MADHVA LOGIC

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of the Lord and the dependence or subservience of everything else, it behoves every seeker of this J freedom (moksa) to understand all things in this way as being essentially subservient to or dependent on the power of the Lord who is independent and absolute. Thus the commentator observes, he that realises all these that are dependent as being subject to the control of the Lord becomes liberated from the bonds of the empirical life. The knowledge of the dependent y and the independent however comes from valid '""1 cognition and this is the reason why this particular treatise has been undertaken with the object of ascertaining the nature of valid cogni-tion. Even though the master Jayatlrtha has elaborately expounded the distinguishing marks of j valid cognition and the rest in such works as the^l Paddhati, etc. (Pramawpaddhati), yet, inasmuch ;| as these works are not easily intelligible to ; persons of feeble intelligence on account of theif deep and thoughtful language in which they are; expressed, this treatise has been undertaken with| a view to make the doctrines intelligible to thestf] readers of average intelligence. And thus this undertaking is not superfluous even though it discusses most of the topics already discussed i%: these other works and gives besides a brief account of some of the objects of valid cognition as well. Since the (scientific) knowledge of Praman and other allied things presupposes the tria

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statement (uddeia), definition (laksana) and examination (pariksa), the definition of statement and the rest is therefore first of all set forth.

UddeSa is the statement or verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only.

i In this definition the word 'udde&a' stands for what is defined and the rest constitutes its definition, viz., the words ' verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only.' This procedure (in regard to the thing defined and the definition thereof) will also be observed in all other cases (of definition) that will come up later on. If we say that a sound as such is a verbal indication, the babbling sound of the Ganges will rank as a verbal indication and thus our definition will be too wide. To exclude such cases we include the word indication in our definition. A verbal indication implies indication by alphabetical sounds (and not by sounds as such

'" which may include non-alphabetical sounds such as the babble of a river). But if we stop here

:- and say that an alphabetical sound as such is a verbal indication, the alphabetical sounds 'the son of a barren woman' should pass as a verbal indication. Hence to exclude such nonsensical combinations of alphabetical sounds the word ; * subject-matter' (in ' indication of the subject-

i? matter') has been included in the definition.

% (The words 'son of a barren woman' ar^ift^^ iT,^««« M «f anvthitisr and therefore indicate

*

*

subject-matter.) But if we stop here and accept % ' verbal indication of the subject-matter' as a ^ logically complete definition (of uddeso), the | * caw' ' caw ' of the crow will pass as a statement or Uddeia. (The 'caw* 'caw' of the crow is a combination of alphabetical sounds and it also indicates something that really exists, viz*» the crow's voice.) Hence the words 'by the name* in the definition which mean * by the words of the sacred language.' Even so, the definition , is too wide applying as it does to a sentence like 'The earth has the character of smell' which amounts to a definition (and not to a verbal indication of the subject-matter only). To exclude such cases, the word ' only * has been added (in ' by the name only '). The meaning is : the name which indicates the subject-matter in a statement is not "| used with a view to bring out the distinguishing % marks of the subject-matter. (The name is used only to indicate the subject-matter and not to define it.) In the case of the sentence 'The earth has the quality of smell' which amounts to a defi-' .nition, though the subject-matter is indicated by means of the words (names) of the sacred i language, yet, since the words have not been selected without reference to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter, the sentence cannot rank as a mere statement. Hence our definition of statement (as givefi| above) is not too wide. Hence we conclude : a

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statement consists in the indication of a subject-matter by means of such words (names) of the Sanskrit language as do not refer to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter in question.

Some hold that the word 'only' has been added (in the above definition of Uddeia) with a view to exclude only such definitions as * The earth has the quality of smell.' For (according to them) an Udde£a is a statement of the subject-matter without reference to its specifying or uncommon properties. Thus in the sentence (which is, in effect, a definition) .' The earth has the quality of smell,' since the subject-matter is indicated by reference to an uncommon property, viz., the possession of odour, the condition of indication of the subject, without reference to any uncommon of it is wanting, and thus our defi] not applying to it) is not too wide, be said that in the case of the earth

4

things, statements in this sense are impol so far as such statements will have to their respective subject-matters through the un« common properties of earthiness and the rest that distinguish them. For what is meant (by a verbal indication without reference to the uncommon properties of the subject-matter) is merely that the statement should not contain any reference to distinctive or uncommon properties other than those

that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question.

This however is not a correct interpretation of our definition, for the definition as thus interpreted will apply to sentences which are in the nature of definitions such as ' The earth has the property of earthiness' and thus will be too wide. ('The earth has the property of earthiness' is a verbal definition and not a statement of a subject-matter.) The sentence ' the earth has the property of earthiness' indicates a subject-matter (viz., the earth) without reference to any uncommon properties other than those that constitute the bare i property of being the subject-matter in question f (i.e., the property of earthiness).

(Having explained the nature of Uddeia, :i we now proceed to define Laksana or definition.) > .:'"-

A defining mark (laksaya) is an attribute that exists only in the thing defined (and not in \ anything else), This means that a defining mark v is an attribute that exists in every instance of the thing defined and does not exist in anything. ■ else. Thus in the case of the cow, the ' posses- \£ sion of a dewlap' serves as a defining mark ■-.-] as it exists only in (all) animals that are v cows and does not exist in animals that are not

COWS. .-•". ;■*■£

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If we say that an attribute as such is al defining mark, the ■ possession of undivided hoofs * will pass as a definition (of the cow) and thus

our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Possession of undivided hoofs is an attribute, but it is not an attribute of the cow which has cloven hoofs.) Hence we insist on the existence of the attribute in the thing defined.

If we stop here and rest content with saying that a defining mark is an attribute that exists in the thing defined, then the ' possession of mixed colour' will pass as a definition of the cow and thus our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Mixed colour exists in some cows but not in all cows and therefore cannot be a definition of the cow.) To exclude such attributes (as do not exist in every instance of the thing defined) we say the attribute (that is, a t defining mark) must exist in every instance of

the thing defined. -

But this also does not suffice, for 'possession of horns' may pass as a defining mark (of the cow) as thus interpreted and thus our definition-: becomes too wide. (Possession of horns can*: not be a defining mark of the cow, for though this attribute may exist in every instance -of a cow, yet it exists also in other animals such as the goat, the dear, etc) To exclude such attributes (as exist both in the thing;

: : defined as well as other things) we say the attribute (that is, a defining mark) must exist only

: ^:ii<all) the instances of the thing defined (and itf nothin!

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3 mIdhva logic

What, then, is the purpose or end (prayojana) subserved by the knowledge of a defining mark ? ,| The purpose or end subserved by the knowledge i of a defining mark is the differentiation of -■ the thing defined from all other things of a homogeneous or heterogeneous nature as also the correct use of terms (without a too wide or too narrow meaning). A thing is said to be homogeneous (sajatlya) with the thing defined when it is specified by the next higher class that subsumes the defined thing under itself. (This means that the homogeneous is a species co- v ordinate with the thing defined and subsumed.| under the same immediately higher genus.) \| A thing is said to be heterogeneous (vijatiya) with the thing defined when it is not specified^ by the immediately higher genus that subsumes under itself the character of the thing defined.,! Thus in the definition of the * cow,* 'the essence J of being a cow' or ' cow-ness' constitutes th^f| character of the thing defined. The immediately | higher genus comprehending this character (ofy 'cowness') is .' animality.' Therefore the horse and other animals which are characterised by this generic character of animality are homogeneous (sajathja) with the 'cow.' (Contrary-wise,) the jar and other things which are non*g characterised by this generic character (o& 'animality') are heterogeneous (vijatiya) with the 'cow.' By 'an immediately higher genra^T

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or ' next higher genus * is meant a genus which while not including any higher class inclusive of the thing defined is yet inclusive of the thing defined. Thus in the example of 'animality/ since the class of animals is inclusive of the class of cows without including the class of material objects which also includes the class of cows, the animal-class must be understood as the immediately higher genus in relation to the cow-class. These considerations (concerning the nature of the next higher genus) leave no room for the objection that all things being included under one all-inclusive class, viz., the class of knowables and the like, are all homogeneous with one another and that therefore there is no real heterogeneity anywhere. (Since all things come under a common all-inclusive class, viz., the class of knowables, they must all be said to be of the same class or genus, i.e., homogeneous. How then can you sensibly talk of the heterogeneous and of one thing being heterogeneous with another? The answer to this objection is furnished by the definitions we have given above of the homogeneous and the heterogeneous as based on the concept of the next higher genus. When a thing is included under the next higher genus or class of the thing defined, it is said to be homogeneous with the thing defined. SVhen a thing is iiot so included, it is said to be heterogeneous.) In tins way in all other defini-

2

tions the homogeneous and the rest are to be .■ understood.

(Having explained the nature of a valid logical definition, we shall now proceed to explain what constitutes the opposite, i.e., an invalid definition or non-definition.)

An invalid definition or non-definition is the negation of a logically valid definition. Hence it is the negation of "that which, existing in every instance of the thing defined, is non-existent in things other than the instances of the thing defined." As a .'; negation, it is of the nature of a negation ; ; of a qualified thing. . A qualified negation..;; or a negation negating a qualified thing may be of three kinds, viz., (a) a qualified negation negating the thing qualified, (&) a'.| qualified negation negating the qualification ;| of the thing, (c) a qualified negation negating both the thing qualified and the qualification of it. (An invalid definition is a qualified negation, because it is the negation of a valid %t definition which consists of a substantive and an adjectival part, the substantive portion being ' that which is non-existent in other things' and 28 the adjective qualifying it being ' while existing 'k in every instance of the thing defined.' Thus a non-definition, as being the negation of this substantive qualified by the adjectival portion, is a qualified negation.) Thus the non-definition

"The cow is an animal possessing horns " is a qualified negation negating the substantive part of a valid logical definition. (It negates the condition that 'the defining mark must not exist in anything other than an instance of the thing defined.' ' Possession of horns ' is existent also in animals which are not cows.) Again the non-definition * The cow is an animal possessing mixed colour' is a qualified negation negating the qualification (that characterises a valid definition). (The qualification 'existing in every instance of the thing defined ' is negated in this case as every cow does not possess mixed colour.) Lastly, the non-definition ' The cow is an animal possessing undivided hoofs' illustrates a qualified negation negating the substantive as well as the adjectival part of a valid definition. ('Possession of undivided hoofs' is present in animals that are not cows and absent in cows. Thus it negates the substantive 'absence from other things ' and also the adjective ' existing in every

case of the thing defined.')

(Having explained the nature of a logical definition and its opposite, we shall now proceed to explain the nature of pariksa or examination.)

Examination or sifting of evidence (pariksa) is mentally reflecting on the cogency or otherwise (of the evidence that has been adduced). Too wide use (ativyapU) consists in the use of a defining mark that exists in things

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12 madhVa LOGlO

other than the thing defined. Too narrow use (avyapti) consists in the use of a defining mark that doe£ not exist in a part of the extent (i.e., in some instances) of the thing defined. Absurdity (asambhava) consists in the use of a property as a defining mark that does not exist in any instance of the thing defined. That which is defined by the defining mark is called the laksya or thing defined.

(Let us now proceed to define the subject-matter of this work, viz., Pramana.) Pramana as such (i.e., pramana in general as distinguished from any particular kind of pramana) may therefore be first of all defined here. Pramana (we hold) is that which agrees, with the nature of the object (known). This means that the essence of pramana consists in | making the cognitum an object (of cognition) in the form in which it actually exists. There are M many things to be said here, but as this treatise4S is meant for young learners and as (more) in- | telligent people may know all these from the work called the Paddhati, therefore they are not mentioned here.* The same observations hold

* The Pramdnapaddhati observes that pramana is here so defined

as to apply both to tbe cognitive process and the knowledge that results

therefrom. The cognitive process conduces to the apprehension of the

cognitum as it actually exists and is called Anupramapa. The resulting

knowledge also apprehends the cognitum as it actually exists and is,

called kevatopramana.

{Pramdpapaddhati t Madhva ViWsa Edition* p.

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also in respect of other matters that will come up later on (in this treatise).

In the above definition of Pramana, since the property of apprehending the object is common to valid as well as doubtful and erroneous cognitions, the qualification ' in the form in which it actually exists* has been included. If we had defined Pramana merely as that which abides in the form in which it actually exists, then our definition would apply also to the cogniser and the cognitum (since these also abide in the form in which they actually exist), :., :: and thus will be too wide. Therefore we say : it must apprehend the cognitum as well (and not merely that it should abide in the form in which it actually exists). Here ' apprehending the cognitum* means 'apprehending the cognitum! * x immediately as well as mediately* (through the ;■'..£■■+} help of a cognitive process). Hence our definition '* .;.;|j as applying also to the cognitive processes of ,j|| perception and the rest (as also to the knowledge v;J

that results therefrom) cannot be said to be too .. : v narrow. Nor can this be said to be an illegiti-mate extension of the meaning of the term Pramana, for such extension is quite unexception- ■;\ able (inasmuch as the term Pramam is, as a matter of fact, used in both the above two senses of the cognitive processes and the resulting : knowledge)'. " " J* ■■' '' J

The subject who cognises a valid cognition

MADHVA LOGIC

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is called the cogniser or knower. The object that is cognised by a valid cognition is called the cognitum or object known. Knowledge of the object as it actually exists is called valid knowledge or valid cbgnition. If valid knowledge were not ■ defined as a form of knowledge, our definition would be too wide as applying also to the processes which are only instrumental in the production of valid knowledge.* Similarly, if . valid knowledge were not defined as apprehension of the object as it actually exists, our definition "j would also be too wide as applying to doubtful

is?

cognitions and the rest. .^1

What, then, is the essence of a doubtful;^!

cognition {saw&aya) ? It may be said that it cannak|| be said to consist merely in an indefinite appre£!| hension for this amounts to a mutual dependence '::::{ (a circular definition). Thus (one may argue) io||j so far as a certain cognition is a definite apprehe«?J|| sion the definition of a doubtful cognition as mergg^ indefinite apprehension amounts to a circular^ definition in asmuch as a certain cognition is the other of a doubtful cognition and a doubtful cog-

* ~*5

* A distinction is drawn betweeu Pramd, valid knowledge, and Pramana, the instrument of valid knowledge. Pramana signifies both the source of the knowledge and the knowledge itself (as correct apprehension of the object). But Pramd means the knowledge only and its instrumental means. Thas PramS must be distinguished from processes of intellection that bring about the result of valid knowli but Pramana may be used alike for the cognitive processes and knowledge that results therefrom.

prama^acandrikI

nitioii (defined as indefinite apprehension) is likewise the other of a certain cognition. This argument, we hold, is not a sound one. An indefinite apprehension is in reality the correct definition of a doubtful cognition. There is no circle involved in this definition (as is contended by the opponent). For by the term 'indefinite apprehension' is here meant a cognition that appears clothed (bathed) in the numerous mutually incompatible forms that manifest themselves in (float on the surface of) one single thing. If we had defined doubtful cognition as that which is a cognition our definition would be too

wide as applying also to the case of the (certain)

cognition 'There is a jar here.' Therefore we say *it must be clothed in many forms.' Even so however our definition would be too wide as applying also to composite or collective cognitions such as the simultaneous cognition of a man and a post, or of a jar, a piece of cloth, a pillar and a pitcher, etc. To exclude such composite (certain) cognitions we say ' there must be one single thing' (in which the different forms are apprehended). But even then our definition remains too wide as applying to cognitions like ' This tree is of the Sim^upa species,' 'The jar is a substance,' etc. (In these also there is cognition of different forms in a single thing.) Therefore (to exclude these), we say 'the different forms must be mutually incompatible. 1

«

But even so, our definition remains too wide as applying to erroneous cognitions like "This is silver/ (In the case of the cognition of silver in the locus of a mother of pearl, there are two incompatible forms, viz.* the form of , mother-of-pearl and the form of silver, and these forms refer to one single thing, viz., the mother-of-pearl, and yet the illusion of silver in the i mother-of-pearl is not a doubtful cognition.) J To exclude such erroneous cognitions we say (not | merely that there should be numerous incompatible forms but also) that, the numerous incompatible forms should also manifest themselves^ as incompatible. 1 (In the case of the illusion*^ the form of silver manifests itself while that of mother-of-pearl remains non-manifest to the cogniser.) Thus (since in the doubtful cog] the different incompatible forms are held also tte present themselves as incompatible forms (refett|f ring to one single thing), our definition is noij-open to the aforesaid objection (of being too^

wide). -

Some hold that this doubtful cognition arises, with the absence of its solvent as an auxiliary condition, from five different cau viz., (1) (cognition of) a common character,

(2) (cognition of) an uncommon chara

(3) (cognition of) contradictory characters (in and the same thing), (4) positive cognition certain objects), and (5) non-cognition

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certain objects). A doubt arising from the perception of a common character is illustrated in the case of the perception of a certain tall stature which is common to a man and a post. The perception of this common character calls forth a simultaneous recollection of the two forms of 'man' and 'post' in the perceiver's mind as the result of which there arises in the latter a desire to ascertain the true nature (of the thing perceived, i. e., a desire to ascertain whether the object perceived is 'a man* or'a post.') In the absence, however, of perception of the crucial test, viz., the curved hollow which is peculiar to the trunk of a tree or the possession of a head, hands, etc., which is peculiar to a man, there arises a doubt in the form of a mental oscillation (between the two alternatives in the form) ' Is that a man ? ' ' Or, Is that a post?.', ; A doubt arising from the cognition of an uncommon character is illustrated in the following case. The cognition that sound is a quality that belongs exclusively to Ether (Ikaia) awakens a doubt, in the absence of a perception of the solvent, as to whether it is an eternal or a non-eternal quality. A doubt arising from the clash of contradictory views is illustrated in the fofe;, lowing case.. The man who discovers that the .yaise§ikas teach that the sensibilities are consti-■/•*gted by the.;elements t$: that the 8aiik%* ■ -teaches that they are aofc-and at the :■&&&&»»

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cannot find the means of deciding between the rival views is thrown into doubt as to whether the sensibilities are constituted by the elements or not. A doubt arising from a positive cognition is illustrated in the case of a man who first discovers the underground water in the act of sinking a well. The discovery of the water throws him into a speculative doubt (as to the real source of the water), and he thus enquires, for want of a solvent, as follows : 'Has the action of digging only made manifest the water which has been existent all along but remained non-manifest? Or, has it made the non-existent water start into existence? The following, lastly, illustrates the case of a doubt arising from non-apprehension. The man who learns from hearsay that there lives a ghost in the banyan tree yonder and yet finds none when he comes If? near the tree is thrown into a mental uncertainty as he does not cognise the solvent. He thus enquires : ' Is the demon not perceived because :^ of its power of making itself invisible? Or, is it unperceived because it does not exist ?' * jl

Others hold that positive cognition and non-■ apprehension (as causes of doubt) being only'J modalities of the 'common character' (as a cause of doubt), doubtful cognition must be said to have three causes only (and not five as stated above). How is--'positive- cognition?: to be regarded as a modality of the 'common!

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character* that is supposed to be a cause of doubt? In this way. There is positive cognition of a jar that exists in a dark place when a lamp is lighted and the surrounding darkness is dispelled thereby. There is also positive cognition of a jar that did not exist previously till the potter has operated on the lump of clay and brought a jar into being. (The positive cognition is thus a character that is common to an existent and a non-existent thing and thus raises doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the object in the mind of the cogniser). How is non-apprehension a modality of the 'common character?' In this way. There is non-apprehension of the existent such as the non-perception of God as well as of the non-existent such as the non-perception of the hair's horn. (Thus non-perception as appertaining alike to the existent and the non-existent raises doubt as to the existence or the opposite of the object noa-perccived.)

