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that Ajnaana can covers?

The self possesses some superimposed qualities but has no real qualities of its own. It is also not correct to say that Ajnaana is covering these qualities for us to perceive. There is no existence for imagined qualities. It is mere imaginations of Ajnaana. Only when the existence of Ajnaana is proved, we can imagine all other attributes projected from it. Right now Ajnaana itself is imagined. Why should we accept Ajnaana? What is its function? What does it cover? No answer is available for these questions. Neither Ajnaana nor its byproducts are proved. No answer to the question of what is that object that Ajnaana can cover. All these questions remain unanswered. It is not possible to say that Ajnaana can cover Jiiva, which is different from attributeless consciousness, or jaDa (inert matter). According to Advaita, the jiiva and the jaDa, which are different from attributeless consciousness are also an products of Ajnaana. Why should we accept Ajnaana to cover the objects, which are the imaginary products of Ajnaana? The same objection that was raised earlier is applicable here also. Moreover the JaDa padaartha (inert matter) is not self-illumined like chaitanya. JaDa can be perceived when senses have contacts with the objects. When that contact is not there, the inert objects are not perceived. One does not have to bring Ajnaana to explain this non-perception of objects. In order not to recognize the self-illumined Aatmaa, which is the embodiment of knowledge, Ajnaana is required. Therefore other than for Aatmaa, for jaDa padaartha there is no need for Ajnaana.

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This is the theory of Advaita. There is nothing to cover in the self. In that case, what is that that the Ajnaana covers? What is the object for Ajnaana to cover, since self is embodiment of knowledge? Where is the need for Ajnaana? Because we are unable to answer all these questions, we should discard this Ajnaana. It is argued that the world is unreal because it is the product of Ajnaana. When the foundation itself has collapsed, how is it possible to claim that the jagat is unreal?

The Ajnaana need to be examined also from an another angle. Those who claim that this Ajnaana transforms itself into the unreal world, cannot say that Ajnaana is real. If Ajnaana is considered as real then how is it possible for the world which is the transformed product of Ajnaana be unreal? The pot, which is the transformed product of clay, is as real as the clay. In the theory where the world is accepted as real, Ajnaana, which is the cause for illusion, is not accepted that it transforms as an object which is perceived in Bhranti. When the rope is mistaken for a snake, there is no material cause for the snake that is perceived. Either silver in the shell, or snake in the rope is not a transformed object of any source. Because we don't have proper knowledge of the shell and the rope, we perceive unreal silver and snake there. To perceive such unreal objects, there is no necessity for a positive Ajnaana. According to Mayaavaada, which accepts unreal and inexplicable (anirvachaniiya), the silver and snake are products of Ajnaana. In order to perceive these unreal objects which are in front, Ajnaana is accepted as the root

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cause. According to Mayaavaada this Ajnaana alone transforms into silver, snake and the world. If Ajnaana is considered as real, then this world which is its product should also be real. If Ajnaana is also unreal, for its appearance don't we require Ajnaana? Again for this Ajnaana there should be Ajnaana as its source. According to Advaita to perceive unreal objects and their forms Ajnaana is required. Without Ajnaana the silver in the shell cannot be formed or perceived. In this way, to imagine Ajnaana requires another Ajnaana which itself requires for its perception another Ajnaana and so on. Thus the chain of Ajnaana will have to be invoked against one's experience.

Some philosophers have tried to prove the positive Ajnaana in tune with direct experience such as, "I am ignorant, I do not know anything" etc. They also say that they do not know the supreme object (parama prameya) of Shaastraas or scriptures. According to Advaita this is how Ajnaana is recognized. This is only the recognition of the absence of knowledge and not the recognition of positive Ajnaana. When you do not know the particular object, one should have some knowledge of it. Even when we don't know the supreme Brahman, we should have some knowledge of that Brahman.

Without knowing the object we cannot negate any of its aspects. Thus the knowledge of Brahman and the negation of the knowledge of Brahman, these two cannot co-exist. "I am ignorant and I do not know Brahman" - in this way one recognizes Ajnaana. Then in this Ajnaana,

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the Parabrahman is perceived as an object. Jnaana and its absence cannot co-exist. Similarly object (bhaava) and its absence (abhaava) cannot co-exist. But only Jnaana and Ajnaana can co-exist. In any case, in this Saakshi perception (I do not know Brahman), knowledge of Brahman and ignorance about Brahman can co-exist. When we get Tatva Jnaana (knowledge of the truth) by means of Vedanta, this ignorance of Brahman (Ajnaana) gets destroyed. Only because of one's experience, the positive Ajnaana has to be accepted. This world is the product of this ignorance, this is what the explanation of Ajnaana by adviatins.

By the experience that "I do not know", "I do not know supreme objects discussed in Shaastraas", we can say that only the absence of knowledge is recognized. There is no need to bring positive Ajnaana to account for this experience. When one says there is an absence of knowledge of an object, it has to be identified. This is true and acceptable. We Samsaariis are not having realization of Brahman. We are ignorant of Brahman. Still, we have some knowledge of Brahman because of statements of the wise and the scriptures. But we do not have direct knowledge of Brahman. We do not have realization of Brahman. We have only indirect knowledge. It can also be said that we only have some common knowledge (saamaanya Jnaana) of Brahman but not particular knowledge (visheshha Jnaana or viJnaana). With the either of these two meanings in mind, we can say that we do not have the knowledge of Brahman. When I say "I do not have knowledge of Brahman", the Brahman is recognized

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as an object in general (saamaanya reeti) and his particular knowledge is negated or the direct knowledge of Brahman (aparoksha) is negated. If it is accounted this way, where is the contradiction? (meaning there is none). When it is said that positive Ajnaana is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman through Vedanta, it is accepted that Jnaana and Ajnaana are antagonistic to each other. If that is so, "I am ignorant" and "I do not know the supreme Brahman" in these two experiences the positive Ajnaana and the objective knowledge of Brahman, how is it possible for them to coexist at the same time? This is how we have to question the advaitins? The Advaitins say that only the knowledge gained by Vedanta is antagonistic to Ajnaana and Saakshi Jnaana, which can co-exist with Ajnaana. This cannot be accepted, because Saakshi Jnaana is more powerful than any other Jnaana. When Saakshi recognizes happiness and sorrow, we do not have the ignorance of them. Hence it is everybody's experience that Saakshi Jnaana is antagonistic to Ajnaana. We cannot say therefore that Saakshi Jnaana of Brahman and Ajnaana can co-exist. Thus there is no proof to accept the positive Ajnaana. Therefore the theory that the world is product of Ajnaana collapses. Hence the positive Ajnaana is not proved by direct experience.

The light destroys darkness. Many philosophers view darkness as some positive object. Knowledge is also an illumining object like light. As the darkness is destroyed by light we have to accept some positive object which is destroyed by knowledge. That object should be Ajnaana. This is how they prove positive Ajnaana by logic. Light

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and knowledge though they have quality of illumination and called light of knowledge, they do not belong to the same category. It is not correct to argue that just because they are called by the same name, the knowledge need not destroy the positive object like the light destroys darkness. In Sanskrit the same word has different meanings. When we say Hari it may mean Bhagavaan or lion. Can we imagine the attributes of a lion on god because of the Hari shabda. In Sanskrit branches of trees are called Shaakhaa. Also different divisions of some institutions are also called Shaakhaa. Because of this word of Shaakhaa, can we prove the qualities of tree on institutions. Hence giving example of light and by twisting the words, positive Ajnaana cannot be proved as opposite to knowledge.

There should be some base for experiencing different illusions. Without mud there is no pot. No object can be created without a material cause. Therefore positive Ajnaana has to be accepted as a root cause for illusions. Even this argument is not correct. The illusory perceptions are also a kind of knowledge. Knowledge is also a modification of AntahkaraNa (mind) just as happiness, sorrow and desire. All these are born as waves in the mind. As water is the root cause of waves, AntahkaraNa is the root cause for knowledge, desire, joy and sorrow. Therefore we do not need positive Ajnaana for the creation of them. Just as waves, born of water are as real as water, the illusion born in AntahkaraNa is as real as AntahkaraNa. A question may arise that if illusion is real, it can become Yathaartha Jnaana and hence PramaaNa. Though illusion

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is real, it is not yathartha. It cannot be considered as PramaaNa. Any knowledge can become PramaaNa only when knowledge and its object are real. Even though the knowledge is real, if the object is unreal that knowledge is Ayathaartha or ApramaNa. It is said in illusory perception objects are unreal, but it is not said that Bhrama itself is unreal and has not occurred. It is said that there was no snake, which is perceived in the rope. But it is not said that the illusory perception of the snake has not occurred. It is everyone's experience that there was no snake, but its illusory perception was there. Hence illusion is real, but only its object is unreal. Thus we should understand the difference between illusion and Yathaartha Jnaana. Hence the illusion like other things born in AntahkaraNa are real only. A positive Ajnaana need not be imagined as the root cause for all this. There is no existence for the objects which are perceived in illusion. They are only imagined. There is no need of any root cause. The object, which is perceived only out of imagination, is not the result of transformation of some other object. Hence we need not accept a new positive object like Ajnaana for illusion to occur.

9. ViswaMithyaaatva vaada:

All this external world consisting of the five elements (Pancha Bhuutaas) and the internal world consisting of joy, sorrow and ignorance etc., together is Mithyaa. All this is superimposed on formless pure consciousness. This Aatmaa alone is real. Everything else is just an imagination

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like in a dream. Just as everything seen in the dream disappears, when awakened, the entire world disappears when the realization of Brahman occurs. Until realization of Brahman takes place, the whole world appears just as in dream. This is the main doctrine of Maayaavaada. To establish this doctrine, they use both logic and Vedic statements. According to Maayaavaadins the statements, "neha naanaanasti kincana" (there is no world of plurality), "ekamevaa advitiiyam brahma" (Brahman is one without a second), etc., establish that the world is Mithyaa. We will discuss later the exact meaning for these statements. Shree Madhvacharya argued that these Vedic statements do not prove that this world is Mithyaa. When the whole world is Mithyaa, will it possible for the Vedic statements which are part of the world to be real? Along with the world these statements also become Mithyaa. No object which is Mithyaa can create anything. Unreal statements cannot prove anything. Just like dream objects they cannot be used for any purpose or action. If that is the case, what is the proof to claim that the world is Mithyaa? Aatmaa, which alone is real does not have any qualities and is actionless. Aatmaa, which remains actionless, cannot contribute anything, in the creation of this illusory world, which is the product of Avidya. Other than Brahman everything else is an imaginary product. The Vedic statements which lost their existence along with the world cannot prove anything to be known. The Vedic statements by declaring that this world is Mithyaa, themselves have become Mithyaa cannot be the proofs in establishing that

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the world is Mithyaa. When the PramaaNaas (means of knowledge) are themselves unreal, there are no other means to conduct any discussions and so all the arguments and counter arguments lose their purpose. In critical discussions, it becomes obvious that the above Vedic statements cannot establish that this world is unreal.

10. Unreal Cannot Be the Cause Of Action:

Though the world and the PramaaNaas such as Vedic statements and others, which are part of the world, are unreal, why cannot they be cause of action? Do we not get fear on perceiving the snake in the rope? Don't all the people experience joy and sorrow from the imagined objects perceived in the dream? Similarly even if the PramaaNa is unreal, why cannot they establish that the world is real? Such questions may arise. But we don't get fear from the snake that is perceived in the rope. We must recognize that fear comes from the knowledge of the snake and not the snake-rope. Even though snake is there, we get scared when we have the knowledge of it. If we don't have the knowledge of snake, even if it is moving around us, we don't get scared. The knowledge of snake or its illusion is the cause of fear. We cannot deny the existence of this snake perception. We see in dream different pictures generated by one's prior deep impressions (Samskaara). It is not untrue that even in dreams we get peculiar and divergent feelings. In dream we experience joy and sorrows which are the results of Samvedana (knowledge of impressions) which are resulting from one's prior

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Samskaara. In all these cases, it is only the knowledge, which is real and it is the cause of one's joys, sorrows and fears, which are different states of mind, but not the objects, which are perceived in dream. The snake perceived in the rope, may be unreal. Even though the object perceived is unreal, the illusion need not be unreal. It is nobody's experience that the illusion that occurred is untrue. Though the illusion is real, the object perceived in illusion is unreal. This is how we should have the discriminative knowledge of real and unreal. Even if the objects perceived in illusion as well as in dream are unreal, it is true that their knowledge has occurred. It is very clear to us if we make critical examination that knowledge which is real, and is the real cause of fears, joys and sorrows.

We need to observe one subtle aspect involved in this. The argument is as follows: Fear and anxiety occur only due to the illusory perception of the snake and not due to the unreal snake which is perceived. Even if we accept that only the illusory perception which is real, is the cause for the fear, then one has to accept that the imaginary snake is also cause for the fear. For fear to occur the knowledge or the illusory perception is not the only the cause. No one gets sacred by the mere knowledge or illusion of any object. One gets scared only when one perceives the snake in a rope. Hence we have to accept that only the knowledge of snake is the cause for fear. Then imaginary snake which is perceived in that knowledge as an object, will it not become the source of fear? If we accept that mere knowledge without the snake cannot be the cause for fear, then along

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with the knowledge, will the imaginary snake not become the cause for fear? Anyhow we need to accept that even the unreal objects can be cause for actions. Even these arguments are not correct.

If we accept that the knowledge of the snake is the cause for fear, the snake involved in that knowledge need not be cause. We call it as snake-knowledge only to differentiate it from the knowledge of other objects. For fear to occur, knowledge alone is the cause but not the snake. When we say the man in blue dress made this pot, it does not imply that the blue dress is the cause for the pot. Only to identify that man, the blue cloth is used as convenient adjective and it has never been used in any way in making the pot. When the seeds in the bag that are sown are germinated, no one says that the bag is anyway the cause for the germination. Just as different plants originate from different seeds which are intrinsically different by nature, knowledge of different objects born out of different senses are the cause for fear, joy and sorrow by their natural power. The objects, which are perceived in the knowledge, are used to identify one knowledge as different from other knowledge. But those objects are in no way involved in the effects caused by the knowledge. In this way, no imaginary object is the cause for anything. By now one may be convinced that if this world consisting of Vedaas is unreal, we cannot prove anything based on Vedaas. By this analysis, it is clear that Vedaas which have lost their existence (unreal) cannot prove that the world is unreal.

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According to Maayaavaada there are different levels of reality. The truth which is never negated by any means of knowledge is considered as the supreme truth. That absolute truth is Supreme Brahman (para Brahman). Other than Brahman no object exists really. The existence of any object is seen till we get realization of supreme Brahman. Hence an object is considered as Vyavahaarika Satya (empirical truth). The empirical objects are temporary potential for utility as long as they are perceived. Even though they disappear after realization of Brahman, till then they are causes for action. As per the theory, the world and the PramaaNas belong to this category. But the snake that is perceived in the rope, is neither the absolute truth nor empirical truth. After we perceive the snake in the rope, upon examination, we get the correct knowledge that this is not a snake and it is only an illusion. Either the snake in the rope, silver in the shell, or dream world perceived for the time being and these perceptions get negated only by one's inquiry of their respective realities. These illusory objects are considered as 'praatibhaasika' (these objects exist as long their perceptions remain). These 'praatibhaasika' objects are not potential for any utility. The world is not absolute truth and it does not belong to this (praatibhaasika) category. It is still Mithyaa, but is empirical (vyaavahaarika), and therefore is potential for utility. The Vedas and other texts, though they are not absolute truths and belong to the empirical category, they can establish that the world is not absolute truth and is Mithyaa. This is the theory of Maayaavaada. Even this

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argument of Maayaavaada is incorrect.

It is meaningless to categorize the truth into three parts and there is no proof for this hierarchical structure. It is not based on experience either. It does not make any difference in terms of their existence for the entities which have been perceived whether they are sublated instantly or after a long time. Though the object is perceived, if it does not have real existence, even during illusion, it cannot be a cause for any action. We cannot make any ornament out of gold that is perceived in illusion. Even if we get joy and sorrow from the objects in the dream, they are not the cause for that joy and sorrow. The illusory perception of the dream objects alone is the cause for that joy and sorrow. Even if the objects in the illusion are unreal their perception is not unreal. "So far I had illusion", this is how the existence of illusory perception is recognized. From this real perception of illusion only we get joy and sorrow, but not from the objects themselves that are perceived in the illusion. These objects are not potential for any actions even during that illusion. Hence the objects, which are not absolute truth, get sublated in time, whether they are perceived for a short or long period. They are not potential for any action. There is no meaning in categorizing the truth at two different levels as absolute and empirical. All the objects, which get sublated at any time, come under a category of unreal. If you don't accept this world as absolute truth, you have to consider it as unreal only. Hence Vedaas also are unreal, as they are part of the unreal world. How can these illusory Vedas prove the unreality of the world?

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11. Kathakataa Vaada

To discuss the reality of the objects and to have arguments and counter arguments where is the need to depend on the reality of the proofs? Don't the atheists conduct debates or discussions without accepting the reality of the proof? To establish the reality of the proofs, some philosophers argue with the Buddhists etc., who do not accept the reality of the proofs. Only one of the two; proponent or the opponent (Vaadi or prativaadi,) accepts the reality of the proof, while the other does not. Still, don't they argue with each other? Similarly, other discussions also do take place without concerning about the reality of the proofs. If that is so, there is no necessity to accept the reality of the proofs for discussions. Without an in-depth analysis of the reality and unreality of the proofs, and also not being concerned about it, at the same time accepting their validity only at their face value, one can still have some serious discussions. Similarly, according to Maayaavaada, to establish that the world is Mithyaa on the basis of Vedaas, there is no need to establish the reality of the Vedaas.

From one aspect, one can say that there is some truth in this argument. The reality of proofs need not be established before the discussions take place. Some kind of rules and regulations are accepted before the discussions take place. Later on during the discussions the reality of the proofs can be established. To prove the existence of any object, authentic means of knowledge (PramaaNa) is

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required. The cause has to presuppose its existence. Spinning machine should exist before one makes a cloth. Nothing can be created without a prior existence of a cause. This theory is accepted by all. To establish the presence of an object, the existence of a proof has to be accepted. This is how they establish the reality of the proofs in discussions that take place. To start the discussions it is not necessary to accept the reality of the proofs. The reality of the proofs will be established in the discussions that start with accepting their validity only at their face value.

The existence of the fire is established as the cause of smoke by using logic that there cannot be any smoke without fire. Similarly discussions cannot take place without PramaaNaas which form the basis for discussions. Thus the reality of the proofs can be established. Hence the question does not arise before the discussions whether the reality of the proofs is accepted or not. Our aim is to establish the reality of the proofs for those who do not subscribe to it by somehow bringing them into discussions.

Even those who argue saying that they do not accept the realty of the truth and are not really concerned about the proofs, in fact, indirectly accept proofs and errors in the arguments. The proponent has to establish during arguments and counter arguments that he has sufficient proofs for validating his arguments, and show defects in the proofs of the opponent for invalidating them. In addition, he has to establish that all components are there in the proofs that he has quoted. On one side, he establishes

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his theory accepting some proofs for the validation of his arguments and the errors in the other's; and on the other side, he argues without being least concerned about the reality of his proofs; is this not a contradiction? Hence even those who say that they can argue without the acceptance of the reality of the proofs have to accept some rules and regulations which are essential for any discussions to start. In establishing their views they have to accept the existence of the rules and regulations and in refuting the opponents views they have to accept the errors in their proofs. In all these they have indirectly accepted the reality of the proofs. Hence it is meaningless to say that one can argue without accepting the realities of the proofs. Thus if world is unreal, all the means of knowledge including Vedaas become unreal and no theory can be established and hence neither discussion nor debate can take place.

12. The World Is Not Inexplicable:

According to Advaita this world, which is different from Brahman, is neither real nor unreal. It is described as 'sadAsatvilakshNa' (neither Sat nor Asat). That (vilakshaNa jagat) is considered as inexplicable (Anirvachaniiya). This theory where this world is neither Sat not Asat is peculiar indeed. It is not convincing to anyone's mind. When one says that an object is not real, he has almost accepted that it is unreal. Then how can he say that it is not unreal? While having accepted that it is unreal denying that it is not unreal is a contradiction indeed. Has anybody anywhere seen an object which is neither real

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nor unreal? By logic it is not possible to prove any object that has never been recognized by anybody anywhere. Can an uncivilized person who is living alone in a remote island and has never seen a fire in his life infer fire on seeing smoke in the hill? A man who has no knowledge of the fire, can he infer fire after seeing the smoke? When we have never seen any object that is Anirvachaniiya (neither Sat nor Asat), how can we establish that this world or silver in the shell are such (Anirvacaniiya) objects?

Even though an object is unfamiliar we can imagine it in a general way. The qualities and attributes that are seen in some objects are not there in all objects. The heat in the fire is not there in the water. The gross form of the earth is not present in air. Even though some qualities and attributes are present in some objects, they may not be there in some other objects. Similarly, though we have seen reality and unreality in some objects, they may not be present in some other objects. Fruits have ruupa (form) and milk has rasa (taste), but air does not have both of them. Similarly we can prove that entities are neither Sat nor Asat. By this we can have some general knowledge of some object that can be neither Sat nor Asat, but we cannot determine that this is that specific object. Can we not arrive at some conclusion that silver that is perceived due to defects in the senses can be such an object, which is neither real nor unreal? Thus, it is argued that having general knowledge of an object that is neither Sat nor Asat, one can logically establish the silver alone is that perceived in shell can be an Anirvachaniiya object. Thus by logic one

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can gain that particular knowledge of Anirvachaniiya object. Even this argument is not correct.

