, called the Ratnatika. Bhasarvajna is well known as the author of the Nyaya-sdra, on which he wrote a commentary called Nydya-bhusana. In this he tried to refute the views of Dinnaga, Dharma-kirti, Prajfla-karagupta, the author of Pramdna-varttikalamkdra,

i44 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

who lived about the middle of the tenth century and is quoted by Ratnakarasanti of about a.d. 980. Bhasarvajna, therefore, seems to have lived in the second half of the tenth century. The Ganakdrikd consists of eight verses, and its purport is the same as that of the Pdsupata-sutras. The Pdsupata-sutra that we have dealt with is the same as that which is referred to as Pdsupata-sdstra, as the Sarva-darsana-samgraha quotes the first siitra of the Pdsupata-sdstra 1 .

Gunaratna in his commentary on Haribhadra's Saddarsana-samuccaya says that the Naiyayikas are also called Yaugas and they walk about with long staffs and scanty loin-cloths, covering themselves up with blankets. They have matted locks of hair, smear their bodies with ashes, possess the holy thread, carry utensils for water, and generally live in the forests or under trees. They live largely on roots and fruits, and are always hospitable. Sometimes they have wives, sometimes not. The latter are better than the former. They perform the sacrificial duties of fire. In the higher state they go about naked; they purify their teeth and food with water, smear their bodies with ashes three times, and meditate upon Siva. Their chief mantra is om namah sivaya. With this they address their guru and their guru also replies in the same manner. In their meetings they say that those men or women who follow the practices of Saiva initiation for twelve years attain ultimately salvation or Nirvana. Siva the omniscient being, the creator and destroyer of the world, is regarded as a god. Siva has eighteen incarnations (avatdra), namely Nakullsa, Kausika, Gargya, Maitreya, Kaurusa, Isana, Para-gargya, Kapilanda, Manusyaka, Kusika, Atri, Pingala, Puspaka Brhadarya, Agasti, Santana, Rasikara, and Vidyaguru. They adore the aforesaid saints.

They further say that the ultimate being that they worship is not associated with any of the Puranic characteristics of Siva, such as having matted locks, or the lunar digit in the hair, etc. Such a supreme being is devoid of all such characteristics and passions. Those who desire mundane happiness worship Siva with such associated qualities, and as possessing attachment or passion. But those who are really absolutely unattached, they worship Siva as unattached. People attain just those kinds of fruits that they wish to have, and the manner in which they wish to worship the deity.

1 Sarva-darsana-samgraha, Nakulisa-pdsupata-darsana: Tatredam ddi-sutram, "athatah pasupateh pdsupata-yoga-vidhim vyakhyasydmah" iti.

Gunaratna says that the Vaisesikas also follow the same kind of external insignia and dress, because the Vaisesikas and the Naiyayikas are very much similar in their philosophical attitudes. Gunaratna further says that there are four types of Saivas—Saivas, Pasupatas, Mahavratadharas, and Kalamukhas, as well as other subsidiary divisions. Thus there are some who are called Bharata who do not admit the caste rules. He who has devotion to Siva can be called a Bharata. In the Nyaya literature the Naiyayikas are called Saivas, because they worship Siva, and the Vaisesikas are called Pasupatas. So the Naiyayika philosophy goes by the name of Saiva and Vaisesika by the name of Pasupata. Gunaratna says that he gives this description just as he has seen it and had heard of it. Their main dialectical works are Nydya-sutra, Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, Udyotkara's Vdrttika, Vacaspati Misra's Tdtparya-tikd, and Udayana's Tdtparya-parisuddhi. Bhasarvajna's Nydya-sdra and its commentary Nydya-bhusana and Jayanta's Nydya-kalikd and Udayana's Nydya-kusumdnjali are also mentioned as important works.

The statement of Gunaratna about the Saivas is further corroborated by Rajasekhara's description of the Saiva view in his Saddarsana-samuccaya. Raja^ekhara further says that Aksapada, to whom the Nydya-sutras are attributed, was the primary teacher of the Nyaya sect of Pasupatas. They admit four pramdnas, perception, inference, analogy, and testimony, and they admit sixteen categories of discussion, namely, pramdna, prameya, samsaya, prayojana, drstdnta, siddhdnta, avayava, tarka, nirnaya, vdda, jalpa, vitandd, hetvabhasa, chala, jdti and nigrahasthdna. These are just the subjects that are introduced in the first sutra of Aksapada's Nydya-sutra. The ultimate object is the dissolution of all sorrow preparatory to liberation. Their main logical work is that by Jayanta and also by Udayana and Bhasarvajna.

Kaundinya's commentary on the Pdsupata-sutras seems to belong to quite an early period, and it may not be inadmissible to say that it was a writing of the early period of the Christian era. But whether Kaundinya can be identified with Rasikara, is more than we can say. Rasikara is mentioned in Sarva-darsana-samgraha, and there is of course nothing to suggest that Kaundinya could not have been the gotra name of Rasikara.

Apart from the Ratnatikd on the Ganakdrikd, it seems that there was also a bhdsya y but this bhdsya was not on Ganakdrikd, but it

146 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

was the bhasya of Kaundinya on the Pasupata-sutras which we have already examined. In the Ganakdrikd, a reference is made to eight categories of a fivefold nature and also one category of a tripartite nature. Thus in speaking of strength or power (bald), which must be a source of the attainment of the other categories, we hear of faith in the teacher, contentment (mateh prasdda), fortitude (that is, power of bearing all kinds of sorrow), merit or dharma, and also conscious carefulness (apramdda).

The question of bala or strength may naturally come when one has to conquer one's enemies. One may, therefore, ask the significance of the attainment of bala or strength in following a course for the attainment of liberation. The answer to such an inquiry is that strength is certainly required for destroying ignorance, demerit, and the like. These are counted as destruction of ignorance in all its dormant seats, destruction of demerit, dissolution of all that leads to attachment, preservation from any possible failure, and also the complete cessation of the qualities that lead to animal existence as pasu through the meditation of God.

This strength may be exercised under different conditions and circumstances. First, when one shows oneself as a member of the Pasupata sect, smearing the body with ashes and lying on the ashes, and so on; secondly, in the hidden stage, when one hides from other people the fact of one's being a member of the Pasupata sect, and when one behaves like an ordinary Brahmin. The third stage is a stage when one conquers all one's sense propensities. Next is the stage when all attractions cease. These include the other behaviours of a Pasupata ascetic, such as dancing and acting like a madman. The final stage is the stage of siddhi, the final emancipation.

The fifth karika refers to the process of initiation (diksd), which consists of the necessary ceremonial articles, the proper time, the proper action, the phallic insignia of Siva, and the teachers.

The karikas then go on to enumerate the different kinds of attainment (Idbha). Of these the foremost is knowledge. This knowledge is to be attained methodically by the enumeration of the categories of knowledge, and thereafter by a sufficient description of them as we find in the Nydya-sutras. This will also include the various kinds of pramdnas or proof, the differentiation between substance and attitude, the definition of action leading up to the

final action of dissociation of all sorrows. In other philosophies the dissociation of sorrows is merely a negative quality, but in this system the dissolution of sorrow involves within it the possession of miraculous powers. This attainment of miraculous powers is called also jnana-sakti and kriya-sakti. Jnana-sakti means jnana as power. This kriya-sakti consists of various kinds of powers of movement. As this system does not hold the idea of evolution or self-manifestation, the attainment of these powers is by association with superior powers. This is quite in accordance with the Nyaya theory regarding the origination of qualities. All the categories of knowledge, merit, etc., are included as being within the range of attainment. This also includes the inanimates and the animate characters such as the elements, the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, and the manas.

God is called the Lord or pati, because He is always associated with the highest powers; these powers do not come to Him as a result of any action, but they abide in Him permanently. For this reason He can by His will produce any action or effect which stands before us as creation and it is for this reason that the creation of the world is regarded as a sort of play by Him. This is what distinguishes Him from all other animate beings, and this is His greatness.

The whole course of vidhi or proper religious behaviour consists of those kinds of action which would ultimately purify the individual and bring him close to God. In this connection tapas is recommended for the destruction of sins and for the generation of merit. Dharma, also consisting of various kinds of ritualistic behaviour, is recommended for the attainment of knowledge. The continuous meditation on God with emotion (nityata) and the complete dissociation of the mind from all defects {sthiti) are also advised. These ultimately lead to the final liberation when the individuals become associated with great miraculous powers liked Siva Himself. In other systems the liberated souls have no miraculous powers; they have only all their sorrows dissolved.

The above attainments should be made by residence with the teacher, or where people live who follow the caste and the Asratna rules, or in any vacant place which is cleaned up and which has a covering on it, or in the cremation ground; or finally the aspirant

148 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

with the cessation of his body may live in fixed association with the supreme Lord.

We must now turn to the means by which the aspirant may attain his desired end. The first is technically called vdsa. It means many things; it means the capacity to understand the proper meanings of words of texts, to remember them, to be able to collate and complete that knowledge in association with knowledge gained in other places, the ability to criticise the teachings of opposite schools in favour of one's own school, to be able to grasp the correct meaning of texts which have been differently interpreted, to be able to carry one's own conviction to other people, the ability to speak without contradiction and repetition and without any kind of delusion, and thereby to satisfy the teacher. To these must be added the proper courtesy and behaviour towards the teacher. This latter is called caryd, paricaryd, or kriya. The term caryd is also used to denote various kinds of action, such as smearing the body with ashes, and so on. According to the Pasupata system the bathing of the body with ashes is equivalent to proper sacrifice, that is, yajna. Other kinds of sacrifice are regarded as bad sacrifices.

Bhasarvajna follows Kaundinya's bhasya in describing caryd as being twofold or threefold. Thus the bathing of the body with ashes, lying down, muttering mantras, etc., are called vrata, which produces merit and removes demerit. All the other recommendations found in Kaundinya's bhasya as regards shivering, laughing, making noises, etc., are also repeated here. In fact, the Gana-kdrikd and the Ratnatikd closely follow the teachings of Kaundinya in his bhasya, which is regarded as the most prominent work of the Pasupata school.

One important point in this system deserves to be noticed. God Himself is absolutely independent. The introduction of the idea of karma and its fruit is not so indispensable, for the simple reason that no karmas can produce any fruit without the will of God. All karmas can be frustrated by God's will. So the introduction of the karma theory, which is held in so high an esteem in other systems of philosophy, is here regarded as superfluous. That this was the idea of the Nakullsa-Pasupata philosophy from the time of the Pdsupata-sutras and Kaundinya's bhasya to the fourteenth century when the Sarva-darsana-samgraha was written, is

thoroughly borne out by texts. The action of all living beings depends upon the will of God. God Himself having no purpose to fulfil, does not want karma as an intermediary between His will and His effect.

After considerable difficulty we obtained a copy of Mrgendra-gama from the Government Manuscript Library of Madras. It appears that this Agama was one of the important texts of the Pasupata sect. But the portions that we have recovered deal mainly with various kinds of rituals and they have no philosophical interest.

The Saiva Ideas of Manikka-vachakar in the Tiru-vachaka.

In the present work the writer has refrained from utilising material from a Dravidian language such as Tamil, Telegu, and Kanarese. This is due to more than one reason. The first is that the writer has no knowledge of the Dravidian languages, and it is too late for him to acquire it, as it might take a whole life time to do so. The second is that this history in all its past volumes has only taken note of material available in Sanskrit. Thirdly, so far as the present author can judge, there is hardly anything of value from the philosophical point of view in Dravidian literature which is unobtainable through Sanskrit. A Tamil work could, however, be taken in hand, if there were any trustworthy translation of it, and if the work were of any great reputation. It is fortunate that Manikka-vachakar's Tiru-vachaka, which is held in very high esteem, has a trustworthy translation by the Rev. G. U. Pope, who devoted his life to the study of Tamil, and may be regarded as a very competent scholar in that language. It appears that Tamil was particularly rich in poetry, and we have many devotional songs both in Tamil and in Kanarese, but I do not know of any systematic philosophical work either in Tamil or in Kanarese which is not presented in Sanskrit. The Tamil literature also abounds in mythical and legendary accounts of many of the saints, which go by the name of Puranas, such as Periya-purana and Tiru-vatavurar-purana, Nampiyandar-nampi-purdna and Sekkilar-purana.

Tiru-vachaka is a book of poems by Manikka-vachakar. It is full of devotional sentiments and philosophical ideas, but it is not

150 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

a system of philosophy in the modern sense of the term. Pope wishes to place Manikka-vachakar in about the seventh or eight century, apparently without any evidence. R. W. Frazer, in his article on Dravidians 1 , places him in the ninth century, also without any evidence. Manikka-vachakar is supposed to have been born near Madura. The meaning of his name is "he whose utterances are rubies." He is supposed to have been a prodigy of intellect and was a consummate scholar in the Brahmanical learning and the £aivdgamas. These Agamas, as we have pointed out elsewhere, are written in Sanskrit verses and also in Tamil. It appears, therefore, that the background of Manikka-vachakar's thought was in Sanskrit. The mythical story about Manikka-vachakar, available in the Tiru-vilaiyddil and in the Vdtavurar-purdna as summarised by Pope, need not detain us here. We find that he renounced the position of a minister of the king and became a Saiva ascetic. His mind was oppressed with the feeling of sadness for all people around him, who were passing through the cycles of birth and death, and had no passionate love for Siva which alone could save them. This state of his mental agitation, and the confession of his ignorance and youthful folly, are specially described in some of his poems.

Later on Siva Himself meets him, and from that time forward he becomes a disciple of Siva. Siva appears before him with His three eyes, His body smeared with ashes, and holding a book in His hand called Siva-jiidna-bodha, the well-known work of Meykandadeva. Pope himself admits that the Siva-jndna-bodha could not have been written by the sixth century A.D., the supposed date of Manikka-vachakar 2 .

In the course of his career he travelled from shrine to shrine until he came to Chidambaram, where in a discussion he completely discomfited the Buddhists, partly by logic and partly by the demonstration of miraculous powers. He then returned to other devotees and set up a lingam under a tree and worshipped it day and night. It was from that time that he began his poetical compositions which are full of the glory of Siva and His grace.

1 In Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

2 Siva-jnana-bodha is supposed to have been written by Meykandadeva in or about a.d. 1223. See article on Dravidians by Frazer in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

A study of his poems reveals the gradual evolution of his mind through various states of repentance, afflictions, sadness, and his extreme devotedness and love for Siva. Pope, in commenting on the poetry of Manikka-vachakar, says "scarcely ever has the longing of the human soul for purity and peace and divine fellowship found worthier expression 1 ."

The fact of the omnipresence of God is often expressed in the Saiva songs as the sport of Siva. The whole universe is bright with his smile and alive with his joyous movements. This idea is so much overstressed that Siva is often called a deceiver and a maniac, and in the Pasupata system the Pasupata ascetics are advised to behave like mad people, dancing about and even deceiving others into thinking of them as bad people, and making all kinds of noise and laughing in an irrelevant manner. It is also supposed that Siva would often try the loyalty of his devotees in various forms of manifestations, trying to represent Himself in an exceedingly unfavourable light. The dancing of Siva is particularly symbolical of his perpetual gracious actions throughout the universe and in loving hearts. He reminds one of the pre-Aryan demon dancers in the burning grounds.

We assume that the teaching of Manikka-vachakar is in consonance with the teaching of the Siva-jndna-bodha, which was composed at a later date. Umapati has a commentary on the Siva-jnana-bodha which has been translated by Hoisington in the American Oriental Society Journal of 1895. In this book various types of liberation are described. Distinguishing the Saiva view from other views, one may find a number of variations in conception in the different Saiva schools. Some of these variations have already been noted in the different sections of Southern Saivism. There are many who think that the innate corruptions of the soul can be removed, and this may lead to a permanent release from all bonds (pasa). The Saiva-siddhanta, however, insists that even in this liberated state the potentiality of corruption remains, though it may not be operative. It remains there in the soul as a permanent dark spot. So the personal identity and the imperfections cling together in all finite beings, and they are never destroyed even in liberation. Other sectarian Saivas, however, think that by the grace of Siva the innate corruptions of the soul may be removed, 1 Pope's translation, p. xxxiv.

152 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

from which it necessarily follows that there may be permanent release from all bonds. There are other Saivas who think that in liberation the soul acquires miraculous powers, and that the liberated persons are partakers of divine nature and attributes, and are able to gain possession of, and exercise, miraculous powers called siddhi. There are others who think that in emancipation the soul becomes as insensible as a stone. This apathetic existence is the refuge of the soul from the suffering and struggle of the cycle of births and rebirths. We have already mentioned most of these ideas of liberation in a more elaborate manner in the relevant sections. But according to Manikka-vachakar the soul is finally set free from the influence of threefold defilement through the grace of Siva, and obtains divine wisdom, and so rises to live eternally in the conscious, full enjoyment of Siva's presence and eternal bliss. This is also the idea of the Siddhanta philosophy 1 .

A great pre-eminence is given to the idea of the operation of divine grace (called arul in Tamil) in the Saiva Siddhanta. The grace is divine or mystic wisdom, to dissipate the impurities of the anava-mala and to show the way of liberation. The souls are under the sway of accumulated karma, and it is by the grace of the Lord that the souls of men, in a state of bondage in the combined state, are let loose and find their place in suitable bodies for gradually working out and ultimately attaining liberation. Through all the stages, grace is the dynamic force that gradually ennobles the pilgrim towards his final destination. The grace of Siva through the operation of His energy (sakti) affords light of understanding, by which people perform their actions of life and accumulate their karma and experience joys and sufferings. The material world is unconscious and the souls have no knowledge of their own nature. It is only by the grace of Siva that the individuals understand their state and acquire the mystic knowledge by which they can save themselves; yet no one knows the grace of Siva and how it envelops him, though he is endowed with all sense perceptions. From beginningless time the individuals have been receiving the grace of God, but they have seldom come under its influence, and are thus devoid of the right approach to the way to deliverance.