But the true view is that the so-called 'uncommon character' as well as 'the clash of contradictory views * being really modalities of the 'common character,' there is only one cause of doubtful cognitions, viz., the cognition of a common character.' The way in which these (ti2., 'the uncommon character,' 'the clash of doctrines,' etc.) are to be regarded as comprised in the ' common character * should be understood

MADHVA LOGIC

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in the manner they are shown to be so comprised in the work called the 'Paddhati.'

(Having explained the nature of doubt we now proceed to explain the nature of erroneous

cognition.)

An error (viparyaya) is a cognition consisting in the conscious certitude that a thing exists just where as a matter of fact it does not exist. If we define an error simply as a cognition, our definition will apply also to doubtful cognitions (which are also cognitions and thus will be too wide* Hence we define* error as a cognition which amounts to a certain^ knowledge or conviction. This excludes the| cases of doubtful and uncertain cognitions. Bti| since valid cognition is also as much self-eonfidenl-as invalid cognition or error, we define error as i cognition that apprehends a thing where reality the thing does not exist. This di tinguishes an error or invalid cognition f valid cognition and thus our definition is fi too wide. But even thus our definition fails exclude the cases of doubtful cognitions, doubtful cognition (though lacking in certitu or decisiveness) also apprehends a thing where does not exist. Hence we say, an error is;-| certain cognition. Even thus however our de tion remains faulty as applying to the case valid cognitions as well, e.g., the cogni 'the tree is in contact with the

"3

The contact does not exist in all parts of the tree. (Therefore contact is asserted in respect of an object which is devoid of contact in some of its parts). Hence we insist on the word just in our definition, i.e., we say an error cognises a thing just where the thing does not exist. Such errors arise from faulty perceptions, fallacious reasonings and defects of verbal communications. The illusion of silver in the locus of a mother-of-pearl is an illustration of error arising from faulty perception. An error of reasoning is illustrated in the case of the man who under the influence of blinding dust imagines he perceives smoke and on the basis of the illusory smoke infers the existence of fire in a , place where fire does not exist. Similarly, when on the strength of the lying report of an untrustworthy man one believes that there are , five different fruits lying on the banks of *■_..,: neighbouring river, we have a case of an errO*^ arising from a faulty verbal communication. :-;.;.-,: An objection however may be raised here),.^ We have defined Pramana as consisting in making f the object of cognition to be cognised in the form in which it exists (actually). Butthe definition may be objected to as being too wide applying as it does to the case of 'memory' also (*Hjg$ •is not usually recognised as a Pramana)- Our reply is : this is not so, for scripture testifies to jgftf^flf that 'men^,f ; >rception,* : ;iaF^^r-;

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and * inference' are to be regarded as the 1 pramanas or valid sources of knowledge in regard to such things as (dharma) merit and the like, by all those who desire liberation. Thus we have the testimony of scripture showing that memory is a form of valid knowing.

Some philosophers define pramana as the karana or instrumental cause of prama or valid cognition. An instrument as such (according to them) is not a pramana, otherwise any instrument such as an axe would rank as pramana. Hence the definition of pramana as an instrument of valid cognition (and not as a mere instrument). Similarly the epithet ' valid * is also necessary as >! without it the definition would apply to non- | valid and erroneous cognition and thus be too wide. Lastly, the word instrument is also! necessary as without it the definition would I tantamount to an absurdity and also be tofr| wide as applying to the consequence or result J that follows from the instrumentality of valid knowing.

We however do not accept the above view as^| we consider the definition too narrow as not-| applying to the result of valid knowing. (Our*' view is that the word pramana signifies the knowing act as well as the result of knowledge that arises therefrom.)

Others define pramana as that which is; pervaded by prama or valid knowledge.

PRAMAtfACANDRIKl &3

This also is not a tenable position. Every knowable object is validly cognised by the Lord. Hence every knowable such as the jar and the like is pervaded by the Lord's valid knowledge. Thus every knowable answers to the above definition of pramana or valid knowing as that which is pervaded by valid knowledge. Thus the definition is too wide as applying to knowables (and not merely to knowing acts).

With a view to escape from the above difficulty, others modify the above definition as follows :— Pramana is that which being either a substrate or an instrument is at the same time pervaded by valid knowledge.

Even thus however the definition is not faultless. The mention of the word 'substrate' in the definition is without rhyme or reason Even granting that the Lord is regarded as a standard of validity, it cannot be said that this in itself is a sufficient reason for introducing the word 1 substrate' in the definition. For the word pramana is derived by means of the suffix lyut, and, according to the rules of grammar, the suffix lyut applies only to the instrumental, the locative and the nominative absolute. There is no rule for its application to a nominative as such, i.e. (as in the present case), to the agent, nominative or subject of valid knowing. (The Lord is regarded as the standard of valid knowing only as the absolute knower, ie., as the agent or

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subject of absolute knowledge and not as its^ substrate or instrument.)

It may be argued that even though the as knower is the subject of knowledge, yet also is the substrate or locus of such knowledge, and thus may very well be the meaning of the word pramana. But even this argument does not bear examination. The Lord as knower is aO^g agent of the knowing act and not its substrate Cji locus in the strict sense. For what is a locus adhikarana? A locus is that which is the adh or container of the agent acting or the obj acted on and is at the same time the a&raya-a substrate of the action itself. (The Lord c be the substrate of the knowing act of w He is the subject.)

Others (the Prabhakaras) define PramanI f anubhuti, i.e., as the apprehension of a.-fi By anubhuti they mean cognition other than n collection or memory. According to . t anubhuti cannot be defined simply as ' other recollection/ for in this case the definition apply to objects of cognition like the jar and rest (which are other than recollection). \ ean it be defined simply as e cognition/ for this case the definition will apply to ' recollection^ (which is not an independent source of knowledge

according to Prabhakaras). _ : ,.,V.:

v But the Prabhakara definition of PramapftH open to the following objections,; .yte^bg$

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PRAMi^ACANDRIKA 25

place, it is too wide as applying to doubtful cognitions (which are also forms of apprehension or anubhuti other than recollection). Secondly it is also too narrow as not applying to memory (smrti) and the social codes derived from the Vedas. (Smrti means recollection as well as the social codes based on the Vedas and their teachings. The latter are analogous to recollection which is based on an original primary presentation. The Madhvas accept smrti as pramana in

both these senses.). -

(This closes our discussion of the definition of Pramaqa. We now proceed to discuss its different

varieties.)! - - - '-■ ■"«■' Pramana is of two kinds, viz., (1) Kevda? pramana, i.e., self-contained, absolute knowing, and (2) Anupramdna, i.e.,. valid knowing as the instrumental cause of self-contained, absolute knowing. This enumeration is baaed! on the order of importance. (Kevalapramafa being of superior importance is first mea*>: tioned.) ". ,..;.^,;

- **

Kevalapramam means knowledge that agrees with the nature of the object known. The words '■ agrees with the nature of the object' dispose of uncertain and doubtful cognitions, while the word 'knowledge' disposes of percerang (and other intervening processes). (Keratapraro^ii*^ the resulting knowledge as distinguished from the processes leading thereto.) ■ <■'-..■•■&£$§$$&"■

"4 ' ■ '

There are four kinds of Kevalapramana (i.e.> four kinds of self-sufficient, self-contained knowledge):—(1)* the knowledge of the Lord or Ihara, (2) the knowledge of the Lord's Consort, Atfcj Laksml, (3) the knowledge of the Sage or Yogin A (4) the knowledge of the Non-Sage or Ayogin.

The Lord's knowledge is the knowledge that rests on, i.e., presupposes, itself only. The fact of its l depending on itself only ' distinguishes the Lord's knowledge from that of the Lord's Consort. (The Consort's knowledge, while depending on itself, also depends on the Lord's knowledge.) The fact of its being i knowledge' distinguishes it from the Lord Himself whose knowledge it is. (This is aimed at the Shankarite theory according to which Brahman is nothing but pure self-revealing Intelligence. The Madhvas distinguish between the Lord Himself and the knowledge which the Lord has of Himself and all other things.) Or, we may say, the Lord's knowledge is knowledge that embraces all that appertains either to the Lord Himself or to that which is other than the Lord. The Lord's knowledge cannot be defined simply as knowledge, for in this case the :|| definition will be too wide as applying to the J Yogin's knowledge as well (which is alsp : .J§ knowledge of a sort). To exclude the latter, the;? definition stresses the words ' that embraces attgj etc.' (The Yogin's knowledge is not all-embracing

•*»

as is the Lord's). Further, the word ' knowledge ' : prevents a too wide application of the definition to the perception of the Lord. The Lord's knowledge is invariably in agreement with the nature of the object known, constitutes the essence or svarupa of the Lord, is without beginning and without end.

The Consort's knowledge is knowledge that depends on, i.e., presupposes, the Lord's knowledge only. If the Consort's knowledge had been defined simply as ' knowledge,* the definition would have been too wide and applicable to the Lord's knowledge as well. To exclude the latter, the words * depending on the Lord's knowledge* have

been added. Since dependence implies a distinction (between the dependent and that on which it depends), the possibility of confusion (between the Consort's knowledge and the Lord's knowledge) is precluded. But mere dependence on the Lord's knowledge does not fully define the Consort's knowledge. The knowledge of Brahma and others is also characterised by this dependence on the Lord's knowledge. To preclude such extension of the definition (to the knowledge of Brahma and others), the word 'only* has been added. (The Consort's knowledge depends on the Lord's knowledge only, but the knowledge of Brahma and others depends both on the Lord's knowledge and the Consort's knowledge.) Further,; the word c knowledge r in the definition serves to

distinguish the Consort's knowledge from the J Consort herself. Or, we may say, the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. Here the '§ word * knowledge' by itself fails to distinguish the Consort's knowledge from knowledge like-that of ourselves. Hence to prevent such too wide application, the words ( of all objects' have. ^ been added. Even then the definition has a too,-1 wide application to the Rju login's knowledge. (The $ju Yog in also has a reflective knowledge, of all objects). Hence the word 'non-reflective.*^ The Rju-Yogin has only a reflective knowledge of objects. Again to say that 'the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects' does not distinguish it from the Lord's :i knowledge (and thus the definition as so worded remains too wide). Heoce the further qualifier tion 'excepting the Lord Himself.' But the Words * non-reflective knowledge of all object£| and no 3uch knowledge of the Lord Himself would be absurd and self-confuting. Henflg the words 'other than 5 {%. e., non-reflecti knowledge of all things other than the Himself). Further, the word r knowledge * iij| the definition distinguishes it from the Consort* perception (t. e.» the process of percei which leads to A or results in, knowl The Consort's knowledge is also inv in agreement with reality^ is the esse

■ ■..

** J .

PRAMAtfACANDRIKl 29

of the Consort herself and is beginningless and

eternal.

The Yogin's knowledge is the knowledge that has attained to special perfection or excellence through the power born of the practice of yoga or mental concentration. It is of three kinds, viz., (1) the Rju Yogin's knowledge, (2) the Tattvika Yogin's knowledge, (3) the Atattvika

Yogin's knowledge.

By Rju Yogin is meant a jiva or individual soul who is capable of the spiritual excellence of Brahman. The Rju Yogin's knowledge is the reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. As the mere words 'the Rju Yogin s knowledge is knowledge ' will not prevent, a too wide application of the definition to our; knowledge as well, the words * of all objects * h$v "been added. As even theo them.is a

^application to the Lord's knowledge, * reflective * has been incorporated. As th the definition entails an absurdity, the being a reflective knowledge of all and yet not a knowledge of the Lord the words 'other than the Lord Himself'BS*R=^ been added. This knowledge is of two kinds &^*$j& (o) knowledge which is the essence or nature of '^M& the , Yogin himself, and (&) knowledge which is only a mental state of the Yogin. Of these* knowledge constituting the Yogin's essence jft!

^begraningless and etaajfeJifcUe knowledge ]|I»

fe:*

>:**■*'■■ y *" m ■'**■

*..

m

30 MADHVA LOGIC

Yogin's mental state is beginningless only as being comprised in a (beginningless) flow stream (of states). Both these however are inH variably in agreement with the nature of thej

objects (known).

The Tattvika Yogins are the supernal beings (with godly qualities) other than the Rju Yogins and full of the conceit of true knowledge of reality. Merely saying that Y the Tdttvika$j> are the gods with self-conscious knowledge of reality' would have involved a too wide application to the Rju Yogins (who also have sdfH conscious knowledge of reality). Hence the words 'other than the Rju Yogins. 9 Merely saying again that * the Tattvikas are other tharf the Rju Yogins would have involved a-wide application to the gods or spirits who are non-Tattvikas. Hence the words 'with self conscious knowledge of reality.' Since there also ungodly beings (other than Rju Yogins) wh#j also have self-conscious knowledge of reality^ therefore the words ' with godly qualities * have been added. The Tattvika Yogin's knowledge $ that which being beginningless does not, even by way of reflection, embrace all things other than the Lord. Merely saying that ' the Tdttvi Yogin's knowledge is knowledge' would ha entailed a too wide application to the Lord' knowledge. Hence the words c does not embra all things.' Even then there would have been

yfi.i

%

too wide application to the Consort's knowledge. The Consort's knowledge is non-all-embracing in so far as it does not extend to the Lord Himself. Hence the words ' other than the Lord.' Even then, there would have been a too wide application to the Rju Yogin's knowledge, for the Rju Yogin's knowledge does not embrace all things other than the Lord in the absence of reflection. Hence the words 'even by way of reflection/ Even then, however,, the definition would have a too wide application to the non-Tattvika Yogin's knowledge. Hence the words 'being beginning-less/ It also is of two kinds, viz., (a) knowledge which constitutes the svarupa or essence of the Tattvika Yogin, and (b) knowledge which is external (i.e., relates to external objects). - Of these, 'essential 5 knowledge is in agreement with reality, but * external' knowledge is occasionally false, i.e., not in agreement with the nature of things. ...

The non-Tattvikas or 'Atdttvikas are the Gods and Sages practising Yoga who are other than the Rju and the Tattvika Yogin$. The non-Tattvika Yogin's knowledge is that which, having a beginning in time, is characterised by slight or partial ignorance in respect of objects other than the Lord. Merely saying that the non-Tattvika Yogin's knowledge is knowledge would have entailed a too wide application to the Lord's irT^TxriafW rrWAfnrp .thii words * characterised

>

32 MADHVA LOGIC

by ignorance' have been incorporated. Even! then there would have been a too wide applicant to the non- Yogin's knowledge. Hence the word ' slight or partial/ Even then the definition would| have entailed an absurdity, for the non-TattmW4 t t knowledge in respect of the Lord is tainted by immense (and not slight) ignorance. Hence the;-* Words ' other than the Lord/ Even then there would have been a too wide application to the Tattvika Yogin's knowledge. Hence the words 'having a beginning in time/ This also is two kinds, viz., essential knowledge, and exl knowledge. The rules as to their truth or untrutl are the same as in the previous case. The begin-: ninglessness and the beginning-in4ime of Tattvika and the wm-Tattvika Yogin's knowli respectively should be understood in the mann< explained in the f Paddhati/

The non-Yogins or Ayogins are the individi souls other than the Yogins or sages. The wo] * Jivas or individual souls ? differentiates Ayogins from the Lord and the Lord's C< and the words 'other than the Yogins* tinguish the Ayogins from the Yogins. ■. The Ayogin's knowledge is knowledge chi tensed by immense ignorance in regard to obj< other than the Lord. Merely saying that Ayogin's knowledge is knowledge chai by immense ignorance' would have entailed too wide application to the Yarn's

T"«.

*tfCi

-#**

also. The Yogin's knowledge is also accompanied by immense ignorance, viz., in regard to the Lord. Hence the words 'other than the Lord/ The Ayogin's knowledge is also of two kinds as in the previous cases. Besides, it is also generated in time and perishable in time. This generation or cessation means generation or cessation with respect to the manifestation of the svarupa or essence. The svarUpa or essence here means the svarupa or essence of the knowing as a cognitive process or state.

The Ayogins or non-Yogins are also of three kinds : (1) those that are fit for liberation, (2) those that are perpetual participators in (the storm and stress of) life, (3) those that are fit only to live the stupefied life of inertia or Tamas. Of these, ' essential' knowledge in the case of ' those fit to be liberated' is in agreement with the nature of reality, while the same in * the perpetual participators in life* is of a mixed character (partly true and partly false). Of others, however, such knowledge is false as being in non-agreement with reality- As regards ' external' knowledge, it is both (true and false, ».e., in some cases true and in other cases false) in all the three kinds of the non-Yogins..

The Vaisesikas accept sense-perception, ^ inference from a mark, memory and the intuitions of the Sages as the four kinds of valid evidene&o: Thio ah* Voieofiiw via™} hnwe.ver is untenable

'-■*ii

34 MADHVA LOGIC

>

as this enumeration does not include the Lord's knowledge which is timeless and eternal as also knowledge derived from authoritative communication (Agama). Further, recollection being the effect of the action of the mind which is a sense-organ, and the intuitions of sages being only a species of Yogik knowledge, and Yogik knowledge being itself a variety of sense-knowledge aided by the power of Yoga (according to their own admission), there is no reason for a separate enumeration of memory or recollection and of. the intuitions of sages as independent sources of;

knowledge.

[Having explained the nature of direct self^

contained knowledge (kevalapramaw), we sh .now discuss the nature of pramfma as Ann* pramdiia or mediating processes.]

Anupramana is the means or instrumental can of valid knowledge. Merely saying * Anuprama is knowledge ' would entail a too wide applicati to knowledge itself (which is the result or effe of Anupramana) and to uncertain and doubtf cognition (which also is a species of knowledge though not valid knowledge). Again ■, merel; saying 'Anupramana is an instrument or effectuating means' will entail a too wide applicati to the axe and other like instruments. Ag merely saying 'Anupramana is valid knowled will entail a too wide application to Kevalt pramana (which is direct, self-contained v

■%i

m

*

PHAMA^ACANbRlKA \> V^5-^" W

knowledge). Simply saying again that l Anu-pramafta is the instrument of that which is valid ' will entail a too wide application to the instrument of perception (which also is valid). Likewise saying merely that 'Anupramaiia is the means to knowledge or cognition' will entail a too wide application to that which is a means to doubtful cognition, etc. Lastly saying that 'Anu-pramana is the cause of valid cognition' will entail a too wide application to the knower. Thus our definition of Anupramiina is proved to be necessary in all the points.

(What, then is a sadhana, instrumental cause or means?) A Sadhana or instrument is that which being absent, the effect does not arise, even though other conditions like the knower, etc., are present, and which being present unobstructed, the effect necessarily arises. E.g., the axe in the process of striking (the tree to be felled). Hence there is no too wide application to any and every concomitant condition, e.g., no too wide application to cases of erroneously cognised marks or signs. Where error is involved, the presence of defects of sensibilities, etc., is the bar (to the cognition of the really effective means).

(The sadhana is thus the cause par excellence, i.e., the most effective of the causal conditions. And this brings us to the question of the. nature of the cause.) ..."