There is no such rule that objects can exist without any attributes. Every object has some qualities and attributes. Let us examine the nature of an entity-ness (vastutva). Is there any entity without an attribute? Every object has the qualities of 'padaarthatva' (particular aspect) and vatsutva (general aspect). Similarly why should the reality (Satyata) be not present in all objects? Even if we accept the rule that all attributes need not be present in one object, that does not prove that an object can be present as neither Sat nor Asat. There is no reality in unreal horns of hare. There is no unreality in the horns of a deer. The presence of reality and unreality are not there in these respective objects (horns of hare and horns of deer). Why should one be obstinate to say that the same object cannot have the presence of reality and unreality?

Therefore by using logic that has no base, it is not appropriate to argue that an object does not have reality and unreality Everyone has a direct experience that the world that is seen is real. We perceive the objects like milk, fruits and cow etc., which are seen, and internal 'entities' like joy and sorrow, which are experienced as real. Does anyone perceive them as unreal? How can logic prove the unreality of the objects by denying their existence (astitva) which has been established by direct perception (Pratyaksha) and by Saakshi (witnessing consciousness)? When it is clear by direct perception that there is no fire in

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the pond, ignoring that, can anyone use logic to prove the presence of fire in it? All philosophers have accepted that logic cannot establish anything against Pratyaksha. Therefore when the world that is recognized by all as real, it is not possible to prove by any logic that it is neither real or unreal?

Is there any logic to prove that this world is either Mithyaa or Anirvachaniiya (inexplicable)? It is argued that this world is not real because it gets destroyed by the realization of Brahman. But why should any object be considered as unreal if it gets destroyed? Only an existing object can get destroyed. Destruction is not possible for non-existing objects. Only pot can be broken by forceful hit and not the horns of hare. (Only those objects that have existence can get destroyed). If the world is destroyed by the realization of Brahman, we can say that the world is destructible and impermanent, but it cannot be said as unreal. According to terminology of Advaita, the object, which is not existing at any time, is unreal (Mithyaa). Is it possible for the horns of hare, which do not have existence at any time to get destroyed? When it is accepted that the world is destroyed by the realization of Brahman, it implies that it was real before destruction. Hence it cannot be proved that the world is unreal as it gets destroyed by the realization of Brahman.

We do not say that the world is destroyed by the realization of Brahman. Just as the dream disappears as soon as one is awakened, this world also disappears as soon

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as the realization of Brahman. After realization of Brahman, one recognizes that this world ceases to exist. Therefore this world is unreal like dream. This is how they establish their arguments.

The argument that the object that was perceived before is now considered as non-existent and unreal soon after knowledge is acceptable. But is there any proof that soon after realization of Brahman one gets knowledge that the world is not existing? Is there anyone who has had such an experience? Only if it is proved that this world is sublated by the experience of such realized souls, we could accept that this world is unreal. No Jnaani has such an experience. If one has such an experience, how can he communicate that knowledge? To communicate one needs body and senses. How can they explain their experience when all these equipments have disappeared? In any case, it is not established that this world is sublated by the realization of Jnaani-s. Hence on that basis, the world cannot be established as unreal.

In fact, Baadha means "the subsequent correct knowledge of the object which was mistaken earlier as something else". When the rope is mistaken for a snake is subsequently recognized as a rope correctly, it is called Baadha. We cannot prove any object as unreal by this sublation. (This may be actually called Yathaartha Jnaana rather than Baadha). As per this definition, even supreme real (Brahman) is not free from Baadha. Brahman who is described wrongly by other philosophers is known in its

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real form. As per the previous definition even Brahman has got Baadha. However Brahman is not unreal. The rule that whatever is perceived in Baadha Jnaana is unreal is not true, since it becomes invalid when it is applied to Brahman. Hence by this invalid and weak rule, one cannot prove the unreality of this world.

If one wants to establish anything based on logic accepting some ground rules, one should give some examples where these rules are applicable. When one sees the relation between the fire and the smoke in a kitchen, the rule that where there is smoke there is fire is validated. Then only if he sees smoke in the hill he can infer the presence of fire. Those who try to prove that this world is neither Sat nor Asat as it is subjected to Baadha Jnaana, have to provide some kind of examples to prove their point. The illusory perception of silver percieved in the shell is given as an example for this rule. But is this silver really sublated? According to their terms, the object that is destroyed by knowledge is called Baadhita. How can the silver in the shell which does not have existence on its own be destroyed? Even if it is accepted that it is baadhita because it is not appearing after the correct knowledge of the shell, we cannot accept it that it is neither Satya nor Asatya. Everyone says that the silver perceived in the shell has no existence and is totally unreal. Hence for the rule that the object subjected to Baadha is different from Satya and Asatya, the example of silver in the shell does not apply. Similarly, it cannot be proved that "the world is inexplicable (anirvachaniiya)" and "different from real and

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unreal (Sadasat vilakshaNa)", by the rule which does not have any example.

"The perceived silver in the shell cannot be unreal, because unreal objects cannot be known. We will get the knowledge of an object only if it exists in some form. We will not get knowledge of unreal objects which has no intrinsic form. But the silver in the shell, snake in the rope are perceived when illusion occurs. Therefore we go after the object to possess the silver. We run away from the rope out of fear of snake. Since silver in the shell is perceived, it is not unreal. Also it is not real, because it is sublated after gaining the correct knowledge that there is no silver in the shell. To prove that this world is Mithyaa (Sadasat vilakshaNa), why we cannot take the example of silver in a shell which is different from Sat and Asat?" Thus such questions may arise. Based on the preconceived concept that unreal cannot be perceived, to say that silver in the shell is not unreal is incorrect since it is against the experience. If there is no knowledge of unreal object or entity, how can one know that this world is neither real nor unreal. A person who does not know the dog cannot say that the animal in front is not dog. Unless you have the knowledge of unreal object, you cannot get the knowledge that this world is different from unreal. Don't we need the knowledge of unreal entity even to say that there is no knowledge of unreal? Unless we have general knowledge of an object even discussion cannot take place regarding that object. Hence we have to accept the knowledge of unreal.

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According to Maayaavaada, to have any discussion about unreal object, to negate that this world is neither real nor unreal, what is essentially required is general knowledge of unreal object. But no one gets direct perception of unreal object. During the illusion we perceive silver in the shell directly. The silver in the shell cannot be unreal as we are seeing it directly. We have to say that it is inexplicable (Anirvacaniiya) only, which is different from Satya and Asatya. We need to examine these arguments carefully.

During the illusion one does not perceive the silver as either Anirvachaniiya or unreal, because if he has recognized the object as unreal he will not go after it. Our perception is that it is real only. The silver perceived in the shell is never real. The reality of the silver is absent in the shell in all the three periods, and hence is absolutely unreal. When silver is directly perceived in a shell, do we not perceive the unreal reality of silver? (The perceived reality of the silver is concluded as unreal after the examination). The rule that unreal objects cannot be perceived is broken here. Just as the silver in the shell, the reality which is perceived in the silver is not unreal but Anirvachaniiya, different from Sat and Asat. We need not accept the perception of unreal objects anywhere. This is how Maayaavaadins may argue. But we need to recognize some very subtle philosophical aspect here. The imaginary objects do not have separate existence other than imagination. It should always be perceived in imagination only. In imagination a mere object is not perceived. It is perceived as an existent entity in the imagination. Without

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the concept of existence mere object cannot be conceived in imagination. According to Maayaavaada, if the existence of an object is never perceived that object as unreal. Unreal may not be perceived in imagination. The imaginary silver entity in the shell which is Anirvachaniiya is considered as Praatibhaasika (one which exists only as long as existence of its knowledge lasts). It does not have separate existence other than imagination. But whether there is a knowledge or not of an unreal objects like the horns of a hare or horse, they are always unreal.

Thus we should understand the difference between imaginary (Kaalpanika) entities and unreal objects. When the two, the silver in the shell and its reality i.e. its existence, are accepted as imaginary entities, both need to be recognized in imagination. Then it follows that existence of the silver in the shell and the existence of the existence and its existence, thus endless series of existence have to be recognized in the imagination. Thus imaginations of hundreds of existence is not perceived by anybody's experience. Instead of saying that the silver in the shell and its existence is Praatibhaasika Anirvachaniiya entity, when it is accepted as mere unreal, there is no need for Kalpanaaparampara (endless imaginations). The existence of silver in the shell is as unreal as the silver and is perceived. As existence is perceived, we go after the silver assuming that is real silver. There it is not necessary to invoke endless unreal existence for the existence, which is perceived in the silver. Only the Praatibhaasika object does not exist without imagination. Therefore the endless existence has

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to be conceived. No one gets such an experience. When we examine the subtler truths between the unreal and the Praatibhaasika Anirvacaniiya, the silver in the shell and its existence have to be accepted as unreal only. There is no other way out. Since unreal entities are recognized in our direct perception, the rule that there cannot be direct perception of unreal objects is meaningless. Hence based on one rule, it is not correct to imagine an object, which is different from real and unreal.

13. Illogicalities In The Theory Of Unreality Of World:

Those who want to establish that the world is imaginary (Mithyaa) have to face one very difficult problem. For any illusory perception or imagination to occur the body senses and the other equipments are essential. Without the help of the body, the self-alone cannot have illusory perception. One cannot get any knowledge. Therefore we should have body and senses prior to illusion to occur. But the entities which exist before illusion have to be real only. We may perceive imaginary objects in illusion. But it is not possible to say that the equipments of illusion, i.e. body and senses, have to be preexistent to illusory perception and they cannot themselves be imaginary. According to Advaita the imaginary objects are produced only during the imagination. Therefore one has to say that the body and the senses which are pre-existent to imagination have to be real only. But the problems don't end with this. One has to accept along with these, some other worldly objects that are the causes for producing and nurturing the body

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and senses, are also real. Is there any other world besides the above objects that constitute all jiivas and their bodies, senses and their supportive objects? Somehow those who advocate that the world is imaginary, to account for this illusion, have to accept another real new world. Thus Jaganmithyaatvavaadins have no other alternative and hence have to accept that the world is real.

14. Who has Ajnaana and Illusion?

Who gets illusion of this world? This also has to be looked into. Brahman cannot have illusion. Shaastraas have declared that Brahman is Omniscient or all knower. Where is the chance for the illusory perception or Ajnaana, which is its cause to exist in Brahman? Even according to those who propound the theory that the Brahman is 'nirguNa caitanya ruupi' (attributeless pure consciousness), there cannot be illusion (Bhranti) in an object which is attributeless (nirvishesha). Even for Jiiva this Bhranti is not possible. According to Advaita theory when Jiiva itself is Brahman, how can Ajnaana and illusion exist in Jiiva. For that Jiiva has to be accepted as different entity from Brahman. However, when it is accepted that Jiiva and Brahman as two different entities existed before illusion occurred, where is the room for the theory of Advaita? Is it not accepted that the difference between Jiiva and Brahman is natural? No one says that the objects which exist before illusion are imaginary. For illusion, Ajnaana alone is the reason. Even for imaginary difference between Jiiva and Brahman, where is Ajnaana to cause this

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difference? It cannot be in Brahman. For Jiiva to have it, the imagination of the difference between Jiiva and Brahman should exist before. For this imagination, Ajnaana is the cause. Where is that Ajnaana? Such question arises again. Where is the remedy for these endless questions? To account for Bhranti, Ajnaana is required. To account for Ajnaana in Jiiva the imagination of difference between Jiiva and Brahman is required. To produce this imagination again Ajnaana is required. Thus it cannot be possible to get out of this vicious circle. Therefore this world, and the difference between Jiiva and Brahman are real. In the end one cannot but accept this.

15. This world is not Mithyaa.

Direct perception (Pratyaksha) cannot establish that this world is Mithyaa. Does anyone of us has an experience that the world which one perceives is not there in reality and it is unreal only? When we perceive the things we recognize them as real only. No one doubts that this world is unreal. A question may arise that though we do not get experience that this world is unreal, we can know that from the words of the wise, who have experience of unreality of the world. But are there such enlightened souls in the world? If such a person exists, we need to meet him and gain knowledge from his teaching. None of us has seen such a great soul who, having realized that this world is unreal, has shared his knowledge. A person who knows fully an object as a shell will not see the illusory silver in it. Similarly those who have realized the truth cannot see

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at all this unreal world. They cannot experience even their own bodies. If so, how can they explain their experience to the world? Thus one, who has realized that this world is unreal cannot teach that to others. Those who teach cannot have this experience. Therefore from whose words, can we know that there is a wise one who has realized that the word is unreal? Thus none has direct perception that the world is unreal.

To establish the unreality of the world, is there any logical proof? We have already examined before such proofs on this aspect. The more we analyze this world using logic, we have to accept that the world is real only. Even the question of illusory world cannot arise without any basis. First there should be an object similar to silver. The person, who perceives the illusory silver, should have seen the real silver somewhere else. Only then with the help of the body and senses he gets illusion. An illusory silver perception is possible only when we really have an object similar to real silver at some other place, body, mind, senses and their defects, etc. We need to examine whether we have such real instruments to have a perception of the illusory world. Just as one should have seen earlier real silver for the present illusory perception of silver, one should have seen real world earlier to have the present illusory

* Dvaita dRistau Avidvatta DvaitaadRistau na vak bhavet I

Because according to Advaita where there is perception of duality it is ignorance that is prevailing. If there is no duality, who will speak to whom? The speaker and listener etc., are all possible only in the plain of duality.

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perception of the world. Does Maayaavaada accepts this? To perceive silver in the shell, the silver and shell should have some similarities. Hence to perceive the illusory world in Brahman, both should have some similar attributes. How can one perceive the world, which has variety of forms, qualities and attributes, in Brahman, which is without any form, quality or attribute? When the body and senses themselves are mere imaginary, how is it possible for an illusion of the world to occur? When Brahman alone is real, how is it possible even to have a concept of ignorance (Ajnaana) and Maayaa as the basis for all illusions? One cannot get any logical answers for all such questions.

We have been observing that this world is continuing systematically in an orderly fashion. How can we say that the divergent forms of creation for variety of reasons, in tune with changing place and time are imaginary? Creation involves different seeds giving rise to different types of plants and trees that yield variety of flowers and juicy fruits. Wheat is produced in black soil only. In spring time only plants bloom. If this world is mere imagination how can we account this variety in creation? We have to accept different causes for our experiences and feelings. Colorful creation or strange imaginations cannot happen from nothing. Just as the shell is the locus for silver perception, what is the locus for the world to be superimposed. It is said that the world is superimposed on the attributeless Brahman. For the variety in illusory perceptions the variety in the loci should exist. The varieties in illusory perceptions involving a man in a distant post, snake in a rope, or silver

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in a shell are because of various attributes of those objects and things. No one imagines silver in a rope. Even though they are illusory perceptions, their variety is due to various real attributes in respective causes. But what variety is there in attributeless, changeless, formless and indivisible Brahman who is the locus for this divergent world?

The house or tree in front of us looks the same for all. If this world is just an imagination it cannot be perceived as the same by all. Why not each perceive them differently?

Thus when it is examined in the light of different experiences and feelings and diversity in creation, it will be established that this world is not imaginary. It is created by different real instruments, which have different qualities. Is there single powerful logic to prove that this world is unreal? No one gets convinced of the unreality of the world by an empty logic that this world is unreal because it is seen. We decide the reality of the object because of the same reason that it is seen. If that is so, what an absurd logic it is to prove that the world is unreal because it is seen! Without this absurd logic there is no other powerful logical proof to establish the unreality of the world.

Others try to prove that the world is unreal using some other type of logic. Silver is perceived in the shell, but it is perceived only temporarily. Subsequently one gets knowledge 'this is not silver but this is a shell", which is called falsifying knowledge (Baadhaka Jnaana), that is, it negates the previous understanding. Similarly this world is also Mithyaa because the perception of the world will be

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negated by a falsifying knowledge (Baadhaka Jnaana). If this world is absolutely unreal it would not have been perceived at all. If it is absolute truth it cannot be negated in future. This world is perceived and at the same time it would be negated; hence this world is neither real nor unreal but inexplicable Mithyaa object. This is how they justify their argument.

It is already established that it is against common experience that unreal cannot be perceived and its knowledge will never occur. To say that this world is neither real nor unreal is as good as accepting the knowledge of unreal. To say that this is not tree don't we need the knowledge of a tree? Similarly when we say that the world is not unreal, the knowledge of unreal is unavoidable. Even to say that there cannot be the knowledge of unreal, it has to be known. When we perceive silver in the shell, the perceived silver exists nowhere. We might have seen silver somewhere else. But we would not have seen silver in the same shape that is perceived in the shell. Therefore the silver that is perceived in shell form is no where present. It is absolutely unreal. Yet it is perceived. Therefore silver-shell example is not proper to establish that this world is neither real nor unreal. Furthermore it is acceptable to all that the world which is perceived is not unreal. Hence it is meaningless to say that it is not real. In contrast to shell-silver, which has Baadhaka Jnaana, there is no proof for the knowledge that "this world does not exist in all the three times". When we have experience that the world exists now, how can we say it does not exist in all the three

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periods of time? If one says that though it exists now it will not exist after realization of Brahman, it will result in accepting that this world is not permanent, it is destructible but not it will be Mithyaa, which is neither real nor unreal. Is there a destruction for the unreal silver which is perceived in the shell? Even to accept destruction for an object, it should exist earlier. Only existing entities can be destroyed. But can it be possible to destroy the horns of the hare which never exists?

The scriptural statement that "na asad aasiit, na sad aasiit" is quoted as an example to prove that this world is neither Sat nor Asat, but Anirvachaniiya Mithyaa. No real nor unreal object existed at the time of dissolution of the world (pralaya). There is another scriptural statement which says "tama aasiit", that means, ignorance existed. At that time when there was neither real nor unreal, from the existence of ignorance will it not prove that an object which is different from Sat and Asat, real and unreal can exist? This is how they may argue to prove the existence of Mithyaa object. Supreme Brahman is absolutely real. The things which have never been experienced like the horns of the hare are unreal. It is the theory of Maayaavaada that the dream and the world and other entities are neither real nor unreal. But at the time of pralaya when neither Sat nor Asat existed along with ignorance (tamas), the Vedic statement says "aaniidavaatam swadhayaa tadekam", that is, the supreme Brahman who is the absolute truth also existed. If that is so, can we say the supreme Brahman is also neither real nor unreal but Anirvachaniiya? Therefore

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this Vedic statement does not mean that ignorance or tamas is Mithyaa. The worlds Sat and Asat imply the objects which are with and without forms (moorta and amoorta). At that time prakRiti which is the primordial cause of the world alone existed. During the time of 'pralaya', when there was nothing created, the omnipotent God alone by his own power began creation. This is the purport of that statement. If one examines any statement in Vedaas, Upanishads and PuraaNa-s, one does not find any statement, which can establish clearly that the world is Mithyaa.

16. Direct Perception alone is the Supreme Valid Means Knowledge:

We have to analyze one more very important issue. The direct perceptual experience is greater than all other means of knowledge (PramaaNa). By mere logical or scriptural statements alone it is not possible to negate the object which is proved by the direct perception. As a mater of fact, no where in the Vedaas it is declared that this world is Mithyaa. Even if some Vedic statements appears to indicate that the world is Mithyaa, such an interpretation which is contradictory to Pratyaksha cannot be accepted.

"kwa ca PratyakshataH praaptam anumAagama baadhitam" - "is there anything which is proved by Pratyaksha that is negated on the basis of logic and scriptures?" - This is what Shree Madhvacharya questions. Whatever may be the statement in the Upanishads or Vedaas they have to be interpreted in a way that they do not contradict Pratyaksha or direct perceptual experience. We

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cannot take the meaning of the Vedic statements 'as they are' by ignoring Pratyaksha. All the people perceive that the internal world such as pain and pleasure, and external world such as earth and water are very real. No body has got any experience that can deny them. No Vedic statements can negate such a Pratyaksha. No means of knowledge is superior to direct experience.

A question may arise here. The Vedic statements declare that the body and the soul are different, but our experience is against this. We all have an experience that we are not different from our bodies. If body is black, I am black, is our experience. We superimpose the physical characteristics on ourselves. Thus though we have the experience by Pratyaksha that the body and the soul are one, only on the basis of the Vedic statements we deny this experience. Therefore even by Vedic statements it is possible to deny the object established by Pratyaksha. Though the reality of the world is experienced, why can we not negate it the basis of Vedic statement?

We need to examine first whether we have the perception of identity between body and soul. Does any body has experience that he is the body? Right from a child onwards everyone experiences the difference between him and the body including the senses, and says "this is my body and my mind". When we say "this is my house", "this is my book", we experience the difference between we and the objects. Similarly when we say "this is my body", we experience the difference between the soul and

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the body. In that case, how does one superimpose the characteristics of the body on the self, saying that "I am black and I am fair". It is possible only when one has illusory perception that the body and the soul are not different, but they are same. Therefore by statements like "I am black", is not the identity of body and soul established? Such a question may arise.

But it is not proper to prove that one has knowledge of identity between the body and the soul, by such statements. We say that the cloth is black after it is immersed in black color. But in fact the cloth is not black but is white. We also know that it has only a color that is black. Thus though we know that cloth is not really black, we say that it is black. Everybody knows that the word black is used for the cloth, only in the sense that the cloth is associated with the black color. The statement "I am black" is also similar to this. We make such statements only in the sense that our body is black. When we deeply analyze we get only this meaning to such statements. Man is proud of his insentient body. He gets pain and pleasure by controlling the movements of his body and associating himself with the different objects through his body. This is how everybody experiences his divergent personalities from his body.

Even the mind of the newly born child is not like a blank paper. It is full of impressions carried from previous births. The mind of the baby is filled with feelings like hunger, fear, etc. It is not absolutely a new entity without

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any impressions. It is full of all kinds of likes and dislikes. It has the impressions in an unmanifested forms of different incidents experienced in previous birth. Hence all the beings even their just born state act naturally in different ways without anybody's training. Therefore everyone is naturally endowed with the discrimination of his body and soul. Nobody has direct illusory perception that he is the body.

