Six Systems of Vedic Philosophy (Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Karma-mimamsa and Vedanta) compiled by Suhotra Swami Introduction [up to line 168] <~>The word Veda means `knowledge'. In the modern world, we use the term `science' to identify the kind of authoritative knowledge upon which human progress is based. To the ancient people of Bharatavarsha (Greater India), the word Veda had an even more profound import that the word science has for us today. That is because in those days scientific inquiry was not restricted to the world perceived by the physicial senses. And the definition of human progress was not restricted to massive technological exploitation of material nature. In Vedic times, the primary focus of science was the eternal, not the temporary; human progress meant the advancement of spiritual awareness yielding the soul's release from the entrapment of material nature, which is temporary and full of ignorance and suffering. <~>Vedic knowledge is called apauruseya, which means it is not knowledge of human invention. Vedic knowledge appeared at the dawn of the cosmos within the heart of Brahmƒ, the lotus-born demigod of creation from whom all the species of life within the universe descend. Brahmƒ imparted this knowledge in the form of sabda (spiritual sound) to his immediate sons, who are great sages of higher planetary systems like the Satyaloka, Janaloka and Tapaloka. These sages transmitted the Vedic sabda to disciples all over the universe, including wise men of earth in ancient times. Five thousand years ago the great Vedic authority Krsna Dvaipayana Vyasa compiled the sabda into Sanskrit scripture (sastra) which collectively is known today as `the Vedas'. <~>In the India of old, the study of the Vedas was the special prerogative of the brahmanas (the priestly and intellectual class). There were four degrees of education in Vedic knowledge that corresponded to the four asramas of brahminical culture (the brahmacari or student asrama, the grhastha or householder asrama, the vanaprastha or retired asrama and the sannyasa or renounced asrama). The first degree of learning was the memorization of the Vedic Samhita, which consists of 20,000 mantras (verses) divided into four sections--Rg, Sama, Yajur and Atharva--that are chanted by priests in glorification of various aspects of the Supreme Being during sacrificial rituals. The second degree was the mastery of the Brahmana portion of the Vedas, which teaches rituals for fulfillment of duties to family, society, demigods, sages, other living entities and the Supreme Lord. The third degree was the mastery of the Aranyaka portion, which prepares the retired householder for complete renunciation. The fourth degree was the mastery of the Upanisads, which present the philosophy of the Absolute Truth to persons seeking liberation from birth and death. <~>The texts studied in the four stages of formal Vedic education are collectively called sruti-sastra, `scripture that is to be heard' by the brahmanas. But sruti-sastra is not all there is to the Vedic literature. Chandogya Upanisad 7.1.2 declares that the Puranas and Itihasas comprise the fifth division of Vedic study. The Puranas and Itihasa teach the same knowledge as the four Vedas, but it is illustrated with extensive historical narrations. The fifth Veda is known as smrti-sastra (`scripture that must be remembered'). Smrti-sastra study was permitted to non-brahmanas. <~>Traditionally, six schools of thought propagated Vedic wisdom, each from a different philosophical perspective. Each of these perspectives or darsanas is associated with a famous sage who is the author of a sutra (code) expressing the essence of his darsana. Vyasa's Vedanta-sutra, which carefully examines and judges the six systems of Vedic philosopy (as well as other philosophies), forms the third great body of Vedic literature after the sruti-sastra and smrti-sastra. This is known as the nyaya-sastra, `scripture of philosophical disputation'. <~>The sad-darsana (six philosophical views) are Nyaya (logic), Vaisesika (atomic theory), Samkhya (analysis of matter and spirit), Yoga (the discipline of self-realization), Karma-mimamsa (science of fruitive work) and Vedanta (science of God realization). <~>The sad-darsanas are termed astika philosophies (from `asti', or `it is so'), because they all acknowledge the Veda as authoritative, as opposed to the nastika philosophies of the Carvakas, Buddhists and Jains (nasti, `it is not so'), who reject the Vedas. Beginning with Nyaya, each of the sad-darsanas in their own turn presents a more developed and comprehensive explanation of the aspects of Vedic knowledge. Nyaya sets up the rules of philosophical debate and identifies the basic subjects under discussion: the physical world, the soul, God and liberation. Vaisesika engages the method of Nyaya or logic in a deeper analysis of the predicament of material existence by showing that the visible material forms to which we are all so attached ultimately break down into invisible atoms. Samkhya develops this analytical process further to help the soul become aloof to matter. Through Yoga, the soul awakens its innate spiritual vision to see itself beyond the body. Karma-mimamsa directs the soul to the goals of Vedic ritualism. Vedanta focuses on the supreme goal taught in the Upanisads. <~>Originally, the six darsanas were departments of study in a unified understanding of the Veda, comparable to the faculties of a modern university. But with the onset of Kali Yuga (the Age of Quarrel), the scholars of the darsanas became divided and contentious. Some even misrepresented Vedic philosopy for their own selfish ends. For instance, Karma-mimamsa (which by 500 BC had become the foremost philosophy of the brahmana class) was misused by bloodthirsty priests to justify their mass slaughter of animals in Vedic sacrifices. But the unexpected rise of a novel non-Vedic religion challenged the power of Karma-mimamsa. This new religion was Buddhism. By 250 BC, the influence of Karma-mimamsa and other darsanas had weakened considerably. When King Asoka instituted the Buddha's doctrine as the state philosophy of his empire, many brahmanas abandoned Vedic scholarship to learn and teach nastika concepts of ahimsa (nonviolence) and sunyata (voidism). <~>Buddhism in its turn was eclipsed by the teachings of the Vedantist Sankara, who revived the Vedic culture all over India in the seventh century after Christ. But Sankara's special formulation of Vedanta was itself influenced by Buddhism and is not truly representative of the original Vedanta-darsana taught by Vyasa (the last chapter will take this up in greater detail). <~>After Sankara, Vedanta was refined by the schools of great teachers (acaryas) like Ramanuja and Madhva. Having shed the baggage of Sankara's crypto-Buddhism, Vedanta philosophers soared to heights of dialectical sophistication that has been much appreciated by many Western intellectuals. <~>It is through the dialectics of the major schools (sampradayas) of Vedanta that students can best observe the six systems of Vedic philosophy `in action'. In dialectical Vedanta, arguments are taken from Nyaya, Vaisesika etc. to 1) demonstrate that Vedanta is the most comprehensive of all the darsanas, and 2) to clarify the points of controversy that arise between the different schools of Vedanta itself. Vedantic dialectics are represented in the bhasyas (commentaries) of the acaryas and the tikas (subcommentaries) of their disciples. All possible philosophical positions, including some bearing remarkable resemblance to the ideas of European philosophers, are therein proposed, analyzed and refuted. <~>The study of the six systems of Vedic philosophy is itself a form of yoga: jnana-yoga, the yoga of theoretical knowledge. But from jnana one must come to vijnana, practical realization of the ultimate truth. The sad-darsana are six branches of theoretical dialectics (sastratha) that twist and turn from thesis (purvapaksa) to antithesis (uttarapaksa) to synthesis (siddhanta) like the gnarled branches of a tree. But the ways of philosophical disputation do not themselves add up to the Absolute Truth. The Absolute Truth, being transcendental, is only indirectly framed in the branches of jnana, like the rising full moon may be framed by the branches of a tree. A friend who wishes us to see the moon may first draw our attention to that tree. This may be compared to the indirect or theoretical stage of knowledge. Seeing the moon is vijnana. <~>There is a straightforward path to vijnana. It is explained in the Mahabharata, Vana-parva 313.117: `Dry arguments are inconclusive. Philosophers are known for their differences of opinion. Study of the branches of the Vedas will not bring one to the correct understanding of dharma. The truth is hidden in the heart of a self-realized person. Therefore one should follow the path of such great souls'. <~>The Sanskrit word acarya is derived from acara, `behavior'. The great teachers of Vedanta, the acaryas, were much more than just theoreticians: by their exemplary God-conscious behavior they marked out the path of practical transcendental realization. This is the path from jnana to vijnana. In India, the sampradayas (schools of Vedanta) established by the great acaryas are bastions of sadacara, spiritual life. Students who enter these schools cultivate divine qualities--cleanliness, austerity, truthfulness and mercy--without which divine knowledge cannot manifest. Cleanliness is destroyed by illicit sex, austerity is destroyed by intoxication, truthfulness is destroyed by gambling and mercy is destroyed by meat-eating; one who cannot restrain himself from these bad habits has no business calling himself a Vedantist or a yogi. <~>There is much enthusiasm today for theoretical yoga and mysticism, but until one follows the path of sadacara set down by the acaryas, one's inquiry into Indian spirituality will be like like licking the glass of a sealed jar of honey: the higher taste (param drstva) will be missed. <~>The Brahma-Madhva-Gaudiya Sampradaya first introduced genuine Vedanta theory and practice in the Western world in 1966, when Acarya Sri Srimad A.C. Bhaktivedanta Svami Prabhupada opened the first branch of the International Society for Krsna Consciousness (ISKCON) in New York. ISKCON now has centers world-wide. This book is but an introduction to Vedic philosophy; those who wish to practice this philosophy and realize the goal of Vedanta--the Form of the Supreme Eternal Being--should contact ISKCON. Common Features of the Six Systems of Vedic Philosophy <~>It has already been explained that the sad-darsana accept the authority of the Vedas, and thus they are classified as astika philosophies. Each darsana was codified by a famous sage--Nyaya by Gautama, Vaisesika by Kanada, Samkhya by Kapila, Yoga by Patanjali, Karma-mimamsa by Jaimini and Vedanta by Vyasa. Because the sages drew their arguments from the same source--the Vedic sastra--their darsanas share many of the same basic philosophical principles, for instance: the self is understood to be an individual spiritual being of the nature of eternal consciousness; the self acquires a succession of physical bodies through reincarnation under the law of karma; the self suffers because of its contact with matter; the end of suffering is the goal of philosophy. A person who adheres to any one of the six systems observes the same sadhana as the followers of other systems. Sadhana consists of the basic practices of purification and self-control that is the foundation of brahminical culture. The major philosophical differences among the systems will be summed up in the final chapter on Vedanta. Nyaya (Part 1) The Philosophy of Logic and Reasoning <~>The Nyaya system of philosophy was established by the sage Gautama. As he was also known as Aksapada, this system is also sometimes referred to as the Aksapada system. Nyaya philosophy is primarily concerned with the conditions of correct knowledge and the means of receiving this knowledge. Nyaya is predominantly based on reasoning and logic and therefore is also known as Nyaya Vidya or Tarka Sastra--`the science of logic and reasoning'. Because this system analyzes the nature and source of knowledge and its validity and nonvalidity, it is also referred to as Anviksiki, which means `the science of critical study'. Using systematic reasoning, this school of philosophy attempts to discriminate valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. <~>Nyaya philosophy asserts that obtaining valid knowledge of the external world and its relationship with the conscious self is the only way to attain liberation. If one masters the logical techniques of reasoning and assiduously applies these in his daily life, he will rid himself of all suffering. Thus, the methods and conditions of determining true knowledge are not the final goal of Nyaya philosophy; logical criticism is viewed only as an instrument that enables one to discriminate truth from illusion. The ultimate goal of Nyaya philosophy, like that of the other systems of Vedic philosophy, is liberation--the absolute cessation of pain and suffering. Nyaya aims to be a philosophy of spiritual life, even though it is mainly concerned with the study of logic and epistemology. <~>The common aims of all six schools of Vedic philosophy are to analyze the nature of the external world and its relationship to the individual soul, to provide a system of metaphysics (i.e. knowledge beyond matter), and to point out the goal of life and the means for attaining this goal. In this attempt, all the systems of Vedic philosophy divide their course of study into two major categories: the study of unmanifested reality, and the study of manifested reality. In Nyaya philosophy, both aspects of reality are studied under sixteen major divisions, called padarthas (see the chart below). These sixteen philosophical divisions are: pramana, the sources of knowledge; prameya, the object of knowledge; samsaya, doubt or the state of uncertainty; prayojana, the aim; drstanta, example; siddhanta, doctrine; ayayava, the constituents of inference; tarka, hypothetical argument; nirnaya. conclusion; badha, discussion; jalpa, wrangling; vitanda, irrational argument; hetvabhasa, specious reasoning; chala, unfair reply; jati, generality based on a false analogy; and nigrahsthana, the grounds for defeat. The subjects discussed under pramana, the source of knowledge, are the most important and the most thoroughly and profoundly expounded of all the divisions. For this reason, pramana will be explained in detail after the other fifteen divisions of studying reality have been described. CHART: Nyaya's Sixteen Divisions (Padarthas) of Studying Reality I. Pramana, four sources of valid knowledge (prama): 1. Perception (pratyaksa) Ordinary (laukika) Indeterminate (nirvikalpa) Extraordinary (alaukika) Classes (samanyalaksana) Association (jnanalaksana) Intuition (yogaja) 2. Inference (anumana) Statements (pratijna) Reason (hetu) Example (udaharana) Universal proposition (upanaya) Conclusion (nigamana) 3. Comparison (upamana) 4. Testimony (sabda) II. Prameya, twelve objects of knowledge: Atman, the body, the five senses, the objects of the senses, cognition, mind. activity, mental defects (attach- ment, hatred, and infatuation), rebirth, results, suffering, freedom from suffering. III. Doubt (samsaya) IV. Aim (prayojana) V. Example (drstanta) VI. Doctrine (siddhanta) VII.Constituents of inference (five avayavas) VIII. Hypothetical argument (tarka) IX. Conclusion (nirnaya) X. Discussion (badha) XI. Wrangling (jalpa) XII. Irrational reasoning (vitanda) XIII. Specious reasoning (hetvabhasa) XIV. Unfair reply (chala) XV. Generality based on a false analogy (jati) XVI. Grounds for defeat (nigrahasthana) Nyaya (Part 2) [Here the padarthas of prameya, samsaya, prayojana, drstanta, siddhanta, avyaya, tarka, and nirnaya are presented.] Prameya--The Object of Knowledge <~>Prameya may be translated as `that which is knowable', or `the object of true knowledge'. The word prameya is derived from the Sanskrit word `prama' meaning `buddhi' or `cognition'. That which is the object of cognition is prameya, and whatever is comprehended or cognized by buddhi is categorized into the twelve objects of cognition known as the prameyas. <~>These twelve divisions are: Atman, the Self; sarira, the body--the abode of the experience of pain and pleasure that is the seat of all organic activities; indriyas, the five senses--smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing--which contact external objects and transmit the experience to the mind; artha, the objects of the senses; buddhi, cognition; manas, the mind--the internal sense that is concerned with the perception of pleasure, pain, and all other internal experiences and that, according to Nyaya, limits cognition to time and space. The mind is compared to an atom (not the atom of modern physics; see Vaisesika philosophy) because it is minute, everlasting, individual, and all-pervading; pravrtti, activity--vocal, mental, and physical; dosa, mental defects that include attachment (raga), hatred (dvesa), and infatuation or delusion (moha); pretyabhava, rebirth or life after death; phala, the fruits or results of actions experienced as pain or pleasure; dukha, suffering--the bitter or undesired experiences of mind; and apavarga, liberation or complete cessation of all suffering without any possibility of its reappearance. According to Nyaya philosophy the goal of life is to understand these twelve aspects of reality, the prameyas, as they actually are. Bondage is born of the misunderstanding of these twelve knowable objects, and one obtains freedom from bondage when he attains the correct knowledge of these twelve aspects of reality. Most of the time, however, this knowledge remains incomplete, and the means for attaining an integral comprehension of reality is not learned, so defective or invalid knowledge is maintained. In order to cast off this invalid knowledge, Nyaya provides a method for determinig valid knowledge that is studied under the category of pramana, which will be discussed following brief descriptions of the other fourteen components in the Nyaya process for attaining valid knowledge. Samsaya--Doubt Doubt is the state in which the mind wavers between conflicting views regarding a single object. In a state of doubt, there are at least two alternative views, neither of which can be determined to lead to a state of certainty. Samsaya is not certain knowledge; neither is it a mere reflection of knowledge; nor is it invalid knowledge. It is a positive state of cognition, but the cognition is split in two and does not provide any definite conclusions. For example, in the dark of the night a person may be looking at a plant, but because he cannot see clearly, he does not recognize the plant for what it is and falsely perceives it as a man. However, if it would be logically impossible for a man to be present at that place, then the mind does not accept that the figure is a man. The mind becomes confused at that moment, questions whether it is a man or a plant, and cannot come to a decision about what it actually is. Thus, doubt is a product of a confused