The cause may be defined as the unconditional,

invariable antecedent of the effect. And t effect may be defined as that which is nega by the negation * consisting in antecedent! non-existence. (This means that the effect is that which does not exist before it i caused to be.) The cause again is of two kinds/ viz.. the material cause and the instrumental cause. The cause which suffers transformation (into the effect) is the material cause, for example, Prakrti or primal matter as the cause the universe, the lump of clay as the cause of t jar. The cause which produces the effect witho being itself transformed thereinto is the inst mental cause, for example, the unseen m forces (Adrsta) as the cause of the universe, t. potter's stick as the cause of the jar. Hence follows that among the assemblage of caus; conditions that which is the cause par excellen&jjp (i.e., most effective) is the sadhana, means -A instrument. '^

. Anupramaqa is of three kinds, viz., percepti inference and authoritative communication. (' these) perception is the means to the appreh of that which is comparatively proximate, is mediated and present here and now. H perception is limited in range, being restricted a small number of objects (i.e., objects whic| are near and present and not separated by w barrier). Inference however is a means i& knowledge of the remote, the mediated

■ L ■,

&"■■

PRAMAtfACANDRIKA 37

the past and the future. Lastly, Agama or authoritative communication is an independent source of the knowledge of all sorts of objects of which the number is endless. The above enumerative statement is based on the order of the kind and number of objects made known (respectively by the three kinds of knowing, viz. 9 perception, inference and authority). There being three kinds of Anupramdna or effective means to valid cognition, the cognition resulting therefrom is also of three kinds, viz., perceptual, inferential and authoritative knowledge. Of these, percep- , tual knowledge is the cognition that is produced by the process of perceiving. This (cognition) is what is meant by immediate knowledge, direct . knowledge or witnessing knowledge (saksatkara) . Similarly, the knowledge reached through inference is called inferential or mediate knowledge. Lastly, the knowledge derived from authoritati^.^ communication is called authoritative knowledge

or revealed knowledge.

(What, then, is perception as a source rf-^ knowledge?) Perception is the process of *|| sense-organ that is free from defects. (In other^S words, perception is the stimulation, by the^ object, of an organ of sense not subject to anjf;J> sensory defects.) Here the word 'sense-organ' prevents a too wide application to inference-iriti^

the rest. -'■ - ■ - '■ V •-*"'? ;W'w%

Rnt it mav be said, perception is a species o

:i!

ct

38 MADHVA LOGIC

an instrumental cause, and an instrumental cause is possible only through an intervening action or operation. For example, the instrument of the act of cutting is the axe, and the axe is an instru- ,^ mental cause of the cutting or felling of the tree through the intervening operation of coming into contact with the tree. The intervening operation is that which being effected by the instrumental cause serves to effect that which results from the action of the instrumental cause, e.g., the contact with the tree which is effected by the axe. (What, then, is the intervening action in the case of perception as an instrumental cause or agency.')

We grant the force of the question which is thus raised. And our answer is this. The sense-organ is the instrument, and the contact of the sense-organ with the object (perceived) is the intervening operation (through which the sense-; ^| organ produces its effect as an instrumental cause) The consequence or effect which results from 'i the action of the sense-organ as an instrument is direct or immediate knowledge (saksatkara)M Here the process or operation (i.e., the perceptive^ operation) is described as the operation of the| eye (i.e., of the sense-organ concerned) with a view to stress the fact that the organ (a*J the seat of the operation) is primary while the J operation inhering therein is secondary. Anjll further the organs are said to be free froflb

defects and to be in contact with their respective objects with a view to ensure the truth or validity of the knowledge resulting therefrom. Hence there is no discrepancy in our definition.

Perception is of seven kinds, viz., the six different kinds of perception consisting of the operations of the senses and the perception of the sdksi or witnessing consciousness. Of these, the perception of the witnessing consciousness is perception consisting in the operation of the Witnessing Intelligence as organ or instrument. The objects of such immediate knowledge or presentation are: the essence of the Self or Atman as well as the properties thereof, the nescience underlying absence or privation, the mind, the functions of the mind such as knowledge, pleasure and the rest, time, Aka$a in its original unmodified condition, etc. It also reveals its own nature.

(Sensuous perception as arising from the operation of the six different organs presupposes the six organs of sense.) The six sense-organs are the olfactory sense, the gustatory sense, the visual sense, the tactual sense, the auditory sense and the mind. Of these, the objects of the olfactory sense are odour and the different kinds of fragrance which are the specific modes of odour; the objects of the gustatory sense are tastes and its specific forms; the objects of the visual sense and touch are substances having magnitude and

40 "*' MADHVA LOGIC

m

perceptible (generated) colour and form, certaift^ qualities such as number and the rest, the different kinds of motion, and the generic;J characters. The feel of air is also an object of touch. Air itself is (not directly perceived by § touch, but only) inferred from its feel (which is % revealed to touch). (The inference is as follows.) ;: The wind that blows is felt as being neither hot _f_ nor cold. Since the feel is a quality like colour and cannot go wandering, there must be some sub-stance in which the feeling in question inheres or abides. What, then, is the substance which is the| substrate of the feeling in question ? It cannot be earth, for earth, though characterised by per-3

ceptible touch, is also characterised by perceptibte| form and colour, whereas the feeling which i experienced (in the case of the blowing wind) evidently has no substrate of a perceptible fo and colour. Nor can the substrate in question b either water or fire, for the feel which it indu is not experienced as cold (as in the case water) or hot (as in the case of fire). Nor again can it be the four ubiquitous substances si they are all devoid of the quality of such feeling. The assumption of tactual properties in the quitous substances would entail a perception touch everywhere and at all times. Nor can the mind be the substrate in question, the mind is atomic or infinitesimal and the of the infinitesimal or atomic is impe

PBAMA^fACANDRlKl Vj* \ 41

V ks ^

i.e., beyond sense-perception. Hence we conw*- - • v

that which constitutes the substrate of the quail that is felt by touch in the case in question is the (specific) substance we call air.

But it may be said air is perceptible (and not inferred as above shown), because it is the substrate of a perceptible touch just as is the jar. This objection is not tenable, for air is the - substrate of perceptible touch only because of an adventitious condition, viz., its association with an object of perceptible form and colour. (An adventitious condition is anything that is in-variably correlated with the probandum but is } not an invariable correlate of the probans.) In ■■■ Q the case in question, the condition is an in- .- ■& variable correlate of the probandum as determined :% by the property of the subject in which it , : (^ is inferred. (The subject of the inference is |§ : air which is an external substance and the pro^/j|| bandum is perceptibility). That the adventitious^ condition is perceptible colour and form is proved,;/^| by the invariable correlation of external sob^gg stances that are perceptible and the presenpgj of perceptible colour and form together .*&*$$ the absence of any such correlation between tbe;|;g|

■ ground of the inference, viz, ' being the BpbBfe^g| of perceptible touch' and the adventitious condprf^

, tion, viz., the 'presence of perceptible colour^;;, J

form.' Thus we find that whatever is an external ■y Substanceand is gerceived is also char^erised v;-

by perceptible colour and form, but we cannot say that whatever is a substrate of a perceptible touch has also perceptible colour and form, (Hence being the substrate of a perceptible touch is a valid ground for perceptibility only on the condition that the substrate has perceptible colour and form and not otherwise. In other words, the ground is a ground only under conditions and not unconditionally and therfore the inference in question is not flawless.) Hence though you affirm the presence of the ground (viz., being the substrate of a perceptible touch), in the subject of the inference (viz., air), yet perceptible form and colour which always accompany the probandum^fj i.e., perceptibility, is no invariable correlate of J the ground (and so the ground fails to prove ) the presence of the probandim being shown-l to be no invariable correlate of an invariable .

«**

correlate of the probandum.) Hence it follows^ that air is inferred from its special touch (and not perceived as contended).

The objects perceived by the auditory sense | are sounds and their varieties in the form of the alphabetical or verbal sounds.

Inadvertence of the mind (partial or complete))! colour-blindness, jaundice, etc., are the defected of the five sensibilities. ,. /j

The objects (of the five different senses) arfrl also objects of the mind (the sixth sense) and? the mind makes them its objects by presiding

■ ■ j "A

over and guiding and directing the operations of the five external senses.

But the mind also perceives past events and in such perception it does not require the aid of the external senses. The result of such perception (of the past independently of the external senses) is memory or recollection. Memory is thus said to be an effect of internal perception (by the mind as the sixth sense). The contact of sense and object in this case (i.e., in the case of a direct perception of the past by means of the mind as the sixth sense) is furnished by what we call the Samshara, trace or disposition left behind by the past experience. (The mind as the sixth sense has a direct vision of the past and what we call the disposition or trace of the past experience is nothing but the contact of the past with the present, or as Bergson would say perhaps, the insertion or prolongation of the past into the present). The process (of the mind in recollection) is thus analogous to that of the specially gifted senses of the yogis which possess extraordinary supernal powers due to the practice of yogik concentration (and thereby cross the gulf between the past and the present).

The defects of the mind (which vitiate the mental or internal perceptions) are desires,

predispositions, etc. ,-

There are also defects of the objects perceived (which interfere with their correct perception) and

■#

■■£

these are long intervals (of time or space), closed proximity (in time or space), subtile or potentiaJJ condition of the objects, intervening barriers : (media) separating the objects from the perceiver,4 non-manifestation of the objects (e.g., of the stars | in daylight), intermixture with objects of a like|g or similar nature, etc. : /ft§

These defects being present, in some cases the^| cognition itself is not generated and in some cases n doubt or uncertainty arises (as to the evidence ofc| ; the cognition that is generated). -

In the case of cognition due to the operation the senses, the cause consists of the contacts of the four beginning with the self. Thus the self mu come into contact with the mind, the mind wi the sensibilities, the sensibilities with the objects; The sensibilities have no immediate intuition of v objects at a distance and must actually dart fo to the place of the objects and come into contact with them in order to reveal them. The se same contacts which enable the sensibilities reveal their respective objects are also the imine* diate cause of the perception of their respecti^ absence. No intervening relations mediate tween the contacts and the absence in the case perception of absence (as Naiyayikas say).

One school of philosophers (the Naiyayika ": holds that the contact which brings on cog 1 ^'^ |L tion in the form of immediate perception g of six different kinds. Thus (according^

■*■;»'-<*

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r

PRAMASACANDRIKA 45 :

this scbool) it is either conjunction, or inner* ence in the conjoined, or inherence in that which is inherent in the conjoined, or inherence, or inherence in the inherent, or the relation of qualifying and qualified. Of these, conjunction is the contact or relation that is effected between the eye and substances like jars, etc. (i.e., the relation which brings on the perception of substances like jars, etc.). The relation of inherence in the conjoined similarly exists in the case of colour (which is a quality), actions and generic characters. (These inhere in substances like jars, dishes, etc., and these latter are in conjunction with the eye. Therefore the visual perception of colour, action and generic character takes place through the relation of *i**'\ herence in that which is in conjunction with the eye.) In the same way in tactual perception, the relation which brings on perception by the tactual <U sense is actual conjunction with the tactual sense in the case of perception of substances such- W as jars, etc., and the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction in the case of the quality of touch, the actions and generic characters oT- f;A these substances. So also in the case of the internal perception of the self'by the mind, the relation is conjunction of mind and the &&?%. substance in the case of the perception of the latter while it is inherence in that which is in conjun|K tion in the case of the perception of the pleasure

and pain that exist in the self. So also in the case of perception of smell and taste by the olfactory and gustatory senses, respectively, the relation is inherence in that which is in conjunction, the smell and the taste being inherent in| substances which are in conjunction respectively with the olfactory and gustatory senses. Similar- • ly, in the perception of the generic characters of-qualities and actions, the relation which mediates^ is inherence in that which is inherent in substances in conjunction (the generic characters; being inherent in the qualities and actions which^ are themselves inherent in the substances of wbic$? they are qualities and actions). In the perception^ of sound By the auditory sense, however, the] relation is simple inherence, for the auditory sense is nothing but ether or AkaSa as limited^ by the tympanum of the ear (sound being a quality of Akaia and so inherent in Akaia). (Th^ auditory sense being Kka§a itself as limited bjr the tympanum and sound being inherent in Akaia the relation which holds between sound and the auditory sense in the case of perception < sound is a relation of pure inherence.) But perception of the generic characters, etc., of the sound (inherent in particular sounds) is medial by the relation of inherence in the inhen (sounds being inherent in Akaia and tberefoi in the limited AkUa which is the auditory sense, and the generic characters, etc., of sounds bein,

A"

inherent in sounds). The perception of the absence of the jar by the eye takes place through the relation of qualification and qualified. In the case of the perception in the form i In this place here, there is no jar,' the absence of the jar is the qualified and the qualification which specifies the absence is the particular place or locality with reference to which the absence is perceived. (The localisation thus acts as the specifying attribute of the absence in question.) In the case again of the perception of the absence being in the form "This place is characterised by the absence of the jar/ 9 the place itself acts as the qualified substrate and the absence of the jar is regarded as its qualification. Similarly in the perception of Inherence itself the mediating relation is that of qualified and qualification (Inherence does not inhere. Nor is it in conjunction with the objects between which it holds. Hence the relation of inherence to the objects between which it holds is said to be a unique relation which is that of qualification** and qualified. The inherence is a qualific3*£ces of the objects between which the inherence haesent Thus in the case of the inherence of the yhjoga) cloth in its parts, viz., the threads, the inhevmen-is related to the cloth and the threads by the jition) tion of qualification to qualified (and not iom a second relation of inherence nor by conjuncti^ Non-All this however is fallacious and unteicausal Qualities, actions* etc., being nothing apart

■KK

(i.e., being non-different from) the things qualifi or the things acting, etc., a relation of inheren between qualities, etc., and their substrates J impossible (for inherence presupposes a different between the inherent and that in which t" inherent inheres). Besides, there is no valifg ground for the acceptance of inherence as reafcjj: Though the relation of conjunction between /ftp self and the mind is required in the case of t" " perception of other objects, it is not so requi in the perception of the self itself or its propert and states, for the self and its properties beii the objects presented to the witnessing Intellige are not objects of perception by the mind. Ag alphabetical sounds being themselves substan are,not qualities at all. It cannot be said t they cannot be substances as besides ha generic characters they are perceptible to one of our external senses. For this rule according to our view, in the case of dar ~~>, (Darkness has generic character, is revealed „ >>pne of our external senses, and yet is a subs ^ , not a quality.) And it fails also m t of the light of the lamp according to

j ; of those who hold it to be substantive. <$ sound ' t . *., -r^gS

h th i of the lamp has generic character,

/ j 3nted to one external sense and yet ugp {sounds . - r">^

: *ii„ i,ie Naiyayika to consist of nothing but

in tne i\ f J _ . _ ■<&-■■ ;*^

A a 3 which are substances.) Further tbo

and tne m , _ ._•-' -y -■■m$

Iphabetical sounds are qualities of

T"

r

Ikafa, yet since as qualities they axe non-different from their substrate of AMia, a relation of inherence between non-alphabetical sounds and Ahtea is impossible. As regards the relation of qualification and qualified, it being only another name for the relation that consists in nothing but the essence of a relation itself (svarupasambandha), no separate relation of qualification and qualified really exists. (Svarupsambandha is the name of the relation that consists in the essence or svarupa of a relation. Thus inherence is related by svarupasambandha to the objects between which it holds. This means that the relation which relates inherence to its relata is no separate relation but the svarupa or essence of the inherence itself.) ■ f ' ' '

• But some however say that memory is the consciousness that is caused only by traces of past experience. The adverb 'only' precludes recognition (which arises not simply from traces but also require other factors). Kecognition is the cognition that arises from the joint operation of traces of past experience and sense-contact with present objects. The word coincidence (samprayoga) means contact (of sense aod object). Non-mention of traces (as a causal condition of recognition) will make recognition indistinguishable from a simple cognition like 'Here is a jar.' Non-mention of coincidence or contact (as a caasal

7

condition) will again make recognition indis* tinguishable from memory. . \>

; The above view is not tenable. For all valid knowledge is due to a valid ground or source of knowledge and therefore since memory is one kind of valid knowledge, the cause of memory, viz. z the traces of past experience, will have to be admitted as an independent pramana or ground of true knowledge. But in this case the number of pramanas or valid sources of

i

knowledge will be four and this is unestablished (as we have seen that the number is three and neither more nor less). It cannot be said that the objection applies also to our view (of recollec-tion or memory). We hold memory to be due to internal perception by the mind with con tration of attention (bhavana) as an auxiliary condition. (Hence in our view memory is M form of perception, a kind of intellectual intuition where the trace of the past experiences serves function of contact of the present mind with t past experience. Thus according to our view* though memory is admitted to be a form of knowledge, it is regarded only as a variety perception, and so the cause of memory is not separate source of knowledge, though no doubt | is a ground of true knowledge.) „ ..;

There are four kinds of perception (as a of valid knowledge), viz., the Lord's percepti© the Consort's perception, the perception ,th«»;^

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belongs to the Yogin or Seer, and the perception that belongs to an ordinary mortal (ayogin). The objects of these different kinds of perception are the same as the objects of the corresponding cognitions or experiences which each kind induces in its respective perceiver. For fuller details the reader is referred to Jayatirtha's Pramana-paddhati (which we think unnecessary to go into over again here). Thus everything (relating to perception) has been set forth and therefore we close our chapter on perception as expounded in this Pramanaeandrika on the lines chalked out by the revered Jayatirtha. We bend our heads in respect to the sage Vyasadeva. ^

Let us now proceed to the next Pramaija, ©&.>> Inference. Inference is flawless reasoning, flawless establishment or proof of a conclusion (by means of a reason or ground). The synonyms of proof are reasoning, arguing from a mark to the thing marked, concluding on the basis of something which is pervaded by an invariable relation to

something else.

Inference cannot be defined simply as reasoning or arguing from a mark, for the definition would then apply to fallacious reasonings such as those where the subject of the inference is fictitious or unreal and where the mark is known by a valid source of knowledge to exdwlr '(instead of being invariably related to) the thing marked. In these cases the reasonings are

<

grounded on an invariable correlation and yet the reasonings are fallacious. (In the former, though the invariable relation holds, the subject of the inference is non-existent and thus the locus in which the relation is to prove the existence of the probandum does not exist. In the latter, the invariable relation is asserted in the reasoning but in actual fact no such relation holds, and thus the conclusion lacks material truth.) Hence inference is defined not as reasoning merely, but as flawless reasoning. Nor again can inference be. defined simply as that which is flawless for in, this case the definition will apply equally to' Perception as a source of knowledge. Hence it is , defined as reasoning (which is flawless).

The instrumental cause of inference is the sign or mark (by means of which we infer the '•■;-probandum). The operation or process (of the instrumental cause) which leads to or establishes th$ collusion is reasoning or argumentation (i.e.,; reasoning by means of the sign through which the ■■ "subject of the inference is brought in relation to* j the probandum). The inferred conclusion is the J result which emerges out of the process. Keason4 : : l ing (Paramaria) consists in the cognition of the mark in the form of its invariable relation to ther;? probandum as a property of the subject of thet^ inference. For example in the inference of. fire in yonder mountain from the perception of smoke :

therein, the reasoning consists in cognition ot

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-'■■■■■

& -;

PRAMAljrACANDRIKA

53

the smoke as an invariable concomitant of fire and as being, as so invariably related, a property of the mountain yonder. The cognition which results from the process, viz. f yonder mountain is on fire, is the resulting inference. Invariable relation means invariable concomitance (or sequence) as in the case * wherever there is smoke, there is fire/ By concomitance or co-existence is here meant a relation merely between the ground of the inference and its probandunu By the invariableness of the concomitance is not meant then co-inherence in the same substrate. The invariableness of the concomitance means simply that the concomitance is fixed and unfailing. The purport of the whole is that vyapti or invariable comitance consists in an unfailing between the ground of the inference probandum. It follows therefore t essential character (the defining mark) consists in the unfailing regularity of tance (between two or more phenomena), when we observe that wherever smoke is perceived, there fire also is perceived, we are said to cognise the relation of vyapti or invariable concomitance between 'smoke' and 'fire.' Here * smoke f is the pervaded and fire the pervading property. The locus or abode of the invariable relation is called the pervaded wlnle that which defines or marks off the relation is called the pervading. [Thus if A is invariably related

V:

54 MADHVA LOGIC

to B, A as the locus of the invariable relation is the pervaded, while B as defining or marking off this (particular) invariable relation from other invariable relations is the pervading' or pervader.] By the pervaded being a property i| of the subject of the inference is meant its; existence in a suitable place (so as to make its invariable relation with the pervader pos-- A sible. It does not mean that the pervaded | property should be spatially or temporally included within the pervader). And thus our theory i is free from flaws even of a trivial character. '

Some however give the following account olM invariable concomitance. Invariable concomi^j|| tance (as an element or factor of inference) means; || the coinherence of the ground and the probandum in one and the same locus so that the probandumM can never be that which is negated by theg| absolute negation that coinheres in the locus of thep ground of the inference and also does not coinhenfe in the locus of that which it negates. (In othe^ words, if the probandum is not that which; *8| negated by the absolute negation that occupies thfl| place where the ground exists and also does not occupy the place where the object negated by th^ said absolute negation exists, then the relation coexistence in the same locus between the grot; and the probandum is an invariable relation.)