If the discriminative knowledge of body and soul is natural, why is it emphasized in Upanishads and PuraNaas that this knowledge has to be gained? Where is the need for the teaching when subject is self-evident. We desire for different sensuous objects for the enjoyment of the body. We are anxious to possess them. We hate the objects that give discomfort to the body. We try to avoid them. How do these activities take place when one has the knowledge that he is not body? Such questions remain to be answered. There is some particular reason for all this. In fact we know that we are different from our bodies. But the soul is pervading completely in the body. The body and soul are mutually intermingled. As the fire pervades the coal all over, the soul is pervading the entire body. Because of the intensive relationship between body and soul, though one has the discriminative knowledge, it is ambiguous, and one acts as if he is the body. The discriminative knowledge, which is experienced, cannot be explained by words. Can we express in words the different degrees of sweetness that we experience? We see the difference between man to man. But we cannot explain this difference in words.

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Therefore because of intermingling of body and soul in the same place, though the difference is seen, because of lack of clarity, we use the words denoting identity of the two. To give a clear picture of the difference between body and soul, Vedaas and puraaNa-s, teach this difference. Because of deep relationship of the body, one develops attachments and love. Therefore there is a possibility of his liking the objects, which are useful for the body and hating the objects which are uncomfortable to the body. However, every being has the knowledge that body and soul are different. Therefore any entity, which is directly experienced by Pratyaksha, cannot be ruled out by any other means of knowledge. When all the PramaaNaas such as direct experience, logic and scriptures, are there to support the reality of the world, it is not correct to argue that the world is Mithyaa on the basis of some empty logic and a few Vedic statements that have not been critically examined and correctly interpreted.

17. Mithyaaatvashruti is against Pratyaksha :

Some attempt to argue that there is no conflict between the few Vedic statements, which apparently propose that the world is unreal, and the direct perception, which experiences that the world is real. The direct perception is limited to the present tense only. " The objects exist now" is the direct perception. The Vedic statement says that in future the world will be negated by the realization of supreme Brahman. Where is the conflict between them? The Pratyaksha cannot establish that an object cannot be

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negated in all the three periods of time. Pratyaksha can grasp only the present tense. Pratyaksha never perceives the past and the future. When Pratyaksha cannot perceive all the periods of time, how can it establish that this world cannot be negated for all times? Therefore there is no problem to say that objects that are perceived now need not exist in future. Therefore there is no contradiction between Pratyaksha and Vedic statements and they can be reconciled - this is how some argue.

However, when we analyze critically what 'Baadha' is, according to Advaita, then it will be clear that to say that the world is unreal is contradictory to Pratyaksha and Aagama. The Vedic statement that "neha naanaasti kincana" does not state that the world will not be there in future. This statement may mean that the divergent world does not exist. But Pratyaksha establishes that world exists 'now'. Therefore it is very clear from the Vedic statement that the world is unreal is contradicting Pratyaksha. According to Advaita, Baadha means world does not exist at all the three periods of time. While accepting the existence of the world now and denying the reality of world after realization of Brahman results in saying that the world is not permanent, destructible only. This is accepted by Dwaita also which says that the world is real. Thus, the unreality of the world cannot be established. 'Mithyaa' (unreal) does not exist in all three periods of time. It is not that the snake which is perceived in the rope exists for the time being and later gets disappeared. It does not exist even at the time of illusory perception. The imagined snake cannot be there

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at any time at the place where the rope is. Those who say that the world is unreal mean that it does not exist for all the three periods of time. All the Adwaitins accept that after realization of Brahman it is recognized that the world does not exist at any time. When by Pratyaksha it is established that the world exists, if Veda states that the world does not exist at any time, will it not be a direct contradiction to Pratyaksha? Therefore to say that the world is unreal is against Pratyaksha.

Though our five senses recognize only the present, internal sense, that is Saakshi, perceives past, present and future. The time cannot be known by logic and by other means of knowledge. Saakshi alone recognizes the time. When knowledge of an object occurs, Saakshi alone perceives whether that knowledge is valid or invalid (Yathartha or Ayaathaartha). When Saakshi recognizes knowledge as valid, it recognizes that the object of that knowledge is also real. Without object being as real, knowledge cannot be valid. The knowledge of real object is only called a valid knowledge. To say a particular knowledge is real or Yathaartha, is the same as saying that the object is real. To say that object is real means that it is not negated in three periods of time. The Mithyaa (at all negated in three periods of time, then a question arises as to how our external senses, which perceive only the present but not all three periods of time, can determine that the object is not times? But it is the Saakshi alone, which perceives all the three periods of time, unreal) though it appears to exist at one time, it is negated, in fact, in all the

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three times. It cannot exist at any time. The Saakshi which perceives the past, present and future, when it recognizes the knowledge as PramaaNa, it also recognizes the object of that knowledge is real, and is not negated in all three times. When our external senses perceive that the knowledge is PramaaNa, that is, it's object is real and is not negated determines that the object is not negated at all times. Saakshi does not perceive only the present. It knows all the three periods of time. This Saakshi determines that an object exists 'now'. When an object is confirmed that it is existent at one time, it is automatically clear that it is not negated at all times. Only an object, which does not exist in all three times, is considered as negated in all the three periods of time (Trikaala Baadhita). The Saakshi, which apprehends all the three periods of time, establishes that the object exists at present. Then it also determines naturally (that is without depending on any other means) that the object is not negated at all the times. Therefore there is no objection to perceive the reality of the world either on philosophical or scientific grounds.

18. Pratyaksha Apprehends Past and Future Tenses:

It has already been proved how the logic, which tries to establish that the world does not exist in all the three periods of time, is invalidated by Pratyaksha, even if it apprehends only the present tense. As a matter of fact, it is not correct to say that the Pratyaksha perceives only the present tense. We all know that 'tomorrow exists'. The faith that we will get liberated in future is the motivating

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force for our spiritual pursuits (saadhana). How do we get this knowledge of tomorrow and future? It has been effectively proved in this Text (Sudha), that but for Saakshi, no other means of knowledge can establish the time. We apprehend the future tense by Saakshi alone. Even to know that from Vedas and other scriptures that liberation can occur in future, we have to apprehend the future time before hand. The sentence is meaningful only when the words are understood. How can we understand the whole sentence without knowing the word by word meaning? To know the meaning of the sentence "we will get liberation in future", we have to know the meaning of 'future'. To have the meaning of the word, the 'object' of that word should be known earlier. To know the meaning of the word 'Go' is 'cow', don't we require the knowledge of the 'cow' earlier. Similarly before we know the meaning of the word 'future', the knowledge of the future time is essential. Therefore without the knowledge of future time, we cannot understand statements from Vedaas and PuraaNaas that indicate that we will get liberation in future. Hence 'tomorrow' which is experienced by all of us, has to be known by Saakshi itself.

To infer that there is fire while seeing smoke by logic, one should know that where there is smoke there is fire. Thus one should know in general all fires and all smokes in the past, present and future. Other than Saakshi, by what means of knowledge can we know this? When an object indicated by the word is known, at the same time we know all similar objects indicated by that word present in the

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past and future also. We do not take it for granted that 'only the cow which is in front of us' is the meaning of the word 'cow'. We understand very clearly that the word 'cow' indicates the cows present in the past and in future. Thus the cows existing in all the three periods of time are recognized by Saakshi alone in a general way. Therefore it is incorrect to say that the Saakshi comprehends objects only at present.

By memory, we comprehend the objects of the past. The memory is also a direct perception. This perception is not derived from external senses. It is internal perception derived from internal sense, that is the mind. It is our experience that an internal perception comprehends the objects in the past. The memory which is the direct internal perception derived from mind is also an example to say that there is no rule that Pratyaksha comprehends the objects only at present. The memory comprehends only the objects, which were perceived in the past by direct perception using external senses. It does not comprehend new objects. The memory is not at all a valid means of knowledge, because it indicates nothing new but an object, which is already known. Some object that, since memory is not a valid means of knowledge, it is an irrelevant example to prove that Pratyaksha perceives objects in the past.

This objection is incorrect. New items are perceived through memory which were not experienced by direct perception. The direct perception comprehends the objects 'exist now' only. But the memory comprehends that object

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existed in the past. The 'time' when it existed is no more, thus it comprehends its past. The past tense and its absence 'now', which is not directly perceived, can be 'new' for the memory. In fact, there is no rule that to become a valid means of knowledge (PramaaNa) it has to reveal some new object. The knowledge should not reveal an unreal object. It should indicate only real objects. Then only it becomes a valid means of knowledge (PramaaNa). (Yathaartham PramaaNam -yathaavastita artha vishayeekaari - which indicates real objects). From this point, there is no doubt that SmaraNa also becomes a valid means of knowledge as it indicates real things. Thus the memory which is considered as direct perception derived from an internal sense i.e. mind, comprehends the objects which are not existing at present. Therefore the rule that the direct perception comprehends the objects which are only at present, is meaningless.

It is not the perception derived by internal senses only i.e. Manas (mind) and Saakshi, comprehend the objects that exist in the past and the future. The perception derived from the external senses, eye etc., comprehend past and future also. When we see a person whom we have already seen "this man is the same person whom we saw before"; that is the knowledge we get from the eye. We have to accept that this perception, derived from the eye with the help of memory of earlier knowledge, is Pratyaksha only. Here a question may arise - there are two types of knowledge; a) the memory of earlier knowledge and b) direct perception of the object in front of us. The Pratyaksha comprehends at present while the other aspect is

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comprehended by memory. Therefore can we not say that the knowledge derived by external senses comprehends the objects only at present?

We can only decide by experience whether the knowledge is one or two types. We cannot change the fact that knowledge is one or two types according to our philosophy and convenience. The experience indicates the knowledge that "the person is the same whom I saw yesterday" is one. A single knowledge which indicates that the person existing in different times. Therefore there are no two types of knowledge. The eye only with the help of memory gives the knowledge that "the same person whom I saw yesterday is now in front of me". This perception is called knowledge by recognition (pratyabhiJNaa Pratyaksha). This is also an example to prove that Pratyaksha can comprehend things in the past.

Thus the Vedic statements cannot establish that the world is unreal against the direct experience of perceptual knowledge (Pratyaksha Anubhava).

19. Proofs for Existence of the World:

So far we have made it clear that there is no proof at all to say that this world is unreal. There are many ways of proving that the world is real. The world created by God is real. This is not magical projection. God has created this wonderful world by his own power, "yacchiketa Satyamit tanna mogham" "yathaatathyato arthaan vyadadhaat" "SatyaH so asya mahimaa" etc., many Vedic statements

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have declared clearly that the world, which is the token of his glory, is real. We can establish the reality of the world on the basis of our experience. We recognize pleasure and pain, knowledge and desire, and such internal feelings through the experience of Saakshi* . Perception by the Saakshi when it recognizes these internal feelings also recognizes their existence. When pain and pleasure are experienced, we recognize their existence. No one feels that pain and pleasure which are experienced by him do not exist. Thus Saakshi which is experiencing the internal feelings like pleasure and pain, it recognizes their existence also. However, experience of Saakshi proves the reality of these entities.

20. Perception of Space by Saakshi:

We can prove the reality of external objects on the basis of experience of Saakshi. "External objects are not perceived by Saakshi at all. They are perceived only by external senses such as eye etc. Thus Saakshi which can never comprehend external objects, how can it prove their existence?" Such questions may arise.

In fact, the external space is perceived by Saakshi alone. Aakaasha means space. The space is called Avakaasha and Deshha. The space and time are all pervading entities. "Here there is space" " We are at this

* Sukhaadivishayam swaruupabhuutam chaitanyedriam hi sakshi iti uchayate I - It is called sakshi that which perceives directly (saakshaat iikshate iti saakshi), which recognizes the pleasure and pain, of the nature of the individual self, and the sense of consciousness.

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time" "Now we are here", thus we can recognize the space and time even without closed eyes. Without any help of external senses, constant perception of space and time is done by Saakshi only. Just as the internal entities like pleasure and pain, the external entities of space and time are also perceived by Saakshi alone. There is no other way than accepting that Saakshi alone comprehends the space and time without any help of other senses. That Saakshi while comprehending time and space, recognizes their reality. No one denies the existence of space and time which are experienced by him. If that is so, when internal Saakshi which recognizes space and time as much real as pleasure and pain, how can we prove that they are unreal by ignoring Saakshi?

Saakshi does not recognize the space. Though it is not perceived by eye and other external senses, we can infer space by logic. We all hear the sound by ears. Where does the sound exist (sound is generally considered as an attribute and hence needs a locus). Attribute cannot exist without any locus. We have to examine what is the locus for sound. Sound cannot be in four of the five basic elements such as earth, water, fire and wind. In these four basic elements, the particular qualities, such as color, taste, smell and touch are born directly. First they appear in the part of their respective elements, later come into being in the fully formed elements. Different colors of the threads get associated with the cloth which is made out of these colored threads. However, the earth, water, fire and wind get their respective essential qualities through their parts

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only but not directly. But sound as an attribute cannot be associated with any parts of any of these elements. Sound is produced when the drum is beaten. Moreover, the qualities like color, taste, smell, touch exist as long as their loci exist. Color of the cloth, chilliness of water, heat in the sunrays etc; are seen as long as their objects exist. These essential qualities do not come and go since they are intrinsic qualities of their objects.

However, the sound is produced suddenly but disappears soon. The sound which exists for few seconds cannot be associated with the earth, water, fire and wind which are loci for permanent qualities. Not only that, how can we hear the sound if its locus is a drum born of earth or other physical objects like drum? If a sense has to comprehend an object there should be some kind of contact between the sense and its object. Our senses cannot comprehend the objects that are existing somewhere else. Any given object, when it is contacted only by a particular sense, it will be perceived by that sense. How can our ears comprehend sound which is associated with some other physical objects? Is there any contact between the ear and the sound? Sound, which is associated with those physical objects, cannot reach our ears. The quality of an object cannot come dissociating itself from its object. Can color of a cloth reach our hand leaving it? No one can say that the ear in our body goes to the drum and gets contact with the sound. We hear the sounds from a distance sitting far away. Thus sound does not reach the ear. Neither ear goes to the source of the sound. Under this circumstance, how

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can we hear the sound?

Therefore the sound cannot be the intrinsic quality of earth, water, fire and wind. Even the Saakshi cannot be the locus for the sound. As we experience pain and pleasure in self, no body experiences variety of sounds in one self. Therefore we will have to accept a new object as a locus for sound. Let us call it as 'space'. The sound which is produced by beating of a drum, creates sound in the space like waves which are born one after another in the water. These series of sound waves produced in the space reach the ear since space pervades between the drum and the ear. If any other object is locus for sound there cannot be any link between the sound and the ear. As no other object can be locus for sound, existence of space as locus for sound can be proved by logic. "As Saakshi cannot comprehend the space, it cannot prove its existence also. Therefore to say space and its reality is perceived by Saakshi is meaningless" - This is the argument of some philosophers.

The view that the space can be recognized only on the basis of logic is against our experience. Everybody has knowledge of space surrounding him in a natural way. "The bird is flying there", "The light is moving there", in such statements, we recognize the space which is implied by the word, "there". When we watch a flying bird, the space where it is flying cannot be unrecognized. That space is called "aakaasha" or sky. Thus from the child on everyone has the knowledge of the space. Therefore the space which is recognized from childhood onwards can be known by

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Saakshi alone but not by logic. The following sequence of logic: "Sound is quality of some object. Hence it needs to have some locus. Earth, water, fire and wind which are grosser elements (Moortha Dravya) cannot be loci for sound. Very transient qualities cannot be on earth and other three elements, etc." Children or lay men, who have no capacity to imagine all of these logical statements, how can they recognize the space? The sky which is colorless cannot be perceived by external senses like eye, etc. Therefore let us accept that all recognize the space naturally by Saakshi alone.

The space cannot be established by following logic alone. When the sound is produced by beating a drum, why should we not feel that drum alone is the locus of the sound? There is no such rule that the qualities of grosser elements, earth etc., are produced from the qualities of their constituents. The qualities and colors can change on objects due to heat of fire or sun. At the same time, new color, taste and smell can be born in assembly and its constituents. It is not true that color changes in the constituents first and later in the object. Due to the association of fire, the qualities and colors change in the parts and the assembled object at the same time. Thus as there is no rule that the attributes of the object are born from the quality of the constituents. Why should sounds not be produced in the drum itself when it was beaten? As new quality is produced in an object due to its association with heat, why not new and transient sounds be produced when drum is beaten or bell is rung? Following questions may arise: What is the

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connection between the ear and the newly produced sounds in drum and bell? How can we hear? As we smell the scent of the flower which is far way, subtler form of the scent is reaching the nose. Just in the same way why not the sounds from distant source reach our ears? There is no end for the wild imaginations. Instead of imagining new entities because of getting entangled with some silly rules, is it not right to amend the rules and account our transactions with well-established existing entities? As color and taste are perceived in the object, why should we not imagine that sounds are born in drum and mridangam when they are played? Instead of imagining new objects, why cannot we change the rules? As the scent leaving its original locus, goes out in all directions in subtler form, sounds can leave the drums and the mridangam and go in different directions. All these possibilities can be imagined. Thus the new entity like space cannot be established on the basis of logic. Therefore there is no other way out to recognize the space and its reality other than through Saakshi.

21. Saakshi Alone Comprehends Time:

In the same way, time is also recognized by Saakshi alone. The time which is devoid of color etc., cannot be perceived by external senses. It is not possible to know time from words of a bonafide teacher. Even a deaf person recognizes the time in a general way. Even deaf man has the knowledge of "now", "tomorrow". The deaf who do not have hearing capacity cannot know time by words of a bonafide teacher. Let us examine whether it is possible to

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know time on the basis of logic. We say that Tarka or logic is to infer an entity which has concomitance with an another entity which has to be perceived. After having seen smoke on the hill, the fire will be inferred due to the concomitant relationship between the two. Knowledge of the hill, knowledge of the smoke, knowledge of concomitant relationship between the smoke and the fire are all needed to get the knowledge of fire on the hill. Similarly we have to see on some locus an entity which has concomitant relationship with the time. Then only we get the knowledge of time. But before this process, even as we are getting the knowledge of an object, and knowledge of an entity on that object, the time is also perceived. The time is perceived along with the object. Without the comprehending time, object alone cannot be perceived. Any object is perceived as "it is" and "it was" and "it will be". When one says "it is" the present tense is recognized. When one says "it was" the past tense is recognized. And when one says "it will be", the future tense is recognized. Without recognizing the time, the mere object cannot be perceived. Even before one infers the time on the basis of logic, the knowledge of both the object (Paksha) and entity on that (Hetu) has to take place. Along with these, time is also recognized. It is everybody's experience that without comprehension time, knowledge of mere object does not takes place. Even a child has the knowledge of time, even though it does not know the words to express it Is there anyone without the experience of time, past, present and future, indicated by the words: "before, now and later." Thus time is self evident

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to all. When the knowledge of time is there, even before the logical process is involved, where is the necessity of proving time on the basis of logic? Thus for everyone to have the experience of time, without logic or words of wise or external senses, it has to be accepted that time is recognized by Saakshi alone.

Let us also examine whether there is any logic to prove the existence of time. Some argue as follows: "This is old", "this is new" thus we transact. What is implied by the following words: "old", "new", "senior", and "junior?" Without accepting a new entity like time, these transactions cannot be meaningful just by the knowledge of the other entities. Senior means one who has been living for a long time and junior means one who has been living for a short time. Because without the knowledge of time one cannot use the words like senior or junior etc., and this transaction is the proof to establish time. Can we not use these words on basis of the movement of the sun? Sun is moving every moment. Based on the number of movements of the sun we can use the words such as 'senior', 'junior', 'old' or 'new'. One is considered as 'senior' when the number of movements of the sun is more since his birth. Similarly one is considered as 'junior' when the number of movements of the sun is less since his birth. A question may arise that, based on the number of movements of the sun if we can account for all these transactions, is there a need for time? But this is not correct. The sun is having independent movement. But we use the word, which indicates an object or a person as old or new. Where is the

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relation between this person and the movement of the sun? We say that water has good smell when it is associated with a scented flower. Similarly to account the relation between the person or an object and the sun who has to his credit large number of movements, we need a third entity which can relate these two; that is the object and the sun. That third entity is time. That is how some have built up the arguments to imagine the time.

However, to relate the object and the sun, why do we need time? Some all-pervading entity can be the link between the object and the sun. Dust particles, sunrays and the space are pervading between the earth and the sun. Thus we can use all these words 'old', 'senior', etc., using the space, dust or sunrays as link between the objects and the sun movements. Hence to establish such a connection, why do we have to imagine a new entity? The need for the imagination of new entity will arise, only when it is impossible to account our transactions with the existing entities. There is no such practice to imagine a new entity by logic, when there is no demand for it. Therefore we cannot establish time only by logic. When everyone can transact from one's childhood, on the strength of their experience of time, it is not right to struggle for logic to prove the time. When Saakshi comprehends time, it also comprehends its reality. Therefore similar to space, time is also established as real, by Saakshi alone.

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22. Saakshi Comprehends the Existence of Other External Objects:

When Saakshi comprehends the internal entities like pain and pleasure, and external objects like space and time, it also comprehends the realities of these objects. Though the reality of them is established by Saakshi, how can it comprehend the reality of external objects, such as trees, pots, etc., since they are not directly perceived by Saakshi? Such questions remain to be answered. When the knowledge of an object takes place by eyes and other external senses along with other instruments of knowledge, such as light etc., then that knowledge is recognized by Saakshi. "I am happy", "I am unhappy", thus Saakshi comprehends happiness and unhappiness. Similarly Saakshi alone recognizes that "I have got this knowledge". When knowledge takes place its validity is also experienced by Saakshi alone, after critical examination. Once the validity of the knowledge is experienced, we don't get doubt about the reality of that object of that knowledge. No one gets a doubt whether it is water after drinking it and feeling happy due to quenching of his thirst. Therefore though the pots and clothes, and other external objects are not perceived directly by Saakshi, it recognizes their knowledge and their validity. The internal and external entities like pain and pleasure, knowledge, space and time, and their reality are recognized by Saakshi directly. But Saakshi does not directly recognize other entities. When the knowledge of other entities takes place by other means of knowledge (PramaaNa), then Saakshi recognizes that

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knowledge directly and examines and determines the reality of those objects. Thus Saakshi alone comprehends the reality of the objects either directly or indirectly. Hence there is no room for any doubt about the reality of the world.

