Śrī Vedānta-sūtra

Adhyāya 2: No Conflict Between Vedānta and Other Vedic Scriptures

Pāda 2: Refutation of Opposing Views (continued)

kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyanaṁ naumi yaḥ sāṅkhyādy-ukti-kaṇṭakān
chittvā yukty-asinā viśvaṁ kṛṣṇa-krīḍā-sthalaṁ vyadhāt

“I offer my respectful obeisances unto Lord Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana Vyāsa, who has removed the thorny bushes of heterodox philosophical systems, such as Sāṅkhya and the rest, with the sharp sword of his reason, thus making this world a plain ground for Lord Kṛṣṇa to play upon.”

Kapila the author of atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy, as well as the Buddhists and Jainas, maintain that there is no God in this world. Kapila says that the world originates from matter [pradhāna]. The Buddhists and Jainas claim that atoms are the cause of creation. One class of Buddhists hold the view that the whole world is void, while all major schools of Buddhism are united in the view that there is no creator of this world, in the sense of a conscious and intelligent being. Philosophers like Kaṇāda [the author of Vaiśeṣika-sūtra] and Patañjali ostensibly admit the existence of God, but practically they are as atheistic in their tendencies as the Sāṅkhyas and the rest, because they do not accept the Personality of Godhead as taught in the Vedas. Vyāsa, seeing the world full of the thorns of the false philosophies of Kapila and the rest, and finding it intolerable that the Lord should tread on them with His soft lotus feet, prepared the way for His coming by cutting away these wild growths with the sharp sword of His reasoning. Then once Vyāsa prepared the world His coming, Lord Kṛṣṇa manifested His pastimes at the end of Dvāpara-yuga.

Similarly, in modern times there has been no dearth of speculative atheistic and impersonalist philosophies, but actually their basic arguments are very similar to those of the ancient authors mentioned above. Most modern materialistic philosophies hold that matter is the independent cause of the creation. Even the churches nowadays accept Darwin’s theory of evolution or one of its variants. Physics speculates that atoms are the only things that really exist, and their combination and reactions are the cause of everything else, even consciousness. Highly-educated scientists labor their whole lives in well-equipped laboratories, spending huge research budgets trying to prove this nonsense. Most people spend a large proportion of their formative years imprisoned in state-run schools, force-fed the materialistic dogma of materialism and evolution. They are not given actual knowledge nor taught how to learn and think for themselves, but simply trained to repeat the opinions of others upon demand. This behavior is rewarded with opulence and material enjoyment, but they remain as confused as ever. Before such bewildered people can come to the platform of real knowledge, all this nonsense must be swept away and the Absolute Truth revealed, so that the actual Lord of the Heart can claim His throne.

In the First Pāda of the Second Adhyāya, the author has answered the objections raised by his opponents to the system of philosophy propounded in his sūtras. He was on the defensive in the last Pāda. This was necessary to prevent the weak-minded from from going astray, abandoning the ancient highway of the Vedas, and from being attacked by the fallacious arguments of these plausible systems, wandering in the pleasant labyrinths of these philosophies, losing their way and being destroyed. Now taking an aggressive attitude, He attacks the positions of His opponents, refuting their systems by proving the uncritical and unphilosophical nature of their doctrines. The author first takes up the atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy and refutes it. Previous sūtras have proved only that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sāṅkhya view, while the task of the present Pāda is to demolish that view itself; therefore the Vedānta-sūtra cannot therefore be charged with needless repetition.

Adhikaraṇa 1: Pradhāna Cannot be the Cause of the Creation

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Kapila the author of Sāṅkhya wrote a collection of sūtras in which he enumerated various tattvas [ontological categories]. According to him, prahdāna is the name given to the original root of matter, and it is defined by him as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas [modes of material nature], namely sattva [goodness], rajas [passion] and tamas [ignorance]. From this prakṛti emerges puruṣa [souls] the mahat-tattva [great principle], from the mahat-tattva proceeds ahaṅkāra [false ego], and from ahaṅkāra come the five tan-matras [subtle sense objects], the five knowledge-acquiring senses and the five active senses, and the gross elements. Thus according to Sāṅkhya philosophy the 25 tattvas of the material creation are as follows:

Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas [modes of material nature], namely sattva [goodness], rājas [passion] and tamas [ignorance]. The essential nature [dharma] of sattva is joy, of rājas is pain and of tamas is delusion. The whole world is the effect of these qualities, and therefore we find joy, pain and inertia in it. Such is the nature of this world.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, prakṛti is eternal and all-pervading. It is the root or primeval cause, and there is no need to inquire into a further cause of it, as we find in Sūtra 1.67 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Since the root has no root, the root of all is rootless. That is to say, there is no other cause of prakṛti, because there would be an infinite regression of the cause of all required another cause, which by parity of reasoning would require another cause, and so on.”

Prakṛti is unlimited and is the material cause of all. It is all-pervading as asserted in Sūtra 6.36 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“She is all-pervading because her products are seen everywhere.”

This prakṛti, eternally producing everything, is herself insentient, but is the cause of the enjoyment and liberation of countless sentient beings; and although she is super-sensuous and imperceptible, yet she is to be inferred from her effects. Though one, she has many heterogeneous attributes, and she produces this wonderful creation through her power of modification, beginning with the mahat-tattva and the rest; thus she is the operative and material cause of the universe. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is attributeless, all-pervading consciousness, individual and separate for each body. Its existence is to be inferred from the existence of organized life, because no organized life can exist but for the sake of something else. As stated in Sūtra 1.66 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“The existence of soul is inferred from the fact that the combination of the principles of prakṛti into their various effects is for the sake of another besides the insentient prakṛti or her various insentient products.”

Since puruṣa is free from all action and modification, nor produced by anything, it follows that it is agentless and without enjoyment. But people mistake puruṣa as agent or enjoyer through illusion. When prakṛti and puruṣa come together, their very juxtaposition produces an apparent exchange of attributes: namely, consciousness appears in matter, and agency and enjoyment in spirit. This adhyāsa [superimposition] falsely attributes the qualities of one to the other. Nature is really unconscious, but the presence of spirit make it appear as if conscious; spirit is neither the agent nor the enjoyer, but its presence in matter makes it appear to be so. All the suffering of the soul arises from lack of discrimination between prakṛti and puruṣa, while liberation consists of realizing the difference. A person who has become indifferent to prakṛti has attained mokṣa.

This summarizes the Sāṅkhya theory, which bears a striking similarity to modern so-called scientific arguments about the process of creation. If we simply eliminate the Sāṅkhya teachings about the soul, add a few more chemical elements and substitute ‘universe’ for pradhāna, Sāṅkhya would become indistinguishable from the modern theories. The false assumption in both theories is that matter can create independently without an intelligent designer. This assumption is embedded so deeply in modern culture, language and thinking that most people are completely incapable of thinking rationally about alternative theories.

In this system there are three means of right knowledge [pramāṇa]: sensory perception, inference and testimony, as stated in Sūtra 1.88 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Proof is of three kinds; there is no need for more, for if these three are established, then all that is true can be established by one or the other of them: sensory perception [pratyakṣa], inference [anumāna] and testimony [śabda], to the exclusion of comparison, which is a distinct source of knowledge in Nyāya, and others.”

We do not have much difference with the Sāṅkhyas regarding perception and testimony, because these two proofs deal with established objects; our difference with them is in regards to certain inferences they have drawn. They have inferred by reasoning that pradhāna is the cause of the universe; it is this reasoning and its conclusion that are erroneous. If we refute their arguments about pradhāna being the cause of the universe, we practically refute their whole philosophy, because this is the major point of their system.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is pradhāna both the operative and material cause of creation or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: Pradhāna is the operative and material cause of creation, because the world consists of three modes of material nature—sattva, rajas and tamas—and so we infer that the principal cause must also have these three attributes, for nothing that is in the effect that is not in the cause. As we see in the case of pots, their material cause of clay belongs to the same category, earth, as the pot. Moreover, inert objects can become agents, for we use active verbs in connection with those objects: “The tree brings forth fruit;” “The water is moving.” Therefore pradhāna alone is the material cause of the universe and the creator as well.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author replies to this view in the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.1

racanānupapatteśca nānumānam

racanā – construction; anupapatteḥ – on account of the impossibility; ca – and; na – not; ānumānam – that which is inferred.

That which is inferred [pradhāna] [is not the cause of the world, because being insentient,] it is impossible [for her to have created the universe.]

Pradhāna is called ānumānam, that which is inferred, because her existence is purely hypothetical. This hypothetical pradhāna is neither the operative nor the material cause of the universe. The world shows wonderful design and construction, therefore it is impossible for unintelligent matter to have produced this universe without the direction of an intelligent agent. No one has ever seen a beautiful palace constructed by the fortuitous coming together of bricks, mortar, and other material without the active cooperation of intelligent agents like the architect, masons and so on. Then how is it possible for the extremely great and complex construction of the universe to have come about by the independent action of matter? No one ever builds a house by calculating its measurements with a roll of dice; similarly, it is impossible for the finely-tuned design of the universe to come about by chance.

The word ca [and] in the sūtra implies that the argument in the Sāṅkhya-smṛti based upon the logic of anvaya [undistributed middle] has no probative force, because it is a logical fallacy. This central argument is contained in Sūtras 1.130-132 of the Sāṅkhya-smṛti:

“Because of their measure, prakṛti and puruṣa are unlimited because they are uncaused, while mind and the rest are limited, being products. Because they conform to pradhāna, mind and the rest are products, thus they follow and correspond with pradhāna; because the qualities of pradhāna are seen in all things, and it is a maxim that the effect is derived from the cause and implies the cause. And finally because it is through the power of the cause that the effect can do anything, as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron that it is made of.”

The logical fallacy of anvaya [undistributed middle] is displayed in the following syllogism:

All Xs are Zs; all Ys are Zs. Therefore, all Xs are Ys.

This is the general form; now here are some examples:

Penguins are black and white; newspapers are black and white. Therefore, penguins are newspapers.

All Communists believe in heavy taxation; Senator Jones believes in heavy taxation. Therefore, Senator Jones is a Communist.

The color of goodness is white; these cows are white. Therefore, all cows are white.

To infer that all cows must be white because some cows are observed to be white is a similar fallacious argument. Whiteness is merely an accidental attribute; it is not the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Similarly the Sāṅkhya philosophy, as quoted in the sūtra above, reasons like this: “Physical objects like the mind and senses give pleasure; pradhāna also has the attribute of giving pleasure. Therefore the mind, senses and so on are produced by pradhāna.” The supposition of pradhāna is never really proved; it is simply assumed, and all creation deemed to be its effect.

Physical objects like flowers, beautiful jars, etc. no doubt possess the quality of producing pleasure. But the feeling of pleasure is internal and subjective, and though they may induce pleasure in us, we cannot say that the attribute of pleasure belongs to the objects themselves. Pleasure is an attribute of the soul or consciousness, and not of inanimate objects. So matter cannot be said to have the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, because these are attributes of consciousness. The proof is that the guṇas are relative to the perceiver; thus the same object may manifest all three guṇas to three different persons, or to the same person at different times. The beautiful girl is an object of joy to the accepted lover, an object of pain to the rejected lover, and an object of indifference to the ascetic. A wife, when in good humor, is a source of joy; when in anger, is a source of pain; and when away from her husband, a source of delusion.

There is a fuller discussion of this point in Śrī Rāmānuja’s commentary on this sūtra:

“...The ca [and] in the sūtra is meant to add as a further argument that anvaya [presence] has no proving force. For whiteness present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect, may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called sattva, rājas and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so on are the causes of the lightness, weight, etc. belonging to substances such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the essential nature of those substances; but they are not observed to be present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as guṇas [qualities]. You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the sattva, rājas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause. For your pradhāna consists in the equipoise of the three guṇas; there are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three guṇas being unlimited. For if the three guṇas are all alike unlimited, and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to assume limitation of the guṇas. Nor is your view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived with equal clearness) are in favor of our view. This the next sūtra declares.”

Similarly, modern science assumes that because today we see matter apparently organizing itself without the guidance of a superior intelligence or creative energy, the creation must have occurred in a similar manner. Not only is this theory a classic logical fallacy of the undistributed middle as described above, it fails to answer the questions: “How does dull, inert matter initiate the process of creation? Where does the original impulse of energy to bring matter into motion come from? What is the origin of time, which is required for all material reactions and transformations; and what is the origin of the universal laws of physics, chemistry, etc.?”

oṁ namo bhagavate vāsudevāya
janmādy asya yato 'nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ svarāṭ

“O my Lord, Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, O all-pervading Personality of Godhead, I offer my respectful obeisances unto You. I meditate upon Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa because He is the Absolute Truth and the primeval cause of all causes of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the manifested universes. He is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations, and He is independent because there is no other cause beyond Him.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.1.1]

Sūtra 2.2.2

pravṛtteśca

pravṛtteḥ - because of the activity; ca – and, only.

And because [inert matter] becomes active only [when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it.]

It is a fact of daily experience that inert matter becomes active only when there is the directive action of intelligence upon it. The activity, therefore, must be attributed to the directive intelligence rather than to the inert matter. The intelligence that sets matter into motion is the real agent. We do not say that a chariot moves by itself, but that the real mover of the chariot is the charioteer, by directing the movements of the horse. Therefore phrases like “the tree brings forth fruits” really mean that the Supersoul directs the activity of the tree, making it bring forth fruits. The fruit is actually produced by the indwelling Lord through the instrumentality of the tree. We learn this from scriptural passages describing the Supersoul, such as Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.7.3-23. This will become clearer later on.

pañcaitāni mahā-bāho kāraṇāni nibodha me
sāṅkhye kṛtānte proktāni siddhaye sarva-karmaṇām

adhiṣṭhānaṁ tathā kartā karaṇaṁ ca pṛthag-vidham
vividhāś ca pṛthak ceṣṭā daivaṁ caivātra pañcamam

“O mighty-armed Arjuna, learn from Me of the five factors which bring about the accomplishment of all action. These are the place of action, the performer, the senses, the endeavor, and ultimately the Supersoul.” [Bhagavad-gītā 18.13-14]

The force of ca in the sūtra is that of ‘only.’ “I do” can be asserted only by an intelligent being. Every activity is seen as the result of an intelligent agent. Therefore inert matter has no agency; pradhāna or matter can have no self-initiated activity of its own.

If an objector says, “It is possible for the world to have been created by the mere coming together of spirit and matter, prakṛti and puruṣa, and by the mutual superimposition of their qualities on one another,” then we ask the following question. What is the cause of this superimposition which supposedly takes place by the mere coming together of spirit and matter? Does it inhere in them as a substance, or is it a modification of spirit and matter? It cannot be the first, because it would be an innate quality of spirit, and in that case the liberated souls would also have this superimposition. Nor can it be the second, because if superimposition be a modification of prakṛti, then it itself being an effect, it cannot be the cause of its own self. Nor can it be a modification of spirit, for according to the Sāṅkhya system, spirit is changeless. The question of the cause of the adhyāsa or superimposition therefore remains unresolved.

Modern science also assumes that the creation began by itself. Instead of prakṛti and puruṣa, science theorizes that time drives all material transformations. But physics attributes the force of time to the expansion of the space of the universe; that expansion supposedly began in the Big Bang, so before the Big Bang there was no time. Then how did the Big Bang begin? What force could have set off this gigantic explosion if there were no material space or time prior to it? If we pursue any materialistic creation theory to its roots, we find similar logical conundrums and unanswerable questions. The agency of an intelligent being external to the material universe is an unavoidable requirement for any explanation of the creation.

An objector says, “Milk is changed into curd by its own inherent quality; water falling from the clouds becomes bitter, sweet or acid according to the fruit it enters. Similarly pradhāna, although homogenous like water, becomes modified into different kinds as it comes into contact with the different karmas of the jīvas. The differences in the bodies and environments, etc. of the souls are the effects of the past karmas of these beings.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.3

payo'mbuvaccettatrāpi

payas – milk; ambu – water; vat – like; cet – if; tatra – there; api – also.

If [it be said that the pradhāna modifies into her various products without the guidance of any intelligence,] like milk or water, [then we reply that the intelligence guides the change] there also.