Mere coexistence with the probandum inland the same locus does not fully bring out t

nature of vyapti or invariable relation. Take the inference, f. i., "Yonder mountain is on fire, because it has the character of knowableness." Here coexistence in the same locus holds (between the ground, * knowableness/ and the probandum, 'fire,', i.e., the locus of ** fire/ e.g., the 'oven/ is also the locus of knowable ness, i.e., the oven is a knowable object). And yet the inference is evidently fallacious. To exclude such cases, the probandum (coexistence wherewith will constitute vyapti) is qualified as being one which is not that which is

; negated by the absolute negation which occupies the place where the ground or Hetu exists. (This qualification of the probandum excludes the case of the above fallacious inference and other like cases- For -fire/ the probandum of the

; above inference, is that which is negated by the absolute negation occupying the place where the ground, viz., ' knowableness,' exists; e.g., fire: never exists in the great lake and yet ' knowableness * exists in> the great lake in so far as the lake is a knowable object. Therefore the probandum* 'fire/ is not that which is absolutely non-existing

I. where the ground,' knowableness/ exists.) Even this qualification of the probandum, however, fails.

-to exclude the case of (the evidently fallacious), inference, "The tree is in contact (with the; monkey) because it has the generic character ol£ ; substances." (Here 'contact' is the probmdfym^;

v

':

56 MADHVA LOGIC

and it is not that which is absolutely non-existent where the hetu, or ground, viz., 'the generic | character of substances,' exists. 'The generic character of substances * exists in substances. * Contact * as a quality also exists in substances. Hence ' contact ' is not that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. And yet the inference is fallacious.) To exclude such cases the proban-dum is further qualified as being one which also does not coexist in the same substrate with that which is absolutely non-existent where the ground or hetu exists. This excludes the case of c contact l and the like. ['Contact' abides in substances. It is thus not that which is absolutely nonexistent in substances. But despite this, contact is also not that which does not coexist with that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. || For 'contact* coexists with the absence of con* tact in the same substance. 'Contact' of thft tree and monkey coexists in the tree with th% ^ negation or absence of such contact in another part of the tree. 'Contact' thus coexists with ; .gs non-contact (with the absolute negation of contact) in one and the same substrate.] Iff im other words, non-contact or negation of cotti-^ tact being coexistent in the same substratft|| or substance with contact which is the object of the negation, the rule, that the probandum should not exist in the same substrate with that which . is absolutely non-existent when*

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the ground exists, fails, and the case cannot be regarded as one of invariable relation or

vyapti. ■'■''■

But all this, we hold, is fallacious and unsound. Take the case of the inference ' There is rain on the hills higher up because the rivers below are full.' Here from the fullness of the rivers at the base we infer the occurrence of rain at the top. In such inferences, where the probandum occupies a different place from that occupied by the prolans or ground, the above definition of invariable concomitance as coexistence, in the same substrate, of the ground and the probandum altogether fails. It cannot be said that our view is open to the self-same objection as the above view, for unfailing relation of effect and cause holds equally, in our view, in the ease of inferences where the prolans and the

probandum occupy different places. ^ ....,

.. (We have so far discussed the meaning of invariable relation. We now proceed to explairi the different forms of invariable relation that constitute the grounds of inference.) Dharmas or properties of things may be related in four different ways. Thus two Dharmas or properties may be related by a positive symmetrical invariable relation so that each is invariably concomitant with the other. Two properties again may be so related that one of them is an invariable concomitant of the other, but not vice versa.

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58 MADHVA LOGIC

Two properties again may be invariably related by the relation of mutual negation and exclusion. Lastly, two properties may be so^jj related that at least in one case where one is, the other is, as also at least in one case where either ^ one is, the other is not. (This last relation is i equal to the following three propositions taken together where A and B express the two properties, viz., ' At least in one case where A is, B is' ' At least in one case where A is, B is not/ ' At least ■* in one case where B is, A is not.' The first form of concomitance is similarly equal to the;| two propositions—'Wherever A is, Bis,' and Wherever B is, A is/—taken together. The second and the third will correspond respectively to the propositions € In all cases where A is, B is ' and 'In no case where A is, B is.') We have av| concrete illustration of the first form of invariable concomitance in the unfailing relation that holds between scriptural (Vedic) prohibition and con-f\ duciveness to demerit and sin and between scrip- J tural injunction and conduciveness to merit and righteousness. Thus whatever is scripturally prohibited is productive of sin and demerit and whatever tends to demerit and sin is scripturafly:.;! prohibited. Here each of the two (related properties)' is at once pervaded by, and pervader | of, the other. Similarly it is] also observed thsk| whatever is scripturally enjoined is also conducive to merit and righteousness and whatever is

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conducive to merit and righteousness is also laid down by scripture. The second form of invariable concomitance is again illustrated in the case of the relation between smoke and fire, as also between the product of will and non-eternity. Thus ( wherever there is smoke, there is fire * but no invariable relation holds in the form ' Where-ever there is fire, there is smoke,' for in the case of the heated iron-ball (where fire is, but smoke is not) the invariability fails. Here ' smokiness p is- the pervaded and occupies a smaller area while ' fireness * is the pervader and occupies a wider area. Similarly, 'whatever is a product of will-causality is also non-eternal,' but no invariable relation holds in the form of the converse of this, viz., 'whatever is non-eternial, is also a product of will-causality,' for it is seen to fail in the case of antecedent non-existence (which is non-eternal and yet is no product of will-causality). The third form of invariable concomitance is illustrated in the relation which holds between the generic character of the cow and the generic character of the horse as also between that of the elephant and that of the lion. Thus wherever there is the generic character of the cow, there is nowise the generic character of the horse and wherever there is the generic character of the horse there is nowise the generic character of the cow. No relation of pervader and pervaded holds betwAPn *\thaT mio and thfl other, all relation

*•

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MADHVA LOGIC

: being non-existent between the two. Simila; ~ T whatever is an elephant, is nowise a lion' ar ' whatever is a lion, is nowise an elephant' well-known mutually exclusive relations to noted in this connection. The fourth kind invariable concomitance is illustrated in the case of the relation which exists between tbe the property of being a cook and the property of; a man as also between the property of being one of the five elements and the property moving. Thus though in one particular ins the property of being a cook and the prop .of being a man may co-exist, yet in another the property of being a cook may co-exist that of being a woman to the exclusion of of being a man as also in a third instance property of being a man may co-exist with t property of being a non-cook to the exclusion the property of being a cook. In this case -no relation of pervader and pervaded between either one and the other, for inspite a relation existing between the two, there instances in which the relation fails. In the way, though the property of being an ele is co-existent in some instances with the pro of moving {viz., in earth, water, air and yet in the case of Skaia or ether (which is element but does not move) the property of being; an element exists to the exclusion of the pro of movingi and in the case of the mind

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property of moving exists to the

of the property of being an element.

is not an element and yet it moves.) , . ■ . ■ >

In all these when the property which is pervaded produces the cognition of the property that is the pervader, we have what is called an inference or anumana* The pervading property (of which the inference produces the knowledge) is called the inferred character, anumeya, or object

of inference.

The following objection may however be raised to the view of inference expounded above, viz., that it is not possible for the smoke that exists in the mountain far away to produce a valid cognition of fire in the man who exists here in his house. The reply to this objection is as follows. In the case of inference the instru- || mental cause is a known agency and not an im-■•* ' known condition as in the case of perceptioa^ (The relation of smoke to fire is known to the man|^^ who makes the inference, but in perception the action of the sensibilities with reference to the

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object perceived is not known before the P«^|M ception.) - ■ ■ "'~;*&ea#'

The reply however does not seem to be coff- -vincing, for there are people (e.g., the savage**!^ the Cocoanut Island) in whom the perception-of smoke at a distance does not call forth the cognition of fire. The answer is that m $Hs case though they have a cognition of the form of

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62 mIdHVA LOGIC

the smoke, yet they have no knowledge of it as an invariable concomitant of fire. For even when an object like smoke might previously be cognised as an invariable concomitant of something else such as fire, it may fail to be cognised on account of failure of memory as an invariable concomitant of the latter in a fresh instance and thus fail to produce the cogniton of fire. (Therefore in the case of savages where the smoke was never cognised as invariably related to fire, a cognition of smoke in the first instance cannot possibly produce the knowledge of fire.)

Therefore we conclude : when an accurately and correctly cognised mark or sign is accompanied by a recollection of its invariable con-;| comitance with the thing marked or signified M and is thereby able to produce the cognition of the thing marked or signified in a fit place or locality, we have what is called an inference or,| *anumana. Hence even though the form of the^jj marked or signified thing may be already known : | yet since the inference makes it known further in relation to a particular place or locality, the|| inferential process is not useless or superfluous. (The inference, in other words, entails a real march of thought conducing as it does to a:| new synthesis of the already known thing with a :| place or situation to which it was not previously known to be related.) Hence inference consists of two factors: (1) invariable concomitance .(of

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the mark with the thing marked); (2) the presence of the mark in a suitable place such as will make possible the inference of the thing marked either in the same place or some other (causally or otherwise connected) place. There is no rule that the mark should also be cognised as a property existing in the subject of the inference (for the mark may exist in one place, e.g., the fullness of the rivers at the base, and the thing marked, viz., rain, may be proved to exist in some other place, e.g., at the top of the hill).

A question here arises : how does the cognition of the invariable concomitance arise? How in other words, do we arrive at the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between different objects or events ? The answer is, by means of the corresponding perceptions, inferences and testimony. Thus in the case of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, we arrive at the knowledge of the concomitance of smoke with fire by the perception of the one together with the other in the domestic oven and other places. Here repeated observation and non-observation of the contrary are the auxiliary conditions. But how can perception which apprehends only that which is present and is in contact with the sensibilities, apprehend an invariable concomitance that extends not merely to all cases (actual and possible) but also to the past (and the

MADHVA LOGIC

: T"'■

future and the remote) ? It would be possib if you admitted a transcendental cont (pratyasatti) of past and present and of h and far (as Naiyayikas do), but according to you, no such transcendental contact exists (between the present sense organ and the past and distant objects). The answer to this is:. though there is no transcendental contact between J a particular instance and its samanya or classg yet since the past and the distant are capable being drawn into relation to the present instan ? by means of similarity or resemblance, the cognj| tion of an invariable concomitance as extendi ' to all instances (actual and possible) is ful|| established. Invariable concomitance as m known mediately by means of inference will illustrated later on. The following are inst of invariable concomitance known from authj»« tative testimony. 'Whoever is a Brahmin, person who must not be put to death,' ' animal that is a cow is one that must not 1 touched with the feet,' ' Whatever is enjoinedj

. the Vedas, ought to be accomplished as a duty/ | Inference is of three kinds: inference *^ effects, inference from causes, and inferenceJroi|J phenomena that are neither causes When an effect is the ground of our inference the cause, we have an inference from an effi e.g., when from the presence of smoke we J|

p the existence of fire. When the cause

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the ground of an inference of the effeet, we have an inference from a cause, e.g., when we say, 'yonder mass of clouds which owes its special character to its own cause proves an impending rain-fall.' When a particular mark proves the existence of a probandum without being either the cause or the effect of it, we have an inference from something which is neither a cause nor an effect, e.g., when the presence of taste proves the,, existence of colour.

Inference may be divided again into two classes from another standpoint, viz., into inference of what is specifically observed and inference of what is generically observed. Thus whei*|*he object inferred is perceptible we have an inference of the specifically observed, e.g., when &»» inferred from smoke. Where the object inferred is not perceptible, we have an inference of the, generically observed, e.g., when the visual,

; sensibility is inferred from the cognition of colour.

Some (the Naiyayikas) hold that inference is

of three kinds, viz., Kevalanvayl inference,

i Kevalavyatireki inference and AnvayavyatireMM

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inference. ;,:

(According to the Naiyayikas) the pakja or the ;*; subject of an inference is that substrate which is

to be proved to own the, probandum as its property.

To exclude the sapaksa or the co-ordinate o*H^ Isttbject and other like substrates, the subject is

defined as that which is to own the proband*** as a

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property. Since the property here means that the $| cognition whereof is to be produced by the sign or mark (in the inference), the definition is not too wide. (The sapaksa is also a substrate of a property, but it is not the substrate of the property the cognition whereof is to be produced by the mark or sign. It is the substrate of a property which is homogeneous with the property that constitutes the probandum, but it is not the substrate of the property which is the probandum itself.). But it may be said that the hetu or ground has also this character of being characterised by the probwndum^^ as being related to it by conjunction (and thus the | definition is too wide as applying to the hetu or ^ ground as well). To meet this objection the J paksa has been defined as a substrate. (The hetu : r$ is not the substrate of the property that constitutes J| the probandum, but is related to it only by J .^| concomitance or conjunction, but the paksa is the substrate in which the probandum is to be proved to abide as a property.) The sapaksa or co-ordinate of the inferential subject is that substrate which owns a property which is homogeneous with that which constitutes the probandum. To preclude a too wide application^ 1 to the case of the smoke in the oven, the definition includes the word 'substrate.' [The smoke in the oven is the familiar instance or drstanta and n

• * #

the sapaksa. It is distinguished from the la by the fact that it is not the substrate, while

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sapaksa is the substrate of a property (in this case the kitchen fire) homogeneous with the property constituting the probandum (i.e., the fire in the mountain)]. To have defined the sapaksa simply as the substrate of the probandum (and not of a property homogeneous with the probandum) would have been absurd. (For the sapaksa and the paksa would in that case have been identical, and a sapaksa other than the pak§a would have been an impossibility.) Therefore in the definition the word ' homogeneous ' has been included. The meaning is that the sapaksa is the substrate of a property homogeneous with the probandum and as such is devoid of the character of uncertainty (i.e., the uncertainty that characterizes the paksa as the substrate of the probandum). V The vipaksa or contra-ordinate of the inferential '^ subject is a substrate devoid alike of the pro-bandum and every property homogeneous with the probandum. The words ' devoid of the pro* bandum' distinguishes the vipaksa from the paksa while the words ' devoid of every property, homogeneous with the probandum' distinguishes it from the sapaksa. (The sapaksa is a similar instance in which the existence of a pror^iy like the probandum is known for certain, and the vipaksa is a dissimilar instance in which the non-existence of the probandum and of all properties similar to the probandum is known for certain.) ;■-," ;.'*-.■:>;'■ ; ' '-'■ '- -

[These definitions of the inferential subject, the co-ordinate of the inferential subject and the contra-ordinate to the inferential subject, prepare the way for the definitions of Kevalanvayi and other forms of inference.]

Thus the Kevalanvayi inference is one which is based on a ground that pervades the subject and also exists in its co-ordinates but which has J no contra-ordinate to its subject actually existing. [In other words, a Kevalanvayi inference is one | that is based on numerous instances of agreement-in presence but is without any instance of agreement in absence.] - ^

Kevalanvayi inference cannot be defined

simply as an inference in which there existed no co-ordinate to the subject, for in this case if;; will be indistinguishable from the inconclusive reasoning 'All things are nameable, because theyg are knowable.' (Here the subject of the inference being 'all things' or 'everything/ no eontraN^ ordinate to the subject exists, but since there is here also no co-ordinate to it, the ground of the inference, viz., the invariable relation between * knowableness' and ' nameableness/ is without a corroborative familiar instance and thus lacks material certitude.) Hence the words *in whi

the ground is existent in the co-ordinate.* even thus the definition remains imperfect for inference which has no <x>ntra-ordinate to its ject and in which the ground is existent a3m

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Ithe co-ordinate, is not distinguishable from the

I fallacious reasoning in which the ground does not

Sexist in the subject of the inference, e.g., the inference 'sound is nameable because it is visible.' To exclude such fallacious reasonings Kevalanvayi inference is further specified by the qualification that it is an inference in which the ground must exist in the subject. Even this, however, is not sufficient, for this by itself does not distinguish it from such fallacious reasonings as ' The jar and sound are nameable, for they are characterised by shape' where the ground,

''?■ viz., 'shape,' exists only in one part of the subject, viz., the 'jar,' and not in the other part, viz.?

ft 'sound.' To exclude such fallacious reasonings

land prevent these being confounded with Kevalanvayi inference, the ground is stated as

{ being not merely existent in the subject but also as pervading it. The pervasion of the subject

£ may again be of two forms, viz., (1) Where the ground pervades both the subject and its eo-'

*. ordinates, and (2) where the ground pervades the subject but exists only in a portion (i.e., in some)

i-0f the co-ordinates. > Sound is namable, because* is knowable, just as is the jar' illustrates the case where the ground pervades not merely the subject but also its co-ordinates. In the same reasoning the words 'because it is a quality just as is colour On place of the words 'because it is knowaWe

IP* as is the jar') illustrates the case where the

m.

MADHVA LOGIC

ground exists only hrsome (i.e. a portion of 1 entire extent) of the co-ordinates. (The gro\& viz., 'quality' is predicable of some nameabl things, but not of all narneable things.)

The invariable concomitance which constitu the ground of inference is of two kinds, viz., invariable concomitance as agreement in presence and invariable concomitance as agreement fe absence. Invariable concomitance as agreement in presence consists in the invariable confj comitance of the ground of the inference with the probandum. Invariable concomitance agreement in absence consists in the invariabli concomitance of the absence of the probandm with the absence of the ground. In the case agreement in presence, the ground is the pervad and fhe probandum is the pervader. In the of agreement in absence, the absence of the pro--bandum is the pervaded and the absence of t ground the pervader. In every case an invariable concomitance is understood as following in t wake of the pervaded. In the case of the abov^ inference ' sound is narneable, because it is know-able, just as is the jar,' the invariable

' knowable' with ' narneable * agreement in presence only. T] presence here is ' whatever narneable, just as is the jai no agreement in absence 1 what is not narneable is

cam

comitance of based on an agreement in knowable, is But we have the form

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in

PBAMi^TACANDRIKA. 71

knowable,' it being impossible to get any case of an object which is not nameable as illustrative of such absence, since all things are nameable and there is nothing that is not name-able. This is why inference based on such concomitance consisting of agreement in presence only is called inference of the Kevalanvayi type. Where the ground pervades the subject, where no co-ordinate of the subject exists and where further the ground is excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject, we have an inference of the Kevalamjatirekl type (according to Nyaya). If Kevalavyatirekl inference had been defined as one in which the ground is excluded from (some instances of) the contra-ordinate to the subject, the definition would have been too wide and would have applied to the fallacious reasoning based on a non-invariable ground, 'yonder mountain is on fire, because it is a mountain.' To exclude such reasonings the definition lays down that the ground must be excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject. In the present case, the ground, viz., 'being a mountain,' though excluded from such contra-ordinates as 'the great lake,' 'the sheet of water,' etc., is yet not excluded from such other contra-ordinates as 'a fireless mountain/ 'a hill without fire.' Hence the ground is not excluded 'from every case of a contra-ordinate to the subject' and thus does not come up to - the requirements of the definition (of a Kevalavyatireki

:V«

72

MADHVA LOGIC

inference as set forth above). Thus the defi does not apply to such cases and is not too wi (as applying to such fallacious reasonings as wel It must be noted however that the mere fact of ground being excluded from every instance of contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance does no suffice as a complete definition of the Kevatid. vyatirekl inference, for as such it remains distinguished from Anvayavyatirekl inferen based both on agreement in presence and agre ment in absence. To exclude such inferen the definition stresses the fact that ' no ordinate of the subject should exist,' i.e., similar instance where the existence of the pro bandum should be known for certain should e (In Anvayavyatireki inference, the existence of t| co-ordinate or similar instance is a sine qu& n while, in Kevalavyatireki the non-existence

. $hs> co-ordinate is a sine qud non.) Bute this added qualification does not suffice aig definition of the Kevalavyatireki inference, as such it has a too wide application to fallacious inference based on a Svarupasi ground (i.e., on a ground that does not exu

*in the inferential subject), viz., 'The of the finite individual has a soul aceo$ panyingit, since this body is conscious.'.... the ground, viz., 'consciousness' is non-existent the ' body' which is the inferential subject, dead body, e.g., is devoid of consciousness.