The grace can be observed as operative when the proper guru comes and advises the person to follow the right course. When the

opposition of sins and merits is counter-balanced, Siva's emancipating grace begins to show its work. In order to be saved, one should know the spiritual essence of karma and the twofold kinds of karma, and the joys and sorrows which are associated with them, and the Lord Who brings the deeds to maturity at the appointed time so that the soul may experience their effects.

Just as a crystal reflects many colours under the sun's light and yet retains its own transparent character, so the energy or wisdom obtained as a grace of the Lord irradiates the soul and permeates the world. Without the mystic wisdom obtained through the grace of Siva, no one can obtain real knowledge. The soul is unintelligent without Siva. All the actions of souls are performed with the active guidance of Siva, and even the perception of the senses as instruments of knowledge is owed to Siva's grace.

In the second stage we are taught how to apply knowledge for the cleansing of the soul. Those who endure the delusive sufferings of worldly experience would naturally seek relief in the grace of God as soon as they became convinced of their impurities. To a jaundiced person even sweet milk appears bitter, but if the tongue is cleansed the bitterness is gone; so under the influence of the original impurities all religious observances are distasteful, but when these impurities are removed then the teachings of the guru become operative.

What cannot be perceived by the senses, supreme bliss, is known by the operation of grace in a spiritual manner. The grace of God is spontaneously revealed to us. The supreme felicity is thus a gift of grace which souls cannot obtain of themselves.

Only those who are introduced to this grace can combine with Siva in bliss. There is a curious notion that the souls are feminine and so is the sakti or energy, and Siva is the Lord with whom there is a mystic unification. Siva is perfect bliss. If there is a mystic union between the soul and the Lord, then they should become one, leaving the duality between the soul and God unexplained; it has to be assumed, therefore, that they both become one and remain divided. When the bonds are removed the devotee becomes one with God in speechless rapture, and there is no scope for him to say that he has obtained Siva. Those who obtain release, and those who attain the state of samadhi, are never torn asunder from the Lord. In that state all their physical actions are under the

154 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

complete control of the Lord. There thus comes a state when the knower, the mystic knowledge, and the Siva appear no more as distinct, but as absorbed in one another.

Though those who enter this state of samadhi gain omniscience and other qualities, yet while they are on this earth they know nothing whatever except the supreme Lord, the object of their mystic knowledge. All their sense-organs are restrained and sink deep into their source and do not show themselves. Within and without the divine grace stands revealed. In this mystic enlightenment the phenomenal universe is only seen in God.

In the Vdtavurar-purdnam as translated by Pope there is an account of the controversy of Manikka-vachakar with the Buddhist teachers in Chidambaram. The controversy does not manifest any great knowledge of Buddhism on either side. The disputation hangs round this or that minor point and lacks logical co-ordination, so that it is unprofitable to follow it up. It is also extremely doubtful if that controversy were in any way responsible for the loss of prestige on the side of Buddhist thought, which must have been due, from the ninth century onwards, to the rise of various South Indian sects which quarrelled with each other, and also, mainly, to political reasons.

Manikka-vachakar and Saiva Siddhanta.

We read in Sankara's commentary (n. 2. 27) that he mentions the name Siddhanta-sdstra written by Siva Himself, and he gives us some specimen ideas of these which can be covered within two concepts: (1) that the Siddhantas assume God to be the instrumental cause, against the Vedanta view that God represents the whole of reality and that there is nothing outside Him. He also (2) refers to the Saiva doctrine which acknowledged three categories, the pati, pasu, and pdsa. Among the Saivas he refers to the Maha-karunikas, Kapalikas, etc. As I have often said, it is extremely difficult to discover with any exactitude the sort of Saivism that Sankara designates by the name Siddhanta, as also to define the characteristics of the systems that he wanted to refute. We have now before us a system of Saivism which goes by the name of Saiva Siddhanta and a whole lot of works regarded as the works of the Saiva Siddhanta school. Much of it, particularly in

the way of commentaries, is written in Tamil: some of it is available in Sanskrit. A sort of Saivism very similar to this is found in the Vdyaviya section of the &iva-mahdpurana. It is said in those sections that the original doctrine of that philosophy was written in the Agama works as composed by the successive incarnations cf Siva. The same teachings are to be found also in Tamil Agamas, which have the same authority and content. Pope says that the Saiva Siddhanta system is the most elaborate, influential, and undoubtedly the most intrinsically valuable of all the religions of India. This seems to me to be a wild exaggeration. The fundamental facts of Saivism are composed of Vedantic monism and Samkhya, and sometimes the Nyaya doctrines have also been utilised. This latter refers to the Pasupata school of Saivism, as has been noted elsewhere. It is also doubtful if it is peculiarly South Indian and Tamil, for we have similar doctrines in the Vayaviya-samhita and also in a somewhat variant form in the Northern Saivism. There are many statements by Pope which seem to have no factual value, and if the present work had any polemical intention, it would be necessary to criticise him more definitely.

Some people say that the oldest form of Saivism is the old prehistoric religion of South India, but I have not found any evidence to show the exact nature of an existent pre-Aryan, Dravidian religion which could be identified with what we now know as Saivism. It is as yet very doubtful whether the pre-Aryan Dravi-dians had any systematic form of philosophy or religion differing from that of the kindred classes of other aborigines.

In our view the Pdsupata-sutra and bhasya were referred to by Sankara and were probably the earliest basis of Saivism, as can be gathered by literary evidences untrammelled by flying fancies. We are ready to believe that there were ecstatic religious dances, rites of demon-worship, and other loathsome ceremonials, and that these, though originally practised for ancestor-worship and the like, were gradually accepted by the earliest Pasupatas, whose behaviour and conduct do not seem to affiliate them with the Brahmanic social sphere, though holders of such Saiva doctrines had to be Brahmins. Castelessness was not a part of the earlier Pasupata Saivism. In a separate section we shall try to give an estimate of the evolution of the concept of Siva from Vedic times. The affirmation that one little Christian Church on the east coast

156 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

of India exerted its influence on the dominant Saiva and Vaisnava faith in the country lacks evidence. We have found that as a rule those who held the Sanskritic culture hardly ever read even Pali texts of Buddhism, though Pali is so much akin to Sanskrit. On this account we find that the reputed disputation of Manikka-vachakar with the Buddhists is uninteresting, as it does not seem that Manikka-vachakar or the Ceylonese knew much of each other's faith. Pope's statement, that Kumarila Bhatta preached the doctrine of a personal deity in the South, is absolutely wrong, because the Mimamsa view as expounded by Kumarila did not admit any God or creator.

Manikka-vachakar, probably of the ninth century, was one of the earliest saints of the school of thought that goes by the name of Saiva Siddhanta. Probably about a century later there arose Nanasambandhar and other devotees who developed the doctrine further. Their legendary tales are contained in the Periya-purana. But it is peculiar that King Bhoja of Dhara, who wrote a Saiva work of great distinction called Tattva-prakdsa, does not take any notice of these Tamil writers. Similarly Madhava, also in the fourteenth century, does not mention any of these Tamil writers. We are told that thereafter came fourteen sages, called Santdna-gurus (succession of teachers), who properly elaborated the system of philosophy known as the Saiva Siddhanta. One of these was Umapati, who lived in a.d. 1313. He was thus a contemporary of Madhava, though Madhava makes no reference to him.

The thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries were periods of great theistic enterprises in the hands of the Saivas and the Srivaisnavas. In interpreting Tiru-vachakam, Umapati says that the real intention of all the Vedas is summed up in three mystic words: pati, pasu, and pdsa, the Lord, the flock, and the bond. These are the three categories of the Saiva Siddhanta system. But we have already pointed out that there were no special peculiarities of the Saiva Siddhanta; it was referred to by Sahkara in the eighth century and it formed the cardinal doctrine of the Pa^upata school of Saivism, and also to the schools of Saivism as we find them in the Vayaviya section of the &wa-mahdpurdna. The pati, pasu and pdsa are equally eternal, existing unchanged and undiminished through the ages. This pati is none else but Siva, who is called by various names, such as Rudra, pasundm-pati, Siva, etc. Umapati

says that Siva is the supreme Being, is neither permanently manifested nor unmanifested; He is without qualities or distinguishing marks, free from all impurities, absolute and eternal, the source of wisdom to innumerable souls, and not subject to any fluctuations. He is immaterial and of the nature of pure bliss. He is difficult of access to the perverse, but He is the final goal of those that truly worship Him. Siva is thus described to be niskala, without parts, perfect in Himself, but is capable of manifestation, and in order to energise in souls the various constituents of that eternal aggregate of impurity which constitutes the bond, He assumes a sakala nature, that is, one composed of pieces of spiritual bodies. He is formless and has the form of wisdom. He creates, preserves, and consigns all to the power of mdyd, but He is the ultimate refuge who never leaves us. He dwells everywhere and pervades all things as fire pervades all wood. He offers His boon only to those who approach Him for it.

Turning to the groups of animate beings called pasu, it is suggested that from beginningless time an infinite number of souls must have obtained their release. Generally there are three kinds of impurities—darkness, deeds (karma) and delusion. When delusion is removed, darkness may still continue. The souls can perceive objects through sense organs only when their functions are supplemented by some innate divine faculty. All beings are infested with original impurities. The threefold impurities which constitute the bond are directly known by Siva.

Para-siva or the supreme Lord and Para-sakti are two in one. Siva is pure intelligence (jnana) and Sakti is pure energy (kriya). Out of their union, evolves (1) icchd-sakti, which is a combination of jnana and kriya in equal proportion; (2) kriyd-sakti which is a combination of jnana and kriya with an excess of kriya; and (3) jnana-sakti, which is a combination of jnana and kriya with an excess of jnana, also called arul-sakti. The arul-sakti is the jnana-sakti active at the time of the liberation of the souls, while as tirodhdna-sakti it is active at the time when the souls are fettered.

To sum up the position of the Saiva Siddhanta as far as we can understand it from authoritative translations of Tamil works, and also authoritative studies of Tamil literature like Pope and Schomerus, we find that the souls which pervade the body are themselves inanimate, and the intellectual apparatus by which

158 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

things are perceived are also unconscious. Conscious experience can only originate by the energy of Siva. This energy, like a ray of sun, is the original sakti or energy which is indistinguishable from Siva. The Saiva Siddhanta school is in direct opposition to the Carvaka school which denies the existence of any creator. The Saiva Siddhanta school argues for the existence of a supreme Being who evolves, sustains, and involves the phenomenal universe. The whole universe, constituted of all beings, male and female, and those which are without life, but which come into phenomenal existence, subsists for a while and then subsides; but yet, as we have said before, this does not clarify our knowledge regarding the nature of the physical world and of the souls. It does not explain how beings became associated from the beginning with impurities called dnava-mala. Even at the attainment of release the souls could not be united or become one with God. Other forms of Saivism have attempted to follow slightly diverse lines to avoid these difficulties.

Though sakti is regarded as a part of Siva—and this has led to many mystical aspects of Tantra philosophy—yet the relation of the individual devotees to God is one of servitude and entire self-surrender. It has none of the amorous sides of rapturous love that we notice among the Vaisnava saints, the Arvars.

Tiru-vdchakam may in some sense be regarded as a spiritual biography of Manikka-vachakar which records his experiences at different times of his life and explains. The work is full of his religious experiences and enthusiasm, showing different states of religious pathology. Thus he says:

What shall I do while twofold deeds' fierce flame burns still out,— Nor doth the body melt,—nor falsehood fall to dust? In mind no union gained with the "Red fire's honey" The Lord of Perun-turrai fair! 1

Shall I cry out, or wait, or dance or sing, or watch?

0 Infinite, what shall I do? The Siva who fills With rapturous image,—great Perun-turrai's Lord Let all with me bending adore! 2

He filled with penury; set me free from 'births,' my soul With speechless fervours thrilled,—blest Perun-turrai's Lord,— The Siva in grace exceeding made me His; the balm For all my pain, the deathless Bliss ! 3

Glorious, exalted over all, the Infinite,—

To me small slave, lowest of all, thou has assigned.

A place in bliss supreme, that none beside have gained or known!

Great Lord, what can I do for thee! 1

All ye His servants who've become, put far away each idle sportive

thought; Such refuge at the fort where safety dwells; hold fast unto the end

the sacred sign; Put off from you this body stained with sin; in Siva's world He'll

surely give us place! Bhujanga's self, whose form the ashes wears will grant you entrance

'neath His flow'ry feet! 2

Saiva Philosophy according to Bhoja and his commentators.

Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha of the fourteenth century refers to a system of philosophy Saiva-darsana which rejects the view that God of His own will arranges all experiences for us, but that he does so on the basis of our own karma and that this philosophy is based upon the Saivagamas, supposed to have been composed by Siva, Mahesvara. In examining the philosophy of Srikantha and Appaya we have seen that they speak of twenty-eight Agamas, which were all written by Siva or His incarnations, and that, whether in Dravidian or in Sanskrit, they have the same import. Though it will not be possible for us to get hold of all the Agamas, we have quite a number of them in complete or incomplete form. On the evidence of some of the Agamas themselves, they were written in Sanskrit, Prakrt, and the local country dialects 3 . We also find that, though written by Mahesvara, all the Agamas do not seem to have the same import. This creates a good deal of confusion in the interpretation of the Saivagamas. Yet the differences are not always so marked as to define the special characteristics of the sub-schools of Saivism.

Bhoja, probably the well-known Bhoja of the eleventh century

who wrote Sarasvati-kanthdbharana and a commentary on the

Yoga-sutra, wrote also a work called Tattva-prakasa which has

1 Ibid. p. 336. 2 Ibid. p. 329.

3 samskrtaih prakrtair yas cdsisydnurupatah,

deia-bhasadyupSyaii ca bodhayet sa guruh smrtah.

Siva-jnana-siddhi (Mysore manuscript, no. 3726).

160 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

been referred to by Madhava in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha. Madhava also refers to Aghora-sivacarya, whose commentary on Tattva-prakasa has not yet been published, but he omits Srikumara, whose commentary on Tattva-prakasa has been published in the Trivendrum Series along with the Tattva-prakasa. Aghora-sivacarya seems to have written another commentary on the Mrgendragama called the Mrgendrdgama-vrtti-dipikd. In writing his commentary Aghora-sivacarya says that he was writing this commentary, because other people had tried to interpret Tattva-prakasa with a monistic bias, as they were unacquainted with the Siddhanta of the Agama-sastras. From the refutation of the Mahesvara school by Sankara in n. 2. 37, we know that he regarded the Mahesvaras as those that held God to be only the instrumental agent of the world and the material cause of the world was quite outside Him. According to the monistic Vedanta of Sankara, Brahman was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world. The world was in reality nothing but Brahman, though it appeared as a manifold world through illusion, just as a rope may appear as a snake through illusion. This is called the vivarta view as opposed to the parinama view, according to which there is a material transformation leading to the production of the world. The parinama view is held by the Samkhyists; the other view is that God is the instrumental agent who shapes and fashions the world out of atoms or a brute maya, the material force. The Naiyayikas hold that since the world is an effect and a product of mechanical arrangement, it must have an intelligent creator who is fully acquainted with the delimitations and the potencies of the atomic materials. God thus can be proved by inference, as any other agent can be proved by the existence of the effect. This is also the viewpoint of some of the Saivagamas such as the Mrgendra, Mdtahga-paramesvara, etc.

Srikumara, in interpreting Tattva-prakasa, seems to be in an oscillating mood; sometimes he seems to follow the Agama view of God being the instrumental cause, and sometimes he tries to interpret on the Vedantic pattern of vivarta. Aghora-sivacarya takes a more definite stand in favour of the Agama point of view and regards God as the instrumental cause 1 . In our account of Saivism

1 vivddddhydsitam visvam visva-vit-kartr-piirvakam, kdryatvdd dvayoh siddham kdryam kumbhadikam yathd, iti sfiman-matange' pi, nirmtta-kdranam tu tsa iti. ayam cesvara-vddo 'smdbhih mrgendra-vrtti-dlpikaydm vistarendpi darsita iti. Aghora-Sivacarya's commentary on Tattva-prakasa (Adyar manuscript).

as explained in the Vdyaviya-samhitd, we have seen how in the hands of the Puranic interpreters Saivism had taken a rather definite course towards absolute monism, and how the Samkhya conception of prakrti had been utilised as being the energy of God, which is neither different from nor identical with Him. Such a conception naturally leads to some kind of oscillation and this has been noticed in the relevant places.

Madhava sums up the content of the &aivdgamas as dealing with three categories, pati, the Lord, pasu, the beings, and pdsa, the bonds, and the four other categories of vidyd, knowledge, kriyd, behaviour or conduct, yoga, concentration, and caryd, religious worship. Now the beings have no freedom and the bonds themselves are inanimate; the two are combined by the action of God.

Bhoja writes his book, Tattva-prakdsa, to explain the different kinds of metaphysical and other categories (tattva) as accepted by the Saiva philosophy. The most important category is Siva who is regarded as being cit by which the Saivas understand combined knowledge and action 1 . Such a conscious God has to be admitted for explaining the superintendence and supervision of all inanimate beings. This ultimate being is all by itself; it has no body and it does not depend upon any thing; it is one and unique. It is also all-pervading and eternal. The liberated individual souls also become like it after liberation is granted to them, but God is always the same and always liberated and He is never directed by any supreme Lord. It is devoid of all passions. It is also devoid of all impurities 2 .