state of mind that is not able to perceive with clarity. Prayojana--Aim Without an aim or a target, no one can perform any action. It does not matter whether that aim is fully understood or just presumed. One acts either to achieve desirable objects or to get rid of undesirable ones; these desirable and undesirable objects that motivate one's activities are known as prayojana. Drstanta--Example Drstanta is the use of an example to illustrate a common fact and establish an argument. This is a very important aspect of reasoning, for frequently a useful example can be accepted by both parties involved in a discussion without any disputation or difference of opinion. For instance, when one argues that there must be fire because there is smoke, he may use the example of smoke in the kitchen to confirm the permanent relationship between fire and smoke. The relationship between fire and smoke in the kitchen is a common occurrence and may be readily accepted by both parties. Therefore, the example of the kitchen for confirming the existence of fire inferred from the presence of smoke is potentially very helpful. Siddhanta--Doctrine Siddhanta is an axiomatic postulate that is accepted as the undisputed truth and that serves as the foundation for the entire theory of a particular system of philosophy. This accepted truth might be derived either from direct experience or from reasoning and logic. For example, it is the doctrine of Nyaya philosophy that there is a God (Nimitta Karana) who is the operative cause of the universe and who organizes and regulates the atoms. Avyaya--Constituence of inference The term avayaya literally means `constituents' or `parts', and in this context it refers to the constituents of inference. This is an important topic in Nyaya philosophy because Nyaya strongly emphasizes describing the minute complexities of the pramanas, the sources or methods of receiving correct knowledge. Among these methods, inference is the most important source of correct knowledge, and Nyaya therefore provides a technical method to test the validity of inference. If an inference contains five necessary constituents, then it can give correct knowledge. <~>These five requisite components of inference are pratijna (statements); hetu (reason); udaharana (example); upanaya (universal proposition); and nigamana (conclusion). These are discussed later in this chapter in the section on inference. Tarka--Hypothetical argument Tarka may be translated as `hypothetical argument'. All the systems of Indian philosophy agree that it is simply the mind's jabbering that creates confusion and misunderstanding within and without. Because the mind is clouded by its own modifications, it is very important to wash out these confusions before attempting to understand something solely through the mind. For this purpose, Nyaya philosophy discusses the possible problems of the mind and clarifies its confusions, using such processes as Tarka. Tarka is the process of questioning and cross-questioning that leads to a particular conclusion. It is a form of supposition that can be used as an aid to the attainment of valid knowledge. Tarka can become a great instrument for analyzing a common statement and for discriminating valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. Nirnaya--Conclusion Nirnaya, conclusion, is certain knowledge that is attained by using legitimate means. If the mind has doubts concerning the correctness or validity of a conclusion it has drawn, then employing the process of tarka (hypothetical argument) can help to resolve those doubts. But it is not always necessary for a conclusion to pass through a doubtful state. It may be indubitably perceived, either through direct perception, inference, testimony, or intuition. Nirnaya is this ascertainment of assured truth about something that is attained by means of recognized and legitimate sources of knowledge. Nyaya (Part 3) [Here the padarthas of badha, jalpa, vitanda, hetvabhasa, chala, jati, and nirgrahasthana are presented. The last padartha, pramana, is introduced.] Badha--Discussion Badha is a kind of debate between two parties--the exponent and the opponent--on a particular subject. Each party tries to establish its own position and to refute that of the other, arguing against any theory propounded by the other. Both, however, are trying to arrive at the truth by applying the methods of reasoning and logic. This is an effective and efficient way to reach valid knowledge if both parties are honest and free from prejudices. Jalpa--Wrangling Jalpa, or wrangling, is the process by which the exponent and opponent both try to attain victory over the other without making an honest attempt to come to the truth; there is a battle of egos instead of a search for knowledge. Jalpa contains all the characteristics of a valid debate except that of aiming to discover truth. It is that type of discussion in which each party has a prejudice for his own view and thus tries to gather all possible arguments in his own favor. Lawyers sometimes apply this method to win their cases in court. Vitanda--Irrational reasoning Vitanda is irrational reasoning. Specifically, it is argumentation that is aimed exclusively at refuting or destroying an antagonist's position and that is not at all concerned with establishing or defending one's own position. It is mere destructive criticism of the views of one's opponent. Whereas in wrangling both the exponent and opponent try to establish their own position, in irrational reasoning either or both tries to refute the other's position instead of establishing his own. This usually occurs when one or both parties realize that his own case is weak and that he cannot defend his point of view. Consequently, he irrationally attacks the other's case with destructive intent. Hetvabhasa--Specious reasoning Hetvabhasa means `irrational argument'. It is reasoning that appears to be valid but is really unfounded. This specious reasoning is a fallacy of inference, and it is therefore discussed later in this chapter in the section on inference. Chala--Unfair reply Chala means `unfair reply'. Here it is used to designate a statement that is meant to cheat or to fool someone. In unfair reply one takes a word or phrase that has been used in a particular sense, pretends to understand it in a sense other than that which was intended, and then denies the truth of this deliberate misinterpretation of the original speaker's words. For example, suppose someone's name is Bizarre, and in referring to this person, someone says, `He is Bizarre'. If the listener knowingly misconstrues this statement and replies, `He is not bizarre; he is just a common ordinary man', then that person is using chala. Jati--Generality based on a false analogy Jati means generality, but as used here,it is a technical term used to describe a debate in which an unfair reply or conclusion is based on a false analogy. Suppose, for example, that someone is arguing that sound is noneternal because it is an effect of a certain cause, just as a pot is produced from clay. But another argues that sound must be eternal because it is nonmaterial, like the sky. This counter argument of trying to prove the eternity of sound by comparing it with the nonmaterial sky is fallacious, because there is not necessarily a universal relationship between the nonmaterial and the eternal. (In the Nyaya system itself, sound is considered to be a noneternal quality because it is produced and can be destroyed. Some other systems, however, do not agree with this view.) Nigrahasthana--Grounds for defeat Nigrahasthana may be translated as `the grounds on which a person is defeated in his argument'. When a proponent misunderstands his own or his opponent's premises and their implications, then he becomes helpless and must eventually admit his defeat in the debate. The point at which he accepts his defeat is called nigrahasthana. Pramana--The Sources of Valid Knowledge Pramana is that through which or by which the prama (valid knowledge) is received. It is the last of Nyaya's philosophical divisions to be discussed. In this system of philosophy, there are four distinct fountains of correct knowledge. <~>These four pramanas are: perception (pratyak-sa); inference (anumana); comparison (upamana); and testimony (sabda). Before discussing these sources of knowledge, the nature or definition of knowledge should first be examined and the method for distinguishing correct knowledge from false knowledge should be determined. <~>In Nyaya philosophy, knowledge is divided into two major categories, anubhava (experiential knowledge) and smrti (memory). Experiential knowledge is received through the four pramanas mentioned above--perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. The second type of knowledge, that which is based on memory, is derived from the storehouse of one's own mind, but ultimately these memories also depend on experiential knowledge because no one can remember something that he has not experienced. During the process of remembering, a memory is called up from its storehouse and is then received as knowledge of an object. These two major categories of knowledge can be divided into two parts: valid and invalid. In the language of Nyaya philosophy, valid experiential knowledge is called prama, and nonvalid experiential knowledge is called aprama. Prama can be received through perception, inference, comparison, and testimony; therefore there are four types of valid knowledge based on these four means. Aprama is divided into doubt (samsaya), faulty cognition (bhrama or viparyaya), and hypothetical argument (tarka). Certain and unerring cognition (such as the visual perception of a chair) is valid knowledge because the knowledge is presented directly to the senses as it really is. Memory is not original knowledge because it is not experiential; it is a mere reproduction of experiential knowledge. Knowledge based on memory may be either valid or invalid, depending on the correctness of the recollection of the experiential knowledge that occurred in the past. A doubtful cognition cannot be called valid (prama) because it is not definite knowledge. Faulty cognition likewise cannot be pramana because it is not true to the nature of its object. Tarka (hypothetical argument) cannot be called prama because in itself it is not knowledge. Although it may help in drawing some conclusions about a fact, it is only a means of attaining knowledge. <~>According to Nyaya philosophy true knowledge is that which corresponds to the nature of its object; otherwise the knowledge is false. To perceive a thing in its true nature is true knowledge. For example, the knowledge of a red rose is true if the rose is really red, but the knowledge of a red rose as white is not true because the rose is not white. How can one know if the rose is truly red and not white? How is it possible to prove the validity or falsity of knowledge? Nyaya philosophy says that the validity or invalidity of knowledge depends on its correspondence or noncorrespondence to the facts. For example, if one wants to have correct knowledge of sugar, one tastes it. If there is some powdery white crystal in the kitchen and one puts a pinch of it in his mouth thinking that it is sugar, he will be surprised and disappointed if he finds that it is salty and not sweet. But he will have certain knowledge that what he had thought to be sugar is instead salt. True knowledge leads a person to successful practical activity, while false knowledge makes one helpless and leads to failure and disappointment. Perception As mentioned earlier, according to Nyaya there are four sources of valid experiential knowledge or prama--perception, inference, comparison, and testimony--among which perception is foremost. Most people believe that whatever is experienced through perception must be true, and they do not further test the data that are received via the senses. Nyaya philosophy, however, is very critical in this respect and makes a thorough examination of perception. <~>Perception is knowledge produced by the contact of the senses with the objects of the world. For example, one has perceptual knowledge of a table when a table comes in contact with the eyes. To be considered valid, the contact of the senses with their objects must be clear and doubtless. The perception of something a long distance away as being either a bush or a bear is a doubtful and indefinite cognition and is, therefore, not true perception. Mistakenly perceiving a rope as a snake may be neither doubtful nor indefinite, but it is a false and therefore invalid perception. <~>Nyaya philosophy has several different systems of classification of perception. According to the first kind of classification, there are two types of perceptions: laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary). When a perception is derived from direct contact with a sense object, that is ordinary perception. When the object is not directly present to the senses but is conveyed to the senses through unusual modes, then that perception is called alaukika -- extraordinary. <~>Modes of perception are either external (bahya) or internal (manasa). In external perception, any or all of the faculties of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell are involved in bringing the object to the mind.<~>Thus, there are five kinds of external perceptions (bahya): visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory. The five senses of hearing. touching, seeing, tasting, and smelling are all gross senses, while mind is the subtle sixth sense. Mind is the internal faculty that perceives the qualities of soul such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, and cognition. <~>In Nyaya philosophy, ordinary perception (laukika) is either indeterminate (nirvikalpa) or determinate (savikalpa). Indeterminate perception is the primary cognition of a thing before judgment is used to specify diverse characteristics. For example, in the first glance at a table, one perceives the mere existence of the table without comprehending its color, shape, and other specific characteristics; one perceives only a general appearance without details. Only upon further inspection does one recognize that it is, say, a round wooden table with a drop leaf. This determinate perception is the cognition of an object that registers some definite characteristics about it. Determinate perception is always preceded by indeterminate perception, and determinate perception is always valid knowledge because it is definite and explicit. <~>Nyaya claims that there are three kinds of extraordinary (alaukika) perceptions: perception of classes (samanya laksana); perception based on association (jnana laksana); and intuitive perception (yogaja). <~>The realization that all people are mortal is an instance of the external perception of classes (samanya laksana). How does one know that all people are mortal? One cannot come to this realization by ordinary perception because the mortality of all people in all times cannot be physically perceived by the senses. But because a person is never perceived without his personhood--that is, the class essence or universality all human beings share--then a conclusion can be made based on that essence. A person is known as a person because of the presence of personhood in him. This direct perception of personhood is the medium through which all people, or the class of people, are perceived. To perceive personhood means to perceive all people as individuals in which this characteristic resides. The perception of all people is due to the perception of the universality of humanity in all people. Therefore, this type of knowledge is called the extraordinary perception of classes. <~><~>A different type of extraordinary perception--jnana laksana (association)--is involved when one says that something looks delicious, or that a block of ice looks cold, or that a stone looks hard. These assertions imply that the taste of food, the coldness of ice, and the hardness of stone can be perceived by the eyes. But how can the eyes perceive the qualities of taste and touch? Nyaya says that the past experience of touch and taste are so closely associated with the visual appearance of the causative agents of those experiences that whenever these sources come in contact with the eyes they bring about the perception of taste and touch simultaneously with that of their color. This present perception of taste and touch due to the revived past knowledge of the color of the food, ice, or stone is called jnana laksana--perception based on association. This type of know]edge is extraordinary because it is conveyed by a sense organ that ordinarily is not capable of perceiving that type of knowledge. Because the mind incorporates previously associated experiences, it is able to perceive such knowledge. <~>The third kind of extraordinary perception is called yogaja, the knowledge born of yoga practices. It is intuitive knowledge that never depends on sense-object contact and is never false; it is perceived after the mind is cleansed through yogic practices. This knowledge from within is divided into two categories, depending on the degree of perfection of yogi attainments. Those who have completed their inward journey and have attained spiritual perfection, who perceive intuitive knowledge of all objects constantly and spontaneously, are called yukta yogins. Those who are still on the path of the spiritual journey, for whom concentration and other auxiliary conditions are required to attain an intuitive knowledge, are called yunjan yogins. Nyaya (Part 4) Inference <~>Nyaya philosophy provides a detailed and systematic description of inference. Inference is the process of knowing something not by means of contact between the senses and the objects of the world and not by observation but rather through the medium of a sign, or linga, that is invariably related to it. Inference involves the process of analyzing memories, correlations, and uncontaminated arguments. There is a systematic method for testing the validity of inferential knowledge, for there are always some inseparable constituents to an inference, and if any of these parts are missing or if there is any defect in the parts, then the knowledge inferred is invalid. <~>The Sanskrit word for inference is anumana, and may be defined as `the cognition or knowledge that follows from some other knowledge'. Two examples are: `The hill is on fire because there is smoke on the hill, and where there is smoke there is fire', and `John is mortal because he is a man, and all men are mortal'. In the first example, we perceive smoke on the hill and arrive at the knowledge of the existence of fire on the hill on the basis of our previous knowledge of the universal relationship between smoke and fire. In the second example, we begin with the perception of a man, John, which inspires the knowledge of the mortality of John based on our previous knowledge of the universal relationship between men and mortality. Thus, it is apparent that inference is a process of reasoning in which one passes through certain necessary stages to reach a conclusion, which is called inferential knowledge. The necessary stages are the