Even in the case of the change of pure water into different saps and juices of plants and fruits or the change of milk into curd, the directive action of intelligence produces the change. We may not directly see the driver of the chariot, but we can infer his existence from the motion of the chariot. Similarly, though we may not see the intelligence working in the tree or the milk, we can infer its existence from the fact of changes in dull matter. Not only do we have this inference as proof, but also the sacred authority of the scriptures: see the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhad-Āranyaka Upaniṣad, where it is stated that that different kinds of living creatures are put into different kinds of bodies by the management of a superior power.

tvaṁ naḥ surāṇām asi sānvayānāṁ
kūṭa-stha ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ purāṇaḥ
tvaṁ deva śaktyāṁ guṇa-karma-yonau
retas tv ajāyāṁ kavim ādadhe 'jaḥ

“You are the original personal founder of all the demigods and the orders of different gradations, yet You are the oldest and are unchanged. O Lord, You have no source or superior. You have impregnated the external energy with the semen of the total living entities, yet You are unborn.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.5.50]

kṣetra-jñaṁ cāpi māṁ viddhi
sarva-kṣetreṣu bhārata
kṣetra-kṣetrajñayor jñānaṁ
yat taj jñānaṁ mataṁ mama

“O scion of Bharata, you should understand that I am also the knower in all bodies, and to understand this body and its knower is called knowledge. That is My opinion.” [Bhagavad-gītā 13.3]

Sūtra 2.2.4

vyatirekānavasthiteścānapekṣattvāt

vyatireka – in the absence of anything else; anavasthiteḥ – because of the nonexistence; ca – and also; anapekṣattvāt – because of the independence.

[As before creation] there existed no other cause but pradhāna, so there would be no necessity of any other [cause than the pradhāna herself to produce her changes.]

This additional argument is to be adduced against the Sāṅkhya theory: According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, pradhāna can produce the whole creation independently. Before the beginning of creation, there existed no other cause than pradhāna. Nor was there the necessity for the existence of any other cause, for all the changes that pradhāna undergoes are self-initiated. There is no cause for the actions of pradhāna except for pradhāna herself. This argument is to be rejected because the actual Sāṅkhya theory is that it is the presence of puruṣa or spirit that starts the changes in pradhāna. Thus even according to Sāṅkhya theory, the pradhāna is not the sole creator, but just by proximity the presence of puruṣa initiates the changes in some mysterious way. This contradicts the theory that the pure inert matter or pradhāna produces this change.

The Sāṅkhyas therefore do not consistently say that pradhāna produces all changes without extraneous help. Their theory of proximity is also open to objection. If the proximity produces the change, then the puruṣa is always in proximity with prakṛti, even in the state of pralaya. The result would be that creation would start spontaneously and pralaya could not be maintained. The Sāṅkhyas may say that the karmas of the jīvas lie dormant during pralaya, so creation cannot start then. But what is preventing the awakening of karma in pralaya? Thus the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is self-contradictory.

The same is true of the theories of modern science. For example, materialistic science says that matter can create and organize itself, and there is no need for any outside force. But science also recognizes the influence of time and the laws of material nature; therefore their theory is self-contradictory. They ascribe the complex structure and transformations of matter to evolution driven by chance, but at the same time insist that nature has inviolable laws that are completely deterministic. This is also contradictory; if the laws of nature are perfect, then what is the need for chance? Actually, chance takes the place of the will of God in their theories. So in all the time since the theory of the Sāṅkhyas was first presented, nothing has really changed; the materialists’ theories are still defective.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher says, “We see that when eaten by a cow, grass, creepers, leaves etc. transform themselves into milk through their inherent nature, without the help of any other cause. Similarly, pradhāna also transforms herself into the mahat-tattva without the guidance of an intelligent principle.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.5

anyatrā'bhāvācca na tṛṇādivat

anyatra – elsewhere; abhāvāt – because of the absence; ca – and only; na – not; tṛṇa-adi-vat – like grass, etc.

It is not like the transformation of grass, etc. [into milk when eaten by a cow] because there is absence of such transformation [when eaten by a bull.]

The Sāṅkhyas argue their doctrine of the self-transformation of matter using the example that plain rainwater transforms automatically into the differently flavored juices of various fruits and vegetables, and grass is transformed automatically into milk when eaten by a cow. The argument of the Sāṅkhyas is not sound, because it is not natural for grass to transform itself into milk when eaten by an animal; it only when eaten by a female herbivore that the grass is transformed into milk. No such change is visible when eaten by a male animal. If it were natural for grass to transform into milk, then we would see such changes happening spontaneously, even when the grass is not eaten by an animal. But we do not see any such change. Therefore, it is not the natural quality of the grass to change itself into milk, but only when it comes into relationship with a female of particular kinds of animals does this change occur. And here also it is the will of the Supreme Personality of Godhead that brings about the change, not just because an animal has eaten it.

yo 'syotprekṣaka ādi-madhya-nidhane yo 'vyakta-jīveśvaro
yaḥ sṛṣṭvedam anupraviśya ṛṣiṇā cakre puraḥ śāsti tāḥ

“He is the Lord who eternally watches over this universe, who exists before, during and after its manifestation. He is the master of both the unmanifest material energy and the spirit soul. After sending forth the creation He enters within it, accompanying each living entity. There He creates the material bodies and then remains as their regulator.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 10.87.50]

It has been sufficiently proved that pradhāna, being inert, has no self-initiated activity of her own. Similarly, the theory of the scientists that chance is responsible for evolving the various species and their qualities and behavior, is fatally flawed. But even if we admit, for argument’s sake, that pradhāna has such an activity, it will not help the cause of the Sāṅkhyas. The author shows this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.6

abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt

abhy-upagamepi – even if it be accepted; artha – purpose; abhāvāt – because of the absence.

Even if it be accepted [that pradhāna has self-initiated activity, yet it is a useless theory,] because it serves no purpose.

The word na [not] is understood in this and the next three sūtras. The theory of the Sāṅkhyas is that pradhāna is moved to activity to cause experience and liberation for the jīvas. Her object is that after enjoying her, and finding her full of evil, the jīva should become indifferent to her, and thus attain liberation. The activity of the pradhāna is purely altruistic, with the object of giving experience and joy to the soul. She has no purpose of her own to be served by her activity. In the Sāṅkhya-sūtras [3.58] it is stated:

“Pradhāna creates for the sake of another, and though it be spontaneous, for she is not the enjoyer, just like a camel that carries the saffron for the sake of his master and not for himself.”

The Sāṅkhyas believe that the jīva is actionless, though the experiencer. They say that the jīva can be a non-agent and yet experience the fruits of activity, just like a person who may not cook food for himself but eat it when it is cooked by another. But such an activity of prakṛti is not a reasonable proposition. Even if such an activity is accepted, it serves no purpose. What is the aim of such activity? It is either to produce experience for the jīva by showing him the various qualities of prakṛti, or to produce liberation for the puruṣa by making him indifferent to her charms.

The first, namely to produce experience for the jīva, cannot be the cause of activity by prakṛti, for it is admitted that before there was any such activity in the prakṛti, the puruṣa existed as pure intelligence—actionless, changeless and self-satisfied. Why should such a puruṣa leave his bliss of isolation to see the enchanting play of prakṛti? Merely because prakṛti is active is no reason for holding that the puruṣa must undergo change in the shape of looking at her. It therefore follows that the activity of prakṛti cannot be the cause of the experience of the puruṣa. Nor can such activity be the cause of the liberation of the puruṣa, because before such activity, the puruṣa was already in a liberated state. Why should the prakṛti make herself active to produce the liberation of the puruṣa, when he is already liberated?

If it is said that wherever the prakṛti is active she is bound to produce some change in the consciousness of the puruṣa, for he is in proximity to the prakṛti and thus the mere activity of the prakṛti is the cause of experience to the puruṣa, then we reply that your proposition is rather too large. Merely because a soul is in proximity to matter is no reason why he should be affected by the activity of such matter; for then since matter is all-pervading, and the proximity of spirit to matter is eternal and impossible to remove, even the mukta souls would be affected by such activity, and fall into bondage again.

The Sāṅkhyas reply, “Even if the prakṛti is not active by her own inherent power, then we have another theory. The correlation between spirit and matter is like that of the blind and the lame. One has no power of motion, the other has no power of vision. The spirit is lame and has no power of motion, and prakṛti is blind, though possessing all power to move. Each is incapable of achieving any result independently. But when the lame spirit comes into contact with the blind but moving matter, it makes this blind matter become active and directs all her movements. Or to take another illustration, the magnet itself without moving, can set into motion the iron in its proximity; similarly the spirit, itself changeless and motionless, sets the prakṛti into motion when they come into contact. Thus this reflection of spirit in matter makes the matter appear intelligent, and sets in motion her creative activity.”

The author replies to this theory of the Sāṅkhyas in the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.7

puruṣāśmavaditi cet tathāpi

puruṣa – man; aśma – magnet; vat – like; iti – thus; cet – if; tathāpi – so also.

If [it be said that prakṛti creates] like [the lame] man [directing the blind, or] like the magnet [moving the iron,] even then [the theory is open to objection.]

Insentient matter has no power of self-initiated activity, and the examples of the lame man and the blind man or the magnet do not remove the difficulty; the inability of the pradhāna to act independently remains. The lame man, although incapable of walking, retains the ability to see the road and guide the blind man. The blind man, though sightless, does have the capacity to understand those instructions and act on them. They are both intelligent entities. Similarly, some entity must bring the magnet into proximity to the iron before the magnet can act on it. But according to the Sāṅkhyas, the soul is ever actionless, without any attributes and incapable of change. If it is said that the soul undergoes no change, but his mere proximity produces changes in prakṛti, then the soul always being near the pradhāna, it would follow that the creation is eternal, and there would never be any emancipation for the soul. Moreover the prakṛti is insentient, and the puruṣa is conscious; but in both examples, both entities are the same type: in the example of the lame and blind man, both are conscious beings, and in the example of the magnet, both and the iron are insentient. Consequently the instances given are not similar to the point they are supposed to support.

The Sāṅkhyas hold that the creation depends upon the superiority and inferiority of the guṇas, and the world results from a certain relation between the tattvas and their subordinate entities, as a consequence of such difference of guṇas. This view is refuted by the author in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.8

aṅgitvānupapatteśca

aṅgitva – the relation of being the principal; anupapatteḥ – on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness; ca – and.

It is impossible [that any one of the guṇas] may be the principal [in the state of pralaya, and hence the world would not originate.]

Pradhāna is defined in Sāṅkhya philosophy as the equilibrium of the three modes of material nature: sattva, rajas and tamas. In the unmanifest state of pradhāna, none of the guṇas is superior or inferior; consequently the relation of principal and subordinate could not exist then. Nor can they say that Īśvara [the Lord] or kāla [time] brings about a disturbance in the equilibrium, making one of the guṇas superior to the others, because the Sāṅkhyas hold that God does not exist, nor do they admit the separate existence of time. Thus Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.92-93] says:

“It is not proved that there is a God. And further it is not proved that He exists, because whatever exists must be either free or bound, and He can be neither one nor the other, because either way He would be inefficient. Since if He were free, He would have no desires which as compulsory motives would instigate Him to create; and if He were bound, He would be under delusion. He must be on either alternative unequal to the creation, etc. of the world.”

And, in Sāṅkhya-sūtras [2.12] Kapila denies the separate existence of time:

“Space and time arise from the ether [ākāśa].”

Nor can the Sāṅkhyas say that the soul is the creator, because according to their theory, the very nature of the soul is indifference to everything. The puruṣas therefore being perfectly detached, have no interest to break the equipoise of the pradhāna and make one of the guṇas superior to the others. Hence the creation is not caused by the relative superiority and inferiority of the guṇas. Even admitting that in every successive creation and in pralaya, the guṇas will always be unequal in their force, there would be nothing to bring about this inequality in the first creation. Even admitting for argument’s sake that there is inequality among the guṇas in the ordinary state of creation, and that such inequality may have come about without any reason, it would follow that in pralaya also the inequality would occur without any reason, and no pralaya will be possible, for creation would start up then also. And even if it can be established that the inequality, once established, continues without any further cause, you cannot explain how it can be brought about without any cause in the beginning.

Similarly in the modern scientific Big Bang theory, no source is given for the material elements, and no mechanism for setting off the explosion Big Bang, because both would require the existence of a potent, intelligent Creator pre-existent to the material creation. So there is nothing in either theory to explain how the inert material energy acquires the initial energy of creation.

“But,” says the Sāṅkhya, “we must infer that the guṇas are of various nature and wonderful attributes because we see their effect in this world, and therefore your objections do not apply.” The author replies to this in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.9

anyathānumitau ca jñaśaktiviyogāt

anyathā – otherwise; anumitau – in case of inference; ca – and; jña – intelligence; śakti – power; viyogāt – because of being destitute of.

Even if it be inferred otherwise, [yet the pradhāna cannot create,] because it does not possess the power of being a conscious entity.

Even if the inference that the guṇas must have different attributes and mysterious powers is accepted, it still does not answer the difficulty we have raised. Being insentient, pradhāna has no power of self-consciousness. Being thus destitute, it has no idea of any plan or change. It cannot say, “Let me create the world in such a way.” Creation never proceeds from dead matter without the impetus of intelligence. Without the directive action of intelligence, the guṇas, no matter how wonderful their powers and attributes, can not create the universe by themselves.

The same objection applies to the creation theory of modern science. Matter has no power to initiate its own creation, because prior to the creation, nothing exists. Without a mechanism to initiate the creation, science cannot explain how it began. Even if we accept the ‘steady-state’ theory of a chain of Big Bangs followed by a ‘Big Crunch,’ this still does not explain how this state of affairs came to be in the first place.

The author concludes his refutation of Sāṅkhya philosophy with this sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.10

vipratiṣedhāccāsamañjasam

vipratiṣedhāt - because of contradiction; ca - and; asamañjasam - untenable.

Because the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is full of internal contradictions, hence not being a consistent theory, it is untenable.

There are internal contradictions in this philosophy propounded by Kapila, hence it is inconsistent and untenable, and should be rejected by those who desire the highest good and the Absolute Truth. For example, it holds that prakṛti is for the sake of the puruṣa alone, who is the experiencer, the seer and the supervising agent. It holds the soul to be something different from all bodies, and vehicles. Thus in Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.139-140] Kapila declares,

“Soul is something different from the body, etc. Nature is a compound and a combination because that which is combined is for the sake of the other.”

Thus spirit and matter are contrasted in these two sūtras. The spirit is single, indivisible and nonmaterial, and matter is composite and divisible, and exists only for the sake of the soul. But later on this same soul is defined to be actionless, changeless, attributeless, devoid of all agency, fruition and sentiency. It is said to be pure isolation. In one place it says that matter is non-luminous and luminosity belongs to the soul. But in the next sūtra it contradicts itself when it says that the soul does not have the attribute of intelligence. Thus intelligence belongs neither to soul nor to matter. In Sāṅkhya-sūtras [1.140-146] we find:

“And soul is something else from the body, etc. because in a soul there is the absence of the three guṇas and because they are not seen in it. And soul is not material because of its superintendence over nature. for a superintendent is an intelligent being, and nature is unintelligent. And soul is not material because of its being the experiencer. It is for soul and not for nature, because the exertions are with a view to isolation from all qualities, a condition to which the soul is competent, but not nature. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the soul which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest. Soul has not intelligence for its attribute, because it is without quality.”

The Sāṅkhyas are further inconsistent, inasmuch as that in one place they say that it is the soul that undergoes bondage, owing to its want of discrimination, and that it attains release when it discriminates between the guṇas and itself; while in another place it says that bondage and release belong to the guṇas and not to the soul, which is eternally free. For example in Sāṅkhya-sūtras [3.71-72] we find:

“Bondage and liberation do not belong actually to soul, and would not even appear to be but for non-discrimination. But in reality the aforesaid bondage and liberation belong to nature alone: so he asserts. It really belongs to nature, through association; like a beast, though being hampered by habits which are a cause of pain: just as a beast, through being hampered by a rope, experiences bondage and liberation. Such is the meaning.”

Thus there are many internal contradictions in the Sāṅkhya system, and anyone who studies it carefully can easily find them out. Similarly there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in the modern scientific theories, which are startlingly similar to atheistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. The reader should study these theories deeply and find out their faults, then uproot these crippled theories from his mind and consciousness. Only Vedānta-sūtra’s theory of emanation from the Supreme Personality of Godhead adequately explains the creation is all its details.