Aghora-sivacarya follows the Saivdgamas like the Mrgendra or the Mdtanga-paramesvara in holding that the existence of God can be inferred by arguments of the Naiyayika pattern. It is, therefore, argued that God has created the world, maintains it, and will destroy it; He blinds our vision and also liberates us. These five actions are called anugraha, which we have often translated, in the absence of a better word, as grace. In reality, it means God's power that manifests itself in all worldly phenomena leading to

1 Aghora-sivacarya quoting Mrgendra in his commentary on Tattva-prakdsa says: caitanyam drk-kriyd-rupam iti cid eva ghanarn deha-svarupam yasya sa cidghanah. This cidghana is the attribute ascribed to i§iva in Tattva-prakdsa.

2 moho madas ca rdgas ca visddah soka eva ca, vaicittam caiva harsas ca saptaite sahajd maldh. Aghora-sivacarya's commentary (Adyar manuscript) on Tattva-prakdsa, kdrikd i.

162 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

bondage and liberation, everything depending upon the karma of the individual. It is quite possible that in some schools of Saivism this dynamism of God was interpreted as His magnificent grace, and these people were called the Maha-karunikas. Anugraha, or grace, thus extends to the process of creation. If it were ordinary grace, then it could have been only when the world was already there 1 . This anugraha activity includes creation, maintenance, destruction, blinding the vision of the individuals, and finally liberating them 2 . Srikumara explains the situation by holding that the act of blinding and the act of enlightening through liberation are not contradictory, as the latter applies only to those who have self-control, sense-control, fortitude, and cessation from all enjoyment, and the former to those who have not got them 3 . God thus is responsible for the enjoyable experiences and liberation of all beings through His fivefold action. His consciousness {pit) is integrally connected with His activity. Though God is of the nature of consciousness and in that way similar to individual souls, yet God can grant liberation to individual souls with powers which the individual souls themselves do not possess. Though God's consciousness is integrally associated with action, it is indistinguishable from it. In other words God is pure thought-activity.

The sakti or energy of Siva is one, though it may often be diversely represented according to the diverse functions that it performs. Srikumara points out that the original form of this energy is pure bliss which is one with pure consciousness. For the creation of the world God does not require any other instrument than His own energy, just as our own selves can perform all operations of the body by their own energy and do not require any outside help. This energy must be distinguished from maya. Taking maya into consideration one may think of it as an eternal energy, called bindu-maya which forms the material cause of the world 4 .

1 anugrahas cdtropalaksanam. Ibid.

2 Tattva-prakdsa, kdrika 7.

3 Ibid. Commentary on Tattva-prakdsa, kdrika 7.

4 kdrya-bhede'pi mdyddivan ndsydh parindma iti darsayati tasya jada-dharmatvdt. adydm pradhdna-bhutam samavetdm anena parigraha-saktisvarupam bindu-maydtmakam apy asya bdhya-sakti-dvayam asti. (Aghora-sivacarya's commentary, Adyar manuscript), isrlkumara, however, thinks that Siva as

The monistic interpretation as found in Srikumara's commentary is already anticipated as the Sivadvaita system in the Puranas, more particularly in the Suta-samhita 1 .

Siva arranges for the experiences and liberation of the individual souls in and through His energy alone. The fivefold action, referred to above, is to be regarded as somehow distinguishing the one energy in and through diverse functions.

The object of Tattva-prakasa is to explain the Saiva philosophy as found in the Saivagamas, describing mainly the categories of pati, pasu, and pdsa. The pati is the Lord and pasu is called anu, and the five objects are the five pdsas or bonds. The anus are dependent on God and they are regarded as belonging to different classes of bondage. The fivefold objects are those which are due to the mala and which belong to bindu-mdya in different states of evolution of purity and impurity. Srikumara points out that since the souls are associated with mala from eternity, it comes under the sway of the maya, but since the souls are of the nature of Siva, when this mala is burnt, they become one with Him. The fivefold objects constituting the bondage are the mala, the karma, the maya, the world which is a product of maya, and the binding power 2 .

It may be asked, if the energy belongs to God, how can it be attributed to the objects of bondage? The reply is that in reality the energy belongs to the Lord and the force of the pdsa or bondage can only be regarded as force in a distant manner, in the sense that the bondage or the power of bondage is felt in and through the individual soul who receives it from the Lord 3 .

The pasus are those who are bound by the pdsa, the souls that

associated with the maya forms the instrumental and material cause of the world:

nimittopdddna-bhdvena avasthdndd iti brumah. Such a view should make Jsaivism identical with the Advaitism of Jsahkara. Aghora-sivScarya wrote his commentary as a protest against this view, that it does not represent the view of the Saivagamas which regard God only as the instrumental cause.

1 Sutasamhitd, Book iv, verse 28 et seq.

- malam karma ca maya ca mdyottham akhilam jagat, tirodhdnakdrl saktir artha-pancakam ucyate. SrlkumSra's commentary, p. 32.

3 nanu katham ekaikasyd eva siva-sakteh pati-paddrthe ca pdsa-paddrthe ca samgraha ucyate. satyam, paramdrthatah pati-paddrtha eva sakter antarbhdvah. pdsatvam tu tasydm pdsa-dharmdnuvartanena upacdrat. tad uktam irvman Mrgendre — tdsdm mahesvaft saktih sarvdnugrdhikd Hvd, dharmdnu vartandd eva pdsa ity upacaryata, iti. Aghora-sivacarya's commentary (Adyar manuscript).

164 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

go through the cycles of birth and rebirth. In this connection Srikumara tries to establish the identity of the self on the basis of self-consciousness and memory, and holds that these phenomena could not be explained by the Buddhists who believed in momentary selves. These are three kinds; those which are associated with mala and karma, those which are associated only with mala (these two kinds are jointly called vijndna-kala); the third is called sakala. It is associated with mala, maya and karma. The first, namely the vijndna-kala, may again be twofold, as associated with the impurities and as devoid of them. Those who are released from impurity are employed by God with various angelic functions, and they are called vidyesvara and mantresvara. Others, however, pass on to new cycles of life, being associated with a composite body of eight constituents which form the subtle body. These eight constituents are the five sensibles, manas, buddhi, and ahankara, and they all are called by the name of puryastaka, the body consisting of the eight constituents.

Those whose impurities (mala) get ripened may receive that power of God through proper initiation by which the impurity is removed, and they become one with God. The other beings, however, are bound by God to undergo the series of experiences at the end of which they may be emancipated.

The bonds or pasa are of four kinds: first, the bond of mala and the karma. The bond of mala is beginningless, and it stands as a veil over our enlightenment and power of action. The karma also flows on, depending on the mala from beginningless time. The third is called mdyeya, which means the subtle and gross bodies produced through maya, which is the fourth. Aghora-sivacarya says that mdyeya means the contingent bonds of passion, etc., which are produced in consequence of karma. Even those who have not the mdyeya impurity at the time of dissolution (pralaya) remain by themselves but not liberated.

But what is mala} It is supposed to be one non-spiritual stuff, which behaves with manifold functions. It is for this reason that when the mala is removed in one person it may function in other persons. This mala being like the veiling power of God, it continues to operate on the other persons, though it may be removed in the case of some other person. As the husk covers the seed, so the mala covers the natural enlightenment and action of the individual; and

as the husk is burnt by fire or heat, so this mala also may be removed when the internal soul shines forth. This mala is responsible for our bodies. Just as the blackness of copper can be removed by mercury, so the blackness of the soul is also removed by the power of Siva.

Karma is beginningless and is of the nature of merit and demerit {dharma and adharma). Srikumara defines dharma and adharma as that which is the special cause of happiness or unhappi-ness, and he tries to refute other theories and views about dharma and adharma. Maya is regarded as the substantive entity which is the cause of the world. We have seen before that bondage comes out of the products of may a (mayeya)', so may a is the original cause of bondage. It is not illusory, as the Vedantists say, but it is the material cause of the world. We thus see that the power or energy of God behaving as mala, mdya, karma, and mayeya, forms the basic conception of bondage.

These are the first five pure categories arising out of Siva. The category of Siva is regarded as the bindu, and it is the original and primal cause of everything. It is as eternal as mdya. The other four categories spring from it, and for this reason it is regarded as maha-mdyd. These categories are the mythical superintending lords of different worlds called vidyesvara, mantresvara, etc. So, from bindu comes sakti, saddsiva, isvara, and vidyesvara. These categories are regarded as pure categories. Again, in order to supply experiences to individuals and their scope of action, five categories are produced, namely, time (kala), destiny (niyati), action (kala), knowledge (vidya), and attachment (rdga). Again, from mdya comes the avyakta or the unmanifested, the gunas, and then buddhi, and ahankdra, manas, the five conative senses and the five cognitive senses, and the gross matter, which make up twenty-three categories from mdya.

We thus see that these are in the first instance the five categories of siva, sakti, saddsiva, Isvara, and vidya. These are all of the nature of pure consciousness (cidriipa), and being of such a nature, there can be no impurity in them. We have next the seven categories which are both pure and impure (cidacid-rUpa), and these are mdya, kala, niyati, kala, vidya, rdga and purusa. Purusa, though of the nature of pure consciousness, may appear as impure on account of its impure association. Next to these categories we

166 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

have twenty-four categories of avyakta-guna-tattva, buddhi, ahankdra, manas, the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five tanmatras, and five mahabhutas. Altogether these are the thirty-six categories.

If we attend to this division of categories, we find that the so-called impure categories are mostly the categories of Samkhya philosophy. But while in the Samkhya, prakrti is equated with the avyakta as the equilibrium of the three gunas, here in the Saiva philosophy the avyakta is the unmanifested which comes from maya and produces the gunas.

To recapitulate, we find that the system of thought presented in the Tattva-prakasa, as based on the Saivagamas, is a curious confusion of certain myths, together with certain doctrines of Indian philosophy. One commentator, Srikumara, has tried to read the monistic philosophy of Sankara into it, whereas the other commentator, Aghora-sivacarya, has tried to read some sort of duality into the system, though that duality is hardly consistent. We know from Sankara's account of the philosophy of the Saiva school that some Saivas called Mahesvaras tried to establish in their works, the Siddhantas, the view that God is only the instrumental cause (nimitta-karana) of the world, but not the material cause (upadana-karana). In Sankara's view God is both the material and the instrumental cause of the world and of all beings. Aghora-sivacarya's pretext for writing the commentary was that it was interpreted by people having a monistic bias, and that it was his business to show that, in accordance with the Saivagamas, God can only be the instrumental cause, as we find in the case of the Naiyayikas. He starts with the premise that God is the sum total of the power of consciousness and the power of energy, and he says that the maya is the material cause of the world, from which are produced various other material products which are similar to the Samhkya categories. But he does not explain in what way God's instrumentality affects the maya in the production of various categories, pure and impure and pure-and-impure. He says that even the energy of maya proceeds from God and appears in the maya as if undivided from it. There is thus an original illusion through which the process of the maya as bindu and nada or the desire of God for creation and the creation takes place. But he does not any further explain the nature of the illusion and the

cause or the manners in which the illusion has been generated. The original text of the Tattva-prakdsa is also quite unilluminating regarding this vital matter. Aghora-sivacarya often refers to the Mrgendragama for his support, but the Mrgendragama does not follow the Samkhya course of evolution as does the Tattva-prakdsa. There we hear of atoms constructed and arranged by the will of God, which is more in line with the Nyaya point of view.

Dealing with the nature of the soul, it is said that the souls are anus in the sense that they have only a limited knowledge. The souls are essentially of the nature of Siva or God, but yet they have an innate impurity which in all probability is due to the influx of maya into them. Nothing is definitely said regarding the nature of this impurity and how the souls came by it. Srlkumara explains this impurity on the Vedantic lines as being of the nature of avidyd, etc. But Aghora-sivacarya does not say anything on this point. It is said that when by the fruition of action the impurity will ripen, God in the form of preceptor would give proper initiation, so that the impurity may be burnt out, and the souls so cleansed or purified may attain the nature of Siva. Before such attainment Siva may appoint some souls, which had had their impurities cleansed, to certain mythical superintendence of the worlds as vidyesvaras or mantresvaras. At the time of the cycles of rebirth, the individual souls, which have to pass through it for the ripening of their actions, do so in subtle bodies called the puryastaka (consisting of the subtle matter, buddhi, ahankdra, and manas).

Turning to the categories, we see that the so-called pasa is also in reality a derivative of the energy of Siva, and for this reason the pasa may be a blinding force, and may also be withdrawn at the time of liberation. The category of Siva or siva-tattva> also called bindu, makes itself the material for the creation of the fivefold pure tattvas and the other impure categories up to gross matter, earth. These fivefold pure categories are siva-tattva, sakti-tattva, saddsiva-tattva, isvara-tattva, and vidyd-tattva. The bodies of these pure categories are derived from the pure maya, called the mahamaya. Next to these we have the pure-and-impure categories of kala, niyati, kala, vidya, and rdga, which are a sort of link between the souls and the world, so that the souls may know and

168 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

work. Next from the maya comes avyakta, the guna-tattva, and from the guna-tattva, the buddhi-tattva, from that, ahankara, from that manas, buddhi, the five conative and five cognitive senses, the five tanma.tras and the five gross objects.

As we have hinted above, most of the Siddhanta schools of thought are committed to the view that the material cause is different from the instrumental cause. This material cause appears in diverse forms as maya, prakrti or the atoms and their products, and the instrumental cause is God, Siva. But somehow or other most of these schools accept the view that Siva, consisting of omniscience and omnipotence, is the source of all energy. If that were so, all the energy of the maya and its products should belong to Siva, and the acceptance of a material cause different from the instrumental becomes an unnecessary contradiction. Various Siddhanta schools have shifted their ground in various ways, as is evident from our study of the systems, in order to get rid of contradiction, but apparently without success. When the Naiyayika says that the material cause, the relations, and the instrumental cause are different, and that God as the instrumental cause fashions this world, and is the moral governor of the world in accordance with karma, there is no contradiction. God Himself is like any other soul, only different from them in the fact that He eternally possesses omniscience and omnipotence, has no body and no organs. Everything is perceived by Him directly. Again, if one takes the yoga point of view, one finds that Isvara is different from prakrti or the material cause, and it is not His energy that permeates through prakrti. He has an eternal will, so that the obstructions in the way of the developing of energy of prakrti in diverse channels, in accordance with karma, may be removed to justify the order of evolution and all the laws of nature as we find them. The Isvara or God is like any other purusa, only it had never the afflictions with which the ordinary purusas are associated, and it has no karma and no past impressions of karma. Such a view also saves the system from contradiction, but it seems difficult to say anything which can justify the position of the Siddhanta schools wavering between theism and pantheism or monism. In the case of the Sankara Vedanta, Brahman also is real and he alone is the material and instrumental cause. The world appearance is only an appearance, and it has no reality apart from it. It is a sort of illusion

caused by maya which again is neither existent nor non-existent as it falls within the definition of illusion. The different forms of Saiva school have to be spun out for the purpose of avoiding this contradiction between religion and philosophy.

The category of Siva, from which spring the five pure categories spoken of above {sadasiva, etc.), is called also the bindu, the pure energy of knowledge and action beyond all change. It is supposed that this pure siva or bindu or mahamaya is surcharged with various powers at the time of creation and it is in and through these powers that the maya and its products are activated into the production of the universe which is the basis of the bondage of the souls. This movement of the diverse energies for the production of the universe is called anugraha or grace. By these energies both the souls and the inanimate objects are brought into proper relation and the work of creation goes on. So the creation is not directly due to Siva but to His energy. The difficulty is further felt when it is said that these energies are not different from God. The will and effort of God are but the manifestations of His energy 1 .

The different moments of the oscillation of God's knowledge and action are represented as the different categories of sadasiva, isvara, vidya. But these moments are only intellectual descriptions and not temporary events occurring in time and space. In reality the category of Siva is identical all through. The different moments are only imaginary. There is only the category of Siva, bristling with diverse powers, from which diverse distinctions can be made for intellectual appraisal 2 .

In the Samkhya system it was supposed that the prahrti, out of its own inherent teleology, moves forward in the evolutionary process for supplying to all souls the materials of their experiences, and later on liberates them. In the Siddhanta systems the same idea is expressed by the word anugraha or grace. Here energy is to co-operate with grace for the production of experience and for liberation. The fact that Siva is regarded as an unmoved and immovable reality deprives the system of the charm of a personal

1 Thus !§rikumara says, quoting from the Mdtanga-paramesvara (p. 79):

tad uktam mdtange: patyuh saktih para suksma jagrato dyotana-ksama, tayd prabhuh prabuddhdtmd svatantrah sa sadasivahi.

2 tattvam vastuta ekam siva-samjnam citra-sakti-iata-khacitam, sakti-vydprti-bheddt tasyaite kalpitd bheddhi. Tattva-prakdsa 11. 13.

170 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

God. The idea of anugraha or grace cannot be suitably applied to an impersonal entity.

God's energies, which we call His will or effort, are the organs or means (kdrana), and the maya is the material cause out of which the world is fashioned; but this maya as such is so subtle that it cannot be perceived. It is the one common stuff for all. This maya produces delusion in us and makes us identify ourselves with those which are different from us. This is the delusive function of maya. The illusion is thus to be regarded as being of the anyatha.~khya.ti type, the illusion that one thinks one thing to be another, just as in Yoga. All the karmas are supposed to abide in the maya in a subtle form and regulate the cycles of birth and rebirth for the individual souls. Maya is thus the substantial entity of everything else that we may perceive.