conditions for a valid inference. In the process of inference, one reaches a conclusion regarding a particular fact through the knowledge of a sign and of the sign's universal relationship to the conclusion. <~>In the example of the inference of fire on a hill, one ascertains the presence of the unperceived fire on the hill through the perception of the smoke on the hill, because one already has the knowledge of the universal relationship between smoke and fire. A primary condition of this inference is the knowledge of smoke on the hill; this part of the inferential process is called linga, or sign. Next arises the awareness of the universal relationship between smoke and fire based on past observations; this is known as vyapti. As a result of this, knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire on the hill arises. This stage is called nirnaya or conclusion. In the terminology of logic, the hill is the minor term (paksa) in this inference because the hill is the subject under consideration. Fire is the major term (sadhya) because this is what we want to prove in relation to the hill. The presence of smoke on the hill is the middle term (linga) because it is the sign that indicates the presence of fire. This `middle term is also called hetu or sadhana meaning `the reason or grounds for inference'. Three parts of inference. <~>Thus, an inference contains three parts: the minor term (paksa), the major term (sadhya), and the middle term (hetu or linga). In the process of inference, the first step is the apprehension of smoke (hetu) on the hill (paksa); the second step is the recollection of the universal relationship between smoke and fire (hetu and sadhya); and the third step is the cognition of fire (sadhya). When used as a formal statement or verbal expression designed to convince others, however, the structure of inference is changed. In stating an inferential verbal expression for others, the first step will be the predication of the major term in relation to the minor term: `There is fire on the hill'. The second step will be the formation of the middle term in relation to the minor term: `There is visible smoke on the hill'. The third step will be the formation of the middle term in its universal or invariable relationship with the major term: `Where there's smoke, there's fire'. In this last step it is sometimes helpful to use a specific example to confirm the relationship between the middle term and major term. For instance, `Where there's smoke there's fire, as in the kitchen'. <~>Thus, inference may be said to be a syllogism consisting of at least three categorical premises. But when one is analyzing the whole process of an inference, and especially when one is using inference to prove or demonstrate something, then it is necessary to state the inference in a systematic and comprehensive chain of arguments. One must then state a syllogism in the form of five premises. These five premises (avayavas) that constitute a valid inference are pratijjna (fact); hetu (reasons); udaharana (example); upanaya (application); and nigamana (conclusion). Here is an example: (1) John is mortal (fact); (2) Because he is a man (reason); (3) All men are mortal--for example, Napoleon, Lincoln, Socrates, and so on (example); (4) John is a man (application); (5) Therefore John is mortal (conclusion). The first premise states a positive fact. The second premise states the reason for this assertion. The third premise then confirms the relationship between the reason for the assertion and the asserted fact itself as supported by a well-known example. The fourth constituent of the syllogism represents the application of the universal proposition to the present case. The fifth part, or conclusion, is drawn from the preceding four parts. <~>To gain a proper understanding of the workings of logic, it is necessary to examine more closely how a systematic syllogism functions. For this purpose, the following example may be reanalyzed. `There is fire on the hill because there is smoke, and where there is smoke, there is fire'. As was previously discussed, fire is the major term, hill is the minor term, and smoke is the middle term. The middle term (smoke) is so-called because, on the one hand, it is connected to the minor term (hill), and, on the other hand, it is universally related to the major term (fire). This middle term is also called reason or grounds since it is because of its perception that the major term is inferred. Thus, an inference has two conditions: the knowledge of the middle term must exist in the minor term; and a relationship must exist between the middle and the major terms. It is not possible to realize the existence of fire on the hill as a conclusion based on inferential reasoning if the invariable concomitance between the middle and major terms is not established. This invariable concomitance between these two terms of an inference is called vyapti, the logical ground for inference. Concomitance guarantees the validity of the conclusion; the validity or invalidity of an inference depends on the validity or invalidity of vyapti. Therefore, Nyaya philosophy goes into great detail concerning the nature of concomitance and the fallacies related to it. Logical ground for inference. <~>Vyapti, meaning `the state of pervasiveness', implies both that which pervades and that which is pervaded. For example, in the inference of fire and smoke, smoke is the pervaded and fire is the pervader. Here smoke is always accompanied by fire--wherever there is smoke, there will also be fire. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true: it is possible to have fire without smoke--for example, a Bunsen burner. But there are examples in which both the pervader and the pervaded coexist permanently--for example, fire and heat. There are, therefore, two kinds of concomitance: equivalent and nonequivalent. Nonequivalent concomitance (asamavyapti) is an invariable concomitance between two unequal entities (such as smoke and fire). It has already been shown that in this type of concomitance, one entity may be inferred from the other, but not vice versa. Equivalent vyapti (samuvyapti) is an invariable concomitance between two coexistent terms, either of which can be inferred from the other. For example, a chair is a nameable thing because a chair is knowable, and whatever is knowable, is nameable. Here nameable and knowable can both be inferred from each other. <~>Concomitance denotes a relationship of coexistence (sahacarla). But not every instance of coexistence is an example of concomitance. Fire, for example, often coexists with smoke, yet it may exist without smoke. The coexistent relationship of fire and smoke depends on certain conditions--temperature and wetness, for instance. The condition on which the relation of coexistence depends is called upadhi, and for an inference to be valid, the relation between the middle and major terms of a syllogism must be independent of any and all conditions. In other words, a valid concomitance represents an invariable and unconditional concomitant relation (nitya anaupadika sambandha) between the middle and major terms of a syllogism. <~>But how does one know that a relation is invariable and unconditional? The Vedanta philosophers reply that concomitance is established by the uncontradicted experiences of the relationships between two things. But according to Nyaya, concomitance is established through the perception of classes (samanya laksana perception), which has been discussed earlier in this chapter in the section on extraordinary perceptions. Actually, the Nyaya method of inference uses inductive reasoning; that is, it draws a particular conclusion on the grounds of a general and universally known truth. The universal truth is considered to fall within the range of vyapti. In Nyaya, there are three types of inductive analysis, or generalization. The first is anvaya, or uniform agreement in presence. This type of inductive process arises from observing a relationship in which if one constituent is present, then in every instance the other constituent is also present--for example, wherever there is smoke there is fire. The second type of inductive analysis is the obverse of the first, and is called uniform agreement in absence (vyatireka). In this method, a negative universal relationship or invariable concomitance is observed--for example, wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke. The third kind of inductive process is a combination of the first and second methods. In this method, known as uniform agreement in both presence and absence (anvaya-vyatireka or vyabhicaragraha), both constituents of a relationship are always found together; neither is ever present without the other. From this, it is induced that there must exist a natural relationship of invariable concomitance between them. These three methods of generalization demonstrate a systematic technique for inductive reasoning. The most crucial concern, however, in any systematic inference is how to make certain that concomitance, the logical basis for the inference, is valid--that is, free from limiting conditions (upadhis). This process of insuring that vyaptis are free from all vitiating conditions is called upadhinirasa. One way of insuring this is by the repeated observation of both constituents of a relationship under all possible circumstances to make certain that the relationship is in fact invariable. Another way is to employ hypothetical critical argumentation or tarka. But nyaya places the greatest emphasis on samanya laksana--the perception of classes--as the major means for insuring the validity of vyaptis. Classifications of inference. <~>Nyaya provides three general classification systems for inference. The first classification system is based on psychological grounds; the second is based on the nature of vyapti or the universal relationship between the middle and major terms; and the third is based on the logical construction of the inference. According to the first system of classification, there are two kinds of inference: svartha, meaning `for oneself', and parartha, meaning `for others'. In svartha, the purpose of the inference is for one to gain correct knowledge by oneself and for himself. In this kind of inference, the whole process of reasoning is internal--one employs systematic logical reasoning to protect oneself from confusion and doubt and to arrive at correct inferential knowledge. In parartha, on the other hand, the inference is meant for others. Here someone is trying to prove the truth of his view. For instance, a man who is convinced of the existence of fire on a hill would use parartha when attempting to convince others of the fire's existence. <~>The second classification system divides inferences into three categories: purvavat, sesavat, and samanyatodrsta. Both purvavat and sesavat inferences display causal uniformity between the middle and major terms, while samanyatodrsta inferences exhibit non-causal uniformity of the middle and major terms. Here the term cause refers to an invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect, and effect refers to an invariable and unconditional consequence of a cause. When an unperceived effect is inferred from a perceived cause, that inference is deemed a purvavat inference. For example: `It will rain because there are dark heavy clouds in the sky, and whenever there are dark heavy clouds, it rains'. Here the future rain (effect) is inferred from the appearance of dark heavy clouds (cause). Sesavat is the reverse type of reasoning, in which an unperceived cause is inferred from a perceived effect. For instance: 'It has rained recently because there is a swift muddy current in the river, and whenever there is a swift muddy current in the river, it has recently rained'. Here we infer the cause (the past rain) from the effect (the swift muddy current). And finally, in samanyatodrsta, the third type of inference in this system of classification, the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term does not depend on a causal uniformity. One term is not inferred from the other because they are uniformly related. In this kind of reasoning, conclusions are based on direct experience and on generally known truths. An example of this sort of inference is the movement of the moon which is inferred on the basis of its changing position in the sky, although the movement of the moon is not perceived directly by the senses. <~>The last general classification system is based on the nature of induction, by which one obtains the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms of an inference. This system distinguishes among three types of inference. In the first, kevalanvayi, the middle term is only positively related to the major term. For example: `All knowable objects are nameable'. In the second, kevalavyatireka, the middle term is only negatively related to the major term. For example: `Whoever is dead has no pulse: this person has a pulse; therefore, he is not dead'. In the last category, anvayatireki, the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. This is the joint method of both anvaya and vyatireka. For example: `All smoky objects are on fire: the hill is smoky; therefore, the hill is on fire. No nonfiery object is smoky; the hill is smoky; therefore the hill is on fire'. The fallacies of inference. <~>In the nyaya system, fallacies of inference are called hetvabhasa. This term literally means `a reason (hetu) that appears to be valid but is not really so'. There are five kinds of fallacies, called sabyabhicara, viruddha, satpratipaksa, asiddha, and badhita. The first, sabyabhicara, means `irregular middle'. In a correct inference, the middle term is uniformly and without exception related to the major term. An irregular middle term is destructive to an inference because it can lead to a wrong conclusion. For example: `All Himalayan beings are saints; tigers are Himalayan beings; therefore, tigers are saints'. The conclusion of this inference cannot be said to be correct, because the middle term, Himalayan beings, is not invariably related to the major term, saints. Himalayan beings come in many different varieties. Instead of leading to one single valid conclusion, such an irregular middle term leads to varied opposite conclusions. <~>Viruddha, the second kind of fallacy, means `contradictory middle'. A contradictory middle is one that dismisses the very proposition it is meant to prove. For example: `Sound is eternal, because it is caused'. Whatever has a cause is noneternal, and so here the middle term, caused, does not prove the eternity of sound but rather confirms its non eternity. The distinction between an irregular middle and a contradictory middle is that while the irregular middle fails to prove its conclusion, the contradictory middle proves the opposite of what is intended. <~>The third type, satpratipaksa, means `inferentially contradictory middle'. This type of fallacy arises when the middle term of an inference is contradicted by the middle term of another inference that proves a completely opposite fact about the major term. For example, the argument `Sound is eternal because it is audible' is contradicted by the inference 'Sound is noneternal because it is produced, as a pot is produced'. The distinction between a contradictory middle and an inferentially contradictory middle is that in the former, the middle term itself proves the contradiction of its conclusion, while in the latter, the contradiction of the conclusion is proved by another inference. <~>The fourth type of fallacy is asiddha, an unproved middle. In this type of fallacy, the middle term is not an established fact but is an unproved assumption. For example: `The sky-lotus is fragrant because it has lotusness like a natural lotus'. Here the middle term, lotusness, does not have any substantial existence because such a thing as a sky-lotus actually does not exist. <~>The fifth is badhita, a noninferentially contradicted middle. Here the middle term is contradicted by some other source of knowledge. Examples are: `Fire is cold because it is a substance', and `Sugar is sour because it produces acidity'. Here `cold' and `sour' are the major terms and `substance' and `acidity' are the middle terms. The existence of heat in the fire and sweetness in sugar is directly perceived by the senses, so one has to consider substance and acidity as contradictory middle terms. Therefore, the inference is fallacious. Comparison <~>According to Nyaya, comparison is the third valid source of experiential knowledge. This kind of knowledge comes when one perceives the similarity between the description of an unfamiliar object and its actual appearance before one's senses. For example, suppose that a trustworthy person has told you that there is such a thing as a crabapple that looks like a regular red apple but is smaller and has a longer stem. One day in the woods you come upon a tree bearing fruit that you've never seen before but that reminds you of apples. You then remember your friend's description of crabapples, and you come to the conclusion that this must be a crabapple tree. <~>Knowledge through comparison is called upamana. Upamana is not recognized as valid in many of the other systems of Indian philosophy. The Carvaka system of philosophy, for instance, does not accept this as a source of know]edge, because this system maintains that perception is the sole source of valid knowledge. The Buddhist system of philosophy recognizes upamana as a valid source of knowledge but regards it as a mere compound of perception and testimony. The Vaisesika and Samkhya systems explain upamana as simply a form of inference, and the Jaina system maintains that it is merely a kind of recognition. The Karma-mimamsa and Vedanta systems agree with Nyaya in considering upamana as an independent source of knowledge, but they explain it in a different way. Testimony <~>Sabda or testimony literally means `words'; it is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences, and is, according to Nyaya, the fourth and final source of valid experiential knowledge. Not all verbal knowledge, however, is valid. In Nyaya philosophy, sabda is defined as the statement of an apta, a person who speaks and acts the way he thinks. Such a person's mind, action, and speech are in perfect harmony, and he is therefore accepted as an authority. Thus his verbal or written statement is considered to be a valid source of knowledge. In Nyaya philosophy, the Vedic scriptures are respected as the words of certain venerable aptas, great sages who realized the truth within and who transmitted their realizations as sabda. The validity of the Veda depends upon the authority of these aptas. <~>In accepting scriptural testimony as knowledge, there are two conditions: first, the meaning of the statement must be perfectly understood, and, second, the statement must he the expression of a trustworthy person, that is, an apta. There are two main ways of classifying sabda, or testimony. The first method of classification divides testimonial knowledge into two categories based on the nature of the object of the knowledge. The first category consists of