Though the knowledge and the reality of other external objects are recognized by Saakshi, those objects need not be real. Saakshi does not comprehend absolute reality of the objects. Saakshi comprehends temporary reality which is there for the time being. Therefore these objects are considered Vyaavahaarika objects which means they exist temporarily. In this way, it can be argued that the world need not be true absolutely on the basis of Saakshi. Such a chain of arguments is not correct. When a doubt occurs about the validity of the knowledge its ultimate judgment is by Saakshi alone. Saakshi recognizes the knowledge, and examines it for any defects or contradictions. Thereby it establishes validity of the knowledge and thus the reality of the objects. By Saakshi alone we recognize the validity of knowledge derived from scriptures, and we try to establish the reality of Brahman. All the Vedic philosophers have accepted that Saakshi alone is the ultimate judge in deciding the validity of the knowledge. Once the Saakshi determines the validity of the knowledge after appropriate analysis, its validity cannot be questioned. It is accepted by all philosophers that Saakshi recognizes the absolute validity of the knowledge. If Saakshi comprehends only temporary reality in direct perception and determines that the reality of the object is also temporary, that will create a chaos, since absolute validity cannot be determined for any

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knowledge, and absolute reality cannot be established for any object. Why should we not also consider the validity of the Vedaas that describe the reality of Brahman, as not absolute? Brahman can also be considered an empirical, and exists temporarily. Thus we cannot get any definite conclusive knowledge of any object. If one accepts that Saakshi can recognize unquestionable validity of the knowledge of entities discussed in Vedas, why should it not recognize the validity of perception of physical objects that are in front of us to the same degree? We should follow the same rule and the method for both Vedic knowledge and perceptual knowledge. If Saakshi comprehends the validity of the Vedic knowledge of entities, which are not perceivable, why not same validity in perceptual knowledge, which is more clearly comprehended by Saakshi? One rule for direct perception and another for Vedic knowledge, such double standard cannot be justified. Therefore Saakshi comprehends the validity of the Vedic knowledge as it establishes the reality of Brahman, it also establishes the reality of direct perception and its objects of the external world.

Though Saakshi comprehends the reality of the knowledge, why the object of the knowledge is real? As we get so many illusory perceptions, why not the knowledge of external and internal entities and self-knowledge (Saakshi Jnaana) which validates all other knowledge are also illusory? Such questions may arise. If we go on suspecting every knowledge as illusory without any basis, we will get doubt in every knowledge and all our activities and

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transactions will come to a stand still. We may stop even eating because of a doubt whether the plate is full of food or something else. No one gets a doubt without any reason. We may determine the validity of knowledge when it is not negated after appropriate examination. We cannot confirm any knowledge as illusory without subsequent negation. Therefore the Saakshi Jnaana which validates other knowledge cannot be illusory.

We need to note another important fact. The knowledge of internal feelings like pain and pleasure is Saakshi Jnaana (Saakshi is locus for the knowledge). This Saakshi Jnaana, that is knowledge experienced by Saakshi, can never be illusory. We will go after silver which is perceived in the shell. We get scared and run away from the snake seen in the rope. Does anybody experience pain and pleasure which are not there? But for these experiences, causes many not be appropriate. Pleasure and pain have to occur in the mind to be experienced. The grosser elements perceived in a dream may be unreal. But the knowledge of those objects, and fears and pleasures are not unreal. Therefore, even if knowledge of other objects can be illusory but the Saakshi Jnaana can never be illusory. When unfailing Saakshi alone recognizes the internal entities like pain, pleasure, knowledge, and external entities like space and time, and the validity of the knowledge of external objects, how can the comprehension of Saakshi be illusory?

Moreover we have to accept some knowledge, which is trustworthy to account for all our transactions and

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activities. Though the knowledge generally derived from external senses, words and logic is real, sometimes illusions do occur due to some defects. Therefore there will be room for doubt whenever knowledge occurs whether it is real or illusory. To clear the doubt we need to examine the knowledge thoroughly. Since examination is also a kind of knowledge, there again a doubt may arise if it is correct or not. In this way, doubt, examination and further doubt on that examination etc., if this occurs in sequence, where is the end? Somewhere we have to stop this chain. Otherwise, we cannot be prompted to act because of these endless doubts. Some where in the chain where there is no more doubt, that trustworthy knowledge has to be accepted; and that is called Saakshi Jnaana. It can never be illusory. On the basis of that Saakshi we have to determine the reality of other knowledge. For example, when we perceive water from distance, we may get doubt about its reality. Then we go near the water, see it and drink it, quench our thirst and feel happy. Then we will not have a doubt about the knowledge that "this is water." When once Saakshi experiences happiness thereby confirms the reality of that water, there is no more doubt. Saakshi is always the valid means of knowledge. It does not recognize unreal objects. On the basis of happiness and sorrow, which are experienced by Saakshi, the validity of the knowledge will be established. That validity of the knowledge cannot be questioned. Thus the validity of the knowledge and the reality of the world are established by Saakshi, which is accepted by all as trustworthy. Now there is no room for

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any objection. If one does not agree with this point but goes on questioning the validity of Saakshi, we cannot establish anything. Thus the reality of the world is beyond any question. If existence of the self itself is denied what can be accomplished by whom?

23. Examination of the Theory of Single Soul:

In the Advaita, there is an important theory of single jiiva (soul). As we see so many objects in the dream the entire world is the imagination of a single soul. The essence of this theory is that if that particular jiiva attains realization, the ignorance gets dissolved and the whole world disappears. There is no proof to say that this world is illusory of a particular person. It is a daring attempt to say without any proof that this world is illusory perception of a single jiiva, when the world is established as real through many valid means of knowledge such as direct perception, experience, etc.

If this world is illusory perception of a single soul who is that perceiver? This needs to be examined. This world is an imagination of a person who is different from us. When we are the products of his imagination we will not be prompted to do any spiritual pursuits (Saadhana) for our liberation from Samsaara. If we are the creation of imagination of a single soul like dream world, from reality, we do not have existence at all. We all will be dissolved when realization occurs to that perceiver. Leaving us, he alone remains. He only has the chance of getting liberation. If that is the case why do we have to strive for liberation?

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Why do we have to struggle for someone else's liberation? Getting entangled by these questions, no one will have any desire for spiritual pursuits.

The person who is imagining this world is none other than himself. If this is the explanation, how can it be confirmed that among the millions of jiivaas it is this particular person who is imagining? This question remains to be answered. The great seer, who is propagating or teaching that this world is his projection, does he see this world and the subjects? If he does not see anybody or anything and if he has full knowledge that this world is just his projection (Kaalpanika), what does he teach and to whom? When he does not see anything in the world, with what spiritual pursuits he can engage himself? When he sees his own images in hundreds of mirrors or when he does not see anybody else, does he give a lengthy lecture? Having understood that the world and the people whom he perceives are real, if that great-enlightened person preaches the unreality of the world, it will be a great self-deception. Having a feeling in his mind that this world is real and preaching that this world is unreal, is it not a self-deceit? Therefore to say this world is imagination of a single person is a great joke. Hence this world is not just the imagination of a single person. It is created as real by God and other demi-gods by their knowledge and will-power. (Sankalpa Shakti)

The Meaning ofShrutiis

24. The Meaning of Shrutiis

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"prapanco yadi vidyeta nevarteta nashamshhayaH I

Maayaamaatram idam Dwaitam

Advaitam paramaarthataH II"

" vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit I "

Such statements are there in Upanishad-s. "Dwaita is just projection of Maaya - Advaita alone absolute truth. This world and notion of the duality is just imagination of some individual, which gets dissolved in future. When the individual soul which has been sleeping due to beginningless Maaya, is awakened nothing remains." When we try to analyze these Vedic statements we may understand that those statements are establishing the theory of the world being imaginary. But when these statements are analyzed using proper procedure to get the correct meaning of Sanskrit sentences, the meaning implied by these quotations will be revealed as entirely different.

We can classify the objects in the world into three types; paramAatmaa, jiivAatmaa and jada (inert matter). The mutual differences of these three objects can be classified into the following five types: 1) Difference between one jiiva and the other, 2) differences between jada-s, 3) difference between jiiva and jada, 4) difference between jada and paramAatmaa and 5) difference between jiiva and paramAatmaa. This alone is referred to as

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pancabheda . The inanimate objects like prakRiti, time and space, and jiivaas and paramAatmaa have been there in the world from eternity. They do not have destruction. As jada, jiiva and paramAatmaa, the three constituents of the universe are eternal, the difference between them should also be eternal (no beginning and no end). No body has created the differences among these three entities. It is not the imagination of anybody. The differences among these objects which do not have end, have to be without a beginning. That which is born has to end. An object or an entity which does not have an end, is not born at all. These statements establish that the differences seen in the world forever have no end and no beginning, "nivarteta na shamshhayaH" "vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenachit' Such statements when they are analyzed with the help of grammar rules, "these differences are illusory" "they are destructible", thus it is not the explanation of the reality. "This world of difference is born, this world is imagined, if they are accepted, the world will have to get destroyed and dissolved." By raising such objections and the inevitable consequences, they in fact establish that the differences are beginningless and endless. According to the definition

* Paramopanishad says: "jiiveswara bhidaacaiva jadeswara bhidaa tathaal jiivabhedo mitaschaiva jaDajiiva bhidaa tathaal mithascha jaDa bhedoyam prapanco bheda panchakaHl" - the difference between jiiva and iiwara between jaDa and iiswara, differences among jiiva-s, difference between jaDa and jiiva, differences among the jaDa-s; since world consists of these five main differences the world is called prapanca. - This is one of the definitions of the word 'prapanca', which means world.

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of valid means of knowledge, these arguments fall into the category of 'tarka" or logic. If there is no fire there cannot be smoke also. Because we see smoke, we have to accept fire on the hill. This is an example for "tarka". Similarly, if the difference seen in the universe is not there from the beginning, and if it is accepted that it is temporary and illusory, then this difference should get annihilated at some time. This difference which is ever existing even during Moksha cannot be accepted as illusory or produced at some time. These Vedic statements prove by using 'tarka' that this classification of difference is eternal.

25. The Meaning of 'Maayamatram Idam DDwaitam':

"Maayaamatram idam Dwaitam Advaitam paramaarthataH", this statement may create some confusion for us. The strong doubt may arise as per this statement that the whole universe consisting of all the duality is just Maaya or has empirical existence and Advaita alone is absolute truth. But when the reality of the world is established by PramaaNaas such as Pratyaksha, experience, Vedaas, Upanishad-s, Bhagawad Geeta, etc., and by (powerful) statements of Upanishad-s which are clear without any ambiguity, it is not possible to prove the unreality of the world by clinging to one or two Upanishadic statements ignoring all of the above. In the same Upanishad (where the above quoted statement is present), many different theories of creation have been examined. Some say that "vibhuutim prasavantwanye" meaning Brahman alone transforms himself as the Universe. Some other

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philosophers say "swapna Maayaa swaruupeti shrushhtiH anyaiH vikalpitaa" meaning the creation of the world is just like dream and Maaya (illusory), "icchaamaatram prabhoH shrishhtiH" - this actually implies that just as the pots and clothes, this world is also created by the mere will of God only. This is the final conclusion by Vedic scholars. From this background only we have to comprehend the meaning of the statement "Maayaa maatram idam Dwaitam". Maaya means not just indrajaala, magical projection. His desire, knowledge and glories are implied by meaning of 'Maaya' of God 1 . The world of the five fold differences is 'Maaya maatram' meaning it is created and preserved by God's will and knowledge 2 . The term 'Advaita' is used in Vedas and Upanishads only with the meaning that God alone is the supreme knowable and supreme being. One should not misunderstand that just by the term of 'Advaita' there is no entity other than Brahman. It is used in the sense that God alone is the supreme being, and that is the meaning of this above statement. Thus when we analyze using the rules of the Sanskrit language, we understand that the above statements do not establish the unreality of the world.

1 Mahaamaayetyavidyeti niyatiH mohiniitical prakritir vaasanetyevam tavecchaananta kacchatell

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26. Meaning of Statements Shruti " VaacaarambhaNam "

There is a statement in Chandogya Upanishad, "vaacaarambhaNam vikaaraH naamadheyam, mRittikaa ityeva satyam", is used to establish the unreality of the world. Those who propound that Brahman alone has been transformed into this world, also establish the theory of transformation (pariNaama vaada) on the basis of the same Upanishhadic statement. In the beginning of the section of the same Upanishad, "ena vijnaatena sarvam vijnaatam bhavti" - such statement is also there. This statement means that one who knows Brahman knows everything. How can we know everything if we know Brahman? Brahman alone has transformed himself into this world, as the clay alone has been transformed into pot. Hence pot is not different from clay. Similarly this world which is transformation product of Brahman is also not different from Brahman. Therefore everything is known if Brahman is known. Bhrama-PariNaama-vaadins argue that this statement only means Brahman alone has transformed into this world.

After the statement , "ena vijnaatena " in the same

section the former statement " vaachaarambhanam "

follows. Pot and other products of clay are of different varieties and we use different words just for transactional purposes although they are of clay. These products do not have different existence apart from clay. Similarly this world which is just a transformation of Brahman does not have existence apart from Brahman. They explain this statement that this world is nothing but Brahman.

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Those who say that this world is unreal, also interpret this statement more or less in a similar manner. This world is just superimposed in Brahman. This Brahman alone is real. This world does not have separate existence. As the products of clay are not different entities from clay, there is no other real entity other than Brahman, "vaacaarambhanam" " naamadheyam" this means we use different words to name different objects of the world. This is just nothing but different names. From the point of absolute truth, all objects associated with the names and forms are not real. Brahman alone is real. If we know the rope we get the correct knowledge of the snake which is perceived. Similarly, when we realize Brahman, we will get correct knowledge of the world that is superimposed on Brahman. This is how they describe that the world is unreal, and this is the essence of the above statement.

But when critical examination is conducted, we can understand that the meaning of the above Upanishhadic statements cannot be either that Brahman alone has been transformed into this world or this world is superimposed on Brahman. In the beginning of this section of the Upanishad, "sadeva soumya idam agra aasiitl... sa aikshatal .. tat tejo asrajatal" such statements imply that Brahman saw all this and he created. Brahman is the creator of this world just as a potter for a pot. Brahman is not the material cause of the world, unlike clay for a pot. Can clay plan and think before it becomes a pot? Can the supreme Brahman, who is of the nature of consciousness and changeless, transform himself into this inanimate whole

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wide world? Therefore this Upanishadic statement cannot establish that this world is just transformation of Brahman.

Similarly if this world is superimposed on Brahman, we cannot say that the world is nothing but Brahman. The snake perceived in the rope cannot become a rope. When a rope is recognized properly the snake that was perceived before will not be seen anymore. After proper realization, he will not have an imagination of snake at all. Similarly, if the world is superimposed on Brahman, once Brahman is realized, the knowledge of the world gets dissolved. When the truth is revealed, the unreality cannot be seen. Whereas after realization of Brahman by jnaani, the world is still perceived. If he can still see the world, it cannot be unreal.

Then what does it mean? How can we know this entire world by knowing Brahman? This has been explained by Shree Madhavacharya in detailed manner. When we eat a fruit we take only its delicious sap throwing out its skin and the seed. But we say that we ate the whole fruit. If the essential part of the fruit is enjoyed, the whole fruit is enjoyed. When we see the important places in a city, even though we have not seen every lane, we still say we have seen the entire city. Similarly Brahman is the essential part of the world. He is the most important part of the world. By knowing Brahman, the entire world is known. In this way, the Upanishad statement, 'ena vijnaatena sarvam vijnaatm bhavati,' indicates the supremacy of Brahman. Only to indicate the greatness of Brahman, creation of this

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world which is his supreme glory is described in this section.

"vaacaarambhanam vikaraH naamadheyaml mRittikaa ityeva satyaml" - This statement also does not establish the unreality of the world, 'vaacaarambhanam' this word only implies that an object which can be transacted through sense of speech. Are all the objects transacted through speech unreal? Even Parabrahman who is talked about in Vedas becomes an object of speech and therefore falls into the category of unreality. Therefore the word 'vaacaarambhanam' does not imply that the world is unreal, 'vaacaarambhanam' implies that an object can be known only through the organ of speech and not by any other means. We use only words to indicate the objects but they have no existence from the point of absolute reality. After deriving such a meaning by stretching the words with great difficulty, an effort is made to squeeze the meaning of unreality of the world. This meaning could be accepted if that Upanishad statement has the words such as 'kevala or maatra' meaning 'only'. But such words are not available in that statement. It is not correct to impose the meaning on the Upanishads by borrowing words which are not there. Similarly 'naamadheyam,' which means the objects which are products of superimpositions are only for the 'name sake'. No such object really exists. This argument which denies the existence of the world also suffers from the same problem, 'naamadheya maatram' ' only for the name-sake' - such an indicative word is not there in the Upanishhadic statement. We cannot get the real meaning of the Upanishad by exercising and imposing our preconceived meanings on

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this. Therefore the attempt will not be successful in getting the meaning that the world is unreal by blowing out of

proportion of the words such as 'vaacaarambhanam

naamadheyam.'

Let us analyze the correct meaning of this statements. Brahman is the essence of this world. If that supreme Brahman is known, the entire world is as good as known. In support of this, the above statements indicates the examples used by our ancestors. The vernacular languages such as Kannada, Marati, Tamil which are born from the colloquial use of Sanskrit are not beginingless. They keep changing with time. The Sanskrit language, which is used by Vedas which are considered as "apourushheya" - not originated from humans, is only eternal. All languages are born out of Sanskrit. That Sanskrit language was the prime language in our world during Vedic period. A person who knew Sanskrit, even if he did not know any other language, could transact in any part of the world. Just as it is said that if English, which is now an international language, is known one can transact in any part of the world. Sanskrit had commanded such a great position in olden days. Hence if such an important language, that is Sanskrit is known, all other languages are as good as known.

By giving this Sanskrit language as an example, to establish the view that if supreme Brahman is known, everything else could be known, this statement describes eternal nature of Sanskrit language. In the Upanishhadic statement the word mRittikaaa word is followed by word 'iti.' It is a general rule in Sanskrit language that if 'iti' is

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used after a word then that word means itself instead of the object. The word 'Raama' means 'Shree Raama', but 'Raameti' means the name 'Raama." Similarly 'mRittikaa iti' word indicates instead of mud, Sanskrit word 'mRittikaa' etc. The word 'mud' or 'mannu' in other languages, is born of Sanskrit and hence not eternal. The Sanskrit language alone which consists of words such as 'mRittikaa' etc., is the eternal mother language of all other languages. This Upanishad statement establishes that Sanskrit language alone is the prime language. "mRittikaa ityeva satyam" here the word 'satya' is used in the sense of 'nitya' or eternal. We can see in Vedas also where the word 'satya' is used in the meaning of 'nitya'. 'etat satyam brahmapuram,' this Vedic statement says that though the body undergoes different modifications due to age, Brahman, being the cause for the life and nourishment by pervading throughout the body, does not undergo any change during aging. It is not destroyed along with the body. The word 'satyam brahmapuram' indicates that the perfect Brahman is 'satya,' and thus implying that he is also eternal or 'nitya.' Similarly to say Sanskrit language alone is eternal, the word 'satya' has been used here. Thus the statements 'vaacaarambhanam vikaro namadheyam', etc., establish that by the knowledge of supreme independent Brahman, the dependent world is also known. They do not indicate that the world is unreal. We are not able to see a single word, which indicates unreality of the world.

In this section of the Upanishad, the example of clay

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and its products is given to explain, using similarity between God and the world, how the world can be known when God is known. By knowing a ball of clay, we can know all the products of the clay in a general way. By knowing a single ornament of gold, all the products of gold are easily understood in a general manner. To identify an elephant one need not see all the elephants in the forest. By knowing a single elephant we can know all the elephants in a general way. Similarly when Brahman who is the embodiment of consciousness, bliss, and omni potency is realized, the whole universe, consisting of sentient and insentient entities, which are of different nature and have different capabilities, is known. To describe this only Upanishad gives the example of clay and its products. Thus the Upanishads, by giving example of objects and language which is used for communicating the presence of objects, explain the similarity between the world and Brahman, and the supremacy of Brahman over the world. By this reasoning, they also explain how the world is known when Brahman is realized.

If the world can be known when Brahman is known due to the similarity between Brahman and the object of the world, on the same basis, can we not know Brahman by knowing the objects of the world? What is the specialty of Brahman? These questions will arise. In this there is some thing special to be noted. The world is a reflection of Brahman (Brahman is Bimba and the world is Pratibimba). For reflection to have any attributes or qualities, they should be present in the Bimba. Each object

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of the world has its own special quality. To see all these qualities individually in each one of them, they should be present in total in condensed form in Brahman. Divergent properties that are seen in different objects of the world are just an echo of infinite varieties of capacities in Brahman. Each object has its own qualities, which are different from those of the other. It is impossible to know severally all these objects with all their individual qualities. All these powers are concentrated in Brahman in the form of consciousness. When Brahman, who is the confluence of all qualities and powers, is known there is no necessity to know this world where these powers are spread separately. But even if we know each of the objects of the universe, we cannot have the concept of the Supreme Brahman who is the ocean of infinite qualities, powers and attributes. If we see a big garden of all varieties of trees and plants, we need not see other trees and plants individually. But if we see trees and plants individually the concept of big garden may not be possible. Brahman is similar to the most beautiful garden with a big museum. When supreme Brahman, who, being a Bimbaruupi (source of reflection) of the world, is the locus of all qualities and powers, what great things are there that can be known in the world, which is just the reflection of Brahman? Thus world is as good as known when Brahman is known due to their relationship of Bimba-Pratibimba bhaava and superiority and inferiority. This is what is exactly implied by the Upanishads showing the example of objects and language, but not the unreality of the world.