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PRA&f AtfACANDBIKl 73'

exclude such cases, the definition insists on the existence of the ground in the subject. Even this, however, does not suffice, for as so qualified the definition applies to the fallacious inference based on a ground that exists in one part of the subject (and not in the whole of it), viz., "The finite individual and the Lord are omniscient, because they are all-creating." (Here the ground 'all-creating' is true only of the Lord and not of the finite individual, i.e., it holds good of one part of the subject and not of the whole of it,) To exclude such cases the definition says, 'The ground must pervade the subject.' The following is an instance of a Kevalavyatireki in£ answering to all the above requirement Lord is all-knowing, because He is alft^^ting/„v^Jr It is based on the invariable agreement/if £bsen<^ j> viz., 'Whatever is not all-knowing, is ^n^ 1 ^ J£ creating, just as is Devadatta.' innumerable instances illustrating this a in absence but none illustrating the positive ment in presence between ' what is all-creating' and 'what is all-knowing,' for Kamkr§na and other Incarnations of the Lord are comprised in the subject of the inference (and therefore cannot serve as corroborative illustrations) while other finite individuals are non-omniscient (and therefore cannot be cited as illustrations of the agreement in presence). For these reasons (©«., that it is based on an invariable relation which can be

10

MADHVA LOGIC

:&S :

actually observed only as agreement in absence! and not as agreement in presence) such inference| is called kevalavyatireki inference.

An inference in which the ground pervades the subject, exists in the co-ordinates or known similar instances wherein the probandum exists, and is ex-.| eluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject is an anvayavyatireki inference. An.'-$ anvayavyatireki inference is not completely defined fl as one in which the ground is found to be non-existent in the contra-ordinates, for as such the definition fails to exclude the fallacious inference based on a non-invariable ground, viz., ' The body I of the finite individual is non-eternal, because it has the character of the element of earth.' In this inference the ground, viz., 'character of the element of earth,' though non-existent in such|f§ eternal entities as the ether, etc., is yet existent ii such other eternal entities as the atoms of earth^j etc. (Thus though excluded from some objects which are not non-eternal, it is yet not excluded from some other objects which are also not non-1 eternal.) To exclude such cases, the definitioi|| says, ' the ground must be excluded from ever^ instance of a contra-ordinate.' But this also by itself does not suffice as a complete definitioi for as such it remains indistinguishable from kevalavyatireki inference based on agreement I in absence only. Hence the definition adds il words, ' the ground must exist in the co-ordinates!

V-

ffi- (The kevalavyatireki is devoid of co-ordinates.}

Even with this added qualification, the definition if" has a too wide application to the fallacious ;, : " inference based on a svar&pasiddha ground (i.e., a | ground that does not exist in the subject), viz., ;•• 'Devadatta is all-knowing, because he is all-V. creating.' (Here the ground 'all-creating' is

excluded from all cases of 'not all-knowing' and :V also exists in 'what is all-knowing,' viz., the J:.-' Lord. But it does not exist in Devadatta, the |- subject of the (inference). Hence the defini-| tion further adds, 'the ground must exist in ■■

the subject.' Even now however the definition ; ; \y. applies to the fallacious inference based on y &,a bhagasiddha ground (i.e., a ground that exists;.;;?

only in one part of the subject and not the whole I of it), viz., ' The mountain and the lake are oafW" %' fire, because they smoke.' (Here the ground,^ J'smoke' exists in one part of the subject, tiz.^y J•:'mountain,' and not in the other part, viz., the£|

'lake.') To exclude such cases the definition jfc* says 'the ground must pervade (i.e., exist in the, f§ whole of) the subject.' As 'smokiness' is

absent in the 'lake' (being true only of the h 'mountain') it lacks the character of pervading H the subject (in the above case). . ''"-^M

Such anvayavyatireki inference based bo^jg

on agreement in presence and agreement in H absence may again be of two kinds. 33«^ v i.«tf .<• « inference with a ground that.

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exists in every case of a co-ordinate, or aga it may be an inference with a ground t exists only in some (not all) instances of co-ordinates. For example, the inference, 'The finite individual is eternal, because there is no cause that can put an end to it' is a case; of an anvayavyatireki inference with a ground existing in all cases of the co-ordinates. W\ respect of all eternal things such as the ether, etc., the ground, viz., ' absence of a cause of| an end or destruction' holds good. Again, the inference ' The mountain is on fire, because it-smokes' is an instance of an anvayavyatireki inference with a ground that exists only in some (and not all) its co-ordinates, for in some ' fiery V things (e.g., the red-hot iron ball) ' smoke 1 (which is the ground of the inference) does not exist. This latter example is a typical anvayavyatireki inference and takes its name from the following two invariable relations (of presence and absence) on which it is based, viz., 'What-ever smokes, is on fire, just as is the oven ' anig ' Whatever is not on fire, does not smoke, just

as is the great lake.' ' ■ ?|jj

Inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence take their character from the corresponding invariable concomi Thus we have invariable concomitance based o agreement in presence in * Wherever there smoke, there is fire.' And we have invari

fc PBAMA^ACANDBIKA

77

concomitance based on agreement in absence in 'Wherever fire is not, smoke is not.' And inferences that resemble these two forms of concomitances considered together are called Anvayavyatireki Inferences or inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence.

All this however (i.e., this division of inference into kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki) we (the Madhvas) reject as untenable. For we consider an agreement in absence as being unsuitable for proving the presence of the sadhya or probandum. In proving the presence of a positive entity by means of the presence of another positive (entity), an invariable relation between the absence of one and the absence of the other has no logical scope. (An m-' variable relation between the negation of one thing and the negation of another does not justify any positive step from the presence of one to the presence of the other.) For in this case the positive ground exists in the subject of the inference (and thus falls within the domain of affirmation) while the invariable relation as an agreement in absence (the absence of the probandum and the absence of the ground) belongs to the domain of negation and thus occupies a different place. Thus the invariable relation occupies one place (the domain of negation) and the ground as a property of the subjeot occupies a different place (the domain of affirmation). (Hence there 18 no

relation between the two to justify an inferenti step.) How then, it may be asked, are kevala4 vyatireki inferences in vogue? In this way.^ Here also the real ground is an invariable relation in presence, e.g., the invariable relation between 'omniscience' and ' all-creativeness' in the above inference. But it is impossible to cite positive similar instances of this agreement in presence in response to the demand for an indication of the ■% actual places where this invariable relation holds. Hence for accomplishing this end by means of inference, an invariable relation of absence acquires relevancy (for our purpose). For example, if in the above instance it is asked:—"What proof have we of an invariable relation between ' all-creativeness ' and ' omniscience ? " w6g can say at once that 'all-creativeness' must be pervaded by 'omniscience,* for it ift|| that which is negated by the negation which pervades the negation of 'omniscience.' When one thing is so related to another thing that the negation of the former pervades the negation of the latter, the former thing is invariably relatafij to the latter. (Thus if A is so related to B that the negation of A is pervasive of the negation of B, i.e., if 'All not-B is not-A,' then A is invaria related to B, i.e., 'All A is B.') This relation is admitted, e.g., by the person seeking'fire,' holding between ' smokiness' and ' fireness^ In the case of the so-called dtwayavyatire^^

ft*?--'

PRAMAtf ACANDRIKA 79

inferences supposed to be based on agreements in

% presence as well as absence, the agreement in absence is in reality purposeless and out of place. The invariable relation in such cases is sufficiently

:■ established by perception, etc., (of the instances of agreement in presence). (Thus the agreement in absence is without real usefulness.) Notwith-

■ : standing this it may be conceded that the agreement in absence serves some sort of purpose as

. indicating in a way that the positive relation of agreement in presence is not negatived by any instances of the failure of the agreement (i.e., by

; any instances to the contrary.)

According to another (Nyaya) classification, inference is of two kinds, viz., (1) inference for oneself, and (2) inference for convincing others.

t Of these, inference for oneself is the cause of self-

| conviction and the knowledge one gathers for one's g-:own self. ...'., J

An inference for oneself takes place in the

|foUowing way. A person in the first place makes\

repeated personal observation of the togetherness

of ' smoke' and ' fire' in the oven and other

^places. From such observation he gathers that'

there is an invariable relation between ' smoke'

and 'fire/ Having gathered the invariable

relation, when he draws near a 'mountain'and

^thrown into doubt as to the existence of ' fire-

the mountain, he notes the trail of smoke

from the mountain and recollects the

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invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire (which he gathered from repeated previous obser vation). "When the recollection takes place (t 'where smoke is, fire also is'), and the saitj person draws near the mountain (with the trailin smoke), the knowledge at once flashes forth that 'the mountain yonder has smoke which is an invariable concomitant of fire.' Thus does hej make an inference for himself. This last step (i.e., the knowledge that the mountain possesses ' smoke' which is invariably related to ' fire') is called paramars'a or inferential reasoning. From this (reasoning process) arises the knowled that 'the mountain is on fire.' (The abov$ illustrates inference for oneself.) As regard^ inference for others, it is a fully-expressed reasoning consisting of five steps which are employed to convince others as to the way of inferring

* fire' from the (observed) presence of ' smoke^* The five steps are :— (1) ' Yonder mountain is fire,' (2) 'because it smokes,' (3) 'Whate has smoke, is also on fire, just as is the oven* (4) 'So is it with this (mountain yonder),' (

* therefore it (the mountain) is so (on fire).' B all this even a second or third person is ass of 'fire' from the knowledge of the pres of the established mark or sign thereof ({•«»» the sign of 'smoke'). The above five steps i called respectively (1) Pratijiia, (2) Hetu, Udaharanaffl, (4) Upanayah and (5) Nigamm

Of these pratijna '(the statement of the proposition to be proved) consists in the statement of the subject of the inference as possessing the proban-dum as a property. (In the above inference), e.g., the statement' Yonder mountain is on fire' is the pratijna. (2) The hetu (the ground of the inference) is the statement of the mark or sign " with a suffix indicative of its instrumentality (towards the conclusion), e.g. t the statement 'because it smokes.' '(3} The drstantah is the concrete case in which the invariable relation or vyapti is apprehended. It is of two kinds, viz., (a) sadharmyadrstantah, and (6) midharmya-drstantah. A concrete example in which an invariable relation of presence is apprehended is called a sadharmyadrstantah, e.g., in the inference (of fire)_ from smoke, the case of the oven. A concrete case in which an agreement in absence is apprehended is a vaidharmya-dfstantah x e.g., in the same inference from 'smoke,' the case of the great lake. The udaharana is the statement of the concrete case or example as exemplifying or illustrating the invariable relation of which it is a case in point. (The udaharana is thus a statement of a case in : point while the drstantah is just the concrete case ?'■!' and no statement of it as illustrative of the ; invariable relation.) It is of two kinds, viss,^ |; (a) sadharmyodaharanam, and (b) vaidharmyo-daharanam. A statement of a concrete example

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illustrating an agreement in presence is if sadharmyodaharanam> e.g., the statement 'Whafc| ever is smoky, is fiery, just as is the oven.' statement of a concrete example illustrating an agreement in absence is a vaidharmyodaharamnitfi e.g., the statement 'What is not fiery, is not smoky, just a&is the great lake/ (4) Upanayah^ is the statement of the mark, the invariable! relation whereof has been well-established in the Concrete example, as existing in the subject of the inference. It is also of two kinds according to the nature of the concrete example (which

establishes its invariable relation)* ' Th^t

mountain yonder has a trailing smoke just as the oven' is a case of a sadharmyopanayah. 'The mountain is not devoid of smoke like the lake: is a- case of a vaidharmyopanayah. (5) Nigt$ manam (the conclusion) is the statement of thfe> subject '(as characterised by the probandum) as proved or demonstrated, e.g., the statement * Therefore, yonder mountain is om fire-'

All this, we hold, is unsound and untenable. 4f|

there is no scope for the two kinds of vydpti invariable relation (in inference), so also there no scope for the two kinds of udaharana (illustratl ing such relation). Besides, the alleged rule as the necessity of five steps in inference is an proved assumption. The way in which the 8 posed necessity of the five steps may be refu has been set forth in the Paddhati and the

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§£;' PRAMll?ACANDBIKA : 83

is referred thereto for an understanding of the method of the refutation. This closes our dissertation on the nature of inference.

We shall now discuss the fallacies of reasoning. The fallacies are of two kinds, viz., (I)' fallacies arising from discrepancy or contradiction ! (virodha), and (2) fallacies of inappropriateness (asangati). Of these, the fallacies of contradiction .; are of three kinds, viz., contradiction in the ; pratijM or proposition to be proved, contradiction .. in the hetu 01 ground, and contradiction in the ; )■- dr§tantah or illustration. Contradiction in the *.': pratijM again may be of two kinds, viz., contra-: diction of the pratijM or proposition to be proved ;. J: with what is established by the recognised source^ J I^Vof knowledge, and internal self-contradiction ifrjM the proposition in question. Of these again, --con^# ' tradiction with the evidence of the accepted sources ] : % of knowledge may be of two kinds, viz., contradict ^|

tion with the deliverance of a stronger evidence ¥■ or proof, and contradiction with the deliverance of an evidence of equal strength or force. The follow-H -ing is an example of a proposition in contradictioig

with the deliverance of stronger evidence :—'The j^subject-matter of controversy (i.e., the world) is false; because it is an object of perception j Whatever is an object of perception, is false, pfc as is the silver that is (falsely) perceived iaJWO; ^shining mother-of-pearl.'. This conch^/$.•;: ieotradicted by the ,e*idence <t £*£!£ MM

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which objects like the jar, etc., are presented real, by the evidence of inference also as it proves the opposite, viz., * The subject under discussion^ (the world) is real, because it yields expected results, just as admittedly real things do,' and lastly by the evidence of scriptural testimony^ which declares the world to be real. It thus J runs counter to the combined evidence of percept tion, inference and authoritative testimony. Hence it is in contradiction with evidence of stronger force or strength. As an example of| contradiction with evidence of equal force <H?:; strength we have the following pair of inferences: —(1) ' The disputed subject (i.e., the world) i»:| false; because it is perceptible; just as is the silver perceived in the locus of the mother-of-pearLVJ (2) 'The disputed subject (i.e., the world) is real; because it is the object of valid knowledge ; josfeS as is the self.' In these two inferences, the corresponding invariable relations as also the presence of the respective grounds in the corresponding subjects being exactly of the same order, we have here a contradiction between evidences of equal strength and force. An internally discrepant or self-contradictory statement may, agafliJJ be of two kinds. It may be an apasiddhanta a jatL An apasiddhanta is an asserted pro] tion that contradicts the accepted beliefs of one' own school of thought. Since one has subscril to the tenets of the school to which one i

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PRAMA^ACANDRIKA 85

elected oneself, in making a statement contradicting such tenets one is really contradicting oneself. This is why an apasiddhdnta is regarded as a form of self-contradiction. A statement of the existence of God by one belonging to the atheistic Sankhya School of thought is an example of this kind of self-contradiction. When one refutes oneself by the very assertion one makes we have that form of self-contradiction which is called jati. For example, one who says 'My mother is childless ' commits this form of self-contradiction. Virodha or contradiction in the hetu or ground is also of two kinds, viz., svarupdsiddkih and avyaptih. The following is an example of svarupasiddhih.: —' Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.' Here visibility is non-existent in sound, sound being audible (and not visible). Avyaptih again is of three kinds. We have avyaptih when the mark or sign (the ground of the inference) is related to the probandum as well as the absence of the probandum. iWe have also avyaptih where the mark or sign is related to the absence of the probandum without being related to the probandum. Lastly, we have avyaptih where the mark or sign is unrelated both to the probandum and the absence of it As an example of the first (of these three) we have the following :— f Sound is non-eternal, because it is know-able/ The following is an example of the second :^-' Sound is eternal, because it is a

MADHVA LOGIC

product of will/ As an example of the third have: 'All that is, is non-eternal, because exists.' In this last example, the subject of tbli inference being ? whatsoever that is' the hetu^ or ground is unrelated both to the probandu and the absence thereof. (Since the subject h this case is 'all,' i.e., everything actual possible, there is nothing outside the subject serve the purpose of a probandum or the abse: thereof. Therefore the hetu or ground as property of the subject is without relation to probandum as well as the negation of it. T being no probandum, there is also no absence probandum and thus the hetu or ground is wi out relation to either.) Contradiction in example is of two kinds, viz., contradicti arising from the example being without relati to the probandum, and contradiction arisi from the example being without relation to ground. The former is illustrated in the follow ing:—'The mind is non-eternal, because it ha| shape, just as the atom has. 5 The second*;*} illustrated by the same inference if in place of. words 'the atom' we substitute the r action.' (We shall now deal with the f of inappropriateness.) An example of the £ of inappropriateness is addressing to an admitted! theist the traditional theistic argument:—*Tfce§ earth and the rest have an intelligent because they are effects, just as is a piecey

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cloth.' The inappropriateness consists here in the absence of any demand for such an inference (the addressee being a theist and therefore not standing in need of being convinced). The inappropriate is just that for which there is no real need. This is the definition of the inappro*

priate. -

Others (the Naiyayikas) enumerate the following five as the essential characters of the hetu or ground of a valid inference :—(1) existence in the subject of the inference as its property or Hharma, '(2) existence in the co-ordinates or ' similar instances, (3) exclusion from the contra-* ; ordinates to the inferential subject, i.e., from : ; . dissimilar instances, (4) non-sublation of its visaya § or object* (5) absence of a counter-feef u or : : ,| f' : counter-ground leading to a contradictory conclusion. Of these, all the five characters are attributed to the ground of an amayavyatirete-j (^inference. The ground of a kevalanvayi inference; :|: § however should possess only four of these^-j

there being no contra-ordinate or dissimilar § instance in such inference and so the exclusion of-^ Ijthe ground from the contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance being impossible in this case. The „ ground of the kevalavyatireki is likewise required feto possess only four characters, there being no co-ordinate or similar instance in such inferen^g^ |bkI therefore existence of the ground in the: lidmate.or- similar, instance being <*M4jg