Adhikaraṇa 2: Refutation of the Atomic System

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the atomic system of the Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that there are four kinds of atoms: earthy [physical], watery [astral], fiery [mental] and aerial [buddhic]. These atoms are partless, but possess the qualities of color, touch, taste and smell, and are spherical in form. At the time of pralaya, they exist in a latent state, without originating any effect, but at the time of creation, they originate this world by combining together and forming binary and ternary compounds, owing to their being in contact with souls, which have a mysterious quality called adṛṣṭa [literally, unseen]. In this theory, two atoms are brought into activity by the action of the adṛṣṭa of the souls residing in them. The souls in the atoms set them in motion, and thus there takes place the union of two atoms, and a binary is formed which is called aṇu. Thus three causes operate to produce a binary: two atoms, the samavāyi [aggregate] cause; their union, the asamavāyi [separated] cause; and the adṛṣṭa of the souls residing in them, the nimitta [operative] cause. Similarly, from three binary molecules, set in motion by the adṛṣṭa of the souls residing in them, there is produced the mahat or ternary. Two atoms cannot produce a ternary, because it requires a bigger cause and larger number of atoms. Similarly, four ternaries give rise to a quaternary, and so on to produce bigger and bigger things. Thus by conglomeration of the molecules are produced the big earth, the big water, the big fire and the big air. The color, taste, scent etc. seen in the big effect depend on the particular atoms that are the samavāyi [aggregate] cause. The qualities latent in the cause produce the qualities in the effects which are manifest. Thus the world comes into existence.

When the Lord wishes to destroy the world, He withdraws the active force of affinity that brought about the union of two atoms from the binaries. When this affinity is destroyed, the binary falls apart, and ceases to exist. The binaries being destroyed, the ternaries and so forth are also destroyed and the creation ceases to exist, just as when the thread is destroyed the cloth is also destroyed. The qualities of color, etc. also cease with the destruction of their substrate, the binaries. This is the method of the dissolution of the world.

In this system, the atoms are called parimaṇḍala or spherical. The size of an ‘ultimate atom’ is called pārimaṇlḍalyam. A binary is called in this system aṇu [atom], while the name paramāṇu is given to the ‘ultimate atoms.’ The size of a binary is called hrasva [short], while the size of the ternary is called mahat [big], meaning which has a perceptible magnitude, macroscopic.

Modern science also rests on an atomic theory of matter, in which the atoms themselves are the cause and ingredient of everything. Science recognizes many types of atomic elements and compounds, as well as subatomic particles and reactions. While Vedānta-sūtra does admit that atoms are the building blocks of manifested matter, it denies them the important role granted by both the Vaiśeṣikas and the scientists. Like all material things, atoms cannot act without the influence of some outside energy and intelligence. This was proved in the previous Adhikāraṇa. Therefore this Adhikāraṇa will also refute the materialistic scientific atomic theory.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is the theory that the word is produced by atoms without the guidance of the Lord consistent?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The adṛṣṭa of the souls sets the two atoms in motion. Being thus set in motion, the aoms come into union, and thus produce a binary, and so on. There is no inconsistency about this view, and it is the right view.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The creation is not brought about simply by the combination of atoms. The next sūtra shows this.

Sūtra 2.2.11

mahat dīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām

mahat – macroscopic; dīrgha – extensible, which is perceptible to the senses; vat – like; vā – and; hrasva – microscopic; parimaṇḍalābhyām – from the atomic.

And as origination of the macroscopic and extensible from the dimensionless [is untenable, so is the rest of the Vaiśeṣika system.]

The word ‘untenable’ is to be supplied from the previous sūtra to complete the sense. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable in its entirety, as their view of the origination of the macroscopic from the dimensionless atomic particles without the aid of the Lord is untenable. The other parts of their system, such as the origination of the earth, etc. are equally untenable along with their theory of the dimensionless sub-atoms giving rise to the ternary, having magnitude and dimension, and those combining to form macroscopic objects. Thus the theory is self-contradictory and unreasonable. No amount of combining dimensionless parts can yield a molecule with magnitude and dimension. A piece of cloth is produced by combining threads which themselves have parts. If the threads were partless or dimensionless, they could not have joined to form the cloth. Therefore it must be admitted that even an atom has magnitude and occupies space and dimension. Otherwise the union of any number of atoms could not give rise to macroscopic objects. Therefore to say that the ternary, which has length and dimension, is produced by a combination of dimensionless atoms, is to assert something which is void of sense. It may be consistent with reason to say that an object of larger bulk must have a larger number of constituent atoms. But even if this be admitted, then the atoms themselves must be admitted to have parts, and those parts will have further parts, and thus there will be an infinite regression.

This is exactly the situation that modern science has got itself into; the more they explore and catalog the subatomic particles, the more seem to crop up out of nowhere. So far, every single subatomic particle predicted by quantum theory has been discovered experimentally, with the exception (at the time of this writing) of the Higgs boson, and confirmation of its discovery is expected soon. This fact alone should raise an alarm, for how is it possible for any theory of such subtle matter to be so accurate? The answer has to do with the nature of quantum effects, which depend on the intention and methodology of the observer. Such subtle matter begins to assume many of the qualities of spirit, therefore every time the scientists go looking for another subatomic particle, they find it. It is very likely that they are creating the particles simply by the design of their experiments. Since the scientists are clueless about the qualities of consciousness, naturally they do not notice this. So we can expect this foolish dance to continue as long as the scientists can demand more money for bigger particle accelerators from the demoniac leaders, in the hope that such arcane research will yield more powerful and destructive weapons.

This sūtra should not be explained, as some have done, as refuting an objection to the Vedānta theory of Brahman being the general cause; for the theme of this Adhyāya is refuting the systems of the opponents, and not in supporting our own theory. The theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is open to further objections, as shown in the next sūtras.

Sūtra 2.2.12

ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ

ubhayathāpi – on both assumptions; na – not; karma – motion; ataḥ – therefore; tat-abhāvaḥ – the absence of that.

On both assumptions, [whether the adṛṣṭa is in the atom or the soul,] there is no motion, and consequently there is absence [of the origination of the world.]

The argumentative Vaiśeṣikas hold that the world is produced by the successive formations of compounds like binary, ternary, etc. of the union of atoms. Now arises the question, “How is this primal motion brought about?” Is it caused by the adṛṣṭa residing in the atoms or in the souls? It cannot be the first, because the adṛṣṭa, which itself is the result of the good and bad actions done by the soul, cannot possibly reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. However, the adṛṣṭa residing in the soul cannot possibly produce motion in the atoms. Thus the motion of the atoms cannot be explained by either of these views. A third possibility may be advanced by the Vaiśeṣikas, that the motion originates in the atoms, as soon as they come into the proximity of souls charged with adṛṣṭa. But this also is an unreasonable view. There can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless, and the atoms, which are also partless; for there can be no contact between two objects, both of which have no parts by which they can come into contact. Thus the adṛṣṭa hypothesized by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms in any of these ways.

We have already proven that because of the inertness of dull matter, one insentient object cannot move another without being set in motion by a sentient being. We have seen that all motion of objects is initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings. Nor can the soul be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of a creative period, because according to the Vaiśeṣikas, during pralaya the soul lies dormant without possessing any intelligence, and thus is in no way superior to the atoms. Nor can it be said that the primal motion of the atoms is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the adṛṣṭa of the jīvas, because His will is eternal, and therefore the creation would be eternal. The Vaiśeṣikas say that during pralaya there is no creation because the adṛṣṭa of the jīvas does not mature and is not awakened, and consequently the will of the Lord is inactive. This view is also wrong, because all the materials being present, the creation ought to take place, irrespective of the maturity. If the adṛṣṭa of the jīvas were the cause of the primal motion of the atoms, there is nothing to prove that the adṛṣṭa, which springs from the actions of the souls performed during many previous lives, should remain in latency without maturity during the full duration of pralaya. If the adṛṣṭa has any power of its own, irrespective of the will of the Lord, why should it remain dormant for such a long period of time? The atomic theory, therefore, is bound to fall back on the Vedānta philosophy that the will of the Lord is necessary, both to begin the creation and to keep the creation from occurring during pralaya.

Consequently there is no definite cause found that can explain the primal motion of the atoms, for neither the adṛṣṭa residing in the jīvas or in the atoms, nor the will of the Lord is a determined cause. The atoms thus being without motion in the beginning of creation, cannot come together and form aggregates. Since they cannot form aggregates, the binary, ternary etc. molecules cannot be produced, and consequently there can be no creation. By a similar line of reasoning, there can be no pralaya also. This refutation of the Vaiśeṣika system is only in regard to the first cause of the motion of the atoms. Vedānta philosophy does not deny the existence of atoms, but it denies the Vaiśeṣika theory of the karma of the souls being the first cause of the primal motions of the atoms. Vedānta philosophy holds that the creation depends entirely on the will of the Lord, and that will is not influenced by the karma of the jīvas.

The materialistic scientists today theorize that the primal motion of the atoms is begun by the Big Bang, a primordial explosion supposed by them to answer this same objection. But there is no way to travel back in time to verify this theory, nor any way to explain how the conditions necessary for the Big Bang came into existence. For the Big Bang would require space to be compressed into a tiny singularity containing all matter, an unimaginably dense condition. Science also theorizes the existence of black holes, compressed matter whose density is so high that no light or other energy can escape. These black holes appear to be stable, so why would a black hole containing all the mass in the universe explode? How would such a huge black hole come to exist in the first place? The scientists cannot answer these questions, because their whole theory is just a rationalization of how the initial creative energy was injected into the material universe. Why not simply admit that it was emanated by God?

Sūtra 2.2.13

samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyādanavasthiteḥ

samavāya – concomitant cause; abhyupagamāt – because of the acceptance; ca – and; sāmyāt – from equality because of equality, by parity; anavasthiteḥ – because there results an infinite regress.

The Vaiśeṣika doctrine is untenable because of its acceptance of the fictitious relation called samavāya, from which an infinite regression results by parity of reasoning.

The Vaiśeṣika theory admits the relation called samavāya [not to be confused with samanvaya, the sixfold principle of Vedic interpretation according to context] and hence their doctrine in untenable. Why? Because the samavāya relation is equal to any other relation, thus it requires another samavāya to explain it, and that samavāya requires another samavāya to explain it and so on, causing an infinite regression of reasoning. The atoms come together to form a binary molecule through the relationship called samavāya. If there were no samavāya relationship, there would be no conjunction of atoms. But this samavāya relationship is a mere assumption, for it is inexplicable. If two atoms come together through a samavāya relationship, it requires another samavāya to bring about this relationship. Thus there would be an infinite regress. The samavāya relationship has the notion of quality, action and general characteristics. Thus it is an unspecified causal relation. As such it would require another causal relation to explain it, and this produces the fault of anavasthā, infinite regression.

If it is objected that a relationship must be assumed to account for the connection between two things, and that this relationship is the essential nature of the thing, then it must be assumed everywhere. It cannot be said that the nature of samavāya is inseparable connection, for that also is open to the same objection. For then every quality would be found everywhere, and the holders of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine would have to admit that the consequence of their philosophy would be that the quality of smell would be found in air, the quality of sound in earth, the quality of form in the ātman and the quality of intelligence in light. Every quality would be found everywhere, because the samavāya being a unity, it would be present everywhere. But this is not a fact, therefore samavāya relationship is an incongruous assumption.

Similarly, the modern scientists are caught in an endless regression of one nonsensical theory on top of another, trying to explain the initial conditions of the material creation. Since matter is dull and inert, even for the simplest material reaction to take place, some source of energy has to supply the impetus to raise matter above absolute zero temperature. Every chemical reaction requires some Brownian motion due to temperature; so how did the ingredients of the universe gain their initial motion and heat? And where did those ingredients originate? Just like the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, material science cannot answer these questions, therefore it is to be rejected.

Sūtra 2.2.14

nityameva ca bhāvāt

nityam – eternal; eva – even; ca – and; bhāvāt – because of the existence.

The world would be eternal because samavāya is eternal.

If the samavāya is admitted to be eternal, then the creation, of which it is the relation, would be eternal. But this is untenable, for even the Vaiśeṣikas do not believe the world to be eternal. If samavāya, which might be described in modern terms as chemical affinity, is considered an eternal cause, then creation would be eternal, because the affinity of the atoms to combine together would be eternal. If samavāya is considered as the destructive cause that separates the atoms, then pralaya would be eternal. Both interpretations of samavāya are untenable, because they lead to the absurdity of an eternal creation or eternal dissolution of the world.

The modern scientific atomic theory is also open to the same objection. Because they do not recognize the existence of anything outside of the material world, the scientists cannot imagine how the universe began, neither can they imagine how it will end. Since the universe is created by a superior power, it is also destroyed by the same superior power.

Sūtra 2.2.15

rupādimattvācca viparyayo darśanāt

rupā-ādi-mattvāt – because of possessing color, etc.; ca – and; viparyayaḥ – the opposite; darśanāt – because it is observed.

The Vaiśeṣika theory is further untenable because its atoms have color, etc. and because the reverse is also observed in them.

The Vaiśeṣikas admit that the atoms of earth, water, fire and air possess the attributes of color, taste, smell and touch and that they are eternal and partless. But the logical result of their assumption should be the reverse: that the atoms are temporary and have parts, because it is observed in ordinary life that anything possessing color, etc. is liable to destruction, such as a pot. The atoms of the Vaiśeṣikas therefore must have the seed of destruction in them, and they must be made of parts, like the pot. Thus this doctrine is full of inherent contradictions.

Modern science also holds that objects derive their qualities from the properties of their component atoms. However, we now know that attributes such as color are actually due to objects selectively reflecting various portions of the spectrum of visible light. We also know that atoms and their parts can be converted into energy and back. Atoms are thus simply a stable form of vibrations of energy. We experience that all energy without exception has a source; light comes from the sun, water from the ocean, electricity from the powerhouse. But the scientists do not admit that the original energy of the universe must have a source that pre-exists the material creation; hence that source must be spiritual in nature. Therefore their theories are also full of contradictions.

Sūtra 2.2.16

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

ubhayathā - in both ways; ca - and; doṣāt - because of the difficulties.

And there are difficulties in both cases.

If it is accepted that atoms have no color, taste, etc. then we cannot explain the possession of these qualities by earth, water, etc., for that which is in the effect must also be in the cause. If we take the contrary view and hold that the atoms have color, taste, etc. then the theory is open to the objection mentioned in the previous sūtra. Thus the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is untenable either way.

Similarly, the modern atomic theory cannot actually explain why substances have particular attributes of color, form, mass, density etc. because they cannot explain the universal forces such as space, gravity and time behind all these attributes. If we inquire deeply into their theories, their chain of cause and effect breaks down and their logic becomes circular. This their atomic theory is untenable.

Sūtra 2.2.17

aparigrahāccātyantamanapekṣā

aparigrahāt – because it is not accepted; ca – and; atyantam – totally; anapekṣā – disregard.

The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas is not accepted by authoritative sages, therefore it is to be disregarded altogether.

Some regard may be shown for the doctrine of Kapila and the rest, because authoritative sages like Manu have accepted parts of their philosophy. But because this atomic doctrine is opposed to the Vedas, the sages have not accepted any portion of it, therefore it is undemonstrated and should be disregarded by everyone who aims at the highest good for man. Similarly, any so-called scientific theory that denies the existence of God and the soul is actually most unscientific, because it ignores the ancient teachings of the greatest sages.

Adhikaraṇa 3: Buddhist Doctrine Examined

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The actual history of Buddhism is largely unknown, especially in the West. Actually there were two Buddhas: Śākyamuni Buddha and the much earlier Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha. Lord Buddha is declared by scripture to be one of the ten incarnations (avatāras) of the Supreme Lord, Śrī Viṣṇu. This is described in Śrīla Jayadeva Gosvāmī’s composition Gītā-Govinda:

vedān uddharate jaganti vahate bhūgolam udbibhrate
daityaṁ dārayate baliṁ chalayate kṣatra kśayaṁ kurvate
paulastyaṁ jayate halaṁ kalayate kāruṇyam ātanvate
mlecchān mūrccayate daśākṭikṛte kṛṣṇāya tubhyaṁ namaḥ

“O Kṛṣṇa, He who accepts ten incarnations! I offer my obeisances unto You for saving the Vedic scriptures as the Matsya incarnation; You held up the universe as the Kurma incarnation and lifted up the world as Varāha, the Boar incarnation; as Nṛsiṁha You vanquished Hiraṇyakaśipu; as Vāmana You deceived Bali Mahārāja; as Paraśurāma You exterminated the corrupt warrior class; as Rāma You slew Rāvaṇa; as Balarāma You took up the plough; as Buddha You bestowed compassion and as Kalki, You kill the mlecchas.”