We have already explained the central confusion as regards the relation of the changeable maya and the unchanging God or Siva. But after this the system takes an easy step towards theism, and explains the transformations of maya by the will of God, through His energies for supplying the data of experience for all individual souls. Time is also a product of maya. In and through time the other categories of niyati, etc., are produced. Niyati means the ordering of all things. It stands for what we should call the natural law, such as the existence of the oil in the seed, of the grain in the husk, and all other natural contingencies. We have translated the word niyati as ' destiny' in other places, for want of a single better word. Niyati comes from niyama or law that operates in time and place. The so-called kala-tattva is that function of niyati and kala by which the impurity of the individual souls becomes contracted within them so that they are free, to a very great extent, to act and to know. Kala is thus that which manifests the agency {kartrtva-vyanjika). It is through kala. that experiences can be associated with individuals 1 . From the functioning of kala knowledge proceeds, and through knowledge all experience of worldly objects becomes possible.

In the Samkhya system the buddhi is supposed to be in contact with objects and assume their forms. Such buddhi forms are

1 Thus !§rlkumara quoting from Mdtanga, says (p. 121): yathdgni-tapta-mrtpdtram jantund'lingane ksamam, tathanum kcdaya viddham bhogah saknoti vdsitum, bhoga-pdtrf kaldjneya tadddharas ca pudgalah.

illuminated by the presiding purusa. The Siddhanta system as explained in Tattva-prakdsa differs from this view. It holds that the purusa, being inactive, cannot produce illumination. Whatever is perceived by the buddhi is grasped by the category of vidya or knowledge, because the vidya is different from purusa and is a product of maya as such. It can serve as an intermediate link between the objects, the buddhi, and the self. Buddhi, being a product of maya, cannot be self-illuminating, but the vidya is produced as a separate category for the production of knowledge. This is a very curious theory, which differs from Samkhya, but is philosophically ineffective as an epistemological explanation. Raga means attachment in general, which is the general cause of all individual efforts. It is not a quality of buddhi, but an entirely different category. Even when there are no sense objects to which one may be inclined there may be raga which would lead a person towards liberation 1 . The totality of kala, niyati, kala, vidya, and raga as associated with the pasu renders him a purusa, for whom the material world is evolved as avyakta, guna, etc. Here also the difference from the Samkhya system should be noted. In Samkhya the state of equilibrium of the gunas forms the avyakta, but here the gunas are derived from the avyakta, which is a separate category.

The Saiva system admits three pramanas: perception, inference, and testimony of scriptures. In perception it admits both the determinate (savikalpd) and the indeterminate (nirvikalpa), which have been explained in the first two volumes of this work. As regards inference, the Saivas admit the inference of cause from effect and of effect from cause, and the third kind of inference of general agreement from presence and absence {samanyato drsta).

The category of ahankara, which proceeds from buddhi, expresses itself in the feeling of life and self-consciousness. The atman, the basic entity, is untouched by these feelings. The system believes in the tripartite partition of ahankara, the sattvika, rajasa, and tamasa, after the pattern of the Samkhya, and then we have virtually the same sorts of categories as the Samkhya, the details of which we need not repeat.

1 Thus !§rlkumara says (p. 124): asya visaydvabhdsena vina purusa-pravrtti-hetutvdd buddhi-dharma-vailaksanya-siddhih, mumuksor visaya-trsnasya tatsd-dhane visaydvabhdsena vind pravrttir drstd.

172 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

The relation between the maya and the category of Siva is called parigraha-sakti, by which the mechanism of the relation is understood as being such that, simply by the very presence of Siva, various transformations take place in the maya. and lead it to evolve as the world, or to be destroyed in time and again to be created. The analogy is like that of the sun and the lotus flower. The lotus flower blooms of itself in the presence of the sun, while the sun remains entirely unchanged. In the same way, iron filings move in the presence of a magnet. This phenomenon has been variously interpreted in religious terms as the will of God, the grace of God, and the bondage exerted by Him on all living beings. It is in this sense again that the whole world may be regarded as the manifestation of God's energy and will, and the theistic position confirmed. On the other hand, since Siva is the only ultimate category without which nothing could happen, the system was interpreted on the lines of pure monism like that of Sankara, wherein it appeared to be a mere appearance of multiplicity, whereas in reality Siva alone existed. This led to the interpretation of the system of Sivadvaita that we find in the Suta-samhita, Yajna-vaibhava chapter.

The sakti of God is one, though it may appear as infinite and diverse in different contexts. It is this pure sakti which is identical with pure will and power. The changes that take place in the maya. are interpreted as the extension of God's grace through creation for the benefit of the individual souls. God in the aspect of pure knowledge is called siva and as action is called sakti. When the two are balanced, we have the category of sada-siva. When there is a predominance of action it is called mahesvara.

The theory of karma in this system is generally the same as in most other systems. It generally agrees with a large part of the Samkhya doctrine, but the five suddha-tattvas, such as sada-siva, etc., are not found elsewhere and are only of mythological interest.

The &iva-jnana-siddhiyar not only advocates the niyamas, such as good behaviour, courteous reception, amity, good sense, blameless austerity, charity, respect, reverence, truthfulness, chastity, self-control, wisdom, etc., but also lays great stress on the necessity of loving God and being devoted to Him.

Srlpati Pandita's Ideas on the Vedanta Philosophy, called also the £rlkara-bhasya which is accepted as the Fundamental Basis of VIra-saivism.

Srlpati Pandita lived towards the latter half of the fourteenth century and was one of the latest commentators on the Brahma-sutra. Srlpati Pandita says that he got the inspiration of writing the commentary from a short treatise called the Agastyavrtti on the Brahma-sutra which is now not available. He also adores Revana, who is regarded by him as a great saint of the sect, and also Manila who was supposed to have introduced the doctrine of six centres (sat-sthala). He adores also Rama, who flourished in the Dvapara-yuga, and who collected the main elements from the Mlmamsa and the Upanisads for the foundation of the Saiva philosophy as it is being traditionally carried on.

The Srikara-bhasya should be regarded as a definite classification of the views of the different Srutis and Smrtis, and for this our chief admiration should go to Rama. But though this work keeps itself clear of the dualistic and non-dualistic views of Vedantic interpretation, it holds fast to a doctrine which may be designated as Visisadvaita, and the Saivas, called Vlra-saivas, would find support in the tenets of the doctrine herein propounded. It may be remembered that Srlpati came long after Ramanuja, and it was easy for him to derive some of his ideas from Ramanuja.

Sankara, in his interpretation of the present sutra "Now then the inquiry about Brahman," lays stress on the pre-condition leading to the necessity of inquiring about Brahman, and Ramanuja also discusses the same question, and thinks that the Purva-mimamsa and the Vedanta form together one subject of study; but Srlpati here avoids the question, and thinks that the sutra is for introducing an inquiry as to the ultimate nature of Brahman, whether Brahman is being or non-being. According to him the sutra is further interested in discovering the influence of Brahman over individuals.

He took for granted the unity of the two disciplines of Purva-mlmamsa and Vedanta as forming one science, but he fervently opposes the view of the Carvakas that life is the product of material combinations. He explains that the Carvakas' denial of Brahman is

174 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

based on the supposition that no one has come from the other world to relate to us what happens after death. He also points out that there are other schools within the Vaidika fold which do not believe in the existence of God or His power over individual beings, and that the power of karma, technically called apurva, can very well explain the sufferings and enjoyments of human beings. So, if one admits the body to be the same as the spirit, or if one thinks that there is no necessity to admit God for the proper fruition of one's deeds, the twofold reason for the study of Vedanta could be explained away.

The doubt leading to an inquiry should therefore be located somewhere else, in the nature of God, Siva, or in the nature of the individual soul. The existence of the God Siva as being the only reality has been declared in a number of Vedic texts. The self, which shows itself in our ego-consciousness, is also known as a different entity. As such, how can the point of doubt arise? Moreover, we cannot know the nature of Brahman by discussion, for the self being finite it is not possible to understand the nature of the infinite Brahman by understanding the nature of such a soul. Moreover, the Upanisads have declared that the Brahman is of two kinds, consciousness and unconsciousness. So even when there is the Brahman knowledge, the knowledge of the unconscious Brahman should remain, and as such there would be no liberation.

Now the other point may arise, that the discussion is with regard to the attainment of a certitude as to whether the Brahman is identical with the self. There are many texts to that effect, but yet the contradiction arises from our own self-consciousness manifesting us as individual personalities. To this the ordinary reply is that the individuality of our ego-consciousness will always lead us to explain away the Upanisad texts which speak of their identity. But the reply, on the other side, may be that the Brahman may, through amdya or nescience, create the appearance of our individuality, such as "I am a man." For without such an all-pervading illusion the question of liberation cannot arise. Moreover, the pure Brahman and all the objects are as distinct from each other as light from darkness, and yet such an illusion has to be accepted. For otherwise the entire mundane behaviour would have to be stopped. So there is hardly scope for making an inquiry as to the exact nature of the Brahman, the souls and the world. For one has to

accept the ultimate reality of the transcendent Brahman which cannot be described by words. Brahman is thus beyond all discussion.

In a situation like this Srlpati first presses the question of the existence of God as being proved by the Upanisadic and Sruti texts, by perception and by inference. We know from experience that often people cannot attain their ends, even if they are endowed with talent, ability, riches and the like, while others may succeed, even if they have nothing. According to Srlpati, this definitely proves the existence of an omniscient God and His relationship with human beings. In ordinary experience, when we see a temple, we can imagine that there was a builder who built it. So in the case of the world also, we can well imagine that this world must have had a builder. The Carvaka argument, that the conglomeration of matter produces things out of itself, is untenable, because we have never seen any such conglomerations of matter capable of producing life as we find it in birds and animals. In the case of cow-dung, etc., some life may have been somehow implanted in them so that beetles and other flies may be born from them. It has also to be admitted that in accordance with one's karma God awards punishments or rewards, and that the fruition of deeds does not take place automatically, but in accordance with the wishes of God.

In some of the Upanisadic texts it is said that there was nothing in the beginning, but this nothingness should be regarded as a subtle state of existence; for otherwise all things cannot come out of nothing. This non-being referred to in the Upanisads also does not mean mere negation or the mere chimerical nothing, like a lotus in the sky. Badarayana in his Brahma-sutra has also refuted this idea of pure negation (11. 1. 7). In fact, the Vedas and the Agamas declare God Siva, with infinite powers, to be the cause of the world, whether it be subtle or gross. The individuals, however, are quite different from this Brahman, as they are always afflicted with their sins and sufferings. When the Upanisads assert that Brahman is one with jiva, the individual, naturally the inquiry (jijndsd) comes, how is it possible that these two which are entirely different from each other should be regarded as identical?

Srlpati thinks that the 'identity' texts of the Upanisads, declaring the identity of the individual and the Brahman, can well

176 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

be explained by supposition of the analogy of rivers flowing into the ocean and becoming one with it. We need not assume that there is an illusion as Sankara supposes, and that without such an illusion the problem of emancipation cannot arise, because we have a direct and immediate experience of ignorance when we say " we do not know."

Sripati objects strongly to the view of Sankara that there is a differenceless Brahman of the nature of pure consciousness, and that such a Brahman appears in manifold forms. The Brahman is of an entirely different nature from the individual souls. If such a Brahman is admitted to have avidya or nescience as a quality, it would cease to be the Brahman. Moreover, no such avidya could be attributed to Brahman, which is often described in the Sruti texts as pure and devoid of any thought or mind. If the avidya is supposed to belong to Brahman, then one must suppose that there ought to be some other entity, by the action of which this factor of avidya could be removed for liberation. Brahman cannot itself find it; being encased by the avidya at one moment and free at another, it cannot then retain its absolute identity as one. It is also fallacious to think of the world as being made up of illusory perceptions like dreams, for there is a definite order and system in the world which cannot be transgressed. Badarayana himself also refutes the idea of a non-existence of an external world (11. 2. 27, 28). Moreover, the differenceless Brahman can only be established by the authority of the scriptural texts or by inference, but as these two are included within our conceptual world of distinctions, they cannot lead us beyond them and establish a differenceless Brahman. Moreover, if the truth of the Vedas be admitted, then there will be duality, and if it is not admitted, then there is nothing to prove the one reality of the Brahman. Moreover, there is nothing that can establish the fact of world illusion. Avidya itself cannot be regarded as a sufficient testimony, for the Brahman is regarded as self-illuminating. Moreover, the acceptance of such a Brahman would amount to a denial of a personal God, which is supported by so many scriptural texts including the Gita.

Again, the Upanisad texts that speak of the world as being made up of names and forms do not necessarily lead to the view that the Brahman alone is true and that the world is false. For the same purpose can be achieved by regarding Siva as the material cause of the world, which does not mean that the world is false.

The whole idea is that, in whatsoever form the world may appear, it is in reality nothing but Siva 1 .

When Badarayana says that the world cannot be distinguished as different from Brahman, it naturally means that the manifold world, which has come out of Brahman, is one with Him. The world cannot be regarded as the body of Brahman, and the scriptures declare that in the beginning only pure being existed. If anything else but Brahman is admitted, then the pure monism breaks. The two being entirely opposed to each other, one cannot be admitted as being a part of the other, and the two cannot be identified in any manner. So the normal course would be to interpret the texts as asserting both the duality and the non-duality of the Brahman. Thus the Brahman is both different from the world and identical with it.

Sripati thinks that on the evidence of the Sruti texts a Brahmin must take initiation in Saiva form and bear with him the Saiva sign, the linga, as much as he should, being initiated into Vedic rites. It is then that the person in question becomes entitled to the study of the nature of Brahman, for which the Brahma-sutra has been written 2 . The inquiry into the nature of Brahman necessarily introduces to us all kinds of discussions regarding the nature of Brahman.

Though Sripati emphasises the necessity of carrying the linga and of being initiated in the Saiva form, yet that alone cannot bring salvation. Salvation can only come when we know the real nature of Brahman. In introducing further discussions on the nature of Brahman, Sripati says that wherever the scriptural texts describe Brahman as differenceless and qualityless, that always refers to the period before the creation. It is Siva, the differenceless unity, that expands His energy and creates the world and makes it appear as it

1 vdcdrambhanam vikdro ndmadheyam mrttikety eva satyam iti srutau apavdda-darsandd adhyaso grdhya iti cen na vdcdrambhana-sruttndm sivopddd-natvdt prapancasya tattdddtmya-bodhakatvam vidhlyate na ca mithydtvam. J§rtkara-bhd$ya, p. 6.

2 !§nkara-bhd§ya, p. 8. Sripati takes great pains to show on the evidence of scriptural texts the indispensable necessity of carrying the insignia of !§iva, the linga in a particular manner which is different from the methods of carrying the linga not approved by the Vedas, pp. 8-15.

Sripati points out that only the person, who is equipped with the four accessories called the sddhana-sampad consisting of satna, datna, titiksd, uparati, mumuksutva, etc., is fit to have the linga.

178 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

is, though He always remains the ultimate substratum. The world is thus not illusion but reality, and of the nature of Siva Himself. This is the central idea which is most generally expanded, as we shall see. Brahman thus appears in two forms: as pure consciousness and as the unconscious material world, and this view is supported by the scriptural texts. Brahman is thus with form and without form. It is the pure Brahman that appears as this or that changing entity, as pleasure or pain, or as cause and effect. Such an explanation would fit in with our experience, and would also be perfectly reconcilable with the scriptural texts.

The suggestion of the opponents, that Isvara or God is an illusory God, is also untenable, for no one is justified in trusting an illusory object for showing devotion to him. Such a God would seem to have the same status as any other object of illusion. Moreover, how can an illusory God bestow benefits when He is adored and worshipped by the devotee?

Srlpati then tries to refute the idea of the pure differenceless Brahman, and summarises the arguments given by Ramanuja as we have described them in the third volume of the present work; and we are thus introduced to the second sutra, which describes Brahman as that from which the production of the world has come about.

Srfpati, in commenting upon Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 2, says that the pure consciousness as the identity of being and bliss is the cause of the production and dissolution of the world, as well as its fundamental substratum. The Brahman, who is formless, can create all things without the help of any external instrument, just as the formless wind can shake the forest or the self can create the dreams. It is in the interest of the devotees that God takes all the forms in which we find Him 1 . He also refers to some of the scriptural texts of the bheddbheda type, which considers the relation between God and the world as similar to the relation between the ocean and the waves. Only a part of God may be regarded as being transformed into the material world. In this way Siva is both the instrumental and the material cause. A distinction has to be made between the concept that there is no difference between the instrumental and

1 bhaktanugrahdrthatri gkrta-kathinyavad-divya-mangala-vigraha-dharasya mahesvarasya murtdmurta-prapanca-kalpane apy adosah. Srikara-bhasya, P -3°-

the material cause, and the concept that the two are the same 1 . There is no question of false imposition.

The individual souls are spoken of in the Upanisads as being as eternal as God. The scriptural texts often describe the world as being a part of God. It is only when the powers of God are in a contractive form before the creation, that God can be spoken of as being devoid of qualities 2 . There are many Upanisadic passages which describe the state of God as being engaged in the work of creation, and as the result thereof His powers seem to manifest. It is true that in many texts maya is described as the material cause of the world and God the instrumental. This is well explained if we regard maya as a part of God. Just as a spider weaves out of itself a whole web, so God creates out of Himself the whole world. For this reason it should be admitted that the material world and the pure consciousness have the same cause. In this connection Sripati takes great pains to refute the Sankarite doctrine that the world is illusion or imposition. If we remember the arguments of Madhva and his followers against the doctrine of illusion as expounded in the fourth volume of the present work, the criticisms of Sripati would be included in them in one form or another. We thus see that the views of Sarikara were challenged by Ramanuja, Nimbarka and Madhva.