the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, saints, sages, and scriptures on matters related to the perceptible objects of the world. Examples are the evidence given by expert witnesses in court, the statements of reliable physicians about physiology, and scriptural declarations concerning the performance of certain rites. The second type of testimony consists of the trustworthy assertions of persons, saints, sages, and scriptures on matters concerning the supersensible realities. Examples are a physicist's assertions about atoms, a nutritionist's statements regarding vitamins, a pious man's instructions on virtue, and scriptural testimony about God and the immortal soul. /Note: The qualification is always necessary, for seeing atoms, too./ The second way of classifying sabda is based on the nature of the source of the knowledge. This method categorizes all testimony as being either scriptural or "secular". Here the word scriptural refers only to the Veda and its corollaries. The words of scriptural testimony are considered to be perfect and infallible. "Secular" sabda is the testimony of fallible human beings and therefore may be either true or false; "secular" testimony that comes from a trustworthy person is valid, but the rest is not. <~>The Nyaya system gives a detailed description of the nature of sabda because testimony is considered to be a valid source of knowledge and should therefore be analyzed thoroughly. In a scripture or a testimony, words and sentences are used--but what is a sentence, what is a word, and what is the nature of their construction? Here, a sentence may be viewed as a group of words arranged in a certain manner, and a word as a group of letters or phonemes arranged in a specific order. The essential nature of any word lies in its meaning, and there must be specific rules governing the arrangement of words in the formation of sentences. Without such rules, the words spoken even by a trustworthy person--an apta--could be reordered to convey a different meaning from the one intended or could mislead a common person because of their lack of clarity of meaning. The potency of words. <~>The Nyaya system states that all words are significant symbols and that all words have the capacity to designate their respective objects. This capacity of words is called sakti, potency, and in the Nyaya system, potency is said to be the will of God. The words used in a sentence have certain meanings because of the potencies within them, and that is why they express certain meanings in a particular context. So the ordering of words in a sentence is very important. In addition, Nyaya maintains that there are four other factors that are essential in the proper functioning of sentences, and without the fulfillment of these four conditions a sentence cannot express the intended meaning These conditions are: akamksa (expectancy), yogyata (fitness), sannidhi (proximity), and tatparya (intention). <~>Akamksa, the first condition, means `expectancy'. Akamksa is the quality by which all the words of a sentence imply or expect one another; it is the need that each word has for the other words in that sentence. According to the Nyaya system, a word is not in itself capable of conveying a complete meaning; it must be brought into relationship with other words in order to express the full meaning intended. For example, when someone hears the word `bring', he asks or he thinks about what to bring. It could be a pot, a book, a pencil, a gulab jamun, or anything else. Thus, expectancy is the interdependence of the words in a sentence for expressing a complete meaning. <~>Yogyata, the second condition, means `fitness'. It refers to the appropriateness of the words in a sentence, to the absence of contradiction in its terms. For example, sentences like `Moisten with fire',, or `He is frustrated because of his inner peace',make no sense because there is a contradiction between fire and moistening, between frustration and peace. Fire has no ability to moisten anything, and inner peace cannot engender frustration. Therefore, although these sentences may be grammatically correct, they do not express valid knowledge. <~>Sannidhi, the third condition, means `proximity'. It is very important for words to be used within the limits of an appropriate time and space. If the duration of their use is prolonged, then words no longer have the capacity to give the desired meaning. For example, if someone who desires to make a statement speaks one word today, another word tomorrow, and a third the day after, his efforts at effective communication are certain to fail. The same holds true for the written word. If someone writes one word on page one, another on page three, one more on page five, and another on page ten, then his meaning will not be communicated effectively. Continuity of time and space is therefore essential for a sentence to convey meaning. <~>Tatparya, the fourth condition, means `intention', and it refers to the meaning one intends a sentence to convey. A word may have various meanings depending on its context, so one has to be careful to determine the real intention of the person who uses the word. This is also the case with scriptural testimony--even the greatest scholars have disagreements concerning some passages because they do not understand the original intention of those sentences. A very simple illustration is this: suppose someone tells you to bring him a bat; you have no way of knowing whether you are being asked to provide a particular type of flying mammal or a wooden club. To understand the real intention of a sentence, one has to comprehend accurately the context in which the words are used. Because of the unique nature of the Sanskrit language and its symbolic usages, the Veda and related religio- philosophica] scriptures are full of this kind of complexity and indeterminability of intention. In order to clarify this and understand the Vedic testimony properly, Nyaya recommends that one study the Karma-mimamsa philosophy because it provides systematized rules and interpretations for understanding the real meaning of the Veda. Nyaya (Part 5) The Nature of the Physical World <~>As mentioned previously, the Nyaya system groups all the objects of the world into twelve major categories: soul, body, senses, objects of the senses, cognition (buddhi), mind (manas), activity, mental modifications, rebirth, feelings, suffering, and absolute freedom from all sufferings. Not all these objects of knowledge are found in the physical world because, according to Nyaya, the physical world is composed only of four gross elements--earth, water, fire, and air. Akasa (space or ether) is considered to be a physical substance, but it is not considered to be a productive cause of anything. Though the soul and the mind are involved in the physical world, they are not physical elements. Likewise, time and space are completely nonmaterial, but they nonetheless belong to the physical world. The ultimate constituents of earth, air, fire, and water are eternal and unchanging atoms. Ether and time and space are also eternal and infinite substances, each being one single whole. All in all, the Nyaya theory of the physical world is very similar to that of the Vaisesika school, and a more detailed discussion of this world view will be provided in the next chapter. The Concept of the Individual Soul <~>There are many apparently different concepts of the soul among the various schools of Indian philosophy. The Carvaka system states that the soul consists of the living physical body and its attributes. According to Buddhist philosophy, there is no soul. Buddhism teaches that the stream of ever-changing thoughts and feelings is the ultimate reality. This may be termed soul, but it is not considered to be a permanent entity, as is maintained by other philosophies. <~>According to the concept of selfhood held by the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems, the soul is a unique substance, of which all desires, aversions, pleasures, pains, and cognition are qualities. There are different souls in different bodies. The soul is indestructible and eternal, and its attribute is consciousness. Because it is not limited by time and space, the soul is also seen as infinite or all-pervading. There are many souls, because one person's experiences do not overlap those of another person; one's experience is completely distinct from any other's. <~>Nyaya gives numerous arguments to prove the existence of the soul. It first argues that the body is not the soul because immaterial consciousness cannot be said to be an attribute of the material body, which in itself is unconscious and unintelligent. Neither can the functioning of the senses explain the process of imagination, memory, and ideation--none of these functions depends on any external sense. The mind can also not be the soul because the mind is considered to be an imperceptible substance. Nor can the soul, as the Buddhists maintain, be identified as the ever-changing series of cognition. The soul cannot be said to be an eternal and self-effulgent consciousness because consciousness cannot subsist without a certain locus. At the same time, the soul is not mere consciousness or knowledge but is the knower of knowledge and the enjoyer of objects. In sum, the soul is not consciousness but is a substance having consciousness as its attribute . <~>The soul experiences the external world through the mind and senses. All the cognition and conscious states arise in the soul when the soul is related to the mind, the mind to the senses, and the senses to external objects. It is because of this sequential contact or relationship that the whole process actuates; otherwise there would be no consciousness in the soul. In its disembodied or disintegrated state, the soul has no knowledge or consciousness. How then can one know whether there is such a thing as an individual soul? The Nyaya system answers that the soul is not known by sensory perception but rather by inference or testimony. The existence of the soul is inferred from the functions of desire, aversion, and volition (will), from the sensations of pain and pleasure, and from memories of these. These memories cannot be explained unless one admits a permanent soul that has experienced pain and pleasure in relation to certain objects in the past. The process of knowledge based on memory requires the existence of a permanent self that desires to know something and then desires to attain certain knowledge about it. Desire, volition, pain, and pleasure cannot be explained by the body, senses, or mind. Just as the experiences of one person cannot be remembered by another person, the present states of the body or the senses or the mind cannot remember their past states. The phenomenon of memory must depend upon a permanent entity--the soul. One's own soul can be known through mental perception, but someone else's soul in another body can only be inferred. The Concept of Liberation <~>Like the other five systems of Vedic philosophy, the Nyaya system maintains that the ultimate goal of human life is to attain liberation. By liberation is meant absolute freedom from all pain and misery. This implies a state in which the soul is completely released from all bondage and from its connection with the body. It is impossible for the soul to attain the state of complete freedom from pain and misery unless the soul is totally disconnected from the body and senses. In liberation, the soul is unconditionally and absolutely freed from all shackles forever. <~>To attain the state of liberation, one has to acquire true knowledge of the soul and of all the objects of experience. This knowledge is called tattvajnana, which means `to know reality as completely distinct from unreality'. Nyaya philosophy prescribes a three-stage path for reaching the goal of liberating knowledge. The first step is sravana, the study of the scriptures. One has to study the spiritual scriptures and listen to authoritative persons and saints. Following this, one must use his own reasoning powers to ponder over what he has learned. This process of rumination is called manana. Finally, one must contemplate on the soul, confirm his knowledge, and practice that truth in his life. This is called nididhyasana. Through the practice of sravana, manana, and nididhyasana, a person realizes the true nature of the soul as being totally distinct from the body, mind, senses, and all other objects of the world. The truth realized within dispels the darkness of self-identification and misunderstanding (mithya-jnana) concerning `I-ness' and `Thy-ness'. When this happens, a person ceases to be moved by his passions and impulses and begins to perform his duties selflessly without having any desire to reap the fruits of these actions. The fire of true knowledge roasts one's past karma like seeds, thereby making them unable to germinate. Thus, true knowledge leads a person to the state where there is no cycle of birth and death. This state is called liberation. The Concept of God <~>According to Nyaya, God is considered to be the operative cause of creation, maintenance, and destruction of the universe. God does not create the world out of nothing or out of himself but rather out of the eternal atoms of space, time, mind, and soul. The creation of the universe refers to the ordering of these eternal entities, which are in coexistence with God, into a mortal world. Thus God, as the first operative cause of the universal forces, is the creator of the world. And God is also the preserver, as he causes the atoms to hold together and continue their existence in a particular order that maintains the physical universe. God is also called the destroyer of the universe, because he lets loose the forces of destruction when the energies of the mortal world require it. God is one, infinite, and eternal, and the universe of space and time, of mind and soul, does not limit him. God is said to possess six perfections: infinite fame, absolute power, unlimited opulence, supreme beauty, perfect knowledge, and complete renunciation. <~>In the Nyaya system, the following arguments are given to prove the existence of God. The first is the causal argument. According to this line of reasoning, the entire universe is formed by the combination of atoms. Mountains, fields, rivers, and so on must have a cause, for they are made up of parts, possess limited dimensions, and are not intelligent. This being so, they cannot be the cause of themselves; they require the guidance of an intelligent cause. That intelligent cause must have direct knowledge of all matter and of the atoms that underlie all matter. He must be omnipresent and omniscient. This intelligent entity cannot be the individual soul because the knowledge of the soul is limited--a soul, for instance, does not have the knowledge of other souls. Therefore, there must he an ultimate intelligent entity, which is termed God. <~>The second argument is based on adrsta, which means `the unseen' or `the unknown', and may be translated as providence or fate. The philosophers of the Nyaya system inquire as to why some people are happy and others are not, why some are wise and others ignorant. One cannot say that there is no cause, because every event has a cause. The causes of pain and pleasure must therefore be one's own actions in this life or in previous lives. People enjoy or suffer according to the merits or demerits produced by their past good or bad actions. This law of karma, which governs the life of every individual soul, requires that every human being must reap the fruits of his own actions. There is often a long interval of time between an action and its effect, however, and many pleasures and sorrows cannot be traced to any action performed in this life. Likewise, many actions performed in this life do not produce fruits immediately. The subtle impressions of all one's actions persist long after the actions themselves and are collected in the soul in the form of credits or merits (punya) and deficiencies or demerits (papa). The sum total of all merits and demerits that are accrued from good or bad actions is called adrsta, fate, and this produces present pain and pleasure. Adrsta is not an intelligent principle, however, and it cannot inspire its own fructification. It must therefore be guided or directed by some intelligent agent to produce the proper consequences. The individual soul cannot be said to be the director or controller of adrsta because souls do not know anything about their adrsta. Thus, the almighty intelligent agent who guides or directs adrsta through the proper channels to produce the proper consequences is the eternal, omnipotent, and omnipresent supreme being termed God. <~>A third Nyaya argument for the existence of God is based on scriptural testimony. According to this reasoning, the Veda, Upanisads, and all other authoritative scriptures state the existence of God. These scriptures were not written by common people but were formulated by those great sages who experienced truth from within. Thus, the authority of testimony depends on direct experience, which is the only source of knowledge about any and all facts. The fact of the existence of God is experienced directly by individual souls, and some of these individuals have expressed their God-realizations. The Veda expresses such direct experiences of God. Therefore, God exists. NOTE TO PART 3 OF NYAYA <~>Here's a clarification of a statement from the explanation of "Jati" (generality based on false analogy) in Nyaya (part 3). The statement is quoted in the next paragraph. <~>"Suppose, for example, that someone is arguing that sound is noneternal because it is an effect of a certain cause, just as a pot is produced from clay. But another argues that sound must be eternal because it is nonmaterial, like the sky. This counter-argument of trying to prove the eternity of sound by comparing it with the nonmaterial sky is fallacious, because there is not necessarily a universal relationship between the nonmaterial and the eternal." Perhaps you find this difficult to follow because some of the terms in this statement have a different sense than what we are used to in Srila Prabhupada's books. Here, "nonmaterial" does not mean spiritual. It means "subtle". Sound is subtle. And the sky in which sound travels is the most subtle of the five elements. So, the "jati" or generality based on a false analogy is that just as sky is eternal, because it is subtle, so also must sound be eternal. But just because something is subtle does not mean it is eternal. That is the sense of the above-quoted statement. =================== The END of the Nyaya ============================ Vaisesika (the Vedic atomic theory) <~>The founder of Vaisesika philosophy is the sage Kanada. He was also known as Uluka, so this system is sometimes called Aulukya. Kanada wrote the first systematic work of this philosophy, Vaisesika Sutra. This work is divided into ten cantos, each canto containing two sections. Prasastapada wrote a commentary on this Sutra entitled Svartha Dharma Samgraha that is so famous that it is called Bhasya, which means simply `commentary'. In Indian philosophical discourse, whenever the word Bhasya is used