Śrīla Jayadeva writes in the ninth verse of his Daśavatāra Strotram:

nindasi yajña vidherahaha śrutijātam
sadaya hṛdaya darśita paśughātam
keśava dhṛta buddha śarīra
jaya jagadīśa hare jaya jagadīśa hare

“O Lord of the universe, Keśava! You took the form of Lord Buddha who is full of compassion, and stopped the slaughter of animals which is strictly forbidden in the Vedas.”

If Lord Buddha is an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu, then His actual identity requires further elaboration and analysis. It becomes imperative to research this matter since so many modern impersonalist and voidist philosophies are based upon Buddhism. How can it be that an incarnation of the Lord would spread an athestic philosophy based on voidism? The answer is that the commonly accepted history of Buddhism is a deliberate fabrication.

The common understanding of Buddha, that the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha that the Vaiṣṇavas worship is the same personality as the recent Śākyamuni Buddha, is inaccurate. Śākyamuni or Śākya-siṁha Buddha was simply a highly intelligent mortal, a vastly learned person who had attained some inner realizations. It was Śrī Śaṅkarācārya who declared Śākya-siṁha to be Lord Buddha, equating him with Lord Viṣṇu’s incarnation. This was a deliberate deception intended to hoodwink the public, which has been handed down by Śaṅkarācārya’s followers and which has since become the gospel of academic texts on comparative religion, thanks to the political disinformation of the British.

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya declared Śākya-siṁha Buddha (also known as Gautama Buddha) and Avatāra Buddha to be the same personality in his commentary on the present Adhikāraṇa of Vedānta-sūtra. While discussing Buddha’s philosophy, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya mentions his name in his commentary:

sarvathā api anādarṇīya ayam sugata-samāyāḥ śreyaskāmaiḥ iti abhiprāyaḥ.

In this statement, sugata is meant to indicate Gautama Buddha, the son of Śuddhodana and Māyādevi, and not to the original Viṣṇu incarnation Buddha. The word samāyāḥ means Gautama Buddha’s siddhānta [philosophical conclusions]. However, Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha is also named Sugata, and thus Śaṅkarācārya falsely interpolated Śākya-siṁha Buddha as if he were Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha. The use of the name Sugata for Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha was already extant in Buddhist scriptures. This is substantiated in the book Amarakoṣa, an ancient treatise written by the famous nihilist and atheist Amara Siṁha. It is believed that Amara Siṁha was born approximately 150 years prior to Śaṅkarācārya’s birth. Amara Siṁha was the son of the brāhmaṇa Sabara Svāmī, who fathered a host of children with different mothers of different castes. This ancient verse about Amara Siṁha was well known in the learned circles of yore:

brāhmaṇyām abhavad varāha mihiro jyotirvidām agraṇīḥ
rājā bhartṛhariś ca vikrāmanṛpaḥ kṣatrātrātmajāyām abhüt
vaiśyāyāṁ haricandra vaidya tilako jātaś ca śaṅkuḥ kṛtī
śüdrāyām amaraḥ ṣaḍeva śabara svāmī dvija sya ātmajāḥ

“Varāha Mihira, foremost among the greatest astrologers, was born from the womb of a brāhmaṇa lady. King Vikrama and King Bhartṛhari were born from a kṣatriya mother. From a vaiśya mother were born Haricandra, a vaidya tilaka [an excellent Āyurveda physician] and Śaṅkhya; and from a śūdra [maidservant] mother was born Amara Siṁha. These six were fathered by the brāhmaṇa Śabara Svāmī.”

Amara Siṁha, the son of a brāhmaṇa in a śūdra lady, authored many books on Buddhism. By coincidence, all these books came into the possession of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, who preserved only the Amarakoṣa and burnt all the others. The following verse about Buddha is found in the Amarakoṣa:

sarvajñaḥ sugato buddho dharmarājas tathāgataḥ
samanta bhadro bhagavān mārajil lokajij jinaḥ
ṣaḍabhijño daśabalo’ dvayavādī vināyakaḥ
munindrā śrīghanaḥ śāstā muniḥ

“All-knowing, transcendental Buddha, king of righteousness, He who has come, beneficent, all encompassing Lord, conqueror of Māra the god of love, conqueror of worlds, He who controls his senses, protector of the six enemies, possessor of the ten powers, speaker of monism, foremost leader, lord of the ascetics, embodiment of splendor and teacher of the ascetics.”

The above verse contains eighteen names of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha including Sugata, and the verse below, also from the Amarakoṣa, contains the seven names of Śākya-siṁha Buddha without any mention of Sugata.

śākyamunis tu yaḥ sa śākyasiṁhaḥ sarvārthasiddha śauddhodaniś ca saḥ
gautamaś cārkabandhuś ca māyādevī sutaś ca saḥ

“Teacher of the Śākyas, lion of the Śākyas, accomplisher of all goals, son of Śuddhodana, of Gautama’s line, friend of the entrapped ones, the son of Māyādevī.”

In these verses, starting with sarvajñaḥ and finishing with muniḥ are eighteen names addressing the original Viṣṇu incarnation Lord Buddha. The next seven names, beginning with Śākya-munistu to Māyādevī-Sutaśca, refer to Śākya-siṁha Buddha. The Buddha referred to in the first eighteen names and the Buddha referred to in the latter seven names are clearly not the same person. In the commentary on Amarakoṣa by the learned Śrī Raghunātha Cakravartī, he also divided the verses into two sections. To the eighteen names of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha he writes the words astadaś buddha, which clearly refers only to the Viṣṇu-avatāra. Next, on his commentary for the seven aliases of Śākya-siṁha he writes, ete sapta Śākya bangśabatirneh buddha muni bishete: “The next seven names starting from Śākya-munistu are aliases of Buddha-muni who was born into the Śākya dynasty.”

Thus from the above verses and their commentaries it is clear that the divine incarnation Sugata Buddha and the atheist sage Gautama Buddha are different personalities. Another edition of the Amarakoṣa was published by the respected scholar H. T. Colebrooke in 1872. On pages 2 & 3 of this book the name ‘Buddha’ has been explained. The Marginal Note on page 2 states that the first eighteen names are names of Ajina or Buddha; the Marginal Note for the latter seven names states these are aliases of Śākya-siṁha Buddha. A further footnote is added to clarify the second Buddha, of the later seven names: Footnote (b) ‘the founder of the religion named after him.’ Mr. Colebrooke lists the names of the many commentaries he used as references in his Preface. In addition to Raghunātha Cakravartī’s commentary, he took references from twenty-five others.

Therefore it can be said with certainty that the propagator of Bahyatmavāda, Jñanatmavāda and Śūnyamavāda, the three pillars of atheism, was Gautama Buddha or Śākya-siṁha Buddha. There is no evidence whatsoever that Sugata Buddha, Lord Viṣṇu’s incarnation, was in any way connected with atheism. Śākya-siṁha or Siddhārtha Buddha received the name Gautama from his spiritual master Gautama Muni, who belonged to the Kapila dynasty. This is confirmed in the ancient Buddhist treatise Sundarānanda Carita:

guru gotrād ataḥ kautsāste bhavanti sma gautamāḥ

“O Kautsa, because his teacher was Gautama, they became known from his family line.”

Besides the Amarakoṣa, so highly favored by Śaṅkarācārya, there are other famous Buddhist texts like Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Astasahastrika Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Sata-sahastrika Prajṅā-Pāramitā Sūtra, Lalita Vistara etc. Proper scrutiny of these texts reveals the existence of three categories of Buddhas:

• Ādi [original] Buddha: the omnipotent Viṣṇu-avatāra incarnation of Lord Buddha.

• Bodhisattva Buddhas, including personalities like Samanta Bhadraka who were born enlightened.

• Human Buddhas like Gautama, who came to be known as Buddha after their enlightenment.

The Amarakoṣa states that Lord Buddha, Śrī Viṣṇu’s incarnation is also known as Samanta Bhadra [universal auspiciousness], whereas Gautama Buddha is a human being. Other than the eighteen names of the Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha mentioned in Amarakoṣa, many names of Lord Buddha are recorded in the above-mentioned Buddhist texts. In Lalita Vistara, Ch. 21 page 178, it is described how Gautama Buddha meditated on the same spot as the Ādi-Buddha.

ea dharaṇīmuṇde pūrvabuddhāsanasthaḥ
samartha dhanur gṛhītvā śūnya nairātmavāṇaiḥ
kleśaripuṁ nihatvā dṛṣtijālañ ca bhitvā
śiva virajamaśokāṁ prāpsyate bodhim agryāṁ

“The one seated on the hallowed earth of the previous Buddha’s birthplace is on the path of voidism and renunciation. With his weapon, the powerful bow, he vanquishes the enemies of distress and illusion. Thus with wisdom he will attain the auspicious state of grieflessness and worldly detachment.”

It is evident from this verse that Gautama Buddha, realizing the spiritual potency of the previous Buddha’s birthplace, chose to perform meditation and austerities in that vicinity, under a pipal tree. The ancient and original name of this place was Kīkata, but after Gautama attained enlightenment here it came to be known as ‘Buddha Gaya’ [Bodhi Gaya or Bodh Gaya]. Even to the present day, the rituals of worship to the deity of Buddha at Bodhi Gaya are conducted by a sannyāsī of the Giri order of the Śaṅkarācārya sect. It is commonly accepted amongst these monks that Buddha-Gaya [Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha] was a predecessor of Gautama Buddha, who came later to the original Buddha’s birthplace to practice meditation. Śākya-siṁha Buddha chose this place to attain liberation, knowing it to be saturated with immense spiritual power.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is a famous and authoritative Buddhist scripture. From the description of Buddha found in this book, it may be firmly concluded that he is not the more recent Śākya-siṁha or Gautama Buddha. In the beginning of this book we find Rāvaṇa, King of Lanka, praying first to the original Viṣṇu incarnation Buddha and then to the successive future Buddha. A part of this prayer is reproduced below:

laṅkāvatāra sūtraṁ vai pürva buddha anuvarṇitaṁ
smarāmi pūrvakaiḥ buddhair jina-putra puraskṛtaiḥ
sūtram etan nigadyante bhagavān api bhāṣatāṁ
bhaviṣyatyanāgate kāle buddhā buddha-sutaś ca ye

Rāvaṇa, the king of Laṅka, at first recited in the toṭaka meter, then sang the following: “I invoke in my memory the aphorisms known as Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, compiled and propagated by the previous Buddha (Viṣṇu’s incarnation). The son of Jina (Lord Buddha) presented this book. Lord Buddha and his sons, who will appear in the future, as well as Bhagavān, the Viṣṇu incarnation, will continue to instruct all from this book.”

Therefore, the Buddha incarnation described in the Linga Purāṇa, Bhaviṣya Purāṇa and the ninth of the ten Viṣṇu incarnations mentioned in the Vāraha Purāṇa and Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam is not the same personality as Gautama or Śākyamuni Buddha, who was the son of Śuddhodana. Vaiṣṇavas never worship the nihilist and atheist [sūnyavāda] Gautama Buddha. They only worship Lord Viṣṇu’s ninth incarnation, Lord Buddha, with this prayer from the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [10.40.22]:

namo buddhāya śuddhāya daitya-dānava-mohine

“O Supreme Lord Buddha! I offer my obeisances unto You, who are faultless and have appeared to delude the demoniac and atheistic class of men.”

Earlier in Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam [1.3.24], Lord Buddha’s advent is described in the following manner:

tataḥ kalau sampravṛtte
sammohāya sura-dviṣām
buddho nāmnāñjana-sutaḥ
kīkaṭeṣu bhaviṣyati

“Then, in the beginning of Kali-yuga, the Lord will appear as Buddha, the son of Añjanā, in the province of Gayā, just for the purpose of deluding those who are envious of the faithful theist.”

The Buddha mentioned in this verse is Lord Buddha, the son of Añjana, also known by some as Ajina’s son. Śrī Śrīdhara Svāmī writes in his authoritative commentary to this verse:

buddha avartāramāha tata iti añjanasya sutaḥ
ajina suta it pāṭhe ajino’ pi sa eva kīkaṭeṣu madhye gayā-pradeśe

“The words tataḥ kalau etc. describe Viṣṇu’s incarnation Buddha as the son of Añjana. Ajina in the word ajina sutaḥ actually means Añjana. Kīkata is the name of the district of Gayā.

The following quote is from Nṛsṁha Purāṇa [36.29]:

kalau prāpte yathā buddho bhavannārāyaṇa – prabhuḥ

“In Kali-yuga the Supreme Lord Nārāyaṇa appears as Buddha.”

A fair estimate of Lord Buddha’s appearance can be made from astronomical and astrological calculation to be around 4,000 years ago. Regarding the astrological facts at the time of His birth, the treatise Nirnaya-sindhu states in the second chapter:

jyaiṣṭha śukla dvitīyāyāṁ buddha-janma bhāviṣyati

“Lord Buddha will appear on the second day of the waxing moon in the month of Jyaiṣṭha.”

Elsewhere in this book is described the procedure for Lord Buddha’s worship:

pauṣa śuklasya saptamyāṁ kuryāt buddhasya pūjanam

“Lord Buddha is especially worshipped on the seventh day of the waxing moon in the month of Pausa.”

The rituals, prayers and procedures for worship mentioned in these scriptures all clearly indicate that they are meant for Lord Viṣṇu’s ninth avatāra incarnation. Lord Buddha also finds repeated mention in many authentic Vedic scriptures like Viṣṇu Purāṇa, Agni Purāṇa, Vāyu Purāṇa and Skanda Purāṇa.

The truth remains that there are many different demigods and goddesses, both real and imaginary, who are worshipped by their respective devotees, in the same way that Śākya-siṁha Buddha (who was an atheist) is worshipped or glorified by his followers. However, this kind of worship and glorification is completely separate and unrelated to sanātana-dharma, the eternal religion of Vedānta-sūtra, enunciated in its natural commentary Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam.

According to the German scholar Max Müller, Śākya-siṁha Buddha was born in 477 BC in the Lumbinī gardens within the city of Kapilāvastu. This ancient, and at that time, well-populated city in the Terai region of Nepal was well known. Śākya-siṁha, Śākyamuni or Gautama Buddha’s father was known as Śuddhodana, while his mother was called Māyādevi; this is all accepted historical fact. Although Añjana’s son and Śuddhodana’s son both share the same name, Buddha, they are nevertheless two different personalities. Ādi-Buddha was born in Kīkaṭa, which is now famous as Bodhi-Gayā, while the second Buddha was born in Kapilāvastu, Nepal. Thus the birthplace, parents, and era of Viṣṇu-avatāra Buddha and Gautama Buddha are totally at variance.

The atheistic Śākyamuni Buddha had four principal disciples, who founded four systems of philosophy called Vaibhāśika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. The Vaibhāśikas hold that every object that is perceived is real. The Sautrāntikas hold that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not; only the ideas of objects exist, and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhāśikas hold that external objects are directly perceived, while the Sautrāntikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third system of Yogācāra holds that ideas alone are real, there is no external world corresponding to these ideas, and external objects are unreal, like things seen in a dream. The Mādhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal, and all that really exists is the void [śūnyam].