Sripati says that the so-called falsity of the world cannot be explained either as indescribable (anirvacya) or as being liable to contradiction, for then that would apply even to the Vedas. The phrase "liable to contradiction" cannot be applied to the manifold world, for it exists and fulfils all our needs and gives scope for our actions. So far as we see, it is beginningless. It cannot therefore be asserted that at any time in the future or in the present the world will be discovered as false. It has often been said that falsehood consists in the appearance of a thing without there being any reality, just as a mirage is seen to be like water without being able to serve the purpose of water. But the world not only appears, it also serves all our purposes. All the passages in the Puranas and other texts where the world is described as being maya are only

1 tasmdd abhinna-nimttopdddna-kdranatvam na tu eka-karanatvam. Srlkara-bhdsya, p. 30.

2 Sakti-sanhocatayd srsteh prdk

parmesvarasya tiirgunatvdt. Ibid. p. 31.

180 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

delusive statements. So God alone is both the instrumental and the substantial cause of the world, and the world as such is not false as the Sankarites suppose.

In the same way, the supposition that Isvara or the jiva represents a being which is nothing else but Brahman as reflected through avidya or maya is also untenable. The so-called reflecting medium may be conditional or natural. Such a condition may be the maya, avidya or the antahkarana. The condition cannot be gross, for in that case transmigration to the other world would not be possible. The idea of reflection is also untenable, for the Brahman has no colour and therefore it cannot be reflected and made into Isvara. That which is formless cannot be reflected. Again if Isvara ox jiva is regarded as a reflection in maya or avidya, then the destruction of maya or avidya would mean the destruction of God and of the individual soul. In the same way Sripati tries to refute the theory of avaccheda or limitations, which holds that the pure consciousness as qualified or objectively limited by the mind would constitute the individual soul; for in that case any kind of limitation of consciousness such as we find in all material objects would entitle them to the position of being treated as individual souls.

The qualities of production and destruction, etc., belong to the world and not to Brahman. How then can the production and destruction of the world, of which God is the source, be described as being a defining characteristic of Brahman? The reply is that it cannot be regarded as an essential defining characteristic {svariipa-laksana), but only as indicative of Brahman as being the source of the world, so that even if there is no world, that would not in any way affect the reality of existence of God. This is what is meant by saying that the present definition (i. i. 2), is not a svarupa-laksana, but only tatastha-laksana. Siva alone is the creator of the world and the world is maintained in Him and it is dissolved back into Him.

In commenting upon the Brahma-sutra 1. 1. 3, Sripati follows the traditional line, but holds that the Vedas were created by God, Siva, and that all the texts of the Vedas are definitely intended for the glorification of Siva. This is, of course, against the Mlmamsa view that the Vedas are eternal and uncreated, but it agrees with Sankara's interpretation that the Vedas were created by Isvara. In Sankara's system Isvara is only a super-illusion formed by the

reflection of Brahman through tnaya. We have already noticed that Srlpati regards this view as entirely erroneous. With him Isvara or Mahesvara means the supreme God. Srlpati further says that the nature of Brahman cannot be understood merely by discussion or reasoning, but that He can be known only on the evidence and testimony of the Vedas. He further says that the Puranas were composed by Siva even before the Vedas, and that of all the Puranas the Siva-mahapurana is the most authentic one. Other Puranas which glorify Visnu or Narayana are of an inferior status.

In commenting on Brahma-sutra I. i. 4, Srlpati says that the Mlmamsa contention is that the Upanisadic descriptions of the nature of Brahman should not be interpreted as urging people to some kind of meditation. They simply describe the nature of Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman is their only end. In this interpretation Srlpati shares more or less the view of Sankara. He further says that the nature of Brahman can only be known through the Upanisads. No kind of inference or general agreement can prove the fact that there is one God who is the creator of the world. In all things made by human beings, such as temples, palaces, or stone structures, many people co-operate to produce the things. We cannot, therefore, argue from the fact that since certain things have been made, there is one creator who is responsible for their creations. This is a refutation of the Nyaya view or the view of many of the Saivagamas, that the existence of one God can be proved by inference.

He further says that the force that manifests itself, and has plurality or difference or oneness, is in Brahman. We cannot distinguish the force or energy from that which possesses the force. The Brahman thus may be regarded both as energy and as the repository of all energies. There cannot be any energy without there being a substance. So the Brahman works in a dual capacity as substance and as energy 1 . It cannot be said that mere knowledge cannot stir us to action; for when one hears of the good or bad news of one's son or relation, one may be stirred to action. Thus, even pure knowledge of Brahman may lead us to His meditation,

1 bheddbheddtmikd saktir brahma-nisthd sanatanl, iti smrtatt sakter vahni-sakter iva brahmddhisthdnatvopade&dt. mradhisthdna-sakter abhdvdt ca sakti-saktimator abheddc ca tatkartrtvam tadatmakatvam tasyaivopapan-natvdt. Sfikara-bhd§ya, p. 45.

182 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

so the Mlmamsa contention that the description of Brahman must imply an imperative to action, and that the mere description of an existing entity is of no practical value, is false.

Sripati makes fresh efforts to refute the Mlmamsa contention that the Vedas are not expected to give any instruction regarding a merely existing thing, for that has no practical value. Sripati says that a pure power of consciousness is hidden from us by avidyd. This avidyd is also a power of the nature of Brahman, and by the grace of Brahman this avidyd will vanish away into its cause. So the apparent duality of avidyd is false, and the instruction as regards the nature of Brahman has a real practical value in inducing us to seek the grace of God by which alone the bondage can be removed. The intuition of Brahman (brahma-sdksdtkdra) cannot be made merely by the study of the Upanisadic texts, but with the grace of God and the grace of one's preceptor.

Sripati says that the nitya and the naimittika karma are obligatory, only the kdmya karma, that is, those actions performed for the attainment of a purpose, should be divested of any notion of the fulfilment of desire. Only then, when one listens to the Vedantic texts and surrenders oneself entirely to Siva, the heart becomes pure and the nature of Siva is realised.

Sripati again returns to his charge against the doctrine of the falsity of the world. He says that since the Upanisadic texts declare that everything in the world is Brahman, the world is also Brahman and cannot be false. The entire field of bondage as we perceive it in the world before us would vanish when we know that we are one with Siva. For in that case the appearance of the world as diverse and as consisting of this or that would vanish, for everything we perceive is Siva. Brahman is thus both the substantial cause and the instrumental cause of the whole world, and there is nothing false anywhere. The world cannot be a mere illusion or mere nothing. It must have a substratum under it, and if the illusion is regarded as different from the substratum, one falls into the error of duality. If the so-called non-existence of the world merely meant that it was chimerical like the lotus in the sky, then anything could be regarded as the cause of the world underlying it.

It may be held that the Sankarites do not think that the world is absolutely false, but that its truth has only a pragmatic value

{zyavaharika-matra-satyatvam). To this, however, one may relevantly ask the nature of such a character, which is merely pragmatic, for in such a case the Brahman would be beyond the pragmatic, and no one would ask a question about it or give a reply, but would remain merely dumb. If there were no substance behind the manifold appearances of the world, the world would be a mere panorama of paintings without any basic canvas. It has already been shown that the Upanisads cannot refer to a differenceless Brahman. If any experience that can be contradicted is called pragmatic (vyavahdrika), then it will apply even to the ordinary illusions, such as the mirage which is called prati-bhasika. If it is held that to be contradicted in a pragmatic manner means that the contradiction comes only through the knowledge of Brahman, then all cases of contradiction of a first knowledge by a second knowledge would have to be regarded as being not cases of contradiction at all. The only reply that the Sankarites can give is that in the case of a non-pragmatic knowledge one has the intuition of the differenceless Brahman and along with it there dawns the knowledge of the falsity of the world. But such an answer would be unacceptable, because to know Brahman as differenceless must necessarily imply the knowledge of that from which it is different. The notion of difference is a constituent of the notion of differencelessness.

Neither can the conception of the vyavaharika be made on the supposition that that which is not contradicted in three or four successive moments could be regarded as uncontradicted, for that supposition might apply to even an illusory perception. Brahman is that which is not contradicted at all, and this non-contradiction is not limited by time.

Again it is sometimes held that the world is false because it is knowable (drsya), but if that were so, Brahman must be either knowable or unknowable. In the first case it becomes false, in the second case one cannot talk about it or ask questions. In this way Srlpati continues his criticism against the Sankarite theory of the falsity of the world, more or less on the same lines which were followed by Vyasatirtha in his Nyaya-mrta. It is, therefore, unprofitable to repeat these, as they have already been discussed in the fourth volume of the present work. Srlpati also continues his criticism against the view that Brahman is differenceless on the

184 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

same lines as was done by Ramanuja in the introductory portion of his bhasya on the Brahma-sutra, and these have been fairly elaborately dealt with in the third volume of the present work.

To declare Brahman as differenceless and then to attempt to describe its characteristics, saying, for example, that the world comes into being from it and is ultimately dissolved in it, would be meaningless. According to the opponents, all that which is regarded as existent would be false, which under the supposition would be inadmissible. If the world as such is false, then it is meaningless to ascribe to it any pragmatic value.

The question may be raised, whether the Brahman is knowledge or absence of knowledge. In the first case it will be difficult for the opponent to describe the nature of the content of this knowledge. The other question is, whether the opponent is prepared to regard the distinction between the false objects (the appearance of the world) and the Brahman as real or not. If the distinction is real, then the theory of monism fails. There is no way of escape by affirming that both the ideas of difference and identity are false, for there is no alternative. Moreover, if Brahman was of the nature of knowledge, then we should be able to know the content of such knowledge, and this would be contradictory to the idea of Brahman as differenceless. There cannot be knowledge without a content; if there is a content, that content is as external as Brahman Himself, which means that the manifold world of appearance before us is as external as Brahman. There cannot be any knowledge without a definite content. Moreover, if the world appearance is regarded as having a pragmatic value, the real value must be in that something which is the ground of the appearance of the manifold world. In such a case that ground reality would be a rival to the Brahman and would challenge His oneness. In this way, Sripati refutes the interpretation of Sankara that the Brahman is differenceless and that the world-appearance is false. He also asserts that human beings are inferior to God's reality, and can have a glimpse of Him through His grace and by adoring Him.

The central idea of the Vira-saiva philosophy as propounded by Sripati is that God is indistinguishable from His energies, just as the sun cannot be distinguished from the rays of the sun. In the original state, when there was no world, God alone existed, and all the manifold world of matter and life existed in Him in a subtle

form wholly indistinguishable from Him. Later on, when the idea of creation moved Him, He separated the living beings and made them different and associated them with different kinds of karma. He also manifested the material world in all the variety of forms. In most of the philosophies the material world has been a questionable reality. Thus, according to Sankara, the world-appearance is false and has only a pragmatic value. In reality it does not exist, but only appears to do so. According to Ramanuja the world is inseparably connected with God and is entirely dependent upon Him. According to Srikantha the world has been created by the energy of God and in that sense it is an emanation from Him, but Sripati refers to certain texts of the Upanisads in which it is said that the Brahman is both conscious and unconscious. Thus Sripati holds that everything we see in the world is real, and has Siva or God as its substratum. It is only by His energy that He makes the world appear in so many diverse forms. He denounces the idea of any separation between the energy (sakti) and the possessor of it (saktimari). Thus, if the world is a manifestation of the energy of God, that does not preclude it from being regarded as of the nature of Siva Himself. Thus Sripati says that liberation can only come when God is worshipped in His twofold form, the physical and the spiritual. This makes him introduce the idea of a compulsory visible insignia of God, called the linga. Sripati also advocates the idea of gradation of liberation as held by Madhva and his followers.

It must, however, be noted that, though God transforms Himself into the manifold world, He does not exhaust Himself in the creation, but the greater part of Him is transcendent. Thus, in some aspect God is immanent, forming the stuff of the world, and in another aspect he is transcendent and far beyond the range of this world. The so-called maya is nothing but the energy of God, and God Himself is an identity of pure consciousness and will, or the energy of action and power.

Though, originally, all beings were associated with particular kinds of karma, yet when they were born into the material world and were expected to carry out their duties and actions, they were made to enjoy and to suffer in accordance to their deeds. God is neither partial nor cruel, but awards joy and suffering to man's own karma in revolving cycles, though the original responsibility of association with karma belongs to God. In this Sripati thinks

186 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

that he has been able to bridge the gulf between the almighty powers of God and the distribution of fruits of karma according to individual deeds, thus justifying the accepted theory of karma and reconciling it with the supreme powers of the Lord. He does not seem to realise that this is no solution, as at the time of original association the individuals were associated with various kinds of karma, and were thus placed in a state of inequality.

Sripati's position is pantheistic and idealistically realistic. That being so, the status of dream experiences cannot be mere illusion. Sankara had argued that the experiences of life are as illusory as the experiences of dreams. In reply to this Srlpati tries to stress the view that the dream-experiences also are not illusory but real. It is true, indeed, that they cannot be originated by an individual by his personal effort of will. But all the same, Sripati thinks that they are created by God, and this is further substantiated by the fact that the dreams are not wholly unrelated to actual objects of life, for we know that they often indicate various types of lucky and unlucky things in actual life. This shows that the dreams are somehow interconnected with the actual life of our waking experiences. Further, this fact demolishes the argument of Sankara that the experiences of waking life are as illusory as the experiences of dreams.

In speaking of dreamless sleep, Sripati says that in that state our mind enters into the network of nerves inside the heart, particularly staying in the puritat, being covered by the quality of tamas, and this state is produced also by the will of God, so that when the individual returns to waking life by the will of God, this tamas quality is removed. This explains the state of susupti, which is distinguished from the stage of final liberation, when an individual becomes attuned to God and becomes free of all associations with the threefold gunas of Prakrti. He then finally enters into the transcendent reality of Siva and does not return to any waking consciousness. So it must be noted that, according to Sripati, both the dream state and the dreamless state are produced by God. Sripati's description oisusupti is thus entirely different from that of Sankara, according to whom the soul is in Brahma-consciousness at the time of dreamless sleep.

Sripati supports his thesis that in dreamless sleep we, with all our mental functions, pass into the network of nerves in the heart,

and do not become merged in Brahman, as Sankara might lead us to suppose. For this reason, when we wake the next day, we have revived in our memory the experiences of the life before the sleep. This explains the continuity of our consciousness, punctuated by dreamless sleep every night. Otherwise if we had at any time merged into Brahman, it could not be possible for us to remember all our duties and responsibilities, as if there were no dreamless sleep and no break in our consciousness.

In discoursing on the nature of difference between swoon (murcchd) and death, Sripati says that in the state of unconsciousness in swoon, the mind becomes partially paralysed so far as its different functions are concerned. But in death the mind is wholly dissociated from the external world. It is well to remember the definition of death as given in the Bhagavata Purdna as being absolute forgetfulness (mrtyur atyanta-vismrti).

According to the view of Sankara, the Brahman is formless. Such a view does not suit the position of Vira-saivism as propounded by Sripati. So he raises the question as to whether the Siva, the formless, is the same as the Siva with the form as found in many Siva-lingas, and in reply Sripati emphasises the fact that Siva exists in two states, as the formless and as being endowed with form. It is the business of the devotee to realise that Siva is one identical being in and through all His forms and His formless aspect. It is in this way that the devotee merges himself into Siva, as rivers merge into the sea. The individual or the jiva is not in any sense illusory or a limitation of the infinite and formless nature into an apparent entity as the Sahkarites would try to hold. The individual is real and the Brahman is real in both the aspects of form and formlessness. Through knowledge and devotion the individual merges into God, as rivers merge into the sea, into the reality which is both formless and endowed with manifold forms.

Vira-saivism indeed is a kind of bhedabheda interpretation of the Brahma-sutra. We have, in the other volumes of the present work, dealt with the bhedabheda interpretation, as made by Ramanuja and Bhaskara from different angles. In the bhedabheda interpretation Ramanuja regards the world and the souls as being organically dependent on God, who transcends the world of our experience. According to Bhaskara, the reality is like the ocean of which the world of experience is a part, just as the

188 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts [ch.

waves are parts of the ocean. They are neither absolutely one with it nor different from it. The Vlra-saivism is also a type of bheda-bheda interpretation, and it regards the absolute reality of the world of experience and the transcendent being, which is beyond all experience. Srlpati sometimes adduces the illustration of a coiled snake which, in one state remains as a heap, and in another state appears as a long thick cord. So the world is, from one point of view different from God, and from another point of view one with God. This example has also been utilised by Vallabha for explaining the relationship between God and the world. The individual beings or fivas may, through knowledge and devotion, purge themselves of all impurities, and with the grace of God ultimately return to the transcendent being and become merged with it. So things that appeared as different may ultimately show themselves to be one with Brahman.

Sripati points out that by the due performance of caste duties and the Vedic rites, the mind may become purified, so that the person may be fit for performing yoga concentration on Siva, and offer his deep devotion to Him, and may thus ultimately receive the grace of God, which alone can bring salvation.