by itself without further specification, it is understood to refer to this commentary. Two well-known explications of Prasastapada's work are Udayana's Kirana-vali and Sridhara's Nyayakandali. The significant feature of this system is the introduction of a special category of reality called uniqueness (visesa). Thus, this system is known as Vaisesika. <~>Vaisesika is allied to the Nyaya system of philosophy. Both systems accept the liberation of the individual self as the end goal; both view ignorance as the root cause of all pain and misery; and both believe that liberation is attained only through right knowledge of reality. There are, however, two major differences between Nyaya and Vaisesika. First, Nyaya philosophy accepts four independent sources of knowledge--perception, inference, comparison, and testimony--but Vaisesika accepts only two--perception and inference. Second, Nyaya maintains that all of reality is comprehended by sixteen categories (padarthas), whereas Vaisesika recognizes only seven categories of reality (see chart). These are: dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (action), samanya (generality), visesa (uniqueness), samavaya (inherence), and abhava (nonexistence). The term padartha means "the object denoted by a word," and according to Vaisesika philosophy all objects denoted by words can be broadly divided into two main classes--that which exists, and that which does not exist. Six of the seven padarthas are in the first class, that which exists. In the second class, that which does not exist, there is only one padartha, abhava, which stands for all negative facts such as the nonexistence of things. The first two categories of reality--substance and quality--are treated in greater detail in the following discussion than are the remaining five. ***[CHART]*** Vaisesika's Seven Categories (Padirthas) of Reality Substance (nine dravyas): Earth, water, fire, air, space or ether, time, direction, soul, and mind. Quality (twenty-four gunas): Color, taste, smell, touch, sound, number, magnitude, distinctness, union, separation, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, tendency, virtue, and nonvirtue. Action (karma) Generality (samanya) Uniqueness (visesa) Inherence (samavaya) Nonexistence (abhava) ***[END OF CHART]*** The Category of Substance--Nine Dravyas Dravya, substance, is that in which a quality or an action can exist but which in itself is different from both quality and action. Without substance, there cannot be a quality or an action because substance is the substratum of quality and action, and it is also the material cause of the composite things produced from it. A cloth, for example, is formed by the combination of a number threads of certain colors. The threads are the material or constitutive causes of the cloth because it is made of the threads that subsist in the cloth. <~>There are nine kinds of substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, direction, soul, and mind. The first five of these are called physical elements because each of them possesses a specific quality that can be perceived by an external sense faculty. Each of the senses is composed of elements, whose distinguishing qualities are registered by specific sensory receptors. For example, smell is the particular property of the earth, and it is apprehended by the nostrils. Taste is the particular property of water, which is perceived by the tongue. Color is the particular property of fire or light, and it is discerned by the eyes. Touch is the particular property of air, which is experienced by the skin. And sound is the particular property of akasa (ether), which is received by the ears. <~>Paramanu--the smallest particle of earth, water, fire, and air. In Vaisesika the smallest indivisible part of matter is called paramanu, or atom. This is not to be confused with the modern scientific term atom because an atom as described in nuclear physics is itself composed of many parts. The Vaisesika usage of the word is different. It simply refers to the most minute indivisible state of matter. The atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are eternal because an atom is partless and cannot be produced or destroyed. The common elements of earth, water, fire, and air, however, are noneternal because they are produced by combinations of atoms and therefore can disintegrate or change. The existence of atoms is proved by inference--not by perception--in the following way. All the composite objects of the world are made up of parts. In separating the parts of a composite object, one passes from the larger to the smaller, and then from the smaller to the smallest part. But when one comes to the smallest part that cannot be further divided in any way, then the process of separation has to stop. That indivisible and minutes part in Vaisesika is called the atom. <~>If one does not accept the concept of indivisibility, then he will commit the fallacy of infinite regression. Because it has no parts, the atom cannot be said to be produced and it cannot be destroyed because destruction means to break a thing down into its parts, and in an atom there are no parts. Atoms, therefore, can be neither produced nor destroyed; they are eternal. Akasa--ether. <~>There are four kinds of atoms--atoms of earth, atoms of water, atoms of fire, and atoms of air--each having its own peculiar qualities. Akasa (ether), the fifth substance, is the substratum of the quality of sound; it is not made up of atoms. Akasa is also translated as space. Sound can be perceived, but akasa cannot be perceived because it lacks two conditions necessary for the perception of an object: perceptible dimension and manifest color. Akasa is unlimited, so it does not have a perceptible dimension, and it is formless, so does not have any color. Therefore, akasa cannot be perceived, but it can be inferred from the perception of the quality of sound which it contains. It cannot be said that sound is the quality of time, direction, soul, or mind because these exist even when there is no sound to qualify them. Therefore, there must be some other substance that has the quality of sound in it; that substance is called akasa. Akasa is one and eternal because it is not made up of parts and does not depend on any other substance for its existence. It is all-pervading in the sense that it has an unlimited dimension and that its quality (sound) is perceived everywhere. Direction and time. Direction and time are also imperceptible substances and they are likewise single, eternal, and all pervading. Direction is inferred on the basis of such concepts as here, there, near, far, on this side, by that way, and so on. Time is inferred from the concepts now, today, tomorrow, past, present, future, older, younger, and so forth. Although space, direction, and time are singular and all-pervading, indivisible and partless, they are spoken of as many because of certain limiting conditions, known as upadhis. For example, when the all- pervading, indivisible space is limited by the walls of a jar, that space is known as the space of the jar (ghatakasa). In the same way, direction and time are also thought of as multiple because of the notions of variety and specificity expressed as east, west, one hour, two hours, and so on. Soul. The eighth kind of substance, the soul or atman, is also considered to be eternal and all-pervading and is the substratum of the phenomenon of consciousness. According to Vaisesika philosophy, there are two kinds of souls: individual and supreme. Individual souls are known as jivatman. and the Supreme Soul is known as Paramatman, or isvara. The Supreme Soul is inferred to be the creator of the world in the same manner as has been explained in the discussion of Nyaya philosophy. In contrast to the Supreme Soul, the individual soul is perceived as possessing mental qualities, such as "I'm happy, I'm sorry," and so forth. Individual souls do not perceive other individual souls, but they do infer their existence in the manner described in the Nyaya section. Mind. The mind is considered to be the ninth kind of substance. It is the eternal sense faculty of the individual soul and the soul's qualities, such as pleasure and pain. Like the soul, the mind is atomic and indivisible--there is one in each body. The existence of the mind is not perceived but is inferred from the following propositions. First, it is apparent that external sense faculties are necessary for the perception of external objects of the world. Likewise, an internal sense faculty is required for the perception of internal objects, such as soul, cognition, feeling, pleasure, pain, and so on. The mind is this internal sense faculty. Second, it is apparent that the five external senses may all be in contact with their respective objects simultaneously, but not all of these perceptions are received at the same time. This demonstrates that there must be some other agent besides the external senses that both limits the number of received perceptions to one perception at a time and that orders the perceptions in sequential succession. In other words, although two or more external senses may be simultaneously receiving data, only that which is being attended to is actually perceived. Attention therefore represents the coordination of the mind with the senses, and every perception requires the contact of the mind with an object by means of the senses. We must, therefore, admit the existence of mind as an internal sense faculty. Additionally, if the mind were not a partless entity, then there would be simultaneous contact of many parts of the mind with many senses, and many perceptions would subsequently appear at one time. The fact that this never happens proves that the mind is a partless, atomic, and internal sense faculty of perception. The Category of Quality--Twenty-four Gunas Guna, quality, the second of the seven categories of reality, cannot exist by itself but exists only in a substance. (In Vaisesika `guna' refers to quality, whereas in Samkhya this term is used to denote an essential feature of Prakriti, nature.) It cannot, therefore, be the constituent or material cause of anything's existence. It may be considered a nonmaterial cause of things, however, because it determines the nature of a thing. It differs from both substance and action in that it is an unmoving property. There are twenty-four kinds of qualities: rupa (color), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), sparasa (touch), sabda (sound), samkhya (number), parimana (magnitudes), prthaktva (distinctness), samyoga (conjunction or unions), bibhaga (separation), paratva (remoteness), aparatva (nearness), buddhi (cognition), sukha (pleasure), dukha (pain), iccha (desire), dvesa (aversion), prayatna (effort), gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (fluidity), sneha (viscidity), samskara (tendency), dharma (merit or virtues), and adharma (demerit or nonvirtue). A brief description of these follows. According to Vaisesika there are six colors--white, black, red, blue, yellow, and green--and there are also six tastes--sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, astringent, and salty. Smell is divided into two categories--good and bad--and touch is divided into three--hot, cold, and neither hot nor cold. There are two kinds of sound: dhvani (inarticulated) and varna (articulated). Number is that quality by virtue of which a thing can be counted. Many numbers starting from one and stretching out beyond the imagination are used, but actually there is only one number which is used as many. Magnitude is the quality by which things are distinguished as big or small. There are four orders of magnitude: extremely small (the atom), extremely big, small, and large. Distinctness is the quality by which one knows that one thing is different from another. Conjunction, or union, is the quality by which one knows the existence of two or more things at one place or in one time, such as a book being on a table at noon. Disjunction, or disunion, is that quality by which a substance is perceived as being either remote or near in time or space. Older, younger, before, and after are temporal examples; far, near, here, and there are spatial examples. <~>Buddhi, a quality of the self, means "knowledge" or "cognition" in Vaisesika and should not be confused with the concept of buddhi that is explained in Samkhya philosophy as "intellect." Pleasure is a favorable experience of mind, and pain is an unfavorable experience of mind. Effort is the quality by virtue of which a substance is capable of changing its position. There are three kinds of effort: striving toward something (pravrtti); striving against something (nivrtti); and vital functioning (jivanayoni). Heaviness is that quality by virtue of which a substance is capable of falling, while fluidity is the quality by virtue of which it flow. Viscidity is the quality (belonging exclusively to the element of water) by which different particles of matter can be absorbed and formed into particular shapes. <~>Samskaras are innate tendencies; they can be of anything, not just the mind. There are three kinds of samskaras in a substance: activity, which keeps a thing in motion (vega); elasticity, which makes a thing tend toward equilibrium when it is disturbed (sthitisthapakatva); and mental impressions, which enable one to remember and recognize a thing (bhavana). This last category is exclusive to the mind. Dharma and adharma mean. respectively, that which is in accordance with conscience, and that which is not in accordance with conscience. Dharma leads to happiness, and adharma leads to pain and misery. The remaining five categories of reality are only briefly described. The Category of Action--Karma Karma, action, is viewed in the Vaisesika school as being physical movement, but the term physical here refers to more than just bodily movements because in Vaisesika mind is also considered to be a kind of substance. Just like quality, the second category of reality, action also exists only in a substance and cannot exist by itself. It is, however, completely different from both quality and substance. The substance of a thing supports both quality and action. Quality is the static character of things, and action is their dynamic character, which is regarded as the independent cause of their union and disunion. Action or movement is always dependent on substances--earth, water, fire, air, and mind. It is impossible to find action in the intangible substances--space, time, direction, and soul--because each is an all-pervading substance, whose position cannot be changed. There are five kinds of action: upward, downward, inward, outward, and linear. The action of perceptible substances like earth, water, fire, and air can be perceived by the five senses, but not all of the actions of tangible substances can be perceived. The movement of the Earth, for example, cannot be perceived; it can only be inferred. The Category of Generality--Samanya Generality. Samanya, refers to an abstract characteristic that is singular and eternal (nitya) and yet pervades many. For example, leadership is a single characteristic, but it resides in many individuals. Leadership is also eternal because it was already in existence before the first leader emerged, and it will continue to exist even if there are no more leaders. All the things of a certain class-- such as men, or cows, or puppies, or horses--share common name because of the common nature they possess. Samanya, generality, is the essence of the common characteristic that unites different entities into one class. Hence, modern scholars sometimes translate samanya as `universality'. <~>Vaisesika recognizes three levels of generality or universality: highest, lowest, and intermediate. The highest kind of generality is existence itself (satta). Beingness or the state of being is the highest generality because all other universals are subsumed under it; it is all-pervading, and nothing is excluded from it. The lowest kind of generality has the most limited referents (such as American-ness, Indian-ness, pot-ness, and chair-ness, which are the generalities present in all Americans, Indians, pots, and chairs, respectively). Concepts such as substantiality (having the nature of substances) represent the intermediate level of generality because they do not include many other categories of reality like quality, actions and so on. The Category of Uniqueness--Visesa Visesa, or uniqueness, is that characteristic of a thing by virtue of which it is distinguished from all other things. Like the imperceptible substances of space, time, direction, soul, and mind, visesa is abstract and is therefore eternal. Everything in the world, regardless of whether it is existent or nonexistent, is accompanied by uniqueness. Generality (samanya and uniqueness (visesa) are opposite concepts. The Category of Inherence--Samavaya There are two kinds of relationships between things: conjunction (samyoga), and inherence (samavaya). Conjunction is one of the twenty-four qualities (gunas) of Vaisesika, but inherence is one of the seven categories of reality described in this system. Conjunction is a temporary, noneternal relationship between two things that may be separated at any time. In this kind of relationship, two or more things exist together, but each remains essentially unaffected by the other(s). For example, when a chair and a table are conjoined together, this does not change the existence of the chair or table. Thus, conjunction is an external relationship existing as an accidental quality of the substances related to it. Inherence on the other hand, is a permanent relation between two entities, one of which inheres in the other, as for example in the relation of the whole in its parts, a quality in its substance, or the universal in the individual. A conjunctional relation is temporary and is produced by the action of either or both of the things related to it. For example, the relation between a man and a chair on which he is sitting is temporary. <~>An inherent relation, in contrast, is not temporary and is not produced. The relation that exists between a whole and its parts, for instance, is not produced because the whole is always related to its parts. As long as the whole is not broken up, it must exist in the parts. Thus inherence is an eternal or permanent relation between two entities, one at which depends for its existence upon the other (the whole cannot exist separate from its parts). Two terms within an inherent relationship cannot be reversed, as can those that are related by conjunction. For example, in order for there to be a conjunctional relation of hand and pen, pen and hand must both be in some kind of contact with each other, but in an inherent relation this is not necessary. A quality or action is in a substance, but the substance is not in the quality or action; there is color in cloth, but no cloth in color; there is action in a fan but no fan in the action. The Category of Nonexistence--Abhava Abhava, nonexistence, the seventh and last category of reality is negative in contrast to the first six categories, which are positive. Nonexistence is not found in any of the six positive categories, and