These were the doctrines held by the four classes of Buddhists. All of them agree that every existing object has only a momentary existence. The first two, namely the Vaibhāśikas and the Sautrāntikas, hold that all perceptible things may be classified as either physical or mental. The physical is subdivided into two classes, bhūta [elements] and bhautika [elementals]. Similarly mental objects are classified as either citta [mind] or caittika [mental]. They further hold that there are five skandhas, namely rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, sañjñā and saṁskāra. The rūpa-skandha is composed of the elements earth, water, fire and air, produced by the aggregation of four kinds of atoms possessing the attributes of hardness, fluidity, hotness and mobility, respectively. These four elements comprise the bodies and senses of the various beings. The rūpa-skandha includes all such elements and elementals, the objects composed of them. The vijñāna-skandha is the stream of consciousness that gives the notion of egoism. Thus the feeling of ‘I am’ is the vijñāna-skandha, also called the ātmā [the enjoyer or agent]. The vedanā-skandha includes the awareness of pleasure and pain, and may be called the skandha of feeling. The sañjñā-skandha includes all names and words. The fifth or saṁskāra-skandha includes the attributes of the mind, such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit, demerit, etc. The last four skandhas are collectively called citta-caittika, mind-mental or internal objects. All activities depend upon them and they constitute the inner life of every being. All internal objects are thus called catus-skandhī or belonging to one of these four internal skandhas. All external objects belong to rūpa-skandha alone. Thus the whole world consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. Except for these two, there exists nothing else like ether, etc.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is this a valid theory or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is valid, because it explains the world and all activities.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not so, as shown in the following sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.18

samudāya ubhayahetukepi tadaprāptiḥ

samudāyaḥ – the aggregate; ubhaya-hetuke – having two causes; api – also; tat-aprāptiḥ – there is non-establishment of that.

Even admitting that these two classes of objects are the cause of the whole aggregate, still the world order is not explained.

The theory of the Buddhists, which classifies all objects as either internal or external, is insufficient to explain the world order, because these aggregates are unintelligent, and there is no intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas that can bring about these aggregations. According to the Buddhists everything is impermanent, and there is no permanent intelligent substance that can bring about the aggregation of these skandhas. If it is said that they come together out of their own internal motion, then the world would be eternal, for the skandhas being eternal and possessing motion of their own, they will constantly bring about creation. Thus the main doctrine of the Buddhists is untenable.

Whenever we see a complicated construction or dynamic machine, we take it for granted that there is an intelligent designer and builder behind it. Even a relatively small, simple machine like an automobile requires regular maintenance by a trained mechanic, or it becomes inoperable and useless. How much more skill and intelligence must be required to maintain the operation of the sun and planets, the biosphere, or space and time themselves. Even accepting for argument’s sake that the Buddhist or modern scientific model of the universe is correct, how foolish it would be to think that the great machine of the cosmic reality has no intelligence, no conscious, powerful builder or designer.

The Buddhists may object, “In our system there is a concatenation of cause and effect, beginning with avidyā [ignorance]. Thus through avidyā arises the desire, aversion, etc. which compose the saṁskāra-skandha. From this arises cognition, or the kindling of mind which composes vijñāna-skandha. From this arises the six sense organs which comprise the vedanā-skandha, and from sensation again arises avidyā. Thus avidyā produces saṁskāra, from which comes vijñāna, nāma-rūpa [name and form], the body, touch, sentiency, tṛṣṇā [thirst or desire], activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain and despondency. Thus the circle of causation goes on. We Buddhists hold this theory of the circle of causation, and as this circle is not refuted by anyone and is admitted by all, and as it moves of its own accord like a waterwheel by which water is drawn from a well, so our theory is not open to any objections you may raise.”

This theory is refuted by the author in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.19

itaretarapratyayattvāditi cennotpattimātranimittatvāt

itara-itara – mutual; pratyayattvāt – because of being the cause; iti – thus; cet – if; utpatti-mātra – merely production; nimittatvāt – because of there being an efficient cause only.

[If it is said that the world is produced by] the mutual causality [of avidyā, etc. then we say no,] because they are merely efficient causes [of the immediately subsequent links.]

If you say that this aggregate of the world is formed by the mutual causation of avidyā and the rest, as described above, then we say it is not so, for each of your links of causation describes only the origin of the subsequent stage from the previous one. It only explains how vijñāna arises from saṁskāra, etc.; it does not explain how the aggregate itself is brought about. A saṅghāta [aggregate] like a house cannot be explained to have been produced merely by putting together bricks, mortar, etc. because this does not explain the design.

We see in the natural world that a small seed contains the possibility of the entire tree, its fruits, and the generation of further seeds. The Lord, the actual designer of the cosmic creation, is so intelligent that He can make one prototype of each species, and they continue producing unlimited descendants automatically. Scientists have boasted for many years that they will create life, but even with genetic engineering they cannot synthesize a single cell; they always have to start with an existing living entity. Therefore the creation cannot exist without God, because any aggregate including living beings requires superhuman intelligence and skill to design, create and maintain.

Any saṅghāta [aggregate] always shows a design, and is created for the purpose of enjoyment. The Buddhists say there is no permanent ātmā, and identity is momentary only. There can be no enjoyment or experience for such a temporary soul, because the momentary soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose consequences it has to enjoy or suffer; it was produced by another momentary soul. Nor can you say that the momentary soul enjoys or suffers the results of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul and its effects must be held to be permanent and not momentary; and if you hold any soul to be permanent, you give up your idea of the impermanence of everything. But if you hold everything be impermanent, then you open your theory to the objection already made in Sūtra 2.2.18. Hence this theory is untenable.

Sūtra 2.2.20

uttarātpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt

uttara - in the subsequent; utpāde - on the origination; ca - and; pūrvanirodhāt - because there is cessation of the preceding.

There can be no causal relation between avidyā and the rest, because when the subsequent one is produced, the preceding one ceases to exist.

In this sūtra the author criticizes the view that avidyā, etc. give rise to the subsequent terms of the series by showing that avidyā, etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms. The Buddhists, asserting the momentary existence of everything, admit that when a thing comes into existence in a subsequent moment, the thing that existed in the previous moment has ceased to exist; an effect produced in a subsequent moment is the result of the total destruction of the cause that existed in the previous moment. This being their doctrine, the series of avidyā, etc. cannot stand in a causal relationship to the subsequent terms, for the cause having totally ceased to exist, cannot stand in the relation of originator to the effect that comes into existence in a subsequent moment.

The essence of the Buddhist doctrine, like scientific materialism, is that it is a psychological trick to make the believer feel that he is not responsible for the causes or consequences of his actions. In Buddhism, the cause ceases to exist as soon as the effect manifests; in materialism, everything comes from atoms and returns to atoms at the end. In both systems there is no permanent existence of the soul, no God, and no reward or punishment after death; therefore one may as well do whatever he likes. This devastates the rationale for morality, which is the civilizing force in human society. Thus we see that cultures under the sway of Buddhism or materialism gradually deteriorate until they are just like animal society, based on nothing more than competition for sense gratification and power, with no morality.

In reality, we always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect, as a thread subsists in the cloth or clay continues to exist in the pot. But the Buddhists hold that existence arises from nonexistence, for they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause; the tree cannot appear without the destruction of the seed. Similarly the material scientists want us to believe that the gigantic cosmic creation appeared from nothing, or if there was a cause in the beginning, it has long since ceased to exist. This view is refuted by the author in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.21

asati pratijñoparodhā yaugapadyamanyathā

asati – if there were nonexistence; pratijña – admitted principle; uparodhāḥ – contradiction; yaugapadyam – simultaneity; anyathā – otherwise.

[If the cause] ceases to exist [when the effect manifests itself, then there results] contradiction of the admitted principle [that the universe is caused by the skandhas,] otherwise [there would arise] simultaneity [of cause and effect.]

If it is said that an effect may originate even when the cause is totally nonexistent, then that would contradict the admitted principle of the Buddhists that the world originates from the skandhas. Nonexistence being present everywhere, then anything may arise anywhere, at any time. If, however, the Buddhists say that the antecedent momentary existence of the cause lasts only as long as the effect does not originate, then they are landed in the complimentary difficulty, namely that the cause and effect would exist simultaneously, for the cause would then remain in the effect. This would contradict the accepted doctrine of the Buddhists that everything is merely momentary. Therefore, it follows that the effect does not originate from nonexistence of the cause.

It is unreasonable and impossible that something should arise from nothingness; but the Buddhists and material scientists want us to accept that this is the case. However, we never see an actual case where something comes from nothing. The gigantic material creation must have an even more gigantic and powerful source, otherwise there is no way for it to appear out of nothing. Even if we accept just for the sake of argument the scientific argument that the material ingredients of the universe are always existing without a prior cause, or the Buddhist theory that the cause ceased to exist as soon as the creation came into existence, then as discussed above, there still must be an outside source of energy and intelligence to put those inert ingredients into motion and organize them into the complex forms and dynamic processes of the cosmos we observe today.

The Buddhists also hold that substances like a pot, etc. totally cease to exist, like the flame of a lamp that is blown out. The author next refutes the tenet that there can be absolute annihilation of a substance.

Sūtra 2.2.22

pratisaṁkhyāpratisaṁkhyā nirodhāprāptiravicchedāt

pratisaṁkhyā – depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; apratisaṁkhyā – not depending upon the volition of some conscious entity; nirodhaḥ – destruction; aprāptiḥ – non-establishment; avicchedāt – because there is no complete interruption.

Nor can there be established that there are two kinds of destruction, volitional and non-volitional, because there is never any complete interruption [of existence.]

Pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha is destruction dependent on the volition of some conscious agent, for example when a man smashes a clay pot with a hammer. Apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha happens by the force of time, or otherwise without dependence on the will of a sentient agent. These plus ākāśa [space], which the Buddhists define as the absence of all obstruction or covering, are the three kinds of nonentities accepted by the Buddhists. The two kinds of destruction and space are called niraṇvaya vināśa [absolute destruction] or nirupākhya śūnyam [total void]. Everything else is momentary only, as found in the following aphorism: “Everything which is an object of conception other than these three is temporary and composite.” The author will refute the theory that ākāśa is a nonentity in Sūtra 2.2.24. The present sūtra refutes the wrong doctrine of the two kinds of nirodha [complete destruction]. These two kinds of destruction are impossible because of the absence of interruption of existence.

An object, once existent, cannot be absolutely annihilated, for the origination and destruction of a substance only mean the change of condition of the substance. When a pot is broken into pieces, the original substance of the pot continues to exist; it has merely changed its form and condition. The substance of an object undergoes modification or change of condition, but the substance remains permanently existent. One cannot say when a candle is burnt out that it is completely annihilated; it substance simply has changed state into heat, light, gases etc. that certainly still exist somewhere. We do not perceive the candle when it has been burnt out, because its substance has been transformed into a more subtle condition. As we can easily infer in the case of a pot or candle that there is no permanent destruction, in all other cases also we will find that so-called destruction is simply a change in the state or condition of the substance, which continues to exist, albeit in a different form. Consequently absolute annihilation is an improvable impossibility.

Next the author refutes the notion of liberation as entertained by the Buddhists.

Sūtra 2.2.23

ubhayathā ca doṣāt

ubhayathā – in either case; ca – and; doṣāt – because there are objections.

In both cases there are objections, and [thus the very idea of liberation is not established.]

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra and the three following ones from Sūtra 2.2.19. The Buddhists define mokṣa or liberation as the cessation of the cycle of avidyā and the rest, which constitute the world cycle called saṁsāra. Does this liberation accrue from direct knowledge of the truth, or does it happen by itself? It cannot be the first, for then the acceptance of apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha, destruction without the agency of a sentient being, would be useless. Nor can it be the latter, for then all the disciplines and methods laid down by the Buddhists for their students would become useless.

Real liberation means reinstatement of the soul, who is temporarily in a state of illusory conditioned consciousness, in his real eternal identity and normal spiritual consciousness. This can only happen through revival of his original relationship with the Supreme Personality of Godhead. The only destruction involved in the process of liberation is destruction of the false, illusory material identity based on the bodily misconception of life. This is due to be destroyed anyway by the force of time; but in actual liberation, the false ego or false material identity is permanently set aside.

The Buddhist idea of liberation is insubstantial because it is based on the mere absence of something, the destruction of an illusion that never existed in the first place. The destruction of a mirage does not automatically reveal the truth. Thus their teaching cannot stand the test of reason, and actual liberation cannot be established in their system. Next the author refutes the Buddhist doctrine that ākāśa is an absolute nonentity.

Sūtra 2.2.24

ākāśe cāviśeṣāt

ākāśe – in the case of ākāśa; ca – and; aviśeṣāt – because of no specific difference.

The tenet of absolute nonexistence of ākāśa also is untenable because there is no difference in this case either.

The Buddhist tenet that ākāśa or space is an absolute nonentity is untenable. Why? The sūtra says it is aviśeṣāt: because ākāśa is no different from any other substance that is an object of perception. When we say, “The bird flies in space,” we perceive space. Space is therefore just as real a substance as earth, water, etc. As we know earth from its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste etc., we know ākāśa by its attribute of being the abode of objects, and by its quality of sound. Thus ākāśa is a real substance and not a nonentity. The Buddhists also say that air exists in ākāśa. If ākāśa is totally nonexistent, then what would be the receptacle of air? Nor can you say that space is simply the absence of any occupying object, for this also does not stand to reason.

The logicians hold that nonexistence [abhāva] is of three kinds: prāk-abhāva [prior nonexistence], as the nonexistence of a pot before being made by the potter; pradhvaṣṭa-abhāva [absence by destruction], as when a pot is broken into pieces; and atyanta-abhāva [absolute nonexistence], as in the horn of a hare, which is a complete fiction. Ākāśa is none of these three kinds of nonexistence. Consequently ākāśa or space is not the negative substance of the logicians. If ākāśa were a nonentity, then the whole universe would become devoid of space. For if you say that ākāśa is nothing but the absence of occupying objects or covering, then it cannot be the covering of earth, etc., and if you say that it is imperceptible because there is an occupying body like the earth, etc. then you land in the position that the whole universe is without space, because something or other exists everywhere. Thus the Buddhist theory of space is untenable on either alternative.

Sūtra 2.2.25

anusmṛteśca

anu-smṛteḥ – because of memory; ca – and.

The fact of memory or recollection also [proves that things are not momentary.]

The Buddhist idea of the momentariness of everything is also disproved by the persistence of memory and recognition. Memory or recollection is the idea or cognition of what was previously perceived, and recognition is based on memory. In recollection we recognize a thing that was perceived in the past, and assert, “This is the thing that was seen before.” This proves at least that the person who recollects is not a momentary thing, but has continuity of existence between the moment of perception and the moment of recollection.

You cannot say that this recognition of a thing that was perceived in the past is only a cognition of similarity, as in “This is the Ganges,” or “This is the same flame we saw before.” In the cases of the Ganges and the flame, no doubt it is a false assumption to say that they are the same things that we saw before, for the water in the river is not the same, nor the effulgent particles that compose the flame. In that case, the perception is merely of similarity, or of a familiar pattern. But unless there exists a permanent knowing subject who can perceive the similarity of the present with the past, he cannot assert that “This is the Ganges,” or “This is the same flame we saw before.”

The knowing, remembering or recognizing subject must be permanent, or at least have continuity of existence in time, and cannot be momentary. It may be possible that sometimes doubts may arise whether an external object is really the identically same one that was seen in the past, or merely something similar to it. But with regard to the cognizing subject, there can never arise the doubt, “Am I the same person who existed in the past?” For it impossible that the memory of something perceived by another personality would exist in one’s own mind. Nor can you say that there is unity due to a succession of impressions, where one impression vanishes after giving birth to a new similar impression, and that this current of impressions gives the appearance of unity. For if the succession of impressions is identical to the original one, that is practically the same thing as admitting to the existence of a permanent chain of similar impressions, and this permanent chain may as well be called ātmā, and thus it would also refute the Buddhist theory. But the fact of memory, recollection or recognition cannot be explained without the permanent existence of a cognizing subject.

Moreover, what exactly is meant by ‘momentary’? Do you mean that which is related to a moment, or that which is originated or is destroyed in a moment? It cannot be the first, for every permanent object must be related to one or more moments, as many moments pass during its existence. Nor can it be the second, for we do not perceive objects coming into existence or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of the momentariness of all things is refuted. These same arguments also refute the theory of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi, which posits that creation is constant and going on at every moment, which is only the theory of momentariness under another name. Consequently things are not momentary, but exist for definite periods of time.

