52. In keeping with earlier discussions in UMS III.3, he concludes that if the result of meditation is liberationif knowledge savesit is untenable to posit distinctions in Brahman or between Brahman and the self.
53. Tr. 890-1.
54. Tr. 891-2.
55. In III.2.11-21; see the treatment of this adhikarana earlier in this chapter.
56. See "Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedanta" (Halbfass 1991, pp. 131-204) for an overview of the issues involved in the following sections.
57. Skt. 449. Vacaspati further specifies reason's limitation, saying that reason is most unreliable when it comes to trying to understand the cause of the world.
58. Tr. 313-14.
59. Tr. 321.
60. Tr. 322.
61. Sankara puts forward a more systematic claim when he responds to the charge that were Brahman the material cause, it would bear all the impurities evident in the world. He proposes an Advaita theory of causality, satkaryavada,the view that effects preexist in their causes (UMS II.1.7; see also UMS II.1.14.)
62. The remainder of UMS II.1 defends the coherence of Advaita by addressing a series of questions and objections: 13: whether Advaita unreasonably denies the distinction of experiencer and experienced; 14, 15-20: whether it is possible to state that Brahman and the world are nondifferent; 21-23: why the nondual (human) self does not always acts to its own best interest; 24-29: how Brahman functions as material cause; 30-31: whether Brahman is omnipotent; 32-33: whether Brahman has any motive to make the world; 34-36 whether Brahman is to be blamed for suffering.
63. UMS II.2.1; tr. 368.
64. The following comments are simply my own suggestion as to how the whole may be read, since this pada is a case where the commentators do not