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Even those who are advocating that this world is Mithyaa also accept that this world is not like the objects of dreams. Neither it is like the snake perceived in the rope. We do not gain anything from the objects of dreams. It is cannot be used for any purpose. We may get scared after seeing the snake in the rope. But that snake cannot bite us. We cannot prepare bangles and vessels by the silver perceived in the shell. No purpose is served by these imaginary objects. Even according to Advaita this is considered as 'praatibhaasika satya' (they exist as long as their knowledge exists). But this world is not like the imaginary objects. They are Arthakriyaakaari, meaning they and their products can be used. We have different benefits from these objects. Even those who accept that this world is Mithyaa, accept the difference between the objects of pratibhaasa and the world. Moreover we realize during our lifetime that the reality of the pratibhaasika objects is negated. We will realize in time that it is not real snake that has been perceived in the rope. That the experience that negates the reality of the world does not occur in our whole life. Even according to Advaita this experience occurs only when Brahman is realized. No body has such experience in this world. Therefore this world is absolutely different from objects of dreams, which are considered as praatibhasika by Adviatins, including the imaginary objects such as snake in the rope. We can establish that this world is not Mithyaa, but it is as much real as Brahman. We can only say that Brahman is eternal as He exists at all times, and this world is impermanent as it gets destroyed. But it is not justifiable from any angle to

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say that this world is Mithyaa like silver in a shell or the objects of the dream.

27. The Identity of jiiva and Brahman is not Implied in Shruti:

Shree Madhvacharya has established in his Anuvyaakhyaana that Vedaas and the Upanishads propound Shree Hari as different from all the souls. He is the Supreme Being, full of infinite qualities and the creator of this world. But according to Advaita vedanta, 'tat twam asi', ' aham brahmaasmi' such Vedic statements imply only the doctrine of single shuddhabrahma (pure consciousness). The fundamental identity between jiiva and Brahman is only accepted by Vedaas. To establish the non-difference between jiiva and Brahman, they quote 'satyam Jnaanam anantam' to describe the nature of jiiva and Brahman, and argue that the ultimate import of the Vedaas is Advaita alone. Even this aspect has been examined in Anuvyaakhyaana in many places. Jiiva and Brahman have many different contradicting qualities. Jiiva is suffering in this Samsaara being ignorant. In contrast to this, Brahman is described in Vedaas and Upanishad-s as omniscient, locus of all attributes, and creator of all. How is it possible for two entities to become one and the same when they have contradicting qualities like fire and water? Jiiva has experience that "I am not without sorrow and I am not perfect." Hence he has explicit knowledge of difference between him and the Lord. If that is the case how can one advocate identity of jiiva and Brahman just on the basis of a few such Vedic statements? It is also not correct to prove

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the identity between only two pure conscious entities, devoid of contradicting qualities of Jiiva and paramAatmaa. Can we propose the identity between fire and water by removing their contradictory qualities? Even though we discard those qualities mentally, is it possible to discard the intrinsic qualities of those objects? Therefore two entities which possess contradicting attributes and qualities cannot become one and the same.

Even though the contradictory qualities are experienced, they are mere illusory. From absolute point there is no quality either in jiiva or Brahman. Though we perceive blue color in the sky, it does not exist there in reality. Similarly the qualities such as sorrow and ignorance experienced by jiiva and the contradicting qualities that is omniscience and independence etc. of Brahman are not really existing. They are just perceived due to ignorance. Therefore according to the doctrine of Advaita, it is not correct to prove the difference by negating Abheda between jiiva and Brahman on the basis of contradictory qualities. But where is the proof to say that the ignorance and sorrow experienced by jiivaas, and the supreme Power and omniscience of Brahman, which are established by Vedaas, are illusory. When the respective qualities are established in jiivaas by direct perception and in Brahman on the basis of Vedas, how can we deny them? We have to accept the difference between jiiva and Brahman on the basis of contradicting qualities, which are proved by PramaaNaas. As an answer to this, the explanation of Advaita follows: The Vedic statements are supreme among all PramaaNaas.

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Such Vedic statements establish the identity between jiiva and Brahman in several parts of Upanishad-s, such as 'tat twam asi. etc.' If sorrow and ignorance which are in contrast to the nature of Brahman are perceived by jiivaas in them, are real, how can Vedic statements declare the identity between jiiva and Brahman when both of them possess contradicting qualities in reality? When valid proof such as Vedaas establishes identity between jiiva and Brahman, we have to accept that the sorrow and ignorance of jiivaas, which are contradictory to the nature of Brahman, as illusory and reject the perceptual experience as valid proof. Rejecting Pratyaksha is only proper following more valid Vedic statements, when there is a contradiction between Pratyaksha and Vedaas. Therefore when the qualities of jiiva, which are perceived by Pratyaksha are rejected in total without any hesitation, then the jiiva and Brahman do not possess any contradictory qualities. Hence the identity between jiiva and Brahman propounded by Vedas remains unaffected.

We cannot be satisfied by this answer. All philosophers try to interpret Vedas according to Pratyaksha without contradicting the perceptual experience. No one interprets the Veda ignoring the direct perception. In Vedas in the context of Yajna, by indicating a fist full of darbha grass says "yajamaanaH prastaraH", "this is yagamaana" (performer of yajna). But can a fist full of 'darbha' grass become Yajamaana? This meaning is quite contradictory to the direct perception. Therefore we are giving the meaning to the sentence that does not contradict Pratyaksha.

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The exact meaning of this statement is, even though Yajamaana has gone out of Yajnashaala, this first full of 'darbha' grass representing him conducts ritual activities on his behalf. All Vedic philosophers have followed the rule that, while interpreting the Vedas, whenever Veda is contradicted by Pratyaksha, the meaning has to be found in accordance with Pratyaksha. Just because it is said by Vedaas, why should we hang on to the identity of jiiva and Brahman, a) by having decided that the qualities such as sorrows etc. perceived jiiva are illusory, b) by rejecting the perceptual experience and c) by discarding the rule of interpretation of Vedaas? Why should we not interpret Vedic statements without contradicting perceptual experience and in accordance with Pratyaksha? A strong fellow is called 'purushha simha'. No one takes him to be a lion in the forest. That word is used indicating that he has the quality of lion. Similarly, can we not interpret the statements, such as 'tat twam asi,' that jiiva resembles Brahman in terms of the qualities of 'knowledge and bliss?' Why this obstinacy in interpreting Veda against direct-perception?

The perceptual experience, which comprehends sorrow and ignorance of jiiva, which are contradictory to the qualities of Brahman, commands more importance than Vedic statement. It is more important not only because it is a direct perception but also Vedic statements depend on it. Before Vedic statement establishes the identity between jiiva and Brahman, we need to have the knowledge of jiiva. It will be possible to identify jiiva with Brahman, only after

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jiiva is realized by Pratyaksha. Thus the Vedic statement cannot establish between jiiva and Brahman without the help of the direct perception that comprehends jiiva. This perceptual experience while recognizing jiiva comprehends sorrow and other defects in him. Thus the Vedic statement, which is supposed to explain 'abheda' (identity), is depending on the direct perception. This is how the direct perception becomes supportive PramaaNa to Vedaas. Hence it cannot deny the qualities and attributes of jiiva which are recognized by Pratyaksha. Therefore these statements cannot identify jiiva with nirguNa Brahman, quite against the perceptual experience.

The identity of jiiva and Brahman cannot be established also from another point of view. To identify jiiva with Brahman it is necessary to know Brahman in advance. To know Brahman there is no other way out than through Vedaas. But Vedaas describe Brahman as omniscient, omnipotent and creator of all, etc. with all his glories. Such supreme Brahman cannot be one with jiiva, who is Alpajna and Alpashatka (with very limited knowledge and power). Therefore we have to accept that the qualities of Brahman described by Vedaas are illusory and account the identity between jiiva and Brahman. Will it be proper to say the identity between jiiva and Brahman by denying the qualities of Brahman, which are established by supporting Vedaas, which are the very basis for revealing Brahman to start with? Can Vedic statement exist after loosing its base of support? To say that Vedic statements support the identity of jiiva and Brahman is contradictory

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to the direct perception, experience and many other Vedic statements. Thus the identity of jiiva and Brahma, which is against Pratyaksha and Veda, can never be the meaning of Vedaas.

The statements of Vedaas that indicate the identity, though they depend on them to know the nature of jiiva and Brahman, can establish that identity by negating Pratyaksha and some other statements of Veda. After seeing an object at a distance, we perceive snake in the rope. Then we get the correct knowledge after examination that it is not snake. Without the illusory perception 'this is snake' the subsequent correct knowledge that 'this is not snake' cannot occur. Therefore only based on the first illusory knowledge that 'this is snake,' the subsequent knowledge, that 'this is not snake', takes place. The second knowledge that 'this is not snake' negates the first knowledge, which is supportive for the second. Similarly why cannot the Abheda Vaakyaas negate Pratyaksha and some statements of Veda, though they depend on them for support? Such questions may arise. But there is a lot of difference between Abhedha Vaakya and knowledge, which negates the illusory perception of snake. To negate any object it is necessary for its illusion to occur. There is no need to negate unless the illusory perception of snake takes place. The second knowledge negates the object of the first knowledge. Thereby the first knowledge becomes in one way as a supportive knowledge to the second knowledge. But the first knowledge need not be a PramaaNa. The second knowledge, though it takes place, depends on the first

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knowledge, since it comprehends the negatable object. Yet it can negate the first knowledge which is only supportive. For reality and validity of the second knowledge, the validity of the first knowledge is not required. The second knowledge that 'this is not a snake' can become a valid one only when the knowledge that this is snake is proved 'ApramaaNa'. The second knowledge, which is 'Baadha Jnaana', does not depend on the validity of first knowledge at any cost. Therefore the second knowledge can negate the first knowledge that 'this is snake' without any problem. But the second knowledge 'this is not a snake' cannot negate the first knowledge though its object was negated.

There are two aspects to be noted in the knowledge that 'this is a snake.' First aspect is the knowledge of 'this' (Vastu Jnaana - Dharmi Jnaana). The second aspect that involves 'is snake' is called 'prakaara', which is a comprehension of a snake. Among these two aspects, the second aspect, which is the comprehension of perceived snake, is only negated by the knowledge that 'this is snake.' But the knowledge that 'this is not snake' does not negate the Dharmi (locus) aspect which is the comprehension of 'this.' When the negation 'this is not a snake' takes place, 'this' aspect still remains unnegated. The object, which is perceived as 'dharmi' in this perception, is never negated. Only the 'prakaara' aspect, that is the perception of snake, is negated. If the 'dharmi' which is perceived as 'this' is not there, which object can we indicate as 'not a snake.' Therefore the second knowledge can negate the snake which is 'prakaara' aspect of the first knowledge. But it can never

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negate 'this' which is the dharmi aspect of the first knowledge.

Similarly when identity of jiiva and Brahman is proposed, jiiva and Brahman are the loci. Jiiva means a soul, which is full of sorrow, ignorance and weakness. Brahman means a soul, which is full of infinite knowledge, power and bliss. Jiiva and Brahman are indicated objects in the identity proposed. When Brahman who is full of infinite qualities and powers and jiiva who is locus of sorrow and other defects are known through the means of Vedas and direct perception along with them the differences are also comprehended. When the snake is perceived in the rope, the perception of the snake is negated. Similarly in jiiva and Brahman some attributes which are perceived as prakaara may be negated. But where Aikya is proposed that dharmi or loci, jiiva and Brahman, which are perceived along with their individual characteristics and the differences, cannot be negated. In silver perception the second knowledge 'this is not silver' meaning, the shining object is not silver, can negate only the silver but not the shining object.

To know the identity between jiiva and Brahman, is it not sufficient if we have the general knowledge of their natural states? Is there necessity to comprehend the limitations, ignorance and sorrows in jiiva and completeness and powers of Brahman? When we perceive snake in the rope we need not comprehend the particular attributes which are differentiating the snake from the rope. In the snake perception long and waviness are only perceived in the

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object. In the silver perception shining aspect is only perceived in the object in front of us. Later when correct knowledge occurs it negates only the super imposed qualities. Similarly when the identity is proposed in jiiva and Brahman, knowing Brahman as Shudda Caitanya, without comprehending any particularity of Brahman, can we not identify Brahman with the j iiva? Without indicating particular attributes such as all powerful, complete knowledge, if Brahman is recognized in a general way, there is no chance to recognize difference from jiiva. When rope is recognized as just long and wavy object it will not be recognized as different from snake. Similarly without comprehending difference from jiivaas knowing from Brahman through Vedaas in a general way, where is the difficulty to prove the identity of jiiva and Brahman? When knowledge of Brahman occurs without comprehending the difference, where is the contradiction for Vedas to prove identity? Such questions may arise.

One has to analyze how to know Brahman in a general way. Is it sufficient for you to recognize Brahman as a mere Chaitanya Ruupa (embodiment of pure knowledge)? If jiiva is identified as such a Brahman, it only proves that jiiva is consciousness. Even Dwaitins accept that jiiva is nothing but consciousness. If jiiva-Brahma-Abheda means the identity between two pure Chaitanyaas, conscious entities, there is no room for conflict between Dwaita and Advaita. The doctrine that jiivaas are Chaitanya Swaruupaas is accepted by all. Having identified Brahman who is perfect, all-powerful and omniscient, and again to identify

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jiivaas with such a Brahman is real identity of jiiva and Brahman. When Brahman is recognized this way then the difference of jiiva and Brahman will have to be recognized. In establishing the identity of Brahman, when Brahman is recognized as locus the differences are also comprehended. In that case how can we establish the identity? Hence Vedaas cannot establish the identity when there is a contradiction from the other Vedic statements which are recognizing the dharmi and thereby more powerful as supportive means of knowledge.

We need to consider one more important fact. When the silver is perceived in the shell, though that knowledge is illusory from one aspect, from another aspect it is Yataartha (dharmi object is real). "This is silver", this knowledge is illusory from the point of 'silver,' because after the examination of the shell object one gains Baadha Jnaana which negates silver. But when knowledge takes place as "this is silver", this knowledge which comprehends shell in front of us as 'this,' is called dharmi; this is not illusory. This is already explained. In this way this single knowledge is PramaaNa (valid means of knowledge -that is the object is real) from the aspect of 'this' and also ApramaaNa (not a valid means of knowledge - that is object is not real) from the aspect of 'silver.'

Similarly to establish identity of jiiva with Brahman, the Vedaas have to indicate Brahman, as omniscient, omnipotent and perfect. Just by indicating only a mere consciousness and proposing the identity of jiiva with that

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object, the identity of jiiva and Brahman cannot be established. To establish the identity of jiiva who is of limited knowledge and power with Brahman who is of infinite knowledge and power, requires chopping off all the qualities, attributes and glories of Brahman. One has to accept that those attributes of Brahman are not real. It is not possible to know all such attributes of Brahman by any means of knowledge other than Vedaas. To establish the identity of jiiva and Brahman, we will have to admit that these parts of the Vedaas, which are describing the greatness of Brahman are not valid. It is possible that part of the knowledge that 'this is silver' is PramaaNa from one aspect, and the other part is ApramaaNa from another aspect. The Vedaas whose prime goal is to propound without any internal contradictions in describing the absolute truth in a self-consistent manner. No Vedic philosopher can admit that a part of Veda is valid and some other is invalid. Therefore is it possible to divide the Vedaas and say that a part of Veda which describes Brahman with all attributes is not valid, and another part of Veda which establishes identity is valid? We have to interpret the Vedaas in such a manner that no part of it becomes invalid as all the parts of Veda are valid absolutely. Therefore it is impossible for Veda to identify jiiva with Brahman, who is full of auspicious qualities.

28. Meaning of Abheda-Vaakyaas* :

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In Vedaas there may be many statements, which are apparently declaring Abheda or identity. But the Abheda need not be the intended meaning. We indicate Abheda from different angles. When it is said, "all the people of the town have united together on the playground," meaning all the people have gathered in one place. No one comprehends the meaning of identity at physical level of all people. We all use the phrases that 'all the people of the country are united,' 'all Hindus have become one', etc. In this context, 'have become one' does not indicate that all the people have given up their individuality and differences and became one. The natural meaning of this phrase is that people have become unanimous in their thinking or leaving their difference of opinions, they are united with a single goal. Similarly if it is said in the scriptures that jiivaas are united with Brahman or one with Brahman, why cannot we say that the liberated jiivaas are living along with the Lord in his abode of VaikunTa? In this Samsaara without knowing the will of God we may behave opposite to that. But in Moksha, we think according to God's will in tune with His opinion. In Moksha we think in tune with the God without any incompatibility. In this sense it is said that we become one with God. It is possible to interpret the Abheda Vaakyaas that we will attain total compatibility

* a) Abheda Vaakyaas - the Vedic statements which propose identity between Jiiva and the Lord (Brahman)

b) Bheda Vaakyaas - the Vedic statements which propose difference or distinction between Jiiva and Brahman

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in every manner with the Lord. We also use the phrase that "he is the only person in this town," It does not mean that there are no other people in the town other than him. It indicates that this man is only a distinguished person. All other people are under his control. Similarly 'Brahman alone is there", "this is all Brahman", etc., statements in Vedaas need not imply the identity of jiiva-Brahman. They can indicate the greatness of supreme Brahman and his independence and his supremacy over all other entities. In this way, we can naturally interpret Veda Vaakhyaas (statements), which apparently declare the identity of jiiva and Brahman. Therefore these Vedic statements cannot be proofs, without any doubts, to establish the identity. These statements can be interpreted in different ways other than the identity of jiiva-Brahman. Therefore these statements are considered as 'Saavakaasha PramaaNaas,'* which means flexible for different interpretations. But there are so many vivid statements in Vedaas which declare the difference between jiiva and Brahman by negating identity. These statements cannot be interpreted in different way other than differentiating jiiva and Brahman. These are called Niravakaasha PramaaNaas. In this way, in relation to the identity, Vedic statements fall into the category of Saavakaasha PramaaNaas. They can indicate different meanings other than Abheda. Whereas statements in relation to Bheda, belong to the category of Niravakaasha

* There are two types of pramaaNa-s: 1. Saavakaasha pramaaNa -flexible for different interpretations, 2. Nirvakaasha pramaaNa -inflexible for different interpretations other than directly indicated meanings.

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PramaaNaas. Other than the Bheda no meaning can be provided for these statements. How can a few Vedic statements establish identity when there is objection from Niravakaasha PramaaNaas.

In addition, there are three types of objections for Vedaas to establish identity: 1) Contradiction from Pratyaksha, which is superior to all other valid means of knowledge. 2) Contradiction from the two supportive PramaaNaas for Abheda Vaakyaas: a) Pratyaksha, which comprehends jiiva and b) Vedaas which indicate Brahman. And 3) contradiction from Niravakaasha Vedic statements, which directly indicate Bheda and which cannot be interpreted in any other way. Against these contradictions from powerful valid PramaaNaas it is impossible for the Vedic statements to establish the identity between jiiva and Brahman.

29. Bheda Vaakyaas are Niravakaasha:

Abheda Vaakyaas are considered Saavakaasha PramaaNaas by giving them scope for different natural meanings easily. Similarly some philosophers have made efforts to give different meanings to Bheda Vaakyaas and treat them as Saavakaasha PramaaNaas. Some Vedic statements may declare the difference. Just because of that the Bheda need not be real. They argue, as the imaginary blue color is perceived in the sky, the imaginary difference of jiiva and Brahman has been declared by Bheda Vaakyaas. In this way, Bheda Vaakyaas can be interpreted without accepting the real difference between jiiva and Brahman.

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Therefore, they question why should we not consider, just as Abheda Vaakyaas, Bheda Vaakyaas also are as SaavakaashApramaaNaas. But this would result in saying that Veda Vaakyaas do not tell the truth. Therefore by this it has been admitted that Veda is invalid means of knowledge or ApramaaNa. This is not the correct method of interpreting Vedaas. The correct method of interpretation of Vedaas is to give them meaning without affecting its validity. To say that any statement indicates unreal is admitting that the statement is invalid. The direct perception of the blue color in the sky may be invalid. It is possible for Pratyaksha to become ApramaaNa, when one comprehends unreal objects due to defects in the senses or defects in their objects in the empirical world. But all the Vedic philosophers have accepted Veda as the supreme valid means of knowledge. Hence it is not proper according to tradition of the Vedic philosophy to interpret Veda in such a way that affects its validity. Therefore Bheda Vaakyaas declare the real difference, 'Bheda', very clearly. Instead of this, we cannot give any different meaning to those Bheda Vaakyaas. When several Vedic statements such as, 'satyam bhidaa, satyam bhidaa, etc.,' declare again and again that the difference, 'Bheda', is only real, it is not correct to misinterpret that they are implying an imaginary Bheda.

There is one more reason why we cannot say that Veda, Upanishad and PuraaNa-s indicate the illusory Bheda. If Bheda of jiiva and Brahma is implied, only at the level of Samsaara, it would have been possible to say that it is illusory. The ignorance exists at the level of Samsaara.

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Therefore it could have been said that Bheda is the product of ignorance. But Vedaas and Upanishad-s are clearly declaring difference even at the state of Moksha.