The author next takes up the theory of the Sautrāntikas and proves its untenability. They maintain that objects leave their ideas in our consciousness—ideas of having a certain color, form, etc. and though they may vanish and cease to exist, they exist in our consciousness as ideas, and are inferred as such. Therefore ideas are the only really existing things, and their manifoldness is caused by the manifoldness of external objects. This view is set aside in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.26

nā'sato'dṛṣṭatvāt

na – not; asataḥ – of that which no longer exists; adṛṣṭatvāt – because it is not perceived.

[There can be] no [persistence of cognition] of that which no longer exists, because it is nowhere seen [to be so.]

The Sautrāntikas hold that a thing that has perished imparts its form to the cognition, and on the foundation of that form, color and so on, the thing itself is inferred. But when the substance perishes, the qualities inherent in it would perish along with it. The cognitions of its qualities, such as its color, etc. cannot be the actual qualities of the thing that has perished, for they exist only in cognition and we never see them in actual reality. All that remains are the impressions of those qualities in our minds. Once the substance itself is gone we do not see the qualities passing over to another object. Nor can you say that objects like pots, etc. are mere inferences and have no objective existence. When a person sees a pot, he says “I see the pot”; he does not say, “I have the idea of a pot in my mind, and therefore I infer that there must be something outside of me which I call a pot.” For this kind of idealism is contradicted by the very pronouncement of our consciousness that declares the pot to exist outside. It follows therefore that the existence of the pot, which is an object of perception, is not inferred from the idea of a pot formed in our cognition. Such existence is intuitively given by the very fact of perception. This is a specific objection to the Sautrāntika theory.

The author next shows a defect common to both the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

Sūtra 2.2.27

udāsīnānāmapi caivaṁ siddhiḥ

udāsīnānām – of persons who are perfectly indifferent and inactive; api – also; ca – and; evam – thus; siddhiḥ – accomplishment.

[If things were all momentary,] then even persons who are inactive could accomplish all their objects without exertion.

If things originate from nonexistence, because everything is momentary, then persons who never exert will accomplish their objects by their mere laziness, because effects are produced without any real cause. In the theory of universal momentariness, the thing does not exist in the next moment, and so there can be no effort made to attain a desired thing or to ward off an undesired thing, for there would remain no motive for such exertion; good things would be obtained without exertion, and evil warded off similarly. One who believes in this doctrine would never exert himself, either to attain heaven or liberation. But the Buddhists are inconsistent in their actions, for while believing in the momentariness of all objects, they still make efforts, such as study, meditation and performance of rituals, to attain mokṣa.

As a matter of fact, everyone believes that to attain an object he must employ appropriate means and right effort. Consequently these two schools of Buddhism merely tend to delude mankind; for they lay down practices for the attainment of heaven and mokṣa for souls that are, in their theory, simply momentary. And believing that entities can arise from nonentities, they still exert for the realization of their objects, as if they believed that the world originated from a real entity, the skandhas which according to them are real substances. Their theory being thus self-contradictory deserves no serious consideration. Thus the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas have been refuted.

Adhikaraṇa 4: The Yogācāra Theory Considered

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author considers the theory of the Yogācāras. They say that Lord Śākyamuni Buddha assumed the existence of external things, and in his systems of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika showed the relation of those things with thought, merely out of deference to those weak-minded disciples of his who were attached to external things. In fact, Śākyamuni Buddha did not believe in the reality of the external world. His highest doctrine is represented by the Yogācāra system, according to which the vijñāna-skandha or cognition alone is real.

According to this system an object like a pot, etc. which is perceived in cognition is nothing more than cognition. The vijñāna modifies itself into the form of the object. It is not an objection that without external objects the worldly business cannot be transacted, because in a dream also there are no external objects, and still all kinds of activities are performed with the thought objects. Even those who believe in the reality of external objects have to admit that those objects are cognized insofar as the mind becomes modified into the shape of those objects. If it were not so, there would not arise phrases like “I know the pot,” or “I know the cloth.” Thus all worldly activities can go on with mere cognition, and all practical thought and communication are rendered possible with cognition alone. What, then, is the necessity of assuming the existence of an external object corresponding to those ideas? Nor can it be objected that thought-forms being very minute and subtle, cannot represent the forms of big things like a mountain. A little consideration will show that the mind can accommodate an object of any complexity or scale. Its smallness is no reason against its containing large objects, for a small object like the retina of the eye can contain within it the the entire visible external world.

Mind or idea itself is the power of illumination. It shines forth, it has a form, and because it has a form it has the possibility of shining forth in the shapes of all these objects. An objector may say that, if there are no real external objects, what causes the mind to assume the manifold shapes? To this we reply that the mind assumes different shapes according to the different vāsanās [desire-impressions] submerged in it. Just as these vāsanās left in the mind create the dream-world in sleep, so the external world in waking consciousness is also the result of the vāsanās. The manifoldness of cognition is thus caused by the manifoldness of the vāsanās, and we can easily find this out by a little thinking. For wherever there is a vāsanā there is a change of mental form corresponding to the vāsanā, but whenever the vāsanās are stopped, the mind also stops. Moreover you also admit that the cognition and the object of cognition are always coexistent, and the act of perception is one. We never see an object without the corresponding conception of it, consequently there is no necessity of admitting the existence of an external object corresponding to the internal idea. But as a matter of fact the object of knowledge is identical with cognition, and is not separate from it. We are conscious of only one form, and that is the idea, though this idea appears to us at the same time as an external object. The latter, however, is an error. And since we are always conscious of ideas and things together, it is useless to assume that the object is different from the idea. Thus only ideas actually exist.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is everything merely an idea, and is it possible to have practical thought and communication with others without external objects, just as in a dream?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The Yogācāras say that all practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, for no good purpose is served by the additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The external world really exists, as shown by the author in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.28

nābhāva upalabdheḥ

na – not; abhāva – non-existence; upalabdheḥ – because they are perceived.

The external things are not nonexistent, because our consciousness [bears testimony to their existence.]

As it is consciousness alone by which we judge the existence or nonexistence of a thing, we must admit that the external things really exist, because our consciousness says that they exist. The very words we use show that we admit the existence of external things. We say “the knowledge of a pot,” which assumes that the knowledge is different from the pot. The wise refuse to consider any theory that goes against the testimony of one’s consciousness. The Yogācāra may say, “I also feel that the object of which I am conscious appears as an external thing; but what I affirm is that I am always directly conscious of nothing but my own ideas, hence the appearance of the so-called external things is nothing but the result of my own ideas.” To this we reply that the very fact of being conscious of external things proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality.

Moreover in the sentence “I know the pot,” there are three things: the knower or ‘I’, the knowledge and the pot, the object of knowledge. The verb to know is an active verb, requiring both an agent or subject, and an object. It also affirms the existence of a relationship between the subject and the object of consciousness. The whole human society believes it to be so, and makes others believe it also. Therefore to say that there is only knowledge and no object of knowledge is to court ridicule and derision. Consequently it is established that an object is separate from knowledge.

An objector may say, “If a pot and other objects are separate from the knowledge of them, how is it that this knowledge arises in cognition? If you say that it shines forth in consciousness, then by the knowledge of the one pot we ought to know everything external, because all external things have the common attribute of being different from knowledge, being its object. If one thing that is other than the knowledge of it is known, then everything that is different from knowledge must be known.” To this we reply, it is not so. There is no doubt that all external objects have in common the attribute that they are different from the sentient subject; they all come under the category of non-self or object. Certainly we can understand the general attribute of non-self by knowing one thing that is non-self. But there are many non-selves and their special relations with the self are all different; one object may be yellow, another may be red, and it cannot be said that the knowledge of the yellow object is the same as that of the red one.

Ideas and things are certainly concomitant, for they always go together. But instead of proving that things are unreal and only ideas are real, this very concomitance proves just the opposite; for the very fact that they go together proves that they are different things and not one. Moreover the Lord Buddha, while denying the reality of the external things, admitted the separate existence of the external world; for he says, “The form that is perceived internally appears like an external object.” He says, “like an external object,” which shows that he admits the existence of external objects. Otherwise he would not have used this word, for no one makes a comparison to something that is absolutely unreal. No one says “He is like the son of a barren woman.”

Now the author refutes the theory that external objects need not exist at all, because all different ideas can be explained as originating from vāsanās without the necessity of believing in the real existence of any external objects. The opinion of the Yogācāras is that all practical thought and communication are possible without assuming the existence of external things, in addition to our ideas about them. As in a dream a person performs all kinds of actions and has communication with other things and objects, which are nothing but his own ideas, similarly the manifoldness of ideas in the waking state may be explained through the vāsanās without the necessity for external things. This view is refuted in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.29

vaidharmyācca na svapnā'divat

vaidharmyāt – on account of difference of nature; ca – and; na – not; svapnādivat – like dreams and the rest.

The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature.

The Yogācāra says, “In the dream state, in reverie and under hypnotic suggestion there are no external objects like the pot, etc. and all experience and different ideas in those states are caused merely by one’s own consciousness, not by anything external to the person; so also it may be in the waking state.” This view is impossible, because the ideas in the dream state are different from those of the waking state. The objects perceived in a dream are memories of waking experiences; in the waking state they are sense perceptions, not memories. The objects in the dream state can instantly change their forms, and upon waking from the dream are found to be unreal. In other words, the dream objects are sublated by waking consciousness. On the other hand, the objects perceived in waking consciousness do not change instantaneously. They retain their appearance, even after hundreds of years.

Moreover, we never have the consciousness of their being unreal; they are never sublated. Although we have said above that things perceived in dreams are mere memories, this is only a partial statement of the real fact. The opinion of Vyāsadeva is that the Supreme Lord as Supersoul creates objects in the dream state and makes the soul experience them, in response to certain karmas created in previous lives. Therefore they are also real, the only difference is that the Lord creates them for a temporary purpose and for a particular soul; while He has created the external world for all souls and for the cosmic period, and given them greater permanence. This opinion will be fully explained in Sūtra 3.2.1, where he will show that all dream objects are creations of the Lord and not of the soul.

The author now refutes the view that the manifoldness of ideas can be explained by manifoldness of without the assumption of external objects.

Sūtra 2.2.30

na bhāvo'nupalabdheḥ

na – not; bhāvaḥ – existence; anupalabdheḥ – because they are not perceived.

[The vāsanās] do not exist [without corresponding external objects,] because it is never so perceived [in experience.]

The vāsanās cannot exist according to your theory, because you hold that there are no external objects. We know that vāsanās are produced by external objects; without external objects there can be no vāsanās. This is demonstrated by the rule of identity and difference. We never see any vāsanās originating without an external object. The Yogācāras cannot explain how the vāsanās originate. And as they do not believe in the existence of external objects, they cannot even explain the existence of vāsanās. The existence of vāsanās is impossible according to their doctrine, as they do not admit the perception of external things.

According to us, the variety of vāsanās is caused by the variety of external objects. A vāsanā is really a kind of mental impression or saṁskāra. This saṁskāra cannot exist without some permanent substratum, a medium in which it may inhere. But the Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of any permanent substratum, hence for this reason their so-called vāsanās cannot exist. The author shows this in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.31

kṣaṇikatvācca

kṣaṇikatvāt – because of momentariness; ca – and.

The vāsanās have no permanent substratum, because of the Yogācāras’ theory of universal momentariness.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra from the previous one. According to the Yogācāras’ theory there is no permanent substratum in which the vāsanās may inhere, for they believe that everything is momentary. According to them, the external ideas that we have during a life on earth and the cosmic ideas that end only with pralaya or the cessation of the world period and exist only in the Monad, are all momentary. Thus there being no conscious self that is permanent in past, present and future, it is not possible to have remembrance, recognition, and so on, which require mental impressions dependent on time, place and cause. All these vāsanās, memories and thoughts practically presuppose the existence of an unchangeable self or personality connected with the past, present and future. Consequently this theory is unworthy of further consideration, for it cannot explain how the vāsanās can exist without a permanent substratum, and how they can be manifold in the absence of that substratum.

Adhikaraṇa 5: Mādhyamika Theory Refuted

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The Yogācāra thus being refuted, now comes the Mādhyamika who holds the doctrine of the universal void. He says, “The Lord Śākyamuni Buddha admitted the existence of external objects and ideas only for the sake of his less-intelligent students who could not at once grasp his doctrine of a universal void. All the preceding theories of the momentariness of things and ideas are just concessions, and may be considered as rungs of a ladder leading to this theory. This is the real doctrine of the Buddha, for as a matter of fact, neither the external objects nor the ideas exist in reality. The only reality is śūnyam, the great void, and reaching this utter nothingness constitutes release or mokṣa.

This is the real secret taught by the Śākyamuni Buddha, and it is proved thus: śūnya [nothingness] is self-existent and self-proved, because no cause need be assigned for it production. Only a thing that exists requires a cause to explain its origination. But no-thing does not require either a cause or explanation. Further, a thing that exists [sat] cannot originate from an existing thing or being, because we do not see a tree with sprout and leaves as long as the seed is not destroyed. It is only when the seed is destroyed that the tree originates. Thus a being cannot originate from another being; not can it originate from a non-being [abhāva], for we do not see the origination of a tree from a seed that has been roasted. However, no-thing can originate of itself. It is not a state of consciousness, for then it would be dependent on ātmā, which would be a useless assumption. Nor can any motive be assigned for a thing originating from itself. Nor can it originate from anything else, for then it would follow that anything can originate from anything else, for all things are other things. Thus there being no origination, there is no destruction. Therefore words like origination, destruction, being and non-being are mere illusions, and the only reality is the śūnyam.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it true to believe that śūnyam is the only reality, or is it not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The śūnyam is the only reality, because it is self-proved while other things are based on illusion and have no real existence. The only reality is the great void.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The śūnyam is not the reality, as shown in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.32

sarvathānupapatteśca

sarvathā – in every way; an-upapatteḥ – because of not being proved; ca – and.

The doctrine of the void is in every way unproved.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra. What is this śūnyam of yours? Is it a being or a non-being or both? You cannot establish your doctrine in any way. If you admit that śūnyam is a being, then you give up your position of nothingness; if you say that it is a non-being, then your declaration amounts to establishing that everything is nothing. But you must admit yourself to be a being and your reasoning also to be something and not nothing, and this contradicts your theory that everything is nothing. If you say that it is both being and non-being, you also contradict your theory land yourself in undesirable results. Moreover, the means of knowledge by which śūnyam is proved must at least be real and acknowledged to be true, for if such means of knowledge and arguments are themselves nothing, then the theory of nothingness cannot be established. And if those means and arguments are true, then something certainly is established, and then the theory of universal nothingness is certainly also disproved. Thus śūnyavāda is disproved in every way; therefore it must be inferred that the Śākyamuni Buddha taught these self-contradictory doctrines in order to delude the world. At one time he teaches the reality of the external world, next the reality of ideas only, and then general nothingness. Thus he has made it clear that his object was to delude the asuras.

The Buddhist doctrine being refuted, its sister doctrine the Māyāvāda also stands defeated. The author of the sūtras has made no attempt to refute the Lokāyatikas or materialists, because their arguments are perfectly futile. The Dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda doctrine that creation depends upon perception, and the Vivarta-vāda doctrine that creation is an illusion similar to the snake and the rope hold in common with the Buddhist teaching that all things are of momentary existence only. Hence the refutation of Buddhism refutes all these teachings as well.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The Jaina Theory Examined

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: Now the author shows the faults of the Jaina theory. The doctrine of the Jainas is that substances are of two kinds: jīva [souls] and ajīva [non-souls]. The jīva is sentient and intelligent, has the size of the body that it occupies, and has parts or members. The ajīva is of five kinds: dharma [merit], adharma [demerit], pudgala [bodies], kāla [time] and ākāśa [space]. Dharma or merit causes movement and progress, and adharma or demerit causes delays and obstacles; both of these are all-pervading. The pudgala or bodies are that which possesses color, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds: atomic and molecular. Air, water, fire, earth, the bodies of creatures and the various planes or worlds are compounds. The atoms, which are of one kind only, are causes. They assume different qualities through modifications. Time is a particular atomic substance that causes past, present and future. Space is one, infinite, contains other things and has dimensions. These six substances—the jīva and the five ajīvas—are called dravyas, and the whole world consists of them. The Jainas describe seven categories that are helpful for the purpose of release of the souls, namely jīva [souls], ajīva [non-souls], āsrava [influx or channel], samvāra [hindrance or obscuration], nirjara [exhaustion of passions], bandha [bondage] and mokṣa [liberation]. Jīva has already been defined. Ajīva is everything which is the object of enjoyment for the jīvas. The āsrava or channel is the senses. The samvāra or hindrances are lack of discrimination and dispassion, which hinder the development of discrimination, etc. Nirjara or exhaustion of passions is that which destroys totally or which exhausts the source of lust, anger, etc., such as austerities. Bondage or bandha is the cycle of birth and death, caused by eight kinds of karmas. Mukti or release consists either in remaining stationary in space above all worlds, or in which there is constant progress towards higher regions. This is accomplished by means of the practices taught in the Jaina scriptures that nullify the eight kinds of karmas and manifest the true nature of the soul. Their practices are called the three jewels: right knowledge, right seeing and right conduct.