There has been a long discussion among the various commentators of the Brahma-sutra as to whether the Vedic duties, caste-duties, and occasional duties form any necessary part of the true knowledge that leads to liberation. There have been some who had emphasised the necessity of the Vedic duties as being required as an indispensable element of the rise of the true knowledge. Others like Sankara and his followers had totally denied the usefulness of Vedic duties for the acquisition of true knowledge. Sripati had all along stressed the importance of Vedic duties as an important means for purifying the mind, for making it fit for the highest knowledge attainable by devotion and thought. It may be noted in this connection that the present practice of the Lingayats is wholly the concept of an extraneous social group and this anti-caste attitude has been supported by some authors by misinterpretation of some Vira-saiva texts 1 . But in commenting on the first topic of Brahma-sutra in. 4, Sripati emphasises the independent claims of the knowledge of God and devotion to Him as leading

1 See Professor Sakhare's Linga-dhdrana-candrikd (Introduction, pp. 666 et seq.) and also Vlra-saivdnanda-candrikd (Vddakdnda, ch. 24, pp. 442 et seq.).

to liberation, though he does not disallow the idea that the Vedic duties may have a contributory effect in cleansing the mind and purifying it, when the person performs Vedic duties by surrendering all his fruits to God. Srlpati, however, denounces the action of any householder who leaves off his Vedic duties just out of his personal whim.

In commenting on Brahma-sutra in. 4. 2, Srlpati quotes many scriptural texts to show that the Vedic duties are compulsory even in the last stage of life, so that in no stage of life should these duties be regarded as optional. In this connection he also introduces incidentally the necessity of linga-dharana. Though the Vedic duties are generally regarded as accessories for the attainment of right knowledge, they are not obligatory for the householder, who may perform the obligatory and occasional duties and yet attain a vision of God by his meditation and devotion.

The essential virtues, such as soma (inner control), dama (external control), titiksa (endurance), uparati (cessation from all worldly pleasures), mumuksutva (strong desire for liberation), etc., are indispensable for all, and as such the householders who have these qualities may expect to proceed forward for the vision of God. All injunctions and obligations are to be suspended for the preservation of life in times of danger. The Upanisads stress the necessity of the various virtues including concentration of mind leading to Brahma-vidya. Srlpati points out that every person has a right to pursue these virtues and attain Brahma-vidya. This is done in the very best way by accepting the creed of Pasupata Yoga.

The duties of a Siva-yogin consist of his knowledge, disinclination, the possession of inner and outer control of passions, and cessation from egotism, pride, attachment and enmity to all persons. He should engage himself in listening to Vedantic texts, in meditation, in thinking and all that goes with it in the yoga process, like dhyana, dharana y and also in deep devotion to Siva. But though he may be so elevated in his mind, he will not show or demonstrate any of these great qualities. He will behave like a child. Those that have become entirely one with Siva need not waste time in listening to Vedantic texts. That is only prescribed for those who are not very advanced. When a man is so advanced that he need not perform the Varnasrama duties or enter into samddhi, he is called jivan-mukta in such a state; it depends upon

190 Saiva Philosophy in some Important Texts

the will of such a man whether he should enter into the jivan-mukta state with or without his body. When a person's mind is pure, he may obtain an intuitive knowledge of Siva by devotion. A truly wise man may be liberated in the present life. Unlike the system of Sankara, Sripati introduces the necessity of bhakti along with knowledge. He holds that with the rise of knowledge, all old bonds of karma are dissolved and no further karma would be attached to him.

abhavayoga, 123

Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu, 143

abhimana, 35

acetana, 94

acit, 25

adharma, 27, 32, 165

Adhipati, 141

Agasti, 6, 131 w., 144

Agastya, 47-8, 53 and n.

Agastya-sutra, 53

Agastyavrtti, 173

Aghora, 141

Aghora-sivacarya, 10, 17, 21 n., 38, 39,

160-1, 164-6 Aghora-sivacarya's commentary on

Tattva-prakdsa, i-\n., 160, 161 and

n. f i6zn., 163/1. \gnivesa, 6 aham, 67 ahahkara, 29, 90, 99, 124, 135, 137,

139, 164-6, 168; distinguished from

buddhi, 34, 171 ajndna, 32, 104, 113 Aksaka, 46

Aksapada, 6, 9, 70 n., 145 alinga, 119/1. Allama-prabhu, 50, 53, 54, 55-6,

59-6° Analogy, 145

Anandagiri, 2, 3, gn., 14, 15, 42, 50 Ancestor-worship, 155 Anga-sthala, 61, 63 Aiigira, 6 Animal life, injury to all forms of

decried, 54 anisvara, 26

antahkarana, 140-1, 180 anu, 163, 167 anubhava, 63 Anubhava-sutra of Mayi-deva, 60,

61-4 anugraha, 161-2,169-70 anyathd-khydti, 170 apdnavayu, 125

aparok$a, 118

Appar, 19

Appaya Dlksita, 10, 17, 51, 65-95,

105, 159 Appearance and reality, 71, 104-5;

bheddbheda theory of reality, 49, 59;

gross and subtle nature of the world,

79, 168-9, 184-8; Saiikara's views

on, 83-4 apramdda, 146 apurva, 94, 174 artha-kriya-karita doctrine of the

Buddhists, 34, 35-6 arid, 152

Arul-nanti Sivacarya, 19, 20 arul-sakti, 157 Asceticism, 125, 130-1, 133-4, J 36,

137-8, 14°, 15° Ashes smeared on the body, 4, 8, 51,

133-4, 136, 137, 144, 146, 148, 150

Airama rules, 147

astamiirti, 119

Atharva-veda, 2

Atoms, 36-7, in, 160, 167, 168

atha, 73

Atri, 6, 7, 13, 131 n., 144

avaccheda, 180

avidya, 49, 54, 104, 118, 174, 176, 180, 182

avyakta, 109, 113, 121, 166, 168, 171

acdra, gn.

acara-linga, 63

acaryas, 6, 10

agama, 96

Agamas, 4, 5, 17-18, 46, 50-1, 69, 87, 91, 98, 123, 155, 175; original language of, 15-16, 96, 106, 150, 159; listed, 16 n.; philosophical achievement of Agama literature, 20-3, 29-41; date of, 40, 96; two types, 71-2

Agama-sastras, 160

agantuka, 27

akasa, 37, 81-2, 103, 119, 135

1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pali technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.

Index

dmndya, 5

dnanda, 63, 67-8, 80-1, 82, 99-100 dnava-mala, 11, 152, 158 Apastawba-siitra, izn. Arvars, 158 Asuri, 6, 70M.

Atman, 62, 64, no, 114, 138 dtman, 26, in, 171 Atma-samarpana of Visuddha Muni, 6 m.

Badarayana, 65, 66, 70, 175-7

6aZa, 100, 146

Bala-vikarana, 141

Basava, 10, 12, 42-7, 52, 53, 55, 59-60

Basava-purdna, 12, 42-4, 53, 59, 60

Basava-rdjiya, 52, 54

Bhairava, 2

Bhairavas, 50-1

Bhaktas, 9-10

bhakti, 13, 54-5, 62-4, 102, 105, 107,

190 Bhandarkar, Sir R. G., 2, 3/1., 5 andn.,

43 andn., 51 Bharatas, 9-10, 145 Bhafta-narayaria Kan^ha, 21 n. Bhavabhuti, 2, 3 Bhavisyottara-purdna, 11 Bhdgavata Purdna, 187 Bhdmati of Vacaspati Misra, 15, 50,

69-70, 97 Bhargava, 6 Bhasarvajfia, 9, n-12, 14, 143-4, 145,

148 Bhaskara, 65, 68, 187 bhdva, 122 bhdvalinga, 62 bhdvayoga, 123 bhdvl, 119

bheddbheda, 49, 59, 68, 178, 187-8 Bhima-natha Prabhu, 61 fc/ioga, 30 bhogdnga, 63 Bhoja of Dhara, King, 10, 14 and n.,

17, 23, 39, 156, 159 Bhrgu, 6 bhutas, 36, 99 bindu, 28, 29-30, 38-9, 64, 120-1, 165,

166, 167, 169 bindu-mdyd, 162, 163 Bio-motor forces, 125 Bliss, 63, 67-8, 80-1, 82, 93, 99, 153-4 Blood-rites, 3 Bodhdyana-vrtti, 68

Bondage, 22, 25, 27, 33, 40, 55, 70, 152, 162; as a veil of impurity that covers our wisdom, 88-9, 116-17, 118-19, !^4; limited knowledge described as bondage, 100; destructible by true knowledge, 108-9; as dependence on the causal power, 131, 136, 163-4, 172; four kinds of bondage, 164-5; removed by the grace of God, 182

Boppa-natha, 61

Brahma, 107, 110-11, ugn., 141

brahma-carya, 134

Brahman, 24-5, 64, 67, 135; devoid of form or differentiation, 48, 49, yet said to be the souls of beings, 49, 175-6; identity of the self with Brahman the highest goal in life, 56-7, 174-5; qualityless and dif-ferenceless, 68, 94, 176, 177-8, 183-4; knowledge of Brahman liberates from all bondage eternally, 73; qualification for inquiry into the nature of Brahman, 73-7, 177; the nature of Brahman Himself, 77-85, 181-2; changeless, 92; the soul a part of Brahman, 93, 94-5, 118; as the unity of sat, cit and dnanda, 99-100, 120; the material and instrumental cause, 160, 168, 178-9, 180, 182; denied by Carvakas, I 73 4'» fallacious to attribute nescience as a quality of Brahman, 176; the manifold world is one with Brahman, 177; reflected through avidya or may a, 180, 181; as energy and the repository of all energies, 181-2; whether Brahman is knowledge or absence of knowledge, 184, conscious or unconscious, 185, form or formlessness, 187

brahman, 75-6

Brahmanism, 43, 142

Brahma-sutra, 65, 66, 70, 72, 80, 112, I 75, 177, 187-8; Appaya Diksita's bhdsya, 51, 65-95; Ramanuja's bhdsya, 2, 3, 50, 51W., 68, 8on., 184; Sahkara's bhdsya, 1, 14-15, 50, 66, 69, 71, 8on., 96, 97-8, 12m., 142, 154, 160, 173; Ssrikantha's bhdsya, 10, 11, i8n., 65-95, 98; Sripati Pandita's bhdsya, 10, 53 n., 60, I 73 9°; Vijnana Bhiksu's bhdsya, 66, 69

i93

Brahma-vidya, 189

Breath control, 123, 124-5

Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 13 m.

Brhadarya, 6, 70M., 13m., 144

Brhaspati, 6

Buccayyaradhya, 46

buddhi, 91, 92, 124, 128, 135, 137, 139, 164, 165, 166; the self reflected through buddhi, 31-2; distinguished from ahankara, 34, 171; the stuff of buddhi is material, 35; not a valid element of true knowledge, 37; as ordinary knowledge, 58; three g'uifas from, 99, 101, 119; also called citta, 140; cannot be self-illuminating, 170-1

buddhi-tattva, 168

Buddhism, 22, 34, 35~6, 4°. I2 4, H3, 154, 156; doctrine of momentary selves, 164

Buddhists, 3, 150

caitanyam drk-kriyd-rupam, 21

Caitanya school, 102

cakras, 55-6

Cannabasava, 53, 54, 59

cara-linga, 62

Carefulness, 146

Carelessness, 126

Carvaka system, 31, 158, 173-5

carya, 22, 122, 123, 136, 148, 161

Caste-division, 13, 43, 45, 92

Caste duties, 122, 147, 188

Caturveda-tatparya-samgraha, 11

Celibacy, 134

Chant, 122, 126

cheda, 140

cicchakti, 11, 33, 35, 76, 82, 90, 92, 100

cidacid-rupa, 165

cidakasa, 81

cidrupa, 165

cit, 67-8, 99-100, 161, 162

citta, 101, 140, 143

Commandment of God, 116, 119

Conscience, 101

Consciousness, 21-2, 26-7, 48, 92, 99-100, 179; energy of consciousness is eternal, 32-3; ego-consciousness of one individual not confused with another, 34, 35; pure consciousness the valid part in knowledge, 37, 57, 58, 62; egohood of £iva as 'pure consciousness', 67, 103-4; energy controlled by Brah-

man, 76, 81-2; a personal quality of Brahman, 80-1; subtle and gross consciousness, 83, 90; in association with unconscious elements, 120; God's consciousness integrally associated with action, 162; five categories of the nature of pure consciousness, 165; theory that pure consciousness, when limited by mind, constitutes the soul, 180; continuity of consciousness after dreamless sleep, 187

Contentment, 146

Contradiction, 183

Creation: God as the agent of, 1, 15, 23, 24-5, 68, 70, 103, 147, 160, 180, 185; energy of consciousness as the instrument of, 81-2, 90, 99, 162; purpose of God in creation, 85-90, I 35 6; as emanation from the state of avyakta, 113; limited by the will of Siva, 120; by anugraha, 161-2, 169; view of the falsehood of the world, 179-80, 182-3

Cruelty, 85, 86

Cycle of births and rebirths, 49, 73, 85-7, 92-3, 95. 108, no, 115, 117, 118, 120, 133, 164, 170

Daksina, 51

Dalai, Mr, 7, 11

dama, 189

daurmanasya, 127

Death as absolute forgetfulness, 187

Destiny, 23, 29, 33, 88, 90, 101, 109, 121, 165, 167, 170

Destruction, 85, 86, 98, 107; as the reversal of creation, 113, 135, 161, 180

Desikaradhya, 46

Deva, 141

Devala, 6, 70/1.

Devotion, 13, 54-5, 62-4, 102, 103, 104, 107-8, 119, 188-9; must be spontaneous, not for some advantage, 122

dharma, 27, 32, 73-5, 132, 140, 146, 147, 165

Dharmakirti, 143

dharanS, 124, 125-6, 189

dhyana, 124, 126, 128-9, 189

Dinnaga, 143

Disease, 126

diksa, 146

Index

Doubt, 37, 78

Dravidian language, 16, 18,47, 66, 72,

96, 98, 106, 142, 149, 159 Dream-experiences, 186-7 drk, 21, 33 drsta, 133 duhkhdnta, 1, 131 Durvasa, 53 n.

Ekorama, 10, 46, 52

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. Hastings), 3, 8n., 150/1.

Energy, 62; as material power, 75-6; as consciousness, 76,82,90,99-100; the ultimate energy, 81-2; in itself changeless, 92; relationship with God, 112-13, 161-2, 165, 166, 169, 184-5; flows in the direction from which obstruction has been removed, 116; an emanation from Siva, 120, 127, 152, 158, 162-3; Brahman as energy and the repository of all energies, 181-2

Faith, 121-2, 146 Falsehood, 179-80, 182-3 Frazer, R. W., 3, 8n., 150 and n. Free will, 88-90, 94

Ganakdrika of Haradatta, 7, 11, 12 n.,

14. 143-4. 145-6, 148

Garga, 6

Gautama, 6, 9, 75

Gargya, 6, 131«., 144

Ghoratara, 141

Gita, 73, 176

God, 6 m.; the instrumental cause of the world, 1, 15, 23, 24-5, 28, 39, 40, 50, 70-1, 72, 76, 90-1, in, 154, 160, 163/2., 166, 168, 178-80; the material cause of the world, 1, 15, 40, 68, 72, 76, 82-3, 90-1, 166, 168, 178-80; the grace of God, 4, 13, 79, 86-7, 89, 94, 108, 113, 115-16, 131, 136, 152-3, 161-2, 182, 188; monotheistic views of, 12-13, 142; His existence known by inference, 22, 23, 25-6, 79-8o, 84, 90, 160, 161-2, 175, 181; all change effected by, 25; all experience manifested by, 27; bestows the fruits of karma, 31, 86-8, 148-9, 175, 185-6; transcendent, yet a material cause, 48-9, 68-9; sixfold powers of, 60; oneness

or identity with, 63, 64; reality of the world lies in the nature of God, 71, 113, 179-80, 182-3; though diversified, is regarded as one, 76, 78; His purpose in creation, 85-6; operates for the benefit of all beings, 86-7; determinism of God and the free will of persons, 88-90, 94; individual souls co-existent with Him, 92-3, 167; the cause of maintenance and destruction of all things, the cause of all causes, 107, 135-6, 101-2, 180; His energy the essence of time, 112-13, the instrument of creation, 162, 165, 166-7, 169, 172; the will of God, 113, 115-16, 117-18, 119, 121, 135, 148-9, 170, 172, 186; transcendental reality of God beyond all logic, 114; He inflicts punishment because He is not indifferent to vice and sin, 114; whole world a personification of God, 120; He pervades the world as the male and female powers, 120-1; associates different persons with different experiences, 137; immanent and transcendent, 137, 139, 185; has no power over liberated souls, 142; highest powers abide in Him eternally, 147; omnipresent, 151; always the same and always liberated, 161; as knowledge combined with action, 161, 169, 172, 185; responsible for blinding and enlightening, 161-2; eternally possesses omniscience and omnipotence, 168; His existence denied, 173-4, but the denial untenable, 178; indistinguishable from His energies, 184-5; the creator of dreams, 186

Goga, 53, 54

Goodness the commandment of God, 114-15

Goraksa, 55-6, 60

goraksa, 58

Goraksa-nath, 57

Grace of God: reveals the world as we ought to experience it, 4,89, 94,131, 136; an inner force which follows the course of creation, 13, 162; manifested in natural laws, 79; extended uniformly to all persons, 86-7; extension of God's grace in

i95

Grace of God (cont.)

devotion, 108, in will, 113, 115-16;

mystic wisdom obtained through

the grace of God, 152-3, 182, 188 grahaka, 33 grdhya, 33 Gunaratna, 6m., 9 andn., row., 13, 15,

17, 144-5 gunas, 28, 35, 36, 99. 109, 112, 115-16,

120-1, 165, 166, 171, 186 guna-tattva, 168 guru-linga, 63

Happiness, 165

Haradatta, 11, i2w., 143

Haribhadra Suri, 9 and n., 10 and n.,

13, 144 Harihara-taratamya, 11 Harsanatha, inscription in temple of,

5 Hatha-yoga, 59

Hayavadana Rao, 10 and n., n Hindu faith, 43 Hoisington's translation of Umapati's

commentary on ^iva-jndna-bodha,

151

icchd-sakti, 62, 63, ioo, 157

Indolence, 126

Inference, 9, n, 13, 28, 145; of the existence of God, 22, 23, 25-6, 79-80, 84, 90, 160, 161-2, 175,181; based on perception, 132-3; of two kinds, 133; of the existence of self, !38-9; of cause from effect, effect from cause, and presence from absence, 171

Intuition, 33, 62, 73, 127; intuitive wisdom, 126; intuitive knowledge of Siva, 189-90

ista-linga, 62

Isana, 6, 13 m., 141, 144

liana, 82, 119

Isvara, 79, 98-9, 124, 132, 141, 143, 168, 178, 180-1

Isvara, 165

Isvara-karanins, 1, 98, 143

Isvarakrisna, 115

lsvara~tattva, 167

jada-sakti, 75 Jagaddhara, 2 Jaiglsavya, 6 Jaimini, 73

Jainism, 22, 40, 118, 134

Jayanta, 9, 127, 145

jiva, 27, 58, 61, 62, 93, 180; not identical with Brahman, 24; can know the world and Siva, 25-6; a part of Brahman, 49, 104, 175; may ultimately return to the transcendent being, 187-8

jivan-mukti, n, 189-90

jndna, 73-4, 80, 100, 105, 132, 157

jndna-karma-samuccaya-vdda, 74

Jndna-ratnavali, 14W.

jndna-sakti, 147, 157

Jftana-sambandha, 19

Jyestha, 141

jyestha, 137

Kaildsa-samhitd of the Siva-mahd-purdna, 99-102

Kala-vikarana, 141

kola, 23, 28, 29, 33, 37. 64, 100, 137, 141, 165, 167, 170-1

kald-tattva, 170

Kalpa-sutras, 92

Kanarese language, i6n., 18, 149

Kapila, 6, yon.