"PrajnaanetraH alokaH" - alokaH means liberated soul who is beyond this world, PrajnaanetraH means ruled by Brahman. Thus it is said that even the liberated soul is ruled by Brahman. The word Prajnaa indicates the Supreme Brahman who is consciousness. "Prajnaa pratishhTaa brahmaa," thus Prajnaa word indicates Supreme Brahman. If in Moksha supreme Brahman is ruling over jiivaas, then the difference between jiiva and Paramaatmaa and continuous tendency of jiiva to serve the Lord even in Moksha have to be admitted. This is not the only valid proof to establish the difference of jiiva and Brahman in Moksha. There are several other clear-cut statements in Vedaas. "paranjyotiH upasampadya swena ruupeNa abhinishpadyate" - This statement means - jiiva, who is the embodiment of knowledge, approaches supreme Brahman, who is the embodiment of supreme knowledge, and experiences his own self, which is nothing but knowledge and bliss. If jiiva approaches Paramaatmaa in Moksha it clearly implies that two separate entities of jiiva and Brahman are still existing in Moksha. In Moksha jiiva approaches Brahman, without becoming Brahman, and he experiences his own nature, which was concealed by Ajnaana at the level of Samsaara. In this way, Veda clearly states the separate existence of jiiva and Brahman in Moksha.

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"paramam samyam upaiti", "mama saadharmyam aagataaH," - such statements indicate that in Moksha, jiiva will have some similarity to Paramaatmaa. He attains knowledge and bliss similar to that of God, but he can not become Paramaatmaa. He will be similar to him. When it is said that jiiva attains all the attributes that similar to Brahman, will the difference between jiiva and Brahman be not clear? "soshnute sarvaan kaamaan sahabrahmaNaa vipaschitaa" - this statement explicitly establishes difference of jiiva and Brahman in Moksha. This statement means in Moksha jiiva experiences bliss along with Brahman. To say that jiiva is along with Brahman, one has to admit that the different existence of two entities, "jagat vyaapara varjam" - this Brahmasutra means liberated soul does not have any transactional relation with the world. God alone manages all the activities in the world. Jiiva without getting involved in any of these activities of the world goes on experiencing his conscious-bliss. Thus the difference between jiiva and Brahman and differences in their attributes have been established. When, by all these PramaaNaas, the difference between jiiva and Brahman is established in Moksha, where there is not even an iota of ignorance, how can we say that they are illusory?

30. The Similarity in the Doctrines of Advaita and Shuunya Vaada:

It is a popular view that Shree Sankaracharya has condemned the Shuunyavaada of Bouddhaas and established the theory of Advaita. While condemning

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Shuunyavaada aggressively, Advaita is completely influenced by it. All ancient philosophers have concluded that, when comparative analysis of both theories is made from the point of the truth, there is no difference between the two. In Anuvyaakyaana and Sudha texts, both philosophies are exposed not to be different from each other from the point of reality. According to Shuunyavaada, if the Shuunya is considered as the supreme reality, according to Advaita Brahman is considered as supreme reality. Is there not fundamental difference between these two schools of thoughts in the description of the supreme truth? Such questions may arise. But one can see the difference only in the names of the supreme reality but not in their intrinsic nature. This aspect will be clear when both of these theories have been examined. In Bouddha philosophy Shuunya is described as attributeless, formless, non-knowable, etc., similar to the parabrahman as described by Advaita. Nothing new can be found in Brahman of the Adviata that is not there in Shuunya. In this way from the point of the absolute truth, there is no difference between these two philosophies. According to Bouddha theory though the world is described as unreal it will be perceived till we realize the truth which is Shuunya. All the transactions in our life can therefore be accounted. There is no difference even in this aspect, since instead of saying that the world is Mithyaa, it is said that it is unreal or non-existent. This difference is only in words.

If Bhouddha's have denied the validity of the Vedaas, in contrast, Advaita has upheld the Vedaas as PramaaNaas.

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Can we not recognize this difference between these two schools of thoughts? One may question this. Shree Shankaracharya having established the validity of the Vedaas, has given a special status for them. We have to appreciate him for this. But when we examine critically from the point of the reality, no difference can be established between these two theories. This is explained by Shree Madhvacharya. Though Advaita establishes the validity for the Vedaas, it does not accept validity for all the Vedaas. Some parts of the Vedaas, which describe Supreme Brahman, are only valid. The Karmakaanda of Vedas, the detailed part of the Veda dealing with ritualistic acts, and many parts of Brahmakanda, which describe 'saguNa Brahma' as 'Sarvajna' and 'sarveswara', are invalid. These parts of the Vedaas do not declare the truth. They are 'atatwaavedaka Vaakyaas' meaning telling lies. According to Advaita some parts of the Upanishads, which describe 'nirguNa akhanDa Brahma' (Brahman which is attributeless and indivisible), are only valid. It is clear that there is no difference between the Shuunya of Shuunyavaadins and Brahman of Advaita, in this aspect, even though it may not deny the validity of the Vedaas. Bouddhaas have opposed only God who is almighty and Yajnaas and Yaagaaas which involve different types of 'karmaas'. Devoid of these objects they may not oppose the parts of Vedaas which are convenient to their theory. In this way, Shree Madhvacharya has established forcefully and explicitly that there is no difference between these two philosophies from the point of reality.

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As a matter of fact there is a lot of difference in practices and spiritual activities between the followers of Bouddha and Advaita. According to Advaita, the religious activities have special importance. There is lot of difference between the followers of Bouddha and Advaita in the aspects of worship, meditation, sacrifice, festivals and other Vedic activities. The followers of Advaita, who have special devotion for incarnations of God like Rama and Krishna and other Vedic Gods and practicing Vedic culture in total, are very close to the followers of Dwaita. There is no doubt about it. It is also very necessary for all the followers of three different schools of thought to get united in protecting our ancient Vedic religion. This analysis has been conducted only from the point of truth or reality. Therefore we hope there should not be room for any misunderstanding and social harmony.

31. Visheshha:

All the Vedas describe infinite attributes in God. He is described as creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world, Omniscient, Omnipotent, full of bliss, etc. When it is accepted that there are differences between these qualities and God, then the existence of this 'difference' itself should be considered as an attribute. Like other qualities, this 'difference' should be different from God. There should be again difference differentiating this difference and God. In this way, the endless chain of differences has to be accepted. This infinite chain of differences is inconceivable and beyond anybody's imagination. If these attributes are

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different from God, they cannot be considered as natural qualities of God. This is just as someone having walking stick or spectacles, which are different from the possessor of the obj ects. They are not his natural qualities. Similarly the attributes that are different from God are not natural to God. There is a possibility for one to assume that these qualities are transient which are born or destroyed. Therefore shall we accept that there is no difference between God and his attributes, and they are one with His nature? In this concept also there are many other problems. We say that God is full of infinite attributes. Even scriptures declare the same. If those attributes are one with the nature of the Lord, what is the meaning for 'that he has attributes' ? The pot on the cot is not the cot. One cannot be in oneself. That means dharmi should be different from dharma. Thus how is it possible for the attributes of Brahman to be one with him? God is one and the attributes are many. Is it possible for the infinite qualities and single God to become one in nature? Therefore we cannot accept either difference or non-difference between God and His qualities. Hence some argue that all the attributes of the Lord will have to ultimately result in agreeing their being Mithyaa.

This is the problem that needs to be addressed to by all philosophers. Advaita accepts the identity between jiiva and Brahman. There also the same question arises. Is this identity one with Brahman? Or is it different from Brahman? If this identity (Abheda) is different from Brahman, it cannot be real. Because according to Advaita, Brahman alone is real and other than Brahman everything

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is Mithyaa. When identity is the supreme principle of Advaita, how can it accept that identity is unreal. If identity is unreal, will not the Vedic statements, which are accepted as declaring the identity, become invalid? Therefore it has to be accepted that the identity is not different from Brahman but one with his nature. Though they are one, we say there is an identity with jiiva and Brahman. When identity is one with Brahman, is it possible to say that it is in Brahman? Can one exist in oneself? How can we answer this objection?

In Upanishad there are statements that describe supreme Brahman as "satyam, Jnaanam and anantam". According to Advaita this statement implies Brahman which is devoid of attributes and forms. According to them, all these three words ' satyam, Jnaanam and anantam' declare indivisible Brahman. Why do we need these three words to explain one single object? Such question may arise. We use different words to describe various qualities and attributes in one object. We use four words to describe a cloth as ' beautiful, soft and white cloth.' These four words in this statement are not unnecessary as they all describe different qualities in the object. But where are the qualities and attributes in 'akhanDa, nirguNa, shuddha Brahman?' What is that new attribute or quality that which is not described by ' satyam', is described by the word 'Jnaanam' ? All these words repeat only a mere indivisible object. Where is the necessity for different words, which repeat the same object, without subscribing any special particular qualities to that object?

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"These words do not establish any new qualities and attributes in Brahman. They only negate imaginary attributes, which are superimposed in Brahman. The words such as 'satya, jnaana and ananta' do not explain Brahman as 'satya swaruupa, jnaana swaruupa and ananta.' These words just negate superimposed attributes that Brahman is not unreal, not ignorant and has no limitations. We superimpose in Brahman the attributes like unreality etc., which are perceived in the world. Only to resolve these unreal concepts, these words are negating attributes of Brahman, by saying that he is not unreal and not ignorant etc. Therefore they are not repetition and hence are not meaningless". In this way some philosophers answer these objections. But when some particular attribute is negated, it will result in establishing some other alternate attribute. When it is said that it is not unreal, alternatively it is accepted as real only. If Brahman is 'not ignorant', then is it not the same as accepting an attribute that he is 'consciousness?' If the attribute of the Brahman, which is of the nature of consciousness, is not accepted, how can one say that he is not ignorant? Therefore negation of some attribute is the same as accepting the opposite attribute. In this way there is no possibility for both negation and imposition of attributes in single object like Brahman.

According to AkhanDa vaada, the Vedaas describe an object of AkhanDa (indivisible), it does not indicate any object other than Brahman. If Veda is not indicating the positive attributes, it cannot indicate negative attributes also. If Veda declares qualities in Brahman either positive

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or negative, there will be violating the notion that Veda describes only the attributes of Brahman. Thus Vedic words, 'satyam, jnaanam, anantam' describe that there are no unreality, ignorance, or limitedness. This will not result in accepting that Vedaas describe only an object of akhanDa. However 'satya, jnaana and ananta', etc., describe only the same Brahman without implying any quality in Him, do we need three words? This question remains unanswered.

Only Shree Madvacharya has solved properly this puzzle, which has been troubling all the philosophers. Every object has some natural and particular power. These natural attributes are one with their locus. But the natural power of the object alone accounts for dharma-dharmi Bheda vyavahaara (usage based on differences between two entities that are substance and attribute, which are intrinsically one). Sugar and its sweetness, flower and its scent are not different. No one says that one exists in one self. We say that there is sweetness in sugar. Though we can see the sugar with our eyes, we cannot experience its sweetness. It can be experienced only through the tongue. But we call both of them by different names - sugar and sweetness. Though the object is the same, why do we call it differently? There is no other way unless it is accounted by some intrinsic power of the object. This natural power of the object (locus) is called Visheshha. This Visheshha alone accounts for the differences in usage, though there is no difference between substance and attributes. All the objects of the world have this particular power, "sosti vastushhu asheshhataH" - By the power of this 'Visheshha

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alone all the objections about the infinite qualities of Brahman can be resolved. There is no difference between Brahman and his infinite qualities. Though all the qualities of Brahman are one with his nature, we can say that Brahman possesses infinite attributes due to this natural power of Visheshha. In Brahman infinite attributes can be there being one with Brahman. How many qualities are there in a fruit? Many of its qualities such as taste, figure, shape, color, quantity, etc. are one with the fruit. All these qualities constitute a fruit. Thus we can experience diversity in unity. All this has to be accounted for by the power of Visheshha alone. Similarly there is no problem at all in accepting infinite qualities in supreme Brahman. Even in Advaita the relation of the identity which is one with the nature of Brahman has to be accounted only by surrendering to Visheshha. By accepting this Visheshha alone one can solve the problem of repetition of words such as 'satya, Jnaana and anantam'.

32. Visheshha is Unavoidable Even for Tarkikaas:

Tarkikaas accept the difference between substances and their attributes. Cloth and its color are different. But still there is a relation called 'samavaaya' (one of the relationships such as samyoga etc. as per tarka Shaastra) between the cloth and its color. Because of this "samavaaya' sannikarsha' (sannikarsha means relationship) only it is said that cloth has color. They do not accept the concept of 'Visheshha' since identity between substances and their attributes is not accepted. Instead they accept the difference between the object and its attributes, and also the relation of 'samavaaya'

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to account all the dharma-dharmi relationships. But they also have to accept 'Visheshha.' When they accept the difference between the object and its attributes, do they have to accept again a difference between the previous difference and the object? To solve this problem, one has to accept the first difference is one with the object. In that case, how can we say that the object has the difference? If an 'attribute of difference' can be one with the object, why can't we accept the other attributes also as one with the objects? Therefore they will be forced to accept the difference between object and its difference. That 'difference' attribute and the object will have to have another difference which is again an attribute. The latter one needs another difference as an attribute and this can lead to endless regression. Instead of that it is better to accept identity between the object and its attributes and qualities, and also identity between the object and its difference from other objects. It has to be accepted that all these attributes and differences put together make an object as one. We can say that with the power of Visheshha alone object has attributes, qualities, and differences from other objects.

Even though this new relation of 'samavaaya' (inherence) between the object and their attributes is accepted, is there any relation between the 'samavaaya' and the object? This question remains to be answered. When we say that the relation of 'samavaaya' of say white color is in that cloth, it requires another 'samavaaya' between the previous 'samavaaya' and the cloth. Which in turn requires another 'samavaaya' thus an infinite chain of

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' samavaaya'-s is required. Therefore tharkika-s have accepted the relation between 'samavaaya' and the object is intrinsic with the object. Thus when Tarkikaas say that the relation of first 'samavaaya' is identified with the object, how can we say that object has the relation of 'samavaaya' ? At least in this case they have to accept Visheshha to account dharma-dharmi vyavahaara. In this way Visheshha alone is required, like 'Rama-baaNa', arrow of Rama, to account all transactions according to their theory in all different schools of thought. Unless this 'Visheshha' is accepted in some form or other they don't have any other way. Thus the concept of Visheshha to the philosophical field is one of the great contributions of Shree Madhvacharya.

33. PramaaNaas:

Pratyaksha:

The means of knowledge, which determines an object, is called a PramaaNa. We comprehend objects through our eyes, tongue, ears, nose, etc., and their attributes, form (color), taste, smell, etc. Therefore these sense organs are considered as PramaaNaas. Similarly we infer the existence of fire at distance by perceiving the smoke. This is called 'Anumaana PramaaNa.' There are certain entities, which cannot be perceived through sense organs, are known through the words of the wise. God, righteousness, etc., which are beyond the sense organs, are known through the statements of Vedaas. This is called 'Aagama PramaaNa.' Thus there are three PramaaNaas such as Pratyaksha, Anumaana and Aagama. Only the knowledge derived due

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to an appropriate contact between sense organs and their objects is called 'Pratyaksha.' Only when contact takes place between sense organs and their appropriate objects, knowledge is produced. There can be the contact between the eye and the space but by that no knowledge is produced. The space is not an appropriate object to be comprehended by the eye. Objects with form and color are only appropriate for perception by the eye. Thus when appropriate contact takes place with sense organs and their respective objects then the knowledge of those respective objects takes place. But the tongue grasps the taste only when it licks the sweet. When there is a direct contact between the skin and the fire, the heat is experienced. The sound is heard only when the sound waves reach the ear. We can smell the scent of the flower only when the molecules of the scent reaches the nose. Thus without contact between the senses and their objects the direct perception does not takes place. For the knowledge to takes place is the contact between the eye and the object necessary? This aspect has been discussed in detail in Nyaayasudhaa by Shree Jayatheertha. Eye comprehends objects, which are at a distance. Unlike the sound waves reaching the ear, neither object nor its forms approach the eye. Eye comprehends the objects being in its place without moving towards the objects. Therefore there is some argument that unlike other senses the contact between the eye and the object is not required to the knowledge to be produced. This is not correct. Why do we have to assign a new method only for the eye, which is not applicable to other senses? For any action to occur in

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an object by an instrument, the contact between the object and the instrument is unavoidable. Is it possible to cut off the tree without any contact between the ax and the tree? We get experience only through the contact between senses, such as tongue and its object. What type of contact between the eye and its object can occur? This question needs to be answered. Some philosophers accept that some rays travel though the eye and make a contact with the object in front. Thereby the perception of color and form, and the object takes place. Since the sense of eye is an entity of energy (taijasa, form of tejas), it produces rays. Thereby the object can be perceived even from a distance. Even Shree Jayatheertha has supported this idea. According to modern science it is only external rays reflected by an object are transmitted through the lens of the eye and focused on to the retina. When the Indian philosophy says that rays from the eyes go towards the objects, the modern science says that rays come or reflected from the object towards the eye. There is some objection against the Indian philosophy as to how can rays from the eyes reach the sun in a fraction of a second. The rays from the eye need not reach the sun. When eye rays get mixed with the sun's rays and thereby sun can be perceived. So many animals can perceive objects very clearly even in pitch dark. In the night there is no possibility for the rays to be reflected from the object towards the eye. Eye is an organ of energy. Since the eyes only send the rays towards the object, those objects could be seen even in the night by those animals. This has to be accepted.* If the defects are there in the senses and their

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objects, then the knowledge, which is derived from those senses, cannot be PramaaNa. A jaundiced eye sees everything yellow. This knowledge is not a PramaaNa. Similarly an object at a distance looks smaller. Thus we misjudge the objects due to different defects in senses and objects. The knowledge produced by the senses, which are free from such defects, is called Saakshaatkaara or Pratyaksha. For this Pratyaksha Jnaana sense organs alone are the instrumental causes. How can we know the defects in the senses and their objects? Sense organs are not perceived by senses. Therefore we cannot find whether there are defects or not in the senses by direct perception. But it is possible to know the validity of the knowledge by examination. When the knowledge is examined and never negated, it is recognized by sakshi as Yathaartha. By the validity of the knowledge alone it will be determined that the senses and objects do not have defects.

There are two types of knowledge of Pratyaksha. One is vikRiri (the, reaction in the, minH) which is horn Hup, to

*Translator's opinion: The above analysis does not seem to be right and requires further examination. Only 'fireflies' as we know emit light. Even in so-called pitch dark, there is a diffused light in which some animals are capable to see. The night-vision of an owl and similar animals is due to their capacity to pick up even the diffused light available in the night. In bright light their eyes go blind and they can not see just as we go blind if the lights are too bright on the eyes. The scientific theory that the rays reflected by the object pass through the eyes and get focused on to the retina seems to be closer to the truth. This fact can be seen if one understands the need for eyeglasses for correcting the eyes that cannot focus the rays reaching the eyes properly.

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contact between the senses and their objects. This is called in Shaastraas as 'vRitti Jnaana' (thought process). The second one is swaruupa Jnaana, which is nothing but self-knowledge. I have constant awareness of myself expressing as-1 am - which is not produced by contact of senses and their objects. I recognize in an awakened state that "I have slept well so far." This memory is not possible in an awakened state if it is not experienced during the sleep state. Therefore a constant consciousness has to be accepted which comprehends the nature of the self, all the time. This is called Saakshi Jnaana which is nothing but self.

34. Saakshi Jnaana:

The Lord is omniscient. He, who has created all the objects of the world and regulates them, must have complete knowledge of all the objects. But unlike us He does not have material (Bhoutika) sense organs. He is the embodiment of pure consciousness without the worldly body. If the Lord knows this entire world without the help of material sense organs, we have to accept the knowledge which is nothing but consciousness and different from the worldly knowledge, where as Jiivaas can transact with the knowledge derived from sense organs (bhouthika Jnaana.)? What is the condition of their knowledge in Moksha? In Moksha there is no possibility of any material senses. Mukti means realizing his own natural consciousness, which is of transcendental nature. In the state of Mukti other than the pure self-consciousness, no material sense organs can exist. One cannot say that there is no knowledge for jiiva in

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Moksha. Vedaas and the Upanishad-s have declared that jiiva experiences divine bliss in Moksha. If there is no knowledge in Moksha and no self-experience, who will desire for such Moksha? Is anybody prepared to fall into a pitch dark well? Therefore it has to be accepted that jiiva has knowledge even in Moksha. This knowledge cannot be possible from material sense organs. He has to get knowledge with his own power of consciousness. There is no other way than accepting consciousness, which is nothing but self-knowledge for Paramaatmaa and jiivaas. If jiivaas will have self-awareness in Moksha, it has to be there even at the state of Samsaara. Mukti means natural state of existence. We cannot attain any unnatural new attributes in Moksha. The unnatural attributes, which will be attained newly, cannot remain permanently. Thus it is tantamount to Moksha as transient. Therefore the self-consciousness which will be in Moksha has to be present all the time that is even during the state of Samsaara. Consciousness, which is existing during Samsaara and Moksha, is called Saakshi-Jnaana, self-awareness. During Samsaara self knowledge comprehends only knowledge, happiness etc., while in the state of Moksha it comprehends all the appropriate objects. During Samsaara-state there are two types of knowledge. 1) Knowledge, which is produced by senses and mind, and 2) Saakshi Jnaana which comprehends knowledge, happiness and itself. In the state of Moksha, fully manifested Saakshi Jnaana alone remains which grasps everything required by him. Thus we can classify Pratyaksha into two ways 1) Swaruupa Jnaana or self-knowledge and 2) knowledge which is the modification of

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the mind because of material sense organs.