They establish all these substances with their system of reasoning called sapta-bhangi-nyāya or syād-vāda. The word sapta-bhangi means “that system of reasoning in which the seven rules are broken.” Those seven rules are:

1. sattvam [existence]

2. asattvam [nonexistence]

3. sat-asattvam [existence and nonexistence]

4. sad-asad-vilakṣaṇatvam [something different from existence and nonexistence]

5. sattve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is existence, yet it is different from it]

6. assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is nonexistence, yet it is different from it]

7. sad-assatve-sati-tad-vilakṣaṇatvam [while there is existence and nonexistence, yet it is different from it]

Thus there are seven kinds of theories regarding the existence of the world, some holding it to be existent or real, others holding it to be unreal, a third class holding it to be neither real nor unreal, and so on. Syād is an indeclinable and has the sense of “somewhat, somehow or not fully.” Thus they establish seven categories:

1. syād-asti [it is somewhat, or maybe it is]

2. syād-nāsti [it is not somewhat, or maybe it is not]

3. syād-avaktavyaḥ [it may be predicted a little, or maybe it is not predictable]

4. syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not]

5. syād-asti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca [it may be, or somewhat it is or is not predictable]

6. syād-nāsti-ca-avaktavyaḥ-ca [it may not be, or somewhat it is and is not predictable]

7. syād-asti-ca-nāsti-ca-avaktavyas-ca [it may be, or maybe somewhat it is or is not, and it is not predictable]

The object of sapta-bhangi is to refute these seven theories of existence. This is necessary for every object is either real or unreal, eternal or non-eternal, different or nondifferent and is manifold because of these attributes. If an object is absolutely existent, then it will exist always, everywhere and in every mode, and no one will ever desire either to acquire it or to abandon it, as no one ever desires to acquire air or reject it, since it exists everywhere. Something that one already has cannot become an object for acquisition, nor is it possible to abandon it, just as gravity which is everywhere cannot be abandoned. If however something does not exist absolutely, but only conditionally, to some extent, and sometimes for one person or place and somehow, then only is it possible to make exertion and attempt to obtain it or reject it. All exertions and cessation of exertions are possible only in regard to substances whose existence is conditional. All objects are either dravyas or different modifications of dravyas, called paryāya. The dravya or substance alone is qualified as sattva or real, while the paryāya or modification has the quality of asattva or unreal. Paryāya is the particular state in which a substance may exist. The substance is permanent, but the modification is impermanent; the substance is real, its modifications are unreal; the substance is eternal, but the modifications have origination and destruction. This is the theory of the Jainas.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: These several categories taught by the Jaina Arhats—souls, non-souls, etc.—are they reasonable or not?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: This theory is reasonable, because it is established by the seven paralogisms.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is, however, untrue: everything is not of an ambiguous nature as the Jainas hold. This is established by the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.33

naikasminnasambhavāt

na – not; ekasmin – in one substance; asambhavāt – because of the impossibility.

These categories cannot be established, because it is impossible [that opposing qualities such as real and unreal can exist simultaneously] in one substance.

These categories of the Jainas and their sevenfold reasoning cannot be established, because it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist in one substance. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold simultaneously. Moreover it would be useless to lay down rules for the attainment of heaven or avoidance of hell, or for mokṣa; because of there being no certainty of anything, what you think of as heaven might actually be hell, and mokṣa nondifferent from these. Since everything is ambiguous, there would be nothing to distinguish heaven, hell and mokṣa from one another. Confusion would arise, not only with regard to spiritual matters, but with the objects of this wold as well. If things are always indefinite, and if everything is “somewhat it is or is not,” then a person wanting water to quench his thirst will accept fire, for it may be that fire is hot, or it may be cold; and so on with everything else. Similarly in this system, there exists not only difference between objects but also nondifference; thus water is not only different from fire, it is also nondifferent from it. Their logic, therefore is as fragile as the thread of a spider and cannot stand the strain of reasoning. As a matter of fact, substances are definite, and the means of establishing their definiteness are the seven logical categories or bhangas. The soul is the subject that makes this definition, and the fruit of this process is definite conception. But in this system of indefiniteness, nothing can be asserted as either existent or nonexistent, and nothing can be known with certainty. Therefore what is the use of examining this system any further, when nothing in it is discernible?

The modern scientists also use such indefinite logic in their statements, such as, “Our theory shows that it may be...” “We think is highly probable that...” and so on. They never make a definite statement because they know full well that the inferential logic they use is always falsifiable; in fact, this falsifiability is built into every so-called scientific theory. The scientists even argue that theories such as the Vedānta-sūtra philosophy, which are derived from the Absolute Truth of the Vedas by a process of deductive logic, are unscientific because they are not falsifiable. But that is precisely the point: the relative truths of material science are all conditional and therefore uncertain, but the eternal Absolute Truth is not falsifiable because it is unconditionally true.

In the next sūtra the author refutes the doctrine of the Jainas that the soul is the same size as the body.

Sūtra 2.2.34

evaṁ cātmākārtsnyam

evam – thus; ca – and; ātmā – soul; ākārtsnyam – not wholeness.

[And in this view of the Jainas,] the soul also loses its wholeness and becomes mutilated.

The Jaina theory is open not only to the objection of predicating contradictory attributes like existence and nonexistence to the same object at the same time; but also their conception is that the soul is divisible into parts. They hold that the jīva has the size of the body it animates; therefore, the soul of a child would not be able to fill the body of a grown-up man. Nor would the soul of a man be able to fill the body of an elephant if, owing to some reaction of his past karmas, he had to occupy that body. The body being too big for the soul, he would not be able to perceive the pleasure and pain of the entire organism. Similarly, a human soul condemned to occupy the body of a fly or gnat would be too big, and unable to occupy it.

Sūtra 2.2.35

na ca paryāyādapyavirodhavikārādibhyaḥ

na – not; ca – and; paryāyāt – because of the assumption of sequential change; api – also; avirodhaḥ – non-contradiction; vikārādibhyaḥ – because it would be open to the objection of change, etc.

Nor would this contradiction be removed by assuming the theory of paryāya, for then the soul would be liable to change and the rest.

The Jaina may say, “The soul is really indefinite in size, and therefore when it animates the body of an infant or a youth, it has that size, and when it occupies the bodies of horses and elephants, it expands itself to that size; so it fully occupies the body that it animates for the time being, by successive expansion and contraction, and thus there is no objection to our theory that the soul is the size of the body.” To this we reply that it cannot be so, because it requires the undesirable assumption that the soul is liable to change. In your own theory you admit that the soul is changeless; but if this paryāya theory is accepted, then the soul would become liable to change, and consequently it would become impermanent. This is a conclusion that neither you nor anyone else desires. Hence your theory is unreasonable.

There is another theory that the soul is free from change only when it assumes the body of mukti; in that body, the soul has the size of the body and is unchanging and permanent. This modified theory, which holds that the final size of the soul results from the mukta-deha, and is permanent because the soul does not pass into another body, is also unreasonable. If this final body is produced at a certain point in time, then it is also impermanent; or if it becomes the eternal body of the soul, which it possesses from the very beginning of its existence, in either case your theory of paryāya fails. Moreover, in your theory of everything being indefinite, the ultimate size of the soul may be either existence or nonexistent, and so there also would be no permanency of that size.

In the next sūtra, the author shows the faults in the theory of mukti as taught by the Jains.

Sūtra 2.2.36

antyāvasthiteścobhayanityatvādaviśeṣāt

antyāvasthiteḥ – in the final state; ca – and; ubhaya – both; nityatvāt – of being permanent; aviśeṣāt – because of there being no difference.

This theory is untenable because the final state of liberation is nondifferent from the worldly state, because both are eternal.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra from the previous one. According to the Jainas, there is no difference between the state of mukti and the mundane state, for both are permanent. They define mukti as eternal progress upward, or remaining fixed in the aloka-ākāśa. Thus there is no difference between between worldly existence and release; for motion, whether in the worldly cycle or in a straight line or infinite progression is, after all, mundane. Moreover, no one can feel happiness in a state of constant upward motion, or in remaining stationary in one place without support. Both of these ideas of mukti of the Jainas are unsatisfying. The Jaina may say, “Such a state of constant motion or permanent fixture may be a cause of pain to an embodied soul, but not to a disembodied liberated soul.” To this we say that even in a state of mukti, the soul has his various limbs, and feels the weight of each one just as he feels the weight of the material body. Moreover, neither the condition of eternal progress nor the permanent fixture in aloka-ākāśa can be said to be eternal, because both presuppose action in order to maintain them, and consequently contain the liability of certain destruction.

Therefore this Jaina theory is futile and ludicrous. This refutation of the Jaina theory also includes the refutation of the Māyāvādins, the secret friends of the Jainas, who also assert that this world is māyā—neither real nor non-real—and that the Brahman taught in the Upaniṣads is not describable by words. The Vedic literature is to be considered a source of real knowledge, but if one does not take it as it is, one will be misled. For example, the Bhagavad-gītā is an important Vedic literature that has been taught for many years, but because it was commented upon by unscrupulous rascals, people derived no benefit from it, and no one came to the conclusion of Kṛṣṇa consciousness. Since the purport of the Bhagavad-gītā is now being presented as it is, however, within four or five short years thousands of people all over the world have become Kṛṣṇa conscious. That is the difference between direct and indirect explanations of the Vedic literature. Therefore Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu said, mukhya-vṛttye sei artha parama mahattva: “To teach the Vedic literature according to its direct meaning, without false commentary, is glorious.” Unfortunately, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, by the order of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, compromised between atheism and theism in order to cheat the atheists and bring them to theism, and to do so he gave up the direct method of Vedic knowledge and tried to present a meaning which is indirect. It is with this purpose that he wrote his Śārīraka-bhāṣya commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra.

One should not, therefore, attribute very much importance to the Śārīraka-bhāṣya. In order to understand Vedānta philosophy, one must study Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, which begins with the words

oṁ namo bhagavate vāsudevāya, janmādy asya yato ’nvayād itarataś cārtheṣv abhijñaḥ sva-rāṭ

“I offer my obeisances unto Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, son of Vasudeva, who is the Supreme all-pervading Personality of Godhead. I meditate upon Him, the transcendent reality, who is the primeval cause of all causes, from whom all manifested universes arise, in whom they dwell and by whom they are destroyed. I meditate upon that eternally effulgent Lord, who is directly and indirectly conscious of all manifestations and yet is fully independent.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 1.1.1]

Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam is the real commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra. Unfortunately, if one is attracted to Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s commentary, Śārīraka-bhāṣya, his spiritual life is doomed. One may argue that since Śaṅkarācārya is an incarnation of Lord Śiva, how is it that he cheated people in this way? The answer is that he did so on the order of his master, the Supreme Personality of Godhead. This is confirmed in the Padma Purāṇa, in the words of Lord Śiva himself:

māyāvādam asac chāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddham ucyate
mayaiva kalpitaṁ devi kalau brāhmaṇa-rūpiṇā
brahmaṇaś cāparaṁ rūpaṁ nirguṇaṁ vakṣyate mayā
sarva-svaṁ jagato ’py asya mohanārthaṁ kalau yuge
vedānte tu mahā-śāstre māyāvādam avaidikam
mayaiva vakṣyate devi jagatāṁ nāśa-kāraṇāt

“The Māyāvāda philosophy,” Lord Śiva informed his wife Pārvatī, “is impious [asac chāstra]. It is covered Buddhism. My dear Pārvatī, in Kali-yuga I assume the form of a brāhmaṇa and teach this imagined Māyāvāda philosophy. In order to cheat the atheists, I describe the Supreme Personality of Godhead to be without form and without qualities. Similarly, in explaining Vedānta I describe the same Māyāvāda philosophy in order to mislead the entire population toward atheism by denying the personal form of the Lord.”

In the Śiva Purāṇa the Supreme Personality of Godhead told Lord Śiva:

dvāparādau yuge bhūtvā kalayā mānuṣādiṣu
svāgamaiḥ kalpitais tvaṁ ca janān mad-vimukhān kuru

“In Kali-yuga, mislead the people in general by propounding imaginary meanings for the Vedas to bewilder them.”

These are the descriptions of the Purāṇas. The direct meaning of the Vedic scriptures is abhidhā-vṛtti, or the meaning that one can understand immediately from the statements of dictionaries, whereas gauṇa-vṛtti, the indirect meaning, is a meaning that one imagines without consulting the dictionary. For example, one politician has said that Kurukṣetra refers to the body, but in the dictionary there is no such definition. Therefore this imaginary meaning is gauṇa-vṛtti, whereas the direct meaning found in the dictionary is abhidhā-vṛtti. This is the distinction between the two. Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu recommends that one understand the Vedic literature in terms of abhidhā-vṛtti, and He rejects the gauṇa-vṛtti.

The purpose of the discussions in the Upaniṣads and Vedānta-sūtra is to philosophically establish the personal feature of the Absolute Truth. The impersonalists, however, in order to establish their philosophy, accept these discussions in terms of lakṣaṇā-vṛtti, or indirect meanings. Thus instead of being tattva-vāda, or in search of the Absolute Truth, they become Māyāvāda, or illusioned by the material energy. When Śrī Viṣṇu Svāmī, one of the main ācāryas of the four Vaiṣṇava sampradāyas, presented his thesis on the subject matter of śuddhādvaita-vāda, immediately the Māyāvādīs took advantage of this philosophy and tried to establish their advaita-vāda or kevalādvaita-vāda. To defeat this kevalādvaita-vāda, Śrī Rāmānujācārya presented his philosophy as viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda, and Śrī Madhvācārya presented his philosophy of tattva-vāda, both of which are stumbling blocks to the Māyāvādīs because they defeat their philosophy in scrupulous detail. Students of Vedic philosophy know very well how strongly Śrī Rāmānujācārya’s viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda and Śrī Madhvācārya’s tattva-vāda contest the impersonal Māyāvāda philosophy.

Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu, however, accepted the direct meaning of the Vedānta philosophy and thus defeated the Māyāvāda philosophy immediately. He opined in this connection that anyone who follows the principles of the Śārīraka-bhāṣya is doomed. This is confirmed in the Padma Purāṇa, where Lord Śiva tells Pārvatī:

śṛṇu devi pravakṣyāmi tāmasāni yathā-kramam
yeṣāṁ śravaṇa-mātreṇa pātityaṁ jñāninām api
apārthaṁ śruti-vākyānāṁ darśayal loka-garhitam
karma-svarūpa-tyājyatvam atra ca pratipādyate
sarva-karma-paribhraṁśān naiṣkarmyaṁ tatra cocyate
parātma-jīvayor aikyaṁ mayātra pratipādyate

“My dear wife, hear my explanations of how I have spread ignorance through Māyāvāda philosophy. Simply by hearing it, even an advanced scholar will fall down. In this philosophy, which is certainly very inauspicious for people in general, I have misrepresented the real meaning of the Vedas and recommended that one give up all activities in order to achieve freedom from karma. In this Māyāvāda philosophy I have described the jīvātmā and Paramātmā to be one and the same.”

How the Māyāvāda philosophy was condemned by Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu and His followers is described in Śrī Caitanya-caritāmṛta, Antya-līlā, [2.94-99], where Svarūpa-dāmodara Gosvāmī says that anyone who is eager to understand the Māyāvāda philosophy must be considered insane. This especially applies to an aspiring Vaiṣṇava who reads Śārīraka-bhāṣya and then considers himself to be one with God. The Māyāvādī philosophers have presented their arguments in such attractive, flowery language that hearing Māyāvāda philosophy may sometimes change the mind of a devotee who is not very advanced. But an actual Vaiṣṇava or follower of Vedānta-sūtra cannot tolerate any philosophy that claims God and the living being to be one and the same.