yet according to Vaisesika philosophy nonexistence exists, just as, for instance, space and direction do. To illustrate: How does one know that there is no chair in a room? Looking into the room, one can feel as sure of the nonexistence of the chair as of the existence of the carpet or of the people. Therefore, nonexistence also exists as such. <~>There are two kinds of nonexistence: the absence of something in something else (samsargabhava), and mutual nonexistence (anyonyabhava). The absence of something in something else is of three kinds: antecedent nonexistence (pragbhava), the nonexistence of a thing after its destruction (pradhvamsabhava), and absolute nonexistence (atyantabhava). Antecedent nonexistence refers to the nonexistence of a thing prior to its creation. For example, in the sentence, `A book will be written using this paper', the book is nonexistent in the paper. This type of nonexistence does not have a beginning, but it does have an end. The book never existed before it was written; therefore, there is a beginningless nonexistence of the book. But when it does come to be written, its previous nonexistence will come to an end. In direct contrast to antecedent nonexistence, the nonexistence of a thing after its destruction has a beginning but does not have an end. For instance, when a jar is broken into pieces, then there is nonexistence of that jar. The nonexistence of the jar begins with its destruction, but this nonexistence cannot be ended in any way, because the same jar cannot be brought back into existence. <~>The type of nonexistence that does not belong to a particular time and space but is in all times is called absolute nonexistence. This type of nonexistence is neither subject to origin nor to end. It is both beginning less and endless. Examples are the nonexistence of the son of a barren couple or the nonexistence of color in the air. <~>Mutual nonexistence (anyonyabhava), the second of the two major divisions of nonexistence, is the difference of one thing from another. When one thing is different from another, they mutually exclude each other, and there is the nonexistence of either as the other. For example, a pen is different from a book, so there is nonexistence of the book in the pen and of the pen in the book. The Concept of the Creation and Annihilation of the World Vaisesika holds to the atomic theory of existence, according to which the entire universe is composed of eternal atoms. But at the same time, Vaisesika does not ignore the moral and spiritual laws that govern the process of union and separation of atoms. In this way, the atomic theory of Vaisesika is different from the atomic theory ox modern science. Modern science's theory proposes a materialistic philosophy; it explains the laws of the universe as mechanical, as being the result of the motions of atoms in infinite time, space, and direction. According to this view, the operation of the atoms is governed by mechanical laws, but according to Vaisesika the functioning of atoms is guided or directed by the creative or destructive will of the Supreme Being. The will of the Supreme Being directs the operation of atoms according to the past samskaras of individual beings. <~>Vaisesika states that the universe has two aspects, one eternal and one noneternal. The eternal constituents of the universe are the four kinds of atoms (earth, water, fire, and air) and the five substances (space, time, direction, mind, and self). These are not subject to change, and they can be neither created nor destroyed. Another part of the universe is noneternal, that is, subject to creation and destruction in a particular time and spaces. In the beginning of creation two atoms are united into a dyad, which is noneternal because it can be divided again into two. The dyads and atoms cannot be perceived but are known through inference. The combination of three dyads is called a triad (tryanuka), which is the smallest perceptible object. It is from these triads that other larger compounds develop. Thus the common elements comprised of eternal atoms are noneternal because they can be broken down into smaller units. <~>The entire universe is a systematic arrangement of physical things and living beings that interact with one another in time, space, and direction. Living beings are the souls of the selves who enjoy or suffer in this world, depending on their meritorious or nonmeritorious past impressions. Thus, according to Vaisesika philosophy, the world is a moral stage on which the life and destiny of all individual beings is governed, not only by the physical laws of time and space but also by the moral law of karma. In the performance of present karma, an individual is free and is thus the creator of his own destiny, but the starting and ending point of the universe depends on the creative or destructive will of the Supreme Being, God. The universal law (adrsta) of the process of creation and annihilation influences the individual selves to function or to be active in the direction of the creative will. Directed by this unknown force of adrsta, the soul makes contact with an atom of air; thus, the primeval motion comes into being. That primeval activity in air atoms creates dyads, triads, and all the rest of the gross physical manifestations of air elements (mahabhutas). In a similar manner, there arises motion in the atoms of fire, water, and earth, which then compose the gross elements of fire, water, and earth. In this way the vast expansion of the physical world comes into existence. <~>The Supreme Lord is endowed with perfect wisdom, detachment, and excellence (jnana, vairagya and aisvarya). He releases the adrsta related to individual beings, which guides the individuals in their flow through the currents of life. At the end of life, the process of dissolution and annihilation also depends on the will of God. He inspires the adrsta corresponding to the individuals or to the universe, and then a destructive motion in the atoms of the body and senses or in the cosmos starts vibrating. On account of this destructive motion, there arises the process of disjunction and disintegration of the body and senses or of the universe. Compound things break down into simpler and simpler components, finally devolving into the state of triads and dyads and ultimately into atoms. In this manner the physical elements of earth, water, fire, and air, and the related sense organs, are disintegrated. After the dissolution of the manifest universe, there remain the four kinds of atoms of earth, water, fire, and air as well as the eternal substances of space, time, direction, mind, and soul, with their attendant meritorious and non-meritorious samskaras. <~>Thus, according to the Vaisesika system of philosophy, there is no creation or annihilation but rather an orderly and morally systematized composition and decomposition of compounds. An individual self or soul is involved in the universe because of adrsta. The karma of each soul is its own earnings, deposited in the safe of the Supreme Being, which come back to the self with interest. The Vaisesika concepts of God, of the liberation of the soul, and of the path of liberation are all basically the same as the Nyaya concepts, which have already been discussed in the preceding chapter. ======================== the END of Vaisesika ================== Samkhya (Nontheistic Dualism) <~>Samkhya philosophy, considered by some to be the oldest of all the philosophical schools, was systematized by an ancient thinker named Kapila (different from the Devahuti-putra Kapila of the Srimad Bhagavatam whose Samkhya system does not exclude God). The first work of nontheistic Samkhya, the Samkhya Sutra, is traditionally attributed to Kapila, but in its present form it is not his original work. So the Samkhya-karika of Isvarakrsna is actually the earliest available Samkhya text. Among its more well-known commentaries are Gaudapada's Bhasya, Vacaspati Misra's Tattva-kaumudi, Vijnanabhiksu's Samkhya Pravacanbhasya, and Mathara's Matharavrtti. Topics traditionally emphasized by Kapila, Isvarakrsna, and other Samkhya commentators are the theory of causation, the concept of Prakrti (the unconscious principle) and Purusa (the conscious principle), the evolution of the world, the concept of liberation, and the theory of knowledge. The special feature of Samkhya is its summing up of all of the Nyaya and Vaisesika constituents of reality--with the exception of Isvara, God, Who is simply excluded from the system--into two fundamental principles: Purusa and Prakrti. Nirisvara Samkhya (notheistic Samkhya) is therefore a dualistic philosophy. The Samkhya Theory of Cause and Effect <~>All Indian philosophies base their explanation of the evolution or manifestation of the universe on two fundamental views of cause and effect: satkaryavada and asatkaryavada. According to satkaryavada, the effect exists in its cause prior to its production or manifestation, but the asatkaryavada position maintains that the effect does not exist in its cause prior to manifestation. This latter theory is also called arambhavada, which means `the doctrine of the origin of the effect'. All other theories related to cause and effect are based on one or the other of these two fundamental positions. Samkhya philosophy accepts the satkaryavada view of causation. Regarding satkaryavada, there are two schools of thought: vivartavada and parinamavada. The first is accepted by Advaita Vedantins, who hold that the change of a cause into an effect is merely apparent. For example, when one sees a rope as a snake, it is not true that the rope is really transformed into a snake; it simply appears to be that way. This theory serves as the basis for the Advaitist explanation of God, the universe and the individual soul. Samkhya philosophy upholds the view of parinamavada, according to which there is a real transformation of the cause into the effect, as in wood being transformed into a chair, or milk into yogurt. <~>Samkhya philosophy developed elaborate explanations to argue the parinamavada version of satkaryavada that a cause actually changes into its effect. These explanations are central to the whole Samkhya system, which proceeds from the premise that the effect exists in its material cause even before the effect is produced. There are five basic arguements for this premise. The first, asadakaranat, states that the effect exists in its material cause before its production because no one can produce an effect from a material cause in which that effect does not exist. For example, no one can turn the color blue into the color yellow, nor can anyone produce milk from a chair, because yellow does not exist in blue and a chair does not exist in milk. The second argument is upadanagrahanat, which states that because there is an invariable relationship between cause and effect, material cause can produce only that effect with which it is causally related. Only milk can produce a yogurt because milk alone is materially related to yogurt. If an effect does not exist in any way before its production, then it is impossible for an effect to be related to its cause. Therefore, an effect must already exist in its cause before it is produced. The third argument, sarvasambhavabhavat, states that there is a fixed rule for the production or manifestation of things. A certain thing can be produced only by a certain other thing; it cannot be produced from just anything or anywhere. This impossibility proves that all the effects exist within their particular causes. The fourth argument, saktasya-sakya-karanat, states that an effect exists in its cause in an unmanifested form before it is produced. This is the case because only a potent cause can produce a desired effect, and the effect must therefore be potentially contained in the cause. The potentiality of cause cannot, however, be related to an effect if the effect does not exist in that particular cause in some form. The fifth argument, karanabhavat, states that if the effect does not exist in the cause, then that which was non-existent would be coming into existence out of nothing. This is as absurd as saying that the son of a barren woman once built an empire, or that people decorate their homes with flowers of the sky. Such statements have no logical correspondence to reality. <~>By means of these arguments, the Samkhya philosophers established the theory of parinamavada or manifestation, according to which an effect is already existent in unmanifested form in its cause. The process of producing an effect from the cause or the process of manifestation and annihilation can be clarified with the analogy of the tortoise, which extends its limbs from its shell. The tortoise does not create its limbs; it merely brings that which was hidden into view. Samkhya philosophers hold that, similarly, no one can convert nonexistence into existence; nor can that which exists be entirely destroyed. A tortoise is not different from its limbs, which are subject to appearance or disappearance, just as golden ornaments such as rings and earrings are not different from the gold used to make them. The theory of manifestation is essential to Samkhya philosophy and indeed serves as the basic foundation upon which all its other theories are constructed. Prakrti--The Unconscious Principle The Samkhya system holds that the entire world--including the body, mind, and senses--is dependent upon, limited by, and produced by the combination of certain effects. Various other schools of philosophy--such as Carvaka, Buddhism, Jainism, Nyaya, and Vaisesika--maintain that atoms of earth, water, fire, and air are the material causes of the world. But according to the Samkhya system, material atoms cannot produce the subtler products of nature, such as mind, intellect, and ego. Therefore, one has to seek elsewhere for that cause from which gross objects and their subtler aspects are derived. If one examines nature, it becomes obvious that a cause is subtler than its associated effect and that a cause pervades its effect. For example, when a seed develops into a tree, whatever latent quality the seed contains will be found in the tree. The ultimate cause of the world must also be a latent principle of potential, and it must be uncaused, eternal, and all-pervading. It must be more subtle than the mind and intellect, and at the same time it must contain all the characteristics of the external objects as well as of the senses, mind, and intellect. In Samkhya philosophy this ultimate cause is called Prakrti. To prove its existence, Samkhya offers the following five arguments. First, it is accepted that all the objects of the world are limited and dependent on something else, so there must be an unlimited and independent cause for their existence. That cause is Prakrti. Second, all the objects of the world possess a common characteristic: they are capable of producing pleasure, pain, or indifference. Therefore, something must exist as the cause of the universe that possesses the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and indifference. That is Prakrti. Third, all the objects of the world have a potential to produce something else or to convert themselves into something else. Therefore, their cause must also have the same potential, which implicitly contains the entire universe. That is Prakrti. Fourth, in the process of evolution an effect arises from its cause, and in dissolution it is reabsorbed or dissolved into its origin. The particular objects of experience must therefore arise from a certain cause, which must in turn have arisen from a certain cause and so on until one reaches the primal cause of the creative process itself. A similar process takes place in involution or annihilation. Here, physical elements are broken down into atoms, atoms are dissolved into gross energies, and gross energies into finer ones until all of these dissolve into the unmanifested One. That unmanifested One is called Prakrti--the primordial nature. Fifth, if one attempts to go further and imagine the cause of this ultimate cause, he will land himself in the fallacy of infinite regression. Ultimately one has to stop somewhere and identify a cause as the first cause of the universe. In Samkhya philosophy that supreme root cause of the world is called Prakrti. The Gunas Prakrti is not to be comprehended as merely the atomic substance of matter. Nor can it be taken as a conscious principle behind the material substance. And it is not a hypothetical construct of the mind (a creation of philosophy and nothing more). Prakrti means literally `exceptional ability'; it is the wonderful nature out of which the vast material world in all of its levels of intricate permutation takes shape. Prakrti is characterized by the three gunas of sattva, rajas, and tamas. The word guna may be translated as `a quality or attribute of Prakrti', but it is important to note that the three gunas are not to be taken merely as surface aspects of material nature. They are, rather, the intrinsic nature of Prakrti. The balanced combination of sattva, rajas, and tamas is Prakrti, and thus they cannot be Prakrti's external attributes or qualities. They are called gunas (that is, `ropes') because they are intertwined like three strands of a rope that bind the soul to the world. One can say that a rope is the name for three intertwined strands, but if one analyzes the strands separately, he does not see the rope. In a similar way, if he analyzes the gunas separately, one will not apprehend Prakrti, since it is a balanced state of the three gunas. <~>According to Samkhya philosophy, sattva, rajas, and tamas are the underlying qualities from which the universe we perceive is derived. These gunas can be inferred from the fact that all features of the material world--external and internal, both the physical elements and the mind--are found to possess the capability of producing pleasure, pain, or indifference. The same object may be pleasing to one person, painful to another, and of no concern to a third. The same beautiful girl is pleasing to her boyfriend, painful to another girl who is attracted to the same boy, and of no concern to many other people not involved. These qualities of the girl, appearing in relation to other people around her, arise from the gunas that underly the manifested world. This example can help one see how the cause of all phenomena, Prakrti, contains all the characteristics found in worldly objects. <~>Samkhya philosophy posits that the whole universe is evolved from the gunas. The state in which they are in their natural equilibrium is called Prakrti, and when their balance is disturbed they are said to be in Vikrti, the heterogeneous state. The three gunas are said by the nontheistic Sankhya philosopers to be the ultimate cause of all creation. Sattva is weightlessness and light (laghu); rajas is motion or activity (calam); and tamas is heaviness, darkness, inertia, or concealment (guru and avarana). The gunas are formless and omnipresent when in a state of equilibrium, having completely given up their specific characteristics when thus submerged in each other. In a state of imbalance, however, rajas is said to be in the center of sattva and tamas, and this results in