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question in this case. The fallacious hetu ground (according to these Naiydyikas) is ground that possesses only some of the abo characters and does not possess the rest. T fallacious ground is either the asiddha, or t viruddha, or the anaikantika, or the kalutyay padista, or the satpratipak$a ground or hetu. An asiddha or unestablished hetu or ground-is one th is devoid either of the character of invariable rela-tion (to the probandum) or of the character afg being a property of the subject of the inference There are three kinds of an asiddha or uflg established hetu, viz., an diraydsiddhah hetu, smrUpasiddhah hetu and a vtjdpyatvdsiddhah hetu> An d&raydsiddhah hetu, i.e., a ground with i diraya or substrate unestablished, is of two kin mz. r z, ground with an asserted substrate'that d not actually exist, and a ground with an assertftjp substrate in which the existence of the bandum is admitted as an established fact, former is illustrated in the following inference It, ' The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lot just as is the lotus in the lake/ Here substrate of the ground is the sky-lotus, a sky-lotus nowhere exists. The second is illustrated in the case where the inference 'The earthy etc., have an intelligent! author, because they are effects, Just as r jfej piece of cloth' is employed for the benefit convinced theist. Here the probandunbs:

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prama^acandrikI 89

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admitted (before the inference) to be a character of the subject, there is no subject in which the existence of the probandum is doubted. Thus there being no subject to which the probandum may be (hypothetical^) attributed for purpose of demonstration and proof by means of the inference, the substrate of the hetu or ground is non-existent for logical purposes. (Here the subject of the inference is ' the earth, etc,/ and this, according to the theist, being admittedly the handiwork of God, the proving of the same b means of the presence of the ground superfluous. Thus the hetu has no logic tion with reference to the asserted su this is the same as saying that the subject is no logical subject, i.e., does for logical purposes. The svarupasiddhah ground is illustrated in the following : * Sou non-eternal, because it is visible.' Here the ground is 'visibility/ and this is non-existent is sound, sound being audible (and not visible). The vyapyatvdsiddhah hetu or ground is of twflK^ kinds, viz., a hetu or ground devoid of all relatio&g| to the probandum, and a hetu or ground rdateSg* to the probandum only through an extraneous |c©»dition. The former ia illustrated . in-th^|gg ^following:—' All that is, is momentary, becao*#p||| ^exists/ -Here as the subject of the infei^»^gfe||" S»B4 (and thus comprises everything), there WW? "'" similar instance or co-ordinate to the subject outside

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the subject, and therefore the hetu or ground has relation to anything outside the subject, i.e., haal no relation to the probandum (there being n# probandum in reality). The latter is illustrated in the following :—' Vedic sacrifice (of animals) is a cause of sin, because it entails destruction of life, just as is the killing of a Brahmin.' Efere^ ' scriptural prohibition * is the extraneous condi^j tion through which ' destruction of life ' become*^ * productive of sin.' (On condition that the; 1 destruction of life ' is also one that is prohibited^ by scriptures, is it a source of sin. Thus not^ ' destruction of life * as such, but such ' des tion of life ' as is scripturally prohibited, is &|

source of sin.) (What, then, is an extraneous| condition or upadhi ?) An upadhi or extraneous! condition is defined as one which pervades thp| probandum but does not pervade the ground. ' Scriptural prohibition ' (in the above inference)^ is an extraneous condition in this sense. Tlnl^ wherever there is productivity of sin, therfc scriptural prohibition may or may not be. Iff the subject of the above inference, e.g., (&«*,.!$ sacrifice sanctioned by Vedic prescription) there is destruction of life but no scriptural prohibition: But how, it may be asked, is the presence of extraneous condition a defect in reasoning? this way, we reply.) The presence of an extraneous condition is a defect as revealing the faita of the concomitance (on which the inference

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based) or as showing the inference to lead to a contradictory conclusion, i.e., as showing forth the subject as related not to the probandum but to the contradictory of it. For the extraneous condition, e.g., scriptural prohibition, being non-pervasive of the ground (viz., animal sacrifice), may also be excluded from the subject of the inference (viz., Vedic sacrifice), and being so excluded may effect the exclusion of the probandum which it pervades, viz., productivity of sin. And so it may show forth the ground* viz., 'animal sacrifice/ as being related, not to the probandum, but to the contradictory of the

! probandum. (In other words, it proves the failure of the concomitance between the ground and the probandum, for as non-pervasive of the ground, it shows forth the ground as capable of /■■;■ falling outside its range and thereby as failing to be related to the probandum which it pervades.) For the pervading (i.e., the extraneous condition :,' pervading the probandum) being itself non-

■ pervasive of, i.e., capable of being unrelated to, ••:, the ground, the pervaded (i.e., the probandum '% which is pervaded by such extraneous condition) ^|| must also be similarly capable of being unrelated to the ground. And so the subject of the inference being shown to be reduced to the position of the contraordinate to the subject, the ground

/asserted to be existing in the subject is shown ta;

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invariable ground. Further, the upadhi shows forth the subject as related to the cont#i|| dictory of the probandum, i.e., it gives rise to an|| inference proving a contradictory conclusion, the following way. The upadhi or extrane condition, being itself excluded from the subj of the inference, also effects the exclusion the from of the probandum which it pervades, thus the absence of the upadhi establishes t absence of the probandum. Hence we get t counter-inference establishing a contradicto conclusion:—'Vedic sacrifice is not productft&f of sin, because it is not prohibited, just as i the daily meal.' In this way ' sacrifice of life' is a vyapyatmsiddah hetu or ground, being subj to an extraneous condition (in the matter of i invariable relation to the probandum). u$)ad may be of four different kinds. In the first p an upadhi may be an extraneous condition vading the probandum without qualification < restriction. Secondly, an upadhi may pervade t probandum as qualified by a property of subject of the inference. Thirdly, an upadhi be a condition pervading the probandum as quaJk f fied by a property of the ground or sddhana. La an upadhi may be a condition pervading the : f|!jfl bandum as qualified by a neutral property (**&>:$■ property which is neither a property of the subje<S|| nor a property of the ground of the inference)*! The first of these is illustrated in the i

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* Yonder mountain is smoky, because it is fiery,', where the presence of greenwood is the upadhi or extraneous condition. (Provided the fire is greenwood fire, it is a sign of smoke. Thus ' greenwood is the condition of the fire being a sign of smoke. Now this ' greenwood' is pervasive of the proban-dum 'smoke' without any qualification.) The second is illustrated in the following:—'Air is perceptible, because it is the substrate of perceptible touch.' Here the upadhi is ' generated colour' which is pervasive of perceptibility in external substances. Here ' being an external substance', is a property of the subject of the inference, viz.,. ■ air. Now 'generated colour' (which is the,:... upadhi) does not pervade the probandujn ^ (viz., perceptibility) simply without qualification. In quality, etc., e.g., there is 'perceptibility/ inspite of the absence of 'generated colour.' Hence we have to say 'perceptibility in substances.' (' Generated colour' does not pery*dfcp| •.perceptibility' as such, but ' perceptibility itk^ external substances.' This excludes ' perceptibility of quality, etc' which is not pervaded by 'generated^ colour.') But even this does not suffice. The Atman or self, e.g., is a perceptible substance, perceptibility of the Atman as substance is ^|g| pervaded by generated colour. And !?have to say, 'perceptibility in external, l^wices.' (The Atman ,4f ; not an ^"J*? bstance. It is an internal substance revealed

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94 MADHVA LOGIC •..#■

to internal perception.) The third form .^ upadhi is illustrated in the following:—'! ehild in the mother's womb ought to be a dark-coloured one, because it is the child of Maitri.|. Here the upadhi is ' vegetable diet/ and it pervades 'darkness of colour with respect to child of Maim: In this case the tipaihi f \ * vegetable diet,' does not pervade the proband^ without 'qualification/ In the (unbaked) ja^ e.g., there is darkness of colour, but there is no 'vegetable diet/ Therefore we have to say ' the, upadhi pervades darkness of colour as relating fe| a child of MaitrV The fourth form is illustrate^ in the following :—' The colour of the atom is perceptible, because it is an object of knowledge just as is the jar/ Here the upadhi is ' genera colour/ and it pervades * perceptibility relating ifl| external substances/ Now 'being an ext substance' is a neutral property in this case, is not a property of the subject (' the colour * the atom'). It is also not a property of the ground (* knowability'). Further in this cast| we cannot say that ' where perceptibility ;1S^ there also generated colour is/ since the concomitance fails in the case of e quality' and tb^ like. Hence 'generated colour' is not pervasi*6; of the probandum (i.e., perceptibility) simplj without qualification. Hence we say ceptibility relating to external substances 1 . the meaning is ' where perceptibility relating

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V-*

prama^acandrik! 95

external substances is, there generated colour also is,' and in this respect the upadhi, ' generated colour/ pervades the probandum, ' perceptibility \ But this upadhi, 'generated colour/ does not pervade the ground, ' knowability \ We cannot say ' whatever is knowable, is also characterised by generated colour/ the concomitance being seen to fail in the case of the subject of the inference (the colour of the atom). (The colour of the atom is knowable, but it is non-generated colour.) If we define upadhi merely as a condition that does not pervade the ground (and leave out the other part of the definition, i.e., that such condition must also be pervasive of the probandum), then in the inference ' sound is non-eternal, because it is a product of will' the property of ' being a jar ' will be. an upadhi, for in a sound which is a product of will, there is absence of the property of a jar. (But the above inference is free from an upadhi, and therefore our mutilated definition of upadhi is the cause of the illegitimate assumption of an upadhi in this case.) Again if we define upadhi simply as a condition that pervades the probandum (omitting the other part of the definition that 'it must be non-pervasive of theground'), then in the inference of fire' from * smoke/ ' the nature of being a substance' will be an upadhi. (Fire is a substance and therefore pervaded by'the nature of being Stsubstance'.) There-tore (to avoid the absurdity of supposing an

^v*

96

MADHA LOGIC

:w

«padfei where there is none) we say * the tfpadhi:^ must also be non-pervasive of the ground,; (The nature of being a substance perv * smoke ' also and thus is not non-pervasive the ground.) The viruddhah heta, i.e., t contradictory ground, is one that is pervaded the negation of the probandum. E.g., the grou0j| in the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is if product of will/ is a contradictory or viruddha ground. The ground in this inference is 'being product of will/ and 'being a product of will' pervaded by 'non-eternality' which is the negation of 'eternality/ The anaikantikah hetu or gro is one that is non-invariable (i.e., one which not invariably related to the probandum). anaikdntika ground is of three kinds, viz., the g sadharana or common, the asadharana or common and the anupasathhdri or inconclusive Of these the sddhdranah anaikantikah is a gro that exists also in that which is a negation of probandum. (It is common to the proba and its negation and therefore is called sad anaikdntika or common non-invariable.) ground in the inference 'the mountain is on because it is knowable' is an example of this of a non-invariable ground. The ground in case is 'being a knowable* and this holds also of the lake which is devoid of fire. uncommon anaikdntika is a ground^ that excluded from all co-ordinates and contra-ordi

Hal

?*>?.; A

pramI^tacandrika

97

to the subject and exists only in the subject.

?': For example, the ground in the inference 'the element of earth is eternal, because it has odour *

f is a case of an uncommon non-invariable ground. Here 'possession of odour' which is the ground or hetu exists only in the subject of the inference, viz., in the element of earth, and is excluded alike from all other eternal and non-eternal objects. The inconclusive anaikmtika is a ground which 'is bereft alike of instances showing its agreement in presence with the probandnm. and instances ., showing its agreement in absence therewith. For example, the ground in the inference 'All that m, is non-external, because it is knowable ' is a -case of an inconclusive non-invariable ground. Here the subject of the inference being 'all *l*gi

* is* there is nothing outside the subject to serve as

-an illustration of the invariable relation between

the ground and the probandnm. The kalMyaya-

t ; padista hetu or ground is one that seeks ^YjMg a probandnm the negation of which is established by valid evidence to be the property of the subject.

mblated

ground

1

following inference is a case in point:— Fire is devoid of heat, because it is knowable/ Here the probandnm is 'absence of heat but tfie Rogation of this probandnm, viz., 'heat, is proved by tactual perception to be the property of fire which is the subject of the inference. The

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plfccY.13

satpratipaksa hetn or ground is one which has a counter-ground opposed to it proving the negation 0| of the probandum (in the subject of the inference). i$ For example, the ground of the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is audible, just as is the class-character or generic nature of sounds' is countered and stopped from functioning by the ground of the inference 'sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, just as is the jar/ A ; countered or hindered ground is also called a , ■ prakaranasamafy hetu. t K

Just as we have the fallacious ground or . : > pseudo-ground (in various forms) so also we have ^ the fallacies of the example or ud&harana, i.e., ..." fallacious examples or pseudo-examples (udaharana-bhasah). There are many different kinds of the fallacious example. For example, with reference to examples illustrating relations of agreement in presence, we have first the case of a fallacious .-example which is bereft of relation to the * ■• probandum. Thus in the inference 'the mind is ■ non-eternal, because it has shape; whatever has , shape, is non-eternal; just as is the atom,' the ^ 'atom* which is cited as illustrating the agree-^ ment in presence is a pseudo-example in this sense. For the atom i3 devoid of 'non-eternality' and so is devoid of relation to the probandum. Secondly, we may also have pseudo-examples that are bereft of relation to the ground. In the same inference if we say 'just as is action ' (in place of * just

:-,r

..»

PRAMAtfACANDBlfcA 99

■ V

as is the atom') we shall have a pseudo-example

bereft of relation to the ground, for action, though

non-eternal, is yet devoid of * shape.' And

thirdly, we may also have fallacious examples

which are bereft of relation both to the ground

and the probandum, e.g., in the same inference,

if we say ' just as is ether' (in place of ' just

as is the atom') we shall have a pseudo-example

devoid of relation to the ground as well as the

probandum. (Ether is devoid of shape and is

devoid of non-eternality.) In the case of examples

illustrating relations of agreement in absence, we

may also have pseudo-examples devoid of relation

to the absence of the probandum. For example, in

.the same inference if we say ' just as is action (by

agreement in absence).' (Action is non-etemal

and therefore is devoid of relation to the negation

or absence of non-eternality.) Secondly, we may

also have in such cases fallacious examples in the

form of examples bereft of relation to the absence of

the ground. For example in the same inference, if

we say ' what is not non-eternal, is not an object

with a shape, just as is the atom.' And

lastly, we may have also fallacious examples

; bereft of relation both to the absence of the

ground and the absence of the probandum. For

example, in the same inference, if we say

• 'just as is the jar.' (The jar is non-eternal

if and therefore bereft of relation to the negation

feflf non-eternality. The jar further has a shape

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si

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:--

100 MlDHVA LOGIC

and is therefore bereft of relation to the negation of shape.)

All these (i.e., the Nyaya fallacies so far set forth) we reject as untenable. Why ? Because^ some of these so-called fallacies are not fallacies? strictly speaking, while the rest are comprehended in 'conflicting evidence * and the other fallacies weg|

have explained above.

The manner in which some of these so-called fallacies may be proved to be logically flawless as : ^ also the manner in which the rest may be showa,1| to be comprehended in our enumerations of the ^ fallacies are fully set forth in the PaddhaU ioj& which the reader is referred for an understanding;!^ thereof. We refrain from going over the same , ground here for fear of prolixity. Thus every-|| thing (relating to inference) has been correctl|||| and intelligibly set forth. This closes the chapte£j| on Anumana of the Pramanacandrika which follows the track shown by the reverend feet-<$J)g Sri Jayatlrtha. Let our heads bend in honour to|p the sage Vedavyasa and let us close with an i*£ : l| vocation of the name of Hari and the incantation of Om.

We now proceed to discuss the nature of Authority or Agama as a source of knowledge Any verbal communication free from defects b Sgama. The qualification *free from defects' ■ (in the above definition) distinguishes agama h the mere (deceptive) appearance thereof,

W- : . : - ■ ■-■■■

PRAMA^ACAMDMKA 101

Hie words 'verbal communication' differentiate it

from perception and other sources of knowledge. '&.'. What, then, are the defects of a verbal ^jporamunication? The defects of a verbal communication are :-(D unintelligibility, (2) conveying of the opposite of the true or correct information,, ? (3) conveying of what is already known, (4) conveying of "useless information (for which nobody cares), (5) conveying of information not derived, :, or sought for by the person to whom it is conveyed, (6) conveying of a command or injunction, to accomplish the impossible, (7) conveying of advice of a more difficult means when easier means I are well within reach, etc. Of these (1) umntelli-,

gibility is of two kinds, viz., (a) unintelligibly. ; , I due to want of significant words, and (6) un-r.^

intelligibility due to want of intelligible relation : ; : (between the words of a verbal communication).. Examples of the former are :-'Because ka^a-ta-.,.. ta-pc'B are ja-ba-ga-da-ha' (of. abracadabra). Examples of the latter are :-'The cow M^ga P f horse,"Manisan elephant,' 'The bowl.rr%g| 'i cumin seed,' ' The ten apples are five cakes. U) Conveying the opposite of what is true is illustrated in the following : -'The world is unrea^| I: ' The Sudras have the right of access to the, IfeVedas,' 'The Brahmins have no such right, etc. ' £&.Examples of conveying what is already k«^||J «e:-«The sun rises in the east, and sets gJSg? -—*!-. < u.i AMUH .» » WR et * 'The Nimbajr^rt :»/.■■-> s

*

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102 MADHVA LOGIC

bitter,' etc. The objection that 'conveying thfc known cannot be a defect as it adds to the forced of the evidence that is already available (and thus strengthens our knowledge), misses the real point at issue. Later evidence strengthens our knowledge only where earlier evidence has failed to remove uncertainty and produce complete certitude in regard to that about which we were in doubt. (Hence where no uncertainty exists, the attempt at further enlightenment by means of verbal communication is waste of energy.) (4) Examples of stupid, pointless communications (for which nobody cares) are :•—' How many teeth has the crow ?' ' What is the weight of the sheep's egg ? * ' How many threads of hair are there ,';| in the blanket?' ' What is the news of the province of Cola? ' (Gola being the name of the place where : S the questioner himself lives), etc. (5) Examples p of communications which are of no use to the*.;/ persons to whom they are conveyed are :— c Advice v;I of business and trade to one who has subdued the desires of the world,' etc. (6) Examples of communications enjoining the accomplishment of the impossible are :—' When alluding to a person who is dead and gone, one proceeds to describe an elixir that will bring the dead back to life and that may be found in the north of a certain hiHl called Mrtiharamahtdhara,* etc. (7) Examp advising more difficult and less accessible remedi where easier ones are at hand are :—* To ask

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PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

103

man to cut down something with an axe which he can easily remove by his finger-nails,' 'To advise a thirsty man on the Ganges banks to sink a well for quelling his thirst,' etc.

A verbal communication is made up of words and sentences. A word is a combination of letters with a case-ending. The words 'with a case-ending' (in the above definition) exclude non-sense combinations of letters like ja-ba-ga-da-ia (which are devoid of case-endings). A sentence is a combination of words characterised by mutual expectation, suitability of relation, and proximity (in time). Expectation is that relation

" of one word of a sentence to another (or others) of the same sentence without which the relation expressed by the sentence will not be apprehended, e.g., in the sentence ' Bring the jar,' the verb ('bring') without the object ('jar') will not produce the apprehension of the relation of a verb to its object, and so the verb ' bring' has the relation of expectation to the object' jar'. Or we may say, expectation is the fulfilling (on the part of the subsequest word) of the intent or expectation which is generated by the word preceding it

. (in a sentence). Therefore, 'The cow is a horse,' ' Man is an elephant,' etc, are not sentences, for in these the words do not expect

: ; i.e., enter into relation to, one another. Though

/^'expectation' is, strictly speaking a property of consciousness, yet objects .(denoted by words),

n\

*

104 " MADHA LOGIC

as producing in the bearers of their respecti names an expectation of these objects in mut relation, are also said to * expect * one ano And as words (the names of objects) denote su objects (with mutual expectation), words also a said to have ' expectation.'