Adhikaraṇa 7: Pāṣupata System Reviewed

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the opinions of sectarians like the followers of Paśupati [Śiva], Gaṇeśa and Sūrya. The Paśupatas maintain that cause and effect, yoga [meditation], discipline [vidhi] and the end of pain are five categories revealed by the great Lord Paśupati Himself to break the bonds of the conditioned soul, here called paśu [animal]. In this system Paśupati is the operative cause, and mahat and the rest are effects. The yoga is the concentration, meditation etc. through oṁkāra. The vidhi is the discipline of bathing three times a day etc., while the end of pain means release or mokṣa. These are the five categories of the Paśupatas. Similar to this doctrine are the teachings of the followers of Gaṇeśa and Sūrya, who hold these deities to be the operative cause, and prakṛti and time to be the causes of creation of the world through the operative agency of these deities. By worshiping these gods the soul gains proximity to them, and there accrues complete cessation of all pain, which is mokṣa.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Now are these systems of the Paśupatas and the rest reasonable?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: The pūrvapakṣin maintains that this system is reasonable, because we see in ordinary life also that an agent like a potter is only the operative cause of the pot that he makes; he is not its material cause. God, therefore is only the operative cause of the universe, not its material cause. The mater of the creation is supplied by the eternal prakṛti, and the disciples laid down are also reasonable and practical.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: This is not the right view, as the author shows in the next sūtra.

Sūtra 2.2.37

patyurasāmaṁjasyāt

patyuḥ – the doctrine of the three patis or lords; asāmaṅjasyāt – because of untenableness.

The teaching of Paśupati also is not right, because of its inappropriateness.

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra. The doctrine taught by Paśupati is not right because it is inappropriate; that is, it is opposed to the Vedas. The Vedas teach that the one God, Nārāyaṇa, is the sole cause of the creation of the world, while other deities like Brahmā, Rudra, etc. are His creations. It teaches that mokṣa [release] depends upon bhakti [devotional service], jñāna [knowledge], and the proper performance of the duties of varṇāśrama-dharma [the four occupational divisions and four spiritual orders of human life] as taught by Nārāyaṇa in the Vedic scriptures. As we find in the Mahā-Upaniṣat [1.1-2]:

“Thus say the sages how creation arose. Nārāyaṇa alone existed in the beginning. There were neither Brahmā nor Īśāna, nor water, nor fire, nor moon; nor heaven nor earth, nor the stars nor the sun. He being alone, did not rejoice; so He entered into meditation. From Him thus meditating, there arose sacrifice and the hymns of the Vedas. From Him arose fourteen Puruṣas and one daughter: namely, the ten Indriyas and Manas, the eleventh; Tejas, the twelfth; Ahaṁkara the thirteenth, and Prāṇa the fourteenth. Fifteenth is the daughter called Buddhi. From Him arose the five tan-mātras and the ten mahābhutas. From Nārāyaṇa thus meditating there arose from His forehead Sūlapāṇi [Śiva], having three eyes and holding Śrī, truth, brahmācārya, austerity, dispassion, etc.”

This shows that the four-faced Brahmā arose from Nārāyaṇa, and also Paśupati [Śiva]. We also find the same version in the Nārāyaṇa-Upaniṣat [1.1]:

“Now verily Nārāyaṇa the Puruṣa desired “Let Me create offspring.” From Nārāyaṇa was produced Prāṇa, Manas and all the sense organs. From Him arose space, air, light, water and earth, the support of all. From Nārāyaṇa arose Brahmā, from Him arose Rudra, from Nārāyaṇa was produced Prajāpati, Indra, the eight Vasus, the eleven Rudras, the twelve Ādityas, all the Devatās, all Ṛṣis, all Vedic hymns; all beings verily are produced from Nārāyaṇa and they merge into Nārāyaṇa.”

So also in the Ṛg Veda [10.125.1-8] we find:

“I travel with the Rudras and the Vasus, with the Ādityas and all gods I wander. I hold aloft both Varuṇa and Mitra, Indra and Agni, and the twin Aśvins. I cherish and sustain high-souled Soma and Tvaṣṭā, I support Pūṣan and Bhāga. I load with wealth the zealous sacrificer who pours the soma-juice and offers his oblations. I am the Queen, the gatherer of treasures, most thoughtful, first of those who merit worship. Thus the gods have established Me in many places, with many homes to enter and abide in. All eat the food that feeds them through Me alone—each man who sees, breathes, hears the word outspoken; they know it not, but yet they dwell beside Me. Hear, one and all, the truth as I declare it. I verily announce Myself and utter the words that gods and men alike shall welcome. I make the man I love exceedingly mighty; make him a sage, a Ṛṣi, and a Brāhmaṇa. I bend the bow for Rudra, that his arrow may strike and slay the hater of devotion. I rouse and order battle for the people, and I have penetrated earth and heaven. On the world’s summit I bring forth the Father; My home is in the waters, in the ocean. Thence I extend over all living creatures, and touch even heaven with my forehead. I breathe a strong breath like the wind and tempest, while I hold together all existence. Beyond this wide earth and beyond the heavens I have become so mighty in My grandeur.”

Similarly in the Yajur Veda [Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.21-22]:

“Let a wise seeker of Brahman, after he has discovered Him, practice wisdom by meditating on Him. The knowers of Brahman seek to understand Him by study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by fasting. He who knows Him becomes a Muni.”

ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.

“It is the Self which must be observed, heard about, thought of and meditated upon with fixed concentration.” [Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.6]

So also the Smṛti-śāstra declare the same truth over and over again, following in the footsteps of the Vedas. No doubt in some places the Vedas and the Smṛti-śāstra use the words Paśupati, Ganeśa, Sūrya etc. and describe them as the ‘ruler of all,’ etc. But in those places these words are to be taken in their etymological sense as applying to Nārāyaṇa. Thus Paśupati would mean “Lord of all souls,” Ganeśa would be interpreted “the Lord of Hosts,” and Sūrya would mean “the Lord of the wise,” just as in the Veda the word Indra is the name of the Supreme Lord, being derived from the root inda, ‘to rule.’ Thus all the Vedas and the Smṛtis actually describe Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman, and not any lower deity. Therefore the proper interpretation of the Vedic texts is that the real creator is the Supreme Brahman.

īśvaraḥ paramaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ
sac-cid-ānanda-vigrahaḥ
anādir ādir govindaḥ
sarva-kāraṇa-kāraṇam

“Kṛṣṇa who is known as Govinda is the Supreme Godhead. He has an eternal blissful spiritual body. He is the origin of all. He has no other origin and He is the prime cause of all causes.” [Brahma-saṁhitā 5.1]

The sectarians like the Paśupatas and the rest have established the existence of a particular deity as the Lord simply by logic and arguments. But reasoning must be according to certain worldly rules, therefore it cannot establish the existence or nonexistence of God, because it is impossible that the Lord is merely the operative cause of the world, without being the material cause as well, for then His connection with the world cannot be established. In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter, who is merely the operative cause of the pot, has a certain connection with the clay, the material cause with which he fashions the pot. What is that connection of the Lord with the souls and the pradhāna, with which He creates the world? The next sūtra shows that the sectarians cannot establish that connection.

Sūtra 2.2.38

sambandhānupapatteśca

sambandha – connection; anupapatteḥ – because of the impossibility; ca – and.

[The Lord can have no] connection as creator of the world, because of the impossibility [of such a connection.]

The sectarians hold that a Lord is without a body, consequently such a Lord can have no connection with matter and spirit. An embodied being, like a potter, can have such a relation with the clay because he has a body. Thus this theory cannot establish a connection between the Lord and the creation, because they imagine Him to be formless.

Sūtra 2.2.39

adiṣṭhānā-nupapatteśca

adiṣṭhāna – having a position; anupapatteḥ – because of the impossibility; ca – and.

A bodiless Lord cannot create the world, because He cannot occupy a position.

Controlling something is a function of embodied beings. An embodied being like a potter can control the clay and produce effects like pots, by virtue of occupying a particular position. A disembodied being cannot do this. It may be objected that the soul is in principle a disembodied being, yet he rules the sense organs and the body, without any particular position, so a disembodied Lord may rule pradhāna. The next sūtra replies to this argument.

Sūtra 2.2.40

karaṇavaccenna bhogā'dibhyaḥ

karaṇa-vat – like the instruments of the senses; cet – if; na – not; bhogādibhyaḥ – on account of enjoyment, etc.

If [it be said that the Lord rules matter] as the soul rules sense organs, [we reply that] it cannot be so, because the soul has to undergo the experiences of pleasure and pain [owing to his karma, but not so the Lord.]

You cannot say that matter exists in pralaya and the Lord creates the world with it, controlling it just as the soul controls the sense organs, because the connection of the soul with the body is so that he may undergo certain experiences of birth and death, pleasure and pain, to get the rewards of his karmas. But in the case of the Lord, there is no such karma. Then why should the Lord have any connection with pradhāna in order to create the world? If you say that His connection is similar to the connection of the conditioned soul to his senses, then the Lord would come under the control of the material energy and be subject to birth and death just like the conditioned soul. This is no idea of God at all.

The sectarian Paśupata may say, “Let us admit then that the Lord also has some kind of karma, some kind of adṛṣṭa, good karma and good adṛṣṭa, and that it is on account of such karma that the Lord gets the body by which He creates the universe. Just as we see a mighty monarch, owing to his great merit, gets a body by which he can rule over an extensive empire.” This theory is open to the objection raised in the next sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.41

aṅtavattvamasarvajñatā vā

aṅtavattvam – finiteness; asarvajñatā – lack of omniscience; vā – or.

If the Lord has karma, however high and refined it may be, then He would be either a finite being, or not possessing omniscience.

If the Lord has a body on account of some karma from His previous actions, then He would be finite like any ordinary soul, nor would He be omniscient, for only one who is not subject to karma can have omniscience. The Paśupatas claim that their Lord is eternal and all-knowing; therefore a contradiction arises in their theory. The Paśupata may say, “But this objection applies to your theory also, for you believe that God is a personality.” To this we reply that our theory of a personal Brahman is not open to this objection, because we do not believe in this on account of any reason and arguments, but because of the revelation of the scriptures. The sacred revelation describes Brahman with personal attributes, and we never try to reconcile this description with reason. In other words, we take the words of the scriptures to be axiomatic, and everything else is derived from them by a process of deductive logic. We have already shown this in Sūtra 2.1.27.

The holy Bādārāyaṇa does not show any disrespect to the mighty deities like Paśupati or Gaṇapati or Dināpati; all that he means is that these three patis or lords are not independent agents, as their worshipers misconceive, but work under the will and direction of the Supreme Brahman. The author of the sūtras refutes only the mistaken notion of the worshipers in attributing perfect independence to their deity. Since they are agents of Brahman, demigods or lords, we acknowledge that they deserve all reverence and worship, but we do not forget their subordinate position to Brahman, the Supreme Lord.

guṇābhimānino devāḥ
sargādiṣv asya yad-bhayāt
vartante 'nuyugaṁ yeṣāṁ
vaśa etac carācaram

“Out of fear of the Supreme Personality of Godhead, the directing demigods in charge of the modes of material nature carry out the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction; everything animate and inanimate within this material world is under their control.” [Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 3.29.44]

These five sūtras are meant to refute the sectarian doctrine of these patis or lords. The word pati is mentioned in Sūtra 2.2.37 without any distinctive attribute, to apply to all three patis, namely the lord of the soul, the lord of the hosts, and the lord of the day. Other commentators hold that these five sūtras are meant to refute the argumentative philosophers and rationalists, who try to establish the existence of God by mere reason without revelation.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The Śakti Theory Reviewed

Viṣaya [thesis or statement]: The author now refutes the theory of the Śaktas. They hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the world, and that She possesses the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and the rest.

Saṁśaya [arisal of doubt]: Is it possible that Śakti could be the independent creator of the world?

Pūrvapakṣa [antithesis]: No agent can accomplish anything without energy or Śakti. The effect, therefore, must not be attributed to the apparent agent. A red-hot iron has the power of burning but the effect of burning should properly be attributed to the fire, and not to the iron through which the fire manifests itself. It is the eternal energy, working through the Lord, that creates the world, and the Lord without energy has no creative power. Thus Śakti is the real creator.

Siddhānta [Vedic conclusion]: The author refutes this theory by the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.42

utpattyasambhavāt

utpatti – origination; asambhavāt – because of the impossibility.

[Śakti alone cannot] create, because creation is impossible [without the cooperation of the Lord.]

The word na [not] is understood in this sūtra. The followers of Śakti have imagined Her to be the sole cause of the world by reasoning alone, unsupported by Vedic authority. Since they base their theory on reason, they must be refuted by such reason as would appeal to the common sense of mankind. It is not possible that Śakti alone could be the mother of the whole universe, because by Herself, She has no power of origination. We do not find immaculate conception in this world, nor do females give birth without connection with males. To attribute omnipotence, omniscience and the rest to Śakti is merely an outcome of non-reasoning, because we do not find energy with these attributes anywhere.

A Śakta may say, “We admit that there is a Puruṣa, Lord Śiva, the husband of Śakti, and She creates the universe through Her connection with Him. To this we reply that it also is not right, as shown by the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.43

na ca kartuḥ karaṇam

na – not; ca – and; kartuḥ – of the agent; karaṇam – sense organ.

The creator has no sense instruments to come into connection with Śakti.

Even if it be admitted that there is a Lord who has connection with Śakti, yet in His case there is an absence of sense instruments like a material body, etc. with which He may create the universe. Thus it is not possible that such a Puruṣa can have any connection with Śakti. However, if it is assumed that He has a body and sense organs, then the objections raised in Sūtra 2.2.40 would apply to Him.

An objector says, “But it need not be that the body and sense organs of the Lord are like ours, made of matter and the result of karma; He may have a body consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc.” The author answers this argument by the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.44

vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ

vijñāna – knowledge; ādi – and the rest; bhāve – of the nature of; vā – or; tat – that; apratiṣedhaḥ – non-contradiction.

If it is said that the body of the Lord consists of knowledge and so on, then there is no contradiction, for our Brahman is such a Lord.

If this Lord of the Śaktas is admitted to have a body and sense organs consisting of eternal knowledge, will etc. then there is no contradiction; the Śakta theory would be included in the Vedānta theory of Brahman, for we do admit that creation proceeds from just such a transcendental Lord.

We do not refute the theory of the Śaktas as a whole, but only the portion of it that portrays Śakti as independent of the Lord. The extreme Śaktas hold that Śakti alone is the cause of the universe. This must not be respected by anyone who wishes to attain final liberation from material existence. The author, therefore, completes this Pāda with the following sūtra:

Sūtra 2.2.45

vipratiṣedhācca

vipratiṣedhāt – on account of contradiction with all authorities; ca – and.

The theory of the Śaktas is untenable, because it contradicts all sacred authorities.

The force of the word ca [and] in this sūtra is to bring in the reasoning of Sūtra 2.2.42. The theory that Śakti alone creates the universe is untenable, because it contradicts the Vedic revelation, the tradition and reason. As we find in the Padma Purāṇa:

“The Śruti, the Smṛti and reason are unanimous in declaring that the Lord is the Supreme. He who declares anything against it is the vilest of the vile.”

The arguments against the sectarian believers such as the Pāṣupatas, Śaktas and the rest also hold true against the Western religions such as the various sects of Christianity, Islam etc. All these sectarian groups are created by ordinary human reason, and have no foundation in the Vedas; therefore they are of limited value in providing spiritual knowledge and bringing souls to ultimate liberation. Just as the arguments against Buddhism and Jainism apply with equal force against the Māyāvāda philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya, the arguments in the last two Adhikaraṇas apply to the Western sectarian religions.

Thus in this Pāda has been shown that the paths of the Sāṅkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and the rest down to the Śaktas, are strewn with thorns and full of difficulties, while the path of Vedānta is free from all these defects and must be traveled by everyone who wishes to attain final enlightenment and liberation.

Thus ends the Second Pāda of the Second Adhyāya of Vedānta-sūtra. All glories to Śrīla Prabhupāda!