creation because manifestation in itself is an action. Action depends on motion, the force of activity that is the very nature of rajas, and so sattva and tamas are dependent on rajas to manifest themselves and thus produce pairs of opposites. Rajas also depends on sattva and tamas, however, because activity cannot be accomplished without the object or medium through which it becomes activated. In the state of manifestation, one guna dominates the other two, but they are never completely apart from each other or completely absent because they are continually reacting with one another. By the force of rajas, sattvic energy evolves with great speed and its unitary energy becomes divided into numerous parts. At a certain stage, however, their velocity decreases, and they start to come closer and closer together. With this contraction in sattvic energy, tamas is naturally manifested, but at the same time another push of the active force (rajas) occurs also on tamas, and within the contraction a quick expansion occurs. Thus do the gunas constantly change their predominance over one another. The predomination of sattva over tamas and of tamas over sattva is always simultaneously in process; the conversion of each of them into one another is taking place at every moment. <~>Sattva and tamas have the appearance of being in opposition to each other because one is light and weightless and the other is dark and heavy. But these pairs actually cooperate in the process of manifestation and dissolution as things move from subtle to gross and from gross to subtle. The expansion of power stores up energy in some relatively subtle form, from which it manifests to form a new equilibrium. These points of relative equilibrium constitute certain stages in the evolutionary process. It might at first seem that there is constant conflict among the gunas, but this is not the case. They are in perfect cooperation during the process of manifestation because it is through their constant interaction that the flow of cosmic and individual life continues. They are essentially different from but interrelated with one another. Just as the oil, wick, and flame of a lamp work together to produce light, so the different gunas cooperate to produce the objects of the world. The gunas play the same role in one's body and mind as they do in the universe as a whole. An individual's physical appearance is simply a manifestation of the gunas that has been brought about by consciousness. This intention of consciousness to cause Prakrti to manifest disturbs the state of equilibrium in Prakrti, thus causing the gunas to interact and manifest the universe. <~>The gunas are always changing or transforming into one another. This occurs in two ways: virupaparinama, `change into a heterogeneous state', and svarupaparinama, `change into a homogeneous state'. Virupaparinama, the first kind of transformation, takes place when one of the gunas dominates the other two and begins the process of manifestation of a particular objects. This type of transformation or interaction of the gunas with each other is responsible for the manifestation of the world. Svarupaparinama, the other kind of transformation of the gunas, refers to that state in which the gunas change internally without disturbing each other. In this state, the gunas cannot produce anything because they neither oppose nor cooperate with one another. This type of change occurs in the balanced state of Prakrti. In describing the process of involution, Samkhya states that all gross elements dissolve into subtle elements and finally they all dissolve into their origin--sattva, rajas and tamas. Ultimately these three gunas also come to a state of perfect balance called Prakrti. Then there remains no weight of tamas, no weightlessness of sattva, and no activity of rajas because the gunas no longer have a separate existence in the sense of predominance of any single attribute. This state--Prakrti--cannot be perceived by one's ordinary perception; it can only be inferred. One can only imagine a state in which all of nature is balanced and there is no levity, no motion, no heaviness; no light, no darkness, no opposing forces; in which the imagination itself, being a product of the mind, is dissolved. Samkhya philosophers describe this state as uncaused, unmanifested, eternal, all-pervading, devoid of effect-producing actions, without a second, independent, and partless. Purusa--Consciousness As was previously stated, Samkhya is a dualistic philosophy that acknowledges two aspects of reality: the unconscious principal (Prakrti) and consciousness (Purusa or the Self). Each body contains a Self, but the Self is different from the body, senses, mind, and intellect. It is a conscious spirit, at once both the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge. It is not merely a substance with the attribute of consciousness, but it is rather pure consciousness itself--a self-illumined, unchanging, uncaused, all-pervading, eternal reality. Whatever is produced or is subject to change, death, and decay belongs to Prakrti or its evolutes, not to the Self. It is ignorance to think of the Self as body, senses, mind, or intellect, and it is through such ignorance that Purusa confuses itself with the objects of the world. Then it becomes caught up in the ever flowing stream of changes and feels itself to be subject to pain and pleasure. <~>Samkhya offers five arguments to prove the existence of Purusa. First, all the objects of the world are meant to be utilized by and for someone other than themselves. All things that exist serve simply as the means for the ends of other beings. (A chair is not made for the chair itself, nor is a house made for the house itself.) Therefore, there must be something quite different and distinct from such objects. Objects cannot enjoy their own existence, nor can one material object be utilized and enjoyed by another material object; therefore, there must be some other enjoyed of the objects. That enjoyed who utilizes the objects of the world is consciousness, Purusa. <~>Second, it cannot be said that all objects are meant for Prakrti because Prakrti is unconscious and is the material cause of all objects. It is the balance of the gunas, of which all the objects of the world are composed. Prakrti is thus the potential or essence of all pain, pleasure, and neutral states and cannot therefore be the enjoyer of itself, just as even the greatest of men cannot sit on his own shoulders. The proprietor or utilizer of all worldly objects must consequently be a conscious being who does not possess the three gunas and who is completely different from them in both their balanced and heterogeneous states. That transcendent Reality is Purusa. <~>Third, all the objects of the external world--including the mind, senses, and intellect--are in themselves unconscious. They cannot function without guidance from some intelligent principle, and they must be controlled and directed by it in order to achieve anything or realize any end. That conscious Self who guides the operation of Prakrti and its manifestations is Purusa. <~>Fourth, nonintelligent Prakrti and all its evolutes, which are by nature pleasurable, painful, or neutral, have no meaning if they are not experienced by some intelligent force. That experience is Purusa. <~>Fifth, every human being wants to attain liberation and be free from pain and misery, but whatever is derived from Prakrti brings pain and misery. If there is nothing different from Prakrti and its evolutes, then how is liberation attainable? If there were only Prakrti, then the concept of liberation and the will to liberate or to be liberated, which is found in all human beings, in the sayings of sages, and in the scriptures, would be meaningless. Therefore, there must be some conscious principle that strives for liberation. That principle is the Self, Purusa. Proof of the Existence of Many Selves According to Samkhya, there are many selves or conscious principles--one in each living being. If there were only one self related to all bodies, then when one individual died, all individuals would simultaneously die, but this is not the case. The birth or death of one individual does not cause all other individuals to be born or to die; blindness or deafness in one man does not imply the same for all men. If there were only one self pervading all beings, then if one person were active, all the selves would be active; if one were sleeping, then all would sleep. But this does not happen, and there is therefore not one self but many selves. Secondly, human beings are different from God and from animal and vegetable life as well. But this distinction could not be true if God, human beings, animals, birds, insects, and plants all possessed the same self. Therefore there must be a plurality of selves that are eternal and intelligent. Thus it becomes clear that there are two realities: Prakrti, the one all-pervading (unconscious) material cause of the universe, and Purusa, the many pure conscious intelligent entities who are not subject to change. It is from the interaction of these two principles that evolution occurs. The Process of the Evolution of the Universe According to Samkhya, the entire world evolves from the interaction of Prakrti with Purusa. This interaction does not refer to any kind of orderly conjunction, as in the contact of two finite male and female material substances. It is rather a sort of effective relationship through which Prakrti is influenced by the mere presence of Purusa, just as sometimes one's body is influenced or moved by the presence of a thought. Evolution cannot occur by the Self (Purusa) alone because the Self is inactive; nor can it be initiated only by Prakrti because Prakrti is not conscious. The activity of Prakrti must be guided by the intelligence of Purusa; this cooperation between them is essential to the evolution of the universe. <~>Given this, two questions yet arise: how can two such different and opposing principles cooperate, and what is the interest that inspires them to interact with one another? Samkhya replies that just as a blind man and a lame man can cooperate with each other in order to get out of a forest--by the lame man's guiding while the blind man carries him--so do nonintelligent Prakrti and inactive Purusa combine with each other and cooperate to serve their purpose. What is their purpose? Prakrti requires the presence of Purusa in order to be known or appreciated, and Purusa requires the help of Prakrti in order to distinguish itself from Prakrti and thereby realize liberation. Thus, according to Samkhya philosophy, the goal of the manifestation of the universe is to attain liberation. Through the interaction of Purusa and Prakrti, a great disturbance arises in the equilibrium in which the gunas are held prior to manifestation. In this process, rajas, the active force, first becomes irritated, and through this, the two other gunas begin to vibrate. This primeval vibration releases a tremendous energy within Prakrti, and the `dance' of these three energies becomes more and more dense, thus manifesting the universe in various grades and degrees. The process of manifestation originates from the unmanifested unity and completes its cycle in twenty-four stages. <~>The process of manifestation begins with the infusion of Purusa (consciousness) into Prakrti (the material cause of the universe). Metaphorically it is said that Prakrti is the mother principle, and Purusa is the father principle. The mother is fertilized by the father; Prakrti is the soil in which consciousness can take root. Thus Prakrti, the material cause of all existence, embodies consciousness. ***TABLE*** Samkhya's Twenty-three Evolutes of Prakrti Purusa (jivas)---Prakrti (gunas) 1. Mahat or Buddhi (intellect) 2. Ahankara (ego): Sattvika Tamasa Rajasa 3. Manas (mind) Subtle senses of elements (tanmatras): Smell Taste Color Touch Sound Jnana-indriyas: Nose Tongue Eye Skin Ear Karma-indriyas: Mouth Hand Leg Genital Anus Five gross elements: Earth Water Fire Air Ether ***[END OF TABLE]*** Mahat or Buddhi The first evolute of Prakrti is mahat or Buddhi, the intellect. This is the great seed of the vast universe--therefore the name, mahat, which means `great one'. This is the state of union of Purusa and Prakrti. Though Prakrti is unconscious material substance, it seems to be conscious and realizes itself as conscious because of the presence of the conscious Self. Mahat is the state in which Prakrti receives light from Purusa, the fountain of light, and sees itself; and this process of seeing is the beginning of the manifestation of the universe. The individual counterpart of this cosmic state, mahat, is called buddhi, the intellect, the finest aspect of a human being that has the capacity to know the entire personality in its full purity. Buddhi is the immediate effect of Prakrti resulting from the guidance of Purusa; therefore buddhi is the evolute closest to Purusa. Buddhi is manifested from the sattvic aspect of Prakrti because the nature of sattva--weightlessness, clarity, and light-- is affected sooner by the active force of manifestation than would be the heavy and unclear nature of tamas. Because of the sattvic quality of buddhi, the light of the Self reflects in the intellect similarly to the way an external object reflects in the clear surface of a mirror. The Self, seeing its reflection in the mirror of Buddha, identifies itself with the reflected image and forgets its true nature. Thus the feeling of `I-ness' is transmitted to buddhi. In this way the unconscious buddhi starts functioning as a conscious principle. <~>According to the Samkhya system, buddhi possesses the following eight qualities: virtue (dharma); knowledge (jnana); detachment (vairagya); excellence (aisvarya); nonvirtue (adharma); ignorance (ajnana); attachment (avairagya); and imperfection or incompetency (anaisvarya). The first four are sattvic forms of buddhi, while the last four are overpowered by inertia (tamas). All of its attributes except knowledge bind Prakrti and involve the Self in buddhi, thereby entangling it in worldly concerns and miseries. The pure Self falsely identifies with buddhi and thereby thinks it is experiencing what Buddha is experiencing. But through the use of the buddhi's eighth attribute, knowledge, it reflects pure and well-filtered knowledge onto Purusa from its mirror, and Purusa comes to realize its false identification with buddhi's objects and to recognize its transcendent nature in all its purity. Thus buddhi, the discriminating or decision-making function, stands nearest to the Self and functions directly for the Self, enabling it to discriminate between itself and Prakrti and thereby achieve realization of its liberated nature. Ahankara: The Sense of `I' Ahankara is a derivative of mahat or buddhi; it is the mundane property of individuation that generates a material boundary of `I-ness'. This false sense of identity separates one's self from all others and focuses it upon matter, leading a person to think, `I am this body, this is mine, and this is for me'. There are three categories of Ahankara--sattvika, rajasa and tamasa-- determined by which of the three gunas is predominant in ahankara. Eleven senses arise from the sattvika ahankara: the five senses of perception (hearing, touching, seeing, tasting, and smelling), the five senses of action (verbalization, apprehension, locomotion, excretion, and procreation), and the mind (manas). The five tanmatras or subtle elements (sound, touch, color, taste, and smell) are derived from the tamasa ahankara. The function of the rajasa ahankara is to motivate the other two gunas, and thus it is the cause of both aspects of creation: the eleven senses and the five tanmatras. <~>This explanation of the manifestation of ahankara is based on the Samkhya-karika, the major text of Samkhya philosophy (see chart). The commentators of this text hold various views. Some state that the mind is the only sense derived from the sattvika ahankara, that the other ten senses are derived from the rajasa ahankara, and that the five subtle elements are derived from the tamasa ahankara. Irrespective of the origin of the senses, all the scholars view the nostrils, tongue, eyes, skin, and ears as the physical organs that are the sheaths of the cognitive senses. Likewise, the mouth, arms, legs, and the organs of excretion and reproduction correspond to the five senses of action--verbalization, apprehension, locomotion, excretion, and procreation. These physical organs are not the senses; rather, they are given power by the senses. Thus the senses cannot be perceived but can only be inferred from the actions of the physical organs powered by them. The mind, the ego, and the intellect are called the internal senses, while the five cognitive senses and five senses of action are called external. The mind is master of all the external senses, and without its direction and guidance, they could not function. The mind is a very subtle sense indeed, but it also has many aspects, and it therefore comes into contact with several senses at the same time. According to Samkhya philosophy, the mind is neither atomic nor eternal, but it is rather a product of Prakrti and is therefore subject to origin and dissolution. The cognitive senses contact their objects and supply their experiences to the mind, which then interprets the data as desirable or undesirable perceptions. In turn, ahankara attaches itself to the objects of perception, identifying itself with the desirable ones and resenting the undesirable ones. The intellect then decides how to deal with those external objects. <~>The five tanmatras of sound, touch, color, taste, and smell are the subtle counterparts to the gross elements; they can be inferred but not perceived. They evolve after the ten senses have come into being and they are the cause of the five gross elements, which are derived in a gradual step-by-step process. First to evolve is the tanmatra that is the essence of sound (sabda), from which in turn ether (akasa), the space element, is derived. Therefore, the space element contains the quality of sound, which is perceived by the ear. The air element is the derivation of the essence of touch (sparsa tanmatra), which combines with that of sound. Therefore, the air element contains the attributes of sound and touch, although touch is the special quality of air and is sensed by the skin. The fire element is derived from the essence of color (rupa tanmatra). It combines the qualities of sound, touch, and co]or, and its special property is sight, which is sensed by the eyes. The water element is derived from the essence of taste (rasa tanmatra). All three preceding qualities--sound, touch, and color--are found in it, as well as its special quality, taste, which is sensed by the tongue. The essence of smell (gandha tanmatra) produces the earth element, whose special property is odor, which is sensed by the nostrils. This grossest element contains all of the four previous qualities. <~>Thus the course of evolution takes place in twenty-four stages. It starts from the root cause, Prakrti, and it ends with the earth element, the grossest manifestation. This process is broken