By suitability or fitness of relation (bet

the words of a sentence) is meant the absence iif^ the cognised relation (between the said words) of?; any clash with valid evidence. Thus in the words 'moistening by water/ the relation of effect and! cause which is asserted between the act * moistening ' and the agency of ' water' remaiM uncontradicted by valid evidence. Here the coBff^ patibility of the relation between 'moistening' and the agency of * water * constitutes the s lity or fitness of the relation between them. F this reason the words, 'He is moistening means of fire,' do not constitute a real sen there being no suitability of relation in this Between 'fire' and the act of 'moistening there is no question of a mutual agreement^ compatibility of relation.

By proximity (in time) is meant the express-1| ing of the words (in a sentence) without-aBj;|j long pause or interval of time between the ferent words. Thus the words, '■ Bring the uttered without any long break or interval' time between them, have this character 0 proximity (in time). For this reason* -tfeR

■' Bring the cow/ uttered separately, each after an hour or thereabout after the previous one, will not constitute a sentence, for they lack the character of sufficient (temporal) proximity (to produce a unity of meaning).

In verbal communication as a source of knowledge, the sentence is the instrumental cause, the recollection of the meanings of the constituent words, the intervening process, and the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, the result (of the process). Verbal communication also (like inference) conveys knowledge only of such correctly Communicated objects as are accompanied by the knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words of the communication. In this respect it is unlike perception (as an instrument of knowledge) which makes things known by its bare existence (without being itself known or apprehended), for an authoritative communication like inference depends on a known instrumental cause (i.e., the knowledge of the meanings of its constituent words). Otherwise the absurdity will follow that an authoritative v knowledge will have to be admitted where a verbal declaration (of a truth), though existing k in itself, has not been actually heard by a parti-:{ : cular person, or, even though heard by him, 5 has not been understood because of lack of knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words.

§•'• 14.

MADHVA LOGIC

(We now proceed to discuss how words mi tteir respective objects.) Some hold that woi like'the cow,' etc., mean only class-characters, these being the first to be presented as attribul (as soon as the words are heard). The individuals are reached (mediately) through these class-characters which drag them behind themselves. Others hold that words mean the individuals as specified by their corresponding class-charao^ ters. According to this view, a class-name is subject to the conditions which regulate the use

^ok words. Thus all words such as ' ether/ etc.^ mean specified individuals, these alone being thftf determining conditions of the use of words. Otters' hold that words like £ the jar,* etc., meatt class-characters; proper names like * Devadatta,' etc., mean individuals ; words like ' possession

/. the "dewlap* mean shape or make; while words like * the cow,' etc., mean all the three. The real

> fac£ however, is that the meaning of a wordil

' jusf "{fiat object which is immediately presented^ to consciousness as soon as the word is heara-i Tn the apprehension of the meaning of a w< similarity acts as connecting or mediating link-Thus since the word 'jar' calls forth the i<k both of c individual jars * and ' the, class-characte||J of jars,' this word must be supposed to be cap) of meaning both the ( class-character T and ' thi individuals.' Again, since the word ' white'* forth the idea of the quality of white <$$%

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SB

P well as the substrate of the quality (the white pithing), it must be supposed to mean both ' the quality ' and ' the substrate.' Similarly, the word H 'gone' means both the action of ' having gone ' W and ' the agent of the action,' the word 'stick-. # in-hand' means both the 'stick' and 'the ^person, Devadatta, who holds it in his hand,' etc. i. Or, we may say, words like 'cow' etc., being 5 nouns or substantives, must denote individuals, while words like ' bring,' etc., should mean attributes or adjectives. .In combinations of words | such as 'bring the cow,' the act of bringing being made possible through an individual '■: agent of the act, the meaning should be conceived ■'■.]. v.; as consisting in the individual (in the individual -i j ^

f agent of the act). '"'"' , '■';■/%

T'- (The question now has to be discussed, how 3 SPwe acquire a knowledge of the meanings of p words.) Our view is that we learn the meanings foof words from the signs made with the fingers T" (by our elders while uttering the words). Thus !; the child sitting on the person of its father or l-mother begins to learn the meanings of wmgg I-when the said father or mother tries to rouse '$g|

from a state of inattention and to draw its attention towards himself or her^a^J «*gp i words which he or she may uttef^ by'mabn|j|=

signs with the fingers, or by producing * feoft sound by Striking one finger-tip against *

"another- In this waj^be «hild is taught the v

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108 MADHVA LOGIC

i

meanings of such sentences as 'Child, that is your mother/ 'that, your father, 1 ' that* your brother,' 'the man is eating the plantain fruit,' etc. Thus by the said signs the child gradually learns that the said words are related in a general way to the said objects pointed^; out by these gestures and that the relational is the relation of meaning or signifying these objects. Later on when such words as ' This is

4

your sister/ 'That is your friend/ 'He is eating a cake/ etc., are uttered in his presence, and he begins to note the different contexts in.is

.-.■83

which these different words are uttered, he learns, through the differences of the contexts

"•'MS

to distinguish the specific meanings that attach || to particular words, e.g., that the word 'mother' attaches to 'the female parent,' etc. Otherof" however opine that the meanings of words are<s learnt from the behaviour of the seniors or elders. Thus the inquisitive child, when he hears a senior say to a junior, ' Bring the cow/ and notes that? immediately afterwords the junior is prompted^ to the act of bringing the cow, concludes t$ agreement and difference that the action of the junior is prompted by the knowledge produce^ by the words of the senior. And so assuring! himself, when he hears other sentences spo in other contexts such as 'Bring the hor 'Secure the cow with a rope/etc., he ga from the divergent contexts that the

*

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' cow ' means one particular kind of animal, the word ' horse,' animal of a different kind, etc. But this view is not tenable. The quickly-forgetful child cannot possibly retain the consciousness of the word he hears till the actual bringing of the

object desired.

A word has two kinds of function or vrtti, viz., (1) primary (mukhya) and (2) non-primary or secondary (amukhya). The direct or primary function of a word is its iakti or power of referring to, or meaning, a particular object. Sakti is defined as that relation between a word and an object which is conducive to the recollection of the object (as soon as the word is heard). Samaya, sangati, sanketa, vacaka, etc., are used as synonyms of sakii. This iakti is of three kinds, viz., yogah, rtMmA yogarudhih. Of these, the power to refer to an object by virtue of the powers of the constituent parts of the . word is yogah. The power of meaning which - belongs to a word as a whole irrespective of the powers of its constituent parts is ru4hih. Lastly, the power of meaning which is derived from both (i.e., both from the word as a whole and the meanings of the constituent parts), is yoga-ruMh. Of these, some words mean their respective objects through the meanings of its H. "constituent parts only, such as the words pdthaka ■'< (reader), pacaka (cook), dan& (the man with a I a stick in hand), kun4all {the coiling thing), etc.

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110

MADHVA LOGIC

PW

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Some words, again, mean their respective object* by the powers inherent in the words as a whol irrespective of the powers of the constituents, Such are words like ghata (jar), pata (piece cloth), etc. Lastly, some words mean objec through their powers as a whole as reinforced by| the powers of the constituents such as the word| pankaja (the lotus), etc. In this manner att'g other words with primary meanings, such as thef mahayogafr, etc., should be understood (as signifying their objects).

The non-primary or secondary function of a^ word is called Laksana or Implication. Implication is a kind of relation to the object of a word's!

&akt% or power of meaning. There are two kin of Implication, viz., (1) Implication which is in* dependent of relation to the direct meani (Jahallaksana), and (2) Implication in whioK| the direct meaning also enters as a facte (ajahallakfana). * The milkman lives in Ganges' illustrates the former. (Here ' the! Ganges' means not the river, but the banks the river Ganges.) ' Men with umbrellas going* illustrates the latter. (Here chatriti i.e. 9 'men with umbrellas,' means * pedestrian®. According to another classification, Implicat is of the following two kinds, viz., (1) Impli tion in which the implied meaning is ij dependent of any special end or purpose to subserved, and (2) Implication depending <&

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prama^tacandrikI 111

some purpose that is subserved. "'Travellers are

going' is an example of the former. (Here

I'm&rgaht literally 'roads,' means 'travellers'

by implication.) Here the traversing of the

• roads by travellers being observed to happen

without any special end or purpose to be served,

* ,: such implication is also called mjhalakma.

'The milkman lives in the Ganges' is an example

of the latter. (Here ' the Ganges' means ' the

banks of the Ganges.') In this case ' living near

the Ganges' being prompted by considerations

of sanctity and the like, the implication is called

kevalalak?ana. The inapplicability or failure of

the primary meaning is the real cause of an

implication. In a similar way should be con-

f ceived other non-primary functions of words such

"/'as the gaunt (the deferred), etc. ,';.,;

" A~gama, i.e., an authoritative verbal communi-

: cation is of two kinds, viz., (1) communication

having a personal source, and (2) communication

IS devoid of a personal source. The Rg-veda and

:> other ; orthodox scriptures are the impersonal

k&gamas, or Agamas without a personal source.

^ Valid personal communications are those recorded

>in"'the Mahabharata and other sacred works.

>v Thus, it is said, " Scriptures are of two kinds,;

|V viz., (1) the eternal, and (2) the non-eternal.

Such, for example, are the Vedas beginning with

Rg-vefa the MahSbharata, the Paflcaratra, the

original Ramayana, and. the Puxanas. AH these

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112 MADHVA LOGIC

as also all those that follow in • the wake of tliesii are to be regarded as the (authoritative) sacre^l scriptures. Those that are other than these. : 0 Janatdana, they are heretical and should not be regarded as authoritative scriptures, etc." ; .1

But it may be said : * The Vedas have 1^ personal source, because they consist of collections of sentences, just as are the verses of Kalidasa r and the rest.' Our reply is, this conclusion does v not follow, the inference in question being vitiated by the presence of an extraneous condK :■■ tion. The extraneous condition is ' a personal origin established by tradition/ In other words, € a collection of sentences ' (which is the ground of the inference) is in itself no proof of a personal origin. It is a sign thereof only on the condition that such personal origin is established by tradition.

But it may be said : ' The Vedas are devoid of evidential value and validity, because despite the due accomplishment of the Vedic prescriptions the promised fruits are not realised, just as are the hopes generated by the utterances of;^| deceitful people.' Our reply is, this is not the case, because the above inference contradicts the following valid reasoning:—'The Vedas are authoritative, because they consist of imperso prescriptions, i.e., of sentences without a perso: origin, just as are the lunatic's ravings by a ment in absence.' (The lunatic's ravings

^

$

-■

non-authoritative, and they are not without a personal source. And thus they illustrate the agreement in absence ' what is not authoritative is also not without a personal source.') It cannot be said that this inference entails the fallacy of an asiddha hetu or unestablished ground. For Sruti (authoritative scripture) declares that the sentences of the Vedas (i.e., the Vedic prescriptions) are eternal verities. (Thus the eternity, i.e., lack of a personal origin, in respect of the Vedic sentences, is not asiddha or unestablished.) Smjii (i.e., the secondary scriptures derived from the primary scriptures) also declares that the Vedic sentences are without beginning and without end, are eternal or timeless, have inherent authority and are self-existent. Nor is non-fruitfulness or non-efficacy of Vedic prescriptions a proof of invalidity (of the Vedas), for the prescriptions being seen to bear the promised fruits only in the properly qualified agents accomplishing them, the non-perception of the fruits in other cases must be attributed to the inherent disqualifications of the agents. .

But it may be said : * Agama is not valid u., evidence, bacause it does not prove anything, just I as a deceitful utterance.' Thus the visaya or I;; object to be proved by valid evidence is of two fjdn&s, viz., (1) the immediate, and (2) the emote nr mediate. Of these, the immediate is

remote or mediate, ui *«

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MADHVA LOGIC

f?ft

the object evidenced by perception. There is no other object, besides these two, which can servel as an object to be established by the evidence rf| Kgama or authoritative communication. If you say that Agama causes the knowledge of the mediate, then as, in your view, nothing is, valid":|| independent evidence which causes the knowledge of the already known, and Agama has application only to objects proved by other forms of evidence, so all Kqamas will be shorn of evidential value aft|!|

""2*

wanting in any distinctive objects to be proved^ thereby. All this, we reply, is wrong. Just as the evidential value of visual perception in regard to objects distinct from the objects of hearing cannot be denied in spite of the fact t visual perception proves only immediate obje . just as hearing does, so also the evidence Kgama in regard to objects distinct from t objects of inference, e.g., in regard to s special objects as heavenly happiness, libera etc. (which are not objects of inference),; ii unimpeachable despite the fact that Kgama ■ indistinguishable from inference in the matt~* of the mediateness of the objects it proves. If| cannot be said that * heavenly happiness, 'liberation/ etc., are objects of inferential pr^® 8 and so Agama is devoid of any special objects' "ttf be established by its evidence. For if you s|§ this, we shall say contrary wise that Kg

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being evidence of mediate : objects (sue

'heavenly happiness,' etc.) is a valid source of knowledge, while inference, being devoid of proper special objects (i.e., objects not characterised by the mediateness that characterises the objects proved by Igama) is devoid of evidential

authority.

The Vawesikas hold that Igama is included in (i.e., is a variety of) inference. But this view is wrong, for even in the absence of the recollection of invariable concomitance and the like, there is realisation of the meaning of a verbal communication, this being a matter of common experience.

Bhaskara and his followers hold that Agama without a personal source is independent evidence, but Agama having a personal origin is a variety .g-of inference. This also is a wrong view. For the sum of conditions for the comprehension of $*^ import of sentences, viz., expectancy, suitability of mutual relation between the constituent words, etc., being identical in both (i.e., both Personal and Impersonal Igama), there is no valid ground^ for assuming any special character attaching to J g|

only one of these.... _■....'-■■- '•'.■■ •■ •• .•'• : sS Thus have we described all the three forms

of evidence or Pramana. Anything other than these (three) is not a'prdmSm or valid source- /<4jj|

: knowledge. - •■-" ■■ ••-:-' '-'' .''*j& : ?i'-

But it may be said: there is another form rf avid*™* distinct from the above three, tnz.,

01 evidence tnswuo-

■■■ m

116 mIdhVa logic

Arthapatti or Presumption. When a thing of% event is seen to be inexplicable except on the & assumption of something else and when on the , basis of our observation of this otherwise inexpH*yf| cable thing we are led to presume that which is T| necessary to account for it, we proceed according $ to the method of Arthapatti or Presumption as a source of knowledge. Thus when we learn v by perception or reliable testimony that Caitra j> is alive and yet is not in the house, we at once ..-| presume that he must be somewhere outside, for ;■; absence inside of one who is alive is not ;■% explicable except on the assumption of his i existence outside. Hence the proof here of outside existence consists in the Arthapatti or Presume ^

tion which is created therefor by the otherwise :| inexplicable fact of inside non-existence of one ^ who is alive. This process is distinct from the-^ processes of perception and the rest, for outside existence is not an object of perception and the

-test. • " ; :

This, we hold, is not the case, for the «v?| called presumption is only an inference '&&$$ disguise). (The inference is as follows: %j. * Caitra must exist outside, because, though alive, he is absent inside; whoever is alive, and does not exist in a certain place, must exist in

— m +

some other place, just as I myself do. inference being quite competent to produce knowledge of the outside existence, whati#|

Til

H

«4 ■ I

" 41 "

I

cVl

PRAM A?A C AKDBIK A

11?

use of assuming a separate source of knowledge such as Presumption? In this inference the words 'though living' preclude the case of the dead (who are non-existent because not alive). Similarly, the substantive (qualified by the adjective ' though alive '), i.e., 'absence inside,' precludes the case of Devadatta and the like who are existent within the house.

But it may be said : there is another separate source of knowledge, viz. , comparison. Comparison ( Upamana) is the cognition of an object as characterised by likeness to another, e.g., of likeness to the cow as produced by the recollection of a comparative statement as an auxiliary condition. Thus a person ignorant of the meaning of the word ' gavaya' first learns from a forester that 'gavaya* means ' an animal resembling a cow.' Thereafter when later on he comes across in a jforest an animal looking like a cow, he recollects the previous advice of the forester that ' gavaya is an animal like a cow.' Thereon the knowledge dawns on him * That animal (resembling the cow) must be what is meant by the word gavaya.' As this knowledge is not caused by perception and the rest, the process (which generates the ' knowledge) is regarded as an independent source . of knowledge called Upamana or comparison.

This, we hold, is not the case, for (the so-;• called) comparison is really comprised in m-i^ Terence. The inference in such cases is as

MI

follows:—' The subject of the enquiry is t&| meaning of the word gavaya, because, not being a cow, it possesses resemblance to a cow| just as is the jar by agreement in absence.* . (What is not the meaning of gavaya, is also noil that which, not being a cow, bears resemblance

* to the cow, just as is the jar which is not the;|| meaning of gavaya and is also not that which,|| not being a cow, bears resemblance to tbe|| cow.) To preclude illegitimate application to a v| second cow resembling a first cow, the words j

',.* *not being a cow' have been included, and to : preclude illegitimate application to the jar an<| the rest, the substantive 'that which bears resemblance to the cow ' has been included.

But it may be said: there is yet anoth* separate source of knowledge, viz., negation^ Abhava. This must be admitted in order account for the cognition of negation. ^ln^ non-apprehension (i.e., negation or absence of apprehension) of the jar and the rest assures; us of the absence or negation of the jar, etc.; * This non-apprehension is just the negation or absence of apprehension. The non-apprehensioiiu being apprehended or realised in consciousness* the negation, i.e., the absence, of the jar, etc., is also cognised or apprehended.

This is not the case, we say; for this called negation as a source of knowledge is reality comprehended in one or other <>t.

.--:■

i **■*■■ to

»X t

■y t ''

w-

v ■

Pramanas we have explained above. Thus, according to our view, that which causes the knowledge of negation (in a particular case) is the Pramana or evidence of the negation in that case. For example, the evidence in regard to the present non-existence of the Kauravas is the testimony of the Mahabharata. In the case of Devadatta's lack of vision we have the following inference as proof or evidence of the lack or negation :— The subject of controversy (Deva-datta) is devoid of vision, because he is ignorant of the nature of colours.' Similarly, the absence of pleasure, etc., is evidenced by the immediate intuition of the witnessing intelligence. The realisation of the non-existence of a jar before oneself results from a quickly-produced perception. It is not an effect of non-apprehension only, for it has the nature of an immediate positive experience. No doubt, a proximate non-apprehension is also an indispensable condition. But the mere fact of a proximate non-apprehension as an indispensable condition does not constitute the latter an independent source of knowledge, for in that case by a similar line of reasoning one may say that in the cognition of positive reality the non-apprehension of its negation is the real evidence or proof. ? Where in the midst of darkness we cognise the absence of a jar and the like by means of exploring with the hands, the non-apprehension

qua non-apprehension is not the real cause of* our knowledge of the negation or absence. Thejl non-apprehension is a cause here only as itia 1 treated as a sign or mark serving as the ground of an inference. The inference in such cases is *: as follows:—'The jar does not exist here, for, f though fit to be perceived, it is not actually ■ observed here, just as an elephant.' But it may be said : a negation or absence being admittedly v incapable of positively stimulating the sensibili- ■] ties, we cannot sensibly talk of negation being perceived by the -senses. Our reply is : this is •., not the case as there is no bar to a negation ;.: being in contact with the sensibilites just as there j is none with respect to a positive entity. : .^ \

But it may be said : we have mathematical -| or quantitative reasonings (sambhava) and these ; ! should constitute a separate source of knowledge, i Thus when the cognition of the greater leads to the cognition of the less we have sambhava or quantitative reasoning. , For example, the knowledge that there is one hundred yields or establishes the knowledge that there is fifty-five.