35. Anumaana:

When we perceive an object we can know the presence of another object that we do not perceive directly but which is invariably connected to the first. When we see the smoke on the hill, we infer the presence of the fire. Since the fire is the cause of the smoke, smoke cannot exist without fire. There is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. It is called Vyaapti. Because of this Vyaapti Jnaana one can easily infer fire by perceiving smoke. This is called Anumaana PramaaNa. Due to the concomitant relationship between one object and the other, inferring the second object from the perception of the first object is called Anumaana. Wherever smoke is perceived there should be fire also, and from which one concludes that smoke is concomitant with the fire. Later on when one perceives smoke on a distant hill, he remembers the relationship between the smoke and the fire and hence infers the presence of fire on the hill. 'Where there is smoke there is fire', this invariable concomitant relationship is called Vyaapti. 'The smoke is on the hill' - this is the expression of 'pakshadharmata.' The knowledge, which is in conjunction with pakshadharmata and Vyaapti, is called 'paraamarsha.' This paraamarsha-knowledge is expressed as 'the smoke, which is concomitant with the fire, is on the hill.' This paraamarsha knowledge is having two aspects; pakshadharmata and Vyaapti. By this paraamarsha knowledge, the inference of fire on the hill takes place. This is called

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Anumiti or Anumaana. Where we are inferring fire (major term) with 'hetu' (a middle term) (here it is the smoke), that object (hill) is called 'paksha' (a minor term.) When a smoke is perceived on the hill and thereby fire is inferred, hence the smoke is called 'hetu.' The fire that is inferred by the smoke, which is 'hetu', is called 'saadhya.'

There are two types of Anumaanaas: Swaartha Anumaana and Paraartha Anumaana. When one concludes the relation of concomitance between the smoke and fire on examination at different places without the help of any other person is called Swaartha Anumaana. This is Swaartha Anumaana because this Anumaana is deduced with his own analysis without anybody's help. When this concomitant relation is accepted due to words of the wise and the 'saadhya' is inferred on the basis of 'hetu', this is called Paraartha Anumaana. Because of the teaching and analysis of the knowledgeable persons when the Anumaana process takes place, it is called Paraartha Anumaana. According to Naiyaayikaas, the five aspects such as Pratijnaa, Hetu, UdaaharaNa, Upanaya and Nigamana together constitute Anumaana. These are as follows: 'Fire is on the hill' - this is called Pratijnaa. 'Because there is smoke' - this is Hetu. 'Where there is smoke there is fire like in the kitchen' - this is called UdaaharaNa or example, 'smoke is on the hill' this is called Upanaya. 'Therefore there is fire on the hill' - this is called Nigamana. One has to use all these five statements for one to infer saadhya, according to Naiyaahikaas. 'Fire is on the hill' - in this way the description of relationship of Paksha and saadhya

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is called pratijnaa. The description of hetu, which is a requisite part for inference, is called hetu-vaakya. The concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya is described by an example, and it is called udaaharana-vaakya. The upanaya-vaakya says that such concomitant hetu (middle term) is in paksha (minor term). Upanaya-vaakya plays the role of setting up a conclusion that because of such hetu is in paksha saadhya must be there. There has been fierce controversy over the pattern of Amumaana as 'all the five statements are not required' or ' only two Vaakyaas are sufficient for inference' or 'three are enough' etc.

Shree Madvacharya has shown a very practical way in this regard. First, we need to examine the purpose of usage of these statements. The knowledge of concomitant relationship of hetu and saadhya is very essential to derive an inference. No one can get an inference unless he has proper knowledge of the relationship between smoke and fire. We have already explained that the invariable concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya is only called Vyaapti. This knowledge of Vyaapti is required for inference. But even though the concomitant relation between smoke and fire is known, unless one perceives fire on the hill he cannot infer the fire. To infer saadhya, the major term, we need to know the hetu, the minor term, in an appropriate place. Naiyaayikaas call this as pakshadharmata Jnaana. The purpose of using the statements is to reveal Vyaapti and pakshadharmata. There are two purposes of using those statements: a) to remind those who already have the knowledge of Vyaapti and etc.,

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b) to motivate to get knowledge to those who are not aware of this relationship. It is not right to be stubborn to say all these five statements are required for this purpose. One has to use as many statements as are just needed to generate curiosity or memory of Vyaapti and pakshadharmata. Some people may gain the knowledge of Vyaapti etc. with just two or three statements. An intelligent may be reminded of all these by one statement. For a dull-headed one even these five statements may not be enough. He may require some more explanation. In a discussion whether there is fire or not 'see! The smoke is perceived.' Doesn't this statement remind him all the needed information to infer? 'Where there is smoke there is fire' by this single statement also one can infer fire on seeing the smoke. To remind the concomitant relation between smoke and fire and the presence of smoke on the hill, it is sufficient to use as minimum number of statements as needed according to one's intellectual capacity. The rule that five or three statements are required is meaningless. In some subtle subjects doubts will not be clear even after using all these five statements. There can be some objections about these statements. To resolve those objections again different explanatory statements have to be made. Therefore, in the context of establishing objects through logic, as many statements as required are to be used depending on one's intellectual grasping power. Hence to put any restriction that one has to use only five statements looks funny.

There is one more interesting matter in this. Some philosophy puts restriction that five statements have to be

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used in the context of logical discussion. Another philosophy that only three statements need be used. Some other philosophy insists on by two statements. When these philosophers have to prove their theory in mutual discussions, a question will arise as to how many sentences have to be used? When Naiyaayikaas use present their logic by using five sentences, the Meemaamsakaas raise objection who insist on three sentences. But Naiyaayikaas do not accept this rule prescribed by Meemamsakaas. If Meemamsakaas use three sentences according to their theory, Naiyaayikaas are not satisfied with that. Thus only dispute alone remains in terms of whose theory will form a basis for their arguments and how many sentences to be used. They will have to leave the major subject of discussion and get involved in a dry discussion as to how many sentences are required in presenting the logic. To resolve this problem they should come to some mutual understanding that each philosopher can present according to his own criterion. When some philosophers can comprehend the matter presented by another philosophers according to his criterion, implies that all systems can provide necessary information for logic. In conclusion, there is no meaning in the rule that to present the logic only certain number of sentences are to be used. To get inference by logic the required information can be obtained through as many sentences as are needed. This appeals to all. Thus Shree Madhvacharya has established that there is no such rigid rule as to the number of sentences required in establishing the logic, and this is acceptable to all.

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36. Errors in Logic:

To know an object thoroughly by Anumaana PramaaNa it should be free from defects. We can infer fire by perceiving smoke. This inference is proper because smoke is invariably concomitant with fire. As there is a creator for all born objects, we can prove God as creator of this whole universe by using logic. This logic can be accepted as flawless. But so many objects that we perceive are proved to be false. We cannot prove that this world is unreal because it is perceived. This logic becomes invalid because it has defects. Logic, which is free from flaws only, can be accepted as valid Anumaana. Among all errors of logic, the error 'virodha' (contradiction) is the most powerful. When we try to establish an entity and if it is contradicted by other means of knowledge then that entity cannot be proved by logic. When we perceive that there is no fire in the lake and if fire is inferred there by logic, then it will be contradicting Pratyaksha. It is not correct to prove by logic that the obj ects in front of us are unreal, when it is experienced by perceptual examination as real. This defect is called 'pratiJnaavirodha or saadhyavirodha', contradiction of major term.

We have already explained that the concomitant relationship is essential between Anumaana and the object, which is to be proved by that. If there is no such invariable relation between hetu and saadhya, it is also considered one of the defects of AnumaanapramaaNa. When we infer fire by smoke this Anumaana is devoid of defects as the relationship between them is present. There cannot be

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smoke without fire. But can we infer smoke on perceiving fire? There is fire in hot burning rod, but there is no smoke. Though smoke has concomitant relation with fire, the fire does not have such a relation with the smoke. Therefore, when we infer smoke by fire, this Anumaana is considered as defective. Similarly when the world is proved as unreal by logic, since it is the object of comprehension, this anumana is also defective. Even supreme Brahman is an object of knowledge. We get knowledge of Brahman from Vedaas and Upanishad-s. Is He also unreal? Therefore, the rule that any object of knowledge is unreal, is broken. This defect is called 'avyaapthi' or 'Vyaaptivirodha', meaning no concomitant relationship.

To prove an object by logic the hetu should be in an appropriate place and time. When smoke is perceived spreading high on the hill, the fire can be inferred at the bottom. If there is actually no smoke but by mistaking a cloud of dust for smoke if fire is inferred, that Anumaana also becomes defective. Once Brahman is realized this world ceases to exist. This world will be negated as the dream objects are negated in the awakened state. Therefore this world is unreal. Even this logic is also defective. Where is the proof to say that the world will be negated after realization of Brahman? It is not correct to prove that the world is unreal by presupposing that the world will be negated when Brahman is realized. If prameya (saadhya - the object, which is to be inferred) has to be established through anumaaana and if that Anumaana itself is not fully established, nothing can be proved on that basis. This defect is called

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'hetu virodha' or non-establishment of hetu or the middle term. Even if hetu is well established, and 'saadhya is not known anywhere, then that Anumaana cannot be perfect. When saadhya is well known, but hetu is not perfect, it becomes invalid. Even if the knife is sharp we cannot cut the space with that. Even if twigs are there but if the knife is blunt, we cannot cut the twigs. Both saadhya and saadhana should be prefect. Similarly in Anumaana PramaaNa, the object which has to be inferred should not be contradictory to any other PramaaNaas and hetu which is meant to prove the object should also be perfect. Thus in the Anumaana PramaaNa there should not be three types of errors, such as 'pratiJnaa virodha, hetu virodha and Vyaapti virodha.'

Shree Madhvacharya has divided systematically all possible errors which can arise in Anumaana PramaaNa into three categories. But tarkikaas have divided them into five types: baadha, satpratipaksha, vyabhicaara, virodha and asiddhi. Tarkikaas have further subdivided the error called pratijnaavirodha into two. a) When there is a virodha (contradiction) from a more powerful PramaaNa for the fact to be established from, it is called baadha. b) When there is virodha from a PramaaNa of equal status, the error is called satpratipaksha. When Anumaana is employed to establish the unreality of the world, there will be a contradiction from PratyakshapramaaNa, which is superior and which establishes the reality of the objects around us. Therefore, the Anumaana, which is to establish the unreality of the world is defective. This is an example for prabhalApramaaNa virodha. When an Anumaana is

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employed to prove the unreality of the world, it will be in conflict with another Anumaana, which establishes the reality of the world based on the activity and utility of the objects we perceive. This is an example for satpratipaksha virodha. These two errors, baadha and satpratipaksha, occur only when there is a conflict from another equal PramaaNa in establishing the saadhya or fact. Therefore it is proper to put both of them into one category as saadhya virodha or pratijnaa virodha. When Anumaana is employed sometimes there will be mutual conflicts between two sentences. For example, when Anumaana is employed to prove the world is neither satya nor asatya then there will be swavaakya virodha. When it is said that the world is not real, it implies that the world is unreal. Again when it is said that it is not unreal, it will be conflicting its own statement. This conflict is neither from higher PramaaNa, nor from an equal PramaaNa. Therefore it is neither baadha nor satpratipaksha. This error is due to mutual conflict within the sentences of Anumaana. But this is also a defect for Anumaana. But this does not fall into any category of errors according to Taarkikaas. This fits into the category of praatijnaavirodha, which has been explained by Shree Madhvacharya in his Anuvyaakhyaana in detail.

We have already described that the invariable concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya is Vyaapti. When there is a contradiction in Vyaapti, that defect is called Vyaapti virodha or Avyaapti. This is a second category of the errors of Anumaana. Tarkikaas have divided this also into two types. Though hetu exists along

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with saadhya in some places and if it exists without saadhya at some other places this defect is called vyabhicaara or anaikaantika virodha. Smoke and fire co-exist in many places, but there won't be smoke in a hot burning rod. Only fire exists but without smoke. Therefore even though smoke has a concomitant relations with fire, fire does not have similar relation with smoke. Hence we cannot infer smoke by perceiving fire. Only fire can be inferred by seeing smoke. Therefore when smoke is inferred by fire this Anumaana will have the defect of vyabhicaara. When saadhya and hetu don't co-exist anywhere, but exists invariably without the other, then by that hetu that saadhya is proved, that hetu will have greater error than vyabhicaara. This error is considered as virodha as per Tarkikaas. It is accepted by all that what is born is not eternal. But if someone employs an Anumaana to establish an object as eternal because it is born, this will have a dosha of asambhaddha or absurdity. It is not correct to prove a fact with a hetu, which never co-exists with that fact. This is an example for virodha. However both vyabhicaara and virodha negates the invariable concomitant relationship of hetu and saadhya, hence they should be considered as just Vyaapti-dosha. There is no need to categorize them separately. Therefore Shree Madhvacharya's classification of the errors or defects of Anumaanaas into three as, Saadhya Virodha, Hetu Virodha and Vyaapti Virodha is more systematic and proper.

Redundancy is also another defect in Anumaana. It will be absurd if someone employs an Anumaana to

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establish a big mountain on a big ground in a broad daylight which is visible. Nobody has any doubt about the presence of the mountain. Where is the necessity to prove an object, which can be directly seen by all? No one needs to prove that the cow milk is white. This is called 'asangati' as another defect of Anumaana.

37. Upaadhi Doshha is Not a Separate Classification:

To establish saadhya if there is some other cause instead of hetu and if that cause is not present in an appropriate place, the knowledge of saadhya cannot be derived from that hetu. This upaadhi dosha arises when smoke is inferred by the presence of fire in the burning rod. Fire alone is not sufficient to produce a smoke. Only when things like wet twigs come into contact with fire a smoke will be produced. The wet twigs, which are in invariable concomitance with the smoke, are not there in the burning rod. Therefore there cannot be a smoke. Hence it is not possible to prove the presence of a smoke by perceiving fire. The contact of the wet twigs above is called upaadhi. That is only an instrumental cause for the smoke. Because of its absence in the burning rod, there need not be smoke. 'This world is unreal because it is perceived' -When this Anumaana is employed to establish the unreality of the world, it is considered as defective with Upaadhi doshha. All unreal objects are negated by valid means of knowledge. But there is no negation of the world. No one has experienced that the world is unreal. Therefore we cannot establish the unreality of the world. This is Upaadhi

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dosha. Here in this Anumaana, PramaaNa baadha (meaning negation by valid means of knowledge) is the upaadhi. This PramaaNa baadha is alone the cause for the unreality of the object. There is no such cause for the world (world is not negated by any PramaaNa). Therefore it cannot be unreal. But this upaadhi doshha is not an independent defect of Anumaana. It is nothing but Vyaapti virodha, which has been explained earlier. It will result in Avyaapti (impossibility of concomitant relationship.) Where saadhya has to be established upaadhi is there invariably. But that upaadhi would not be there where hetu exists. Where there is an absence of Upaadhi that is concomitant with saadhya, but hetu is present, then the concomitance of hetu and saadhya will be broken. Whichever object is unreal should be negated by PramaaNa. But the supreme Brahman, which is the content of scriptural knowledge and the world, which is perceived are not negated by PramaaNaas. Thus the rule or Vyaapti that 'which is perceived is unreal' is broken. Therefore upaadhi doshha has to be considered as Vyaapti virodha. If upaadhi is absent at the appropriate place, and which is concomitant with the object that has to be established, there even saadhya cannot be present. The wet twigs, which are concomitant with smoke, are absent in the burning rod. Hence we cannot prove the presence of smoke there. Therefore this upaadhi dosha may be considered as saadhya dosha or pratiJnaavirodha. In this way it need not be considered for a separate classification. Thus virodha and redundancy are defects of Anumaana. The classification of virodha into three varieties such as

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pratiJnaavirodha, hetu virodha and Vyaaptivirodha is most justifiable. We need to include two more defects of Anumaana along with virodha and redundancy. Nyunata (inadequacy of words to explain) and aadhikya (more words than are required to explain) are also defects of Anumaana. When an Anumaana is employed if words are used more than required, it is called aadhikya defect, and if there is a non-usage of required words then it is called nyunata defect. These are verbal defects of Anumaana. Virodha and redundancy are the direct defects related with the fact, which has to be established by Anumaana.

38. 'Aashyrayaasiddhi' is Not a Defect:

If dharmi where we have to establish a major term is unreal or not at all known as existence then such Anumaana becomes defective. Tarkikaas have established that the absence of the locus or paksha is also considered a defect of Anumaana. When Anumaana is employed to establish the sharpness of horns of a cat, that Anumaana will be condemned because of the absence of horns of the cat. Therefore they argue that the absence of dharmi or the minor term is a defect of Anumaana. There is no dispute that such a Anumaana is defective. But a question will arise whether it is the absence of the dharmi, which is the cause for the Anumaana to be defective. This has to be analyzed. We will have to consider an Anumaana to be perfect if the following conditions are fulfilled: 1) The invariable concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya, 2) hetu, which has to establish the fact, should be present in its

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appropriate place. 3) saadhya is not opposed by any superior PramaaNa such as a direct experience. Only if none of these conditions is satisfied then that Anumaana becomes defective. When all these above said conditions are fulfilled irrespective of the presence or absence of dharmi, Anumaana becomes valid. Anumaana is employed to establish the absence of a dharmi, taking it as a paksha. We use Anumaana to prove invalidity of 'samavaaya' which is accepted by Tarkikaas. Anumaanaas are also employed in statements such as "the horns of horse and hare are false because they are not perceived". In all these examples dharmi is absent. Assuming such unknown and unreal objects as dharmi, then proving its absence by logic is everyone's experience. Even if dharmi is unreal or unknown if Anumaana becomes valid, a question may arise whether Anumaana becomes perfect when it is employed to prove that the horn of the hare is real. It is true that such Anumaanaas are invalid. But the unreality of dharmi is not the cause for the invalidity of that Anumaana. To say that the horns of the hare are real is contradictory to everybody's perception. Everybody knows that the horns of the hare are not at all real. Any logic if it is attempting to prove any fact against Pratyaksha cannot survive. When there is no opposition or negation by PramaaNaas and when all the other requirements such as concomitance of hetu and saadhya, etc., are present, then even if dharmi is not there, that Anumaana is not at all invalid.

39. Saadhya-Aprasiddhi is Not Defect:

Similarly the saadhya, the major term, which has to be

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established, though it is unknown, but all the other requirements for Anumaana are there, then that Anumaana also becomes valid. We use Anumaana to prove unknown objects such as God, heaven, righteousness, unrighteousness, etc., which are not known. Even though those objects are unknown they can be established by Anumaana using examples. But we cannot prove the horns of the horse, and also we cannot establish that the world is neither real nor unreal. The reason is not that they are unknown. They are contradicted directly by Pratyaksha and other PramaaNaas. Saying that it is neither real nor unreal is mutually contradicting statements. Therefore such Anumaanaas are invalid. When Anumaana is free from such defects, it can establish unknown objects.

If saadhya is unknown and if it is not seen anywhere, we will not suspect its presence at all. Only a person who has seen fire at different places, gets doubt about the presence of fire on the hill tries to infer fire by logic. A man who does not know anything about fire does not get suspicion about the presence of fire. The beings, who do not have any concept of hell or heaven, do not get doubt about them. No one makes an attempt in employing Anumaana without getting any doubt about the fact, which is to be established. Does anyone try to prove fire on the hill by Anumaana when he can directly see it? Therefore there is a chance for Anumaana to be employed only when there is a doubt. When saadhya is unknown there is no chance for doubt. Hence Anumaana cannot establish unknown objects. This is how some argue.

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It is also not correct. We have several examples where Anumaana is employed even though there is no chance for doubt about the fact. When we are deeply engaged in some work, we suddenly hear the sound of a thunder. Then we can immediately determine that it will rain by using logic.

It has never struck him that it will rain since he was deeply engaged in some other work. No discussion took place whether it will rain or not. No talk about the rain was there. Thus he has not got any doubt about the rain and the rain is inferred by hearing the thundering sound. Therefore we can decide that doubt is not required before aunumaana is employed. Although so many objects are known by direct perception and through words of wise, but when logic strikes Anumaana is employed naturally. Even though one knows fire on the hill very clearly when he perceives smoke on the hill, will he not get the knowledge of the presence of fire? Even though one has got the information that a tree is full of fruits, when he perceives the same tree, he will get direct perceptual knowledge of the fruits. Though once knowledge occurs when all the required instruments are there, there is no objection to get another knowledge. Similarly even if saadhya is known from other PramaaNaas, if all the requirements of Anumaana are there, one can get inference. Therefore though God is proved by Veda and other means of knowledge, still we prove the existence of God by different Anumaanaas. Thus for Anumaana to take place, a doubt of the object is not required earlier. Hence we can infer an unknown object by Anumaana

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though there is no doubt about that fact.

Without knowing the concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya, one cannot have the full knowledge of inference. Unless one knows the invariable concomitant relation of fire and smoke, he cannot know fire by perceiving smoke. Therefore one may argue that if the fact which is to be established is not known, then the concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya will also not be known. Hence the inference of saadhya is not possible.

However there is no rigid restriction that saadhya must be known to have the knowledge of the concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya. After getting the knowledge of the existence of creator of the universe, we will know that he has the full knowledge of the entire universe. We will infer that God is omniscient (Sarvajna), because he is the creator of the universe. Till this Anumaana is employed no one is recognized as all knower. We are not aware of such an omniscient person. Thus though the Sarvajna is unknown, we can establish such a Sarvajna by logic. As a general rule one should know the object before he creates it. Because God has created this universe, we infer he has omniscience. In this Anumaana the saadhya (here it is the omniscience) is not known earlier. Therefore we may not have particular Vyaapti Jnaana between Sarvajnaana and sarvakarthRitvaa. But we can know the general rule that creator of an object must have the knowledge of its creation. With the help of this general rule we can infer omniscience in the all creator, who is God.