down into two major categories: the development of Prakrti as buddhi, ahankara, and the eleven senses, and the evolution of the five subtle elements and five gross elements. <~>The first category is divided again into two parts: the internal senses (antahkarana) and the external senses (bahyakarana), which are the five cognitive and five active senses, respectively. The second category is also divided into two main parts: nonspecific qualities (avisesa) and specific qualities (visesa). The five tanmatras, or subtle elements are said to be nonspecific because they cannot be perceived and enjoyed by ordinary beings. But the five gross elements are said to be specific because whey possess specific characteristics of being pleasurable, painful, or stupefying. These specific manifestations can be categorized into two major parts: the external gross elements, and the three bodies--physical, subtle, and causal. The Sources of Valid Knowledge Samkhya philosophy accepts only three independent sources of valid knowledge: perception, inference, and testimony. Included within these three are other sources of knowledge such as comparison, postulation, and non-cognition, which are therefore not recognized as separate sources of knowledge. According to Samkhya, there are three factors present in all valid knowledge: pramata, the subject; prameya, the object and pramana, the medium. Pramata is a conscious principle that receives and recognizes knowledge. It is none other than the Self, pure Consciousness. Prameya is the object of knowledge that is presented to the Self. Pramana is the modification of the intellect through which the Self comes to know an object; thus it is the source or the medium of knowledge. Valid knowledge is therefore the reflection of the Self in the intellect which is modified into the form of an object. <~>The Sankhya concept of perception (pratyaksa) as a source of valid knowledge is different from those posited by other systems of Vedic philosophy. In Samkhya, valid knowledge means a definite and unerring cognition that is illuminated or made known by the Self through its reflected light in buddhi. The mind, intellect, and senses are unconscious material entities and therefore cannot perceive or experience any object. For perception or experience, consciousness is needed, and consciousness belongs only to the Self. But the Self cannot directly apprehend the objects of the world because the Self is niskriya, meaning `motionless' or `without action', and without motion or activity apprehension is not possible. If consciousness alone could apprehend the objects of the world, then, because the Self is infinite and ever-present, one would know all the objects of the world. But this is not the case. The Self knows objects only through the mind, intellect, and senses. True knowledge of an external object is attained when the impression of the object is perceived through the senses and reworded in the intellect, which then reflects the light of consciousness onto those objects. Perception is the direct cognition of an object through the contact of the senses. When an object, such as a chair, comes within the range of vision, there is contact between the chair and the eyes. The impression of the chair is produced in the eyes, and that impression is then analyzed and synthesized by the mind. Through the activity of the mind, the intellect then becomes modified and transformed into the form of the chair. The predominance of sattva in the intellect enables it to reflect the modification of the chair in the Self. It is then reflected back to the intellect. Thus the unconscious intellect, which is modified by the object chair, becomes illumined into a conscious state in which perception is possible. Just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and therefore illuminates other objects, so the intellect, an unconscious principle, reflects the consciousness of the Self and recognizes objects. <~>Two major proponents of the Samkhya theory of reflectionism-- Vijnanabhiksu and Vacaspati Misra--hold differing views. According to Vijnanabhiksu, the knowledge of an object takes place when there is a reciprocal reflection of the Self in the intellect (the intellect having been modified into the form of the object) and of the intellect in the Self. The senses contact the object and supply the impression of it to the mind, which transmits this impression to the intellect. The intellect then becomes modified by the object, but because the intellect is unconscious substance, it cannot analyze the experience of the object by itself. Its predominance by sattva guna, however, enables the intellect to be reflected in the Self, and the Self is in turn also reflected in the mirror of the intellect, which contains the modification of the object. In this way, the intellect then experiences the object. This theory of reflectionism is also accepted by Vyasa in his commentary on the Yoga Sutras. <~>According to the second view, held by Vacaspati Misra, perception is a process of one-sided reflection: There is a reflection of the Self in the intellect, but there is no reflection of the intellect back into the Self. He maintains that an object comes into contact with the senses, that its impression reaches the mind, that it is transmitted to the intellect, and that the intellect then becomes modified into the form of that object. It is at this stage that the ever-radiating light of the Self illuminates the clean sattvic mirror of the intellect, which reflects the same light onto the object. The intellect then experiences the object as if the intellect were a conscious being. The intellect is just like a mirror that rellects the light of a lamp and itself becomes capable of illuminating other objects as well. This means that the intellect, but not the Self, experiences the pain, pleasure, or neutrality of worldly objects, while according to Vijnanabhiksu, the pleasure, pain, and indifference are experienced by the Self because the Self and the intellect are reflecting each other. <~>Both of these views are possible within the major theory of reflectionism because the Self's experience of external objects, or pain and pleasure, depends on the intensity of its identification with the intellect. One-sided reflection and reciprocal reflection are both valid views because whatever comes to the intellect is experienced by the Self. A self-created state of oneness between the Self and the intellect exists, but if the identification is loosened a bit, then the consciousness radiating from the Self allows the intellect to appear as though it were conscious, and thus the intellect experiences the external object. The more the identification is loosened, the more the intellect experiences and the more the Self watches the experiencing intellect as a witness. <~>Samkhya recognizes two kinds of perception: indeterminate and determinate. The first is called alocana, which means `merely seeing the object'. It arises at the moment of contact between the senses and the object and is antecedent to all mental analyses and syntheses of sensory data. In this state there is recognition of the object as a mere `something' without any recognition of it as a specific object. Determinate perception, in contrast, is the result of the analysis, synthesis, and interpretation of sensory data by the mind. This type of perception is called vivecana (`interpretation of the object'), because it is the determinate cognition of an object as a particular identifiable thing. Inference Knowledge derived through the universal or invariable relationship between two things is called anumana (inference). The Samkhya concept of inference is slightly different from that held by Nyaya philosophy. In Samkhya, inference is of two kinds: vita and avita. Vita is based on a universal affirmative proposition and avita is based on a universal negative proposition. Vita, positive inference is of two types: purvavat and samanyatodrsta. Purvavat inference is based on previously observed uniform concomitance between two things. For example, one can infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke because one has already observed that smoke is always accompanied by fire. Samanyatodrsta inference is not based on any previously observed concomitance between the middle and major terms (see the Nyaya chapter for an explanation of the terms of inference). This type of inference does, however, require facts that are uniformly related to the middle and major terms. For example, how can we know that we have senses? One cannot perceive his senses because they are beyond their own reach, so one must accept the existence of the senses by inference. Their existence can be inferred in the following way: for all action, some kind of instrument is needed; seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching are actions that must have their corresponding instruments; the senses are these instruments. <~>Negative inference, avita, is explained in the Nyaya system as sesavat, in which an inference results by the elimination of all other possible alternatives. For example, a certain whole number is inferred to be two because it has been determined that it is not three or more, nor is it one or less. Yet it is a certain positive integer; therefore, it is two. Testimony Testimony (sabda) is the third source of valid knowledge. Samkhya holds the same view of sabda as Nyaya, and so the reader is referred to the discussion of this subject in the chapter on Nyaya. The Concept of Liberation According to Samkhya philosophy, the universe is full of pain and misery, and even what is thought of as pleasure is mingled with sorrow because all pleasures ultimately end in disappointment, which is the basis of misery. It is the natural inclination of all living beings to rid themselves of pain and misery, but Samkhya states that this can be achieved only through the correct discriminative knowledge of reality. <~>The entire external world and all internal phenomena belong to Prakrti, but pure consciousness, Purusa, is free from the limitations of space, time, and causation. All activity, change, thought, feeling, pain, and pleasure belong to the body/mind organism, not to the Self. The Self is pure ever-illumined con- sciousness that transcends the entire phenomenal world, including the body/ mind complex. The Self has a body, but the body is not the Self. In the same way, the Self has a mind, ego, and intellect, but it is quite distinct from all of these. Pleasure and pain, virtue and vice, merit and demerit do not color the pure Self; they color the intellect as it becomes involved with its surroundings. All the experiences of the phenomenal world are received by Purusa because of its false identification with the mind, intellect, and ego. The intellect is responsible for all experiences, but whenever Purusa ignorantly identifies itself with the intellect, it thinks it experiences as the intellect does, even though Purusa is actually always and forever beyond the evolutes of Prakrti. <~>The manifestation of the universe into the twenty-three evolutes of Prakrti is not meant to create bondage for Purusa but rather to help Purusa realize that it is free and distinct from Prakrti. Although it may seem that external objects are meant for physical, mental, or internal enjoyment, that is not really the case because the mind, ego, and intellect do not function for themselves; they exist to provide experiences to Purusa. Feelings of pain and misery are experienced because Purusa falsely identifies with rajas and tamas and forgets its capacity to see through its false identification. Thus, also, Purusa fails to use Prakrti's sattvic manifestations as efficient instruments for discriminating the Self from the non-Self. The predominance of rajas and tamas in the mind, ego, and intellect does not allow these instruments to filter external experiences properly, so Purusa receives unfiltered, contaminated experiences and ignorantly thinks it is suffering the pain and misery reflected by the intellect. <~>Samkhya views Prakrti as a compassionate mother that provides everything to Purusa that he needs to understand his true nature distinct from Prakrti in her manifested and unmanifested states. Prakrti manifests herself out of compassion for Purusa, just as a mother's milk is produced out of compassion for her child. Unless it is somehow contaminated, the milk from the mother's breast is always healthful to the child, and likewise the evolutes of Prakrti are healthful to Purusa unless they are contaminated by the predominance of rajas and tamas, false identification, selfish action, possessiveness, or lack of discrimination. <~>Both Prakrti and Purusa are infinite and eternal, and when Prakrti is in her unmanifested state, she is so intermingled with Purusa that he becomes anxious to realize his own true nature. Purusa's anxiety allows him to come even closer to Prakrti, and it is this move or intention toward her that inspires the latent forces in Prakrti to function. Thus Purusa initiates the manifestation of the universe, and thus Prakrti helps Purusa realize himself as distinct from her. But when through ignorance Purusa forgets his purpose in coming closer to Prakrti, then instead of discriminating himself from the unconscious principle, he entangles himself with it. The moment he remembers his purpose and discriminates himself from this manifest world and from its cause, he rea]izes his true nature and recognizes his freedom. Just as a chef continues cooking until the food is cooked and stops the moment it is ready, so Purusa continues to flow in the current of life until his purpose is fulfilled. The moment the highest goal of life--realization--is attained, he stops flowing in that current. Likewise, a dancer performing to entertain her audience continues to dance until the audience is satisfied. The moment the course of dance (which depends on the audience's duration of enjoyment) is fulfilled, the dancer stops her dance. In the same way, the great dancer Prakrti continues her dance until her discriminating function is accomplished. The moment she accomplishes her job she withdraws herself back into her unmanifested state. The purpose of the manifestation of Prakrti is to show herself to Purusa so he can realize that he is distinct from her. The moment Purusa realizes that he is not the external objects, then the entire manifestation is withdrawn. <~>In actuality, pure consciousness, Purusa, is subject neither to bondage nor to liberation, because he is never really in bondage. The concepts of bondage and liberation, pain and suffering, are the result of ignorance or false understanding. Prakrti binds herself with the rope of her own manifestation, and when Purusa recognizes her as distinct from him, she liberates herself. As has previouslyy been stated, there are eight attributes of mahat or buddhi (the intellect), which is the prime evolute of Prakrti. These eight are attachment and detachment, vice and virtue, nonmeritorious and meritorious actions, and ignorance and knowledge. Prakrti binds herself with the first seven attributes and liberates herself with the eighth--the light of knowledge. Thus bondage and liberation are both concepts of the intellect. Through the practice of the yoga of discrimination--that is, the repeated affirmation of nonidentification with the body, senses, or mind (such as, for instance, `I am not the experiencer, I am not the doer; whatever is going on is in Prakrti')--one polishes one's intellect and becomes more consciously aware of one's true nature. This type of knowledge or understanding leads one to the state of freedom from all confusions and false identifications, and thus one attains the knowledge of the true Self. After the Self realizes its true nature, all anxieties are dissolved. Then the Self becomes disinterested in seeing Prakrti, and Prakrti becomes disinterested in showing herself, because she has seen and her purpose has been fulfilled. Prakrti and Purusa are both infinite and all-pervading and are therefore eternally together, like two sides of the same coin, but when their purpose is fulfilled the process of manifestation ceases. <~>In the Samkhya philosophy, there are two kinds of liberation: jivana mukti and videha mukti. The liberation attained in one's lifetime is called jivana mukti. In this kind of liberation, a person continues his existence on this platform as a liberated being. He lives in this world and enjoys the worldly objects until he casts off his body. He continues his journey through worldly life just as a fan continues to revolve, due to its previously generated speed, for a short while after it has been switched off. When all the samskaras--the impressions of past actions--are finished, then he casts off his body and is said to enter into videha mukti, which is liberation after death. The Concept of God The earliest available text of Nirisvara Samkhya, the Samkhya Karika, does not discuss the existence of God at all. The absence of any proof for God in the Sankhya scriptures led the proponents of this system to conclude that the early Samkhya philosophers did not accept the existence of God. They in turn developed the argument that because the entire universe is a system of cause and effect, it could not be caused by God because by definition God is eternal and immutable. That which is unchanging cannot be the active cause of anything, so the ultimate cause of the universe is eternal but ever-changing. That cause is Prakrti, the eternal and ever-changing unconscious material principle. In reply to this, theists argued that Prakrti is not intelligent and must, therefore, be controlled and directed by some intelligent principle in order to produce the universe. But because there are many Purusas, they cannot guide and lead the infinite, all-pervading Prakrti, so one must therefore conclude that there is a God. But this is not possible, the proponents of nontheistic Samkhya replied, because the act of controlling or guiding Prakrti means to do something or to be active. In addition, if God controls Prakrti, then what inspires God to make her create a world full of pain and misery? Moreover, one cannot say that God has desires because desire implies imperfection, which is a quality God cannot have. Therefore, there is no such thing as God. Purusa is sufficient to inspire the unconscious Prakrti to manifest herself in the form of the universe. The result of such persistent atheistic dogmatism was that the Nirisvara Sankhya philosophers found it very difficult to explain the creation logically. One logical weakness of Nirisvara Samkhya that was attacked by theists is the belief in many Purusas but only one Prakrti. Was it one Purusa or all the Purusas together that inspired Prakrti to manifest? If only one, then creation occured against the wish of the other Purusas. Why did the desire of only one soul implicate all others in birth and death? If all the Purusas together inspired Prakrti to create, then there must be some communication and agreement among the Purusas. But there is no record of a cosmic conference of all the Purusas to make such a decision. Therefore, there must be one Supreme Being who guides Prakrti independently.