To this our reply is : quantitative reasoning is only a variety of inference. The inference here is as follows : ' Devadatta must own fifty-five, ^ because he owns one-hundred, just as I myself

do/ .' "; y._;:\,

There is another kind of knowing, viz., knoWr,J ing by the method of exhaustion. Thus whe^l

f'Zl

w +

43, 7

PRAMAtfACANDBIKA ,151

by eliminating other possible alternatives one after another we arrive at the last or remaining alternative, our knowledge of the truth of this last alternative is gained by the method of exhaustion. It is of two kinds, viz., (1) that which proceeds by the method of affirmation, and (2) that which proceeds by the method of negation or exclusion. The former is illustrated in the following : —When we know that the two persons before us are Gaitra and Maitra, then the knowledge, ' this one of the two persons is Caitra,' entails the knowledge, ' the other one is Maitra.' The second is illustrated in the following :«*r When we know that the two persons before us are Caitra and Maitra, then the knowledge, ' this one (of the two) is not Caitra ' entails the knowledge, ' this, then, must be Maitra.' ■_-_ . j; -This also, we hold, is a case of inferential knowledge. The inference is as follows: The disputed subject is Maitra, because, being either Gaitra or Maitra, he is not Caitra (in fact), just as is Gaitra (by agreement in absence). (In other words he who is not Maitra, is also not he who, being either Caitra or Maitra, is not Caitra, just as is Caitra, who is not Maitra and is also not he who, being either Caitra or Maitra, is not Caitra) Here to preclude the illegitimate extension of the hetu to the cases of the jar, etc., the h^ords ' being either Caitra or Maitra' have been included. _

-5- ■ v ** .-*■#>£ Ji-i •£■ *t-; r^y* ^ -" " v ' *"

Upakrama, etc., are also forms of inference?! for they produce an inferential knowledge of the purport of sentences. An unbroken continuum of tradition without any known originator thereof is ^ Aitihya or Tradition- For example, the hearsay, g 1 In this fig-tree lives a demon' (is a case of aitihya). r| This is nothing but verbal testimony (and should not count as an independent source of knowledge). "So f t also all the rest such as omens and signs (Sakuna) 9 written language (Upi)> gesture language (cesta). ■: —ail these as sources of knowledge are included in the forms of evidence (i.e., the three we have '_* explained) we have set forth above. We shall now explain the nature of validity itself. The intrinsic nature of validity is of two kinds? t>t0 M

(1) intrinsicality in respect of origin (utpattt), and (2) intrinsicality in respect of verification ^ in consciousness (jiiapti). Of these, intrinsi cality in respect of origin means that the validity arises from the same conditions as cause the cognition itself of which the validity is a logical character. In other words, validity being an intrinsic or essential character of-a cognition in the matter of its origin means that the causes which produce a cognition are also the causes which produce the validity of the cogni-tion. By intrinsicality in respect of verification in knowledge is meant that the validity is apprefj hended by the same agency a& is.the cbgnitic itself of which it is a logical character, • Itt-^

^

••-.

■::■■;

* t

w

words, validity being an intrinsic or inherent character of a cognition in respect of its being known as such means that that which apprehends the cognition also apprehends the validity of the cognition.

... The extrinsicality of invalidity is likewise of two kinds, viz., (1) extrinsicality in respect of the origin of the invalidity, and (2) extrinsicality in respect of its confirmation in consciousness as such. Of these, extrinsicality or adventitiousness in respect of origin means that the invalidity arises from conditions other than those which cause the cognition itself* Again, extrinsicality in respect of the invalidity being known as such means that the invalidity is cognised by an agency other than the agency which cognises or apprehends the cognition itself. Thus everything has been set forth in its proper place.

- The Sankhya philosophers however hold that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic alike in respect of their origin and their being known as such. The Naiyayikas, on the contrary, hold that both are extrinsic. And they say in this connection that a cognition itself is caused by the sense-organs, etc., while the validity of the cognition is caused by the presence of certain specially efficacious qualities in the il causes of a cognition. Similarly, the didity of the cognition is due to the presence

1 ■ r" *~\> •+.

V, * ■

mm -^

* '*»

of certain special defects or deficiencies in th#i causes of a cognition. And so also (in tito£ matter of being known) a cognition itself i»| cognised immediately by internal perception by tb#f| mind. But the validity of a cognition is cognised mediately by inference from the mark or j| sign of successful or unsuccessful practical re^;^ action. Thus the general condition (according to]■■ NySya) of valid cognition is an efficacious quality (in the cause), and the general condition dfjjj invalid cognition is a certain defect or deficiency (in the cause). The Buddhists, again, say^T invalidity is intrinsic while validity is extrinsic^ But the real fact is, both the cognition and its] validity are caused by the sense-organs and the -rest. But the invalidity is generated by /&^ sense-organs, etc., together with certain defect^ as auxiliary conditions. Similarly, both theg; cognition and its validity are cognised immediate ly by the witnessing intelligence. But invalid cognition is cognised only as cogn by the witnessing intelligence. The invalidity

of it is known mediately by inference from mark of practical unfruitfulness or failure.

But it may be said : the position taken by the author here is not tenable. The author's v is : the agency which cognises the cognition a cognises the validity thereof. Further the po of the instruments of cognition to produce Cognition becomes the power to produce

*

invalidity when aided by the special causes of invalidity. The power thus becomes as it were a different power through the influence of the defects in the matter of producing invalidity. Moreover, the cognition of these instruments takes place through a different agency, for the sense-organs, etc., are themselves cognised each by its own pramana or suitable knowing process (e.g., the sense-organs are cognised by inference from the results which their actions produce). At the same time their conduciveness to the production of valid knowledge is also cognised by inference (i.e., by another inference from the mark of practical fruitfulness). But why should this be so? (i.e., Why should you suppose that the agency which cognises a cognition also cognises its validity, but the fitness of the sensibilities to '? produce a valid cognition is not cognised by the , : same agency, i.e., the inference that cognises the sensibilities themselves?) What is the bar to the supposition that the validity is cognised by an agency other than that which cognises the cognition (just as the fitness of the sensibilities is cognised t by an inference different from that which cognises the sensibilities themselves) ? ' .

^ Our reply to this is : this cannot be admitted,

I; .because any such admission will entail an infinite regress. Thus we say : the validity of a valid I cognition must itself be cognised as such by I? „„™„ «.im virion, otherwise there will be no

valid cognition anywhere. And such validity cannot possibly be cognised by any agency other than that which cognises the cognition itself.. In the event of any other agency apprehending the validity, the validity of this apprehension will itself have to be apprehended by another (i.e., a third) apprehension, thus leading to an infinite regress. And if to avoid the infinite regress we say that the second cognition apprehending the validity of the primary cognition is self-validating or self-evident, then sq may also be the primary cognition. There-? fore by the method of elimination of other;;-possible alternatives, the intrinsicality of validity is established as the only position that remains unshaken. It cannot be said that the objection of an infinite regress holds equally in respect ': of our view that the validity is imme* diately cognised by the witnessing Intelli- ; gence, for the witnessing Intelligence (in our view) is- self-revealing and as such reveals ■ both itself and its validity. But why not assume the same with regard to cognition also? Because, we reply, cognition being a state or function of the internal organ is non-intelligent and as such is incapable of self-illumination or self-revelation. The validity of the instruments should be understood on the lines of the Paddhati. Thus is everything beauti-i fully explained.

■** Ui

y\r:

PRAllAtfACANDBIKA

This brings the chapter on Iga Pramanacandrika by Srimacchalarifefi

close.

May the sage Sri Vedavyasa be pleas

M^I*lNfe*l

ire*r. ^rlr^:

frft urannk 1*1 «**» *#^ w J*""

17

MADHVA LOGIC

4IT4K3 T?W I ^flt 'TTOfa I irt^T'WTt^src: I rfSTfo «!el<tfd I BW «WUd*II ^lRpffet 4ld)«B& I WWt

^rn^ff^ *fa ^4*ddiMi ^JufdUKctiifti*;; *3*

*

3T3W I H'*WdM'nJ<chlfd^l?BWiyK^y^iqMi.l3W'

rftrr^r^«^«^i

r: i mi

e«

*T- «

*

m^fai * foc&rd « mr« : I a«ift?iTra stow* fa« fifrramfri wraroi^i ^a i a* *fffS*9 ****

i

srafcs^ ^P^T^'wsnfir. i «* www

-V * "

MADHVA LOGIC

q*arq" W§ STW3TW Srffalfi I *S*«jTH*lfq W3T*l \

^wm^i^n f^ctft5H«e(i^ 1 *rt «sra *^# *ni qz *t> vrsis^rrfH*. 1 < nft#Bi^nn9»n#i^ im 1

ni'wg* <NHHy*ft gjqz^WT^TT *?3TT> **I?T-

ar^ara yg: fsjapn, sir $^fadi i n^Hfcfdmirn : 1 *ra1

isr^juj 1 ?^ ^to^ MqqiTHTqT-resiaT: ^jiw-^T 1 i* tok^n&mi: #jrat tot 1 sn*-

--"■*!

xpjqt wst fMfafsreTOrat wugwfaflig* *i»*U<ff?«f *toAnjM*j«^ fam wrw- jprat ^» ^rerarr^-Wfrawn'wi fdm!ij*^aiMd: «'swt *refo firatf

TO Ut ^ ww ftft » ^^rf^w: ^>rat ami

*rfafl «w2»Tt *?n*fa wh«1«iu<iw»wwH set i *»mt gznft*i ^5n«T^nqHH^<r*<rd i *pjq*w:

<t.qfafd 1 CTflBV M*H*\y\^i>Tf\oH\VH: I *?«$<< WT3T-

wroniirert *rai i ^^t *m ^ifa =^n^tf?r irans-g# *mra: i xstsrri«mrH$% I ?nr, ^fifsarre: i

^/

"■Jfl

* For the use of the word vfflpf in masculine, compare—

<anr*ftsfa sr j'finrt ««*m«<: s^ffir a

SarasvatiA:antJia6fearano, eh., 61. 70.

X.

PRAMA^ACANDRIKA

135

'j

* ►

Wt Jl^l^ t^ H«ltrt ff^T

to. nHT^p^TOt^Jtra?T \fh %j, i i ?rerw«3sfa

ijfoMm$l warrtmifkfow*: I to «'w-toto ftfro t^wgroro %fa i to *reT*i-

I wt tm i ^faft » to>kto ifcHfof-

: i

s*wiR{«wir<i"«ifH;

/♦ *

to

tow? ^rata^rawf? fa<* ^« tfonmrw-

aftnn* g Jprrcatsril^ i **mfa f^wlf <icn«*i i sfa tundra ^t^wssrcrafaiw wt mfe*-

-■■

trefwitf^fti wsst^i ynt^ T^n^ -W&wnfc <j**u Hih^wifrwaftiig-

'V

^ * r

*"

<#'

'^"^^^"^^r

f*^" -' -

t

■^sii

#

.vijrf^Be

18

MADHVA LOGIC

y

K

?nrafc ?^T^t wrssmfon iw

*3*ffignT «n«iMt ^ft?ro ftwn i ■«■* **« «M iW ^i**"™ *** **<**;

MADHVA LOGIC)

m

m

/- >S

*i, *'^

i

?*

^

*pi tut *w**rat: wrararcj. i rm ^w«m«ww

cnra«ii «h«m<wW * < " l " ,ll "Jll4J '...! 1 ?" iEww^a* ««M ***** wii^ fo*** *

**

-Ta.

142

V r

MA.DHVA LOGIC

>

i*

;* i

I ?ra I TOT *afn wwi-

1 -

^gf*N lfSTO( I §TGTOT3W «P9ita<3TO #mwi

5W

^: wiitu 1

Ml

*

y—

^

i

v

.•.^r—

4a

FreK

i *rat forbid i Tipnaw

farot *nfm i to «wto tat: wfr ww-

anting i aa wt «m: *f»a*W. i amrafe-aWfer aro tmPwfaiBftkJ faafwwj *ft *

■;■*•*■«

144 mIdhva logic •' " ; ;£|

qrcqrarosnfafwnT i ?m*lf w$& &m

- y.

5Bsi*f v fentar tot ^*iwit*i«iw-»»w^| Sweeny i ** fi^i ?rar^«rsf«^ «fl»M|

sb&^to^i *» w^sfa ***** fo mafafa sura: i «i«nfo<*w ?w sRwafafa

* gfeas*r* ^fasmfvi ftft to: i

3iTBi3TTirawT9: i **ra^wn*ni i «* m wa * qmaswaa: S**f^ **n^ m^ra 3^3-

19

3

\8

14G MADHVA LOGIC

tm: i qa*n«wmi g ^TfinjTHdteufww:« ft sitow: * i ^erai: i *n ^: *t =! q?T wsan j

41<Ud)fdf<!l$*r *Mfrd<4l * W[>sft w: Tift <lfli " n

^%nt wff fore: i ^sf^fonw* *n«rcf*?T-

smfa: i *rt. *nra§^tfii i *<re3fa *fa*wwfow

«wwN4,fafo i tfsfawn w^^qf-^^-?ren»ta irf?rerat g^f^fcfa <m#*S*3fti i

*ifirftife:i mr * f^ 5 ^ «* ***** **,, *m*z ifin " 9 ■***< *****

i *refa * *nfo*?rr * w^fh tot t^m *fa arf?ft*-

qrf«hrtre*n^ §^: ^RfaqwsjTafTSTWF* *fa ihfljj tot: «*i*dffiif<fd ^qiftrisfosrTfH: i *ra: vm-

3fltapm I ?H^§ qlriV^ ^fe«*dt OTH^Tf^fe

^

«■*

***<.

?TH«ns3: l *? fs 3* ^T^l %feWT^ TOT

WW I qtsfrWT^ T »T*f?l « W^l 1 «*fo TOT

g^ i ^TfirroH&RftTOfaww ^ TO «ta «t* i

W^fM « to t£* sntm i f*^ *nf*r?re*-wpi# i firnffiqfti^raa^ st ^foa«wi$*gii «at$g«r^i at st^itto ^nt^fNti§«TO i w»-*s^rf^ sgar wr« <*iirHr«*i*i*iyi TO*<ta

?PH«1iTO^ar«TMi ft*«|i *PTO*af?tft%ftr g *fr wi i fiH«maifo i tTOt%asrra: «wtr

Sfii i

S^rcgnM ftfro ^ra <wro * ifiii to *ro

q ianfaftfil *nt* *s*tar ?i^ffrf to?ttoW to: » nrt wiro «Ptot* * f* ^ ** wfin to fMMMMM ***** '***'** ^

MA.DHVA LOGIC

0\

iTTO *TWcf ^fai "BT*<*JrtJ^ I nr^mV

wh<w<hhJ *$$& i treat ^%WT^ ^q-wic^ |

forssw feaq^ fg: i tot ^<wifcfd i srrtw-

tot wJTTrjJna «i?H«: i 5^t?tfan*nfFrw , >ra^ twsBrer. tot fifewpra w&tf?. i *nffr-

*mrafe«iiriifoiM ^ra^i^iHuj i tot qt w^HJ ^sfrwnr tot sirre ^fa i ^fa^STfinRsi'f-

«T5[ a wMa « spur, a wfa tot WW*

3RTctf ^r^gtrro: i ^arsta

aa «m«w mvi twaTsfa mrfttn iwMf.

--*

■JE?

-W

'-'V*

•■$?

PRAHA^ACANDRIKA

151

fattarwfaj^Tct i aa f^t^fefw. i ufatnfaita-fgfafta-ssT'rTfaflwsTa, i aa wfrmfa^t ftrfar. i

aa iresnmT'JrfMtasiteT^if g faaa fa^n, ssasiq, aisa afapan, am ssfarcsrafafa i *ra aa, az *arfi?-a?a%v, fawa a<a»i, *rata*ir<di<i, a«*faqaaf?eaT-

gawarfefta t 5^: l wiawronfadawterf**

i aaraOTas^ aafaqwraaV. anaia^ awa*?nmpirfa*Nt *Tasr. I *aaaafa*lat fefaa: j srofaaTaaarfaw^i i aa aafara-

jaa at ro i ffteiflwKnw : i aa?-

aTaaaa^rrta ^aaiftaaaa

jt^ I aar (*Hlw<«u«yw«a'

iti ^k: i *iaaa *a .«*wfiraHfc i aw

fTTrTT 4%y<*i1< I

^ngrfini

*na afa a?«Taaa a*F«: ; wpww^wrmfH i aroit TOT si^tsfaa: n*\uvife fa I ftr^tat tot ais?t taar. 3faai3Tf%fa i aatat tot aswtaaf «**ifefd i *re aaw a^caatwaawain ar% i

ggi a i fa ftaT t%t%^: i aTvsaaanai anHl**i ^ta i *tt*i tot watsta<a ^aWi mwntf-ifo i tVata tot "aaaTaiTTa tot awta i

aaraaf *W««ll<«ti4t<jfd | ^HTqfTfffWT^Tra

aspRsrt^f?! i aiMir^ifac-^tis-faftfd a§r^>nt?ta i

aa* guwra wwwh faqarcnwfa: aaTfaa-faaaca *nwfdmM' afa tat a«3 wfa I aaTiaa-

cqfa3 :t a f <r . q^rfa faafearfa i %a3TTJataa^i ^wift

^mfir i aw fannvnaa faqispsrreMceroTTaT^ i

%rei *qftft£Mft sfo aiaTft ^sarfa, aw aqtSTMTaa w»

awgqq'a: i aa faafisa'sqa, arfaaaatVaT: «nf«i«M-jfen faww. i a aTfaa-f2ra^Taant*r^irF^3raT-qf^-aiataqarw. q^^amrer: i sjnfipra^araa*:-faanai fgtfar. i a=a fafaa:, araaTtaa: uvufttV arracaTfaaafa i aaTaaTtaat fefaa: i wrsroa: faaaTaa i a ta i ^rrot tot i aaarctaaS ***** 'a^^a^^TarttaFda'a^ i *ra aaareta'^araa:, * f aTaaa i taatat aaT i ata^iRa afa fawife*

■■a

*is

vravfti *"**** ******* ^ T ^ fl ^

<$ fan* <msfo Wfcwwmwm 13 ;™*z

ftmmor m fiwn* «**■*■*•*' rftritairt fern i «wfc ** <mr*TT*fc™

20

. , .-. 3>& / ■ •>-

^^^-HW^ira^rafH i *rrat m\— q&ft ««qi*i1*fl-«rnwg5?re:q^ 1 *ra ^f%5^r^ trow: 1 ^atiw-

IK, —

otllM^dt «H% I ?piT^ «uf*WHJcl 1 *rat wfr

n<*rad erateriwn^fara ^rM«um<hm "shir i w

H*\>M d^5d*&X|fafd ^rT^*toqTq^iffT llw I

OS

wftfa 1 w^mv^fi wifaft«*fsr *hi«j*iw1 -?WB"

»■..-»(:

■«.'.

----- " * ■ k-5>5

m n«mffl Sgfzrw. I *raT aj^ ftw

*ra ^^nfq twani s^T^t *n%' to *wwra:

wanwrere* *w*rf to tort « '^^ [ gm sp^t fSrar: ^st^^^I «^**i ^V™.

T^

156

MADHVA LOGIC

,., - -i

:m

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