Kapilanda, 6, 131ft., 144

karma, 23, 28, 40, 108, 131, 157, 162, 163, 164, 170, 190; compromise between theory of grace and theory of karma, 13; experience manifested in accordance with karma, 27, 109, no, 152-3; fruits of karma bestowed by God, 31, 50, 85-9, 94-5, 148-9, 168, 185-6; path of karma distinguished from the path of knowledge, 73-5; theory of karma in Siddhanta system, 172

karund, 4, 131

Kaunada language, 47

Kaundinya, 4, 5-6, 13-14, i7» i3°-2, 139, 142, I4S-6, 148

Kaurusa, 6, 13 m., 144

Kausika, 6, 13 m., 144

Kala, 137, 141

kdla, 33, 90, 99, 101, 109, 112, 121, 165, 167, 171

Kalamukhas, 2-3, 9 and n., 50, 51, 7on., 91, 97, 145

Kalidasa, 46

Kdlottardgama, 14W.

kdlya, 137

Kamikdgama, 18 andn., 21, 46, 48, 50, 61, 72, 91, 124

Index

Kamin, 141

katnya karma, 182

Kanada, 6, 70 n.

Kanadas, 15

Kanphata Yogis, 58

Kapalesvara, temple of, near Nasik,

2-3 Kapalikas, 1, 2-3, gn., 50, 70, 72, 91,

97, 154

Kapalika-vrata, 2

kdrana, 1, 15, 131, 133, 137, 170

Kdravana-mdhdtmya, 7, 13, 14

kdrika, 115, 146

Karunika-siddhantins, 1, 2, 4, 50, 70

kdrya, 1, 131, 132, 133

Kdrika, 11

Kdsikd-vrtti, izn.

Kasmir form of Saivism, 98, 101-2

Kayarohana (Karavana), Bhrgu-ksetra, 7

kdya-siddhi, 59

Kena Upanisad, 119

kevalin, 141

Knowledge, 35, 48, 55, 63, 75, 165, 170-1, 174, 181; identical in essence with activity, 30-1; wrong knowledge, 32, 100; in the stage of ahankdra, 34; as pure consciousness, 37, 57, 58, 93; special quality of knowledge possessed by the soul, 92-3; an aspect of Siva, 100-1, I 53~4I devotion identified with knowledge, 102, 103, 105; sorrow removed through knowledge, 108, 117; mediate and immediate knowledge, 118; leads to yoga, 122, 125; revealed through awareness, 133; Pasupata view of, 141-2, 146-7; pragmatic and non-pragmatic knowledge, 182-3; whether Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, 184; acquisition of knowledge assisted by performance of Vedic duties, 188-9; intuitive knowledge of Siva, 189-90

Koluttunga I, Chola king, 45

kriya, 33, 123, 148, 157, 161

kriyd-sakti, 62, 100, 147, 157

kriydkhyd sakti, 120

ksara, 109

kula, 58

Kumara, 6

Kumarila Bhatta, 156

kundalinl, 59

Kuni, 6

Kuresa, 45

Kusika, 6, 13, 131 ft., 144

Kurma-purdna, 6n., 66, 72, 73

Lakulisa, 5, 6 and n., 7

lakullsa, 7

Lakulas, 50-1

Lakullsa-pasupatas, 1, 51, 72, 142

Ldkullsa-pdsupata-darsana, 7

Liberation, 22, 67, 69, 70, 73, 76-7, 142, 145, 162, 171, 174, 186; although attainable by personal action, such action is due to the grace of God, 78-9, 88-9, 105, 115; and the enjoyment of pure bliss, 82, 86-7; soul becomes omniscient in liberation, 93, 141, 161, and one with Brahman, 94; four types of liberation, 102-3; attained through true knowledge, 105, 115, 118, 189-90, through meditation, 108, 147, through suffering, 117, through the will of God, 119, 136, through non-attachment to virtue and vice, 122, through yogic processes, 122-8, 152, through the grace of God, 131-2, 152-3, through strength or power (bald), 146, through the dispersal of the non-spiritual, 164-5, through the worship of God in the physical and spiritual form, 185; assisted by performance of Vedic duties, 188-9

linga, 42, 52, 61-2, 119/1., i33~4. *77 and n., 185

linga-dhdrana, 38, 42, 44, 46, 53, 189

Linga-dhdrana-candrikd of Nandikes-vara, 52, 188 n.

linga-sthala, 61-2

Lingayats, 42

Logos, 121

Lokaksi, 6

Madhva, 65, 179, 185

mahat, xxqn.

Mahabhdrata, 5, 7, 67, 91, 97

mahdbhutas, 166

Mahadeva, 141

mahddeva, 120

Mahadevi, 53

mahddevt, 120

Maha-guru Kalesvara, 61

Maha-karunikas, 12 m., 154, 162

197

MahalaksmI, 4

mahdmdyd, 165, 167, 169

Mahanisa, 141

Mahapurna, 45

mahdtma-linga, 62

Mahdvrata, 2

Mahavratadharas, 2, 9 and n., 145

Mahavratadharins, 51

Mahavratins, 3

mahdyoga, 123, 124, 127

Mahesvara, 1, 7, 17, 58, 70, 71, 97, 121, 133, 138, 159, 181; beginning-less and indestructible, 135

mahesvara, 62, 63, 64, 90, 172

Mahesvaras, 1, 14, 70, 91, 160, 166

maitra, 139

Maitreya, 6, 13 m., 144

Makutdgama, i6n., 52

mala, 22-3, 24-7, 31, 32-3, 95, 100, 109, 116-17, 163, 164-5

Male and female principle, 99-100, 101, 120

MaUikdrjuna-linga, 52

manas, 34, 35, 55, 90, 92-3, 99, no, J 39» J 47» J 64, 165, 166, 168

mantrayoga, 123

mantresvara, 164, 165, 167

Manu, S3 n.

Manusyaka, 6, 13 in., 144

Manila, 47, 173

Marula-siddha, 52, 53/1.

mateh prasdda, 146

Matsyendra-natha, 57

Macaya, 53

Madhava, 1, 4, 5, 10, 12, 14 and n., 17, 42, 50-1, 97, 142, 156, 159-61

Madhavacarya, 10

mdhesvafl sakti, 22

Mdlatt-madhava of Bhavabhuti, 2

Manikka-vachakar, 19, 41, 149-59

Manikyaradhya, 46

Mdtanga-paramesvara, 16»., 160, 161, 169/1., 170M.

Mdtanga-paramesvara-tantra, 28-9

maya, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31, 49, 54, 55, 56, 62, 87, 99, 103, 112, 157; as the energy of God, 29, 109, 185; a material cause, 80, 82-4, 118-21, 160, 162, 164-72, 179-80; always associated with J5iva, 82-3; pure and impure mdyd, 90-1; as delusion, 107

mdyeya, 164-5

Mayi-deva, 60, 61

Meditation, 122-9, 139, 142, 147, 189

Memory, 37, 164

Meykanda, 11

Meykandadeva, 10-n, 19, 20, 24-7,

150 and n. Mlmamsa doctrines, 156, 173, 180-2 Mlmamsd-sutra of Jaimini, 73 Miraculous powers attained by yogic

processes, 56-7, 127, 135, 139, 147 moha-sastra, 72 Mohenjo-daro, 7 Moral responsibility, 85-95 Movement, 35, 147; in creation, 62;

an aspect of Siva, 100, 117 Mrgendragama, 14M., i6n., 18, 21

andn., 27, 38, 39, 72, 149, 160, 161,

167 Mrgendra-vrtti-dlpikd of Aghora-siva-

carya, 21 w., 26, 160 Mudda-deva, 48 Mukha-lingesvara, 46 Muktayi, 54 mumuksiitva, 189 Muni, Visuddha, 6n. Mysore Oriental Research Institute, 38

naimittika karma, 182

naisthikl, 63

Naiyayikas, 1, 9-10, 15, 50, 70, 93,

130-1, 143-5, 160, 161, 166, 168 Nakullsa, 5, 6-7, 130, 13m., 144 Nakullsa-pasupatas, 1, 5, 14, i=;, 17,

148 Nakullia-pdsupata-darsana, 5, 144//. Namah-sivaya-desika, 19 Nampiyandar, 19 Nampiydnddr-nampi-purdna, 149 Nandikesvara, 52 Nandiperuman, 18 ndda, 64, 120, 166 Naka-raja Prabhu, 61 ndndgama-vidhdyine, 69, 70 Nanasambandhar, 156 Narayana, 4, 181 Nescience, 104-5, io 7> Il 3> Ir 8, 174,

176 Nimbarka, 10, 179 nirvikalpa, 171 nirvisaya, 128

niskala, 38-9, 137, 139, 141, 157 nitya, 182

niyama, 134, 138, 140, 172 niyati, 23, 29, 33, 88, 90, 101, 109, 121,

165, 167, 170

Index

Non-attachment, 29, 54, 55, 144;

causes disappearance of vices, 56;

leads to union with the supreme

Lord, 138-9; of the self to all other

objects, 140-1 Non-being, 175-6, 182 Non-injury, 134 Nyaya doctrines, 13, in, 130, 155,

167, 181 Nydya-bhusana of Bhasarvajna, 143,

145 Nydya-kalikd of Jayanta, 145 Nydya-kusumanjali of Udayana, 145 Nydya-ma.nja.fi of Jayanta, 127 Nyaya-mrta of Vyasatlrtha, 183 Nydya-sdra of Bhasarvajna, 143, 145 Nydya-sutra of Aksapada, 9, 145, 146

om, 70, 134, 142

om namah sivdya, 144

Omkara, 141

Pantheism, 168, 186

Pancaratra school, 118 and n.

Pancasikha, 6, 7on.

Pancdrtha bhdsya of Kaundinya, 4, 5,

6, 13-14

Pancartha-ldkulamndya, 5, 7

Pancdrtha-vidyd, 5

Panditaradhya, 47, 52

Paragargya, 6, 131ft., 144

Paranjoti, n

para-prakrti, 81

pardsakti, 100

Parasara, 6, 7on.

paricaryd, 148

parigraha-sakti, iyz

parindma, 92, 160

parindmakrama-niyama, 4

paroksa, 118

pasu, 28, 70, 82, 108, 113, 146, 154, 161, 163, 171; defined as pure consciousness covered with impurities, 26; that which experiences and reacts, 29; inanimate, in; connected with pdsa to mean 'cause and effect', 131, 141-2

pasundm-pati, 156

Pasupati, 14

pasupati, 7, 82

Pasupati-pdsa-vicdra-prakarana, 26 and n.

Patanjali, 6«., 14, 49, 55, 124, 125, 143

pati, 141, 147, 154, I S6, 161 163

Pauskardgama of Umapati, 14*1., 19, 39«.; summary of general argument, 29-37

pdsa, 25, 26, 33, 70, 82, 113, 154, 161, 163; threefold, 27; destructible, 108; inanimate, n 1; connected with pasu to mean 'cause and effect', 131, 141-2; may be a blinding force, 167

Pasupatas, 1, 6«., 9, 10, 12-13, I 5> 4 2 > 50-1, 70 and n., 97, 145, 155; ascetics, 13071, i33~4> I37-4I. !46,151

Pasupata-Jsaivism, 10, 38, 70, 123/1.; five categories, 1, 131, 141; identified with ascetic practices, 130-1, 133-4, I37-4I, 146, 14 8 ; view of perceptual knowledge, 132-3, of moral virtues, 134, of the supreme Lord, 135; difference between cause and effect, 135-6, 141-2; contact with Brahmanism, 142; nature of Pdsupata-yoga, 143; development of the Pasupata system, 143-6; categories of religious behaviour, 146-9

Pdsupata-sutra, 4, 5-6, 7, 14, 155; Kaundinya's bhdsya on, 5, 13, 14, 17, 130-2, 135, 139, 142, 145-6, 148, 155; philosophical and doctrinal content, 130-49

Pdsupata-sdstra, 6n., 10, 142, 144

pdsupata-vrata, 138

pdsupata-yoga, 138-9, 189

Pdsupata-yoga, 91, 143

Perception, 145, 171, 175; and inference as the only two pramdnas, 9; sense-perception, 34-6, 92; defined in the Pauskardgama, 37

Periya-purdna, 19, 149, 156

Phallic symbols, 8, 15, 20, 40, 45, 133, 146

Pillai, N., 19, 20

Pingalaksa, 6, 131«., 144

Pope, G. U., 16, 20, 140-52, 154, 155, 156, 157

Prabhu-linga-lild, 53 and n., 54 and n., 55 n., 56 andn., 60

pradhdna, 29, 107, 109, 135-6, 141-2

prajnd, 63

Prajna-karagupta, 143-4

prajndloka, 126

prakrti, 24, 29, 30, 35, 92, 93, 143; endowed with form and also formless, 36; as a material cause, 40, 80, 82, 98-9,168; co-existent with God,

199

prakrti (cont.)