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Similarly we can prove the presence of Aatmaa by logic to the materialist or atheist who do not believe in self or God. Some particular natural action is experienced in human body, which is not seen in inanimate objects. The inanimate objects such as pot, cloth or books cannot act independently. But the physical body acts independently. Therefore there is some conscious entity in the body, which is not seen in inert objects. This conscious entity alone is Aatmaa or self. But for atheist this Aatmaa is an unknown object. Though this object is unknown it is established by Anumaana, that is, a particular action by a physical body. Atheist who do not at all accept the presence of self cannot see anywhere the concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya. Here hetu is particular action of the body and the saadhya is the presence of conscious self. But they can be made to understand the Vyaapti or the concomitant relation between the hetu and saadhya by some other method. The particular action of the physical body is not perceived in an inanimate object. Therefore this physical body which has this particular action is different from other inanimate objects that cannot act. Hence we have to accept some conscious presence in physical body which is not there in the other inanimate objects. When it is proved that where there is no fire there is no smoke, we can infer the presence of fire by the presence of smoke. This concomitant relationship is called Vyatireka Vyaapti. When an object, which is to be established is unknown, then wherever the absence of that object (saadhyaabhaava), there is the absence of hetu (hetvabhaava). By this vyatireka Vyaapti we can establish the presence of

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saadhya by perceiving hetu. When hetu and saadhya and their relationship are not directly determined then by concomitant relationship between their absence (saadhyaabhaava and hetvabhaava), one can establish the concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya. Thus anvaya Vyaapti is established by Vyatireka Vyaapti. Though saadhya is unknown there are so many other methods to establish the concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya. Therefore just because saadhya is unknown, when Anumaana does not have any other defects it can still be valid.*

Every philosopher establishes his own new theory, which is not accepted by other philosophers. Among philosophers discussions on dialectics are conducted about the new aspects and established the facts. They employ logic to establish unknown new theories. Even though the theory is new, it will be established by using opponent's doctrines, and thus they conduct discussions. Therefore, the fact, which is to be proved or disproved, need not be known earlier.

40. No Restrictions for Hetu to Exist in Paksha:

To establish a fact by Anumaana, we use hetu. According to Naiyaayikaas there is a rule that hetu should be present in paksha where saadhya is to be established.

* There are two types of Vyaapti-s:

1) anvaya Vyaapti: invariable concomitance between hetu and saadhya.

2) vyatireka Vyaapti : invariable concomitance between the absence of sadhya (saadhyaabhaava) and absence of hetu (hetvabhaava). anvaya Vyaapti can be established by vyatireka Vyaapti.

PramaaNaas

All

We establish that God is omniscient because he is the creator of all. To prove that God is omniscient, we employ sarvakartRitva as hetu. It is possible to prove that God is omniscient only when this sarvakartRitva hetu is there in God. If he is not creator of all on the basis of sarvakartRitva, how can we prove that God is knower of all. In an Anumaana if the hetu, which is to establish saadhya, does not exist in paksha, saadhya cannot be established. For example if smoke does not exist in mountain fire cannot be established there. Therefore Naiyaayikaas insist on the presence of hetu in an appropriate place where saadhya has to be proved. Technically this is called paksha dharmata. But Shree Madhvacharya has established that hetu need not exist in the same place where saadhya is going to be proved. We infer that it has rained on the hilly area by perceiving flood in the river. The flood, which is the hetu, that proves the rain on the hill, is not on the hill. We determine the rain uphill by the flood in the downstream. By perceiving the smoke on the sky above the hill, we infer the presence of fire down the hill. By these examples we can understand that the presence of hetu is not required in the same place where saadhya has to be established. We can arrive at some conclusion that hetu should be in an appropriate place so that saadhya can be proved in a particular place. It is not right to insist that hetu should coexist with saadhya in the same place and at the same time. Shree Madhvacharya has explained this aspect very well by giving practical examples.

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In short, to establish a fact the hetu in an Anumaana should be present in an appropriate place. There should be invariable concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya. These two aspects are essential for the validity of any Anumaana. Other aspects need not be considered as a must for Anumaana.

41. Upamaana:

Thus there are three types of PramaaNas such as Pratyaksha, Anumaana and Aagama. Some philosophers accept Upamaana also as another PramaaNa. We have seen bulls in the village. A person who is informed by elders that an animal similar to bull, which lives in the forest should be called 'gavaya'. When he sees similar animal he remembers that it should be called 'gavaya.' Tarkikaas call this as Upamaana PramaaNa. They argue that when similarity of bull, which is in the village (domestic), is perceived in the forest bull (wild bull), then he remembers this similarity of the forest bull with the bull in the village. Bull in the village is not in front of us, then how do we know its similarity in the forest bull? Some Tarkikaas say that this knowledge occurs because of upamaana PramaaNa. But all this can be known by the Anumaana PramaaNa. If bull in front of us is similar to the bull in the village, then even though the bull in the village is not in front of us, one can infer the similarity of this bull with the bull in the village. This can be known by general logic, which is known to all. Similarly when someone is informed that all animals similar to bull should be called 'gavaya' when he

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perceives animal in the forest which is similar to bull, he remembers that it should be called 'gavaya' by logic alone. Therefore there is no need to accept upamaana as a different PramaaNa.

42. Arthaapatthi:

Meemaamsaka-s accept Arthaapatthi as a different PramaaNa. Someone has declared that he will go on hunger strike. Nobody has seen him taking food during the daytime. But he does not have any physical symptoms of fasting. He looks hale and healthy. Then we conclude that the fellow takes food in the night secretly. This is considered as arthaapatthi PramaaNa. They also argue that when some other fact is inferred to account this situation in front of us that is called arthaapatti PramaaNa. A person who is fasting during daytime looks hale and healthy. To account that we have to determine that he must be consuming food during night times. Meemaasaka-s give this example for arthaapatti PramaaNa. Let us examine this in the light of our experience. A person who has not taken food during daytime and looks healthy, he must be taking food in the night. This is inferred on the basis of common rule i.e, he takes food because he is healthy and in a cheerful mood throughout the day. There is no necessity for another PramaaNa such as arthaapatti. Thus it is our experience that upamaana and arthaapatti are included in Anumaana PramaaNa only.

43. Anupalabdhi:

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How do we know the absence of an object? For that Meemaamsaka-s have accepted anupalabdhi as PramaaNa. They argue that if an object is present in front of us, it should be perceived. If it is not seen, it is not present. Thus by the non-perception of an object we conclude that object does not exist. This also is not correct. The absence of an object can be known either by prathyaksha or by Anumaana. In a dark room by moving our hands all over the floor, if we do not find a pot, we will conclude that there is no pot by examination. This knowledge is derived by logic only. In some places we can know the absence of an object by perception itself. T do not have happiness', T do not have unhappiness', and thus these are experienced by sakshi alone. Without depending on any critical examination, when knowledge occurs all of a sudden, it should be due to direct perception. We can directly perceive the absence of a pot on the floor in broad daylight. Thus we can know the absence of an object either by Pratyaksha or logic. There is no necessity for another PramaaNa such as anupalabdhi. Thus the classification of the PramaaNaas into three types is highly scientific.

44. PramaaNa LakshhaNa:

(Definition of valid means of knowledge)

So far divisions and classifications of PramaaNaas have been analyzed. To identify PramaaNa collectively in general, we should know what PramaaNa is, what is its definition and which cannot be a PramaaNa. The knowledge, which comprehends an object as it is, is called

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PramaaNa. The direct perception derived by sense organs, inference deduced by logic, knowledge derived from scriptures and words of wise, are all called kevala PramaaNaas. The sense organs, logic, and Aagama-s which are instruments for knowledge are also PramaaNaas. These are considered as anuPramaaNaas. However the knowledge, which comprehends an object as it is, and means of such knowledge are all considered as PramaaNaas. Thus Shree Madhvacharya has expounded the general nature of the PramaaNaas in a nutshell.

45. Memory (SmaraNa) as PramaaNa:

We need to discuss about one more aspect. We remember many things, which we saw in the past. The impressions born of out of the experiences cause the memory of those objects. The philosophers inquire on the question of whether this memory belongs to the status of PramaNaas or not. Shree Madvacharya has regarded this memory as a PramaaNa. But, this has been objected to by other philosophers. When we perceive an elephant in front of us, this means the elephant exists at this time and place. When we go to a different place we may get the memory of that elephant. Would that elephant exist at the time of the memory? At the time of the direct perception elephant was present. Therefore that perceptual knowledge was also Yathaartha or valid. But when memory occurs the object of that experience might not be there. Hence memory cannot be a valid PramaaNa. This is the objection. This objection has been made due to lack of critical analysis.

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When the object is existing in the same manner in which it was comprehended then that knowledge should be regarded as Yathaartha or PramaaNa. The memory does not comprehend an elephant as existing now. The elephant is comprehended in memory as 'it was there'. As it is comprehended in memory the object existed there at that time. If direct experience comprehends "the object is here and now", memory comprehends as "the object was there at that time." Both these direct perception and memory are Yathaartha only as they comprehend the objects in the manner they are existing. Therefore Shree Madvacharya has given the memory the status of PramaaNa which is in tune with the direct perception.

Those who do not accept memory as PramaaNa, they defend their case in a different way. It is not sufficient for knowledge to become PramaaNa if it comprehends a mere object as it is. That object should have novelty. It is regarded as PramaaNa only when it reveals a new object. It cannot become a PramaaNa if it explains repeatedly what is already known. What is new in memory which comprehends what was perceived in the past. What is the use of this knowledge? If there is any usefulness that knowledge can be considered as PramaaNa. Useless knowledge cannot be PramaaNa. This is how they argue to prove that memory is not PramaaNa. Memory not only comprehends what was perceived in direct experience, but also comprehends what was not experienced earlier. Direct perception comprehends an object as "it is there" along with present tense whereas memory comprehends an objects

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as "it was there" along with past tense. Thus there is slight difference in comprehension of time in both direct experience and memory.

In reality it is not proper to argue that for knowledge to become a PramaaNa it should be a new object which is not known before. We do perceive our house, cot, wife, and children everyday. We perceive forest, mountains, etc., daily which were already seen. Thus whether we perceive the objects which are already seen or known, we should treat only that knowledge as PramaaNa which comprehends a real object as it is. From this perspective there is no objection to accept memory as valid PramaaNa. It is not correct to say that there is no benefit from the memory. When we remember pleasant incidents of the past we feel happy. Likewise when we remember unpleasant occurrences we feel unhappy. As we keep on remembering the incidents of the past, their impressions become strong. As we reflect on the subjects discussed in the textbooks, their impressions strengthen in our mind. Don't the devotees of God get special benefit from constant reflection of God? Therefore it will not be proper to say that memory is not PramaaNa because there is no benefit.

A question may arise if memory is also accepted as PramaaNa, whether the classification of PramaaNa into three types, Pratyaksha, Anumaana and Aagama is incorrect. Though memory is PramaaNa it is not regarded as different from Pratyaksha. Memory is also a king of direct perception. As the direct perception occurs through

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the five sense organs such as eye etc., the memory knowledge is caused by mind with the help of impressions. Since mind is also considered as a sense organ, the memory, which is born in mind through the impressions of the objects, is included in the direct perception. Thus memory should be regarded as PramaaNa. Having analyzed all this thoroughly, Shree Madhvacharya has defined PramaaNa as knowledge and means of knowledge, which comprehends objects as it. If the original text is valid (PramaaNa grantha), then its translated or abridged version is also valid. If it is defined that the PramaaNa has to reveal new aspects the abridged version reveals only actual contents of the original text. Since there is no novelty in its information, it should be treated as ApramaaNa. When we look at the scenarios of natural beauty continuously we get continuous flow of knowledge of the beauty of the nature. This continuous flow of knowledge comprehends the real world in front of us. Since it is a continuously flow, sequence of isolated knowledge comprehends the same object. No one says that this flow of sequential knowledge is invalid. Therefore it is quite obvious that for a PramaaNa the reality of the object only is required. All other aspects are immaterial.

46. Logic (Tarka):

All philosophers use logic (tarka) as supportive to Anumaana for a fact to be established. Tarka has a prominent place while the discussions are conducted to prove or disprove arguments and counter arguments to establish the truth. What is a tarka? What is its position

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with reference to the different types of PramaaNa? These aspects have to be analyzed. When an Anumaana is employed to establish the presence of fire by the presence of smoke, then an objection may arise as to why should there be fire where there is smoke. Why should we not say in some places even if smoke is there, fire is not there? Then the necessity of tarka arises. When Anumaana becomes weak by such objections, tarka comes to its rescue by providing answers to the objections and helps Anumaana to produce perfect knowledge. Fire is the cause of the smoke. If there is no fire, there cannot be smoke. By this negative proposition, tarka forces an opponent to accept the presence of fire because of the absence smoke is not agreeable, since it is perceived. Thus tarka supports Anumaana and establishes the presence of saadhya (fire.) What is the problem and what are the consequences, if a fact, which is to be established by Anumaana, is not accepted? Tarka provides answers to all these objections. If God is not accepted there cannot be a systematic orderly world. But the world is in an orderly way. Therefore on the basis of this, an Omniscient and powerful entity has to be accepted and that entity should be God. Thus tarka helps to prove God.

Some philosophers argue that though tarka helps to establish a fact, it is not a PramaaNa independently. It cannot be PramaaNa which propose unreal objects. Tarka contains unreal facts. When it is said through tarka "if there is no fire on the smoky-hill there cannot be smoke

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also", it implies there is "no fire and there is no smoke." But in reality there are both smoke as well as fire. Thus tarka cannot be PramaaNa as it is proposing unreal aspects.

In reality, tarka is regarded as Anumaana. Anumaana is of two types: Saadhana Anumaana and DuushaNa Anumaana. Tarka is regarded as duushhaNa Anumaana. Tarka reveals or rejects the inferential knowledge. "An object that is born must have a creator. Since the world is created, it must have a creator." This is an example for Anumaana, which establishes a fact. "This world is not unreal, because many actions and useful functions occur in the world." This is example for duushaNa Anumaana. DuushhaNa Anumaana in turn is of two types. When this Yukti or Anumaana is employed all the rules of Anumaana have to be followed. Even this Anumaana should not have contradiction from other PramaaNaas. The Anumaana, which is employed to prove or disprove, should be present in an appropriate place and time. These PramaaNaas should not be used based on unreal facts. If an objection is raised indicating that there are some unreal aspects in the Anumaana, the proponent of this Anumaana has to establish the facts and convince the opponents. When it is not established that the employed Anumaana is not free from the defects raised, it will not be able to prove or disprove any facts.

The second type of duushaNa Anumaana is as follows. Though the proponent does not accept the fact, using the argument of the opponent, he raises a counter objection to

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establishes the original fact. The opponent says, "there is no fire on the hill." The proponent will not accept it. But he objects taking the statement of the opponent, "if there is no fire, then there cannot be smoke also." Using the very statement of the opponent, he will be forced to accept that was not agreeable to him. Through this process he establishes the saadhya. Based on the unagreeable fact that 'There is no fire', then counter objection is made that "there cannot be smoke also", which is not mutually acceptable. This process is called tarka. In the tarka, the aapadya aspect, that is "there cannot be smoke", and the opponent statement that "there is no fire", ( that is aapaadaka), based on which this counter objection is made, both need not be real. Finally the truth will be established using negative arguments. "If there is no fire on the hill, then there cannot be smoke also. But smoke is perceived. Hence there is fire". Thus tarka ends in establishing the truth. Therefore even though the ingredients of tarka are not acceptable as they are, since the truth is established by that, tarka becomes PramaaNa only. Only the style of tarka is different from another Anumaana. Whether the logic accepted by the opponent is correct or incorrect, using the same logic and compelling the opponent to accept unagreeable fact thereby establishing the truth, is the aim of tarka. Hence tarka is also a PramaaNa.

47. Types of Discussions:

The discussion with critical analysis, which is conducted by scholars, is called 'kathaa' in Shaastraas. The

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arguments and counter arguments regarding the existence of God and the validity of Vedaas by scholars is called kathaa. This kathaa is of three types: vaada, jalpa and vitanDa. The discussion conducted to ascertain the truth is called vaada. If we have doubt about some scriptural aspect, the truth can be determined by the discussions with critical analysis without any prejudices. Though one has determined-knowledge of the truth, these discussions can also be conducted at the request of people to preach them that truth. Thus the discussions conducted with the aim of finding the truth for one self and preaching the same to the people is called "vaada kathaa'a'.

The discussions about the valid doctrines conducted by virtuous and wise scholars with an aim for fame and financial benefits is called 'jalpa'. When the followers of valid doctrines conduct discussions with the followers of other doctrines is called 'vitanDa kathaa'.

'vaada kathaa'a involves scriptural knowledge and talent which are useful to prove and disprove the facts with the help of PramaaNaas. Whereas jalpa and vitanDa involve intellectual acrobatics just as the arguments between the lawyers in the court with the intention of defeating the opponent. In 'vaada kathaa' the proponent and the opponent need not be equally qualified. A student can have a debate with the teacher. The victory or defeat are not important in this. Student and teacher conduct 'vaada kathaa'a with the sole aim of learning the truth, though they are not equal in erudition. But in jalpa and vitanDa, where the victory and

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defeat are prominent, the two opponents have to be equal in knowledge. There is no chance for jalpa and vitanDa if one of the opponents is already established as distinguished scholar by his popularity. If the erudition of the opponents is not yet determined to examine that, both of them have to be involved in 'vaada kathaa'. But they are not mentally prepared to join 'vaada kathaa'a, because they came with the main purpose of competing with each other. In addition, they do not have the desire to know the truth, which is required in 'vaada kathaa'. But the organizer of the 'vaada kathaa' should insure that they get involved in 'vaada kathaa'. Abiding the rules of assembly of scholars (sabhaa), without getting into jalpa and vitanDa, the discussions should takes place within the limits of vaada. If it is decided that both of them are equal in knowledge, later they can conduct discussions of jalpa and vitanDa. They should not be given a chance for jalpa and vitanDa, if one of them is proved to be of greater scholar in vaada. The discussion should be immediately concluded by giving a special award, which is meant for the victorious in jalpa and vitanDa, to the one, who has won in 'vaada kathaa'.

This preliminary 'vaada kathaa' intended to test the relative erudition of the two opponents can become real 'vaada kathaa' to establish the truth. This has been explained already. Controlling the competitive spirit, the two opponents, who have the desire to win, are persuaded to get involved in the discussions. Though these discussions are meant to test the relative erudition of the two, it is also called 'vaada kathaa', since in the process the truth is also

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established. This 'vaada kathaa' that is meant for evaluation should also be conducted according to the rules of the regular 'vaada kathaa'. In one way, this pariiksha 'vaada kathaa' can be regarded as jalpa, because the two opponents have natural competitive mentality.

Thus only after evaluating the erudition of the two opponents either on the basis of their popularity in philosophical field or discussions (katha) which are meant for test, thus should be engaged in jalpa and vitanDa.

All necessary arrangements should be made to insure that the discussions to be held without any confusion and conflict, and to award the winner in befitting manner making sure that no injustice is done in the selection of the winner. A president should be appointed to award the victorious scholar in the scriptural discussions. The role of a judge, who gives judgment, without any partiality, by examining merits and demerits in the arguments of the opponents, is also very important. Sometimes, supposing even this judge is unable to determine the merits and demerits of the arguments, then some distinguished scholars are also required in this katha. All of them should conduct themselves without any partiality and be free from passion and aversion. The judge and the assembled scholars should be well versed in all Shaastraas as they have to evaluate the merits and demerits of the discussions. The president who has organized the debate may not necessarily have the scholarship, but he should also be free from passion and aversion and partiality. If a situation arises such that when judge and the assembled

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pundits are unable to decide the merits and demerits of the arguments due to some confusion, then help should be sought from the great scholars from for-off places. Arrangements should be made in such a way so that the final judgment will be free from any injustice to either one.

In debate opponents should establish their theories on the basis of PramaaNaas accepted by them. Those who admit the validity of Vedaas should quote first Vedaas and present other PramaaNaas which are supportive to their Vedic statements. When Vedaas are contradicted by Pratyaksha PramaaNa, without invalidating them, they should be interpreted providing different meaning in such a way not to contradict Pratyaksha. In this way, by accommodating all the PramaaNaas, without affecting the validity of Vedaas, and maintaining self-consistency in the arguments the truth has to be established. Thus when the nature of the pramaaNaas in full detail, their relative strengths and weaknesses and the rules of philosophical discussions, etc., are fully known, then our discussions and critical analysis will have a sound basis.

Thus we should examine the nature of the PramaaNaas and their strengths and weaknesses on the basis of scientific knowledge, and conduct comparative analysis against the background of Pratyaksha, Anumaana, Veda and words of wise. Then we can understand supreme Brahman, Shree Hari, as the most supreme among all beings and things, full of infinite attributes, without an iota of defects, and is the cause for all activities in the world. The world created by Him is absolutely real. One should not get averse to the

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obligatory duties assuming the world is 'maayaa' or imaginary. One should proceed in the spiritual path to realize God by detachment, devotion, scriptural studies, and contemplation by discharging one's social and religious duties with a firm conviction that this world is the field for evolution. Some doctrines reject Brahman as the supreme and complete with infinite attributes. Some schools of thought reject the very existence of God. Shree Madvacharya has critically examined both the theories and analyzed the nature of the PramaaNaas, revealed the true import of the Vedaas, and clarified the nature of Brahman, who is the creator of the universe and Supreme Being with infinite attributes. Thereby he has given us the divine message to promote single pointed supreme devotion to the supreme Brahman. Shree Madvacharya has described the nature of Mukti as continuous experience of one's own self, which is the embodiment of total bliss, forever. This can be attained through supreme devotion to God and with His supreme grace. In this way Shree Madhvacharya has given us clear definition and knowledge of PramaaNa and prameya (source of valid knowledge and the knowable object). For any possible objections or questions either from scriptural point or scientific point, satisfactory answers can be provided on the basis of Anuyvaakhyaana of Shree Madhvacharya and its interpretation in Shreeman Nyaayasudha, by Shree Jayateertha. Thus this text is like a mirror in the hand where one can get a very clear picture of PramaaNa and prameya. It is the treasure house for all philosophical issues. This is the greatest contribution to

the philosophical world by Shree Madvacharya and also by Shree Jayateertha who is popularly known as 'Teekaacharya.'

Offering to Shree Madhvacharya and the Lord. HHHHH