69, 161; gross and subtle prakrti, 79; difference between prakrti and Brahman, 84, 90, 107; manifests itself in the form of pleasure, pain and numbness, 109-13, 136, 166; moves for the fulfilment of the purpose of the purusas, 115-17, 119

pramdna, 9, 133, 145, 146

Pramdna-vdrttikdlamkdra of Prajfia-karagupta, 143

prasdda, 132, 146

Prasdda-ghana-linga, 62

pratibhd, 127

pratibhdsika, 183

pratyabhijnd-darsana, 1-2

Pratyabhijfia system, 14, 15, 17, 18

pratydhdra, 124, 125, 143

Prakrt dialect, 15, 18, 159

prdna, 77

prdna-linga, 62, 64

prana.ya.ma, 124-5, !28, 134

prdrabha-karma, 94

prema, 105

Puranas, 53, 68, 69, 91, 143, 149, 179, 181; Ssaiva philosophy in, 96-129; Sivadvaita system in, 163

purusa, 29, 30, 31, 69, 99, 100-1, 103, 107, 109, in, 115, 119, 135, 142, 165, 168, 171

puryastaka, 164, 167

Puspaka, 6, 131 n., 144

Purva-mlmamsa, 173

Purva-mimdmsd-sutra of Jaimini, 73,

74 purvavat, 133

Ratnakarasanti, 144

Ratnattka of Bhasarvajfia, 12 and n.,

14, i43> i45» 148 Ramandtha-linga, 52 Raudra, 51 raudfi, 119

rdga, 28-9, 90, 101, 109, 165, 167, 171 Rajaraja III, Chola king, 11 rdjasa, 171

Rajasekhara, 6m., 8-9, 13, 17, 145 Rama, 173 Ramakanda's Commentary on Kdlot-

tard, 14M. Ramanuja, 4, 10, 45, 65, 70M., 80, 83,

85, 93. 97, 173, 178-9, 185, 187; his

bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, 2, 3,

50, 5im., 68 8on., 184

Rama-siddha, 53 n., 55 Rasikara, 5, 6, 13 m., 144, 145 Rdsikara-bhdsya of Kaundinya, 5, 13,

14, 17 Reality and appearance, 71, 104-5;

bheddbheda theory of reality, 49, 59;

gross and subtle nature of the world,

79, 168-9, 184-8; Ssankara's views

on. 83-4 Religious persecution, 45 Renukacarya, 47, 48, 53, 54 Renuka-siddha, 47, 53 Revana, 47, 173 Revanarya, 12, 44 Revana-siddha, 52, 53 and n. Rsabha, 6 Rsi, 141

rfit 51,58

Rudra, 2, 5, 107, 119M., 135, 137, 141,

156 Rudra-samhitd of the Siva-maha-

purdna, 98-9, 102 Ruru, 6

sac-cid-dnanda-rupdya, 67, 100, 103,

120 Sacrifices, sacrificial duties, 73-5, 125,

148 saddsiva, 29, 90, 99, 121, 165, 169, 172 saddsiva-tattva, 167 sahaja, 27, 28 sakala, 137, 157 Sakhare, Professor, 52, i88«. samddhi, 124, 126, 153-4, J 89 samdna, 125 sama-rasa, 59 samsdra, 115, 117 Sanaka, 6 Sanandana, 6 Sanatana, 6 Sangamesvara, 61 Sanskrit, 15-16, 18-19, 47, 66, 96,

106, 149, 150, 155, 156, 159 Santana, 6, 13m., 144 Sarasvatt-kanthdbharana of Bhoja, 159 Sarva, 141 Sarva-darsana-samgraha of Madhava,

4, 5, 11, 14 andn., 17, 20-1, 42, 50,

72, 130, 142, 144 andn., 145, 148,

159-60 sat, 67-8, 80, 99-100 Saumya, 51 Saurabheydgama, 14W. savikalpa, 171

Index

savisaya, 128

sddhana-sampad, lyyn.

sdmdnyato drsta, 133, 171

sdmarasya, 58

Samkhya doctrines, 34, 35, 40, 50, 70,

93. 99. i°9, I", "3. "5. "9 andn., 124, 139, 143, 155, 161, 165, 170-1

Sdmkhya-sutra, 115, 143

Sdmkhya-yoga, 13

Samkhyists, 160

sdttvika, 171

sdyujya, 139, 142

Schomerus, H. W., 16, 17, 18 and n., ign. t 123*1., 157

Sekkilar, 19

Sekkilar-purdna, 149

Self, 27, 29; not identical with Brahman, 24-5, in, 174, 176; reflected through buddhi, 31-2; necessity of realising the unity of self with Siva, 54, 138; body and the self completely separate, 56-7, no; existence of self known by inference, 138-9; separation of self from all other objects, 140-1; identity of self established through self-consciousness and memory, 164

Self-perception, 131-2

Self-realisation, 62, 118

Self-shiningness of God, 25

Self-surrender to £iva, 137, 158, 182

Sense perception, 34-6, no; distinguished from self-perception, !32 _ 3; unable to comprehend supreme bliss, 153

Siddha-natha, 48

Siddha-ramesVara, 47-8, 53

Siddha-siddhdnta-paddhati, 57-60

Siddhdnta-dlpikd, 19

Siddhantas, 1, 50, 52, 58

Siddhdnta-sdstra, 154

Siddhdnta-sikhdmani, 12, 44-50, 54 and n. ; eclectic nature of its thought, 50

Siddhesa-linga, 52

siddhi, 146, 152

Sleep, 186-7

Somanatha, 14, 52

Somas, 50

Sotnesa-linga, 52

Sorrow, suffering, 22, 93, in, 133; related to the mercy of £iva, 79; as

a part of creation, 85, 86, 94; caused by ignorance, 108, 127, 141; as a punishment of God, 114, 116, 185-6; caused by impurities in the soul, 117, 118, by the senses, 140; dissociation of, 146-7

Soul, 22-3, 28-9, 86, 163; not identical with Brahman, 24-5, 84-5; devoid of action, 26; an eternal entity, 31-2, 85, 161, 179; identified with Brahman in Siddhdnta-sikhdmani, 49; practises worship of the supreme Lord, 71; directly controlled by Brahman, 83; co-existent with God, 92-3; omniscient in liberation, 93; a universal entity, no; moved into activity by the motivity of God, 111-12; held in bondage by the existence of impurities, 116-17, "8, 151, 153, 157, 167; potentially corruptible even after liberation, 151-2; no knowledge of its own nature, 152; unintelligent without £iva, 153; mystic union of the soul with the Lord, 153-4; veiled by the non-spiritual mala, 164-5; categories which link souls and the world, 167-8; as pure consciousness limited by mind, 180; and sleep, 186-7

spanda, 100, 101

sparsayoga, 123

Speech, 121, 125, 140, 148

sthala, 44, 60, 61-2

Sthala-mdhdtmya, 3

sthdna-samasyd, 126

Strength (bala), 100, 146

Sundara, 19

Suprabheddgama, i6n., 52

Suradantacarya, 26

sumsargika, 27

Suta-samhitd, 18 and n., 21, 44, 50-1, 163, 172

Svdyambhuvdgama, 16 n., 18, 26, 52

Saiva-darsana, 1, 159

Saivagamas, 1, 4, 10, 14-15, 18-19, 21-2, 61, 66-7, 68, 69, 71-2, 92, 121, 150, 159-61, 163 and n., 166, 181

Saivas, 1, 52, 145; distinguishing signs and robes, 2, 14-15; orgiastic practices, 2, 3; practice of smearing the body with ashes, 4, 8, 51, 133-4, J 36, 137, 144, 146, 148; teachers of

201

the Pasupata school, 6, 7, 8-9, 17, 131 and n., 144; as ascetics, 8, 125, 130-1, 133-4, 136, 137-8, 144 iaaiva-siddhanta, 19-20, 97-8, 168-9; historical development, 154-6; three categories, 156-8; doctrine of grace (anugraha), 161-2, 169-70 Saiva-stddhanta, 19 and n. 151 Saivism: Agamic iaaivism, 17-18; philosophical content of Agama literature, 20-3, 29-41; doctrine of creation and experience, 24-7; categories of Mdtanga-paramesvara-tantra, 28-9; schools of, 51-2, 97, 123 and n., 145; antiquity of, 66-7, 155; view of the pure egohood of iaiva, 67-8; relation between the universe and God, 68-71; some schools partly opposed to Vedic discipline, 72; view of the qualifications for inquiry into the nature of Brahman, 73-7, of the nature of Brahman Himself, 77-85; view of the determinism of God and moral responsibility of man, 85-95; philosophical content of the Puranas, 96-129; destruction of early iaaiva literature, 106; doctrine of the Pdsu-pata-sutras, 130-49; philosophical ideas in the Tiru-vachakam, 149-54; Ssaiva Siddhanta, 154-9; doctrines of Bhoja and his commentators, 159-72

Ssakti, consort of Ssiva, 51, 100, 120-1, 128, 157

iakti, 28, 29, 31, 48, 90, 165, 185; as intuitive knowledge and action, 33; the will of God, 39; a material cause, 40, 84; iaiva identical with his sakti, 58, 120-1, 152, 158, 162; as energy in creation, 62, 172; changeless, 92; existing in all time, 99-100; notion that sakti is feminine, 153

saktimdn, 185

sakti-tattva, 167

soma, 189

3ankara, 17, 24, 31, 42, 51, 54, 59, 65, 70, 73-4, 77, 79-8o, 83, 93, 105, 106, 118, 131, 141, 154, 155, 166, 168, 172, 176, 180-1, 184-8, 190; his bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra, 1, 14-15, 50, 66, 69, 71, 8on., 96, 97-8, 121«., 142, 154, 160, 173

£ankaracarya, 16

Sankara-vijaya of Anandagiri, gn., 14-15, 50

£ankarites, 12, 49, 50, 179, 182-3, 187

sarana-sthala, 63

Sarva, 82, 141

£alihotra, 6, 70 n.

Sankara Vedanta, 57

iantyatlta, 30, 62

sdrvl, 119

Saastri, Anantakrisna, 5, 130

iaastri, K. M. Subrahmanya, 21 n.

JaSstrl, Professor Shesagiri, 11

sesavat, 133

giva, 6, 36, 44, 50, 51, 94, 128-9; a merciful Lord, 4-5, 79; incarnations of, 7, 12, 57-8, 66, 123, 130, 144, 155; devoid of all impurities, 21, 112, 118, 157, 167; instrumental agent of creation, 21-2, 50, 68, 72, 98, in, 142, 162M., 175, 178; remains unmoved in creation, 29-30, 39, 80-1, 103-4, 169, 172; known by inference, 25-6, 80; remover of impurities, 27, 151-2; sole agent of all actions, 30-1; called niskala, 38-9, 141; unity of all with ^iva, 54-7, 58; the ultimate category, 61, 103, 165; attainment of union with 3iva, 63, 108, 116-17, 127, 138, 153-4, I ^3, 189-90; as 'pure being', 'pure consciousness' and 'pure bliss', 67, 82, 103; omniscient, 81, 144, 168; material cause of the universe, 82-3, 175, 176^7, 178, 180; denoted by the term sakti, 91, 158, 162; the author of £aiva scriptures, 96, 97, 154, 159, 181; true knowledge equated with devotion to Saiva, 102, 104; energy of iaiva, 112-13, 162-3, I ^9> 177-8; service to others his essential nature, 113, 114; the whole world a manifestation of iaiva, 119, 157, 185; indivisible from his sakti, 120-1; approached only through sincere faith, 121-2; self-surrender to iaiva, 137, 158, 182; eternally dissociated from all sorrows, 141; appears before Manikka-vachakar, 150; joyous and dancing, 151; the soul unintelligent without £iva, 152; perfect in Himself, 157; as knowledge combined with action, 161, 169, 172; as form and formlessness, 187

Index

siva, derivation of, 4, 69

Siva-dharmottara, 15 and n.

Siva-jndna-bodha of Meykandadeva, 10, 19andn., 123 n., i$oandn., 151; summary of general argument, 24-7

Siva-jndna-siddhi, 24, 40, 159M., 172

Siva-linga, 63, 187

&iva-linga-bhupati, 11

Siva-mahdpurdna, 2, 4, 5M., 6, 7, 18, 51, 67 and «., 70, 72, 73, 91; philosophical content, 96-129; most authentic purdna, 181

Siva-rahasya-dlpikd, n

Siva-sidddnta-nirnaya, 48

Siva-siddhdnta-tantra, 61 an J «.

Siva-sutra, 100

siva-tattva, 91, 100, 167

Ssiva-worship, spread of, up to 8th century, 8; outcaste worship, 3; vow of service to Ssiva, 9-10; image of isiva worshipped as isiva Himself, 114; the proper worship of £iva, 119-20; external expression of emotion in worship, 122; brings cessation of sorrow, 136

Ssiva-yogisvara, 48

Ssivadvaita system, 99-102, 163, 172

Ssrikantha, 10, n, iSandn., 65-95, 97, 98, 101, 105, 142-3, 159, 185

Sfikara-bhdsyaofSripatiPandita, ion., 53 n., 60; philosophical content, 173-90

£rikumara, 10, 17, 160, 162 and n., 163 and n., 164, 165, 166, 169W., 170M., lyin.

Ssripati Pandita, 10, n-12, 42, 43, 44, 53 andn., 60, 173-90

£risaila, Kapalika centre in, 3

£ruti texts, 173, 176, 177

sruti, 11

suddhddhva, 39

suddha-vidyd, 90

Ssuka, 6

susupti, 186

Ssudra Kapalikas, 2, 72, 134

Ssveta, 66-7, 69, 70 and n.

Ssvetaketu, 6

Ssvetasvatara Upanisad, 7, 112

Saddarsana-samuccaya of Haribhadra Suri, 9 andn., ion., 13, 144

Saddarsana-samuccaya of Rajasekhara, 6n., 8 and n., Qn., 13, 145

sat-sthala, 15, 38, 42, 44, 49, 52, 53, 54-7, 59-6o, 61, 173

taijas, 63

tamas, 186

Tamil, 15, 16, 19 and n., 20, 66, 149,

150, 155 Tamil-veda of Nampiyandar, 19 tanmdtra, 34, 36^7, 91, 99, 109, 119,

124, 166, 168 tapas, 122, 126, 147 Tatpurusa, 141 tat tvam asi, 56 Tattva-prakdsa of King Bhoja of

Dhara, 10, 14 and «., 17, 23, 38,

39. 156; philosophical content, 159-

72 tamasa, 171

Tantric forms of worship, 3, 8, 158 Tdtparya-pariiuddhi of Udayana,

145 Tatparya-nka of Vacaspati Misra,

145 Telegu language, i6w., 149 Teleology, 115, 169 Testimony, 145, 171 'Thou art that', 56 Time, 33, 90, 99, 101, 109, 112-13,

121, 165, 170 tirodhdna-sakti, 157 Tirumular, 19 Tiru-vdchaka of Manikka-vachakar,

19, 20, 41; philosophical content,

149-54 Tiru-vdtavurar-purdna, 149 Tiru-vUaiyddil, 150 titiksd, 189 tydgdnga, 63

uddna, 125

Udayana, 9, 145

Udbhataradhya, 53 n.

Udyotkara, 145

Ujjain, Kapalika centre in, 3

Uluka, 70M.

Umapati, 19, 20, 151, 156

Upamanyu, 53 n., 61, 98, 120

Upanisads, 14, 46, 53, 98, no, 173, 189; view of the soul in, 24, 85; Ankara's interpretation, 59, 105; thought expounded in Vedanta teachings, 65, 67-71; texts on the nature of Brahman, 74, 75, 77, 80-1, 83, 92, 105, 112, 174-6, 181, 182-3, 185; on the creation, 179

uparati, 189

203

vacanas of Basava, 12, 53

vairdgya, 122

Vaisesika, 130

Vaisesikas, 1, 9-10, 93, 145

Vaisesika-sutra, 9

Vaisnavism, 13, 43, 97, 156

Vaisnavas, 4, 12, 64, 103

Valla'bha, 65, 84, 188

Vardha-purdna, 72, 73, 91

Varndsrama dharma, 98, 189

Vasubandhu, 143

Va&stha, 6

Vatsa, 70 n.

Vacaspati Misra, 1, 2, 4, 14,15, 17,42, 5°, 5i. 69-70, 97, 98, 115, 117, 145

vag-visuddha, 140

Varna, 51, 141

Vamadeva, 6, 47, 53 n., 137

Vdrttika of Udyotkara, 145

vdsa, 148

Vdtavurar-purdna, 150, 154

Vdtsydyana-bhdsya, 145

Vdtuldgama, i8n., 38, 48, 61

Vdtula-tantra, 38-41, 42, 61

Vayaviya-samhita of the Siva-mahd-purdna, 4, 5, 6w., 10, 17, 18, 7cm., 72, 91, 96-7, 142-3, 155. 156, 161; philosophical content, 106-29

vdyu, 55-6, 135

Vdyu-purdna, 6n., 7

Vedanta, 14, 22, 44, 50, m, 165; view of the soul, 49, 118; primarily means the teaching of the Upani-sads, 65, 67; leads to liberation, 104; view of Brahman as reality, 120, 154, 160, 168; Ssrlpati Pandita's ideas on, 173-90

Veddnta-kalpataruparimala of Appaya Dlksita, 51

Vedas, gn., 28, 71-2, 74, 110, 156, 179, 182; testimony of the existence of Brahman, 84, 90-2, 181; declare God to be the cause of the world, 175; created by God, 180

Vedic duties, 73-5, 76-7, 88-9, 188-9

Vedic worship, 21, 188

Vemanaradhya, 53 n.

Vibration, 100, 119

vidhi, 1, 6, 131, 132, 133, 142, 147

vidyd, 33, 62, 90, 101, 109, 121, 161, 165, 167, 171

Vidyaguru, 6, 13m., 144

vidyd-tattva, 167

vidyesvara, 164, 165, 167

Vijjala, 42-3, 45

Vijfiana Bhiksu, 66, 69

vijndna-kala, 164

Vijiidndmrta-bhasya, 66, 69

vikarana, 137

Vipra, 141

visayas, 119

Visistddvaita-vdda of Ramanuja, 68,

85, 173

Visnu, 107, 119M., 181

viiva, 63

VisvSradhya, 52

Visvarupa, 5

Visvesa-linga, 52

Visvesvara-guru, 46

vivarta, 160

Vlra-bhadra, 46, 47

Vira-mallesvararadhya, 46

Vlranaradhya, 46

Vira-iaivdgama, 46, 51, 52, 54

Vira-scdva-guru-parampard, 46-7, 52

Vira-iaiva-siddhdnta, 60

Vira-saivas, 15, 43-5, 97

Vlra-saiva Tantra, 48

Vira-saivism, 10, 17, 18, 38; doubtful if Basava was really the founder, 12; the tradition of foundation by Basava, 42-4; history and literature, 42-8, 50-2, 61; origin of the name, 44-5; view of the nature of Brahman, 48-9; doctrine of karma, 50, oisthala, 53-60, 62-4; the Srtkara-bhdsya as the fundamental basis of, 173-90

Viresaradhya, 46

vrata, 148

Vratyas, 2

Vrsabha, 46

vrtti, 92

vyakta, 91

Vydkhydna-kdrikd of Suradantacarya, 26

vydna, 125

Vyasa, 97, 115, 143

Vyasatlrtha, 183

Will, 100-1, 186; free will, 88-90, 94; of God, 113, 115-16, 117-18, 119, 121, 135-6, 148-9, 170, 172, 186

yajna, 148

yama, 6n., 134, 138, 140

Yaugas, 9, 15, 144

yoga, i, 131, 133, 161; arresting of yoga-mata, 8

physical processes by, 55-6; state of yogdtlga, 63

yoga attained by meditating on Yogasdstra of Patanjali, 6n., 49-50, 55, £iva, 108, 122-8, 188; the word 124, 127, 143

'yoga' denotes contact of the self Yoga-sutras, 115, 117, 124, 143, 159

with God, 132, 138, 143; miracu Yogic processes, 56-7, 122-8, 135, lous powers attained through, 139 139

I

i